THE LABOUR PROCESS AND TRADE UNIONISM: A STUDY
OF THE RISE OF UNIONISATION IN THE BOOKMAKING
INDUSTRY.

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THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF PhD WITHIN THE SCHOOL OF INDUSTRIAL
AND BUSINESS STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK.

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THESIS SUMMARY:

The thesis critically examines the main theories of union growth, especially white-collar unionism, and argues they have inadequately analysed the labour process and its precise importance in understanding the development of unionization. It is suggested that unionization is better understood through analysing (a) the various pressures which imply changes in the labour process; (b) the impact of these changes on the relationships between employees and not just those between employer and employees; (c) how this shapes the patterns of employees experience and their response in terms of collective organization and action. This allows a clearer understanding of how certain conjunctural influences may affect union organization and activity; in particular, the role of employers policies, state intervention and the autonomy of trade unions from the labour process. These arguments are developed in the context of a detailed analysis of the Bookmaking Industry, the rise of The Union of Bookmakers Employees (TUBE) in the early 1970s, and its subsequent merger with the TGWU.
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KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS

ACAS  Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service
ACTSS  Association of Clerical, Technical and Supervisory Staffs
APEX  Association of Professional, Executive, Clerical and Computer Staffs.
ASSET  Association of Supervisory Staffs, Executives and Technicians.
ASTMS  Association of Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staffs
CAC  Central Arbitration Committee.
CCOG  Churches Council on Gambling.
CIR  Commission on Industrial Relations.
EAT  Employment Appeals Tribunal.
ERS  Electoral Reform Society.
GMWU  General and Municipal Workers' Union.
HBLB  Horserace Betting Levy Board.
IT  Industrial Tribunal.
LBO  Licensed Betting Office.
LPSNA  London and Provincial Sporting News Agency.
NALGO  National and Local Government Officers' Association.
NBPA  National Bookmakers Protection Association.
NIRC  National Industrial Relations Court
RC  Royal Commission
TGWU  Transport and General Workers Union
TUBE  The Union of Bookmakers' Employers
WHO  William Hill Organisation.

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INTRODUCTION

Author's Preface and Acknowledgements.

"He does more than treat them when they are ill; he is the objective witness of their lives. They seldom refer to him as a witness. They only think of him when some practical circumstance brings them together. He is in no way a final arbiter. That is why I chose the rather humble word clerk: the clerk of their records.

He is qualified to be this precisely because of his privilege. If the records are to be as complete as possible - and who does not at times dream of the impossible ideal of being totally recorded? - the records must be related to the world at large, and they must include what is hidden, even what is hidden within the protagonists themselves."


John Berger's description of one facet of the life of a country doctor has more than a passing resemblance to the activity of the social researcher: the recognition of the efforts of people to cope with the world in which they find themselves, of trying to effect change within their society; while simultaneously developing an understanding of the sources and implications of those activities within the wider framework and structure of society. But here perhaps the similarities end. The doctor can offer something more to his patients: his recording and recognition of their existence combine to assist medical diagnosis to provide help and hope for their future. The researcher too often
utilises the information received from workers and ordinary people against them at a later stage; and in any case may provide little in return for their efforts. The researcher is parasitic, and why anyone should assist someone involved in research remains a very pertinent question.

Nevertheless, in this respect I have been lucky and have received extensive and often welcoming co-operation from those people actively involved in the area I have researched. They are too numerous to mention, but many of them appear regularly in the text of this thesis. However, I would like to give particular thanks to George Sawford, the former TUBE General Secretary for his immense help and encouragement and for providing the vast range of historical material which now comprises the main part of the TUBE Archive.\footnote{1} In addition, Bernard Weston in Birmingham and Roy Brown in Scotland gave me much appreciated assistance in my research in those regions. I would like to think this thesis in recounting the struggles of bookmaking employees will in some small way be a contribution in return.

But merely to acknowledge the very important practical assistance given by those involved in the Bookmaking industry is insufficient. It is always of interest to learn why someone looked at a particular subject in the way they did since it necessarily informs any understanding of what they have produced. My personal interest in bookmaking should be made clear. Both of my parents (and one grandparent and other members of my family) have worked in Bookmaking most of their lives. I also worked in the industry on a casual basis during the period which preceded the formation of TUBE.

\footnote{1. See \textit{Bibliography} for the detailed contents of the TUBE records.}
This lifelong connection with the industry has been combined with a developing interest in why trade unionism developed and the potential which the emergent debate on the labour process could provide in this direction. When I began my research Braverman's 'Labour and Monopoly Capital' had just resurrected the significant chapters of Marx's 'Capital' in connection with the labour process. Soon afterwards Carchedi's contribution on class ambiguity was produced. During the subsequent five years a whole range of literature has appeared in this area, with titles resplendent in the use of the 'labour process'. But the general inspirational sources have been those mentioned above.

Finally it remains to acknowledge the assistance of those who have experienced the many ups and downs of my thesis. Many friends have given me general encouragement over the years. In particular I would like to thank Richard Hyman, my supervisor, who has received and read many drafts at different stages and given me invaluable help and encouragement at crucial moments of writing-up. Yet most of all I must thank Jill Hardman, without whose support, encouragement and constructive criticisms of both my field research and draft chapters this thesis would not have been written. I am also indebted to Norma Bainbridge for her excellent typing of an often straggly hand-written original.
Methods and Problems of Research.

The reader may be interested to know precisely how the material used in this thesis was obtained for there must essentially be certain biases in what is written according to the source and manner of obtaining the information. I used four particular methods of research:

(1) **Participant Observation**

In retrospect my periods of employment in Bookmaking during the summers of 1968-71, provided an essential background to my understanding of unionization. This comprised, in total, a period of twelve months working in different LBOs in London for a range of employers when major changes in the industry were taking place. Since I had no intention at that time of doing any research in the industry, there are no records of my experiences - only what I can recall.

(2) **Formal Interviews**

One problem of the research was the general lack of information on Bookmaking and its history. It was essential to gain an historical perspective if the connections between the labour process and unionization were to be established or discounted. In consequence a good deal of the initial period of fieldwork was spent in merely talking to the representatives of a number of bodies who could provide general background information on the industry. This shortened the time available for formal interviews of union activists and employers, but nevertheless the following interviews were secured:

- **(i)** TUBE activists for their accounts of how the union had begun, developed, and operated. Total - 15 interviews.
- **(ii)** TGWU representatives in the West Midlands area, using a structured interview formal. Total - 5 interviews.
(iii) TGWU Full-time officers who were involved in areas where there had been TUBE membership and/or current TGWU membership. Total - 10 interviews.

(iv) National Bookmaking Employers (i.e. all the 'Big Four' some more than once), and some local employers in various parts of the country. Although the National Companies were at different times extremely co-operative, many smaller employers refused any communication. Total - 12 interviews.

(v) Representatives or past members of other bodies such as the CIR, ACAS, HBLB, and the CCOG.

With the exception of the West Midland interviews, the research involved widespread travelling throughout England and Scotland which necessarily restricted the number of interviews; nevertheless in no sense were the number of interviews inadequate or disadvantageous, except where key employers declined to reply to my requests.

(3) Continual Association

The inherent inadequacies of formal interviews necessary demanded closer contact with union activists in order to discover how the union operated. During a period of some three years, 1974-1977, I maintained a regular liaison with union activists in different parts of the country. These continuing associations cannot be called formal interviews and they are listed separately:

(i) Regular contact with TUBE activity in the West Midlands between 1975-1977, involving membership recruitment, union meetings, industrial tribunal cases, etc.

(ii) In depth case study on Connor and Forbes Ltd Liverpool in 1974 and 1976.

(iv) Working with the TGWU on their submission to the Royal Commission on Gambling, 1976-1977.

(v) Involvement in the initial stages of the campaign to gain recognition in the J.Coral Group, 1977.

All of these activities involved continuing contact with members of the union at all levels as well as employers and other bodies.

(4) Use of archival material

During the research I was given the bulk of the documentary records of TUBE which now comprise the main part of the TUBE Archive. These records, the details of which are set out in the Bibliography, proved an invaluable source of information and reference as to how the union developed and most of the precise dating prior to 1974 is derived from them.
Thesis introduction

"In the trade union world, all marriages are apparently blessed, however bigamous or unnatural; but all births are now illegitimate" Turner (1962) p.308.

In 1971 a group of workers decided to form a union in the Bookmaking Industry. It has scarcely been noted as a major event of trade union history, which perhaps tells us something about labour historians and industrial relations writers. Try finding a reference to The Union of Bookmakers' Employees (TUBE) in any account of trade unionism in the 1970s. Yet the foundation of TUBE was an event of particular interest: the formation of a new union in an area of employment without any traditions of union organization.

Why the lack of interest in the development of unionization in an industry of 100,000 potential members? Ignorance? Possibly but why are people aware of some things and not others? The answers lie elsewhere: Bookmaking is not to be taken seriously. It is not central to the economy. The workers are not in trade unions. It is therefore not worth attention. The chroniclers of the labour movement too often reflect those sections who are only interested in 'organized' labour and ignore the 'unorganized'.

This thesis is an attempt in some small way to rectify that imbalance; to consider the problems of workers in one sector of employment not in the mainstream of 'normal' trade union traditions; to understand how unionization developed amongst the workers; and to gain some insights into the role of the labour movement, the employers, and state agencies in relation to this process.

Areas such as bookmaking are normally treated as being part of the growth of 'white-collar' unionism, which has arguably been the major feature of the expanding union membership in the post-war period. [1]

1. See Bain and Price (1976) for details of this expansion.
Bookmaking, in the official classification, is part of the 'private sector services'. This, as Table (1) shows, is the great area of non-union labour, where only 12% of workers are in unions; but the potential, in terms of numbers, is larger than in the whole of the public sector.

The extent of this potential depends, of course, on how private sector services are defined. The above figures, from Bain and Price, are based on the Department of Employment classification, where private sector services comprise:

"... professional services; hotels and catering; entertainment and media services; insurance, banking, and finance; distribution; business services; and miscellaneous services (hairdressing, laundries, dry-cleaning, motor repairs, boot & shoe repair, and betting and gambling)." (1)

Such a collection of activities illustrates the breadth of the term "service sector" - which raises immediate problems. Firstly, how to specify the "service sector"? Presumably the intention is to differentiate manufacturing from services, physical products from intangible commodities. Yet what is virtually the same task may be classified in either manufacturing or services depending on the context of the work. (2)

This underlines the descriptive basis of the above distinction between manufacturing and private sector services; there appears no coherent analytic division, merely a lumping together of the bits and pieces which do not seem to fit into the public sector or manufacturing. This raises a second question: does the categorisation of 'service sector' in this way obscure divisions that might be made otherwise? Within the Department of Employment list of 'services' some definitely operate in a different way to others in relation to capitalist economy:


2. An example can help to clarify precisely what is meant here: The cook in a hotel clearly does produce a physical product which can be seen as a direct parallel to the preparation of frozen dinners in a food factory; the cook forms part of the service-sector, while the food operative works in manufacturing.
Table (1)

Union Membership and Density by Sector in the UK, 1974

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Labour Force (000s)</th>
<th>Union Membership</th>
<th>Density (%)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Public Sector</td>
<td>6,112.6</td>
<td>5,079.4</td>
<td>83.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>7,778.9</td>
<td>4,836.4</td>
<td>62.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual</td>
<td>5,678.6</td>
<td>4,164.2</td>
<td>73.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-Collar</td>
<td>2,100.3</td>
<td>672.2</td>
<td>32.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, Forestry,</td>
<td>427.7</td>
<td>99.7</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishing.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Sector, Services.</td>
<td>6,689.3</td>
<td>810.0</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bain and Price (1976) p.342
"The function of middle-men, which expands in the course of the growing social division of labour and which can be ascribed in capitalism to enterprises dealing with trade, transport, storage, credit, banks and insurance, only constitutes a part of (the so-called services) sector, which sociologists and bourgeois political economists make into a pot-pourri of the most various activities, stretching from pure commodity producers (gas, water and power production) to parasites and crooks."


So in approaching the problem of the lack of unionization amongst the private sector services, the problem itself must be reformulated since the category of private sector services remains conceptually inadequate. Can the various dimensions of those activities grouped under this heading point to the questions that could be raised?

Firstly, developing Mandel's position, there is the important 'middle-man' function, those activities which lubricate the wheels of capitalist economy. Mandel's formulation reflects an important distinction in Marxist theory: that between the sphere of production and the sphere of circulation. While the former is concerned with the expansion of value through production, the latter concerns the realisation of value through the sale of products and the provision of finance for new periods of production. This leads to a second general distinction: that between productive and unproductive labour. In the sphere of production, labour can be seen as productive since it creates surplus value, while in the sphere of circulation, value is not created, only redistributed, hence labour is unproductive. Can this provide a basis for understanding differences in the degree of unionization? (1)

A second possibility concerns the characterisation of large sections of the service sector as white-collar. Given white-collar workers are less unionised than manual workers, can this distinction serve as basis for understanding the lack of unionisation in private sector services? (2)

---

1. The terms 'productive' and 'unproductive' are given, following Marx, a specific meaning in terms of the production (or non-production) or surplus value. See below Chapter 2.
2. One crucial problem that emerges here concerns the category of 'white-collar'. See below, Chapter 2.
Thirdly, can any explanations be put forward to lower levels of analysis? Is the problem with private sector services the fact that they are private, that public sector employers are more supportive of trade unionism, while private employers are more hostile? Or do, perhaps, the various activities have particular occupational characteristics which tend to promote or inhibit trade unionism? While such aspects may be important, it would be difficult to sustain them as influences explaining general tendencies in unionization. They might be useful in explaining individual differences around a general level, but not the general rise in unionization itself.\(^{(1)}\)

In this brief discussion some wide-ranging questions have been raised about approaching an understanding of unionization in the private sector services; and, in doing so, the usefulness of the categorisation has been queried. But the implications go further than this. Once the specification of 'private sector services' has been questioned the whole basis of the general categorizations between sectors of employment becomes problematic. Thus to approach the development of unionization amongst any group of employees, whether in private sector services or not, demands an understanding of the general basis of trade unionism and any subsequent justifications for drawing generalised analytic distinctions within the structure of the labour force.

---

1. It would be highly circular to "explain" trade unionism in terms of employers' attitudes and policies towards trade unionism; and it would be equally nonsensical to explain trade unionism in terms of the strength or lack of occupational solidarity. Such explanations must be considered in the context of general tendencies towards the growth of unionization.
The first part of the thesis is devoted to just this task. In Chapter 1, the various approaches aimed at explaining the growth of trade unionism are considered, both in general terms and in relation to explanations of general divisions across the workforce. The latter receive disproportionately greater attention given the particular concern with the basis of those divisions.\(^{1}\)

In Chapter 2, an attempt is made to overcome the inadequacies of these various approaches and reformulate a general approach to trade unionism within, broadly, a Marxist perspective, including an analysis of potential divisions which may be useful in understanding unionization, and putting forward the labour-process as the central feature.

The second part of the thesis explores the usefulness of this approach by applying it to the growth of unionization in the Bookmaking industry. This considers the changes of the labour process in the historical development of the industry and derives an understanding of unionization within the framework. Subsequently the impact of formal union organizations, the employers, and the State are considered in the context of the labour process approach.

The final part of the thesis consists of a concluding discussion which returns to some of the themes developed in Part One and offers an appraisal of how the evidence of the Bookmaking industry has specific implications for the general proposition that unionization must be understood in relation to the labour process.

\(^{1}\) Therefore there is an accentuated focus on Bain (1973) and Lockwood (1966) as the main proponents of an orthodox approach to white-collar unionism, while Klingender (1935) is considered at some length as representative of a Marxist tradition in this area.
PART ONE: THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS.
Chapter 1: The Basis of Trade Unionism

The initial problem is two-fold. To understand the development of unionization amongst particular groups of employees requires a prior consideration of the general basis of trade unionism. This necessarily demands an answer which can explain not differences between levels of unionization, but the existence of trade unionism as a widespread social phenomenon. Nevertheless, there are wide differences in the level of unionization across different employee groups, which raises a second question: is it necessary to suggest specific explanations for certain groups of workers in understanding how trade unionism develops? And if so, how can these be specified?

One starting point is to consider the work of previous contributors to the debate on trade unionism. These, broadly speaking, can be divided into two categories: on the one hand, the so-called "orthodox" approaches which depend on divergent strands of theoretical ancestry, but which all can be criticised in not considering the specific nature of capitalist society and the consequent implications for understanding trade unionism.

On the other, there are a number of approaches which attempt to overcome this problem and which are termed "Marxist" in that they broadly follow a class analysis of society within an historical materialist perspective. These tend to emphasise the importance and specificity of wage-labour as the basis for understanding trade unionism.

There are limitations with both general approaches. In consequence, an attempt is made to reformulate an understanding of trade unionism within a Marxist perspective. This necessarily involves a more precise specification of the problems in terms of union growth, organisation, and activity. And it is within this context that the labour process is put forward as crucial in tackling these questions.
Orthodox approaches to understanding trade unionism.

The way in which problems are defined informs relevant areas of concern and structures modes of explanation. Looking at American and British traditions in approaching trade unionism, it might be generally concluded that American writers have focussed rather more on trade union growth, while their British counterparts have emphasised union activity. In consequence, the American literature embraces grandiose schemes of wideranging 'variables' which 'explain' union growth; the British writing, in contrast, has become channelled within a fairly narrow institutionalism which concentrates on 'bargaining arrangements' between employers and trade unions. In consequence, the problem of 'why trade unionism' is not of equal concern or importance in these different traditions.

Despite their best endeavours, the concern of American industrial relations theorists, particularly in the early post war period, has not generated a coherent theoretical model of union growth. A host of 'variables' have been 'established' as 'significant' in 'explaining' union growth, but these cover a wide variety of influences. Of these approaches, perhaps of most pervasive influence has been the work of Dunlop.

Having briefly surveyed a variety of approaches to union growth, Dunlop (1948) brings these various strands together:

"The labour movement, or any similarly complex social organisation, may be fruitfully explored by an examination of four interrelated factors: technology, market structures and the character of competition, community institutions of control, and ideas and beliefs." (ibid, p.174).

1. For instance, Bernstein (1954) who concluded unions grow in periods of social disaster (7); Shister (1953) who identified work environment, socio-legal influences, and trade union leadership as the main influences; and Lester (1958) whose decisive factors were missionary spirit, inter-union rivalry, and active rank and file members - the decline of which led to the maturity of trade unions.
Dunlop, who is seeking to explain the origin, growth, and goals of the labour movement in America as well as the psychology of individual members, is unwilling to present these variables as other than a "comprehensive scaffolding"; this "method of approach does not in itself constitute a theory of the labour movement" (ibid p.175).

That, it subsequently appears, arises from the interaction of these variables (ibid p.192).

In effect, Dunlop argues that trade unions are merely another form of "complex social organisation(s)" which require no special explanation. The pattern of the overall blueprint for exploring such organisations fits very neatly - it merely remains to apply it. Such a position is entirely consistent with Dunlop's advocacy of organisation theory and is subject to the appropriate criticisms. It might also be added, that there is absolutely no basis presented as to why these variables should be selected and not others. This is arguably due to the inability (or refusal?) to consider the specific nature of capitalist society.

The British tradition in approaching trade unionism has shown rather less interest in union growth; increasingly, emphasis has been placed on how trade unions conduct their activities, with particular stress on the processes of collective bargaining. To a large extent this is a partial and distorted inheritance of the work of the Webbs. The descent of the Oxford School of the 1960s can be traced directly. That of the Fabian movement even more so. All of which suggests the importance of the way the Webbs have influenced mainstream

1. See Herding (1972) pp.65-69 for a brilliant criticism of organisation theory and which is discussed later in this chapter.

2. Given the generally high level of manual (and now 'white-collar') unionism in Britain, it is, perhaps, not altogether surprising that issues of union growth have taken a back seat in favour of union activity.
emphasises the significance of their definition of trade unions:

"A trade union, as we understand the term, is a continuous association of wage-earners for the purpose of maintaining or improving the conditions of their working lives".
(Webb (1920) p.1).

Closer examination shows two aspects in that succinct definition. Firstly, trade unions are seen in terms of a continuing organisation of wage-earners. For the Webbs spasmodic collectivism was an insufficient criterion for defining a trade union, while collective organisation by non-wage earners was considered qualitatively distinct. Secondly, the objectives of trade unions, while widely defined, concerned the substantive conditions of those wage-earners.

These two aspects were brought together through collective negotiation with employers, commonly known as collective bargaining. The continuity of bargaining between the employer and his employees, represented as a collectivity, was predicated on a continuity of union organisation itself, while collective bargaining was the means of negotiating the wages and conditions of the employees.

While for the Webbs collective bargaining was only one aspect of trade union activity, the subsequent inheritors of their position have placed collective bargaining as a central feature of 'industrial relations'. This is an important shift. The focus has now moved to definitions of 'industrial relations' rather than 'trade unions', while the accentuated portrayal of collective bargaining minimises the substantive conditions of employees, in favour of the method of agreeing such conditions. This is evident in Flanders' concept of 'job regulation', which also underpins Bain's approach to white-collar unionism.1 'Job regulation' is developed within the notion of an

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industrial relations 'system' and is central to the processing of bargaining issues between management and unions. (1)

Such a position necessarily implies a narrower view of employer-employee relations (as well as relationships within these groupings):

"Most experts on industrial relations would treat it as virtually self-evident that certain kinds of relations in industry should be disregarded and that they should concentrate their attention on, for example, the collective bargaining activities of trade unions". (Hyman (1975) p.9).

Emphasis shifts to management-union bargaining relationships rather than those between employer and employees, accentuating the institutional arrangements of industrial relations to the detriment of the wider economic and social processes involved. This necessarily obscures how and why trade unionism develops, for the answer to that question lies outside the institutional patterns of industrial relations. Approaches which develop from a collective bargaining perspective tend to assume that trade unionism already exists. The development of trade unions thus becomes an increasingly irresolvable problem, yet simultaneously a less important one, since the source of trade unionism has become separated from trade union activity. (2)

If the British tradition has steered away from general explanations of union growth in recent years, nevertheless those same theorists have had to come to terms with the dramatic growth of unionisation amongst 'management' - the development of 'white-collar' unionism. Attention has specifically been turned to this problem with the result that 'explanations' of 'white-collar' unionism have been put forward despite the absence of a generally accepted framework of union growth.

1. Flanders' theory of union growth is penetratingly analysed by Pickard (1978). For a partial discussion of his model see below Ch. .. Only Bain of the main proponents of Pluralist Industrial Relations has decided to pursue the avenue of Union Growth with any vigour.

2. This contrast, however, between American and British industrial relations thought must not be overdrawn. There are strong links between these traditions, perhaps best exemplified in Flanders adoption of the concept of the 'industrial relations system' as developed by Dunlop.
Two major contributions stand out in offering explanations of 'white-collar' unionism: one is that of George Bain who stands within the institutional traditions of British industrial relations, yet nevertheless also draws on the North American notions of organisation theory; the other is that of David Lockwood who, in contrast, relies almost exclusively on the work of Max Weber in the manner of European sociology. Can these explanations provide insights on the specific problems involved? Since Bain, in some sense, writes in opposition to the sociological approach of Lockwood, it seems appropriate to consider Lockwood's position first.

Lockwood's analysis of the 'Blackcoated' worker remains the most widely influential work on the development of trade union organisation amongst clerical workers. As such, he set the framework for future research and debates which ensued at the beginning of the 1970s. It is important to note the historical context of Lockwood's contribution. The Blackcoated Worker was first published in 1958. Taking issue with the crude proletarianisation thesis of Klingender, Lockwood, at the height of the 'cold war', sought to discredit the notion that clerical workers possessed a 'false' class consciousness. Yet Lockwood set out not to criticise Klingender within the Marxist tradition, but to refute the relationship between a Marxist definition of class and the development of clerical unionism. The distinction of ownership/non-ownership as the fundamental class division is "insufficient to explain the problem of false class consciousness which it poses". (Lockwood (1966) p.213).

1. Lockwood (1966). As Crompton (1976) p.409-9 comments: "Any account of the sociological tradition of analysis in this field must begin with the work of David Lockwood ... Lockwood's work has profoundly influenced research and theorizing in the study of white-collar unionism ..."

2. Blackburn (1967) and Blackburn and Prandy (1965) can be considered inheritors of Lockwood's position. Crompton also derives from this tradition.

3. Klingender (1935), whose contribution is discussed below.
Lockwood instead tries to reformulate the relationship between class and trade unionism. He introduces three elements which comprise his notion of 'class position': firstly "market situation" which embraces the economic position of the clerk in terms of income, job security, and possibilities of promotion; "work situation" which is concerned with social relationships at work deriving from the division of labour; and, thirdly, "status situation", which relates to the position of the individual in the wider society. It seems that "status situation" is relatively unimportant in relation to trade unionism; for Lockwood eventually concludes that while variations in the degree of blackcoated unionization are related to "work situation", the "market situation" accounts for variations in union character. (ibid pp. 211-12).

Lockwood develops this reconstruction of the link between class and trade unionism in identifying 'bureaucratization' as the driving force which generates the conditions for unionization in the "work situation":

"It would not be straining the facts excessively to argue that the unionization of blackcoated workers has been very closely associated with what may be called 'bureaucratization'. By the latter is simply meant the process by which bureaucratic rules come to predominate in administrative organisation". (ibid p.141).

Lockwood juxtaposes two 'ideal-types' of office organisation: on the one hand Paternalistic administration where working conditions are "determined by the personal relations of employers and clerks;" (ibid p.141) and, on the other, bureaucratic organisation where working conditions are "regulated by impersonal rules which strictly exclude all forms of personal consideration between employer and clerk"; (ibid p.141). Adding that bureaucratization may be associated with a "blockage of clerical

1. See ibid p.15 for full definitions.
promotion" and the "isolation of a separate clerical class" (ibid p.142), Lockwood concludes:

"Thus defined, bureaucratization represents a set of conditions extremely favourable to the growth of collective action among clerical workers. It is not too much to argue that in fostering black-coated solidarity bureaucratization has played a role analogous to that of the factory and labour market in the case of manual workers". (ibid p. 142).

Lockwood's position has been strongly criticised, not simply by the institutionalism of Bain who denies the importance of linking class and trade unionism, but from sources who see Lockwood's reformulation of that link as inadequate. While Lockwood in fact argues that the combination of 'market situation' and 'work situation' amounts to what Marx "essentially understood" as 'class position' (ibid pp 15-16), his model is developed within a Weberian framework - not a Marxist one.

This provides the case for Crompton's critique:

"Lockwood's account of social class ... is essentially a Neo-Weberian market-oriented approach, and, because such an approach fails systematically to take into account the structures and relationships underlying work and market situations, explanations deriving from this approach to social class can only be partial. That is, Lockwood may or may not have established a more or less accurate correlation between trade union membership ... and social class - as he has defined social class. However, his analysis fails to explain why the white-collar market situation is as it is, or why the white-collar work situation is as it is - and provides no guidance or explanation as to why they have changed recently". (1)

The 'market situation' and the 'work situation' "can only be fully understood if they are seen as being mediated through capitalist production relationships". (Crompton (1976) p.409).

Hence, through not realising the primacy of production relations

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1. Crompton (1976) pp. 409-410. Consider also the different understanding of class by Lockwood: "'Class' like any other sociological concept, is a device by which social facts are understood". (op.cit. p.211 - my emphasis), as compared with Braverman (1974) who views class as a process: "we are not dealing with the static terms of an algebraic equation, which requires only that quantities be filled in, but with a dynamic process the mark of which is the transformation of sectors of the population". p.24 emphasis in original.
in the determination of class, Lockwood's formulation is itself inadequate in understanding class and the link between class position and trade unionism. (1)

Leaving this discussion to one side for the moment, it is initially useful to look more critically at the internal consistency of Lockwood's model, rather than its general inadequacy. This implies some consideration of his concept of bureaucratisation and its shortcomings.

1. Crompton, however, fails to draw the full implications of her critique. In her argument, while class position determines whether a collective response is made by employees, the ambiguities in class position are responsible for the "varying and often contradictory nature of much white-collar collective representation..." (Crompton (1976) p.422). Consequently, some white-collar workers opt for unions and others for staff associations; the use of class ambiguity overcomes any theoretical problems of false consciousness:

"That some white-collar workers should see their interests as being best fulfilled by co-operation with management (or the capitalist function) - for example, in staff associations - and others in the same occupation see their collective interests as being best served by identification with the labour function - in trade unions - is, I would argue perfectly compatible with their ambiguous class situation". (ibid.p.422)

This seems to be the main gist of Crompton's argument. Class is the important determinant of trade union organisation, but white-collar workers may possess contradictory class positions hence their collective response may be contradictory and take different institutional forms.

This is a brave attempt by Crompton to overcome the fruitless debate between the 'sociologists' and the 'industrial relations' schools. In order to do so, she attempts to synthesise an orthodox Marxist approach to the capitalist mode of production, and recent theoretical enunciations on the potentiality of contradictory class positions, with her own inheritance from industrial sociology. The result, however, is not entirely convincing. There are some very real problems. The most immediate and, indeed, surprising is her persistent use of 'white-collar', which she manages to haul right through the sociology-industrial relations debate and into her Marxist framework with scarcely a misgiving. At one point she does appear to see something of a difficulty:

"......... the approach I have been developing has revealed considerable variations in class situation within the 'white-collar' sector as a whole - in fact, perhaps it is misleading to refer to the class situation of white-collar workers" (ibid, p.420).

Perhaps it is. Perhaps it is also misleading to refer to white-collar workers at all. This reticence in discarding concepts more readily associated with the approaches she has already discredited scarcely aids understanding. While criticising the use of market and work situation, she affirms that both "......... are useful starting points for the analysis of white-collar trade unionism" (ibid p. 424). This leads her into real difficulties when discussing concrete examples:
"As the class situation (she means structural class position otherwise it does not make sense) of technicians has become less ambiguous - as they have been truly 'proletarianised' so have their market and work situations changed in the manner described". (ibid p. 421. Who or what is 'proletarianized' - the technicians or their class position?)

So Lockwood's 'work' and 'market situations' rise from the ashes, somehow determined by the changing class situation of the technicians. This is merely a false separation. As the technicians increasingly began to perform the function of the collective labourer rather than acting as agents of capital, their class position changed; yet in Crompton's framework this amounted precisely to a change in their position in the production process. Lockwood could no doubt argue that his concepts of work and market situations encompass just these changes; and Crompton will have paid the penalty for transposing the concepts.
There seems a particular ambiguity regarding form and content in the concept of bureaucratization. It is not at all clear whether merely the imposition of impersonal rules is involved or if the content of those rules is relevant. There seems an emphasis on bureaucratic rules per se - which can give no indications on the important question of the content of the rules. In fact, while Lockwood attempts to employ bureaucratization in a technical sense within his framework, at the same time it serves to cover over all the various changes which occur within Lockwood's defined 'work situation' as a result of that process. In that sense bureaucratization serves as a blanket term to condense the experiences of employees, as wage-labourers, into one amorphous mass. One aspect which Lockwood thus successfully obscures constitutes a second point: the way in which the control of the employees and their work is subsumed within bureaucratic, impersonal rules. The imposition of control by the employer or management on work activity and the way in which the employees experience it are both neatly glossed over.

Thirdly, Lockwood's use of bureaucratization is unable to pinpoint the differential impact that it might have on employees. The loosely defined category of 'clerks' are seen less as workers performing different job tasks within a labour process, than a mass of undifferentiated labour. Through abstracting from the concrete processes of work Lockwood eliminates the question of the contradictory effects of bureaucratization. Hence all 'clerks' are seen to experience bureaucratization in the same way and with blanket consequences.

In the light of the above discussion, what understanding of the development of unionization amongst blackcoated workers does Lockwood's use of bureaucratization provide? Just as Crompton has questioned the explanatory
powers of Lockwood's overall approach, so bureaucratization can be
seen to explain little.

While Crompton has criticized the inadequacies of Lockwood's
efforts to pose a link between class and trade unionism, Bain is,
perhaps, the foremost critic of the class based view of trade unionism.
In contrast to Lockwood's Weberian sociological traditions, Bain draws
more heavily on the empirical legacies of the Webbs, G.D.H. Cole,
Allan Flanders, and Hugh Clegg [1]. Hence while Lockwood emphasises
the social processes which generate unionization, Bain focusses on
institutional arrangements in explaining the same phenomenon. In
consequence, Bain has sought to play down the central position of class
within the sociologists' approach. He has, in fact, addressed part
of his work specifically to this end.

In Bain (1973) he attempts to show, armed with an extensive
collection of counter examples and empirical data, that the connection
between social stratification and union membership and character is
inadequately formulated by the sociological approach and that social
stratification constitutes an inadequate explanation of unionization.

He concludes, firstly:

"... no matter how wide and various were the definitions of
social position, there was no easy correlation between them
and patterns of union growth". (Bain (1973) p.154).

Secondly:

"... there is no close and simple relationship between the
social position of an organisation's membership and that
organisation's goals or behaviour". (ibid p.154)

and finally:

"no easy equation could then reasonably be expected between
social position, social imagery and trade unionism". (ibid p.154)

1. And also the North American emphasis on organisation theory.
These conclusions are, however, scarcely controversial. Even the 'sociologists' against whom they are aimed would not wish to contest them: for Bain's approach, attempting as it did to draw together many strands of the sociological position, only managed to set up a 'straw man'. This meant that his general model of the sociologists explanatory framework was far too simplistic. (1)

And in consequence his criticisms can be deflected for, so generalised, they merely constitute misrepresentations of particular positions. (2)

But the crudities of Bain's theoretical challenge must not hide two important aspects of the institutionalist-sociologist debate. Firstly, the empirical evidence cannot be as easily shrugged off as the theoretical argument. Crompton, a self-confessed heretic of the sociological tradition, takes the point:

"Although I would broadly reject the industrial relations critique of the sociological approach, their criticisms do reveal some serious weaknesses. In particular, the countless examples provided by Bain et al in order to contradict or destroy the relationship between class position and trade union membership or character, which the sociological approach seeks to establish, cannot simply be dismissed as the exceptions which prove the rule. For the pattern of white-collar union membership and activity does show many inexplicable variations which are sociologically embarrassing if we are seeking to establish a more or less coherent relationship between union membership, character, and social class". (Crompton (1976) p.412).

1. As Mann (1974) p.323 comments:

"... it is a 'destruction job' on some of the crudest sociological arguments I have ever encountered".

2. As Crompton (1976) argues:

"Bain's comment that there is 'no easy correlation' between social position and union growth is scarcely a criticism of Lockwood who postulated a relationship between work situation and union growth" p.412.

Crompton's critique of Bain only explicitly amounts to a refutation of Bain's criticisms of Lockwood, Blackburn, and Prandy. She does not take issue with the core of Bain's argument as set out in Bain (1970), but merely tackles him on his weakest point - a point not essential for Bain's position to remain largely intact.
The sheer force of Bain's empirical weaponry thus makes some impression on the sociologists position. Yet the substance of the disagreement is not entirely obvious; what is the status of the debate? Consider Bain's alternative to a class understanding of trade unionism:

"What is being suggested here is that possibly union growth can more fruitfully be explained by concentrating on the properties of trade unions as organisations rather than on the properties of the individuals or groups which they seek to organize". (Bain, (1973) p.159).

Within this perspective, Bain enlists the assistance of the Flanderian notion of 'job regulation' which is defined as the "making and applying of rules to employment relationships". (ibid p.159-160). Union growth now "becomes predominantly a function of union participation in job regulation (ibid p.150).

This, however, does not place Bain in fundamental opposition to the sociological position: the debate really turns on the centrality of different concepts, rather than the incompatibility of different theoretical frameworks. (1) This is shown in Bain's view of the relevance of social stratification in his approach to white-collar unionism:

"If the relationship between social stratification and trade unionism is to be adequately understood, then it must be fitted into a much wider approach to the study of trade unionism". (Bain (1973) p.157).

Social stratification does have a part to play in Bain's analysis, but not a central part. Instead, he focusses on job regulation as the

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1. As Mann (1974) observes (p.324):

"(Bain et al) suggest, right at the end, that a better theory of unionization must be based on the concept of 'job regulation,' that is, the union's role in determining the distribution of work rewards. But why is this an alternative theory? May we not hypothesize that it is also related to the stratification system?"
motive force within a framework of institutional influences. Those influences Bain had identified in an earlier work, making extensive use of econometric methods.\(^{(1)}\) Basing his analysis on white-collar workers in British Manufacturing industry, Bain concluded there were three significant factors: firstly, the degree of employment concentration; secondly, the degree to which employers are prepared to recognize unions representing white-collar employees; and, thirdly, the extent of government action which promotes union recognition. The limitations to Bain's institutionalism are, perhaps, more aptly expressed in a more general discussion of the limits of the orthodox approaches.

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1. Bain (1970); in utilising econometric methods Bain appears as far less arbitrary than his N.American predecessors, such as Dunlop, in identifying variables; but the establishing of a negative theoretical point still does not generate a positive theoretical framework.
The limitations of the orthodox approaches.

Having considered some of the general approaches which seek to explain union growth and activity and, in some depth, those writers who have sought to explain 'white-collar' unionism as a specific area of unionization, what can be concluded? Firstly, some writers, within the broad traditions of different strands of thought, have seen 'white-collar' unionism as an area of concern requiring specific explanations. Not only that, but they have derived different, even opposing opinions as to why 'white-collar' unionism has grown - although this is partially explained by the way they have posed the 'problem'.

1. The distinction between Lockwood and Bain is related to how they conceptualise the 'problem' they try to explain. Lockwood is trying to tackle a social phenomenon and understand the processes involved; starting with workers and a Weberian perspective of 'authority' relations, he aims to explain the conditions under which white-collar unionism develops. In contrast, Bain begins with the 'problem' of a growing membership of 'white-collar' unions, emphasising patterns of unionization, and treats workers as subsidiary. In this he shows a definite positivist orientation, very much in accordance with Durkheim's principle that:

"Sociological Method ... rests wholly on the basic principle that social facts must be studied as things, that is, as realities external to the individual." Durkheim (1970). pp. 37-38.

It is not surprising that, starting from opposite ends, Lockwood and Bain do not meet in the middle.
Do these approaches assist in understanding how trade unionism develops. Lockwood and Bain do point to important questions: Lockwood raises the issue of the significance of social class in understanding trade unionism, while Bain correctly emphasises the role of institutional arrangements. The main limitation is, however, the same in both approaches: the failure to consider the specific nature of the capitalist mode of production. This has profound effects on the explanatory power of their conceptual frameworks.

Lockwood, it will be remembered, was criticised by Crompton for not considering class position as primarily mediated by production relations. This failure to understand the primacy of production relations is related to a more general failure to grasp the nature of the capitalist production process as a whole.

Following Marx, the predominant feature of capitalist production is wage-labour; this implies the potential of exploiting the wage-labourer through the expropriation of labour beyond that for which the labourer is paid. This enables the capitalist to expand the value of his capital (valorisation) through appropriating the surplus value created by the wage-labourer. Surplus-value is therefore created in the sphere of production; yet the surplus is also contingent on what is paid for wage-labour which is determined not in the sphere of production, but circulation. This is a crucial question for Marx. Does money change into capital (as self-expanding value) in the sphere of production or circulation? The answer is both:

1. In this respect Bain and Lockwood can be considered as representative of their particular traditions - Bain as straddling the North American concern with union growth in relation to organisation theory, and the British institutional tradition; Lockwood as representing the mainstream European sociological thought. As such, comments concerning their specific explanations of white-collar unionism do carry wider implications.
"This whole course of events, this transformation of money into capital, both takes place and does not take place in the sphere of circulation. It takes place through the mediation of circulation because it is conditioned by the purchase of labour power in the market; it does not take place in circulation because what happens there is only an introduction to the valorization process, which is entirely confined to the sphere of production". (Marx (1976) p.302)

While the sphere of production is determinant, the production of surplus value is dependent on the interrelationship between the spheres of production and circulation. Within a Marxist framework, therefore, not only is it inadmissible merely to lump together, as Lockwood does, supposedly distinct components of class position; it is not possible to make that differentiation in the first place. The purchase of labour-power and the utilisation of labour-power (which Lockwood parallels with market and work situation respectively) are essentially interrelated in the very logic of capitalist production. The implication must be that in ignoring this connection, Lockwood cannot fully comprehend the relationship between the capitalist production process, the structural formation of class, and the emergence of trade unionism.

Such inadequacies in his overall approach are reflected in his utilisation of key concepts within his framework, most notably that of bureaucratization. For Lockwood, it describes a process - the content of which has already been questioned - but it is a process without any historical or material basis. Why does bureaucratization emerge? Other than references to the size of organisation or the development of modern industry, there is no answer. Why does it emerge when it does? Again, no answer. In Lockwood's analysis, bureaucratization
presumably develops as the inexorable consequence of the
growing size of organisations. To omit any consideration
of the capitalist mode of production and the historical context of
changes in the capitalist economy suggests fundamental shortcomings
in Lockwood's approach. If he develops the ownership/non-ownership
criterion of class in understanding unionisation amongst blackcoated
workers, he must posit the emergence of unionisation both historically
and analytically within capitalism as well. Yet, despite his
empirical material, Lockwood fails to do this:

"It is true that the wealth of historical material
presented by Lockwood provides many suggestive indications
as to why clerical and market and work situations should
be as they are, but these indications are not related to a
systematic body of theory." (2)

Bain's non-consideration of the specific nature of capitalist
production is perhaps more blatant than that of Lockwood, since his
emphasis on the institutional arrangements of the industrial relations
system is more abstracted from wider social processes. For instance,
in attempting to deny Lockwood's postulate that bureaucratization and
the growth of 'white-collar' unionization are dialectically related he
argues:

1. There is clearly a direct link here between this absence of any
critical discussion of bureaucracy in Lockwood's work and the Weberian
tradition. Weber "... identifies the advance of bureaucratic rationality
as an inevitable component of the growth of capitalism." (Giddens
(1972)p.47). Since it is "inevitable" it is quite understandable why
Lockwood should not concern himself with such trivia. A further indication
of the Weberian influence in Lockwood is the acknowledgement to Dahrendorf
in the Preface to Lockwood (1966). The parallels between Lockwood and
Dahrendorf (1959) in apparently developing a position from Marx's
understanding of class, yet merely using it as a peg for a Weberian approach,
are interesting and perhaps not coincidental.
2. Crompton (1976)p.410. It is interesting to contrast Lockwood's empirical
work which draws on the first 50 years of this century, with that of
Braverman (1974) ch.15, to give an indication of how the position of the
clerical worker has changed in that time.
3. In line with this persistent non-usage of Marxist terminology, Lockwood
"... the findings of this study suggest that the degree of interdependence between bureaucratization and unionization is very slight. Employment concentration and the bureaucratization associated with it are primarily a function of the techniques of production and as such are exogenous to the industrial relations system". (Bain (1970) pp.184-5 My emphasis).

This separation of the "industrial relations system" from the wider economic and social processes of society traces back to an important influence in Bain's thought: that of organization theory - a school of thought, which Herding convincingly argues, has been characterised by an inability to adequately explain trade union behaviour:

"... it fails to reveal that the very assimilation of organizational structure of unions to that of business organisations, as well as the specific problems and cleavages this process causes for unions, depend on the inherent conflict within them between acceptance and reinforcement of the conditions created by the economic system and attempts to change it". (Herding (1972) p.69).

Hence Dunlop's (1958) "subsystem" approach to industrial relations has:

"placed unions in a technocratic vacuum, aloof from the larger societal conflict which they are based on and cannot escape entirely". (Herding (1972) p.69).

In this, Bain is Dunlop's disciple. Employers, unions, and government all appear "aloof" from the reality in which they must essentially be located. Despite the weight of this empirical material it is a major paradox of Bain's approach that his theoretical formulations do not approximate the reality from which they are supposedly drawn.

As with Lockwood, this general inadequacy is reflected in the effectiveness of Bain's explanatory variables. Perhaps Bain's major contribution has been his emphasising of the employer's role in influencing union growth:

"The employers' role in union growth has generally been neglected ... even the most superficial reflection should indicate that employer policies and practices may profoundly affect the growth and development of trade unionism". (Bain (1970) p.122).
Clearly, employers do play an important part in shaping the pattern of industrial relations. In a society based on capitalist relations of production, where employers own and control the means of production - in vivid contrast to the worker whose means of living rests merely on his labour power - employers hold a dominant position. Their "policies and practices" are distinctly linked to the perpetual changes inherent in capitalist development. And the imperatives here point to the inseparability of "industrial relations" from other aspects of employers' policies.

Yet despite his concern with the neglect of the employers role in industrial relations, it is precisely at this point that Bain's analysis is most inadequate. For instance, he identifies two "employer policies for discouraging white-collar employees from joining trade unions". (ibid p.131). These are: "peaceable co-operation" and "forcible opposition", and he then describes the various strategies which fall under each category. There is, however, no indication under what conditions these different practices might be adopted, or towards which group they may be directed. This represents the limits of Bain's framework. He cannot transcend this institutional perspective and hence employers' policies are essentially separated from the logic of the capitalist economy from which they fundamentally derive.

If Lockwood and Bain, and the schools of thought they represent, are thus limited in providing an understanding of trade unionism, can the tradition which does consider the specific nature of capitalist society provide any better insights?
(b) Marxist approaches to understanding trade unionism.

For Marxist approaches to trade unionism, the omissions of the Industrial Relations theorists are not merely undesirable, but crucial. The processes of collective bargaining can in no sense remain contained within the institutional arrangements of the Industrial Relations System, but must be seen in terms of a society based on a capitalist mode of production. Such an approach necessarily emphasises power relationships within society, focussing on the ownership and control of the means of production.

Marxist approaches, as understood here, broadly contain three components. Firstly, they embrace the specificity of capitalist society; in other words, capitalism is an historical stage in the development of society and cannot be seen as, in some sense, eternally given. Secondly, within the specific context of capitalism, the basic struggle between groups within society takes on a particular form; class struggle is seen as endemic within capitalism, but not peculiar to it. While, thirdly, the basis of that class division and the operation of capitalism as a whole is the exploitation of wage-labour. Therefore, a Marxist perspective embraces a class view of capitalist society based on the material conditions of the exploitative relationship of wage-labour.

Furthermore, the development of this form of class domination is essentially understood within the historical progress of society in its various stages.

The immediate central focus is that of wage-labour, whose generality is the most significant defining characteristic of capitalism. Its fundamental importance for capitalism, Marx sets out in Volume I of Capital. 1

1. The discussion that follows must be essentially cursory of what is a complex and rigorous argument. The reader is referred to Marx (1976) Ch 1-6 for the source of the arguments which follow.
Here he analyses the underlying logic of the capitalist mode of production, arguing that it is based not so much on the usefulness of objects, but on the expansion of value (measured by the necessary social labour embodied in commodities) and the constant pursuit of generating and acquiring surplus value. However the only source of surplus-value for the capitalist is labour-power, the productive potential of labour. The capitalist can buy labour-power paying only sufficient for the labourer to exist; yet the capitalist now possesses the use of the labourer's labour-power which potentially can create value of a greater magnitude than s/he receives.

Capitalist production thus relies on the freedom of the wage-labourer:

".... and this worker must be free in the double sense that as a free individual he can dispose of his labour-power as his own commodity, and that, on the other hand, he has no other commodity for sale". (Marx (1976) p.272)

Yet in selling his labour to the capitalist, the labourer finds that he now "works under the control of the capitalist to whom his labour belongs" (ibid, p.291) Not only this, but the product of his labour is now the property of the capitalist and not that of the labourer, the "immediate producer" (ibid, p.292). These are the key characteristics of capitalist relations of production: a relation built upon coercion, not of the direct kind as, for instance, in slavery, but indirectly through wage-labour. That "free" labourer who possesses only his labour-power is, of course, not free. In order to survive s/he must sell her/his labour-power. Hence production takes place on the basis of antagonistic social relations: on the one hand the wage-labourers who possess only their labour power; on the other, the capitalists, who own and control the means of production and who expropriate the product.

Within the Marxist framework, trade unions are seen as an expression of the antagonistic form of the social relations of production: as the
means of raising, or at least maintaining the price of the sole commodity
of the wage-labourer - her/his labour-power. Trade Unions operate
to ensure wage-labour receives the value of labour-power and that the
price (i.e. wage) does not fall below it.

"... the value of labour-power constitutes the conscious
and explicit foundation of the trade unions, whose importance
for the English working-class can scarcely be overestimated.
The trade unions aim at nothing less than to prevent the
reduction of wages below the level that is traditionally
maintained in the various branches of industry". (ibid p.1069)

Combination on the part of the wage-labourers is necessary, stresses
Marx, because of the inequality of the employment contract. Quoting
a contemporary Union Secretary at some length:

"The workers combine in order to achieve equality of a sort
with the capitalist in their contract concerning the sale
of their labour. This is the rationale (logical basis)
of the trade unions". (T.J.Dunning quoted in Marx (1976)
p. 1070).

This emphasis on the market role of trade unions is reflected
in the whole tradition of Marxist approaches to trade unionism.

'Economism', since Lenin's sharp criticism of trade unions, is used
to denigrate efforts which do not consider wider political aspects, and
characterises trade unionism as both deriving from and concerned with
the market position of labour-power.

Gramsci, too, emphasises the limitations of trade unions. He
argues that the origins of trade unionism can be seen as a mirror image
of capitalism itself:

"It can be maintained that (trade unions) are in a certain
sense an integral part of capitalist society, and have a
function which is inherent in the regime of private property.
In this period, when individuals are only valued as owners
of commodities, which they trade as property, the workers
too are forced to obey the iron laws of general necessity;
they become traders in their sole property - their labour
and professional skills. More exposed to the risks of
competition, the workers have accumulated their property in
ever broader and more comprehensive 'firms', they have created
these enormous apparatuses for the concentration of work energy,
they have imposed prices and hours, and have disciplined the
market". (Gramsci (1969) p.11).
Wage-labour thus provides the link between the source and activity of trade unions:

"Objectively, the trade union is the form that labour as a commodity necessarily assumes in a capitalist regime when it organises to dominate the market". (ibid p.14).

There is not a substantial body of literature which attempts to relate this general perspective to specific categorizations of wage-labour. One particular effort to do this was Kingender's work on clerical unionization where he sought to explain this phenomenon primarily in terms of economic proletarianization.\(^1\) In his short monograph, Klingender tried to tackle two important problems: the historical expansion of the 'right arm' of capitalist control into a pattern of highly differentiated and routine job tasks and the potential allegiance of those workers with the Fascist Movement.\(^2\)

Klingender argues that proletarianisation has been the crucial process in the historical devaluation of the position of clerical workers. Their interests now lie with the manual working class, and Fascism, while it may succeed temporarily in "maintaining the petty-bourgeois masses in a state of intoxication", will eventually turn on its militant supporters with the same "savage terrorism" it had hitherto reserved for its working class opponents. (ibid p.101).

Throughout there exists a tension in Klingender's work between this political purpose and analytic clarity. In his enthusiasm for separating the clerical workers from the "intoxication" of fascism, he

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1. Klingender (1935)

"A widespread and clear understanding by clerical workers of what is happening to them and why, is essential to preventing their use as the raw material of Fascism in Britain. To this end the study which this book provides is a valuable initial contribution".

In the context of the developing Fascist influence in Western Europe Klingender's work, published in 1935, had a fundamental political purpose: to argue the case that a substantial section of the British petty bourgeoisie, the clerical workers, were objectively in common accord with the mass of the British proletariat.
simultaneously simplifies and confuses the concepts of class and proletariatisation, and their relationship to trade unionism (1).

Starting with the basic Marxist distinction of class, that between the bourgeoisie class as owners of the means of production, and the proletariat as wage-labourers, Klingender concludes:

"That social strata which lie between the capitalists and the proletariat do not constitute a class in the true sense of the term, for they perform as a group, no specific economic function". (Klingender (1935) p.xi).

This intermediate group may, therefore, place its allegiance with either of the main classes. Historically, however, Klingender argues, clerical labour has formed part of the capitalist class, yet within the logic of the capitalist mode, the process of proletariatisation has meant a separation between the capitalist class proper and its one-time assistant, the clerk. Now the confusion begins. Nowhere is proletariatisation defined. In the early part of the book, where Klingender describes proletariatisation as "complete" by 1914 (ibid p.18) he seems to understand proletariatisation in terms of the historically declining wages of clerical workers relative to other groups. In this he follows through orthodox Marxist notions regarding the devaluation of labour-power. Subsequently, however, proletariatisation begins to shift in meaning. Klingender talks of how office mechanisation "completes the technical proletariatisation of clerical labour". (ibid p.61) He also argues that the "social isolation" of clerks from the working class had "definitely broken down" thus confirming the proletariatisation of

1. This allows criticisms like those of Lockwood to carry the force which they would scarcely otherwise possess. Lockwood is able to produce this caricature of Klingender, which carries little validity against current Marxist theorists (or, indeed, Marx himself): "The internal skill differentiation of the propertyless class with the advance of industrialisation and the increasing heterogeneity of interests associated with this development, was definitely discounted in the Marxian concept of a class-conscious proletariat. Homogeneity of position and interest were rather the order of the day. The increasing impoverishment, insecurity, and caste-like character of the propertyless class world, according to this theory, override internal differences and provide the principal dynamic of the class system of late capitalism. And into this vortex of 'proletarianisation' the blackcoated workers were to be irresistibly drawn to experience their latent community of interest with the working class"

Lockwood (1966), p.203
clerical labour - which suggests a wider social content in his notion of proletarianisation (ibid p.64). But Klingender places most emphasis on economic proletarianisation. That he regards as "established" by the facts of his interesting and fairly thorough empirical work. His accentuation of the primacy of the economic would no doubt set his contribution firmly in the category of 'vulgar' Marxism and with the label of 'economic reductionism'. This would not be unfair. But in common with many of his potential critics of today, for Klingender trade unionism flows naturally as a class response to the impact of proletarianisation:

"The preceding chapters have, I hope, produced ample evidence of the value to clerks of one typically working-class means of defence that is of great importance in the former phase: that of trade union organisation. It is the only available means of safeguarding the economic interests of clerks as a class in face of the ever-present desire of the employers to economize at the expense of their staffs". (ibid p.102).

Klingender thus echoes the economic/political dichotomy of Marxist writing. Trade unions arise amongst clerical labour through the economic proletarianization of the latter, and thus seek to rectify the market position of their members.

1. This would also include the loss of security of employment:

"... the final barrier against their complete economic proletarianization". (Klingender (1935) p. 98).
The limitations of Marxist approaches.

The major strength of the 'Marxist' approaches over those of the 'orthodox' theorists is the way in which capitalism is considered as a specific historical epoch which is premised on particular kinds of social and economic relationships. This allows an understanding of why trade unionism emerged through pin-pointing the exploitative relationship of wage-labour and the underlying logic of capitalist economy - the expansion of value. Nevertheless, there are severe problems with the approaches set out above: firstly, in the neglect in not following through the precise relationship between wage-labour and trade unionism; secondly, in the theoretical and political consequences of this neglect which served to emphasise the economism of trade unions, thus obscuring the origins of trade unions. Furthermore, it is arguably these problems which underlie the inadequate exposition of any understanding of unionisation amongst specific employee groups, e.g. clerical labour.

Initially, consider wage-labour as the 'necessary' condition for trade unionism. Throughout Marxist perspectives, trade unionism is conceived as the collective organisation of wage-labourers; of those who own only their labour and are exploited by the capitalist class. Indeed, it is this division between the owners and non-owners of the means of production, the exploiters and exploited, which constitutes the basic class division within capitalism. Yet while this distinction possesses conceptual clarity at higher levels of abstraction, at more concrete levels of analysis, it becomes clear that wage-labour is a condition common to widely disparate groups.

"Class is to be defined, not as a concrete entity but in terms of a set of relationships: specifically, for Marxists, in terms of social relations of production. But in modern industry, the complexity of these relations is considerable. White-collar employees, like manual workers, sell their labour-power as a commodity: but so, it could be added, do the most senior levels of management, whom few would regard as "working class". (Hyman (1978) p.59)."
The problems of defining wage-labour as a precondition of trade unionism are the same as defining it as a precondition of class position: while theoretically necessary it is of limited usefulness in differentiating at the concrete level. Rather more needs to be done than specifying the exploitative relationship of wage-labour if trade unionism is to be understood; yet the neglect of the major Marxist theorists in not pursuing the link between wage-labour and trade unionism with more endeavour is apparent and is reflected in the work of some modern inheritors such as Allen (1972).

His framework illustrates the potentially schematic and crude extensions that can be made of Marxist approaches to trade unionism. Quite correctly he begins with wage-labour as the 'necessary' condition for trade unionism, noting that where labour is freely bought and sold, trade unionism is "endemic, universal, and permanent" (ibid p.11)

But other than this, Allen declines to specify any particular influence which structures the development of trade unionism. Instead he states it is necessary to consider "sufficient conditions". These:

".... consist of any factor which injects the realities of the labour market situation into the lives of people who were previously not conscious of them". (ibid p.14)

Besides the obviously fallacious implication that trade unionism is reducible to wage-labour plus consciousness, it is equally clear that if this is all Marxist theory has to offer it does not compare favourably with the work of the orthodox sociologists and institutionalists - for at least they try to identify these "sufficient conditions" and, in some instances, explore how they may influence the development of trade unionism.

The failure of Marxist approaches to move beyond wage-labour in any systematic fashion in relation to trade unionism is a consequence of how the 'problem' of trade unionism was specified: this was not so much
in terms of origins, but activities. The dominant Marxist approaches to trade unions have embraced specific political motives - the exposure of trade unions as inadequate social institutions for the transition to socialism. The problems of the working class could not be resolved by the policies of the trade unions, but needed a wider, political response embraced in a relationship between the mass of the proletariat and the advanced sections of the class, the revolutionary vanguard, in the form of a party. (1)

Intellectually, this involved a conflation of the sources and activity of trade unionism which provided a one-sided account of the origins of trade unionism: that in terms of the inequality of the labour contract, trade unions arise to sustain the market value of labour-power. This explains the origin of unionization while simultaneously positing the source of trade union economism. There is more than a suspicion of circularity here, that the origins of trade unions are being explained in terms of current actions. (2) But, in any case, this emphasis on the market role of trade unions tends to dispense with one whole area of possible explanations of trade unionism: the conditions under which the work was performed as against the level of remuneration for doing it. The accentuation of the market role of trade unions thus serves to obscure the whole question of the control and structuring of the labour process. (3)

1. Scathing attacks on the trade unions are not limited to those with a "Leninist" viewpoint. Consider also Rosa Luxemburg, who partly rejected the predominant role of the party in favour of the "spontaneity" of the "mass strike", albeit partly derived from her experience of German trade unionism.
2. If trade unions arise from inequality in the labour market, it might be anticipated low paid workers would be unionized - but this is scarcely borne out historically.
3. and indeed, how changes in the labour process might carry implications for wage levels. It is interesting that Marx, despite emphasising the primacy of production for capitalism should stress the role of trade unions within circulation (i.e. on wage levels), and not explore the relationship between the control of production and trade union organisation.
To conclude: there appear two major limitations within the Marxist approaches as generally put forward: firstly, the inadequacy of the link between wage-labour and trade unionism; secondly, the neglect of the conditions of production in understanding the source of trade unionism. These are not, however, problems of the same order as emerged with the orthodox approaches. They do not imply the inherent failure of the general perspective to come to terms with an understanding of trade unionism, merely inadequacies within it. If these two problems are overcome, then perhaps something can be said about the source of trade unionism in general and unionization amongst specific employee groups - which given the undifferentiation of wage-labour is scarcely possible at this stage. It now remains to attempt a reformulation of an approach to trade unionism within a Marxist perspective.
Chapter 2: Trade Unionism and the Labour Process.

In this chapter there are two major tasks: firstly, to reformulate a Marxist perspective on approaching trade unionism generally; secondly, to develop this analysis in an effort to determine what basis, if any, there is for a differentiation between different employee groups.

The deficiencies in the Marxist approach, identified at the end of the last chapter, were two-fold: the uncritical linking of wage-labour to trade unionism and the relative non-consideration of production relations as a source of trade unionism. The resolving of these problems is not achieved individually, but simultaneously. In an attempt to do so, three conceptual categories are introduced: interests, the collective labourer, and the labour process.

Wage-labour is not simply the position of one individual in relation to another; it is a generalised social phenomena expressing the prevalence of a particular form of exploitation. Wage-labour is, therefore, a common condition and experience for many individuals; and it is this position as wage-labourers which represents their common denominator as a social group. As such, wage-labour may be seen as defining a relationship where interests are in common.

Potentially this can provide a link to trade unionism, if the latter is seen as the translation of common interests to collective action. For this connection to be justified, two particular questions must be successfully tackled: how are interests structured and how does this lead to collective action? In answering these questions, the impact of production relations is directly confronted: how the labour process can be seen as the source of collective action amongst wage-labourers; and the consequent implications of the collective worker as the basis of common interests and collective action.
But even if these links are established, this does not move the analysis beyond collective action - which is not synonymous with trade unionism. Collective action is problematic. Why do certain forms of action occur in some instances and not others? What is the relationship to trade unionism? Such questions are integral to any attempt to formulate a general approach to trade unionism.

The first part of the chapter is therefore concerned with outlining a general approach to trade unionism. It then remains to tackle a further complex problem: divisions within wage-labour, in particular posing alternatives to that of 'white-collar'/'blue-collar' which pervades the orthodox literature on union growth. Having refuted the traditional distinction, two potentially fruitful areas are investigated as alternative bases for such a division: that between productive and unproductive labour; and ambiguous (or contradictory) class positions. After some discussion, the latter is put forward as the most useful framework when analysing the unionization of workers in the 'problem' category of 'white-collar'. In particular this indicates a suitable focus for approaching concrete labour processes – that of patterns of control and domination over the labour process.

The final and concluding section of the chapter draws on the discussions of the previous two. In doing so, it sets out the tasks to be attempted in order to discern the utility of labour process analysis in understanding unionization.
(a) General Approach to Trade Unionism.

The first stage of the approach concerns the interests of wage-labourers and how these are structured. The concept of 'interests' can be a little slippery, and perhaps for that reason has been avoided by industrial relations 'theorists'. Nevertheless, this does not mean interests have not been implied - for instance, in the utilisation of co-operative and conjunctive bargaining - nor that they should continue to be omitted. That conceptual problems and categories may involve methodological difficulties is not a reason for ignoring them. In consequence, this section begins with a discussion of the concept of interests, drawing on the work of political theorists who have not shirked this particular issue, in the anticipation this will provide some guidance on its use and potential in understanding unionization.

(i) The concept of interests.

The significance of the concept of 'interests' is immediately realised once it is shown to be essentially related to the problems of political obligation and power. The fundamental issue of political obligation - how power is legitimately exercised by one group over another - leads directly to interests: are the governed, in giving consent to the governors, acting in their own interests? How can such interests be specified? (1)

The traditional response in classical liberalist theory was to equate interests and expressed wants. This emphasised both the importance of individual determination of one's own interests, and the reliance upon observable phenomenon as the crucial defining characteristic. (2)

1. The discussion of interests in Lukes (1974) is entirely in terms of power relations.

2. For a critical discussion of interest in the classical liberal tradition see Balbus (1971).
More recently, writers in this tradition have attempted to come to terms with the significance of groups, rather than individuals, in the political process; interests are assigned to groups, but again are defined in terms of observable phenomena - professed policies or action. Any conflicts between the groups are seen as conflicts "... between preferences, that are assumed to be consciously made, exhibited in actions, and thus to be discovered by observing people's behaviour. Furthermore, the pluralists assume that interests are to be understood as policy preferences - so that a conflict of interests is equivalent to a conflict of preferences". (Lukes (1974) p.14. Emphasis in original).

The assertion that interests are equatable with observable social phenomenon, with expressed wants, is open to serious criticism. Two writers who challenge this approach are considered here: Lukes (1974), who finds that the treatment of power by pluralist writers is inadequate and, in consequence, so is their approach to interests; and Balbus (1971), who argues that such an emphasis on subjective interests ignores how interests are socially determined.

Lukes is primarily concerned with the way "power" is understood within various pluralist and radical perspectives. Most of the pluralist approaches, he argues, only consider observable conflict (and observable interests). Once Lukes concludes that non-observable or "latent" conflict is essential to an understanding of power, he is forced to take issue with the pluralist conception of interest:

"(The pluralists) are opposed to any suggestion that interests might be unarticulated or unobservable, and above all, to the idea that people might actually be mistaken about, or unaware of, their own interests." (ibid p.14)

1. Lukes (1974) suggests such a label is misleading and uses the term "one-dimensional" instead. Nevertheless, his characterization does apply to the broad sweep of pluralist writing, particularly the American tradition. The components of the "one-dimensional" view are summarised by Lukes on p.25.
But where there is a potential conflict which "may never in fact be actualised" (ibid p.24), there may appear ....

"... latent conflict, which consists in a contraction between the interests of those exercising power and the real interests of those they exclude. These latter may not express or even be conscious of their interests...." (ibid pp. 24-25. Emphasis in original). (1)

While Lukes is concerned to argue in favour of an approach which focusses on both "subjective and real interests" (ibid p.25), Balbus (1971) asserts that the pluralist reliance on subjective interests and the disregarding of the objective component, has left the sources of interests unquestioned. He argues the Marxist approach is superior since the integration of the objective and subjective dimensions of interest allows an examination of how wants are socially generated. (2)

So both Lukes and Balbus argue the case for "real" and "objective" interests, respectively. Whatever their differences and deficiencies in doing this, the essential argument takes the analysis beyond observable social phenomenon. (3)

1. Lukes amplifies this in a footnote (ibid p.25) where he argues "This conflict is latent in the sense that it is assumed that there would be a conflict of wants or preferences between those exercising power and those subject to it, were the latter to become aware of their interests."

2. The limitations of the pluralist approach in understanding the sources of interests have been admitted by self-confessed "radical pluralist", Aldridge (1976): "... despite their repeated emphasis on the crucial role played by consent, pluralists have been slow to examine the origins and character of that consent". p.xvii.

3. Lukes' discussion of real interests is slight (see ibid p.34-35). He cites Connolly (1972) and suggests he (Lukes) would "connect real interests with (relative) autonomy and choice".p.34. His use of Connolly, however, implies real interests could be discerned if the individual had perfect knowledge of the consequences of choosing various options; this would seem to imply ideological neutrality. Furthermore, it develops from a fundamentally philosophical, non-materialist position. The position adopted here will suggest expressed interests must be understood in relation to positions within society - not some hypothetical 'what-might-be-chosen-in-a-different situation'. Balbus' (1971) definition of objective interests tends to be both positivist and empirical. See below.
But once this has occurred, they are faced with the full rejoinder on
false consciousness\footnote{1} and, in Balbus' case, vehement denunciations
of the prescriptive nature of Marxist analysis:

"(The Marxist) tells us what desires we ought to have. That is what he means by our objective interests; and
false consciousness consists precisely in our adherence to 'false' goals and profession of 'false' needs. The
falsity is a quality that can be determined objectively and irrefragably by Marxist analysis. Whereas pluralists,
in the liberal tradition, act as midwives to desire, Marxists gladly practice abortion".\footnote{2}

There is really only a need for one response to this kind of
criticism: that ideology is not neutral - as the tone of Aldridge's
near-hysterical outburst clearly indicates.\footnote{3} Once that is established
then, whatever the methodological problems, false consciousness is a
possibility. But this may well prove a fruitless discussion unless
there is something other than a mechanical juxtaposition of objective
and subjective interests.

Aldridge (1976) makes a lamentable attempt to ensure the compatibility of
pluralism with an investigation of the ways in which wants are socially
generated, with the concept of false consciousness, while upholding all-
important liberal values. See Aldridge (1976) p. 121. He fails, amongst
other things, to discuss the source of wants, but merely suggests the "shaping
and modification of aspirations in the light of experience". (ibid p.122)

2. Aldridge (1976) p. 121, who matches the ignorance of Marxism with an
insensitivity to the women's movement. It is, of course, highly
hypocritical, since pluralists are more usually found in the corridors of
power in Western Capitalism than Marxists, and there seems little shortage
of proclamations of the short-sightedness of trade unions, or the real
interests of workers in relation to pay policy.

3. Aldridge's distasteful analogy does reveal his pre-occupation with
procedures: it does not matter how good the midwife is if there is
nothing to deliver - and since the collapse of the post-war boom, there
is little the pluralists can deliver. For a discussion of the procedural
emphasis in pluralism see Hyman (1978).
What can be concluded from this discussion of interests? Firstly, it is insufficient to remain at the level of expressed wants and preferences, if the intention is to understand how interests are structured and how they may develop. This implies, secondly, that there must be some consideration of the sources of interest, and that, thirdly, these must be related to expressed wants.

Consider the definitions of the subjective and objective components of interests which Balbus develops. The subjective component,

"... refers to a psychological state in the mind of the person who is said to have the interest". (ibid p.152).

This is distinguished from objective interest in terms of the impact of external processes which do not necessarily alter expressed wants. The objective component,

"... refers to an effect by something on the individual which can be observed and measured by standards external to the individual's consciousness". (ibid p.152)

Such a definition of objective interest is open to criticism as both positivist and empirical. It is not so much the "observable and measurable standards" which are important, but the understanding of the way in which the positions of individuals, groups, and, ultimately, classes are structured by the nature of capitalist society. Nevertheless, the main thrust of the argument that Balbus puts forward - that it is important to move beyond expressed wants and explore the source of interests - is necessarily convincing for any approach which tries to understand social processes.

It remains important, therefore, to link the objective and subjective components of interest. Subjective interests are not, however, random, but ultimately structured in a specifically capitalist form:
"..... an individual's subjective interests are not merely given or randomly generated, but rather are systematically determined by the way in which his life-chances are objectively affected by objective conditions". (Balbus (1971) p.153).

Subjective interests must therefore be understood in relation to objective interests which are identified through the historical and materialist study of capitalist social relations. This necessarily involves power relationships, the struggle between and within classes. Subjective interests are thus in no sense an outcome of some neutral experience of an objective position: political and ideological levels of analysis are important in understanding subjective interests and the disjunction between them and objective interests. It must be remembered that ideological and coercive power within any society can be used to uphold the prevailing social and political order and can strongly influence the perception and expression of interests of subordinate classes. (1)

Finally, it must be added that using the concept of interest is not straightforward and not without problems. The derivation of objective interests is in itself a controversial process, since any postulates must necessarily reflect the general approach adopted. Indeed, it might also be argued that the separation of interests into objective and subjective components is itself a false dichotomy and may lead to crude determinist approaches to understanding social processes.

1. As noted by Fox (1973) p.216.

"The few can use ... power ... not only directly in determining the behaviour of the many, but also indirectly through their effect on the many agencies of socialization, communication, and attitude forming, in inculcating beliefs, values, and assumptions which render the many amenable and submissive to the social structures which the power holders wish to maintain".
The contention here is that the concept of interests can prove useful in understanding social position and social action; that the distinction between objective and subjective interests can, on balance, be usefully made; and that the prior task is to specify objective interests. It now remains to approach wage-labour and the labour process and explore how objective interests are structured.

(ii) Wage-labour, the labour-process and the structuring of common interests.

Objective interests, within a Marxist approach can be derived theoretically using an historical and materialist analysis of capitalism as a specific mode of production. The objective interests of the mass of wage-labourers are thus understandable from their position as wage-labourers and constitute a reflection of the fundamental class division within capitalist society. The categorisation of wage-labour and the conception of class divisions both derive, in Marx's analysis, from an examination of the processes of capitalist development over a given historical period. Thus objective interests are seen as rooted in the material conditions of capitalist society and identifiable historically. The growth of wage-labour therefore as an historical process constitutes the development of the proletariat with an objective common interest as exploited labour.

1. The justification of these assertions partly derive from the inadequacies of alternative approaches, but, more positively, rest on the understanding such a perspective provides in the second part of the thesis.

2. Some critics of Marx, however, do not seem to understand this fundamental method of analysis. The petulant criticism by Aldridge (1976) of Marx, for instance, rests on his (Aldridge's) notion that objective interests within Marxism are developed from an ideal conception of man - totally ignoring the importance of historical materialism. See Aldridge (1976) p. 121.
While this may represent the limit of many Marxist approaches, it is really only a theoretical starting point. In the first place, the question of a common interest amongst wage-labourers must be examined more closely. As shown in Chapter 1, wage-labour, at lower levels of analysis, cannot be viewed in an undifferentiated way; in consequence, a simplistic common interest amongst wage-labourers cannot be read off. For instance, a dichotomy in the working class might be posed between 'organised' and 'unorganized' labour, where the 'organised' group can make gains to the detriment of the 'unorganized' working-class. Or the division might be more precise: an occupational group which can make gains at the expense of the rest of the working-class; or a crucial workgroup within a factory, e.g. skilled engineers, who are able to secure gains at the expense of other work groups within the factory. The bases for achieving such gains may vary substantially, but the important point for present purposes is that interests may differ between wage-workers at these different levels of analysis; that these interests may be conflictual; and only in the last analysis need they be in common.

The relationship of wage-labour is an exploitative one, in both social and economic terms. And, as such, it runs through the whole spectrum of life within capitalist society, influencing the structuring and developing of relationships. At root, however, it depends upon a particular context: that of production, i.e. the exploitation of wage-labour as the generator of value and surplus-value.

1. This kind of discussion is evident in Harding (1972); see below, Chapter 6

2. This applies to interests within, as well as between, groups; this necessarily raises the question of contradictory interests, depending on the level of analysis used, which might usefully also be seen in short and long term components of interests. Balbus (1971) hints at contradictions of objective interests, but does not pursue it. Once it is seen that objective interests are not unequivocal, this approach might well be used to forestall the critics of 'false consciousness'. One interesting division is suggested by Wright (1979) who differentiates fundamental and immediate interests. (p.197).
If wage-labour is considered in terms of production, then any attempt to move beyond wage-labour as a source of common interests must deal with the question of how production is organized. It implies a consideration of the labour process in its capitalist form; how the structure, and changes in that structure, of the labour process can generate, through common interests, the basis of collective action.

What is meant by the labour process? Following Marx (1976) the labour process can be defined as:

"... the universal condition for the metabolic interaction between man and nature, the everlasting nature-imposed condition of human existence, and therefore independent of every form of that existence, or rather it is common to all forms of society in which human beings live". (Marx (1976) p.290)

For Marx, the labour process is fundamental for human development. Here he discusses the labour process as the production of objects of utility to man - in other words the production of use-values - a process which Marx does not regard as specific to any historical forms of society. Clearly the production of use-values underlies the continuity of man's survival.

At the same time, the labour process assumes different forms in different societies in different historical epochs. It is important, therefore, to note the conditions under which the labour process is performed. At any given point in time, Man is confronted by given conditions of production. These take two forms: on the one hand, there are the instruments of production, the tools, and the raw materials on which s/he can work, representing the technical conditions of production; on the other, there are the social relations under which the production of use-values takes place which may vary historically, e.g. the contrast between tribal societies and the conditions of capitalist production.
Now, in any given historical epoch, the production of use-values is subservient to the underlying logic of the mode of production under which it takes place. This will throw up particular social and technical conditions of production. As noted in the previous chapter the rationale of capitalist production is the expansion of value. As regards the individual capitalist:

"His aim is to produce not only a use-value, but a commodity; not only use-value, but value; and not just value, but also surplus value". (1)

It is the creation of surplus value (valorization) which distinguishes the capitalist mode of production:

"The production process, considered as the unity of the labour process and the process of creating value, is the process of production of commodities; considered as the unity of the labour process and the process of valorization, it is the capitalist process of production, or the capitalist form of the production of commodities". (ibid, p.304).

The labour process is thus unified with the valorization process, but it is a relationship where the labour process is subservient to the logic of valorization. The labour process has now become a capitalistic labour process. (2)

The shift in the objectives of production consequently give rise to the reorganization of the labour process within capitalism. And while each individual labour process may be altered in a specific way, there are tendencies which shape the patterns of labour processes in general, and which provide the basis for common interests amongst wage-labourers in a sense other than their common exploitation. Here two such tendencies are considered: the socialization of production and the devaluation of labour power.

1. ibid p. 293. There is not a direct equation between value and exchange value, but the latter exists as the phenomenal form of value. See Marx (1976) Chapter 1.
2. For a fuller discussion see Marx (1976) Chapters 7 and 8.
(1) The socialisation of production: the interdependence of capitalist economy.

"All the contradictions of the capitalist mode of production can be summed up in one general and fundamental contradiction, that between the effective socialisation of production and the private, capitalist form of appropriation. It is the objectively co-operative labour of all men that makes production under modern capitalism function." Mandel (1974) p.170.

The interdependence of the capitalist economy is reproduced at different levels: here, Mandel points to its most general application, yet it appears both in the interrelationships of different sectors of the economy and in the objective co-operation of employees within specific labour-processes.

The logic of capitalist production implies that some sectors will expand while others contract, changes ultimately dependent on the rates of profit within those industries. This becomes more complex when considering the relationship between general sectors of economy: between financial and manufacturing capital. Overall movements within the capitalist economy imply shifts in this relationship which may carry implications for the expansion/contraction of different sectors, industries, and firms and hence changes in the labour processes which prevail at that time. Therefore, changes in the labour process are not arbitrary. The structuring of individual labour processes must be located within the development of that particular industry and ultimately in the context of the overall capitalist economy.

But in terms of the general tendency of the socialisation of production, the interdependence within the economy as a whole is paralleled

1. As Elger (1979) p.70 suggests ...... " ...... the analysis of the development of the capitalist labour process must be set within an analysis of the organisation of capitalist production as a whole."
by a growing interdependence within and between labour processes. (1)

The capitalist labour process is necessarily one of co-operation amongst
the wage-labourers, bringing together workers in order to produce
commodities.

"... the co-operation of wage-labourers is entirely
brought about by the capital that employs them. Their
unification into one single body, and the establishment
of a connection between their individual functions, lies
outside their competence. These things are not their own
act, but the act of the capital that brings them together
and maintains them in that situation". (2)

Commodities are now produced on a collective rather than individual
basis. This tendency is continuously exaggerated through the application
of division of labour, and the emergence of “specialised” workers who
become proficient at partial operations. These “specialised” workers
do not individually produce commodities. Only as combined labour power,
as the collective labourer, do they produce commodities (ibid p. 475).

In consequence, not only do wage-labourers have their position of
exploited labour in common; they are now mutually dependent within the
labour process, since they do not produce commodities individually, but
collectively. This unity of the collective labourer as a productive
power for capitalism is therefore paralleled by the development of a common,
collective, interest on the part of the wage-labourers. With the developmen
t of the collective labourer, the conditions under which wage-labour takes
place becomes a collective question. (3)

1. It is important to note that co-operation is not simply applied to the
organisation of a specific labour process, but also to their interrelationship
For instance, distinct labour-processes may be developed to produce components
in the case of a physical product; or, regarding a less tangible commodity,
specialised workers may carry out the same tasks in different sections, e.g.
licensed house managers who co-operate to produce profits for the brewery
companies, rather than competing within the same firm.
2. Marx (1976) p.449. This is in contrast to the era of petty commodity
production since co-operation is now effected not through the exchange of
commodity producers, but is “mediated through the sale of the labour-power of
several workers to one capitalist”. Ibid p.476
3. Marx (1970) p.53: “Further, the division of labour implies the contra­
diction between the interest of the separate individual or the individual
family and the communal interest of all individuals who have intercourse with
one another. And indeed, this communal interest does not exist merely in the
imagination as the “general interest”, but first of all in reality, as the
mutual interdependence of the individuals among whom labour is divided".
The Devaluation of labour-power.

The continuing socialization of production which implies the co-operative and interdependent nature of the capitalist labour process is, in effect and intention, the expansion of social productivity. Yet the conditions under which this increasing social productivity occurs are capitalist ones; where the expansion of value predominates over the use-value of the commodities. Under capitalism, therefore, the increasing social productivity is not an end in itself, but a means to the creation and appropriation of surplus value. This implies a general tendency within the structuring and development of labour processes: the continuous effort to increase surplus value through the devaluation of labour-power:

"Capital ... has an immanent drive and a constant tendency, towards increasing the productivity of labour, in order to cheapen commodities and, by cheapening commodities, to cheapen the worker himself." (Marx (1976) p. 437).

The ability of capital to expand value depends on the special property of labour - that its use-value is a source of value. Hence labour receives a wage sufficient for its own reproduction, while it may add labour of a greater value to the objects on which it works. In order to obtain the maximum surplus value, therefore, the capitalist attempts to make the most effective use of the time when the labourer is working for him and to reduce the cost of her/his reproduction (i.e. the value of his/her labour-power). It will be seen, assuming the length of the working day either to be fixed or at a maximum, that these two points are interrelated. In order to make the most effective use of labour-power, the capitalist must increase the productiveness of labour. Yet in order to increase productiveness, the capitalist will tend to reorganise production in a way that devalues specific labour-powers; and as a consequence of increased productivity, the commodities produced become cheaper and hence devalue labour-power in general.
It is the direct devaluation of labour, of specific labour-powers, which is of particular importance for the organising of the labour-process. Within the generally socialised labour process, the direct devaluation of labour-power constitutes the basic underlying tendency of the determination of relationships between different groups of wage-labourers, in both a technical and social sense. Through the logic of the law of value, it carries the imperatives for changes in the technical components of job tasks, usually in terms of deskilling, and thus the interrelationship of revised job tasks in a restructured labour process.\(^1\) In consequence, this allows an examination of the basis of co-operation within the labour process, how this may change and how this may affect the structuring and patterns of interests. For while the socialisation of the labour process may generate a general common interest for the collective labourer, it may simultaneously structure divisions of interest amongst the wage-labourers based on the self-same interdependence. Whether there is a tendency towards solidarity or differentiation of interests depends on the basis of co-operation of different groups of wage-labourers within the labour process; yet this in turn is ultimately structured by the law of value.

Through focussing on the underlying tendencies which structure and change the capitalist labour process, the development of common interests can be more clearly understood. This approach moves beyond the ultimate unity of wage-labour as exploited labour, to a position where

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1. It is recognised that the whole question of 'deskilling' is both complex and problematic. It is perhaps necessary to point out that here it is assumed the devaluation of labour-power is a general tendency of capitalist economy, whereby all labour would notionally, in the last analysis, be reduced to a general level. Nevertheless this is only a tendency and can be considered as entirely consistent with the counter-tendency to revalue labour-power, which is likely to occur simultaneously with devaluation-tendency. Thus, in general terms, the devaluation of labour power is likely to generate a basis of co-operation within the labour process commensurate with a growing common interest amongst the wage-labourers involved; while simultaneously it may provide a source of division of interest as the position of some employee groups is revalued. For an interesting discussion of deskilling, see Eiger (1979).
collective interests can be understood and specified in terms of the co-operative interdependence of the labour process - personified in the collective labourer - and the basis of that co-operation, which may be a source of common or conflictual interests, and which can be approached through examining the devaluation of labour-power. This represents an advance from the monolithic category of wage-labour while simultaneously placing the relations of production at the forefront of understanding collective action.

Yet the main proponents of Marxist positions, as shown in Chapter 1, emphasised the market role of trade unions, of the level of wages as the important determinant of collective action and, implicitly, the structuring of common interests. While here the conditions of wage-labour have been emphasised rather than the remuneration, this does not mean the latter can be ignored. Indeed, it is important to integrate the analyses.

Wage issues focus directly on the general relationship of wage-labour; as such, they potentially transcend production and workplace relations implying a common interest as widespread as wage-labour itself. Simultaneously, however, as wage-labour expands, so the effect of socialized production and the tendency to devalue labour-power generates an increasing intensity of competition amongst homogenised labour for wages. This gives rise to a position where the immediate interests of some groups of wage-labourers are in conflict with wage-labour in general; thus wage-issues are simultaneously a source of solidarity and sectionalism. 1

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1. This should not be seen as an adoption of Wright's (1979) p.197, distinction of fundamental and immediate interests. For Wright "immediate interests are defined primarily in terms of market relations" while fundamental interests are "defined at the level of the mode of production". The former take "a mode of production as given". This schematic division is important in raising different levels of interests; yet sidesteps the question of immediate interests in relation to the mode of production. In terms of the above discussion the existing of immediate interests as concerned with market relation (i.e. wage issues) cannot be separated from production relations. Wage issues can challenge the mode of production; equally demands about the conditions of work may not constitute the posing of choices between alternative social relations of production.
While wage-labour provides a basis for a common, collective, interest as exploited labour, the labour process provides a context for collective interests which is fundamentally work-based. In the latter case, the collectivity revolves around a particular capitalist social formation - the firm - which implies a narrower structuring of interests. Immediate achievements can and need to be made through that employer.

However the disjuncture between wage-labour and the labour process as a source of common interest in relation to wage-issues is by no means complete. For insofar as wages are tendentially related to the value of labour power, so the process of the devaluation of labour-power as it affects the organisation of the labour process will also affect wage levels. Indeed, as suggested in the criticism of Lockwood, the interrelationship of production and circulation implies the non-separation of market and work situations. Thus it is entirely consistent to integrate the questions of the remuneration and conditions of wage-labour within the context of the labour-process.

So far, while suggesting a framework for approaching the question of common interests there has been no attempt to link interests with collective organisation and action. What are the mechanisms which allow the transition from common interests to collective action? And is this merely read off as trade unionism? These questions are taken up in the next section.

1. As Crompton and Gubbay argue (p.154) :" ... we can best begin to understand the unequal structure of incomes from employment if we examine the development of the capitalist labour process, and the associated emergence of the global function of capital on the one hand, and the collective worker on the other". See also the discussion in section 2 below.

2. see Chapter 1.
Common interests, workplace activity, and trade unionism.

The preoccupation of bourgeois academics with the issue of social control rather than understanding implies they have little to offer when it comes to developing the links between common interests, workplace activity, and trade unionism. Bain's emphasis on number counting as an indicator of union growth - to the exclusion of any analysis of the growth of trade unionism as a social force - is one dimension of this tendency; while the sociologists have concentrated attention on union character and "unionateness", which are concerned with the patterns of union behaviour and sources of collective strength. In consequence the crucial questions of collective action and organization have been largely ignored.

Consider for instance Lockwood's contribution to this problem in his discussion of the basic precondition for "concerted action":

"Concerted action is a function of the recognition by the members of the occupational group that they have interests in common." (Lockwood 1966,p.137).

In one sense this is undoubtedly correct, since it is virtually a truism: furthermore it does allow the observation that it is not merely the objective position of workers which must be understood in approaching trade unionism; it also demands the consideration of workers experience as exploited labour. This necessarily opens up a discussion on the visibility of capitalist social relations and the way in which ideological and political forces consistently invert the real nature of those relationships. (2)

1. Lockwood (1966) discusses union character in an attempt to integrate social class as a determinant of the patterns of collective behaviour. "Unionateness" is developed by Blackburn (1967) to help explain the potential and actual disjuncture between the density of union membership and collective strength. See Bain (1973) pp 79-108 for a critical evaluation of the use of these concepts by Lockwood and Blackburn.

2. This is a major recurrent theme in Marx's writings. See Marx (1976) pp. 163-177.
in which labour is exploited, the operation of the underlying economic forces of capitalist production continuously throw into view the contradictions of the system. This may be on a large scale, e.g. high levels of unemployment combined with a shortage of commodities; or it may be at the level of the workplace. But arguably the general tendency of the growing interdependence of capitalist economy involves an increasingly complex and volatile interrelationship of general sectors; and here the antagonistic basis of the social relations of production may tend to become increasingly apparent. For the moment, however, this discussion is left to later chapters. (1)

While Lockwood invites discussion of the question of consciousness his comment is profoundly misleading, for it implies a movement from inactivity to action on the part of workers. But through focussing on the labour process, it becomes clear that workers are already organized and act collectively - for capital:

".... we must, first of all, keep in mind that unions are associations of members who, before, they can become members of unions, are already members of other organizations, namely employees of capitalist enterprises. Thus, unions are "secondary" organizers, and capital itself functions as a primary organizer". (2)

So if workers are already acting collectively, what is this "concerted" action that Lockwood refers to? By implication it can only refer to particular forms of action or action in particular contexts. But how can these be delineated from the everyday functioning of the collective worker? Is it indeed possible to do so?

1. See below Chapters 3 and 4.

2. Offe and Wiesenthal (1979) p. 72 (emphasis in original). The point, in less academic style, is forcibly made by Draper (1955).

"Workers are taught organization not by their superior intelligence or by outside agitators, but by the capitalists themselves. They are organized on the assembly lines, in the factory gangs, in shifts, in work teams, in the division of labour of capitalism itself. Capitalism cannot live and cannot grow without "organizing" its workers and teaching them the virtues of a form of "solidarity", of working together".
In the first instance it is necessary to link the way in which workers act to their position as exploited labour, to the inequality of the employment contract. The peculiarity of labour-power as a commodity in that it remains under the physical control of the worker, yet belongs to the capitalist, allows for certain forms of resistance inherent in the functioning of the collective worker:

"The work can only be done by the worker, although his labour legally "belongs" to the capitalist. If the capitalist wants to get the work done, he has, for better or worse, to rely on the willingness of the worker to "give away" his/her physical and intellectual capacities by applying them to concrete labour tasks. In this way, the quantity and the quality of actual work performance remains subject to a permanent conflict that is not to be resolved by formal contractual relations in which both sides have engaged. Therefore, both "partners" of exchange try to improve their respective positions by resorting to a wide variety of positive and negative sanctions. This is the only way in which the "equivalence" of a certain amount of labour and a certain wage is established, challenged, and reestablished." (Offe and Wiesenthal (1979) p. 73).

Once it is recognised that merely in performing the work of the collecti labourer, workers are taking collective action, then certain forms of resistance are possible, independent of any formal organization. But there are inherent limits to this kind of response. The general processes of socialization of production and the devaluation of labour power imply the options of taking action of this kind diminish or that they can only rectify certain kinds of problems. Most obviously, it scarcely permits any articulation of positive demands on a variety of issues, e.g. pensions and sick pay; while the development of multi-plant and multi-national companies increasingly undermine the potential of informal workgroup practices.

The expanding interdependence of different groups of workers, through the labour process, illuminates the limitations of informal modes of resistance. It carries a functional imperative: that, on the one hand, new forms of action are necessary for which the existing
organization is inadequate; and, on the other, that the same kinds of action must be utilised within a different context. This implies the development of a formal organization, perhaps within the workplace, but also going beyond it. At this point trade unions enter the discussion as an outcome of collective action, as a mode of expression of common interests through certain forms of workers' action. (1)

But clearly trade unionism is not synonymous with collective action. Trade unionism is not the only form of workplace collectivism; furthermore it embraces wider components than those merely derived from workplace experience. (2) Trade unionism cannot be "read off" as workplace collectivism because it is both historically and socially determined:

"The trade union is not a predetermined phenomenon. It becomes a determinate institution, i.e. it takes on a definite historical form to the extent that the strength and will of the workers who are its members impress a policy and propose an aim that define it". (Gramsci (1977) p.265).

The nature of trade unionism is thus not once and for all determined, but undergoes constant revision; and in consequence the sources and explanations of trade unionism are historically specific.

At the same time, trade unionism exists as a particular form of workplace activity; and again whether collectivism takes this form is both a social and historical question - although for many years trade unions have existed as by far the most predominant institutional form of workplace collectivism. In consequence, it is a relationship which demands empirical analysis at the level of individual labour processes and workplaces.

1. The development of formal organization must not be seen as replacing, but co-existing with, informal practices. The relationship is indeed complex since certain informal practices may continue in this way, while others are taken over by/administered through, the organizational structure.

2. Although it has been argued that workplace experience remains the primary source of trade unionism.
Because of the mediating role of workers experience, the precise links between common interests, workplace activity and trade unionism cannot be specified, in that the transitions between forms of action and organization will differ between different groups of workers according to their different experiences. But some general points can be made. Firstly, that the conditions for collective action and common interests are simultaneously determined through the development of the collective worker. Collective action must be understood in relation to the labour process with the potential of collective resistance inherent in the organizing of the labour process by capital. In consequence little can be said about the particular forms of resistance other than that they arise from within the concrete labour processes through workers experience as structured by their collective interests.

Secondly, formal workplace organization will appear increasingly as an option with the development of capitalist economy, whereby informal workgroup practices have less potential and/or unable to achieve desired objectives. In this way collective organization becomes both the means and the consequence of collective action. This seems scarcely controversial, but interestingly it does carry implications for how forms of action are analysed: it implies looking beyond the immediate appearance of workers resistance to its context and is necessarily opposed to typologies such as individual and collective responses. (1)

Finally, a distinction can be made between workplace collectivism and trade unionism, although they are interrelated through the commonality of trade unionism as the socially and historically determined response of workers to their exploitation.

1. See the discussion in Chapter 4.
Having laid the groundwork for a general approach to trade unionism, the question of the validity of making broad divisions within the workforce is considered which, perhaps, underlie the notion of 'white-collar' unionism. But what of the conceptual status of 'white-collar'? It is interesting to note that neither Lockwood or Bain actually spell out the nature of the distinction between 'white' and 'blue-collar', nor why this is important for understanding trade unionism amongst 'white-collar' groups. While Lockwood sidesteps the problem by focussing on 'clerks' - scarcely an analytical category, either - Bain implies a distinction should be made, though in an operational rather than analytical sense.

It is not difficult, perhaps, to come to the same conclusion as Braverman, that the white-collar/blue-collar distinction is an historical anachronism. And, as he clearly portrays, the experiences of clerical workers in terms of changes in the labour process, parallel those of manual workers in earlier periods. This is not, however, to dismiss the basis of the 'white-collar'/blue-collar' distinction. As Braverman, himself, points out:

"It was not the colour of the employee's collar, still less the mode of payment on an annual or monthly basis as distinguished from the daily or hourly wage of the manual worker, that in themselves had a determinate meaning, but rather the whole complex of social position and position in the enterprise and the labour process that these terms symbolized." (ibid p. 349)


"... the traditional distinctions between "manual" and "white-collar" labour, which are so thoughtlessly and widely used in the literature on this subject, represent echoes of a past situation which has virtually ceased to have meaning in the modern world of work".

Dismissing the terminology leaves different questions. Can any
categories be developed which more accurately reflect the basis on
which that distinction rests? Is that kind of distinction meaningful
in any case?

In this section two approaches within a Marxist analysis are
considered which might potentially provide a basis of such a distinction:
the first relates to the fundamental nature of capitalist exploitation,
the production of surplus value, and explores the potential of a
distinction between those sectors and activities which produce value
and, potentially, surplus value) and those that do not. The second
refers to the structure of class divisions within capitalism and follows
recent work on the patterns and potential ambiguity of class position.

(i) Productive and Unproductive Labour.

The inadequacy of the orthodox sociological distinction between
white and blue collar workers is met in Marxist approaches by
formulations which root the position of wage-labourers in the very nature
of the capitalist production process and which generate divisions cutting
across the 'white-collar'/blue-collar' distinction. Capitalist production
rests on surplus value; it thus provides a basis for a dichotomy
between those wage-labourers who produce value, and are thus a source of
surplus value, i.e. productive labour, and those who do not, i.e.
unproductive labour.\(^{(1)}\)

In the first instance, productive labour can be defined as labour
exchanged with capital to produce surplus-value. Hence whether an activity
is productive is not contingent on the content of that activity, but on
its social form - the production of surplus value within capitalist
production relations.

\(^{(1)}\) Braverman (1974) provides a highly readable discussion of this
distinction. Gough (1972) examines in some detail Marx's analysis of
productive and unproductive labour and provides a useful starting point
for more complex analysis.
"The distinction between productive and unproductive labour refers neither to the usefulness of the product nor the type of work required, but to the social relations in which the wage labour is embedded". (1)

Given this definition, any discussion of the relationship between productive and unproductive labour must not only focus on specific activities, but the relationships within capitalist society as a whole; it must consider both specific capitals and capital in general. (2)

Crompton and Gubbay (1977) recognise this in discussing the class "situation" of unproductive workers:

"..... if we are to understand the class situation of unproductive workers in industry, as well as that of non-industrial workers, we have to examine the manner in which surplus value flows through the system as a whole, and how different groups of workers are related to this system." (Crompton and Gubbay (1977) p.76).

Analysing specific capitals from the perspective of productive and unproductive labour emphasises the acticity as a source of value, rather than its content. It raises the question of the social relationships of production, of what functions are performed by whom in the labour process. Ultimately that distinction is between carrying out the function of capital or the function of labour. On the other hand, capital in general indicates the importance of different sectors of activity and their function within the economy.


In terms of what labour is productive or unproductive, Gough gives some guidance (ibid p.51). Subsistence farming is unproductive, for the crops are not produced for exchange; also, services paid for out of revenue (the income of the capitalist) are unproductive, for they merely relate to the capitalist as consumption and not production.

2. As Braverman notes, the movement of unproductive labour into productive labour "..... is the very process of the creation of capitalist society". (Braverman (1974) p.413).
Bringing these two dimensions together can result in some sterile debates over the categorisation of sectors. There is broad agreement that activities outside capitalist relations must be unproductive (since by definition no surplus value is produced); and that private capital production of physical commodities is productive, since this comprises the sphere of production; furthermore, activities in the sphere of circulation, primarily concerned with the financing and realisation of value (but not its creation), are considered unproductive. However, once the complication of intangible commodities and state-controlled production are introduced, differences of opinion emerge.

The important point is that by analysing capital in general, certain sectors are ruled out from being productive, irrespective of the kinds of job tasks performed in them, and whatever function is carried out within the labour process as a whole.

Looking at the delineations within specific capitals, the division between productive and unproductive labour is apparently straightforward, but becomes immediately more complex. Since wage-labour is the only source of surplus value, only those performing the function of labour can be productive; those performing the function of capital are consequently unproductive. The difficulty arises when trying to identify who does what function. Is someone who is paid a wage necessarily a wage-labourer and merely carrying out part of the function of labour? Put another way, it is virtually the problem of defining the working-class - not a very fruitful pastime since it denies the importance of class as a process.

1. For instance, whether the 'service' sector is productive. Crompton and Gubbay (1977) argue that it is (p.76 and pp.81-85), while Mandel (1976) argues it is largely unproductive (pp.403-406); see also the brief discussion at the beginning of Chapter 3 which raises the issue of how bookmaking can be categorised.

2. This debate is not pursued here. See Gough (1972) and Crompton and Gubbay (1977) Chapter 5 for similar perspectives. For more restrictive views of productive labour, see Mandel (1976), Chapter 12 and Poulantzas (1975) pp. 209-223.

3. "Although every worker is a wage-earner, every wage-earner is certainly not a worker, for not every wage-earner is engaged in productive labour". (Poulantzas (1975) p.20).

4. See Wright (1976) for a discussion of the way the working class can be delineated.
Merely to try and categorise sectors and/or job functions as productive or unproductive is often a contentious and unrewarding exercise. As with any other concepts, the significance and usefulness of the productive-unproductive distinction must depend on what it is intended to explain. Whatever the arguments at the margins, this distinction does allow some means of drawing a division between sectors and functions within the capitalist economy which might have some implications for unionization. Gough (1972) concludes that the "political implications" are not unambiguous, and allows two "extreme views" to be held:

"The first rigorously identifies productive workers with the working class, thus deduces the political class structure of capitalist society from these economic categories. The second denies any theoretical link or practical correlation between the two". (Gough (1972) p.69).

While allocating these positions to various writers, Gough also traces both perspectives to Marx's own writings (ibid p.69). The first emphasises the differences between productive and unproductive workers, while the second focusses on their similarities. It is, perhaps, most useful to consider each proposition in reverse order.

One strand of Marx's thought was to suggest commercial wage-labourers share common characteristics with their counterparts in surplus value production: firstly, their labour is exchanged with capital; secondly, they perform surplus labour, in that they work part of the day for nothing; thirdly, wages are determined in a similar fashion - the cost of production of their labour power. This perspective has been taken up and extended to unproductive wage-labourers generally:

"... the situation of 'unproductive' workers resembles that of 'productive' workers in so far as control over their labour has been relinquished - an essential similarity that will fail to be sufficiently emphasised if exploitation is simply seen as the appropriation of surplus product". (Crompton and Gubbay (1977) p.33).
Following such a view to its logical conclusion, Wright finds:

"It is hard to see where a fundamental divergence of economic interests emerges from the positions of unproductive and productive labour in capitalist relations of production". (Wright (1976) p.17).

This perspective can be summarised as follows:

(1) That the objective interests of unproductive workers and productive workers may well coincide through the commonality of the social form of exploitation.

The second position emphasises the productive workers as the working class, arguing there is a fundamental difference between the activities of various sectors of the economy, however they have been developed and utilise wage-labour (1). The existence of unproductive-workers is necessarily predicated on productive workers and the former therefore have an objective interest in the exploitation of the latter. (2) Crompton and Rubbey (1977) accept, for instance, that

"...... although we have argued that class situations within productive and unproductive spheres are basically similar, it is still the case that the fact that work is unproductive does complicate the class situation of the unproductive worker". (Crompton & Rubbey (1977) p.96).

It may imply a mutuality of interest between labour and capital in unproductive sectors (ibid p.96) and/or divergent interests between productive and unproductive workers (ibid p.97). A second proposition can therefore be put forward:

(2) That the interests of unproductive and productive workers are fundamentally dissimilar; that productive workers alone constitute a potential revolutionary group; and that the objective interests of

1. The two perspectives would therefore seem consistent with the distinction between specific capitals (performance of social functions of labour or capital and capital in general (spheres of productive and unproductive activity).
2. The most forthright proponent of this view of class identification is Poulantzas. See Poulantzas (1975) and also Wright (1976) for a very useful exposition and critical analysis of Poulantzas’ position. For a discussion of this position as arising in Marx’s work see Gough (1972) pp.70-71.
productive workers rest with the capitalist class, since their income rests on the production of surplus value by productive workers.

Gough tries to "move beyond the confines of the opposing theories" (ibid. p.1) but this only comprises an attempt to eliminate this important contradiction between the commonality of the social form of exploitation vis-a-vis the means of existence. (1) The analytical objective, however, is not to eliminate the contradiction, but to explore its implications.

What is the importance of this contradiction for specifying common interests and any potential for collective action? While the commonality of wage-labour provides a prima facie underlying common objective interest as exploited labour, the predication of the income of unproductive workers on the surplus value created by productive workers provides an inherent objective basis for conflicts of interest between these two groups. This tension, however, is not relevant to the internal relationships within these groups.

The implication is that the productive-unproductive distinction is more or less important, depending on the questions that are asked. In considering the concrete relationships between these groups, the distinction must be considered; yet looking at each group independently,

Despite his efforts to the contrary, Gough's own perspective of trade union activity rests upon this distinction and tension. Initially he seems to go some way to agreeing with proposition (1).

"... it would seem evident that white-collar and commercial workers are increasingly displaying trade-union and political militancy in a par with associations of productive workers (e.g., ASTMS). This spread of political consciousness follows from the increasing proletarianization of the workforce, forecast by Marx long ago. To this extent, his distinction between productive and unproductive workers is not relevant for deriving political attitudes". (ibid. p.7)
there is no reason to suppose that changes in the social organisation of work will not generate collective interests and responses amongst unproductive labourers, just as they do amongst productive ones. The extent to which this is valid depends initially on how unproductive workers have been affected by changes in the labour-process; and there is substantial evidence to suggest that experiences amongst some sections of unproductive workers, e.g. clerical labour, have matched those of their productive counterparts. \(^{(1)}\) But ultimate validity depends on whether unproductive workers are exploited in the same way, i.e. as wage-labour, as productive workers. Clearly, there is a difference, since the former do not produce value; yet it would be nonsense to talk of unproductive labourers being paid a wage commensurate with the equivalent of labour provided by them. This leads Carchedi, for instance, to conclude:

"Even though, strictly speaking we cannot talk of exploitation of unproductive workers because these workers do not produce and thus cannot be expropriated of surplus value, we can talk of economic oppression of these workers". (Carchedi (1975a) p.19).

Exploitation still exists for unproductive workers, but in a different form:

".... While the productive worker is expropriated of his labour in the form of value, the unproductive worker is subjected to a direct exploitation of labour". (ibid p.19)

Thus insofar as productive and unproductive workers are similarly exploited, there remains a fundamental common interest. And while unproductive labour is seen in terms of wage-labour, the potential of collective action based on the twin structures of wage-labour and the changing, capitalistic, labour-process can be specified. \(^{(2)}\) Yet this

1. See, for instance, Braverman (1974) Ch.15.
2. That wage-labour is a social relationship is crucial to understanding unproductive labour. Most workers are paid in what is commonly called "wages", but this does not necessarily denote 'wage-labour'.
would really imply the comparative irrelevance of the distinction of productive-unproductive labour in analysing work-based collectivities except where considering relationships between different groups; and even here the prior development of collective organization is assumed. In focussing on the development of workplace collectivities, therefore, the conclusion must be that the productive-unproductive distinction does not provide us with a sufficient basis for drawing distinctions within wage-labour.

(ii) The ambiguity of class position.

The earlier discussion of the link between common interests and collective action emphasised the importance of understanding how interests are structured as a prior task to exploring the social experience of workers which may lead to certain forms of collective action. The categories of 'white' and 'blue-collar', despite appearances, do not really reflect a structured division of class position in any consistent sense. And it is not merely a question of anachronism. It also reflects the comparative neglect of the sources of class position in orthodox sociology:

".... to focus on the forms of consciousness exhibited by class agents and the associated question of how individuals achieve class membership through mobility - the institutionalized obsession of British sociology - leaves the prior question of the determination of class positions unanswered and, therefore, subject to arbitrary operationalism". (Johnson (1977) p.195. Emphasis in original). This opens up the possibility of reconstituting the links between class and trade unionism, inadequately made by Lockwood and his followers and denied importance by Bain and the institutionalists of industrial relations. The question is quite straightforward:

1. See, for instance, the efforts of Bain & Price (1972) to draw the line between these categories.

2. See Braverman (1974) p. 325-6 and quoted above p.55
a link be established between class position and the structuring of objective interests, particularly at the level of production relations, which goes beyond the general categorization of wage-labour? The answer is less simple: and involves an exceedingly complex path through the debate on the new middle class to the consideration of ambiguity in class position. (1)

The fundamental distinction between wage-labourers as non-owners of the means of production, and capitalists as the owners of the means of production does not apply unequivocally to all groups. Historically, there have been non-wage-labourers who nevertheless could not properly be characterized as capitalist. Such groups e.g. self-employed shopkeepers, have been referred to as the 'petit bourgeoisie' indicating the intermediate character of their class position.

But of more recent significance has been the growth of a new intermediate strata: the characteristic of this new group is that while they do not own the means of production in any real sense, they nevertheless perform the function of capital as opposed to the function of the collective labourer. They are neither owners of capital nor exclusively wage-labourers. This indeterminancy presents the possibilities of ambiguous class positions. (2)

1. It is not intended to make a detailed study of the new middle class debate, merely to specify some of the problems involved. The reader is referred to Carcedi (1975a), Poulantzas (1975), Urry (1973), and Mallet (1975) as an "introduction" to the debate within a Marxist tradition.

2. How this class is identified is indeed different according to which writer is considered. This distinction is that broadly developed by Carcedi.
One of the most recently influential formulations of ambiguity in the position of the new middle class is that of Carchedi. In what is often a difficult article to understand, Carchedi derives the essentially contradictory position of the new middle-class by exploring the capitalist mode of production at two high levels of abstraction: the pure capitalist structure and the capitalist socio-economic system. While he draws a distinction between capital and labour at the 'pure' level, at the socio-economic level this becomes a distinction between 'agents' who are defined in terms of their 'position' within production relations. They perform correspondingly different functions of both a social significance (i.e. the function of capital and the function of labour) and technical quality (job description).

Within capitalism the function of labour soon takes on a specific form - the function of the collective worker. But historically, Carchedi argues, the function of capital itself also becomes fragmented. It becomes:

"the task of a structure, not of an individual; that is transformed into the global function of capital (Carchedi (1975a) p. 29. Emphasis in original).

But what does this function of capital involve? Here Carchedi builds on Marx's two-fold characterisation as a basis for specifying contradictory class positions. Marx noted that:

"The control exercised by the capitalist is not only a special function arising from the nature of the social labour process, and peculiar to that process, but is at the same time a function of the exploitation of a social labour process ...." (Marx (1976) p. 449).

Thus Carchedi divides the capitalist function of supervision and management into, on the one hand that deriving from the exploitative

1. Carchedi's main theoretical statements can be derived from Carchedi (1975). Among those who draw extensively on his approach are Crompton and Gubbay (1977) while Wright (1976) also takes the notion of contradictory class positions from Carchedi's work.
relationship of capitalist production from, on the other, that
deriving from the technical problems of organising a social labour
he
process. The first/calls the work of control and surveillance, the
latter the work of co-ordination and unity. (Carchedi (1975a) p. 24).

The core of Carchedi's argument is that these two aspects can
be analytically distinguished; and that the former can be seen in terms
of the function of capital, the latter as the function of labour. Now
when the function of capital becomes fragmented, these two aspects
become separated. Within any given firm, the higher echelons now only
perform the work of control and surveillance, while those at lower
levels may perform both. The new middle class which does not own
capital in either a legal or real sense, thus performs both the function
of the collective labourer and the global function of capital (in a
variable balance (ibid p.33) This is the basis for their contradictory
class position: on the one hand they are non-owners of capital and
perform the function of the collective labourer which implies a
commonality of interest with wage-labour, i.e. those performing only
the function of the collective labourer. On the other hand they
simultaneously perform the global function of capital which separates
them from wage-labour and provides a greater identification with the
capitalist class.

This characterisation of an intermediate strata with ambiguous
class positions can provide some potentially useful insights in the
specification of objective interests at the level of production relations. (1)

1. The suggestion that this is a more potentially useful approach than
the productive/unproductive labour division gains some support from
Crompton and Gubbay (1977) in their assessment: "... the distinction we
have been emphasising between global capital and collective worker
overrides the distinction between productive and unproductive labour."
An initial approximation would suggest that the interests of this new middle class at the economic level will reflect their contradictory position in production relations.

A further inference that can be drawn from Carchedi's analysis is the dynamic quality of this ambiguity and the general tendency for the objective interests of the new middle class to become increasingly predicated on the basis of wage-labour. This derives from the transient position of this strata, the performance of either the global function of capital or the function of the collective worker being part of a process whereby an 'agent' carries out either function to a greater or lesser extent. As Carchedi is at pains to point out:

"... whatever time is spent in performing one social function is detracted from the performance of the opposite social function." (ibid p.21)

Carchedi argues that there is a general tendency within capitalism to reduce the component of the global function of capital in any given contradictory position. This he links to the process of the devaluation of labour-power: while it is characteristic of earlier phases of capitalism that the function of the collective labourer underwent persistent reconstruction in the simplification of job tasks, the same subsequently applies to the differentiation of the capitalist function. The devaluation of the technical aspects of positions performing both the global function of capital and the function of the collective labourer goes hand-in-hand with the devaluation of the social aspect of that position; i.e. the diminution of the global function of capital and the expansion of the function of the collective worker. (ibid p.64)

Therefore the dynamic is two-fold: the reduction of labour-power to an average, unskilled level combined with the elimination of the global
function of capital (1). The ultimate result of these tendencies
Carchedi characterises as the proletarianisation of the new
middle class (ibid p.64).

Carchedi does not discuss the implications of these changes on the
labour process. But quite clearly the tendency to devalue positions
within the new middle-class will result in changed patterns of control
and surveillance, perhaps the removal of control functions to higher
levels within the firm; while job tasks will become more routinised
and simplified. It will mean changes in the basis of co-operation
within the labour process.

Proletarianisation will also have an impact on remuneration
for labour-power. Carchedi argues this has two components: a
reduction in wages as labour-power is technically simplified and
a reduction in revenue as the global function of capital is diminished. (2)

In summary, it might be argued that the devaluation of the
position of the new middle class at the level of production relations
has a determining effect on the structuring of the objective interest
of that class. This is not merely reflected in a changing class
position, but also in terms of more immediate interests involving work
relations: increasing interdependence within the labour process provides
the basis for collectivism in the context of the social relationship
of wage-labour. It is this change which arguably underlies the
phenomenal demands concerning working conditions, routinized job tasks,
and insufficient wages.

1. Crompton and Gubbay (1977) in their discussion of foremen (p.190) miss
the point. Their suggestion that "even if the foreman only supervises labour
in accordance with rules laid down from above, this does not make his control
over labour power ... any less real" indicates a basic insensitivity to
the impact of changing patterns of control on social relationships at work.
Their intimation that this does not result in a changing class position
seems totally at odds with their acceptance of class ambiguity.

2. Ibid p.64; see also pp.54-59 for a discussion of the income of the
new middle-class.
There are two major problems in developing Carchedi's analysis in this way. The first concerns the partial quality of his analysis: his discussion is entirely concerned with the "economic identification" of the new middle-class and omits any discussion of the implications of integrating this analysis with political and ideological "identification". This is a major conceptual problem and has provoked some debate about the separation of these levels of analysis.

A second, related, problem concerns the relevance of Carchedi's abstract theorizations at more concrete levels; in particular can the distinction between on one hand surveillance and control and on the other unity and co-ordination be sustained in analysing specific labour processes? If not, what are the implications?

Both of these problems are considered below; the discussion of the former difficulty will provide some insights into how the latter one can be resolved.

Taking the first problem, the partial quality of Carchedi's analysis, it is interesting to contrast his approach with that of Poulantzas. Arguably, Poulantzas has made the most thorough and comprehensive attempt in recent years to identify class position in terms of economic, political, and ideological dimensions. It does little justice to Poulantzas in summarising his concepts in such a short space, but it is important to see how they are developed and inter-relate. Firstly, at the economic level, there is a broad distinction made between productive and unproductive labour; any labourers who are not involved in the

1. this discussion is taken up below.

2. Reference is made here primarily to Poulantzas (1975), but see also Poulantzas (1973). His style is a little easier than Carchedi, but his particular use of concepts can lead to a misunderstanding of his arguments if not closely followed, e.g. his restrictive use of productive and unproductive labour. See Wright (1976) for a discussion of how Poulantzas uses some of his main conceptual categories.
production of surplus value (and that, for Poulantzas is "material production") are not part of the working class at the economic level.\(^1\)

There still remains the political and ideological levels. These it should be noted, are concerned with class position and not practice. The characteristic of political relationships within capitalism in terms of production relations is the subordination of the working class through the hierarchy of capitalist control. In terms of the new middle-class\(^2\), their social function as exercisers of capitalist control dominates their technical functions of co-ordination, which implies their identification with the capitalist class at the political level.\(^3\)

Poulantzas draws the distinction at the ideological level between mental and manual labour. Again this is not concerned with ideological practice, but the material possession of knowledge arising from the position within the capitalist process of production. Nor surprisingly, Poulantzas concludes that the foremen, technicians, etc. who make up the new middle-class, do exert ideological domination over the working class, since they have the possession of knowledge, denied to the workers, which can be used for the continuing reproduction of class relations.

The combination of these different levels, for Poulantzas, generates a class position for members of the new middle-class which will place them within the capitalist class. As such, he necessarily opposes the view of contradictory class positions as put forward by Carchedi\(^4\).

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1. Poulantzas (1975) p. 221; but the discussion runs throughout pp.209-223.
2. Poulantzas calls it the "new petty bourgeoisie".
3. ibid pp.224-230. This discussion is in terms of supervisors; the position of technicians, etc. is not so clear cut, ibid pp.239-250.
4. Poulantzas specifically refutes the notion of contradictory class positions (ibid p.228).
In consequence, the most interesting critique of Poulantzas in this context is that of Wright, who in refuting the former's analysis, argues in favour of contradictory class positions. Wright develops two main criticisms of Poulantzas' approach:

"...1. That there is little basis for regarding the distinction between productive and unproductive labour as determining the boundary of the working class at the economic level; 2. That Poulantzas's use of political and ideological factors effectively undermines the primacy of economic relations in determining class position". (Wright (1976) p.13).

Despite a somewhat schematic presentation, the points are well made. The core of the critique concerns Poulantzas's specification of the economic and political/ideological levels. In particular Wright suggests:

"... he incorrectly identifies the technical division of labour with economic criteria whenever he discusses the role of political and ideological factors". (ibid p.13)

The autonomy which Poulantzas appears to give to the political ideological levels can be overcome:

"... rather than viewing economic criteria as being rooted in the technical division of labour and political-ideological criteria in the social division, both should be considered dimensions of the social division of labour". (ibid p.19).

Wright's own way out of this problem is to develop a framework of contradictory class positions from the social division of labour, similar to Carchedi, at the economic level and then to argue that:

"... the extent to which political and ideological relations enter into the determination of class position is itself determined by the degree to which those positions occupy a contradictory location at the level of social relations of production". (ibid pp.39-40. Emphasis in original).

The more contradictory the position at the economic level, the more influence is exerted by the political and ideological relations.

Now, quite clearly, Wright sees this as only a modification of his basic premise of contradictory class positions at the economic level.
The fundamental arguments are not challenged. As such the approaches of Wright and thus Carchedi have merit and validity for social explanation even when located at the level of the economic.

In consequence, any challenges to their approach must be made in terms either of a denial of the notion of contradictory class positions itself, or in the non-separability of the economic/political/ideological levels. Nichols (1980), while accepting Wright's work as a "thorough critique", seems to incline to Poulantzas' view against contradictory class positions. He emphasises the following passage from Poulantzas:

"... there is no division or co-ordination of tasks that simply corresponds to purely "technical" requirements of "production", and exists as such". (Poulantzas (1975), p. 227 and quoted in Nichols (1980) p.214).

This inseparability of the social and the technical, and the essential political domination (in Poulantzas's terms) of foremen and supervisors over workers, disallows any notion of contradictory class position. Nichols, it seems clear, feels the "something to be learnt" is Poulantzas's insistence

"... that foremen and supervisors, for instance, do not have a double class membership (working class and capitalist); implicitly, he denies that they are marked by a contradictory class location either. As Poulantzas sees it the work of supervision is simultaneously the performance of a co-ordinative function and a process by which the capitalist consumes labour-power". (ibid pp.214-215).

Now this constitutes the major argument against notions of contradictory class positions. In some ways it is obviously correct: the co-ordination of the capitalist labour-process is not somehow a separate activity from surveillance and control, for the co-ordination of a capitalist labour-process is surveillance and control.

Nevertheless, there is rather more to it than that. And here, not merely is Carchedi's partial analysis at stake, but also his use of levels of abstraction. For the question is not so much whether the
distinction between co-ordination/unity and surveillance/control can be made, but at what levels of analysis it can be made. Quite clearly, the study of concrete labour processes will not permit that kind of separation. But does this deny the utility or validity of making that kind of distinction at higher levels of abstraction? If it does, few Marxist categories will be left untouched.

The justification for analysis at higher levels of abstraction must be in terms of whether this aids understanding of concrete society. This underpins Marx's analysis and whole approach to 'Capital'.

The inseparability of unity/co—ordination and surveillance/control at the concrete level does not deny the utility of the distinction in understanding events at this level. What it does imply is the distinction cannot be studied directly, but through an interventional form.

Similar comments might be made about the separation of the economic, political, and ideological levels. All constitute forms of domination arising, as Wright correctly argues, from the social division of labour: that between capital and labour, the social relationship of wage-labour. In terms of production relations, it is the wage-labour relationship and the organising of the labour-process which embrace the patterns of economic, ideological, and political domination, again inseparable at the concrete level.

1. The inseparability, at the concrete level, of these two aspects, Carchedi appears to consider, but does not follow through. His appreciation of this is limited to a footnote: "But to give orders can mean both to co-ordinate the labour process and to help perpetuate the system based on exploitation. Similarly, to carry out orders can mean both to perform the function of the collective worker and to perform the global function of capital ...." (Carchedi (1975a) F/N. 58 p.79).

It is in drawing these two strands together, the relationship of different levels of abstraction and the patterns of domination arising from the social division of labour, that the necessary focus for approaching an analysis of concrete society must be made. In terms of the discussion on contradictory class position and its utility in understanding patterns of unionization, the focus must centre on the resolution of this ambiguity at the concrete level: the way in which control is exercised in the labour-process.

At the level of concrete society, the different functions of unity/co-ordination and surveillance/control, simultaneously performed, are embodied in the control of the labour process. Furthermore, the tendencies to devalue labour-power, where agents perform both functions, can be identified in terms of shifts in control of the labour-process. This provides a possible focus for how the structuring of shared interests operates and how such interests may develop into a collective expression. The question of how the labour process can be approached at the level of concrete society in terms of the way control is exercised, the consequent changing patterns of interests, and how this relates to workplace collectivism and trade unionism, is tackled in the last section.
(c) The labour-process and managerial control: the focus for analysing the development of trade unionism.

It is appropriate at this point to bring together the threads of the argument so far. Chapter 1 discussed the deficiencies of various approaches to 'white-collar' unionism, which in terms of bourgeois themes usually reflected an insufficient specification of the capitalist mode; or in terms of Marxist theories, an inadequately formulated specification of class position. In this Chapter, some attempt has been made to overcome these problems through the identification of interests in terms of class position, and while embracing the ultimate importance of wage-labour, establishing the labour-process as the central focus at the level of production relations.

The significance of the labour process as both an explanatory concept and focus for understanding trade unionism can be seen in three ways. Firstly, the labour-process provides a link between wage-labour and trade unionism. Trade unionism must be initially understood as an expression of the antagonistic social relations of capitalist production which underlie wage-labour. Yet the labour process embodies the capitalist relations of wage-labour in terms of production relations, and thus provides a means of explaining how trade unionism develops as a consequence of changes in the labour-process.

Secondly, the labour process provides a focus for identifying the structuring of interests at the level of production relations. Changes in the labour-process imply changes in the basis of co-operation within and between individual labour-processes; similarly, they also imply changes in methods of capitalist control. These can be seen as the material movements generating shared interests at the point of production.

Thirdly, the labour-process provides the context of workers' experience at the point of production. While objective interests can be specified in terms of changes in the labour-process, the subjective
experience of labourers takes place within the labour-process: thus it becomes a basis for exploring the relationship between objective and subjective interests.

The theoretical standing of these three points is not, however, the same. The first point is a fundamental theoretical link at a higher level of generalisation than the second and third. In consequence it is the latter points which must be tackled empirically: the validity of the first point depends on its derivatives - points two and three.

The problem now remains of transferring these various theoretical interconnections into empirically testable hypotheses. In order to focus on changes in the labour process as a basis for the structuring of interests, it necessarily implies that the sources of those changes must be considered. Such changes are not arbitrary, but must be understood in terms of general tendencies within the capitalist economy.

This implies it is insufficient to examine specific labour processes merely at the point of production. The development of the labour process must be traced historically in the context of overall movements within the particular industry and the shifting relationships within the economy. It is precisely this kind of analysis which is neglected by both the industrial relations and 'sociological' explanations of 'white-collar' unionism. Therefore the initial task is to explore the relationships of changes in the labour process to overall capital movements and relationships in capitalist production. Empirically this implies tracing the changes in the labour process in a specific industry within the context of changes in production relations within that industry and between that industry and the wider economy.

A further question involves the precise focus on the labour process
itself. Since it is not merely the technical performance of job descriptions and how these alter which is important, but the social relationships which this involves, the central question of managerial control of the labour process is raised. Of particular concern are those groups whose capitalist control of the labour process is diminishing; yet, at the same time, the way in which management exercises control determines the form of social relations within and between employer and employees.

Thus a second empirical task is to explore the historical changes in the labour process by focussing on the control of that process by management and thus identifying both the social and technical aspects of those changes and the implications for the structuring of interests amongst employees.

Within this various questions may arise. Firstly, can such changes in the labour process be seen to have an unequivocal one-sided impact on the structuring of interests or are they in some sense contradictory? Secondly, is collective organisation best understood as arising out of changes in individual positions in the labour process, or in terms of a response to a changed basis in the form of co-operation? Thirdly, if changes in the labour process are emphasised as a source of trade unionism, how can the importance of the remuneration of wage-labour be specified rather than the social and physical conditions under which it works? All these questions must be tackled empirically as well as theoretically.

As the concreteness of a specific labour process is approached, the issue of subjective interests becomes more important. Having specified objective interests, it now remains to confront the question of workers experience. Hence the third empirical task: to explore the relationship between objective interests and workers experience and to attempt a
reconciliation between expressed interests concerning collective organisation and the objective conditions of the labour process.

If these tasks are successfully completed, this will represent a substantial step forward in explaining the development of unionisation. It remains to outline how they will be approached.

Any consideration of these three empirical questions necessarily involves a highly detailed examination of the historical developments within industries and labour processes. In view of this, the validation of these relationships will be explored using one case study: the Bookmaking industry. In Chapter 3, changes in the labour-process are located within the changing structure of the Bookmaking industry and the relationships between bookmaking and other areas of the economy. This allows an analysis of the important changes in the labour-process, how the interests of employees were affected and how this structured the rise of trade unionism within the industry.

Chapter 4, explores the relationship between these changes and the response of the employees involved, attempting to show how expressed interests related to the development of unionisation and simultaneously reflected changes in the labour-process.

The use of only one case study is far from limiting. Positivistic assumptions that the argument might only prove sufficiently strong if raised in the context of a handful of case studies are unfounded. And in this case, singularly inappropriate, for the full complexity of the relationships involved would be obscured given allowable space.

Bookmaking, in fact, has distinct advantages as a case study. Firstly, since the development of the industry was historically limited by legislation, the processes of capitalistic development have only recently come to full fruition. Until 1960, Licensed Betting Offices did not exist and it is the development of cash betting which constitutes by far the major thrust of the emergence of the industry. Secondly, in 1971,
some bookmaking employees started a totally new union - The Union of Bookmakers Employees (TUBE) - which covered all of the Bookmaking Industry. Thus their response can be directly related to internal processes within the industry rather than external efforts by existing trade unions to organise them. (1)

Both aspects permit a relatively clear understanding of the empirical relationships: the condensed time period of expansion allows the interrelationships between the labour process and developments within the industry and economy to be viewed with some precision; while the emergence of TUBE as a new union again permits a close scrutiny of the links between the labour process and unionization.

Using the example of the Bookmaking industry to explore the three tasks developed above can therefore provide an understanding of the origins of unionization - but it only reaches the point where a union is formed or where employees decide to join a union. Is this the limit of the labour process approach, or is it useful in understanding the course of unionization? The evidence of TUBE suggests this is indeed the case. Having outlined the history of the union in Chapter 5, the relationship between changes in the labour process, branch formation, and the autonomy of union policy is explored in Chapter 6. It will be argued that changes in the labour process can provide a basis for understanding the course of union development.

But even if the labour process can be established as an important structural influence on unionization, a trade union is hardly free to choose within such constraints. Trade unionism is fundamentally a response to the initiatives of capital, actual or potential; and

1. This, of course, is not to argue that trade unionism in bookmaking can be explained entirely in terms of internal processes.
the success or failure of unionization is dependent on the inter-
relationships with employers, as the personification of capital,
and the state, in its political and ideological upholding of capitalist
society. Consequently, Chapters 7 and 8 represent attempts at
understanding the role of employers and the state in the development
of unionisation. Chapter 7 concentrates on the policies and strategies
of employers towards TUBE and links them to the development of the
industry at that time. In consequence, the labour process provides
a useful starting-point leading towards a materialist analysis of
employers policies towards unionization.

In Chapter 8, there is an attempt to understand the impact of
industrial relations legislation on the development of unionization.
The conclusion is that such legislation is contradictory and its impact
must be understood not merely in relation to institutional structures,
but in terms of contingent patterns of capital accumulation. Again,
the labour process approach provides a useful focus in understanding the
impact of labour legislation on union organization and activity.

The Bookmaking industry can provide important insights on all the
six areas of concern detailed above. Clearly, some will establish more
tentative links than others; on occasions the analysis may be considered
only partial. Yet it is contended this approach does constitute an
improvement on many previous analyses; and, in consequence, Chapter 9,
will conclude the study by considering the potential of labour process
explanations, particularly in relation to other areas of employment. But,
firstly, the Bookmaking industry is considered in exploring the strengths
and weaknesses of the labour-process as a basis for understanding
unionization.
PART TWO: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BOOKMAKING INDUSTRY
AND THE RISE OF TUBE
Chapter 3: The historical development of the labour process in Bookmaking.

In this chapter there are two objectives. Firstly, to locate the development of the labour process within the overall pattern of the changing structure of the bookmaking industry. This will show that how the labour process is organized is not arbitrary, but is subject to the continual imperatives of capital accumulation and is sensitive to the wider inter-relationships between sectors of the economy. Secondly, to explore how these concrete changes in the labour process have generated a basis for collective or contradictory interests amongst bookmaking employees.

The first objective raises the immediate question of what are the significant elements in understanding the changing labour process in relation to the history of bookmaking; in other words, the problem of periodisation. The bases of periodisation will depend on what it is intended to investigate. Looking at the relationship between the labour process and trade unionism, the principles behind any periodisation must relate to the changes in the labour process which reflect qualitative developments in the Bookmaking industry. This allows for the identification of three key periods, although internal divisions are also important within them:

(a) the transition of bookmaking from sidestake wagering to a capitalistically-based industry;
(b) the two-fold development of bookmaking in the first half of the 20th century: legal credit offices and illegal street pitches;
(c) the expansion of legalised cash betting in the post-1960 period.

The main focus will be on the third period, for it is in this phase that trade unionism developed in bookmaking at the beginning of the 1970s.
But within this period itself, there were significant qualitative changes in bookmaking with vital consequences for the labour processes in the industry. These can be broadly divided into two parts:

1. the initial expansion: the atomized, localised expansion of Licensed Betting Offices (LBOs);
2. Bookmaking as retailing: the rise of the betting chain and the relationship between bookmaking and established capital.

The changing nature of bookmaking at the end of the 1960s provided the basis for a rapid reconstruction of the labour process in the industry, which underlay the development of trade unionism. This is the transition from (1) to (2). Subsequently, the involvement of 'established capital' exaggerated the impact of these changes while simultaneously introducing new aspects to the relationship between and amongst employers and employees.

Within this general periodisation, the historical development of bookmaking can be viewed both externally, in terms of the relationship of the industry to the wider economy, and internally in terms of the nature of bookmaking in relation to market size and structure. The more general question of the external relationship involves the immediate problem of whether bookmaking falls within the sphere of production or circulation; whether it involves the production of surplus value or its redistribution.

Two seemingly well-balanced arguments can be put forward which produce opposite conclusions. It might be argued that bookmaking produces a commodity - structured chance - which when produced capitalistically\(^1\), involves the expansion of value and the acquisition

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1. That is as against the provision of a personal service, which would be unproductive of surplus value. See the discussion on productive and unproductive labour in Chapter 2 and the distinction between personal service and capitalistic production later in this chapter.
of surplus value by the employer. On the other hand, it might be suggested that chance exists naturally: the bookmaker is merely trying to expand money capital and secure a redistribution in his favour of existing surplus.

The resolution of these two contradictory possibilities involves a detailed examination of the relationship between productive and unproductive labour. It is a debate which has not always proved fruitful and has not been assisted by apparent inconsistencies in Marx's own treatment of the question.

Nevertheless, the broad lines of distinction can be drawn, as they were in Chapter 2. On the one hand, there is the sphere of production, which is the fundamental source of surplus value through the exploitation of labour-power; while on the other there is circulation, where surplus value is not generated, and merely assists the realization of value, contributing to the production of surplus value only indirectly. Mandel has attempted to build on this broad distinction in analysing the 'problem' of the service sector, a contribution which might usefully be applied to bookmaking:

"The frontier between productive capital and circulation capital ... runs between wage-labour which increases, changes, or preserves a use-value, or is indispensable for its realization - and wage-labour which makes no difference to a use-value, i.e. to the bodily form of a commodity, but merely arises from the specific needs involved, i.e. altering (as opposed to creating) the form of an exchange value. Extending this definition by Marx, we may therefore conclude that actual service capital - so long as it is not mistakenly confused with capital which produces commodities - is no more productive than circulation capital." (Mandel (1976) pp. 405-6. Emphasis in original).

1. For further discussion of this debate, including the problems in Marx's treatment of the question, see Gough (1972), Braverman (1974) and Mandel (1976).
Such a restrictive approach to the nature of commodities would seem to rule out any possibility that bookmaking is productive of surplus value. But relaxing Mandel’s assumption that commodities are physical objects, would bookmaking rest more easily in altering the form of an exchange value rather than creating it? Consider Mandel’s subsequent argument, that the extension of the service sector is merely a lesser evil from the perspective of the capitalist class in general, hence:

“The logic of late capitalism is therefore necessarily to convert idle capital into service capital and simultaneously to replace service capital with productive capital, in other words, services with commodities.”


This characterization of the service sector as some sort of half-way house between “idle” and “productive” capital appears convincing in some instances: the replacement of transport services by cars, theatres and cinemas by television sets. But what commodities can substitute for bookmaking? While Mandel has emphasised the process of replacing service capital with productive capital, he omits the alternative possibility: that service capital may be developed towards circulation rather than production. As will be shown, bookmaking, as legal cash betting developed, functioned increasingly as a source of cash, emphasising an affinity with the sphere of circulation.

Thus, in an area of controversial debate, it seems appropriate to view bookmaking as unproductive of value; and that the mechanism of expansion for bookmaking therefore rests in the accumulation of money capital rather than productive capital.

Viewed internally, the development of the Bookmaking industry and the consequent changes in the labour process can initially be seen in the context of the size and structure of the ‘market’. The size
of the market is necessarily dependent on a suitable betting medium; without the expansion of a betting medium, bookmaking itself was restricted. In this sense, betting is necessarily dependent, parasitic, on other activities. Bookmaking, as a social form of betting, has been linked historically to sport, notably horseracing; therefore the volume of betting (thus bookmaking) is necessarily limited by the amount of horseracing.

This does not merely carry implications for the size of the market, but also its structure: while the various technical conditions of communication were undeveloped, betting could only take place, to any great extent, where the sporting event was held, i.e. 'on-course'; while betting away from (or 'off-course') was further restricted by the legal prohibition of cash betting.

Yet as the various legal, technical and social divisions were eliminated, the market for betting grew; as, in consequence, did bookmaking, thus providing opportunities for restructuring the labour process within the industry. (1)

Within this general perspective of the inter-relationship of externality and internality, the tendencies of the generalized capitalist mode of production inform the development of the labour process. Here the concepts developed in Chapter 2 are important. Initially it implies an examination of the development of wage-labour within the industry, the movement from the era of personal service to exploited labour. Assuming that bookmaking is unproductive, workers in the

1. The determination of the market size and structure is not merely economic. The focus has been largely centred on the general economic motive for expansion (capital accumulation), and the removal of obstacles to that expansion in terms of technological/social/legal restrictions. Yet there is the wider question of gambling and leisure in capitalist society.
industry are not exploited in terms of value, but, following the discussion in Chapter 2, their labour.

In consequence, the expansion of the exploitation of labour is developed in terms of an absolute and relative direct exploitation of labour, which parallel Marx's exposition of absolute and relative surplus value. And given that the extent of betting opportunities is the crucial influence on the volume of betting, this exploitation can be identified in three ways:

(a) the expansion of the working week, i.e. that betting can take place every day since horseracing takes place everyday;

(b) the expansion of the working period per day, i.e. extending the time period covered by horseracing;

(c) a more intensive use of the working period per day, i.e. by expanding the number of horseraces and betting opportunities in that period, and perhaps staggering the time of races.

Now (a) and (b) can be seen as an expansion of the working period in an absolute sense. This is clearly not the case with (c). This concerns the exploitation of labour in a given period, which can be referred to as relative exploitation. The phases of development of the betting medium can be understood through the efforts of the bookmaking employers acting upon the direct exploitation of labour in both these ways.

With the expansion of the Bookmaking industry, the emphasis is now placed on the growing socialization of the labour process; how job tasks are structured within different historical periods and how the basis of co-operation alters; how this involves a differential
rate of the devaluation of labour-power as some job tasks are simplified and routinized and others not; and, finally, the implications for how the labour process is controlled both in terms of the changing managerial levels at which control is exercised as well as the systems of control utilized.

It is these processes which throw up the objective conditions for common interests amongst wage-labourers in the industry; just as they generate the basis for divergent and contradictory interests. Ultimately the question that is tackled in this and the next three chapters is how far does this approach lead to an understanding of the development of trade unionism? This chapter represents the first stage: how far does the emphasis on the labour process lead to an understanding of collective interests?
(a) Bookmaking in the nineteenth century: the transition from sidestake wagering to a personalized service; and to the brink of a capitalistically based industry.

Bookmaking is merely a specific historical and social form of betting. Predicated on a multiple choice outcome, the underlying principle is to ensure that, whatever the outcome, the bookmaker retains a percentage of all stakes. In an effort to achieve this, the bookmaker offers various odds on each possible outcome, attempting to secure an even staking of money. He must therefore make each possible outcome an attractive proposition for backers, but ensuring that overall the odds will favour the 'book'. In this way, while the bookmaker cannot be certain he will win on every event, the probability remains that over a period of time he will retain a percentage of stakes. (1)

Particular social relationships are involved here. Firstly, there is a separation between those who bet on outcomes and those who take bets on outcomes: on one side the backer and on the other the layer (of odds). Secondly, it implies that for one layer there are a mass of backers, otherwise the layer's liabilities on a given outcome will not be offset by the other possibilities. But not all forms of betting imply such relationships.

The historical origins of bookmaking in Britain can be traced by focussing on sidestake wagering on horseracing, which was based on social relationships quite distinct from those of bookmaking:

1. For a more detailed exposition see Note 1 at the end of this chapter.
each person involved is simultaneously backer and layer, while the basic relationship is between two individuals. Bookmaking begins, therefore, when one person accepts wagers from several individuals who back different outcomes. It thus appears as a personal service.

The bookmaker in providing this facility for betting thus parallels the self-employed independent commodity producer who exchanges a commodity for the revenue of the capitalist, rather than her/his labour for the wage of the capitalist. And, for the bookmaker, the exchange was very much against the revenue of the capitalist since the medium of betting was horseracing, originally a leisure pursuit of the aristocracy.

The transition of sidestake wagering to bookmaking raised immediate possibilities for the expansion of this form of betting. The separation of layers and backers, combined with the atomisation of the latter, implied a potentially massive enlargement of betting opportunities: while one bookmaker could accommodate a substantial number of backers, betting could also take place on a larger scale away from the scene of the event. But this was only a potential. Eventually bookmaking would undergo a large-scale capitalist expansion, but at this stage various preconditions needed to be fulfilled for even bookmaking as a personal service to become generalised.

1. Ford (1977) pp. 82-83 indicates that the early 'bookmakers' offered one horse against the field - an adaptation of sidestake wagering where the bets are only placed on one of two possible outcomes.

2. This is an attempt to draw parallels in the social relationships involved. It is not meant to imply that bookmaking as a personal service could be productive of surplus value or indeed value.
Such conditions can be seen under two headings. Firstly, the shaping and developing of betting, in its bookmaking form, as a recreational activity of the working class. In part this depended on the mass of people being able to financially afford recreational pursuits; or, to reverse the point, that the proportion of the wage spent on the physical means of existence had fallen, thus allowing some of the wage to be spent on leisure activities. But more specifically it involved the promotion of betting as a suitable pursuit; and since this was historically linked to horseracing, the popularisation of this particular sport. This latter point opens up the whole question of working-class leisure activity, its particular forms and transformation within capitalism:

"The cultural achievements of the proletariat won by the ascent and struggle of the modern working class (books, papers, self-education, sport, organization, and so on) lose those features of voluntary self-activity and autonomy from the processes of capitalist commodity production and circulation, which defined them in the period of classical imperialism, .... and become drawn into capitalist production and circulation to an increasing extent." (Mandel (1976) p.393).

In the context of bookmaking and horseracing, this process is twofold: on the one hand the form of recreation changes, emphasising the vacarious pleasures of spectator sport rather than direct participation; on the other hand, this process is reinforced as bookmaking replaces sidestake wagering in providing a new form of recreational activity, resting parasitically on its chosen medium: sport, and in particular, horseracing. (1) The transition to bookmaking was

1. There is something of a difference with horseracing, insofar as this was primarily an area of aristocratic participation. Nevertheless, the general emphasis of capitalist relations on spectator sport, on the passivity of working class pursuits, applies just as clearly. However, it is important in such a cursory account not to overdraw this pattern of determination. Ford (1977) cogently argues that the sporting activities of the working class were a consequence of their desire to gamble. He also argues: "Sport as a form of relaxation for the lower classes is a concept which was not mentioned until the end of the eighteenth century and certainly had not general acceptance until well into the nineteenth...".p.75. For a very interesting account of gambling in relation to a range of sports, see pp.74-86. It does illustrate the importance of distinguishing bookmaking as a particular social form of gambling.
not necessarily clearcut. An individual might be both a backer and a bookmaker at the same or different times. But by the 1850s it seems likely that two hundred men were 'standing up' around the country's racetracks.

But the extensive expansion of bookmaking would have remained essentially limited without the development of specific technical preconditions. Horseracing and betting would have remained fundamentally localised forms of recreation, without the major technical advances of the nineteenth century. A variety of important developments at this time provided necessary preconditions for the national system of bookmaking. The extension of the transport system, in particular the railway boom of the 1840s, provided a wider potential audience for horseracing as well as a means of travel for the bookmakers. This assisted the development of betting at the racecourse.

Betting away from the course ('off-course' betting) was facilitated by improvements in other forms of communications.

1. An early example was John Gully, who lived a colourful existence in the mid-nineteenth century. See Kaye (1969) p.23

2. Ibid p.24. 'Men' is chosen deliberately, illustrating the male domination in the industry. The way in which bookmaking developed, co-existing with sidestake wagering, in the latter part of the nineteenth century is evident in Rees (1977) which provides a fascinating account of horseracing and hunting in West Wales in this period. Ford (1977) suggests there was a significant change in betting in the "first years of the nineteenth century... Then Bookmaking became a profession" pp. 82-83.

3. It also enabled the horses to be transported, thus allowing a national rather than regional sport. See Ford (1977) p.141. Betting was not entirely confined to the actual racecourse itself, but continued in the locality during the period of the racemeeting. For instance, the evening before the 1867 Grand National might profitably have been spent at the "... Washington Hotel, at Liverpool,where all the chief bookmakers and backers resorted, with the idea of either doing a little betting, or hearing the latest news of the big chase." Rees (1977) p.15
Of particular significance was the Press, as acknowledged by one of the stalwarts of Carmarthen races in 1867:

"... without the aid of (The Press) we could do very little, and very few would learn of the proceedings in the town of Carmarthen. Without the aid of a liberal and expansive Press the world would not hear of our meeting, or the other side of the world know the result. For that reason, therefore, "The Press" is very powerful and important, especially as regards our proceedings...." (1)

This, however, was before the development of a popular press and the publicising of results in this way was restricted. The invention of the telegraph assisted the dissemination of results, but it also made the backing of horses at a distance a real possibility and so opened up the opportunity for highly successful betting coups. (2) Later in the century the introduction of the telephone added a further dimension - this not forgetting the Penny Post of 1840.

Such improvements were not simply preconditions for the development of horse-racing and bookmaking, but continued to encourage the expansion of more sophisticated forms, with the establishing of bookmaking firms. (3)

With the development of the bookmaking firm, bookmaking as a personal service was challenged by a specifically capitalistic expansion of the industry:

"The private relationship between the seller of specifically qualified labour power and the spender of private revenues, which still predominated in the 19th century ... becomes increasingly converted into a capitalist, but at the same time objectively socialised, service business." (Mandel 1976 p.385)

1. The Chairman of the Carmarthen Stewards' Ordinary, February 1867, recounted in Rees (1977) p.7

2. The first ever racing results machine was reputedly installed by the Exchange Telegraph Co. Ltd. in the King Lud Public House, Ludgate Circus, London, in 1879. See Kaye (1969) p.31

3. Kaye traded the development of off-course betting back to 1820 in London, but it was sometime, probably the 1860s before bookmaking firms became formally established. Who was the first firm seems contentious: Kaye opts for the London-based Valentine and Wright as the first starting-price bookmakers; yet the Manchester-based firm of Seymour (now Seymour & Story) claims to be the oldest bookmaking concern, being established in 1868. See CIR (1974c) p.2.
The hallmark of capitalist relations is wage-labour. The transition from personal service to a capitalist business is precisely a reflection of the increasing preponderance of waged work, where labour is now employed and necessarily exploited. That this development should take place in bookmaking might be explained in terms of what Mandel calls overcapitalisation, where there is a secular fall in the rate of profit in the areas involved in the direct production of surplus value; hence new capital moves into areas which are non-productive.

The development of bookmaking can be seen as part of that general tendency; yet at this point this expansion was confronted by a particular obstacle which distorted this transition, hindering the process generally and promoting a dichotomy within the structure of the industry: the impact of legal restrictions. At the beginning of the twentieth century, while the law did not prohibit betting, it was illegal to "resort to a place" for betting. The precise judicial interpretation of this law carried crucial implications for the development of book-making. In the first instance, on-course betting was unquestionably legal:

"..... bookmakers on racecourses were nominally peripatetic and thus not deemed to be in a 'place'".

(Hood (1972) p.184)

2. ibid p. 387-8
3. see Hood (1972) p.184 for a more detailed exposition of the legal position regarding betting.
Yet similar cash betting off-course was illegal. Bookmakers who stood on street corners, in regular pitches, were considered as "resorting to a place". To confuse the issue still further, some off-course betting was legal. The improvements in communications in the previous century now meant that individuals could bet without 'resorting', simply by using the telephone or telegraph, given the readiness of bookmakers to agree to credit accounts. Off-course credit betting was legal, but not off-course cash betting.

The effect of the law was to accentuate on-course cash betting and off-course credit betting at the expense of off-course cash betting. The underlying rationale behind this decision no doubt rested on the presumed immorality involved in the visibility of betting. If it took place behind closed doors or in a limited, out of the way, geographical area, this did not imply an offence to public morality: bookmaking on street corners was rather too obvious.

There is another side to this distinction: the class division which it embraced. Those who could legitimately bet off-course needed access to telephones and credit accounts - which meant they required money to begin with. The Street Betting Act of 1906 attempted to specify just this distinction: the poorer sections of society were denied the opportunity of legal betting while the richer groups could carry on betting without risk - so to speak. (1) The outcome was an exaggeration of the distinction between credit and cash betting off-course, whereby credit betting as a legally acceptable method of bookmaking continued to develop into the predominate section of the industry; while off-course cash betting was pushed underground, continuing on an illegal basis, but necessarily limited by the legal restrictions.

1. The legal class distinction in gambling goes back more than 400 years. An Act of 1542 prevented the lower classes from taking part in a range of activities including cards, dice, and 'games' generally. This was still in force at the beginning of the eighteenth century. 'Gentlemen' could pursue gambling interests as they wished until the Act of 1712 which limited the amount of a gamble to £10. See Ford (1977) pp. 74-75.
(b) The two-fold development of bookmaking in the first half of the 20th century: legal credit offices and illegal street pitches.

(i) The Pattern of Development

The main characteristic of off-course betting in this period was the simultaneous separation and integration of legal credit and illegal cash betting. The number of bookmakers in the first quarter of the century increased dramatically. By 1926-27 there were 12,834 licensed bookmakers (1). While nominally in business for credit and on-course betting, many of these bookmakers had links with off-course cash betting. The distinction between clienteles, the credit and cash backers, was not generally reflected in divisions between bookmakers. (2) Ostensibly legitimate credit bookmakers operated networks of street pitches with the kind assistance of the local police. And in addition, there were a host of unlicensed bookmakers, whose numbers were not known, operating in factories, cafes, or on their own street pitches.

The inter-war years were a period of some buoyancy, particularly in the early phase. Concrete evidence is not always easy to find, but in 1949, just after the dramatic post-war betting boom, the NBPA stated:

".... it is our considered opinion that today less money is being spent on betting than at the time of the last Royal Commission (1933)." (RC (1949-51)b p. 352).

1. Figures from H.M.Costums. See Royal Commission (1949-51)b p. 352

2. It was on this point that the ineffectiveness of Churchill's betting tax rested. See Hood (1972) p. 187 Ladbrokes were one of the few exceptions to this general integration of credit and cash betting. Formed at the end of the 19th century for the purpose of backing horses, it was taken over by Arthur Bendir who steered the firm towards the exclusive clientele of the aristocracy. Ladbrokes did not need the illegal cash betting. See Kaye (1969) p.34f
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A further comparison between the inter-war and post-war periods also indicates a substantial fall in the number of bookmakers. By 1949, the NBPA claimed the number of bookmakers was now only 5,000, less than half the figure some twenty years earlier, although again the extent of illegal bookmaking is not known.

Such a decline might be explained in terms of a downturn in betting or a period of unusually unfavourable results for the bookmakers. Without substantial monetary backing, bookmaking could prove insecure. In part the bookmaker depended on his skill of "making a book", attempting to spread his liabilities through laying most of the horses in a race and ensuring that his liabilities on any particular outcome were not excessive. Nevertheless, for the individual bookmaker, luck could play an important part: the actuarial skill only places the probabilities in the bookmaker's favour, but he cannot make backers support the horses he wants them to. A run of bad results for the book could therefore mean the whittling away of money capital. Bookmaking skill could reduce the impact of bad results but could not eliminate their consequences altogether. While there may be some truth in this explanation, the evidence that is available suggests the ranks of individual bookmakers were constantly changing with new enthusiasts replenishing the numbers as many lost all their money.

A second explanation may be of greater importance and of particular significance: the degree of monopolisation. During this period, individual credit offices had expanded; not perhaps dramatically, but nevertheless significantly. In 1950, D. Summers of the NBPA stated that the number of employees that an individual bookmaker might have ......

1. By turning backer himself and betting with another bookmaker. This is known as "hedging".
2. RC (1949-51)b p. 358.
is very difficult to estimate. There are large (bookmakers) and small ones. There are men whose sole staff is their wife who answers the phone when he is out; there are others who have 20, 30, 40, in some cases 100 or 200 .......

The transition from 'personal service' to 'capitalist service business' was scarcely complete even by mid-century. With a few exceptions, most firms were small-scale, while the vast majority were individual bookmakers. That a degree of concentration and centralisation had taken place is not at all surprising. This, after all, was part of a general tendency in capitalist economies. What is, superficially, surprising is the lack of concentration and centralisation. Why did off-course bookmaking remain on such a small scale for so long?

An explanation can be offered in terms of the extent of the market. As legitimate bookmakers, credit betting was essentially the core of any large-scale expansion; yet this market was severely limited, eliminating the mass of the population. Those bookmakers linked to off-course cash betting could turn to this as a reliable source of funds for expansion: its illegal nature restricted the extent of this dependency. In any case, the illegal nature of cash betting meant that from the bookmaker's point of view, that market was sorely underdeveloped. So it can be argued that expansion was limited by the extent of the market for betting, given the importance of legal restrictions.

A second aspect concerns the structure of the market for bookmaking rather than its extent. Legal restrictions on cash betting not only meant it was underdeveloped; they also meant the essential localisation of cash betting. To understand this point more clearly we must look at how illegal cash betting operated.

1. ibid p. 359. In comparison with the size of bookmaking firms some 25 years later, these are comparatively small employers of labour. For instance, at the time of writing, Ladbrokes employ more than 3,000 workers in their LBOs alone.
There were two main systems of illegal cash betting which were related to geographical divisions: in the north of England, the most popular method was to use a shop for betting purposes, with the bets being passed under the counter; in the south, the tradition was to use street corners, or street pitches, where the bookmaker or his assistant would stand. Now the legal problem really concerned the visibility of betting, not betting itself. Therefore, to continue illegal activities, either in the shop or on the street pitch, the bookmaker could not make his presence too apparent. The impact on the extent of his potential market was immediately significant: only those who knew where to look for a bookmaker could make a bet. In other words, the market was essentially localised: the illegal bookie might cover an area, rather than have one pitch, but access to his services was both local and partial.

While cash betting off-course remained illegal, its development was severely limited; at the same time, that part of the industry which was legal had only a limited market. This restriction of the development of the industry, while continuously challenged during the first half of this century, remained an insurmountable stumbling block to the wholesale capitalistic expansion of bookmaking: a position not resolved until 1960. Even so, had that obstacle been removed it is questionable how rapid that expansion would have been since it would also have needed a substantial development of the betting medium.

In looking at the betting medium two different aspects must be considered: firstly, the relationship between bookmaking and sport and how the latter changed as a consequence of the influence of betting. Secondly, the specific technical improvements which assisted bookmakers and provided qualitative encouragement to betting.

The overall relationship between bookmaking and sport has already been discussed. The general tendency within capitalism to emphasise the
passivity of the working class is reflected in the promotion of spectator sports rather than participation in the sport themselves. This makes sport a highly suitable medium for bookmaking: outcomes can be varied and sometimes unpredictable, while betting gives a certain edge to the vicarious pleasures of being a spectator. Bookmaking, however, was historically linked to horseracing. In an age without television this exposed a weakness and a tension between the two: could bookmaking rely on a sport which most people did not see?

Consider also a second point. Bookmaking was almost entirely dependent on horseracing. Was an alternative betting medium possible? One major possibility was football on which both pool and fixed odds betting developed in this period, but that only involved one event per week - bookmaking demanded a sport where events were frequent, since the greater the number of events in a given period, the sooner the law of probability would operate through the 'book'.

These two influences, the relative inaccessibility and dependency on horseracing, provide the background to the reintroduction of Greyhound racing to Britain in 1926, after a break of fifty years. The first track was opened in Belle Vue, Manchester in July 1926 and was soon followed by White City, London, in 1927. It provided an immediately popular form of entertainment. In contrast to horseracing, it was easily accessible to those in towns and did not clash with normal working hours. For bookmaking, it provided a regular 'long-stop' to horseracing as a betting medium.

1. Rees (1977) describes the scene on the day of the Carmarthen Open Steeplechase, in 1867, at the time one of the most important races in the Racing Calendar:
"Crowds of pedestrians from early morn wended their way to the course. All sorts and conditions of men, some women, and many children succumbing then as now, to the unfailing attraction of horse-racing, and its attendant chance of a gamble." p. 4.

2. See Wimhurst (1961) Ch. 7
The general expansion of off-course bookmaking, however, depended on the development of suitable technical services. In the earlier period, these had been general in nature, such as the telegraph and the telephone. Now they were more concerned with specific developments. And here the most significant was the introduction of the 'Blower'. Officially known as the London and Provincial Sporting News Agency, the Blower was developed as a means of relaying information on horseraces actually taking place at that moment, through the GPO telephone system. Thus up to the minute information could be sent to bookmakers throughout the country (1) on declared runners, changes in betting, results, starting prices, and, indeed, commentaries on races as they happened. The 'Blower' which became a public company in 1929, also performed a different and important function: placing bets on the racecourse on behalf of off-course bookmakers who felt their liabilities were larger than they wished. (2)

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1. In this instance, 'country' refers to England and Wales.
2. For more information on the L.P.S.N.A. see RC (1949-51)b p. 87-90.
(ii) The dual expansion of bookmaking and the labour process

The restricted expansion of the bookmaking industry had important implications for the labour process in the different sections. The illegality of cash betting necessarily meant limitations in the socialization of the labour process, whereas in the credit offices, despite the limits of the market, a systematic division of labour was evident by the middle of the century.

The tasks involved in bookmaking comprise three technical stages: the taking of bets, their calculation, and payment of winnings. But in terms of street pitches a further task was important: a careful eye for the police. The typical organization of a street bookmaker thus involved three key positions: firstly, a bookmaker who might or might not be a legitimate credit bookmaker, and who would settle bets, acquiring the excess of stakes over payments; secondly, a 'runner', who would take the legal risks of standing on the pitch, receiving bets before the start of the day's racing and paying out the previous day's winning bets; the 'runner' would also take the bets to the bookmaker, with the stakes, and collect payments of winning bets; thirdly, a 'look-out', who could warn the 'runner' of any policemen.

In many respects the operation of street pitches represented a limited extension of bookmaking as a personal service, with the 'runner' as an adjunct to the bookmaker. Clearly the relationship, like all wage labour, was exploitative, but the generalization of this relationship was limited by legal restrictions; and the number of 'runners' that a bookmaker might employ was severely restricted by the essentially localised nature of his business.

The bookmaker was the employer, the 'runner' and 'lookout' nominally wage labourers. But it was not the characteristic form of wage labour, since there was a lack of continuity in employment. The
emphasis was on flexible, mobile, casual labour. Since the work of the 'runner' was illegal, s/he could not remain on the same pitch indefinitely; while the work was not a full-time job - the 'runner' was only needed for part of the day and horseracing did not take place every day of the year.

This pattern of work permitted the use of a variety of workers whose main activity was not this particular job or indeed wage labour itself. In some cases the 'pitch' might be in a factory or cafe; while the street pitches often used the casual layers of the reserve army or the hidden unemployed mass of married women. Whatever common interests such disparate groups possessed as 'runners', that this was not a central activity emphasises the greater significance of other influences in structuring interests, e.g. the position of women as housewives indicates the importance of considering their role in performing domestic labour in understanding their interests. Clearly, the influence of external pressures must always be considered - interests do not only arise through the labour process - but they are arguably of particular significance when analysing situations where work is not a central activity.

In contrast, employees in the credit offices were neither part of an illegal labour force, nor were they widely distributed in carrying out their work. While the extent of concentration and centralization was not dramatic in this period, this was far from saying that some systematic division of labour was not possible in the larger credit offices. Consider the following account (written for the benefit of the backer) of the labour process in David Cope Ltd in 1948, a major London credit firm. (1)

1. David Cope built up one of the largest credit firms in the country - the business eventually being sold to William Hill in the early 1960s. Born Badenkof, he changed his name to Cope when coming to England from Poland at the end of the last century. Developing a network of street pitches, he first opened a credit office in 1895.
The telephone room had more than 100 telephones, open for business from 9 a.m. to 6 p.m. every day except Sunday. On phoning, the backer is transferred from an "experienced" switchboard operator to a "waiting" telephonist:

"The clerk has in front of her a list of the day's runners and a book, each sheet of which has a carbon back so that at all times there is a duplicate record of every wager that is written down. The clerk takes your bet; calls back (for checking purposes) your name (or nom-de-plume), and number, your bet and the total amount you have invested. The deed is done, you are 'on'. " (Cope (1948) p.53 my italics).

The telephone room is also provided with up to date racing results, runners, prices and other relevant information which the telephonist can tell the caller. Having performed this routine task, the female telephonist passes on the carbon copy to the "field Table" where it is "timed, numbered, and photographed", before the bet is recorded. (ibid p. 54)

The bets are now taken in "locked" boxes to the "making-up room" where "scores of 'settlers!'" are "waiting to analyse" the bet. One settler calculates the bet which is passed to a second settler who "checks the figures of his predecessor." (ibid p. 54. My emphasis.) If there is no agreement, the bet is passed to the Supervisor.

Next the bet passes to the ledger where "high speed electrical adding machines" record the profit or loss on the bet. From there, it goes to the collating section for the attention of the ledger clerk:

".... at the end of the week, the clerk has before her your statement form, showing, with winnings or losses, the various wagers you have placed." (ibid p.55, My emphasis).

Before dispatch, the statement is checked by the Section Supervisor against the bets placed. Then losing and winning bets (complete with cheques) are passed through a machine which automatically seals and franks the envelopes.
In contrast to the era of personal service, where the bookmaker performed a range of functions, the labour process had now become more socialised. The employment of wage labour on an increasing scale implied the potential breaking down of job functions, with the workers collectively performing most of the activities previously undertaken by the bookmaker himself. The taking, settling, and paying out of bets had been delegated and separated out according to the principles of the division of labour.

It is apparent that in breaking down the various job tasks, the devaluation of labour power (or deskilling) had not been evenly pursued. There was a routinization of various tasks, notably in the telephone and ledger rooms, which allowed the use of cheap labour; yet there had been little progress in devaluing the settling function which still required "a searching mathematical examination." (ibid p. 54)

The growing size of the firm and the consequent increases in the number of employees posed problems of control for the bookmaker. In David Cope Limited, there had only been six settlers in 1925, yet by 1948 there were forty, rising to sixty in the 1950s; and employment in the phone room had risen in similar proportions. For the employer, the problem of control changed fundamentally in this period, given the greater size of the business. The paternalism of the inter-war period was replaced after the war with a more stringent attitude to labour discipline - as the above description suggests.

In some instances direct supervision was used, to ensure the routine tasks were performed (1) yet the control of each specific labour process was also structured into the job itself. For instance, the duplicate recording of bets by the telephonist was not merely

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1. Cope (1948) p. 55, where there is a photograph showing male supervisors sitting at the end of rows of women workers.
a safeguard for backer and bookmaker, but represented a structured system of control over the performance of her job. The post-war period did not so much imply new systems of control as a general tightening of labour discipline, e.g. through the elimination of the pre-war system of ‘job and finish’.

This tightening of control over the labour process was not equally applied to all employee groups; this reflected the technical functions performed. For instance, while those who worked in the phone room taking bets had a workload spread throughout the day, the settlers had to wait for racing to start before they could begin work.\(^{(1)}\) So while lunch breaks for the phone room workers were ‘tight’, those for settlers were often ‘extended’.

While this leads to a source of potential division within the workforce, it is important initially to identify the bases of common interests. The immediate point is the technical functions of receiving, settling, and paying bets were all performed by wage labour; hence the basis for a common interest as exploited wage labour. Secondly, those performing these job functions all performed exclusively the function of the collective labourer. Despite the greater demand on their skills, the settlers did not exercise any more capitalistic control over the labour process than those in the more routinised job tasks. The bookmaker had delegated the settling function but not control. The task of the settlers was merely to settle bets and they were controlled both through direct supervision and system of work: they were set in motion with the transfer of bets from the phone room, while the pressure of having to send out regular payments of winning bets limited allowable settling time.

\(^{(1)}\) Some work was performed in the morning - viz. any bets left over from the previous day and any bets taken on evening greyhound racing.
The basis for collective interests can, therefore, be identified both in terms of their common exploitation and their interdependence as the collective labourer. Yet the influences which had prompted this collective interest had also generated the basis of divisions. Firstly the technical division of labour implied a greater affinity between the employer and the settlers, than with other employee groups. Both were immediately affected by whether it was a winning or losing day for the 'book'. Bets which lose do not have to be settled; but they still have to be taken, recorded, entered in the ledger, and the accounts dispatched. A good day for the 'book' meant less work for the settlers, but not for the other employee groups.1

If the technical division of labour implied an intrinsic difference of interest over workload, the way in which the specialised job tasks resulted in the physical isolation of employee groups also served to promote divisions in interests. The continuing references to the "telephone" room, the "making-up" room, and the "ledger" room in the above account of David Cope Ltd, indicate the extent of physical separation along the lines of job tasks. This, however, has more to do with the workers experience of the labour process, rather than the structuring of interests and this discussion is left until Chapter 4.

Secondly, the structuring of the division of labour was not random: and the differences in the skills required of different employee groups both reflected the contemporary inability of breaking down the skill of settling and provided a source of differentiation within the workforce.

1. Clearly a day when many losing bets are placed might mean that backers do not make so many bets, which in turn lessens the workload, but this applies to all employees generally, i.e. to settlers as well.
The skill of settling was crucial to the overall labour process in bookmaking; it was specific to the industry and, therefore, unlike telephonists, clerks, and typists, not readily available on the labour market. And this distinction was also reflected in the differential wage rates between the groups.

This distinction of skill and remuneration provided a basis for divergent interests between these groups. The less, but more generally, skilled employees were neither crucial for nor dependent on the bookmaking industry. The settlers, however, found themselves in an important position in the labour-process, yet simultaneously dependent on the bookmaking industry through their degree of skill specificity. And this skill division simultaneously reflected and was reflected in the unevenness in the control exercised by the bookmaking employer over the labour process. The built-in systems of control within the labour process did not constrain the activities of settlers in the same way as other groups, notably the telephonists. In part this can be seen in terms of the content of the work involved; and in part it reflects the time period over which job tasks could be performed – the settler could take longer over his work than the telephonist over hers.

While differences in skill and remuneration provided a basis for divergent interests within the workforce in terms of relationships between employees, they also influenced and were influenced by the social relationships between employer and employees. The obverse side of skill is employer dependency. The existence of a group

1. In the inter-war period, settlers in David Cope Ltd received £5-£6 per week while telephone room operators would only get £3-£3.50 per week. Unfortunately, there is little concrete evidence on wage rates at this time and in any case would not take into consideration bonuses etc.
possessing a specific technical skill, yet objectively performing only the function of the collective labourer, implies that the employer must pay particular attention to the integration of that group at the political and ideological levels. The development of the settling "pool" in the large credit firms, demanded a certain concentration at the political and ideological levels, to compensate for the gradual devaluation of the position of the settler. And readily to hand was the mechanism which had united bookmakers from the early days: occupational solidarity, which now encompassed employees as well.

Occupational solidarity in bookmaking derived from two particular sources: the predominance of Jewish origins amongst those working in the industry and the social antipathy towards bookmaking as an activity or occupation. Both aspects implied a certain isolation of bookmaking - and those who worked in it - from other parts of society. And the illegality of off-course cash betting both reflected and prompted this isolation. Historically, these pressures had resulted in a particularly strong occupational solidarity amongst bookmakers and, to a lesser extent, their employees, operating as additive to the general determinants of occupational solidarity. (1)

Paradoxically, the strength of settlers in the bookmaking process, their irrereplaceability, made them particularly vulnerable to social antipathy against their work. Hence, occupational solidarity provided the means whereby the employers and settlers could share interests, despite a growing difference in interests as employers and employees. But such a solidarity could never be specified in these terms for the telephonists and clerks: while on the one hand employer dependency was less significant, the non-specificity of their skills made them less dependent on bookmaking.

1. See Note 2 at the end of this chapter for a more detailed discussion of the sources of occupational solidarity.
The first two sources of the structuring of different interests have been identified through the technical and social relationships embodied in the labour process. The third, however, emphasises the importance and direct impact of generalised social relationships other than that of employer-employee in specifying interests at the workplace. (1) Here, the most notable influence is that of sexual divisions, reflected in a pronounced sexual division of labour in the labour process and predicated on the uneven devaluation of labour-power.

These sexual divisions were strictly maintained, (at least as far as the men were concerned) and followed the now familiar separation between the relatively skilled task of settling, which was predominantly male, and the routinized work of the telephone and ledger rooms, where women were employed as cheap labour. (2) Neither did women play a part in controlling the labour process, for the supervisors were men.

The significance of this generalised sexual division of labour is that the interests of men and women at work may diverge; and this is due to the more demanding position of women in relation to domestic work.

1. This is not to deny that the relationships in the labour process as discussed in the first two aspects are not related to wider social considerations: skill, for instance, is not merely technically, but also socially determined, and any use of "skill" as a concept necessarily implies this ambivalence. But these might be seen as "indirect" rather than "direct" influences in specifying interest.

2. In Cope (1948), there are photographs of various rooms which clearly show the extent of the separation of male and female work, pp. 52-55. Yet the women were used to "help out" in other areas of the office (including settling) when required. No such 'flexibility' was demanded of the men.

3. Hardman (forthcoming) argues that unionization amongst women must be understood in the context of their position as wage and domestic workers.
Thus, in the credit office of the bookmaking firms, the sexual division of labour served to reinforce the wider societal domination of men over women and provided a further dimension to the differences of interests between the employee groups.

To conclude: the development of off-course credit betting, combined with limited avenues to cash betting, resulted in the growth of bookmaking firms on a relatively small scale. The consequent increasing socialization of the labour process embraced the development of the collective labourer and the segregation of job tasks. Yet while this provided, on one hand, a common interest amongst the settlers, phone room operators, and clerks, it also generated the basis for divisions in terms of job content, skill, remuneration, and the degree of control exercised over them. This division was further compounded by the sexual division of labour.
(c) The expansion of legalised cash betting in the post-1960 period.

(i) The Initial Expansion.

(1) Legalisation of Cash Betting.

The legal restrictions placed on off-course cash betting remained in force until 1960, and necessarily contained the persistent pressures on the expansion of cash betting. The law was commonly brought into disrepute with the existence of 'known' betting shops and street pitches and continued to operate with the connivance of the local police; given the prevalence of betting, the law was also very difficult to enforce; while the discriminatory effect of the legislation was challenged by the 'champions of the working-class punters', such as Bob Mellish and George Wigg in the House of Commons.

While the legislation was persistently 'stretched' by the activities of the illegal cash bookmakers, any changes in that legal position required a political solution. It required some change in the positions of key interested parties. Traditional opposition to legal cash betting had come from the Churches and the institutions who controlled horse and greyhound racing; the former had taken a moral stance while the latter felt their sports would suffer. Successive Governments, while sensitive to these pressures, were not convinced; there was, after all, the major carrot of revenue from a betting tax. And in the context of the post-war betting boom of the late 1940s, the Labour Government set up a Royal Commission to investigate Betting, Gaming and Lotteries. (1)

The Royal Commission reported in 1951, advocating the legalisation of cash betting. Amidst governmental changes the report was initially

1. RC (1949-51)(a)
shelved; but the recommendations could never gather too much
dust given the obvious fiscal temptations and as the post-war boom
began to diminish, the attractiveness of this source of taxation
grew.

While the Government, no doubt under the prompting of the
Treasury, saw the increasing possibility of a successful betting tax,
other interested parties began to move in favour of legalising cash
betting, sensing the potential source of income. With horse-racing,
in particular, suffering from falling attendances, the possibility of
using money from betting to supplement the ailing finances of the sport
became more acceptable. This switch of allegiances by the
horse-racing institutions left the Church isolated as the main opponent
of legal cash betting. Thus the general economic force within the
bookmaking industry itself, ever challenging its imposed legal limits,
now found new allies in the government\(^1\) and the horse-racing institutions.
The juncture of these various forces resulted in the legislation of
1960 which lifted the barrier to the economic development of the
industry, thus allowing for an imposed levy on cash betting for the
benefit of horse racing, and establishing the preconditions necessary
for the introduction of a betting tax later in the decade.

While the balance of forces now shifted in favour of legalising
cash betting, if the Government of the day was to retain some control
over its development, then a blueprint for the legalisation had to be
produced. Given the existence of illegal off-course systems of betting -
betting shops and street pitches - the choice was not an open one;
debate centred around these alternatives and when the Bill came before
Parliament, it was the betting shops which won the day. This did not

1. This is, of course, something of a simplification. There is no
   attempt here to differentiate between 'Government' and 'State' or within
   'Government' itself.
receive unequivocal support. The Parliamentary champions of the working-class punters, Bob Mellish and George Wigg, were now left behind. Adopting a fundamentally conservative approach in arguing for the legalisation of existing practice, they found themselves in an unholy alliance with the large credit bookmakers, who feared the various implications of betting shops. (1)

Such a position, however, was a yearning for the past, and it had no relevance for the future.

".... licensed street pitches would not have suited Northern betting shop operators, the police or large bookmakers, since it would have kept the trade on a strictly personal basis, which would also have militated against effective taxation." (Hood (1972) p. 191).

Hood, correctly, points to the various institutional pressures which would always favour betting shops rather than street pitches, once the decision to legalise off-course cash betting had been taken. Yet street pitches were also an irrelevance to the economic expansion of the industry, since they would quickly restrict the developing division of labour and also prevent the full utilisation of the various technical developments which would enable continuous betting. The importance of betting shops, or Licensed Betting Offices (LBOs) as they are formally called, was to allow a qualitatively distinct expansion of the bookmaking industry.

1. "During the passage of the Betting and Gaming Act, Mr. Mellish took an active part in the debates. He strongly opposed the establishment of betting offices, considering that the existing street runners should be licensed". CCOG (1962) p. 34

See below for the position of the credit bookmakers in relation to LBOs at this time.
The Pattern of Post-legislative expansion.

Following the legalisation of cash betting, the bookmaking industry developed dramatically. As can be seen from Table 3.1, by June 1962 the bulk of the licences which were to be taken out had been granted. The peak number of licences, 15,741, was reached in 1966. (1)

This indicates the most important aspect of the post-legislative period: the rapid growth of LBOs. Apart from this, Table 3.1 gives few clues as to early development of the industry. While it can be seen that Bookmakers' Permits grew at a slower rate than office licences, this tells little since credit bookmakers needed permits too. Again the decline in betting agency permits - introduced where 'demand' was 'insufficient' to warrant a betting shop - suggests different possibilities. Were they simply unviable or so successful that they were exchanged for fully fledged betting office licences? In view of the overall expansion of the industry, the latter is most likely.

Perhaps the most useful indication, and it is little more than that, of the way the industry developed is given in the magnitude of bookmakers' permits. Bookmaking was apparently an industry of small firms - and remained so for most of the decade.

1. For the moment the subsequent decline is passed over. It is interesting to note that by 1975, licences had fallen below the 1963 figure.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>BOOKMAKERS' PERMITS</th>
<th>BETTING AGENCY PERMITS</th>
<th>BETTING OFFICE LICENCES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>9,944</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>8,802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>10,712</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>13,340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>11,061</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>14,388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>11,114</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>15,025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>11,235</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>15,638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>11,253</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>15,741</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>11,138</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>15,535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>11,069</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>15,732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>10,723</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>15,490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>9,917</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>14,644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>9,414</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>14,462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>9,131</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>14,812</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>8,731</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>14,873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>8,602</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>14,837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>8,369</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>14,371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>8,221</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>13,865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>8,082</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13,254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>7,960</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12,812</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: derived from:

i) Betting and Gaming Act 1960 - Annual Reports.

ii) Betting, Gaming and Lotteries Act, 1963 - Permits and Licences schedule. Annual Reports.

(LONDON, HMSO).
These impressions are, perhaps, confirmed by the rather more revealing employment statistics. Table 3.2 shows the official statistics for employment in the "betting industry"; while this is not identical with LBO employment, it is probable that changes in employment patterns are primarily a reflection of the developing Bookmaking industry. What features are of interest? Firstly, employment has risen by more than 50% between 1960 and 1966, indicating the general expansion of the industry. But within that, the bulk of the increase (and during 1960-64, all of it) is in terms of male employment. Now given the virtually rigid sexual division of labour in LBOs this indicates the most significant development of the initial expansion: the generalisation of the settler-manager. Given the structure of the industry, this movement laid the basis for the future unionization of the employees, since, in part, this was the transition from self-employment to waged work.

This trend apparently co-existed with a growth of small concerns. Not only did male employment increase until 1965, after 1964 female employment increased as well. The last year in which both male and female employment rose was 1966. This was also the peak year for Betting Office Licences and perhaps marks the culmination of the period of initial expansion.

The pattern of this first phase of the development of LBOs perhaps owes more than a little to the reluctance of the large credit bookmakers to become involved in this expansion:

"When the Betting and Gaming Act of 1960 legalised Betting shops, both Ladbrokes and Hills were at first disinterested. Alfred Cope, then head of one of the largest bookmaking businesses in the country, told me that he strongly disapproved of the idea of betting shops as he thought it would lead to protection rackets and gangsterism". (Kaye (1969) p. 266).
### Table 3.2: No. of Employees in Employment in the "Betting Industry" 1959-68 (U.K.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960-61</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-62</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962-63</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-64</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-65</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-66</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-67</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-68</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTES:**
- Figures in 1,000s.
- Males and females are based on current ratios rather than figures for the whole year.
- For 1958-60, the figures are based on mid-year estimates.
- For 1961-67, the figures are based on mid-year estimates.
The objections of the large credit firms were not simply moral ones. In their evidence to the 1951 Royal Commission, the representatives of the trade associations had expressed concern that betting shops would “gobble us up”.\(^1\) This threat to those who had already made the top was thus countered by a developing conservative attitude towards bookmaking: the defence of the status quo.

Others, however, were quick to seize the new opportunities the legislation now offered, in particular the existing illegal cash bookmakers. Mark Lane \(^2\), operating on the outskirts of London’s East End, was well-prepared:

> “Convinced before the end of the 1950s that legal betting shops were only a matter of time, I began acquiring options and leases: when the Act did go through he had 17 offices all ready for opening.” (Caulkin (1973) p.69).

In 1971, Lane secured control of J.Coral Ltd and became Chairman of one of the largest bookmaking companies in Britain.

The rapid expansion of LBOs - 9,000 licences by July 1961 and 13,000 by July 1962 - was not, however, simply the old illegal systems appearing in a new form. It reflected the involvement of the outsiders, always willing to replenish the ranks of bookmakers.

> “The shops were opened more by entrepreneurs than by bookmakers. The entrepreneurs saw the opportunities and the bookmakers didn’t. The multiples didn’t enter the field for five or six years and they bought their way in”.\(^3\)

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1. RC (1949-51) (b) p. 369.

2. Having run a book in the army during the 1939-45 war, Mark Lane had set up in Dagenham after the war, relying heavily on street pitches and the workers in the nearby Ford factory:

> “With two ex-Army colleagues, Lane set up in Dagenham after the war with a capital of £200 and a couple of year’s experience running a book in the forces. He quickly lost the money; but with some help from his friends, he made a second start and this time never looked back”. (Caulkin (1973)p.69

3. Interview Don Bruce 20.2.76.
By the time the major credit firms - Ladbrokes and William Hill - decided to become involved, the new cash betting industry had already begun to experience the initial processes of concentration and centralisation with the growth of the betting chain. As yet, these chains were relatively small and restricted to limited localities. They had been built partly through the granting of new licences, but increasingly through the takeover of an existing bookmaker and his LBOs. Those that built the chains tended to have a bookmakers 'pedigree'; no doubt for some entrepreneurs, LBOs had not proved the 'licence to print money' they had hoped for.

The basis for this expansion rested on the ability of the bookmakers to accumulate money capital; and this in turn was dependent on the betting opportunities that could be provided - largely through the expansion of horseracing. The 1960 Act allowed LBOs to remain open between 9.00 a.m. and 6.30 p.m.; in other words betting could take place continuously throughout the day - provided there was something on which to bet.

As outlined in the introduction to this chapter, the direct exploitation of labour could be achieved in either an absolute or relative sense depending on how the betting medium was developed. In the period of initial expansion, the bookmaking employers were particularly concerned with the absolute direct exploitation of labour which implied an effort to develop the betting medium in a particular direction. Firstly, the expansion of the working week could be secured by ensuring horseracing took place on every weekday. While Sunday racing was illegal, there were still blank days throughout the racing calendar. The first priority was to fill those gaps. Secondly, the

expansion of the working day implied extended race meetings or staggered start and finish times on days when there were more than one race meeting; in this way the period of racing would be expanded.

The success with which bookmakers pursued these objectives is in part reflected in the development of horseracing at this time. The historical dependency of bookmaking on sport now became apparently reversed as horseracing increasingly accommodated the demands of bookmaking. In Table 3.3 the trends in scheduled and actual race fixtures and in racecourse attendances can be clearly seen. While total public racecourse attendance fell by 18% between 1961 and 1973, and the average attendance per daily fixture by more than 30%, in the same period the number of scheduled fixtures actually rose by 18%. A sport which was being supported by fewer and fewer people was managing not simply to hold its own but to expand operations. The clear implication is that the importance of the 'sport' lay not so much in those who attended the racecourses but in what it offered to those interests away from the courses, which leads us to bookmaking.

A more detailed look at Table 3.3 shows that the most rapid rise in scheduled fixtures occurred between 1965-69, accounting for nearly 60% of the total increase 1961-73. The trend had begun slightly earlier, but had not taken off properly until then. It is, perhaps, not coincidental that at that time the bookmakers had found strong allies.

The institutions that controlled British Horseracing had been successful in gaining a quid pro quo for their support of legalised cash betting: the Horserace Betting Levy Board (H.R.L.B.) had been established by the Government to administer the levy charged on bookmakers' profits for the 'good' of horseracing. By 1963, the HBLB had found its feet. Its controllers also knew where their best interests lay:

1. Trade Associations were long established and provided a suitable means to articulate these kinds of demands.
Table 3.3: Horseracing fixtures and racecourse attendances in England, Scotland and Wales 1961-73.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>SCHEDULED FIXTURES</th>
<th>FIXTURES TAKING PLACE</th>
<th>TOTAL RACECOURSE PUBLIC ATTENDANCE</th>
<th>AVERAGE ATTENDANCES PER FIXTURE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>778</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>5,409,474</td>
<td>7,213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>787</td>
<td>682</td>
<td>4,594,777</td>
<td>6,737</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>804</td>
<td>753</td>
<td>5,219,213</td>
<td>6,931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>837</td>
<td>747</td>
<td>4,665,762</td>
<td>6,246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>888</td>
<td>792</td>
<td>4,110,085</td>
<td>5,190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>896</td>
<td>853</td>
<td>4,270,495</td>
<td>5,006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>924</td>
<td>894</td>
<td>4,426,176</td>
<td>4,951</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Horserace Betting Levy Board
Racing Statistical Information Digest.
higher bookmaking profits meant more money for racing, but those profits depended on the availability of races to bet on. As the Chairman stated:

"The spread of race fixtures is the responsibility of the Turf authorities. It has a relationship to the volume of betting and hence of the levy. In theory the ideal way from the point of view of promoting the volume of betting would be a minimum of one fixture every week day ....... " (1)

In March 1966, the state took a stake in the expansion of horseracing: the Chancellor of the Exchequer introduced a new betting tax of 2½% on turnover, i.e. amount staked. In contrast to the HBLB, who took a proportion of profits, the taxation was on stakes. The more races on which to bet, the more the tax would roll in. This effectively gave the state an interest in the expansion of bookmaking, in contradiction to the rhetoric, and even conditions of the 1960 Act (2). While the 1960 Act had supposedly aimed to restrict betting by legalising it, the interests of state agencies rested in expanding betting: for the treasury who saw betting as a suitable source of taxation; and for the HBLB who wanted increased betting to finance horseracing.

The coinciding of the interests of bookmakers and the state institutions thus had its impact on the quantitative expansion of the betting medium. Yet bookmakers were also concerned with qualitative improvements which would encourage an increase in the volume of betting.

One important development in the conduct of horseracing itself was the introduction of overnight declarations of intended runners at race meetings. The significance of this was to enable potential backers to know definite runners before the day of the races. The daily papers

1. Lord Harding, Chairman of the HBLB, quoted in Daily Herald 10.4.63. (and also in CCOG (1963) p.37).
2. Various restrictions had been integrated into that legislation in an effort to curtail the extent of betting. In the first place, to obtain a licence for a LBO, the onus was on the bookmaker to show the local licensing committee that there was sufficient 'demand' for his services. Other parts of the Act which aimed at restricting betting included the limitation on opening hours, and legal sanctions to be used where betting (Footnote continued ............
offices were advertised or where bookmakers induced any person in a betting office to bet. This reflected the emphasis in the Act merely to legalise the existing level of betting rather than generate conditions under which it could expand. A clear example of this was the position taken by R.A. Butler, then Home Secretary on continuous betting.** In November 1959, he said:

"I think it would be wise for all to bear in mind the undesirability of doing anything, in the final form of the Statute, as it emerges, that might encourage continuous betting." (HC Official Report 16.11.59 col. 812).

** The opportunity to bet race by race.
could now list definite runners rather than a long list, many of whom would not race. The benefit for the bookmaker was clear: a reduction in bets on non-runners, which were otherwise void bets and of no use to the bookmaker.\(^1\)

On the technical side, there was an important extension of the Exchange Telegraph Service to LBOs, enabling virtually instant relaying of racing commentaries, information on horses, betting odds, and results. This allowed the bookmaker to inform backers of their fate immediately, and for him to settle bets without delay, thus permitting any returns to be restaked; it also encouraged the interest of backers in their betting by providing commentaries on the races.

---

1. Previously trainers had been allowed to make 4-day declarations until the day of the races, when they would announce non-runners. The extent of non-runners on this system inhibited backing because punters would not know till towards race-time which horses would be running. Overnight declarations were introduced in 1963.
The labour process in the period of the initial expansion.

The period of initial expansion was characterised by the rapid development of LBOs, where ownership was widespread with a small-scale emergence of betting chains. What were the implications of this development for employees in bookmaking?

The demands of the new LBOs were different from their predecessors, the street pitches and credit offices. In contrast to street pitches, the legalised LBOs implied the legitimacy of cash bookmaking as an occupation and permitted an open labour market. Furthermore, LBOs were physically fixed and demanded staffing while they remained open; it implied regular employment rather than the casual nature of street pitches.

In relation to credit offices, the cash betting in which LBOs operated implied extensive decentralisation taking the facility to bet to the backer. The degree of integration of the labour process in the credit offices was therefore broken down: staff were widely distributed in small units.

The structure of the labour process in the LBOs did, however, inherit the same traditions of division of labour that had existed before in the industry. The division between taking bets and setting them remained the fundamental one, and formed the basis of the differentiation of job tasks. The bets were taken by a counter clerk and settled by the bookmaker himself or the settler-manager. Paying out winning bets might be carried out either by the counter clerk, employer (or settler-manager), or, in large LBOs, a specialist cashier. The generalised integration of the large credit offices was thus replicated within each LBO, the degree of differentiation dependent on the volume of betting.

1. Not until the late 1960s did betting chains reach the 100 mark.
The structuring of the labour process in LBOs developed around a uniform pattern, as set out in figure 3.1, and which shows the hierarchy of control. Settlers would only be required where there was a large turnover of bets; while the boardman would be responsible for displaying results and betting odds.

**Figure 3.1: The Basic Employment Structure of a LBO.**

```
MANAGER (or EMPLOYER)
     |
     SETTLER
     |
COUNTERHAND    BOARDMAN.
```

The control of the labour process, to begin with, was exercised by the employing bookmaker through direct supervision. Yet with the development of betting chains, physical supervision was no longer possible, and increasing reliance had to be placed on the manager of a LBO. With the expansion of the business, the employing bookmaker had to delegate control over the labour process as well as the technical functions of bookmaking. This problem was of a different order to that of the credit offices, where the settlers and phone room operators could be directly supervised; the wide distribution of employees in small units implied a measure of control had to be delegated to employee(s) working in the LBO. Hence the creation of the settler-manager.

The functions of the settler-manager involved not merely the control of the operations of the LBO in terms of job tasks, but also aspects of the bookmaking function itself; this does not merely refer to setting. This reflected the new form of bookmaking which LBOs implied. In contrast to street pitches, LBOs offered race by race or continuous
betting. It implied settling had to be carried out as soon as possible to allow the backer to restate on subsequent races. In consequence each LBO required a settler. Yet the pressure of continuous betting also implied the immediacy of decision taking on bookmaking questions. With the growth of betting chains it became virtually impossible for the bookmaking employer to make all the decisions on his liabilities on a particular race. Decisions needed to be made quickly and required some expertise and knowledge of the precise action to take. A mistake could have disastrous financial consequences. (1)

This delegation of the content of bookmaking activity, was coupled with the delegation of control over the labour process itself. The two were clearly entwined: decisions on bookmaking were not purely technical, but concerned the operation of the LBO itself. Whether or not a bet should be taken is not merely a bookmaking question, but one of control over the taking of bets.

In practice, the exercising of control over the labour process within the betting shop accompanied the delegation of settling and hence the managing and settling functions of the LBO were combined in the same position: the settler-manager. In the initial expansion, without systematic means of control, the bookmaker tended to rely increasingly on settler-managers to ensure the adequate, and even honest, running of

1. An example may be helpful here: For instance while LBOs operated on starting prices, as did the street pitches, they were also at liberty to bet at board prices, i.e. to strike bets at the odds offered on the course market prior to the race. These odds were transmitted simultaneously to the shops by Extel. However, whereas these odds reflected the strength of the on-course market, they might not have reflected the bets struck by an individual off-course bookmaker. In this situation, the bookmaker might 'lay-off' some of the money placed on the more popularly-backed horses to cover himself against heavy losses. This is known as "hedging" and to do this a bookmaker would need to contact a trade bookmaker willing to take such bets. Alternatively, he might offer longer odds against horses that had not been backed, with the similar consequence of spreading his liabilities more widely. Clearly, to misread the situation could involve heavy losses.
his LBOs as his chain began to expand.

The importance of considering this development in some detail is to understand how collective interests were structured through the labour process. And the creation of the settler-manager is crucial in understanding both the extent and limits of common interests amongst the LBO employees. Insofar as the settler-manager controlled the labour process within the LBO, he performed not only the function of the collective worker but the global function of capital. To this extent the interests of the settler-manager on the one hand and the other LBO employees on the other were fundamentally different.

In performing the global function of capital the interests of the settler-managers were linked to those of the employer. This was not merely reflected in the content of their work and their activities as agents of control and supervision, but in remuneration. Commission payments on LBO profits were not uncommon; and to the extent that LBOs were run independently of each other within the same ownership, the settler-managers might be seen as relatively isolated and without generalised common interests amongst themselves.

The material basis for common interests between employers and settler-managers was reinforced at the political and ideological level. The notion of occupational community still persisted and was encouraged by employers desperately short of skilled settlers; it also gained continuity through the recruitment of labour from within the preceding illegal cash betting system and the credit offices. Yet this proved

1. It is perhaps important to note at this stage, that the bookmaking industry developed very rapidly after 1960, but that this development was uneven. Many LBOs remained one-man concerns. And even where chains developed locally, the delegation of control may have been very limited. This does not detract, however, from the general tendencies towards the growth of betting chains and the delegation of control and aspects of bookmaking activity to the settler-managers.
inadequate for the employers, even when considering the input of those with previous connections with bookmaking and now drawn back in through the offer of high wages. The shortage of settling expertise could not be overcome immediately and indicates the strong market position of the settler-managers at this time. Until a new generation of settlers could be trained, employers were particularly dependent on the initial stock of settler-managers and the continued integration of this group with the employer's interests was paramount. Not until the late 1960s would the external training schools, such as the London School of Turf Accountancy, together with internal training programmes of the larger firms increase, in any substantial way, labour supply and erode the strong market position of the settlers.

While the position of the settler-manager had been revalued in consequence of this early development of the LBO chains, the general tendency to devalue labour-power produced a contradictory effect. The efforts of the employers to increase the supply of skilled settlers was coupled with strategies to devalue the settling component of the position. The reduction of settling skill to its elementary components combined with the application of mathematical knowledge, to simplify the process of settling bets. The development of settling schools allowed the widespread dissemination of standardised settling systems, more simplified and quicker than the varied systems used by the 'older hands'. In particular, the 'block' and subsequently the 'crash block' system substantially reduced the time necessary to settle many complex bets. Settling was both simplified and speeded up, and the position of the settler(-manager) devalued.

While the performance of the settling function, and its gradual devaluation, implied some basis for common interest amongst all LBO employees - as the collective worker - the differences were overwhelming.

1. There is no systematic data on wage rates at this time. There is general evidence from interviewing various workers in bookmaking that they left other jobs because they could earn higher wages in bookmaking at this time, e.g. see Interview F.Martin 10.6.75.
In terms of the labour-process itself, the other LBO employees were under the control of the settler-manager, constituting an essential point of divergence. Once again, as in the credit offices, the division between settler-manager and counter clerk was reinforced not merely in terms of skill, but through the sexual division of labour. For the counter clerks, common interests did not exist so much within one LBO as across different LBOs.

In the initial expansion, these wide differences of skill tended to increase. The devaluation of settling was just beginning; that of the counter clerk was soon complete. The division of taking and settling bets implied the potential use of less skilled labour for the former task. And given that most bets were taken during the three or four hours of racing in the afternoon, it allowed the use of part-time workers. This made the counter clerks job 'women's work' with very limited exceptions.

The skills required were initially on a par with those needed in the phone-room of a credit office: the ability to take bets quickly and under pressure. Once a race has been run, bets cannot be taken. Yet the initial working systems placed inherent limits on the speed of taking bets. In the North of England, bets were placed verbally by the backer and the counter clerk would write them down. In the South, it was usual for bets to be written out by the backer, who would receive a hand-stamped receipt.

With the expansion of the betting medium and the increasing volume of betting, the limitations of these systems became apparent, and resulted in the rapid introduction of electrically operated cash registers. By the end of the 1960s, some form of electric cash register was common.
Such registers were designed to record the placing of the bet, the precise time it was taken, the amount staked, and to produce a receipt for the backer. This increased productivity through shortening the time needed to take a bet, thus enabling more bets to be taken in a given time.

The premium placed on continuous betting, emphasising the all-important speed in returning money to the backer in the hope it would be restaked and lost on the next available opportunity, accentuated the importance of taking bets rather than checking their accuracy. Whereas the counter clerk had previously acted as a filter for wrongly written bets, any errors in writing out or in understaking were now deemed the fault of the backer. The skill of understanding bets was thus minimally demanded; the emphasis was now placed on the ability to handle money and operate the cash register.

While the introduction of machinery was at the heart of the routinisation of the counter clerks' activities, it simultaneously embraced a systematic check on the performance of her work. It provided a constant monitoring on the amount of money that should be in the till, through 'ringing up' the amount staked on the bet itself, the backer's receipt, and on the till roll. While the employers rationale might be set out in terms of the elimination of fraud, the cash register, like other machinery, represented an attempt to control the work patterns of the employee - in this case the counter clerk.

Against this background any basis for common interests between the settler-managers and counter clerks was fraught with differences. While both, to some extent, performed the function of the collective worker, this interdependence was continually overlaid with the domination of the counter clerk by the settler-manager and the existence of prior allegiances.

1. In 1962 there was an exhibition of Betting Shops Equipment held in London. See CCOG (1962) p.38 for a brief comment on the exhibition.
For the sake of completeness it is necessary to mention the boardman's position, but the relative insignificance of this job task within the labour process, as well as the numbers involved, does not warrant detailed attention. The function of the boardmen was to assist both the backer and the LBO employees in displaying racing results and up-to-date betting odds.\(^1\) The work was limited to racing hours and thus suitable to part-time employment. It was not, however, crucial (as was the counter clerk's task) to the taking, settling, and paying out of bets; in offering only a qualitative improvement to the backer, the boardman's job lent itself to casual, and not merely part-time, labour. In this vein boardmen were made up of sections of the workforce who did not regard this job as a central interest: moonlighters, OAPs, dropouts, and 'unemployed' workers.

At the same time, some boardmen were employed as regular, full-time employees: but these were learning the 'trade', the LBO managers of the future, and obviously an entirely different group to the casual boardmen. Not until the end of the decade did the trainee manager grade come to replace the 'apprenticeship' of the boardman.

In consequence, it is impossible to generalise about the interests of boardmen. Clearly, the function itself remained wholly within the collective worker; yet the interests of the groups involved were either not primarily determined by their position in the labour process or conditioned by their visions of becoming a settler-manager. As such, the Boardmen constitute another strand of the divergent rather than common interests among the LBO workers.

\(^1\) Depending on betting turnover and/or race meetings, it would require someone to perform only this function.
To conclude: the structuring of the labour process in the expansion of the LBOS inherited divisions from the preceding sections of the bookmaking industry. Yet due to the decentralised nature of off-course cash betting, the employers soon faced problems of control with the expansion of betting chains. This implied a delegation of some bookmaking functions and a measure of control over the labour process to the settler-manager in each LBO. This served to generate a basis of common interest between the employing bookmaker and the settler-manager in opposition to any common interests between the LBO staff through performing the function of the collective worker. Such divisions were reinforced both through the sexual division of labour, as it had in the credit offices, and the casual nature of much boardman employment.
(ii) Bookmaking as Retailing: the growth of betting chains.

(1) The pattern of expansion in the period of betting chains.

The characteristic form of the individually-owned LBO, or small-scale betting chain, of the initial expansion gave way in the late 1960s and early 1970s to the growth of national, large-scale, betting chains. The continued expansion of bookmaking was accompanied by a rapid concentration and centralisation of ownership and control of LBOs, with growing links between bookmaking firms and other sections of the economy, which can be called 'established capital.' These changes altered the very nature of the bookmaking industry with important implications for the LBO employees.

As the period of initial expansion came to a close in the mid-late 1960s, the basis had been established for the dramatic development of the industry. Between 1967-68 and 1974-75 betting stakes rose by more than 50%, as table 3.4 shows. A closer examination suggests that the vast majority of this increase was in the turnover of the off-course bookmakers. Within this general expansion, however, the gradual emergence of localised betting chains established the preconditions for a period of rapid centralisation of ownership and the development of national LBO concerns.

Prominent in this phase of development were the two major bookmaking firms who had initially declined to become involved with LBOs:

Ladbroke and William Hill. (1) The traditional areas of credit

1. William Hill was the most notable of the various rags to riches stories in bookmaking history:

"One of 11 children, he was born 68 years ago (1903) in a Birmingham slum, and left school at 12 to work as a farmer's boy." (Sporting Life 16.10.71 p.3).

During the first world war, Hill found himself working as an apprentice in the BSA works in Birmingham. And it was here he started making a book. It was not until 1929 that he came to London, 'standing up' at the important Southern race meetings and greyhound tracks:

"More than once in those days he knew what it was to be broke" (ibid). However, business eventually proved so successful that just before the war he was able to move from his credit offices in Jermyn Street to the more desirable Park Lane area.

"He was heavily committed financially, so while the biggest firms of the day contracted their businesses, he had no

...... footnote continued .........
It was this period that laid the foundation for Hill's immense business success. In 1954, the firm became a public company, the first bookmaking firm to do so. And Hill himself pursued a very successful 'second' career in breeding racehorses.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>On-course bookmakers</th>
<th>Off-course bookmakers</th>
<th>Totalisators</th>
<th>Total subject to gen'1 betting duty</th>
<th>Totalisators at dog racecourses</th>
<th>Football &amp; other similar pools</th>
<th>Betting by coupon at fixed odds</th>
<th>Total taxed stakes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>Horse racing</td>
<td>Dog racing</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>(c)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-65</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-66</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-67</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>8(d)</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>1,194</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>160.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-68</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>957</td>
<td>34(d)</td>
<td>1,252</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>160.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968-69</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>898</td>
<td>39(d)</td>
<td>1,252</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-70</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>993</td>
<td>27(d)</td>
<td>1,252</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-71</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>1,041</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1,232</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>160.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-72</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>1,161</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1,232</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>160.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-73</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>1,288</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1,232</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>160.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-74</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>1,465</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1,232</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>160.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-75</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>1,607</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>1,232</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>160.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-76</td>
<td>(estimate)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) The analysis between dog racing and other betting (mainly horse racing) is an approximation.

(b) To 23 October 1966. Subsequently included in the general betting duty.

(c) Revised series.

(d) In 1968-70 and earlier years certain bets on horse race totalisators were classified as being with off-course bookmakers; the stakes involved are believed to have been of the order of 7 per cent of those shown under the horse racing totalisators.

bookmaking were now in decline. The first major casualty had been fixed odds betting on football. This had taken place for many years, but in the early 1960s, perhaps with the outlet of LBOs, fixed odds betting was effectively competing with the pools promoters. There was no tax on fixed odd betting, unlike football pools, and the government were scarcely indifferent bystanders. In 1964, a tax was introduced which resulted in the virtual collapse of fixed odds betting.\(^1\)

Even more significantly, credit betting on horseracing was under pressure. Table 3.5 shows the dramatic decline in the credit business of William Hill at this time. While in 1968, credit betting had been twice the figure for LBOs, by 1971 it is little more than one third. Credit betting had nearly halved, while LBO turnover had more than trebled. The explanation of this dramatic decline rests partly in the non-separation of the cash and credit betting clienteles; the anticipation that credit backers would not frequent LBOs had not materialised. Secondly, it reflects the diminishing importance of 'trade' business; the traditional role of the large bookmakers in accepting bets from other bookmakers attempting to offset their liabilities was less significant with the rise of betting chains able to sustain

---

1. See Table 3.4 in 1964-65, the year in which the tax on fixed odds was introduced. Fixed odds coupon betting accounted for 15% of the combined fixed odds-football pool betting stakes. By 1969-70, this had fallen below 1%, and by 1974-75 to 1%.
Table 3.5: William Hill Organisation: a comparison of Credit and Cash Bookmaking 1968-71.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>LICENSED TURNOVER £000</th>
<th>BETTING OFFICES PRE-TAX PROFITS £000</th>
<th>CREDIT, COURSE AND ANTE-POST TURNOVER £000</th>
<th>PRE-TAX PROFIT £000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968a</td>
<td>18,221</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>38,564</td>
<td>L 245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>20,620</td>
<td>827</td>
<td>23,378</td>
<td>L 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>29,020</td>
<td>1,087</td>
<td>26,119</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>58,716</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>22,811</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:  
a 15 months  
b not discernible.  
L loss.

Source: Extel British Company Service.
large liabilities themselves. (1)

1. In the 1950s, the trade department in William Hill was run by Sam Burns, one-time boxing manager and subsequently a managing director of William Hill:

"Burns built up the Trade Room - a clearing house for smaller bookmakers hedging their liabilities - into the most efficient in the business. 'There was a lot more trade money in those days' recalls Burns. 'Nowadays, as well as the big firms like Hill's, Ladbroke's, Coral's, and Mecca, there are many other combines with over 100 betting shops which can afford to hold their liabilities". Hadert (1975).

Burns' career is of some interest. In the inter-war years, he coupled his more famous talents in the Boxing world, with making a book at West Ham and Clapton greyhound stadiums. Born in 1913, into a boxing family in London's East End, Burns left school to work in Fleet Street, eventually moving to the "Sporting Life" for whom he compiled racing form and wrote a Boxing column:

"But for me it was a bit slow. I could see I'd be stuck as a wage-earner. I've always been ambitious, and was determined to make money". (ibid).

Burns succeeded in both boxing and bookmaking. Having built up a small chain of betting shops with Terry Downes, whom he had 'managed' to a boxing world title, Burns sold out to William Hill. He eventually became managing director of the William Hill Organisation in 1972.
Against this background, the major firms entered the market for LBOs. In 1967, Ladbrokes became a public company which provided a launching pad for a massive 6-year expansion. Through taking over existing betting chains, Ladbrokes aimed at a national network, transcending the geographical restrictiveness of the early betting chains. William Hill soon followed the example of their major rival.

These institutional re-arrangements both reflected and determined the rapid concentration and centralisation in the industry. Table 3.6 shows the extent of this transition. Taking turnover (i.e. total stakes) as a measure of centralisation, in 1969-70 the four major firms (or their forerunners) held just 15% of off-course betting. By 1972-73 their share had more than doubled to over 37%. Alternatively, taking LBO ownership as an indication, the change is even more dramatic. Between 1970 and 1973 the 'Big Four' trebled their number of LBOs. Since there had been little change in the total of LBOs in this period, this increase is almost entirely a reflection of the processes of concentration and centralisation. By 1973, the 'Big Four' owned 23% of all LBOs and received 37% of total stakes.

1. Betting chains of various sizes were taken over by Ladbrokes. Some were very large such as Danny Quastel in London, whose 137 LBOs Ladbrokes acquired in 1972. The driving force behind the expansion of Ladbrokes was Cyril Stein, whose uncle, Max Parker, had bought the firm in 1956. Stein, whose grandfather had arrived in Britain, a Jewish immigrant, at the end of the nineteenth century, had inherited an immediate bookmaking pedigree from his father, who had founded the 'Blower'. " ...... a grammar school boy who had graduated from business college into his uncle's betting business" (Kaye (1969) p.156), Stein brought Ladbrokes from their aloof position as bookmakers to the aristocracy to that of the leading firm of the Bookmaking industry.

2. Which indicates they owned the more lucrative LBOs - a trend which continued in 1975 with turnover rising above 40% and LBO holdings declining to 21.4%.
Table 3.6 A comparison of the four main bookmaking firms 1970-1975.

(i) Estimated Turnover

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIRM</th>
<th>1969-70</th>
<th>% INDUSTRY</th>
<th>1972-73</th>
<th>% INDUSTRY</th>
<th>1974-75</th>
<th>% INDUSTRY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>£000</td>
<td></td>
<td>£000</td>
<td></td>
<td>£000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ladbroke Group</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>161,000</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>195,000</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mecca</td>
<td>16,100a</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>124,000</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>175,000</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Hill</td>
<td>44,000</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>123,300</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>161,400</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J.Coral</td>
<td>20,200b</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>75,000</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>123,000</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>150,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15.1%</td>
<td>403,300</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>654,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total for Industry:

|                | £000    |            | £000    |            | £000    |            |
|                | 993,000 | 100.0      | 1,288,000 | 100.0    | 1,607,000 | 100.0     |

(ii) Licensed Betting Office Ownership.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIRM</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>% INDUSTRY</th>
<th>1973</th>
<th>% INDUSTRY</th>
<th>1974</th>
<th>% INDUSTRY</th>
<th>1975</th>
<th>% INDUSTRY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NO.</td>
<td></td>
<td>NO.</td>
<td></td>
<td>NO.</td>
<td></td>
<td>NO.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ladbroke Group</td>
<td>481</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>1,140</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>1,096</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>989</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mecca</td>
<td>119a</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>705</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Hill</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>830</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>790</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J.Coral</td>
<td>260b</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>623</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>624</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>3,413</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>3,300</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>3,074</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total for Industry:

|                | 14,644| 100.0 | 14,873| 100.0 | 14,837| 100.0 | 14,371| 100.0     |

Sources: Various: the above figures are not generally available in several instances and some are approximations based on confidential interviews and reports. Annual Reports provide some information but tend not to show figures specifically on LBO turnover — particularly where gaming (i.e. casino) interests exist.

a. Taken as Clubman’s Club (Mid ’69).

b. Taken as Mark Lane Group in 1970.
The outcome was a general dichotomy within the industry between the large betting chains and individual operators; and it was a gap which increasingly widened. As the betting chains increased in size they were now able to hold their own liabilities, unlike the small-scale bookmakers. This allowed them to increasingly dispense with 'limits' on the amount that could be won by a backer and enabled them to compete on increasingly favourable terms with the small-scale bookmaker.\(^1\)

The basis for this dramatic expansion rests on the general capitalistic tendency of accumulation of capital, reflected in the developing concentration and centralisation. Undoubtedly, the potential rates of return on capital were particularly attractive; yet this is unlikely to explain the rapidity of concentration and centralisation since this was based on the development of various preconditions which underlay the high rates of profit.\(^2\) Firstly, this concerned the availability of money capital to take advantage of the rates of profit; secondly, the continued expansion of the industry depended, as ever, on

1. Limits might apply to different parts of the bet as well as a whole. While there might be restrictions on the total payout on any one bet, there could be a maximum return on a 'double', for instance. The limit would be in terms of a ratio to the initial stake (e.g. 200 to 1). If the amount 'won' on that double exceeded this limit, the bookmaker would only pay at the odds stated in the limit.
   * a 'double' is one bet on two different selections in different races; if both selections are successful, the bet is calculated accumulatively.

2. Estimates of the return on capital at this time were varied, but all were exceedingly remunerative:

"In the Times 4 March 1970 Mr. John Carrington considered that it could be 40 per cent to 50 per cent. The opinion was expressed by Mr. Raymond Eisenstein in the Investor's Chronicle 29 May 1970 that it might be between 30 per cent and 45 per cent .... On 1 October 1971 Mr. Balshaw of Hill's was quoted in the Evening Standard as saying that turnaround in bookmaking was quicker than in most industries. He liked to get the purchase money of a betting office back in eighteen months and mostly he succeeded". \textit{Moody} (1972) p. 39
the prior development of the betting medium; and, thirdly, there is the activity of state agencies who played a crucial role in assisting the rapid expansion of betting chains and the betting medium.

In the absence of interest from established capital, it was the bookmaking firms who continued the expansion of the industry. The finance for the growth of individual firms derived from two sources: firstly, the availability of money capital accumulated through LBOs, which was of considerable importance given the rapid cash flow. (1) Secondly, through opening up the channels of indirect funding by 'going public' and issuing share capital.

The extent of the funds available through the activities of LBOs was in part a consequence of the expanded betting medium. As the gaps in the racing calendar were filled, the emphasis switched from the absolute direct exploitation of labour to relative exploitation. This meant the expansion of betting opportunities within the period of horseracing, rather than its extension. This could be achieved by staggering race times at different meetings where two or more race meetings were held on one day. Since the normal time between each race was half an hour, offsetting the racing times of two concurrent meetings would provide a race to bet on every quarter of an hour, instead of two races at the same time every half an hour.

The precondition of staggered race times was two meetings per day per weekday. And again the bookmakers found the H.B.L.B., under the new Chairmanship of Lord Wigg, sympathetic to their demands. In 1968, the H.B.L.B. offered to 'arrange' racing fixtures so that two meetings per day

---

1. For instance, during 1968-69, Ladbrokes doubled their number of LBOs, but issued capital remained unchanged: "A cash flow of around £350,000 with a small overdraft and deferred liabilities amounting to no more than £167,000 had financed the expansion programme". Moody (1972) p.39
on a weekday would take place with staggered race times, thus enabling commentaries on all races in LBOs. (1) Despite some opposition from bookmakers concerning the 'price' - the basis of the betting levy would now be turnover and not profits - the deal eventually went through. (2) It increased the dominance of bookmaking interests over horseracing as a spectator sport, reflected in the reallocation of race meetings from Saturdays, Bankholidays, and evenings to days when there was little public attendance. (3)

1. One problem with having races at the same time was the constant interruption of race commentaries with betting shows and results. That this was the (new) policy of the HBLB is set out in the Guardian 24.7.68. As one critic of the HBLB commented: "This (policy) was intended to combine the interests of the Board and the bookmakers against punters, and to enlarge both the levy and bookmakers' profits." CCOG (1968 p.4)

2. The new levy scheme placed a disproportionate burden on the large firms. The new policy came in with effect from 1969.

3. CCOG (1968) : "The value to the Board (and to bookmakers) of additional afternoon meetings can be deduced from the fact that according to reports, the Board paid £2,000 to the Ayr racecourse authorities on 8th June 1968 when it transferred a meeting from the evening to the afternoon. A spokesman for the course said that 1,500 people attended. In the evening 5,000 to 6,000 people would be expected. The loss at the turnstiles was £2,000. Evidently, 44% of the extra off-course betting that took place in betting offices all over Britain greatly exceeded that sum".
The introduction of Greyhound Racing as a complementary alternative betting medium at this time allowed both absolute and relative direct exploitation of labour. The working day was lengthened with the introduction of Saturday morning greyhound racing, which provided betting opportunities over a period of perhaps six or seven hours - usually with an overlap between the morning greyhounds and afternoon horseracing. Also, Greyhound racing soon became promoted as a systematic afternoon alternative to horseracing.\(^1\) With Extel providing betting shows, results, and commentaries.\(^2\) With Greyhound racing offering eight races in two hours (compared with six races in two and a half hours in horseracing), more betting opportunities were provided in a given time.\(^3\)

This effort to expand the volume of betting through the development of the betting medium was not only quantitative, but qualitative. Links with the televising of horseracing were established in the 1960s and since 1969 the larger bookmaking firms have developed a bet (ITV 7) which explicitly covers the televised races.\(^4\)

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1. For many years a popular evening event. Greyhound racing became popularised as an afternoon betting medium when horseracing was restricted by the outbreak of foot and mouth disease and adverse weather conditions (1968-69).

2. Initially when less than two horserace meetings took place and, subsequently, when less than three.

3. There was also a qualitative difference, since it was a different medium and involved a different emphasis on types of betting, viz: forecast betting.

4. The larger companies have attempted to develop different forms of complex bets - not necessarily connected with television - which yield a higher losing rate (for the punter) than 'single' bets.
has provided a means of broadening and popularising betting in
general and a basis for developing specialist bets on these races. (1)
In addition, television provides opportunities for advertising particular
firms and not just betting generally. This may be entirely open,
through race sponsorship for instance, or slightly covert, such as
the strategic placing of an advertising hoarding where the TV cameras
cannot avoid it. (2) Bookmaking sponsorship of individual races has
increased, with whole race meetings sponsored on occasions as well as
the extension of bookmaking interests as owners of racecourses and
greyhound stadiums.

The development of the betting medium was not merely aimed at the
expansion of betting or influencing betting methods. The growth
of the LBO chains depended not merely on the volume of their funds, but
also their predictability. This implied the 'regularisation' of betting
returns, minimising the degree of uncertainty. Off-course betting
depended on the market prices determined on-course; and a major
contradiction of the LBO expansion was its reliance on an increasingly
weakened on-course market for returned prices of runners. (3) A weak

---

1. There is little doubt that the televising of horseracing by ITV owes
rather more to betting than the sport itself. "The broadcasts emphasise
the betting, giving as much attention to bookmaking as to horseracing".
(Moody (1972) p.40). This is especially apparent when horseracing is
abandoned, because a 'back-up' service is ready to hand in afternoon
greyhounds at Harringay so that some opportunities to bet are still provided.
Televised racing, in its present form, is two-edged for the bookmakers.
The backer may well prefer to place bets before racing and watch the races
on television at home. Thus while the market is expanded, continuous
betting suffers. Hence the persistent campaign to introduce television
into LBOs (at present illegal) which resolves this contradiction.

2. Interviews and 'hot' news in the change of ante-post betting on
forthcoming important races conveniently relayed to the announcer when
racing is being televised are other methods of 'free' advertising.

3. Starting Price returns are decided by representatives of the two
sporting papers. (Sporting Life and Sporting Chronicle) based on the
odds offered by the course bookmakers at the start of the race.
market could mean false prices; an increasing problem for off-course bookmakers as their demands for the expansion and redistribution of race meetings coincided with falling racecourse attendances. The danger that the on-course market would not reflect the pattern of off-course betting implied an uncertainty in the liabilities of the bookmakers. Consequently, the larger bookmaking chains could use their resources to drastically affect the on-course market, with a relatively small sum.

A further source of uncertainty in betting returns concerned the totalisator dividends. Unlike betting odds, the state of the totalisator pool at any one time was unknown and therefore difficult to influence. Gradually, the bookmakers stopped taking bets at totalisator dividends, initially at specific racetracks, but eventually introducing 'computerised odds' as a general replacement.\(^1\)

The development of the betting medium was both a consequence of the expansion of off-course betting and a precondition for its continuation. State agencies also played an important role in assisting this process, not merely in generally expanding bookmaking, but in promoting it in a particular direction. The activities of the HBLB have already been noted; but also of significance were the fiscal interests of the government and the state. The potential of the betting tax did not merely imply a policy of encouraging the expansion of bookmaking generally, but in promoting the development of large bookmaking chains. This would enable a more efficient method of tax collection and, arguably, reduce the extent of tax evasion.\(^2\)

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1. The totalisator odds were particularly important for forecast betting, which was also the most unpredictable of the pool dividends. Greyhound racing was particularly 'suspicious', and vulnerable, as far as the bookmakers were concerned, especially the afternoon meetings. At one particular greyhound track, Oxford, a succession of exceptionally high dividends prompted a widespread refusal to take bets at totalisator odds on their meetings.

2. Hood (1972) gives a succinct account of the development and impact of betting taxation.
In 1969, a new form of betting tax was introduced on the rateable value of LBOs. This was in addition to the turnover tax, now at 5%, and ostensibly gave a competitive advantage to the on-course bookmakers whose business had suffered in the 1960s. But the impact on the small-scale LBO owners was dramatic. By 1970, when the tax was repealed, the number of LBOs had fallen by nearly 1,000, representing 6% of the total number. In just seven months, the rateable value tax had driven out a large number of marginal businesses, both to the advantage of the larger chains (who increased their turnover) and the Treasury - as had been intended. It no doubt speeded up the process of concentration and centralisation through promoting a redistribution of both turnover and ownership in favour of the betting chains.

1. The tax was levied at three times the rateable value of the LBO and was expected to yield £7 million; it would also give on-course bookmakers (who were exempt since they had no 'premises') an advantage of 1% on turnover.

2. It was replaced by a 6% turnover tax on off-course bookmaking.

3. As Hood (1972) in his discussion of the tax suggested: "Very probably another motive was to counter local evasion of betting duty by driving small shops out of business since they could not evade this type of tax". p.194. It was probably only the bizarre side-effect of the tax - the near bankruptcy of the Government sponsored Horserace Totalisator Board - which saved the day of the small bookmaker; although it is important not to underestimate the impact of the militant action of many smaller bookmakers led by John Pegley, and assisted amongst others by Don Bruce, who campaigned against the tax despite the indifference of the Bookmakers' trade associations and the hostility of the large bookmakers. As Hood (1972) suggests, the large bookmakers were not happy about the withdrawal of the tax: "This clemency no doubt displeased the largest firms, which were looking for a 'clean-up'". p.195.
The discussion so far has centred on how the structure of the industry changed so rapidly; it remains to consider the implications. In particular, how this quantitative expansion of individual firms implied a qualitative change in the nature of bookmaking. Essentially, a bookmaker relies on long-run probability in order to retain a certain percentage of the amount staked; this implies the short-term vulnerability of smaller bookmakers to a series of 'poor' results for the book. (1)

The legalising of LBOs had an important impact in reducing the long-term period in providing the opportunities of continuous betting, given the development of the betting medium. The expansion of betting chains added a further dimension. As the bookmaker expanded his business, increasing his holding of LBOs, the number of backers necessarily increased and the total number of bets on any one race rose. As the expansion continued, the bookmaker took an increasing number of bets from an increasing clientele. The implication was that the 'book' would 'make' itself.

While during the initial expansion, in a small betting chain, a 'bad' result might have had a similar impact in all the LBOs, as the betting chain grew a 'bad' result for one LBO might be a 'good' result in another. At a given size of betting chain, the bookmaker becomes virtually indifferent to the results of particular races, or of the performance of individual LBOs, since he knows that local unevenness will tend to cancel itself out over the firm as a whole. The percentage return on stakes becomes largely predictable, and income can be relied upon with some certainty. This characterises the period of bookmaking as retailing. (2)

1. Actuarial skill may minimise their effects, but can scarcely reverse them.
2. In the words of a representative of William Hill: "It's a retailing business. I'm successful because I'm a retailer." (Interview D. Konrath, 12.9.74).
Once the predictability of return on money capital had been achieved and generalised, the links with established capital became tighter. The post 1970 phase of the expansion of the Bookmaking industry has been characterised by the increasing interdependence of bookmaking and other sectors of economy, ending the relative isolation of the industry. The precise complexities of this relationship are beyond the scope of this discussion: what is of particular concern are the important influences on the relations between and amongst employers and employees, as mediated through the labour process. In this context, the relationship between established capital and bookmaking has appeared in two forms: the purchase of bookmaking firms by conglomerates and the diversification of bookmaking companies into other areas.

Looking at the 'Big Four', only Ladbrokes and J.Coral Ltd remain in the hands of the bookmakers. And both have diversified, with Ladbrokes the outstanding example.

1. As Mandel (1976) has argued:
   "... Monopoly capital has no reason to be hostile to the whole development of the intensive capitalization and industrialization of all sectors of society because it participates itself in this process - at least as soon as 'new' capital has successfully performed its historical role of opening up new fields for investment and experimenting in new products, so that the profitability of these novel realms is guaranteed." (p.389).

2. Both aspects are, of course, different sides of the same phenomenon: if the larger firms do not diversify then they are likely to be swallowed by the conglomerates. Hence Mandel's exposition appears as schematic if considered to reflect the replacement of 'new' capital by established capital at the level of institutions. The transition is from one institutional form to another, not from one institution to another.

3. Despite the attentions of various conglomerates, e.g. EMI's interest in Ladbrokes in 1977.

The Founder of J.Coral Ltd was Joe Coral. Born in Poland in 1904, he came to England in 1912:

"He now says that his career was settled by his very first bet, on the 1918 Derby: Grand Parade sailed in at 33-1, which netted him four times his regular weekly wage and persuaded him from then on, wholly logically, to spend more time studying form than studying for his job." (Caulkin (1973) p.68)

Footnote 3 continued ............
Footnote 3 cont'd ......

In the early 1920s, Coral was placing the bets of his fellow workers with the local street bookie; noticing the regularity with which the bookie won, he started to hold the bets himself, "backed by fully £5 in the Post Office, which I had been given on my Barmitzvah". (ibid p.68).

By 1930, Coral had an office in Stoke Newington. Despite various setbacks, using £30,000 capital he managed to open a West End credit office, after the war, primarily for trade accounts. The venture failed and he was forced to rely on the street pitches to build up the business again; which he did very successfully.
Table 3.7 shows the development of the Ladbroke Group between 1963 and 1974. As the bookmaking side rapidly expanded at the turn of the decade, so Ladbrokes developed outside interests, casinos, entertainments, property, holidays, and hotels.

The basis by which Ladbrokes could so dramatically expand was that which also attracted firms outside the bookmaking industry: the immense success of the betting chains with many of the larger firms recording ever increasing and predictable "returns" each year, combined with the particular attractiveness of the business as an immediate source of cash. Since 1971, the William Hill Organisation has been part of the ubiquitous Sears Holdings, while Grand Metropolitan Ltd own Mecca Bookmakers.

Such an involvement in the Bookmaking Industry is not limited to the largest companies. For instance, in 1970, Leisure and General Holdings, who had wide interests in catering and other parts of the service sector, bought a chain of 56 betting shops in Liverpool owned by W.J.Connor. This new purchase was itself to finance a large-scale expansion:

"The liquidity flowing from the cash trading policy and the profitability of Connor will greatly assist the development of the Company in its expansion and for further acquisitions." (1)

This highlights the relationship between the newly developed bookmaking sector and established capital: the former was to be used to finance the expansion of the latter, or at least other areas within the 'service' sector. In practice this has meant a reinforcement of the tendency which emerged with betting chains: the expansion of turnover and regularisation of returns. This was now not simply demanded by the internal logic of the bookmaking industry, but also by the requirements of other sectors of activity.

Table 3.7

The development of Ladbroke Group 1963-1974

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>HOTELS</th>
<th>HOLIDAYS</th>
<th>ENTERTAINMENTS</th>
<th>RETAIL BIGHTING</th>
<th>CREDIT BIGHTING</th>
<th>CASINOS</th>
<th>PROPERTY</th>
<th>SPOT BALL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1971</td>
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<td>1970</td>
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<tr>
<td>1967</td>
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<td>1966</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ladbroke Group Limited, Report and Accounts 1974
(2) The labour-process in the period of retailing bookmaking.

Retailing bookmaking implied the predictability of retained stakes and the maximising of cash flow. The impact of these changes was rapid, with important developments in the way work was organised not merely within LBOs, but between them. The increasing interdependence of the LBOs of a betting chain, implied the increasing socialization of the labour-process, establishing a new interrelationship between LBO employees.

The general impact of these changes can be seen in the changing pattern of employment in the industry. Table 3.8 indicates how overall employment levels stabilised at the end of the 1960s after a decade of expansion. In fact since 1967, overall employment had slightly fallen back, the expansion in female employment not sufficient to compensate for the decline in that of men. When the fall in male employment finally stopped in 1971, the level was below that of 1964. This represented the declining demand for settler-managers, presumably as individual LBOs grew in size and the number of LBOs declined.

1. It should be noted Table 3.8 is for Great Britain, while Table 3.2 is for the United Kingdom: in consequence the decline in male employment between 1969 and 1970 is probably understated; it may also mean that total employment began to decline slightly earlier. However, given the non-correspondence between "LBOs" and "Betting and Gambling", the differences are not of sufficient order to draw more than general conclusions. The balance of the figures might, for instance, be affected by the growth of casinos at this time.

2. Consider Table 3.1 which shows an 8% fall in the number of LBOs between the peak of 1966 and 1971.
### Table 3.8: No. of employees in employment in "Betting and Gambling" 1969-73.

Figures in '000s.

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>35.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>36.9</td>
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<td>Males &amp; Females</td>
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<td>58.0</td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>79.6</td>
<td>85.8</td>
<td>91.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Interpretative Notes:**

a  Figures for 1966 (UK only) are shown for comparative purposes. See Table 3.2
b  Figures for UK only.

With the proposed discontinuation of national insurance cards, which provided the basis for employment statistics, a new system of deriving labour statistics has been introduced, operating on a census method in a particular week in June. This is more fully described in the Dept. of Employment Gazette, August 1973 pp 739-40. The changeover year was chosen as 1971, for which estimates were made on both bases. 1971 (a) relates to the insurance card system, 1971 (b) to the census system. The disparity is probably explained by this passage from the August 1973 Gazette, p. 740.

"...... in the Census of Employment, a person who had two regular jobs with different employers in the census week would be counted twice. Consequently, the Census of Employment might be expected to give estimates higher than the Census of Population in particular industries and services where secondary employment is common".

**Source:**

The continuing expansion of female employment since 1963 may also suggest that the tendency for the size of individual LBOs to increase outweighed the impact of the falling number of LBOs. There is little suggestion of the substitution of female for male labour, since this was probably not significant until the mid-1970s. But of particular importance was the increasing use made of part-time workers. The nature of the industry, with most of the work being performed in the afternoon period, offered employers the opportunity to eliminate full-time workers as the new betting chains were gradually rationalised. Table 3.9 gives some indication of the growth of part-time employment, showing an increase of 25% between 1971 and 1973.\(^{(1)}\)

The advent of retailing bookmaking had seen a continual fall in the number of settler-managers, a stabilising of employment opportunities for the counterclerks, and the development of part-time work on an increasing scale.\(^{(2)}\)

The question facing the employer was how to implement the imperatives of retailing bookmaking.\(^{(3)}\) Essentially, it involved two related strategies: changing the pattern of control over the labour-process and an increased exploitation of labour.

The changing nature of bookmaking both demanded and permitted new patterns of control. While the settler-manager retained discretion over working methods and bookmaking functions, each LBO functioned as

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1. Of all the periods for which statistics are given, the early 1970s are perhaps the least reliable. Did, for instance, the Department of Employment census merely 'discover' existing casual work? How much seasonal employment is picked up in a June census? What effect did the expanding casino industry have at this time? Still it is worth noting that the number of LBOs in 1973 was the highest since 1969. See Table 3.1

2. There were more part-time than full-time women workers in the industry. By 1973, they comprised more than a third of the total labour force in Betting and Gambling.

3. This also includes the pressures to expand in and from areas other than bookmaking.
Figures in '000s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1971</th>
<th>1972</th>
<th>1973</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Full-time employment:</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>24.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>47.2</td>
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<td><strong>Part-time employment:</strong></td>
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<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>41.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Interpretive Note:**

Part-time is not more than 30 hours per week. This analysis is available through the adoption of the Census method discussed in the notes to table 3.8; the national insurance card system did not distinguish between full and part-time staff.

**Source:** Department of Employment Gazette May 1974 p. 403.
a relatively independent unit in opposition to the desired interdependence of the betting chain necessary for the predictability of returns. At the same time, the lessened significance of the performance of the individual LBO implied the settler-manager could be relieved of some areas of discretion and control. What did this mean in practice? It resulted in increasing control over the activities of the LBOs, through the introduction of machinery and uniformly-imposed working systems, often under the guise of improving security.

In the period of initial expansion, the extent of mechanisation had been limited. The only aspect of the labour process which lent itself to immediate and systematic introduction of machinery was the taking of bets. In that context, the use of cash registers (a) increased the productivity of labour by enabling more bets to be taken in a given period of time, (b) directly devalued labour-power through deskilling and (c) provided a means of control over the performance of specific tasks.

Focussing on the third aspect, the use of cash registers gradually came to be accommodated as one aspect of administrative control over the labour process. Subsequently it was accompanied by various forms of control over betting slips, usually a camera fitted with a time clock into which bets were fed as they were taken.

The employers' rationale is that such checks are structured in the pattern of work to minimise fraud. The use of electric cash registers and timed cameras reduce the possibilities of 'fiddling'.

1. "We think our security is more or less foolproof, and we tell our staff so; it's a guarantee for them, apart from anything else. But you always get someone trying to fiddle. We find we have to sack about 100 shop managers a year for cheating or betting themselves". Ron Shaw, head of J.Coral's bookmaking security. Quoted in Caulkin (1973) p. 72.
The security system at J.Coral is perhaps typical of those operated by the major firms. This sycophantic description shows what happens to the bet after it has been taken by the counter clerk and photographed in the LBO:

"Coral's security arrangements are a wonder to behold. Every single winning bet at every one of the group's 500-odd offices comes back to security headquarters at Dagenham, where 70 people take constant samples of the incoming slips. Every bet paying over £10 is singled out, as are bets on the dogs, and any slip which has been altered. They are then screened by two votters, who make a further selection, whence they are passed on to experienced settlers who recalculate the winnings electronically. Finally, the time when the bet was accepted is double-checked against the time the race started." (1)

While the introduction of security systems might be seen as eliminating one source of uncertainty - fraud - security itself was just one aspect of control, as illustrated in this very revealing comment of one Personnel Manager:

"As you expand you have to have more control. The employer has to become more security-minded in a systematic manner, for it is no longer possible to vet on a personal basis. It demands a control system". (2)

In practice, 'security' was used as a blanket term to cover the monitoring of a whole range of working procedures. It was not merely confined to machinery, but encompassed the work process as a whole. It provided a rationale for the constant checking of the cash statements of individual LBOs: this did not merely test the honesty of employees, but was a means of ensuring particular and uniform accounting systems.

1. Caulkin (1973) p.72. Not all employers responded to 'fiddling' in this way, although clearly the scale of the monitoring operation would depend on the volume of bets received. Some, such as J.Windsor in Leeds, allowed for a certain amount of 'fiddling' in their wage rates ! See Chapter 4 for a further discussion of 'fiddling'.

It provided a basis for developing new working systems, e.g.
instructions on 'cashing-up' tills, on the banking of money, and on
the paying out of bets. 'Security' was thus used as a means of
extending a whole range of standardised, controlling, working practices
into the labour process of the LBO employees.

While control over the labour-process was structured within the
new working systems (1), an administrative structure between the
employer and the LBO employees was developed to ensure the day-to-day
compliance of the LBO staff to established procedures and to take
decisions no longer required of the settler-managers. To this extent,
a hierarchical system of management had been established, with specialist
departments at head office. A typical example is that of the
J.Coral Group, who at this time (1974) owned more than 600 LBOs.
Their structure is shown in Figure 3.2 (2). This shows that three
levels of management had been inserted between the LBO employees and
the employer. This new line management structure was accompanied by
an expansion of head office with the growth of an estates department.

1. Apart from cash registers and cameras, machinery as yet had made
little impact. The use of settling machines has become more widespread
in recent years, but usually in addition, rather than instead of settling
expertise. The microelectronic revolution, however, is likely to change
the operation of LBOs, certainly eliminating the boardmen.

2. This structure came into being after the merger in 1971 between
J.Coral Ltd and the Mark Lane Group. The latter had employed area
managers for several years, but J.Coral Ltd was predominantly a London-
based firm, with LBOs controlled direct from Regent Street Head Office.
Following the merger the J.Coral settler-managers found themselves
responsible to this hierarchical structure and not head office. Other
major firms operated similar systems to that in Figure 3.2, though often
with different titles.
Figure 3.2

The Administrative Structure of the J.Coral Group.

MANAGING DIRECTOR

REGIONAL MANAGERS
(10)

AREA MANAGERS
(33)

ASST. AREA MANAGERS
(35)

SHOP MANAGERS
(various grades)

HEAD OFFICE

PERSONNEL
ESTATES
SECURITY

Source: Interview B. Kavanagh (Personnel Manager J.Coral Ltd)
security section, and personnel department\(^1\). The significance of this differentiation of the function of capital is that it was based not merely on the delegation of that function by the employer, but on the removal of control functions from the settler-manager.

If the demands of a predictable cash flow and percentage return on stakes implied new patterns of control, then the desire to increase cash flow and the percentage of stakes retained implied a greater exploitation of labour. The development of the betting medium meant longer working hours particularly on Saturdays with morning greyhound racing\(^2\); increased work through the staggering of race times during the racing period; and an increase in work through the general expansion of betting and/or the raising of work load levels\(^3\). Pressure on work loads was often drastically increased: for instance the loss of a counter clerk might mean an increased workload of 50\% (where there had been three counter clerks) or 100\% (where there had been two) for those who remained.

1. This development of head office had taken place between 1968 and 1974. See Interview B. Kavanagh 13.8.74
2. Lunch breaks on a Saturday became something of a sick joke amongst LBO employees. And still are. With the overlap of Greyhound Racing and Horseracing (aimed at keeping the punters in the LBO), there is no opportunity for a break.
3. The development in the initial expansion of one race meeting per day was often approved by employees (not just the settler-manager) who might otherwise have a boring day. The expansion of the betting medium in the late 1960s and early 1970s was not well received since this was merely extra pressure.
This was related to a second aspect of increasing the 
exploitation of labour: the volume of betting could be increased 
with the same workforce if labour was sufficiently mobile. While 
racing was held at the same time throughout the country, and with 
the wide distribution of LBOs, there were inherent limits to the 
mobility of labour. Yet not all LBOs were equally busy on every 
day; even on Saturdays some LBOs would not take many bets. It 
was this potential movement of labour which was attractive to the 
employers. Providing labour was mobile, the same turnover could be 
achieved with less labour. The potential gains from this mobility 
now became both desirable and worthwhile as the betting chains embraced 
more and more LBOs and an increasing workforce.

The consequences of these various changes in the labour-process 
was the generation of a stronger basis for common interests between 
the LBO employees; the increasing socialisation of the labour-process 
affected social relationships both within and between LBOs. These 
changes can be understood in exploring the position of the settler-managers.

Firstly, retailing bookmaking implied the devaluation of the 
position of the settler-manager, which resulted in a changed basis 
of co-operation within LBOs. The settler-manager no longer retained 
discretion over bookmaking functions; insofar as decisions had to be taken, 
these were made further up the hierarchy - all the settler-manager had 
to do was notify the extent of liabilities. Instead, he had become a 
salesman\(^1\). This can be seen as a decline in the position of the 
settler-manager both in terms of control and surveillance, and unity

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1. As D. Konrath (WHO Personnel Director) commented: "No shop managers 
are able to take bets on a hedging basis. His responsibilities have 
changed in emphasis - selling the service and building up the shop". 
(Interview 12.9.74).
and co-ordination. At the concrete level they are inseparable, and must increase or decrease together. The removal of the bookmaking function from the settler-manager is by definition a restriction on his control of the system of work.

The settler-manager became rather more a 'settler' than a 'manager', notionally a salesman, but in practice an administrator of rules and regulations passed down the hierarchy and the provider of routine information on the performance of the LBO. The old 'skills' were no longer required - indeed, they were a liability. By the early 1970s it became clear that the larger firms

"don't have managers nowadays - firms don't even want them - only boys to carry out orders". (1).

In contrast with the initial expansion, the control of work organisation was now increasingly exercised externally to the LBO. To this extent, the settler-manager increasingly performed the function of the collective worker to the exclusion of the global function of capital. Or, more precisely, the settler-manager became increasingly an integral part of the labour-process within the LBO, rather than the external controller of that labour process.

In consequence, the basis of co-operation was altered: settler-managers, counter clerks and boardmen were all subject to an increasing external control; and in performing the function of the collective worker, their common interests were strengthened.

1. Interview George Sawford 23.7.74

This loss of discretion also extended to staffing matters; settler-managers, in contrast to (some) instances in the initial expansion, could not hire and fire; nor did they have much say over who else worked in the shop. They were expected to ensure the day-to-day 'smoothness' of the operation of the LBO, but within fairly stringent guidelines.
Yet, perhaps more significantly, the demanded interdependence of retailing bookmaking established a second basis for common interests: that between the settler-managers of different LBOs. Now that the individual performance of an LBO on any given day was relatively immaterial\(^1\), the settler-managers in each LBO were brought into a relationship of co-operation, not competition.\(^2\)

Clearly, they remained individually accountable for the performance of their LBO, but retailing bookmaking emphasised their interdependence with the removal of the bookmaking function from the settler-manager. Furthermore, the diminution and elimination of commission payments served as indicators that the era of isolated LBO units was passed.\(^3\)

All settler-managers were affected by these changes; the general devaluation of their position was accompanied by falling wages, partly due directly to this devaluation, partly to their increasingly worsening labour market position.\(^4\)

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1. Not to be confused with the longer term profitability of individual LBOs. Just as the chain as a whole would be expected to make a predictable gain over a relatively short period, so would individual LBOs in the long term.

2. This coincided with the breaking down of the bond of occupational solidarity. Retailing bookmaking meant the diminution of employer dependence on the 'old-style' settler-manager.

3. The increasing salaries of head office staff and betting duty rates had seen a decline in the importance of commission. One City Tote Manager had received more than £1,000 p.a. as Commission in the early mid 1960s, yet by 1970, in the same LBO with very little difference in the profit of that LBO, the Commission was negligible. Ladbrokes and Hills 'bought out' commission payments in the 1970s (but not until TUBE had been established), while Coral managers had lost their commission following the merger with Mark Lane.

4. The decline in commission can be seen as a fall in the revenue component as that performance of the global function of capital diminished. Simultaneously the reduced employer demands of the settler-managers implied an element of deskill ing, i.e. elimination of bookmaking function; while the training schools were now producing settlers in greater numbers.
If the increasing interdependence, and its consequences, established a basis for common interests amongst the settler-managers, this was further reinforced by the efforts of the employers to exact a greater productiveness from their employees. Standards of settling workloads were raised; while the more 'efficient' use of labour implied staff shortages: settler-managers might find themselves operating the till or doing the board. While settler-managers had lost a measure of their control, they were now expected to 'manage' in a rather different sense.

The dramatic changes in the social organisation of work did not merely generate tendencies for common interests; pressures built up which divided employees, particularly within the LBOs. Firstly, even though the relationship between the settler-manager and other LBO employees had altered, he still remained an immediate source of control. This was a structured division within the labour process which could never be entirely overcome, despite the pressures generating a greater degree of common interests amongst all LBO employees. Perhaps the settler-manager did not determine the rules and systems of work, but part of his job was to enforce them. Secondly, despite all these rapid changes in the industry, the sexual division of labour was still rigidly adhered to. Few women had become settlers, and fewer still settler-managers. The domination of settler-manager - counter clerk was still simultaneously one of male-female.  

1. It is important to point out that some firms did employ women settler-managers, from the outset e.g. John Joyce Ltd in the North East, Roland Jones in Blackpool. Yet in the major firms it was extremely unlikely to find women settler-managers. (Men might be counter clerks temporarily). Not until the mid-1970s did Ladbrokes become the first national company to regularly use female settler-managers - in the North-East.
Aside from these general parameters, the specific changes in the labour process had different effects on the different job functions. For instance, the demands of mobility of labour were particularly disruptive of the routines and social relationships of the counter clerks. It could involve a good deal of extra travelling time at very short notice. Yet it could benefit the settler-managers in helping them to run their LBOs. A second example arises from the removal of control from the settler-manager. While this devalued his position into an increasingly routine range of tasks, the counter clerks were not altogether unhappy that the arbitrary control of the settler-manager had been curbed. In this way, the organisation of the labour-process promoted both common and divergent interests amongst the LBO employees.

To conclude: The development of retailing bookmaking resulted in the devaluation of the position of the settler-manager. Control over the labour-process was increasingly exercised from outside the LBO, through the use of standardised procedures and security systems. The effect was partly to emphasise the bases of common interest amongst workers in the LBOs; but more significantly the changed position of the settler-manager implied an inter dependence across LBOs, and hence a basis for common interests amongst that group.
Note 1: The Principles of Bookmaking.

It is important to draw a distinction between betting in the form of sidestakes and the practice of bookmaking. In sidestake wagers, those involved have a necessary interest in the result; in contrast the art of bookmaking is to achieve a pattern of betting which leaves the bookmaker relatively indifferent to the outcome. A hypothetical example can help here.

If A and B make a wager about a particular event, which to simplify matters, has two possible outcomes, X winning or Y winning, this is not bookmaking. It is a simple sidestake. Only when A (or B) begins to take bets from other people nominating X or Y as the winner does bookmaking emerge. Suppose that B makes a wager of £11 on X and C makes a wager of £11 on Y, and both wagers are made with A. Now A will have had to state the odds at which he is prepared to take such bets. He might have considered the chances of X and Y to have been similar, thus he might offer the same odds about both outcomes. Given that A, like most bookmakers, is not setting up in business as a public charity, he will not offer odds which will ensure a loss. In other words he must ensure that, at any one time, B (or C) cannot back both X and Y and still win.\(^{(1)}\) Thus if he offered even money (odds of 1:1) about X or Y, whatever the result A would neither win nor lose. A would receive bets totalling £22. If X won, then B would collect £22 (£11 winnings plus £11 stake). If Y won, C would collect £22.

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1. i.e. that added together the inverse of odds, the chances of outcomes should be greater than 1. If A offered 2:1 against X winning and 2:1 against Y winning, then B could place £11 on X and £11 on Y, thus £22 in all, but would be assumed of a return of £33 (£22 winnings plus £11 stake) whatever the outcome.
The problem here is that A makes no money for his skilfull services. What he must do is ensure that he pays out less than he receives. And this must be achieved by offering shorter odds; he must bet in his own favour. So instead of offering even money about X and Y, he shortens both odds. They become 10:11, i.e. in order to win £10, B or C must stake £11. This time, whatever the result, A pays out only £21 (£10 winnings plus £11 stake). Thus he 'wins' £1 and is much happier.

This schematic view, however, hides the Art of Bookmaking. Nobaiy makes a bet without knowing the price offered. Nor does he have to bet. The above example in practice only holds true when B and C accept the odds offered by A. If C declines to bet, A takes only £11 from B and runs the risk of losing if the outcome is a win for X. Indeed both B and C may consider X to have a better chance than Y and will both back X. In this way A may stand to lose £20 if X wins (although he will win £22 if X loses).

Thus a bookmaker only attempts to make a book; he cannot ensure it. He tries to attract betting on all the outcomes of an event and he may alter the odds he is offering in consequence. But he cannot ensure that B and C will back X or Y such that he will win. Only that the probabilities are in the Bookmaker's favour.

1. This leaves to one side the question of agreeing to accept the ruling market price at the start of a race, i.e. "starting price" betting. It does not affect the basic principles involved.

2. That A will win £22 if Y wins owes nothing to bookmaking. He is in fact making the equivalent of a bet himself on Y winning.
Note 2: The Jewish influence on the development of the Bookmaking Industry: individual achievement and occupational community.

The historical links between Jews and the business of money are well documented. As effectively guest workers in other people's countries, it is not surprising they have concentrated their activities in areas as essentially transferable as money and finance. The movement of a number of Jewish immigrants into a developing Bookmaking industry is another facet of this.

Many of the important firms were built up by - and remain in the control of - those and their descendants who entered Britain at the turn of the century from Eastern Europe. That first generation included, for instance, David Cope and Joe Coral; while some of those currently in charge of major firms, Cyril Stein and Bernard Coral, for instance, can trace their ancestry directly to the Jewish immigrants of some seventy to ninety years ago.

This disproportionate involvement provides rather more information about bookmaking than the Jews. As an occupation it did offer opportunities of individual achievement, based on some actuarial skill, yet essentially a skill that was mobile and which demanded little other than human resources. Consequently, bookmaking did not merely draw the interest of the Jewish immigrants; it also brought in those looking for a way out of the dead end position of working-class life, the most famous example being William Hill. The Bookmaking industry reflected gambling generally: the opportunity to go from 'rags to riches' - and very often the reverse in even quicker fashion. (1)

1. Many of the major bookmakers had at one time or another 'gone broke'; e.g. William Hill and Joe Coral.
While the nature of bookmaking promoted a particular brand of individual achievement within the dominant ideology of individualism characterising Western capitalism, the Jews also made a significant contribution to the development of occupational community within the industry. The impact of the Jews on capitalism has been critically examined, amongst others, by Weber who challenged previously held views that Jews possessed a 'capitalistic spirit'. Following Weber, Antoni summarises his argument:

"... (The Jews) contribution to the development of the West rests ... only in their character as a guest people who follow the petty bourgeois ethic of the prophets and psalmists towards the members of their own sect, an ethic which reflects the ancient rule of good neighbourliness and solidarity, while practising usury and speculation in their relations with the stranger."

(Antoni (1970) p.138)

Such a distinction involves a separation which perhaps does not resemble reality, highlighting the disadvantages of Weberian 'ideal-type' analysis; yet the possibilities of contradictory tendencies can be seen. Against the background of an activity whose social form emphasised individual achievement, the traditional values of the Jews provided the basis for a communal dialogue.

Of course, the pressures for occupational community did not merely derive from the traditions of Jewish society: antipathy against the Jews was reinforced by the social distancing of bookmaking generally. "Respectability" for the 'profession' has been a constant demand from bookmakers. Wealth has not bought social respect, even for the lucky few. (1)

1. Kaye (1969) p. 50, in reference to the 1920s, reflects that bookmaking was " ... then in many quarters regarded as an unsavoury occupation". In more recent times the profits of the Bookmaking firms who are public companies have been applauded by the stock exchange bundits and admired by 'respectable' business men.
Bookmakers have always wished to be considered as just another profession:

"What we feel is that someone should at some time say that bookmakers are ordinary respectable members of the community... Bookmakers are honourable people, meeting a demand from the majority of people". (D.Summers quoted in RC (1949-51)(b) p. 357.

The general public are somehow given the 'wrong' impression, the 'wrong' image:

"Unfortunately, through Tom Webster, and people like that, everyone visualises the bookmaker with a watch chain and large cigars and diamonds etc. That is merely his stock-in-trade; no-one wants to bet with a seedy bookmaker, therefore he has got to look well dressed. Bookmaking is like every other profession: if you work hard you will get a living at it, but I cannot recall, and none of my colleagues can recall, any bookmaker dying and leaving a fortune comparable with those made much more easily in industry". (ibid p. 363).

But if social traditions and antinathy had the impact of pushing together bookmakers and their employees, there were also strong reasons in the practice of bookmaking for the existence of trust amongst the bookmaking fraternity. The placing and hedging of bets did not necessarily involve an exchange of money at that time and might only be a verbal commitment. If such agreements were not honoured, then bookmaking at least before LBOs, could scarcely have functioned. An awareness of this fact (in addition to the potential consequences of defaulting) prompted a degree of trust both between bookmakers and clients and amongst the bookmakers themselves. (1)

1. In addition gambling debts are not recoverable at law. Although put forward as something of a publicity exercise D. Summers' (NHPA) comment to the RC (1949-51) is interesting:

"(Bookmaking) is a calling in which a man's probity must remain above reproach if he is to retain the goodwill so essential to his business, and in no other trade or profession does money change hands to anything like the same extent without the backing of written deed or agreement enforceable in the courts." RC (1949-51)(b) p. 357.
Chapter 4: The context of workers' experience: the strengths and weaknesses of labour-process explanations.

The analysis of the labour process has so far attempted to provide an understanding of how collective interests can be specified amongst and between different groups of workers; it has indicated the sources of both common and different interests. Yet the development of unionisation cannot be seen simply as a mechanical reflection of those objective structures. The problem remains of how the objective position of wage-labourers within the labour-process is linked with particular forms of consciousness and action.

This chapter explores if and how labour-process analysis can help there. The arguments that are put forward can be summarised as follows:

(1) that the labour-process is the crucial influence in structuring work experience;

(2) that the labour-process provides an essential starting point in understanding articulated grievances and forms of action.

These hypotheses can be elaborated in due course; initially, however, some conceptual clarification is necessary of 'experience', which also serves to highlight the analytical problems that are faced. It embraces major areas of debate, most recently in relation to historiography.

'Experience' stands as the central concept in the work of E.P. Thompson, by which he means "social being's impingement on social consciousness"; in other words it provides an understanding of the relationship between the response of individuals and groups to the

1. People are not the simple product of the forces that work on them. People are not 'the effect' or 'the cause' but both one and the other at the same time.... (Nichols and Beynon (1977) p.77).
2. See Thompson (1978) and Johnson (1978) for contrasting perspectives on approaching history. See Anderson (1980) for a critique of Thompson. I would like to acknowledge the assistance of Jill Hardman in discussing the problems arising from Thompson's work.
circumstances which confront them. (1) The crucial problem, as he sees it, is how experience is produced. The notion that social being determines social consciousness, Thompson finds "difficult", (2) and he argues against mechanistic divisions of being and consciousness. (3) Experience, he argues,

"... arises spontaneously within social being, but it does not arise without thought." (ibid p.200)

Through their interpretation of their circumstances, people act and make history; it is their experience which determines rather than itself being determined:

"... we cannot conceive of any form of social being independently of its organising concepts and expectations, nor could social being reproduce itself for a day without thought. What we mean is that changes take place within social being which give rise to changed experience; and this experience is determining, in the sense that it exerts pressure upon existent social consciousness, proposes new questions, and affords much of the material which the more elaborated intellectual exercises are about". (ibid p.200).

It is undeniably important to emphasise the significance of experience; that people are not merely passive recipients of changing structures (4). Yet Thompson himself tends to decline any opportunities of moving beyond the level of 'experience' and has dismissed efforts by other historians - notably those with predispositions towards Althusser - to do so. His emphasis on the centrality of experience has exposed him to criticisms concerning the role of theory. In particular his

"... overriding concern with 'culture' and 'experience' and a wholly 'hidden' and ambiguous relation to 'theory'or 'abstraction'". (Johnson (1978) p.81)

1. experience "comprises the mental and emotional response, whether of an individual or social group, to many inter-related events or to many repetitions of the same kind of event." Thompson (1978) p.199
2. ibid p.200
3. which is a sideswipe at Thompson's caricature of Althusser.
4. As Johnson has accepted, Thompson's work is a "permanent reminder" of the limitations involved in reverting to "mechanical notions of society". Johnson (1978) p. 96.
Thompson, in criticising the structuralist perspectives of the Althusserians, asserts a preference for "experience" to "theory", where "experience" is also "authenticity". and it is not at all clear that Thompson does not deny "theory" per se. If this were the case, then Thompson would be open to valid criticisms as empiricist (as distinct from empirical).

This debate is far from over; yet even from this general discussion it can be concluded:

(1) that there is an importance in discussing the role of experience, and not merely to 'read-off' social consciousness and action from objective structures.
(2) that nevertheless it is necessary to go beyond 'actual' experience to gain a theoretical understanding of social phenomenon and social forces.

The first point is apparent from Thompson's own arguments; the second is concerned with the context of experience, and whether it is dismissed as 'social complexity' or if an attempt can be made to analyse how the context of experience is shaped. To do this is not to argue a mechanical structural determination of experience, but to establish the limits and possibilities of experience which will influence consciousness and action.

This leads on to what is attempted in this chapter: to explore, somewhat tentatively, the relationship between workers experience and changing patterns of the labour process; to understand the links between

Footnote cont'd
historical process. He argues that: "The way to a better materialist understanding of historical action is not to be found in a regression to evermore intangible sources of motivation, but in progressing towards an ever more specific and concrete grasp of the manifold of its social determinations". (p.80). This would seem entirely in accordance with the view put forward in this Chapter. However, it is not clear where Anderson stands on this question of experience. He seems to regard it as an "ambiguous void" (p.80); yet its conceptual source, 'agency', cannot easily be dispensed with and he sees some virtue in retaining it (p.19). How he overcomes this problem of the determination of social action is not clear.
changes in the social organisation of work with consciousness and action. Referring back to the points made at the beginning of the chapter, the initial argument that the labour-process is the crucial influence in structuring experience can be made more precise. The real concern is to indicate the contextual nature of experience in relation to changes in the labour process and to draw out any implications for collective action. The immediate point that derives from the analysis is the way in which the problem may be posed; given their position as exploited collective labourers it would seem more relevant to pose the problem as why not collective action rather than why. (1)

In exploring this relationship three particular points are considered. Firstly, the importance of the wage-labour relationship in structuring the centrality of work experience. Secondly, how the changing pattern of the labour process, with the general tendency to develop an increasingly co-operative organisation of work, implies changing contexts for work experience. Finally, this allows some conclusions to be drawn concerning the implications for different forms of action.

While this may (or may not) lead to general conclusions about the structuring of work experience, actions are the product of wage-labourers interpretation of contingent social forces. Their expression of grievances, their actions, are therefore crucial; and insofar as the analysis of the labour process possesses any utility in understanding collective action, it must therefore offer some guidance in understanding grievances and action. In other words, this relationship is a crucial test of the utility of labour process analysis in respect of collective action at the workplace. It will, in fact, be argued that while the

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1. This does not affect the problem considered here - how does the interdependent, co-operative nature of the labour process shape experience?
labour process provides an essential starting-point in understanding employee grievances, certain grievances cannot be seen as arising from experience in this context, and that it possesses limited usefulness in understanding forms of collective action. It would indeed be surprising if the complexities of social phenomena could be explained in any narrow way.

The Labour-process and the structuring of work experience

The wage-labour relationship and the centrality of work.

The wage-labour relationship is fundamentally an exploitive one. Irrespective of how ideological forces may suggest otherwise and mask the essential contribution of labour, that the worker is exploited in her/his work activity is the essential starting point in understanding work experience.

In particular, the discussion of employees at the various stages of the development of the bookmaking industry indicates the importance of the centrality of work in shaping experience. In simple terms, the more significant the role of work, the greater its impact on experience. While assessing 'significance' may be a tricky task, an initial approximation can be attempted through examining the extent of continuity of employment and the hours worked.

Casual and seasonal employment have always been a feature of the Bookmaking Industry. The street pitches relied on casual workers, while the credit offices, although offering more stable employment, also tended to reduce staff levels in the winter period. In addition, the boardmarkers in LBOs were often casual workers, while students provided a highly suitable source of labour in the busy summer period.

These instances indicate the relative importance of other sources of experience in comparison to that arising from the workplace. And
while they would not have an unequivocal effect on workplace experience they must be considered a priori as mitigating against workplace collectivities, since they reduce the centrality of work as a prime source of experience.

Similar comments might be applied to part-time workers, given that working hours are reduced and other activities, such as family responsibilities, permeate experience to a greater extent. While this is admitted, part-time work also embraces the continuity, the timelessness, of waged work; and to designate a distinction between 'full-time' and 'part-time' work is always somewhat arbitrary.

The argument, crudely stated, is that the development of collective action and organisation is partly dependent on the centrality of work experience in determining people's actions; if the influence of work on experience diminishes, then it must be anticipated that action will be increasingly determined by experience elsewhere. In that case it might be supposed that continuity and regularity of employment will favour the influence of work on experience and the development of collective action and organisation.

Information on workplace action and organisation in relation to street pitches and credit offices is not readily available. Yet the conditions in LBOs represented a relative diminution of casual and seasonal work especially, given the need to have LBOs regularly staffed and the expansion of the betting medium in the winter months. LBO employees were thus employed on a regular and continuous basis throughout the year. To this extent, the labour process within LBOs would

1. The author has been unable to find any evidence of regular, cohesive workgroup activity either within or outside of trade unions, prior to that in the LBOs. It should not, however, be taken as conclusive that it did not occur.

2. With the exception, in some cases, of seaside towns. See for instance, CIR (1974f).
tend to have a greater influence on workers' experience than in previous phases, and arguably establishing important preconditions for collective action.

(ii) The changing labour-process and the context of experience.

The tendency of the changing labour-process, both in general and in the Bookmaking industry, was to generate a greater interdependence of workers accompanied by an increasing fragmentation of job tasks. These developments necessarily provided the context of work experience; but they were not unequivocal and even contradictory in their impact. On the one hand, the increasing interdependence of the labour process was associated with varying institutional forms: the increasing objective co-operation of employees was commensurate with the relative isolation both within and between different employee groups. On the other hand, the fragmentation of job tasks was uneven in its impact, generating both "key" and "marginal" groups on whom the changes in the labour process had a contradictory effect.¹

These two aspects can be examined in the context of different periods of the Bookmaking industry. Firstly, the way in which the interdependence of the labour process affected the context of experience. The practice of bookmaking implied the ready availability of betting facilities; it therefore tended to result in an industry of relatively widespread units, and for employees, social isolation in their work.

1. This distinction of "key" and "marginal" groups is used in the context of the unevenness of capital accumulation; as such it is expressed in different ways; viz, (i) the distinction between the expanding LBO chains and the individually owned LBOs, where workers in the former represent "key" groups and in the latter "marginal" groups, (ii) the distinction within the labour process between the settlers (key groups) and counterclerks (marginal groups). Groups of employees are "key or "marginal" both in relation to employers and employees collective action. The LBO chains were fundamental for the capitalistic expansion of the industry and whose workers were crucial in the development of effective action on the part of employees; the settlers (-managers) represented for many years an obstacle to employers in breaking down the labour-process, a group on whom they were dependent; while it was precisely this crucial role in the labour-process which promoted their support as imperative for any employee collective action.
In the period of street pitches, for instance, "runners" were necessarily separated and isolated from each other in their work; their objective co-operation for one bookmaker was not subjectively experienced as a work group and to this extent the social organisation of work might be seen as emphasising responses which did not focus on their co-operation within their work-group. This embraces physical obstacles as well as their social construction of their position.

It might be thought that experience would be structured towards collective action during the phase of the large-scale credit offices. Here the employees were not dispersed, but brought physically together to perform different component parts of the collective labourer. Nevertheless, these groups were isolated according to job function; the settlers, phone-room operators and clerical workers all worked in different locations within the offices in this way, the interdependence of job functions was largely experienced within workgroups who only performed that function; hence the relative isolation, not of individuals as in street pitches, but of workgroups based on particular job functions.

The importance of this discussion is to show that just as the growing interdependence of the labour-process creates not only common but divergent interests, it also generates contexts within which experience is structured promoting both collective and fragmentary responses. This might mean that objective collective interests may be reinforced by experience; on the other hand it may be divergent interests are reinforced.

The transition of the industry with the expansion of the LBOs resulted in a situation where the objective co-operation of the LBO workers was combined with a physically shared experience across job functions. The settlers-managers and counter clerks were physically separated from others in the same category, but were brought together within the LBOs.(1)

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1. It would be very unusual for an LBO to employ more than three counter cler
Insofar as both groups suffered the impersonal control of security and head office, this emphasised the commonality of interests amongst all the employees in the LBOs, rather than their differences. To this extent the context of their experience tended to overcome potential differences in interests.

The isolation of each LBO was, however, a further problem, since the widespread distribution of small workplaces produced physical obstacles for collective action and organisation amongst the LBO employees. (1)

Comparing each of the phases discussed above, it is possible to identify the different ways in which the changing labour-process affected the context of experience. The street-pitches emphasised the isolation of the 'runner', the credit offices the individual functional work groups, the LBOs the inter-relationship between functional work groups. This underpins the different influence of the labour-process on workers experience in different phases of the development of bookmaking (2); and it carries implications for how workers respond to their position at work. The development of TUBE, in this sense, can be understood in terms of the conjuncture of common interests amongst LBO employees reinforced by their shared experience of changes in the labour process;

1. Nichols and Beynon (1977) (pp.109-110) argue the impact of shift systems within two different plants on the same (Chemical) site resulted in social isolation of workers and "significant" problems for "collective organisation".

2. It is important to note this is a fundamental critique of theories of unionisation which focus on individuals and not on the collective organisation of work. What appears as simply a change in the position of the settler-manager is in fact a reflection of changes in the labour process and changes in the form of co-operation within that process. Treating the settler-managers as a group outside of the labour process could only mean that the first aspect would be picked up ("proletarianisation effect"). The development of collective action must include consideration of the inter-relationships of the various groups involved in the labour process.
the union embraced, not just one section of the workforce, but the combination of settler-managers and counter clerks - a reflection of the LBO structure.

The precise inter-relationship of different employee groups depended ultimately on how the division of labour within bookmaking had been effected. On the whole, this had generated distinct functional divisions which were, in fact, to place certain groups in a crucial position within the labour process, while others were largely peripheral. This differentiation will be familiar from the discussions in Chapter 3: the general separation between, on the one hand, the settling of bets and, on the other, their receipt and payment; a division based both on skill and sex. But in addition this potential divergence in the objective interests of these employee groups was compounded through their uneven experience of employer control of the labour-process. This is most easily understood in terms of the settlers as a "key" group.

The growth of the credit office bookmakers into large-scale firms occurred after 1949; but the discontinuities in employment which the war had effected in the industry had allowed the employers to introduce tighter labour discipline in the post-war period. The enforcement of labour discipline was not, however, uniformly applied to all employees. The settlers still received preferential treatment to those working in the phone room and performing other clerical duties. This can be seen as a reflection of the dependency of employers on settlers at this time, while the routine tasks of the other employees made them relatively easy to replace.

In consequence, the work experience of these distinct work groups, already divided in terms of skills and sex, was very different. While it is perhaps easy to overdraw the contrast, on the one hand there were the male settlers who were not required to carry out tasks other than settling, who were granted certain "flexibilities" in their conduct, e.g.
the length of lunch breaks, who received a fairly good wage, and whom employers could still integrate as part of the occupational community of bookmakers. On the other side were the female clerical and phone room workers, who were required to "fill in" in other areas as necessary, who were relatively closely supervised, received substantially lower wages than the settlers (even though they might be asked to do settling when necessary), and amongst whom employers had no need to promote notions of occupational community. The context and actuality of work experience of the groups was in these terms diverse. And it seems to have proved a strong barrier to any common action across these groups.

In contrast to the credit offices, employees performing different job functions were brought together in LBOs, but in this situation the counter clerks were under the control of the settler-manager. In the initial expansion, the discretion of the settler-managers was at its height and the other LBO employees remained vulnerable to the arbitrary decisions of the settler-managers both over what tasks they performed and how they performed them. Quite clearly, work experience could easily promote opposition between the settler-manager and other LBO employees.

In this context, the advent of retailing bookmaking, which heralded the diminution of the strategic position of the settler-manager in the labour process and exposed his work to increasing external control, was in some senses beneficial to the other LBO staff. The arbitrary control of the settler-manager had been reduced and established working methods implied some clarification of the demands made of employees. Furthermore,

1. An example here (from personal experience) is the way in which some settler-managers would insist on the boardman sweeping the floor and generally tidying the LBO after racing had finished. Others might say not to bother - it was the cleaner's job.
The expansion of the betting chains could also have a similar beneficial effect:

"I worked for a small bookmaker. He was very nice to me... but I worked on my own; I did the board, pay out, everything. Hills took over and suddenly there were three extra girls." (1)

While, in this instance, the employees of a small firm had found their working load reduced through the change of ownership, the existing employees of the large betting chains were experiencing increasing workloads; effectively the total volume of betting was increasing as racing fixtures expanded and racing times staggered, while employers now demanded higher thresholds of the number of bets taken or settled before allowing extra staff.

This indicates the contradictory impact of the labour process on the experience of workers: that some employees experience some changes in the labour process as increased control over their activities, others as the reduction in arbitrary control; that some employees experience workload levels as a decrease, others as an increase on their previous position. Such contradictions are not, however, necessarily even. The changes in workload leading to a reduction were often momentary, and might soon begin to rise; less arbitrary patterns of control may also be rigid and tiresomely imposed. To this extent, differences in experience may be offset by more significant shared experience. For instance, increasing workloads were commonly and simultaneously experienced by all LBO employees; similarly with the impact of control over the labour process as it was increasingly imposed from outside the LBO. Despite her professed gains in the takeover by Hills, Millie soon began to feel the harsher side:

1. Interview Millie 9.3.76.
"I worked in Barker Butts at the time and the manager there was interested in the union. We chatted about things and we felt we needed a union then. We didn't have our own way so much, controlled from Leeds. They think different to us, up there. We were ruled by morons - sent us memos, you do this and that." (1)

Thus the exercising of control over the labour process by head office provided a unifying experience for the counter clerks and the settler-managers. While in one sense the changes in the labour-process had a differential impact on counter clerks and settler-managers, in another, they generated a certain solidarity between these groups.

There is a strong contrast here between the positions in the credit offices and the LBOs. In the credit offices, the strategic position of the settler remained largely intact with a good measure of employer dependency on their skills reflected in the extent of occupational community; in the LBOs, the position of the settler-manager was being eroded, although they still maintained some expertise in settling, but the employers now felt sufficiently confident to break the links of ideological integration. In the credit offices, objective interests and differential experience had promoted divisions between work groups based on job functions; in the LBOs, the expanding work loads and externally imposed control were commonly experienced by those performing all job functions, although the impact of such changes could be contradictory.

It would be deterministic to suggest that certain forms of action can be "read off" from certain combinations of objective interests and experience. But at least it is now possible to move beyond treating "experience" as determined by a multitude of influences; arguably, the centrality of work and the shaping of the context of experience through

1. Interview Millie 9.3.76.
changes in the labour process can be traced in such a way as to identify sources of different and common experience which may promote certain forms of action. It now remains to examine this relationship between experience and forms of action.

(iii) The labour-process, experience, and forms of action.

Discussion of the kind of action workers take usually revolves around distinctions such as 'individual-collective' or 'unorganised-organised'. This allows some analysis of different forms of action and how they may be substitutable in different situations. This kind of approach is evident in Hyman (1972) who here does not substantially differ from other writers on industrial conflict. (1)

"The distinction between organised and unorganised conflict is of great analytical importance ... in unorganised conflict the worker typically responds to the oppressive situation in the only way open to him as an individual ... Organised conflict, on the other hand, is far more likely to form part of a conscious strategy to change the situation which is identified as the source of discontent". (Hyman (1972) p.53 (Emphasis in original).

There are two strands to this distinction: there is the main juxtaposition of collective and individual forms of action, the former 'organised', the latter 'unorganised'; there is also a distinction of 'calculative - non-calculative' strategies. In contrast to collective response, an individual reaction "... rarely derives from any calculative strategy". (ibid p. 53). This is indeed problematic, with its behavioural overtones, but of main concern here is the 'individual-collective' distinction.

Hyman admits that the 'organised-unorganised' dichotomy is "occasionally difficult to draw in practice" (ibid p.53)

1. For instance, Kerr (1964) : "Several (forms of conflict), such as sabotage, restriction of output, absenteeism, and turnover, may take place on an individual as well as on an organised basis and constitute alternatives to collective action". (p.171).
It also has severe analytical limitations. Essentially, it misses the point that the labour process approach has illustrated most clearly: that workers are already 'organised' by capital. As such, the distinction tends to be read in abstraction from capitalist social relations, ignoring the significance of wage-labour and the collective labourer. This is scarcely surprising: the 'organised-unorganised' distinction possesses a generic quality such that it can be applied to any 'conflict situation'. It cannot hope to cope with the specificities of the social relationships of work in capitalist society. In this way, the practical differentiation of individual and collective responses is not accidental, but a consequence of an inadequate analytical distinction. For instance, in some situations a form of action may be 'individual' in that an individual worker may respond in isolation from other workers. In relation to street pitches s/he may 'fiddle' some of the bets, cheating the bookmaker out of some money. Yet fiddling this way may be widespread, a known activity and response; it may even be a conscious work group strategy. It is hard to see how the 'organised-unorganised' dichotomy can help in an understanding of 'fiddling' as a response by workers: the practice remains the same and is carried out by individual workers - who must be seen in the context of their workgroup. Whether a response is 'individual' or 'collective', 'unorganised' or 'organised' is always problematic since the focus must rest on the collective labourer in which the 'individual' participates on capital's insistence.

These problems of analysing forms of action can be overcome by analysing capitalist social relations: in particular wage-labour and the labour process. In this way workers responses are seen as arising from their position as wage-labourers and as collective workers. More specifically, it is the conditions and restrictions imposed through
wage-labour and the labour process which shape, through workers' experience, certain forms of action; this provides a potential basis for understanding why particular actions are taken in different contexts.

There are two essential components to wage-labour. Firstly, the flexibility of movement or the 'freedom' of wage-labourers to become wage-labourers and that within the system as a whole labour can move from one area of work to another; secondly, that in return for performing work, the labourer receives payment, the wage. These conditions throw up areas of concern which may result in particular responses. For the employer, the inherent contradiction of demanding labour flexibility is that labour itself can use that flexibility - to become employers themselves or wage-labourers elsewhere. This can be termed as job quitting. Regarding the question of remuneration, this can be raised in various contexts with varying responses. Within Marx's framework, the employer only paid for a potential, the labour-power of wage-labour, leaving the actual contribution of the labourer as a variable. (1) The relationship, therefore, between remuneration and value added is indeterminate and subject to what has been termed the 'effort bargain' (2), where a 'balance' is reached between remuneration and the amount of labour performed. The opportunities for either employers or employees to improve their position in the 'effort bargain' must vary according to a large number of conditions: the product produced, labour market 'tightness' or 'slackness', product market conditions and so on. In particular, in Bookmaking, one manner of response can be identified which arises out of the nature of the work: pilfering or 'fiddling' as it is more usually referred to in the industry.

1. Indeed, it will be remembered that it is precisely the difference between wages and value added by labour-surplus value - which is the basis of profits. 2. See, for instance, Hyman (1972) pp. 126-7 and Turner (1962) p. 18
The existence of varying options of response imply that certain forms of action may be preferred to others. It would appear from the evidence of the Bookmaking industry that insofar as workers sought to resolve their problems at work this was by job quitting rather than within the workplace; and that 'fiddling' was not uncommon and on occasions became an accepted part of the wage, proving a more popular response than making overt demands from employers as a work group. There is little mystique about such preferences; as long as the options of 'job quitting' and 'fiddling' remained, they were far easier responses than acting as a workgroup to remedy grievances.

The potential for job quitting was of three kinds: to become self-employed (i.e. petty commodity producer), usually as a bookmaker; to move to another bookmaking firm; to leave the industry altogether. At different times, these options changed in terms of availability to bookmaking employees. The general pattern of development of the industry implied a generally diminishing option for the bookmaking employee to become a bookmaker. This occurred in two ways: firstly, the growing significance of off-course betting accompanied by increasing monopolisation of ownership and control. This meant a decline in the on-course market - where the opportunities to 'stand up' as a bookmaker were most immediately available - and the constriction of viable areas to become an off-course bookmaker. Secondly, that the increasing fragmentation of job tasks and specialisation reduced opportunities for bookmaking employees to gain the skills and expertise needed to become bookmakers; the tangibility of 'going it alone' diminished.

In consequence, the options of becoming a bookmaker rapidly diminished in the period after 1945; in the immediate post-war period

1. See ch.3 for a discussion of the decline of one-man LBOs.
'standing-up' on-course was still entirely possible, but the on-course betting boom soon declined in the 1950s. The new LBO industry offered these opportunities in a slightly different form, but by the end of the 1960s there was little chance for an employee to become a bookmaker.

Similarly, movement to another job within bookmaking provided little real change as the industry developed. Again, until after 1945, there were very few large firms; there was a wide variety of options for settlers to 'progress' in smaller firms if they were unhappy where they worked. Such possibilities remained for the next twenty years, though gradually diminishing. Most spectacularly, the LBOs offered a new opportunity for settlers - often to become settler-managers - which many credit office workers took. But with the emergence of large-scale betting chains, the opportunity to move was increasingly in terms of one large employer to another; and given their increasingly non-competitive position, the smaller firms often paid lower wages.

While the options of becoming bookmakers or joining other bookmaking firms became increasingly limited, the opportunities of gaining a comparable job outside the industry were not improving. The other side of the employer's dependency on the skill of the settler, was the dependency of the settler on the employer. In other words, skill specificity can cut both ways: bookmaking skills were not easily applicable to jobs outside of the industry, which would necessarily pre-empt those with a long history of employment in bookmaking from finding a job comparable in pay and conditions.

This discussion applies rather more abrasively to the 'key' settling workers than to the 'peripheral' groups. The former found the option of job quitting increasingly less attractive; the latter had never any real pretensions of becoming bookmakers, nor did they have the
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These problems of analysing forms of action can be overcome by analysing capitalist social relations: in particular wage-labour and the labour process. In this way workers responses are seen as arising from their position as wage-labourers and as collective workers. More specifically, it is the conditions and restrictions imposed through
wage-labour and the labour process which shape, through workers' experience, certain forms of action; this provides a potential basis for understanding why particular actions are taken in different contexts.

There are two essential components to wage-labour. Firstly, the flexibility of movement or the 'freedom' of wage-labourers to become wage-labourers and that within the system as a whole labour can move from one area of work to another; secondly, that in return for performing work, the labourer receives payment, the wage. These conditions throw up areas of concern which may result in particular responses. For the employer, the inherent contradiction of demanding labour flexibility is that labour itself can use that flexibility - to become employers themselves or wage-labourers elsewhere. This can be termed as job quitting. Regarding the question of remuneration, this can be raised in various contexts with varying responses. Within Marx's framework, the employer only paid for a potential, the labour-power of wage-labour, leaving the actual contribution of the labourer as a variable.\(^1\) The relationship, therefore, between remuneration and value added is indeterminate and subject to what has been termed the 'effort bargain',\(^2\), where a 'balance' is reached between remuneration and the amount of labour performed. The opportunities for either employers or employees to improve their position in the 'effort bargain' must vary according to a large number of conditions: the product produced, labour market 'tightness' or 'slackness', product market conditions and so on. In particular, in Bookmaking, one manner of response can be identified which arises out of the nature of the work: pilfering or 'fiddling' as it is more usually referred to in the industry.

1. Indeed, it will be remembered that it is precisely the difference between wages and value added by labour-surplus value - which is the basis of profits.
2. See, for instance, Hyman (1972) pp. 126-7 and Turner (1962) p.18
The existence of varying options of response imply that certain forms of action may be preferred to others. It would appear from the evidence of the Bookmaking industry that insofar as workers sought to resolve their problems at work this was by job quitting rather than within the workplace; and that 'fiddling' was not uncommon and on occasions became an accepted part of the wage, proving a more popular response than making overt demands from employers as a work group. There is little mystique about such preferences: as long as the options of 'job quitting' and 'fiddling' remained, they were far easier responses than acting as a workgroup to remedy grievances.

The potential for job quitting was of three kinds: to become self-employed (i.e. petty commodity producer), usually as a bookmaker; to move to another bookmaking firm; to leave the industry altogether. At different times, these options changed in terms of availability to bookmaking employees. The general pattern of development of the industry implied a generally diminishing option for the bookmaking employee to become a bookmaker. This occurred in two ways: firstly, the growing significance of off-course betting accompanied by increasing monopolisation of ownership and control. This meant a decline in the on-course market - where the opportunities to 'stand up' as a bookmaker were most immediately available - and the constriction of viable areas to become an off-course bookmaker. Secondly, that the increasing fragmentation of job tasks and specialisation reduced opportunities for bookmaking employees to gain the skills and expertise needed to become bookmakers: the tangibility of 'going it alone' diminished.

In consequence, the options of becoming a bookmaker rapidly diminished in the period after 1945; in the immediate post-war period

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1. See ch.3 for a discussion of the decline of one-man LBOs.
'standing-up' on-course was still entirely possible, but the on-course betting boom soon declined in the 1950s. The new LBO industry offered these opportunities in a slightly different form, but by the end of the 1960s there was little chance for an employee to become a bookmaker.

Similarly, movement to another job within bookmaking provided little real change as the industry developed. Again, until after 1945, there were very few large firms; there was a wide variety of options for settlers to 'progress' in smaller firms if they were unhappy where they worked. Such possibilities remained for the next twenty years, though gradually diminishing. Most spectacularly, the LBOs offered a new opportunity for settlers - often to become settler-managers - which many credit office workers took. But with the emergence of large-scale betting chains, the opportunity to move was increasingly in terms of one large employer to another; and given their increasingly non-competitive position, the smaller firms often paid lower wages.

While the options of becoming bookmakers or joining other bookmaking firms became increasingly limited, the opportunities of gaining a comparable job outside the industry were not improving. The other side of the employer's dependency on the skill of the settler, was the dependency of the settler on the employer. In other words, skill specificity can cut both ways; bookmaking skills were not easily applicable to jobs outside of the industry, which would necessarily pre-empt those with a long history of employment in bookmaking from finding a job comparable in pay and conditions.

This discussion applies rather more abrasively to the 'key' settling workers than to the 'peripheral' groups. The former found the option of job quitting increasingly less attractive; the latter had never any real pretensions of becoming bookmakers, nor did they have the
strength or weakness of skill specificity. Yet if they wanted to
work within bookmaking, their choice was being similarly restricted;
the option of moving to another firm where conditions might be better
was diminishing.

In posing the question of remuneration, there is an immediate
difficulty in terms of the lack of information on rates of pay and
earnings. It can be reasonably assumed that formal records were
scarcely ever kept for any period and even if they were, would be
unlikely to show any real relationship to "earnings". The evidence on
'fiddling' is also largely impressionistic, yet it is possible to
understand how the patterns of development within the industry presented
this as an option which has diminished in the 1960s and 1970s.

The tradition of 'fiddling' is no doubt as old as gambling itself.
In the early days of bookmaking, it was often the bookmakers themselves
who were most adept at sharp practice, particularly when becoming backers.
For instance, at the beginning of this century many S.P. bets were made
by telegraph and as long as the telegram was timed before the 'off'
the bets would stand. This provided a real opportunity for risk-free
betting. One sharp-witted 'operator', using the names of various friends,
would take a series of telegrams to a remote country post office:

"All would be time-stamped the moment they were handed in and
before being transmitted. The first telegram handed in might
have consisted of a chapter of the Bible, so that by the time
the telegram actually backing the horse was dispatched the
race would have been over. As there would have been no money
on the racecourse for the horse, a very favourable Starting
Price would result." (Kaye (1969) p. 36).

Kaye continues to tell how, by such methods, Arthur Bendir (of
Ladbrokes - the Gentleman's Bookmaker) managed to place £700 each way
on a horse at Gatwick Racecourse which won at 20 to 1.

This indicates a difference between bending the rules and outright
theft. No doubt examples of the latter did occur - for instance, the
returning of winning postal bets claiming they were received too late -
but traditionally 'fiddling' was not as blatant as that. Perhaps contrary to popular belief, it is not easy for bookmakers to 'fix' the odds on a race; but given the way Starting Prices are obtained from a weak on-course market, it is possible for major coups to be landed. Consider this, perhaps slightly exaggerated, story of a 'colourful' inter-war bookmaker.

"At one time if the market at the dog tracks wasn't very strong, the Sporting Life would take as the starting price that offered and laid by one of the bigger bookmakers. There was murder one night at one of the London tracks. There was a real good thing in one of the races and all along the line they're showing it at 2 to 1. Then just as the hare's running, S .... from whom the 'Life' took the prices sticks up 8 to 1. Straightaway he lays it: 'eight tenners, O.K' and then another 'eight tenners before the dogs are off. So the good thing sluices home - returned at 8 to 1. Its there in his book that he's taken bets at that price on the off. Of course, all the lads have backed it off-course at S.P. and made a nice few bob." (1)

In more recent times, the attractions of such activities have diminished for the large-scale bookmaking firm. (2) In particular, they seem rather more concerned with 'fiddles' conducted against them, rather than being involved in perpetrating some themselves.

'Fiddling' on the part of employees may take place in a variety of ways. It might involve the open embezzlement of money where an employee might steal a large sum of cash and disappear. This would be an extreme case, however. More commonly, as the word implies, it would be an occasional, perhaps regular, pilfering of cash within the 'normal' system of work. For instance, it might be achieved through altering a bet and pocketing the difference between what should have been paid out and what was actually paid out; it could also occur through under-recording

1. Interview former bookmaking employee, October 1976. The name of the bookmaker is omitted for obvious reasons.

2. It would seem that casinos are a more lucrative area for bending the rules, given the persistent police opposition to the granting of casino licences to some firms with longstanding bookmaking interests and traditions.
the amount received for a bet and taking the difference between the actual stake and recorded stake. There are many, many ways of 'fiddling' cash in this manner without openly taking the money.

The opportunity to 'fiddle' principally existed where cash betting was involved. Street pitches could, and no doubt were, 'worked' in this way, providing the fiddle was not too obvious. The occasional 'winning' bet might be inserted before all the bets were delivered to the bookmaker. (1)

It might seem that 'fiddling' would have proved a less significant possibility in the credit offices. To the extent that betting was on a credit basis, this was true. But not all the business in the credit office was on this basis. Perhaps the most important source of cash betting for the credit firms arose through the system of postal betting. At one time the larger credit firms utilised addresses in Scotland in the belief that postal bets in Scotland were legal. Having been sent to Scotland, they were immediately returned to England by rail, where they were opened and settled accordingly - providing an opportunity for some employees to supplement their wages:

"When we were opening the bets, old Flo used to sit at her place at the end of the table with a waste paper basket next to it. Every now and again she'd drop a note into the basket - that was hers and she'd collect it all later. One day the old man came in; he was a bit short that week, so he goes up to the end of the table and picks up the wastepaper basket. "I'll empty this for yer, 'Flo', he says and rushes off. Of course, she couldn't say a thing, but everyone knew what had gone on." (2)


2. Interview Charlie, October '76. The 'old man' was Charlie's father not the employer.
Opportunities for 'fiddling' still prevailed with the expansion of LCSOs, but the increasing control of employers over the labour process provided severe obstacles and checks in the larger firms. The introduction of security systems, with cameras, timeclocks, and regular monitoring was indeed successful. Some firms demanded that any shortage of cash in the tills should be made up by employees - irrespective of whether any 'fiddling' was involved.

'Fiddling' was thus a 'known' response, although its practice is very difficult to estimate; but there is little doubt it had prevailed as a form of response throughout the history of the industry. Its feasibility was, however, increasingly diminished as retailing bookmaking developed. It eliminated the practice of occasional 'fiddles' through to the systematic workgroup fiddles accepted by both employers and employees as part of the wage for the job.

The context of action by employees thus changed during the development of the bookmaking industry. Generally it meant diminution in both opportunity and attractiveness of particular options. Job quitting was no longer a realistic alternative to improved working conditions; fiddling could no longer compensate within the effort bargain.

And while these options began to close down, others began to open up.

1. although this was only the ostensible reason for the introduction. See above Chapter 3.

2. e.g. W.J. Connor Ltd in Liverpool.

3. e.g. Jack Windsor, based in Leeds. When William Hill took over this firm in 1972, the low wage rates allowed for 'fiddling' by employees. Mars (1973) has stressed the importance of fiddling as an income source for hotel employees, and that this is a known and acceptable practice for both employers and employees.
Once the labour process is characterised by the collective labourer there is an immediate shift in any discussion on collective action. The question now becomes why not collective action rather than why. This arises out of the interdependency of wage-labourers in the context of their mutual dependency and exploitation.

This throws some light on the earlier discussion of workers' responses and how they can be analysed, for in any situation where workers perform the function of the collective labourer, any response is made in the context of a collective dependency. It is a truism that all actions are individual responses; but once the collective labourer is in evidence, all actions are taken within a socially collaborative context. It is therefore meaningless to talk of 'job quitting' and 'fiddling' as 'individual' responses juxtaposed to 'organised' 'collective' responses.

The question is whether the labour process, through the collective labourer, promotes certain forms of action within and between workgroups. In a general way it does imply collective action on the part of employees since it emphasises their interdependence. The more difficult question is whether it can inform what kind of action is taken and by whom.

As the options of job quitting and fiddling were affected by the development of the collective labour-process, certain options diminished, and others appeared more preferable or necessary. One such option of particular interest is the willingness to secure objectives within

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1. Which is why the 'individual-collective' distinctions are misplaced.

2. The extent of 'fiddling' is difficult to assess (obviously). Yet it is probable that many employees did not 'fiddle' at all and very few did so on a regular basis. This does not, of course, affect its availability as an option. Nationally TUBE took a very hard line on the question of 'fiddling', adopting a moral stance against it and, in their early days especially, taking a pro-employer view.
the workplace through open workgroup representations to employers.
The next part of the chapter discusses how the labour process may
assist here in more precise detail. Yet for the moment it can be
noted how the basis of co-operation within the labour process promoted
or discouraged such action by and between workgroups.

In the credit offices differences in experience compounded
different interests amongst functional workgroups, which may help to
explain any lack of open work group response from the workers as a whole.
But it does not indicate why the settlers or phone room/clerical workers
did not take independent initiatives. To begin with the analysis does
help in suggesting why the settlers may not have been prompted into
a more overt form of collective action: the double-edged nature of their
skill specificity had resulted in a mutually reinforcing interdependency
with their employers, which combined the vulnerability of settlers
with relatively high wage rates and an ideological integration into
the relative isolation of the bookmaking community.

The phone-room and clerical workers, who experienced the worst
conditions of employment and the harshest labour discipline, were
never in a position to make an open collective response with any
continuity. Easily replaceable, they could never be in a position to
impose any effective controls or sanctions, unless they gained the
support of the 'key' settling group. The way in which the labour
process was broken down through the division of labour thus promoted/
reduced the variety of options which workgroups might utilise in response
to their exploitation.

In some contrast, the development within the LBOs emphasised
the diminution of some alternative options; the eradication of a particular
tradition of bookmaking employees could not be combatted through job
quitting or informal activities within each LBO. The emergence of
retailing bookmaking and its implications for employees had placed
certain forms of action on the agenda, while effectively removing others. This is discussed more fully in the second part of the chapter.

(b) The limits and possibilities of the labour process as a source of workers grievances, demands, and action.

After 1971 unionisation did develop amongst bookmaking employees, concurrent with the dramatic changes in the labour process in the LBIs. But what is the relationship between these developments? This can be partly answered through the historical analysis of the previous chapter, where the preconditions and context of workers resistance have been developed. But it also demands an examination of these changes in relation to expressed grievances and demands on the part of those involved, and the forms of action with which they respond. It is these two relationships that are now considered: this necessarily implies some assessment of the utility of the labour process as the main focus of explaining the development of unionisation.

Initially the labour process is examined as a source of expressed grievances and demands. It is intended to show how using such an analysis serves to bring a coherence in understanding the disparate experience of workers; yet it will also be seen as important to look beyond the labour process in the development of TUBE, examining closely the events which led to the formation of the union. Furthermore the efforts of the employers to reconstruct patterns of working will be shown as an important motive force in the formation of TUBE; nevertheless, other potentially significant influences will be identified in why and how unionisation took place.
The labour process as a basis for understanding employee grievances and demands.

If the grievances expressed by workers in the bookmaking industry can be characterised in any particular fashion, it is the wide diversity of these grievances that stand out. There seems little merit in categorising these varied expressions in some pseudo-scientific manner, abstracted from their social context. What must be attempted is to understand the bases of these grievances and identify their sources. The contention is that changes in the labour process can be established as the primary source for explaining grievances.

The discussion in chapter 3 indicated that the changes in the labour process would have a dramatic and deleterious effect on many employees within the large betting chains; and it seems beyond question that it was employees in this part of the industry that provided the main support for unionization. As will be described, the source of TUBE rested in one particular takeover of a leading London betting chain. And those who formed the union saw this aspect of the industry's development as the reason for the emergence of TUBE:

"Prior to the union there was a spate of takeovers. The effect on employees was drastic. Wages fell, they were given extra duties and there was a security offensive. Working conditions worsened." (1)

Here the deteriorating conditions suffered by the employees were linked explicitly to the mergers taking place at the time. Furthermore, these mergers were seen as providing the main source of recruitment for the union:

".... at present about 21% of LBOs are in the hands of the Giants. Within two years the position will be drastically altered and at the present rate of takeovers, 75% will be owned or operated by the big combines... Your job is your living, you must protect yourself now." (2)

1. Interview Don Bruce 20.2.76
2. TUBE Broadsheet October 1971.
The message struck home amongst many bookmaking employees. As the larger companies began to amass LBOs and consolidate their expansion, TUBE was seen as a possibility to combat worsening conditions. The following extract from a group of employees in Newcastle is a typical example in making this connection:

"My colleagues and I work for Ladbrokes, who have over 100 betting shops on the Tyneside area. This area is shortly to be merged with that of Teesside which will result in a group of approx. 200 shops in Northumberland-Durham-North Yorkshire. We feel that while conditions at the moment are far from perfect, they show every sign of becoming worse and that uniting the labour force through your union will help to combat this and to improve conditions." (1)

"Conditions" here covers a multitude of possible grievances: and, as mentioned earlier, the ways in which employees articulated their dissatisfaction were indeed varied. To make this point most emphatically, it is useful to consider how stewards at the same firm, who could have been expected to experience broadly similar changes, expressed themselves in very different ways.

The firm is that of Connor and Forbes, a Liverpool based group which followed the typical pattern of development outlined in the previous chapter. At the end of 1970, Leisure and General Holdings, originally a catering company but with interests in other spheres of the 'service' industry, bought a chain of LBOs owned by W.J.Connor; in the Spring of 1972 they added two further chains - Forbes and Frank & Mawdsley - completing a holding of some 120 LBOs. TUBE began to recruit members.

The impact of the takeovers was soon felt, but different aspects were emphasised by different stewards. (2) Significantly, comments were made on the systems of control; but while George M. referred to the

1. Letter P.Arnold to George Sawford 25.5.72
2. i.e. those who subsequently became stewards.
activities of head office as "organised chaos" (1), George P. was more explicit about the direct impact of these changes:

"People were moved around; previously you were left alone to run your own shops. I didn't like the treatment - 9 shops in 3 years, moving me around to make me fed up. Then they sent letters to employees, treated like kids. 'Keep your door locked' and so on." (2)

Other responses, if less articulate, were suitably blunt. "Treated like cattle" was one of the reasons why Pat joined the union. (3)

But others found it difficult to describe how things had changed:

"Hard to explain how it changed; just felt generally treated differently. Tightened procedures, time sheets and a lot of casual workers and a hard core of regulars. Most people feel working conditions were better before the amalgamation". (4)

Thus even in these few examples there is a wide range of dissatisfaction: the ineptitude of head office; the lack of discretion of the LBO manager; management's treatment of employees - either as "kids" or "cattle"; and the disruption of social relationships amongst employees. All are expressions of discontent, of different importance to different employees.

It is not perhaps surprising that workers demands should reflect the diversity of experiences. And some of the employees at Connor and Forbes, who supported a staff association in opposition to TUBE, gave vent to their frustrations of a management who virtually refused to negotiate, in outlining a wide range of complaints:

1. Interview, George M. 20.8.74
2. Interview, George P. 19.8.74
3. Interview, Pat 19.8.74
4. Interview, Irene 19.8.74.
"Here is a list of grievances: Wages; Christmas Bonus; Christmas Holidays; staff dismissals; attitude of management towards staff committee and procedure; methods of security staff; lack of communication; insufficient staff and equipment; attitude of management to shop requirements and problems; insufficient cash in the shops; lack of stores; movement of staff and travel expenses; poor conditions in shop; insufficient office staff to deliver betmasters and cash; lack of information to staff committee regarding changes in working conditions and changes in policy. No definite job responsibility laid out for staff. Information re shortages, overpayments, and percentages. Stopping payments of bets." (1)

Taken out of the context of what was happening in Connor and Forbes and in the Bookmaking industry generally, this is merely a list of grievances. But what might appear as a lengthy list of individual grievances obtains coherence when seen from the perspective of the earlier analysis of changes in the labour process.

The lack of stores, equipment and reduced cash 'floats', indicate a tightening of control necessitated by the financial demands of Leisure and General's expansion. The issues concerned with inadequate staffing and mobility of labour reflect the strategy of management in reorganising the labour process within the betting division as a whole; just as the complaints on job responsibility, cash shortages, overpayments, staff dismissals, and the methods of security staff, reflect the strategy of management in reorganising the labour process within the LBO, which included the imposition of labour discipline.

Thus the ways in which employers generally throughout the industry were trying to secure greater control over the labour process in order to increase their share of revenue, manifested themselves in many forms. Different employees not only experienced, but articulated, this assertion of control in a variety of ways. Focussing on the labour process helps in understanding the source of their grievances.

1. S.A.C. to Leisure and General Directors 1.12.72
There are, however, limitations to the extent that expressed grievances can be directly linked to changes in the social organisation of work. In particular one area where it might be argued that the labour process is less useful is in relation to wages. After all, why should the market position of employees bear any particular relationship to their activity in production?

The conclusions from the earlier discussion in Chapters 1 and 2 indicated the importance of not separating the market position from the conditions under which the job task was performed. The labour process does carry implications for wage levels; the logic of capitalist economy is to continuously cheapen the value of labour-power, so that a greater surplus is produced.

The exposition in Chapter 3 showed how the position of the settler-manager was devalued in relation to the reorganising of work activity both in and across LBOs. The consequence was a reduction in the wage component through the falling value of labour-power and the reduction in the performance of the global function of capital.

In this sense grievances over wages can be seen as essentially related to changes in the labour process. It might be anticipated that grievances over wages would therefore be linked to those on other issues. Consider again the comment of Don Bruce mentioned earlier in the chapter:

"Prior to the union there was a spate of takeovers. The effect on employees was drastic. Wages fell, they were given extra duties and there was a security offensive. Working conditions worsened."  (1)

Here wages are cited as one aspect of the deteriorating conditions of employees and are attributed to the general changes in the industry.

1. Interview Don Bruce 20.2.76
The impact on wages through the changing labour process can be identified in both the system of payment and the general level. The tightening of procedures and the introduction of new systems of work also involved predictable wage costs. This often involved the elimination of accepted practices and perks. Such changes frequently occurred with takeovers. As one Sheffield worker protested:

"I am a betting office manager working for Windsor Sporting Investments, and am receiving a weekly wage of £28. Until recently, when the firm was taken over by William Hills, we were paid £26 a week plus all unpaid winning bets. Although we were responsible for all our own debts (settling errors), I had a tax free gain of £6 plus per week... For the present I am not interested in a wage rise, but only in regaining my past standard of living." (1)

Here William Hill had eliminated the practice of the settler-manager receiving money due on unpaid bets which they (William Hill) considered belonged to the firm. Despite a superficial increase in wages, the workers involved were now financially worse off - a consequence of the introduction of working systems utilised elsewhere by William Hill.

Secondly the pressures to standardise within the labour process generally had a direct effect on wages. For some groups of employees this meant a fall in wages:

"After the amalgamation, Connor's wages had to be raised to match Frank & Mawdsley's. Their wages were held down. Forbes' were even worse off since they used to get a bonus several times a year." (2)

The employer's demands for an effective cash flow for expansion and practicable levels of accumulation emphasise the internal aspects whereby wages and wage demands are explained in the context of changes in the labour process; this can even be extended to include the increasing supply of labour, since the training of settlers must be seen in terms of how the LBO operations could be organised.

1. Letter to George Sawford 22.8.72
2. Interview Irene 19.8.74
Yet there are limits to the internal explanation. The employers were also pressurised through increasing overhead costs and taxation levels; but furthermore, the state of the labour market generally in relation to the transferability of skills and/or the supply of labour must influence wage levels; and such conditions are determined by far more general forces in the capitalist economy, than the labour process in a specific industry. Wage levels will tend to reflect the availability of labour able to do the kind of work demanded by employers; and that is determined across the economy as a whole, although certain rigidities will remain in local labour markets.

So naturally wider questions of market position cannot be ignored. But the initial question about wages must be in terms of the labour process if the development of unionisation in a particular industry is under discussion. It is insufficient to state that wages are low because there is an excess of labour. That is merely a description of the market mechanism; and not an explanation of why this should be the case.

The focus on the labour market suggests a second important consideration in identifying the context of workers' experience which does not derive from the analysis of industry-specific labour processes: the impact of previous experience of work in other areas of employment. This was particularly important in the expanding Bookmaking industry of the 1960s when employment rose by more than 50%.

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1. Based on information derived from British Labour Statistics yearbooks. The details are shown in Table 3.9. This shows total employment in the 'Betting' industry as 38,200 in 1960, that in 'Betting and Gambling' as 58,000 in 1970. The change in classification seems to account for little, since the Figure for 'Betting' (alone) in 1968 was 58,100. By 1973 the figure was 91,500, but it is unlikely this expansion in the 1970s reflected a vast increase in bookmaking, given the number of LBOs was in decline in this period.
The influx of 'new' labour into an industry may well result in the promotion of a general dissatisfaction with working conditions\(^{(1)}\), especially where these are worse than previously experienced. There is little doubt that while support for TUBE initially came from long-serving employees in the industry, the new labour in the industry provided substantial support for unionisation.

All positions in the LBOs attracted labour new to the industry. The changes in the labour process which allowed this potential development to become real are detailed in Chapter 3: the changing position of the settler-manager and counter clerk. Clearly, the overall figures show an increase in the numbers of both men and women employed in the industry, which supports the view that new labour entered all the job functions in LBOs.\(^{(2)}\) This expansion included the increasing amount of part-time work in bookmaking, notably in the position of counter clerks, which had brought many women workers into the industry.\(^{(3)}\) They could compare their new jobs with what they had done before. Pat, one of the TUBE stewards in Connor and Forbes, had worked in both offices and factories when single, but once married with a small son, she looked for a more suitable job:

1. or indeed acceptance of working conditions.

2. Again see Table 3.8. But note how male employment nearly doubled between 1960 and 1964, while female employment was static. This is presumably due to the emergence of small concerns during the initial expansion. Male employment declines between 1966 and 1971, while female employment increases consistently after 1964 - again presumably in part a reflection of the changing structure of the industry.

3. Part-time employment in 'Betting and Gambling' was approx. 42% of total employment in 1971. See Table 3.9.
"I didn't fancy factories. They were boring, so I tried cleaning - the hours were handy. The same with betting; the hours were good and the money poor. People in betting are hard done by." (1)

Pat, along with four of the five TUBE stewards at Connor and Forbes, had only worked in bookmaking since 1970. Irene had been a housewife; George P had previously run his own snackbar at Crosby before his business was ruined; and George M had worked on the docks. This gives some indication of the diversity of the backgrounds of the 'new' labour force in bookmaking; but more significantly it suggests the importance of their work experience prior to their involvement in bookmaking as an important influence in their attitudes to unionisation.

A third area where it is necessary to move away from the focus on the labour process concerns the relations of production. So far the emphasis has been on grievances largely concerned with the immediate effects of control at the workplace or remuneration. But looking further into the experiences of the bookmaking workers, while they protested at the day-to-day conditions and control imposed on them, this did not mean they were unaware of the wider context of their exploitation as wage-labourers. Again this was particularly clear with the Connor and Forbes workers.

Now it might be expected that changes in the labour process in terms of external control would bring into question the whole interpersonal relationship between employer and employee. Such a view is substantiated in this discussion of her employers past and present, by Edna, who subsequently became the Convenor at Connor and Forbes:

"If we had worked under our old employer (Forbes), we would never have had a union. We didn't need one; wages were better, treated right; you were an individual. When Connor asked me why I joined the union, I said it was his reputation, I didn't want to be treated like that; that he didn't care about his employees." (2)

1. Interview Pat 19.8.74
2. Interview Edna 19.8.74
At first sight this might appear that Edna only sees the change in terms of management style, of 'good' and 'bad' employers. Yet it is clear this is not the case, for when Forbes succeeded Connor in controlling the bookmaking division in 1973, she found herself opposing her old boss:

"I'd never have (fought) him in a million years, he was so good to us. But it was big business as far as they were concerned." (1)

Forbes had become part of them. The real basis of the employer's control over and exploitation of employees, while not explicit, is contained in this indictment of the Connor and Forbes management. The personality of employers was irrelevant: they were now seen merely as 'profit-making businessmen'. In this way grievances were wider than the immediate content of changes in the labour process. They involved a more complete understanding of the social relationship between employers and employees, through experiencing the introduction of a reorganised system of work.

Again, do wage demands raise questions about the exploitative relationship between employer and employees? The earlier examples might suggest that for many employees the fact of wage labour remained unquestioned. Yet in periods of expansion capitalism appears as self-contradictory in holding down wages on one hand, yet financing expansion on the other. And this contradiction is most blatant when money is utilised to expand into areas where existing employees do not work.

In Connor and Forbes, the employees realised that they were paying for the expansion of head office within the division:

1. Interview Edna 19.8.74
"Frank and Mawdsley was a small company with about 15 shops and 2 people in the main office running it. Now go to the main office in town. There are six or seven directors with staff checking and rechecking work from the shops. Look at the money going out." (1)

The LBO employees thus realised that their efforts had provided sufficient money for an enlarged head office staff. Yet that was money which could have gone to them for wages. But it was not only the head office expansion they were financing:

"(Connor and Forbes) made huge profits last year. They put it into holiday inns and things like that. Their conscience must have got the better of them and they gave us £1." (2)

Profits from bookmaking had been channelled into new, expanding areas; yet the company were only prepared to give their employees an insignificant wage rise. Thus the question of how profits are allocated is raised, again emphasising the social relationship between the employer and employee as one of exploitation. (3)

To conclude: In general terms the labour process 'approach' does seem to provide a coherent, even essential, understanding of workers' grievances and demands; and it remains the starting point even when wider influences are involved. But it is important to avoid any tendency to remain merely at the level of the workplace; understanding workers' grievances must involve an appreciation of wider social pressures, e.g. the impact of inflation on wages or the general exploitative relationship between employers and employees.

1. Interview George P. 19.8.74
2. Interview Pat 19.8.74
3. Such awareness is usually translated into demands about basic working conditions of employment - in this instance a wage demand. This, of course, is not always the case and may result in more far-reaching objectives, e.g., the much-quoted Lucas Aerospace Corporate Plan.
(ii) The labour process and forms of workers action: the origins of TUBE

So far in this section the diversity of the experiences of employees in the bookmaking industry have been explored in an attempt to show that the varied grievances can best be understood in terms of changes in the labour process, specifically indicating the links with wage demands and wider perspectives on the exploitative relationship of wage labour. Yet while the changing labour process provides the primary context of work experience, it still remains to develop the links between the labour process and trade unionism as a form of workers action.

But why should their response take the form of trade unionism? As briefly discussed in Chapter 2, the answer to that question is essentially historical. While the focus on the labour process has led to an understanding of collective action, it does not determine the form of that collective response.

Consider initially the historical development of TUBE. Some twelve months after TUBE had been formed, George Sawford, the General Secretary, received a letter which perhaps sums up the problem:

"I work for Ladbrokes here in Bromsgrove and there is a general feeling that a strong union is called for, as at the moment we are going to be put into operation without prior consultation with workers, e.g. opening on the Friday and Saturday before Christmas with wages being well below the national average across the board. Something needs to be done and the union is the obvious answer." (1)

Trade unionism is thus seen as an "obvious" solution to the problems faced by wage labourers. But what is it about trade unionism that makes it such an "obvious" response? It is interesting that for those employees who eventually formed TUBE, a union was not their immediate objective.

1. Letter to George Sawford 12.12.72
The motive forces behind the birth of TUBE derived from the patterns of concentration and centralisation in the ownership of LBOs in the London area, with combinations of large-scale betting chains taking place for the first time. For instance, in December 1970, Ladbrokes bought the London-based Joe Solomons and Bud Flanagan chain; in March 1971, the William Hill Organisation, making up lost ground in the race for profitable sites, took over the Hurst Park Syndicate owned by Sam Burns and Terry Downes; on an even bigger scale, 1971 had seen the merger of two large London groups, Mark Lane and Joe Coral.

But perhaps most importantly for TUBE there had been the merger of City Tote Limited and Ron Nagle Limited. The workers of City Tote had been particularly affected by the spate of take-overs in the late 1960s and early 1970s. At the beginning of 1969, the original London-based firm of City Tote had been taken over by a firm operating in the 'leisure' industry called Clubman's Club. However, early in 1970, they sold out to Mecca, the entertainments group. By that time, Mecca had acquired other bookmaking interests, particularly the London firm, Ron Nagle Limited, which was controlled by four members of the Nagle family. To begin with the different groups were run independently, but gradually they were merged into one unit. In the boardroom the Nagle faction gained the upper hand against the City Tote representatives and by 1971 they had effective control of Mecca's LBO interests, who were by now themselves owned by Grand Metropolitan Hotels, following the takeover of 1970-71.

This rapid centralisation was not merely brought about by integrating firms owning a hundred or more LBOs. There was also a readiness to buy up smaller concerns; and it was the takeover of one of these small-scale local firms which provided a major spark for TUBE:
"There was a local bookmaking firm, Ledgers, who had 10 shops. A good firm. They were taken over by City Tote. The staff were assured by their ex-employer they were secure. First thing, the area manager was made redundant on the first day of the takeover. In three months, every employee had left. There was some harrassment, no doubt, but it's hard to prove. Their terms and conditions were above the going rate therefore it paid the company to get rid of them. So at that point I said the industry needs a union."

Those employees most affected by these changes were, as we have seen, the settler-managers. The option which those staff at Ledgers had taken - to leave - rather than to adhere to the dictates of their new employer had now become a rapidly diminishing one. Declining wages and their devalued position could not be offset by moving to another firm. Those small firms who owned 'quality' LBOs were under continuous pressure from the market leaders to sell up; those that did not could scarcely offer high wages. The option to move now presented itself as the option to take a similar job in a different firm or, of course, to leave the industry altogether.

Against this background, in March 1971, a group of bookmaking workers approached Don Bruce, a well-known and respected Bookmaker in the West London area. Their ambitions were clear - to improve the general position of bookmaking employees - but they were not clear how they might achieve this.

Don Bruce received their representations favourably. Bruce, a prominent figure in the bookmaking world, had for many years been involved in a number of employers organisations most notably as a Director of the National Sporting League. In 1969 he had taken a particularly active role in the various campaigns to influence government policy over

1. Interview Don Bruce 20.2.76, "Local" means local to Ruislip, Middlesex area.
the rateable value tax on LBOs. His prominence and experience were, however, coupled with extremely articulate and powerful liberal views, and perhaps it was the combination of these qualities that made him attractive to the employees who approached him in March 1971.

A group of employees concerned with events in the industry was formed as a result of discussions with Bruce. It was fairly fluid, but the most prominent figures were Bruce himself and George Sawford, who did much of the canvassing for support. He was a LBO manager with City Tote and came from West London. He had been connected with bookmaking for many years. Following his brother's footsteps he became a bookies runner and eventually made his own 'book' before "going broke" when Airbone won the Derby in 1946. He "drifted into the credit business" and moved into LBOs in the 1960s, working for small firms until City Tote took over the firm he was with in the late 1960s.

The steering committee, as the group called itself, was faced with the immediate problem: what action should they take? In Bruce they found an advocate, of visionary proportions, of forming a union for bookmaking employees:

"I saw this as a unique opportunity for this industry to have had a completely independent union, untrammelled by past experience - the struggles of the 1930 period - part of which still governs the attitude of unions today. We could, and should, have had an independent body functioning in the true meaning of a union ... I felt we were better to go it alone. A new independent union had not been formed for 40 years. It suited what I wanted to do." (4)

1. Interview Don Bruce 20.2.76. See above, Chapter 3, for the context.
2. He was an active Liberal Party member.
3. Interview George Sawford 12.9.74. At one time he was also a casino worker.
4. Interview Don Bruce 20.2.76.

* of the rateable value tax.
Bruce, at this time, was an important influence on the path which eventually led to TUBE. Yet TUBE did not derive from the visions of one man. It could only arise and develop if the conditions amongst those employed in the industry were such they would give it support.

So what conclusions can be drawn? Firstly, that TUBE emerged during a period when a range of alternative forms of action were diminishing as a consequence of the changing patterns of ownership and control in the bookmaking industry. The options to leave were deteriorating for many LBO staff; the tightening of security procedures was limiting any opportunities for fiddling; while other informal practices came under closer scrutiny, such as the length of lunchbreaks and leaving early from work. Secondly, there was also a worsening of working conditions, particularly for the settler-managers, who were inspirational in the formation of TUBE; this reflected changes in the social organisation of work which was becoming increasingly generalised at this time.

These influences are related to how the labour process was reorganised in this period and which arguably provided the groundswell of support for the union. This is reflected for instance in the decision to form an industrial union for all bookmaking workers and not merely attempt limited representation in the workplaces involved.

In forming a union, workers are developing their own formal organisation on the basis of their position as the collective worker. It is distinct, yet essentially interrelated, with how they are organised by capital at the workplace. Workplace grievances are the source of union demands; hierarchies in the labour process are likely to be reflected in the union; while the patterns of union organisation may
tend to reflect the structure of the industry. These relationships are complex and demand detailed study; in part they are taken up in Chapter 5 where the history of TUBE necessarily involves discussion of who dominated the union and what policies were pursued; in part, and most directly, the link between the labour process and the course of unionisation is taken up in Chapter 6 where the expansion and contraction of TUBE is examined in detail in relation to the changing industrial structure and organisation of the labour process.

The emphasis on the labour process has arguably been instructive in understanding how TUBE was formed, both in terms of the specific extents which led to the union and the wider support which it gained. Furthermore, this approach may have some potential in explaining the speed of unionisation over the next three years as well as assisting the understanding of the internal structure and operation of TUBE.

Yet it would be nonsensical to try to explain unionisation entirely in terms of the internal processes of the organisation of work activity and ignore wider social forces. Not even the Bookmaking industry was that isolated.

In the first instance, whatever the changes in the labour process, the diminishing forms of action, there remains the question why form a union? There are two aspects to this; on one hand, why form a union in preference to other activities; on the other, why form a new union when there seem plenty in existence already. The workers who eventually formed TUBE did not originally set out with this intention in any positive way; but they soon decided on this option and in part it was a decision made for them - not so much by Don Bruce, but the whole history of working class activity in Britain which has presented trade unionism as the foremost option for any group of workers in the position of the bookmaking employees in 1971. The existence of a widespread
trade union movement gives testimony to this and supposedly provides an existing organisational umbrella for those who want to join. In practice, although the bookmaking workers decided to follow the well-trodden path of trade unionism, they did so against the indifference and even hostility of some sections of the trade union movement.

The decision to form TUBE in 1971 and the support it commanded cannot therefore be removed from the context of contingent social forces at the time: it must be seen in terms of working class activity both historically and concurrently and the relationships with employers and the state; it must be examined in the context and willingness of trade unions (including TUBE itself) to organise and reflect the demands of actual and potential members.

It is not only the contextual and organisational activities of the working class that must be considered; those of the capitalist class and their supporters must also be examined. In this particular period the offensive on the part of the employers was being explicitly carried through by the new Conservative government. In this way the state had an important and immediate impact on the activities of the bookmaking employees in their promotion of the IRA 1971. There is little doubt that the legal support given to certain kinds of trade unions was a significant influence on the decision to form TUBE at this time; it is a relationship which must be examined in detail, but must initially be seen as promoting the decision to go it alone on the part of the bookmaking workers.

The general influences of the state and employers reflect the balance of class forces at that particular time and demand analysis. For the bookmaking workers, their action was in response and in relation to employers with particular traditions and under certain kinds of pressures flowing from the demands of accumulation, who could either
support or oppose the union. Arguably their policies towards TUBE were informed by the same developments which prompted their efforts to reorganise the labour process. The success or failure of TUBE could be significantly influenced by how the employers responded to this initiative from their workforce: they could inhibit certain kinds of action and promote others; and therefore demand explicit attention.

The internal pressures towards unionisation must therefore be seen in the context of a range of conjunctural forces which might determine the specific development of the actions of bookmaking employees. Their work experience was complemented by the legacy of a working class emeshed in the traditions of trade unionism; by a trade union movement who did not offer real assistance in their struggles; and by the sponsorship of certain forms of trade unionism by the state. Their efforts to develop and sustain their own union received the continual motivation derived from their continuing work experience, but were subject to the indifference and/or hostility of the trade unions and employers and the ambivalence of state sponsorship.

If these forces represent the limits of labour process explanations, it can also be seen that they can be integrated into the approach. Furthermore, they should not detract from the determinacy of workers experience itself. The task is now to explore the relationship between the labour process and the course of unionisation and then to explore the relationship between changes in the labour process and other social forces. While it is clear that the labour process is not a 'full' explanation of the development of unionisation, the analysis has thrown up a way of understanding the role of employers, the state, and trade unions in terms of workplace position and experience.
Concluding Remarks on the discussion of workers experience.

This chapter began with a discussion of the supposed debate between Thompson and the 'structuralists', e.g. Johnson; in terms of the positions adopted in those debates and in the rest of this chapter, the two points concluded in relation to the theoretical debate have been confirmed. To have remained at the level of workers experience would not have provided such a clear understanding of the processes of the unionisation in terms of the development of the conditions of the labour process; neither would it have provided any meaningful understanding of the source of workers experience and demands.

Yet at the same time, the problems of structural determination are evident. It would have been easy, but incorrect, to read off from the changing objective position of the workers involved their decision to form a union; but the events which actually took place demand a more sensitive understanding of the varied social forces involved and illustrate that a conscious decision was necessary on the part of those involved. On the one hand their experience was determined by a variety of historical and conjunctural forces; but their experience also determined the course of events, and in forming TUBE brought into play a range of social forces in new and different ways. While men and women are a product of their social environment they also make history. Hopefully this chapter has indicated that it is possible to link structural forces and workers experience albeit in the partial explanation of the labour process.
Chapter 5: A Short History of The Union of Bookmakers Employees.

The Union of Bookmakers Employees (TUBE) lasted just three years. It was formed in September 1971 and amalgamated with the TGWU in September 1974. It might seem a very small part of trade union history, yet its significance was something greater. It was a new union in an area of employment previously unorganised. Most employee groups join established trade unions. Most newly-formed unions - breakaways for instance - last only a short time. TUBE, however, reflected the wishes of many bookmaking employees in going it alone and was successful in doing so for three years.

The history of TUBE can be divided into various temporal phases, sometimes blurred at the edges, but nevertheless reflecting the fortunes of the union. The first concerns the formation of TUBE which followed a mass meeting of London bookmaking employees in September, 1971. Next there is the period of expansion when in fifteen months TUBE changed from a London-based nucleus to a national organisation. This expansion was largely complete by the end of 1972. With the influx of members and the growing strength of the union, the first months of 1973 were a phase of optimism, of new and more militant policies, when the union sought to utilise collective strength. However, defeats in industrial disputes set TUBE into its fourth phase, that of decline, with the collapse of branches and membership during 1973. Finally, under various pressures, the union leadership sought amalgamation.

In this chapter the history of TUBE is considered in the context of each of these phases.

1. For a discussion of breakaway unions see Lerner (1961); also Lane & Roberts (1971).
(a) Formation: Birth of a New Union.

TUBE was formed on 7th September 1971. It was the outcome of six months preparation by the steering committee, who had set up the necessary technical arrangements in anticipation of formal ratification, and had given widespread publicity to the inaugural meeting.

The decision to form TUBE was not taken lightly. It was no doubt inspired by the views of Don Bruce and the general feelings amongst those involved of the idiosyncratic nature of the industry. Yet there was also a sense in which there was little choice due to the indifference and/or ineffectiveness of existing unions.

Initially, the steering committee had approached the TUC for assistance. They received the following advice:

".... the best course would be to enter an established TUC union which would be able to provide the necessary benefits, professional advice and methods of representation." (1)

Taking this at face value, the steering committee now approached "several of the established trade unions for advice and assistance", (2) but were unimpressed with the apparent indifference of those unions. But it was not only the lack of interest which concerned them. There was also the record of failure of the major unions in the bookmaking industry:

".... isolated and unsuccessful attempts to organise within the industry have been made by well-established trade unions in the recent past." (3)

Once the decision to form TUBE had been taken, the steering committee had to consider the financial and legal requirements of forming the union. On the question of money, Don Bruce was able to use his contacts:

1. Letter, Vic Feather to George Sawford 22.3.73 in which he refers to the earlier, similar, advice.
2. CIR (1973) p.7.
3. Ibid p.7. In research, two areas have come to light: Wales and Glasgow (see Interview Don Bruce 20.2.76). George Sawford suggested they "Failed dismally": Letter G. Sawford to V. Feather 26.3.73.
"Finance was fixed up with a chap I play golf with, manager
of a local bank." (1)

Meanwhile, in June 1971, a firm of London solicitors were contacted
to advise in the formation of the union. They were to prepare:

".... draft minutes containing resolutions to be passed at
the inaugural meeting of the proposed members." (2)

and

".... draft objects as a guide and advising generally as
to steps which would have to be taken if it was decided to
apply for registration". (3).

The request to consider the technical processes of registration
was significant. It indicated the intentions of the steering committee
to utilise the protections and potential benefits of the IRA 1971 in
developing TUBE. The attractiveness of a legal protection against unfair
dismissal and a legal right for recognition were particularly important.
So much so, in fact, that the steering committee decided to wait for the
Industrial Relations Bill to receive Royal Assent before holding the
inaugural meeting at the Horseshoe Hotel, Tottenham Court Road, London. (4)

With 350 people present, The Union of Bookmaking Employees was
formed by a unanimous vote (5). The meeting was addressed by Don Bruce,
as chairman, with Tom Chapman a "great fellow" and "good friend" of Bruce
as the guest speaker. (6)

1. Interview Don Bruce 20.2.76. He also commented "He was bloody good
really. We had a £7000 overdraft at one time - the costs of the legal process
3. Ibid. Registration refers to registration under the IRA 1971.
4. The Bill was given Royal Assent on 5.8.71, with the inaugural meeting
held just one month later. The meeting was publicised by much hard work on the
part of the steering committee: "Most helpers spent their nights showing
notices through letter boxes". Interview Don Bruce 20.2.76.
5. Minutes of inaugural meeting 7.9.71. See Appendix 1.
6. Interview Don Bruce 20.2.76
Chapman, who was apparently well-received at the meeting\(^1\), held the position of Industrial Advisor to the Church Council\(^2\). Both Bruce and Chapman were to figure prominently in TUBE's early history.

The purpose of the meeting was to find out the extent of support amongst the bookmaking employees, and to ratify the proposals of the steering committee. In both instances, these objectives were fulfilled. The support was apparent from the turnout and all the necessary decisions were taken to launch the union as an organisational force. This included the election of union officials and committee.

The successful nominee for union President was David Kruger, who had participated in the steering committee. He came from one of the suburban areas of Essex bordering East London and for many years had worked in the credit office of City Tote Ltd prior to the legalisation of LBOs. He subsequently became a LBO manager. He was well-known and respected by the City Tote employees. Later he commented on his election as President:

"Frankly, I didn't really want the job of union president, but when I saw for myself how the workers are treated by bookmakers in Scotland, the North and Wales - so dreadful you wouldn't believe it - I jumped at the job." (3)

Kruger was to strike up a strong partnership with fellow steering committee member and the now newly-elected General Secretary, George Sawford. More than anyone, Sawford was to dominate the future of TUBE. He combined powerful oratory with an immense capacity for hard work and he was to retain his position as General Secretary throughout the existence of TUBE, while several of the original group who started the union were to disappear from the scene.

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1. Following his speech he took his seat "amid loud cheering & clapping" - Minutes 7.9.71. Perhaps for the way he had dealt with hecklers trying to disrupt the meeting.
3. Sporting Life 16.2.72. Kruger was only too well aware of the hazards of bookmaking having himself been the victim of a savage attack in a LBO.
The other post, that of Treasurer, was filled by Sidney Salkild, a settler working for Don Bruce. Again, a man who had worked in the industry for some years, Salkild had at one time been a tic-tac, but like many others in various parts of the industry, he had moved into LBOs. (1)

With the consequent election of the executive committee, the main objectives of the steering committee were fulfilled. In effect, the meeting had served this purpose well and provides some indication as to how the union had emerged - not so much through mass action by grassroots support, but through a small group, who having knowledge and personal experience of what was happening in the industry, felt that something needed to be done, and set out purposively to do it. In consequence, the trend of policy decisions and the general affairs of the union were embodied in the very origin of the union, with the establishment of a highly centralised system of control and administration. While the plan for union government was basically simple - a number of local, geographically-based branches being directly responsible to, and represented by, an Executive Council - the union had no branches. The inaugural meeting elected national officials and Executive; in an organisational sense these were the union.

Focussing on the composition of the Executive Committee, gives some guidance as to the specific sources of support for TUBE, since the membership of the committee in part reflected this. Following the election of the three officials, an Executive Committee (2) was now formed

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1. Sporting Life 16.2.72; a tic-tac is someone who relays prices from one bookmaker to another at a racetrack, often involving the use of well-known sign language for each odds selected.
2. Throughout TUBE’s history, especially until December 1972, there is a confusion about the use of “Executive Committee” and “Executive Council”. Strictly speaking, in the rulebook, the “Executive Council” was the biannually elected executive body of the union, while the Committee comprised a small group of the Council in charge of day-to-day policy matters. In practice this formal distinction was not strictly adhered to and the terms used, at times, interchangeably in union records and minutes.
by electing a further ten nominees (1). This gave an Executive Committee of thirteen members. Three important characteristics of the newly-elected Executive stood out. Firstly, the extent of male representation; secondly, the disproportionate number of settler-managers, and others in managerial positions; and thirdly, the strength of employees elected from the larger companies.

The earlier discussion of the sexual division of labour in bookmaking showed how job positions tended to be predominantly male or female with a rigid separation in terms of occupational structure. It is not surprising that the general subjugation of women in society is reflected within the institutions of the labour movement. Neither can it be seen as surprising that the male domination within the bookmaking industry would be reflected in the significant power-holding institutions of TUBE. Despite the undoubted numerical dominance of women in bookmaking, only two women sat on the Executive. (2)

The essential link between male dominance and job positions also implied the disproportionate representation of settler-manager and managerial staffs to the detriment of predominantly female job positions, i.e. counter clerks, and the relatively peripheral boardmen. Most of the Executive were settler-managers, though as an occupational group, they comprised little more than 30% of LBO staff. (3)

1. Ten nominees were unanimously elected; the only other nominee was Laurie Franklin who, although a member of the steering committee, was not elected. He worked as a training officer for the J.Coral Group, a position which apparently made his nomination unacceptable to various J.Coral employees at the meeting. See Inaugural minutes of TUBE, 7.9.71.
2. The use of women as sex objects in bookmaking is extensive. In the early days of LBOs, especially, employers would deliberately advertise for women whose physical appeal would bring in customers, regardless of expertise. Their values are now extolled in a more sophisticated fashion to encourage existing staff, e.g. beauty competitions. Gambling is traditionally strictly a man's activity - where women are used as 'sellers'.
3. It is difficult to be precise here, due to the lack of information (some members of the E.C. are never again mentioned), but only one counter clerk (at the most two) sat on the E.C. at this time. It is not, perhaps, coincidental that most of the few female activists in TUBE who achieved official positions were settler-managers.
They had rather more in common than being merely settler-managers. Again, most of the Executive worked for major London (or National) bookmakers. There were three staff from J.Coral Ltd, two from the William Hill Organisation, and one from Ladbrokes. But in particular evidence were the workers of the City Tote - Ron Nagle combine, now owned by Grand Metropolitan Hotels. They had five representatives, including the President and the Secretary\(^1\). While it was to be expected that these major firms would all be represented, the strength of their representation was such that only two members of the Executive were employed by smaller concerns.

Looking beyond the predominant characteristics of the Executive - male settler-managers in the major combines - what were the backgrounds of those who came to the forefront of TUBE’s activity? The significant election of the three officials indicates a greater commonality than expressed above: all three were middle-aged men with their background firmly rooted in the bookmaking industry. Their experiences were not confined to LBOs for they had been involved in the industry before the days of legal cash betting. They represented those elements in bookmaking who sought to uphold pre-existing social and economic relationships within the industry. They reacted generally to the changing pattern of the industry and specifically to the elimination of their position within the labour-process.

Such perspectives were not merely limited to those who had experienced the pre-1960 days of illegal cash betting. On the Executive, others with backgrounds in bookmaking, who had only really been involved since LBOs were apparent: for instance, Dot Calzetti, a long-serving and resilient counter clerk from the East End, who worked for City Tote; and

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\(^1\) only one of the five came from the Nagle side of the firm.
Dave Dyster, who had been employed by the J.Coral Group for twelve years and now at the age of 30 had worked in all the departments of the firm from "the board to trade room".\(^\text{(1)}\)

While variations in perspective might arise, the point remains that TUBE emerged from the reaction of those who had a history of employment in bookmaking; who had experienced the changes in the labour-process outlined in Chapter 3; who now demanded that something be done to halt their deteriorating position both within the labour process and the labour market; who found that collective action was now their main hope of making their feelings felt and their position improved.

Clearly the interests of TUBE members, or those active in beginning TUBE, were not monolithic. But the dominant influence at the time of TUBE's formation were the settler-managers, in particular the long serving employees, who were most severely affected by the changes in the labour-process. The devaluing of their position prompted a specific reaction from that group which focussed on the right of settler-managers to manage, a fundamentally reactionary response, harking back to past times and embracing the historical mythology of bookmaking. How this affected the nature of TUBE can be understood in the context of two aspects: the tendency to develop independently of the labour movement, i.e. the actual formation of TUBE; and, secondly, the non-oppositional character of TUBE's policies.

Chapter 3, showed how, historically, the development of the bookmaking industry and its relationship to the rest of the economy, and society, had generated tendencies to a solidarity amongst employers and employees. Those in the front of TUBE at this stage inherited this perspective of what the bookmaking industry should be like, emphasising the idiosyncracy of bookmaking and the relationships between employers and employees:

1. EC Election Notes, 1972. See Appendix 2.
"being a specialised industry it appeared that the existing unions were inappropriate: the bargaining between employer and employee would be of such a special nature that it appeared to the workers concerned that only a new union could meet the situation. (Chapman (1971)).

Thus, this 'special relationship' cannot merely be attributed to the undoubted managerial perspectives of TUBE's new leaders, although this can play a part in the notion of 'inappropriateness' as applied to trade unions in general; its source also lay in the historical isolation of the bookmaking industry, and the corresponding ignorance of outsiders in understanding the problems involved:

"....... we feel that such a union must spring from within the betting game itself. Because our jobs are highly specialised only we really understand the difficulties." (1)

Hence TUBE emerged as a means of coping with the 'special' problems of the settler-managers, to combat the changes in the bookmaking industry, to provide an organisation articulating fundamentally conservative notions concerning employer-employee relationships.

Given this, it is not perhaps surprising that TUBE's policies were in general terms non-oppositional in character. The objectives of the union, as set out in the inaugural meeting, were essentially parochial and modest, limited to the processes of collective bargaining in the bookmaking industry. This sectional perspective was further reflected in the non-political position of the union.

TUBE was:

1. D. Kruger quoted in Sporting Life 16.2.72
The Objectives of The Union of Bookmakers Employers as set out in the Minutes of the Inaugural Meeting, 7.9.71.

(a) The protection, care and welfare of employees engaged in the bookmaking industry.

(b) To regulate the relations between employees and employers in the said industry and to improve working standards and conditions and to alter same where they are improper, unjust or oppressive and to provide legal advice and representation for all members of the Union.

(c) To negotiate the settlement of disputes between members and employers.

(d) To give advice and to provide benefits to members as in the case of accident, strikes, lockouts, hardship of victimization subject to the Executive Councils authorisation and the availability of funds at the time."  

1. Minutes of Inaugural Meeting of TUBE, 7.9.71. See Appendix 1.
"...... not to affiliate with any Political Party without the approval of the membership at a meeting called for that purpose". (1)

Thus any connection with the Labour Party, and the political levy, was effectively ruled out.

Besides embracing limited objectives and an explicitly non-political position, TUBE took on another trapping of the 'ideal-type' 'white-collar' union: high subscription rates: the joining fee was set at 25p and thereafter 75p a month, the same rates to apply for women as for men. (2)

But underlying these indicators of the character of TUBE at this time there was the question of interests; a question which prompted a particularly strong bond between TUBE's new officials and the moderating advice of Don Bruce and Tom Chapman. In the first instance, whatever the bookmaking experience of the Executive, union expertise was indeed lacking. The meeting at the Horseshoe Hotel was a mass meeting of 350 bookmaking employees. Many who went along were enthusiastic at first, like Fred Martin, who later became secretary for the London Eastern branch of TUBE:

"I went to the meeting to join and pay my subscriptions. I thought there would be people there to do something for us. But soon I learnt there was no-one there to do anything. George Sawford was just a betting shop manager. He didn't know anything more about the union than me." (3).

1. Minutes of Inaugural Meeting, 7.9.71
2. A motion to allow reduced rates for women was heavily defeated, see ibid. Other comparable unions at that time charged lower subscription rates than TUBE. TUBE subscriptions were £6 per annum (= 50p per month), while the ASTMS maximum was 65p a month.
3. Fred Martin Interview, 10.6.75
Lacking in union experience, the Executive were forced to rely on their own intuition and judgement - and on the advice of two outsiders, Don Bruce and Tom Chapman.

Bruce had played a significant part in organising the formation of TUBE, assisting with financial backing, legal advice, and in developing the initial strategy. Tom Chapman's help was also well received, as Kruger pointed out at the time:

"We know that, as a union, we're only amateurs .... But we are getting some wonderful help from no less a person than the industrial advisor to the Archbishop of Canterbury." (1)

With the formation of the union, the positions of Bruce and Chapman as advisers were officially confirmed. At the first Executive meeting, just eight days after the inaugural meeting, they were both made honorary vice-presidents of the union by a unanimous vote. (2)

At the same time, the close relationship with Bruce indicates the extent to which the TUBE leadership primarily challenged the large betting chains, but retained a dialogue with the smaller employers. This was a fair reflection of the pressures that had generated the basis for collective action. And the dominating tendency in TUBE, the long-established settler-managers, embraced the paternalistic small-scale employer as the contemporary inheritor of what bookmaking was really about, and what should really be. They at least talked the same language, even if it proved to be the language of a dying breed.


The period of fifteen months which saw the transition from the inaugural meeting in London to a national organisation started disastrously for TUBE. Within eight days of the formation of TUBE, George Sawford had been dismissed by his employers, City Tote Ltd, as a settler-manager. The eventual consequences for TUBE were not necessarily

1. D. Kruger, Sporting Life, 16.2.72.
2. EC Minutes 15.9.71.
OFFICIALLY formed only last week, the Union of Bookmakers' Employees is already shaping up for its first big battle.

George Sawford, the first secretary of T.U.B.E., has been sacked by his employers, City Tote Ltd.

Mr. Sawford was told yesterday morning that his employment had been terminated and the news was quickly followed by a statement from a union spokesman who said: "We have no intention of taking it lying down."

The Union Executive met last evening to determine their course of action.

"VICTIMISATION"

Mr. Sawford himself expressed amazement that his employers had dismissed him and described it as "obvious victimisation."

He added that he had never allowed his work for the union to interfere with his job, and in fact, the takings of the shop he managed had gone up since he took it over.

In addition, he pointed out that when he gave City Tote notice to leave some ten weeks ago over a disputed overtime payment, he was asked to stay on, which, he said, "proof that my work was not unsatisfactory."

But a spokesman for City Tote said that his dismissal was on the recommendation of the area manager for a breach of security regulations.

"COINCIDENTAL"

Mr. Sawford's character was not in question and his activities for the union were purely coincidental." City Tote had no objection to their employee joining the union.

The spokesman for the firm added that Mr. Sawford withdrew his own notice to leave and was not asked to do so.

George Sawford, who is 47, has been with City Tote for two years, having been taken into their employ when they acquired a betting shop previously owned by Eddie Spark (Alexanders).

At the time of his dismissal he was manager of the Field End Road betting shop, at Ealing, Middlesex.

Sawford's dismissal competes with the more regular racing features in the Sporting Life 16.9.71

PIGGOTT LANDS CHANTILLY DOUBLE

By OUR PARIS CORRESPONDENT

LESTER PIGGOTT had a double at Chantilly yesterday, and was desperately unlucky to be beaten into third place on his only other mount, who made most of the running.

His double was sparked off in the Prix de Polynesiens worth about £1,500, over a mile and a half, in which he rode Minno, from Jack Clayton's Newmarket stable.

Minno, who has won both his races in England this year, led from start to finish. It was only in the last furlong that he was genuinely challenged by Head Charmeur ridden by Pimio Head, who was beaten a short head, with Morocco Capac the same distance away.

Par-Mutuel dividends were: £2.60 for a win and 1.70, 2.30 and 3.10 for the places.

The British champion completed his double at Turf n Blue

Continued on page three

LATEST

YARMOUTH.—2.15, Scots Fusilier, N Ballantine (7); 2.45, Aibington Park, L Wargren; 3.15, Very Tender, N Ballantine (7).
harmful: partly as a result, the union soon had a full-time General Secretary. Yet it was obviously a personal misfortune for Sawford, and insofar as it preoccupied the attention of the Executive Committee in subsequent months, the issue deflected concern from the main objectives of the union.

The new union immediately faced a dilemma. The Executive was unprepared to call out the membership over this "obvious victimisation". Equally, the new IRA 1971 provided no legal support - the provisions on unfair dismissal had yet to be implemented. The actions, or rather inactions, of the Executive are of some interest. While the refusal to organise industrial action might have reflected the lack of confidence in the members - either in terms of their willingness to take action or their effectiveness - it does seem that the TUBE Executive had a clear preference for using institutional channels in an effort to effect a degree of conciliation. For four months, they utilised the Department of Employment, lobbying selected MPs, and even involving the Industrial Society. All to no avail and Sawford remained dismissed.

The actions of the Executive in preferring a conciliated settlement in part reflect the basis of their trade unionism: that the way forward for the union was not by struggle, but by discussing with the employers in a 'reasonable manner'. They were keen to eliminate 'unreasonable elements' from the union and in fact made this a major plank of the recruitment campaign:

"The Elected Committee will be responsible for all major decisions concerning your future - it is up to you to see that level headed responsible men and women look after your interests." (2)


2. Handbill: "TUBE comes to Liverpool" 10.4.72. Similar handbills were used elsewhere throughout the year.
TUBE had arisen, as they saw it, to rectify an 'unfair' situation in a society that was basically 'fair'. The union slogan was 'Justice our Cause':

"Our aim is to be just to employers and members alike and we will not hesitate from backing an employer so that we may do our best to keep harmony in the industry". (1)

Leaving aside the undoubted rhetoric, there remains an impression that 'justice' can be obtained; that it is the 'normal' situation; and that it only needs the employers to see the situation properly for justice to be achieved. Social justice in a wider sense is not problematic: 'just' employers already exist - it only remains to persuade the bad ones of the error of their ways:

"This union exists only to secure justice for its members, therefore no just employer need fear us". (2)

Such perspectives imply that existing social institutions can, more or less, deliver the goods. The failure of the various important bodies to assist on the Sawford issue at least partially brought the reality of the situation home to them: morality is not all powerful. (3)

1. Letter George Sawford to Dept Employment, Manchester 9.10.72.
2. Letter George Sawford to Sporting Life, undated (but probably 1972).
3. The reactions of groups of employees who become discontented with their position may well involve moralistic viewpoints. In their study of the Pilkington Strike of 1970, Lane and Roberts noted: "The strike had brought to prominence a number of men not wise in the ways of the world. More able perhaps than many of their fellows but probably not notably different in their outlook. Men who looked at issues in uncomplicated terms of justice, fair play and democracy; innocent men in the sense they had not learned the ultimate cynicism: 'politics is the art of the possible'. 'Politics' for them was not a question of practicability in a world of conflicting entrenched interests. 'Politics' was a question of what was right and what was wrong. Issues were judged in terms of morality rather than in terms of expediency. The strike did not change this outlook, but it did change their perceptions of the world. The world, they discovered, was not a very pleasant place".

The issue of Sawford's dismissal eventually gave way to more important issues; and Sawford himself became the only full-time employee of TUBE in early 1972, as General Secretary.

Sawford was now able to devote his full attention to organising new branches for the union. During 1972 membership increased sevenfold: in January there were 479 members (1), but by October, Sawford claimed the figure was now "in excess of 3,500". (2) And by the end of the year, there were thirteen branches throughout England, Scotland and Wales.

The expansion of TUBE in this period was characterised by two particular aspects: firstly that there were distinct temporal phases of branch formation; secondly, that branches were geographically widespread. The initial phase of branch formation comprised the efforts, mainly in London, following on from the inaugural meeting. But the main thrust did not come until March-April 1972, when five branches were added to the only branch to develop in the initial phase, London Eastern. The third and final phase of branch formation did not take place until July-August 1972. This gave TUBE a wide geographical coverage with the Midlands area the only conspicuous absentee.

TUBE existed as an Executive elected by a mass meeting of Bookmaking employees. This was the sole, tenuous, relationship between the union as an organisation and the potential membership. The question of providing organisational continuity was immediately raised and the TUBE Executive confronted the problem of developing a branch organisation, and chose where to utilise the scarce resources of the union. Although some efforts were made elsewhere, the main focus rested on London, which had provided the impetus for TUBE. In October 1971, the Executive:

1. EC Minutes 27.1.72
2. Letter George Sawford to Dept. of Employment, Manchester, 9.10.72.
agreed that the Secretary book three or four venues for meetings in various parts of London with a view to increasing membership and forming branches where possible.\(^{(1)}\)

Meetings were arranged for late October in Harlesden, Tottenham, and Stratford. Even allowing for the lack of money available and the difficulties of publicity, the results were still slightly disappointing. Only the Stratford meeting resulted in a union branch, that of London Eastern.

This remained the only branch formed in 1971. Despite enquiries from Anglesey, Cardiff, Glasgow, and Manchester, the Executive were reluctant to sanction further union branches. There is little doubt this was largely due to the fears of victimisation of union activists at the hands of the employers:

"Some of (the betting shop workers) have been fired for joining a union, some have been discharged for even discussing a union; several have been sacked for merely saying that they were thinking of attending a union meeting." \(^{(2)}\)

Tactically, the Executive now delayed further branch formation until the legal protection of unfair dismissal, enshrined in the IRA 1971, became operative at the end of February 1972. In consequence the second phase of branch expansion was rapid as TUBE made up for lost time. In the last week of February and the first week of March, four branches were officially established: Cardiff, Manchester, Glasgow and West Middlesex. In addition, Sawford had developed membership in Bangor at this time and although never officially made a branch, it was eventually considered as such.

The sources of membership were contrasting. The Cardiff branch drew support from local, small-scale, Welsh firms, while the Manchester and Glasgow members were primarily William Hill employees. The West Middlesex branch had something of a balance of employees from local

1. EC Minutes 14.10.71
2. D.Kruger quoted in Sporting Life 16.2.72.
THE UNION
OF BOOKMAKERS EMPLOYEES
WILL HOLD A
GENERAL MEETING ON
MONDAY 10th APRIL.

AT
THE STRAND HOTEL
BRUNSWICK STREET - PIER HEAD
COMMENCE 8.00 pm SHARP
ALL BOOKMAKERS
EMPLOYEES WELCOME

The object of this meeting is to form
a branch for the Liverpool area.

The Elected Committee will be responsible for
all major decisions Concerning your future — it is
up to you to see that level headed responsible
men and women look after your interests.

COME ALONG AND BRING A FRIEND
firms - especially Don Bruce's own firm - and the national companies. Membership in the branches soon grew, and within a couple of months had reached the 100 mark in Glasgow and West Middlesex and even higher in Manchester. In contrast, London Eastern and the Welsh branches gained rather less support.

There was little rest for Sawford. Having formed four branches in two weeks, he now responded to interest shown in Liverpool and Swansea. In Liverpool, local firms provided most support for the union. In particular, the 100 plus betting chain of Connor and Forbes provided several members and representatives on the local committee, when the branch was formed in April 1972. Similarly, though on a smaller scale, the Swansea branch, also formed in April, drew support primarily from employees in local firms.

With six branches formed in seven weeks, a framework for national expansion had been set. While many members were serviced through head office, where branches had been formed it was up to the representatives in those areas to look after their membership and provide a focus for expansion. By May 1972, TUBE membership had risen to 1500.

Between the middle of April and mid-June, no further branches were formed. In part this reflected the importance of not merely expanding the union, but to actually achieve something through it and on behalf of the members. Recognition by employers not only did not come easily - it seldom came at all. The efforts of TUBE to collectively represent the membership were largely a history of successive defeats. Yet again the union leadership looked to the law and hoped that registration under the IRA 1971 would give them the right to recognition through the legal procedures. But until registration was achieved, they had no recourse to these legal channels. And against a background of rebuffs, voluntary recognition by employers was seldom a live possibility. It is not perhaps surprising that the TUBE Executive shelved any further
Industrial Relations Act 1971

CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION AS A TRADE UNION

It is hereby certified that the Union of Bookbinders Employers, Register No. 0516, T., was registered as a trade union under the Industrial Relations Act 1971 on 2nd June 1972 being an organisation of workers other than a federation of workers' organisations.

Chief Registrar of Trade Unions and Employers' Associations
plans for branch formation until they could do something more
effective for the potential membership involved. It is not perhaps
coincidence that TUBE became registered under the IRA 1971 on 2nd
June 1972 and that between mid-June and the end of August, a further
five branches were formed. Two of these branches were London-based.
Both were formed in June and catered for members on either side of
the Thames: hence they were known as London North and London South.
Both drew support from large London chains; Hector MacDonald in the
North where there were at least 100 members, and in James Lane Ltd
in London South who was one of the few employers to have some sympathy
for TUBE.

Further branches were subsequently formed at the other end of the
country: in July, the Stockton branch held its inaugural meeting, largely
comprised of employees from the local betting chain of John Joyce;
while in August, 1972, the Ladbroke members in Newcastle were
instrumental in forming a branch which soon had 200 members. Efforts,
however, to start a branch in Sunderland came to nothing.

This left the main gaps in branch organisation as Yorkshire and
the Midlands. One of those was largely filled when the Leeds branch
was started at the beginning of August. With William Hill taking over
the main Leeds firm of Jack Windsor, interest in the union was strong.
Claims that meetings held by the branch were attended by upwards of
150 to 200 people were made at the end of 1972, and without doubt, the
Leeds branch proved one of the strongest areas of support for TUBE.

This completed the third, and final, phase of branch expansion
in 1972. During the first twelve months of its existence, TUBE
had become a national organisation, establishing a succession of active
branches largely as a response to local demands. Yet, paradoxically,
1972 in other ways proved a particularly unsuccessful year: notably
in gaining acceptance from employers. Apart from two small successes
in Wales, and Don Bruce, TUBE did not gain recognition in any bookmaking firm. In some cases, such as with the national companies, this was the beginning of long campaigns. In others, the union suffered real and disastrous defeats, such as in James Lane, where at one time success had seemed a formality. Defeats by individual employers in some cases resulted in the collapse of branches, noticeably in Wales where there was a foretaste of future fortunes.

Yet the failure of the union to press home its demands to collectively represent its membership cannot merely be related to the hostility of the employers. With the rapid organisational expansion over such a wide area, internal difficulties soon arose. Problems of communication between head office and branches were a common complaint from local activists, often linked to the apparent inactivity of the union. On the other side, Sawford was the only full-time employee of the union, and it could scarcely be expected that he should service all the thirteen branches effectively, build membership, and negotiate with employers. And, again, at the local level, the problems of collecting subscriptions, of sustaining paid-up membership, where members worked in relatively isolated units, posed real problems in almost every branch.

But underlying the organisational difficulties of TUBE, there was the crucial question of union democracy. The caretaker Executive, elected at the very first mass meeting, was scarcely representative of the newly expanded membership. Furthermore, during 1972, they had struggled to maintain an effective complement. Within three weeks of formation, seven of the thirteen-strong Executive had effectively dropped out. This left a small hard core, including the three officials - Sawford, Kruger and Salkild - who continually sought to replenish the ranks through intermittent co-option and the introduction of delegates from newly-formed London branches. During 1971-72, 24
different lay representatives sat on the Executive at various times.

The union rules demanded that elections for the Executive should be held in 1972, and the closing date for nominations from the branches was set for 31st August 1972. The Council was now to comprise 16 members plus the three officials: Secretary, Treasurer and Chairman.

It was hoped that the holding of elections would enable a more effective representation of the provincial branches and thus strengthen union organisation. Yet from the start, this could be only partial. The newly-formed branches in the North East and Leeds were too late to make nominations, nor were any forthcoming from Wales. The other provincial branches did make nominations, however: four from Liverpool, two from Scotland, and one from Manchester. Still, the bulk of the candidates came from the London branches, who provided sixteen nominations.

The elections were held in October 1972 and the results published in December. They provided an interesting mixture: six of the seven provincial candidates were elected; Laurie Gilmurray from Scotland had topped the poll by a clear margin. At the same time, most of the established Executive were re-elected, only Bill Morgan of those who had offered themselves for re-election being defeated.

With a new Executive, a national branch structure, and 3,500 members, TUBE entered a new phase in 1973 where the union could push to the forefront the problem of making real gains for the membership.

1. Elections were to be held every four years.
2. At some point in 1971-72, the position of President was replaced by Chairman.
3. Each branch could make four nominations.
4. Each TUBE member had 16 votes - the same number as seats on the Executive. Voting was by postal ballot under the auspices of the Electoral Reform Society. See Appendix 2.
THE UNION OF BOOKMAKERS EMPLOYEES

BALLOT PAPER

FOR

ELECTION OF EXECUTIVE COUNCIL 1973

Vote by placing X against the candidates at your choice. The number for selection is EIGHTEEN. You may vote for less, but not more.

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<td>Morris &amp; Philip</td>
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<tr>
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<td>WARREN, S. (MRS.)</td>
<td>A. Williams</td>
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This paper must be returned to reach the Union's Returning Officer, The Electoral Reform Society, 6 Chancel Street, London S.E.1 by TUESDAY, 31ST OCTOBER, 1973.
There were similar comparisons to be made between the new Executive and the one elected the previous year. Firstly, there were only two women, Shirley Warren from London North and Carole Richardson from London South, just as there had been in September 1971, but now the lack of female representation was greater in proportion than it had been twelve months previously. Secondly, with neither of the two women employed as counter clerks, the new Executive Council drew exclusively on employees from managerial positions. The male-managerial dominance on the Executive remained.

Yet the predominance of the major firms diminished. In 1971, the four main chains, Ladbrokes, Hills, Corals and City Tote had provided eleven of the thirteen strong Executive. Now they only provided ten from eighteen. Partly this reflected the influence of the provincial branches, particularly Liverpool whose three representatives all came from local firms. Yet it can also be seen in the London representatives, with candidates working for local London firms. It was perhaps a reflection of the unions presence in these smaller groups.

There were also changes in official positions. Kruger, the President, resigned on health grounds having suffered a heart attack in 1972. His deputy in the interim period, Tony Pawle, a LBO manager with City Tote, also resigned to take up a position in that company's newly created personnel department. They were replaced by Barney Saville, a prominent member of London Eastern, as the new chairman; and by Laurie Gilmurray as vice-chairman. Shirley Warren took over the difficult task of treasurer.

1. Interestingly, both secured high places in the polling list, Warren in fact finishing runner up to Gilmurray.
2. Kruger was given a promotion to administer the new pension scheme.
The new Executive determined that results should be achieved - and quickly. At the first meeting in January, "Union Policy" was added to the proposed agenda and involved a far-reaching discussion of both the internal and external problems of TUBE. In consequence, three key areas were identified: the consolidation of membership; union organisation; and strategy towards employers and attempts at recognition.

The first two of these objectives implied a consolidation of the progress of the previous year: a continuation of branch formation on the one hand and maintaining existing membership on the other. Here union organisation was weak. Sawford, the only full-time official, was largely responsible for servicing all the branches - an impossible task - and undertaking the administration of the union. Continued branch formation and maintenance also implied an expanded administrative structure.

In the early months of 1973, the gaps of the previous year of expansion were largely filled. In December 1972 there was a dispute in Hull between William Hill and local employees and Sawford was called in by the employees to back them up. The dispute concerned the non-payment of a traditional Christmas bonus, and following a stoppage on Boxing Day the Hill's employees were successful. In early January, a local branch was formed - the final stage in the TUBE expansion into the North-East and Yorkshire.

In 1972, the Midlands had proved a particularly unsuccessful area for TUBE. As far back as October 1971, TUBE had tried to form a branch in Birmingham and while during 1972 support had developed amongst the J.Coral staff, even in October 1972 efforts to establish a branch in Wolverhampton failed. Only in December 1972 was a Birmingham branch formed. And in February 1973 it was closely followed by a new branch for the Coventry area.
For the remaining branch expansion, it was now a question of mopping up lesser areas. Requests for branches, for membership, had come in from smaller areas e.g. Cornwall, Devon, East Anglia, and Oxford. In these areas membership potential was small and Sawford was unwilling to give any substantial time to these groups at the expense of larger urban areas. But where membership did rise above a few isolated employees, Sawford was to be prepared to form branches. In January 1973, three new ones were added, Portsmouth, Bristol and Blackpool.

The question of administration was now posed more strongly. Sawford demanded more assistance from his new Executive. And they responded by establishing three positions of area officials to assist in servicing the membership and the branches; and by giving priority to new union offices and secretarial support for Sawford.

Between them, the three area officials were to cover England, Scotland, and Wales. Dividing the country into three areas, the Executive invited the branches to nominate candidates by mid-February. The Executive would appoint from these nominations. While there were eight candidates, five had applied for the Area 2 position - from Carlisle to Birmingham. The one who proved eventually successful was Sawford's protege, Andrew Long, the Leeds Branch Secretary. In Area 1, the northern region, the Executive appointed the only applicant, Walter Lavery who had been active in the NUM for twelve years before entering the betting industry. Unfortunately, the Executive could not immediately fill the Southern position, although shortly afterwards, John Hobbs, a new member of the Executive, took on the job.

1. The precise areas to be covered were: "(1) Newcastle, Stockton and all areas north of Carlisle including the whole of Scotland, (2) South of Carlisle including Liverpool and up to and including Birmingham. (3) South of Birmingham including the London area, Bristol, and South Wales." EC Minutes 21.1.73.

2. It will be remembered Leeds were not represented on the Executive.
This provided Sawford with support around the country. The central administration still remained, and in January the Executive voted Sawford a 'girl Friday'. Yet this necessarily hung fire until union offices were found. Sawford still worked from his home, while using Don Bruce's offices as a formal address. Various efforts to secure offices had come to nothing and while the new Executive made union offices a top priority it proved a long time before anything was finally achieved. In April 1973, the Executive even went as far as appointing an office manager - Barney Saville - to take effect when offices became available.

This three months saw a conscious change in TUBE policy towards employers. The new Executive were ambitious: they had shown this in their approach to strengthening the organisation of TUBE. But they desperately wanted to achieve success with employers: and to this end were prepared to support a more militant line than their predecessors.

The central focus at this time were the two major firms, William Hill and Ladbrokes. In December 1972, William Hill employees at Hull had successfully staged a one-day stoppage. On 3rd February 1973, William Hill employees stopped work in Manchester, Coventry, and Yorkshire in an effort to secure better conditions. The Executive were willing to support this line, culminating in proposed national stoppages in William Hill and Ladbrokes at the end of March.

However, only one stoppage actually took place, that in Ladbrokes. Here the support was patchy: while the North-East solidly supported the withdrawal of labour, the response in London was immensely disappointing with most Ladbroke employees working normally. In between, in the Midlands, there were partial successes: some sixteen LBOs remained open in Birmingham indicating that while the majority of employees had joined the stoppage, a substantial minority had worked
normally. On the whole, the Ladbroke stoppage had failed. Far from demonstrating a general solidarity, the uneven response of the membership highlighted their divisions.

It was scarcely a good omen for the planned stoppage in William Hill the following Saturday. Already, the reality of a C.I.R. investigation had undermined TUBE policy towards industrial action (1); now the Ladbrokes stoppage had proved disappointing, posing another query over this course of action. Finally, Sawford received the results of the ballot of William Hill members, which did not give encouraging support for industrial action. Three days before the proposed stoppage, Sawford, on his own initiative, entered negotiations with the managing director of William Hill, Sam Burns, with the assistance of the Department of Employment. The Company were prepared to concede a five day week plus extra payment for bank holiday working if the stoppage was called off. Sawford agreed.

The failure of the national stoppages was a major disappointment after the optimism of the Executive earlier in the year. But why did it fail? Within TUBE, two distinct positions adopted differing perspectives: the first put the main blame on the poor organisation of the stoppages; the second suggested the apathy of the rank and file was the major reason.

Prominent amongst the advocates of the first explanation were the Newcastle branch, who had proved the strongest supporters of the Ladbroke stoppage, despite only coming out on the instructions of the Executive, and not because of any local grievances. David Patterson,

1. See Ch. for a detailed discussion of this question.
the Branch Secretary, sent strongly worded letters to the Executive immediately after the stoppage indicating that the Ladbroke members were ".... disgusted at the fact that they had been misled", and criticising the lack of information they had received prior to the stoppage. (1) Patterson then circulated the Branch Secretaries of the union canvassing support for the Newcastle members who believed the "poor response" to the stoppages was due to the "lack of communication between London and the branches". (2)

What the Newcastle members felt was subsequently echoed by others, including Don Bruce who was closely involved in the early stages of this campaign:

"I laid down the plan of action. Four days before, I found things were not at all as had been presented. It was a tragedy because the means was there". (3)

These explanations of the union's defeat clearly placed the blame on those organising the stoppages, not on those participating in them. Sawford, as General Secretary, was naturally the prime target. The responsibility for co-ordinating the stoppages was his and at the April meeting of the Executive he was heavily criticised for the mishandling of the Ladbroke stoppage and his initiative in calling off the Hills stoppage - contrary to the instructions of the Executive.

Sawford, however, was unwilling to accept the blame for the poor response to the stoppages. Contradicting Bruce and the Newcastle members, Sawford sought to explain the defeat in terms of the apathy of the members. On 18th April, 1973, he wrote to Patterson, commenting on the attitude of the Newcastle members:

1. Letter D.Patterson to George Sawford 29.3.73.
2. D.Patterson to R.Cowern 1.4.73. Significantly Sawford also received complaints about the organisation of the Ladbroke stoppage from London. See Letter C.Cousins to George Sawford 28.3.73.
3. Interview D.Bruce 20.2.76.
"The EC can understand the feelings of your members who took part in the one day strike and are amazed at the apathy shown by Ladbroke employees." (1)

This particular response was part of a more general view held by Sawford, for instance, in the general comment "people in this industry associate unions with strikes." (2) It is a view of the membership which questions their commitment to trade unionism, indicating the general source of failure for TUBE's policies within the rank and file.

As such it directly contrasts with the explanation of defeat in terms of 'poor organisation', which conversely implies the willingness of the rank and file to take industrial action in certain situations.

Either explanation of the failure of TUBE's early campaigns in 1973 can only be partial. In particular the causes of defeat were not entirely internal. For the moment, however, the significance of the defeats and their divisive impact within the union must be noted. They stand out as the beginning of TUBE's decline.

(d) Decline: March 1973-September 1973: the collapse of the branch structure

In a period of six months, TUBE suffered substantial loss in membership and a collapse of the branch structure, so optimistically and enthusiastically developed in the previous one and half years.

The most striking feature of the decline of branch organisation was its generality. All branches were affected, and many collapsed entirely. Some, such as those in Wales, were relatively small branches, but others included major areas of support and were among the earliest TUBE branches.

1. Letter George Sawford to David Patterson 18.4.73.
2. Interview George Sawford 23.7.74.
By June 1973, therefore, not only had support in Cardiff, Blackpool and Coventry dwindled, but the strongholds of Birmingham, Newcastle, Manchester, and Scotland had become major casualties. By September 1973, Swansea and Stockton could be added to the list, while the London branches were also suffering. In fact, by this time it would not be unfair to describe TUBE as comprising relatively isolated firm-based branches with little scope for the general solidarity which had developed early in the year.

The decline of branch organisation can be understood in terms of membership composition: on the one side, the branch drawing almost exclusively on members from national companies; on the other, where membership was entirely based on local firms; and, finally, the hybrid model, where membership was sustained in both local and national firms. As examples of each type, the branches in Scotland, Manchester, and Wales are considered. Most typical of the first was Scotland, where William Hill employees dominated. While William Hill employees were also prominent in Manchester, support within the branch simultaneously derived from local firms, and provides a good example of the hybrid branch. Finally, the Welsh branches again illustrate most clearly the problems of local dependency.

The membership in Scotland had spent most of 1972 waiting for something to happen. For branches based on national firms could make little inroads locally - success depended on a co-ordinated national effort, including in this case, William Hill branches in other parts of Britain. Following the elections of 1972, Scotland now had two representatives on the Executive: Laurie Gilmurray and Stuart Montgomery, both influential in the new emphasis in TUBE policy. The potential for action now seemed to be there and it became a reality with the February stoppage in Leeds, Manchester, and the Midlands and the proposed Grand National Day stoppage that March.
However the events of that second stoppage found little favour in Scotland. While the precipitate action of Sawford in calling off the strike was criticised on the Executive, the terms of this agreement with Burns was sufficient to induce criticism from the Scottish membership. Sawford, they believed, had endorsed differential rates of pay between London, the Provinces, and Scotland; with Scotland having the lowest rate. (1)

Twelve months of waiting had produced little for the Glasgow Branch; and the disappointment appears to have rubbed off on the activists too. Neither Gilmurray nor Montgomery attended the Executive meeting in April to discuss the aftermath of the stoppages. In fact, Montgomery, who like Gilmurray had attended the Executive meetings in January and February, now withdrew from the Executive. While locally Gilmurray tried to maintain support in the union, dues were not forthcoming. (2) And when Gilmurray was dismissed by William Hill at the end of May, he had already made plans to open his own LBO, thus resolving his own individual problem. By then, the branch in Glasgow had disintegrated.

While the story at Manchester was somewhat similar, it was rather more complex. Here the membership had been actively involved in the February stoppage in William Hill. Here also, TUBE had been close to success in gaining recognition from local companies. And, at the end of 1972, Manchester had seemed one of the most promising branches.

Yet within four months everything had gone sour. While in December 1972 and January 1973, 90 new members had been recruited in the Manchester area, by April 1973 Sawford was concerned that few had continued to pay subscriptions. While in February, the William Hill

1. Letter Anon to George Sawford 30.3.73.
2. On 1.4.73 the Glasgow Branch account was the only overdrawn branch account in TUBE - a reflection of the lack of subs paid. It will also be remembered that members of the branch had complained about paying dues in 1972.
THE UNION OF BOOKMAKERS EMPLOYEES  
40 High Street, Ruislip HA4 7AN  
Telephone: 01-841 0916  

Minimum Wage Scale for Bookmakers Employees working in the London Area — July 1973

MANAGERS

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<th>Shop Taking:</th>
<th>Number of Slips:</th>
<th>5 day 37½ hours:</th>
<th>6 day 45 hours:</th>
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To compute Cash or Slip ceiling: — Take the best 13 consecutive weekly period during the Flat season.

Grades may be achieved by either Shop takings or the number of Slips taken during a Six day week.

SETTLERS

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COUNTERHANDS

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<tr>
<td>2 - 3 years continual service</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 - 5 years continual service</td>
<td></td>
<td>£22.38</td>
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BOARDMEN — BOARDWOMEN

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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>£22.38</td>
<td>£28.13</td>
<td>£0.70</td>
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All employees to receive Three weeks Annual Holiday (2 Summer & 1 Winter)
8 years continual service Four Weeks Annual Holiday (2 Summer & 2 Winter)
All overtime to be paid at Time & One Half
Employees working over 21 hours weekly are entitled to Holidays as above.

CAMERA TECHNICIANS, SECURITY STAFF AND COURIERS

As the duties vary so much in each company, rates of pay and specific duties will be published according to the various companies operating.

RACING TELEPHONISTS (Not settling) Rates as per Counterhands.

PROVINCIAL RATES ARE AWAITING RATIFICATION BY PROVINCIAL BRANCHES.
employees had closed 50 LBOs by June, the leading activists, Ken Wheeler and Dave Wagstaffe had dropped out, with branch subscriptions totalling only £20. And while at the beginning of 1973, recognition had seemed possible in the local firms of Fred Booth Ltd and Foy Bros Ltd, within a few months these hopes had been dashed - in the latter despite a successful Agency Shop ballot.\(^1\) As Jack Rashman, the Branch Chairman, later recalled:

"The Manchester members slowly became disenchanted. Andrew Long did nothing. Dave Wagstaff chucked it in. All did, felt they were getting nowhere. The branch folded. I remained a member, but the branch ceased to function.\(^2\)."

At least Manchester knew that full-time organisers existed:

in Wales the isolation was even more pronounced. In the expansion of TUBE Wales had provided the extremes of success and failure for the union, largely attributable to the dependence of the branches on local firms. Two branches, out of the four, survived into 1973. Of these, Cardiff appeared the strongest.

At the beginning of 1973, Cardiff seemed likely to enjoy further success. Recruiting substantially in Derek Pugh Ltd, which employed approximately 40 staff, Sawford approached the Management in early February, demanding an Agency Shop Agreement thus building on the representational rights secured previously. Agreement was reached that the employees should be ballotted. In the meantime, the Cardiff branch suffered two setbacks. In March, Brian Stephens, the Branch Secretary, left the industry to become a meter reader, thus resigning his union position. And later that month, some TUBE members in

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1. See below, Ch.6.
2. Interview, J. Rashman, 5.8.76.
Derek Pugh notified Sawford that they were leaving the union.\(^1\)

By the time the ballot preparations had been made and ballot run it was June. In those four months, membership had declined by 50% and TUBE failed to gain the required number of votes. And the Cardiff branch merely faded away.

In Swansea, it was a little different. Here, activity was negligible and only the predominantly female employees at Val Jones Ltd maintained TUBE's presence. Isolated from the main body of the union, they were unaware, until September 1973, that they were "covered" by an area organiser. And this they only discovered when Pauline Player, their leading activist, informed Sawford that membership had dwindled and that she herself was leaving to start a family. Even Sawford was forced to admit that TUBE had neglected the branch "rather badly".\(^2\)

These three examples show the generality of decline, both across large branches, such as Manchester, and small ones, such as Swansea; across those drawing membership largely from national firms, such as Glasgow, and those dependent on local employers, as in Cardiff.

By the time Pauline Player wrote announcing the final collapse of the Swansea branch, TUBE had been reduced to little more than a basic shell. Some support remained in Leeds and Hull among the William Hill Organisation employees; but elsewhere branches depended on "success" in local firms, such as Connor and Forbes in Liverpool, Hector MacDonald in London North, and Ken Munden in London South.

This period of decline was accompanied by an increasing reliance on the legal provisions for gaining recognition. The period of near total dependence was yet to come, but at this stage, two cases, that of

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1. Though not because they did not think the industry needed a union. Their reasoning was entirely based on their view of their employer: "This boss is one in a million, but if I ever left this firm I would like to rejoin TUBE". Letter B. Halter to George Sawford 27.3.73.

2. Letter George Sawford to Pauline Player, 9.9.73.
Connor and Forbes in Liverpool and the national reference in William Hill were being investigated by the CIR. Although the legal process was proving a long haul, by the summer of 1973, success in Connor and Forbes seemed highly probable. This was in contrast to the apparent defeat of more militant tactics in Ladbrokes and William Hill.

In consequence, by the Autumn of 1973, TUBE had embarked on a new policy direction from that developed by the fresh enthusiasm of the newly elected Executive. The decline of branch organisation underlied the new focus on firms, reinforced by the attentions of the CIR.; the failure of the stoppages had meant the defeat of militant policies and with the favourable response of the CIR, the legal road to recognition now seemed unquestioned.

The decline in this phase necessarily generated conflicts within the union - conflicts which had appeared incoherently throughout 1972, but were now fought out with vehemence and bitterness on the Executive itself. The changes in policy were not achieved without internal struggles within the union.

The challenges to the Executive in 1972 and the expression of oppositional tendencies on the Executive in 1973 had not merely embodied policies, such as the more militant approach to recognition; they simultaneously involved questions of union democracy. And with the failure of the stoppages in William Hill and Ladbrokes, questions of union democracy now came to the forefront. Initially, the focus had been the handling of both disputes by Sawford: his unconstitutional negotiations with William Hill and his mishandling of the Ladbrokes stoppages were both sources of discontent amongst many members of the Executive.

1. The precise course of the legal recognition process is set out in Ch. 8 where the whole relationship between the law on recognition and trade union organisation is discussed. Basically, the CIR performed an investigating function on behalf of the NIRC, who had the legal jurisdiction of making decisions on recognition cases.
Such criticisms had been raised at the April Executive meeting. And, at the same meeting, questions were also raised about the positions and attendance of the two vice-presidents, Don Bruce and Tom Chapman. Both, it will be remembered, had been appointed to those offices by the caretaker Executive in 1971. Some of the newer members were unimpressed. Shirley Warren, a main focus of oppositional support, on Don Bruce:

"I was deeply opposed to having a bookmaker on our EC - he may have helped start the union, but no way could I see how he could sit on the EC. Under no circumstances would I accept this. You can't be on both sides". (1)

Her criticism of Bruce concerned his position as an employer; that of Chapman centred on his personal qualities, echoed elsewhere on the Executive. Fred Martin, co-opted at the April meeting:

"Most of the time Tom Chapman seemed drunk. He talked nonsense and his mind wandered". (2)

At the time, there was only a partial victory for Warren and Martin. While the Executive decided unanimously that they themselves had the sole right to invite guests, a proposal to invite both Chapman and Bruce to the next meeting was carried.

The continued presence of Bruce in the affairs of TUBE was not decided by the activities of his opponents on the Executive; his fate was sealed by the CIR. Investigating the Connor and Forbes reference, they suggested that the presence of Bruce, as an employer, on the Executive raised doubts about the independance of the union.

These misgivings were expressed in the draft report on Connor and Forbes in mid-June. At the Executive meeting on 1st July 1971, Bruce's resignation from TUBE was announced and accepted.

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1. Interview S. Warren 24.8.76.
2. Interview F. Martin, 10.6.75
By this time, the decline of the union brought many issues sharply into focus: two immediate concerns were the loss of many activists, including Executive members, and the rapidly deteriorating financial position of the union. By the July meeting, only eight of the original eighteen members of the Executive remained and again co-option was continually used to bring numbers up to strength - increasingly so, as branches collapsed and many activists became disillusioned. With the disintegration of the branches, membership also fell away, and thus financial problems rapidly emerged. While at the end of 1972, TUBE was holding its own, by August 1973 the union was more than £4,000 in debt, with current expenditure exceeding current income.

Such influences tended to bring support to Sawford's position: the declining branch organisation weakened the position of several EC members, while the worsening financial position emphasised the need for strong, centralised leadership. And, just as the use of the legal machinery had served to reinforce tendencies towards the collapse of branch organisation, so it now exerted a centralising influence on the distribution of power within the union, through reinforcing the control of recognition policy in the hands of the central leadership in general and the General Secretary and administration in particular.

So that when, in July, Sawford was criticised within the Executive on a wide variety of issues, the forces within the union were running in his favour. The criticisms were wideranging: Shirley Warren claimed the minutes of the April meeting had misrepresented her position and that of her branch over the question of the attendance of Bruce and Chapman; John Hobbs raised the question of Sawford's inactivity in the representation of members in his branch who had been dismissed by their employers; Mick Levy proposed a motion of censure for Sawford's action in defending a non-TUBE member at an industrial
tribunal. Furthermore, Sawford had to argue his case for

recommending the dismissal of Walter Lavery, the full-time organiser for

the North-East and Scotland, which the Executive were reluctant to

accept. (1)

Sawford managed to parry the criticisms, and then launched a

counter attack by threatening to resign. It produced a dilemma for

his critics: Shirley Warren:

"George was always telling you how nice the employers are.

You lose faith in a man who seems to believe what Guv'nors
tell you, but there was no feasible alternative to
George Sawford". (2)

The uncertainty as to whether Sawford would remain lasted until

the next Executive meeting in August - to be held in the new union

offices in Don Bruce's premises at Ruislip. Here Tom Chapman made

his comeback; addressing the meeting he announced his refusal to

accept Sawford's resignation. Sawford's grievances concerned the

lack of support he received from the London members of the Executive,

and the financial drain on his personal resources. The Executive had

little option but to give support in this direction. In a vote of

confidence in Sawford, only Shirley Warren voted against. With Sawford

agreeing to continue, Chapman demanded Shirley Warren's resignation

as treasurer.

It is important to see how these shifts in power at the national

level of the union reflected the changes in the overall pattern of

union organisation. The declining strength of oppositional elements

within the Executive reflected the deteriorating branch organisation.

Furthermore, the focus of attention had now swung firmly on to the legal

possibilities, for the recommendation by the CIR that Connor and Forbes

1. Lavery had been particularly unfortunate. Having successfully
organised an almost total stoppage in the North-East in Ladbrokes that
March, he now found himself with a disillusioned and increasingly apathetic
membership.

2. Interview S. Warren 24.8.76.
should recognise TUBE was made public on 2nd August. It is significant that Sawford's account at the Executive meeting on 12th August of the current state of play in recognition attempts was almost entirely within the framework of the use, actual or potential, of the legal provisions.

This direction of policy was made explicit in a newsletter, prepared at the beginning of September 1973 for distribution to the branches. Here the achievements of TUBE's two year history were set out:

"The satisfactory completion of many wrongful dismissal cases, the CIR inquiries, the recognition issues and Agency Shop Agreements are just a small part of what TUBE is doing on your behalf". (1)

A small part? Surely not. It was indeed significant that only these specific activities are mentioned. Future policy was clearly spelt out:

"It has been decided that in the coming months your Executive will concentrate all their endeavours to obtaining recognition and Agency Shop Agreements on a selective basis rather than throughout the country at one and the same time." (2)

While not expressed specifically in terms of the IRA 1971, the emphasis was clear. Achieving recognition on a selective basis meant through the legislative procedures. Past success and future policy were seen respectively in terms of legislative activity and possibilities.

The voices of opposition on the EC had never represented a majority position nor had they presented themselves as an organised alternative to the position of Sawford and his supporters. With their basis of support being continually undermined, Shirley Warren's resignation as Treasurer, was only a matter of time. (3)

2. Ibid.
3. She still remained a member of the Executive Council.
All the key positions on the EC were now held by Sawford’s supporters and it left the one remaining office holder with dissenting views, John Hobbs, in an increasingly exposed position.

Sawford regarded the August meeting as a turning point. Shortly afterwards he wrote to Dave Dyster, who had just resigned his position on the EC having secured employment outside of the bookmaking industry:

“After Sunday’s meeting, I am still Secretary and for the very first time, the EC got down to some serious business and planning for the future instead of the petty arguments that have arisen in the past”. (1)

And Sawford, increasingly unimpressed with the performance of John Hobbs as an area organiser, decided to remove this particular obstacle to “planning for the future”. Hobbs was dismissed by Sawford on 12th September.

But this dismissal would bring the TUBE Executive into its most serious crisis. And it would involve a new issue which focussed on TUBE’s survival as an independent union. That issue was the question of amalgamation.

(e) The Road to Amalgamation: September 1973 - September 1974.

The most significant feature of the phase of TUBE’s history leading to amalgamation concerned the non-reversability of the decline of branch organisation and membership, experienced in the middle months of 1973. If anything, the situation became worse. By the beginning of 1974 only three sound branches remained: London South, effectively organising the Ken Munden employees; Liverpool, where the Connor and Forbes workers still battled for recognition; and Hull, where Ron Grantham maintained solid membership among his William Hill member

1. Letter George Sawford to D. Dyster 19.8.73.
Elsewhere, the position had deteriorated. West Middlesex and London North suffered both from setbacks with local employers and the divisions nationally within the union; Birmingham, although reformed in November 1973, soon became little more than a shell; in the North, the Manchester Branch survived only in terms of the membership in Seymour and Story; while the once strong Leeds branch, at one time having 400 members, fell as low as eighteen members in 1974.\(^{(1)}\) In the North-East, local defeats in Newcastle virtually finished off the remnants of membership there, although Stockton eventually emerged victorious in their struggle with John Joyce. And while employees in Scotland and Wales expressed an interest in TUBE, the branches in these areas no longer functioned.

In consequence, TUBE was plunged into a severe organisational and financial crisis. That the union could effectively represent and pursue the interests of its members was now called into question. Only two full-time officers remained: Sawford in London and Andrew Long in Leeds. The task of reconstructing union branches and maintaining them demanded a more substantial back-up structure than this. Organisationally TUBE had immense problems.

Any plans to expand the number of full-time organisers, and at the end of 1973 and beginning of 1974, the TUBE Executive were considering just this possibility, immediately floundered on the problems of finance. Again, for TUBE, the Catch-22 position: to increase membership full-time organisers are needed; yet in order to employ full-time organisers money is needed to pay salaries - and money has to come from subscriptions.

\(^{(1)}\) Interview A. Long 19.5.75.
Aware of the weak financial position of the union, the Executive had appointed a finance sub-committee in August 1973 in an effort to put TUBE on a viable financial basis. Yet the financial position became even worse. At that time TUBE’s deficit stood at £4,000. Within twelve months that figure had reached £10,000. Expenditure was always in excess of income: many membership dues were not collected while those that were remained insufficient to sustain the union.

These interrelated features, the collapse of membership and branch organisation and financial insolvency, were the immediate pressures which pushed TUBE towards amalgamation. But, in addition, these problems were exacerbated by the failure of union policies and the internal divisions which developed.

Towards the end of 1973, a major conflict occurred on the Executive concerning Sawford’s dismissal of John Hobbs, the area organiser for Southern England. This decision arose, in part, from Sawford’s decision to rely on the processes of the legal recognition procedure, placing his hopes in the CIR. Hobbs was scarcely paying his way as an organiser and Sawford felt this was not adequate.

However, Sawford took this decision irrespective of the Executive, not even consulting them before the dismissal. In consequence, there was an immediate polarisation on the Executive, with most of the dwindling number of members siding with Hobbs. This dispute was the flashpoint for long standing differences to surface. Barney Saville, now TUBE Chairman and long-time Sawford supporter, emerged as the principal advocate of Hobbs’ position and generalised the issue into an overall attack on Sawford’s performance as TUBE General Secretary. Hobbs himself had taken a militant position on the way forward for TUBE, arguing industrial action rather than legal procedures: he thus received support from the remaining oppositional
The dispute within the TUBE leadership over the John Hobbs dismissal: the Chairman orders the Secretary to ensure the union offices are available for use.
The dispute within the TUBE leadership over the John Hobbs dismissal: the Chairman orders the Secretary to ensure the union offices are available for use
elements on the Executive as well as those from the London Branches in which he had been most involved: London North and West Middlesex.

Sawford, at this time, was relatively isolated. Yet the strength of support for Hobbs soon began to crumble. Barney Saville decided to leave the union in the midst of the dispute in October 1973, while Hobbs made injudicious statements to members of his own branch and the Executive. Eventually, in November 1973, the Executive reprimanded Sawford for the way he had handled the affair, but nevertheless confirmed that his judgement was correct in dismissing Hobbs.

This whole affair had lasted two months; and if in fact, the appeal by Hobbs is also considered, it was March 1974 before the issue was finally resolved. Valuable time had been spent on internal disputes while the union struggled to survive. More directly, the dismissal of John Hobbs substantially contributed to the decline of the West Middlesex and London North branches from where he had received strong support.

Meanwhile, the policy of recasting branch structures in terms of firm-based units, to make the most effective use of CIR investigations, was under test. Between mid-September and mid-October, the NIRC referred six recognition cases involving TUBE to the CIR. Some were successful, such as the John Joyce and Ken Munden references, providing a boost for the membership in Stockton and London South respectively. Others gave TUBE little encouragement and unfavourable reports from the CIR tended to be associated with the collapse of local support, as in Roland Jones Ltd in Blackpool and Ken Hailes Ltd in Newcastle. And since these branches were now primarily firm-based, it also meant the collapse of local branch organisation.

While the results of CIR investigations were equivocal for TUBE at a local level, nationally Sawford and the Executive became

---

1. Statements in which he placed his own interests before those of the union.
increasingly dependent on the CIR. On one hand, the deterioration of branch structure and worsening financial position, made the alternatives that much harder, while, on the other, the CIR could dangle the very lucrative carrot of a favourable report on William Hill. Yet the CIR were reluctant to back TUBE on such a major reference as William Hill without guarantees that TUBE could be a viable organisation to represent the 3,000 William Hill employees. The demands the CIR made were ones TUBE would struggle to meet, including, as they did, a 3-month period of financial stability and the successful reformation of three key branches.

In fact, the CIR were consciously, through delicately, pushing TUBE towards an amalgamation with the TGWU. This, in turn, matched an internal pressure within TUBE itself, expressed officially for the first time in June 1973 that they should seek to amalgamate with another union. At that time, London Eastern had passed a motion recommending a merger with ASTMS. The representatives from this branch, Fred Martin and Barney Saville, continued to advocate this position within the Executive where they gained further support from Shirley Warren and John Hobbs.

Sawford was strongly opposed. During the John Hobbs dispute, he tried to isolate Saville, Hobbs and Warren as a "splinter group ... active in trying to get TUBE swallowed by one of the big unions". But as TUBE's fortunes failed to improve, even Sawford, now personally deeply in debt through the lack of money to pay his wages, began to accept the necessity of amalgamation. Alan Schooler, the CIR Commissioner in charge of the bookmaking references, set up a contact for Sawford in the TGWU.

1. Letter George Sawford to EC members 26.9.73.
2. See below. Ch. & for a full discussion of the influential role of the CIR in promoting this amalgamation.
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN.

I hereby certify that I was the Scrutineer at 40, High Street, Ruislip on Tuesday 2nd July, 1974 when the count of the Postal Ballot concerning the resolution "That T.U.B.E. transfer its engagements to T & G.M.U. in accordance with the terms set out in the Instrument" was conducted.

The result was as follows:-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Voting Papers received</th>
<th>462</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In favour of the Resolution</td>
<td>474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against the Resolution</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spoiled Papers</td>
<td>nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>462</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Resolution was carried with a majority of 466 votes.

Signed J. & Pratt

of Munn & Nunn,
Chartered Accountants,
10, College Road,
Harrow, Middlesex.
Events now moved along fairly quickly. On 3rd February 1974, an emergency meeting of the Executive took place. In the morning they were addressed by Moss Evans, then National Organiser of the TGWU, who outlined the benefits of amalgamation. In the afternoon they heard the gloomy financial position: debts in excess of £7,000 with Sawford now unpaid since October 1973. The Executive unanimously decided to pursue the possibilities of amalgamation. At the beginning of March, a draft agreement on amalgamation, drawn up by the TGWU, was circulated to the Executive. A final meeting was arranged for March 31st at Transport House where the members of the Executive would take a firm decision on amalgamation.

However, the position that month soon became more complicated. TUBE was now also courted by APEX, who in a very short space of time also drew up a draft agreement on amalgamation including various guarantees for TUBE's continued independence within the APEX structure. It was not an option seriously considered by the TUBE Executive, however.

On 31st March 1973, the decision to join the TGWU was overwhelmingly supported by 15 votes to 1. (1)

This decision still had to be confirmed by the membership. A postal ballot was held in June 1974 of existing members and gives some indication of how the union had declined, with less than 500 members voting. The result was nearly unanimous with the Executive decision confirmed by 474 votes to 8. On August 14th, 1974, TUBE formally became part of the TGWU.

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1. The only dissenter was F. Martin who voted to amalgamate with ASTMS.
INSTRUMENT

This instrument of transfer of engagements of the Union of Bookmakers Employees hereinafter called T.U.B.E. to the Transport and General Workers Union hereinafter called T. & G.W.U. shall if duly approved by a resolution of the members of T.U.B.E. take effect on the date of registration of this instrument. Upon the coming into operation of the instrument the members of T.U.B.E. will become members of the T. & G.W.U. and be subject to that Union’s rules, copies of which can be inspected on application to Branch Secretaries or the Head Office of T.U.B.E.

T.U.B.E. shall become a section of the T. & G.W.U. as part of the A.C.T.S. group of that Union and shall be known as the T.U.B.E. section. The Branches of T.U.B.E. shall continue to operate as Branches of the T. & G.W.U. and will be entitled to the assistance of the full time officials of T. & G.W.U. as necessary.

Members of T.U.B.E. shall contribute to Scale 1 of the T. & G.W.U. Membership of T.U.B.E. and the T. & G.W.U. shall be regarded as continuous and members in compliance for benefit with T.U.B.E. shall immediately be in compliance for benefits in Scale 1 of the T. & G.W.U. The contributions and benefits payable under Scale 1 are scheduled to this instrument. Arrears of contributions due to T.U.B.E. at the date of transfer shall be carried forward and become due to the T. & G.W.U.

All property and assets of T.U.B.E. shall vest in the Trustees of T. & G.W.U. as at the date that this instrument comes into effect, and the T. & G.W.U. shall assume responsibility for the liabilities of T.U.B.E.

The present full time officers of T.U.B.E. shall become officers of T. & G.W.U. on terms no less favourable than those applying immediately before the transfer takes effect.

Members of T.U.B.E. may obtain exemption from payment to the political fund of the T. & G.W.U. by completion of an exemption notice which, if completed within one month of their receiving copies of the T. & G.W.U. rules following registration of this instrument, will operate with immediate effect.

Signed on behalf of the Transport & General Workers Union:

J.L. Jones, General Secretary

Signed on behalf of Bookmakers Union:

G. Sawford, General Secretary

M. Levy, A. M. Evans, P. Heenan

Approved

Chief Registrar
6 June 1974
This instrument of transfer of engagements of the Union of Bookmakers Employees hereinafter called T.U.B.E. to the Transport and General Workers Union hereinafter called T. & G.W.U. shall if duly approved by a resolution of the members of T.U.B.E. take effect on the date of registration of this instrument. Upon the coming into operation of the instrument the members of T.U.B.E. will become members of the T. & G.W.U. and be subject to that Union’s rules, copies of which can be inspected on application to Branch Secretaries or the Head Office of T.U.B.E.

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Members of T.U.B.E. shall contribute to Scale 1 of the T. & G.W.U. Membership of T.U.B.E. and the T. & G.W.U. shall be regarded as continuous and members in compliance for benefit with T.U.B.E. shall immediately be in compliance for benefits in Scale 1 of the T. & G.W.U. The contributions and benefits payable under Scale 1 are scheduled to this instrument. Arrears of contributions due to T.U.B.E. at the date of transfer shall be carried forward and become due to the T. & G.W.U.

All property and assets of T.U.B.E. shall vest in the Trustees of T. & G.W.U. at the date that this instrument comes into effect, and the T. & G.W.U. shall assume responsibility for the liabilities of T.U.B.E.

The present full time officers of T.U.B.E. shall become officers of T. & G.W.U. on terms no less favourable than those applying immediately before the transfer takes effect.

Members of T.U.B.E. may obtain exemption from payment to the political fund of the T. & G.W.U. by completion of an exemption notice which, if completed within one month of their receiving copies of the T. & G.W.U. rules following registration of this instrument, will operate with immediate effect.

Signed on behalf of the Transport & General Workers Union:

J. L. Jones, General Secretary

Signed on behalf of Bookmakers Union:

G. Sawford, General Secretary

A. M. Evans, General Secretary

Approved

Union Secretary

6 June 1974
APPENDIX 5.1

Minutes of Inaugural Meeting of The Union of Bookmakers Employees

7th September, 1971.

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The Inaugural Meeting of the Union of Bookmakers Employees (M.U.B.E) held at the "Jordon" Hotel Tottenham Court Road on the 7th September 1951. The meeting opened at 6.10 p.m. and there were some 350 people present.

The Chairman for the meeting was Mr. Ben Bruce.

Guest Speaker was Mr. Tom Chapman, Industrial Adviser to the Church Council.

The meeting was called to order by the Chairman who explained how he came to be involved with the Union as he was an employer - Mr. Bruce was approached some six months ago by workers in the Bookmaking Industry who were keen to form a union and asked for his advice, thus a working committee was formed and the result was tonight's meeting.

The first business of the evening was to ask for the approval of the agenda. Proposed by J. Carter and Seconded by J. Herow this was carried unanimously. The Chairman outlined the objects of the Union and the kind of things that the Executive Committee would have to look into such things as Bank Holiday rates of pay, 40hr. 5 day week, lunch hours, overtime rates, Saturday working hours, 5 weeks annual holiday, 42hr week and other blank day working, extended programmes, evening racing, Transfer of staff without notice, Loss of seniority particularly with take over bids, Discrimination, Mechanisation, Employees risk attached to security, On course minimum wage rates and travelling expenses, Equal pay for women, Superannuation.

The Chairman then introduced Mr. Tom Chapman who addressed the meeting on the need to let a Union form and not to let one or two people who were trying to disrupt the meeting succeed, it was essential that this meeting form a strong Union to fight against and he complimented the people present on their determination to improve working conditions in their Industry, and loud cheering and clapping Mr. Chapman took his seat.

Proposed by Mr. J. Derval and Seconded by Mr. Higgins that the objects of the Union be:

(a) The protection, care and welfare of employees engaged in the bookmaking industry.

(b) To regulate the relations between employees and employers in the said Industry and to improve working standards and conditions and to alter some where they are improper, unjust or oppressive and to provide legal advice and representation for all members of the Union.

(c) To negotiate the settlement of disputes between members and employers.
(d) to give advice and to provide benefits to members as in
the case of accident, strikes, lockouts, hardship or
victimization subject to the Executive Councils
authorisation and the availability of funds at the time.

This was put to the vote and carried with two
against.

It was proposed by Mr. Wacker and Seconded by Mr.
Humphries that this meeting resolves that a Union of bookmakers
employees be formed and that registration be applied for. Voted
Unanimously.

It was proposed by Mr. Breeze and Seconded by Mr.
Bromley that the Union be named the Union of Bookmakers Employees.
Voted Unanimously.

It was proposed by Mr. Calzetti and Seconded by Miss.
D'arcy that the subscription be 75p per month, Mr. Buckingham
moved an amendment Seconded by Mr. Short that the subscription be
65.00 male and 50p female per month and explained that he thought
that male employees earned more than their female counterparts.
Mr. Calzetti stated that one of the aims of the Union was to get
equal pay for women and that they wanted to pay equal rates, there
were quite a large number of ladies present who supported this, the
amendment was then read again to the meeting and received three votes,
the original motion was then put to the meeting and carried with
three against.

It was proposed by Mr. Wacker and seconded by Mr.
Bromley that the entrance fee be 25p.

Proposed by Mr. Wacker and Seconded by Mr. Breeze
that Messrs. Tarleton, Kent & Company be appointed Solicitors to
the Union. Voted Unanimously.

Proposed by Mr. Holland and Seconded by Mr._Biemson that
the Executive Council open a Bank account in the name of the Union
and that Signatories be approved and Trustee appointed. Voted
Unanimously.

Proposed by Mr. Wacker and Seconded by Mr. Breeze
that this Union does not affiliate to any Political party without
the approval of the membership at a meeting called for that purpose.
Voted Unanimously.

Proposed by Mr. Henon and Seconded by Mr. Humphries
that the U.C. appoint a rules committee and that when completed a
General meeting be called to approve the rules. Voted Unanimously.

Election of Officers to serve on the Executive

President

D. Kruger Proposed by Mr. Martin and Seconded by Mr.
Humphries.

T. Carter Proposed by Mr. Short and Seconded by Mr.
Brace.
Both nominees were invited to address the meeting and after both men had made short speeches a vote was taken and Mr. J. Kruger duly elected.

**Secretary.** G. Sawford Proposed by J. Sullivan and Seconded by Mr. Bagshaw.

There being no other nomination Mr. Sawford was duly elected.

**Treasurer.** S. Salkild Proposed by Mr. Sawford and Seconded by Mr. Greene.

There being no other nomination Mr. Salkild was duly elected.

**Committee.** J. Franklin Proposed by Mr. Atkinson and Seconded by Mr. Jones.

There was an objection by members of J. Coral and Mr. Franklin was invited to address the meeting which he declined, his nomination was then put to the vote and Mr. Franklin was not elected.

The following nominees were duly proposed and Seconded and were elected unanimously.

- Mr. Samuels.
- Mr. Daytor.
- Mr. Hutchinson.
- Mr. McCanna.
- Mrs. Calzetti.
- Mr. Wacker.
- Miss. Darcy.
- Mr. Lockley.
- Mr. Bolton.
- Mr. Pearson.

R. Naile Ltd.
J. Coral Ltd.
City Tote Ltd.
William Hill Ltd.
City Tote Ltd.
J. Coral Ltd.
Ladbrokes Ltd.
R.J. Murphy Ltd.
William Hill Ltd.
J. Coral Ltd.

There being no further business the meeting closed with a vote of thanks to the Chairman and Mr. Ron Chapman at 10:15 p.m.
APPENDIX 5.2


Resume of Candidates (in original format).

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THE UNION OF BOOKMAKERS EMPLYEES

ELECTION OF OFFICERS TO THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL 1973

RESUME OF CANDIDATES

SIDNEY CURRIE
Lives in Liverpool and has been in the industry for 11 years, he is married with 2 children and is employed by B. Taylor Ltd as a Manager, his hobbies are all kinds of sport. Age 44.

DAVID DYSER
Lives in Essex and has been in the industry for 13 years, he is single, and employed by J. Coral Ltd in the Head Office trade room, he is a founder member of the Union and is at present serving on the Executive Council, his hobbies are Cricket and Bridge. Age 31.

Laurie Gilkner
Lives in Clydebank and has been in the industry for 9 years, he is married with 4 children and is employed by J. Hill Ltd as a Manager, he is a founder member of the Union and was responsible for the formation of the Glasgow branch of which he is Secretary, his hobbies are Soccer and Golf. Age 34.

PADDY HEENAN
Lives in South London and has been in the industry for 20 years, he is married and is employed by K. Munden Ltd as a Manager, he is at present serving on the Executive Council and has just been appointed Press and Publicity Officer for the Union, past Secretary for Penge C.C. his hobbies are Poole and Darts. Age 55.

Lives in London and has been in the industry for 6 years, he is single, and employed by City Tote Ltd as a Manager, he is a founder member of the Union and is at present serving on the East Middlesex Committee, his hobbies are Table Tennis and Chess. Age 27.

LEWIS HODGSON
Lives in Liverpool and has been in the industry for 11 years, he is married with 2 children and is employed as a Manager for the Leisure and General Group, he is Minute Secretary for the Liverpool branch and his hobbies are Music and Sport. Age 49.

HENRY HUTCHINSON
Lives in Essex and has been in the industry for 8 years, he is married with 2 children and is employed by City Tote Ltd as a Manager. He is a founder member of the Union and is at present serving on the Executive Council, his hobby is Sport. Age 42.

JAMES JENKINS
Lives just outside Liverpool and has been in the industry 1 years, he is married with 2 children and is employed as a Manager by the Leisure and General Group, his hobby is Sport. Age 55.

HARRY KARSHAR
Lives in Liverpool and has been in the industry for 8 years, he is married with 2 children and is employed as a Manager by the Leisure and General Group, he is at present Secretary of the Liverpool branch and his hobbies are Sport and his family. Age 41.
DAVID
KRUGER
Lives in Essex and has been in the industry for 20 years; he is married with 2 children and is employed by City Tote Ltd as a Manager. He is a founder member of the Union, he is the President of the Union and prior to his illness - travelled all over the country for the Union during his holidays, his hobbies are Music and Sport. Age 54.

LEVI
Lives just outside London and has been in the industry for 26 years, he is married with 1 child and is employed by J. Coral Ltd as a Manager. He is a founder member of the Union and is at present serving on the Executive Council, past Noble Master of a Friendly Society, his hobbies are Bridge and Gardening.

FRED
PARTIN
Lives in East London and has been in the industry for 15 years, he is married with 3 children and is employed by Prinkworth Bros as a Manager, he is the present Secretary of London South branch and his hobby is Football. Age 45.

MARTIN
Lives in East London and has been in the industry for 26 years, he is married with 1 child and is employed by Prinkworth Bros as a Manager, he is the present Secretary of London South branch and his hobby is Football. Age 45.

KICK
LEVY
Lives just outside London and has been in the industry for 26 years, he is married with 1 child and is employed by T. Coral Ltd as a Manager. He is a founder member of the Union and is at present serving on the Executive Council, past Noble Master of a Friendly Society, his hobbies are Bridge and Gardening.

FRED
PARTIN
Lives in East London and has been in the industry for 15 years, he is married with 3 children and is employed by Prinkworth Bros as a Manager, he is the present Secretary of London South branch and his hobby is Football. Age 45.

MARTIN
Lives in East London and has been in the industry for 26 years, he is married with 1 child and is employed by Prinkworth Bros as a Manager, he is the present Secretary of London South branch and his hobby is Football. Age 45.

BILLY
MORGAN
Lives in East London and has been in the industry for 15 years, he is married with 4 children and is employed by J. Edwards Ltd as a Manager and is at present a member of the Executive Council, he is on the Committee of London Eastern branch and his hobby is Boxing.

NELL
Lives in South London and has been in the industry for 5 years, he is single and is employed by J. Ltd as a Manager, he is on the Committee of the London South branch and his hobbies are Sports and Debating. Age 24.

TONY
RITCHIE
Lives in North London and has been in the industry for 5 years, he is married with 1 child and is employed by City Tote Ltd as a Manager. Is at present serving on the Executive Council and is Vice-Chairman of the Union, past Treasurer of Local Union Co-operative Party and past E.C. member of Middlesex Youth Committee, his hobbies are Dancing, Organisation and International Affairs. Age 26.

NICK
CAROL
RICHARDSON
Lives in South London and has been in the industry for 10 years, he is single and is employed by J. Ltd Ltd as a Manageress. Is at present Secretary of London South branch and is also Acting Treasurer until a new appointee is made, she is at present serving on the Executive Council and her hobbies are Electronics and Current Affairs.
Roderick Lives in Surrey and has been in the industry for 5 years, he is single and is employed by A. Williams & Son Ltd as a Manager, his hobby is Music.

Daville Lives in East London and has been in the industry for 27 years, he is married with 2 children and is employed by City Tote Ltd as an Office Manager. He is at present Treasurer of the London Eastern branch and his hobbies are Physical Sports and Trade Union Representation.

Tennis Lives in North London and has been in the industry for 12 years, he is married with 4 children and is employed by Hector MacDonald Ltd as a Manager. He is at present on the Committee of the London Northern branch and is a member of the Executive Council, his hobby is Football.

Vernon Lives in West Middlesex and has been in the industry for 7 years, he is single and is employed by Harris and Philip Ltd as a Manager, he is Treasurer of a local Football Club and his hobbies are Football and sports in general. Age 30.

Helen Lives in North London and has been in the industry for 11 years, she is married and is employed by A. Williams & Son Ltd as a Manageress. She is past Treasurer of a local Tenants Association and was a founder member of the Union, her hobbies are Current Affairs and Organisation.
APPENDIX 5.3


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THE UNION OF BOOKMAKERS EMPLOYEES

48 PRINCE ROAD,

HARROW, MIDDLESEX

BALANCE SHEET as at 31st DECEMBER 1972

Assets:

Office Furniture and Equipment 34
Less: Accumulated Depreciation 4 30
Stock of Stationery 322
Stock of Badges 80
Cash at Bank and In Hand 225 657

Deficiency in Central Fund as shown in Account 145 002

Liabilities:

Sundry Creditors and Accruals 802

AUDITORS’ REPORT

We report that the Auditors’ Reports for the twelve branches stated that the records for the period under review were not adequate to verify subscription income in full. Subject to this qualification we report that the Accounts for the Union give a true and fair view of the matters to which they relate for the period from 9th September 1971 to 31st December 1972.

HUGH & HUGH
THE UNION OF BOOKMAKERS EMPLOYEES

40 PINNER ROAD,

HARROW, MIDDLESEX

ADMINISTRATION EXPENSES AND OTHER OUTGOINGS
FOR THE PERIOD FROM FORMATION TO 31ST DECEMBER 1972

Salary of Officer 1750
Auditors Fees 220
Expenses of Conferences - Hire of Meeting Rooms 435
Travel and Hotel Expenses 1339
Purchase of Badges 328
Printing, Post and Stationary 1266
Advertising 464
Legal Expenses 716
Telephone 120
Bank Charges 91
Hire of Office Equipment 33
Sundry Expenses 25
  Depreciation of Office Equipment 2

Branch Expenses:
  Travel and Hotel Expenses 127
  Printing Post and Stationery 516
  Advertising 4
  Hire of Meeting Rooms 109
  Bank Charges 10
  Sundry Expenses 22
  Depreciation of Office Equipment 2

Charged to Central Fund 950 7747

Total 7747
THE UNION OF DOCKHAKERS EMPLOYEES

48 FIDDLER ROAD,

HARROW, HILDESEY

CENTRAL FUND ACCOUNT

FOR THE PERIOD FROM DATE OF FORMATION TO 31st DECEMBER 1972

Central Fund - Income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subscriptions and Contributions</td>
<td>7656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donations</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Receipts</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7910</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Central Fund - Expenditure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Victimisation Pay</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration Expenses (see Account)</td>
<td>7747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deficiency in Central Fund at end of Period (per Balance Sheet)</td>
<td>(145)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 6: The development of TUBE: the importance of the labour process approach and the limits and possibilities of union autonomy.

The objectives of this chapter are two-fold: firstly, to examine the importance of the labour process approach in understanding the patterns of expansion and decline of TUBE; secondly, to draw out the limitations of this kind of explanation through delineating the extent of union autonomy. Both points need some elaboration.

How might the labour process exert an influence on the development of TUBE? It is useful to return to one of the hypotheses made at the end of Chapter 2:

"... it will be argued that changes in the labour process can provide a basis for understanding the course of union development."

In Chapter 3 it was shown how changes in the labour process were informed by developments in the Bookmaking industry, arising from competitive pressures - ultimately a consequence of capital accumulation - and movements between different sectors of the economy. Changes in the labour process are thus derived from other changes; the significance of the former is in comprising the point of experience for wage-labourers. That changes in the labour process are derived is significant in posing a relationship between movements of capital and trade union growth and organisation. How definite and determinant are those links?

Hopefully this focus on the labour process, as a way of understanding the development of unionization in the Bookmaking industry, will establish a range of constraints and preconditions within which that development took place. This forms part of a structural explanation of unionization. Yet such an explanation is only partial, for it must not be seen as crudely determinist, but in relation to those workers in the industry who were trying to improve their conditions of employment. The relationship between workers and the structural constraints which
they face is dialectical: while structural influences may provide a framework within which decisions and actions are taken, those decisions and actions will help to shape society. Yet workers face a variety of structural influences, some of which are very difficult to counter through workplace and/or industrial unionism; in particular the competitive pressures of the market, which may imply changes in the labour process and/or redundancy, raise very difficult problems in developing alternative policies and strategies at the workplace level. But there is an area, a constantly shifting one, where structural imperatives are not overriding, where they may be ambiguous or in conflict with other pressures. This can be referred to as the extent and limits of autonomy. The question then becomes the extent of autonomy which this implies.

Both aspects - the structural determination of the labour process and the potential of union autonomy - can be explored in looking at TUBE's history. But exactly how can this be done? What conceptual categories are most useful? This is a necessary task before re-engaging the history of the union.

One fundamental dilemma of trade unionism is the necessity to take an organisational form within capitalism, despite being an expression of the antagonistic social relations on which capitalism is based. This exists as a functional imperative if the continuity of demands and collective strength is to be sustained. The characterisation of the precise nature of that form - the role of trade unions - is a crucial question and the subject of fierce debate. Here it is instructive to consider the contribution of Allan Flanders, who as the major

1. See McCarthy (1972) Part One, for four distinct contributions.
theorician of the Oxford school can be considered as the most significant formative academic influence in British industrial relations thought and policy in the post-war period.

Flanders never published a detailed theory of union growth; it has to be gleaned from various indications in his writings. However, his definition of the problem can be seen as dependent on his view of trade unions as primarily concerned with collective bargaining and "job regulation". For Flanders, participation in these areas is the object of trade unions; or, more precisely, the means by which trade unions can best represent the interests of their members. This poses an immediate problem: if trade unions are to participate in collective bargaining and job regulation they must have an organisational form. How that organisational form develops, and its precise nature, becomes an essential problem for Flanders to tackle. He does this by using the twin interrelated concepts of 'movement' and 'organisation'.

"Trade Unions are a mixture of movement and organisation and the relationship between the two is the key to an understanding of the dynamics of their growth." (Flanders (1975) p.43).

What does Flanders mean by these concepts of 'movement' and 'organisation'? 'Movement' is really the upsurge of collective strength; 'Organisation' on the other hand implies the harnessing of this collective strength into a less volatile and more rationalistic continuity overcoming the fragility of collectivism. 'Movement' thus implies common ends and community of purpose amongst a group - virtually a normative consensus. For Flanders, this must eventually give way to 'organisation' if trade unions are to survive:

"One problem which has always confronted trade unions is how to convert temporary movement into permanent organisation". (Flanders (1975) p.43)
In terms of union growth, therefore, it is 'organisation' which is the main driving force. 'Organisation' depends for its continuation on the rewards and sanctions that it can utilise through the processes of collective bargaining (i.e. job regulation) and the effect of internal discipline which it implies on the membership. It is this expansion of job regulation - for which 'organisation' is a necessary precondition - which generates the growth of trade union membership.

Various criticisms can be made of Flanders concerning the explanatory power of his model: the internal logic of moving from individuals to a collectivity is in some sense false, given the socialisation of the labour process with the organising of the collective worker by capital; \(^1\) there is also a circularity in the inter-relationships of 'job regulation', 'organisation', and 'union growth', where it is not always clear what is determining what. \(^2\)

But in focussing on the foundations of Flanders' dualism, 'movement' and 'organisation', two major problems are revealed of particular interest in the context of this chapter. These arise not so much from the internal inconsistency of the concepts, but the methodology of utilising this dual process of transition. \(^3\) One underlying assumption of Flanders' model is that the survival of any agency of articulation depends on the transition from 'movement' to 'organisation'. In other words, the argument constitutes a general theory of organisational development. In consequence, Flanders fails to consider the specific

\(^1\) See Chapter 4 for a critique of individual-collective approaches.

\(^2\) see Pickard (1978) for an expansion of this criticism.

\(^3\) For a discussion of these concepts, especially the role of movement in Flanders' theory, see Pickard (1978).
nature of trade unions; and this derives from his basic failure
to consider trade unions within an historical and social context -
the underlying social formations of capitalist society. (1)

The second problem concerns the way the 'movement' - 'organisation'
dichotomy serves not merely to redefine the essential contradiction
of trade unionism, but to eliminate it. Far from viewing the growth
of trade union organisation as the dialectical interrelationship
of the developing opposition to capitalist social relations and the
accommodation of objectives within capitalism, Flanders expounds a
process of union maturity, with the channelling of continuous upsurges
of opposition (i.e. 'movement') into the rationalistic patterns of
'organisation'. This reflects Flanders' notion of the objectives
of trade unions as participation in collective bargaining and job
regulation. But this is a definition of union objectives in
institutional terms; once removed from this context, union objectives
can be seen as problematic and dependent on the balance of power
relationships within the union, necessarily calling into question
Flanders' exposition.

The first deficiency - the neglect of capitalism as generating
specific social processes and institutional forms - is precisely the
criticism set out in Chapter 1 concerning orthodox approaches to trade
unionism. Again the answer is the same: to understand unionisation
it is necessary to consider the changing labour process in the context
of capital accumulation.

1. This is entirely in keeping with Flanders' emphasis on Industrial
Relations 'systems', which necessarily excludes the importance of external
social and economic processes. See the critique of Bain in Chapter 1,
who is a disciple of Flanders in this (and other) respects.
The processes of concentration and centralisation will be familiar from the description of the historical development of the Bookmaking Industry. That account is clearly in keeping with Marx's assertion concerning centralisation:

"The attraction of capitals no longer means the simple concentration of the means of production and the command over labour, which is identical with accumulation. It is concentration of capitals already formed, destruction of their individual independence, expropriation of capitalist by capitalist, transformation of many small into few large capitals". (Marx (1976) p. 777).

The expanding size of firms is not accidental: it is part of the inherent logic of capital accumulation, whereby concentration (growth of firms through their 'own' resources) leads to centralisation (takeovers and amalgamations) which in turn feeds further growth.

In Western capitalism, this has resulted in:

"..... a radical reduction in the number of 'different capitals' competing with one another, until entire branches of industry were dominated by a handful of trusts, companies, and monopolies...." (Mandel (1976) p.311)

It is important not to equate the remorselessness of capital accumulation with evenness. While the tendency to 'monopoly capitalism' continues, it does not so much supercede the establishing of small capitals as continuing to exist with them:

"Primitive accumulation of capital and capital accumulation through the production of surplus-value are, in other words, nor merely successive phases of economic history but also concurrent economic processes". (Mandel (1976) p.46 Emphasis in original).

This is clearly true of different industries, where the processes of concentration and centralisation in one industry 'set free' capital and labour for the small-scale development of a new industry\(^1\); but it can also apply to existing industries, in that a polarisation can occur

\[1. \text{ Marx (1976) pp. 1035-1036.}\]
between large and small-scale firms.\(^{(1)}\)

While the unevenness of capital accumulation thus allows a spectrum of firm size (whatever the criterion) at a given moment in time, there are other dimensions that can be considered. Firstly, the geographical spread of concentration and centralisation: while some areas may have large firms, others may have smaller ones. Secondly, there is a time dimension, whereby accumulation is at a faster rate in some firms than others. Combining the two aspects, capital concentration and centralisation proceeds at a faster rate in some areas than in others. The result can be, especially in an industry such as bookmaking where the 'service' is immediately 'consumed', an immensely uneven structure.

The labour process approach would seem to anticipate a relationship between the development of support for TUBE (and thus branch formation) and patterns of capital accumulation. This can be examined in terms of the three dimensions of uneven accumulation outlined above.

The second deficiency in Flanders' approach concerned the problematic nature of union objectives. What objectives are pursued by the members and officials of trade unions?\(^{(2)}\) This is ultimately a question of power relations within unions, both within and between members and officials. The relationship between union policy and union democracy therefore demands some examination; and perhaps the most useful attempt, in terms of understanding union growth, is that of Herding (1972)

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1. Friedman (1977) considers the relationships within both firms and industries in terms of the 'centre-periphery' distinction. See especially pp. 105-119.

2. Clearly 'trade unions' cannot have 'objectives' - that is reification. It can only be the people that comprise the union that have objectives.

3. One of the most useful analyses of power in trade unions is that of Anderson (1967) in his discussion of 'power for' and 'power over' subsequently taken up by Hyman (1975).
In his examination of job control and union structure, Herding is particularly concerned to emphasise the important role of organising policies in contributing to union growth. Following Bernstein (1961) he divides all previous arguments about why trade unions grow into one of two camps: they are either "structural" or "historical". The former, it seems, look particularly towards institutional factors or labour force characteristics in 'structuring' the propensity of groups to unionise; 'historical' explanations, however, emphasise the importance of economic influences, such as the upswing of the business cycle. But whichever argument is considered important in explaining union growth, Herding argues they both have one particular underlying common assumption:

"The historical argument as well as the structural assumes a fundamental tendency of organised labour to expand and look at the unorganised for obstacles." (Herding (1972) p.56)

In other words, the development and growth of trade union membership is not problematic for most theorists; they are concerned with why trade unions grow and look for reasons why they do not grow in terms of the unorganised sectors. Herding, however, queries these assumptions:

"... the reality in unionism may sometimes better be explained by the restrictive tendency of the 'happy few': The organised may be a more serious obstacle to expansion than the unorganised." (Herding (1972) p.56).

Therefore the expansion of membership is not an unproblematic objective within trade unions. Indeed, unions may seek to restrict recruitment or eliminate existing membership. Drawing on his empirical analysis of organising amongst the U.S. steelworkers, mineworkers and teamsters, Herding concludes:
"By their own dynamics, unchecked by political consciousness, unions seem rather likely to forget about 'organising the unorganised'- or may just translate the situation of the unorganised into that of a secondary-status group within the organisation. Bargaining interests in themselves are ambiguous." (Herding (1972) p.64).

In this way the organising of various groups may well be dependent on patterns of membership and democracy within the existing union organisation. It suggests the union may adopt a selective policy in organising occupational or stratified groups within industries; some will be organised and others not. Herding relates the growth of union membership to particular organising policies, not merely in terms of number counting, but also in relation to the nature of potential membership. And organising policies are in turn related to the processes of internal union democracy:

"Organising policy was found less a matter of 'automatic' expansion drives, or of the target workers' inclination to yield to unionisation, but in practice, one more instrument for the union leadership to manipulate consent for cooperative deals, to divert from internal rifts, or to recruit auxiliaries for the core constituency's bargaining position." (Herding (1972) p. 65).

Thus in unions where internal democracy is itself limited, organising policy rests in the hands of the leadership; and can thus be developed in a more conscious and deliberate fashion.

The importance of Herding's analysis is in his integration of the expansion of collective organisation and the processes of internal democracy within the union. Trade unions are not seen in the monolithic dualism of Flanders, but in the constantly shifting distribution of power relationships within the union. Hence, organising policies, through the consideration of the interests and abilities of union members to expand the union, can provide a basis for examining the extent and limits of union autonomy in the growth of trade union membership and organisation.
However, there is a slight problem in utilising Herding’s approach since his analysis is developed in the context of the USA, where he suggests the norm is for employee groups to be organised from external forces, i.e. existing trade unions, rather than organising themselves from within. This may not, however, be the case in Britain or in 'white-collar' groups generally. Indeed, in the case of TUBE, the employee group did in fact organise from within. Does this pose any particular limitations on the conceptual use of organising policies?

Firstly, organising from within may well be related to conscious decisions on the part of existing unions not to organise particular groups; this seems indisputably the case with TUBE, which arose at least in part due to the indifference of the established trade unions. But, more generally, Bain has investigated the role of organising policies in examining the recruitment tactics of 'white-collar' unions. He notes:

"Whatever the nature of union recruitment strategies, they have generally not been pursued with much tactical aggressiveness. The recruitment process tends to be more passive than active in the sense that potential members generally have to contact a union before there is much attempt to recruit them". Bain (1970) p.92

Although Bain does not confront the nature of organising policies in any systematic way, his investigations provide some insights. He cites trade union officials as stating their priorities in organising large groups of workers in preference to small, disparate groups.

"I will drop everything to get them in. If they weren't from a combine I might not do this unless it was an extremely large group or I wasn't very busy." ASSET official in Bain (1970) p.92.

Bain, however, argues that even when there is a large group of potential members the recruitment process is essentially passive. This enables him to discount the importance of organising policies in
explaining either the aggregate or overall pattern of union growth. However, in the light of Herding's analysis two queries emerge about Bain's conclusions. Firstly, that for Bain, once recruitment has taken place membership is somehow sustained unproblematically; on the contrary, Herding's analysis has shown that members may well be organised out of the union, or quite possibly relegated to an inferior status within the union. Passivity in organising policies, therefore, is not merely related to potential members, but also to existing members; Bain, however, does not consider organising policies in any sense other than recruitment policies. Secondly, the passivity of organising policies may themselves be related to internal democracy within the unions and the interests of existing membership. This is of particular importance in connection with 'white-collar' unions when considering the expansion of established manual unions into areas of 'white-collar' sections. Passivity, therefore, does not signify the absence of organising policies and hence cannot be used in order to discount their importance in explaining union growth.

It would therefore seem valid to approach the limits of union autonomy in terms of organising policies; this is attempted in the second part of the chapter.
(a) The labour process and the course of unionisation.

The development of TUBE from the point of its foundation, through the periods of expansion and decline, to amalgamation can be linked quite clearly with the uneven patterns of capital accumulation. This, it will be argued, is beyond doubt. In showing this relationship, a distinction is made between the phases of expansion and rationalisation within the industry; the former is largely concerned with the period up to 1972, while the latter becomes generalised in 1973-74.

(i) The unevenness of capital accumulation and the expansion of TUBE.

The course of TUBE's expansion in 1971-72 can be compared with the three dimensions of unevenness in capital accumulation. To do this it is useful to distinguish analytically between the development of industrial structure on one hand and its geographical and temporal phasing on the other. (1) This, hopefully, will enable the relationships to be drawn more precisely.

In the first instance it seems beyond doubt that the development of union support and organisation was closely related to centralising capital. Several of the union branches established in the initial expansion of TUBE were based primarily on the expansion of national firms or those aspiring to that level. Employees of the eventual 'Big Four' provided substantial membership in London, as shown in TUBE's beginnings. Elsewhere, support could be found in Manchester from William Hill employees, who provided four of the six steering committee members; in Glasgow, where the Branch Secretary was a William Hill employee; in Leeds, where William Hill bought 118 LBOs from Jack Windsor, and the branch developed primarily as a William Hill branch; and in Newcastle, where Ladbrokes employees provided most of the local membership.

1. As a proxy for firm size the most appropriate indicator in this period is the number of LBOs; in subsequent years it becomes less useful since the major firms increased their share of betting turnover while reducing the numbers of LBOs.
Usually, in these branches where membership was dominated by employees from the larger companies, support was also evident from employees in local firms. In some instances, this latter membership was in a majority, most noticeably in Liverpool and Stockton. Here, the consequences of expanding local firms provided the conditions for union organisation, while the national companies had made less significant inroads into these areas. In Liverpool, for instance, the newly formed Connor and Forbes chain, an amalgamation of existing firms, comprised more than 100 LBOs, the largest in the city.

While the process of expansion might be expected to produce conditions for unionisation, the implication of the labour-process approach suggests those sections within the industry where expansion did not take place would provide little membership potential for TUBE. In general terms this was true. The individually-owned bookmaking firms with only a handful of employees did not appear as significant areas of recruitment. Only in Wales was there any serious organisation in the firms at the bottom end of the market. With the rapid expansion and consequent increasing economic advantage of the larger firms, the smaller firms competed on increasingly less favourable conditions; thus the pressures on those employees were greater since they had to compensate for the lower profit margins. But only where these 'bottom market' concerns had managed to expand above a handful of betting shops did the physical basis for collective organisation develop. This happened in Wales. The uneven expansion of bookmaking had meant that LBOs in Wales tended to operate on lower levels of cost and turnover than they did in England. The national companies had shown little interest in expanding in this area; it was left to the local bookmakers to develop small-scale betting chains lacking viability for
large-scale accumulation. It generated poor conditions for employees; and with the expansion of betting opportunities these conditions worsened as the working day was extended and intensified.

The uneven structure of the industry thus generated two prime bases of trade union organisation: those responding to the impact of retailing bookmaking, and those working in the bottom market-concerns, suffering increasingly worsening conditions as these firms struggled to compete with the large conglomerates.

It is perhaps not surprising and indeed reinforces the general argument, that employee groups in these different sections of the industry, emphasised different grievances. It is interesting to contrast the responses of the workers caught up in retailing bookmaking (which are discussed in Chapter 4) with the somewhat more basic demands of the Anglesey employees.

It was not the possibility of takeovers that concerned them, working at the bottom end of the market in Wales. Their conditions were not so much worsening as a direct consequence of the expansion of the firms in which they worked, but through the generalised increasing economic domination of the industry by the larger firms and their efforts to expand the betting medium. The increasing exploitation of the employees resulting from the expanded betting medium affected those workers just as much:

"We feel that the present time would be ideal for a 'recruitment' campaign, as feelings are running high due to the fact that some employees are having to forego their Saturday lunch-hour, and similar problems caused by the early commencement of racing". (1)

1. Letter Owen Williams to George Sawford 13.11.71.
At the forefront of the demands from the Anglesey members were higher wages. This was scarcely unimportant to other bookmaking workers. But whereas in the expanding sectors of the industry, wage levels reflected the devaluation of labour-power, and a consequent weakened market position, at the 'bottom market' level of the industry low wage levels reflected the weak competitive position and low profit margins of those firms. Efforts to increase wages by the Welsh employees were made against the background of potential redundancy.

This contradiction was reflected in the demands which the Anglesey workers considered putting forward to their employer. In January 1972, they agreed the following resolution for minimum rates of pay:

- Managers, £30 per 6 day week;
- Settlers, £20 per 6 day week;
- Trainee settlers, £12 per 6 day week;
- And the same for full-time counter-clerks, part-time counter clerks, £8 per week.\(^{(1)}\)

In comparison with other areas, who were in part responding to the request of the Executive to produce minimum wage rates, these proposals were exceedingly low.

For instance, the minimum rate for trainee settlers and counter clerks set by Anglesey was less than half of that suggested by London Eastern in April 1972 - £4.20 per day.\(^{(2)}\)

To conclude: the expansion of TUBE was primarily associated with national and local centralising capital, in which, as shown in Chapter 3, there were dramatic changes in the labour process. Yet the impact of the processes of accumulation implied a relative worsening position for the smaller firms and consequently deteriorating conditions for employees in those firms. While this prompted, where the physical basis existed, some form of collective organisation, this was essentially unstable given that it operated in the dilemma of insecure employment.

1. Letter O. Williams to G. Sawford, undated, referring to a staff meeting of 17.1.72.

2. Minutes of London Eastern Branch meeting 18.4.72.
Turning to the temporal and geographical dimensions of capital accumulation it seems that this unevenness provided necessary preconditions for branch expansion. In London, the centralisation of ownership and its consequences in 1970-71 had precipitated the formation of TUBE. Given the existence of TUBE, other areas where firms had already expanded, particularly on a national basis, provided immediate support: Manchester and Glasgow both approached the newly formed union in 1971, and in both cities, William Hill (who provided most of the membership) already had extensive interests - in the latter since the late 1960s.

Patterns of local centralisation also occurred before branch formation. In Liverpool, three separate chains were brought together under Leisure and General Holdings, a catering firm, expanding its interests between 1971 and 1972 - the third chain being added in April 1972, the month the Liverpool branch was formed.

On the other side of the Pennines, the response came a little later. It was May 1972 before employees in John Joyce, later to form the Stockton branch, and the Ladbrokes workers in Newcastle approached Sawford. In Leeds too, it was in the summer of 1972 that William Hill purchased the Windsor LBOs, which immediately resulted in the Leeds Branch of TUBE. Now William Hill also turned to other parts of Yorkshire and bought the Hull chain of John Hudson, comprising thirty shops, giving Hill's a virtual monopoly in the area. In December 1972 a bonus dispute arose in part from the introduction by William Hill of their own systems of working and payment - which did not include a traditional Christmas bonus. Soon, the ex-Hudson employees discovered that wage-rate differentials existed across different areas and they were unimpressed. Sawford was more than happy to enrol more William Hill employees and formed the branch in early January, 1973.

1. Interview Ron Grantham 14.5.75.
With solid support developing in William Hill, Sawford was alive to any potential recruitment. As the William Hill Organisation had expanded and introduced their own working and payment systems, i.e. as the labour process and wages had altered, conditions had developed enabling TUBE to recruit members. In the Coventry-Tamworth area, Hill's were now poised to take over a small local betting chain of eleven shops. Sawford, campaigning on the likely consequences for the employees, successfully recruited most of these workers, forming the Coventry branch on 1st February 1973.

While the William Hill Organisation had made inroads into Coventry and Tamworth, their main rivals, Ladbrokes, had bought one of the main Birmingham chains, Cutler Prescott. TUBE had been trying to build a Birmingham branch since 1971, but without success. Some members had been recruited in J.Coral Ltd, but it was late 1972 before the involvement of the major firms became generalised. City Tote were buying shops in the Wolverhampton area and Sawford received complaints from employees in September 1972 concerning the conditions of employment imposed by the new management.

The major impetus came when Ladbrokes proposed takeover of Cutler Prescott came to light. Now the employees were no longer surprised by the impact of centralisation. The fear of redundancies and lower wages was sufficient for widespread interest in TUBE from the 150 workers in these 52 LBOs. The branch in Birmingham, formed in December 1972 was dominated by Cutler Prescott staff. (1)

From the perspective of branch formation, the example of the Midlands illustrates the importance of the preconditions necessary for collective organisation to develop. The workers here, of course,

1. They provided 50% of the Branch membership.
had already seen the consequences in other parts of the country as the large firms moved in - they knew what to expect and did not want to experience it themselves. But TUBE had been unsuccessful in recruiting members in any meaningful quantity until the workforce had come face-to-face with the probable consequences of being immersed in the national companies. The only difference being that while the founders of TUBE had experienced the consequences of centralisation and concentration, with the generalisation of these processes, workers could now anticipate them and act collectively on the basis of these fears.

Obviously, there is no simple relationship to be made between the uneven development of the industry and the growth of trade union organisation. Yet this does not mean general parallels cannot be drawn. The course of uneven development in terms of economic domination, geographical and temporal dimensions generated necessary, yet insufficient preconditions for the phased development of TUBE. All the evidence of branch formation in TUBE's eighteen months of expansion points to the importance of these preconditions.
(ii) Industrial rationalisation, uneven patterns of accumulation, and the implications for TUBE.

The processes of concentration and centralisation are inherent in capitalist economy, and that sense continue unceasingly. Yet at different times the conflict between the process of capital accumulation and the institutional form - the firm - becomes apparent. Despite the assistance of finance capital and the system of company shares, this requires the expansion to be less than even: periods of expansion are followed by restructuring and consolidation.

TUBE had developed in conjunction with the growth of large-scale betting chains; branch expansion and formation largely reflected patterns of concentration and centralisation within the industry. But the phase of 1973-74 brought a new problem for TUBE. So far, TUBE had sought to represent members within a rapidly developing bookmaking industry, where major firms had bought up many small and not-so-small betting chains in an almost mad scramble to expand.

1973-74 was the period when this process slowed down, and a major rationalisation took place within the industry. Firstly, there was an overall decline in the number of LBO's which had increased since 1971. Secondly, the total number of LBOs owned by the four major firms fell, for the first time, by more than 3%.

The total number of LBOs, after reaching a peak early in the 1960s, had declined until 1971, when, in relation to the overall expansion of the industry, there had been a small, but steady, increase. The turning point of this brief expansion came in 1974, when the number of LBOs fell slightly below the 1973 figure; and in 1975 this decline became more exaggerated with a net fall of 466 LBOs on the position in 1974. (1)

1. A decline which still continues. See Table 3.1
This decline was proportionately more severe in the larger firms. Between 1973 and 1974, the number of LBOs owned by Ladbrokes, William Hill, and Mecca all decreased, by 44, 50 and 20 respectively; while the J.Coral Group had a net addition of one LBO. This compared with the total industry figure of a net fall of 36. And by 1975, the holdings of these four major firms had fallen by nearly 10% on 1974, with the number of LBOs owned by each of the groups falling substantially. (1)

In other words, as the end of 1973 approached, TUBE was no longer organising in an industry where the number of LBOs were expanding or where the Big Four were intent on buying betting chains on sight. For the first time since its formation, TUBE faced a position of decline in the number of LBOs, and decline in the ownership of the major firms, as the smaller, non-profitable LBOs were closed or sold off.

This inevitably made an adverse impression on the already diminishing strength of the TUBE membership. And perhaps the most dramatic example was the severe pruning of their Leeds holdings by the William Hill Organisation. Here, many of the ex-Windsor shops were closed and the number of William Hill LBOs in this area quickly fell from 118 to 66. This meant that nearly half of the Leeds membership in Hills disappeared irrespective of TUBE policies. The collapse of the Leeds Branch in this period can scarcely be separated from the savage rationalisation carried out by the William Hill management and the consequent weakening of the collective strength of the branch. (2)

1. The precise figures are set out in Table 3.6
The unevenness of capital accumulation, however, implies that within an industry different sections are expanding or rationalising at different times. While the expansion of the major firms in terms of LBOs was coming to a close, the continuation of concentration and centralisation in other sections of the industry remained a common feature. And in the context of smaller firms, the whole section at any point in time is necessarily portrayed as simultaneously expanding and rationalising, as individual firms develop and new firms begin. Thus in bookmaking in 1973, TUBE adopting a deliberate new policy focus in favour of small firms after the disillusioning experiences in Ladbrokes and William Hill, found themselves tackling firms of varying sizes, often in the course of expansion.

Why did TUBE subsequently suffer so many defeats in local firms? Internal organisation was part of the answer, for instance, the poor servicing, especially in Wales. Yet, given the policy intention of focusing on small firms, this can scarcely be a credible explanation for wide ranging defeats, particularly in the relatively strong and important branches.

In part the continuing centralisation underlay the various defeats TUBE suffered in local firms. These were not limited to any particular geographical area, and indeed were spread throughout the country. And, at the end of this phase, despite immense promise in several firms, TUBE's efforts had generally failed to secure recognition.

Some examples are relevant here, particularly ones where success always seemed imminent. Firstly, Manchester: In 1972, Sawford had approached a small local firm, Foy Bros Ltd, employing approximately 44 staff, for recognition. Following meetings under the chairmanship of a Department of Employment official, the company agreed to a ballot of their employees to determine whether they wished TUBE to represent
them and also if they wanted an Agency Shop Agreement. The ballot was held in December 1972 and the results made public in January, 1973. They immediately highlighted the problems of such a system - only 24 voted, but an overwhelming majority, though a minority of the employees, voted for TUBE to represent them (20 votes to 4) and with an Agency Shop Agreement (18 votes to 6). Technically, TUBE had won the ballot, yet immediately different interpretations arose. Sawford claimed victory, while the company refused to grant recognition when it was not supported by a majority of the staff. The Agency Shop Agreement, despite TUBE's technical victory, was out of the question. Discussions took place, but with no avail. Irrespective of the ballot, Foy Bros were demanding TUBE should produce evidence of more than 50% membership in the company before granting recognition. In March 1973, Sawford took a hard line - if there was no offer forthcoming, he was going to the Courts. Time passed. In April, Jack Rashman contacted Sawford, utterly confused at the lack of appointment of shop stewards in Foy Bros and the absence of the collection of subscriptions through check-off. Sawford could only reply that Foy Bros had sold their business which had become part of a larger group. Recognition was no longer on the agenda.

A similar example can be found in the experiences of London South, the strongest London Branch. In late 1972 and early 1973, the branch had suffered from the collapse of support in James Lane Ltd, a sizeable local firm. A few months later they experienced a different kind of frustration in Ken Munden Ltd. Towards the end of 1972 Paddy Heenan, a prominent member of the TUBE Executive, began to recruit members amongst his fellow workers in Ken Munden Ltd, a South London firm with nearly 60 LBOs and nearly 200 employees. In April 1973 TUBE held a meeting for Ken Munden staff in Central London, which proved successful.
By June 1973, Sawford could claim a majority of regular employees were members of TUBE and with membership still growing the company had little grounds to refuse recognition.

Yet just as it seemed certain, success was taken from TUBE's grasp. The company managed to prevaricate until July when it promptly announced that TUBE's claims were incorrect - the bargaining unit was now far wider than before. The secret lies in the history of the company.

Ken Munden had sold his betting chain to the Homdale Group in May 1972, who themselves had been taken over by Equity Enterprises - a holding company with interests in entertainment, property, finance, and investment - in January 1973. As part of their own expansion in July 1973, Equity Enterprises bought a company called Nalim Limited which happened to control the South Wales bookmaking firm of Shermans. Although Shermans was run independently of Ken Munden, it provided a suitable means of widening the bargaining unit and thus denying TUBE recognition.

Finally, Newcastle. Towards the end of 1972, Sawford had approached a small local firm - owning 15 LBOs - called Harry Kirtley, for recognition. There was substantial support from the workers for TUBE and a bitter dispute over the non-payment of a Christmas bonus provided further support. This TUBE retained, despite the apparent efforts of the company to intimidate employees into leaving either the union or the firm. The failure of the company to respond to the grievances of the employees set off a strike by the Kirtley employees over Easter 1973. They were joined by the employees of Ken Hailes Ltd which was owned by the same local businessman who owned Kirtley's, W.S. Martin. The strike was successful: out of a total of 30 LBOs between the two groups, 24 were closed.

The problem was how to follow this up. Walter Lavery had met Martin, who had offered minor concessions in substantive terms without granting TUBE bargaining rights. After the strike, nothing more seemed
on offer. The employees became apprehensive about taking further strike action and failed to attend meetings. The three-day stoppage had not secured an improved offer from Martin. What could TUBE do now?

In all these examples, TUBE had secured substantial support, and recognition had appeared a live possibility. The events in Ken Munden and Foy Bros illustrate particularly how the buoyancy of the process of centralisation undermined TUBE's efforts. The two firms show the other side of the same coin - Ken Munden taking over another firm and expanding the bargaining unit, while Foy Bros had become part of a new distinct unit altogether. (1)

The third example shows the relative impotence of TUBE in pressing home the undoubted support amongst local employees against a small-scale employer who was prepared to sell his holdings to a large betting chain, at a time when there would be buyers.

The patterns of development within the industry now weighed against TUBE's success in both the large national companies and the small-scale employers. Given this, it might have been expected that TUBE's most lasting success would be in the medium-sized firms, which were expanding within a given locality and who wished to remain independent of the

1. And such developments could cut across the union branch structure: the events in Ken Munden implied that the union now had to organise members in Wales as well as London South, posing problems of internal organisation. At this moment in time, the collapse of TUBE organisation in Wales indicates how the general decline of branch organisation affected the fortunes of the remaining branches.
Big Four, and could, in fact, compete with them. It is probably not unfair to say TUBE was most successful in such firms - Ken Munden in London South (where the membership did not diminish and the efforts of the employers thwarted), Connor and Forbes in Liverpool, and Hector McDonald in London North were centres of TUBE membership for much of the union's history.

In conclusion it is important to draw out the contradictory nature of the uneven development of the Bookmaking industry, the continually opening and closing of different possibilities for TUBE's development. The rationalisation of the major firms seriously weakened several of the union branches as membership and finances were drained away. But the uneven accumulation of capital meant that conditions favourable to the expansion of membership and union organisation were constantly generated; only to be withdrawn where the process of centralisation implied the swallowing of pockets of membership into larger employee groupings.

Yet even this process had a contradictory impact on TUBE. The membership was not necessarily lost and indeed might play an important future role. This, in fact, was the case with the membership of Foy Bros in Manchester. In May 1974, Sawford received a request from an employee of Alan Carlisle, the firm who had taken over Foy Bros, for membership forms. By July, most of the Alan Carlisle employees had joined TUBE and Sawford was negotiating to secure recognition on behalf of the 65 workers. This illustrated the more positive side of losing membership through a firm being taken over - eventually the union might reap larger rewards.  

1. Jack Rashman had used just this argument in the discussions on the TUBE Executive: that the way to secure recognition in the major companies was through building support amongst employees in the smaller ones, anticipating their firms would be taken over. See Interview, J. Rashman 5.8.76.
In other instances, enquiries came from groups of workers who had not been members of TUBE before, although with the union now lacking the organisational structure to service them properly, little membership was sustained. Examples here included Wales, where all of the branches had collapsed, yet there were enquiries from the employees of Shermans (after their takeover by Equity Enterprises); and in Scotland, where the Ladbroke employees showed an interest for the first time.
Having outlined the various structural influences which affected the development of TUBE, it now remains to identify the extent and limits of autonomy on the part of the union. What choices could be made? How and why were these policies chosen and not others? Can other crucial influences be identified which do not arise from the labour process? This part of the chapter will attempt to answer these questions in the context of the historical development of TUBE.

It does, in fact, go a little beyond that. While, initially, attention is focussed on TUBE as an independent union during 1971-74, it is interesting to draw a contrast with a similar time period following the amalgamation with the TGWU. The first section, therefore, looks at TUBE; the second, at the TGWU.

(i) TUBE: Union Growth and Organisation: the influence of Organising Policies.

Two important points must be stressed in any discussion of TUBE in this context. Firstly, TUBE was a new union which had developed in a non-unionised section of the work force; secondly, it arose primarily as an industrial union and remained so throughout its history. The emergence of a new union immediately poses problems of survival - the necessity of adequate finances and resources; the restriction that the union should only represent employees within a given industry, serves to intensify that pressure.

TUBE developed as a union from the top downwards. From its date of formation, the leadership of the union was firmly established while the membership were conspicuously absent. Consequently, those in command could consciously develop organising policy, in particular directions:

1. With one small qualification, the attempt to recruit casino staff in 1973-74.
which groups to recruit or what areas to concentrate on. But such policies could only be developed within the more general problems of the survival of the union and the ambitions for an industrial union. This implied an overall policy of general membership expansion within the industry; and the rapid and widespread growth of TUBE in 1971-72 would definitely seem to suggest this was indeed the case - there is certainly no record of membership applications being turned down. Nevertheless this 'open door' recruitment policy did not preclude priorities: in practice, organising policies were selective towards certain employee groups and favoured certain areas. This process can be understood in terms of four dimensions: job tasks; sex differentiation; geographical areas; type of firm involved.

(1) **Job Tasks.**

On the whole, TUBE restricted its activity to the Bookmaking industry. Only in one instance did any diversification take place: the recruitment of casino workers in the autumn of 1973. This seems to have been largely a personal whim on the part of George Sawford, although the members were a potential source of much needed finance. (1) Sawford eventually received a good deal of criticism over the time he spent on the casino workers. (2)

In a way, it was the exception that proved the rule: TUBE was the Union of Bookmakers Employees. Yet did the leadership of the union attempt to recruit all bookmaking employees? There is some evidence to suggest that while Sawford and his fellow Executive members genuinely launched a recruitment campaign towards all employee groups, some of the groups remained higher on the priority list than others.

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1. Sawford was at one time a casino worker.

2. See, for instance, Interview Fred Martin 10.6.75.
TUBE membership figures scarcely exist in any detail, thus evidence on recruitment policy is largely impressionistic. Fortunately, however, the C.I.R. inquiry into the William Hill Organisation, does provide an overall picture of the distribution of membership between employee groups, and on a significant scale. Table 6.1 gives the results in detail. This shows, not altogether surprisingly since they constitute some 60% of the workforce, that LBO managers, cashiers, and counter clerks provided the main source of membership for TUBE; but of these groups, the managers were disproportionately likely to be TUBE members. Indeed more than 28% LBO managers were TUBE members, compared with an average figure of 18% for all LBO employees.

There is no obvious reason why this should reflect organising policies: workers are not, of course, passive recipients of union efforts or propaganda. Yet, comparing the levels of actual membership with 

professed support for TUBE, then some explanations must be put forward for the massive discrepancies. The potential support for TUBE, as discerned by the CIR, is also set out in Table 6.1. Here the proportionate level of support for the four main occupational groups in the LBOs is remarkably similar, ranging from 61.5% to 66%. The wide discrepancies across occupational groups in terms of actual membership have disappeared.

Various explanations may be put forward regarding the differences between actual membership and potential support. In this particular case, employer hostility towards TUBE was probably an important influence. This, however, is scarcely likely to explain wide disparities across

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1. It should be noted that some groups, notably cleaning staff in LBOs, were scarcely ever recruited into the union. Significantly, TUBE did not seek to represent them in any of their applications to the NIRC.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Licensed betting offices</th>
<th>Total Respondents</th>
<th>TUBE members No.</th>
<th>TUBE members Per cent.</th>
<th>Support for TUBE (a) No.</th>
<th>Support for TUBE (a) Per cent.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area Supervisors</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Managers</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>39.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers</td>
<td>851</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>62.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlers</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>66.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter Clerks/Cashiers</td>
<td>1,036</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>637</td>
<td>61.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boardmarkers</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>62.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,457</strong></td>
<td><strong>451</strong></td>
<td><strong>18.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,499</strong></td>
<td><strong>61.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Administrative and Head Offices**

| Supervisors              | 26                | 4               | 15.4                  | 11                       | 42.3                          |
| Settlers                 | 88                | 6               | 6.8                   | 59                       | 67.1                          |
| Genie Operators          | 19                | 1               | 5.3                   | 4                        | 21.1                          |
| Racing telephonists      | 50                | 6               | 12.0                  | 31                       | 62.0                          |
| Clerical and Admin. Staff| 223               | 11              | 4.9                   | 88                       | 39.5                          |
| Others                   | 73                | 2               | 2.7                   | 25                       | 34.2                          |
| **TOTAL**                | **479**           | **30**          | **6.3**               | **218**                  | **45.5**                      |

**General Total:**

| 2,936                    | 481               | 16.4            | 1,717                  | 58.5                     |

(a) i.e. "Staff who wished TUBE to represent them in negotiations with the Company about pay and conditions."

occupational categories. The suggestion therefore remains that these differences may at least partially reflect the nature of TUBE and the objectives pursued by the union and the priority areas for recruitment; though the evidence is scarcely conclusive. \(^{(1)}\)

There is some more impressionistic evidence: representation and policies at the level of the Executive suggest that TUBE was primarily a union of LBO settler-managers. \(^{(2)}\) It was from this job category that the majority of TUBE representatives arose, both at local and national level; furthermore the reluctance of the leadership to take up the issue of the mobility of labour - a strongly expressed grievance of the counter clerks - is particularly important since most LBO managers were ambivalent on this matter. Finally there was an enquiry from Newcastle regarding TUBE, where the sender assumed the union was mainly for settler-managers and indeed wondered whether counter clerks and similar groups would be admitted. \(^{(3)}\)

1. It might have been the case, for instance, that LBO managers who did not wish to join TUBE could effectively prevent other LBO staff from doing so. The manager was in the crucial position, e.g. opening mail, controlling access to telephone etc. besides his general authoritative position. But where a LBO manager supported TUBE, he did not possess a symmetrical power to persuade other LBO staff to join. Even so, it still begs the question why the manager might join, but not the other LBO employees.
2. See above Chapter 5 for a discussion of the composition of the Executive.
3. They asked for advice on a "few points", one of which concerned:

"The position regarding the female counter and board staff, most of whom are part-time and working purely for 'pin money'". Letter P. Arnold to George Sawford 25.5.72.
The evidence is clearly circumstantial and somewhat limited: yet organising policies are not necessarily blatant, nor without contradictions. While TUBE may have been dominated by settler-managers, both in terms of representatives and membership, official union policy was to embrace all bookmaking employees; and only through expanding membership could a sound financial and organisational position be achieved and maintained.

(2) Sex Differentiation

The evidence here is even more inconclusive than in terms of job categorisation. The sexual division of labour parallels the division between settler-managers and counter clerks. Thus, insofar as the TUBE leadership and branch activists tried to recruit settler-managers rather than counter clerks, this necessarily implied recruiting men rather than women. It is possible to speculate that some mutual reinforcement did occur - again the letter from Newcastle, where women are portrayed as working for pin-money, comes to mind. Nevertheless some predominantly female firms did receive support from the TUBE Executive: in John Joyce Ltd and Roland Jones Ltd the virtually all-female workforce received no less backing than other groups in similar positions.

Insofar as involvement in a union is related to organising policies and insofar as that degree of involvement is reflected in representation in the union, some tentative conclusions can be drawn from the pattern of representation at branch level. Table 6.2 indicates the distribution of local branch officers by sex. Of 65 identifiable branch officials across the TUBE branch structure, only 12 were women. There is no record of any female Chairperson, while the positions of Secretary and Treasurer were equally under-represented with only six women
Table 6.2: TUBE Local Branch Officials by Sex. (a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairperson</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasurer</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL:</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TUBE Archives

Note (a) These records are as complete as the archive records allow.
The male domination amongst local branch officers, at 82% of all positions, thus reinforces the impression gained in the examination of the National Executive: TUBE was a male-dominated union in an industry using predominantly female labour. The weight of the evidence points to TUBE as a male/managerial dominated union; and insofar as organising policies reflect the interests and objectives of dominant groups within the union, female/counter clerks were of a lower priority.


More definite conclusions can be drawn in terms of geographical differentiation. One identifiable aspect is the granting or withholding of official sanction by the TUBE leadership in the formation of branches; another concerns the provision of organisational support to the branches, and where it was absent. The first aspect involves a brief examination of branch formation from the perspective of organising policies in 1971-72; the second an analysis of how the full-time organisers operated in 1973.

1. The results are particularly interesting in that they support the results of a larger scale analogous study in NALGO: Chairperson (or equivalent) was again the most underrepresented position at 5%, while Treasurer embraced 10.5% and Secretary 16%. This survey included a far wider range of positions, but the overall figure for female representation as branch officers was 15.5% - remarkably close to the TUBE figure. See NALGO (1975) p.30
As an Executive without a membership, the TUBE leadership in 1971 were necessarily anxious to build support and recruit members; nevertheless choices had to be made as to where to actively campaign for such support. Branch formation may in this way be seen as an institutional consequence of organising policy. On the other hand, the membership could still organise from within and request official approval from the union to be received as a branch. As such, the organising policy of the leadership can be seen as essentially passive, and, insofar as such requests are granted, indiscriminate in terms of recruitment. As regards TUBE, most branch formation was a combination of these two processes, an outcome of their dialectical interrelationship. Yet at different phases of expansion, such processes were not necessarily in balance.

In assessing the three phases of TUBE's expansion, only in the initial phase did the union actively campaign to build membership and branches prior to local demands. The efforts to form branches in three areas of London and in Birmingham, shortly after the inaugural meeting, were not successful. Only one branch resulted, that of London Eastern; employees in London and Birmingham did not immediately respond to TUBE's campaigning. On the whole, the Executive had tried to build membership in the immediate locality: it is worth remembering the domination on the Executive in this early period of the employees of the London-based City Tote/Ron Nagle combine.

While the TUBE Executive were ambitious to expand the union, the subsequent impetus for local branches came less from the national leadership than the local employees. The remaining twelve months of expansion was largely the story of Sawford offering TUBE's meagre resources to assist local efforts to organise. While certainly not passive in the matter, the TUBE leadership, after the initial months, was
cast in a largely responsive mould. Organising policy was thus primarily concerned with what areas not to take up.

Generally, the TUBE leadership responded favourably to most requests; nevertheless some areas were not supported. While branches were formed in the major conurbations requests from the less central, rural areas were not followed up. This was true notably in Kent, South Devon, and East Anglia.

Between the priority areas of the industrial conurbations which formed the basis of the TUBE Branch structure, there was little evidence of selective organising on a geographical criteria in the period of expansion. Although the Executive members spent most of their efforts on the organisation in London, this did not prevent Sawford, as the only full-time official, providing support throughout the country.

Far more pronounced was the selectivity over the phasing of organising support and branch formation. This reflected the centralisation of power in the union, and the relative autonomy of the Executive in determining when resources should be utilised to build which branches. To this extent, the phasing of branch formation was largely a strategic choice on the part of the TUBE Executive: to await the legal backing of the unfair dismissal sections in the I.R.A. 1971 before starting the second phase of branch formation; and to await formal registration under the Act prior to the third phase. Such strategies reflect the objectives and interests of those dominant within the union and who structured organising policy at least partially in terms of general union policy to utilise the IRA 1971.

The elements of conscious choice not to organise certain areas appear more clearly with the appointment of the geographically-based full-time organisers in 1973. But to the extent that these organisers were autonomous, organising policies became more sharply contradictory. Between
them/three full-time organisers covered all TUBE branches and membership. The divisions were drawn on geographical lines, with one organiser responsible for an area from Birmingham southwards; a second, running from Birmingham towards the North-West Scottish border; and a third incorporating the North-East of England and Scotland. Clearly the coverage of some parts of these areas would only be nominal.

Just as certain areas had not been actively canvassed, despite local requests, in 1972, so in 1973 certain areas were not serviced either by Sawford or the organisers. The most dramatic example was the virtual abandonment of the Welsh branches, even though pockets of membership remained some months afterwards. Decisions were made by the Executive to put TUBE resources into developing membership elsewhere and while branches were being formed in the Midlands and North-West, the Welsh branches were receiving little attention.

The elimination of such areas did in part reflect the difficult choices faced by the union: how were resources to be allocated where they were simply insufficient? The Welsh branches were relatively difficult to service, given the way the structure of the union had developed, and provided only a limited membership potential. This had to be weighed against demands and potential elsewhere. (1)

The impact of the area organisers, however, interposed an organisational tier between the Executive and local branches. This generated a degree of dislocation between the policies of the Executive and the practices of the full-time officials. The principles of the latter group were indeed rather different. Faced with such wide

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1. The interesting question of who does the "weighing" and what criteria are used is discussed in the conclusions of this chapter.
geographical areas to service, all of the organisers placed a premium on existing loyalties and connections with their 'home' branches. But outside of these branches all three were subject to criticism over their inactivity. It meant that branches suffered which were crucial to the Executive’s general strategy, e.g. Manchester and Birmingham; while others, e.g. Liverpool, survived in spite of the full-time organiser, rather than because of him.

The contradiction between the instrumentality of the full-time organisers and the policies of the Executive implied that out-lying areas of peripheral significance to the main objectives of the TUBE leadership would not be serviced: they were both physically difficult to maintain and low on the membership priority list. Yet, where the physical problems of servicing and membership priority moved in different directions, i.e. difficult to service/high priority, easy to service/low priority, the outcome of organising policies was less predictable: but largely it was resolved in favour of the organisers inactivity. Such contradictions did not merely operate in terms of geographical policies, but also concerned strategies towards firms - the fourth dimension of organising policy.

4. Firm-based differentiation

The general contradiction in the organising policies of the TUBE leadership is reflected once again in the dimension of firm-based differentiation. This time that contradiction, i.e. the general imperative to expand membership in order to survive which nevertheless implied that certain priorities would be sought in terms of organising, was resolved in favour of the larger firms.
Throughout TUBE’s history—with the exception of a fairly short period in the spring of 1973 - the priority of establishing membership in the major companies was never seriously challenged.

TUBE had arisen in the context of changes in a large London-based combine; and initially the new Executive had tried to build membership in that firm. Subsequently as support developed elsewhere, it became clear that membership was expanding rapidly in William Hill and Ladbrokes - scarcely surprising given the dramatic expansion of the ‘Big Four’ in this period. The TUBE national officials decided to give priority to these groups in their efforts to secure recognition, to the inevitable detriment of other groups of actual and potential members. For instance, with the impending stoppages in William Hill and Ladbrokes in the Spring of 1973, Sawford was actively campaigning for members in these firms and played a leading role in forming the Birmingham and Coventry branches; yet, simultaneously, elsewhere in the country, e.g. in Wales, where the firms involved were primarily local employers, little support was given.

That TUBE showed more interest in recruiting members in the large firms did not mean that recruitment and retention of members was any easier than in the small ones; the size of LBOs was virtually the same. Only insofar as the LBOs of the larger firms were closer together and in the large towns was there any economy of effort involved. It was rather a reflection of the dominant policy amongst the TUBE leadership from the outset that the success of the union depended on gaining recognition in one of the major companies whereupon all the other firms would, sooner or later, fall into line - the domino theory of union success. While this perspective was seriously challenged for a brief period in 1973 - in the aftermath of the stoppages in William Hill and Ladbrokes - the importance of the efforts to gain recognition in William Hill soon came to override all other policy objectives. The attempted resurrection
of the TUBE branch organisation in late 1973 and early 1974 reflected this choice; efforts were concentrated on reforming those branches where there was potential or past William Hill membership.

The policy of the national Executive in these matters was not, however, always reflected in similar policies at local branch level. The Executive had developed a pattern of geographically based branches; and this necessarily cut across the patterns of firm-based membership. Hence while some branches were dominated by membership from the large, national companies other branches were primarily based on local firms. The evidence of local branch activities suggests that where branches were dominated by particular firms, members from other firms were excluded, or opted out, from participation in branch affairs; and given there was no other forum for union activities, this also meant the union itself. In some cases this meant that membership in the national companies declined in branches where membership in local firms were dominant, e.g. Liverpool or where membership in one of the major companies was dominant, e.g. in Coventry.

(ii) The TGWU: organising policy in the Bookmaking industry, and the impact on union growth.

While TUBE developed as an industrial union for the bookmaking industry, the TGWU was Britain's largest union, with some two million members, and recruited in a wide range of industries and occupational groups. Therefore the starting point in examining organising policies is immediately different. With TUBE the important question was given the intention was to develop an industrial union, did organising policy focus on particular groups within the industry? What was the basis, if any, for selectivity in organising amongst the bookmaking employees? The TGWU, on the other hand, as a large general union with a wide
variety of membership, was involved in an issue which TUBE had pre-empted by its very existence: should the union recruit members in the bookmaking industry at all? The bookmaking membership was, after all, only a small proportion of the TGWU membership.

It is important to see the organising policies of the TGWU towards the bookmaking employees as part of the wider interests of the total membership of the union. This is developed in the first part of the section: what policies were adopted within the TGWU towards the building of membership within the Bookmaking Industry? Once this general question of whether the TGWU was prepared to devote resources to organise bookmaking employees has been considered, it then becomes possible to analyse which groups of bookmaking employees the union particularly sought to recruit. Finally, there is an examination of the kind of organisation that was implied by the involvement of the TGWU and the impact of the TGWU structure in the development of membership amongst bookmaking employees. This will also consider and contrast notions of how trade unionism actually develops.

But firstly, how did TUBE fit into the TGWU structure? This is an essential precondition for understanding how the TGWU organising policies developed in the way which they did; and how the TGWU took on the responsibility for organising the bookmaking employees in practice.

The TGWU has a twin structure of geographical and occupational organisation and representation. Any member is attached both to a trade group, depending on his/her occupation, and to a geographical region (there are eleven regions for the whole country). The trade groups are represented at district, regional, and national level with trade group committees, and can also elect a member to the General Executive Council, the policy making body of the union (with the exception of the Biennial Delegate Conference which is the "supreme policy making body").

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The trade group structure is paralleled by an administrative structure at District, Regional and National level, with committees at both District and Regional level. The full-time officials are attached to the union through this administrative structure. The administrative and trade group structures are integrated at the national level in the General Executive Committee: while the national trade groups elect delegates, so do the regions through a membership ballot in the region. TUBE comprised one small part of one trade group - the white-collar section ACTSS - and the bookmaking membership was scattered throughout the eleven regions of the TGWU. Hence the membership in bookmaking would, notionally, be organised in local branches of bookmaking employees attached to the relevant regions. Where there was insufficient membership they would comprise part of a "holding" branch until such times as their numbers were sufficiently large to warrant a branch of their own. National contact could be achieved through the national trade group, i.e. the ACTSS group.

Where there were branches, they would be serviced by a full-time official, located at district or regional level. In some instances usually at regional level, there would be an ACTSS official who would concentrate his efforts on this particular trade group. At district level, however, it was a question of the local official adding this membership into his already varied mixture.

It is important to appreciate the position of ACTSS within the TGWU. The TGWU developed as a manual union and its membership remained predominantly in the so-called manual groups. The 'white-collar' membership remained a growing, but less than significant, numerical grouping within the union. As such, it does not have a particularly strong position within the union. Hence TUBE became a relatively insignificant part of the ACTSS trade group, which itself was a lightweight in terms of the power relations within the TGWU. The prominent groups
within the union could be found in the car industry and general engineering. These groups provided most of the TGWU full-time officials that were interviewed. To that extent ACTSS was a poor relation within the TGWU and TUBE a poor relation within ACTSS. This provides the context for examining the organising policies of the TGWU in relation to bookmaking employees.

1. Where to build membership?

The decision of the TGWU to develop membership in bookmaking was taken in the context of the interests of the union membership as a whole. The decision to amalgamate was taken within that context; and the perspectives and activities of full-time officials and elected members continually developed from this basis - that was the objective position in which they were involved.

To an extent there was little choice: the TGWU did not start from scratch. When amalgamation was effected they inherited the TUBE membership; admittedly this was rather patchy to say the least, and as some officials found to their cost, very much a paper membership. But nevertheless they did start with substantial membership and potentialities in William Hill and with certain strong local groupings of membership, e.g. in Liverpool. That membership could either be built upon or let go.

Within the TGWU the obvious financial pressures and lack of resources which had hampered TUBE were no longer a problem - or so it appeared. The largest trade union in Britain could surely muster sufficient money and resources to organise the bookmaking employees.

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1. See TGWU (1975) pp6-7. Note the way in which the trade groups are set out in a semi-circle, with the 'vehicle building and automotive' group in the most prominent position; ACTSS is on the extreme right hand edg
if they wanted to. Consequently the options to build membership were reasonably open; resources could be put into areas of 'untapped' membership if it was so desired.

Looking at the commitment of the TGWU to organise bookmaking employees, two specific questions can be asked: Firstly, did the TGWU after the amalgamation provide special arrangements for the building of this membership over and above the normal structures of recruitment into the union? Secondly, what was the impact of the normal patterns of recruitment, i.e. the existing structure of local full-time officials within the TGWU, in organising the bookmaking employees?

The priorities given by the TGWU to organising membership in the bookmaking industry manifested themselves in two particular ways. The first concerns the position of the NationalOrganiser, at this time Moss Evans who was destined to become the General Secretary shortly afterwards and whose job it was "to enthuse officers into organising" (1). One of the areas which Moss Evans took up with some enthusiasm concerned organising the workers within the horseracing industry, of which the TUBE membership was a part. Secondly, there was the question of organising at the local level; and here the inherited full-time officials from TUBE, who had now become full-time officials in the TGWU, Andrew Long and George Sawford, were given special dispensation within their jobs in order to organise bookmaking employees.

A closer examination of the position of Moss Evans as National Organiser, suggests this was primarily a troubleshooter function, involving areas that were difficult to handle through the normal TGWU structure; to that extent the taking over of membership in bookmaking without recognition in the major companies clearly could fall into that category of warranting special attention. The newly acquired bookmaking

1. Interview Moss Evans 2.2.76.
membership complemented the efforts of Moss Evans in co-ordinating
the building of union organisation in the horseracing industry
and in expanding the influence of the TGWU into the institutions of
that industry. The TGWU already had membership in the Totalisator
employees (indeed this had been a selling point in persuading
the TUBE Executive to amalgamate) as well as amongst the stable lads.
The TUBE membership thus gave the TGWU a monopoly within the
industry. Yet none of the sections were that strongly organised,
hence the involvement of the National Organiser.

Even within his own terms of reference, Moss Evans gave priority
to the TUBE membership:

"I have spent a lot of time (on TUBE). I've spent more
time attempting to develop organisation in the industry
perhaps (than in other industries)". (1)

While Moss Evans performed his troubleshooting role at national level
was his enthusing effective locally? How did the special dispensation
given to Sawford and Long work out in practice? For a time both
were given some freedom to develop bookmaking membership. Sawford,
for instance, was given special responsibility in 1975 for building
membership in the home counties and for reforming branches in London.

His efforts, however, were not successful. By September 1976 his work on
TUBE had diminished:

"I'm doing very little on TUBE now. I'm doing Sainsbury's.
Road Transport, JICs and so on. Therefore TUBE doesn't get
half the attention it should." (2)

Whatever the policy of the TGWU nationally, at local level the
priority given to Andrew Long and George Sawford to organise in
bookmaking had been substantially eroded within two years of amalgamation.
In the case of Andrew Long, as early as 1975 he was under pressure
from senior officials in the TGWU to broaden his horizons as an organiser:

1. Interview Moss Evans 2.2.76
2. Interview George Sawford 27.9.76.
"It is hard to orient to the TGWU. As an Officer you have to service other industries. I try to give as much time as possible to TUBE, about three days a week. It involves a lot of footwork. I use buses (I haven't a car) and I've got about three hours to get around as many shops as I can." (1)

The reduction in the special dispensation given to Sawford and Long soon made its mark on the lay activists amongst the bookmaking employees. Fred Martin, for instance, who was still trying to organise membership in East London, commented:

"When the TGWU first took over, Andrew Long's first job meant he was sent to a plastics factory to settle a strike. He didn't know anything about it. We needed all we had - as if they couldn't have found somebody else! Once they got us they seemed to ignore us." (2)

Thus the reality of events at the local level appears in some contrast to the national policy expressed by the National Organiser. Soon after the amalgamation this contradictory position within the TGWU towards the bookmaking employees was brought into very sharp relief for Fred Martin in his efforts to organise an East London branch:

"Moss Evans said although you need 50 members to form a branch they'd accept 25. When I got 27, I phoned George Sawford. He was out, so I phoned Bert Fryer (TGWU official in London) - I had more chance of talking to George. I got on to some assistant who said it was out of the question. They said we're cutting down on branches in London. I had to ask if we were talking about the same thing. There are no branches in London, I said, which is why all those cards are going into the head office." (3)

This illustrates the tension between the activities of the National Organiser and the local branch bureaucracies. The troubleshooting role of Moss Evans necessarily meant the rules might be bent on occasions; in this case it was arguably better for TUBE branches to exist with

1. Interview Andrew Long 19.5.75
2. Interview Fred Martin 10.6.75
3. Interview Fred Martin 10.6.75
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below the required membership as a platform for expansion. But the local administrative controls could effectively cut across these kinds of initiatives.

There was, however, a further limitation on the activities of Andrew Long and George Sawford and this concerns the areas they were allowed to cover. In the days of an independent TUBE, Sawford and Long between them had serviced all the TUBE branches throughout the country. Not so under the TGWU. The 'special dispensation' only applied to the region in which they were employed; hence George Sawford was restricted to the London area, and Andrew Long to Leeds. This was a cause of great frustration to the ex-TUBE officials:

"I can't service Liverpool - its out of my area. Its frustrating to know that branches need servicing. In Liverpool it isn't good, the officers service other industries." (1)

This raises the important question of the position of local officials in developing organising policies. During the course of the research, a number of TGWU full-time officials were interviewed. In all cases they were officials in areas where TUBE membership existed prior to amalgamation or where membership had developed under the TGWU. To that extent they represented the full-time officials who were perhaps more interested in bookmaking employees than most. Some were regionally based ACTUS officers while others were local officers handling a variety of membership.

Three key questions can be raised concerning the role of the full-time officials in relation to the expansion of union growth and organisation amongst bookmaking employees. Firstly, how did they organise groups

1. Interview Andrew Long 19.5.75
of employees; what were the methods of recruitment? Secondly, what autonomy did they possess in making decisions on organising policies? Thirdly, did the officials have any particular awareness of the problems of organising the bookmaking employees within the structure of the TGWU?

Firstly the methods of recruitment. With little, if any, exception, all of the officials interviewed supported Bain's characterisation of the full-time official as primarily a passive recipient of new members. This applied generally to all groups of employees as well as specifically to the bookmaking employees. As one full-time official commented:

"I spend very little time on TUBE. I suppose if I had nothing else to do I could do a job on bookmakers in Liverpool. I could go round the shops. But we don't operate that way." (1)

The point is clearly made: full-time officials in the TGWU were not to be found campaigning around widely distributed LBOs in order to recruit membership. If the members came along, all well and good. The full-time officials might not only gain such membership through approaches from local employee groups. In at least one case, a full-time official had been asked by his Regional Secretary to take on members in bookmaking.

Passivity in recruitment was sometimes matched by passivity in terms of sustaining and developing the membership. Even where full-time officers had bookmaking membership on their books this did not necessarily imply a change in attitude. Some declared they had no time to service the members and would merely wait for the numbers to increase without providing support. But, in contrast, some full-time

1. Interview Eddie Roberts 6.8.76. My emphasis.
officials showed a live interest in developing their bookmaking membership. Terry Austin in Birmingham, for instance, was supportive after the amalgamation:

"We circulated a recruitment letter throughout the region. We got twelve replies. The management - they always get copies somehow of everything we send out - said it was a big improvement on what had been sent out before." (1)

Such differences in attitude proved increasingly important the more autonomy local officials possessed over organizing policy.

The role of the national organiser is interesting in this respect; his job was to "enthuse" organisers into organising - which immediately suggests that he possessed little more than powers of persuasion and indicates an absence of centralised control within the union. To a large degree this proved a fair reflection on how the TGWU operated in relation to the everyday tasks of recruitment and organising the membership, indicating the autonomy, within broad guidelines, of the full-time officials in the regions.

The extent of this autonomy can be seen in terms of the impact of the amalgamation on TUBE membership. Within a matter of months areas of strong TUBE membership were in decay. One particular example was that of Manchester, where the TGWU had ironically assisted in the revitalisation of the branch in the Summer of 1974, prior to the official amalgamation date. But where, nevertheless, by 1975, the branch had collapsed. As Jack Rashman later commented:

"The organiser of the TGWU didn't know if he was coming or going. He just had an extra task on his plate." (2)

1. Interview Terry Austin 23.6.75.
2. Interview Jack Rashman 5.8.76.
At the same time interest in other areas prompted an expansion of membership in bookmaking employees. This was notably true in Scotland where the Glasgow branch had begun to thrive under the influence of a new Branch Secretary, Roy Brown, and assisted by an enthusiastic full-time official. They built up a strong membership in Brown's own firm, J.Coral Ltd, and which provided a solid branch structure for the campaign amongst the Ladbroke workers.

In cases such as Scotland, and also Newcastle, the amalgamation with the TGWU in providing keen full-time officials had proved beneficial in expanding union membership. The reputation of TUBE in these areas was in fact poor - a legacy of the 1973 stoppages. The TGWU presented a fresh image which won the support of many members who would not have rejoined TUBE.

On the whole the local officials were free to decide on their priorities. They had many and varied areas to cover. Consider the responsibilities of one ACTSS Officer:

"I am the only ACTSS officer for 7,500 members in the whole of this region. That includes bookmaking employees and other ACTSS groups." (1)

He had a relatively high number of bookmaking employees in membership at this time, approximately 300; but even that was only a small proportion of the total membership which he had to service. Choices had to be made on which members had to be serviced and which members suffered.

Those officials who did make serious efforts to expand the bookmaking membership soon realised there were inherent limits to their local efforts; they had to move beyond the regional boundaries.

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1. Interview Bernard McCordie 31.8.76
of the TGWU structure. For instance, Terry Austin in 1976 called a national meeting of union representatives amongst the J.Coral Group, plus Andrew Long and George Sawford, to discuss the possibility of a national campaign amongst the J.Coral employees. The limitations of local success were indeed appreciated by Bernard McCardle in Newcastle in the context of building up the Ladbroke membership at a time when a national campaign in Ladbrokes was supposed to be taking place:

"Our achievements have been on a local basis. We tried to extend nationally, I approached Moss Evans, but the information was very sketchy. This concerned our members. Why is it no good elsewhere? The national campaign seems to have done more harm than good. I feel we'll never get anywhere if there is nothing in Birmingham or London and so on." (1)

The problem for local full-time officials concerned the expansion of membership in national companies on a local basis. The large bookmaking companies were not prepared to concede local recognition; and even where membership was substantial, as in Newcastle at this time, the union lacked the muscle to enforce it.

To conclude: the TGWU possessed an overall commitment to developing membership in the bookmaking industry as part of an overall policy of expanding membership in the horseracing industry - which in turn was part of a wider policy of expanding into new areas of untapped membership. Yet while this appeared as the official national policy of the union, it is evident that local officials could and did have a large say in whether they recruited in certain areas; and that their recruitment methods were usually passive, responding to approaches from employee groups rather than campaigning actively to expand or even to sustain existing membership.

1. Interview Bernard McCardle 31.8.76.
2. What membership was organised?

Since the major question on organising policy was whether or not to recruit any members in the bookmaking industry, it is scarcely surprising that there was rather less emphasis on precisely which employee groups within bookmaking to recruit than in the days of TUBE. Furthermore, the TGWU already effectively discriminated against certain sorts of employees with their widespread use of a passive organising policy; for instance, this implied that potential members would be largely self-supportive in their local organisation - which might exclude groups lacking the time or confidence to effectively organize without the help of a full-time official.

But in terms of the dimensions considered in the discussion of TUBE, the TGWU did not face the same problems as TUBE in relation to financial and organisational resources. The evidence from the interviews of the full-time officials and observation of the development of union membership and organisation under the TGWU does not suggest any conscious discrimination against certain job tasks or sex specific to bookmaking employees; nevertheless, the general principles of organising adopted by the full-time officials could effectively eliminate certain groups of actual or potential membership. There appeared a general reluctance to spend a disproportionate amount of time on groups where the 'rewards' were 'small', manifested in a lack of practical enthusiasm for part-time or women workers, which constituted a large part of the potential bookmaking membership. But this does not appear to have been a conscious decision in relation to bookmaking employees.

Again, in part, this reflected the role of full-time officers as passive recipients of membership who effectively left the details

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1. The four sources of differentiation were specified in terms of sex; job tasks; geographical areas; and firms.
of organisation to the local lay officials; hence any real
differentiation would take place before the full-time official
was involved. This suggests that the full-time officials might
be more influential in decisions affecting recruitment in the other
dimensions of geographical and firm-based differentiation. This
would seem to be justified: already it has been shown how the
development of membership on a geographical basis was largely
discretionary depending on the defined priorities of the local
officials; now the policy towards which firms to organise must be
examined, a policy which was uniform throughout national and local
levels of the union in emphasising the building of membership in the
larger firms, notably the national companies.

In the three year period after amalgamation the TGWU developed
campaigns in three of the major companies. The first, in 1974-75,
built on the TUBE membership in William Hill with Moss Evans playing
an active co-ordinating role across the various regions. Despite
effective localised industrial action in Leeds and Hull the union were
unable to secure recognition from the company. The second campaign
was in Ladbrokes, which flowed from the refusal of the Ladbroke
workers in the West of Scotland to accept the level of wage increases
offered to them by the company in summer 1975. They immediately
joined the union and the dispute became one of union recognition with
some 300 Ladbroke workers in this area on an indefinite strike,
eventually resulting in the closure of virtually all the Ladbroke LBOs
in the West of Scotland for nearly six months. The TGWU, who had
quickly made the strike official, soon tried to extend the dispute
into areas south of the border. The response was patchy as was the
enthusiasm of some of the local officials; and the dispute was not
effectively widened. Eventually the strikers were to receive paltry financial compensation for their efforts at the Industrial Tribunal. Following the defeat of the Ladbrokes dispute, attention soon turned to the J.Coral Group. This derived primarily from the efforts of J.Coral employees in Essex and East London who built up a substantial membership on their own initiative. Again the union tried to widen the dispute and a national conference was called in Birmingham by Terry Austin, the ACTSS officer in that region. Yet again support was uneven across the country.

While the building of national campaigns in the national companies may have put some pressure on local officials to recruit members in bookmaking, as regards local firms the full-time officers possessed a large element of discretion. On the whole the TGWU were not really interested in recruiting in either small firms or small units; and some expressed incredulity at the activities of the former TUBE officials:

"I've got Andrew Long working with me. Its a different world. He's chasing round like a blue-arsed fly. One member here and two there, he doesn't understand the world we operate in. He's picked up a bit, but he's still out of his depth." (1)

Clearly Andrew Long had not learnt the 'real' world of the trade union official: small units and small firms were not worth the bother.

Those officers, such as Andrew Long, who were prepared to put in the effort found the problems exactly as they had been under TUBE in organising the bookmaking employees, despite the resources of the TGWU:

"My main problem is organising - to get people to a meeting. The shops are spread over an area and it's hard to get them all together. The collection of subscriptions is the worst. Its impossible to visit each office weekly. Arrears become a problem and people have to be reapproached and its hard to get them back once they've resigned. We go in for check-off as soon as we can and they (the management) know this is our problem and they make trouble for the people who collect for us." (2)

1. Interview Eddie Roberts 6.8.76.
2. Interview Andrew Long 19.5.75.
Membership in local firms is impossible to estimate\(^1\). It is difficult enough even to find whether any agreements have been secured with local companies. But it is still reasonably clear the membership in local firms in the regions investigated had usually collapsed since amalgamation. In Manchester, London, and Newcastle for instance membership in previously organised firms under TUBE had disappeared without trace. Even in areas of real strength, the membership and organisation had dwindled and deteriorated under the TGWU, such as in Liverpool. The general policy of the TGWU thus emphasised the large, national companies to the exclusion of the local firms. If the full-time officials were going to spend time on bookmaking employees it was likely to be in the context of the national firms rather than local ones; but again the autonomy and priorities of local officials proved significant in determining precise policies towards recruitment in this area.

3. Power relationships within the TGWU: Organising policies and the implications for union growth.

There is an immediate contrast to be drawn between the TGWU and TUBE which had profound implications for organising policy. TUBE, while embracing contradictions between local and national level, had developed with a strong leadership co-ordinating a central and indeed national policy towards the expansion of membership and organisation. The TGWU, while emphasising the role of national co-ordination, encompassed a large degree of local autonomy. The amalgamation thrust the organising of the bookmaking employees into a union with a different balance of power relationships within its structure which had particular implications for the development of membership amongst the bookmaking employees.

\(^1\) The TGWU do not keep centralised records of bookmaking members.
Firstly there was the movement from centralised control to that of co-ordination which necessitates a more detailed examination of the role of National Organiser within the TGWU. In September 1974, George Sawford remained highly optimistic about the outcome of the amalgamation; the industry would be "sown up" under the TGWU in a couple of years. Moss Evans had clearly made a strong impression:

"Moss has a lot on his plate. That man has so much work on his plate." (2)

Yet within twelve months the full realisation of what amalgamation meant had begun to impress itself on the old TUBE activists; and a major complaint was the lack of direction at the national level:

"They'll never get anywhere in this industry until they get a national officer; and I can't see that happening because the TGWU are trying to save money, not spend it." (3)

This was a continuous criticism reflecting the relative powerlessness of the National Organiser in achieving concrete results:

"It all comes back to having a National Officer. We'll never succeed until we get one. Someone who will get the Regional Secretaries to get their finger out." (4)

In other words the power of the Regional Secretaries was certainly sufficient, that if they did not wish to spend their time organising bookmaking employees, there was little that could be done to force them to do so. This, of course, undermined the efforts in other areas. Since most of the membership was in the major, national companies, Regional Secretaries who were not prepared to organise bookmaking employees necessarily undermined the efforts of those who did try, given the significance of national membership in these companies. Within the existing structure of the TGWU there seemed little that could be done to overcome this problem.

1. Interview George Sawford 23.7.74.
2. Interview George Sawford 12.9.74.
3. Interview George Sawford 6.10.75.
4. Interview George Sawford 16.2.76.
Sawford found himself particularly stymied at times in his efforts to expand membership. For instance during the Ladbroke dispute with 300 Ladbroke workers on strike in Glasgow and the union at the national level trying to widen the dispute into England, Sawford outlined the action taken in London concerning the dispute:

"Sod all. I need authority to call a meeting and spend money. To call a meeting you need adverts, hall bookings and so on. I can't get assistance from the regions. Like other firms, costs are going up and the powers that be obviously feel that the money could be better spent elsewhere." (1)

The ability of the Regional Secretaries to restrict activities in their regions necessary undermined the efforts of national co-ordination. Sometimes criticism was made, perhaps unfairly, at the full-time officers who did take national initiatives rather than those who did nothing. The following comment was made in relation to the organising of a national campaign meeting in the J.Coral Group:

"Far be it for me to criticise a fellow officer, but I thought there was a complete lack of organisation. He should have ensured the attendance of other officers. Why wasn't there anyone from Manchester or Liverpool? There was no-one from Wales and most important of all from Bristol - the biggest concentration of Coral's shops in the country. Why wasn't there anyone from there? Southampton too. Also there is not enough lay membership involved." (2)

The immediate impact of this discrepancy between notional policy and actual practice implied that internal problems within the TGWU had to be overcome before any meaningful expansion could take place. Quite clearly, in some areas, the expansion of membership at all was problematic; but within the TGWU structure the lack of an effective national co-ordinating policy at precisely the time when the major companies were consolidating their positions as national companies, militated against any coherent and prolonged expansion of membership in any particular area. This was a problem which TUBE had faced and had

1. Interview George Sawford 6.10.75
2. Interview (Name withheld) The comment was made some eight days after the national campaign meeting on J.Coral Ltd in February 1976.
failed to resolve, apparently because of their lack of resources; but now Britain's largest trade union could not solve it either - this, however, was an expression of the priorities of the full-time officials and the interests of dominant membership groups in influencing the utilisation of resources within the union. The availability of resources within the TGWU was in many respects only notional for the majority of bookmaking employees.

A further dimension to the question of regional autonomy and national co-ordination concerned the inter-communication between regions and branches - or rather the lack of it. Under the TUBE structure communication had proved a problem: it had been a major complaint from various branches that they were in ignorance of what was happening. But within the TGWU it was now commonplace that what happened in one region was not known in another - certainly amongst local activists. Any communication which took place was largely informal. This even applied to Sawford himself:

"There's no organisation. I don't know what's going on. You probably know more than me. The regions won't spend any money. The only way I learn about anything is through the 'Sporting life'." (1)

The structure of any union reflects the power relationships within that union; and the extent to which the TGWU were prepared to organise (or not to organise) bookmaking employees reflects the dominance of certain groups within the union and the consequent priorities in union policies - even if these were not explicitly articulated. It meant the TGWU structure could encompass employee groups of a particular kind: Primarily factory-based units in limited localities. This, however, implied more than just an organisational mismatch which could be corrected

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1. Interview George Sawford 6.10.75.
if only the 'right' administrative structures were introduced; it also implied a particular view of trade unionism and how it develops. Some groups of workers could be readily defined as trade unionists; others, however, even if they wanted to organise collectively could not be considered in the same way at all. Furthermore, there was a correct way in which trade unionism developed; other methods were distinctly inferior and not the real thing at all.

The background of nearly all of the TGWU officials interviewed was that of the motor car industry. Their experiences were based in the workplace model of union organisation, which emphasised the importance of self-activity in generating union organisation and the corresponding passivity of the full-time official. But organising bookmaking employees in a wide number of geographically distributed units was a very different problem than organising car workers that worked within a limited geographical area and who were in daily and regular contact with each other. Some of the full-time officials asserted the superiority of the workplace model as THE way in which trade unionism can and must develop. One described his six years as an ACTSS officer:

"I had a different union background. I was in the car industry. Areas these days are not trade unionism. You can't use traditional methods at all. It's like running on the spot dealing with these people. They've no inkling of trade unionism. Some do have previous experience, but mostly they're dreadful. I can't go along with some white-collar officials; they say join us and we'll do it all for you. I say if you can't stick up for yourselves I can't do anything for you." (1)

Such views also embrace a scepticism about the naivety of the members when they do join the union:

1. Interview Eddie Roberts 6.8.76.
"We offer umbrella assistance. We address meetings. We're asked what is the union going to do for us? I joined tonight, can I have a rise tomorrow?" (1)

And as if to reinforce this view, very often the union members don't 'stick up' for themselves. As one full-time official commented on the collapse of a recently formed branch during the Ladbroke dispute:

"I am afraid matters have fallen very flat with Ladbrokes. Our membership have not shown the 'steel' which is necessary with such a company and our organisation hardly exists anywhere in the country." (2)

And amongst some full-time officials the reality that the struggle in bookmaking was in fact a national one had not been fully grasped, expressing a degree of naivety about how the affairs of their bookmaking membership might be handled with paralleled the 'workplace' model of unionism; that all that was needed was to build the membership and go in and negotiate with the employer:

"When the membership comes we go in and say 'you're lagging behind, what about this and that?" (3)

Such a view indicates how a background in the car industry - or any other similar workplace - colours the attitude of the official to trade unionism as a whole; one which is consistent with local negotiation in the setting of a factory organisation, but generally inappropriate to bookmaking employers whose local LBOs might provide only a small minority of their business and who take the view (for some years past) that local negotiations were out of the question. (4)

The other side of the 'workplace' model which the full-time officials espoused was the effect it had on the lay activists and membership. The paradox of the self activity model is that far from

1. Interview Eddie Roberts 6.8.76
2. Letter D.Buckle to author 27.10.75
3. Interview Fred Palmer 13.8.76
4. It is true that many negotiations are carried out at the national level, including the car industry itself. But this does not deny the traditions of local bargaining which strongly influenced this generation of union officials.
encouraging the self activity amongst the membership, this line of approach from the full-time officials may merely serve to disenchant lay activists in their efforts to build local union organisation. This was evident in the experiences of Fred Martin who was trying to rebuild the London Eastern branch. Shirley Warren, a former member of the TUBE Executive and still active locally in the TGWU at this time, had similar views:

"The TGWU? Freddie Martin said all they wanted was the name and numbers. They haven't done anything - wouldn't even put an advert in for members......
"The TGWU? they haven't got a very good name. Freddie Martin was the only one who really opposed it (amalgamation). He knew from the docks. He wanted Clive Jenkins. I know why he did now. He said they wouldn't do anything and they haven't." (2)

Freddie Martin himself echoed these sentiments:

"Since (the amalgamation) most London delegates have been disappointed with the TGWU. I believe in the provinces they seem to get a lot of help. Here we were promised the TGWU would get two ex or retired officers with the sole job of talking to employers." (3)

The impression amongst many of the TUBE activists that after amalgamation TUBE would retain something of an independent identity was not borne out in their experience. For instance:

"George Sawford said there would be a newspaper every eight weeks. It's been promised since we started. TUBE had a press officer but that's fizzled. The TGWU said 'everything at your disposal'. We can get everything printed". (4)

But the only newspaper the bookmaking employees ever received was the same as all the other TGWU members: the Record.

Fred Martin's comment that perhaps the activists in the provinces were receiving more support than the London based ones had some justification: Scotland, Newcastle, and Leeds had been revitalised.

1. see earlier discussion in this section.
2. Interview Shirley Warren 24.8.76
3. Interview Fred Martin 10.6.75. The officials never materialised.
4. Interview Fred Martin 10.6.75
On the other hand, the solid Liverpool membership had undergone some near disasters before finally the local activists and their full-time official had sorted out their respective difficulties. But perhaps the most continually successful partnership was struck in Hull, where the TUBE Branch Secretary, Ron Grantham, operated closely with his full-time officer, Terry Dunn. Yet even here this was no measure of a general enthusiasm with the activities of the TGWU:

"Membership has fallen off in the last two months due to the TGWU’s lack of action. I wrote to Moss Evans and had a reply - I always go to the top, I don’t mess around with little people - I wrote to Moss Evans and said I was totally dissatisfied (every time I threaten to resign something’s been done) with action taken in London and if I hadn’t received written notification of forming branches in London, I’d resign. Moss Evans replied that it may seem bureaucratic but I should go through the Area Manager and go through the chain. It wasn’t very satisfactory. I said I must be able to contact Moss Evans - I’m an individual in that respect and I’ve got the right to use my own tongue. The effects were not very resounding. I doubt if the Area Manager voiced my words." (1)

To conclude: the patterns of power relationships within the union, the consequent structure and defined objectives, embracing a particular view of the nature of trade unionism, all militated against the expansion of membership in the bookmaking industry. Yet the relative autonomy of local officials in relation to organising policies could and did have beneficial effects in promoting the growth of membership and organisation; but when it is realised that the basis of that local autonomy did not derive from any inherently democratic processes, but was more correctly a reflection of the relative power of different membership groups within the union - dominated by the factory based, localised, membership - then it is apparent local autonomy in organising policies held no particular advantage for bookmaking employees. This, 1

1. Interview Ron Grantham 14.5.75. An interesting slippage in his use of the term 'Area Manager' instead of 'Regional Official' which reflects Ron Grantham’s view that the union was controlled from the top.
coupled with the notion of self-activity as a basis for union development and the passivity of the full-time official, meant that potential organisation amongst bookmaking employees was effectively discouraged in various parts of the country.
(c) Concluding Discussion.

The objective of this chapter has been two-fold: to show the labour process as an important focus in understanding the course of unionisation; while nevertheless indicating that union policies did possess a certain autonomy, that choices were possible. The first point seems substantiated by the discussion in section 1 on the expansion and contraction of TUBE; the second by the analysis of organising policies both within TUBE and the TGWU, in section 2. But, to conclude, it is instructive to draw the threads together a little tighter.

That both aspects have been given a measure of empirical validation is not surprising; both can be seen as deriving from the essential contradiction of trade unionism outlined at the beginning of this chapter - that trade unions must take an organisational form within capitalism. The outcome implies trade unions are primarily responsive organisations on terms not of their own choosing, while they comprise workers who can take action and influence their own futures.

Since capital owns and controls the means of production (including economic activity in non-productive sectors), ultimately it is employers who determine how work is organised, how labour processes are performed. In consequence, it is employers, as agents of capital, who are instrumental in developing the conditions for unionisation. The existence and continuity of trade unionism must therefore depend on the vagaries of capitalist development.

Section 1, on the fortunes of TUBE, reveals this quite clearly. It locates patterns of membership recruitment and branch formation in terms of the unevenness of capital accumulation, mediated through the labour process; and analyses the decline of the union in terms of
rationalisation. The widely distributed, small work units of the LBO structure implied serious organisational problems. How were branches of the union to be set up? On the basis of firms - which might cover a massive area - or geographically - which would raise problems of the interrelationship of employees from different firms within the branch? TUBE opted for geographical branches - each still covering a large area because of the widespread distribution of LBOs and posed travel problems for members wishing to attend. The use of women workers in the industry - increasingly as part-timers - meant many members had special problems of attendance at branch meetings due to domestic commitments.

The structure of the industry did not merely militate against branch activity; it made collecting subscriptions difficult and time-consuming, threatening the financial viability of the union as a whole. It also undermined membership, since once an employee had fallen behind in subscriptions, there was usually some reluctance to pay arrears. Such problems were compounded by the high rates of employee turnover, a feature of the industry.

These influences necessarily constrained the choices of the union members at both national and local level. The national leadership were

1. This would seem to comprise a severe criticism of the restrictiveness of the industrial relations system as a focus for analysis, a point made earlier in this chapter in the discussion of Flanders.
2. 90% of the subscriptions were transferred from the branch funds to the central account.
confronted by these severe organisational problems - recruitment/retention of membership, lack of finance, erratic branch activity - in developing union policy and strategy. The local activists, faced with the failure of the union at the national level to cope with the problems, had to take them up themselves: encourage participation in the union, or use the branch committee as a proxy for the branch itself.

Quite clearly, union activists at both national and local levels were not passive recipients of these processes - they themselves could influence the seriousness of the problems - but the prior context was not their choice; it derived from the way the structure of the industry had developed and the organisation of work in small units.

The influence of capital accumulation, through the labour process, is not merely one of constraint. It did, after all, provide the basis for unionisation! The impact of capital accumulation must be seen as contradictory: although it generates the conditions for unionisation through the labour process, it provides constraining influences on the consequent development of employee organisations. One interesting aspect of this general contradiction brought out in section 1, was the way the process of centralisation of capital might eliminate a union presence in a firm, only for unionisation to resurface at a later stage in the enlarged company.

It is also important to realise that such contradictions in capital accumulation did not merely affect developing branch and membership organisation, but also laid preconditions for the potential of union action generally: the development of national firms, for instance, provided the potential for national action by TUBE. Although setting increasingly higher membership targets and greater problems of union organisation, the establishing of national firms both allowed and occasioned national union action which could potentially bring the
geographically based branches into a more cohesive relationship; despite increasing material obstacles, national action was on the agenda, a potentially unifying force as much as a sectionally divisive one.

Given the way in which the development of TUBE's organisation and action can be linked, through the labour process, to patterns of capital accumulation, is there much left for union autonomy? Just how 'free' were bookmaking employees to make their own history? There are two questions here: what choices were available and how were they made?

In the discussion of TUBE in both sections 1 and 2, the contingency of organising policy on the preconditions of labour process changes was evident. Attempting to organise membership where retailing bookmaking had yet to make an impression was not usually successful. Perhaps the main area of choice was in the timing of branch formation, over which the Executive asserted some control; but they scarcely had any measure of real choice to deny significant areas of membership the opportunity to form a branch - the priority of survival being paramount.

This, perhaps, raises the fundamental question of autonomy: to what extent can structural pressures be overcome? While workers can determine their existence, their position in the labour process, the utility of employee organisations, will affect their ability to do so. The history of struggles within bookmaking has shown the ability of employers to withstand pressure from employees. The most dramatic example - the Ladbrokes dispute in Glasgow and the West of Scotland - indicates the relative comfort of the employer involved in a dispute.

1. National "action" is not just industrial action (e.g. strikes), but the wider co-ordination of employee involvement (e.g. firm-based structures within the union).
with more than 300 LBO workers. But what of employee organisations? Could they challenge the pressures of retailing bookmaking?

The contrast between TUBE and the TGWU is interesting here for it illustrates the difference in resources which the unions commanded and the potential this implied. For TUBE, the limited organisational and financial resources were crippling. The material obstacles were immense, even for a relatively enthusiastic membership. They placed inherent limits on organising policies irrespective of political will. In contrast, for the TGWU to provide an effective structure, it was largely a question of political will. TUBE could never have managed to pay the Ladbroke workers strike pay for one day, let alone the six months which the TGWU financed. TUBE struggled to sustain any full-time officers, but the TGWU employed them as a matter of course. The extent of autonomy is dependent on resources.

A further point: if a challenge to the various implications of retailing bookmaking could be developed how could it be carried through? Men and women may make history, but some more so than others. The opposition to retailing bookmaking at the workplace might have achieved certain concessions over pay and conditions, even labour mobility to an extent, but it could scarcely have halted it per se. That kind of challenge demands a political response and political power. Again look at the contrast between TUBE and TGWU in terms of resources and political muscle. Autonomy must be related to the levels at which structural influences operate and can be opposed.

This, perhaps, delineates the parameters of choice, but does not indicate how they are made. The latter question must be understood in relation to the problem of union survival and the different implications

1. The relationship between employer and union objectives is taken up in Chapter 7.
of different policies that unions may pursue. Ultimately, decisions on which employees are organised are made on economic grounds: without finance, the union ceases to exist. This was the perpetual problem for TUBE, and their all-embracing organising policies must be seen in this context. Nevertheless, once unions develop, the way they are structured may serve to deter certain groups of potential members. In TUBE, for instance, the branch structure, without a commensurate firm-based structure, inhibited the involvement of many bookmaking workers whose particular problems were not catered for at either local or national level. Furthermore, the intervention of full-time officials implied another authoritative voice in where resources should be placed, to the inclusion of some workers and the exclusion of others.

The issue of full-time officers illustrates the most significant dilemma: the wages of the officers are paid from members subscriptions; financial solvency thus demands full-time officers pay for themselves in relation to the membership they service. In its extreme form, it implies a systematic accounting method on their activities. Less starkly, it raises the question over how long a time period should officers pay their way? Is it short or long-term cost efficiency that unions must pursue?

The significance of this discussion is when this economic constraint is counterposed with the political commitment of unions to organise. This, perhaps, is the basis for Harding's ambiguity in bargaining interests. The involvement of the TGWU in bookmaking outlines the issue quite clearly and points to the potential problems and consequences of different policy options. The question of whether the organising of bookmaking employees was economically worthwhile was one the TGWU faced from the outset. They had to decide whether to
take on board a union which, superficially, had grown out of the 
disparaged IRA 1971, had little organisation and was in financial 
trouble. Scarcely an encouraging economic proposition at first 
sight. The TGWU were unsure:

"TUBE were in debt up to £10,000. George Sawford and his assistant were unpaid. Eventually, they came to us and I talked to the (TUBE) Executive. We were in difficulties as a union; never been involved in this industry before and rather reluctant. But we have ideological views and the people in the industry needed organising. But whether we could organise them within our structure remained to be seen." (1)

The reluctance to organise reflected priorities within the union:

whether the resources of the union might be better utilised elsewhere.

But better for whom? Not for the bookmaking employees, presumably.

Decisions on the allocation of resources are necessarily concerned 
with favouring one group of members at the expense of another (actual or potential) group.

The principle that full-time officers must pay their way thus involves a profoundly conservative dimension, since it focuses on maintaining and securing existing areas of membership. It must inherently oppose expanding membership in any new area unless the 'rewards' are virtually guaranteed. Putting resources into a new area is necessarily something of a gamble, for the results, especially in the early stages, may not justify the expenditure of time, energy, and money. In Liverpool, for instance, Eddie Roberts was becoming concerned at the amount of effort that was being put in without any money coming in from subscriptions. Subsequent to the amalgamation, he was waiting on the local Branch Secretary in Connor and Forbes to

1. Interview Moss Evans 2.2.76
deliver all the forms from the membership to allow check-off facilities to be finalised with the company:

"He's been an unhealthy long time about it. He's only been around half the shops. He's got to get the rest so that we as a union can at least get some money out of the membership. We haven't had a penny for years." (1)

Other full-time officers proved less willing to give the TUBE membership any real opportunity:

"The Manchester officer is a bloody businessman. He sees unions in terms of debits and credits. There's been no activity in Manchester at all. J.Nixon, then ACTSS officer, said he was steering well clear. There's no activity in Manchester at all and you can apply that to a lot of industries." (2)

Despite obvious resentment on the part of Sawford and Long to the limitations placed on their efforts to recruit and develop organisation amongst bookmaking employees, any direct challenge to the idea that full-time officials should pay their way would certainly have been ironical in view of TUBE's history and the dismissal of Hobbs and Lavery.

Indeed Sawford accepted that individual officers should pay their way:

"You have to look after the membership you've got. Wages have to be paid - all officers have to have a certain membership." (3)

Yet this did not mean a general acceptance of the principle concerning the amount of work full-time officers might be expected to do or the amount of money that could be expended on organising bookmaking employees. (4)

This could be extended to involve a general criticism of the approach of the TGWU to the employment of full-time officials:

1. Interview Eddie Roberts 6.2.76
2. Interview (name withheld)
3. Interview George Sawford 29.9.76
4. See Sawford's comments on the importance of having a national officer and the efforts of the TGWU to cut back on expenditure.
"They're not replacing full-time officers. They get promoted then the TGWU advertise. The applicants aren't good enough, so then they wait another three months and readvertise." (1)

Clearly unions do have finite resources and choices do have to be made in terms of priorities; but the question then becomes how do unions effectively recruit new areas of membership? And it poses a particular dilemma for general, supposedly open house unions, such as the TGWU who are geared to recruiting certain kinds of membership groups where notions of self-activity predominate as the accepted method of trade union development. If the union is faced with the problem of recruiting membership groups which do not conform to the accepted pattern, there are two choices: either there is a retreat into established, traditional areas of recruitment or a transition in general organising policy. The dilemma for the union is all the more severe given the decline of the traditional areas of membership; yet there is little evidence from the experience of TUBE that there is sufficient flexibility in the organising policies of the union to cope with this changing pattern of actual and potential membership.

It would, however, be a mistake to leave the discussion in terms of inappropriate structures. If "structure is a function of purpose" (2), then it must be purposeful for someone or some groups of members.

Hobsbawm, after all, was careful to link organising policy to patterns of union democracy. The interpretation of how the union survives is also a political one.

1. Interview George Sawford 16.2.76
There are two aspects to this: the role and activities of full-time officers and the relative strengths of different membership groups. The discussion of the TGWU full-time officials in section 2 concentrated on their passivity as a hallmark of workplace unionism within the specific context of their experience. This was a little one-sided and it is important to redress the balance - not so much to give a more precise picture of their activities, but to indicate the constraints of their work. Politically, the numbers and activities of full-time officials will depend on the role they perform in the union. This is not meant in some functionalist sense, but in terms of the pressures of local membership, national committees, etc., the built-in control systems of the union, and the full-time official himself.\(^1\)

This is not merely organising membership, but negotiating with local and national employers, general administration, taking up members (or, more probably, stewards and convenors) problems. Full-time officials therefore perform a range of tasks: most could have an endless job if they wanted. The question is which tasks get priority.

Now the full-time officials in the TGWU clearly do have some control over choosing those priorities; but in some instances it is greater than others, for some membership groups necessarily carry more weight than others. The other side of full-time officers paying their way, is that the members who do the paying may demand he gives them attention rather than spending time on people who are not even in the union.

The involvement of TUBE with the TGWU did, in fact, give rise to that kind of animosity from some of the existing membership. Its generality is perhaps indicated in that Moss Evans as national organiser,

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1. Few full-time officers are women.
saw it as a problem:

"...... Some say we're not a horse and cart union, that we'll be taking on prostitutes and casino workers next. We have a job to tell some of our men that working in a betting shop is the same as working in a car factory. Its hard to break down the distrust surrounding those involved in the betting industry. They're not all knaves... Some managers in betting shops are articulate and have as much skill and expertise; so I bring the lads together so they can see what sort of people they are." (1)

The impact of such divisions between members and potential members could prove severe on the organising policy of officials both at national and local level. At least one local official explicitly stated that he had received comments from car workers in his district suggesting that he should not waste his time organising bookmaking employees. (2) Hence Herding's analysis of the organised workers being a central problem in the organising of new employee groups seems to receive some support. (3)

The relationship, then, between existing unions and new areas of membership is exceedingly complex. The naivety of some of the TUBE activists that the TGWU was the answer to their prayers was shown for what it was. Even for Britain's largest union, the utilisation of resources was a political question: the needs of the bookmaking membership were scarcely going to override those in the car industry.

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1. Interview Moss Evans 2.2.76
2. Interview D. Buckle 30.6.75
3. It would be easy to jump to conclusions and suggest this arises from differences between productive and unproductive workers. Clearly (perhaps most clearly of all) workers see how bookmakers cream off their wages, but does this necessarily imply hostility to those who are employed and are also exploited?
But it would be unfair on the TGWU to suggest they did nothing. The financial support for the Ladbroke strikers in Scotland is evidence of the willingness to utilise resources; and after all, they did resolve TUBE's financial position.

Whatever the measure of the TGWUs opportunity in overcoming many of the obstacles TUBE faced, in no sense are they free agents, able to secure whatever they wished. Both national and local officials of the TGWU put a lot of effort and money into the Ladbrokes dispute, but without securing recognition. The employers, in this instance, had other ideas; and they played a very significant part in TUBE's lack of success. This is considered in the next chapter.
Chapter 7: Employers policies and the implications of the labour
process approach: the Bookmaking employers and TUBE.

The purpose of this chapter is to explore how far the labour
process approach provides an understanding of employer policies
towards unions and unionisation. That employers are an important
influence on how unions may develop and act is accepted. As noted
in chapter 1, Bain has made this point quite forcibly. Yet the problem
remains as to why employers develop certain policies when they do
and towards which employees. Bain’s failure to link employers policies
and strategies to the overall logic of capitalist production constitutes
a major weakness in his approach.

By focussing on the labour process these deficiencies can, to
some extent, be overcome: for employers, the labour process represents
the concrete expression of their attempts to produce, or secure a
share of, surplus value. As in the previous chapter, this allows some
consideration of the various pressures of capital accumulation which
structure employers’ policies. At the same time, the labour process
represents a source of workers’ interests and the context of experience.
In this sense, it can provide a mediating link between the structural
imperatives of capital accumulation, reflected in employers policies,
and the patterns of workers’ organisations.

The implication is that employers’ policies towards employees
and their unions are not to be seen in some neatly contained industrial
relations ‘system’. Clearly, employers do shape and adopt policies
as a consequence of the actions of unions or employees, just as unions
and employees respond to those of employers. But outside of that limited
framework, such circularity can scarcely aid understanding and misses
the impact of wider social and economic processes.
Just as the development and activities of TUBE were subject to the varying impacts of capital accumulation, so must employer policies be located within this context. In this way, the labour process approach can break the functional circularity of the industrial relations system. This chapter attempts to do just that, albeit in a tentative and partial manner; but in analysing relations between employers, unions, and workers within periodisations based on the development of the bookmaking industry, it is hoped to establish the labour process as an essential focus in understanding employers' policies.

How can employer-union relationships be characterised? One way is to concentrate on the willingness of employers to receive representations from their workers as a collectivity. In the institutional approaches to industrial relations this has been given a particular name: recognition. The willingness, or otherwise, of employers to grant unions recognition is seen as an important influence on union growth.

There are differences of opinion concerning how recognition should be understood. Flanders, for instance, adopts a fairly narrow view, suggesting recognition can be seen as

"... a readiness on the part of employers to conclude collective agreements with a representative trade union or unions." (Flanders (1975) p. 178)

Fellow institutionalists have criticised such 'once and for all' definitions. McCarthy (1973) argues that "... recognition is an open-ended affair" (p.147). It is better to view the content of recognition as infinitely variable:

"... a claim for recognition means very different things in different circumstances; ranging from the position where the employer simply agrees to meet with union representatives, but will not enter into collective agreements on their behalf, through to the situation where a union is already accepted as having a right to bargain over a broad range of subjects but management is still refusing to recognise it for certain additional purposes." (1)

1. McCarthy (1973) p. 147. Bain (1970) p.123 (F/N) puts forward a similar definition: "The assumption is often made that a union either possesses recognition or it does not. But, in reality, union recognition is a matter of degree".
But if the content of recognition differs in both approaches, its form certainly does not: recognition in this sense is part of the institutional relationships of industrial relations, tied into the processes of collective bargaining. For the employer it is the acceptance that unions can represent and negotiate over certain conditions of employment; conversely for the union it is the procedural opening to represent their members.

The significance of this discussion of recognition concerns the different implications for employer policies which the varying perspectives suggest. Consider Bain's contribution on 'white-collar' unionism. Here he argues that recognition generates union growth. While admitting there is a problem of cause and effect between recognition and unionisation, he nevertheless dispatches the determinant influence to the employer's decision. Now, if employers do not want unions to grow, it would therefore be logical to withhold recognition.¹

This leaves a problem. If employers do not recognise unions, membership will not grow; there will be no collective bargaining between employers and unions, which is precisely what Bain and his fellow pluralists are trying to establish. In consequence, recognition must be promoted as a positive gain for employers, perhaps in terms of efficiency. Employers who do not recognise unions ......

"...... never achieve the maximum of productive efficiency. All they can ask for is slave labour; and, in nearly all cases, that is all they get." (Webb (1917) p.35)

¹. This in Bain's model would not be difficult since he has discounted the efforts of the workers and suggests government policies have had most impact on the employers' decision to grant recognition. "...... most 'white-collar' union recognition in private industry has come about, directly or indirectly, as a result of government policies and the favourable climate they created for trade unionism". Bain (1970) p.181
The prescribed practice in post-war Britain, therefore, is for employers to recognise unions and share (within collective bargaining) control over "... pay structures and the organisation of work ...." (Flanders (1975) p. 197). Management have lost control ".... because of their refusal to share it". Employers have to be educated directly, but also through the state sponsorship of collective bargaining as 'good' industrial relations. Finally, for those employers still not convinced that trade unions are really to their advantage, there is the prospect of worsening the position by refusing recognition:

"Whatever time may be taken up by the trade union official, by the grievances that he brings forward or by the interviews that he demands, there will be, sooner or later, still greater difficulties, if the management takes up the old-fashioned attitude of declaring that it will 'deal only with its own employees'." (Webb (1917) p. 36).

Far from restricting union growth, the refusal to concede recognition may give employees the spur to join.

In consequence, the policy of employers towards unions is not unambiguously determined. While employers may immediately respond by opposing the actual or potential influence that a unionised workforce may possess over the conditions and organisation of work, it may, on occasions and in certain situations, suit employers to grant recognition rather than withhold it - and not just because the workforce are pressing for it. Even the most significant weapons of workers can be turned against them.

1. ibid p.197. For an interesting account of how one company attempted to develop and channel unionisation in order to introduce a new productivity scheme, see Nichols and Beynon (1977) Ch.7
2. This notion presumably underpins Bain's attempt to give such a positive role to state initiatives. Bain (1970) drew inspiration from his earlier Research Paper for the Donovan Commission. See Bain (1967)
3. Consider for instance, employer sponsorship of the closed shop. See Hart (1979), who suggests employers' favour closed shops since it facilitates the handling of labour relations.
The widespread hostility towards TUBE from the bookmaking employers cannot be treated unproblematically. Why were their policies so hostile? Why develop anti-union policies and strategies rather than ones of incorporation? What strategies did they use, when, and why? This chapter attempts to provide some answers to these questions by exploring employer policies and strategies in relation to the labour process and underlying features of capital accumulation, and the historical development of TUBE. (1)

1. It should be added that there are accepted limits to the following discussion. It concentrates, for instance, on the larger companies and in particular on the 'Big Four'; quite clearly, not all the firms in the industry followed the same pattern of development or at the same time. Nevertheless, the major companies have always provided the core of union members and such bias is not unwarranted.
(a) Concentration and Centralisation: the Growth of the major companies and the period of TUBE expansion.

The period between 1970 and 1973 was one of dramatic expansion for many firms in the Bookmaking industry. The process of centralisation resulted in a distinct group of market leaders - the 'Big Four' - measured in terms of LBO ownership and, subsequently, in terms of turnover. It was this rapid transition which provided, through the labour process, the preconditions for unionisation amongst the bookmaking employees. (1)

This section looks at how the major firms responded to the formation and development of TUBE in this period. (2) Initially there is an examination of their general policy in relation to the recognition of TUBE. The conclusion, that the employers displayed an almost universal anti-unionism, demands some explanation and leads onto a discussion of the bases of anti-unionism. Finally, there is a concluding discussion on the relationship between policy and strategy at this time.

(1) The Employers and TUBE: The Refusal of Recognition.

The policy of employers towards unionisation does not have to take on a concrete form until employees begin to join, or consider joining, a union. (3) In that sense, any discussion of recognition (however defined)

1. This expansion is discussed in Chapter 3 and the precise figures shown in Table 3.6

2. 'Major firms' is not used synonymously with the 'Big Four'; the former includes the 'second tier' of centralising capital, the (usually) localised, but expanding betting chains.

3. Although some employers may develop certain policies in order to forestall unionisation even when it is not an immediate possibility e.g. paternalistic management. This does not affect the general drift of the discussion, which is the importance of seeing employer policies on recognition as dependent on the actual or potential demands of employees.
must begin with the union rather than the employers. Who were TUBE aiming at and with what intentions?

The policy of TUBE on recognition paralleled that of organising policy. The general tendency to recruit wherever anyone would join was reflected in widespread demands for recognition; while the emphasis on major firms was the first stage of a deliberate plan aimed at unionising the whole industry.

In 1972, Sawford developed two general programmes for union recognition. The first coincided with plans laid in 1972 for the formation of branches in conjunction with the operative date for the unfair dismissal provisions of the IRA 1971. On 20th February 1972, Sawford circulated a host of employers asking for voluntary recognition. The second programme followed the long-awaited registration of TUBE under the IRA 1971 at the beginning of June 1972. This time Sawford sent out letters at various dates in June and July, indicating the legal rights of the union and asking for recognition. In selected cases, follow-up letters were sent warning of the intentions of the TUBE Executive to use the new legal opportunities.

While TUBE demanded a response from a wide range of employers, the Executive were most interested in the response from the 'Big Four' companies. This, in part, reflected the dominance of the employees from these companies in the union membership; it also indicated the policy of the Executive in pursuing the 'domino' theory of union recognition. The 'domino' theory, strongly advocated by Don Bruce,

1. See Chapter 6

2. In particular, TUBE drew strong support from City Tote (now Mecca) employees in 1971-72; the J.Coral Group membership was most significant during 1971- late 1972; while the William Hill Membership continued to expand throughout 1972. Ladbrokes developed slightly later, early 1973 being the peak.
amongst others, implied that success must be initially achieved in one of the larger companies (i.e. one of the 'Big Four'), after which the rest would fall into line; securing recognition in the smaller firms would resemble something of a mopping up operation at a later stage.

TUBE, therefore, demanded a response from a range of employers, but in particular the 'Big Four'. Such demands were, of course, meaningless without membership. On balance, 15% seems a reasonable estimate of TUBE's presence in the 'Big Four';

but the employers did not necessarily know that - only that TUBE had been formed and that some employees were members.

The specific demand which TUBE sought was the procedural one of formal recognition. Given the opportunity, TUBE did take up conditions of employment: for instance, union branches were asked to prepare minimum wages rates in 1972 and the union produced minimum pay scales in 1973; while another industry-wide issue was the Christmas working period, with TUBE attempting to secure a longer period at Christmas without horseracing. But in terms of individual employers, TUBE pushed for recognition as a prior objective to substantive issues.

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1. Consider Table 6.1 which indicates William Hill membership in 1973 at 16.4%. During 1972, membership in J.Coral Group was claimed at one time as in excess of 400 (out of approx. 3,000). It is probable the membership in the pre-Mecca group was higher, perhaps 20-30% in 1971 - early 1972.

2. TUBE received numerous requests from employers asking for the details of membership - which TUBE refused to provide.

3. In the few instances where recognition was achieved, TUBE tried to conclude agreements on improved conditions of employment. In one, this resulted in improved holiday entitlements and extra payment for working on bank holidays.
The response of employers, large or small, was almost universally hostile. Recognition was hardly conceded anywhere; many employers did not reply to TUBE's requests for recognition while some only replied abusively; union members and officials were sometimes sacked, often pressurised. Some indication of the vehement anti-unionism of the employers can be seen in the decision of the TUBE Executive to delay branch formation until legal protections for unfair dismissal were introduced. Why were the employers so resistant to TUBE's approaches? Why did they not see any benefits in recognition?

(ii) The bases of anti-unionism.

The impact of retailing bookmaking has been extensively discussed in Chapter 3. It implied a reconsideration of bookmaking activity itself, with serious consequences for workers in the industry. The details of the changes are not repeated here; but two main themes can be developed which indicate the importance of these changes for the relationships between employers, unions, and employees. One concerns the restructuring of LBO operations; the other, the development of management structures.

The crucial impact of retailing bookmaking was the elimination of the need for a whole section of the labour force: the long-serving, experienced, settler-managers. They had swiftly changed from an asset to a liability as far as the employers were concerned; and those who opposed the new working systems were often dealt with ruthlessly by at least one of the 'Big Four'.

But those employees who were now 'unwanted' provided the source and inspiration of TUBE. In consequence the anti-union policy was merely an extension of the general campaign to eliminate certain employee

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1. This was the embryonic Mecca Bookmakers; there is little reason to suppose the treatment was that different elsewhere.
groups, or at least make them conform to the revised demands and systems of control within the labour process. Since TUBE drew, initially, from employees whose professed objectives were to combat and restrict the effects of the growth of large-scale betting chains, the union represented a collective obstacle to the ambitions of the major employers; just as those employees were also individual obstacles, irrespective of union membership.

The implications of retailing bookmaking in relation to the labour process did generate an anti-union response from employers, especially given the union was predicated on the kind of principles which directly confronted the changes employers wished to introduce. But why so vehement a response? In part, this must surely be connected with the very real difficulties employers faced in asserting the new patterns of control, not merely over LBO workers, but over levels of management as well.

A picture of a totally purposeful and united management systematically eliminating 'unwanted' employee groups and pressurising upsurges of union activity, bears little resemblance to the management of bookmaking firms between 1970-1973. The rapid centralisation of the early 1970s soon challenged the existing management structure, developed to cope with a far smaller-scale enterprise; in addition, severe divisions arose within management as a consequence both of continuing mergers of bookmaking firms and the imperatives of centralised control.

A major contradiction in capitalism is that the anarchy of the market contrasts with the order and planning within the social organisation of work. Thus the firm operates within the competitive strictures of the market, yet internally its activities are extensively structured through the hierarchy of authority. Yet there is a constant tension between the internal organisation of the firm and its involvement in the market; and this is highlighted when mergers take place. The
centralisation of capital is in one sense unifying, bringing together in larger, co-operative units the mass of wage labour and the tools and materials which they use. But in contradiction, the internal organisation of the firm becomes chaotic as different working systems have to be accommodated. The continuity of social relationships between employer and employed is broken and there is potential conflict between different management groupings.

There is little doubt this was a common occurrence in bookmaking in 1970-71, and several examples of mergers and their impact have been given in previous chapters. An interesting illustration is provided by the merger introduced in Chapter 4, which provided the immediate spark for the formation of TUBE: that of City Tote Ltd. It will be remembered that following the merger with Ron Nagle Ltd, there were boardroom battles concerning the control of the enlarged grouping. This competition between the two different factions also existed at different levels of management. Significantly, one particular area of dispute was in the personnel office, where Jim Popkin, the Nagle group personnel manager, and Syd Oliver, his opposite number at City Tote, clashed:

"There was discord in the office between myself and Syd Oliver and it became obvious one of us had to go. This spread out to the shops." (1)

If battle lines were drawn up within management on the basis of previous loyalties (often, of course, reflecting different management practice), differences also occurred between those performing certain management functions while the efforts at centralising control could be seen as unifying the operations of the firm, the consequence was to create divisions between central management on one hand and regional management

1. Interview J.Popkin 20.10.75
on the other, as the latter lost autonomy over various activities. This second dispute took place in all the major firms, to a lesser or greater degree, but was not finally resolved for some years.

The rapidity of centralisation had given employers little opportunity to develop suitable managerial structures, while simultaneously generating inter-management conflicts. The consequences for employees and the union were severe. The divisions within management resulted in an arbitrary imposition of control over the employees, reflected in, for instance, the lack of information, unco-ordinated staffing policy, and an unevenness in labour discipline. This was the way changes in the LBO labour process were introduced.

The implication for the union was not merely employer opposition, but the wholesale denial of unionisation. Given the internal problems of reorganisation within the imperatives of retailing bookmaking, issues of control were simply non-negotiable for employers. Furthermore, the imposition of new systems of control had largely broken down cooperation between employer and employees on anything other than an economic basis. Broadly speaking, the employers could do little else than adopt a policy of "forcible opposition":¹ there was no possibility of resolving the arbitrary treatment of employees or the anomalies of pay and conditions; the political and ideological integration of the workforce would take some time to rebuild; and the last thing that seemed to have potential was a union derived from the 'old-style' settler-managers and advocating policies in opposition to retailing bookmaking.²

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¹ The term used by Bain (1970). See discussion in Chapter 1.
² The employers may, on the last point, have been short-sighted, given the eventual involvement of the TGWU.
(iii) Policy and Strategy

The internal divisions within management not only influenced the anti-union policy of the employers, but also their strategy. Most of the large chains were in no position to compete with TUBE until the consequences of centralisation had been resolved. They could scarcely offer anything positive to their employees in terms of employment and working conditions until this was achieved.

The principle was therefore to gain time: but how could this be achieved? Two strategies were adopted, often concurrently, but with a different emphasis at different times. The first was direct coercion through the use of victimisation; the second, more subtly, was the continuous stalling of negotiations.

Victimisation had dated from the formation of TUBE with the dismissal of Sawford and other activists trying to establish the union. Throughout TUBE's history, there is a continuing tale of victimisation, by firms of all sizes, of union activists; but the concern of the TUBE Executive over the unfair dismissal provisions of the IRA 1971 suggests this early period may have been worse than most. The forms of victimisation did not simply imply dismissal; some were continually moved from one LBO to another, or given long distances to travel; they might be subject to frequent spot checks by the security department; or made to work consistently short of staff. A wide range of tactics were used by employers - not merely to irritate and upset union activities, but to force employees to either accept the conditions or leave.

1. For a discussion of the impact of the unfair dismissal provisions in providing protection for TUBE members, see Chapter 8.

2. Later tactics have included the introduction of computerised telephone systems (where the user can only (supposedly) secure the numbers on the supplied cards), which prevents workers in different LBOs communicating with each other. In a similar vein, direct line systems have been introduced in some firms where contact can only be made between a LBO and head office.
In some instances these strategies worked - for a time.
Dennis Smith, the main union organiser in Hector MacDonald was sacked in 1972 and the membership fell away; but by 1973, it had been re-established. Still, no doubt such strategies appeared attractive in providing employers a breathing space. Nevertheless, heavy handed treatment can be two-edged and assist the union (would TUBE have gained a full-time General Secretary if City Tote Ltd had not dismissed Sawford?) It may also generate resentment amongst employees in exposing the employer as anti-union.

Many employers began to realise there were alternatives. Both large and small firms began to utilise a very effective neutralising tactic: to delay TUBE's approaches, give themselves time to sort out the internal problems caused by the rapid changes in the industry, and wait for support to fade away. The replies received by Sawford during 1972 from employers throughout the country are full of requests for information about the union, about union membership in the firm, of rearranged dates for meetings, and so forth. Some exchanges of this kind continued for several months and were clearly efforts by employers to stall TUBE's advances for as long as possible.

To conclude: the immediate policies of the employers towards TUBE were fundamentally hostile. While they were obviously afraid of how effective TUBE might become, the policies and strategies towards the efforts of their employees to organise derived fundamentally from the changing structure of the industry and the implications this carried for the reorganisation of the labour process and managerial structures. The twin strategies of direct coercion and stalling TUBE's advances gave the

1. There does seem some evidence to suggest that TUBE's registration under the IRA 1971 may have prompted the widespread use of this tactic, since employers were initially wary of the legal consequences of the recognition procedure, and did not want to appear anti-union in front of the NIRC - or indeed at any stage of the legal process.
emergent betting chains time to come to terms with their internal problems and to develop more positive strategies to compete with the union.
(b) Rationalisation within the major firms: Employers policies and TUBE in the period from 1973.

Following the dramatic expansion of the industry in the early 1970s, the period after 1973 was essentially one of consolidation for the major firms. Within the 'Big Four', LBO ownership began to decline at a faster rate than the industry as a whole, as they closed or sold some of the less viable LBOs purchased during the rapid expansion. Even so, the 'Big Four' continued to secure an increasing share of turnover, indicating the development of the larger, more profitable, LBOs in the most remunerative areas.

One crucial aspect of this process was the reconstruction of employer-employee relationships - both as a consequence of the implications of rationalisation and the threat (actual or potential) of TUBE. This section considers the policies and strategies of employers in this period within that context. As in the previous section, following an examination of the general policy towards TUBE, the bases of anti-unionism are considered in some detail, including how the policy was put into practice. Finally, there is some consideration of the strategic use of the policies.

(i) Employers and TUBE: the continued refusal of recognition.

The failure of TUBE to gain recognition in the period of expansion of the major firms was reinforced once rationalisation became a priority of the employers. The union had responded in various ways to the continued hostility and refusal of recognition from the employers. The threatened use of the legal process became fact from the autumn of 1972, sending both union and employers into unknown territory; while the newly-elected TUBE Executive decided to adopt more militant policies from the beginning of 1973. The outcome was a dual policy - use of the legal procedure in some cases, with industrial action where possible. (1)

1. Chapter 5 gives an outline history of the 'new militancy', while Chapter 8 looks at recognition policy and the IRA 1971 in some detail.
In relation to the 'Big Four', efforts in taking City Tote Ltd and the J. Coral Group through the legal process were abandoned in 1973, with support declining. In contrast, the growing strength of membership in both William Hill and Ladbrokes encouraged the union to seek recognition in both companies, the former through the legal process, the latter by industrial action.

The failure in Ladbrokes was much quicker than that in William Hill. The disappointing stoppage of work in March 1973 meant the immediate decline of membership in Ladbrokes. The legal route of the William Hill issue continued for most of TUBE's history, before the collapse of membership in 1975-76.

The refusal of the 'Big Four' to concede recognition prompted a reappraisal of policies within the TUBE Executive during 1973: a renewed emphasis on smaller firms and the placing of responsibility for industrial action on the local branches. This made little difference, although recognition was eventually achieved in Connor and Forbes Ltd, and John Joyce Ltd. The general picture was, once again, hostility from the employers towards the union.

The situation, however, was slightly more complex than that. Certainly, the majority of employers remained decidedly anti-union - less than a handful conceded recognition to TUBE for collective negotiation - but in some instances this was tempered by an accommodation of union demands; in particular the concession that TUBE could represent individual members involved in grievances and disciplinary cases. This was certainly agreed between TUBE and Mecca Bookmakers during 1973, while there is some evidence this occurred in some regions of the William Hill Organisation where union membership was substantial. Such policies reflected the contradictions in the anti-unionism of the employers, in the reconstruction of employer-employee relations.

There are also indications this may have been the case in some local firms, but no direct evidence that can be cited.
(ii) The bases of anti-unionism

Just as the initial anti-unionism of employers had derived from the problems of centralisation, so the continued anti-union policy in the subsequent phase derived from the implications of rationalisation. The imperative of retailing bookmaking was the centralising of control over the activities of the LBOs; the emphasis had changed from LBOs as individual units to an integrated whole. The implication was, simultaneously, the central control over the labour process and labour as a resource throughout LBOs and the administrative/managerial structures.

The consequence, in all the 'Big Four' firms, was the development of Personnel Departments who could act as a means of asserting control over both LBO employees and local and regional management. The Personnel function mediates the imperatives of capital accumulation and the impact which this has for employees within the institutional structure of the firm. As a staffing section, it acts as a mere lubricant for the employment and allocation of labour. In a more developed form, it constitutes a systematic approach to the recruitment, retention, and training of employees while simultaneously developing procedures and methods of defusing conflict between employers and employees. It is important to note this wider aspect of the Personnel function: for in the development of personnel departments, the demands were nothing less than a reconstitution of the social relations upon which bookmaking was now based.

In 1973, the Personnel departments of the major firms became rather more than staffing sections. This is reflected in the growth of centralised control within these firms. The rapid expansion of 1970-72 had meant the assimilation by the major firms of various chains of different sizes and thus creating differing practices in different
areas within the same firm: for the employees this had meant pay anomalies, widely fluctuating conditions of service, and exposure to apparently arbitrary decision-making. This was further reinforced by the extent of regional autonomy in deciding such matters. In the J. Coral Group, for instance,

"Until the beginning of 1973, the Regional Manager determined the salary scales for his area, and thus the variations in rates." (1)

The extent of autonomy also held true for Ladbrokes and William Hill. The expansion had been built on giving the regions a relatively free rein, but the imperatives of bookmaking and labour relations now pointed to centralised control and company wide policies.

In three of the major firms, personnel specialists were employed from outside of bookmaking to control the Personnel Departments, something of a surprise in an otherwise incestuous industry. In the J. Coral Group, Brian Kavanagh had joined the firm in 1968 and remained in charge of a growing Personnel department, until a further outsider was appointed as Group Personnel Manager in 1975. Ladbrokes chose the opposite method and appointed John Wilson, an ex-Unilever man, in 1971 to a senior position as Personnel Controller. Syd Oliver joined the firm later that year from Mecca to take over day-to-day personnel matters. Finally, in 1973, the William Hill Organisation appointed an ex RAF and TV Rental manager, David Konrath, to take control of personnel, although it was early 1974 before he formally became Personnel Director. Thus of the 'Big Four' only Mecca appointed internally, expanding the Personnel section at the beginning of 1973 with the appointment of assistants to Jim Popkin - at least one an ex-union activist:

Tony Rawle.

1. Interview B. Kavanagh 13.8.74.
Power-holders in Personnel: The four main firms in the 1970s.

**Ladbrokes:** Personnel Director, John Wilson

Graduated from University in 1963. Joined Unilever and worked in two of their companies in Personnel and Line Management. Joined Ladbrokes Racing in 1971 as Personnel Controller and then moved across to Group Personnel Controller. Subsequently returned to the Bookmaking Division as Personnel Director.

**William Hill:** Personnel Director, David Konrath.

Spent six years in the RAF (early commission), then joined a TV Rental company and within 7 years became General Manager in North East. Then moved into credit drapery, slot TV before joining Ladbrokes as an area manager in the late 1960s. In 1973, he joined William Hill as Personal Assistant to Sam Burns and took charge of Personnel at the beginning of 1974.

**Mecca:** Group Personnel Manager, J.S.Popkin.

Joined Ron Nagle Ltd as a wages clerk in 1967 and has successfully progressed as the 'Nagle group' within Mecca Bookmakers have secured control of the enlarged firm. A working-class lad who has made it.

**J.Coral Ltd:** Personnel Manager, B. Kavanagh.

Worked in manufacturing industry until joining Mark Lane in 1968. Following the merger with J.Coral, he took charge of Personnel. Something of a lower level position than in the other companies; and in 1975 J.Coral Ltd appointed:

- Group Personnel Manager: Michael Milne.
- Formerly with Coventry Radiators.
The development of centralised Personnel control made it simultaneously unnecessary and undesirable for the union to be recognised. The employers now possessed their own machinery to gain the support of their employees and eliminate the 'teething troubles' of the early 1970s; why bother to recognise a union if such policies proved successful? (1)

The introduction of Personnel Departments in this fashion can be seen as both a consequence of the imperatives of retailing bookmaking and the attentions of TUBE; certainly, the policies and strategies to oppose the union were developed from within this section of the management structures. (2) In contrast to the negative policies of the earlier period, the existence of the personnel department provided the opportunity for the employers to systematically compete with TUBE for the first time. Indeed, the implications for reconstructing employer-employee relations necessarily made this the case.

How, then, did the employers, through the Personnel Department, achieve this reconstitution of relationships with their employees and simultaneously compete with TUBE? This can be analysed in three ways. Firstly, through the improvement of substantive conditions of employment, including their standardisation on a company basis; secondly, in the development of structures for the processing of grievances; and, thirdly, in the re-establishing of the political and ideological integration of the workforce.

1. Any attempt to incorporate the union would have been unlikely to assist in controlling local/regional management unless the personnel departments had already asserted control.

2. Within the broad policy guidelines, no doubt, of top management.
(1) **Improvements in the substantive conditions of employment.**

One consequence of the restructuring of LBO operations was the need for employers to recruit new employees to the industry; to do that implied some improvement in employment conditions:

"There was an awareness of what went on outside (and I don't mean other bookmakers). I mean other industries. We had to offer the benefits to get the staff we wanted." (1)

Simultaneously, TUBE were pressurising on terms and conditions of employment. When the union minimum rates were produced in 1973, only the J.Coral Group of the 'Big Four' could claim to be paying above these scales. Within William Hill, industrial action had been taken in protest over pay and conditions in early 1973; indeed, this was the basis of the projected stoppage in March 1973. (2)

It was not just the level of pay, but the anomalies that were a source of concern to both employers and TUBE (including their members). The employers wanted systematic pay scales and conditions of employment, primarily to establish central control over the labour process and predictability of costs; for the union, it meant some members were simply not getting the rate for the job.

The consequence of the combined pressures of retailing bookmaking and the union presence, prompted the improvement and standardisation of conditions of employment from 1973 onwards. At the beginning of the 1970s the conditions of employment in bookmaking were scarcely attractive;

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1. Interview J.Popkin 20.10.75

2. Naturally, the employers were not keen to admit the influence of TUBE in such matters. "Improvements made are 90% down to recruitment problems and 10% to the union."
   
   Interview, J.Popkin 20.10.75
standardised wage scales did not exist in the major companies; Saturday and bank holiday working was regarded as part and parcel of the job, not warranting extra remuneration; there was a normal working week of 6 days (or an 11-day fortnight); and finally, holiday entitlements were usually two, at best, three weeks. But during the 1970s, beginning largely in 1973, all the major firms made improvements in these conditions. By January 1974 all had introduced standardised pay scales; by 1975 there was at least a nominal five-day week; recognition of bank holiday working meant extra payment or time off in lieu; and by 1976 four weeks holiday was becoming more common, through not a standard feature.

The importance of this period in 1973 was that it marked the beginning of the widespread systematic restructuring of employment conditions. And it posed problems for TUBE. The union was increasingly unable to exploit widespread anomalies; and, given the existence of incomes policy, was restricted in wage demands. The practice of the major employers, in promoting the operations of the personnel department and improving employment conditions, indicated that improvements could be achieved without TUBE being recognised and to some extent proved effective competition for the union:

1. The impact of government incomes policy had a significant effect on the relationships between employers, unions, and employees in the industry. Between June 1970 and November 1972, the Heath Government adopted the 'N-l' policy of trying to successively reduce pay increases. But by 1972, this had failed, and a three-stage incomes policy was introduced, the extent of restraint being eased at each stage. Between November 1972 and March 1973, there was a statutory pay freeze; a slight loosening between March 1973-November 1973; and a further loosening after November 1973. This allowed the Bookmaking employers the necessary flexibility to develop their pay structures during 1973-74 within the context of statutory limits. For TUBE to pursue, or campaign for, larger increases could therefore be seen as challenging the law of the land. The pay policy, in some respects, removed TUBE's potential in developing campaigns around wage issues.
"Management started making concessions and the members thought they'd made it and the membership dropped off". (1)

And while TUBE was being challenged in terms of substantive conditions, the major employers attempted to show the union was unnecessary in its representative function.

(2) The processing of grievances.

The problem of control for employers is not merely restricted to the way work is performed; it extends to ensuring the various protests from workers are made in such a way that they are predictable and controllable. The prime method for achieving this is the use of procedures for the issues of discipline and grievances.

The non-neutrality of such procedures has been shown by Beynon (1973):

"The pervasiveness of management's assumed right to manage is captured by the Ford disciplinary procedure and others like it. It is based upon the premise that management have the right to run their establishment as they think fit...." (p.253)

This is achieved by reducing issues to questions of fact rather than rights: it is only a question of whether an employee has disobeyed a company rule or an order - any question that s/he has a right to do so is irrelevant. Such a perspective can be extended to grievance procedures - does the worker have genuine cause for complaint? Is s/he being treated differently to any other employees? Again, grievances can now be reduced to questions of fact rather than rights - facts on management's terms. (2)

2. For instance, the William Hill Organisation outlined grievances in the following way:

"Grievances usually arise when there is a breakdown in communications and misunderstanding occurs. The object of the formal grievance procedure in your contract is quickly and effectively to restore the communications and clear up the misunderstanding." William Hill Organisation "Your Company" May 1973 pp.6-7.
The utility of procedures for management or unions will depend on the contingent social and economic context. What appears at one point as a useful mechanism through which management can channel grievances, so that they can be 'lost' until the issue has faded away, may on other occasions appear as an impediment in asserting managerial authority. Nevertheless, whatever the benefits to the bookmaking employees that each of the 'Big Four' companies introduced written grievance procedures in the 1970s, it brought the Personnel departments into competition with TUBE in providing the means for workers to express grievances.

The development of the procedures was another aspect of centralised control, not merely in terms of channelling employee grievances, but in eliminating the arbitrariness of local management. The legal obligations of the IRA 1971 to produce written procedures also played an influential role: but the decision to assert central control determined how the procedures would operate. This is an important point, since there were alternatives in how the proceduralisation of grievances could be developed.

One option was to sponsor or support a staff association in opposition to TUBE, and some employers did attempt to do this. But only one of the 'Big Four', the William Hill Organisation - took this option, and only did so in 1974-75 in a somewhat tentative fashion. In view of the potential of staff associations and their history in similar areas of employment (e.g. banking and insurance), this may seem surprising; it is in the nature of deciding to form a staff association that its

1. Connor and Forbes Ltd, Hector MacDonald Ltd, and Seymour and Story were three significant firms in TUBE's history where the employers gave quite open support for staff associations against TUBE. Indeed, in some instances, they were instrumental in establishing them. See, for instance, CIR (1974c)
supporters will tend to adopt managerial definitions of problems and be more amenable to incorporation. But the Personnel Managers of three of the 'Big Four' were unimpressed. Their attitudes to staff associations developed from the position that they would be ineffective in resolving the problem of handling grievances.

"What can a staff association do? Negotiate? Over what?". (1)

The general view implied there was little gain from staff associations - more a potential loss. Firstly, employers might be seen as anti-union:

"No, I don't think a staff association would be a good idea now. It would appear an attempt to thwart TUBE". (2)

And, secondly, it might encourage the union directly:

"You've just set up the organisation for the union to take it over". (3)

There was indeed some support for these views in the experiences of Connor and Forbes, where a management-inspired attempt at developing a staff association resulted in many employees turning to TUBE instead.

The contradiction in employers supporting staff associations is in legitimising the collectivity of grievances and the means of representation. In this way it was certainly seen as a second-best alternative (if that) by the Personnel Managers of the 'Big Four'; more generally, staff associations only seem to have gained any management support in bookmaking when TUBE had established substantial membership, and were pushing for recognition.

1. Interview J. Wilson 19.2.76
2. Interview B. Kavanagh 13.8.74
3. Interview J. Wilson 19.2.76.
Handling grievances on an individual basis posed no such problems: grievances could be defined in individual terms and could be handled in an individual fashion. This constituted the most attractive option for the employers, for it denied the collective nature of employee grievances, yet simultaneously offered opportunities to channel those grievances on an individual basis in a controlled framework. Furthermore, it provided part of the material practice on which the employers tried to reconstruct their relationships with employees on an individual basis.

But this policy was not without contradictions. Clearly TUBE were being denied the opportunity to represent union members on a collective basis, but what of individual representation? If the employers were establishing a 'fair' procedure, surely individuals could be represented by someone if they wished? In this guise, TUBE gained de facto and sometimes de jure representation rights for individual members. In some instances, as noted above, Sawford or one of the full-time officers were permitted to represent members in grievances or disciplinary cases. But the usually present clause in these procedures, permitting employees to be represented by a fellow employee if they chose, allowed the lay union representative in the company to take up the cases of union members; though, of course, the company could still claim to be withholding 'recognition' in the formal sense.

But the processing of grievances cannot be seen in abstract from other employer policies: while improvements in employment conditions, 'freely granted', were undermining TUBE's raison d'être, so too did the creation of 'proper' channels of raising grievances. Such policies

1. The theme of the individualising impact of procedures is taken up in Chapter 8 in the context of the unfair dismissal provisions.
provided a challenge to TUBE both in material terms in delivering the 'goods' and in suggesting the union was unnecessary. But it was also accompanied by a positive attempt at re-establishing employer-employee relationships at the political and ideological level.

(3) The reconstruction of the relationships between employer and employees at the political and ideological level.

The mediating role of the Personnel function would only be partial if it concentrated on the processing of grievances and the structuring of employment conditions. Such material conditions are important yet insufficient to integrate employees into voluntary co-operation in the labour-process. It demands also that this integration takes place at the political and ideological levels.

Despite the subordinate role of labour in the social relations of capitalist production, unwilling compliance on the part of the worker to the demands of his employer is not seen as a stable basis for continued production. The existence of wide ranging academic specialisms across psychology and sociology which are concerned with the 'motivation' of employees performing an everyday drudgery masquerading as work, are sufficient evidence to suggest that co-operation on the part of the workforce is an essential component of the continuation of capitalist activity. Schemes to achieve such co-operation range through payment systems and job content, to managerial style.

The major contradiction in these approaches is that all are concerned with remedying the consequences of wage-labour, yet remain unprepared to do anything about the root cause. This illustrates the value to the employer of retaining an ideological and political integration of the workforce—something the bookmaking employers were indeed aware of.
Until the 1970s, the employers had needed their experienced settler-managers, but the dramatic changes in the industry now made that group simultaneously unnecessary and undesirable: the resulting reorganisation of the social labour process and the devaluation of the position of settler-manager implied he was less an agent for the global function of capital, than part of the collective labourer.

In general terms, the historical devaluation of the position of the settler-manager had been largely completed in the betting chains by mid-1973. But the necessary concomitant was the undermining of the prevailing basis of occupational solidarity within the industry. (1)

The ideology inherited from the credit office days now wore thin with the routinisation of the job; and at the same time, politically, the employers no longer wished or needed to retain the staff versed in those experiences. The compromise, at the ideological level, was to redefine individual achievement in more conventional style. And the task to exact this compromise fell to the developing personnel departments. The William Hill Organisation produced a booklet for employees which indicated the fusion of the new and the old:

"The policy of the Company, whenever possible, is to promote from within and many of the Senior Executives of the Company rose from very junior positions. William Hill never forgot his humble start and determined that in his Company anyone who had the merit and drive could rise to the top". (2)

William Hill, however, had not reached the 'top' through the hierarchy of the career ladder now advocated by the Senior Management who had replaced him. This kind of redefinition is not peculiar to bookmaking; as Wright argues, it can be seen as the ideological transition between the old and the new petty bourgeoisie:

1. See note 2 to Chapter 3 for a brief discussion of the sources of occupational solidarity.

"While it is true that individualism characterises the ideology of both the new and old petty bourgeoisie, the individualism of the two categories is extremely different. The individualism of the old petty bourgeoisie stresses individual autonomy, be your own boss, control your own destiny, etc. The individualism of the new petty bourgeoisie, on the other hand, is a careerist individualism, an individualism geared towards organisational mobility." (Wright (1976) p. 24)

Perhaps the line between these two strands cannot be drawn quite so starkly. In bookmaking, the opportunities did remain for some employees to become small-scale bookmakers; while for most, wage-labour was the inevitable future. The growth of the retailing chains now meant a severe reduction in the chances of employees to become self-employed, while necessarily demanding a measure of co-operation of employees with the new organisational forms of the industry. The reconstruction of the labour process demanded new patterns of ideological integration.

If the changing employer-employee relationships implied by retailing bookmaking implied this kind of reconstruction, the individualist card could also be used against the union:

"The very nature of the business is against the growth of a union. The people in this industry are somewhat individualistic and reckon they can take care of themselves." (1)

The very success of the efforts of the Personnel Departments to develop employer-employee relationships on the chosen basis depended on discrediting the union. The practice on employment conditions and processing grievances attempted to show the union as unnecessary, emphasising that issues could be handled individually. The above statement, from one of the most experienced Personnel managers in the industry, indicates not only that a union was unnecessary, but also inappropriate; and it was this aspect which constituted a major strand of the ideological offensive against TURK.

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1. Interview S.Oliver (Ladbrokes) 3.10.74. "The very nature of the business" is a return to the past era of bookmaking, where fortunes were won and or lost in a day (according to folklore - with some justification). This, perhaps characterised the 'old' petty bourgeoisie ideology of the industry. Here it is used in a statement which collapses the bookmaking industry as it once was, into a prescriptive statement for employees in the contemporary - and rather different - industry.
The arguments about inappropriateness developed, on the one hand, from a perspective that the industry itself was 'unsuitable' for unionisation; and, on the other, that particular unions were not the 'best' ones or did not behave 'correctly'. The first aspect was developed not merely from the past "nature" of the industry, but the structuring of the overall labour process within bookmaking:

"As I see it, union structure is based on a structure appropriate to the shop floor. In Bookmaking, there are a large number of very small widespread units. Attempting to graft a shop floor pattern on this is costly and ineffective. The union cannot service its members." (1)

And where the union necessarily fails short, management can provide satisfactory solutions:

"(The union) know nothing about our staff. When they raised the question of Christmas working last year, we went round all our staff and in three weeks had heard their views. We know our staff's views better than the union". (2)

It is a short step to justifying a policy against a particular union:

"Until they have an adequate organisation with sufficient resources .... in no way would we recognise them". (3)

And, perhaps, to develop the criticisms of the union's lack of resources into querying the ability of the officials:

"I've little time for TUBE. It is not strong enough, lacks expertise and I have no confidence in the people involved. They seem to have a chip on their shoulder." (4)

As well as their conduct:

"TUBE are irresponsible. Sawford was engaged in a strike in Leeds, but he had no facts. He had to call off the strike. He hadn't followed the proper procedure... People telling lies and behaving in an inappropriate manner - we don't want to do business with them." (5)

1. Interview D. Konrath 12.9.74. Claims for the 'special status' of the industry were also made by Cyril Stein of Ladbrokes "He (Stein) said he didn't think the industry was appropriate for trade unions. He expected and was prepared to have his hotels and so forth organised, but not his betting shops." Interview Moss Evans 2.2.76
2. Interview J. Popkin 20.10.75
3. Interview S. Oliver 3.10.74 on TUBE
4. Interview B. Kavanagh 13.8.74
5. Interview D. Konrath 12.9.74
Clearly, TUBE did provide an opportunity for these kind of criticisms to make an impression on employees. Some ex-TUBE members already had decided views on the union.\(^1\) The widespread distribution of the membership, the lack of experienced leadership and the consequent errors of judgement and disappointment, did generate divisions within the union that could be exploited. Nevertheless, the inappropriateness arguments did possess contradictions - and dangerous ones for employers.

Less than twelve months after suggesting to the CIR that

"(TUBE) is not a union with which in the group's opinion it would be appropriate to conduct collective bargaining. The group would however regard more favourably an established union with appropriate resources and experience." \(^2\)

The William Hill Organisation found they were now dealing with the TGWU. Under pressure to concede recognition, the William Hill management were backtracking:

"Joining the TGWU? We don't quite know what this will mean. If the TGWU control TUBE effectively, that might make us happier regarding the possible behaviour of the union. However, if they don't (and affiliated unions tend to go their own way) then we will still question TUBE's responsibility." \(^3\)

Clearly the merger of TUBE with the TGWU undermined many of the inappropriateness arguments - resources, experience, and thus management's credibility. A further redefinition was necessary:

"I'm not happy with the TGWU link-up. I want to talk to people concerned with the industry." \(^4\)

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2. CIR (1974b) p.4
3. Interview D. Konrath 12.9.74
4. Interview J. Popkin 20.10.75: a wondrous comment given that TUBE were forced to amalgamate with the TGWU because they had been unable to cope with the hostility of the employers.
The ideology of inappropriateness derived from a number of sources: it traded on the remnants of an occupational community, which the labour process changes were concurrently undermining; but those changes themselves, in the context of the widespread LBO structure, provided an argument for inappropriateness palpably untenable in the context of the credit offices. The continuing aspect, however, was the juxtaposition of 'individual' against 'collective' solutions, the inappropriateness arguments serving to reinforce the former while discrediting the latter.

The significance of ideological integration should not be underestimated, for the political integration of employees was rather more difficult. The socialisation of the labour process continually undermines the basis for individualist ideology. Given that the settler-managers were not only objectively co-operating under retailing bookmaking in a qualitatively different way, but that this also involved a devaluation in their position in performing the global function of capital, their political integration posed problems. They had lost areas of control over the work of the LBO, and had been left with a general supervisory responsibility. While attempts might be made to provide an alternative means of integration, e.g. importance of salesmanship, these were distinctly lightweight compared with the patterns of control which higher management and Personnel sought to impose.

This threw importance onto the credibility of management as being just and fair in relation to TUBE; something indicated in the development of coherent arguments as to why recognition would be refused until certain conditions were met. Once again the employers were able to utilise the very resourceful doctrine of the freedom of the individual; though the pressure to develop coherent arguments, in whatever guise,
were not simply prompted by the need to appear 'just' employers to their employees. (1)

One contradiction of advocating the ideology of individual freedom is the danger of people making the 'wrong' choices. The overall policy of the employers, carried through by the Personnel Departments, was to re-establish a pattern of employer-employee relationships on an individual basis; to effect some continuity between the past practice of bookmaking and occupational community with a newly-defined individualism predicated on the implications of retailing bookmaking. But for such a policy to succeed, other options could not be blatantly foreclosed: the freedom of individual choice must be seen to include the opportunity of unionisation given the existence of TUBE.

The outcome was a general proclamation, virtually throughout the industry, that the employers would grant recognition if a majority of employees want it:

"We're neither for nor against TUBE. We are interested in our staff. We're against TUBE gaining representation by default. If 55% of the staff want it we'll have to give it. But when the number is around 12%, it's a bit of a joke, like the tail wagging the dog." (2)

Within the 'Big Four' this went hand-in-hand with a similar condition:

1. One particular external pressure was the demands of the legal recognition process, where employers had to put forward and establish a case for the refusal of recognition. In consequence, the positions of employers towards the union gained a 'rehearsed' quality and a broad similarity, as each employer was brought before the NIRC.

2. Interview D. Konrath 12.9.74.
"We are a national company with national policies". (1)

Both positions appear eminently 'fair'. It is only 'common sense' that the employers should not give in to the wishes of a minority and that recognition can only be conceded on a company-wide basis.

But:

"Common sense alights on the obvious, delights in the cliche - and deplores explorations that tunnel under the surface of things." (Lane (1974) p. 183)

There is plenty below the surface here: for the conditions for recognition simultaneously appear as 'reasonable' while setting impossibly high targets for the union to achieve. This the employers were able to do by presenting themselves as neutral ("neither for nor against TUBE") and their employees as free agents. In no sense does this bear any relation to the Bookmaking industry which appears in this and other chapters. Employers do exert influence over patterns of unionisation: as agents of capital they create the conditions for it. Employees who were 'free' to join the union sometimes found themselves 'free' from the obligations of working.

But the magic of 50% prevails for it is as strong as the dominance of individualism (which has managed to survive not despite the differences in power relations, but because of them). In terms of individual freedom and rights, the 'fairness' of 50% is unassailable: it requires challenging in terms of collective rights.

Similar comments might be made about national recognition. Like the 50% argument, its practical strength was in denying recognition per se since the LBO structure virtually ensured the union could never muster 50% membership in all the LBOs of one of the 'Big Four' at any one time; yet it seemed eminently 'rational' that the larger firms should continue to decide

1. Interview J.Wilson 19.2.76.
terms and conditions centrally and not in a piecemeal fashion. (1)

There are other aspects to the relationship of this professed policy on recognition and actual practice. What is it 50% of? All LBO employees (including cleaners)? If TUBE did approach the majority figure, it was not unknown for the absolute figure to alter. (2) How were the "wants" of employees assessed? By actual membership of the union or preferences to be represented by it? (3) But one point in particular is made here: the way in which these arguments could be put forward in support of an individualist approach of employer-employees and as a practical denial of union recognition.

"I would like to see 51% membership before giving recognition. And then I'd fight to stop the will of the other 49% being trodden on. I'm bitterly opposed to a closed shop and I'd fight tooth and nail to stop that happening. Why? It comes back to individuals. Anything that takes away the freedom of choice is out as far as I'm concerned." (4)

The traditions of individualism have a long-established dominance in Western capitalism. But the use and internal consistency of those arguments in bookmaking in the early 1970s must be seen in the context of how retailing bookmaking had rapidly developed and changed the labour process within the industry at that time.

1. Local recognition was totally out of court while the Personnel Departments were trying to establish control over the regions.

2. Traceable to patterns of centralisation. See the discussion of bargaining units in Chapter 8.

3. The William Hill Organisation reference indicates this problem dramatically See Table 6.1; and also the discussion of the William Hill reference in Chapter 8.

4. Interview J.Popkin 20.10.75.
(iii) The strategic use of policy.

The practice of the Personnel Departments in developing the wide-ranging policies to reconstruct employer-employee relationships was not merely to compete with and undermine the union in a general fashion, but to take certain initiatives at crucial moments. Perhaps the most clear and interesting example is how John Wilson, as Personnel Controller at Ladbrokes, used the stoppage of March 1973 to compete with TUBE through the introduction of a new wage structure and how competition with TUBE was not a substitute for coercive policies but a complement.

One of the weaknesses of the national stoppages was the long delay between the calling of the stoppage and it actually taking place: specific procedures were laid down in the union rulebook, procedures vetted and agreed by the Registrar under the IRA 1971. The gap was approximately five weeks and allowed the employers involved sufficient time to develop a counter strategy.

In the Ladbrokes dispute, this strategy took on distinct, discernible phases. Initially there seems to have been something of a softening-up process: rumours circulated through the management structures and around the LBOs that strikers would be dismissed, with visits from local management to the betting shops "threatening" and "cajolling", particularly in the weaker areas.

Ladbrokes were not merely relying on pressurising their employees in this way. They also intended to compete with TUBE and show the union to be unnecessary. Just eleven days before the stoppage, on March 13th, the Personnel Department circulated the results of the job evaluation scheme.

1. TUBE rules had been agreed prior to full registration. While one of the 'carrots' of the IRA 1971 had been the benefits a registered union could obtain, the 'stick' was most certainly the pressure that could enforce changes in union rulebooks to bring unions into line with what the Conservative Government thought they ought to be.

2. Letter George Sawford to Sporting Life 14.3.73. Documentary evidence in the TUBE files seems to support Sawford's assertions (as indeed did future policy by Ladbrokes in 1975).
begun in June 1972, detailing salary grades and salary increases. Ladbrokes were now going to have a "nation wide salary structure".\(^{(1)}\)

Clearly the timing of such an announcement was strategic. The offer of tangible increases in wages had been made; and geographical anomalies and irregularities were to be removed. Hence management were employing the twin strategies of "forcible opposition" and "peaceful competition", as Bain has called them \(^{(2)}\), wielding the stick and dangling the carrot at the same time.

Part of the reasons for the defeat of TUBE lies in the inability of the union to cope with this strategy. Even as the strike occurred, Ladbrokes had outmanoeuvred the union. Capitalising on the uneven response to the stoppage call, Ladbrokes transported blackleg labour from London and the South into the Midlands with some success. And with the TUBE ranks in disarray selected one of the weaker, isolated areas, Nottingham, to carry out the rumoured threats of the previous week. Nine men were dismissed "for taking part in the strike".\(^{(3)}\)

The timing of these strategies clearly related to the immediate possibility of the stoppage. But the form and the content are rooted more fundamentally in the context of bookmaking at that time. The effectiveness of the pressurising tactics - which may vary in content, e.g. threatened dismissals, hints at transfers and harassment by security staff - rested on the structure of the industry, widely distributed, relatively isolated working units, and the weakness of trade union organisation. Ladbrokes, as a national company, could ensure by such tactics that the smaller groups of their diffusely scattered employees might remain outside the union umbrella, for their vulnerability as a group was plain to see.

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1. Letter Ladbrooke Personnel Dept. to employees 13.3.73. Given the pay freeze salaries were to be raised by "the maximum approved by law".
3. Letter George Sawford to D. Patterson 18.4.73.
The strategic introduction of new pay scales was echoed in two other major firms. The J.Coral Group had brought in standardised pay scales at the beginning of 1973, which coincided with their withdrawal from negotiations with TUBE over recognition. And when William Hill finally instituted similar changes in January 1974, this coincided with the CIR investigation, just a few months before the CIR were to issue a favourable report for TUBE on the William Hill reference.

(c) Conclusions.

The discussion of employers' policies in this chapter has, admittedly, been a partial one. Concentrating mainly on the 'Big Four' companies, the intention has been to draw out from their policies, towards both employees and the unions involved, an understanding in terms of the labour process approach.

The initial conclusion that can be drawn concerns the source of employers' policies. In utilising the labour process as an initial focus, an understanding of employers' policies towards their employees and TUBE was achieved in relation to patterns of capital accumulation. The expansion of retailing bookmaking and then the rationalisation of the betting chains provided certain imperatives and constraints in the kinds of policies that could be adopted by the employers: the specific sources of antiunionism and potential choices of coercive and co-operative policies in terms of economic improvements as well as ideological and political integration. Furthermore, the social organisation of work with the widely distributed LBO structure provides the basis on which the policies were introduced.

Insofar as this provides an understanding of employer policies, it does indicate the contingency of employer-union relationships on external pressures: for employers, their policy towards employees is necessarily affected by their efforts to create (or, in this instance, gain
a share of) surplus value. Taken together with the discussions of Chapter 3 and Chapter 6, concerning the dependency of unionisation on the changing basis of co-operation in the labour process, and uneven patterns of accumulation, the result is significant: the conditions which generate unionisation amongst employees derive from the same source as the primary influence on employer's policies towards trade unions. Considering employer and union policies only in relation to each other, obscures the degree of commonality of the source of those policies.

It is one thing to conclude the importance of the labour process in examining both employer policies and the pattern of unionisation; it is another to argue that source is determinate of employer-union relationships. Indeed, the complexity of the relationships involved can be seen once it is realised employer-union relationships are also determinate: the policy of the employers was influenced by TUBE; while the lack of concessions from the employers affected the activities of the union; Furthermore, the impact on the membership of the union (and thus the union on the employers) was not merely affected by the lack of success, but by the objectives pursued by TUBE.

To begin with, it is clear from various discussions in this chapter, that the actual or potential presence of TUBE did have an effect on employers' policies. While it would be impossible - and undesirable - to draw any monocausal line between TUBE and employers policies, this does not deny the existence of a link. The 'Big Four' would probably have developed Personnel Departments as a means of centralising control irrespective of TUBE- yet the union did have an impact on when these developments took place, how personnel policy operated, and what objectives were pursued. The attentions of TUBE generated an added imperative to the need for employers to reconstitute employee relations and prompted for instance changes in substantive conditions of employment at an earlier, rather than later, date, e.g. the improvements for Ladbroke
employees in 1973. The implementation of personnel policy was frequently strategic, being used to oppose the efforts of TUBE; while the actual policies used against TUBE, e.g. the use of blackleg labour, would scarcely have been introduced without the demands for unionisation. The influence of TUBE on employers' policies can therefore be seen in both the timing and nature of employer response.

But, at the same time, the lack of concessions from the employers also affected union policies and objectives. The general anti-unionism and victimisation pushed the TUBE leadership into an increasing use and reliance on the legal protections of unfair dismissal and recognition; the continuing refusal of the major companies to recognise TUBE raised serious questions within the union about their general policy towards employers and how this could be implemented; furthermore it resulted in the promotion of recognition as the crucial objective of the union. In short, employers' policies had a wideranging effect on how TUBE developed, functioned, and succeeded or failed.

This, however, does not diminish the importance of the labour process approach, but enhances it. Consider the impact of employer policy on union branch organisation.

While in Chapter 6 links were established between concentration and centralisation and patterns of branch formation, employers, as do unions, mediate this relationship: responding to the pressures of accumulation, they can adopt policies which can affect the success or failure of branch organisation. Against the background of TUBE's development of geographically-based branches, employer policies might result in the collapse of membership not merely in that firm, but also the branch as well; while national companies presented particular problems for local union activity.

The best example of the first occurrence can be seen in the
experience of the Welsh branches. In Anglesey, Bob Jones Ltd, by agreeing to the demands of the staff association, pre-empted TUBE's attempts at recognition; in Bridgend, a blatant threat of redundancy from Jack Brown Ltd, had thwarted the union. These different forms of anti-unionism had the same effect: the collapse of local branches reliant on the membership of these firms.

Where branches were dependent on more than one firm, the impact of individual employers was more limited; but where they involved membership of the national companies, the problem was slightly different. The general employer policy of national recognition implied union success depended on the simultaneous growth of membership in different areas. This scarcely happened, and membership only came together in this way for a very short period. For the most part, local union members in the National companies found themselves dealing with a local bureaucracy; opportunities for success were therefore limited.

But the impact of employer policies (and the conditions for their adoption) was dependent on the general patterns of capital accumulation: its uneven development between different geographical areas and in terms of industrial structure. This necessarily promoted limits on potential autonomy within employers policies, just as it did with those of TUBE.

The precise relationship between the bookmaking employers and TUBE cannot be understood without a more direct reference to the objectives of the union. The response of employers is in part dependent on what the union seeks to achieve, but does in turn influence those objectives. The reaction of the 'Big Four' employers was in part due to the nature of the early TUBE membership and the anti-retailing bookmaking perspectives; while their refusal to concede recognition prompted the union into pushing this forward as a major demand. These highlight two important influences on the objectives of TUBE: the demands and grievances
of the membership and the willingness of employers to make concessions. The discontinuities of these two pressures had severe implications for employer-union relationships.

In the first place, TUBE had originally opposed the expansion of betting chains. In the formative period of early 1971, this had been aimed against a potential development; by 1973, the union had to come to terms with the existence of the large-scale LBO chains. By implication union objectives on questions of control over the labour process became problematic. Notions that there could be some return to the idyllic world of the small-scale bookmaker, where individual settler-managers could make decisions on betting and bookmaking on their own initiative, were no longer tenable for large sections of the industry. Consequently, 'reward' issues became the central focus: wages, holiday entitlement, extra payment for holidays, etc. (1)

With this shift, the demands of TUBE became increasingly non-oppositional to employers policies, who were seeking to rationalise and standardise conditions of employment. This served to undermine the union in some instances, since it showed the union as unnecessary; membership declined as, in consequence, did the impact of TUBE on employers.

The predominant union objective was not, however, improving conditions - either in terms of control or remuneration - but the securing of recognition. This was a logical consequence of the refusal of employers to accept TUBE as representing their employees; but it generated particular problems for the union. The struggle for recognition per se is to fight for an insubstantial objective, a means to an end. But part of the fetishism

1. These had always been important as tangible objectives. Note the special way in which 'control' issues developed, as the desire to exert capitalistic control over the labour process, to perform an employer's function as an individual bookmaker. Issues of control over labour mobility were scarcely ever pursued - such mobility was sometimes helpful to the LBO settler-managers.
which accompanies the institutional/pluralist emphasis on procedurisation, establishes 'recognition' as an end in itself. The corollary in union practice is to separate the demand for recognition from those for conditions of employment. (1)

Once such a separation occurs within the objectives of the union, problems are likely to arise. While on the one hand, the TUBE campaign in William Hill (which despite all its shortcomings, was remarkably successful in sustaining membership and pressure on the company) continually linked recognition with employment conditions, (2) this was not achieved in Ladbrokes. In the context of the Ladbroke stoppage in March 1973, one local activist tackled Sawford on this issue:

"Are we going on strike just for recognition of the union? If Ladbrokes still do not recognise the union where do people stand who go on strike?" (3)

The membership in this area, Blackpool, soon disappeared; as did the Ladbroke membership generally. The reasons were complex, but owed something to the inability of the TUBE leadership to make real connections between the demands for recognition and those for substantive improvements. The consequent decline in membership took any immediate pressure off Ladbrokes for more than two years.

1. The existence of legal channels for securing recognition may also serve to do this; indeed the NIRC made distinctions between recognition disputes and other disputes. See Chapter 8.


3. Letter Harry Richmond to George Sawford 7.3.73.
The one conclusion that can be drawn from this discussion is the complexity of social forces which underpin employer-union relationships. Employer policies affect and respond to union objectives and organisation, yet both find a partially common source in the desired and actual patterning of the labour process. It is important to understand these various relationships rather than evade them; or, as Bain attempts to do, reduce the social complexity to a series of determinant 'factors'.

The labour process approach allows a far greater understanding of employer policies towards unions, since it essentially locates employer-union relationships within the immediate context of employer-employee relationships and the contingent pressures of capital accumulation. In consequence, the approach necessarily denies the usefulness of unequivocal statements of how employers affect unionisation outside of those contexts.

1. For instance, in his attempts to separate the strength of union membership from the employers attitude towards recognition. In relating the latter to the exogenous 'variable' of government policy, he denies the significance of the inter-relationship between the two 'factors'.
Chapter 8: The impact of state intervention on union organisation and activity.

Given the continuing historical pre-occupation of successive governments with the 'problem' of labour relations, it is scarcely contentious to argue that the state could have an important influence on union organisation and activity; of more potential disagreement is the nature of that impact. The current tendency for governments to acknowledge the legitimacy of union representation while pursuing anti-union policies, indicates some of the difficulties in analysing this question. Does the state act to support or undermine unions? The answer is both.

The formation of TUBE occurred in a period when this contradiction in state policy was quite open. The Conservative Government had been elected at least partly on the platform of anti union policies and against the background of the "anti-union hysteria" of the late 1960s. Superficially, this gave little encouragement to the formation of a new union; yet the cornerstone of the Government's labour relations policy, the Industrial Relations Act, was a clear source of inspiration to the Bookmaking workers in forming TUBE. This paradox is explained in the kind of unionism that the Industrial Relations Act (I.R.A. 1971) offered - 'responsible' unionism - where collective representation could be achieved without the normal struggles associated with it and where employers would willingly receive the 'reasonable' views of such unions.

It might seem that the limits of the labour process 'approach' had been reached when considering state intervention. How, for instance, could the changing labour process in the Bookmaking industry in any way provide an understanding of the basis of state intervention in

1. Hyman (1973) p. 113
employer-employee relations within that industry? Quite clearly
the policy of the 'state' on industrial relations must be understood
in the context of the national (and international) economy; and the
range of state institutions are scarcely developed with just one
specific sector in mind. It is transparently implausible that an
understanding of state intervention can be achieved through analysing
the changes in the labour process in bookmaking. (1)

Nevertheless, the labour process 'approach' is arguably of
use when analysing the impact of state intervention. If the way the
state tries to influence industrial relations is abstracted from the
social and economic context in which it takes place, there can be little
understanding of how union organisation and activity are affected. Thus
the labour process can be seen as providing the general context and
source of unionisation, with the IRA 1971 constituting an important
conjunctural influence on the development of TUBE: while the founders
of TUBE had decided on a particular response, the formation of the
union was delayed until the IRA 1971 had received Royal Assent; Branch
formation was consciously restricted until the unfair dismissal provisions
were operative; recognition attempts were initially phased according
to the status of TUBE's registration under the IRA 1971 and access to the
various entitlements that went with it. Such examples show how the
IRA 1971 influenced the timing of these developments, but can scarcely
be seen as an underlying reason for the developments per se.

Yet the IRA 1971 did have an impact on union organisation and
activity through its procedures and institutions; one that was
essentially contradictory in the way it impinged on pre-existing conditions
for union growth and organisation, both promoting and discouraging

1. This can be qualified to the extent that bookmaking did have a
   specific relationship to the fiscal policies of the state which could imply
certain predispositions as regards state intervention in this industry.
unionisation. In order to explore this effect and understand why
this should be the case, it is first necessary to gain a perspective
on the position of the state in capitalist society and develop
the general position of bookmaking and legal enactment in that context.

Therefore the chapter begins with a discussion of various
approaches to the capitalist state emphasising the contradictory role
of the state; this is followed by an examination of the context of
state intervention in relation to the bookmaking industry and the
general characterisation of the state in the development and operation
of labour legislation. Finally, the bulk of the chapter is concerned
with the impact of the IRA 1971 and the Employment Protection Act
(EPA) 1975 on the development of TUBE, particularly in relation to the
procedures on unfair dismissal and recognition.
The State in Capitalist Society: a discussion of views of the State

Within the mainstream of industrial relations literature, the state appears as primarily neutral in relation to employers and employees. The chief proponents of the industrial relations 'system' - Flanders and Bain - present the state as an external influence on the everyday conduct of labour relations. The state therefore appears as a potentially progressive force in assisting employers and employees to overcome their industrial relations 'problems':

"... there is a crucial role for government, not least in providing support for a network of public agencies designed to encourage and assist the parties in their own initiatives." (McCarthy (1973) p.6).

This view of the state suggests neutrality is achieved as long as such institutions retain an independence from government policy - and will thus be free to pursue the objectives of 'good' industrial relations. (1)

The extensiveness of the involvement of the state as a neutral mediator and referee is reflected in the variety of institutions set up under the aegis of the state and embracing the notions of tripartism. But as Hyman argues, such neutrality is only superficial:

"The ostensibly neutral functions of mediation and conciliation - most recently embodied in the 'independent' Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service - in fact serve the essential purpose, for both employers and the state, of stabilising the existing mode of production." (Hyman (1975) p. 137).

If the state is not neutral, however, what is the basis of this non-neutrality? It is important to realise that neutrality and non-intervention are not identical. Hyman argues that the state did not systematically intervene in British industrial relations until the post-war period, because employers did not require such assistance from the state. (3)

1. Bain (1970) p.186 is explicit: "... government action is also largely an exogenous variable from the point of view of the industrial relations system." Flanders is not so forthright, but consider his discussion of the role of the state in relation to voluntarism: Flanders (1975) pp. 288-294
2. McCarthy (1973) p. 6
3. Hyman (1973) p. 112
The tradition of voluntarism thus derived from an essentially practical basis - that capital did not need state intervention - and therefore non-intervention was historically abstention in favour of capital. (1)

Such a position relates the extent of intervention by the state to the requirements of a predominantly capitalist economy. It is only a short step to functionalist views of the state, which understand state activity in terms of the 'logic' of capital. It is a view readily associated with expositions of vulgar Marxism which attempt to explain the activities of the state in terms of the requirements of capital, often within a framework of economic determinism. (2)

A contrary view of the state, which plays down its economic functionability for capital, locates state activity as primarily political: the state thus possesses an autonomy from the 'logic' of capital accumulation. (3) But the formulation that the state is largely unresponsive to the dictates of capital accumulation is just as untenable as the functionalist position. Perhaps the most significant contribution in recent years to overcome this juxtaposition of economic determinism and political autonomy is that of Holloway and Picciotto. They argue that the state must be understood in terms of the outcome of class struggle within the specifically capitalist mode of production, characterised by the "capital relation" which simultaneously embraces economic and political dimensions:

"The starting point must not be the specificity of the political nor the reduction of state action to the 'logic of capital', but an analysis which founds the specificity of the political in the nature of the capital relation." (Holloway & Picciotto (1977) pp. 84-85).

1. Hyman (1975) p. 148
3. See for instance, Poulantzas (1973)
For Holloway and Picciotto, the "capital relation" is an "historically specific form of class domination", which means it is derived from and reflects the struggle between classes which is peculiar to capitalism as a system based on the exploitation of surplus value. As such, the state necessarily embodies the contradictory bases of capitalism and reflects the balance of class forces:

"If the growth of state activity is seen merely as a shift in the form of capitalist domination... it is clear that it can do nothing to escape from the fundamental contradictions of that domination." (ibid, p.95)

Yet capital is not monolithic, and is composed of a variety of different capitals, essentially in competition. This anarchy of the market is necessarily reflected in the activities of the state:

"...... the reproduction of competition within the state apparatus ensures an inevitable dislocation, an inevitable tension between state activity and the interests of capital in general - an inevitable arbitrariness and imbalance in the way that the state ensures the reproduction of capital." (ibid p.95)

Thus while the form of the state is essentially capitalistic, state activity cannot be read off in any straightforward or unambiguous way: it embraces the general struggle within and between classes and reflects the contradictions within capitalism in its own contradictory activities.

It is this perspective of the state as inherently contradictory in form and activity that is developed and utilised in this chapter.

1. ibid, p.77
But as a preliminary, it is necessary to qualify the monolithic shorthand of the 'state'. In terms of activity, the state operates as a mediator of, primarily, legal and financial control. The use of coercion as a direct method of control is symptomatically hidden behind such 'legitimate' controls in the bourgeois state. In terms of its form, the state comprises a range of institutions, which serve to carry out 'state' policies; such institutions have 'institutional needs' and possess a degree of autonomy within the vast state structure; or, more correctly, reflect the competition of different capitals in the anarchy of the market.

Within and between these mediations and institutions the contradictions of state form and activity are expressed. In terms of the impact of state intervention on unionisation, it is important to examine these contradictions in relation to the industry concerned as well as the contradictions within labour legislation and between the legislation and the institutional arrangements for its implementation. This is taken up in the next section.

1. This view is both historically contingent and related to a particular form of capitalist society; nevertheless, given the main characteristic of capitalist economy is wage labour, it is not surprising that the state should mirror the obscuring of the real relationships of class domination.
General Contradictions in state activity: Bookmaking and Labour Legislation.

The consideration of the impact of state intervention on unionisation in the bookmaking industry can be seen in terms of three general contradictions. The first concerns the relationship between the state and the bookmaking industry which indicates the divergent policies and practices of different state agencies; the second focuses on the generalisation of labour legislation and the unevenness of capital accumulation which brings out the inherent contradictory impact of labour legislation on unionisation; the third examines the contradictions between legislation and the institutional arrangements for implementation.

In order to carry out its various functions, the state must be provided with some means of finance - both to spend on desired projects and to support state institutions. The precise sources of taxation are a key political and administrative matter: new sources which are politically acceptable and relatively easy to collect are particularly attractive options. This underlies the continuing relationship between the bookmaking industry and the state for the past sixty years. As was shown in Chapter 3, successive governments showed more than a passing interest in the potential of a betting tax, a pressure which was an important contribution to the legalisation of cash betting in 1960. But of particular interest is the role of the Treasury in promoting the development of large-scale betting chains as a direct consequence of fiscal requirements. The collection of tax from a large number of small firms was a very inefficient method, and the Rateable Value Tax of 1969 can only be seen as an effort to drive out many of the small concerns.
The consequence of this policy was the active involvement of a range of state agencies in the promotion of changes in the industrial structure of the industry which would give rise to the alterations in the labour process underpinning the growth of unionisation amongst bookmaking employees. Yet simultaneously other state agencies, such as the Department of Employment, were involved in developing collective bargaining amongst employees in order to promote 'good' industrial relations. While one branch of the state was trying to push the expansion of the bookmaking industry in a particular direction, another was concerned with promoting collective bargaining which might effectively limit the extent and impact of this expansion.

The source of this contradiction is partly to be found in the essential generality of legislation. In some situations, the promotion of collective bargaining might assist capital; in others it will hinder it. The difficulty is in producing a legal enactment which will accommodate such differences; it is arguably impossible for the state to do so. It is this point which is central to the second general contradiction.

If legislation is to have a widespread effect, it must be generalised in its application; this, however, is also a source of limitation - in applying in such a general way it means there will be a different impact on different groups in society. In particular, it contrasts with the unevenness of capital accumulation, and in the context of interest here, the strength and spread of unionisation. In consequence, the impact of labour legislation can be seen as inherently contradictory. This is most clearly illustrated in the case of the IRA 1971.

The IRA 1971 was introduced as the collapse of the post-war boom was making a definite impact on the British economy. It provided a partial, yet significant string to the bow of government policy at that
time: a policy aimed at both the living standards (through incomes policy) and the organisation (unions) of working people. It comprised an attempt to reconstitute the relationship between capital and labour in favour of a new expansion of capital accumulation and profitability.

Within the labour legislation, the Government sought to channel trade union activity in a particular direction, constraining certain aspects and encouraging others. This contradiction - the suppression of trade union activity against the necessity to accommodate it - runs through all aspects of the IRA 1971; and this is because the generality of the legislation comes up against the uneven development of the economy and of trade union organisation and activity. Laws aimed at the 'problem' of the unions in general terms also gave positive legal benefits to some unions or employees: the recognition procedures did not bring many of the major unions into line, but they did encourage unionisation in new areas; the strongly unionised groups may not have used the unfair dismissal provisions, but non-unionised employees might gain some protection.

While this contradiction is inherent in the legislation itself - although it is not necessarily even - there is also the relationship between the generality of the law and the way it is implemented. This comprises the third general contradiction; and it is one familiar to students of industrial relations in a particular guise:

"The judiciary for their part, show an interpretative skill which ordinary human understanding has not always been able to appreciate." (1)

The resourcefulness of the judiciary in watering down the meagre legal protections given to trade unionists is just one aspect of the potential conflict between the spirit and letter of the law and the institutional processes of legal regulation. The IRA 1971 introduced a whole series of institutional structures, with legal powers, to handle

industrial relations matters: the cornerstone was the National Industrial Relations Court (NIRC) where Justice Donaldson made his several ill-conceived judgements on industrial relations; industrial tribunals were set up on a regional basis to handle cases of unfair dismissal and redundancy; while nationally, the Commission on Industrial Relations (CIR) was utilised as an investigatory agent in industrial relations generally and in recognition disputes specifically.

Such institutions were variably composed: the NIRC as the main legal channel incorporated the legalistic ethos and persona. The tribunals, however, were supposedly an attempt to escape legal formalism and involved a degree of lay representation. The CIR had existed prior to the IRA 1971 and was composed of non-legal representatives at the policy making level, while the Executive was mainly civil servants. The character of the CIR derived from its Donovan ancestry; it embraced pluralistic notions of industrial relations and promoted collective bargaining as a 'good thing'. As such its operation when integrated into the IRA 1971 led one commentator to remark on "... the relatively limited effect which the IRA had on the CIR's methods". (James (1977) p.30)

The overall philosophy of the CIR employees, as well as their activities, could and did on occasions conflict with the intentions of the IRA 1971.¹

Such contradictions between the legal mediation of the state and its institutions - and indeed between the institutions themselves - cannot merely be laid at the door of different interest groups, e.g. the legislators against the civil service. They reflect the kinds of contradiction inherent in the "capital relation": the policies for expanding surplus value are not unambiguous - are the unions to be forcibly repressed or accommodated? The dilemmas of capital are, quite understandably, reflected in the state form and its institutions.

¹ This is amply illustrated by the relationship between the CIR and TUBE which is examined later in this chapter.
The bulk of this chapter is devoted to the impact of the recognition and unfair dismissal provisions on union organisation and activity. The main sources of information derive from the period of the IRA 1971 rather than the EPA 1975; but it is interesting that despite the very different circumstances in which these pieces of legislation were introduced the essential core of the legislation is remarkably similar. The conclusions that are drawn would therefore have some kind of general validity for the operation of these procedures over the past decade.

1. The institutional arrangements under the different pieces of legislation are set out below.
(c) The role of the state in the procedurisation of industrial relations: the impact on union growth, organisation and activity.

(i) The Role of state procedures

"Like the Donovan Commission, the authors of the Act proposed to create new rights for trade unions and for individual workers. They agreed with the Donovan Commission that the law should assist trade unions to secure recognition from employers, and offer protection to workers who had been unfairly dismissed." (Clegg (1976) p. 454).

This view of the legal procedures on recognition and unfair dismissal introduced in the IRA 1971 emphasises their position as 'new rights' for trade unionists and employees, categorising such provisions as 'sweeteners' offsetting the more punitive sections of the legislation. (1)

Yet these new procedures were not simply a sop for the employees; they were the outcome of contradictory pressures, embraced differential aims and objectives and had a contradictory impact on union organisation and activity.

Insofar as they were indeed 'new rights', they reflected the demands from certain sections of the trade union movement that such legislation should be introduced. (2) To that extent the state was accommodating trade union pressure. Nevertheless, the ambitions of those who designed the procedures and protections were not entirely concerned with extending the rights and powers of employees.

The definitive work on the IRA 1971, for instance, succinctly summarises the varied intentions behind the recognition procedure:

"..... the IR Act's recognition procedure was intended to be multifunctional. It was aimed at reducing multi-unionism and preventing industrial action over recognition as well as promoting union recognition and growth". (Weekes et al (1975) pp. 150-151.)

1. ibid. pp. 453-4
2. NALGO and GMWU both argued for legal recognition procedures in their evidence to the Donovan Commission. See Weekes et al (1975) p.120.
Recognition procedures were thus to be used to reform the 'irrationality' of trade union structures and activity: on the one hand, they could reduce the 'problem' of multi-unionism and create 'rational' bargaining structures and thus assist 'good' industrial relations; on the other, recognition issues could now be removed from the arena of industrial conflict hence the strike 'problem' would be reduced.\(^{(1)}\)

There are similar parallels in the intentions behind the unfair dismissal provisions. These were hailed as the "least contentious and most successful aspect" of the IRA 1971.\(^{(2)}\) This arose from the assumption that rights against unfair dismissal were meaningful employee protections; a view earlier put forward by the Donovan Commission which argued that a legal right against unfair dismissal would promote job security.\(^{(3)}\)

Yet Donovan also put forward other benefits which might be gained from such legislation: firstly, it would encourage the reform of voluntary disciplinary procedures; and, secondly, it would reduce the number of industrial disputes over dismissals. Thus, once again, as with recognition, the provisions on unfair dismissals aimed at tidying up the 'irrational' and 'arbitrary' procedural arrangements between unions and management; and to make a further contribution to the strike 'problem'.

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1. "It will be unnecessary to strike over the question of deciding who belongs to whose union or whether an employer should recognise a particular union ... because an orderly procedure is laid down". E. Heath in 1970 quoted in Weekes et al (1975) p. 121.

2. Weekes et al (1975) p. 9 ... This may not be saying very much.

3. Donovan (1968) Ch.9. The 'successfulness' of the provisions in the IRA owed just as much to the limited effect they had on employers, see Weekes et al (1975) p. 224.
The provisions on recognition and unfair dismissals can scarcely be seen in the relatively simplistic view put forward by Clegg: they were not intended merely as 'sweeteners' for the unions. Yet neither were they merely functional for capital, totally embracing the logic of capitalist rationality. (1) They represented the contradictions of the contemporary capitalist economy reflected in the role of the state: the accommodation of trade union demands on one hand and the need to suppress them on the other. This was not merely resolved by the state in trading off concessions and restrictions: these concessions and restrictions were inherent to any provisions introduced. Hence the new areas of legally backed recognition and unfair dismissal necessarily involved the simultaneous accommodation and suppression of organised labour.

(ii) The recognition and unfair dismissal procedures in the IRA 1971; a brief comparison with the EPA 1975. (2)

The examination of the role of the procedures on recognition and unfair dismissal provides some perspective for examining their impact; yet to make the discussion in the rest of the chapter intelligible, it is important to be aware of how the procedures were formally constructed.

In order to make use of the recognition procedures, a trade union had to be registered under the IRA 1971. This would involve the certification officer examining the union, especially the union rules, to ensure the union complied with the conditions of the IRA 1971.

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1. See Martin and Fryer (1973) for an excellent discussion of how the Redundancy Payments scheme operated to the advantage of employers although presented as an employee right.
2. The position outlined here for the EPA 1975 is that prior to the Employment Act 1980 and other changes on unfair dismissal introduced by the Conservative Government since May 1979.
It was the vetting of rules in this way which prompted much of the union opposition to the IRA 1971 and few established unions registered under the Act.

But once a union had registered, the legal recognition procedure was now available. Leaving aside some of the technical details, the process was as follows: the union would initially approach the employer in an attempt to effect a voluntary settlement. Once it was clear that a voluntary recognition would not be forthcoming, the union would notify the Secretary of State for Employment of the failure to agree and make an application under Section 45 of the IRA 1971 for bargaining rights. (1) Here the conciliation services of the Department would intervene in an attempt to effect a voluntary agreement. If they failed, the NIRC would hear the application and decide whether the case was sufficiently strong for it to be referred to the CIR for investigation. The CIR would encourage the employer and the union to reach a voluntary settlement on the basis of their investigation; eventually, the CIR would produce a formal report on its findings which could be used as a basis for resolving the dispute. If a voluntary settlement was still not achieved, the CIR recommendations could be made legally binding by the NIRC provided the majority of the employees involved voted in favour of the recommendations in a ballot.

The unfair dismissal procedure was, perhaps, less complex, but involved similar questions of eligibility and procedural adherence. (2) Only employees with two years continuous employment with their current employer were eligible, unless the dismissal was being contested on the grounds of trade union activities as the alleged reason. There was also a tight schedule for making an application for unfair dismissal: the requisite

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1. Applications to the NIRC could be made not only by registered unions, but by employers and the Secretary of State for Employment. See IRA 1971 section 45 (2).

2. The unfair dismissal provisions are contained in the IRA 1971 sections 22-23.
form had to be obtained from the Department of Employment and submitted to the Central Office of Tribunals within four weeks of the dismissal. At this stage the Department of Employment would attempt a conciliation, but if this failed the case would be listed for hearing at a Regional Office of Industrial Tribunals. The industrial tribunal notionally comprised three members based on the tripartite principle: one employers representative, one union representative, plus a legally qualified chairperson. The burden of proof rested on the individual employer to show the dismissal was fair and he had acted reasonably and correctly in dismissing the employee. The tribunal could either accept or reject the employer's view: if they accepted it, the application was dismissed; if they rejected it, they could award the employee financial compensation or recommend re-engagement. There was an appeal against the tribunal decision only on a point of law.

It is useful to make a brief comment about the procedures set out here under the IRA 1971 and the EPA 1975, for in essence the underlying philosophy of how these procedures should operate remains the same - given the removal of the legalistic structures of the recognition procedure. Under the EPA 1975, the recognition procedure has been altered in detail, but not in essence: the penalty clauses of registration have gone as have the institutional arrangements of the NIRC and the CIR. Yet it still embraces the notions of voluntary agreement and conciliation rather than enforcement. The Department of Employment conciliation service and the CIR function have now been collapsed into a new enlarged body, the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS), but which necessarily carries out the similar functions of conciliation and investigation. Finally, there is recourse for legal enforcement to the Central Arbitration Committee (CAC), which parallels the IRA 1971 procedure though dispensing with the ballot.

1. The non-co-operation of trade unions with the IRA 1971 meant the trade union side did not take up their options to sit on tribunals.
The unfair dismissals procedure is virtually identical, given the relaxation of criteria for qualification (reduced to six months continuous employment) and the extension of the time limits for application for unfair dismissal to three months. The only other difference (besides the co-operation of the trade union side in nominating union representatives to industrial tribunals) is the installation of the Employment Appeals Tribunal (EAT) which performs the function its title indicates.

Given there are only differences in detail and not in the nature of the procedures, there is a strong argument that the experiences of TUBE under the IRA 1971 are essentially transferable to any consideration of similar state procedures on recognition and unfair dismissal. In other words, the experience of TUBE has immediate contemporary relevance and holds important lessons for trade union organisation.

(iii) The overall impact of procedural reform.

The commitment of the TUBE leadership, throughout the history of the union, to the legal procedures of the IRA 1971 is best understood in their hopes that these provisions would give them the legal rights and protections which would enable them to build the union. This made the recognition procedure and the unfair dismissal clauses the most potentially advantageous sections of the Act: the former to advance employer acceptance of the union, the latter to give legal protection against victimisation.

The important questions for trade unions are very basic: did the recognition procedure help TUBE gain recognition? Did the unfair dismissal provisions provide adequate support? Or were the legal provisions in these areas more successful in the other objectives of those who put them forward, i.e. to rationalise bargaining structures and defuse industrial conflict? In this section the general impact on TUBE
is examined; while in the following section these aspects are considered in more detail.

To begin with it is important to stress that the impact of the IRA 1971 on industrial relations has generally been considered insignificant:

"When the IRA Act is said to have had no effect, what is generally meant is that it was little used, either because unions, employers and workers (and even government) had little use for it, or because, if some saw its utility, the likely or actual reaction of others prevented them from using it ... Our evidence is that the Act had little influence on the general practice of industrial relations." (Weekes et al (1975) p. 232)

One consequence of the lack of use of the IRA 1971 has been the focussing of attention on the 'minnows' of the trade union movement who did use the legislation. This has forced various commentators into assessments of the use of the Act by these small unions, including TUBE. Despite their general verdict on the IR Act, Weekes et al comment that TUBE "had cause to be thankful to the Act's recognition procedure". (Weekes et al (1975) p. 232), while another study glibly suggests:

"The recognition provisions were also highly instrumental in stimulating collective bargaining in another relatively unorganised sector, that of bookmaking concerns." (Thomson and Engleman (1975) p. 87).

Were such views justified? Table 8.1 details the progress of known efforts by TUBE to gain recognition in this period and give some general indication of the usage and effectiveness of the formal recognition procedure. A number of points can be made: firstly, the failure of TUBE to secure recognition, except in a handful of cases, through voluntary means is evident. This would seemingly make a legal procedure for recognition all the more important - yet less than 40% of known recognition claims were referred to the NIRC. Secondly, at the conciliation stage of the procedure, no employers were persuaded of the error of their ways; more is said about the impact of conciliation in
Table 8.1: TUBE and Formal Recognition 1971-1974: Details of Recognition attempts.

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a later section. Thirdly, only 50% of the NIRC referrals actually reached the CIR. In some cases this was due to the union withdrawing from the hearing; in others, because the NIRC ordered a further period of conciliation. Fourthly, only five out of nine CIR references resulted in a favourable report for TUBE, while in only three of these cases was recognition actually achieved. In other words less than one fifth of the cases referred by TUBE to the NIRC resulted in recognition.

This is scarcely a story of unmitigated success. Certainly it is not clear that TUBE should be "thankful" for three successes when the hopes of fourteen others have been dashed; neither does it appear that the provisions were "highly instrumental" in "stimulating" anything, let alone collective bargaining. (1)

Still, it might be argued that it cannot be expected that every case will be successful and that at least the procedure provided recognition in three firms which might otherwise not have been achieved: hence the procedure was successful. Such a view, however, rests on two assumptions: that TUBE achieved recognition in those firms because of the legal procedures; and that the impact of the procedure is in some sense neutral when not recommending recognition. This demands a more detailed examination of the work of the CIR in these respects.

The CIR handled more recognition cases through TUBE'S applications than for any other trade union. In total, they undertook nine references, and these are spelt out in Table 8.2. A brief examination of the dates of reference illustrate the decision of the TUBE Executive to utilise the CIR, as the union declined. Six of the nine cases were referred to the CIR, by the NIRC, between 14.9.73 and 26.10.73, with each case involving a different branch of TUBE and predominantly localised firms.

1. Interestingly, the legal procedures have indeed legitimised multi-unionism within the industry. Although TUBE (and thus the TGWU) has been the main union involved, ACAS recommended the recognition of the GMWU in one instance in 1977. See ACAS (1977)b.
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All applications made by TUBE

**Note:** This includes references examined by the study team; it does not cover all Section 46 references received by the commission.

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This includes references examined by the study team; it does not cover all Section 46 references received by the commission.

Footnotes:
Adding the continuing reference in William Hill, in the autumn of 1973, the CIR were involved in seven different references spread throughout England and Scotland.

The CIR was important in the recognition procedure because it could offer something positive - a favourable report leading to recognition; the NIRC, in contrast, was only a hurdle to be overcome. But the other side of this coin was the consequence of unfavourable reports; the impact of the CIR cannot merely be judged in relation to its favourable recommendations.

The two-edged impact of the CIR in this sense was distinctly uneven, proving far more favourable to employers than to TUBE: unfavourable reports from the CIR were associated with the total collapse of membership in those firms and branches, while favourable ones did not meet with unequivocal success.

For instance, in Blackpool, the Roland Jones membership had declined before the CIR investigation had been completed. There was no effort to reorganise the staff in the firm, or to reform the Blackpool branch. In Newcastle, the Ken Hailes membership disappeared altogether and only a handful of members throughout all the firms in the area remained.

In Manchester, the union lost the membership in Seymour and Story and eventually Jack Rashman as well, who decided to work within the staff committees given the lack of support from the TGWU. The branch itself was reformed in 1974 with the help of the local TGWU officials, but drew its membership from the William Hill employees, not from those in Seymour and Story. While the decline in union organisation was indeed complex, there is substantial evidence to suggest that the decline in specific sections of the membership can be at least partially attributed to the activities of the CIR.
Still, leaving that aside there are still the successes after all. Or are there? Recognition, as Table 8.1 shows, did not automatically follow from favourable recommendations. In two cases, the intransigent Yorkshire employer Gordon Nunns and the ubiquitous William Hill organisation, the CIR recommendations were rejected by the employers and TUBE were unable to make further progress before the recognition procedure was wound up by the incoming Labour government. This leaves three firms: Connor and Forbes, John Joyce, and Ken Munden Ltd, where recognition was achieved after supportive CIR recommendations.

Yet even in these cases, it is difficult to place the credit for success on the activities of the CIR. The Connor and Forbes employees had to return to the NIRC to make the CIR decision legally binding and, even then, close nearly all the LBOs on Grand National Day in March 1974 before the employers would negotiate. In John Joyce Ltd., the CIR had issued a favourable report as early as January 1974, but progress was slow. Not until the John Joyce members threatened industrial action in May 1974 unless the company entered into “meaningful negotiations”(1) was recognition successfully achieved.

That leaves a third firm, Ken Munden Ltd., where the CIR report gave support to the membership in arguing against the efforts of the company to forestall recognition by expanding the bargaining unit. In the short term, the company, in the face of the CIR recommendation and an exceptionally high level of union membership, agreed to recognise the union and signed agreements in mid-1974. Yet in 1975 the Munden management cancelled the agreement and, amid some confusion, the union became internally divided and was defeated.

1. Letter, G. Sawford to John Joyce 21.5.74
The indications are, therefore, that the impact of the recognition procedure cannot be taken at face value. Certainly there are serious question marks over the assistance given to TUBE by the procedures: also, it is clear they did not supercede industrial action in the cases where effective recognition was finally achieved. From TUBE's standpoint, the outcome was clearly disappointing. The following sections consider in more detail why this was the case and identify more precisely the impact of the procedures on union organisation and activity and thus provide a more sophisticated evaluation than shown in the formal record.

What of the unfair dismissal provisions? Did they provide adequate protection for the employees in the industry and, in particular, those building the union? The unfair dismissal provisions were used far more widely than the recognition procedures, since these were 'rights' given to employees, not registered trade unions. As such, the judgements on the provisions have been general ones, rather than in relation to specific industries. Weekes et al, despite their initial comments on the success of the provisions, subsequently concluded:

"..... the statutory remedies scarcely ensured security of employment". (Weekes et al (1975) p. 27)

With many employees excluded by the length of the qualifying period and the predominantly managerialist criteria adopted by the tribunals, the conclusions of the Warwick study might be seen as over-cautious. Less reticent in comments on the Redundancy Payments scheme, which closely parallels the unfair dismissal provisions, Martin and Fryer comment:

"The belief that the Redundancy Payments Act has to do with employment security is reflected by the inclusion of the legislation under this heading in legal text books. This mistaken classification is perhaps understandable in view of the fact that the reviewers of the statute have decided that:

'It was recognised at the outset that the "restrictive" attitudes and practices of workers were a legacy of years of
economic insecurity, and that these could only be reduced by tackling their source". (Martin and Fryer (1973) p.245-6, quoting Parker et al (1971) p.3)

Just as the Redundancy Payments scheme was aimed at breaking down 'irrational' worker resistance rather than giving employee rights, so the unfair dismissal provisions offered a (relatively meaningless) protection against dismissal which necessarily and simultaneously legitimised the principle of dismissal and tried to erode the "restrictive" attitudes and practices of the workforce. In this context, it is not altogether surprising that Weekes et al concluded that while security of employment was not assisted, the main impact of the legislation was to provide financial compensation for dismissal.\(^1\)

If the general effect of the provisions was to provide compensation for dismissal rather than prevent dismissal in the first place, what protections did this give to those trying to build and develop union organisation? For once, Jenkins seems to have hit the nail squarely on the head:

"Although the unfair dismissal procedures have been extended to dismissal for reasons of union activities this can be difficult to prove. If an employer is determined not to reinstate an employee, even if ordered to by the tribunal, the only penalty is a financial one. This is very small when compared with the overheads of the average-sized company and an employer may well calculate that it is a fair price to pay for thwarting a union." (2)

This would suggest the unfair dismissal provisions relating to trade union activities\(^3\) were relatively worthless in preventing victimisation for trade union activities; that it was a difficult case to argue while employers were prepared to pay the cost of individual compensation to forestall or weaken collective organisation.

1. Weekes et al (1975) p. 32. See also Anderman (1973) p. 105
2. Jenkins (1979) p. 74. However, he quickly manages a 'U'-turn in taking a generally supportive position on such protections; see ibid p.95
Does the experience of TUBE suggest such pessimistic views of the provisions are warranted? A major claim of the union was the dramatic success achieved at industrial tribunals. George Sawford claimed to have fought nearly eighty cases of unfair dismissal and only losing two. It is not easy to trace all the records of unfair dismissal cases, but in Table 8.3 some 34 cases have been listed where TUBE was involved, providing details of the cases. Table 8.4 summarises and analyses some of the main results.

Initially three points can be made concerning the use by TUBE of the unfair dismissal provisions. Firstly, on the whole, the union were successful in gaining compensation for their members, although re-engagement was only achieved in a small number of cases. Some 75% of the cases taken up by the union resulted in compensation or re-engagement.

1. Interview George Sawford 23.7.74
2. The cases are derived from an examination of TUBE archives and the consequent co-operation of the Central and Regional Offices of Industrial Tribunals. It is unfortunate that unfair dismissal cases are listed by applicant and not respondent - which would have made possible a fuller investigation of cases in the bookmaking industry.
3. No unfair dismissal cases under the TGWU are included here.
4. This omits the two cases in the "others" column of Table 8.4(b) leaving a total of 32 cases of which 2 were withdrawn and 6 lost at tribunal.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Union</th>
<th>Job</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Branch</th>
<th>Date of Birth</th>
<th>Married</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Pay Period End</th>
<th>Pay Period Start</th>
<th>Pay</th>
<th>Wages or Costs</th>
<th>Date of Appeal</th>
<th>Result of Appeal</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Smith</td>
<td>Hilt</td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>9.11.72</td>
<td>2.6.72</td>
<td>15.12.72</td>
<td>£10.00</td>
<td>11.72</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11.72</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taylor</td>
<td>Windsor</td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>Leeds</td>
<td>2.12.72</td>
<td>9.11.72</td>
<td>15.12.72</td>
<td>£10.00</td>
<td>11.72</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11.72</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jones</td>
<td>Hilt</td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>Glasgow</td>
<td>9.11.72</td>
<td>2.6.72</td>
<td>15.12.72</td>
<td>£10.00</td>
<td>11.72</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11.72</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brown</td>
<td>Hilt</td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>Manchester</td>
<td>9.11.72</td>
<td>2.6.72</td>
<td>15.12.72</td>
<td>£10.00</td>
<td>11.72</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11.72</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.3: TUBE and the use of Industrial Tribunals 1971-1974.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNION</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Branch</th>
<th>Result of Appeal</th>
<th>Date of</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.3: (Cont.)
Table 8.4. Analysis of Industrial Tribunal Cases involving TUBE members.

(a) Details of Respondents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Firm</th>
<th>No. of cases</th>
<th>% of all cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>William Hill</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>35.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ladbrokes</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mecca (incl.City/Tote/A.Williams)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J.Coral</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>34</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Outcome of Cases.

| Total No. of Cases | Abandoned Pre-Ind. Tribunal | Settled out of I.T. | Re-engagement | Financial Re-compensation | Engage-ment | Dis-compensation | Others | |
|--------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------|----------------|---------------------------|-------------|------------------|--------|
| 34                 | 2                           | 15                  | 3              | (14 + 1)                  | (3 + 3)     | (3 + 3)          | 2      |
| 100%               | 5.9%                        | 44.1%               | 8.8%           | 17.6%                     | -           | 17.6%           | 5.9%   |

(c) Financial Compensation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Compensation</th>
<th>£</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Settled out of I.T.</td>
<td>285.30</td>
<td>450.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Award by I.T.</td>
<td>165.46</td>
<td>427.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Cases</td>
<td>251.06</td>
<td>450.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: TUBE Archives
           Industrial Tribunal Decisions.
Over the three year period the compensation averaged approximately £250 (1) which would support the general conclusions of Weekes et al (1975) and Anderman (1973), that the provisions were primarily compensatory. Nevertheless, it was superficially an area of trade union success to gain compensation.

Secondly, while TUBE may have been successful in gaining compensation for union members, it resulted in severe financial cost to the union, especially in the early part of the union's history when using external legal representation. By the end of 1972, on the information available in Table 8.3, TUBE had spent some £260 on legal fees for the handling of unfair dismissal cases. This was an expense that could not be regularly sustained and, as Table 8.3 shows, Sawford increasingly took over the role of representing union members at tribunals - which meant the cost to the union was less financially but greater in terms of human resources that would have been utilised elsewhere.

Finally, what can be said about the protections given to trade union activists in the industry? It will be remembered that the provisions had not been introduced when George Sawford in London and Susan Heath in Manchester were dismissed by City Tote Limited and Ladbrokes respectively. In consequence the expanding TUBE organisation was kept under wraps until the provisions were introduced at the end of February 1972. Did, however, the rights on unfair dismissal offer any subsequent protection? Of the 34 cases listed in Table 8.3, some 15 involved activists in the union. In some of these cases individual compensation was achieved, but collective organisation was weakened, in some instances severely, by the dismissals.

1. As shown in Table 8.4 (c). Interestingly, the financial settlements out of tribunal were somewhat higher than the national average, while the tribunal awards were lower. The latter, however, only covers a small number of cases where compensation was awarded and must be treated with caution. See Weekes et al (1975) p.17 for information on tribunal awards in this period.
It is important to remember that the effectiveness of protections should be judged on the cases which did not come to tribunal; where the employer was reluctant to dismiss a trade union activist because of the provisions. However, bookmaking employers do not seem to have shown such reticence. For instance, Dennis Smith had successfully built up substantial membership in Hector McDonald by the autumn of 1972. In November he was summarily dismissed by a senior director of the company for disobeying the technical rule of leaving his LBO without permission. The tribunal subsequently found the dismissal to be unfair.\(^1\) Smith received financial compensation and soon secured a new position (with Ken Munden Limited), but the union organisation in Hector McDonald fell away and took some months to rebuild.

A similar case was that of Brian Davis in Birmingham, who was dismissed in January 1974, some two weeks after Sawford had approached his firm, Tom Currigan Limited, for recognition:

"Tom Currigan wasn't going to stand for a union. He said to me that anyone who wanted to be in the union was out". (2)

Eventually, the case went to tribunal, who were exceptionally dismissive about the alleged reasons for dismissal and the respondents in general.\(^3\)

In the course of evidence the employers (of some 24 full-time staff) expressed their ignorance of contracts of employment and the IRA 1971, let alone a disciplinary procedure. Not surprisingly, the tribunal took a strong line with such 'cowboy' employers, and Davis received financial compensation. Nevertheless, Davis had lost his job, had unaccountably

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1. They also commented: "The provisions of the Code of Practice relating to disciplinary action were totally ignored." Smith v Hector McDonald Ltd., London, case No. 11904/72.
2. Interview Brian Davis 3.12.75.
3. In a superbly sarcastic judgement, the tribunal referred to the respondents evidence as "sometimes vague, sometimes evasive" and commented "we were not favourably impressed by them" explicitly favouring the evidence of the applicant. See F. Davis v. Tom Currigan Ltd, Birmingham, case No. 1200/74.
failed to obtain employment with any of the four multiples (who were advertising for staff at the time) and eventually found himself working for a small-scale employer in Birmingham - thus effectively excluded from activity in the betting chains. The membership in Currigan's soon declined; the one member who did not leave the union found life difficult:

"They kept picking on him; all sorts of things; and eventually he got fed up and he came to work for us". (1)

In both the above cases, the union activist had only received financial compensation, not protection, from the unfair dismissal provisions. And in both cases the collective organisation had suffered crucial setbacks. The similarities, however, go deeper: both dismissals were undoubtedly connected with the trade union activities of the employees concerned; yet in neither case did the union (i.e. Sawford or his advisors) use the argument that trade union activities were the reason for dismissal. And this was generally true of all the cases involving union activists: Sawford chose to fight the employers on their own ground, rather than try to prove victimisation for trade union activities.

In part this was due to the difficulties of proving such an assertion; it also reflected the fact that most bookmaking employers were increasingly more sophisticated in how they dismissed union activists. Indeed one of the most pronounced effects of the unfair dismissal provisions and tribunal system was to ensure that employers 'covered all the angles' when dismissing employees. And the multiples were indeed the most adept in this respect. William Hill, for instance, dismissed the Leeds Branch Treasurer, Harry Kay, and the Branch Secretary for Scotland,

1. Interview B. Davis 3.12.75

2. In the case of Davis, the employers put forward "Personal activities being dealt with during working hours" - a reference to trade union activities - as a reason for dismissal; they did not pursue it, however, at the tribunal.
and TUBE Vice-President, Laurie Gilmurray, on technicalities where both members had left themselves open to severe accusations. Both claims of unfair dismissal were dismissed by the tribunals. And in both instances any suggestion by the applicants that the reason had been trade union activities was refuted. Kay's dismissal had come at a time when the previously strong Leeds branch had diminished in active strength - albeit temporarily. Gilmurray's dismissal signalled the end of any active TUBE presence amongst William Hill employees in Scotland.

The section 5 defence was never used by Sawford. Perhaps the nearest occasion came when Ladbrokes dismissed the 'Nottingham Nine' after the one-day stoppage in March 1973. In three of the cases, the only possible way of taking them to tribunal would have been under section 5, given their ineligibility under the main provisions. In the event, Ladbrokes settled out of tribunal to the tune of £3,000 much to the relief of TUBE's legal advisors who were not at all confident the cases would be won.

1. And, indeed, at the tribunals Sawford had obviously decided not to pursue the argument under section 5. In the case of H. Kay v. William Hill (NE) Ltd., Leeds, case no. 1301/74, the tribunal referred to Kay's submission prior to the hearing in which he suggested trade union activities were a contributory reason to dismissal: "But nothing at all has been said about those at the proceedings and, therefore, we are quite sure that the only reason for his dismissal was his conduct." Gilmurray had made similar, indeed more blatant, accusations regarding his dismissal in his original submission, yet again these were not mentioned at the tribunal hearing. The tribunal referred to these accusations, and the fact that they were not followed up at the hearing, in their decision; and as in the Kay case, there seems more than a suggestion that because these were not followed up at the hearing, the tribunal considered them ill-founded. See L. Gilmurray v. William Hill Organisation, Glasgow, case no. 186/635/73. Sawford, not without reason, was so incensed by the tribunal decision that he prepared a three page appeal within days of the decision. However, whatever the numerous mistakes and misunderstandings of the tribunal, their decision was not incorrect in law. The appeal was dropped.

2. See Letter O.H. Parsons to George Sawford 14.5.73
To conclude: the unfair dismissal provisions do not seem to have provided any real security for union members and activists and the general judgement that they were primarily concerned with compensating rather than preventing unfair dismissal seems well-founded on TUBE's experience. The TUBE leadership set great store by tribunal victories as a real union achievement: this cannot be dismissed, but must be related to the overall consequences this held for the development of the union. Also, it has been shown that the provisions failed to amply compensate for the individual and collective consequences of dismissal; but can the provisions take the blame for these events? Certainly, those such as Mellish (1976), who argue that tribunals only really operated where no other option remained, must be treated with respect. But are tribunals really neutral in relation to union organisation and objectives?

These are similar kinds of questions to those raised under the examination of the recognition procedures; and they demand a deeper consideration of the impact of those legal provisions on union organisation and activity. To this end, four main aspects are examined: firstly, a closer look at the operation of the procedures, particularly in relation to recognition, and an area of common criticism: the time lags involved. Secondly, the question of trade union activity, where it is argued that the impact of the legislation on union activity is best understood in terms of contradictory pressures in the legislation generating both activity and passivity amongst employee groups. Thirdly, the important question of solidarity is taken up: did the legislation break down collective solidarity or help create it? Fourthly there is the issue of dependency of trade union organisation on the law, discussing the extent to which TUBE became dependent on the legal procedure and the implications for the future of union organisation and activity.
(iv) Aspects of State procedurisation.

(1) Time periods: the length of procedures

Anyone who has cast more than a cursory glance at the procedures for recognition under the IRA 1971 and the EPA 1975 has seemingly managed to conclude that the length of the procedures is scarcely helpful to extending recognition of trade unions. Earlier, more superficial, studies of union organisation in Bookmaking, suggested the time lag had set back the efforts of the union to sustain membership, and how employers had utilised the breathing space this had given them. Such findings have been exonerated by more general studies. Weekes et al (1975) did not emphasise this aspect, but did note the lengthy hearings of the NIRC. The first general study to make the point particularly forcibly was that of James (1977), who took due note of the representations made by trade union officials during his research. He concluded that the length of the CIR investigation had allowed membership to "wane" and employers to organise. Furthermore:

"These moves could be timed to influence the actual level of membership, the attitudes expressed in the CIR's attitude survey, and the outcome of any recognition ballot which might be held." (ibid p.38)

Such comments are not merely reserved for the IRA Act 1971. They have also appeared in connection with the supposedly superior EPA 1975 procedure. Dickens (1978) has received similar complaints from trade union officials in the course of the Warwick study, particularly in relation to the conciliation stage. And, as she legitimately argues:

"Time is not neutral in a recognition dispute. The longer the time which elapses before the workers' opinions are surveyed, the more support for the union is likely to wane as employees become exasperated with the lack of results or are subjected to anti-union pressure from the employer". (ibid p.175)

2. Allum (1976)
4. James (1977) p. 38 "However, the suggestion was made by several trade union officers that the length of time taken by the inquiry had an adverse effect on recognition prospects."
Jenkins (1979) goes further and ascribes the delays almost entirely to employer procrastination (p.98). While McMullen (1978) has also warned of the "long-winded" procedure and how employers are likely to force unions "through all the legal hoops." (1) Finally, Hart (1978) has coherently shown how the experience of U.S. unions in relation to legal procedures is relevant to the British unions and how procedural delay was one of the most significant problems (p.205).

Against such a plethora of assertions, it would indeed be surprising if the evidence from TUBE's experience did not support the arguments put forward above. On the other hand, some of the authors might be rather grateful for concrete evidence to support their positions given their reliance on interviews with trade union officials - who are scarcely likely to comment that the procedures are too short! Table 8.5 details the course of events in 16 of the 17 TUBE referrals to the NIRC, while Table 8.6 summarises the time scales involved at different stages of the procedure.

McMullen (1978) estimated, somewhat impressionistically, that it was "not unusual" for the ACAS procedure to take a year (p.251). The evidence from TUBE's experience of the IRA 1971 suggests such an estimate is very close to the mark. On average, the institutional procedure, from the referral by the union to the NIRC until the issue of the CIR Report, took some 11½ months. But the formal procedure, which involved the union jumping "through all the legal hoops" to show it had done its best to effect a voluntary settlement, can be timed at an average of 16 months; in one case it took more than two years; while the minimum period was 11 months.

1. McMullen (1978) p. 250-251. As he comments: "A slow procedure is no procedure."

2. There is insufficient information on T.Benfield Ltd., in the union archives for inclusion.
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1. McMullen (1978) p. 250-251. As he comments: "A slow procedure is no procedure."

2. There is insufficient information on T.Benfield Ltd., in the union archives for inclusion.
Table 8.5:

TUBE and Formal Recognition 1971-74:

Details of Firms taken through the legal procedure.


Table 8.6  TUBE and the use of legal recognition procedures: the length of procedures involved.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>TIME PERIOD (MONTHS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal approach for recognition until union referral to Secretary of State</td>
<td>n = 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referral to Secretary of State until NIRC hearing</td>
<td>n = 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIRC hearing to CIR Report</td>
<td>n = 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Formal approach to employer to CIR Report</td>
<td>n = 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>= Total Formal Procedure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From NIRC Referral to CIR Report</td>
<td>n = 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>= Total legal procedure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:  TUBE Archives

CIR Recognition Reports.
In disaggregating the time scale, it appears that, on average, TUBE took four months in trying to obtain voluntary recognition before a referral to the NIRC could be risked; then a further four months delay was likely while the Department of Employment tried to conciliate and before the case was heard by the NIRC; thus the union could expect to wait more than 8 months (and certainly longer since first recruiting members in the firm) before the NIRC would consider whether a recognition dispute existed and whether further attention by the state was warranted. Those cases which had survived to this stage could now wait another 7½ months while the CIR carried out its investigation.

The point about the non-neutrality of time in recognition disputes has been adequately made by Dickens. In such a view, using the procedure (let alone successfully) might be seen as a supreme test of the collective organisation, given these delays. And, in more detail, the experiences of TUBE indicate just how the potential delays in the procedures provided opportunities for employers to counter the efforts of the union and make the task of sustaining membership increasingly difficult.

By the end of 1972, TUBE had spent 15 months in trying to utilise the legal procedures for recognition, but had yet to get beyond the hurdle of the NIRC. It had taken 9 months and a very valuable £350 in legal fees to secure registration under the IRA 1971. The legal recognition procedure was, therefore, not even available to TUBE until June 1972. The employers knew the value of prolonging the procedure: the onus would be placed on the union to try and maintain the level of membership; yet, as was shown earlier, the difficulties of organising, recruitment, and retention of membership were immense in bookmaking, which meant the longer the procedure the more likely it was that the membership would dwindle.
The legal procedure emphasised voluntary recognition where possible; and astute employers could easily prolong the procedure by showing a willingness to talk. Generally, the larger companies were most adept here, in particular the 'Big Four', who managed to keep TUBE at arms length in 1972 with the kind assistance of the NIRC. The experience of TUBE with the J.Coral Group is perhaps typical.

Sawford applied to the company for recognition in June 1972 - shortly after TUBE had received full registration. For three months, Coral's prevaricated through asking for additional information on membership in the company and for copies of the rule-book, through the 'necessary' steps of consulting the Board of Directors; and finally through questioning exactly which employees TUBE sought to represent.

At the end of August, Sawford at last made the Section 45 application and the case was heard on 2nd November 1972, at which it was suggested the parties should go away and talk things over. These talks eventually began in December. In August, TUBE had claimed 427 members but by the end of November this figure had been reduced to 350. Against this background, there was little chance the talks would succeed and, in January 1973, Coral's wrote to Sawford declining recognition rights. The Section 45 application, due to be heard in March 1973, was dropped by the TUBE Executive.

TUBE had similar experiences with City Tote Ltd., (owned by Grand Metropolitan Hotels) and the William Hill organisation. In all these cases, the procedures under the Act had done little to help TUBE; far from arresting the delaying tactics of the employers, the recognition process, through its lengthy cumbersomeness, and emphasis on talking and conciliation had placed a most strenuous burden on TUBE's limited resources; and had legitimised the companies' attempts to keep the union at arms length at the same time.

1. Two other national companies had the applications against them treated in a similar fashion at this hearing.
2. The bookmaking side of the J.Coral Group employed about 3,000 people.
The emphasis of the initial stages of procedure on conciliation was further reflected in the activities of the CIR who were again committed to voluntary settlements where possible. Once more the procedure allowed employers to temporise and prolong the investigation in the hope that membership of the union would decline. This is best illustrated in the Roland Jones reference to the CIR which eventually resulted in a report unfavourable to TUBE.

The owner of Roland Jones, a relatively small Blackpool based firm, had decided she could do without the conciliation service of the Department of Employment and had refused to meet them. When the case was referred to the CIR in September 1973, they visited the owner, Dorothy Jones, who stated that she "did not consider the question of recognition an urgent matter." (CIR (1974f) p.3)

The CIR were, however, undaunted and pursued the possibilities of a voluntary settlement. Finding some support amongst the employees, they suggested to Sawford that TUBE should make a formal approach for recognition. In November 1973, Sawford and Dorothy Jones met under the chairmanship of the CIR, where it was agreed the CIR should draft a recognition and procedure agreement. It was February 1974 before it was ready. At this point Dorothy Jones rejected the agreement.

Now the CIR began again; but too late. The 50% union membership of October 1973 had disappeared, along with the disintegration of the local branch; many employees had sought other solutions, having waited for recognition for so long, and had left the firm. It might be argued, as did the CIR, that TUBE should accept the blame for the decline since they did not service their membership properly. This misses the point: if TUBE had been able to organise and maintain the membership effectively
they would not have needed the CIR. Here, where the CIR could have been most supportive, their willingness to seek voluntary settlements and the length of the procedures involved, merely served to reinforce the decline of TUBE membership in the area.

Observations on the delays in the CIR section of the procedure are not restricted to the conciliatory efforts of the CIR. They must also extend to its investigatory role. And criticisms here can be levelled at delays both before and after the investigation.

In the Ken Hailes investigation, for instance, the local union representative had a particular complaint regarding the CIR's activities:

"Of course, the length of time taken by the CIR to bring out the questionnaire did not help matters." (1)

In this case, the NIRC had referred the case to the CIR on 26th October 1973, yet it was mid-February 1974 before the ballot was held. Here the management were particularly hostile to the union - even by standards in the bookmaking industry - and the members in the Ken Hailes organisation were subjected to 3½ months of crude anti-union pressure by the management before the CIR held the ballot. Arguably an earlier ballot may have been more supportive to TUBE. (2)

Yet even where the investigation had been prompt and the ballot had been held in the early stages there were problems with delays over the publication of the results. The CIR held an inquiry and disappeared back to London while the union members waited for the results. This happened with Seymour and Story, the Manchester/Yorkshire firm. Here the NIRC referred the case to the CIR in mid-October 1973; by December, the CIR were holding a postal ballot. Yet in mid-February 1974, the members in Manchester still knew nothing of the outcome:

1. Letter David Petterson to George Sawford 28.4.74
2. See CIR (1974e) for the history of this dispute.
"I would appreciate, if possible, some information on any happenings. Things appear to be at a dead end and my members are constantly enquiring and asking for information, especially regarding the CIR inquiry regarding Seymour and Story." (1)

It was 1st March 1974 before the CIR issued the draft report and mid-month before Rashman received a copy from Sawford. The report had not given TUBE recognition rights which would no doubt depress enthusiasm locally; but some of the members had already begun to lose patience:

".... a number of staff who joined the union have lapsed membership and I suppose have lost interest because of the lack of any spectacular union happening." (2)

Whether the ballot was held at the start of the investigation or the end, 7½ months was a long time to wait for what might, or might not be, a favourable report.

The conclusion must be that the evidence from TUBE tends to support the general concern expressed over the time delays in the procedure. The Seymour and Story example shows the difficulties of sustaining interest amongst the membership, of the credibility of the union, during such a long process; the Ken Hailes example illustrates how the procedure encouraged anti-union activity on the part of the employers; while the J.Coral and Roland Jones examples indicate the problems thrown up by excessive concentration on conciliation.

But is the problem the time period itself or the activities which occur during it? Presumably both; but if this is the case, can these 'defects' be remedied by shortening the time-scale or are they inherent in the procedures themselves? This is an important question since it goes to the heart of the problem as to whether trade unions should demand a legal recognition procedure. Furthermore, it has particular implications for the status of the time-scale criticisms.

1. Letter J. Rashman to George Sawford 18.2.74
2. Letter J. Rashman to George Sawford 27.3.74
Some of the above writers do not really go beyond criticising the delays in the procedure; for them the answer is to reduce the time periods. James (1977), for instance, wonders "whether the time taken by inquiries could not be lessened" and suggests the IRA 1971 procedure could be improved by holding recognition ballots "fairly soon in the proceedings" (p.40). Dickens (1978) endorses this view, arguing the inquiry stage in the ACAS procedure ought to be brought forward; nevertheless, despite her evidence that trade union officials object to the length of the conciliation procedures, she is reluctant to close down this option to any great extent:

"The problem with attempting to speed up the procedure is that the conciliation stage is clearly valuable and by its very nature conciliation cannot be rushed." (1)

This very revealing passage gives an insight to the contradictions which Dickens faces: how can the procedure be speeded up given the underlying philosophy is "rooted ...... in voluntary agreement"? (2)

To the extent that James and Dickens attempt to resolve the 'problem' by suggesting changes in the existing procedure, they are essentially caught in the Donovan trap of trying to resolve substantive issues by procedural reform. In this sense criticisms about time delays are reformist - and they allow the opening to those who pursue such policies in terms of getting the 'right' procedures. Clegg, for instance, saw in the EPA 1975 legislation, sufficient reforms of the IRA 1971 to argue:

".... Britain will therefore now have an effective statutory procedure." (Clegg (1976) p.482)

1. Dickens (1978) p.175. Unfortunately there is no evidence in Dickens work which suggests conciliation is "clearly valuable"; and indeed the TUBE evidence suggests conciliation was largely a waste of time.

2. ACAS Annual Report (1977) p.41
Given that they have "reasonable support" the established unions:

"... will have much to gain from seeking recognition and little to lose; many claims are likely to be received; by and large the recommendations are likely to favour the unions; and a rapid extension of recognition and trade union membership may be expected." (1)

The "rapid extension" is still awaited. Perhaps the procedures are not quite 'right' yet. No doubt debate will continue around how the procedures can be improved. (2) This, however, merely serves to deflect from the inherent limitations of procedurisation for the extension of union recognition. It is a lesson easily learned from the American experience, as Hart suggests:

"... the administration of legal procedures can be cumbersome, and inherent delays can impede organising campaigns."


Time delays are inherent in procedures which involve litigation but most importantly in the British context, conciliation. Any criticisms of the time-scale of procedures quickly fall foul of the underlying philosophy of the recognition procedure: conciliation and mediation.

In other words, the procedures, whether under the IRA 1971 or the EPA 1975, are not about forcing recalcitrant employers to recognise trade unions, but encouraging and educating employers into realising the benefits of recognising trade unions and developing the practice of collective bargaining (1); this is not achieved, in such a view, by coercion (leastways not of the employer), but rests on the tried and trusted traditions of voluntarism in British industrial relations.

1. ibid.p.484. Jenkins (1979), a main advocate of the recognition procedure, is still able to argue the case for a procedure despite referring to the current provisions as "inoperable" after Grunwick (p.99); debate is centred around the potential powers of ACAS rather than the nature of the procedures themselves.

2. Under the new Employment Act, they will disappear altogether.

3. Or, in the words of the philosophical architects of the EPA 1975, to achieve "Management by agreement". See McCarthy (1973).
This is why the time period criticisms are such a sensitive issue. Can anything be done about the problem while the underlying philosophy of voluntarism remains intact? Possibly not. But how long can the visible inadequacies be allowed to continue and thus undermine the legal fiction of the procedure as an enforcement Process?\(^1\)

The contradiction of a procedure aimed at having an educative impact is seen in the necessity on occasions to deliver the goods, while the employers most likely to respond to the 'good sense' of collective bargaining are not likely to be the ones taken through it.

Finally, the emphasis on time delays turns the main focus of attention away from the impact on union organisation to the procedures themselves. It might be argued that the major effect of the time delays on TUBE was not so much the problems within individual firms of sustaining membership and coping with anti-union pressure, but of assisting the employers in reconstructing their business and reconstituting employee relationships during the period of massive upheaval in the industry. For instance, when TUBE had first approached William Hill for recognition in 1972, the firm was operating as a series of relatively autonomous regions with arbitrary, sometimes openly oppressive, systems of control over their employees. When the CIR published their report in 1974, there was an established centralised personnel department with a standardisation process well under way; and the regions were now under much firmer central control. A favourable CIR report, even in 1973, might have had a galvanising effect on TUBE in its optimistic expansion and could have led to a very strong challenge for recognition. Issued in 1974, it was merely a lever to push TUBE into an amalgamation with the TGWU, given the decline of the union. The impact of procedural delay is thus

\(^1\) Nothing is said here about unfair dismissal provisions. Yet interestingly nothing appears in the literature about time delays in this context. The reason should now be apparent: tribunal delays do not challenge the validity of the system in such an obvious way as the recognition delays. Nevertheless, the information on TUBE suggests a delay of some 3½ months between dismissal and tribunal decision (including out of tribunal settlements), during which time individuals suffer considerable trauma, and the "perishable" collective issue evaporates.
contingent on other developments: the experience of TUBE thus suggests the specific conditions under which collective organisation emerges may not necessarily persist in precisely that form or intensity: hence the importance of time delays in the recognition procedure.

Thus if unions consider time delays are a crucial undermining feature of their efforts in using legal recognition, the only real option, if they wish to have a legal procedure, is to demand one which is based on the principle of enforcement rather than persuasion. The question then becomes whether such a procedure, on a new basis and in a shortened form, would be effective or in the best interests of union organisation. This necessarily leads on to questions of union activity which are taken up in the next section.

(2) The impact of the legislation on union activity

The architects of industrial relations reform from Donovan to the IRA 1971 through to the EPA 1975 at least shared one common perspective: the recognition procedure would replace the 'traditional' method - still favoured by the TUC - of employees relying on their own efforts to secure recognition; and the unfair dismissal provisions would simply deter employers from injudicious actions and simultaneously provide compensation for unjust dismissal: hence industrial action would be less necessary. As James (1977) argued in the context of the CIR investigations, the objective of such institutional arrangements and processes was of "lowering temperatures raised in the dispute". (p.38)
Did this in fact happen? If so, how did it happen? And if not, what impact did the legislation have on trade union activity? The experience of TUBE suggests that the impact was essentially contradictory: that the utilisation by the union of the legislative provisions generated both passivity and activity amongst employees, although this contradictory effect was not necessarily even. In the case of 'full-scale' industrial action the union did appear inhibited by the legal restrictions; this issue is dealt with separately, and in some detail, towards the end of the section.

Trade union activity is given a wide interpretation in this section: it is not just industrial action, but the task of building and sustaining a cohesive, collective unity amongst employees which has an organisational presence distinct from, yet related to, the social organisation of work. As such it is a continuous process for those actively involved and demands are wideranging. The development of membership and branches in TUBE was necessarily dependent on the work of local activists. While Sawford and other members of the Executive worked tirelessly, the limitations of their resources meant their influence was spasmodic. It was up to the local activists to sustain a union presence in that area.
To that extent any organisation built in a particular locality was the consequence of the efforts of workers in that area.\(^{(1)}\)

Any subsequent efforts to gain substantial improvements and recognition from local employers were predominantly their issues.\(^{(2)}\) In this way, union activity was a lived experience for those involved, in that it was their organisation, their issues, and their lives. They retained a measure of control over how disputes developed (given the refusal of employers to accede to their demands) which, at least partially, remained an area where their actions could determine the outcome. This is the essence of self activity.

One view of trying to gain recognition embraces just these notions: that workers should improve their position by their own efforts rather than rely on outside agencies, notably the state. Yet there are limits to this perspective: what if the efforts of a group of workers are insufficient to achieve their objectives? What if the physical problems of organising are too immense? Should not some assistance be supplied - such as a legal recognition procedure?

There is no easy answer to this dilemma; but it demands some examination of the impact of using such a legal procedure on the self-activity of employees at the workplace, since this will indicate the extent to which the legislative procedures either foreclose or encourage the so-called 'traditional' methods.

1. This poses an interesting contradiction in the impact of the IRA 1971 on the development of TUBE. While the formation of the union had been positively influenced by the introduction of the legislation, local support for unionisation seems to have gained some inspiration from the opposition to the Act by the labour movement generally. e.g. the disputes in the Docks in London and Liverpool and the UCS occupation in Glasgow and the formation of TUBE branches in these areas. It is impossible to establish definite relationships between these events; nevertheless, the expansion and contraction of TUBE does generally follow the active campaigns and defeats of workplace opposition in this period.

2. Although Sawford retained control of negotiations.
Taking an issue into a state procedure, whether in relation to recognition or unfair dismissal, has the same effect as any procedure: the dispute is removed from its local context and meaning and those directly involved at the workplace(s) lose a measure of control over it. With the 'voluntary' procedures in industrial relations the local membership concede overall control to local or even national union officials; the dispute disappears into the procedural hierarchy. With state procedures this removal is compounded: the issue is also taken over by a state body, e.g. in relation to recognition, the NIRC or the CIR under the IRA 1971 or ACAS under the EPA 1975. Furthermore, the issue may be geographically as well as institutionally removed: the institutions under the IRA 1971 were London-based, hence the removal of the dispute from its local context was also a move from that locality to London. In addition, the formal channels of communication between the state institutions and the union necessarily involved the General Secretary of the union: hence Sawford played a key intermediary role in processing applications for recognition and handling unfair dismissal cases - thus reinforcing the separation of the issue from its local context.

The outcome of such processes was to generate inactivity on the part of the membership. Having largely organised themselves they now waited upon the activities of other agencies - the union, the legal procedures and institutions - for the results of their efforts. There was little they could do to influence a tribunal decision or that of the NIRC.

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2. At least not positively: see subsection on industrial action below.
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1. To a limited extent ACAS overcomes this through having regional offices; but essentially the argument is not altered.

2. At least not positively: see subsection on industrial action below.
The experience of TUBE suggests the generation of passivity on the part of the membership was particularly evident in the recognition procedure lasting to the NIRC stage. For instance in June 1972, Sawford made three section 45 applications against local Welsh employers. The consequences were similar: a conciliation attempt by the Department of Employment, a ' shelving' of the application, and no recognition. Certainly the time lag played a part. For instance, in the case of Jack Brown Ltd., the hearing was eventually set six months after the initial section 45 application. But the question of recognition had now also been removed from the hands of the employees at the place of dispute. The legal machinery in London effectively dissolved the issues of contention into a question of debate, thus the local employees had become hamstrung; and their collective strength consequently dissipated. For the law, which was supposedly supporting them and to which the TUBE Executive had given its backing, was considering the question of recognition; and it was up to them to await the decision; to await the outcome of endless conciliation; to do nothing. Their local dispute had been lost in a maze of legal and conciliatory machinery.

As shown in the Seymour and Story example, the CIR investigations could also have a similar effect: the local activists found themselves hamstrung awaiting the results of the inquiry; and devastated when it was unfavourable. There was little basis for activity given the content of the report, but this was also due to the ingrained passivity of the membership during the procedural stages.

But the CIR stage also prompted activity amongst the local membership. In contrast to the withdrawal of the issue from its local context by the NIRC process, the CIR investigation at the workplace level
necessarily reinvolved the employees within the firm concerned. The investigation usually involved discussions with management and employees as well as a ballot of the membership. It now meant something was happening; something that local employees were in contact with and could influence, in contrast to previous stages of the procedure. The issue of unionisation had come alive, with the union and management trying to win support for their different positions and the CIR trying to sort out which recommendations to make. Just as the NIRC had removed the issue from its local context, so the CIR investigations served to bring it back.

The CIR investigation thus simultaneously denied and encouraged union activity; and the start of the investigation was indeed a focus for activity - but for both unions and employers. Sawford began to use the CIR investigations strategically. With the union resources increasingly of meagre proportions, he tried to establish just sufficient membership to warrant an NIRC referral to the CIR and then move in to help build the membership. In Seymour and Story, Sawford was timing his organising effort to coincide with the investigation. He dismissed Jack Rashman's worries on this score:

"Andrew Long has done a very good job in Yorkshire and will do exactly the same for Manchester once an inquiry is ordered." (1)

There was a similar story in John Joyce Ltd. The NIRC had referred the case to the CIR in mid-September 1973 - at which time the TUBE Stockton branch (in which the John Joyce members were organised) was virtually defunct. At the end of October 1973, Sawford made a lightening visit: on October 23rd, an open branch meeting was held in Stockton to rekindle

1. Letter George Sawford to Jack Rashman 9.10.73. My emphasis
interest, while just two days later a special meeting for John Joyce members was held. Sawford and the local committee were laying the ground for a successful CIR ballot and report:

"At the time of the reference the union also carried out a successful recruitment campaign in John Joyce and reinstated many lapsed members." (CIR (1974)d p.3)

If the investigation provided a focus for union activity, it also provided one for the employers. In Seymour and Story for instance the management had attempted to resuscitate some defunct staff committees in an effort to thwart TUBE. And by mid-November, just as the CIR investigation was getting underway, they had achieved this. At the same time Jack Rashman commented that the staff ".... are being subjected to what is virtually a one-way political broadcast." (3)

In the Ken Hailes case anti-union pressure also came to a head as the CIR investigation got under way. Here the employer deliberately set out to intimidate his employees prior to the ballot -having failed by equally crude means to stop the investigation earlier:

"The managing director said that if TUBE were to gain recognition he would seriously consider closing down all the betting offices as he was not dependent upon the betting industry. This position was restated to the staff in January and February 1974, shortly before our postal survey was conducted." (4)

This point is made above by James (1977).

They had tried, unsuccessfully, to pre-empt the legal procedure at the NIRC stage by showing their employees favoured the staff committees. In the Yorkshire offices, management had conducted a ballot with employee names on the forms; while in Manchester, the company "canvassed" their employees through telephones and personal visits.

Letter Jack Rashman to George Sawford 8.10.73

Evidence from both the CIR ballot returns and local union representatives suggest the ballot was lost because of this intimidation.
Thus while the CIR investigation provided a focus for union and employer activity, the imbalance in the outcome is clear. The union were in no position to refute the claims of the owner of Ken Hailes Ltd, any more than they could compete with the "one-way" political broadcast of Seymour and Story. As Dickens commented on the ACAS inquiry procedure:

"There is nothing in the statute to prevent employer or union action designed to influence the way workers reply to the questions in an ACAS inquiry. The ability to influence employees is, however, not equal as between the parties. The very nature of the situation means an employer has ready access to the employees in a way an unrecognised union does not." (Dickens (1978) pp. 167-168).

Employers also tend to have greater and easier access to resources; TUBE managed just one broadsheet to counteract the propaganda of the Seymour and Story management.

Thus the impact of their utilisation of the recognition procedure was to largely forestall the very self-activity the TUBE leadership wished to supplement; the procedure developed as largely a substitute for - and not an adjunct to - union activity. Does such an opinion extend to the unfair dismissal protections? To act collectively over dismissal implies industrial action and this is left until the concluding part of this section.

In the context of the study of the Redundancy Payments Act, Martin and Fryer noted that the "regulatory effect" of the Act

".... rather than restricting management, has been to take redundancy out of both conflict and the area of collective action and control by workers," (Martin and Fryer (1973) p.250)

Did the unfair dismissal provisions have a similar effect?

Weekes et al duck the question, arguing that you cannot tell what otherwise would have happened without the provisions.
Mellish (1976), however, suggests those who used the provisions were precisely those groups who had little option - otherwise, presumably, they would have taken it. (1) Still, it is a difficult one to prove.

The evidence from TUBE, though, is clear in one respect: there is no recorded case of industrial action over a dismissal. Even when Sawford himself was sacked there was no response. This, however, is a long way from suggesting that had there not existed unfair dismissal provisions, then on some occasions the TUBE membership would have taken action in support of a dismissed colleague.

Nevertheless, the tribunal procedure does offer an alternative method of resolving dismissal from the union point of view; it is therefore continuously posed as an alternative to collective action and/or support and is necessarily divisive in the perspective the union membership may take. Certainly, for instance, over the Sawford dismissal the union spent a good deal of time trying to find out whether he would be covered by the protections, rather than organising support to fight the dismissal: while the alacrity with which TUBE processed unfair dismissal claims through the tribunal system suggests a reconciliation into not fighting dismissals. Essentially, this led the membership into a passive role over dismissals: it was not their issue, but one handled by the union machinery and the legal system. If the dismissal was unfair, then the individual involved would get compensation.

Such divisiveness, created by the existence of an alternative, seemingly rational and just, way of achieving objectives, is shown more clearly in relation to industrial action over recognition and substantive issues. Indeed, there is a period in TUBE’s history which shows particularly

1. Mellish (1976) p.177. He also comments “... the tribunal has a duty to settle the individual complaint it receives and so necessarily treats it in relative isolation from the bargaining context whence it came”. (p.176)
well the uneasy co-existence of industrial action and the recognition procedures under the IRA 1971. This was in 1973, when a newly elected Executive Council decided to take a more militant stand against the major employers and counterposed a policy of industrial action against the accepted wisdom of using the legal recognition procedures. (1)

In the event a compromise was reached: both avenues were explored. Yet this necessarily generated contradictory imperatives for the strategy towards recognition, affecting the potential solidarity of the national stoppages that March and endangering the possibilities of success in TUBE's legal application under Section 45.

This contradiction arose most explicitly in the stoppage in William Hill, where a legal application under Section 45 co-existed with intended industrial action. On the other hand the dispute with Ladbrokes had not been taken into the legal procedure, thus there were no immediate complications regarding industrial action.

It is important here to pinpoint the background to the stoppages and the issues at stake. Firstly, Ladbrokes: TUBE had been relatively unsuccessful in building membership in the company in 1972. The main impetus had come later, rather than earlier in the year, with the substantial support from Newcastle. But in late 1972 and early 1973, TUBE recruited widely from employees of firms recently taken over by Ladbrokes, in London and the Midlands. This gave TUBE solid support in different regions. Without the background of an NIRC application, the

1. This change in policy at this time can be seen against the background of rising militancy on the part of several employee groups who had not been noted for taking industrial action in the past. The media discovered the 'new militants' of the white-collar unions. To take strike action no longer seemed so unusual - an important consideration for the newly organised bookmaking employees. For an opportunist journalistic assessment of this rise of the new militants, see Ferris (1972).
options of which approach to utilise were open. The Executive, following an unfavourable response from the company, decided to stage a one-day stoppage on Saturday, 24th March 1973, when the first major race of the new flat racing season, the Lincolnshire Handicap, was due to take place.\(^{(1)}\) While the Ladbroke dispute was explicitly over recognition, the William Hill one was nominally concerned with the differential conditions of service imposed on their Yorkshire employees. The proposed national stoppage on March 31st grew out of local stoppages in Hull and Leeds in December 1972 and February 1973 respectively. TUBE membership in William Hill was widespread: Scotland, Yorkshire, Lancashire, and the Midlands all had branches where William Hill employees dominated. Against the success of the local stoppages, the Executive hoped that the holding of a national stoppage on Grand National day would be sufficient to ensure substantial concessions from the company.\(^{(2)}\)

In order to explore the relationship between industrial action and the legal procedures for recognition, the dispute in William Hill is examined more closely. It is evident that the contradictions in this relationship emerged in two related forms: firstly, that the existence of different options necessarily made for divisions within the union and thus a weakening of the utilisation of resources; secondly, that the content of the legal process, and the terms of compliance, undermined industrial action.

1. The choice of a one-day stoppage is interesting. Quite clearly it was a demonstration of the extent of support for TUBE and a longer withdrawal of labour might not have received widespread support. But it should be seen against the regular use of one-day stoppages in this period, both against the IRA 1971 and as an industrial tactic, e.g. in the civil service, to draw attention to poor pay and conditions of employment.

2. The two stoppages in William Hill and Ladbrokes were thus timed for successive saturdays and aimed to hit the employers hardest within the limitations of a one-day stoppage, by focussing on big race days.
TUBE had been seeking recognition from William Hill through the legal procedure since mid-1972. Talks had taken place following NIRC directions, but in January 1973 William Hill gave a final, negative, answer to TUBE's requests. By now, however, the issue of the employment conditions for the ex-Windsor employees in William Hill was developing and the movement towards the February stoppage was building up. Yet, simultaneously, Sawford was handling the national question of recognition and decided to take the case back to the NIRC for directions. Consequently, just four days after the TUBE Executive decided to call a national stoppage in William Hill on March 31st, the NIRC met, on February 22nd, to give directions on the recognition dispute.

This spelt problems for TUBE. Under the IRA 1971, no industrial action in furtherance of a recognition claim could be permitted if the case had been placed in the due legal process. It will be remembered that this part of the legislation was specifically intended to eliminate strikes and stoppages arising from recognition disputes. If the NIRC interpreted TUBE's action as a stoppage related to the recognition issue, then the legal application might be ruled out. Taking industrial action thus became a calculated risk - was it worth it or should the union pursue the legal route alone? The dilemma was made more acute by the decision of the NIRC to have a full hearing of the case on March 21st - just ten days before the proposed stoppage. Here the NIRC decided the case should be referred to the CIR for investigation.

Hence the contradictory implications of the different options: the promise of a CIR investigation partially overcame the nine months of frustration. Yet it was dependent on TUBE not taking industrial action on recognition. This constraint was further accentuated by the non-comparability between the legal separation of recognition and other...
issues and the day to day practice of employer and employee relationships. While the law might draw a distinction between wage demands and recognition demands, it is clearly rather fine. Regarding TUBE's efforts to improve the conditions of the William Hill employees, this implied a de facto demand for recognition. As a fundamental challenge to managerial prerogative, it demands that the employer must consider the collective expression of his employees. Thus, despite the specific objectives stipulated in the William Hill stoppages, these issues necessarily spilled over into the realms of recognition.

Given this, the tensions in the policy of the Executive become apparent: taking a more militant position, using industrial action could have disastrous consequences for the alternative route of the legal process. Or, to put it another way, the introduction of a legal road to recognition inhibited the historical processes of collective struggle more usually associated with trade union activity. And for TUBE in early 1973, with a consciously more militant policy in the offing, this contradiction in methods was necessarily resolved in favour of the legal process. For the legal option always remained a live option, not so much due to relationships within the Executive, but in terms of the physical, material problems of organising the membership; and the legal process is self-re-enforcing since it can break down the self-activity of the membership.

The compromise, therefore, between industrial action and the legal process was from the start unequal. Even in the period of TUBE's history where conditions for industrial action and a militant strategy were most favourable, the legislative process could not be successfully challenged as the dominating principle of recognition policy - despite the aspirations of the Executive. The chances of success for the militant strategy were not great; and the debacle of the stoppages in March 1973.
merely served to force the TUBE Executive to place increased reliance on the legal machinery.

To conclude: the experiences of TUBE suggest the recognition procedure is likely to adversely affect self-activity amongst local union membership. This may be achieved by attaching specific conditions to the procedure; yet it will also be the case because of the existence of the procedure itself. It is difficult, however, to be quite so conclusive about the unfair dismissal provisions; nevertheless, given the large number of activists dismissed, the provisions would scarcely have assisted any efforts to fight the dismissals.

Yet there are contradictions: aspects of the procedures did provide potential foci for self-activity, e.g. the CIR investigation or the result of a tribunal hearing. But activity for what? To pursue the demand of recognition? To demand a fairer tribunal hearing? It is not enough to say that certain aspects of the legislation generated activity amongst employee groups. It is also necessary to explore the extent to which this was directed towards which particular issues. This is taken up in the section on dependency; but firstly there is the question of solidarity amongst employees. Any industrial action involves a degree of solidarity - what impact did the legislation have in this respect?
Legislation and worker solidarity

In terms of using the 'traditional' union methods of fighting for recognition or against dismissals, solidarity on the part of the membership is essential. This is not the case in relation to the 'legal fiction' of the state procedures. All that is needed for the operation of the recognition procedure is a reasonable level of membership; while the unfair dismissal provisions suggest collective strength is largely unnecessary. Hence arguments have developed, particularly around unfair dismissal, that the legislation inhibits collective solidarity.

In the case of unfair dismissal, this is through the legitimising of the grievance as individually rather than collectively based:

"The new dismissal law processed individual complaints, offered individual remedies, and - at least at tribunals - generally refrained from entering into the wider circumstances of the case. The law thus paid little regard to the collective interest which workers might express on the issue of an individual's dismissal." (Weekes et al (1975) p.225)

Mellish subsequently takes the argument a further stage:

"Individual cases might be test cases for other individuals, but otherwise they can scarcely be part of a collective strategy by a group engaged in group conflict with an employer. The individualising of conflicts in dismissal law is not accidental. Since Donovan the intention of unfair dismissal law has been to take dismissal questions out of the area of collective industrial disputes by providing an alternative individual remedy." (Mellish (1976) p. 176-177)

If the intentions and the impact of the unfair dismissal provisions has been to individualise the question of dismissal to the detriment of collective activity and organisation, the legislation in this area must necessarily have weakened any solidarity (actual or potential) amongst employees. (1)

1. Mellish is nearer the mark than Weekes et al (and thus his previous position) in that he seems to argue the individualisation of grievances is inherent in the provisions; on the other hand, Weekes et al seem to suggest that if the tribunal would only consider wider questions, collective interests could be accommodated.
There is no comparable concern with the recognition procedures, however, and how these may affect collective unity; yet it is soon apparent there are parallels with the way the unfair dismissal provisions affected collective organisation. Firstly, it can be argued that the procedures necessarily promoted sectionalism through the focus on firm-based units for recognition. Secondly, the restrictions of the bargaining unit necessarily isolated groups of employees within the firms themselves.

TUBE had developed on a system of geographically based branches, where, in local branches, members from different firms were involved. As such, the branch structure provided some potential for cutting across the narrow divisions of issues centred solely on firms. Yet the legal recognition procedure could only be used against individual firms, and in consequence, it can be argued had particular effects on how branch organisation developed both in terms of national union policy and local activity. This was particularly noticeable in 1973 as the union became increasingly involved with the activities of the CIR, and when the union faced the major crisis of declining membership and organisation.

In January 1973, the CIR began its first investigation of a TUBE referral on recognition: Connor and Forbes, the Liverpool based company. Here TUBE had been in competition with a management sponsored staff association, which had affected membership levels. Throughout the first half of 1973, while TUBE had passed through optimism, the one-day stoppages and into decline, the CIR had investigated the affairs of the union and the recognition question in Connor and Forbes. In June 1973, Sawford was informed of the outcome of the CIR investigation: TUBE were to be recommended as sole bargaining agent for Connor and Forbes.
This decision of the CIR brought once again to life the potential of the legal road to recognition. Failures in national and local companies, where membership had been built only for the employers to deny the union, surrounded the Executive. The disappointing, lengthy procedures of the previous year were now offset by the prospects of enforced recognition.

This re-emergence of the legal road to recognition as an attractive proposition occurred at precisely that moment when the more militant policies of the Executive had apparently failed; when the aftermath of the stoppages had indicated the falling away of membership and the possibility of the widespread collapse of branch organisation. The CIR thus offered a potential policy direction when few other options seemed realistic. Hence the favourable report on Connor and Forbes became known at a time when movements both internal and external to TUBE had sunk the 'militant' option to a low point. The influence of the CIR was thus immediately far stronger than might otherwise have been accepted.

Sawford immediately saw the CIR as a means of resolving various problems. He was, in any case, predisposed towards the legal procedure - if it could succeed. Now there was a real possibility of taking further obstinate employers through the Courts, into a CIR investigation and get legal backing for recognition.

Sawford's enthusiasm for the CIR meant that other options could now be closed. The dilemma over retaining full-time officials who failed to pay their way was now resolved: in Newcastle and Stockton, Sawford, having just received news of the union's success in Connor and Forbes, decided that Harry Kirtley and John Joyce could be handled the same way. Walter Lavery, the Full-time officer, was now dispensable.

Thus, on one hand, there are the various aspects of TUBE's development and the changing structure of the bookmaking industry itself which mitigated in favour of using the CIR: the defeats of the more
militant policies, the inability of TUBE to secure local successes, the collapse of branch organisation; all of which were brought sharply into focus with the Connor and Forbes recommendation. And, on the other, the way in which adopting the legislative road necessarily structured policies regarding union organisation. This was the significance of the Lavery dismissal: it emphasised that TUBE in the foreseeable future would give a priority to membership in firms rather than branches. The decline of branch organisation had shaped this tendency, illuminating the contradiction between supporting geographically based branches while needing to secure recognition in firms. In pursuing recognition as a priority over branch development, the decision to utilise the CIR would mean this process would be reinforced: the CIR would investigate firms not branches and the logic of organisation was now changed. It demanded a fire-fighting force rather than a stationed army of officials. Given TUBE's diminishing financial resources, such flexibility could be seen as an advantage.

The price, however, of taking the legal road was severe. It meant the abandoning of branch organisation, as such, in favour of organising isolated firms. The necessary consequences were an increased emphasis on sectionalism - a process which the CIR served to reinforce.

If the effect of the recognition procedure was to pose dilemmas in the way of Sawford's policy towards both recognition and, at this stage, the organisation of the union, the processes also reinforced sectionalism and division within the local branches. Where members in local branches found that the issues concerning their firms were not really taken up by the branch, they generally disappeared from local branch affairs. This happened, for instance, in Liverpool, where the Connor and Forbes employees dominated the branch. The legal procedures exaggerated these differences of interests amongst the membership: why was one group selected for special treatment and not another? That one group was subject to a referral
under Section 45 was an immediate source of difference between union members.

The fragmentation of the union membership, generated and reinforced by the recognition procedures, did not end with the division of firms and branches; there was also the question of solidarity within firms. Recognition could be claimed and granted for a specific section of the workforce. Whichever groups were involved would then comprise a bargaining unit. The CIR, during its investigation, would make recommendations about the size of the bargaining unit, as to whether these were appropriate groups for the union to represent. This almost certainly cut off certain employees from some sections, and in one particular case eliminated a key union activist. On the whole, the CIR were consistent in their recommendations on bargaining units which usually excluded managerial levels external to the LBOs at the top end of the hierarchy, and the cleaners of the LBOs at the lower end. But TUBE were necessarily constrained in relation to building membership by the existence of the 'appropriate' bargaining unit; it was not so much a question of which employees TUBE wished to represent, as to how the 'appropriate' bargaining unit was defined by the state institutions. On some occasions this hampered TUBE, while on others the union found this beneficial.

1. Though not until after the CIR had been 'wound up'. In the Ken Munden case, Paddy Heenan, a leading TUBE member, was forced out of his position as union representative at Ken Munden by Sawford and the TGWU, because he had been promoted outside of the agreed bargaining unit.

2. In an early ballot for an Agency Shop agreement (the IRA 1971 watered-down closed shop), TUBE had been forced to include casual and part-time boardmen and LBO cleaners as part of the bargaining unit - even though they did not wish to represent these groups. The union lost a ballot it might otherwise have won. See Table 8.7

3. e.g. Ken Munden Ltd, where the CIR ruled against the employers efforts to widen the bargaining unit. Even so, in a period of continuing expansion, of concentration and centralisation, the bargaining unit in any firm was always increasing. TUBE, therefore, had to increase membership just to sustain the same union density.
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This suggests, however, that contradictions in the impact did exist: if the bargaining unit, on one hand, splits off certain employee groups, on the other, it implies a unifying of those who are contained in the bargaining unit. Similarly, while the procedures may have emphasised firms and not geographical branches, simultaneously it might be seen as providing a unifying effect within the firms - of particular importance in relation to multiples, e.g. the William Hill reference. In other words, it may be incorrect to see the procedures as operating to break down collective strength, but rather as prompting a particular brand of solidarity: firm-oriented, with 'rational' divisions between groups to be represented and those who are not. Once again this raises the issue of union objectives and how these were structured by the commitment to and use of the legal procedures: this is taken up in the next and final section.

(4) Legislation and union dependency

"We were a little afraid of the law getting into the picture, on the theory you start to depend on the law to organise, the first thing you know you'll be controlled by law." (1)

The discussion in the previous sections has already touched on the question of union dependency: firstly, in the extent to which the legal procedure generates passivity amongst the local union membership and, insofar as a measure of local activity is induced by the legislation, the ends to which such activity is directed; secondly, in the way provisions on recognition and unfair dismissal can promote divisions and sectionalist tendencies amongst the membership, while, insofar as it brings groups together, in the context of what objectives. In this section it is argued that the full implications of union dependency on legal provisions must be understood not merely in terms of debilitating activity and solidarity, but in the way specific objectives of the union membership are supplanted.

1. George Meany quoted in Hart (1978) p. 214
It is not a question that, in these terms, has received a great deal of attention. The objective of 'recognition', as shown in Chapter 6, has been used unproblematically in the mainstream approaches of British industrial relations; yet it is surely correct that the highly formalised, procedural, notion of recognition promoted by the institutions in the state procedure is rather different to the immediate objectives of employees in the workplace: their demands are for changes in substantive issues, not procedural containment. To that extent, the legal procedures tended to supplant the original objectives of the workforce through their involvement. 'Recognition' was promoted as the key demand within the procedures and by the union leadership of TUBE; and this implied a particular policy orientation, fragmenting the demands of securing gains for the employees into gaining success at the NIRC and a favourable report from the CIR, as if the travelling was more important than where the union and its members eventually arrived. The argument pursued here is that the more the union embraced the legal procedures, the more objectives were defined in terms of formalistic recognition and the consequent changes in organisation made TUBE increasingly dependent upon the procedures and the sponsorship of state institutions.

A little more has been said which can help in understanding the way unfair dismissal provisions substituted a different objective for union activity. Weekes et al hint at this in their exposition of the provisions as oriented to compensation. Martin and Fryer, however, draw out the point most clearly in relation to the Redundancy Payments Act and the application of management philosophies in terms of 'formalism' and 'human relations':
"In short, the primary concern of both philosophies is not so much to validate the worker's own definition of the problem redundancy but rather to encourage him to adapt himself to the managerial definition, which, in turn, redefines the worker's problem to what happens to him after he has been declared redundant." (Martin and Fryer (1973) p. 242).

Using the tribunal system may therefore confuse union objectives; it may channel resources away from fighting the dismissal to fighting for compensation. This again has particular consequences for union organisation and how it is developed: if the aim is to fight dismissal this involves building a very different organisation to one which specialises in compensation.

Mellish has taken the view that in practice unions are unlikely to face the problem in such acute terms:

"It is extremely unlikely that where employees have a collective interest in a certain practice which contravenes employer's rules, they will let an employer enforce such rules - albeit with procedural and other safeguards insisted on by tribunals - simply because of the availability of tribunals in cases where procedures or good personnel management practices have not been followed." (Mellish (1976) p. 177)

Those that possess collective strength, in this view, will not use tribunal provisions; only the unorganised or those with "little collective strength" will use the provisions. (ibid p. 177)

As a contemporary comment on these new "protections", this may be a fair reflection of the impact of the IRA 1971. Yet as a more general point it contains a severe flaw, for there is a certain circularity: is it the case that those who are not organised use the unfair dismissal provisions, or is it that those who use the unfair dismissal provisions remain unorganised? The tribunal system is not merely an external option which may be pulled into use as a last resort. Its existence permeates the very nature of union organisation, carrying implications for the way the organisation is developed. In this sense, the unfair dismissal
provisions - as with the recognition procedure - divides the attention of employees, emphasising different objectives and different means of achieving them than the 'traditional' union self-activity. For a small union such as TUBE these contradictions were quickly resolved, within two years of its formation, in extreme dependency on the legal structures for its continued existence. As Hart argues in relation to America, the process of dependency with larger unions takes a longer time. (Hart (1978) p. 215)

How did TUBE become so dependent on the legal procedures - especially the recognition - and what were the consequences? Sawford and others on the TUBE Executive viewed the legal procedures as the means of resurrecting the union from its decline in 1973, yet the impact of the procedural emphasis was eventually to add to the decline of the union, rather than to support it. The dependence of TUBE on the CIR, especially in the latter part of 1973, was almost explicit and reached a new level in the Autumn of that year.

At this time, six new references were under investigation by the CIR. Elsewhere events were cementing the relationship between TUBE and the CIR. In September, the Connor and Forbes employees had returned to the NIRC to demand an enforcing ballot on the CIR recommendations; a ballot which TUBE duly won in November 1973, making the CIR recommendations legally binding. And while events progressed favourably in one long standing reference, in another, the William Hill reference, a critical stage had been reached. The preliminaries had at last been resolved and a ballot was scheduled for October 1973.

This deepseated involvement of the CIR with TUBE had important consequences for the future of the union. As the CIR became more involved in the industrial relations of the bookmaking industry, those in charge of the investigations confronted problems regarding the viability of TUBE and the overall strategy they should take to employee representation. This
problem was particularly acute in relation to William Hill, one of the largest bookmaking firms, and of key significance to the future of unionism in the industry.

This combined with a feeling among the CIR investigators and shared by the Commissioner responsible, that this was an area where the CIR could play a constructive role in promoting collective bargaining. With the TUC unions not registering under the IRA 1971, such opportunities were few and far between. As they became more involved, the CIR began to 'sponsor' TUBE, taking on duties outside of their normal routines and providing advice in an unofficial capacity; while the problems the William Hill reference posed provided the CIR with the justification to intervene in the general direction of the union and promote amalgamation in a positive, yet delicate, manner.

To the CIR, TUBE appeared a most peculiar organisation and one about which they were immediately unsure. Alan Scouller was the Commissioner in Charge of the CIR investigations of TUBE:

"I had doubts as to whether the union could possibly survive. It was a dilemma: chuck it up then no collective bargaining; or do you give it a chance and suggest a merger in the longer term." (1)

This was the CIR policy from their earliest involvement with TUBE and Scouller soon broached the subject with Sawford and Don Bruce:

"We suggested mergers, but Don Bruce was very anti and George Sawford said the Executive were against." (2)

But in the Autumn of 1973, events came to a head. Greater CIR involvement combined with the organisational and financial problems of TUBE, posed the question of continued CIR support for TUBE in a more acute fashion:

"The union was running into debt by now and was pretty shaky. We were getting nervous about how far we could recommend them to stay alive." (3)

1. Interview Alan Scouller 24.8.76
2. Ibid
3. Ibid
The crucial point of this dilemma came with the key William Hill reference. The October ballot of the 3,500 employees had produced real problems for the CIR investigators: a majority had wanted some form of representation (63%), with most favouring TUBE (58.5%); but only 16.4% were TUBE members. Could the CIR make a recommendation supporting TUBE while the membership was that small?

The CIR investigators decided that it was now essential to tread carefully in their recommendations and that this demanded a substantial appraisal of TUBE as a viable union. At the same time, the William Hill issue provided an excellent opportunity to promote their sponsorship of TUBE and push the idea of an amalgamation. So the CIR took action outside of their normal remit:

"We came to the conclusion we should try to see the whole of the Executive of TUBE. It was very different normally. But we met them in a hotel in London." (1)

That meeting took place on Sunday, November 25th 1973, and the CIR attended in force. In addition to Scouller, at least four other CIR representatives attended, including Bill Thomas, who was in immediate charge of the investigations. The TUBE Executive had been given a proposed agenda and had discussed these issues at a special meeting earlier that month: finances, branch structure, union organisation, and strategy towards recognition. The facts were dismal: debts of £5,000, poor membership trends, and a collapsing branch structure.

TUBE strategy was to throw the problem back on the CIR. Success would come if only the CIR would issue favourable reports. The CIR, on the other hand, took a different line - success would come from a secure financial organisation - and pushed the amalgamation:

"Although I'd been told by George Sawford that the Executive had thrown out a merger, I put it to them. I was surprised they didn't tell me to mind my own business ... When I suddenly suggested merging it was quite obvious they hadn't even discussed it." (2)
Over the next few months the CIR reinforced the notion of amalgamation. In January 1974 they told the TUBE Executive that specific conditions on financial and organisational stability would be attached to any favourable recommendation on William Hill. TUBE could never meet these conditions unless there was a major upturn in their fortunes. Hence the carrot of the William Hill reference was reinforced by the stick of organisational viability, raising continuously the issue of amalgamation. More positively, Scouller consulted a contact in the TGWU and gave Sawford his name. There can be little doubt that the advocacy of the CIR of the TGWU as a potential partner had a determining influence on the direction in which TUBE sought to amalgamate. (1)

So the impact of the CIR at national level was primarily to urge TUBE into the mainstream of the trade union movement. To this end, the William Hill reference was used as a suitable lever. By the time the final report had been issued, the TUBE Executive had already voted to join the TGWU. What can be drawn from TUBE's experience with the CIR is the essentially contradictory role of that agency in the legal recognition procedure. It is important to note the centrality of the CIR stage in that procedure: the NIRC was a hurdle to overcome, but the CIR offered tangible support - an authoritative, potentially legal backing to a recognition claim. A favourable CIR report could become legally binding; it could mean legally enforced recognition. Employers would thus break the law if they defied TUBE in such circumstances.

1. The repeal of the IRA 1971 by the newly elected Labour Government in 1974 was hailed as a major victory for the trade union movement. For TUBE, however, both the threat and the actuality of the repeal prompted a whole area of uncertainty within the union. At the beginning of March 1974, on the day before the formation of a Labour Government was announced, the TUBE Executive was in the midst of deciding to amalgamate with the TGWU. Within the month that decision had been made firm. The indications are that TUBE found yet another pressure exerting on them to join another union - the uncertain future of any legal recognition procedure.
Yet this notion that the CIR could play a supportive role in collective bargaining, aiding groups such as bookmaking employees to overcome the physical problems of organising and intransigent employers, was immediately contradicted by the practice of the CIR in their investigations. The experience of TUBE illustrated earlier in this section shows how the time the investigations took made it difficult for the union to maintain membership; how delays in balloting could give employers the opportunity to pressurise their employees not to support the union; how delays in making decisions disillusioned local union organisation; and how an unwarranted preoccupation with conciliation compounded these problems. Where the TUBE membership was not already strong, the practice of the CIR investigations served to reinforce their weaknesses. In precisely those cases where TUBE needed the assistance of the CIR, it was not sufficiently forthcoming.

This contradiction between potential and practice of the CIR was reflected in the distinction between the national policy of the CIR towards TUBE and the local practice of the investigating teams. Investigations necessarily focussed on firms and it has been argued at length that this generated sectionalist tendencies within the membership and both prompted and reinforced the decline of branch organisation. Yet nationally, as the CIR became involved in TUBE's internal affairs, one of the conditions of continued support for TUBE was the maintenance and reconstruction of branch organisation.

This disjuncture highlights a very important problem for weakly organised groups. For the CIR, favourable support on recognition issues depended on pre-existing financial and organisational viability. Yet for weakly organised groups - those who might see their only recourse in terms of such state agencies - the support of the CIR could provide the basis of such stability. Again, the position of the TUBE Executive illustrates this in their hopes of reforming branches and building membership on the basis of CIR recommendations.
Given this, agencies such as the CIR can scarcely offer organisations like TUBE any continuity of support. Such unions are judged by the standards of the organisationally solid and financially sound trade unions in the mainstream of the movement. Which means the only long-term option for such agencies is to promote amalgamation as a lasting solution, to integrate unions and groups such as TUBE into the established trade unions - precisely the course taken by the CIR.

For the CIR this policy posed its very own peculiar contradiction: that an agency of a government who introduced the IRA 1971, was advocating that a trade union registered under this piece of legislation should join another who was not. Such a bizarre position reflected the shambles of the IRA 1971. Yet it does point to the autonomy the CIR enjoyed and actively pursued, prizing the objective of collective bargaining above that of legalistic obligations.

This leads to the concluding discussion concerning the sponsorship of TUBE by the CIR. This is central to the understanding of how the CIR acted towards TUBE and raises important questions regarding the dependence of unions on such agencies.

The CIR sponsorship of TUBE has been largely described in terms of national events: how the CIR urged TUBE to amalgamate; how the Commissioner and investigators had gone beyond their normal activities in meeting the Executive of TUBE to discuss and tentatively advise on their problems; how the groundwork was laid for a link-up with the TGWU; and so on. Such involvement also spilled over into the references themselves. These included services the CIR might have provided generally, but in relation to TUBE they seemed to border on the generous side, e.g. the organising of shop steward training in Liverpool for Connor and Forbes stewards; organising publicity for the publication of the William Hill report; and the provision of extensive comments on draft agreements.
as the views of the team investigating TUBE references, not to be confused with official Commission activity.

Sponsorship involved an increasing dependence for TUBE on the CIR, not merely as a source of authoritative support, but as a resource, as a purveyor of information and contacts. On one hand, that an agency such as the CIR might be necessary in such situations is a poor reflection on the trade union movement and on the attention paid to newly and/or weakly organised groups. On the other, the question of whether there should be an agency such as the CIR providing such information, embracing the values of 'responsible' collective bargaining is even more acute. It both denies the self-activity of the unionists concerned and structures the solutions to their problems in a specific way. And for organisations such as TUBE, such answers are incompatible with their continued, organisationally-independent, existence.

(v) Concluding Comments on TUBE and the procedurisation of Industrial Relations through state intervention.

In conclusion the implications of TUBE's experience must be broadened as widely as possible; and the argument that is put forward suggests the consequence of utilising the legal procedure is not only to prompt a reformulation of objectives of trade unions, but serves to emphasise a particular kind of unionism which is the mirror image of capitalist commodity production and exchange.

Consider unfair dismissal: the record of TUBE in unfair dismissal was certainly a good one - Sawford could and did claim this as a major success of the union and was broadcast to the membership (actual and potential) as such. Nevertheless, while it stands as a real achievement, it deprived scarce resources from building effective organisation to combat the dismissal in the first place. Arguably, it could show the union as doing something, which might be particularly important where membership
But it remains the case that this is a substitute objective for developing collective organisation; it is a second best 'soft' option which in the face of the daunting task of establishing a union organisation, both the union leadership and the membership are tempted to take.

Similarly with recognition. Using the procedure throws the emphasis away from the membership. This may not be conducive to self-activity, but it does seemingly remove the burden from the employees involved and render the local struggle less important - indeed irrelevant. Again the procedure appears as a 'soft' option, as a means of getting recognition without fighting for it.

The consequence is to generate a particular brand of trade unionism, and not one that is merely 'responsible' in collective bargaining and reluctant to take industrial action. It is one which separates the union and the membership, reifying the union as an organisation which delivers the goods, provides the service, or indeed sells a commodity. It is this crucial denial of self-activity, of the non-identification of the membership with the union, which underlies the failure of TUBE in 1973-74. The leadership could provide expert advice and representation at tribunals or in processing and supporting Section 45 applications, but the experience (and even the will on occasions) was lacking in helping the self-activity of the membership and in presenting the identity of the union and the membership. Perhaps the most commonly heard phrase in talking to union activists (besides "if ever an industry needed a union this one does") was "nothing is happening" or the "union is doing nothing". But who is the "union"?

1. One TUBE representative in the Birmingham area was in such a position. His response was to make employers pay as this was the only way to get at them.

2. Nichols and Beynon (1977) pp. 161-162 also discuss the union as a service organisation in the experience of workers, identifying a further aspect - that such a view tends to limit unionism to the workplace to the detriment of any wider union movement.
It might have been expected that this distinction between the "union" and the "membership" would have been overcome following the TGWU amalgamation. This, of course, would have reckoned without the TGWU organising policies. But now there was a 'good' piece of labour (sic) legislation on the statute books which was an entirely different matter to the 'pernicious' Tory model. Unfortunately, the EPA 1975 took some time to go through Parliament and for a long while there was no recognition procedure. Even so, this did not daunt the advocators of the state procedure. The cry was now "just wait till the legislation comes in"; and until then its really only a holding policy. (1)

The consequences of such a policy have been two-fold: on the one hand TUBE developed as a 'slot-machine' union, where the union provided services in respect of subscriptions; on the other, the failure of the legal procedures in recognition is blamed diffusely at the door of the union - the union is "doing nothing", etc. These are the directions in which TUBE was pushed through the adherence of the union to legal procedures: it was not so much debilitating of the union as prompting the union into a form reminiscent of the fetishism of capitalist economy.

1. Even when Ken Munden cancelled the recognition agreement in 1975, Sawford decided not to do anything until the EPA 1975 came into force. By that time, the membership was beyond recall.
PART THREE

CONCLUSIONS.
Part 3:

Conclusions

The intention of this concluding section is to return to some of the issues and problems which have been raised in previous chapters, in particular those which involve the use of the concepts set out in Part 1, and consider how those discussions can be informed by the bookmaking study. The crucial area concerns the basis of unionization as developed in Chapter 2. There it was argued that unionization is fundamentally located in the social antagonisms inherent in capitalist production and derives its main inspiration for both its collective nature and internal structure in the simultaneous social and technical differentiation of the labour process.

In this discussion a range of concepts were used and a series of questions can at this stage be raised. Firstly, what is the nature of the social antagonisms inherent in capitalist production? More specifically, is the distinction between those who own and control the means of production and those who are merely wage-labourers a viable one? In turn this leads to the use of the notion of interests as a way of exploring the implications of this division. Secondly, there is the process through which the socialization of the labour process generates both the basis for common interests and divisions amongst wage-labourers; this contradictory effect of the expansion of social productivity within capitalism necessarily informs the structure of workplace collectivities. But can unionization be seen as a particular form of workers resistance linked to phases of capitalist domination - in particular, formal and real subordination? Thirdly, the impact of the devaluation of labour power has frequently been discussed in terms of deskilling, a debate which in recent times has centred on Braverman's portrayal of the diminution of craft controls. Any analysis based on
the labour process must consider the issues raised here; is the 'deskilling hypothesis' valid and what are the implications for workers resistance?

1. **Social Antagonisms in Capitalist Production: Interests reconsidered**

The concept of interests was introduced in Chapter 2. Here some attempt was made to show how the use of this concept varied between different theoretical approaches. In particular, how interests tend to be connected with expressed wants or actions in the broadly pluralist perspectives while more radical views tried to go beyond this reliance on subjectivity by relating interests to the position of people in society. Within Marxist frameworks the class division of interests has been emphasised, which implies the existence of inherent conflict between the owners of capital, the means of production, on one side and wage-labourers on the other.

In non-Marxist approaches, the existence of a fundamental class antagonism is problematic and necessarily refuted. Those adopting a 'unitary' perspective deny conflicts exist, while pluralists admit conflicts of interest, but not of a class nature and not ones that are irresolvable. (Fox 1973). It is not usual for writers who claim to be writing within a Marxist tradition to argue that interests are not fundamentally conflictual; but recent contributions from Michael Burawoy attempt to do so and some consideration of his ideas provides a useful concluding discussion on the question of interests.1

Burawoy (1978) notes the development by Marx - adopted in recent times by many writers on the labour process, including Braverman (1974) - of the fundamental opposition between labour and capital. This he views 1. Burawoy's position is developed here rather than in Chapter 1 for two reasons. Firstly his formulation of interests would not have had any significant impact on the way the concept was subsequently utilised. Secondly, his approach can be usefully contrasted with the conclusions drawn from the Bookmaking study, which is most appropriately taken up at this stage.
in the following way:

"the economic relationship of capital to labour is zero sum - the gains of capital are always at the expense of labour."  (Burawoy (1978) p. 255).

But in posing the question as to how the working class recognise that their interests are opposed to those of capital, Burawoy notes that class struggle, the process by which this recognition occurs, does not always act to expose their differences but may well be the motor which

".... mollifies the opposition of interests and frequently co-ordinates the interests of labour and capital."  (ibid, p.256).

The analytical basis for this Burawoy characterises as the distinction between exchange value and use value. Whereas in terms of exchange value capital and labour are involved in a zero sum game, in terms of use-value the 'game' is non zero sum. This is connected to the expressed actions and needs of workers through their experience. Burawoy argues that workers do not understand their interests in terms of exchange value, but "in terms of the actual commodities they can purchase with their wage" (ibid p.256). The ability of capital to make concessions to workers in advanced capitalist economies following increasing social productivity is therefore seen by Burawoy as the means of producing common interests between labour and capital; and is put forward in opposition to the orthodox Marxist view that interests are inherently antagonistic.

There is also a second theme to Burawoy's approach:

"The crucial issue is that the interests that organize the daily life of workers are not given irrevocably; they cannot be imputed; they are produced and reproduced in particular ways. To assume, without further specification, that the interests of capital and labour are opposed leads to serious misunderstandings over the nature of capitalist control if only because it provides an excuse to ignore the ideological terrain where interests are organised."  (ibid p.256-257).

1. Burawoy's continuous use of game to describe the relationships between labour and capital is symptomatic of his position as an observer of that relationship rather than a participant.
The implications of this assertion are not spelt out until his book on manufacturing consent. Here, the notion of what Burawoy means by interests becomes more clear. Where do interests come from? They "clearly emerge out of ideology" (Burawoy (1979) p.19).

Burawoy, in attempting to escape from the continuing dichotomy of "actual and postulated behaviour" which underpins the distinctions between "rationality and irrationality, logical and non-logical behaviour, interests real and false, short and long-term, immediate and fundamental" (ibid p.19),

suggests that interests arise out of ideology. This would certainly seem to oppose the main strands of Marxist theory, and the position taken in this thesis. It might be useful to ask what Burawoy means by ideology. Unfortunately this is not clearly defined, but there are some hints. For instance,

"ideology expresses the way people experience relations, so it is through ideology that men become conscious of conflict and fight it out." (ibid p.18).

Does this mean that interests arise out of experience? If so Burawoy would appear clearly aligned with Edward Thompson - and therefore subject to the same criticisms as made earlier in this thesis (see Chapter 4).

So while Burawoy makes a useful contribution in pointing out the mechanical nature of distinctions between short and long term interests, he does not seem in his theoretical sections to outline the sources of interests or how these can be analysed. Quite clearly he is correct to suggest that

"the problem is to explain interests in any given situation not to describe them empirically." (ibid p.19).

But the basis for that explanation cannot remain entirely in the realms of ideology as he is suggesting. To argue that interests arise from ideology (or experience) is merely to pose the question what determines ideology or experience.
Also problematic is Burawoy’s distinction of exchange value and use value. Firstly, it would seem misplaced to make this separation at the level of analysis of workers’ experience. To complain that wages are too low could be either a statement about the lack of use values that can be purchased or an expression of workers’ dissatisfaction with the “effort bargain” at the workplace. Furthermore, it is entirely questionable whether workers do understand their interests in terms of use values rather than exchange values. Or - in Burawoy’s terminology - it would seem unlikely that workers merely assess their position in terms of their absolute level of pay; the importance of pay differentials, employers’ demands on productivity, and the extent of employers profits constitute important influences on how workers may assess their wage levels - independent of the use values that may be bought with their wage. The contradiction in Burawoy’s approach is that it is in precisely those periods of increasing social productivity when interests would become co-ordinated because capital can make concessions, that workers may see opportunities to pursue wage demands as a consequence of increasing productivity; which may in turn provide further problems for capital as workers continue to demand wage increases at the expense of profits.

Finally, there is a tendency to reduce the relationships between use and exchange values to an entirely economic one. The range of issues that workers may take up do not only concern wages; other demands may reflect the exploitative basis of capitalist production. Irrespective of the ‘concrete coordination’ of interests over the economic aspect of use values, workers may still find themselves having conflicting interests with employers over other issues.

In Chapter 4, the complexity of the range of workers’ expressed interests was developed; it was certainly not reducible to a general distinction between use value and exchange value. Expresssed interests covered wide
ranging areas, and their coherence, it was argued, depended on a
careful analysis of the changing labour process at that time;
furthermore, they reflected the relations of production, whereby workers
saw how the profits made within their industry were being used to
finance other activities rather than their wage packet.

On the other hand, the position taken by Burawoy that interests are
not given irrevocably does receive some support in the complexity of
interests expressed by the Bookmaking employees. In particular, the
introduction of retailing bookmaking had a contradictory effect, some
for instance found workloads increased but others found they had
decreased. Clearly, this brought some groups into conflict with retailing
bookmaking and the efforts of employers to change the labour process;
while others found they would certainly benefit in some way from these
changes. But this proved to be far from a co-ordination of interests -
merely a less dissatisfying exploitation.

If Burawoy is suggesting this kind of contradiction of interests cannot
be determined in abstraction, then clearly the bookmaking study would
confirm this view; yet to suggest that the basis of this conflict and
contradiction must be derived from and within the ideological terrain
appears a very strange conclusion to draw. The argument put forward in
this thesis has been that the material development of the labour process
and the contradictions inherent in capitalist development to throw up
contradictions in interests. But this has not been by ideological analysis,
but historical analysis: the attempt to comprehend the position of
workers and why they unionise through studying the historical development
of the Bookmaking industry within a capitalist economy - the construction
of historical moments within a conceptual framework.
Burawoy's conception of interests is perhaps a little too one-sided. He tends not to separate out different kinds of interests, but to assign them in a uniform way. Conflicts of interests are not evident — partly because he writes in opposition to the fairly crude dichotomies of Short/long term and immediate/fundamental interests. The bookmaking study does indeed give support to the view that these distinctions are not a useful way of approaching interests. The complexity and contradiction of the expressed wants of the bookmaking workers indicate that different interests are held concurrently in their complexity and in contradiction.
2. Unionisation and Formal and Real Subordination

One important objective of this thesis was to establish a way in which the circularity of the industrial relations 'system' could be overcome. Consideration of the labour process was essential to this approach for it raised the relationships within and between employers and employees in such a way that explanations of 'industrial relations' did not merely rest on internal pressures. Unionization was therefore related to capitalist society via the labour process to patterns of capital accumulation and the traditions of workers' experience.

Some writers have been content, as seen in Chapter 1, to make limiting assumptions about the nature of industrial relations systems, which necessarily calls into question the validity and utility of their approaches. Others have, however, seen the importance of linking the development of unionization to changes within the overall pattern of the industry concerned. A good example is Hawkins (1973) in his study of the brewery industry in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

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1. The mainstream industrial relations writers would fall into this category. Notably, in the UK context, Flanders and Bain. See above Chapter 1.

2. Hawkins (1973) outlines the transition of the brewery industry from predominantly "old-established family interests" to large-scale national companies by the end of the 1960s. The consequence was both a restructuring in the commercial operations of public houses, involving extensive closures, and the reconstruction of relationships between the brewery owners and the licensed house tenants, with the companies attempting to utilise an increasing number of licensed house managers. The formation of tenants associations and the National Association of Licensed House Managers (NALHM) is seen against this background. While Hawkins provides virtually no useful connection between the changes in the industry and unionisation - it is virtually assumed that workers join unions - it is clear that without his analysis of the brewing industry and its historical changes, the growth of unionisation cannot be adequately understood.
While Mars and Mitchell (1976) illustrate the 'backcloth' approach - changes in the structure of the industry are identified as important, but remain unconnected (by the authors) to the growth of unionization. (1) Arguably, the labour process approach would assist the explanations put forward in these - and similar - attempts to understand unionization. For instance, Hawkins' tendency to 'read-off' unionization from wage-labour would surely be enhanced by a more thorough analysis of the differentiation of wage-labour in the brewery industry and a specific understanding of relationships between workers within the labour process. Mars and Mitchell's approach provides a direct comparison with the Bookmaking study given their emphasis on 'fiddling'. In this thesis an attempt has been made to show the historical relevance of 'fiddling' as a response by the Bookmaking workers and to indicate the pressures, both within the industry and outside it, which have encouraged or discouraged this kind of option.

There is little of this kind of discussion in Mars and Mitchell, where fiddling is presented as the crucial barrier to unionization and where the absence is seen as the explanation for the growth of collective organisation and action amongst hotel workers; they are forced into this unnecessary abstraction because they have not adequately specified the historical development of the labour process in relation to the changes in the hotel industry.

1. Mars and Mitchell (1976) is a good example of a recent approach where the authors clearly feel it is necessary to paint a background picture of the industry they are interested in, but fail to draw out the implications for the workforce. Despite the discussion of centralised ownership, the increasing central control over the unit managers, and the involvement of conglomerates in the Hotel and Catering Industry, Mars and Mitchell produce a monocausal explanation for unionization - that many employees receive a substantial proportion of their total "pay" in a form other than wages; unionization would reduce the scope for fiddling. Whether or not this represents a useful or accurate way of looking at unionization, it possesses an inherent weakness without any coherent discussion of the labour process. There is no discussion of the relationships between workers; indeed there is little information on the job structure in the industry and any bases for collective action amongst and between different groups of workers.
This thesis therefore represents an attempt to move beyond the assumptions underlying mainstream industrial relations approaches concerning the developments in specific industries and their relationship to forms of workers organisations. In Bookmaking this involved the linking of the changes in the labour process to the wider industry reconstruction and the imperatives under which individual bookmaking firms operated, e.g. the pressures of legal restriction, the development of horseracing, and the involvement of established capital. Different phases of the bookmaking industry saw the continued reconstruction of the labour process and the consequential changes in the relationships between the workers involved.

The efforts of employers to change the social and technical organisation of work in this way underpinned both the potential for collective organisations and the forms of action workers were likely to take.

The response to this approach from other writers may well fall into two categories. No doubt those who have developed their understanding of industrial relations on the basis that capitalism does not exist will continue to do so and find the arguments in this thesis irrelevant. On the other hand, some may agree in spirit with the approach, accepting that the labour process must be understood in terms of the exigencies of valorisation, but may argue this is not done as precisely as it might be.

It is useful at this stage to open up a dialogue, if somewhat limited, with the second group and perhaps take up one issue that seems to deserve attention: the potential link between unionization and formal and real subordination.

The potential significance of formal and real subordination is the way in which this distinction specifies a transition in the relationship between labour and capital. It therefore encapsulates a change which might delineate certain kinds of responses from workers rather than others and hence a link to unionisation may be inferred. To explore this further
it is necessary to consider precisely what comprises the distinction between these different patterns of subordination. (1)

The term 'Formal subordination' was used by Marx to indicate the initial dominance of the labour process by valorisation; it has become a capitalist and therefore exploitative relationship - one which necessarily involves the social relationship of wage-labour. For Marx, formal subordination implied a particular change in the labour process:

"... does not in itself imply a fundamental modification in the real nature of the labour process, the actual process of production. On the contrary, the fact is that capital subsumes the labour process as it finds it, that is to say, it takes over an existing labour process, developed by different and more archaic modes of production". (Marx (1976) p.1021. Emphasis in original).

Operating within the constraints of a labour process not developed by capital, but merely inherited, valorisation is confronted by inherent limitations. Formal subordination is characterised by a particular method of surplus value production:

"... given a pre-existing mode of labour ... surplus-value can be created only by lengthening the working day, i.e. by increasing absolute surplus-value. In the Formal subsumption of labour under capital, this is the sole manner of producing surplus-value." (ibid p.1021) Emphasis in original.

Real subordination, on the other hand, builds on formal subordination: and constitutes the development of a specifically capitalistic mode of production:

"On this foundation there now arises a technologically and otherwise specific mode of production - capitalist production - which transforms the nature of the labour process and its actual conditions. Only when that happens do we witness the real subsumption of labour under capital." (ibid pp. 1034-1035. Emphasis in original).

1. The term used here is 'subordination', while 'subsumption' appears in Marx (1976). It seems the precise characterization of this relationship cannot be adequately expressed in English, which accounts for different writers using different words. 'Subordination' possesses the dominance of capital over labour, but in a way which suggests their concrete independence of each other. Labour is part of Capital however and in this sense their relationship is more accurately presented as one where Capital subsumes Labour. 'Subsumption' does not however, contain any meaning within the English Language and for this reason 'subordination' is preferred. See Cressey and Maclnnes (1980) p.24 F/N 12 for different arguments as to why 'subordination' is preferred.
In this way

"... capital employs labour materially as well as formally: the production process is created by capital, the worker is slotted into it." (Cressey and MacInnes (1980) p. 8).

This transition creates new opportunities for valorisation with new forms of surplus value production:

"If the production of absolute surplus value was the material expression of the formal subsumption of labour under capital, then the production of relative surplus value may be viewed as its real subsumption." (Marx (1976) p. 1025)

The distinction between formal and real subordination possesses both analytical and historical content for Marx. It enables him to differentiate patterns of subordination in relation to valorisation; yet these are simultaneously historical progressions which underpin his comprehension of the development of British capitalism. As such, the developments involved in this transition necessarily impinge on the organisation of the labour process:

"Whereas private ownership of the means of production, divorce of the workers from the means of subsistence, and the wage form give rise to a formal subordination of labour, it is only really materially subordinated when capital can control exactly what the worker does in the workplace, ensuring that the worker orders all his activities to one goal: valorisation" (Cressey and MacInnes (1980) p. 7).

If workers resistance and combinations are linked to the labour process, it follows that different forms of workers' organisations and actions will be connected with different phases of subordination.

"The collective nature of the labour process under capital, both in its early development with formal subordination and in its predominance with real subordination, has implications for the nature of workers' action. While the impulsion of workers to act on their own behalf derives from the nature of capitalist labour in itself, the collective form of the activity is structured in general by the collective form of the labour process." (2)


2. Anon (1979) p. 174. This is an unpublished work on the nature of workers collectivities and combinations. Since it contains ideas which have influenced the discussion of formal and real subordination in these conclusions it is clearly desirable to refer to the work while respecting the author's wish for anonymity.
Once it is established that by real subordination, Elger understands "the development of a complex organisation of specialised labourers, and the intensification and co-ordination of work in that context......" and that this constitutes "...... the initial transformation of the labour process from its inherited basis into a specifically capitalist mode of production..." (ibid p.65)

then workers combinations which develop from the collective worker would appear as necessarily located within the framework of real subordination. Elger would therefore seem drawn into the conclusions that

"..... it seems to be the case that unions are connected to the real subordination of labour to capital. So much is this the case that some have associated unionization with the collective labourer of this mode of capitalist production (e.g. Crompton, following Carchedi)" (Anon (1979) p.228).

Two crucial questions arise from this discussion. Firstly, can such a distinction about the forms of workers resistance be given any general validity? Secondly, if so, can they be related to specific labour processes?

In one sense the link between formal and real subordination to forms of workers resistance seems clearly made. The movement from formal to real subordination is not merely the working through of the law of value, but the reconstruction of social and political domination within capitalist society. To suggest that the nature of workers resistance to capitalism will remain unaffected by changes to the capitalist mode of production would be to deny the significance of wage-labour itself. But once it is seen this is little more than a truism - for the argument is essentially circular - the issue becomes whether changes in the capitalist mode are usefully explored in this way.

One approach which forcefully argues against the dichotomy of formal and real subordination is that of Cressey and MacInnes (1980).

There are a number of strands to their criticisms, but in particular they point out the way in which the progression of unproblematic capitalist control over labour implied by the distinction (and even in the
terminology itself), masks the contradictions which capital faces during this process.

"It is precisely because capital must surrender the use of its means of production to labour that capital must to some degree seek a co-operative relationship with it, unite labour with the means of production and maximise the social productivity and powers of co-operation. Here is the central point of our critique of the Real Subordination of Labour. The two-fold nature of the relationship of capital to labour in the workplace implies directly contradictory strategies for both labour and capital which in turn represent the working out of the contradictions between the forces and relations of production at the level of the workplace itself." (Cressey and MacInnes (1980) p.14 Emphasis in original).

The implications of this critique - not only in relation to the general division of formal and real subordination, but to the relationship with specific labour processes - is immediately evident. Does the distinction obscure more than it reveals? Is it restricted to the highest levels of generality? Some writers have tried to connect formal and real subordination with specific labour processes. Marx's own discussion tends to be located in the transition of master-journeyman relationships to those of manufacture and then machinefacture. It has a specific historical context - the early-mid 19th century in Britain; Braverman's analysis is largely based on the elimination of craft practice by capital between the 19th and 20th centuries, while Elger's discussion of the transition of the movement from formal to real subordination (and corresponding surplus value production) tends to be located in late 19th and early 20th century, British and American capitalism.

The problem is clearly one of levels of analysis, the relationship between the general and the specific, how one informs the other. Marx, Braverman and Elger are all attempting to locate the changing structure of work organisation within the general tendencies of capitalist economy.

1. In particular they argue that the real subordination of labour fails to consider the significance of use-value production. See Cressey and MacInnes (1980) pp12 - 14.
their understanding of specific labour processes both informs and depends upon these general tendencies. Yet all are concerned with particular historical epochs which are not chosen randomly but because they represent important stages, not only in the transition of specific industries, but of the economy as a whole. Arguably they might be seen as historical conjunctures where the processes of formal and real subordination are closely and directly entwined with developments in the social and technical organisation of work in crucial industries.

However, once those transitions have occurred the situation has changed. The utility of formal and real subordinates in relation to specific labour processes is diminished since the mode of production now embraces real subordination. To put the point bluntly, if the transition from formal and real subordination is used to explain the historical transitions of British industry in the 19th century, how can that analysis be utilised to the same effect and in the same way to labour processes in the latter half of the 20th century? In the former case the analysis concerned the mode of production as a whole and not just the specific industry. In the latter, it merely becomes nonsensical.

Consider the Bookmaking Industry. How would the progression from formal to real subordination provide an understanding of the labour process? Presumably the late 19th century and early 20th century represented growing formal subordination of labour as small bookmaking firms developed soon to be followed by real subordination with the division of labour in the credit offices. Yet what about the subsequent development of LBOs? In the 1960s this would seem to possess the characteristics of 'formal' subordination prior to the 'real' subordination of retailing bookmaking. The arguments of Cressey and MacInnes do seem to have relevance here - why bother to use concepts which conflate the
contradictions of capitalist economy and serve merely as a 'dustbin' for a range of influences?

Moving away from the specific labour processes of Bookmaking to the generalities of class relationships, the problem still remains. If Marx did mean formal and real subordination to apply to capitalist economy as a whole (and the distinction is surely pointless if he did not), he was concerned with the real subordination of the working class and not just individual workers in specific labour processes. Is it somehow possible to have the real subordination of the working class while individual workers are only formally subordinated?

These overwhelming problems in the use of formal and real subordination must not be passed over in the apparent attractiveness of linking unionization to real subordination. The tendency to do so may at least partly be understood in the way writers within a broadly Marxist approach perceive the objective of trade unions. If unions are seen as primarily concerned with the value of labour-power it may be irresistible to connect them with the phase of real subordination where valorisation is 'in command'.

This would, however, represent a crude understanding of both valorisation and trade unions. Such perspectives would seem to accentuate the organisational and inter-capital activity of trade unions as against activity within specific capitals. Workers resistance, as the Bookmaking study once again shows, is not merely concerned with the value (or price) of their labour power, but with the many facets of the social antagonisms in wage-labour. So it is perhaps an unhelpful truism to

1. The phrase 'valorisation in command' was coined by the Brighton Labour Process Group of the CSE.
2. Anon (1979) draws a distinction between unions as regulators of the law of value across different capitals and workers combinations which arise in connection with conditions in specific capitals. It should be noted that the author does eventually reject the notion that formal and real subordination are directly related to workers combinations/unionization, but nevertheless views trade unionism largely in terms of the operation of the law of value.
suggest that unionization is connected with real subordination. It might be more useful to look at the processes which Marx outlined as characteristic of real subordination and apply those to the question of how unionization develops.
3. **Skill, the Labour Process and Workers Resistance**

The tendency within capitalist production to increasingly socialise the labour process goes hand in hand with the devaluation of labour power; this was identified in Chapter 2. \(^1\) Here it was shown that labour power can be devalued in two ways: a general reduction in the value of all labour-power, for instance through failing food prices; or a fall in the value of specific labour powers through the reconstruction of the labour process. The second process has become more commonly known as **deskilling**.

This is often linked to proletarianization as the outcome of deskilling; but Carchedi (1975) has identified a second aspect of the process leading to proletarianization where ambiguous class positions increasingly tend to perform the function of the collective worker at the expense of the global function of capital. \(^2\) Crompton (1979) has adopted these two aspects and attempts to link this "double proletarianization" to white-collar unionism.

In this final concluding discussion it is useful to consider the 'deskilling' and 'double proletarianization' approaches and identify how the bookmaking study can contribute to these debates.

**The concept of skill** \(^3\)

The notion that labour-power is continually devalued can certainly be derived from Marx's writings. The development of the capitalist mode of production is characterised by a process where:

".... the capitalist buys with the same capital a greater mass of labour-power, as he progressively replaces skilled workers by less skilled, mature labour-power by immature, male by female, that of adults by that of young persons or children." (Marx, 1976 p.788).

\(^1\) See above p.46ff

\(^2\) See above p.55ff

\(^3\) The ambiguities in 'skill' have already been noted. See above p.47.
The logic of valorisation is the continual reduction of labour costs. The socialisation of the labour process involves the development of the division of labour; this is both the potential and the actuality of the fragmentation of the activities of "skilled workers" and which results in the 'progressive' reduction of skill component of the jobs of successive generations of workers.

The response to this process within the Marxist tradition has tended to be ambivalent. The breakdown of jobs into less skilled occupations has arguably provided a greater mass of homogenous labour, thus enhancing the potential for collective action by the working class. Divisions are continually reduced by the perpetual process of deskilling. On the other hand some writers in more recent times, most notably Braverman (1974), have focussed on the inherent degradation of the deskilling process and have lamented the loss of craft expertise and control over the production of use values which this implies.

Braverman and deskilling

Braverman's analysis of the impact of deskilling as a consequence of the restructuring of the labour process is a major contribution to work in this area. He writes in opposition to orthodox social scientists who have played their part in trying to convince workers that skill is something demanded of them in 20th century capitalist production; that skills are increasing in occupations. Braverman exposes the shaky foundations of this perspective. He identifies the way in which the term 'semi-skilled' has been used to give credence to a particular layer of occupations which appear to have little technical skill warranting this description. Furthermore his analysis of the way occupational statistics are constructed amplifies the potential for creating skills "with a mere stroke of a pen" (Braverman (1974) p.49). Far from being an assessment of the "broad range of abilities" (ibid p.434) required
of workers, the category of skill may be little more than "promotional labelling" (ibid. p.434)

But in developing his argument in opposition to these perspectives, Braverman tends to overstate the process of deskilling: skill clearly fluctuates in meaning in his own mind. One strand of his definition is that skill is connected to craft - "craft mastery":

"For the worker, the concept of skill is traditionally bound up with craft mastery - that is to say, the combination of knowledge of materials and processes with the practiced manual dexterities required to carry on a specific branch of production. The break up of craft skills and the reconstruction of production as a collective or social process have destroyed the traditional concept of skill and opened up only one way for mastery over labour processes to develop: in and through scientific, technical, and engineering knowledge." (ibid p.443)

Such a loss of "craft and traditional abilities" (ibid p.425) may be absolute - they may disappear altogether - or relative - where the craft remains, but the technology of the labour process alters. (1)

But that is only one side of Braverman's definition of skill: it is also implied that deskilling involves a loss of control by workers over the labour process (ibid. p.425)

Braverman's analysis of skill within the labour process then has three components: primarily it is in terms of craft expertise and its elimination; secondly it involves the loss of control by individual workers over craft activity; thirdly, the way in which skill embraces an ideological meaning in its continuing redefinition.

Eiger's Critique

Braverman is not so informative as to how workers respond to changes in skill; he explicitly rules out workers resistance and organisation from his analysis, thus little can be said about the links between skill and workers resistance. This forms part of a recurrent criticism of Braverman and there are many critiques of his work. Perhaps the most

1. See Braverman (1974) p.425. "The more science is incorporated into the labour process, the less the worker understands the process; the more sophisticated an intellectual product the machine becomes, the less control and comprehension of the machine the worker has."
significant is Elger (1979), who takes up several issues with Braverman, but in relation to skill he raises three particular points. Firstly, there is Braverman's juxtaposition of craft and capitalist control. Elger suggests:

"There is a strong tendency in Braverman's account to conceptualise the transformation in terms of a switch from thoroughgoing craft controls to pervasive capitalist direction of the labour process." (Elger (1979) p.63)

For Braverman the erosion of craft controls is the assertion of capitalist control. A second related point concerns the subordination of craft competence within capitalism and the way in which "a complex structure of collective labour" is "effectively subordinated to capital accumulation." (Elger (1979) p.63) For Braverman, capitalist control and craft competence seem necessarily opposed, yet concretely it appears entirely possible for craft controls to be subject and entwined with capitalist control. Finally, Braverman fails to raise the question where skill is not based upon craft, other than when it is ideologically created by social scientists, employers, and governments. As Elger suggests:

"Collective organisation may gain increased wages and the status of skilled worker with little evidence of craft expertise." (ibid p.64)

Braverman fails to take on board the possibility that workers themselves may secure skill status, that it is not merely the ruling class and their supporters who can construct skill in a social rather than technical sense.

All of these points constitute significant criticisms of Braverman's approach; but the first is perhaps the most relevant here, since Braverman fails to realise that the potential of workers resistance is not necessarily related to individual craft control. The consequence of doing so would be to suggest, firstly, that craft competence may remain but without any effective strength in resisting capitalist control; or secondly, that effective resistance can be established against capital which is not based on "craft mastery."
The Bookmaking study does add some light to this discussion. There are indications how the 'craft' of settling survived throughout the period examined and, generally speaking, remained with the same group of workers who possessed continuity in the handing down of the craft in the different phases of the industry's development. Yet the diminishing importance of settling as a craft is also evident. With the growth of the large bookmaking firms the importance of correct settling was modified. The introduction of security systems and monitoring techniques constituted an attempt to control that craft even though the technical component of settling scarcely altered.

In terms of workers resistance the significance of that craft control as an instrument of resistance against capitalist control was different in different phases of the development of the industry. In the inter-war period when credit bookmaking was in the forefront, the refusal of workers to settle bets could, broadly, only result in the delay in payment of winning bets. Since accounts were based on credit, clients could continue to bet in the knowledge that they had secured winnings or had lost, irrespective as to whether settlers had actually calculated them. Yet in the period of LBOs, refusal to settle bets implied that bets could not be restaked, unless the backers had the necessary cash in order to bet without drawing any winnings. The potential for resistance in these different periods was scarcely even, despite the similar levels of technical skill involved; and insofar as it did change it no doubt diminished between credit offices and LBOs.

Rubery : Skill and Bargaining Strength

This non-correspondence between skill and bargaining strength has been taken up amongst others by Jill Rubery in her discussion of labour markets. She comments on Braverman's analysis:
"It was the ability of craftsmen in manufacturing industry to use their specialised knowledge as a basis for organisation and to control entry into the craft which improved their bargaining position. The resultant ability to control the work process was both important in maintaining their privileged in the labour force, and costly for management. What may therefore be crucial for the mass of workers in their relations with their employers is not whether mechanisation and scientific management techniques decrease their opportunities to use judgement and knowledge, but how they affect their bargaining opportunities." (Rubery (1978) p.256).

What does Rubery mean by "bargaining opportunities"?

"The bargaining position of workers did not enter directly into Braverman's study, because he was deliberately excluding considerations of working-class consciousness and organisation (ibid.p.256-257)

So it seems that bargaining position is a mixture of labour market position plus consciousness. Rubery is not quite certain of this however: She also suggests that bargaining opportunities are connected with output control:

"There may or may not have been more skill, according to the Braverman definition, in pick-and-shovel work, than there is in operating a machine, but it is certain that the transformation of many labouring jobs into operating jobs, where workers were in direct contact with the machine and thus exercised some control over a greater output than their own unassisted labour could produce, created improved bargaining opportunities for the mass of workers." (ibid p.256)

Unfortunately, Rubery does not develop her analysis any further.

Bargaining position will be dependent on a wide range of influences. Yet this does not mean that the source of those influences cannot be identified. Both Braverman and Rubery tend to concentrate on the changing position of a particular aspect of concrete labour - the movement of individual workers from one job to another, e.g. 'pick and shovel' work to machine work; consequently, they have failed to indicate precisely the implications in terms of the potential of workers resistance. This point has already been made. What might be added: it is necessary to look at the labour process as a whole to identify why certain groups of workers who possess technical abilities may be able to exert resistance in positions where according to Braverman's approach that
potential has been reduced or even does not exist. In Bookmaking the devaluation of the position of the settler manager achieved or carried two implications; firstly they were brought into a cooperative relationship with each other for the first time in the history of the industry; secondly, the reconstruction of the labour process brought them directly into contact and shared experience with other workers in LBOs, whose work had been performed in relative isolation before that time. To refer to workers resistance in isolation from the relationships between workers is certainly problematic.

A further point also emerges: the one-sidedness of the deskilling argument. It suggests that resistance is not possible, certainly not within craft controls and competence; in this way the contradictions inherent in the efforts of employers to control the labour process through the devaluation of labour power tend to be overlooked.

"The problem of control for capitalists, is not just one of preventing the development of class consciousness, but of organising the social relations of production." (Rubery (1978) p.259)

How do employers effect those changes?

"The development of capitalism not only presents problems for worker control and organisation, inducing defensive tactics on the part of existing trade union organisations, but it also offers new opportunities for organisation." (ibid p.261)

The contradictions in changing methods of work is that while certain groups may lose aspects of their control, it may increase it in other ways or it may increase the potential for resistance amongst other groups of workers. It would have been one thing for management to overcome the refusal of the phone room workers in the credit offices to take bets - by use of other workers in the building or temporary staff from outside; but the difficulties which counter clarks faced in developing unionisation when working in the widely distributed LBOs, also went hand in hand with the problems it creates for management in covering any general action by counterclerks who refused to take bets.
The complexity of skill may be assisted by a more thorough analysis of the social relationships between workers, of the way in which the labour process changes, rather than a concentration on particular groups of workers and how their individual skills may alter. If the crucial question is concerned with workers resistance, then it would seem that any discussion of technical skill must be approached in this broader context.

Crompton and 'double proletarianisation'.

'Skill' does not merely involve technical ability, as was seen earlier, it also implies a measure of control; deskilling may involve the notion of the loss of control. In Braverman's analysis this usually means the loss of craft competence, i.e. control over the technical aspects of performing a use-value. But within the context of ambiguous class positions control diminishes in another sense, the reduction of that element of capitalist control. This approach in terms of the performance of functions was developed and utilised in relation to the unionisation of the Bookmaking workers; but Crompton (1979) has also attempted to establish a similar link with unionisation in the Insurance industry and initially this is worth consideration.

Crompton has produced three contributions which indicate how she sees the link between unionisation and 'double proletarianisation'.  

The two articles, Crompton (1976) and Crompton (1979) should really be taken together. The former is largely concerned with a critique of other approaches to white-collar unionism and only tentatively suggests her own approach. This is subsequently put forward in Crompton (1979) where she attempts to develop Carchedi's analysis, slightly modified, to explain white-collar unionism amongst office Insurance workers.  

1. These are Crompton (1976), Crompton (1977) and Crompton (1979). See also the continuing debate with Heritage (1980) and Crompton (1980)

2. The confusions in Crompton (1976) are indicated above pp.9-10 and are not repeated here. The important article at this stage is Crompton (1979).
In between she has co-authored a book which addresses the nature of class relationships in both Western and Eastern economies and which necessarily underpins her approach to white-collar unionism. (1)

Crompton follows what is now becoming a familiar path: production relations are the fundamental area of class delineation (Crompton (1979) p.404); the distinction between 'productive' and 'unproductive' labour is rejected as a "major axis of class differentiation" (ibid p.405. Emphasis in original); and the ambiguity of class positions is a more fruitful approach (ibid pp. 406-407). In consequence:

"The 'proletarianisation' of the white-collar worker, therefore, may occur in two ways: i) the 'unproductive' labour process may, in Braverman's terms, be 'deskilled'; that is 'conception' split off from 'execution' and work reduced to a series of fragmented, repetitive operations; ii) the extent to which the white-collar worker carries out the function of capital may be progressively reduced, rendering the worker nothing more nor less than unproductive labour." (ibid p.407)

These are the elements of 'double proletarianisation' which may "empirically.... occur as different aspects of the same process" (ibid p.407).

Crompton then argues that 'double proletarianisation' has been of "considerable importance" in the unionisation of insurance clerks.

To do justice to Crompton's argument it is useful to consider her case study in more detail and indicate how she links 'double proletarianisation' to changes in the Insurance industry as a whole.

The combination of declining profitability in the Insurance Industry in the late 1950s and 1960s and the increasing size of risks resulting from technological change, she suggests, prompted a range of mergers: while 21 composite firms existed in 1956, only 8 major composite groups remained in 1968. The impact was a decline in job security for many

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employees and the introduction of 'modern management techniques' and computerisation. In consequence, the productivity of labour was increased; the labour force was rationalised with a sharp division between the managers and the data processors; and there was an imposition of centralised computer control, allowing the reconstruction of internal labour markets and the reduction of promotion possibilities. In Crompton's framework, the class position of the insurance clerk altered in this period which can be connected with the growth of ASTMS membership and staff associations in the late 1960s and 1970s. 'Double proletarianisation' has indeed occurred. The nature of the work has been deskilled, while control has been centralised through computerisation.

The next stages of the argument are perhaps more contentious. Crompton still clings to the terms 'market' and 'work situations' which seem to provide the concretization of class positions:

"The changes in the class situation of the insurance clerk have been reflected in changes in their market and work situations." (ibid p.418)

Given these changes, the links with trade unionism follow, although this seems more an historical coincidence than an analytical connection:

"I would argue that the evidence presented above demonstrates that the increase in trade union membership amongst insurance clerks from 1970 onwards was immediately preceded by a radical alteration in their class situation and, therefore, that the classification of particular groups is an important factor in the understanding of the growth and nature of white-collar unionism." (ibid p. 418).

The connections, baldly stated, run as follows: changes in the industry result in 'double proletarianisation' of insurance clerks which implies declining market and work situations; hence unionisation. (1)

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1. This makes the argument in Crompton and Gubbay (1977) a most peculiar one: ".... with the contemporary spread of unionism into the managerial hierarchy, trade union activity encompasses conflicts between different sections of global capital over the allocation of surplus value, as well as between capital and labour." p.192.
Crompton's analysis has been challenged by Banks (1978) and Heritage (1980). The more serious critique is that of the latter, who takes issue on a number of points. In particular he criticises her efforts to validate 'double proletarianisation' in her empirical work. He argues that she overestimates the extent of double proletarianisation in insurance; that the extent of deskilling, promotion blockages, and falling pay relativities are not proven empirically and that Crompton does not show any indication that workers so affected joined trade unions. From his own research in Banking he asserts:

"'Proletarianisation' ... has not contributed to unionisation in the financial industries in any direct or unmediated fashion". (Heritage (1980) p.288)

and he questions whether the approach has any wider validity:

"...... whilst the formation of an office proletariat may be a necessary condition for the substantial unionisation of workers in white-collar industries, it is by no means a sufficient one." (ibid p.288)

Furthermore, the "organisational forms" of proletarianisation may inhibit rather than encourage unionisation through drawing a sharp sexual division of labour within banking and presumably white-collar work in general. In the broadest sense, Heritage seems eventually to argue that the 'industrial relations' approaches are more fruitful in understanding white-collar unionism.

For many of his arguments Heritage can be rightly taken to task. Crompton (1980) in reply notes the crudeness of some of his points, notably the fatuous assertion, quoted above, that there was no "direct or unmediated" link between proletarianisation and unionisation. Since few sociologists - and certainly not Crompton - would ever entertain

1. "Crompton's initial intimations of its empirical consequences tend to be both over-simplified and implausible." Heritage (1980) p.28

This concerns Crompton's discussion of the relationship between proletarianisation and the options of trade unionism and staff associations in Crompton (1976).

2. The feminization of clerical work is seen as a way in which employers may secure a "docile and undemanding labour force."
the thought this might be the case, the comment is scarcely the
earthshattering condemnation Heritage tries to make it. It is
reminiscent of an earlier approach to white-collar unionism, which
Crompton aptly points out:

"In short, Heritage seems to be recommending a methodology
which closely parallels that of the 'industrial relations'
school - where variables are taken one at a time and if
they fail to correlate with the dependent variable (union
membership) are subsequently rejected." (1)

Heritage, in that sense, clearly stands within (though not of) the
'industrial relations' tradition. Unionization is about membership
rather than social processes and like Bain before him, Heritage is
largely concerned to count the numbers. (2) This is unfortunate in
more senses than one. Firstly, it means that Heritage has little
positive to offer in this debate; secondly, his critique of Crompton
can be - and is - comprehensively refuted, although her approach is
open to criticism and Heritage has the information, though not
apparently the perspective, to do it.

The weakness of Crompton's approach is not, directly, her use of 'double
proletarianisation'. After all, it does encapsulate a range of
economic and social processes which are concretely identifiable; (3) and,

in which Heritage links the notion of 'double proletarianisation with
measures of empirical validation. This echoes Bain (1973) in his effort
to deny the links between class and unionisation. Bain at least has
the excuse he is not a sociologist. See above pp. 12-15, for critical
discussion of this specific point in relation to Bain.

2. For instance "I have tried to indicate where, within the membership
statistics of the collective organisations catering to insurance workers,
one might look to locate the impact of computerisation." Heritage (1980)
p.287. The limitations of the 'Membership Figures' approach can be nicely
illustrated in the way workers themselves define whether they are members.
The CIR ballot in the William Hill Organisation showed remarkably high
figures for paid union membership. For instance, the Scotland branch had
virtually collapsed by the time of the ballot, yet TUBE apparently had 71
members. See CIR (1974)b.

3. It may, of course, not be the best terminology, or Crompton may be too
demanding of it as a conceptual category, but that is a different question.
Consequently it does not affect the conceptualisation of mediations of class position which prompt unionization. These do not change throughout her writing: 'market' and 'work situations'. The crucial problem is the movement from the structural determination of class position to social activity on the part of actual (or potential) trade unionists.

It is in this sense that the discussion of the empirical work in the Insurance industry becomes important. This is not to be conducted at the level of the extent ASTMS cook the membership books, but whether Crompton's case study provides any understanding why unionisation should develop. Is the insurance work 'deskilled'? Does double proletarianisation occur? If it does, what are the effects on the insurance workers and why does this mean they unionise? It is this third question where the weaknesses are most glaring and rests on a fundamental problem with her approach: the inadequacy and indeed lack of conceptual categories.

In brief, Crompton does not develop a concept which allows her analysis to move from structural position to social process. 'Market' and 'Work Situation' are shifted in from their Neo-Weberian context, but Crompton cannot (and does not) use them: they do not enable her to consider social relationships, only social position. This places extra pressure on 'double proletarianisation' as an explanatory force and it is found wanting.

In particular, Crompton's desire to keep a tight grip on 'double proletarianisation' restricts any perspective of contradiction in this process in its impact on workers.

1. Possibly one of Heritage's more accurate comments.
2. See above p. 16ff for a discussion of these concepts in Lockwood's framework.
3. Since Heritage (1980) does not seem to possess any better concepts than Crompton, it is not surprising he cannot articulate the critique he implies.
As Heritage (1980) notes, more bemused than triumphant, deskilling may be beneficial to staff:

"Complex controls and checks over cash flows have always existed in the financial industries - in the first instance to prevent theft and fraud on the part of customers and employees. The mechanisation of such checks with associated "higher deadlines" may actually benefit staff. In banking, for example, the mechanisation of 'balancing' after business hours has resulted in greater predictability of banking hours - the previous unpredictability of which had been a widespread source of complaint." (Heritage (1980) p. 292 F/N 18).

While his understanding is questionable, Heritage at last begins to put forward a meaningful critique of Crompton. "Double Proletarianisation" involves processes which are contradictory: it may affect different groups of workers in different ways and also have more than one effect on the same group of workers.

Now it is the case that Crompton does make some distinctions in the impact of changes in the insurance industry on workers: the separation of the managers and data processors (Crompton (1979) p.414); the disproportionate effect on the "older and long-serving managers" (ibid p. 417); and the male-female differentiation (ibid p.418). Yet she tends not to use this information to understand the growth (or otherwise) of unionisation, but instead orients the material back towards proletarianisation. Hence, her discussion of the sexual division of labour is whether the men are as proletarianised as the women (ibid p. 418). This would seem further evidence to suggest Crompton's difficulty in moving from the structural position of clerks to their social activity.

In the end, Crompton's understanding of unionization depends on class position and, in turn, 'double proletarianisation'; yet this must be inadequate. Not in the common sensical approach of Heritage that other

1. It is symptomatic of his approach that he discards it in a footnote.
'factors' are involved as well, but in the way it only provides a partial insight on relationships within and between workers and employers and provides little or no basis for understanding the influences of wider social processes. The fundamental problem is that she tries to use 'market' and 'work situation' rather than the Marxist category of the labour process, which would have allowed the discussion of social relationships between workers and permitted an understanding of unionization arising from the collective organisation of the work rather than the restrictive, often undifferentiated, categorisations of class position. The double proletarianisation thesis might add usefully to an understanding of the labour process, but it cannot substitute for it, even when disguised in its Neo-Weberian cloaks. The contrast with the way Bookmaking has been analysed in this thesis may prove instructive. Using Crompton's approach, the settler-managers were clearly 'doubly proletarianised'; their 'market' and 'work situations' were declining in consequence; and they formed a union. In view of the discussions of Chapters 3 and 4, the problems of this analysis are somewhat clearer. In the first instance, the one-sidedness of the approach is evident. The settler-manager (like the insurance clerk and technician in Crompton's own work) appears as an unproblematic occupational category. The contradictory impact of proletarianisation is not developed at least partly because there is no appreciation, however imprecise, of the unevenness of capitalist economy. The Bookmaking industry, like the Insurance industry, is not a monolith of firms in exactly the same position with workers doing exactly the same work in the same relationship to their employers.

1. Consider Crompton's approach to Government influence or union growth in Crompton (1979). It stands almost entirely separate from the main body of the argument and is only introduced because Government intervention seems to have been important. But she has no basis to introduce it in any other way.
The terms are a short-hand for a range of complex processes and structures and 'double proletarianization' will not affect the position of all workers in the same way. This does deny the validity of 'double proletarianisation' but indicates it should be used in a less determinist fashion.

This leads to a second point, since to do this would demand an examination of the labour process within any industry as a whole, and not just the position (whether 'class', 'market', or 'work') of one employee group. Where would the other bookmaking workers appear in Crompton's analysis? If at all, they would be analysed only insofar as they impinged on the 'market', or 'work situation' of the settler-manager. But this is a reversal of what is happening: job structures arise from the labour process, not the other way around.

The position of workers must be analysed in relation to the labour process as a whole, otherwise only partial understanding is obtained. Or, put slightly different, 'double proletarianisation' is both a determinant and consequence of the reconstruction of the labour process and must be understood in relation to it.

Thirdly, this would provide two subsequent advantages of the labour process approach over that of Crompton. In the first instance, it enables a more complete understanding of workers' experience. Clearly, 'double proletarianisation' would provide some context for the settler-manager's experience, - the diminution of control within the LBO together with the decline of (and need for) settling skills - yet this is only one aspect of their experience of the changing labour process. This necessarily forces attention on the way job tasks are constructed, not merely proletarianised, for instance, in the way the settler-manager became a salesman; it allows consideration of the changing relationships within the 'collective worker', in particular those between the settler-manager and counterclerk; and it provides insights into the forms of

1. The detailed arguments are not repeated here, but a central argument of this thesis has concerned the differential impact of changes in the
workers' response, which means not only that it prevents any
"reading-off" of unionisation from proletarianisation, but allows
consideration of how the options for responding change historically,
e.g. the potential for fiddling or job quitting.
The second point concerns the way in which wider social processes
impinge on unionisation. In Crompton's work 'double proletarianisation'
and government policy simply do not meet; yet Chapter 8 is concerned to
show, in some detail, how government policy had a varying impact on
unionisation depending on the development of the labour process at
that time. That is only possible because labour process analysis
allows for a continual relationship between social and economic processes,
and not the once and for all effect implied by 'proletarianisation'.
In short, the argument that class ambiguity and the derivative 'double
proletarianisation' may have potential in understanding unionization
can be supported by the Bookmaking study, but only insofar as these
influences are understood in relation to the labour process. The desire
to continually redefine and reshape the processes of proletarianisation
is an understandable consequence of the deskilling debate; but the
links between proletarianisation and unionization have remained largely
untouched within Marxist perspectives. This thesis is a tentative
step to move beyond the blind alleys of proletarianisation and to
locate the important processes involved in a more useful explanatory
framework. This has led to a 'rediscovery' of the importance of the
labour process in an effort to offset the obscuring of the basis of
unionization in much of the current literature on industrial relations.
Bibliography

(i) Primary Sources

(a) TUBE Records

The bulk of the information on TUBE is derived from the detailed documentary records retained by George Sawford during his period as General Secretary of the union. These records comprised:

(i) Agendas and Minutes relating to the Executive Council
(ii) Correspondence between George Sawford and other members of the Executive.
(iii) Correspondence between George Sawford and branch officials.
(iv) Correspondence between George Sawford and employers.
(v) Correspondence between George Sawford and the CIR.
(vi) Various communications with other bodies, e.g. TGWU, APEX, TUC, 'Sporting Life'.
(vii) Details of unfair dismissal tribunal cases taken up by TUBE.
(viii) Some Branch membership figures, including a large quantity of membership forms.
(ix) Record of solicitors letters, and accounts, etc.

They provide a comprehensive record of the day-to-day communications between the branches and Head Office and enable a reasonably clear view to be drawn of the events at national and local level. Because of the nature of the records it was necessary to find out how the branches operated locally and interviews of union activists were made in an effort to discover the extent and nature of local activity.

About 40 formal interviews/discussions were undertaken along these lines. Further knowledge resulted from involvement in union campaigns between 1974 and 1977, both of the history of TUBE in its independent days and within the TGWU. Consequently, additional information was documented:
(i) Record of interviews and correspondence with TUBE activists.

(ii) Detailed Minutes of branch activities, e.g. London Eastern, Scotland, and Liverpool.

(iii) Interviews and Newspaper cuttings on the Ladbroke Dispute in Scotland (1975).

(iv) Records of interviews of TGWU Full-time Officers, particularly in areas of bookmaking membership.

The above records are now contained in the TGWU archive at the Modern Records Centre, University of Warwick, where they are available for inspection.

(b) The Bookmaking Industry and the Employers.

Since there is little written on the Bookmaking industry, there was some pressure to discover most of the information through primary sources:

(i) Company Annual Reports.


(iii) Interviews of employers and workers in the industry.

(iv) Personal knowledge from working in Bookmaking.

(v) Industrial Tribunal Records.

(vi) Royal Commission Evidence 1940-51.

But I am particularly indebted to Gordon Moody and the Churches Council on Gambling for their loan of their newspaper archive which proved an invaluable source of information and corroboration of oral accounts.

(ii) Secondary Sources and References.

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Addendum


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