After the Creative City?

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The Creative City is an idea, a theory, and a diverse range of urban policies. Within intellectual debates across Europe, the term ‘creative city’ is also a symbolic marker of a now defunct era of economic optimism. Even Germany, who did not suffer the fate of the UK in the global financial crisis of 2006-8, is facing an era of city, regional and national budgetary scrutiny and reassessment, where caution, risk-aversion and insecurity are quickly morphing into cultural values.

The crisis is not simply about contracting resource allocation for urban development, but is generating what we in the UK call a ‘poverty mentality’ or a perceived state of reduced possibility (whatever the material conditions of that state). The psychopathology of urban policy – the disordering of the policy mentality – is something normally only understood in terms of its adverse impacts.

The psycho-political process and (ir)rationality of urban policy making surely requires more attention from the thinking public.

The original Creative City idea addressed this phenomenon. It was principally concerned with the way people in power ‘thought’ and conceived the city as a space, place or platform for social, cultural and industrial activity. The Creative City idea asserted a challenge to the ideational basis on which policy decisions were made about the shape, function and development of the urban environment. It dispelled the assumption that a deductive, linear conceptual trajectory proceeds from the political public policy objectives of national government right through to the urban policy implementation of particular cities. In other words, the Creative City idea was a challenge to the rationalist epistemologies that still seem to underpin the varied processes of political deliberation that determine our cities’ evolution.

**Enlightened capitalism?**

Throughout the pre-crisis era of inflated prosperity, the cry of creativity carried with it a level of radical change to which only the political Far Left had previously aspired. Even though, in time, Creative City cultural policy would become an unwitting urban handmaiden of global neoliberalism, its use of cultural metaphors, artistic rhetoric, and neo-anarchist social ideals, obviated the need to oppose capitalism. The kind of capitalism the Creative City had promised was enlightened, where surplus value simply became material for further redevelopment, in turn helping repair the damage capitalism inevitably causes. Profit no longer signified capital accumulation or increased monopoly over the means of production. Quite the contrary. It was the R&D money for the new search for knowledge, technological experimentation, communications and universal access to information.

The original Creative City idea emerged in strength the mid-1990s as a kind of avantgarde cultural policy. In the UK, for example, it was framed by growing political investment in urban regeneration, whose successive waves of redevelopment and renewal were originally driven by the fragmentation of the fast-built post-War industrial infrastructure, along with increasing social problems in the ‘inner city’ areas. The avant-garde thrust of the Creative City idea was its potential to generate an alternative to the development of the neo-liberal city after the collapse of modernist urban paradigms in the 1970s. Where modernist design was basis, and understood the city as a series of task-driven activities, the Creative City was animated by dialogue and generative urban cultures.

Rapid post-industrialisation and the rise of the communication industries in the 1980s made this reconfigured idea credible. The city could itself become a creative subject or actor, which first involved a re-thinking of the way its governing policies are thought-through and thought-out. Policy makers, urban planners, city officials, and even industrialists would talk to each other. Knowledge of the city would make its way out of the professional silos of city departments and professional services. New kinds of observation, language and conceptual frameworks would develop – not simply forming a new lexicon of urban life, but forming a city specific lexicon, where the urban-cultural particularity of a city would be registered in the forms of the dialogue it generated. The setting of an urban policy objective would be a creative act. The artist would displace the engineer as the model of professional labour in the hard physical contexts of the urban realm. This was not an exercise in neo-romanticism. From Constructivism to the Bauhaus to Situationism, the Twentieth Century European avant-garde understood this. Art was a laboratory through which new forms of urban life could be constructed – physically, aesthetically, spiritually and politically. We have not lost a sense of the interconnectedness of life, but the cultural politics of that interconnectedness.

Initiated by Charles Landry and Comedia in the late 1980s, the Creative City concept contained both simple and complex challenges. Simply, urban policy and planning should learn more from the patterns of imaginative thinking endemic to art and culture. More complex was the challenge of the institutionalization of art and culture – how they had become organizationally formalized to a high level. For urban policy in the major cities of Europe, ‘art and culture’ were either historical (heritage), aesthetics (style or decoration) or intellectual stimulation (entertainment for the cultured). For Landry, despite the evident ‘cultural’ dimension of many a city’s social problems, an emphatic concept of culture was missing from urban policy tout court. Similarly, the term ‘art’ signifies a genre of object, not a reflexive approach to existing empirical realities. The Creative City idea was explained by Landry and colleagues through a policy-friendly empiricism, with lots of
practical tips on how policymakers can provide the strategic conditions for transforming urban environments. There was a danger to this – for the Creative City all too easily became just a series of policy techniques [Landry himself referred to it as a ‘toolkit’]. It was not sufficiently ‘politically’, in the sense that its concept of creativity needed to become internal to local democracy and city governance, so as to gain the crucial normative dimension it obviously craved. Creativity traded only on its impact value, without strong ethico-democratic ideas that could have inspired the hidden stakeholders of urban change, such as local communities.

**Art into Industry:**

This was perhaps not without trying – as Landry was interfacing with city governments directly, which during the early 1990s [in the UK at least] were more interested in civil engineering than civil society. His work was important, and did to a great extent make credible the otherwise ‘fakey’ idea that creativity is what we need at the heart of city management. His emphasis was not simply on liberalizing bureaucratic city management, but both expanding creativity across the organizational life of the city and re-framing the question of culture outside the usual cultural economics of cultural policy. It is the case that in the last ten years across Europe the concept of the Creative City is serving a kind of epistemic function, beyond simply enrolling culture in urban regeneration. It is now possible to a greater degree to dialogue with city politicians and discuss the relation between political culture and cultural politics, and how urban policy is always embedded with ‘cultural’ assumptions [about ‘life’, sociality, human needs, values, and so on].

And yet, discussions of the Creative City in cultural policy circles tend to be framed by ‘urban regeneration’, a term that has taken on a life of its own. In discussing the Creative City it is important to remain with the concept of the city and not supplant it with urban regeneration per se. First, ‘the city’ posits a relation between actual physically delimited territory and political legitimacy. Urban regeneration is for the most part a ‘scheme’ based mechanism, where specific projects often seem to ‘contribute’ to the forming of the city, and yet all too often maintain their own economic agenda. Urban regeneration’s now highly developed discourse all too often elides the cultural-political dimensions of urban development [an enthusiasm for destination marketing and place branding being symptomatic of its complicity with broader economic erosion of identity and substantive experience of place]. Driven by so many priorities, multiple policy initiatives, stakeholders and vested interests, urban regeneration emerged from a confluence of civic, local, regional and national actors [all transfixed by the growing potential of transnational capital investment and global cultural tourism]. In the UK a central mechanism of urban regeneration was the partnership of public authorities with private construction and property development companies – a model of social democracy in action? Complicated contracts, the parallel universe of public and private management, different accounting procedures facilitating profligate expenditure on both sides, made these ‘PFI’ projects [the Private Finance Initiative], a national scandal so big the newspapers hesitate to report.

Urban regeneration, detached from the question of city governance and the political commitments that entails, can, and has generated a crisis of political legitimacy in urban development. It does not itself offer a coherent framework for thinking about the Creative City, whatever great techniques for urban re-design it has generated.

The Creative City idea, increasingly pervasive in Europe after the Millennium year 2000, offered a dimension of reflexive thinking to city government and the cultural sphere alike. Culture could be re-defined as an economic ‘sector’, and re-cast as an economic actor. It enabled a cognitive shift, pushing beyond the dichotomy of fine art versus applied art, aesthetics versus commerce. It opened new alliances between the art institution, media and design, just at the time the microchip revolution was creating new market and new public spaces alike. Contemporary Culture was re-defined among other things as a source of problem-solving capabilities, to be harnessed for economic growth. Where after the rise of the ‘Asian tigers’ in the late 1970s-early 1980s, economic growth was increasingly ‘global’, the highly internationalist and multi-cultural world of contemporary art and culture no longer seemed foreign to national interests. Of course, even modern and contemporary art always played some role in the nation state’s project of patrimonial image consolidation, but after 1980 a radical reassessment of ‘national interests’ figured in the political agenda of every Western European country.

**Public Culture Private Creativity**

In Europe before 1980, culture was not a ‘sector’ but a series of historical or educational institutions, public exhibition spaces and a transnational art market. European cultural products – works of art – had always been international, even if they were always heavily framed within the institutional project of nation state aggrandizement. An interaction between major European cities was internal to art movements, classical and modern – between Paris and Rome, Rome and Vienna, between Moscow and Paris, between...
the city and culture – their intrinsic relation – and raises an important point on the relation between to quantify). However, this simple economic fact

City authorities are often the prime spenders on agencies (from Arts Council England downwards). (i.e. city government) expenditure on culture has exceeded that of the national Government funding (i.e. city government) expenditure on culture has exceeded that of the national Government funding mass, hypertextuality, interaction, cultural conflict and endless hybridity – are crucial to creating the social milieu that is the incubator of new art movements and their modes of production.

In the UK from the late-1980s, a largely enclosed art world found itself with a minor role in city development policies, for the most part through urban regeneration. This could take the form of a ‘strategy’, an ‘initiative’, or just the local development plan. This role was consolidated in the 1990s, where easy available capital funding fuelled a massive surge in urban ambition within city council sponsors and their private real estate partners. The rise of public art was one manifest form of this. Private developers increasingly accepted the 'Percent for Art' finance scheme, as it became clear how art added an immediate and direct value to property. Urban regeneration ‘partnered’ with culture, and in doing so became much more than just a strategic urban planning mechanism. It became a broad philosophy of urban transformation, generating its own lexicon of cultural terms. Its aspirationalism inspired artists, urban designers, visionary architects and social entrepreneurs. It allowed for new policy-making research and became a framework within which new ideas were generated and designs were formulated.

In the cultural sphere itself, professionalization and career specialization generates a geo-politics of intellectual territorialisation – at once increasingly sophisticated and parochial. Of course, professionals naturally stick to their own sphere of influence, becoming ever more delimited by congealing professional sub-cultures and the self-referential discourses that sustain them.

Such a cultural sector formation is something the Creative City challenges. It also (inadvertently perhaps) challenges the phenomenon of ‘enclosed interests’ – the (ironic) way in which public culture, fully institutionalized, becomes driven by the private interests of its professionals. Even though the term ‘cultural economy’ is now a common one, explaining how culture works as ‘an economy’ is something few cultural professionals might actually be able to do. The relation between money, power, space, and the mechanisms of cultural production, are not easy to discern. In the last two decades in the UK, for example, local authority (i.e. city government) expenditure on culture has exceeded that of the national Government funding agencies (from Arts Council England downwards). City authorities are often the prime spenders on culture (though of course, this spending is often integral to a lot of other services, and thus difficult to quantify). However, this simple economic fact raises an important point on the relation between the city and culture – their intrinsic relation – and

the lack of attention to the city in national cultural policy. The ‘art world’ and its national sponsors are once-removed from ‘the city’ as a cultural project.

The economic life of the city and the intellectual discourse of culture are kept safely apart – however much cultural actors benefit from the city's facilities, locations and social life. Yet, as Landry noted, the city is the place that generates contemporary art as it is the place that generates contemporaneity itself (cf. Baudelaire). It is not just its host. The characteristics of urbanity – critical mass, hypertextuality, interaction, cultural conflict and endless hybridity – are crucial to creating the social milieu that is the incubator of new art movements and their modes of production.

Accross Europe, urban regeneration became the principal conceptual arena for rationalizing the function, value and benefits of a whole range of economic, social and cultural activities in urban space (and the relation between them). Ideologically, urban regeneration could play a canny game, seducing the imagination of city officials and art curators alike. By capitalising on the ideological appeal of culture, regeneration schemes could at once evoke anachronistic Victorian values of heritage and patrimony in the context of the global economy, at the same time leverage new branded opportunities in rising property yields. The labouring classes were as enthusiastic as any on rising property costs – within a decade the pension-poor retired worker was sitting in a house worth three times its original value. The change in property and land re-allocation seemed like one massive value-creation scheme where everyone benefitted. Yet economics is rarely linear in its development. As surely as a civic renaissance did indeed emerge, national urban regeneration lacked a specific fulcrum of political commitment.
which in turn became apparent to the extent it was capable of masking and misrepresenting (in politically persuasive imagery) a range of socially unacceptable mechanisms for the control or disposal of public assets.\(^5\) With the current economic decline of massive capital investment and free-flow cash, the urban regeneration as we know it will also decline (and already has, though currently we live in the ‘netherworld’ of contractual obligations, where funds committed five years ago are only now being spent).

The public art of urban regeneration – the new sculptures, installations, performances and cultural festivals – might remain, but will emerge from an economically more demanding and culturally less optimistic commissioning framework. Each type of public art has its own order of value, of course, and in our new era of scarcity will fare differently. Revenue-raising arts, like mega-event performance and festivals, might well expand. Otherwise, we will no doubt see a contraction of artistic activity, as well as a retraction of artistic labour back into the established silos of art institutes and contemporary museums. In a recessionary framework, the relation between culture and poverty is theoretically interesting. Currently, artists – probably one of the most economically resourceful and adaptable of social groups – are indeed trying to find a way of ‘doing it cheaper’, without the patronage of capital-funded frameworks. Aside from the attraction of new technology, there has been a discernible shift to the internet and to social media as preferred cultural locations. In the city, we have pop-up art shops, installations in other provisional spaces, like bankrupt business space in city shopping centres. Many artists are of course hoping for a ‘capital flight’ from the spaces of retail, to an extent that echoes the post-industrial vacation of factory space in the 1970s. However, the artist doing it on the cheap is not the problematic of the post-Creative City. Our problematic is broad – the manifest role of ‘creativity’ in the city and its mechanisms of political reproduction.

Despite the extent that art and culture have been involved in urban regeneration, both national urban and cultural policy in the UK have actually prevented the internalization of art within urban development. Cultural Policy-making in the UK has by and large adapted models of economic rationality – cost-benefit ratios and value-for-money algorithms, along with their formulaic best practice policy procedures – that determine the extent of art-culture’s justified funding from national public revenue sources. This is usually predicated on art-culture remaining free of any local political obligation, despite the demand for ‘impact’. The term ‘impact’ obviates any question of involvement or engagement, as its cause-effect logic assumes an ontological separation of the art-culture from society-economy. The categorical separation of subject and object becomes the organising principle of the bureaucratic rationality that is the political administration of urban culture.

The issue facing us is the way ‘culture’ is formulated as a concept with public policy. Principally, culture is ‘the arts’ (its institutions and related cultural assets). Formulating cultural policy as an integrated policy field that is effectively situated within the spectrum of public policies relevant to the development of cities, is something yet to be undertaken in the UK. In the UK, there is in fact no ‘cultural policy’ as such, only a series of co-extensive policy areas, which after the established post-1997 jurisdiction of the Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS), are sport, media, heritage, leisure, tourism, and museums and libraries.\(^7\) Arts funding remains one of the most problematic, since it extends from central city-based historic cultural institutions and the national’s cultural assets (properties, art and antique collections), out to internationally mobile artists and the powerful art markets.

Arts funding plays an enormous role for determining the concept and function of art and its framework of possibility. It supports and legitimizes, through state mechanisms of recognition, the intellectual, curatorial and historical preferences of art world elites.

The quasi-canonical selection of art and artistic practices that are chosen for national exhibition and publicity are the frameworks for national debates and reference points for arts pedagogy in all its forms, in time consolidated in historical narratives as much as professional identities. However, ‘cultural policy as arts funding’ is an odd venture, at once demanding assurance of the nature of its public investment, yet post-facto in the sense that it intends only to ‘support’ the good art that already exists.

Arts policy would blanche at the accusation that it is prescriptive of artistic development and production. And yet, its concentration of cultural capital in the approved silos of central art institutions promote a well-defined and very specific forms of patronage: the criteria for officially State-approved art are increasingly apparent. The actual role of national funding mechanisms in national cultural production per se, remains under-researched.

**Where is the Creative City?**

One of the animating principles of the original Creative City framework was that the city itself was a creative product. The saliency and social necessity of its creativity is attested to by history, and only a political act of historical erasure could deny it. Neoliberalism is myopic, and for all its benign provisions of plenty, recognises no value other than that embedded in the current cycle of consumption, measured by demand and the
exchange ratios exhibited by that demand. However, cities cannot develop that way, only markets. To develop a city requires a creative act and creative activity. Landry’s gambit was that that urban policy-making can emerge from a creative engagement with the conditions and processes of cultural production. That is, urban policy-making could itself become a series of city-establishing creative acts.

At present, after decades of art commissioning and patronage, we have a lot of impressive creative elements of our cities, creative components and cultural events, many if not all are the product of policy initiatives. But do we have a Creative City? What do we actually think of when we think of a Creative City?

Many global cities, from Sydney to Abu Dhabi, boast the components of a Creative City, at least, as these have featured in the growing theoretical and empirical literature on the subject. From Charles Landry to Charles Leadbeater, from John Montgomery to Richard Florida, we have very different models of the creative city. These models are distinct largely through emphasis than uniqueness, and they each have a different basis – whether urban policy, urban design, cultural entrepreneurship, business networking and clustering, creative class development, and so on. For Florida, in his book Who’s your City (2008), the ability to assess a city’s urban culture is now essential to planning your career trajectory.

To date, most city urban development policies, if they talk in terms of a ‘creative city’, tend to synthesise the original Landry vision with the ‘creative professionals’ emphasis of Richard Florida, and perhaps with the expectation of ‘clustering’ so promoted by bodies like Eurocities and the European Commission. In the UK, the Creative City was premised on some happy alliance between the notoriously philistine centre of urban command and control – local Town Planning – and incoming new trends in urban design (such as American ‘placemaking’). However, surveying the available books in the marketplace on the subject of the Creative City, we do not find tales of success. We find, more often than not, problems – problems that have arrived via the law of unintended consequences. Most of these books, of course, are written by academics (who make a living out of finding problems); nevertheless, these problems have a very concrete and undisputed reality. These problems include gentrification and property-orientated development, with its social class segregation, and consequent ‘class cleansing’ of suburbs (family and community dispersal). Gentrification is a form of social change that moves beyond the previous class trajectories of embourgeoisement and proletarianization – it is both. It both enculturates the social subject into more ‘refined’ and individualist cultural behaviours, and cultivates a collective homogeniety, bereft of the power of solidarity. Gentrification is bereft also of the identity-forging cultural production that characterised the European middle classes in their post-war aspirant form. Add to this the phenomena of metabolitanisation, endless suburbanisation, then commodification, where the city’s social mechanisms of development are redefined and redesigned according to generic measures of retail distribution, service industry labour efficiency and transportation speed. The culture of cities change, where public or civic space is slowly eroded by the private providers of fast consumption, new retail and leisure services. Where city centres were open spaces of congregation, protest and celebration, the focus of social interaction has moved to retail centres, often privately owned, and where congregation is prohibited. The range of architectural building types is contracting, despite the increase diversity of decoration or stylistic facades.

Rhetoric and Reality

The rhetoric of national urban regeneration is ‘quality of life’, ‘culture’ and sustainability, but is predicated on increased property values, corporate ownership and large capital investment that radically reduces any sense of form of civic self-determination. And where the city brand scheme reconstitutes the indigenous social identity of a place, making it a pliable object of strategic destination marketing, where even residents are re-cast as visitors. The lure of international capital invariably meant that every city high street was given over to international brands, with a priority on luxury and consumer goods rather than local trade. Indigenous craft or produce from the local economy was entirely displaced. It is a story told many times; where the Creative City was meant to concern itself with ‘the city’, it became a means of enabling the city to act as both platform for and cipher of the new global economy, whose interests are inimical to the long term development of existing social communities and their urban spaces. The general point is that the Creative City is not sustainable, and like the global capital markets, will sooner or later fragment through its own contradictions. One blindingly obvious contradiction is articulated through the disconnect between the investment in the physical infrastructure of the city and the (lack of) investment in the cultural intelligence of its people. In cultural policy a similar disconnect is evident in the investment in established cultural institutions and their services, and not people (either artists or other forms of participants,
Public Culture

The 1980s witnessed two other major cultural developments across Europe, both seemingly unexpected [and also in part accounting for the paradoxical lack of concern for art in the public policy arena]. The rapid rise in small airlines and the price of air flight and global travel created a new 'global cultural tourist trail' in just under a decade. This was followed by new trends in international 'city breaks', both within countries and, more importantly, within Europe. Central city museums, cultural parks and art institutions, once quiet and refined places, became bustling popular visitor destinations, with cafes and shops and entertaining events. The second development was in the art markets: on March 31, 1987, one of Van Gogh's four 'sunflowers' paintings were bought by Yasuo Goto from the Yasuda Fire and Marine Insurance Company of Japan for 25 million pounds (at Christie's, London). A few months later, the waves of record prices, now legendary, began to hit the market. For reasons still

notwithstanding the evident increase in 'visitors'). The mismatch here can be manifest in varied ways: in Europe it is not uncommon to find a city full of extraordinary art institutions and cultural assets, with rather slim and weak means of cultural production [take Paris, or Vienna]. In the past, Europe has been so prodigious at cultural production and the creation of new art forms and movements, that it not only has been taken for granted, but it is assumed that this can somehow be directly employed as one means of building a creative city.

It was not until after French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu's studies of the late 1970s that cultural production began to be a serious object of public policy analysis. In any case, the object of Bourdieu's attention was canonical museum-art world feted art. There is also a sense in which the swift and irrepressible rise of creative media (film, TV, then video) in the 1970s, along with design communications [advertising, branding, corporate spatial design] in the 1980s, relegated 'the arts' to third place in the creativity stakes. Art was no longer the exclusive domain of new ideas, individual expression, style and creative visual communication. The real creativity was now communications technology and media. Moreover, media was far more accessible and 'democratic' [or at least responsive to popular demand], and truly captured the imagination of the public beyond anything possible in art (and beyond anything the new mass communications managed to do in the 1930s and 1940s, against which influential modernist critical theories of culture were formed). In many European countries, media and artistic culture remained separate – suspicious of each other. Artistic production was a minimal supplement to the social and economic reproduction of urban life. For the Creative City imagination, however, it needed to make good its unfulfilled romantic-era promises. Art could become a model and cipher of urban cultural development.

The extraordinary rise in the international popularity of art and 'culture', along with the ubiquity of 'creativity', created a disadvantageous sense of success along with an intellectual prosperity that blinded many to the real value of artistic culture to public policy. Arts historic institutional autonomy, it was assumed, was best left alone, and financially successful on its own terms. It did not need to be appended to the broader project of city-based urban development.

However, the Creative City required more than just heritage plus the contemporary international art world and its visitor attractions. Yet where art and creative culture is at once the realm of innovative ideas, unrestrained thought, new perspectives, investigation into the unknown, the unmasking of the repressed or suppressed dimensions of the 'human', they are nowhere to be seen in the actual realms of public sphere deliberations and policy development. Putting artists in parliament is not what the Creative City vision demanded [notwithstanding the Council of Europe's Parliament of Artists project]. The vision was that art could play a generative role in upsetting the instrumental rationalities that are always the default setting of civil engineering-based urban governance. The internal interconnection of art and the city could be cultivated and art could find a route into life without sacrificing its anarchic impulses.

However, the financial success of art institutions, the rise of curatorial professionalisation, the effective accommodation of private interests for the 'public good', and the evident popularity of museums and galleries with tourists, students and public alike, have all become disincentives for change. Indeed, the 'art world' by and large have not lobbied hard for a Creative City. Their ambivalence is understandable.
The original Creative City model demanded more from culture than institutions and new art spaces, and more from institutions and new art spaces than just art. Culture was laden with the expectation of socio-urban impact, from which emerged a discourse of cultural change powerful enough to shape public policy in the city, perhaps involving new models of urban communication, social interaction, extended public spaces, participation and representation. Culture should be a transformative force for urban development, not just a cultural service sector, visitor destination or R&D business park.

Looking across Europe, it seems that the original Creative City vision of Landry, et. al., with its emphasis on arts and culture, has been almost entirely superseded by a Florida-based vision framed by economic innovation and its requisite skilled labour. The Creative City in many places has become a business project, not a framework for total urban policy transformation. It has scaled-down its expectations, and no longer demands that urban policy develop a creative imagination – and do so through participation and liberalisation of the public realm. This business project is also discovering that biotechnology and pharmaceuticals are more advantageous economic catalysts than design and media agencies. We are moving beyond a culturally defined ‘creativity’ to a scientific model.

Richard Florida’s Creative Class thesis has proved itself appealing to city politicians and managers all over the world. The ‘thesis’ can be implemented as strategy without unsettling too many ruling assumptions on the role of cities in the global economic order [as a knowledge economy, an information or networked society, and so on]. It allows the onus for ‘creative’ activity to be transferred to the professional ‘class’ that are [yet] to be imported into the city. In fact, this imported class always seems more promising than the ‘indigenous’ creative population! And the creative industries do not require the same level of legitimacy [and thus public deliberation] as does ‘culture’: their value is self-evident within existing economic frameworks of employment and industry. Thus the axis of the Creative City’s intellectual discourse witnessed a shift post-Florida [after 2002] from the cultural politics of urban policymaking to the mechanics of the creative industries and making spaces for cultural production in the city. In terms of policy, creativity could be ‘bolted-on’ to existing policies for external investment and industrial development.

Of course, the creative industries are indeed important, and always were an intrinsic component of the Creative City. But in themselves they do not generate a vision or holistic understanding of the urban space of the city as a creative sphere of public action and development – not unless Bruce Mau’s Massive Change project happens to be visiting.

Politically, making the creative industries the focus of a Creative City strategy favours closed specialist networks and generously funded clusters that [inadvertently perhaps] allow urban development to side-step the real nexus-issues of power in city governance. Even the Richard Florida-inspired Memphis Manifesto of 2003 [where representatives of 48 American cities gathered to declare their commitment to creative urban change], does not mention politics, urban or city governance, for all its conviction in generating ‘creative ecosystems’. Indeed, it is interesting how terms of the Memphis Manifesto places responsibility for change on the individual citizen (in their ‘community’) and not on the public policy-maker or city official. The reasons for this are perhaps obvious.

Cultural Capital

It’s not hard to dismiss the Creative City idea as cultural policy idealism. Cities are complicated and huge urban entities, both physically and politically. They are not created overnight, but can take half a century to reform in a definitive shape. Given the way cities have developed in Europe and in the USA, cultural workers can only reasonably expect to play a small role, and often feel fortunate to find a space for themselves within the spectrum of stronger and more urgent fields of infrastructural services, land development, housing, retail and industrial economy. Does art or culture have anything to say in these areas? Most artists have enough of a problem just attending to the business of their art, and can do without the endless complications of urban cultural politics. Europe and the USA in many ways face opposing predicaments, given the different ways their cities have developed. The historical structure and heritage-based asset value of European city centres contrast with the modernist functionalism of most American cities. Yet the urban development of American cities in the Twentieth Century is instructive. Europe’s trends in urban regeneration have been visibly employing some of its most notable urban techniques, like suburbanization, extended ‘urban sprawl’, out-of-town shopping malls, food halls and plazas, design business centres, and high risers.

Throughout Europe the spatialisation of social class and aspiration can be seen in new residential areas and apartment blocks, particularly around new ‘bobo’ friendly [in David Brooks’ terms, ‘bourgeois bohemian’] cultural zones or waterfront and dockland areas. Throughout the US, the modern urban zoning that seemed so logical in the 1920s and 1930s, by the 1960s entrenched socio-economic and ethnocultural segregation. By the 1980s, ‘urban flight’ left the residential centres of many major cities to immigrants and the socially deprived, without a broader social identity they gradually clustered according to ethnicity or religion [forming ghettos]. High-density tenements were often adjacent to an otherwise well-protected ‘downtown’ business district, the populace of the former used to service the latter. Business workers travelled in from the suburbs, generating a demand for the priority of transport over ‘functionless’ public spaces. The
public spaces of the old inner city became either routeways, parking lots, social dangerzones, or retail developments. Many of the popular spaces of social life are now retail spaces, where high security and surveillance is norm, group congregation constitutes illegal loitering, and social interaction is limited to five persons, unless with family members.  

American cities have, of course, developed in extraordinary ways. The cities of Seattle, San Diego, Austin and even Chicago are outstanding places, and have generated impressive strategies of urban renewal. Yet the basic traits of the American Inner city demonstrate that where public, municipal or social priority is relinquished throughout the city, and where the city loses its physical and aesthetic coherence as a contiguous expanse, enormous problems emerge.

Where the city is designed and developed as a high-cost engine of economic growth and not a social habitat of cultural production, the public policy debates revolve around the priority of physical-economic assets and not the relations between its people. The economy becomes the ‘subject’ and the people become the ‘object’; all research attention is on the former, despite all possibility for creative production remaining with the latter. This is one of the ironies of Florida’s Creative Class thesis – where the object is the development of the creative and scientific-technological industries, the subject is actually the creative class. Florida knew that the priority must be on the people, their identity, their socio-cultural mobility and their sense of creative capability. He did not lobby policy makers to set about constructing creative economies; creative economies would emerge if they cultivated the socio-cultural conditions of a creative class.

Most cities in Europe seem to have taken Florida’s thesis, the other way – investing in facilities and economic capability will attract creative labour and in turn develop the city’s creative infrastructure. This is logical, but for Florida puts the cart before the horse.

The creative industries are unique and cannot be created by public policy makers. The task of public policy makers is to put in place the conditions of a developing Creative City. This will then begin to attract a Creative Class.

There are many problems with Richard Florida’s attract the Creative Class’ gambit. For attracting this ‘class’ of self-interested specialised professionals may well easily develop a creative segment to a city (like a business park style creative quarter), but not necessarily impact on the city itself. And mobile labour will always move onto somewhere else if it is in its interests. This is where Landry’s initial vision is important – creativity must be the modus operandi of urban policy itself, working with the existing populace. Moreover, creativity is not just a set of professional specialisations; it is unpredictable. Urban creativity is something that needs to be discovered or uncovered or otherwise itself invented as a mode of developing urban democracy. What is clear in relation to the American city example, is that where the political process of urban infrastructural development becomes so driven by private economic interests, democratic control over huge segments of the city expanse are lost. Only creative quarters will ever be possible (and often in marginal parts of the city). For a city constructed through an instrumental rationality of economic production, you cannot simply ‘add’ creativity; if you do, you may even mess things up.  

Across American and Europe we see cities re-defining the Creative City concept as a strategy for expanding capability in both cultural sector and creative industries (which otherwise remain distinct unrelated segments of the city). The European Regional Development Fund supported project, Development and Promotion of Creative Industry Potentials in Central European Cities (involving the five Central European cities of Leipzig [DE], Genoa [IT], Gdansk [PL], Ljubljana [SI] and Pecs [HU]), is based around this economic creative industries model. The well-publicised Detroit Creative Cities Summit 2.0 in 2008 was of the same order. To be sure, all these schemes have profound virtues and sometimes great results. But the Creative City idea was meant to pose a greater (political) challenge.

With some irony, perhaps, the UNESCO Creative City index only registers one UK Creative City – Bradford. (Scotland is the only country in the world having two creative cities – Glasgow and Edinburgh). Bradford, however, is only creative on account of its investment in one single creative industry sector – film. Does this mean it is a Creative City? Santa Fe and Iowa City are the two US creative cities. Montreal is the Canadian creative city. However, it is the city of Toronto who arguably is one of the most globally recognised creative cities (as well as being reputedly the most ethnically diverse). In this context, the opening of Toronto’s impressive Creative City strategy is telling: It states:

‘The Mayor’s vision of creativity as an economic engine; Richard Florida’s arrival in Toronto: two prominent indications of the importance of creativity at this moment in the city’s history. The components are all in place: Toronto’s wealth of human talent; its openness to diversity; its strong social infrastructure; the breadth and depth of higher education institutions; strong and safe neighbourhoods. And last but not least, its extraordinary strengths in creative and cultural industries. It is all here.’ (Creative City Planning Framework 2008). It may all be there. However, the next paragraph begins: ‘But success requires political will’. 
Toronto probably has the most extensive and well-thought-out creative city strategy in existence. But they still end up with the 'but' question. The situation in the UK is like this. Like Toronto, impressive 'components' and the facility to initiate, develop and manage components have been consolidated. But something to do with political will, or political commitment, is lacking. And 'will' is not a simple matter of intention or volition: there are plenty of good intentions around, and would-be leaders. 'Will' requires a philosophically defensible rationale. Creativity as such is not the issue either: it is everywhere. The issue is the nexus between politics and policy and what culture can become within that nexus.

Somehow our cities do not have a cultural coherence, not in vision, trajectory or lifestyle, as urban-city development itself has not been principally generated by the kind of critical research that would comprehend the deep political nature of urban cultural life.

**Culture and Political Will**

Where in France, preserving a sense of the French 'way of life' is a normative imperative for cultural policy, for many other countries the term 'way of life' is more problematic. After the Second World War, Germany went through an enormous renegotiation of its cultural values and historical reference points (which is perhaps still continuing). The end of the War also saw to the political end of Britain's infamous class structure, the cultural implications of which are still visible in our social order. In the UK — a union of four countries (three Celtic and one Anglo-Saxon) — there is little sense to the term 'way of life', even though the Victorian celebration of 'tea time', warm beer and cricket still convinces us we had one, or that one is repressed somewhere, requiring a revival of some kind, or reduced immigration. New Labour's almost obsessive celebration of minority cultures perhaps belied a painful acknowledgement of the lack of coherent 'indigenous' culture: new vibrant immigrants seem to possess something 'authentic' we lacked. And while the inherently conservative provincial parish routines are still visible around the English countryside, mass immigration, demographic change, globalisation and the return of radical religion to the public sphere, all increasingly remind us that culture and 'way of life' was not something to be taken for granted. It is more than simply the historical social order.

One of the formative influences for Comedia's Creative City research was European cultural planning and the work of the Council of Europe from the late 1970s. This was where the fashionable urban regeneration term 'renaissance' was derived (the European Campaign for Urban Renaissance: 1982-1986). The term renaissance employed in New Labour cultural policy from around 1999 — in the arts, urban design and planning, and museums and heritage — signified an attempt to reconstruct a sense of a cultural way of life. The term renaissance evoked a sense of something lost, to be regained; in policy terms, it was an odd bedfellow of multicultural social policy. Yet the rhetoric of restoration and rebirth pervaded New Labour's 'holistic' approach to government on accession to power in 1997. In the foreword to the Urban White Paper, Our Towns and Cities (2000), Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott stated 'How we live our lives is shaped by where we live our lives', inflecting a technical strategy for city development with New Labour polemic.

The political argument was that the urban regeneration of past governments was premised on property reconstruction, ignoring the more fundamental issues of culture and 'quality of life'. Both these terms were deployed in the first impressive The State of English Cities reports (and the enormous national database of city development and infrastructure, inspired by similar policy-driven urban research in the USA). The report expressed Tony Blair's stated aspiration to put public interest at the heart of city management through a renewed local democracy — expressing ‘...a connected rather than reductionist view of the world’. The term 'quality of life' was used in relation to urban policies designed to increase a sense of civic life, identity, pride, belonging and sense of cultural richness. In terms of policy strategy, therefore, it was interconnected with the development of local democracy and devolved powers of governance. However, these nebulous terms aimed for fulfillment of the most part only via urban regeneration projects, and the addition of flagship cultural facilities, heritage centres, conspicuous public art, signature-style architecture, leisure services and new retail parks. We still have all these fabulous cultural assets; they are, as yet, largely untouched by the global recession. Yet quality of life seems again to be in decline.

The cities of Sofia, Marrakesh and Bangalore, are all 'cities of culture', with profound dimensions of cultural experience and a distinctive way of life. They are not 'creative cities' in our sense of the term. They remain a critical, if tacit, reference point for the Creative City ideal (as well as a principle focus of global cultural tourism). The 'cultural city' signifies something of a 'way of life' that has been lost, and a sense of 'quality' that is internal to a way of life (not just a characteristic of productive conveniences of added physical amenities). In one sense, this appears like nostalgia for lost culture or a quality of life that the Creative City seeks to simulate in positive ways. Yet, as many a Creative City strategy has found, increased arts funding and new cultural facilities do not in themselves create quality of life.

The problem with 'quality' as the historic cultural city demonstrates, is that it is socio-aesthetic. It is not simply social and not just aesthetic (as if
architecture and planning could create culture. Quality of life speaks of a certain indefinable relation between social interaction and its urban environments.

And whilst the loss of singular, organic national cultural way of life is of course intrinsic to industrial modernity per se, the old cultural city still generates something indicative of what we are looking for, where the loss of culture becomes an enigmatic socio-aesthetic experience of the everyday, and generates particular styles of social interaction. Barcelona’s El Raval perhaps expresses something of the socio-aesthetic of a ‘quality’ of place. A sense of social anarchy pervades the area, a hint of squalor, danger, and ‘street life’ uninhibited by the regulatory mechanisms of State order. Without doubt, life here has a quality, in the sense of a texture and palpable atmosphere. Closer to home, with a more parochial example, London’s Camden Lock exhibits a different yet related experience. It attracts up to 150,000 young visitors on a summer’s weekend. The Lock is not great architecture, and offers no notable art or musical events. A quotidien set of mid-nineteenth century waterways warehouses, through which operate a series of canal locks, are the context around which a local market sits. Much of the market sells unimpressive low-grade low-price domestic ware. Yet, Camden Lock generates a specific sense of place and space and quality of experience that has the power to forge particular social relations.

Architecture, planning, and physical facilities do not in themselves create an enigmatic cultural dynamic. It is the way the space and place generate forms of undirected social interaction, and how this mediates a sense of ‘lost’ culture. It is something impossible to define in policy terms (as arts, heritage or national patrimony). It can take the form of a degraded social space, where production and consumption are almost indivisible, and where profound forms of cultural defamiliarisation as well as social differentiation seem endlessly possible. The cultural quality of these places is not nostalgia or maintained by preservation order: El Raval and Camden are not fossilised historic parks. They are not managed by policy. However, policy does construct the conditions through which they are enabled to manage themselves or maintain some form of responsive interchange with the mechanisms that govern their environment. They contain something being sought after in the Creative City project, and something that eludes the grasp of creative city policy-making.

What we seem to be enchanted by in El Raval or Camden Lock is the historically degraded, the unmanaged, the unreformed or even deformed, or the impossible or downright nihilistic. This does not mean we are looking for the right thing – we are surely not: the reflex to look for ‘real’ culture in the obsolete ‘historic-cultural city’ is surely symptomatic of a disorientation caused by the dislocation of culture from the contemporary urban and its political conditions. Our cities import or reproduce culture, not create it (and in turn are created by it).

Over the last few decades new cultural spaces have emerged in almost every major European city. These new spaces have been initiated by artists or squatters, sometimes private entrepreneurs, sometimes through a direct policy initiative. The most famous include Berlin (Tacheles), Grenoble (Quartier Berriat), Lausanne (Flon), Marseille (Friche Belle-de-Mai), the Dortmunder ‘U’, and Birmingham’s Custard Factory. To this can be added the recent rise in ‘artist-run’ galleries or practitioner managed arts centres. This is not a single phenomenon, of course, but taken as a general trend appears to be a symbolic resistance to the institutionalized forces of arts administration and the normative cultural order of Creative City development. Many of these organizations can be understood in this way: at the same time such projects are part of the colonizing impact of State-sponsored culture-led regeneration. In China, ‘warehouse-style museums’ are now a big thing for this reason.

The intellectual task

In theory, these new hybrid culture spaces collapse the categorical separation of production and consumption. This presents a few problems for cultural policy or arts funding regimes [usually the same thing], which need to keep the business of the artist distinct from the activities of the viewing public. Furthermore, freed from the restraints of cultural heritage, these new spaces have shifted the emphasis from objects and collections and even exhibitions (and the asset value of public cultural products) to social interaction, communication, research and dialogue. As organizations they operate more like the enterprises of the creative industries than museums, which traditionally provided the models of labour for modern art galleries. In all, the new culture spaces demonstrate a need for ‘space-creation’ over institution-building, and are responding to new economic configurations of social life by experimenting with new alignments of the cultural, the social and the economic. In the context of the Creative City, the new culture spaces articulate the increasing disjunction between cultural production and cultural management – the (necessary) socio-urban basis of production and the politically-constituted regimes of management. They at once articulate a need for the ‘unmanaged’ or self-managed cultural-urban life, as they do ‘public’ culture. There is, however, an internal contradiction in the impulse for cultural autonomy and an increasing need for relevance and significance only found by playing a role in the formation of the public realm. The latter is a role only afforded by cooperation with bureaucratic cultural policy, and remains an issue for the future Creative City.
Currently, in the UK at least, the growing shock of a second economic recession – which could last up to a decade – could helpfully expose the fundamental priorities of our cultural policy mechanisms. Recession is already provoking a massive retrenchment of institutional interests and consolidation of official forms of patronage. And yet, history surely reveals an intimate connection between social crisis and the artistic imagination (and the fact that heavily institutionalized cultural production is never productive for very long).

As is often observed, the way urban and social policy has appropriated ‘culture and creativity’ as terms of reference has generated new forms of State administered control. Administrative control, reaching a certain level, always generates a consciousness of its (absent) opposite – cultural autonomy. The dream of modernism [which was surely autonomy] is never far from even the post-post modernist culture of the global economy. The conceptual opposition of ‘control’ and autonomy is not so easily discerned, in part as ‘autonomy’ in culture [as in our democracies] has no real substantive form. The collapse of the historical rhetorics of aesthetic autonomy [from Kant to Greenbergian modernism of the 1960s and 1970s] allowed both critical, anti-foundationalist and interventionist art production as well as its opposite – policy-managed social and economic instrumentalism. The policy appropriations of culture, to which we are now so acculturated, we can hardly imagine our culture without them, have of course radically increased the productive power, professionalism and public profile of museums, galleries and other centres of public cultural production. State ‘control’, therefore, is often manifest in formations of cultural autonomy, particularly in policy cultures that celebrate entrepreneurialism, enterprise and leadership. Charismatic individuality (in the arts as much as business) has been one of the most productive forms of State control, against which few have argued given its effectiveness.

State control, its rationales and rhetorics, have become so internalized in our mechanisms of cultural management, it is now inseparable from cultural production itself. Where autonomy has dissolved individualism, the individual is celebrated as never before, particularly in advanced forms of artistic production. Only a small minority of artists work collectively, or take their city and its social communities as their subject, or address the ethics and politics of urban life, or public culture [or public politics at all]. Rather, highly inflected single-object artworks, individualized visual languages, ego-driven eccentricity, is still the register of the normative for artistic ontology. Many of the most visible artists and architects remain creatures of the market, and the large public art and architectural commissions in our cities attest to this.

A phenomenon so deconstructed by Bourdieu in the 1980s, it is extraordinary the degree to which cultural production remains a field of competitive individual's career trajectories, where the artist's brand and signature styles vie for dominance. Public art or architecture commissioning operates whereby the commissioned object or product is calculated to return on the capital invested [which for both art institution and city government could be calculated as political, economic, social or cultural capital – city government officials are often disciples of Bourdieu in this regard]. The ‘stararchitecture’ of culture-led regeneration demonstrate just how such irresistible the celebrity and luxury of artistic individualism are in terms of a capital return to a city centre. It also demonstrates how the new economy of capital accumulation has a way of supplanting the urban vernacular and socio-urban basis of cultural production. As defined by geographers David Harvey, Nigel Thrift and others, creativity has been central to the reconstitution of labouring subjectivities for new hypermobile and flexible neoliberal economy.21 It’s easy to claim that all art and culture has been made over into a ‘creative industry’. 21 What is not so easy to explain is how the creative industries are no longer just ‘industries’, but legislative mechanisms for culture per se, through which we must imagine a public.

Collective culture

The very term public has become vested with all kinds of power and interests. The emergence of a ‘post-public’ condition in the UK can be traced through the cultural and urban policy of the UK New Labour government (1997-2010). New Labour were not simply a government, but a radical cultural sect, who set out to orchestrate (and achieved) a massive cultural shift in the values, behaviours and ethics of the British public. With a difficult British press, and largely dysfunctional local government, the (re) construction of a more effective public sphere was impossible. Labour therefore set about creating a new post-public realm, a political landscape of devolved governance, whose many agencies and quangos discharged their central task in implementing the New Labour political project (as it was called) in their locale. The post-War ‘arm’s length’ principle of non-governmental agencies was not dissolved, but reconstituted. Like a good religious organisation, a divergence of political interpretation was always tolerated in this broad spectrum of post-public governance, as long as faithful membership was both affirmed and promoted.

Before New Labour were elected, their party manifesto of 1997 had asserted an unprecedented commitment to the use of art and culture in socio-civic reconstruction: The arts, culture and sport are central to the task of recreating the sense of community, identity and civic pride that should define our country. Yet we consistently undervalue the role of the arts and culture in helping to create a civic society.22 Tony Blair later stated that the arts and culture were ‘part of the core script’ of the Government. Creating a new ‘civic society’ – was the language of a post-public culture. The ‘civic’ was a euphemism...
for something like ‘a contributory role to the
development of the new urban political economy’.

The creation of new European Union-inspired
Regional Development Agencies and Regional
Cultural Consortia (RCC) and Regional Spatial
Strategies (RSS) did not disperse invested focus on
‘the city’ in favour of the region. It reconstructed ‘the
city’ as a politics-free entity. The city was redefined
as an economic engine, and an entity with its own
soo-urban integrity, and not principally defined in
terms of interlocking political territories. The British
city was always, by and large, formed in identity
and government as a platform and segmented
fiefdoms of political representatives (who sat the
city council, or national Parliament). The city’s
powers of representation in the national government
was largely through these representatives.
A new era for the city, however, had arrived.

The city emerged as a major theme for the UK’s
The Government commissioned a new Urban Task
Force, headed by Lord Richard Rogers (co-architect
of the Centre Pompidou). It continued support for the
European Core Cities Initiative, started in the UK in
1995. It set up the enormous American city-inspired
data gathering exercise, the State of the English
Cities project [from 2000]. It introduced emphatic
design components into national planning guidelines
and generated a cultural-shift in the otherwise
philistine construction industry. The arts and culture
were subject to ministerial representation in the
centre of Government, and a newly constituted
Department of Culture, Media and Sport shifted
the public priorities from heritage and historical
patrimony to contemporary art, media and the
new public policy category of ‘creative industries’.

During New Labour’s tenure, the Arts Council
England continued to defend the ‘autonomy’
of the arts, but with a new rationale.

Artistic autonomy for
publicly funded arts
remained at the level of
the individual artist [what
they did with media and
its composition], but not
on the level of meaning
and cultural engagement
[its distribution and
consumption]. Of course,
in time this distinction
became purely analytical.

The Arts Council accordingly invested its research
budget and strategy-making energies into proving
art’s meaningfulness and usefulness to society,
which meant inserting artistic practice into projects
otherwise framed by Government social policy.

It is impossible, however, to understand the
changing political status of the arts and culture
without taking into account the emergence of
the new creative industries and New Labour’s
growing integrated vision of a creative economy.
The Government’s Creative Industries Task Force
(CITF) consolidated the ‘creative economy’ as a
public policy concern with research devices like
their Creative Industries Mapping exercises [of
1998, then 2001]. Public cultural institutions
and the arts, of course, were not featured, and
contemporary art only appeared as ‘Art and Antiques
market’, and within a matrix for calculating their
contribution to the UK’s GDP. But looking at the
‘market-end’ of the art world became a common
way of calculating how public subsidy of culture could
leverage commercial enterprise, or how in theory,
every arts or cultural organisation operated in a
consumer market [albeit in a non-profit capacity].

Collective culture

The ubiquity of ‘the market’ – a strange new
universal ontology – re-framed all of social
life within its global context. Every museum
radically increased their retailing capability [café,
books, souvenirs, and so on] and publishing, providing
hospitality, and offering education as a commercial
service arrangement. The 1990s, of course, was the
decade where American New Public Management
(NPM) was adopted by the British Government,
quickly supplanting traditional forms of civil service
public administration. NPM used administrative
mechanisms and measures derived from the
corporate world and commerce, yet with an irony.
For creativity [at least as a concept] emerged
everywhere in the late 1990s, even in corporate
management consultancy. As if in response to
the divestment of the culture of traditional public
administration, governments both national and local
began hiring countless management consultants.
Independent Management Consultancy companies
in the UK between 1998-2008 were everywhere
throughout the public sector, even the arts. They
did not merely offer new techniques or skills, but a
new culture of values for a now out-of-date public
eths of public administration. ‘The public’ became
a continuum of market segments, from ‘audiences’
to ‘partners’ or ‘stakeholders’ and so on. There was
also a shrinking of the distinction between the
artist and the business entrepreneur or aspirational
corporate leader. The artist became a model worker
in the new global innovation economy and the new
management consultancy never tired of using
creative terminology derived from artistic production.
Furthermore, new terms like ‘cultural entrepreneur’
or ‘social enterprise’ appeared, where ‘creative
business’ operated new non-commercial arenas.24

And from herein, the relation between public and
private became intriguing and very fluid. There was
much talk about ‘synergies’ between the cultural

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sectors and creative industries [where education institutions acted as ‘bridging partners’]. The arts, in fact, benefitted from the success of the creative industries, as holding onto their traditionally function-less cultural autonomy could be positioned as the imagination incubator of society, and a kind of open source R&D resource for industry creatives. Leaving the arts alone for the sake of free creativity gained a new instrumental logic, particularly with a fast growing visitor and tourist economy. ‘Brit artists’ – new contemporary artists, among which were Damien Hirst and Tracey Emin – were feted by high level politicians for demonstrating to the world the liberating creativity of British culture. Prime Minister Tony Blair rebranded the UK as ‘Cool Britannia’, which passed through the British Council and other promotional media as an invitation to the world’s entrepreneurs to come and be energised in innovation [and ‘use’ the country’s publically-available resources to set up shop].

By 2005 the political validation of ‘creativity’ was complete, sealed perhaps by the now famous Government commissioned report The Cox Review of Creativity in Business.

The ‘city’ was never conceptualized as an entity for national cultural policy. European cultural planning models were largely rejected by British cities. A tendency for what Andy Pratt called ‘xerox policy making’ (i.e. repeating ‘successful’ models, such as ‘clusters’ or ‘creative quarters’) emerged and has remained to this day in most cities. We have a concentration of cultural quarters’) emerged and has remained to this day ‘successful’ models, such as ‘clusters’ or ‘creative industries’ and the creative industries to this day remain very separate areas of endeavor – the former wholly defined as a public subsidy the latter wholly commercial – and both detached from the mechanisms and intellectual confluences of urban policy. This, while contradicting the previous ideological integration of art and business, also remained an obstacle for the aspirations for city regeneration. Arts Council England developed no lexicon of urbanism or framework for the role of public culture within city urban development. Despite the growing achievements of public art and artists who were demonstrating profound knowledge of the social dynamics and political economy of city life, national arts funding remained focused on individual organizations, traditional art institution silos, and the use of mainstream contemporary art projects to contribute to social policy objectives.

The idea of a ‘public policy’ was not equivalent to ‘government support’ or ‘funding mechanisms’. Public policy entailed a far broader cultivation of the conditions required for the development of public goods and public culture over generations, even centuries. This may seem like idealism: what is interesting is that it has only come to seem like idealism in our own epoch of market consumerism. We therefore need to re-think our concept of culture itself, and see how far it is aligned with our concept of ‘the public’, and how intimately the development of the public is bound up with specific delimited urban locations. ‘Cultural policy’ should be that discursive space where the question of culture is re-thought in relation to its urban contexts and the ideologically-driven demand for its social instrumentality. Art must be more than the amelioration of the collateral damage of a government’s economic policies. It should drive the politics of public culture.
Cultural policy in the UK is less a ‘thinking’ space than a series of funding mechanisms, whose powers over cultural production are largely concealed by the continuing political fiction of ‘arm’s length’ public agency governance. Cultural policy is constituted through a categorisation of professional activities (media, sport, the arts, etc.) and not places or spaces (like cities). National arts policy are devolved to city-based local cultural strategy. Yet these strategies (which are often just national policy writ small), are largely investment in local arts institutional silos and media organisations whose framework of reference is ‘vertical’ in that they relate to national and international organizations (usually in London). Their intellectual investment is largely in their own perceived professional interests, and not ‘the city’ as a creative project. The city is a business location, not a creative project. This may seem like a parochial protest, but in the context of the growing global importance of cities, it is the opposite. Most creative industries still remained transfixed by the promises of the global economy, whose major actors usually reside in the ‘central cities’ (London, Milan, Berlin) and yet, the potential for regional cities in the coming decades is huge.

**Policy Issues**

Part of the problem here is the compartmentalisation of policy itself, that by using finance-employment ‘stats’ as the unifying framework of these seemingly disparate areas of a city’s creative activity, more effective conceptual frameworks articulating their possible interrelations are ignored. Strategic thinking is thus usually compartmentalised within the categories constructed by public policy. In the UK, the ‘cultural’ spans three distinct policy fields, the arts being one. These are the creative industries, the arts and the urban (or ‘built’) environment. Sometimes these are referred to as ‘sectors’, sometimes ‘economies’ in their own right (and this is confusing, as both these terms are embedded with presuppositions on the nature of their autonomy or co-dependency). The term ‘cultural economy’ is often used to define the arts plus all the creative industries that facilitate its development (from arts consultancies to exhibition designers to cultural PR agencies).

The conceptual separation of these ‘economies’ or sectors (whatever the reality of their overlapping and interconnection) is a structural feature of British policy making, and has implications on how we think through future scenarios. My suggestion is that a new macro-urban cultural policy thinking needs to start thinking about the dynamic between the three economies (moving beyond the categorisations instituted by the DCMS ‘mapping’). And ‘the city’ can be the necessary framing device that delimits our possible scenarios. What became clear half way through New Labour’s tenure was that even the most imaginative and intellectually adventurous of New Labour cultural or urban policies (and there were many), there was a chronic disjunction between national and local policy-making capabilities and their appropriate forms of governance.

The separation of the arts as a unique and distinct object of policy may seem logical in the light of its public subsidy and seemingly natural connection to heritage and national patrimony, but this categorical ‘uniqueness’ carries with it adverse implications for developing thinking on cultural production in the city. The role of the arts in a broader cultural policy framework is characterised by a caveat – the arts (contemporary art, etc.) by and large inhabit a cultural field and discourse that is transnational, and whose primary economic frame of reference is not any one urban environment (even if it is a ‘city art gallery’). It is the historical-international discourse of contemporary art and its global art economy. New forms of ‘participatory art’ aside, contemporary art generally attains to ‘greatness’ (in the Arts Council’s terms) by virtue of not being embedded in the urban cultural everyday. The Arts Council England’s current national strategy and ongoing campaign of ‘great art for everyone’ is a last chance café, which rests on the premise that international contemporary art is socially relevant, even to ‘ordinary’ people who don’t inhabit its discourse, or have any reason to. Attempting to entice the public into the art world is not a rationally defensible objective (as the statistics of successive Arts Council national cultural participation surveys, ‘Taking Part’, seem to indicate). It is one of the ironies of contemporary art history – that the artworks and artists who punctuate the official narratives of twentieth century art were invariably creatures of the market, not public subsidy.

To compound the caveat – the heavy patronage of the arts within national urban regeneration over the last two decades has to some degree masked a policy-level strategic detachment of art from its urban environment. The Arts Councils have retained a distinctively modernist concept of ‘autonomy’, as a policy principle (where modernist autonomy of course was embodied in the very principle of ‘arm’s length’ governance that was the Arts Council’s political modus operandi as specified in its Royal Charter). While in 1989 the Arts Council of Great Britain published An Urban Renaissance: The Role of the Arts in Urban Regeneration, (in part inspired by the then Department of Environment’s earlier ‘art and architecture’ initiatives), and then supported the US originated ‘Percent for Art’ scheme in British public sector construction, the urban realm remained marginal to their policy thinking throughout the 1990s up to the present (see A Creative Future: The Way Forward for the Arts, Crafts and Media in England).

It was left for the Department of Culture Media and Sport to make the big case for integrating art in urban contexts, with their [belated] 2004, Culture at the Heart of Regeneration. Despite the enormous development of public art practice by mid-2000, particularly after the high point of Millennium commissions, the theme of ‘regeneration’ was just one of a spectrum of Arts Council concerns, some
would say deliberately downplayed and certainly overtaken by the investment of the arts in social and community services [see the 2006 review, the three-part The Power of Art]. When by 2007 the significance of public art and participatory art in the public realm became impossible to ignore, the Arts Council invented a new category of ‘Outdoor art’ (the theme of which was ‘public’ space, but the focus of which was transient performance-based art).

Generally, arts-focused cultural policy became a repetitive exercise in seeking different ways to helpfully ‘insert’ art into benign social policy contexts. A more compelling demonstration of the ‘power’ of art was arguably taking place in the urban realm, with local authorities and their various stakeholders. Many high profile artists, consultants or agents and architects developed public advocacy roles during this period, articulating a broader vision on the integration of art into the city.

Cultural policy, being focused on the arts, became overly concerned with the economics of arts funding and blind to the economics of cultural production (which for the most part is embedded in cities).

Whilst to some degree this reflects the territorialisation of the policy landscape (the ‘city’ is seen as local authority responsibility and not the preside of national arts funding bodies), there is a strong sense that vested interests alone are determining the role of art in the city and the fate of the real Creative City ideal. The challenge of the Creative City framework was that it not only demanded art should be internal to the way a city plans its urban development, but that urban development itself should become generative of art. Conceptualising this process requires imagination, as we are currently working with a three-sphere economy of arts, culture and urban and no real strategic direction into a future other than a will to preserve and survival. Cultural policy does not have such an ‘imagination’ facility, but it needs to develop one given the possible scenarios of our developing era of scarcity.

Thinking art in Urban Spaces

It’s easy to demand that ‘policy making’ develops an intellectual imagination: but what does this mean? I can only make one major suggestion – cultural policy needs to develop out of an engagement with cultural production itself, out of the terms developed by artists and groups working in [and against] the actual concrete conditions of civic and urban life, generating the ‘quality’ of life and socio-aesthetic experience of the everyday noted above. Public art – in its many forms – is one region of artistic production that has developed an ‘urban intelligence’ capability and could become a partner in a cultural policy critical dialogue, in turn generating a dialogue with broader urban policies now fixated on Creative Class creative industries models of the Creative City. In what follows below I offer six examples of ‘urban-public’ art practice, from which some more general points on creative policy in the city can be extrapolated.

(i) The NVA organisation’s ‘Grow and Sow Project’ (SAGE: starting in Glasgow 2009, ongoing in various permutations). NVA is one of the UK’s major public arts and urban intervention organisations, and the SAGE project’s stated aims include transforming derelict and vacant land into visually articulated spaces through growing natural produce and micro-agricultural activity. The food is not for market as such, unless new local markets emerge around them; in fact, they seem to be primarily aimed at breaking the dichotomy of producer-consumer and is aimed at those who have no experience of growing garden produce. Framed by rising food costs and the globalisation of the supply chain – this project is a powerful way of reconstituting community, identity and leisure (i.e. patterns of consumption) around urban land, perhaps unused, reclaimed, or politically contested. It has been designed as a mobile initiative – when land is required for development, the infrastructure can move to a new site. In some ways it bears some affinity with the Guerilla Gardening initiatives, or some projects on DIY City experiments. As an idea it in some ways extends old Victorian idea of land ‘allotments’, the kind of which became so essential to Britain’s local economies during two successive world wars. The allotment, however, was based around an individualized model of production. ‘Grow and Sow’ is more communitarian. Its compelling aspect is in the recolonisation of space for a local economy, whose production values could be as social as cultural as political, if or when poverty levels ‘politicize’ the food chain.

(ii) Cittadellarte – Fondazione Pistoletto – is perhaps an example on an opposite pole. The 1960s art luminary Michelangelo Pistoletto is demonstrating a new form of creative entrepreneurship. While on the face of it, the Cittadellarte seems like classic high-cost urban regeneration in a celebrity-driven mode, yet its artistic patronage demonstrates profound intellectual potential. Artistic patronage, or any other kind of artistic leadership in the UK, is very small and undeveloped. Normally, artists might set up a charitable foundation, whose grant-awarding committee disburses so-committed funds. But what is it for a foundation to be ‘creative’ and itself a centre of artistic production? Called a ‘creative laboratory’, the Cittadellarte runs courses and convenes creative research teams to apprehend major social and economic problems, forging policy initiatives through artistic practice, whether urban decay or economic sustainability. While the ‘art lab’ idea was indeed a 1990s trend, this is far far more – it is an industrial size complex that challenges university-
based Humanities research in its potential for high-impact knowledge creation. Where most universities have largely abandoned a direct public role for their humanities research, this offers a measure of hope, particularly as Cittadellarte’s cultural activism has given the small town of Biella both a strong regional and a national profile. This kind of active cultural citizenship requires further thought.

(iii) Mirjam Struppek’s European Urban Screens project are a relatively low cost way of transforming urban aesthetics through networked public life. The screens integrate forms of communication now normal in domestic computers, but also form an ever changing and highly active site for new media art. Simply having a large screen in a public place instantly creates new urban networks of information, and hold enormous potential for art and cultural documentary. Many potential culture-spaces are vacated at nighttime for reasons of security, or simply aesthetic reasons – dark parts of the city are inhospitable. Most of northern Europe needs nocturnal and winter-period use of urban screen transformation, given how prohibitive the weather is to public congregation. Inserting screens in key public spaces is something that is also gaining pace of course by commercial-corporate actors – and preventing this colonisation of public space is an achievement in itself. Theoretically, however, the screen could play a significant role in engaging with a culturally indifferent social populace on street-level. While the express attempt at using the virtual world of plasma screens to create the conditions of a ‘new public sphere’, is seemingly idealistic, the recent examples around the world of social media-facilitated political protest is anything but. The screens could demonstrate a practical way of ‘externalising’ art world culture, creating perhaps [in Bourdieus’s terms] a new public ‘habitus’, which goes some way to helping dissolve the enduring cultural class system. I can also provide new methods of the politicization of public space, with its effective routes for the dissemination of political information.

(iv) CM Architecten’s (Amsterdam) Agorascapes project is just one of many examples of contemporary European architects who draw on architectural history’s enormous intellectual resources, designing spaces for dialogue and interaction. Like the ancient Greek agora, or open ‘place of assembly’, this project aims at purposively designating civic spaces for the purpose of discussion and debate. In cities, the places of political deliberation are closed, and enclosed, accessible only in badly tabulated documents well after the fact. They are usually assemblies, or politically designed interiors for select members only. CM Architecten proposes the reconstruction of the agora-shaped public place of participation – as a symbolic act, but also an architectural intervention that has profound physical consequences for the way social space is perceived. Even open social spaces have been colonized by retail behaviours, even if they are not retail or commercially-owned spaces. The state often considers public space their own space, and polices that space jealously. We therefore need a new architectural-urban language of public discourse and interaction. That language needs to be embedded in the very morphology of the city, creating structures that cannot be appropriated by the forces of retail. That language will remain and develop. CM Architecten’s architectural forms are not monumental, and do not claim permanence – but are open to development and modification, and for the constant dynamics of changing social usage. Altogether, low cost modification of the environment can generate new ways of re-instituting an agora-culture in city centres.

(v) Faith groups have largely been written out of the narrative of cultural sector policy development. Throughout Europe, governments maintain a politically strategic interest in ‘recognising’ established denominations [particularly the ones who have played a historic role in supporting the social order or State social formations]. However, with the rise of Islam, such prejudices are no longer sustainable. The UK is unique in Europe for its centuries-old proliferation of non-established, non-conformist and free church groups. With enormous (and largely uncontrolled) immigration over the last 15 years, the religious landscape has been transformed. Culture, belief and urban politics are now one and the same for millions of minorities in the UK. Yet, they are kept out of ‘cultural policy’ and policy debates. Taking a minor, local and parochial example: a Baptist church on the edge of Oxford is one interesting site of multi-ethnic cultural production. A project called the Ark T Centre programme, uses both church and adjacent building as a space for artists, community engagement, and a site for dialogue about theologically defined issues on human worth, meaning and purpose. Despite the work of the UK Faith Based Regeneration Network and the various Interfaith Councils, the role of faith communities in regeneration has been largely stunted. Here, however, we see a faith group defining its own cultural autonomy outside of state-sponsored programs, and using their potential for a creative community mobilization. With some irony, most faiths have at their theological roots a concept of a ‘creator’ or the origin of human life as an act of creation. With many faith groups now discovering their creative potential, they need to become a more sustained object of policy critique.

(vi) Participatory art: new forms of socially-embedded art are emerging, and in ways that have long term potential for urban development. Strange Cargo in Folkestone on the South Coast of England is one example of an organisation with a long-term political commitment to an urban locale. They find the means to adapt their artistic production to the broader rhythms of local cultural production. Here we find artists inhabiting regional vernacular culture for long periods, speaking the visual language of the area, working at providing an alternate method of
constructing cultural capital to a populace always once-removed from ‘official’ culture. Strange Cargo participate in vernacular creativities from school activities, fetes and winter grottos. Within the familiar and unthreatening world of the parochial everyday, they reorder the patterns of social interaction, which enable local people to learn, think, and access the discursive forces that ultimately shape their physical environment. They cultivate a horizon of expectations whereby local people think about the socio-urban structures that are the parameters of their everyday life and future direction.

(vii) My last example is the most complex: Initially commissioned as part of the European Capital of Culture 2010 [awarded to the Ruhr region of Germany] – 2-3Strassen began in 2009 when artist Jochen Gerz advertised around Europe for volunteers to occupy, free of charge, 80 apartments. Out of 1,457 applicants, 80 initially took up residence in each of the 3 streets, in Duisburg, Dortmund and Mülheim an der Ruhr (the latter is a ‘vertical street' or towerblock and vicinity). Located for regeneration, each street had an internet café and office space as an organisational HQ, and all apartments containing a laptop computer connected by internet to a central database. Contributing on their laptops, the resident creatives formed the core of authors that wrote the now published 3,000-word record: 2-3StrassenTEXT (Dumont, 2011). As a model of housing reclamation, residential enculturation and ethnic-immigrant acculturation, this art project opened up a new front for art in the public realm. Many of the volunteers were artists or designers, many were not, and many continued to hold down their regular jobs. Together, the volunteer creatives lived in their streets from January to end of December 2010, 40 of which have remained. The objective for Gerz was to make the street a ‘living exhibition’ of art. With reference to Josef Beuys he sometimes called it ‘social art’. And as social art, it introduces a powerful sense of reorientation within a physical urban place, and introduced a new cultural politics of housing into the city’s regeneration programme.

My above examples are, of course, atypical public-urban art projects, but chosen to present a spectrum of activities that need to be considered by policy makers in considering the relation between culture, city governance and urban development and the ways they can work together to create a Creative City. These are not unique projects, but together they give us a glimpse of the realms of urban life art could inhabit, which increased to a critical level of funding, would establish a critical mass of activity and in turn could become formative of a new city public culture. Once cultural activism reaches the level and consolidation of a truly ‘public’ cultural sphere, it then becomes political, as the ground on which it works, and the subjects through which it speaks, are replete with political interests. All our examples involve a mobilization of a public, or a process whereby art spectators are turned into cultural citizens.

My intention in this meandering discourse on the Creative City has been to set down some observations on the influence and changing Creative City model of cultural policy. This was not to glory in the demise of a ideology, but to recognize its significance in our thinking of the future of public culture after the large-scale ambitions of European urban regeneration. How can we understand cultural production in the urban complex of the city without the patronage of capital investment? I pointed out that most cities have opted for a ‘creative industries development’ model of Creative City, where even the arts become a segment of the creative industries. This related more to Richard Florida's Creative Class framework, than the British Creative City idea.

I suggest that we need to rethink the Creative City idea, and cultural policy should be the ‘thinking space’ where this takes place. New public art can be an important dialogue partner in this thinking, ensuring that the emerging thought processes morph through substantive ideas and not succumb to the idealism or romantic humanism that is so embedded in European cultural policies.

All my examples of art projects in urban spaces are animated by ideas that contrast with the priorities of urban regeneration. The role of artists in urban regeneration was always as a junior partner, and the art always submerged in a complex of symbolic meanings articulating global economic forces always beyond view. National cultural policy is fixated on the international contemporary ‘art world art’, and evangelizes on behalf of this art world, attempting to convert the public into art spectators. It needs to consider how to turn art spectators into cultural citizens, whose life in real cities can be creative and generative of the non-capital social investment that is the only way to develop an urban ‘way of life’. It needs to consider the real meaning of the term ‘public culture’, and how a genuine public culture can exist as an integral part of city governance. Of course, the opportunities will be [and are being] suppressed by a new public management ethos of ‘survivalism’, a retrenchment of self-interest, and a negation of risk. In the next decade – the ‘lost decade’ (as the British media are calling it) the most critical issues of the life of our cities will emerge. Perhaps I can make a few suggestions:

Conclusion
The original Creative City is a valuable concept. It is a challenge to transform the 'cognitive' dimensions of city policy making (the way the city is understood, is represented, and the thought processes that animate its decision-making and the strategic approach of its governance). It is more than a case for funding arts labs, quarters or institutions, regardless of their intrinsic value.

We need to recognise the importance of cities in this new era of crisis-globalisation, where a re-scaling of global markets, a rising of new global powers and new cultural reference points are making for some unexpected changes. National capital centres are becoming less the exclusive fount of culture they were, rather, regional cities are rising in cultural importance and must assert a cultural independence as a matter of political principle. The contemporary art/artistic culture models within cities should not be dominated by national funding models, whose frame of reference is the global art market or international art world. We need contemporary art that takes the city as its principal subject, its site of production and distribution.

The art and culture labs, alternative and artist-run galleries, cultural centres, quarters and arts institutions that have emerged and developed in European cities over the last two decades are significant. They express a new intellectual capability and a powerful facility in art production that can be used to further investigate the 'political' dimension of the Creative City idea.

In the UK as elsewhere, a new drive to create networks and interconnected spaces is needed. Space for 'public culture' is still something conceived in the framework of 'art exhibition' space or a space for works of art, and not principally where research, documentation, discourse and ideas are generated. We need new kinds of public cultural space. Cultural spaces in the UK are largely dependent on national arts funding schemes, and are only active in the context of national funding strategy. A new EU-wide range of culture spaces needs to emerge, which are not dependent upon national funding regimes, and which can facilitate an engagement with the Creative City problem in a collaborative way.

Cities must be encouraged to open up spaces for cultural 'nomadism' and transient creativity between such spaces and places. They need to create the conditions for fluid and fast travel across Europe's cultural centres, both preventing parochialism and extending the limited intellectual life of regional cities. Public universities and art schools need to reverse the trend of privatised member-only education management, and use their spaces for open citizen politics, collaboration, facilitating European cultural nomadism. We need to fight the chronic political inertia on such topics as participative local democracy, local economy and sustainable subsistence, the use of vacant land and land reclamation, housing and immigration. The Creative City is not just about stylistic architecture and new museums of modern art. It is about a radically democratic city culture of new public spaces, cultural citizenship, urban activism, local identity and a sense of future possibility. It is where art becomes a critical dimension of the public sphere, against the post-public fatalism that seems to be our current ideological foe.

Notes

1. This paper was serialised weekly on LabKUL TUR website, in 15 parts, between May-July 2012. It began as a public talk for MADE centre for place-making, Birmingham, November 2011. I am grateful for Bernd Fesel for his invitation to rewrite the paper, and for Christian Caravante acting as editor.


3. The term Creative City was popularised by Charles Landry in the 1980s in part through his empirical research on cities like Glasgow, and his consultancy Comedia, subsequent international conferences [Glasgow, 1994; Helsinki, 1996; Huddersfield, 2000], and current creative urban strategy-making across the world. His ideas are articulated most clearly in the latest edition of The Creative City: A Toolkit for Urban Innovators [London: Comedia/Earthscan, 2009]. His earlier influential reports include The Art of Regeneration: Urban renewal through cultural activity [Landry, C., Greene, L., Matarasso, F., and Bianchini, F., Stroud, Glos.: Comedia, 1996].

4. The Creative City is a generation of cultural policy researchers was a cultural policy framework capable of addressing the 'new' post-industrial urban landscapes of the post-Fordist economy, along with new economic growth theory and propelled by notions of the new knowledge economy. There is a sense in which Landry’s work in the UK parallels economist Richard Florida in the USA, where creativity inserts human agency and imaginative subjectivity into general economic theory [The Rise of the Creative Class — and how it is transforming leisure, community and everyday life, New York: Basic Books, 2002]. The other formative influence to Creative City thinking is John Howkins [The Creative Economy: How people make money from ideas, London: Penguin, 2001]. The 'non-academic' way these three texts were written [as well as their empirical bent] was essential to their influence among urban policy makers.

5. The PFI or Private Finance Initiative was a model of the financing of urban development which became copied around the world; it was initially a dimension of the ‘Private Public Partnership’ schemes allowed by an Act of Parliament for the Conservative Government in 1992. These regeneration schemes were intended to raise large capital funding for major urban public projects, like schools, hospitals and roads, from private capital not public funds. However, the contractual arrangements heavily favoured the private contractors, many of which have been authorised to collect high returns on the projects for up to 25 years, near bankrupting the
public organisations that were 'partnered'. See John Ware for Panorama, 'Who's Getting Rich On Your Money?' [BBC One, Monday, 28 November, 2011]. See also George Monbiot's 'Our very own Enron', The Guardian [28th June, 2005].


9. The classic critique of American urban planning is of course Jane Jacobs, 'The Death and Life of Great American Cities' [New York: Random House, 1961]. See also Richard Fogleson's important Planning the Capitalist City [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986]. For a straightforward empirical account of the American period, ten currently, see Claude Green's New Urban Development: looking back to see forward [Rutgers University Press, 2010]. For an interesting, if not unique attempt to re-think the American city, see Steinberg and Shields, What is a City? rethinking the urban after Hurricane Katrina [University of Georgia Press, 2008].


13. For example, see the agenda and its rhetoric in http://www.detroitcreativecorridorcenter.com/our-work/open-city/ [accessed 12/02/12]. See also: http://creativecitiesthissummit.com/ [accessed 12/02/12].


17. In British parliamentary process, the 'White Paper' (sometimes called 'command paper') follows a process of research and consultation [often tabulated in a Green Paper] and is the final government policy statement of intent. However, there is nothing in law that commits a government to enacting the terms of the statement.


19. In the DETR White Paper Tony Blair confirmed this shifting mind-set: 'Success has been measured by economic growth – GDP – alone. We have failed to see how our economy, our environment and our society are all one. And that delivering the best quality of life for us all means more than concentrating solely on economic growth [...]. We must ensure that economic growth contributes to our quality of life, rather than degrading it'. DETR (1999) A Better Quality of Life: A Strategy for Sustainable development for the United Kingdom, London: Department of Environment, Transport and the Regions/ Stationery Office: q.3.13.


27. It would be unfair not to mention the ACE attempt in the form


30. This began in 2009-10 with the strategic framework Achieving Great Art for Everyone [London: Arts Council England] developed in 2009 and published 2010; the most recent publication furthering this theme is the Arts Council Plan 2011-15 [London: Arts Council England]: http://www.artscouncil.org.uk/publication/archive/arts-council-plan-2011-15/ [accessed 12/02/12]. The theme of the intrinsic value of art is a consistent philosophical problem for cultural policy, animating the constant search for ‘public value’ that characterized New Labour’s politics, and threaten to remain their legacy. From the lobbying of the Social Inclusion Unit, the Urban Task Force, even Regional Cultural Consortia, the demand for a problem-focused approach to cultural funding reached an impasse in 2004 with culture Minister Tessa Jowell’s oddball policy essay, ‘Government and the Value of Culture’ [London: DCMS/Stationery Office]. Arguing for an intrinsic value to culture [broadly, in the context of the European philosophical tradition], she arguably generated a new humanism in cultural policy, which was broadly welcomed but remained little more than an enormous question mark. Sir Brian McMaster’s government report in 2008, went some way to articulating the policy function of this new humanism, where professional judgment was affirmed to be superior to impact measurement. The object of judgment was ‘excellence’, which ultimately raised another large question mark. See The McMaster Review: Supporting excellence in the arts — from measurement to judgment [London: DCMS]. The problem of ‘value’ in cultural policy remains a chronic one, and most of the pre-Jowell bureaucratic demands for empirical measurement of impacts still remain at large. DCMS are still commissioning studies.


