Tomlin, Patrick (2014) Retributivists! The harm principle is not for you! Ethics, 124 (2). pp. 272-298. doi:10.1086/673437 ISSN 0014-1704.

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Abstract

Retributivism is often explicitly or implicitly assumed to be compatible with the harm principle, since the harm principle (in some guises) concerns the content of the criminal law, while retributivism concerns the punishment of those that break the law. In this essay I show that retributivism should not be endorsed alongside any version of the harm principle. In fact, retributivists should reject all attempts to see the criminal law only through “other” person-affecting concepts or “grievance” morality, since they should endorse the criminalization of conduct that is either purely self-harming or good for somebody and bad for nobody (i.e., Pareto improvements).

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Punishment -- Philosophy, Retribution, Lex talionis
Journal or Publication Title:	Ethics
Publisher:	University of Chicago Press
ISSN:	0014-1704
Official Date:	January 2014
Dates:	Date Event January 2014 Published 1 January 2014 Accepted
Volume:	124
Number:	2
Page Range:	pp. 272-298
DOI:	10.1086/673437
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access
Date of first compliant deposit:	4 July 2018
Date of first compliant Open Access:	5 July 2018

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