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Epistemic self-trust and doxastic disagreements

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Peter, Fabienne (2019) Epistemic self-trust and doxastic disagreements. Erkenntnis, 84 . pp. 1189-1205. doi:10.1007/s10670-018-0004-x ISSN 0165-0106.

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Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-018-0004-x

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Abstract

The recent literature on the epistemology of disagreement focuses on the rational response question: how are you rationally required to respond to a doxastic disagreement with someone, especially with someone you take to be your epistemic peer? A doxastic disagreement with someone also confronts you with a slightly different question. This question, call it the epistemic trust question, is: how much should you trust our own epistemic faculties relative to the epistemic faculties of others? Answering the epistemic trust question is important for the epistemology of disagreement because it sheds light on the rational response question. My main aim in this paper is to argue – against recent attempts to show otherwise – that epistemic self-trust does not provide a reason for remaining steadfast in doxastic disagreements with others.

Item Type: Journal Article
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BD Speculative Philosophy
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Knowledge, Theory of, Trust
Journal or Publication Title: Erkenntnis
Publisher: Springer
ISSN: 0165-0106
Official Date: December 2019
Dates:
DateEvent
December 2019Published
18 April 2018Available
9 April 2018Accepted
Volume: 84
Page Range: pp. 1189-1205
DOI: 10.1007/s10670-018-0004-x
Status: Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Published
Access rights to Published version: Open Access (Creative Commons)
Date of first compliant deposit: 9 April 2018
Date of first compliant Open Access: 9 May 2018
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