Coercion, compliance, and the collapse of the Soviet command economy
UNSPECIFIED (2002) Coercion, compliance, and the collapse of the Soviet command economy. In: 2nd Oxford/Houston Conference on Initial Conditions and Russias Transitional Economy, UNIV HOUSTON, HOUSTON, TEXAS, APR, 2001. Published in: ECONOMIC HISTORY REVIEW, 55 (3). 397-+.Full text not available from this repository.
Are command systems that rest on coercion inherently unstable, and did the Soviet economy collapse for this reason? Until it collapsed, the Soviet economy did not appear unstable. Why, then, did it collapse? A game between a dictator and a producer shows that a high level of coercion may yield a stable high-output equilibrium, that stability may rest in part on the dictator's reputation, and that a collapse may be brought about by adverse trends in the dictator's costs and a loss of reputation. The facts of the Soviet case are consistent with a collapse that was triggered by the strike movement of 1989.
|Item Type:||Conference Item (UNSPECIFIED)|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
D History General and Old World
H Social Sciences
|Journal or Publication Title:||ECONOMIC HISTORY REVIEW|
|Publisher:||BLACKWELL PUBL LTD|
|Number of Pages:||38|
|Title of Event:||2nd Oxford/Houston Conference on Initial Conditions and Russias Transitional Economy|
|Location of Event:||UNIV HOUSTON, HOUSTON, TEXAS|
|Date(s) of Event:||APR, 2001|
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