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Reelection and renegotiation : the political economy of international agreements

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Buisseret, Peter and Bernhardt, Dan (2018) Reelection and renegotiation : the political economy of international agreements. American Political Science Review, 112 (4). pp. 1016-1035. doi:10.1017/S0003055418000400

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Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000400

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Abstract

We study dynamic international agreements when one of the negotiating parties faces a threat of electoral replacement during negotiations, when agreements made before the election are the starting point for any subsequent renegotiation, and when governments cannot commit to future negotiation strategies. Conflicts of interest between governments may be softened or intensified by the governments’ conflicts of interest with voters. We characterize when the threat of electoral turnover strengthens the prospect for successful negotiations, when it may cause negotiations to fail, and how it affects the division of the surplus from cooperation. We also show how changes in domestic politics—including uncertainty about the preferences of domestic political parties—affect a domestic government’s ability to extract greater concessions in negotiations.

Item Type: Journal Article
Subjects: J Political Science > JZ International relations
K Law [Moys] > KC International Law
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): International obligations, Elections
Journal or Publication Title: American Political Science Review
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISSN: 0003-0554
Official Date: 4 November 2018
Dates:
DateEvent
4 November 2018Published
10 September 2018Available
22 May 2018Accepted
Volume: 112
Number: 4
Page Range: pp. 1016-1035
DOI: 10.1017/S0003055418000400
Status: Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Published
Publisher Statement: © American Political Science Association 2018
Access rights to Published version: Restricted or Subscription Access
Copyright Holders: American Political Science Association
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