UNSPECIFIED. (2003) Computational levels and conditional inference: Reply to Schroyens and Schaeken (2003). JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY-LEARNING MEMORY AND COGNITION, 29 (1). pp. 150-156. ISSN 0278-7393

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Abstract

This article is a reply to W. Schroyens and W. Schaeken's (2003) critique of M. Oaksford, N. Chater, and J. Larkin's (2000) conditional probability model (CP) of conditional inference. It is argued that their meta-analysis does not falsify CP because the evidence may bear on more than one computational level of explanation. Moreover, it is argued that CP provides a rational account of more of the data than W. Schroyens and W. Schaeken's mental models theory. Other points are also addressed. It is suggested that W. Schroyens and W. Schaeken's model and CP converge on the importance of probabilistic prior knowledge in conditional inference. This is consistent with the normative literature, which (like CP) treats conditionals in terms of subjective conditional probabilities.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
Journal or Publication Title:	JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY-LEARNING MEMORY AND COGNITION
Publisher:	AMER PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOC
ISSN:	0278-7393
Date:	January 2003
Volume:	29
Number:	1
Number of Pages:	7
Page Range:	pp. 150-156
Identification Number:	10.1037/0278-7393.29.1.150
Publication Status:	Published
URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/10132

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