Atikcan, Ece Ozlem and Chalmers, Adam William (2018) Choosing lobbying sides : the General Data Protection Regulation of the European Union. Journal of Public Policy . doi:10.1017/S0143814X18000223 (In Press)

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Abstract

Despite the impressive amount of empirical research on lobbying, a fundamental question remains overlooked. How do interest groups choose to lobby different sides of an issue? We argue that how groups choose sides is a function of firm-level economic activity. By studying a highly salient regulatory issue, the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation, and using a novel dataset of lobbying, we reveal that a group’s main economic sector matters most. Firms operating in finance and retail face unique costs and are incentivized to lobby against the GDPR. However, these groups are outgunned by a large, heterogeneous group of firms with superior lobbying firepower on the other side of the issue.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Politics and International Studies
Journal or Publication Title:	Journal of Public Policy
Publisher:	Cambridge University Press
ISSN:	0143-814X
Official Date:	26 September 2018
Dates:	Date Event 26 September 2018 Available 10 June 2018 Accepted
Date of first compliant deposit:	19 June 2018
DOI:	10.1017/S0143814X18000223
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	In Press
Publisher Statement:	This article has been accepted for publication in a revised form for publication in Journal of Public Policy https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-public-policy
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access
Related URLs:	Publisher

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