A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick

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"THE AESTHETICS OF GEORGE SANTAYANA"

BY

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A THESIS FOR THE DEGREE OF PH.D. IN PHILOSOPHY

SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK

RESEARCHED IN THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK

SEPTEMBER, 1974
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Synopsis

The aim of this thesis is to give a thorough exposition of Santayana's philosophy of art, with a critical commentary using the methods of analytical aesthetics.

The subject of the first chapter is the thesis that beauty is objectified pleasure. It is argued that Santayana's views suggest an insight defensible by analytic techniques. The second chapter is concerned to expand Santayana's insights into the role of the materials of a work of art. Chapters III and IV are a consideration of his views on form and expression, respectively. The subjects reviewed are the classification of forms, the sources of pleasure in form, the nature of form, the nature of expression, tragedy, comedy and the sublime.

Chapter V is concerned with Santayana's views on the nature and relation of poetry and religion. An outline of an analytic theory of poetry is offered in criticism.

Chapter VI deals with the presuppositions of the aesthetics of the life of Reason period, and with Santayana's view of the nature of art as emergent from instinctive action. Chapter VII is concerned with his views on the aesthetics of music, architecture, the artistic uses of language, painting and sculpture. Neglected insights are stressed, e.g. his theory of the nature of representation. The eighth chapter sets out Santayana's doctrine of the relation of art and morality.

Chapter IX deals with late papers and passages on aesthetics reflecting the philosophy of the Realms of Being. The subjects dealt with are: the spiritual life; alleged similarities of doctrine with Proust; his views on Cubism, caricature, and the aesthetic movement; the varied meanings of the key predicates in aesthetic discourse; his revised formalist theory of beauty, and scattered remarks in his final work, 'Dominations and Powers'.

The conclusion is that Santayana has far more to offer analytic aestheticians than is generally considered to be the case.
THE AESTHETICS OF

GEORGE SANTAYANA
NOTE

Figures in brackets refer either to page references or to references accompanied by notes. Where a figure refers to a note, and not merely a page reference, it is followed by an asterisk, within the brackets.
INTRODUCTION

I: Aims and Method of this Thesis

George Santayana died in 1952 at the age of eighty-nine. He left an oeuvre of twenty-eight full-length books and a host of articles, dealing with metaphysics, epistemology, aesthetics, ethics and politics, together with a play, two volumes of poetry, a novel and an autobiography. Since his death, his letters have been published, together with several volumes of uncollected papers and unpublished manuscripts. Neither during his lifetime nor after it was there any lack of discussion of his work. He was the second philosopher to be made the subject of a volume in Schilpp’s ‘Library of Living Philosophers’, and has been the subject of many studies. His philosophy of art, or parts of it, has already been made the subject of four studies of book length. What room, then, is there for a fifth?

There are two main reasons why a further study of this subject is justified. In the first place, three of the four extant studies are almost entirely expository: those by Arnett: ‘Santayana and The Sense of Beauty’; Ashmore: ‘Santayana, Art, and Aesthetics’, and Lida, ‘Belleza, Arte, y Poesía en la Estética de Santayana’. Again, Señor Lida’s book, as is evident from its title, takes as its subject-matter only certain aspects of Santayana’s views. The fourth study, Singer’s, ‘Santayana’s Aesthetics: A Critical Introduction’, while containing far more critical appraisal than the other three studies, is avowedly not exhaustive. Moreover, Dr. Singer takes for granted an answer to one of the central questions of Santayana scholarship, the compatibility of the system of the Realms of Being with Santayana’s earlier works. Finally, of these four books, only that by Dr. Arnett comes close to setting Santayana’s philosophy of art in the context of its varying presuppositions. None of the studies so far published, then, is exhaustive, and only one aims at providing a critical evaluation.

Secondly, no writer has considered Santayana’s aesthetics from
the point of view of analytical philosophy. Apart from occasional references to "The Sense of Beauty", Santayana's philosophy of art is almost completely ignored in analytical circles. (The same is true of the rest of his philosophy. Islands of interest both in Britain and the United States are few and far between.) Though an established figure with a place in the history of philosophy, Santayana is now very little read.

The aims of the present thesis emerge from these considerations. They are firstly to give a thorough exposition of Santayana's philosophy of art, setting the views of each period into the context of the presuppositions Santayana employed at the time; and secondly to offer a commentary on his aesthetics from an analytical standpoint, to see whether he might have more to offer to current trends in aesthetics than his present neglect seems to indicate.

The treatment of the subject-matter in what follows is fundamentally chronological: Chapters I - IV deal with "The Sense of Beauty"; Chapter V chiefly with "Interpretations of Poetry and Religion" (1900) and such parts of "Three Philosophical Poets", 1910, as are relevant; Chapters VI - VIII are concerned with "Reason in Art" (1905) and Chapter IX with late pieces on aesthetics which reflect the development of the system of the Realms of Being. It happens also that this chronological method almost completely coincides with treatment by topic, since, so far as aesthetics is concerned at any rate, Santayana said almost all of what he had to say on a given subject in one place, other comments being few and only very rarely showing a development in his opinion. Wherever possible, and this is almost always, all Santayana's remarks on a given subject are gathered into a single chapter. There is only one exception to this generalisation, i.e. the theory of the nature of beauty. The development of the realms of being committed Santayana to a change in the opinion on this matter expressed in "The Sense of Beauty". Because the later remarks are unintelligible without an explanation of the concepts involved, the treatment of Santayana's views on the nature of beauty are divided between the first and last
II: Some Biographical Data

Santayana is now a historical figure, and some information on his life helps to put his work in perspective. This section deals very briefly with his life and major works, the next with the leading influences on his thought.

Jorge Augustin Nicolas Ruiz de Santayana was born on December 16th, 1863 in Madrid of Spanish parents. This was his mother's second marriage, she having first been the wife of a Boston merchant named Sturgis. Before his death, Sturgis had gained from his wife the promise that their children would be educated in Boston, and so to Boston Senora Santayana moved shortly after the birth of her son by her second husband. Santayana himself stayed in Avila with his father until 1872, in which year Senor Santayana took him to Boston (since America offered better opportunities for his son) and, having spent the winter there, returned to Spain, leaving his son in his wife's care. Santayana was to stay in America for forty years, passing through the Boston Latin School, Harvard, and doctoral studies in Germany. He worked as a member of the philosophy department at Harvard (1889-1912), attaining the rank of Professor. His colleagues included Josiah Royce and William James.

During the tenure of his post at Harvard, Santayana published his poems (1) and his play. (2) The major philosophical productions of these years were 'The Sense of Beauty' (1896) and the five volumes of the most ambitious of his early works, 'The Life of Reason' (1905-6). During this period he also published his two most sustained pieces of literary criticism: 'Interpretations of Poetry and Religion' (1900) and, 'Three Philosophical Poets'. (1910).

The last work named was the final book completed before Santayana's departure from America in 1912. The proximate reason for his resignation of the Harvard Professorship was the death of his mother in the previous year, and the consequent removal of any family bond to keep him in America;
and he had also by this time acquired enough money to provide him with a private income. These, however, were merely the immediate circumstances of his departure. His wish to leave was of many years' standing, since, early on, he had come to find the American ethos in general - the 'gentle tradition' as he calls it - and the 'genius loci' of Harvard quite antipathetic to his nature. He was sophisticated, cultured, and inclined to a detached attitude to life. The remnants of Puritanism which survived in the unwritten morality of Harvard - the stress on the non-contemplative virtues of action, efficiency, and enterprise - were rebarbative. This morality paid little heed to the ideals of detachment and reflection, both deeply ingrained characteristics of this European déraciné. Santayana never returned to America.

After periods in Seville and Paris, Santayana came to England, where the first War detained him until 1918. This stay produced most of the essays later collected and published as 'Soliloquies in England and Later Soliloquies' (1922). Further travels eventually led him to Rome, where he settled in 1925, and which became his home for the remaining twenty-seven years of his life. Much of this final period in his life was given over to the working out of his philosophical system, elaborated in 'Scepticism and Animal Faith' (1923), and the four volumes of 'The Realms of Being' (1927-40). He also wrote his best-selling novel, 'The Last Puritan' (1936), and his last philosophical work, the massive political treatise, 'Dominations and Powers' (1951). He continued to work to within a few days of his death, on September 26th, 1952.

III: Some Influences on Santayana's Thought

The present thesis does not pretend to supply a complete study of Santayana's philosophical debts; it is appropriate, however, to indicate briefly those philosophers who most deeply influenced his outlook. The present section is restricted to writers whose work had a marked effect on his philosophy in general; specific debts with regard to aesthetics are set out below, mainly in the notes to the relevant chapters.
In the history of American philosophy, Santayana is usually located as a member of the Critical Realists, the group forming the second wave of the reaction against Hegelian Idealism in America (3). Santayana's encounter with Idealism in his philosophically formative years was of the first importance. Two Idealist philosophers in particular provided points of view largely in opposition to which he worked out opinions which he retained all his life: they were Hermann Lotze and Josiah Royce.

Royce suggested to Santayana that Lotze would be an appropriate subject for a doctoral thesis, a suggestion which Santayana somewhat reluctantly accepted. The duly completed thesis, and marginalia in his copies of Lotze's works, show that Santayana did not take over any specific doctrines from the German philosopher. Typical in this respect is the relation of the two on the subject of the nature of beauty. Lotze regards the sense of beauty as at once an emotion of pleasure in us and a belief in the objective value of what gives us this pleasure: what distinguishes an aesthetic emotion is its interpretative nature. Beauty is the sense that nature has succeeded in her task, has subdued her materials, and accomplished her purpose. The sense of beauty becomes the pledge of real harmony of law and purpose in the world, and the subjection of the original facts to both. (4) Santayana, at least so far as his early theory of beauty is concerned (cf. Ch. I, below) would agree that the experience of beauty is one of pleasure; but there his agreement with Lotze would end. For Santayana, beauty is objectified pleasure, i.e. pleasure projected onto an object and experienced as one of the object's qualities. This view does not commit Santayana to regarding the object as objectively valuable.

Moreover, while Santayana would agree that the feeling of pleasure produced by a beautiful object indicates a certain harmony, he would maintain, taking the theory of evolution far more seriously than Lotze, that this harmony is between organism and environment and brought about by mechanical means.
He entirely abjures the final causality postulated by Lotze.

What Santayana did take from Lotze were general themes of thought which occupied him for many years, some all his life. In the latter class comes Santayana's concern with the relation of the real and the ideal, and this problem must have been very deeply impressed upon him by the study of Lotze. The German metaphysician takes it as axiomatic that the real in all respects satisfies our ideals, and offers his entire system as a confirmatory argument for this axiom. Santayana could not accept the conclusion, but he must have begun to work out his own position in opposition to that of Lotze. Again, Lotze contends that the languages of poetry and science are not to be regarded as incompatible, modes of language and culture being irreducibly many. The theme of the nature and relation of poetic and scientific language is of considerable importance in Santayana's thought. (cf. Chs. V and VII, below).

For Royce's philosophy Santayana had a marked dislike, objecting chiefly to the former's theory of good and evil. Royce regards the relations of both good and evil, truth and error, as indivisible: there can be no truth without error, no good without evil. The presence of evil is said by Royce to be a necessary condition for perfection. From this it follows that the Absolute, the ultimate reality, is itself impure. Again, Royce holds that there is necessarily conflict between values. This was to Santayana possibly the most pernicious of all the doctrines he regarded as Romantic, and which he always detested. He thought of Royce's view as a consecration of evil by a demonstration of its inevitability, a consecration which would lead to indifference to it. Royce depicts the world as intrinsically and inescapably evil, and yet blesses it as a model of what ought to be. Santayana summarized his objection to this type of view some time later. Life itself, he claims, exists only in virtue of a relatively permanent modicum of organization within the general flux of things:

"The momentum of such organization at first creates a diff-

..."
ence between good and evil, or gives them a meaning at all.
Thus the core of life is always hereditary, steadfast and
classless; the margin of barbarism and blind adventure round it
may be as wide as you will, and in some wild hearts the love of
this fluid margin may be keen, as might any other loose passion.
But to preach barbarism (i.e. as Santayana considers Royce does)
as the only good, in ignorance or hatred of the possible perfect-
ion of every natural thing, was a scandal: a belated Calvinism
that remained fanatical after ceasing to be Christian*. (6)

The main positive influences were Spinoza, and several ancient
philosophers. From Spinoza Santayana took materialism and moral relativism
in the form of the belief that things are good or bad not in themselves
but in relation to human wants and needs. (7) From the Greeks he again took
materialism (e.g. from Democritus, and from the Epicureans, via Lucretius),
but his affinity with classic culture was far deeper than simply doctrinal
sympathies. This affinity becomes clear from the period when, as a doctoral
student in Germany, he began to discover the ancient world. (There was no
course in Greek philosophy for undergraduates at Harvard at that time.
Santayana himself later introduced one). He wrote to a friend: "Greek
statues say so much more to me than any other form of art, and the Greek
view of life and nature appeals to me so strongly that I am unjust to other
forms". (8) Again, to William James: "What I enjoy most here (i.e. Berlin)
in the museum, where I go almost daily. The ancient statues are the most
beautiful things I have ever seen". (9) He was deeply impressed by
Paulsen's lectures on Greek ethics: "...here at last was a vindication of
order and beauty in the institutions of men and in their ideas". (10) Ten
years later, he employed a sabbatical year at Cambridge (1896-7) in the
study of Plato and Aristotle: "...by that study and change of scene my
mind was greatly enriched, and the composition of 'The Life of Reason'
was the consequence". (11) The central place accorded to the values of
harmony in his early ethic (cf. Ch. VI, below) and to a Platonistic contemplation in the later (cf. Ch. IX, below) testifies to his unwavering allegiance to Greek standards. As Jacques Durou says: "Santayana est un disciple des Grecs, qui incarne à ses yeux la sagesse perdue". (12)

For Royce's philosophy Santayana had a permanent dislike and for that of Spinoza and the Greeks a deep and equally durable allegiance. His relation to the thought of William James by contrast is ambivalent. With James's later doctrines, Santayana had no sympathy - he could not even take seriously the Pragmatist doctrine of truth. (13) His debt is rather to the James of the 'Principles of Psychology' period. Here the influence is not in the form of explicit, particular doctrines, but rather concerns the spirit and deepest assumptions of James's thought: "Chief of these... was a sense for the unadulterated, unexplained, instant fact of experience". (14) James was deeply aware of experience as a flux of ephemeral, immediate impressions, and this left its mark on Santayana in the form of the latter's acceptance of the epistemological distinction between the immediately given in experience, and the mind's construction on it. He held this view all his life; hence his remark that he remained a disciple of the early James: "A master in the art of recording or divining the lyric quality of experience as it actually came to him or me". (15) The immediatemediate distinction is crucially important in Santayana's aesthetics, being used in his theory of aesthetic experience, both of the spectator and the creator. (cf. especially Ch. V, below).

IV: Santayana's Conception of Aesthetics

It might seem paradoxical that a philosopher now probably best remembered as an aesthetian should have written that: "...in philosophy I recognize no separable thing called aesthetics; and what has gone by the name of the philosophy of art...seems to me sheer verbiage." (16) Again, writing in his autobiography about the lectures at Harvard which eventually became 'The Sense of Beauty': "...although I didn't have, and haven't now, a clear notion of what 'aesthetics' may be, I undertook to give a course
on that subject."(17).

The apparent paradox, however, is easily dispelled. In the first quotation in the preceding paragraph, Santayana maintains that he recognizes no separable study called aesthetics. What emerges both from his theoretical remarks and his philosophic practice is that he regards aesthetics as inseparable from certain other areas of inquiry, most notably psychology and ethics. Just as in his aesthetics Santayana always (implicitly or explicitly) denies the autonomy of the work of art, so he always considers aesthetics itself irrefragibly linked with these other studies.

His position is set out clearly in a short paper dating from 1904, "What is Aesthetics?" His thesis is that, "the word 'aesthetics' is nothing but a loose term lately applied in academic circles to everything that has to do with works of art or with the sense of beauty". (18) Thus the student of Venetian painting is said to be employed in aesthetics; so is the psychologist in his laboratory experimenting to determine the most pleasing division of a strip of white paper; also said to be part of aesthetics is any dialectical speculation about the relation of the beautiful to the rational or to the absolutely good: "The truth is that the group of activities we can call aesthetic is a motley one, created by certain historic and literary accidents". (19)

Santayana continues that, in his view, several types of inquiry can legitimately be said to form part of aesthetics. Much that is aesthetics is factual, e.g. description of the phenomena of taste and the psychology of aesthetic experience. Again, moral philosophy must sometimes consider aesthetic values; aesthetic experience must justify its place in the good life by being beneficial, and compatible with other goods. The breadth of Santayana's conception of aesthetics is again shown in his definition of a third activity which, in his view, can legitimately be called aesthetic, "the art and function of criticism";
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"..."
"This is a reasoned appreciation of human works by a mind not wholly ignorant of their subject or occasion, their school, and their process of manufacture". (20)

These views on the scope of aesthetics are reflected in Santayana's philosophic practice. In the introduction to 'The Sense of Beauty', he puts forward a view of aesthetics which for the time and place was revolutionary: instead of metaphysical aesthetics in the Platonic or Hegelian manner he offers his readers a scientific investigation into the roots of taste. He distinguished between three approaches which have been taken equally to both ethics and aesthetics. The first is didactic and consists in the exercise of the moral or aesthetic faculty itself, the actual pronouncing of praise, blame, and precept. The second is historical and consists in the explanation,

"of conduct or of art as a part of anthropology, and seeks to discover the conditions of various types of character, forms of polity, conceptions of justice, and schools of criticism and art". (21)

The third approach, to which 'The Sense of Beauty' is devoted, is psychological:

"It deals with moral and aesthetic judgments as phenomena of mind and products of mental evolution. The problem here is to understand the origin and conditions of these feelings and their relation to the rest of our economy." (22)

Such an inquiry, if successful, would reveal the roots of taste in human nature, and enable us to distinguish transitory preferences from those which, springing from universal elements of the human constitution, are comparatively permanent and widely shared. Again, such a study would have a beneficial consequence by clarifying the experience on which it is directed. It should reveal which habits make for greater and more diversified aesthetic enjoyments." (23)
In 'The Sense of Beauty' (cf. Chs. I - IV, below), it is psychology on which Santayana draws most heavily for non-philosophical support for his aesthetics. In 'Reason in Art', (cf. Chs. VI - VIII, below) while psychology and biology are still greatly in evidence, the dominating concern is a moral one: Santayana is concerned to estimate the place of art in his (then) conception of the good life. The stress changes again in his late papers and remarks on aesthetics dealt with in Chapter IX, below. Here he is most often concerned to trace out the implications for aesthetics of the metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy of mind of the Realms of Being. He is never tempted to waver from his early conclusion that aesthetics could not exist if pursued in isolation. The relation of this conception of aesthetics to an analytic point of view is one of the themes of the following pages.
Chapter I: The Nature of Beauty

I: Introduction

The subject of this chapter is the doctrine, put forward in the first chapter of "The Sense of Beauty", that beauty is objectified pleasure. This theory is the only part of Santayana's aesthetics to have gained wide currency; it is unusual among Santayana's views in having been taken over wholesale on occasion. Two points can be made by way of introduction. The first is historical. While "The Sense of Beauty" was in general well received by reviewers, the commonest reaction to the objectification theory was that it is too down to earth, giving a blatantly naturalistic account of a phenomenon which had received far more mystical treatment at the hands of idealists: as Boas comments, beauty had been for some time a sensuous manifestation of the Absolute.

Secondly, it is ironic that the objectification theory of beauty should be by now the only part of Santayana's aesthetics which is at all widely known, since the theory of beauty was one of the few points on which he changed his mind. A new theory, from which the idea of objectification is absent, is entailed by the doctrines of "The Realms of Being". For reasons already given in the foregoing general Introduction, this later theory is discussed separately below, in Chapter IX.

II: Presuppositions

Santayana confesses that he has what he calls, "a certain temperamental rhetoric" personal to him. One of its most obvious features is a deliberate luxuriance of terminology, designed to avoid the aridity which technicality often brings with it. Another feature of his manner of writing is a nonchalant neglect of the proper sequence of exposition. Both features of his style are present from the time of "The Sense of Beauty" onwards. The first feature leads to ambiguity, the second to inexplicitness over the presuppositions of his doctrines. This section is concerned to set
out those presuppositions, in the form they take at the time of writing of "The Sense of Beauty".

Least explicit in this early book is the metaphysical doctrine of materialism, i.e. the view that the ultimate stuff of all there is, is in some sense of the term matter and none of it is mind, where the latter is conceived of as non-extended substance. This view is simply taken for granted, together with the common-sense view that there is an external, spatio-temporal world of discrete objects. Neither doctrine is stated as explicitly as this in "The Sense of Beauty", nor is either argued for. The reason for this neglect is partly Santayana's temperamental dislike for technicality, but even more so his absolute conviction of the truth of his world-view. As he wrote later (he refers to these doctrines as 'naturalism', his usual term for them): "The necessity of naturalism as a foundation for all other serious opinions was clear to me from the beginning..."(5) If naturalism is condemned, supernaturalism has no point of application to the natural world, and if solipsism is true, the whole edifice of human knowledge crumbles. One cannot do serious history, science, or philosophy, Santayana contends, unless naturalism is allowed as true. This quasi-transcendental argument seems to be at the root of Santayana's metaphysical belief, and it certainly has some force. After centuries of failures to provide a workable alternative to a conceptual scheme based on the assumption that what there is is a world of physical objects, it is truistic to point out that the concepts of material objects are central to ordinary language, as it is also to indicate that the falsity of solipsism is assumed in all branches of human enquiry except certain epistemologies. It is not at all clear if this stratum of our conceptual scheme could be altered. A language in which there were no such concepts would be unimaginably different from our own.

His remarks bearing on the philosophy of mind in "The Sense of Beauty" are ambiguous. The characteristic position of his later writings is
epiphenomenalism, and, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is reasonable to assume that he held some form of this theory when writing this early work. It must be admitted, however, that his few remarks in "The Sense of Beauty" on this subject are ambiguous between epiphenomenalism and other forms of materialist theory of the mind, e.g., discussing expression, he writes: "The musked reverberations of these associated feelings continue in the brain..." (6. My emphasis). One must turn to his later writings for more precision on this point. (7)

Inexplicitness is a characteristic of the theory of perception of "The Sense of Beauty". The most that can be said with safety is that a variety of representationalism is presupposed throughout. Writing of the judgement of beauty he claims that it is "based on the character of immediate experience" (8), and such a mediate/immediate distinction is presupposed in the discussion of the objectification of pleasure in the experience of beauty. (9) What the data of immediate experience are, and how immediate-data-statements are related to mediate-experience-statements are problems not faced in "The Sense of Beauty". Santayana did not put forward a fully developed theory on these points until he came to formulate the doctrine of essence thirty years later.

Moving from the perceptions to the perceiver, it is worth noting that Santayana is free from any naive tendency to hypothesize in his view of the self. He remarks that:

"I care about myself because 'myself' is a name for the things I have at heart. To set up the verbal figment of personality and make it an object of concern apart from the interests which were its content and substance, turns the moralist into a pedant, and ethics into a superstition." (10)

Again:

"... among the ideas with which every object has relation, there is one vaguest, most comprehensive, and most powerful one, namely,
the idea of the self. The impulses, memories, principles and energies which we designate by that word baffle enumeration; indeed, they constantly fade and change into one another; and whether the self is anything, everything or nothing depends on the aspect of it which we momentarily fix, and especially on the definite object with which we contrast it. \(11^\star\)

One cannot pretend, however, that Santayana provides here anything more than a suave restatement of the introspective discovery made by Hume, though one must concede to Santayana that his concerns in "The Sense of Beauty" do not require a theory of the self and its identity.

III: Santayana's Early Definition of Beauty

The aim of the first chapter of "The Sense of Beauty" is to define the nature of beauty by the method of genus and difference. The conclusion is that beauty is value positive, intrinsic, and objectified. The simplest method of exposition is to set out what Santayana says about each of these terms, beginning with "value".

Santayana was of course not an analytic philosopher, and accordingly his theory of value is different in intention and content from the analyses of the logic of evaluative judgment which are the proper staple of analytic ethics and aesthetics. The style of theory he puts forward is most clearly understood as an answer to the question: why is it that human beings value anything at all, as opposed to making mere judgments of fact about what there is? Briefly, Santayana's answer is that we value things because we have wants and needs which must be satisfied. We value whatever maximizes our satisfaction, and disvalue whatever has the reverse effect. In the vocabulary of his commentators, he puts forward a variety of the interest theory of value.\(12^\star\) This doctrine is one which Santayana retained throughout his career. It is adumbrated in his doctoral thesis, and assumed in all his published works.\(13^\star\) It is of importance not only in the theory of beauty but also determines his views on the role of the subject-matter of the work of art. (cf. Ch. V, below.) Moreover, it is
fundamental to his ethics, and, since he regards ethics as having
authority over aesthetics, is of importance in his views on art and
morality. (cf. Ch. VIII, below).

One must concede to his critics that Santayana is ambiguous with
regard to the unit of value, and the terms 'wants' and 'needs' above were
used merely to allow synoptic brevity. Towards the end of his first
chapter, summarising the argument, Santayana writes:

"Beauty is a value, that is, it is not a perception of a
matter of fact or of a relation; it is an emotion, an affection
of our volitional and appreciative nature". (14)

This statement is imprecise in many respects, some of them philosoph­
ically important. Does he mean, for example, that anything to which a
person assigns value is something a propos of which he feels an emotion,
or does he mean that evaluative statements are sophisticated expressions
of emotion, as Ayer and Stevenson were later to claim? Other remarks do
not help in resolving these ambiguities: for example, he writes even more
imprecisely, "...all worth leads us back to feeling somewhere, or else
evaporates into nothing - into a word or a superstition". (15) Again,

discussing in effect necessary and sufficient conditions for something's
being valued, he argues that the existence of conscious beings is merely
a necessary condition for the occurrence of the activity of valuing,
sufficiency being attained only when these beings also have emotions:

"...for the existence of good in any form it is not merely consciousness
which is required but emotional consciousness that is needed. Observation
will not do, appreciation is required". (16) In his most lengthy remark on
the theory of value in general in "The Sense of Beauty", the terms 'feeling',
'pleasure', 'need' and 'passion' all occur close together:

"...from these feelings of ours the great world of perception
derives all its value, if not also its existence. Things are
interesting because we care about them, and important because
we need them. Had our perceptions no connexion with our pleasures, we should soon close our eyes on this world; if our intelligence were of no service to our passions, we should come to doubt, in the lazy freedom of reverie, whether two and two make four". (17)

'Pleasure', 'need', 'feeling', etc., are therefore all introduced by Santayana into the discussion of the question why anything is ever valued, but this is a strength and not a weakness as Pepper and Singer, for example, assume. (18) Indeed the assumption by these writers that this is a weakness betrays a naive essentialism on their part. The force of what Santayana says can be exhibited as follows: to say of any x that 'I value x, yet it satisfies no desire of any person, nor any want or need or passion, nor gives anyone any pleasure' is to say something logically odd, the oddity revealing a conceptual link of a high order of generality between the notions of valuing anything and the valuer's having wants, needs, etc., which demand satisfaction. As Santayana says, if there were beings whose nature were merely intellectual, who merely described events outside them, there would be no evaluation among them. This insight is absent from all but the most recent analytic studies of evaluation, where it deserves a more prominent place. (19)

Pepper makes two further criticisms of Santayana's value theory, the first of which can be rebutted. His first point is that the standard proposed by Santayana whereby we are to order and evaluate the various wants, needs, and interests that we have, is inexact. (20) In, "Reason in Common Sense" (cf. Ch. VI, below), Santayana advocates what might be called sympathetic weighing of possibilities in order to harmonise our desires, to consider all the interests which would be involved in each of the various possibilities of action open to us, and to perform that action which promoted the maximal satisfaction of desire. (21) Certainly this is inexact, but it is also all that a human being can do. The problem which
faces Santayana is the same as that which faces Utilitarians and in response to which Bentham composed the felicific calculus, namely, that wants, needs, and so forth are not amenable to exact quantification, with the consequence that no exact measure of their optimal satisfaction can be worked out. The only answer to this is to admit its patent truth, but to point out that people do make such comparisons and predictions, with varying degrees of rationality and success, merely on the basis of remembered and reported satisfaction. Of course this is inexact and imperfect, but there is no alternative.

Pepper's third criticism cannot be dismissed so easily. His point is that to set up harmony and maximal satisfaction of interests as the necessary and sufficient condition of the rational life, as Santayana does (even if only in passing in "The Sense of Beauty") is to make an arbitrary stipulation: this is merely to make one interest among many the standard for the ordering of all others, and no justification can be produced for such a move. Santayana's reply to this point is as follows. He admits that human beings may have intense passions which it is impossible to harmonise:

"There are, then, intense values that are evils in one another's eyes. To harmonise them is simply impossible; all that the interest in harmony (itself only one of the passions) can aspire to do is to separate, to alternate, or partially to sacrifice all the passions, or some of them, so that they may collide as little as possible and that each may not fanatically call evil that which another finds good".(23)

What is odd here is firstly that Santayana in effect admits Pepper's criticism by saying that the interest in harmony is only one of the passions; and secondly the admission that the life of harmonised passions—and so, in Santayana's view, happiness—is unattainable. The attempted justification of harmony in the last sentence of the above quotation merely
repeats the theory in question and invites the same queries: why is partial satisfaction of most desires to be preferred to complete satisfaction of a few? The only justification which could be provided for this position is to maintain that maximal harmony of interests brings maximal happiness. Yet Santayana nowhere proves this, nor does he provide any argument for the further assumption which would have to be demonstrated to make this case cogent, i.e. that it is irrational to wish not to be happy. These are difficulties which Santayana never satisfactorily overcomes.

Value is the genus of which beauty is a species. The remaining argument of Chapter I of "The Sense of Beauty" is a specification of three differentiae intended to define its exact nature. The first of these differentiae is that beauty is a positive value. The distinction between positive and negative values is the weakest link in the argument of Santayana's first chapter. It is constituted by two claims, firstly that aesthetic judgments are largely positive, i.e. of approval, while moral judgments are largely negative (24), and secondly that the perception of beauty is of the presence of something good, while that of ugliness is merely of a lack or absence (25). No aesthetic perception is of a positive evil. The first point, intended to contrast aesthetic with moral judgments, has only to be stated for its extreme superficiality to appear. Statements of aesthetic condemnation are common enough, as are expressions of moral approbation, and accordingly, Santayana's alleged contrast is of no use in distinguishing them. The second point is rather better. There is a good reason to regard ugliness as merely an absence or a lack, i.e. that the notion of ugliness is such that the term 'ugly' is predicated of those aesthetic objects which do not have the form they ought to have. The only further comment which Santayana makes on this point is to say that where ugliness ceases to be merely amusing or uninteresting, it becomes a positive evil sure enough, but a moral evil, not an aesthetic one (26). The force of the term, "moral" is revealed if one considers the second of the alleged differentiae of beauty, namely its intrinsicality.
Once again contrasting moral and aesthetic judgments, Santayana writes that judgments of beauty are "necessarily intrinsic and based on the character of immediate experience," never consciously on the beliefs one has concerning the utility of the beautiful object. (27) Moral judgments, by contrast, when they are positive, are derived from beliefs concerning the benefits involved in a certain course of action. The distinction is parallel, Santayana argues, to that between work and play. (28) Play is whatever activity is done spontaneously and for its own sake, work being that which is done under the spur of necessity. A corollary drawn from this is that all values are in one sense aesthetic, since all instrumental values are valuable as a means to an intrinsic value. (29) The corollary can be dismissed at once: if whatever leads to an intrinsic value is itself ipso facto an intrinsic value, then all values are intrinsic, and there ceases to be any work for an intrinsic/instrumental distinction to do. If on the other hand, instrumental values are intrinsic in a sense of the latter term other than its normal sense, then the distinction remains as it was, and the corollary is superfluous. The main claims, however, demand a longer consideration, since they raise complex issues, and contain elements of truth and falsity.

Santayana claims that all positive moral judgments in some sense refer to the anticipated beneficial consequences of the object of the judgment. This is not true, even where the moral system is Utilitarian, for every Utilitarian system involves at least one assertion of the form, "x is good in itself", where x may be pleasure, happiness, self-realization, and so on. Intuitionist accounts of ethics generally include more than one such assertion: Moore, for example, in "Principia Ethica", gives both aesthetic enjoyment and personal affection as intrinsic goods. Santayana's reply to this criticism would be simply this: certainly all moral systems embody at least one assertion of intrinsic goodness, but whatever is an intrinsic good is an aesthetic good, not a moral one.
Whatever one might think of this position as a conceptual recommendation, it is certainly not defensible as an analysis of the usage of the terms, 'aesthetic' and 'moral'. The meaning of these concepts is of course still the subject of philosophical debate, but the main lines of difference can be adumbrated fairly briefly. Bullough, following the English aestheticians of the Enlightenment and Kant, points the way with the concept of psychical distance. Whatever is aesthetically good is good without reference to our common physical wants and needs; very roughly, the aesthetically good is that which pleases in contemplation. (This subject is taken up in more detail at several points in the following pages.) This view indicates the truth on which Santayana has fastened, namely that no aesthetic judgment positive or negative is an evaluation of the aesthetic object in terms of consequences, precisely because the aesthetic attitude precludes such a practical consideration. Certainly, then, all aesthetic goods are, in Santayana's vocabulary, intrinsic goods; but the converse, which he also asserts, that all intrinsic goods are aesthetic goods, does not hold of ordinary usage. The intrinsic goods of moral systems, e.g. pleasure, happiness, self-realisation, are not objects of contemplation, but the goals of what one might label practical interest: their attainment, and the avoidance of the corresponding evils is the aim of a large part of our deliberate action. Indeed only when a generous degree of certainty in respect of these moral goods is attained can we usually find peace of mind enough to take up the aesthetic attitude to anything.

By way of approaching the last of the differentiae of beauty, Santayana makes several preliminary comments. So far he has located beauty within the species of positive, intrinsic value, but to say only this does not differentiate the pleasure of the experience of beauty from any physical pleasure, which is equally a positive and intrinsic value. He solves this problem without difficulty by drawing attention to the fact that it is a common feature of what we call physical pleasures that they, "call
our attention to some part of our body, and...make no object so conspicuous to us as the organ in which they arise". (31) By contrast, in the aesthetic experience of pleasure, our organs are "transparent, they must not intercept our attention, but carry it directly to some external object". (32) This settled, he attempts to refute two classic theories of the nature of aesthetic pleasure.

The first of these is the view that aesthetic pleasure is disinterested pleasure, that in the contemplation of beauty the passions are quieted, and we are content merely to be in the presence of what we do not seek to possess. Of his two objections to the view the first is that the alleged disinterest of the response cannot be fundamental:

"The beauties of nature and of the plastic arts are not consumed by being enjoyed; they retain all the efficacy to impress a second beholder. But this circumstance is accidental, and those aesthetic objects which depend upon change and are exhausted in time, as are all performances, are things the enjoyment of which is an object of rivalry and is coveted as much as any other pleasure". (33)

This objection clearly miscarries. No-one would dispute that works of art and their performances where they have them are sought after and that in consequence their exchange value is often very great; but it does not follow from this that aesthetic contemplation is other than disinterested, as Santayana seems to think. He continues:

"The truth which the theory is trying to state seems rather to be that when we seek aesthetic pleasures we have no further pleasures in mind...This is true, but it is true at bottom of all pursuits and enjoyments. Every real pleasure is in one sense disinterested". (34)

What is wrong here is the assumption that the real truth behind the disinterest theory is the truism that pleasure is pursued for its own sake; certainly aesthetic pleasure is an end in itself; but the point which
disinterested/distinct theorists wish to make is that aesthetic pleasure has the additional property of being contemplative.

Kant is presumably the source of the second theory of aesthetic pleasure which Santayana attacks, the view that aesthetic pleasure is a universal pleasure. (35) When one judges an object to be beautiful, one expects everyone else to agree. Santayana considers this view to be nonsense: "It is unmeaning to say that what is beautiful to one man ought to be beautiful to another". (36) The reasons Santayana gives in support of this assertion are derived from his deterministic epiphenomenalism:

"There is notoriously no great agreement upon aesthetic matters; and such agreement as there is is based on similarity of origin, nature and circumstance among men, a similarity which, where it exists, tends to bring about identity in all judgments and feelings". (37)

There are several difficulties involved in these assertions, not the least of which is the use of the vague term 'similarity' to carry all the weight of explanation. More important, however, is Santayana's apparent misconstruction of Kant. What Kant assumes with regard to the universality of the aesthetic judgment is this: where gratification is concerned, we do not expect people to enjoy what we enjoy, and do not bother to argue about different preferences. This is not the case, however, with aesthetic objects, where we do bother to argue and expect other people to agree with us. Kant is discussing the logical form of aesthetic argument: Santayana's factual generalisations are beside the point.

The final step in the argument to define beauty is the claim that the last of its differentiae is objectification. Objectification is a psychological phenomenon which Santayana defines as "the transformation of an element of sensation into the quality of a thing". (38) The argument behind this involves the immediate/mediate distinction, and a theory of concept formation. Santayana claims that concepts were formed originally
to serve as labels for whatever groups of sensations are associated by repeated, simultaneous occurrence, and that in an alleged pristine state, human beings regarded all sensations as qualities of objects. As time went on, however, the need for a simpler conception of objects led to a reduction of properties of objects to a minimum, only a few primary qualities of objects like extension retaining their status as objective. All the rest, like colour, are regarded as secondary qualities, effects of the object on us. The naive tendency to objectify remains, however, in certain areas of experience, and one such area is the experience of beauty: "Beauty is an emotional element, a pleasure of ours, which nevertheless we regard as a quality of things". (39) Why should the tendency to objectify have remained in operation with respect to beauty? Santayana's answer is that the pleasure afforded by a beautiful object is not localised in one organ, and so does not draw attention to the perceiving body; again, the pleasure is intimately connected with the form and substance of the object, and so naturally we fail here to separate the pleasure from the other objectified qualities of the object. The conclusion of the analysis is the definition of beauty with which this section began: beauty is value positive, intrinsic and objectified.

Nelson Goodman has some hard words to say about the objectification theory; he does not refer to Santayana by name, but must have him in mind. Having stated the theory, he comments:

"Apart from images of some grotesque process of transfusion, what can this mean? To consider the pleasure as possessed rather than occasioned by the object - to say in effect that the object is pleased - may amount to saying that the object expresses the pleasure. But since some aesthetic objects are sad - express sadness rather than pleasure - this comes nowhere near distinguishing in general between aesthetic and nonaesthetic objects or experience". (40)
To be made to stick, Goodman must back up this criticism with some harsh readings of the text of "The Sense of Beauty" (assuming, once again, that it is Santayana he has in mind). He assumes that the objectification theory must be construed as a theory intended to define the aesthetic in general, rather than beauty in particular. Yet Santayana, in the present work and in later ones, has distinct definition of aesthetic experience as immediate experience. If the objectification theory is construed as a theory of beauty alone, then Goodman's criticism is beside the point. It must be admitted, however, that Santayana leaves the exact mechanism of objectification out of his account, thus giving perhaps some ground for Goodman's sarcastic references to a grotesque process of transfusion.

Santayana's theory of beauty does, however, contain an important difficulty. What is wrong with it emerges if one considers its main linguistic corollary. If it is the case that beauty is pleasure regarded as a property of an object, then it follows that 'beautiful' is a denoting term, its denotation being the quality of pleasure which 'ex hypothesi' I regard as a property of the object of my judgment. But if this were so, it would be the case that I would regard the object's beauty as a quality of the same kind as its shape or weight, for example, a quality whose presence I can indicate, more or less effectively, by ostension and measurement.

No-one does this, however, when beauty is in question. I cannot go up to an object and indicate its beauty in the same way that I can indicate those properties which are allowed ordinarily, and by Santayana, to count as objective.

The theory of objectification in conjunction with Santayana's thesis as to the nature of aesthetic experience, involves him in a further serious difficulty. Throughout the earlier part of his career (i.e. prior to the development of the philosophy of the Realms of Being), Santayana maintains that aesthetic experience is immediate experience, i.e. though he would not have used this vocabulary, experience of the flux of sense data, The
The difficulty is that, in any common philosophical usage, "immediate experience" is experience of sensations which are unconceptualised. This being so, it is difficult to see how an aesthetic experience could be experience of an object as an object, since to experience something as an object is to have conceptualised it to some degree. How then can beauty be pleasure objectified, i.e. regarded as a property of an object? Santayana cannot maintain both his early definition of beauty, and his theory of aesthetic experience. (Further difficulties in this early theory of aesthetic experience are discussed in Chapter V, below).

To condemn the conclusion of Santayana's analysis might seem to indicate that he has little of value to tell us about the nature of beauty. This would be, however, a hasty conclusion and ignores some of the important truths about beauty on which he has fastened. He sees firstly that beauty is an intrinsic value, that it is sought for its own sake. No object is beautiful in the central uses of the term in virtue of any beneficial consequences with which it may be connected. Those who maintain a functionalist account of beauty could not be more wrong. Secondly he stresses properly that the experience of beauty is an experience of pleasure. This is a conceptual matter, for to say, "I find object x beautiful, yet it gives me no pleasure," without any qualification (i.e. one must rule out accidental unpleasant associations) is to violate the rules for the use of the term 'beautiful'. As he says "An object cannot be beautiful if it can give pleasure to nobody; a beauty to which all men were forever indifferent is a contradiction in terms". (41) Thirdly and most importantly, the remainder of "The Sense of Beauty" is given to the study of three classes of elements in the aesthetic object which contribute to beauty: materials, form, and expression. The argument of the next section is that if this insight (i.e. that these factors are all contributors to the beauty of an aesthetic object) is combined with some recent discoveries in the logic of evaluative terms, the product is an accurate analysis of the logic of the judgment of
beauty. Logical analysis supports the major insight Santayana gives us about the factors which contribute to beauty.\(^{(42^* )}\)

**IV. Logical Analysis of the Judgment of Beauty**

For the sake of completeness a few minor points about the term 'beauty' and its cognates can be cleared up at the outset. The present analysis is concerned only with the central uses of the term. What these central uses are will emerge in the course of what follows; non-central uses are those in which 'beauty' and more often 'beautiful' are used as synonyms for 'good', i.e. merely as a general adjective of commendation, most often in phrases like, "This is a beautiful cake", or adverbially in phrases like, "This is beautifully made". In its central uses it is predicated of a wide range of objects: works of art of all kinds, works of craft, and natural phenomena, animate and inanimate. Again, it is predicable in degrees - objects can be more or less beautiful than one another - though there is no unit of beauty, just as there is no unit of pleasure. Finally, while it is undoubtedly the most written about of aesthetic virtues, it has no special conceptual link with the notion of a work of art. It is certainly not a necessary condition for anything's being a work of art, for while many works of art are beautiful, one wants to say that some are neither beautiful nor ugly. (The concept of art is discussed at more length in Ch. VI, below.)

The first point of substance to note is that 'beautiful', to borrow a term from contemporary ethics, is a supervenient or consequential predicate. \(^{(43)\text{ }}\) The force of this claim has in effect been adumbrated already in the rebuttal of Santayana's objectification thesis: 'beautiful' is not a predicate applied to an object on the same grounds as predicates specifying its colour, shape, weight, duration, or size. (These one can call 'first-level' predicates.) Rather it is what one might term a second-level predicate, applied to an object because that object has certain qualities which are specified by first-level predicates. This is why one cannot indicate an object's beauty in the same way that one can indicate its colour, shape, etc. What typically these first-level qualities and
predicates are in the case of beauty will be discussed shortly.

The second major point - again an importation from ethics - is that the meaning of the term 'beautiful' is distinct from the criteria for its use. (44) If an object is called 'beautiful', then before one knows for what reasons the predicate has been applied on this occasion, one knows that the object has been commended - in its non-ironic uses 'beautiful' is an honorific term - as aesthetically pleasing in certain respects. (It is to be emphasised here again that the present analysis is limited only to the most central uses of the term 'beautiful'. In certain cases, the term can be not only not honorific but pejorative. It could be said of a work which tended to be cloying: "This is too beautiful".) As it stands of course this theory of the core of meaning of the term 'beautiful' is remarkably uninformative, not serving to differentiate 'beautiful' from any other aesthetic virtue predicate, but it is not too difficult to fill out the crucial lacunae. One notes firstly the recurrence of one of the themes on which Santayana is justly insistent, namely the link between beauty and pleasure. Any experience of a beautiful object is pleasant.

The elaboration of the force of the qualification, "aesthetically pleasing" leads back to the delicate issue of the analysis of the aesthetic attitude. Most attempts at a characterisation of this attitude fasten on one variety of experience occasioned by a work of art or a natural aesthetic object, and advance to the claim that such a type of experience is occasioned by all objects to which one takes up the aesthetic attitude: such are the theories of empathy, of repose, synaesthesia, a feeling of unreality, or simply pleasure. It is unlikely that any person with a wide experience of the effects of aesthetic objects would wish to deny that all these feelings can be occasioned by such objects, but in no case is any of these experiences an invariant feature of aesthetic experience. To repeat a point already made above, the best analysis remains that of psychological distance: the aesthetic attitude consists in the separation of the aesthetic experience from the
wants and needs of everyday life, and the responses we normally make to
the environment in the execution of our practical purposes.

A good deal of pressure here rests on the term, 'practical', and
it is by no means easy to give an exact explanation of its meaning. One
can, however, give a general characterisation of what is meant by considering
some uncontroversial facts. It is a psychological commonplace that
ordinarily, our perceptions register roughly what we need to perceive and
indeed to a degree what we want to perceive. All we notice of the morning
bus is its number, not the shape of the radiator grill, nor the proportions
of the windows in relation to one another and in relation to the side area
of the bus. Again, turning to cases of expectation, when we are waiting
for a 'phone call, many sounds take on at any rate initially the sound of
the 'phone bell; when we are urgently looking for a friend, many people
take on, again initially, a resemblance to them. The peculiarity of the
aesthetic attitude is that we are to a degree released from this bondage
of needs and can concentrate on what one rather helplessly labels the whole
set of qualities of the object for their own sake, not in relation to our
most obvious and time-consuming satisfactions.

Sight is the sense on which we rely most for our information, and
it is a feat of some difficulty to stop seeing in a want-and-need governed
way. That is why we need books to tell us how to look at pictures; to
concentrate our attention on what is there to be seen, rather than merely
noticing what would normally be noticed. Realistic pictures in exact
geometrical perspective are in a sense the most accessible and yet the hardest
to approach with a purely aesthetic attitude, since they present us with
scenes which we interpret without difficulty in a want-and-need governed
way.(45*) To notice subtleties of colouring, chiaroscuro, disposition of
forms, brushwork and so on is something most of us must learn to do. Non-
representational paintings demand an aesthetic approach; hence the common
feeling of bewilderment experienced by so many when confronted with them.
Hopefully, this account gives some indication of what is meant by 'psychically distanced'. The theory reappears on the conceptual level in studies such as Grumon's, "What makes a situation aesthetic?" (46). He concludes that to react aesthetically to an object is to be impressed favourably or otherwise by a sensible property of the thing, with no ulterior grounds. Or again, to appreciate aesthetically is to be concerned solely with a thing's looking somehow without concern for whether it really is like that. (47) This is of course highly inexact, but one can see the link with the theory of psychical distance: the absence of ulterior concern, or a concern with the real nature of the object considered marks off the aesthetic attitude from the more practical one which takes up most of our living time.

This analysis allows one to gloss the above claim that the core of the meaning of 'beautiful' is to be aesthetically pleasing in certain respects. To be aesthetically pleasing is to please without reference to the satisfaction of practical wants and needs, to give a pleasure which is independent of the accomplishment of our ordinary purposes. This is the truth which lies behind Santayana's identification of aesthetic and intrinsic values, for to regard an object as beautiful is to commend it independently of its instrumental properties. The final major point in the logic of beauty is to specify what these non-instrumental properties are, and this is in effect to specify first-level properties, the typical criteria for the use of 'beautiful'.

The judgment that an object is beautiful can be supported by reasons, and what these reasons specify are material, formal, and expressive properties of the beautiful object, 'a fortiori' not predicates concerning its function, i.e. in effect, its relation to our practical purposes. Santayana saw this truth fully enough to structure the whole of "The Sense of Beauty" around it, and its force readily becomes apparent if one considers even one example. Suppose I am asked why I consider Watteau's
"Le Faux Pas" to be a painting of great beauty. The reasons I can give fall naturally into the three classes implied by the structure of Santayana's book: I can refer to the delicacy of the colouring, to the organic disposition of the forms, and to the expression of a sad, delicate and sophisticated sense of ephemerality. This is not to say that there are always reasons from each of the three classes for every use of 'beautiful', merely that there must be at least one reason from at least one of them.

Reference to the classic sources on the theory of beauty reveals that most writers have considered only one class of reasons - formal reasons - to be in question where beauty is ascribed to any object. Most of Plato's writing on the subject is of course an application of the theory of forms to the notion of beauty (48), but occasionally Plato discusses what an object which participates in the form of the Beautiful looks like. At 'Philebus' 64c, he writes: "measure and symmetry are beauty and virtue all the world over", (Jowett's translation) and at 'Sophist' 228 he analyses deformity or ugliness as consisting in disproportion. The link between beauty and form remains the dominant theme in the classic analyses of beauty. Aristotle's scattered remarks on the subject exhibit him as a formalist, in the present sense of the term, i.e. one who holds that the term 'beautiful' is always ascribed on the basis of formal properties of the object. In the 'Metaphysics' he writes that: "The chief forms of beauty are order and symmetry and definiteness..." (49), and at more length in the 'Poetics':

"...to be beautiful, a living creature, and every whole made up of parts, must not only present a certain order in its arrangement of parts, but also be of a certain definite magnitude. Beauty is a matter of size and order." (50)

Augustine argues that the essence of beauty is what he calls unity, and this unity results from the relations of the parts of the object. (51)
Taking a very long step forward to the Enlightenment, one finds similar views, as indeed one expects from a period self-consciously devoted to classical models. Lessing remarks that: "Physical beauty arises from the harmonious effect of manifold parts that can be taken in at one view." (52) Diderot, attempting to find a common meaning for all uses of the term, concluded that beauty consists in the perception of relations ('rapports') (53).

Examples of formalistic analyses in this manner can be multiplied easily enough (54) but neither weight of numbers nor stature of proponent entails the adequacy of the view, and indeed a writer as early as Plotinus realised that it could not be the whole story. As he points out, beauty cannot merely consist in symmetry, proportion and the appropriate colour, for on this view only complex objects can be beautiful, yet one wants to say that things which in any ordinary sense do not have discernible parts are also beautiful, e.g. a single note, or a colour. (55*) The truth of the matter is, as Santayana saw, that both material and expressive properties can equally be specified in reasons advanced in support of a judgment of beauty. Undoubtedly formal properties are of great importance but they do not constitute the whole truth about beauty.

This leads on naturally to the question of the condition-governing of the term 'beautiful'. No one condition or set of conditions is necessary for the predication of 'beautiful': the example of simple objects given by Plotinus demolishes the prima facie attractive view that some formal predicate is a necessary condition; and reflection shows that material and expressive predicates can equally be advanced independently of one another. There is an indefinite set of predicates of the three classes proposed, and the varieties of human sensibility are such that almost any one or combination of logically compatible predicates can be used in the reasons given in support of the judgment of beauty. 'Beautiful is condition-governed simply to the extent that the set of conditions used
in its central cases has for its members predicates specifying properties of any of the three classes proposed.

A final point is the question of how a distinction is to be made between 'beautiful' and 'pretty'. Both terms can qualify almost the same class of nouns; both are aesthetic virtue predicates; both have the logical properties of supervenience and a distinction between meaning and criteria for use, and the ascription of 'pretty' can be supported by reasons, as is the case with 'beautiful'. The difference lies firstly in the classes of reason advanced to support them: while material and formal predicates can intelligibly be used to support the ascription of prettiness, cases where expressive predicates are used are extremely rare. Secondly, the contents of the material and formal reasons is different: the predicates used will commonly have the connotations of superficiality and ephemerality in the case of 'pretty'. But perhaps the most important difference between the two notions - indeed this is probably why there is a distinction between them in the first place - lies in the quality of the experience which prettiness and beauty respectively provide. Pretty things provide immediate attraction, and a temporary and superficial feeling of pleasure. The experience of beautiful things is of quite a different order, and deserves a section to itself.

VI: The Experience of Beauty

Analysis of the judgment in which the term 'beautiful' is used does yield the benefit of a clear understanding of what is happening when this word is used, and its logic fits in with the common-sense beliefs about beauty which are commonplace, mainly of course the disagreement between person and person, century and century, culture and culture, over what is beautiful. But analysis omits one important feature of the phenomenon of beauty, the effect which a beautiful object has on us. As Santayana says, no object is positively valued unless it provides us with some kind of satisfaction, and beautiful objects have been the subject of devotion
time out of mind. So far, the experience of beauty has been described merely as aesthetically pleasant; but there is reason to believe that the experience can be more exactly described, since descriptions of it agree in important respects. The experience beauty provides is that of deep inward peace and harmony; this is the harmonious free-play of the faculties of which Kant speaks, Schopenhauer's blissful release from the stream of willing, the "serene and blessed mood" Wordsworth felt at Tintern Abbey, the sleep of health and quiet breathing of Keats. And further, the beautiful object is such that it does not lose its efficacy: it is a joy forever, again as Keats says. Of all this Santayana was perfectly aware:

"The instability of our attention, the need of rest and repair in our organs, makes a round of objects necessary to our minds; but we turn from a beautiful thing, as from a truth or a friend, only to return incessantly, and with increasing appreciation. Nor do we lose all the benefit of our achievements in the intervals between the vivid realizations of what we have gained. The tone of the mind is permanently raised; and we live with that general sense of steadfastness and resource, which is perhaps the kernel of happiness. Knowledge, affection, religion and beauty are not less constant influences in a man's life because his consciousness of them is intermittent. Even when absent, they fill the chambers of the mind with a kind of fragrance. They have a continual efficacy as well as a perennial worth."

II: Conclusion

While the conclusion of the early theory of the nature of beauty must be rejected for the reasons given, yet Santayana's treatment of the subject yields an insight which can be expanded with profit by means of the techniques of philosophical analysis. Santayana sees justly that a complete philosophy of beauty must take account of the role of the material
and expressive properties of the aesthetic object, and not merely formal properties. In analytic idioms, this becomes the thesis that the judgment of beauty can be supported by reasons specifying properties of any or all of these kinds possessed by the beautiful object. It should be emphasised finally that this early view of beauty has a virtue characteristic of much of Santayana's aesthetics, i.e. the avoidance of all simple forms of essentialism. It is one of the most striking features of Santayana's philosophy of art that he attempts to do justice to the complexity of the data of the subject, far more so than many writers who are better remembered. This is a point to be reinforced in the following chapters.
Chapter II: The Materials of Beauty

Introduction

At the end of Chapter I of "The Sense of Beauty", Santayana considers that he has established the nature of beauty. In the second chapter, he investigates fairly briefly what he calls the materials of beauty. It is as well to be clear from the outset that the term 'materials' in the title of the chapter is slightly misleading, since Santayana is not concerned primarily to discuss what role the material of a work of art or nature plays in its total aesthetic effect; on this point in fact he says fairly little, though it will be argued that his few hints are well worth expanding and investigating at more length. Instead, he reviews certain main features of the human constitution—basic instincts, the five senses—and considers how and to what degree each contributes to aesthetic experience. The materials of the title are not those of aesthetic objects, but of the human aesthetic sense. As a consequence, most of the chapter consists of informal psychological generalisations, which while they show Santayana very much 'au fait' with the psychology of his day, would probably not now be considered proper philosophical subjects at all. In the present chapter, it is argued that the value of Santayana's remarks in the second chapter of "The Sense of Beauty" lies in the 'aperçus' concerning the materials of a work of art, casually asserted by him in his conclusion. It is in any case to Santayana's credit to have mentioned this subject at all, it being almost entirely neglected by aestheticians.

Three points of philosophical interest are passed over deliberately with little comment in the critical exposition which follows: Santayana's remarks on the role of the subject-matter in a work of art, his theory of physical objects, and some remarks about music. The reason for this present neglect is that in all cases, these subjects are considered at greater length in the first volume of "The Life of Reason", i.e. "Reason
in Common Sense", and in Santayana's second full-length work on aesthetics, "Reason in Art". The views put forward in the present chapter are best considered in conjunction with the appropriate sections of chapters VI, VII and IX, below.

III: The Materials of the Sense of Beauty

The aim of the second chapter of "The Sense of Beauty" is to review, "the various elements of our consciousness"(1) to see what each contributes to the beauty of the world. Santayana considers the differentia of beauty to be objectification, and consequently for him any element of consciousness contributes to our sense of beauty if and only if it is "inextricably associated" with the objectifying processes of the understanding. There is no function in human nature which cannot contribute something to the effect, though functions vary very much among themselves in the amount and directness of their contribution: sight, hearing, memory, and imagination are the main contributors, but to regard this list as complete is to betray an inexcusable haste.

For example, while bodily functions such as the growth and decay of tissues and the circulation of the blood are unconscious, yet their efficient functioning is a necessary condition for our well being, and they affect the quality of our conscious experience:

"Slight alterations are not without their conscious echo; and the whole temper and tone of our mind, the strength of our passions, the grip and concatenation of our habits, our power and attention, and the liveliness of our fancy and affections are due to the influence of these vital forces".(2)

Efficiency in bodily functions is a necessary condition for taking pleasure in anything, and consequently for taking aesthetic pleasure in anything; but one must stress that health merely makes a sense of beauty possible; it does not guarantee it. The sense of beauty is guaranteed by other features of consciousness.
The element these features have in common, according to Santayana, is that they are favourable to what he calls, "ideation". (3) He does not define this term, but his examples make it apparent that he means, roughly, favourable to the occurrence of mental imagery. A state favourable to ideation is drowsiness, for in such a state, lethargy falls on the outer senses, leaving the imagination all the freer, "and by heightening the colours of the fancy, often suggests and reveals beautiful images". (4)

If, by contrast, the body is over-exercised and over-fed, the imagination is retarded, while the senses remain awake, and the state is one of aesthetic insensibility. Why exactly states favourable to ideation should contribute to the sense of beauty (= objectification) is not clear. Santayana's remark is that such states, "are of course apt to extend something of their intimate warmth to the pleasures of contemplation, and thus to intensify the sense of beauty and the interest of thought". (5)

But how does a state such as drowsiness aid the projection which Santayana asserts to occur in aesthetic experience? A state in which lethargy grips the senses is surely antipathetic to the occurrence of this alleged projection, since in a state of drowsiness, or any other state in which we are absorbed in private imaging, we take less notice of the external objects on which we are alleged to project our pleasure.

Of the instincts, the most powerful contributor to the sense of beauty is love. Ideally, Santayana claims, a female should arouse a male only at such times as it is fit she should become pregnant, leaving both animals free to exercise other functions the rest of the time. In point of fact, arousal is far more frequent than reproduction and the maintenance of the race demands. This redundancy in strength of the sexual drive is of the greatest importance in aesthetics, since, "it is precisely from the waste, from the radiation of the sexual passion, that beauty borrows warmth". (6) Commonly, the aesthetic response is an emotional response, or at least partly so, and this whole phenomenon is due to redundant sexual passion: "...the whole sentimental side of our aesthetic sensibility
- without which it would be perceptive and mathematical rather than aesthetic - is due to our sexual organisation remotely stirred."(7)

The occurrence of such phenomena as sublimation, and the wide-spread reverberations of the sexual drive are now psychological common coin, and undoubtedly there is some truth in Santayana's assertions. The only defect of his presentation is its brevity. No reason is given, for example, why the aggression drive, 'remotely stirred' should not also be a contributor to the emotional side of the aesthetic response.

Before sexual union can take place, the drive must be aroused; the prospective partners must find one another attractive. For this reason, both sexes develop secondary sexual characteristics, and simultaneously the sexual instinct is extended to various secondary objects. Colour, grace, and form owe their aesthetic power to the stirring of profound sexual impulses. Again, there is no denying the role of association, especially sexual association, in aesthetic responses, but Santayana's theory as it stands - once again it is only very briefly presented - will surely not explain certain obvious facts. Why, for example should human beings take an aesthetic interest in highly rectilinear forms, or stone or metallic surfaces, not obviously related to secondary characteristics of either sex?

Love is favourable to objectification, and so to beauty, because in love, "The attention is fixed upon a well-defined object, and all the effects it produces in the mind are easily regarded as powers or qualities of that object."(8) Further, on Santayana's theory of value, we value most whatever interests us most, and since the objects of love are of the most profound interest to human beings, love is the most considerable of the contributors to the sense of beauty. If the fancy is occupied with the image of a single person, the person appears perfect, and we are said to be in love. When the drive lacks a specific object, or has been sacrificed to some other interest, or is not as yet fully
conscious, it manifests itself in other directions: "religious devotion, zealous philanthropy, fondness for pet animals, love of nature and of art: "We may say, then, that for man all nature is a secondary object of sexual passion, and that to this fact, the beauty of nature is largely due."(9)"

The social instincts - the parental, the patriotic, and the merely gregarious - are not directly of such importance in aesthetics. Such importance as they have is indirect, in that an appeal to them in works of art helps fix our attention on the work. (Love also has this indirect importance). The reason for their lack of direct influence in comparison with love is said to be this: man is pre-eminently a social animal, and social needs are almost as fundamental in him as vital functions, and often more conscious. Friendship, wealth, reputation, power and influence, added to family life, constitute the main elements of happiness. Such goals are only very partially composed of images of definite objects; when by chance they are so composed, e.g. 'home' imagined as cottage and garden, then they become beautiful objects. But this case is exceptional; the goals of the social instincts are rarely objectified, (10) granted the objectification theory of the aesthetic experience, Santayana is on shaky ground at this point. The goals he mentions can be and usually are pursued in specific forms: the pursuit aims at a specific position of influence or power, a certain amount of money, a certain reputation, a certain friend. This being so, they are quite susceptible to imaging, and so to the objectification of value. Ironically, the detachment/psychical distance view of aesthetic experience, rejected by Santayana in the previous chapter, accords far better with the claim that the social instincts, apart from the indirect contribution as subject matter in works of art, are of small consequence in aesthetic experience. Indeed, the distanced experience is antipathetic to them: it is precisely such wants and needs as these which are in some way held in abeyance in aesthetic experience.
Santayana turns next to consider the contributions made to aesthetic experience made by the five senses. The lower senses, touch, taste and smell, furnish the least part of our objectified ideas, and so play the smallest part (among the senses) in aesthetic appreciation. They have been called the unesthetic as well as the lower senses, but their lack of aesthetic utility is not due to any inherent defect, but to the function they happen to have in our experience. Smell and taste are not intrinsically spatial, and so not suited to the representation of nature, which can only be spatially represented. Again, they have not reached the same degree of organisation as sounds, and so cannot furnish any play of subjective sensation comparable to music in interest. Musical forms owe their objectification to their fixity and complexity; tastes by contrast have never been so accurately or universally classified. For this reason, the art of combining dishes and wines remains servile, rather than fine. As in the case of the social instincts, the main aesthetic value of the lower senses is indirect. Using a stanza from Keats', "The Eve of St. Agnes," as illustration, Santayana claims that poetry which suggests 'real sensations' of the lower senses ipso facto gains in power. (11)

One point here requires elucidation. The distinction between fine and servile art is developed at length in "Reason in Art". All art has two stages, the first mechanical, industrial, or servile, the second liberal or fine. In the first, untoward matter is prepared; in the second, it is appropriated to ideal uses and endowed with a spiritual function. This spiritual function consists in the activity of turning an apt material into an expressive and delightful form, thus filling the world with objects which by symbolising ideal energies tend to revive them under a favouring influence, and therefore to strengthen and refine them. (12) Thus in the present context, Santayana is claiming that the creations of cookery are incapable of performing the functions which he holds to be distinctive of fine art.
There is little to quarrel with in these straightforward assertions, beyond the objectification theory of aesthetic experience which underlies them. By his phrase, 'not intrinsically spatial', all he appears to mean is that olfactory and gustatory sensations do not have a shape or form in a sense analogous to that in which the objects of sight have shape, and thus cannot be used to represent natural objects — the only point to dispute is the apparent assumption that visual art is always representational, so obviously falsified by architecture. (Compare the parallel emphasis on imitation in section III, below.) The reason for this untenable stress on representation is surely the objectification theory of aesthetic experience; if we are to objectify our feelings, there must be some definitely formed object on which to project them, and such objects are not provided by the lower senses, barring perhaps touch. Indeed, the real oddity of these remarks is that Santayana can allow the lower senses to contribute to aesthetic experience as much as he does. It is hard enough to make sense of the idea of regarding pleasure as a quality of objects in the case of objects of sight and hearing; what it is to project pleasure onto a tactile or gustatory sensation, for example, defies the imagination. Small wonder Goodman speaks of "images of some grotesque process of transfusion" being called up by the objectification theory. (13)

The mythical distance theory avoids such grotesqueness. There is no oddity or difficulty about enjoying tactile and olfactory sensations from a distanced point of view, witness the pleasure of touching fur or silk or marble or steel, and of savouring the various natural and artificial perfumes that there are. (A fictional but credible example of a highly developed aesthetic experience of perfumes is provided by Des Essentiens in Huysmans' "A Rebours" (14).) Sullough maintains that distance is also possible, in privileged moments admittedly, with gustatory sensations, and refers to a passage in Guyau's, "Problèmes de l'Aesthétique"
Contemporaine", in which the author describes the effect of drinking chilled milk after a long and tiring climb: "...en buvant ce lait frais où toute la montagne avait mis son parfum et dont chaque gorge savoureuse me rénaisait, j'éprouvai certainement une série de sensations que le mot agréable est insuffisant à désigner. C'était comme une symphonie pastorale saisie par le goût au lieu d'être par l'oreille."(15) Certainly, though, such moments as these are rare; Santayana is right at least to regard the lower senses as far less important than hearing and sight in their contribution to aesthetic experience, though his view is neither especially insightful nor original.

The theory of objectification governs the few remarks Santayana makes about music in the present chapter. He cannot deny the importance of hearing as a contributor to aesthetic experiences, yet is faced with a slight difficulty. He holds that sounds, like tastes and smells, are not 'intrinsically spatial', meaning once again that they lack so permanent, definite and easily identifiable a shape as visual objects. How then do the undisputed aesthetic pleasures of sound arise? His answer is that because sounds are precisely measurable in respect of pitch and duration — he omits volume — "an object almost as complex and describable as the visible one can be built out of them."(16) Again, "(Sounds) have comparable pitches and durations, and definite combinations of those sensuous elements are as truly objects as chairs and tables."(17) Underlying this is an embryonic form of the theory of physical objects more fully developed nine years later in, "Reason in Common Sense". Santayana holds a variety of representationalist theory of perception, and so is committed to explaining why various sets of sense should come to be regarded as individual objects. Here he comments only that, "...for a critical philosophy, visible objects are also nothing but possibilities of sensation... objectivity can accrue to any mental figment that has enough cohesion, content, and individuality to be describable and
recognizable, and these qualities belong no less to audible than to spatial ideas."(18) But while this is so, while the world of sound is, "capable of infinite variety,"(19) and has as much as the world of matter the power to interest us and stir our emotions, yet sound, "has proved the less serviceable and constant apparition; and, therefore, music, which builds with its materials, while the purest and most impressive of the arts is the least human and instructive of them."(20) What exactly is the intended force of these reservations is not explained, and there is little point in speculating, since the key terms - 'human', 'serviceable', etc. - are all extremely imprecise.

The subject of sound leads Santayana to some more general observations. A sound is a note only if its vibrations are regular; otherwise it is a noise, and this distinction illustrates a conflict of principles which, according to Santayana, occurs everywhere in aesthetics. The principles involved are those of purity and of interest. The principle of purity states that the value of an artistic element, and indeed our ability to perceive it, depends on the omission from the field of attention of all elements which do not obey a simple law. In the present case, we hear a note only when a set of regular vibrations is discriminated in the chaos of sound. But it cannot be the case that purity is the sole criterion of aesthetic merit, since if it were there would be no sound more beautiful than that of the tuning fork. The principle of purity must compromise with that of interest: the object must have enough variety and expression to hold our attention for a while, and to stir our nature widely. This is all perfectly true, perfectly uncontentious, and tells us very little.

Primacy among the human senses goes to sight. Again the theory of physical objects lies behind Santayana's remarks: "When the time came for our intelligence to make the great metaphysical leap, and conceive its content as permanent and independent, or, in other words to imagine things, the idea of these things had to be constructed out of the materials already
present to the mind. But the fittest material for such construction was that furnished by the eye...as the essence of the thing is its existence in our absence, the thing is spontaneously conceived of in terms of sight." (22) (One wonders why the thesis that thinghood consists essentially in existence independent of our perception should alone entail that the thing should spontaneously be conceived in terms of sight.) Since sight is thus pre-eminent, and since all aesthetic values are perceptual values, then beauty is to be expected to be largely a visual phenomenon.

Prior to the effect of form, however, is that of colour, which while purely sensuous and so no better intrinsically than the effect of any other sense, is the more readily an element of beauty since it is involved in the perception of visual objects. The values of colours differ appreciably, and further, have analogy to the values of other sensations. The explanation of the first point is that each has a specific nervous process, and so naturally each has a different value. Affinities between sensations of the different senses are explained by similarities in these processes: high notes and violet colours both involve responding to high rates of vibration. The effects of colour, he concludes, deserve more study than they have hitherto received. The colours of stained glass windows, for example, have a powerful aesthetic effect.

These few points concerning sight and colour are not especially illuminating, and some have been falsified by events and discoveries since Santayana wrote. There is not the one to one correspondence between frequency of light waves striking the retina and the experience of colours which Santayana asserts to be the case: a variety of different combinations of wavelengths can result in the same colour being experienced. (Cf. J.J.C. Smart: "Philosophy and Scientific Realism", London, 1963, Ch. IV, and D.C. Bennett: "Content and Consciousness", London, 1969, p. 143). Again, the effects of colour, especially intense colour have been discussed, for example, by Huxley, in "Heaven and Hell".
The most striking feature of the synoptic concluding section of the second chapter, "Materials Surveyed", is Santayana's blithe triple equivocation on the term, "material". To begin with, he uses it in an epistemological sense, to mean roughly sense: "We have now gone over those organs of perception that give us the materials out of which we construct objects..."(23) Materials are of less importance in a work of art than form or arrangement, he claims, but one must not ignore the importance they do have. The first aspect of their importance claimed by Santayana involves a shift to the second sense of "material", now used in a metaphysical sense to mean that of which form is the form, or some formless substance. Materials are indispensable, since, "form cannot be the form of nothing."(24) This is presumably meant to be a necessary truth; in any event, it is not especially informative in aesthetics. The third sense of 'materials' has the common sense meaning of the sort of stuff a thing is made of. The wise use of material will heighten the effect of any aesthetic object:

"There is no effect of form which an effect of material could not enhance, and this effect of material raises the latter to a higher power and gives the beauty of the object a certain poignancy, thoroughness, and infinity which otherwise it would have lacked. The Parthenon not in marble, the king's crown not of gold, and the stars not of fire, would be feeble and prosaic things." (25)

This casual remark, left undeveloped here by Santayana, is arguably the most valuable in the whole chapter, since it suggests a line of investigation almost entirely neglected by aestheticians, namely that of considering what general truths, if any, there are to be found concerning the materials of a work of art. Santayana himself, while continuing to hold views on the matter comparable in generality to those in the present chapter, does not develop his thesis in detail. Nine years later, in "Reason in Art", he writes:

"That the medium in every art has a character of its own, a
character limiting its representative value, may perhaps safely be asserted, and this intrinsic character in the medium antedates and permeates all representation."(26)

And four years after that, in 1913, he writes in a letter:

"...lines, attitudes, stuffs all have a certain hypnotic power, a sensuous magic that enthralls us if we gaze at them intently. This I have always known, and it is the fault of our Renaissance (from the sixteenth century to the middle of the nineteenth, and even today among academic and conventional artists) not to have felt this sensuous quality enough, to have no natural idolatry, but to have been interested in a pompous completeness and discursive literary reports - Solas on canvas."(27)

The rest of this chapter is an expansion of this 'aperçu', the beginning of a general investigation of the role of the material of a work of art.

III: A Remark by Santayana on the Material of a Work of Art

One further suggestion can be drawn from Santayana himself. In an early paper only recently edited and published (an address to the Harvard Camera Club) he considers the relationship between photography and the fine arts. In the course of his argument, he claims that the 'essence' of the fine arts is, "not so much to mirror or reproduce the outer aspects of things, however bewitching, as to create in imitation of the processes of Nature, but in different materials, things analogous to the natural."(28)

Again, a few pages later:

"...it is only the fascination exercised over us by real things that can suggest to us the possibility of their ideal perfection; and if we hasten to render this ideal perfection in some artificial medium, and are enraptured even by the dead suggestion of a complete beauty, how much more must we desire that complete beauty itself..." (29)

In both remarks, Santayana stipulates in effect, that for anything to be a work of art, two necessary conditions must be satisfied: (a) that the
work be an imitation of nature, and (b) that it be in a material
different from that of which it is an imitation. The restriction of
works of art to imitations of nature is of course untenable, at least
in any informative sense of 'imitation'; but, restricting oneself to
the sub-class of works of art which are imitations, is it the case that
they are always different in material from that which is imitated? In
other words, is it a necessary condition for being a work of imitative
art that imitation and imitated are composed of different materials?
Certainly the condition is satisfied by imitative works of sculpture,
painting and literature. What of ballet? Where a ballet aims to be
imitative, what it imitates are the gestures of human beings or animals
or fantasy creatures, often in states of intense emotion, but it does
so by means of similar gestures made by dancers. Does this entail that
there is no change of medium in ballet? Perhaps the point can be saved,
since ballet is not imitation of gesture 'tout court', but to a musical
accompaniment. If this be allowed as part of the definition of ballet,
then the point derived from Santayana is carried.

Even if it be disallowed on the ground that a dance might still
quality as a ballet even if danced without accompaniment, the minimal
finding remains that in almost every case of imitation, the material is
changed. This is itself of importance, since as Bullough points out, the
change of material is a feature of the presentation of a work of art which
helps the spectator or listener to take up the distanced attitude.
Artificialities of staging play a parallel role in the performing arts.

Further, the simple fact of noticing the change of medium in almost every
case of works of imitative art, again set down so nonchalantly by
Santayana, reinforces the suggestion that a study of materials might help
towards understanding art.

IV: Questions About the Materials of A Work of Art

From the philosophical point of view, the study of materials arranges
itself around three questions:

(1) do the materials used in works of art have a nature or set of intrinsic properties such that it is possible to be 'true' or 'false' to these natures in the uses to which the materials are put? In other words, is any form of the doctrine of truth to materials interesting, informative, tenable?

(ii) how, if at all, do the properties of the materials of works of art affect the other properties of the work? For present purposes, one can divide up the properties of works of art into various classes: material, formal, expressive, concerning meaning, and concerning subject-matter.

(iii) does the answer to question (ii) differ importantly for the various arts?

In the following sections, these questions are considered using the remarks of a number of modern artists and writers on art as data.

VI: Truth to Materials

Varieties of the doctrine of truth to materials have been held by leading artists of the present century. One version of it is included in Frank Lloyd Wright's doctrine of organic, or integral, or Usonian architecture. The natural house is above all an organic unity in which site, materials, form and function are all harmonious and in some sense unified. To live in an organic house, with its sense of space, shelter, and integration with nature maximizes the happiness of the indwellers. The sense of space also brings with it a sense of dignity which is in perfect accord with the American ideal of democracy, where freedom and the happiness of the individual are the theoretical 'summa bonum'. Only with the coming of Broadacre city, composed of Usonian houses will the American dream become a reality, and America come to have a true, indigenous culture of its own.

This vision of a Usonian Utopia may seem a long way from the idea of truth to materials, but in fact the doctrines are simply and closely
related. The ideal city is composed of Usonian houses, and a necessary condition for being such a house is that the materials of which it is built be used according to their own nature, and are not made to look or function like anything other than what they are. Describing his early evolution as an architect, he writes:

"I began to learn to see brick as brick. I learned to see concrete or glass or metal each for itself and all as themselves. Each different material required a different handling, and each different handling as well as the material itself had new possibilities of use peculiar to the nature of each. Appropriate designs for one material would not be at all appropriate for any other material." (31)

The materials of which Wright speaks most often are glass, steel, and wood. Obviously, the most striking property of glass is its transparency, which allows great spaces to be connected. (32) Advantage is taken of this when glass is used properly, not merely to fill in holes punched in the walls to let in light, but used as the wall:

"By means of glass, the first great integrity may find prime means of realization. Open reaches of the ground may enter as the building and the building interior may reach out and associate with those vistas of the ground." (33)

The most important properties of steel are lightness, tenacity, and flexibility (34), and its proper use, according to Wright, is that which fully exploits its tensile strength, which allows the spanning of large areas without the need for columns. (35) It also allows the realization of continuity in architecture, for beam and post as separate entities can be done away with. Wall, floor, and ceiling can become one, thanks to steel welding. (36) Again, the freer, more open spaces allowed by steel further the sense of healthfulness permitted by glass. (37) Wood in itself has, "beauty of marking, exquisite texture, and delicate nuances of colour," (38)
and the appropriate uses of wood are those in which these features are allowed to show - elaborate carving, joining, painting, etc., destroy the natural beauty of the material and are inappropriate to it.

The use of paint and papers to change the surfaces of materials violates the rules of organic architecture. The only treatment allowed is that which tends to preserve things as they are. What is not allowed is, for any material, to, "change the character of its natural expression." (39) This principle is violated when,

"In our so-called sky-scrapers...good granite or Bedford stone is cut into the fashion of the Italian fashion of Phidias and his Greek slaves. Blocks so cut are cunningly arranged about a structure of steel beams and shafts (which structure secretly robs them of their meaning), in order to make the finished building resemble the architecture depicted by Palladio and Vitruvius."(40)

It is violated also in John Wellborn Root's Monadnock building. In this structure, bricks are specially made in order to follow a curved line:

"The brick was carried across openings on concealed steel angles and the flowing contours, or profile, unnatural to brickwork, was got by forcing the material - hundreds of special molds for special bricks being made - to work out the curves and slopes."(41)

Le Corbusier subscribes to similar views, though putting them forward in less detail, in his early book, "Towards a New Architecture" ('Vers Une Architecture').:

"...in the last fifty years steel and concrete have brought new conquests, which are the index of a greater capacity for construction, and of an architecture in which the old codes have been overturned. If we challenge the past, we shall learn that 'styles' no longer exist for us, that a style belonging to our own period has come about; and there has been a revolution."(42)

Steel and concrete must not be used in imitations of the buildings of the past, but as their nature demands and allows. They permit new forms, e.g.
concrete leads to the suppression of the roof and its replacement by terraces (43), and new appearances, for these new materials "evade the attentions of the decorative artist."(44)

Again, the Italian specialist in concrete architecture, Pier Luigi Nervi subscribes to the view that materials have a nature to be respected, and makes the exercise of such respect a necessary condition for a good building:

"A structure that does not follow the simplest and most efficient schemes or a construction detail that does not consider the specific characteristics of the material with which it is built will only with great difficulty achieve good aesthetic expression.

"The new materials, in particular reinforced concrete and steel, have form-giving possibilities, derived from their technological characteristics, that are completely different from those of wood or masonry materials of the past."(45)

At one stage of his career, Henry Moore laid great stress on truth to materials as a necessary condition for good sculpture: "Every material has its own individual qualities...Stone, for example, is hard and concentrated and should not be falsified to look like flesh - it should not be forced beyond its constructive build to a point of weakness. It should keep its hard tense stoniness."(46) Similarly the American sculptor Jack Rich, in a textbook on materials claims that, of all the material available to the sculptor,

"Each...has its individual color, texture, and hardness; each possesses capacities and limitations peculiar to itself, determined by its physical characteristics. Materials are therefore not interchangeable...The camouflaging of one substance in imitation of another manifests lack of respect for the medium."(47)

Common to all these writers is the view that for any material, it has an intrinsic nature, and that this nature should be taken account of.
Failure to comply with this principle is held to result in a work less impressive than any work in which the principle is respected. The question is whether this principle is as interesting and informative as its advocates allow.

There are certainly difficulties connected with it. In the first place, the principle is often interpreted by those who hold it to entail that the covering of one surface by another—such as paint, paper, stucco, or whatever—is aesthetically impermissible if maximum effect is to be achieved. But there are so many examples of works of agreed greatness where this rule is broken that it appears to be without foundation—how many great buildings are stuccoed, extensively painted, and decorated in other ways, and how many of them would not suffer if the decoration were absent? Again Moore claims that because stone is hard and flesh is soft, stone should not be used to model imitations of flesh. On this principle it is hard to see what sculpturally viable materials are allowable for imitating flesh: bronze, marble, plaster of Paris are all excluded, all being hard. Only impermanent media such as wax or plasticine are left; and once again there are legions of counterexamples of works of agreed greatness which deprive the recommendation of all its force.

Perhaps Moore himself came to see this, since in a piece written some years after the one quoted above, he writes that truth to materials should not be made the criterion of aesthetic merit, since if were a snowman made by a child would have to be praised at the expense of a Rodon or a Bernini. In the earlier passage, Moore also says that material should not be used in a sculpture if the form is such that use of the particular material will result in structural weakness; but this is surely nothing more than common sense, not a profound recommendation the observance of which guarantees success in sculpture.

The principle of 'truth to materials' thus appears to degenerate quickly
into banality of falsehood. Why then should it have had such a vogue, and been held by artists of the calibre of Wright, Le Corbusier, and Moore? The reason might be as follows, at least so far as the architects are concerned. Both Wright and Le Corbusier reacted against that brand of architecture which consists in imitating 'styles' of the past, the result being a vulgar botch. They both saw that in order to be impressive, a building must be conceived in response to the demands of the age in which it is created, and be in some sense in harmony or of a piece with its life-style. Le Corbusier writes acutely that style, "is a unity of principle animating all the work of an epoch, the result of a state of mind which has its own special character,"(49) and Wright argues in much the same vein: "...every people has done its own work, therefore evolved its art as an expression of its own life, using the best tools."(50) The present age is industrialized, possessed of incomparable machines and materials, and to use these to produce works of art in imitation of the styles of the past is inauthentic. What is a necessary condition for good art is not so much a naive truth to materials as truth to the life-style of its own epoch. Of course this is a fairly nebulous thesis, and difficult to argue for with great precision; but there is far more to be said for it than for the false or uninformative varieties of the truth to materials thesis.

VI: The Role of the Materials of a Work of Art

While there is little to be said for the truth to materials thesis, it does not follow that the role of the material in a work of art is negligible. In architecture and sculpture, the material determines the form within certain broad limits, and insofar as expression depends on form, determine it also. In painting, not only does the medium embody the all-important colour, but also to some extent conditions the quality of line, and insofar as expression and meaning depend on line and colour, influences them also. Finally and most obviously, the colour, texture and pattern
of the materials of each of these arts play a role in the total aesthetic effect. These claims need support.

Bright points out that, "The materials of which a building is built will go far to determine its appropriate mass, its outline and, especially proportion." (51) Of course, the materials determine also what the building looks like: "A stone building will no more be nor will it look like a steel building. A pottery, or terra cotta building will not nor should it look like a stone building..." (52) The textures of materials can enhance the forms they partially determine: "In architecture, expressive changes of surface, emphasis on line and especially textures of material or imaginative pattern, may go to make facts more eloquent - form more significant..." (53) The tensile strength of steel is mentioned above: this allows the architect to use the cantilever principle, and so to create forms unthinkable in the past. In general, "Just as many fascinating different properties as there are different materials that may be used to build a building will continually and naturally qualify, modify, and utterly change all architectural form whatsoever." (54)

Nervi shows how the nature of materials together with the elementary state of the knowledge of statics in the past largely explains the forms of Greek, Roman, and Gothic buildings. The pediments of Greek temples are the clearest examples of building limitations imposed by the nature of materials. The space between columns is determined by the spanning capability of the monolithic architraves. Nervi thinks that the lesser span between the end columns, which is agreed to improve the look of the building greatly, is probably the result of the constructional expediency of leaving the end architraves the same length as the others, rather than increasing them by half the width of a column. (55) The Roman invention of thrusting roofs - simple vault, groined vault, dome - and the consequent introduction of powerful horizontal forces in the static interplay of structures radically modified the planimetric distribution
and at the same time made possible internal shapes and dimensions
unimaginable in preceding structures based on the architrave-column system.
To see how different is the expression produced by the two styles, one need
only compare the colossal hypostyle hall of Karnak with the great Roman
baths.

To support their vaulted and domed roofs, the Romans used massive
masonry walls, needed to take the horizontal thrust of the roof. The
progress from this simple solution to that of the Gothic architects is
miraculous. The equilibrium of heavy masses of masonry is replaced with
the equilibrium of forces created by the interplay of thrust and counter-
thrust of slender ribs built of good materials. The weight of the roof
over the central nave of a Gothic cathedral is carried down to the
foundations by the slender flying buttresses. The change in expression,
as compared to the Roman buildings, is too obvious to need comment.(56)

Wright, Nervi, and Le Corbusier all emphasize the liberating effect
of the new materials of the last hundred years or so, steel and reinforced
concrete. They make possible forms undreamt of on the past. Their
immense strength makes possible a great reduction in the mass of material
used in a building, with a consequent effect on its emotional impact.

In architecture then, the role of materials is both obvious and
important. The purpose to be served by the building, together with the
properties of the materials used, suggest and limit the form, and so the
expression to some degree. This limiting or conditioning must not of
course be overstressed, since there is quite plainly room for individual
genius, taste or the lack of them. Nervi sums up the point clearly:

"...the objective data of the problem, technology and statics
(empirical or scientific), suggest the solutions and forms; the
aesthetic sensitivity of the designer, who understands their
intrinsic beauty and validity, welcomes the suggestion and models
it, emphasizes it, proportions it, in a personal manner which constitutes the artistic element in architecture."

The situation in sculpture is roughly similar—material directing form and so expression to some degree, and contributing its own pattern, colour, and texture, though the limitation on form is less crucial. Sculptors and writers on sculpture agree that carving from stone limits the forms available to the sculptor; the designs are of necessity relatively compact, and are associated with such expressive properties as timelessness and repose. Stone carvings tend to be isolated in their own envelope of space, and do not enter freely into relations with the surrounding space. (58) Henry Moore writes, comparing stone and bronze:

"it (bronze) enables me to do things I couldn't do in stone. I was wanting to do upright figures. No stone figure..can stand on its own ankles..That's why the Greeks supported their standing figures with tree trunks, the Egyptians placed theirs against temples, and so on. But bronze has tremendous tensile strength. You can see your figures long and thin, wider at the top than at the bottom, giving them uplift, a soaring feeling." (59)

Bronze figures are usually cast from a first version which has been made by modelling—building up the work in clay or wax around a wire armature. The modelling method, in contrast to that of carving, allows greater freedom of design. The forms are less hermetic than those arrived at by carving. Again, the hardness of sculptural material is important, for the harder a material is, the more difficult it is to produce a naturalistic treatment, where this is desired. Marble is more suited to detailed treatment than granite.

The materials of painting affect not only the all-important colour, but also the quality of line. Tempera, the standard medium in Europe before oils were introduced, is stiffer than oil paint, and dries quickly. The quick drying of the medium results in the limitation that the painter...
cannot work freely in wet colour but must gain effects of tone and modelling by separate touches laid side by side or superimposed. It therefore denies the artist the richness and depth of oil painting, precluding effective chiaroscuro and the painterly line. The virtues of tempera are the strong linear composition and brilliant colour contrast which it allows. Oils, allowing the effects precluded by tempera, differ among themselves according as they are 'long' or 'short'. Modern tube paint has an additive, aluminium sterate, which effectively counteracts the viscous condition of the paint used by the artists of the past. This viscous condition, that of being polymerized, is caused by the action of the air on the linseed oil in the paint. Nonviscous paint is short, viscous paint, long. Because of the constituency of short paint, brush strokes made with it tend to have a brittle appearance; those made with long paint are smoother and suppler. In each case, line and texture are different.

The cases of music and literature are slightly different, since in the straightforward sense of 'material' in use in this section, there is only one material for each of these arts: the sounds made by an indefinite number of instruments, and words. Further, there are no restrictions on form in these arts imposed by the materials analogous to those in architecture and sculpture. Yet there are obvious and important links between the material and the expressive properties of the works: change the instrumentation of a piece, in effect changing the timbre of the sounds, and the expression of the melody can be wholly altered, even if played at the same pitch and speed: think of a flute and a harpsichord. There is a parallel effect in literature, especially in poetry, where sound and rhythm (qualities of the medium) are as important as meaning, and indeed interact with it. A change of word for a synonym of different sound, rhythms, and overtones can change the whole meaning and expression of a poem or part of a poem. It is precisely this fact
that, in a poem, the intrinsic qualities of the language are maximally exploited that makes poetry difficult if not impossible to translate.

The conclusion to be drawn from this cursory survey of materials in the arts is that Santayana is right to stress their pervasive and fundamental influence on other features of the work. The medium is not the message, but it affects its impact: in varying degrees in the various arts, the materials affect form, expression, and meaning, both directly by their own qualities and indirectly by their limiting effects on other properties of the work. Santayana can have the last word:

"The beauty of material is thus the groundwork for all higher beauty, both in the object, whose form and meaning have to be lodged in something sensible, and in the mind, where sensuous ideas, being the first to emerge, are the first that can arouse delight."(62)
Chapter III: Form

I: Introduction: Santayana and some classic views on Form

The concept of form figures in a more diverse and extensive set of problems than perhaps any other in aesthetics. Santayana's treatment of it is silently selective. For example, he does not deal with the notion of organic form (1), with the distinction between form and content, or with the outlines of the development of form within a style. What he does is to offer a definition of form, a classification of forms, both natural and artistic, under three headings, and a discussion of the psychology and physiology of their perception, making general comments about certain artistic forms en route. More than in any other chapter of "The Sense of Beauty", he reveals his debt to the German psychologists of the nineteenth century, and shows how deeply impressed he was by the theory of evolution.

Santayana's tendency to nonchalance in exposition is a marked feature of the third chapter of "The Sense of Beauty", where almost all his remarks on form are set out. Philosophical and psychological discussions alternate, and the discussion of types of form is not only interrupted by lengthy digressions but is incomplete. Again, the concluding six sections on literary aesthetics have little to do with form as understood in the preceding part of the chapter, and are dealt with in a later chapter of the present thesis. In the interest of clarity and consequential exposition, Santayana's argument has been re-arranged. What he does in a fairly disorderly way is to give his answers to three of the basic questions in the aesthetics of form:

(1) what is form?

(ii) how are forms to be classified?

(iii) why is there an aesthetic pleasure in form?

The explanations which make up the answer to this third question are themselves of two kinds, psychological and physiological.

An important point concerning form can be dealt with here, namely
the relation of Santayana's views on form to the body of classic theory which can be called formalism, i.e. a set of beliefs gravitating around the central tenet that the form of a work of art is its most important feature and/or defining property. Formalism in the theory of beauty, to which Santayana emphatically does not subscribe, has been dealt with in Chapter I, above: Santayana does not believe that beauty is the result always and only of formal properties of aesthetic objects; or, put in terms of conceptual relations, he does not believe that the ascription of the predicate 'beautiful' is or ought to be supported always and only by reasons referring to formal properties of objects.

The most recent occurrence of the doctrine of formalism in the theory of art is classically associated with Whistler, Clive Bell and Roger Fry, (2) and varieties of it occur in other writers of the present century. For example, announcing the doctrine of Purism in 1920, Le Corbusier and Amédée Ozenfant claim: "In true and durable plastic work, it is form which comes first and everything else should be subordinated to it. Everything should help establish the architectural achievement." (3) In 1941 and subsequently, Susanne Langer set out a theory of music according to which music and human feeling share the same morphology, and hence the former is one way — in fact the only way, if the theory is correct — of articulating, formulating, and communicating these feelings. (4) Again in 1961, Eva Schaper in her paper, 'Significant Form', argues, with cautious imprecision and an acknowledged debt to Langer, that, "it belongs to the function of art (but it is by no means the only function of art) to articulate 'significant form'." (5)

The Whistler-Bell-Fry formalism consists in subscription to some or all of the following beliefs (Bell is the most thorough-going of the three, Whistler the least; Fry hovers gingerly around most of the doctrines, coming close to complete agreement with Bell in the last essay, 'Retrospect', in "Vision and Design."); (1) as already mentioned, that the most
important and/or defining property of a work of art is its form, 'form' being understood to include combinations of colour as well as line (6); (ii) that the subject-matter of a work of art is of next to no importance (7), and hence (iii) being representational is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for aesthetic merit (Bell in fact considers representational accuracy to be a hindrance to the creation of significant form) (8); (iv) that formal properties alone are capable of causing ecstatic aesthetic experiences, and ought to do so. Not to be thus moved is to exhibit lack of sensibility - it is easy to see that the doctrine runs the risk of becoming irrefutable. Like the moral intuitions of Prichard, Moore and Ross, lack of which marks us as morally blind, so failure to experience quasi-mystical ecstasy before Italian Primitives or Post Impressionists marks us as devoid of real sensitivity to visual art. Since form alone does not appeal to our humdrum emotions, some feeling must be found for it to appeal to, hence the doctrine (v) that there is a special emotion stimulated always and only by formally excellent works of art, and having this emotion is both a necessary and sufficient condition for aesthetic experience. This is the aesthetic emotion. (10)

The fallacies and falsehoods involved in these views are by now well known. For example, Bell makes the essentialist assumption that all members of the class "works of art" have some feature in common; his view about the nature of aesthetic experience is false, and he himself admits to what grotesque critical verdicts he is lead by his views on representation (11*). The chief defect of formalism, however, as of all theories which try to define art in one word - Expression, Communication, and so on - is that, not only is it false to the logic of talk about art and open to ready refutation by counter-examples, but, if taken seriously must impoverish aesthetic experience. To approach all works of art looking only for form, or expression, or representational accuracy, is to miss much
of what is there to be seen or heard, and it usually leads to the
dismissal of whole periods as poor stuff or 'not art.'

Here is the relevance of this brief consideration of formalism to
Santayana, at least as far as his earlier period is concerned; he
accepts none of these doctrines; form is 'for him one factor in aesthetic
experience and of aesthetic objects, and an important one, but it is not
the most important or defining property of either. One of the
sanest features of "The Sense of Beauty" as a whole is Santayana's grasp of the
contribution made by each aspect of the aesthetic object to aesthetic
experience. To make it a virtue in Santayana not to be a formalist is
therefore neither so odd nor so trivial as it sounds. His giving due
emphasis to each aspect of the aesthetic object is especially creditable
in a writer working in the eighteen-nineties.

II: The Nature of Form

To write a chapter on the beauty of form is to presuppose that there
is such a species of beauty, i.e. that it is irreducible to beauty
resulting from other properties of the aesthetic object. It is with a
defence of this assumption that Santayana begins his treatment of form.

He bothers to do so because he thinks the effect of form is more
mysterious than either the sensuous delight we take in an object because
of its materials, or the pleasure we take in an object which has pleasant
associations (he considers that expression is a species of association).
The effect of form is to be found, "where sensible elements, by themselves
indifferent, are so united as to please in combination."(12) So 'unexpected'
is this phenomenon that some - he does not say who - attempt to deny the
existence of formal beauty. The attempt to reduce beauty of form to
beauty of materials is easily refuted - one need only re-arrange the
same materials in order to disprove the thesis; and moreover the
reductionist view has a false consequence, since, "it would follow to
the comfort of the vulgar that all marble houses are equally beautiful".(13)
More plausible is the attempt to reduce beauty of form to that of expression. It is as well to be clear at this point, even at the expense of repetition, what Santayana understands by expression. Objects and feelings which repeatedly co-occur are associated in the mind, and when one of a pair or group of such associated feelings occurs in isolation, our experience of it is modified by the faint recurrence of the associated experiences of those objects with which it has occurred:

"The hushed reverberations of these associated feelings continue in the brain, and by modifying our present reaction, colour the image upon which our attention is fixed. The quality thus acquired by objects through association is what we call their expression." (14)

The difficulty which Santayana finds in the attempt to reduce formal to expressive beauty is that it entails a false consequence, namely that there are no immediate aesthetic values whatever, since all values would necessarily become suggestions of moral good - it will be remembered that, for Santayana, all intrinsic goods are aesthetic, and all instrumental goods moral; moreover he also holds the converse of each of these beliefs: all aesthetic goods are intrinsic, and all moral goods instrumental.

The argument to establish the entailment of the false consequence alleged by Santayana is as follows (15):

(1) formal beauty is reducible to beauty of expression;
(11) therefore, wherever a form appears beautiful, it really derives its beauty from some association which is expressed.
(111) but the expressed object (i.e. that which is associated and so expressed) cannot itself be formally beautiful, for ex hypothesi there is no such thing as formal beauty.
(1111) therefore, the expression must be of some practical or moral good, for at some point the expression must be of something other than
beauty.

Santayana objects that the conclusion of this argument is clearly false. Innumerable aesthetic effects are "direct transmutations of pleasures and pains; they express nothing extrinsic to themselves, much less moral excellences."(16) Straight lines and curves produce different impressions on us which are "almost emotional"(17):

"The quality of the sensation is different, like that of various colours or sounds...There is a distinct quality and value, often a singular beauty, in these simple lines that is intrinsic in the perception of their form."(18)

Santayana is confused in his argument here. What is so strange is this: the argument of "The Sense of Beauty" as a whole is designed to establish two major theses: (i) that beauty is value positive, intrinsic and objectified, and (ii) that three aspects of the aesthetic object can have the effect of causing us to project and objectify our pleasure, namely, its material, its form, and whatever it expresses. From this it of course follows that objectification occurs in the presence of any one (or conjunction) of these three factors, and hence it occurs whenever we find an object expressive. Further, it follows from Santayana's definition of aesthetic value that expressive value is intrinsic, and so immediate. In the course of the foregoing argument Santayana appears to contradict this, assuming that if all beauty is expressive, no values are immediate. What he does is to assume that if what is expressed does not itself have aesthetic value, then no values are immediate, a conclusion which does not follow from the premises to which he subscribes — indeed, it will be seen in the next chapter (on expression) that he there assumes the correct position, with regard to his own premises at any rate, on this matter. The nature of the value of what is expressed does not affect the aesthetic nature of the entire expression, and therefore, even if all formal beauty could be reduced to expressive beauty, the immediacy of the
value would be unaffected.

While Santayana's argument is thus unacceptable, the conclusion which he seeks to establish, i.e. the irreducibility of formal to expressive beauty, is surely true. To claim that the former can be reduced to the latter is to claim that all propositions specifying formal features of an aesthetic object can be reduced to or in some way accounted for in terms of propositions specifying expressive features of the object.

Further, the reductionist would have to maintain that anyone who takes pleasure in the form of an aesthetic object and denies that he finds the object expressive is deceiving himself. It is hard to believe that any of the required propositional equivalences could be found, or that self-deception in aesthetic experience has occurred so constantly and so massively.

The form of an object, then, can contribute a species of beauty peculiar to itself. Can anything be said about the nature of form in general? Santayana believes that it can, and approaches his definition via two preliminary observations. The first is that:

"A form is an aggregation, it must have elements, and the manner in which the elements are combined constitutes the character of the form. A perfectly simple perception, in which there was no consciousness of the distinction and relation of parts, would not be a perception of form; it would be a sensation." (19)

Modern psychology supports Santayana here. In her well-known book on the psychology of perception, Dorothy Vernon writes that, if a field of view is completely homogeneous, and no part of it is in any way different from the remainder, then the figure-ground experience, fundamental to the perception of shape or contour, is impossible. The perceiver sees only what psychologists call film-colour, which has no definite position in space. (20) There is also a highly general philosophical point here which can surely be allowed. Following Santayana in restricting attention to
sight, it is a necessary and sufficient condition for an experience to
count as an experience of visual form that the field of vision be other
than an undifferentiated monochromatic patch. An example is not hard to
think of: suppose I am lying on my back outdoors on a summer day, looking
at a cloudless sky overhead, with no nearby trees or tall grass at the
edge of the field of vision, such a visual field does not provide an
experience of form in any ordinary sense of the word. But if a cloud
appears anywhere in my field of vision, then immediately I may be said
to be experiencing forms - there are 'elements' in my perception.

The second preliminary point is less successful. Santayana claims
that form is what specifically appeals to an aesthetic nature, and what
specifically does not appeal to the 'unattentive'. The unattentive are
those for whom objects are merely stimuli to private reverie, or those
who consider objects solely with regard to their function. The true
aesthete, by implication, is he who has the inclination to stop and study
the parts and their relations. Santayana evidently considered that the
'unattentive' were in the majority at the time when he wrote:

"The indulgence in sentiment and suggestion, of which our time is
fond, to the sacrifice of formal beauty, marks an absence of
cultivation as real, if not as confessed, as that of the barbarian
who revels in gorgeous confusion."(21)

Santayana is here exhibiting his taste for art in the best Greek manner
in preference to the (relatively) formless productions of the Romantics.
Of course, the ability to appreciate form, and to take a genuine aesthetic
pleasure in it, are necessary conditions for full and rich aesthetic
experience, but there is no philosophical reason to think that they are also
sufficient. This quirk of taste runs throughout "The Sense of Beauty":
Santayana is at pains to show how material and expression can also be
sources of beauty, but his own favourites are clearly works in which the
commanding element is the form.

Santayana's definition of form is that form is the unity of a manifold:
"The synthesis...which constitutes form is an activity of the mind; the unity arises consciously, and is an insight into the relation of sensible elements separately perceived." (22)

This synthesis differs from sensation in that it is conscious, and from expression in that its elements are homogeneous, and also simultaneously present to sense.

Commenting on this, George Boas writes that the definition of form as a synthesizing activity of the mind reveals the influence of the Idealistic tradition on Santayana. He goes on:

"...in 1892 it was too much to ask of a young professor to see mind detached from its rank in the hierarchy of values. To have doubted its superiority - not merely its difference - to body would have been to ally oneself to vulgar materialists and aesthetic hedonists." (23)

This is badly inaccurate. Even as a 'young professor', Santayana had a materialist theory of the mind, witness the scattered remarks in "The Sense of Beauty" (about which Boas is writing, and which incidentally appeared in 1896) about brain processes. Santayana evidently did not find the theory vulgar and moreover never changed his mind about it.

As for influences, the vocabulary of Santayana's definition is very close to that of Kant, rather than an Idealist; so close indeed that one is tempted to speculate that he must have had the former in mind. In the "Critique of Judgment", Kant writes that the "formal (element) in the representation of a thing" is "the agreement of the manifold with a unity..." (24) Moreover, the careful stress on the consciousness of the activity and of the separate perception of the data reveals the influence of the psychology of Herbert and Lotze. For both these thinkers, we construct the world out of discrete sensations by means of acts of mental synthesis which are introspectible, and have emotional overtones. (25)

Several difficulties are involved in Santayana's definition of form.
There are several general difficulties over the representationalist theory of perception involved, for example over the identity conditions of the sensations out of which we build the world, and over the presupposition that whatever is complex is made up of discrete simples. This latter point is assumed, not proved. Again, it is assumed by Santayana in common with other representationalists that there are unconceptualised data. This hypothesis is unnecessary and unprovable, for whatever is experienced is experienced as something, and therefore the assumption that there are unconceptualised data is unverifiable. There is a further difficulty also. The sensible elements of which Santayana speaks must themselves have forms, since otherwise it would follow from Santayana's premisses that experience of them would be of undifferentiated sensations rather than experiences of a plurality of elements. Yet if this is so, Santayana is committed to the view that every experience which is an experience of form is accompanied by an act of synthesis which is conscious, introspectible, and possessed of a definite emotional tinge. But such a thesis is obviously false - if Santayana were right, then almost the whole of our conscious activity would be taken up with these posited mental acts. Of course, where the forms of works of art are temporally extended, there is a sense of fulfilment when the formal design is successful; when the work has the beginning, middle and end recommended by Aristotle (26), then there can be a deliberate and reflective relating of formal features by the mind. But Santayana's thesis is on a far higher plane of generality than this. He is making a claim about the way we unify the buzzing, booming confusion, the less than dreamlike experience of unconceptualised sensation.

Having given a definition of form, Santayana turns to consider further basic questions in the aesthetics of form: can forms be subdivided in a systematic way? Can anything be said in general about classes of forms with regard to their contribution to aesthetic experience? Santayana believes that each of these questions can be given an affirmative answer.
The physicist turned psychologist Gustav Fechner, having published his great psychological work, "Elemente der Psychophysik" in 1860, came late on in his life to be interested in aesthetics. In 1876 he published "Vorscule der Aesthetik", and in one of his rare footnotes, Santayana acknowledges that his classification of forms is suggested by a passage in that work. It is assumed in accordance with what has been said about the definition of form and perceptions of form that whatever has a form has elements, and that these elements are related. The classification is according to the type of relation which holds between the elements, and the type of elements:

(i) forms whose elements are all alike. In such cases the diversity of elements is merely numerical. (It is evident from Santayana's main example - the stars - that the relations between the elements need not be identical.)

(ii) elements differing in kind, but so as to compel the mind to no particular order in their classification.

(iii) elements so constituted as to suggest inevitably the scheme of their unity: "in this case there is organisation in the object, and the synthesis of its parts is one and pre-determinate." This classification is intended to be applicable to both natural and artistic aesthetic objects, extended both in space and time.

The first and most obvious comment is that the second and third classes of forms are defined in a more subjective way than the first. One can imagine a large number of disagreements about which forms are to be considered compelling and which are not. It is probably too much to ask of any classification of aesthetic forms that it be absolutely watertight; but this division by Santayana openly invites important disagreement. There are difficulties too over the innocuous-looking first class, and these are brought out later on.

Santayana nowhere defines what is to count as an element. One might
perhaps expect, in view of his definition of form as the unity of a manifold that he would continue to operate on a plane of high epistemological generality, and take sense as his elements. In fact he does not do this; nor does he, as for example "smirinsky does in "Point and Line to Plane", seek to find a special set of basic elements common to visual or other forms. (29) He seems to have had no special notion of an element in mind—in his examples, he uses ordinary physical-object-descriptions to identify the elements in the complexes of which he speaks.

He says (30) that he will discuss each type of form in succession, together with the effects proper to each. In fact he does not do so—he discusses the first and second classes of forms, which he seems to refer to as examples of multiplicity in uniformity, and forms of indeterminate organisation, respectively. There is no discussion of the third class of forms, those whose elements inevitably suggest the scheme of their unity, and this omission, as well as confusing certain commentators (as is noted below) impoverishes his argument. Clearly, most works of art fall into this class, and by neglecting to consider it, he deprives himself of the opportunity to discuss the most aesthetically important type of form.

Santayana begins his consideration of multiplicity in uniformity with the assertion that we have a "perception of extension" and that this is a rudimentary perception of form in which the elements are all alike and differ 'solo numero'. This perception of extension is alleged to be a species of feeling of relation:

"The essence of (the sense of space) is the realisation of a variety of directions and possible motions, by which the relation of point to point is vaguely but inevitably given." (31)

The sensation has the further negative property that it is a sense of the unbounded: "...we can have the sense of space without the sense of boundaries; indeed, this intuition is what tempts us to declare space infinite." (32)

(There is an obvious similarity with the second of Kant’s arguments in
Section I of the Transcendental Aesthetic in the "Critique of Pure Reason".

Since he says no more about it, it is not clear whether this claim about our experience of space - if it is, then he should make it clear that the concepts of motion and space are related by mutual entailment: neither is prior to the other. Equally important is the apparent inconsistency between this claim and his above view that, for any perception to count as a perception of form, it must be other than an undifferentiated sensation. This is to assume, of course, that this posited intuition of space is undifferentiated; but if it is not undifferentiated, this perception must surely be of a spatial object, and not of space 'tout court'. There is a further difficulty here. At the end of Chapter II of "The Sense of Beauty", Santayana asserts that form cannot (logically) be the form of nothing; but of what is the form experienced in this pure intuition the form?

There is a closely related difficulty over consistency in Santayana's next claim, which is that the aesthetic appeal of extensiveness is entirely different from that of particular shapes. The effect of surface is not necessarily that of either material or colour:

"...the evenness, monotony, and vastness of a great curtain of colour produce an effect which is that of the extreme of uniformity in the extreme of simplicity; the eye wanders over a fluid infinity of unrecognisable positions, and the sense of their numberlessness and continuity is precisely the source of the emotion of extent." (33)

If this example of perception of a monochromatic coloured surface counts as an example of the perception of form, then the above distinction between synthetic and undifferentiated sensations collapses, for one could pick out points or positions in any colour field.

With the mention of what he calls here, "the emotion of extent", Santayana shifts his ground from the highly general pure sensation of space to the less contentious subject of the effects of large objects,
notably buildings, in aesthetic experience. He draws a distinction between the emotion of extent and the idea of size. The former is primary, and "unequivocally has a physiological ground," whereas the latter is secondary, and involves associations and inferences. A photograph of St. Peter's will tell us its size, always granted that we know the scale of the representation; but, "the value of size only becomes immediate when we are at close quarters with the object."(34) Of course, associated ideas also affect the impact a building or other large object has on us,

"but the pure sense of extension, based upon the attack of the object on the apperceptive resources of the eye, is the truly aesthetic value which it concerns us to point out here, as the most rudimentary example of form."(35)

From this uncontroversial claim, in concluding his first example of multiplicity in uniformity Santayana moves to some equally safe generalities about the relation of form to material. If the aim of the artist is to highlight the beauty of the material - and this proviso is important - then the form must be left as simple as possible: "...of all forms, absolute uniformity in extension is the simplest and most allied to the material; it gives the latter only just enough form to make it real and perceptible."(36) Again, rich materials are generally best left simply formed: "You will spoil the beauty you have by superimposing another; as if you make a statue of gold, or flute a jasper column, or bedeck a velvet cloak."(37) Granted the important proviso concerning the aim of the artist, these generalisations can stand. It might be objected that they are liable to refutation by counter-example, citing highly wrought works in fine materials, such as Faberge's jewelled trinkets; but Santayana can reply that the aim in such creations is not simply to highlight the beauty of the material.

A second example of form in which there is a uniformity in multiple elements is the starry sky. If asked why they are affected by this sight,
the majority would probably seek the cause of their feeling in the ideas associated with the stars, as regards their distance, size, and possible habitation. Such an explanation, Santayana contends, involves the fallacy of false cause, for these ideas are inessential to our admiration: "Before the days of Kepler the heavens declared the glory of God; and we needed no calculation of stellar distances, no fancies about a plurality of worlds, no image of infinite spaces, to make the stars sublime." (38)

This is a curious argument, since it gives the associationist against whom Santayana is arguing a perfect reply: what set of ideas more likely to stir the heart than that the heavens are the work of an omnipotent creator?

However, Santayana is insistent on the point that the emotion produced by the stars is not in any way to be accounted for by associated beliefs, but by the "sensuous character of the object" which is "sublime in itself." (39) It might be argued that the sublimity of the experience is due to the arousal of the intellectual idea of infinity, but this cannot be so, since the same idea is aroused by infinitesimal objects like grains of sand. The experience is in fact to be accounted for on a sub-personal level, in terms of the physiology of seeing:

"Every point on the retina is evenly excited, and the local signs of all are simultaneously felt. This equable tension, this balance and elasticity in the very absence of fixity, give the vague but powerful feeling that we wish to describe." (40)

This set of contentions is unconvincing for at least two reasons. The associationist can plausibly deny that the same idea is associated with the sky and a grain of sand - the one is associated with the idea of the infinitely great, the other with the idea of the infinitely small. Moreover, the physiological description is inexact. It is well-known that the rods and cones which make up the light-sensitive surface of the retina have
different properties, the rods having greater sensitivity in bad light, the cones giving higher definition.

The concluding remarks of this example of the stars are more convincing. The heavens are, "very happily designed to intensify the sensations on which their beauties must rest." (41) There are two factors to be considered here: (1) the breaking up of the continuum of space by points so vivid that it is impossible not to remain aware of their individuality; and (ii) the contrast of the dark background to the "palpitating fire" (42) of the stars themselves is an important material element of the effect. To see how important these elements are it is necessary only to imagine their absence: the second is absent in photographs of the stars; and as an alternative to the facts described in (i) Santayana invites us to imagine the stars in the shape of a Latin cross, surrounded by the motto, "In hoc signo vinces". As in the less intense experience of the lights of a city seen across water, what affects us is precisely multiplicity in uniformity. (43)

The experiences of which Santayana speaks in this example do undoubtedly occur; and he is also right to stress the effect of material properties in them – though in doing so, he should be less eager to claim that the source of the effect is purely the formal arrangement of multiple repetition of uniform elements. What is not convincing in his argument is his insistence that related beliefs are of no consequence in these aesthetic experiences.

Santayana considers that aesthetic principles have a far wider application in our experience than merely to those works of art or natural phenomena whose beauty arrests our attention, and he finds an effect of multiplicity in uniformity in the appeal of the political ideal of democracy. Every activity of the human mind, every emotion, is in some way related to pleasure and pain. Often these activities precipitate "psychical solids called ideas of things" (44) and when this occurs, the
concomitant pleasures and pains are incorporated into the objects, and thus the things acquire an aesthetic colouring. Usually this goes unnoticed, especially in objects of practical concern; but nevertheless it is present, and accounts for a great deal in our moral and political attitudes. (Santayana is once again using the psychological notion of projection).

Of course, the democratic ideal gained support firstly in a strictly practical context, as a remedy to injustice and oppression, but as time went on it began to acquire an intrinsic value. Democracy consists largely in love of uniformity. Usually, this fact is disguised by the use of a moral label - love of democracy is claimed to be a love of justice - but occasionally the beauties of democracy are presented to us undisguised. According to Santayana, the moral disguise is most completely absent in Whitman's poetry:

"Never, perhaps, has the charm of uniformity in multiplicity (sic) been felt so completely and so exclusively. Everywhere it greets us with a passionate preference; not flowers but leaves of grass, not music but drum-taps, not composition but aggregation, not the hero but the average man, not the crisis but the vulgarest moment..."

We find a "resolute marshalling of nullities". Santayana is undoubtedly rather unfair here to the idea of democracy - in principle at any rate it is not incompatible with advanced cultivation of the individual of the kind of which Mill speaks. More important is the point that no-one who dissents from Santayana's assumptions about value and aesthetic experience need accept this; and again, this set of claims about democracy exemplifies a general defect of this chapter, i.e. Santayana's readiness to wander off the point, for assuredly the idea of democracy has nothing to do with the aesthetics of form.

This first type of form - in which identical elements are repeated - has two major limitations or inherent defects. The first of these is
monotony, and this itself can take two forms: (1) if the repeated impressions are acute, the monotony becomes painful. The constant requirement for the same reaction is wearying; and (2) if the repeated stimulations are not very acute, we become unconscious of them, like the ticking of a clock.

The second defect is that the capacity for association of this type of form is limited: "What is in itself uniform cannot have a great diversity of relations."(48) Works of art involving such forms tend to be dry, crisp, and definite. Santayana gives two examples of what he considers to be such forms: (1) the heroic couplet: "Its compactness and inevitableness make it excellent for an epigram and adequate it for a satire, but its perpetual snap and unvarying rhythms are thin for an epic, and impossible for a song,"(49); (2) the Greek colonnade. It has a finished and restrained beauty but is incapable of development: "The experiments of Roman architecture sufficiently show it; the glory of which is their Roman frame rather than their Hellenic armament."(50)

The difficulty here concerns the justice of classifying the couplet and the colonnade as examples of multiplicity in uniformity. In neither case is there strictly unrelieved repetition; caesura variation and enjambement are available to the writer of couplets, and as to the colonnade it is well known that the interval between the end pairs of columns is less than that between those in the centre. Moreover, it is surely more than defensible to class, for example, many of the works of Dryden and Pope, as well as surviving colonnades as examples of organic forms, or, as Santayana prefers to say, forms which "compel the mind" to order the elements in only one way. That Santayana's classification should break down over such major examples is a grave defect.

The second major class of forms is that in which the elements are diverse but yet do not compel the mind to order them in only one way.
Santayana comes to refer to them as forms of indeterminate organisation - the actual vocabulary of the classification, in terms of elements and their relations, never recurs in the form in which it is introduced.

Indeterminate objects - the incoherent, suggestive, and variously interpretable - stimulate the free exercise of the activity of apperception, and it is this which gives them their value. (The concept of apperception is discussed below. What he means is that an indeterminate form is one which requires the spectator or auditor to enrich it with contributions from his own memory and mental habits.) Works involving such forms are not enjoyed by those who have poor and literal minds, for they lack the necessary resources. On the other hand, the artist who is not artist enough, who has too many irrepressible talents, is sure to produce indeterminate works. The consciousness that accompanies this type of form is that of profundity or mighty significance; nor need this be an illusion.

Even in the finest art there is an appeal to the spectator to do some work - the nature of our media (words, sounds, plastic materials) will not allow exhaustive representation of experience. Thus even where there is real profundity, "when the living core of things is most firmly grasped,"(51) there will be felt to be some inadequacy of expression. But this occurs only when the resources of a well-learned art are exhausted; otherwise what passes as depth is merely incompetence and confusion. Such incompetence, Santayana claims, is widespread in "the present age". The distinction Santayana is concerned to make here, between mere obscurity and real profundity, is of course genuine, though usually only established by the test of time. What is strange is his assumption that all art aspires to "exhaustive representation of experience". In the first place it is false to claim that there is one aim that all art has, and secondly, that exhaustiveness is even a common aim. Moreover, it is truistic to point out that the artist must select, and that this is not a defect, since by selection he can highlight the effect he wants to make, whatever it may be.
The natural landscape is an example of indeterminate form:

"...it almost always contains enough diversity to allow the eye a great liberty in selecting, emphasising, and grouping its elements, and it is furthermore rich in suggestion and vague emotional stimulus."(52)

He insists that pleasure in landscape is largely associative. A landscape will seem beautiful to us if we have learned to see in it, "hints of a fairyland of happy living and vague adventure."(53) He is as much concerned to stress the associative element in the experience of indeterminate form as he is to exclude it from any role in the experience of repetition of identical elements, and perhaps does more justice to the facts of introspection as a result. Yet it is odd that he should not even countenance the possibility of pleasure in pure shape and colour in the natural landscape, since it is form which he is ostensibly discussing.

Turning to painted landscapes, Santayana remarks that the artist has selected and emphasised, but from this draws the inference that it is therefore vastly inferior to painted landscape. No doubt there is little indeterminateness (in Santayana's sense) in painted landscape, even in a work which exemplifies the baroque characteristics which Wolfflin describes; yet it is strange to consider painted landscape inferior (especially in a chapter on beauty of form) for more nearly having organic form. Moreover, it has been forcibly argued (e.g. by Clark in "Landscape into Art") that the way in which human beings see and appreciate landscape follows the way in which landscape is depicted in paintings; English gentlemen in the early eighteenth century wanted their landscapes to look like Poussin's painted landscapes. Granted the truth of this, it is hard to see a justification for Santayana's assertion as to the inferiority of painted landscape to its natural counterpart.

Evidently Santayana could find little to please him in landscape painting, since he condemns 'in toto' both Impressionistic and what he
calls highly realistic works. The extreme of Impressionism (he says) tries to fix a momentary view on canvas. The result is that, if the beholder has himself been struck by that aspect, the picture has extraordinary force and emotional value. On the other hand, such a work is trivial in the extreme. It is as if it were the photograph of a detached impression, not followed as in nature by many variations of itself. Highly realistic landscape painting, despite its accuracy of representation, often seems unreal and uninteresting; and this is because it is formless like those objects it depicts, while it lacks that sensuous intensity which might have made the reality interesting. (54) It is hard to agree with anything Santayana says here. From his first claim it would follow that all Impressionist landscapes appear trivial to all persons who have not glimpsed exactly the same scene as the painter, which is absurd. If the second assertion were true, it is a mystery why landscapes were ever considered a fit subject for painting at all. Moreover, Santayana contradicts himself, for the formlessness which above was claimed as a strength of natural landscape is now a weakness, and the determinateness above attributed to painted landscape is now denied of it. Again, he here makes the appeal of landscape depend on material properties and not association as above. (He makes its appeal depend on anything, in fact, except form.) One can only suppose that a personal indifference to landscape in art is the reason for this entirely undistinguished theorising. (For a possible reason for this indifference, cf. note 183 to Chapter VII, below).

He continues that our attitude to landscape has changed for the better over the centuries. Formerly, it was obligatory for painters to introduce ruins or figures into their landscapes, to give them human association: "The indeterminateness of the suggestions of an unhumanised scene was then felt as a defect; now we feel it rather as an exaltation." (55) This is an advance because we can now see beauty where we did not see it before, and
aesthetic education consists in nothing but training ourselves to see
the maximum of beauty. Commonly we are in a state of aesthetic
unconsciousness towards most of those objects that are determinate and
natural: "We treat human life and environment with the same utilitarian
eye with which (the peasant lacking aesthetic sense) regards the field
and mountain." (56) He is assuredly on safe ground as regards the truth
of this last remark, but in contrasting the aesthetic with the utilitarian
attitude, he approaches the disinterest/distance view of aesthetic
experience ostensibly rejected in the first Chapter of "The Sense of Beauty"

One of the characteristics of Santayana's unsatisfactory chapter on
form in "The Sense of Beauty" is the tendency to assimilate subjects
which are not in fact closely related. The section on the aesthetics of
democracy is one example of this; a second is the assimilation of the
aesthetic experience of the natural landscape to the highly general
subject of the conceptualisation of data by the mind. In contemplating
landscape, the mind is alleged to impose an unstable series of forms on
its experience; but, Santayana continues, this is not the only area of
experience in which such unstable categorisations of nature are made. The
same process is exemplified in theories of history, religion, and moral
and natural philosophy. He goes on to argue, very briefly, that all
theories are simply conceptualisations of experience, and firmly embraces
the sceptical position to which a representationalist theory of perception
so easily leads - there is no possibility of testing the truth of any
theory, since this would involve a comparison of conceptualised data and
stimuli which is in principle impossible. (57) This excursion into the
upper reaches of the theory of knowledge has no real relevance to the
aesthetics of indeterminate form; its presence here, like that of an
embryonic form of the theory of poetry and religion at the end of the
chapter, is simply an indication of the unfinished state of Santayana's
philosophy at the time at which he wrote "The Sense of Beauty" - he
retained this theory of knowledge throughout his career, though he elab-
orates it fully only in "Scepticism and Animal Faith" (1923), twenty-seven years later.

Returning to indeterminate form, Santayana claims that the first of the inherent weaknesses of this species of form is ambiguity. Being ambiguous, such forms, when used to convey a meaning, cannot do so unequivocally. Where a meaning is not to be conveyed, as is the case, he thinks, in landscape, architecture, and music, illusiveness of form is not so objectionable, though even here the tendency to observe the form is a sign of increasing appreciation - this last remark repeats a claim also made at the end of the second chapter of "The Sense of Beauty", namely that formal features of an aesthetic object are usually the last to be appreciated, material and associative (i.e. for Santayana, expressive) properties preceding them in the process of aesthetic education. Clearly the most stagger ing claim here is that no meaning is conveyed by music, architecture and landscape. "Meaning" is a term which can be applied to music without logical impropriety. For example, the fifth symphony of Beethoven, the fourth and fifth of Tchaikovsky, and the first of Brahms can all be said to have the same meaning: the progress of the spirit from depression or despair to renewed hope, faith, or determination. Other symphonies have a roughly contrary meaning, showing the spirit crushed by events and unable to overcome them, e.g., the fortieth symphony of Mozart, the sixth of Tchaikovsky, or the sixth of Mahler.

Santayana continues that in literature, where the sensuous value of the material is comparatively small, indeterminateness is fatal to beauty, and if extreme, to expressiveness also: "For meaning is conveyed by the form and order of words, not by words themselves, and no precision of meaning can be reached without precision of style."(58) This is a curious remark, since if taken literally it must be false - Santayana seems to be asserting that words do not have meaning. What he says must presumably be an ellipsis for something like the assertion that the order
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of words is important in meaning; but Santayana is guilty at least of writing extremely loosely at this point.

A second defect of indeterminate form is that it is indeterminate in value; it demands completion by the mind of the observer, and will consequently vary in value according to his abilities. This is a simple consequence of the conjunction of the definition of indeterminate form and the interest theory of value.

Thirdly and finally, indeterminate form is unprofitable, even to the mind which takes it up; it is experienced under the forms of apperception which the mind already has, and does not enrich the mind by providing a new form. Of course, a creative mind, given such a stimulus, may produce such a new form, "but the fertilising seed came from elsewhere, from study and admiration of those definite forms which nature contains or which art, in imitation of nature, has conceived and brought to perfection."(59) It is hard to see how this particular informal psychological generalisation can be verified or falsified in any significant degree. There is surely evidence, however, for the assumption Santayana makes in the course of these remarks, namely that works of art enrich the mind. George Steiner describes the phenomenon in the opening words of his "Tolstoy or Dostoevsky":

"In a manner evident and yet mysterious, the poem or the drama or the novel seizes on our imaginings. We are not the same when we put down the work as we were when we took it up. To borrow an image from another domain: he who has truly apprehended a painting by Cezanne will therafter see an apple or a chair as he had not seen them before. Great works of art pass through us like storm winds, flinging open the doors of perception, pressing upon the architecture of our beliefs with their transforming powers."(60)

Whether this sort of experience can be or cannot be caused by works of indeterminate organisation surely varies with the individual.
The concept of indeterminate organisation leads Santayana to discuss what he calls the illusion of infinite perfection. Jacques Duron (61) is surely right to claim that Absolute Idealism, especially that of Schelling, forms the background of ideas in opposition to which this section is conceived - Santayana (it may be repeated) was thoroughly acquainted with Idealist systems, not least because of the presence of Royce at Harvard. In his "System des transcendentalen Idealismus" (1800), Schelling writes as follows: (the two activities of the first sentence are the conscious activity of freedom and the unconscious activity of nature)

"Every aesthetic production starts from an essentially infinite separation of the two activities which are separated in all free productions. But as these two activities are to be represented in the product as in union, this product represents an infinite in finite form. Now the infinite represented in finite form is beauty. The fundamental character of every work of art, which comprehends in it the two former characters is therefore beauty, and without beauty there is no work of art." (62)

Santayana begins with more psychological generalisations. While indeterminate forms can stimulate the intelligence and imagination, yet the effort involved in contemplating these fugitive forms would become wearisome if unrelieved. This is because the effort of our activity is aimed at achieving determinateness. (63) This preference we would all clearly admit to ourselves, were it not for an illusion proper to the romantic temperament (for which Santayana has a marked dislike) which lends a mysterious charm to things indefinite and indefinable. This romantic preference is the illusion of infinite perfection. The idea contains a philosophical error, since, he argues,

"In reality, perfection is synonym for finitude. Neither in nature nor in the fancy can anything be perfect except by realising a definite type, which excludes all variation, and contrasts sharply
with every other possibility of being." (66)

All perfections are finite and definite, and these finite perfections are incompatible:

"...every age, every country, each sex, has a peculiar beauty, finite and incommunicable; the better it is attained, the more completely it excludes every other. The same is evidently true of schools of art, of styles and languages, and of every effect whatsoever." (63)

It is unlikely that these claims would be contested now – with the decline of Absolute Idealism, the problems to which it gave rise, and which were matters of concern to Santayana in 1896, have disappeared from the centre of aesthetics.

Not unusually, Santayana gives a psychological account of the origins of the belief in infinite perfection. There is a certain state of mind in which we are incapable of realising a given thought with absolute clarity. One reason why the idea cannot emerge is that it is not alone in the brain – a thousand other tendencies simmer in confusion there, and when some definite image is presented to us, we feel it to be inadequate, precisely because it is perfect. In this mood, we are incapable of serious attention to one thing, of sinking into it and enjoying its harmonies. Instead we are beset by imprecise thoughts and vague yearnings. The sum of these incoherences has an imposing volume, and what delights us is not a precise exemplification of one possibility, but that which, while it instantiates none perfectly, suggests many. The illusion here, however, is obvious – Santayana repeats his philosophical claim on a psychological level – for from our emotion all that would emerge, could they do so, would be a host of determinate forms. In fact, the emergence of a definite form from this fluid state is precisely what happens, Santayana claims, in the creative act. The conclusion of his treatment of indefinite form is a re-assertion of the superiority of the finite and
"Whenever beauty is really seen and loved, it has a definite embodiment: the eye has precision, the work has style, and the object has perfection." (56)

This is all Santayana has to say about the classification of forms. There is no treatment of the third class of forms which he specifies in his initial classification, those in which the elements are so arranged as to suggest inevitably the scheme of their unity. This is a grave defect of omission, since, as has been mentioned above, almost the entire class of what one wants to call works of art would be included in it. Despite this, however, and despite some hasty generalisations, Santayana undoubtedly deserves credit for attempting a classification of forms. He does at least try to answer an important question about form which by no means all writers on the subject consider.

Having discussed the nature of forms and attempted a classification of them, Santayana continues his aesthetics of form with a discussion of a third fundamental question: why do human beings take pleasure in form? His answer is in two parts: physiological and psychological.

IV: Symmetry and The Physiology of the Perception of Forms

Santayana quite rightly feels no hesitation in introducing the findings of science into his aesthetics whenever he considers them relevant. In his answer to the question of why we take pleasure in form he considers briefly the physiology of visual perception - he believes that audible form could be given a parallel treatment, but precludes from a discussion of it on the grounds of the technicality of the subject. (67) It is necessary to refer to physiology because, in his view, "The charm of a line evidently consists in the relation of its parts; in order to understand this interest in spatial relations we must inquire how they are perceived." (68) Only the presence of the lens in the eye makes possible
representation of an object point by point - otherwise, each point of the object would send rays of light to every part of the retina; eyes without lenses give consciousness only of diffused light, without boundaries or diversions in the field of view. This has the corollary that the abstraction of form from colour is no artificial distinction, for, by a simplification of the organ of sense, one can be perceived without the other. (69)
The difficulty here is obviously that the initial assertion is false. Eyes without lenses would provide experience of forms which were blurred, but which were forms nevertheless.

Santayana continues that reception of a distributed image on the retina (i.e. of an eye with a lens) does not of itself explain why we perceive an object as a manifold of parts juxtaposed in space. The parts of the retina might have sent to the brain detached impressions, comparable perhaps, but not necessarily in terms of spatial positions. (70) He believes that the further explanation required can be given in terms of the movement of the eye. By an instinctive movement, the eye seeks to bring every impression near to the centre of the retina, to that point (the macula) which is most acutely sensitive. Thus a series of muscular movements always follows the conspicuous excitation of any outlying retinal point. Further, as the eye moves to bring the object into the centre of vision, the object excites a series of points along the retina, and the feeling proper to each point is associated with the series of muscular sensations. On the occasions of future stimulations, these feelings revive together. Any peripheral stimulation will excite the associations of muscular movement and the feelings proper to the retinal points between the excited peripheral point and the centre of vision. A network of associations is thus set up whereby the sensation of each retinal point is connected with all the others in the manner of points in a plane:

"Our notion of visual space has this origin, since the manifold of retinal impressions is distributed in a manner which serves as the type and
exemplar of what we mean by a surface."(71)

Santayana says that he takes over this view from "various psychologists" (72), but in accordance with his declared policy of leaving his text uncluttered by scholarly apparatus (73) does not disclose his sources. The chief of these must have been Lotze. Having published his "Metaphysik" in 1841 and his "Logik" in 1843, Lotze turned to psychology. He presented his opinions in his "Medizinische Psychologie" in 1852.(74*) He was convinced of the importance of physiology for psychology, and sought to unify both in a systematic manner. His chief illustration of the relevance of physiology to psychology was his theory of the perception of space: there is no point in setting out the theory again, since Santayana has taken it over almost without alteration.(75)

These physiological beliefs are assumed as premises in Santayana's remarks on the values of geometrical figures. The sense of the position of any point consists in the tensions of the eye, which not only tends to bring that point to the centre of vision, but feels the suggestion of all the other points related to the given one in the web of experience. From this, Santayana infers the truth of the definition of space as the possibility of motion, "since the most direct and native perception of space we can have is the awakening of many tendencies to move our organs." (76) While it is true that the concepts of space and motion mutually imply one another, Santayana is not justified in his inference. The alleged physiological point does not entail the logical truth which he takes it to entail: the statement, "Movements of the eye lead to our sense of space", does not entail, "The concept 'space' is definable in terms of the concept of motion."

Among geometrical figures, the circle, Santayana claims, is dull and stupifying. While simple and pure, it lacks any stimulating quality. The reason is alleged to be physiological (one wonders why it is not at least partly psychological): the eye naturally centres on the centre of
the circle, and no matter which way it moves encounters sameness of sensation. The ellipse is less stupefying, since it is different in different directions. Small circles, like buttons, are less in danger of being ugly, since the eye considers them as points, and they help to divide and diversify surfaces.(77) (Again, this point seems far less incontestable than Santayana appears to assume. Is it even true that, say, buttons are regarded as points? Are they not as liable to be ugly as larger circles? Santayana gives no evidence whatever in favour of his assertions.) He also considers the straight line, zig-zag, and curves which we call graceful. These last involve the optic muscles (he claims) in a natural and rhythmical set of movements. These movements involve, as it were, rhymes and assonances: "We find ourselves at every turn re-awakening, with a variation, the sense of previous position."(78) Such movements are pleasurable. Avoiding a discussion of the physical basis of pleasure, he writes: "Suffice it that measure, in quantity, in intensity, and in time, must involve that physiological process, whatever it may be, the consciousness of which is pleasure."(79)

The foregoing physiological principles are also used to explain the value of symmetry, or to be more exact, bilateral symmetry - Santayana is concerned only with this one species of symmetry. (The mathematician Hermann Weyl gives a systematic catalogue of the natural and artistic occurrences of this diversified phenomenon, which is to be found even in molecular structure.(80).)

The head and eyes, Santayana continues, survey an object more easily from side to side than from top to bottom, and therefore, if an object is bilaterally asymmetrical, it tends to make us feel restless. We easily notice asymmetry of this kind; hence the need for bilateral symmetry in the objects by which we are habitually surrounded: "The comfort and economy that come from muscular balance in the eye, are therefore in some cases the source of the value of symmetry."(81) In other cases, symmetry
appeals through the charm of recognition and rhythm. When the eye runs
over a regular facade, finding objects that appeal to it spaced at
regular intervals, an expectation is set up the non-satisfaction of which,
if it is uncompensated by the emergence of some interesting object, will
lead to a sense of ugliness and incompleteness. Symmetry, "quiet beauty"
(82) as Santayana calls it, gives pleasure because symmetrical objects
have "fitness to be perceived" (almost a 'faculty explanation', one notes):
"It contributes to that completeness which delights without stimulating,
and to which our jaded senses return gladly, after all sorts of
extravagances, as to a kind of domestic peace."(33*)

Not only, however, is symmetry a condition for beauty; it is also what
the metaphysicians call a principle of individuation. The recurring
elements are each regarded as one individual. If there were no recurrent
points, no recurring impressions,

"the field of perception would remain a fluid continuum, without
defined and recognisable divisions. The outlines of most things are
symmetrical because we choose what symmetrical lines we find to be
the boundaries of objects."(84)

Of course, we do learn to regard asymmetrical objects as wholes; but this
is only because we recognize in them associated elements, and the symmetry
of these parts, or their composition as wholes, may enable us to fix their
boundaries and observe their number. He concludes: "The category of unity,
which we are constantly imposing upon nature and its parts, bas symmetry,
then, for one of its instruments, for one of its bases of application."(85)

Later work in psychology abundantly confirms at least some of what
Santayana says here a propos of symmetry. Dorothy Vernon sums up
experimentation which has exhibited a tendency in human beings to perceive
the simplest and most stable configurations of data possible. Symmetrical
forms are eminently stable, and there is experimental confirmation of
the expected corollary that we find symmetry wherever possible: subjects
shown slightly asymmetrical displays and asked to draw them produced
symmetrical representation; and people shown a solid object, hemispherical
on the side facing them, but flat on the hidden side, all decided that
the object was a sphere, a belief which persisted even when they were
allowed to touch the hidden side. Phenomena of this kind were
extensively documented and canvassed by Gestalt psychologists from
Ehrenfels onwards, who found in them confirmation of their claim that the
data of experience are not discrete sense but organised wholes or
'Gestalten'. Köhler faithfully records symmetry among 'Gestaltqualitaten'
(87), as does Arnheim (38). Again, following Wertheimer, Köhler reports
among his laws of perception the claim that equal and similar items tend
to form units, and to be separated from similar items. Simple and regular
wholes, also closed areas, are formed more readily and more generally than
irregular and open wholes.(89)

This is not the place to debate fully the philosophical or
psychological merits of the Gestalt or other psychological schools.(90)
It is sufficient in the present context, following Vernon (91), to point
out that the experimentally established tendency to see symmetrically
is explicable in another way, and moreover a way which is coherent with
the psychical distance view of aesthetic experience. One of the essential
claims of the distance view is that the undistanced attitude is governed
by practical, humdrum, wants and needs. We are as a rule concerned to
see only so much as will enable us to identify what we see; and if shapes
are symmetrical, they are comparatively easy to see because only parts
of them need to be seen. The remainder is 'redundant', easily inferred
from what has been perceived. Hence the observed tendency to perceive
symmetry.

Santayana concludes his treatment of symmetry by first making the
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Santayana concludes his treatment of symmetry by first making the readily admissible claim that where an object is so large (or small, one
supposes) that symmetry cannot contribute to the unity of our perception, then its being symmetrical is of no value. (92*) Turning to symmetry in representational art, he argues that animal or vegetable forms gain nothing from being symmetrically displayed, if what is intended or wished is to convey their life or motion. On the other hand, if it is intended to use their forms as decoration, then symmetry is required to accentuate their unity and organisation:

"This justifies the habit or conventionalising natural forms, and the tendency of some kinds of hieratic art, like the Byzantine and Egyptian, to affect a rigid symmetry of posture. We can thereby increase the unity and force of the image without suggesting that individual life and mobility, which would interfere with the religious function of the object, as symbol and embodiment of an impersonal faith." (93)

Certainly, as Wölflin noted independently (94), symmetrical composition in painting tends to produce a monumental effect; but the main point to notice here is the link Santayana sees to exist between the form or style of an image and its function, a link so convincingly explored by Seebach (95). Santayana, however, simply states the matter here, and lets it drop. As was the case with some of his best ideas about the materials of a work of art, this sharp insight remains an isolated 'aperçu'.

V: Philosophical Psychology of the Perception of Form

The preceding section is the first stage of Santayana's attempt to explain why there is an aesthetic pleasure in form; but this is only a part of the story. Pleasure in form is not restricted to the conscious repercussions of the optic or other muscles; we also deliberate consciously about forms, regarding them, for example, as remote from or approaching our aesthetic ideals. He spends a good deal of time in the third chapter of "The Sense of Beauty" on giving an account of the processes involved in formal appreciation on a second level of explanation, that of personal consciousness.
When in the perception of an object a notable contribution is made by memory and mental habit, the value of the perception will be due, not only to the pleasantness of the external stimulus, but also to the pleasantness of what Santayana calls the apperceptive reaction. He does not define what he means by "apperception" but his usage makes it clear that his meaning for the term is more closely related to that of Herbert than to that of Leibniz or Kant. For Herbert, apperception is the mingling, thanks to association and recollection, of the image or representation derived from the past experience of the observer. This is much the same sense as that in which the term is used by Santayana, who goes on to stress that apperception of form varies with age, health, constitution, and genius.

Santayana asserts that the recognition of a form is an act of the mind which occurs as follows: the form which is the stimulus has the effect of reviving a more or less definite set of images; "this revival constitutes the recognition, and the beauty of form is the pleasure of that revival." In connexion with this process, Santayana uses the example (from 'Hamlet') of a cloud whose shape gradually changes from that of a camel to a whale. While in the indefinite intermediate state—that is, while having no particular shape—there is very little apperceptive activity; while as soon as we say, "Yes, very like a whale," apperceptive reaction begins. Santayana stresses that he does not mean the associations which whales may have for us, of fisherman's yarns and the sea, but strictly, "the intrinsic value of the form of the whale, of its lines, its movement, its proportion."

This example of the Protean cloud has caused some confusion in writers on Santayana. Irving Singer thinks it is an example of the third class of forms—those whose elements inevitably suggest the scheme of their unity. There is no textual basis whatever for this view: in Santayana's text, the philosophical psychology is placed between the
discussions of the first and second classes of forms. (Singer's treatment of Santayana's views on form is in general misleading. He lays a great deal of stress on remarks which are incidental in the text, and omits to consider those distinctions which are developed at length. (102a.) More understandable is Jacques Duron's mistake that the cloud is an example of the second class of forms, those whose elements differ from one another but are not inevitably arranged. (103) Duron fails to notice that neither the form of a camel nor that of a whale could be said to fall into this class of indeterminate forms — no one is tempted to re-arrange the elements of these forms at will. In fact the example is intended to illustrate simply what Santayana means by apperceptive reaction.

He continues that the stimulus which has revived images in the brain can either reinforce or conflict with those images. If the revived images are reinforced, the object is beautiful; if the stimulus conflicts with the memory images the object is ugly. (104) The aesthetic value of form therefore depends on two factors: (1) "the acquired character of the apperceptive form evoked; it may be a cadenza or a trill, a major or a minor chord, a rose or a violet, a goddess or a dairy-maid; and as one or other of these is recognised, an aesthetic dignity and tone is given to the object." (105) At this stage of the apprehension of form — that of mere recognition — there is very little pleasure to be had, since aesthetic types in the abstract differ very little in intrinsic beauty; (ii) the relation of the particular impression to the form under which it is apperceived. This is more important of the two factors, since it determines the value of the object as an example of its class. (106)

Accordingly, the formation of the concepts, or "types" as Santayana calls them in this argument, by which we judge particulars, is for him a most important feature of our perception of form. The mental type is the residuum of particular experiences:

"Our idea of an individual thing is a compound and residuum of our several experiences of it; and in the same manner our idea of
a class is a compound and residuum of the particulars which compose it. Particular impressions have, by virtue of their intrinsic similarity or of the identity of their relations, a tendency to be merged and identified, so that many individual perceptions leave but a single blurred memory that stands for them all...we have a general resultant - a composite photograph - of these impressions.

Probably, in Santayana's view, there is a cerebral basis for the type-formation he describes: "The new percept - the generic idea - repeats to a great extent, both in nature and localization, the excitement constituting the various original impressions." (108)

The vocabulary of this theory, with the use of the terms, "image" and "photograph", is reminiscent of the naive theories of concept formation of the Empiricist classics; but Santayana is at pains to make it clear that he is not so naive as that. The idea of an object has few if any of the properties of the particulars which are subsumed under it. Often, an artificial symbol, the sound of a word, is the only element which the generic image clearly contains. Perhaps with people whose thinking is highly imagistic various ideas are accompanied by definite images; but this is neither invariable nor essential. (109) In general, a generic idea usually gives a biased or inadequate view of the field it means to cover. With Locke and Berkeley in mind, he writes:

"When I remember, to use a classical example, that the triangle is not scalene, nor rectangular, but each and all of these, I reduce my percept to the word and its definition, with perhaps a sense of the general motion of the hand and eye by which we trace a three-cornered figure." (109)

This theory of concept formation does at least avoid the grossest of the simplicities to which philosophers in the past have committed themselves. Santayana is far closer to the facts of introspection when he stresses the non-imagistic nature of most conceptual thinking, though his
choice of vocabulary in the earlier stages of his exposition is at odds with this accuracy. However, his theory is not without its difficulties. In the first place and most obviously, a word, like 'triangle', is not a compound or residuum of impressions of individual things. The word is learnt by examples of its use in language, not produced (somehow) by the merging of particular ideas of triangles. Again, he claims that a stimulus revives an individual set of images, that the revival constitutes recognition, and that the pleasure of revival constitutes the beauty of form. Further, this recognition is said to be an act of the mind. One difficulty in this is that to make beauty of form depend on the objectification of the pleasure of an alleged act of recognition makes it impossible for me to take pleasure in the form of an object I have never seen before, i.e. an object which 'ex hypothesi' I cannot recognise as belonging to a class with some members of which I am already acquainted. The only way around this is for Santayana to accept a false corollary (as indeed he does later on), namely that, since all conceptualised sense-experience of objects involves recognition under some formal descriptions, and since therefore the alleged act of recognition must be recurring ceaselessly, then all objects are to some degree beautiful. The converse of this objection is also a difficulty for Santayana. If beauty of form is the pleasure produced by recognition, then surely, it must either increase with increased familiarity with the form in question, or must at least remain constant. Yet this is psychologically false: frequent acquaintance with even a beautiful form is likely to dull the response, and induce boredom — after a certain number of repetitions — as it is to induce greater pleasure, or to induce a constant response. Again, Santayana's account of concept formation as the production of a blurred image after repeated sense-experiences only has plausibility in the case of the concepts of physical objects. It is clearly a non-starter as an account of the formation of the concepts of logical connectives. Finally (from
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concepts of physical objects. It is clearly a non-starter as an account
of the formation of the concepts of logical connectives. Finally (from
the philosophical point of view) Santayana has omitted to consider
certain logical questions of considerable importance: the necessary and
sufficient conditions for having concepts, and the logical relation of
having concepts to the ability to make judgments.

Again, while Santayana has made some advance on the psychology to be
found in earlier philosophical works, his theory is not a complete account
of concept formation and use. No doubt it is the case that cerebral
events occur which in some sense correspond to or underlie what emerges
in conceptual thought; but to say merely this is to leave almost every­
ting to be explained. Not that Santayana can be censured at all heavily
for these gaps, glaring as they are. The psychology of concept formation
and use, and the corresponding part of neurophysiology are proving to be
of great complexity - Robert Thomson provides a synopsis of the work of
Bruner and Piaget (111), and Grey Walter indicates the state of the
knowledge with regard to the cortex (112).

Next, Santayana turns from the formation of concepts in general to
a sub-set of concepts, aesthetic ideals. It has been said that a
general idea is seldom if ever an unbiased compound of the objects of
which it is the generic image. One reason for this is that our observation
is itself not impartial but directed by some interest, we tend to notice
qualities in which we have some interest, and these are the qualities
which stand out in our general ideas. Analogously, Santayana claims, our
aesthetic ideals are modified by our aesthetic interest; the average is
modified in the direction of pleasure:

"Not all parts of an object are equally congruous with our
perceptive faculty; not all the elements are noted with the
same pleasure. Those, therefore, which are agreeable are chiefly
dwelt upon by the lover of beauty, and his percept will give an
average of things with a great emphasis laid on that part of them
which is beautiful." (113)
The difficulty here arises from the assumption, a corollary of the objectification theory, that the aesthetic attitude is comparable in kind and differs only in direction from other interests. The psychical distance view has a different corollary, for the distanced attitude differs from the undistanced precisely in not being at the service of any particular want or need; the first vocabulary in which the theory was expressed makes this perfectly explicit: it is dis-interested. Further, the direction of our aesthetic preferences is not to be explained in the simple way Santayana proposes. Wolfflin pointed out that in respect of style in art, not everything is possible at all times (114); the same is true of taste in art. The direction of taste at a given time depends on the facts of individual psychology which Eombrich has explored in "Art and Illusion"; on the stage which a style has reached in its historical development, and on the imponderable idiosyncrasies of personal genius which operate within the stylistic limits of a period.

From this point about the formation of aesthetic ideals, Santayana draws the corollary that this explains why the world is so much more beautiful to artists than to ordinary men, i.e. because the types or ideals in the mind of the artist all have beauty as their chief characteristic. Not that the artist finds individual people or objects more beautiful than does the non-artist; quite the contrary, only the very best satisfies his developed aesthetic sense. Yet his general ideas, biased strongly by pleasure, are of far more beautiful types than those of the non-artist. (115) This is a strange view for Santayana to adopt. He says in his general theory of concept application that the chief part of the pleasure in form comes not from recognition but from comparison of the present particular with the general type in the mind. If it is the case, as Santayana here asserts that it is, that only a very few things satisfy the aesthetically cultivated man, then surely such a man is likely to find the world much less beautiful than the unaesthetic man - the point
about the beauty of the types in the mind is irrelevant, on Santayana's own premises.

In general, he continues, in any ideal type, those elements are indispensable which are generally present in our experience — for example, a human being must have a nose and ears, and must have nails on fingers and toes. Absence of these common attributes makes the object appear repulsively ugly to us. (116) This is surely correct; it is another way of saying that we find ugliness where we find deformity — an ugly object does not have the form it ought to have.

Moreover, where an aesthetic ideal differs from the average of its class, it must be (granted Santayana's premises) that the difference is due to the intrinsic pleasantness or impressiveness of the formal feature exaggerated. The ideal human form, he claims, differs immensely from the average, and is indeed near the extreme, since tallness is part of the ideal of beauty. The reason is obvious: greater size makes things stand out. (117) It is strange that Santayana should pick so contentious and personal an ideal as that of the human body, where ideals vary so much from person to person, even in the same race at the same time. Were tallness so ubiquitously admired as Santayana thinks, there would surely be some indication of it in language: we would all say — what we do not — that a woman is beautiful, but of average height. The oddity of this qualification shows how unfounded Santayana's generalisation is.

From his general theory of concept formation, Santayana derives his answer to a question he considers crucial to any aesthetic, namely whether or not all things are in some degree beautiful. (118) The question is no longer crucial: Santayana in all probability inherited it from Schopenhauer, whose pessimism, along with that Leopardi and Musset he absorbed as a young man. (119) For Schopenhauer, since everything is to some degree an objectification of the will, everything is in some degree characteristic and in some degree beautiful. (120)
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Jantayana retains the Schopenhauerian conclusion, but for reasons quite other than those of systematic metaphysics. No object is essentially ugly: "If impressions are painful, they are objectified with difficulty; the perception of a thing is therefore, under normal circumstances, when the senses are not fatigued, rather agreeable than disagreeable."(121)

Further, when repeated perception has given rise to an ideal of that type of object, the recognition of that norm will give pleasure. This set of claims is surely false: as if every case of ugliness were the result of fatigue on the part of the perceiver. Nor again is this consonant with Santayana's own general theory of subsumption under types: recognition per se involves next to no pleasure; it is the relation of particular to type which determines beauty.

He continues by emphasising that the view that all things are beautiful does not commit him to what he calls the mystical view, that all things are equally beautiful, and that we would realise this could we transcend our human constitution.(122*) He offers two criticisms of this view, the first of which is that it entails the destruction of taste altogether: if we could so modify our taste as to find beauty equally everywhere, then there could be no discrimination in beauty. There is little bite in this: the mystical view does not entail either that there could be no aesthetic judgment (though there would be only one aesthetic judgment) or that there could be no aesthetic attitude. If Santayana is complaining that there could be no exhibitions of fine discrimination, the mystic would no doubt reply that the loss is trivial compared with the gain in beatitude.

The source of the second criticism of the mystic is the interest theory of value. Relativity to our partial human constitution is, "essential to all our thoughts, judgments, and feelings.

And when once the human bias is admitted as a legitimate, because for us a necessary, basis of preference, the whole wealth of
nature is at once organized by that standard into a hierarchy of values."

This is really an evasion of the central issue with the mystic, whose basic belief is that self-transcendence can and does occur in moments of unquestionable and self-certifying authority. When Santayana states that the human scale of interest is a necessary component in all our views, he bears the question, assuming the denial of the mystic's belief without argument.

His concluding qualification to this point is much less contentious. To say that human nature conditions our aesthetic preferences is not to be committed to a false belief in a universally shared taste. It is not the case that, granted an ideal enlargement of sensibility, all men would admire the same things. The reason is simply that, "human nature is a vague abstraction; that which is common to all men is the least part of their natural endowment." Scientific confirmation of this probable guess must await the realization of what is yet a very distant ideal: a universal psychology.

Having considered the formation of formal types and ideals at some length, Santayana turns to the second theme in his discussion of the role of apperception in the experience of form. The second theme is that of the origin of types.

Not surprisingly, he begins with the thesis that Nature is the source of apperceptive forms. According to the theory of evolution, mechanical necessity has brought it about that certain systems of atoms move together as units, and that these organisms reproduce themselves and occur so often in our environment that our senses become accustomed to view their parts together: "An order and sequence is established in our imagination by virtue of the order and sequence in which the corresponding impressions
have come to our senses." (126) The mechanical organisation of nature is
thus the source of apperceptive forms in the mind.

These forms of apperception would degenerate into indistinctness did
not sensation constantly renew them. (127) In the arts, this process of
renewal and enrichment is quite evident in the well-known development of
Greek sculpture, from the archaic forms of the seventh and sixth centuries,
through the classic phase to the Hellenic period of the second century.
This development of style is to be explained psychologically, Santayana
thinks, as a process of enriched apperception of the human body. It is
an example of, "the gradual penetration of nature into the mind, of the
slowly enriched apperception of the object." (128) The acceptability of
this doctrine depends on exactly what it is taken to mean. It was once
customary to explain why there are styles in art with the far-fetched
hypothesis that the sense-experience of men of different countries
equipped them with different data, which they allegedly copied in works of
art. Santayana's doctrine of apperception does not commit him to so
strange a theory as this; but there is no hint that he saw the importance
of the schema (as Gombrich calls it) in the process of creation. His view
is simply indiscriminate. (It is only fair, however, to note that much later
in his life, he laid stress at least on the importance of tradition in
artistic creation. In his autobiography, he writes that creativity is
"helpless without traditional models." (129))

There is a limit to the process of enrichment (he continues); there
is a most beautiful and inclusive apperception, and once attained, there
seems nothing more to do. From its summit, art declines in one of two
directions. Either it degenerates into empty invention, abandoning the
study of nature, or it forsakes beauty, and sinks into a tasteless and
unimaginative technique. (130) Art escapes from degeneration in these two
ways when artists go back to looking at reality, rather than other works
of art. If such reawakenings do not occur, then our apperceptions become
worn and merely traditional. Too great a study of past art can hinder
artistic development: "...we cannot work out our own style because we are hampered by the beauties of so many others."(131) What results is eclecticism, without aesthetic unity or power to please.

These last remarks at least are acceptable. Inbreeding in art — concentration on technique, and too exclusive a devotion to copying the achievements of the past — produces the same unhealthy effetsness as does its counterpart in life. It is a necessary condition for avoiding this effetsness that art be authentic, i.e. the result of the artist's response to some living problem, felt on the pulse — this is what Santayana means when he speaks of going back to reality. As to the hindering power of the styles of the past, the object of Lloyd Wright's protests is a perfect example — the official style of architecture which assumes as a premise that you have only to stick classical features onto a building in order to produce a classic result — whatever has a cornice, a cupola, and a colonnade, must be good.

The principle by which natural forms are ordered is what Santayana calls utility, by which he means maximal adaptation in the struggle for survival. Those forms survive which are in harmony with the prevailing forces of the environment.(132) Granted this, some thinkers have concluded that utility is the essence of beauty. It is said that we call objects beautiful when we are conscious of the practical fitness of their forms, e.g. the legs of a horse are said to be beautiful because they are fit to run.

Santayana refutes this doctrine of functionalism in the theory of beauty: "The beautiful does not depend on the useful; it is constituted by the imagination in ignorance and contempt of practical advantage."(133) The relation of use and beauty is rather this: only well-adapted forms survive, and so our ideal is necessarily derived from experience of such well-adapted forms. Hence, the beautiful, "is not independent of the necessary, for the necessary must also be the habitual and consequently the
basis of the type, and of all its variations."(134) Aesthetic ideals are refinements on the forms conditioned by causal necessity. The aesthetic eye, studying natural forms, "tends...to bring the type within even narrower limits than do the external exigencies of life."(135) On the conceptual level, this appears as follows: when the term "beautiful" is used in its central aesthetic sense, grounds for its ascription do not include, "because the object is well-adapted to its function."

Santayana also rejects the converse of the functionalist account, which he calls the metaphysical theory, the view, "that would make the beauty of intrinsic rightness of things the source of their efficiency and of their power to survive."(136) He must reject this, since it presupposes an objectivist theory of value, and is therefore incompatible with his own subjectivist interest theory.

From his sane and acceptable rebuttal of formalism, Santayana moves to some erratic views about art. As he has said, not all natural forms are beautiful, and hence there is room for art, for, "art organises objects in ways to which nature, perhaps, has never condescended."(137) The chief feature which the imitative arts add to nature is permanency; and therefore, he considers, the forces which determine natural forms also determine those of the imitative arts.(138) This is a staggering inference. He has just been at pains to stress - quite correctly - that natural forms are determined by all the forces operative in evolution. It is absurd to go on to suggest that the forms of art which imitate nature are determined in the same way; and doubly absurd to infer this from the premise that art is permanent.

More reasonably, he continues that non-imitative arts generally have their forms suggested by utility: "Architecture, for instance, has all its forms suggested by practical demands.."(139) The presence of the qualification 'generally' will deflect the objection that this view has little plausibility where music is concerned. He expands the point on
architecture as follows: houses and temples evolve like animals and plants. The first forms are stringently determined by mechanical necessity, and the eye becomes used to them: "The line of use by habit of apperception, becomes the line of beauty."(140) He realises, however, that habit cannot be the sole factor determining the forms of buildings. Appeals to the intrinsic susceptibilities of the human imagination and eye are also important. According as forms are grateful or painful to eye and mind they may be called for that reason intrinsically better or worse: "Herein lies the superiority of a Greek to a Chinese vase, or of Gothic to Saracenic construction."(141) There are two main faults here, both of which have occurred elsewhere in the course of Santayana's arguments about form: in the first place, he is too ready to make universal claims about what is grateful to the imagination, underrating cultural conditioning; and secondly he has a tendency to believe that this universal taste coincides with his own, witness the exaltation of the Greek case.

He turns finally to consider ornament. Presupposing the truth of his claim that utility conditions both natural and artistic forms, he writes that there are two sources of effect in works of art. Firstly, there is the useful form, which generates first the type, and then, by exaggeration of its intrinsically pleasing features, the aesthetic ideal; secondly, there is the beauty of ornament, "which comes from the excitement of the senses, or of the imagination, by colour, or by the profusion of detail."(142) There is, of course, a great deal of room for variety and compromise. For some artists, decoration is the main concern, and form is made subservient to it; while others, more austere, "allow ornament only to emphasize the main lines of the design, or to conceal such inharmonious elements as nature or utility may prevent them from eliminating."(143) One of the most striking examples of the use of ornament to turn a mechanically necessary feature into an element of beauty is the Gothic flying buttress and pinnacle (needed to carry the load of the walls down
to the foundations). Applied ornament makes the transformation possible:

"A moulding on the arches; a florid canopy and statue amid the buttresses; a few grinning monsters leaning out of unexpected nooks; a leafy budding of the topmost pinnales; a piercing here and there of some little gallery, parapet, or turret, into lacework against the sky - and the building becomes a poem, an inexhaustible emotion." (144)

Santayana evidently anticipated trouble from objectors of a functionalist persuasion. He states again that there is no reason to suppose that a cultivated taste will find all natural forms, conditioned by utility, to be beautiful. Such beauty as there is in nature is,

"a result of the functional adaptation of our senses and imagination to the mechanical products of our environment. This adaptation is never complete, and there is, accordingly, room for the fine arts, in which beauty is the result of the intentional adaptation of mechanical forms to the functions which our senses and imagination already have acquired. This watchful subservience to our aesthetic demands is the essence of art. Nature is the basis, but man is the goal." (145)

This is the nearest Santayana comes to a general contrast between the forms of nature and the forms made by men. The biologist C.H. Waddington draws different lines of distinction. (146) The main point is that the unity of natural forms is far subtler than that of man-made forms. The reason for this is two-fold: in the first place, natural forms are the result of the interplay of a great number of forces, both internal and external - for example, the cells in a living creature are controlled by several hundreds of hereditary factors. In the second place, natural forms must be adapted to a large number of functions. A limb-bone, for example, must be adapted to walking, running, jumping, sitting, and leaping sideways and backwards. Only very rarely do man made forms, even in art, approach
the subtlety and multi-functionality of natural ones. The products of men are simpler, for man is usually more single-purposed than nature; and further, he has a liking for simplification and patterns.

VI: Conclusion

This third and longest chapter of "The Sense of Beauty" is divided by Santayana into twenty-nine sections, of which twenty-three have been considered above. The last six, as has been mentioned, concern literature, and are barely connected with the earlier part of the argument. This is a further indication of the prevailing feature of this chapter, i.e. the unusual degree of disorganisation evident in the arrangement of the material. The impression given is that the data are less completely assimilated than in the rest of the book. There is a lack of the originality one finds in the other chapters; rather, there is a fairly even distribution of scattered merits and failings. Santayana avoids the simplistic varieties of formalism in the theory of beauty and of art; does not set out to treat the problem of form in several of its most important aspects (nature, classification, etc.) and does produce isolated insights, e.g. the link between style and function. On the debit side, the classification of forms is incomplete and breaks down importantly in other ways, and there are some surprisingly hasty generalisations about art. Santayana's views on form are perhaps not especially distinguished; but unlike much classic writing associated with this subject, his treatment of the subject at least attempts a philosophical scrutiny of the idea of form on the most fundamental level.
Chapter IV: Expression

1. Introduction: Santayana and Some Classic Theories of Expression

Expression, like form, is a term which has found its way into a large number of aesthetic theories, and, again like form, has been claimed to be the essential or distinguishing property of art. For example, Wordsworth and Tolstoy both hold that expression is the distinctive mental process of the artist, and being a result of this process is a necessary and sufficient condition for something to be a work of art. Wordsworth writes:

"All good poetry is the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings... it takes its origin from emotion recollected in tranquillity: the emotion is contemplated till, by a species of reaction, the tranquillity disappears, and an emotion, kindled to that which was before the subject of contemplation, is gradually produced, and does itself actually exist before the mind."(1)

Tolstoy, speaking of art in general and not merely poetry, claims that:

"Art is a human activity consisting in this, that one man consciously by means of certain external signs, hands on to others feelings he has lived through, and that others are infected by these feelings and also experience them."(2)

Tolstoy insists that, in order for a work to be a work of art, the artist must himself have experienced the feeling he deliberately expresses and transmits - a view which involves attributing an unlikely gamut of experience to certain major artists, notably and obviously Shakespeare. The only true test for art, Tolstoy argues is infectiousness, and the greater the infectiousness, the greater the work of art.(3)

There are defects enough in both views. Wordsworth's psychology is naive: a state of emotional agitation is hardly likely to produce a good work of art, where the deliverances of the unconscious must be scrutinised by the conscious intelligence. Tolstoy makes no attempt to describe the psychology of expression; moreover his examples of what counts as genuine
art are astonishing. In the name of the brotherhood-of-man ethic which he latterly adopted, he dismisses all art which is not intelligible to the ill-educated masses. (In fact he comes fairly close to the aesthetics of Soviet Realism.) Philosophically, both share the defect of essentialist assumptions, i.e. that wherever there is poetry or art, some common quality is present also. Again, both views would seem to make the expressed properties of the work of art external features of it, to be inferred from it rather than experienced in it. Santayana would reject such views, by implication from his arguments in “The Sense of Beauty”. He gives due weight to the influence of expression in aesthetic experience and to expressed properties in works of art; yet, as also with formal properties, he declines to give them essential or definitional status. Expression is vital in art, and accounts for a part of its value to us; but it is not a necessary condition for art.

Croce’s expression theory is explicitly criticised by Santayana in several places. In Croce’s view, art is intuition or expression, and an expression is artistic only when, “it has a vital principle which animates it and makes for complete unity.”(4) What lends unity and coherence to intuition is intense feeling. It can arise only when this latter is its source and basis. Further, art is the same as language, the latter term being used in a broad sense. It is not limited to articulate language, but includes its tonal, imitative and graphic forms. Hence the science of art is the same as the science of language.(5)

Santayana takes exception to this definition of aesthetic as general linguistic in his 1904 paper, “What is Aesthetics?” Concerned to answer the question of the title, Santayana remarks that one way of doing so would be to give a stipulative definition. The difficulty with this approach is that, flawless and symmetrical as such a definition might be, it “would absolve itself from any subservience to usage, and would ignore the historic grouping and genealogy of existing pursuits.”(6) Croce’s
definition falls into this class, since for him aesthetics, as has been said, "is purely and simply the science of expression; expression being itself so defined as to be identical with every form of apprehension, intuition, or imaginative synthesis. This imagined aesthetics includes the theory of speech and of all attentive perception, while it has nothing in particular to do with art or with beauty, or with any kind of preference. Such system-making may be a most learned game, but it contributes nothing to knowledge."(7)

A second criticism, from the point of view of Santayana's interest theory of value, is put forward in a 1913 paper, "Plotinus and the Nature of Evil". According to the interest theory, we value those things which satisfy our wants and needs, and disvalue whatever thwarts their satisfaction. Further, since some wants and needs are of more importance than others, not all positively valued objects or experiences are equally valued. Therefore Santayana cannot accept any doctrine which regards all perfections as of equal value. (We call an object perfect when it satisfies a given want or need in an exemplary or paradigmatic way.) Perfections must be graded in their importance. Hence he writes that, "...when Mr. Benedetto Croce tells us that all expressions, if successful, are equally perfect works of art, and that a perfect Neapolitan sigh is aesthetically equal to the Iliad, I should be far from wishing to contradict him; only I should feel that the aesthetic quality so defined was interesting to aesthetes only, and that man must continue to value and to compare works of art on far more humane and complex principles. Just because goods are relative to living interests, each interest may establish a hierarchy among the several goods it recognises, according to the depth and force of its need for them."(8)

Santayana also finds a logical fault in Croce's concept of expression,
According to Croce, Spirit is the primary reality, and expression the primary form of Spirit. But, Santayana asks, what can expression be the expression of? By definition, nothing can be ontologically prior to Spirit, and therefore it is not easy to see what could possibly be expressed. For Croce, any term like, 'nature', 'feeling', 'life' etc, alleged to be prior to Spirit and expressed by it,

"is merely a hypocritical term, used instead of apparition, in an instinctive effort to disguise the solitude and groundlessness of the Spirit, as a consistent idealist would conceive it."(9)

Santayana is here too hard on Croce; the idealist can reply intelligibly that spirit can express itself.

Three further criticisms of Croce are put forward in Santayana's review of the first edition of the former's "Aesthetic"(1903). Croce's cardinal tenet, it may be repeated, is that nothing is aesthetic except the art of intuition, and that nothing is a work of art except the inner momentary product of fancy. This polemic, Santayana comments, while it exhibits Croce's firm grasp of the transcendental conditions of aesthetic experience, only serves to make manifest the barrenness of any strictly transcendental philosophy. This is because, by insistence on the 'formal truism' that all art or beauty, to be appreciated, must fall within a transcendental unity of apperception, and by reducing all aesthetic theory to this truism, most of the problems with which critics deal are banished from aesthetics without being solved or clarified.(10)

Secondly, it follows from Croce's views that, when expression is successful, beauty is perfect, no matter what the feeling is that is expressed. The expression of pain and evil, if it is adequate, is as delightful as the expression of good and of pleasure. A good deal of problematic aesthetics is avoided as a result. (What Santayana has in mind here will become clearer from the sections below on tragedy, comedy and
the sublime, topics which involve Santayana in a considerable amount of difficulty.) Such conclusions, Santayana comments, lead one to suspect that the system under consideration must be artificial in some respect. In the case of Croce, the artificiality results from his three-fold division of the mind: (i) sensation or animal consciousness, in which flux is absolute and nothing can be discriminated from other things; (ii) apperception or intuition, in which attention and synthetic imagination have generated definite ideas or expressions, and (iii) thought, the level of concepts or universals. Thus on this view, art (expression) is anterior to thought and independent of it. Santayana objects—and surely quite correctly—that this isolation of the aesthetic is false: ulterior judgment, practical and moral, will inevitably colour every perception given to a rational animal. It is not true that such simultaneous reactions have no effect on aesthetic feeling. The division of the mind is untenable anyway; man does not feel without distinguishing nor distinguish and see without thinking and knowing. If intuition has nothing to do with sense or reason, so much the worse for intuition.(11)

The situation is well illustrated, Santayana continues, by what Croce says about language. A word, being an expression, a synthesis reached by creative genius, is not a sign. However, Santayana comments, Croce would presumably admit that it can become a sign; and it is precisely in doing so that it becomes useful. Discourse without concepts (Santayana writes) is "singularly tedious to the sensitive, political and thinking animal properly called man."(12) If there is a difficulty in this last objection, it is only that Santayana has understated the case; it is not clear just what 'discourse' without concepts might be—in the ordinary philosophical acceptance of the terms, discourse without concepts is logically impossible.

Santayana's theory of expression, it will be clear, is to be sharply discriminated from essentialist and idealist accounts. His own non-
essentialist and materialist account begins with a definition of expression.

II: Santayana's Definition of Expression and an alternative View

Santayana subscribes to several widely held beliefs in philosophical psychology. One is that the mind constructs sensible objects out of the data of experience. In his theory of expression, he relies on another commonplace, the fact of association:

"We not only construct visible unities and recognisable types, but remain aware of their affinities to what is not at the time perceived; that is, we find in them a certain tendency and quality, not original to them, which upon investigation we shall see to have been the proper characteristics of other objects and feelings, associated with them once in our experience. The hushed reverberations of these associated feelings continue in the brain, and by modifying our present reaction, colour the image upon which our attention is fixed. The quality thus acquired by objects through association is what we call their expression."(13)

In cases of beauty of material and form, there is involved only the object, which stimulates pleasure in the observer; in cases of expression, by contrast, there are two terms, the object present to the observer, and the associations which this object has in the observer's mind. Expressive beauty may co-occur with the two other species of beauty, or it may occur in isolation.

It is to be emphasized that, in Santayana's account, the second term, (that which is expressed) is not itself fully present to consciousness during the experience of expression - were it to be so, then the value of the first term (that which expresses) would lie solely in its associations, and would not itself express. The experience whose residue makes up the second term must fade and blur, and "remain simply as a halo and suggestion of happiness hanging about a scene."(14) An important difficulty is indicated by the term happiness: why should the blurred association be
always a suggestion of happiness? Santayana presumably has in mind his thesis that beauty is objectified pleasure. Since expressive beauty is a species of beauty in general, it must, on Santayana's premises be pleasant. If this is his reason for restricting associations to happiness Santayana is guilty firstly of equating happiness and pleasure; and secondly, maintaining that what is expressed is always pleasant, a thesis which is simply false to the facts of experience. How much difficulty this second consequence causes him is clearly shown in the sections on comedy and tragedy, below.

Santayana's theory is flexible enough to allow for the variety of objects which express, and the variety of things that can be expressed by them: "in all expression we may thus distinguish two terms: the first is the object actually presented, the word, the image, the expressive thing; the second is the object suggested, the further thought, emotion, or image evoked, the thing expressed...These lie together in the mind, and their union constitutes expression."(15)

This definition of expression in "The Sense of Beauty" is the most detailed of those which occur in Santayana's writings. In "Reason in Art", he argues that expression and beauty are present,

"whenever the outer stimulus agreeably strikes an organ and thereby arouses a sustained image, in which the consciousness of both stimulation and reaction is embodied."(16)

The intention here is evidently to restate the objectification theory; the difficulty is that the phrasing is inexact. It is not clear, for example, how consciousness can be said to be embodied in an image.

The development of the philosophy of the Realms of Being committed Santayana to a denial of the objectification theory of beauty, and since objectification is a necessary condition for expression in the theory under consideration, he is committed to abjuring at least that condition from his theory of expression. How he would have accommodated expression in
his later philosophy must remain a matter for conjecture, since he does not discuss the subject at any length elsewhere. One short passage occurs in the late paper, "The Mutability of Aesthetic Categories" (cf. also Ch. IX, below), but it adds nothing to the earlier views:

"Expression for an observer, as by gesture or language, is such a modification of one object that it suggests or seems to be pregnant with quite another sort of thing, perhaps incapable of appearing at all in the same medium, as a visible smile expresses pleasure or amusement, which are invisible things."(17)

While Santayana is logically committed to a change in his theory of expression, he left no record of a developed view compatible with his later philosophy.

Returning to the earlier theory of expression, Santayana stresses, concerning the associative process itself,

"that the process of association enters consciousness as directly, and produces as simple a sensation, as any process in any organ. The pleasures and pains of cerebration, the delight and fatigue of it, are felt exactly like bodily impressions; they have the same directness, although not the same localisation."(18)

Whatever might be the historical conditions or causes of my state of mind, when it exists, it exists,

"immediately and absolutely; each of its distinguishable parts might conceivably have been absent from it; and its character, as well as its existence, is a mere datum of sense...The pleasure that belongs to consciousness of relations is therefore as immediate as any other."(19)

This emphasis on immediacy is the result of Santayana's need to make the theory of expression consistent with the definition of aesthetic experience as immediate experience.

A consequence of his definition to which Santayana draws attention is that what an object is taken to express will vary a good deal from person
to person:

"Expression depends upon the union of two terms, one of which must be furnished by the imagination; and a mind cannot furnish what it does not possess. The expressiveness of everything accordingly increases with the intelligence of the observer." (20)

This again is a point to which he returns in "Reason in Art". When reading poetry,

"What a line suggests at one reading, it may never suggest again, even to the same person. For this reason, among others, poets are partial to their own compositions; they truly discover depths of meaning which exist for nobody else." (21)

The difficulty involved in this last remark is a result of its ambiguity. It is not clear whether Santayana intends this proposition to be necessary or contingent. In the latter case, it would mean that the depths felt by the poet are not as a matter of fact usually felt by others; in the former, that these depths cannot be felt by others. The contingent proposition, if true, would not be of any great interest; while the necessary proposition could be of very great interest indeed, depending on what arguments were used to support it. (It might be part of an argument to prove the possible limitations of communication via poetry, for example.) Santayana, however, does not indicate the exact sense which he attaches to his remark, and so the difficulty remains.

While the indefinite association of two terms described above is a necessary condition for expression, it is not sufficient; there is a second necessary condition, which with the first is alleged to be jointly sufficient. This second necessary condition (as has been indicated) is that objectification must occur. In this instance, the objectification theory leads Santayana to stress an important feature of aesthetic expression, namely that the expressed properties appear to be in the expressing object:

"The value of the second term must be incorporated in the first; for
the beauty of expression is as inherent in the object as that of material or form, only it accrues to that object not from the bare act of perception, but from the association with it of further processes, due to the existence of former impressions.*(22*)

(The undefined term 'incorporated' is evidently to be understood as a synonym for 'objectified'.)

It is objectification which distinguishes expression from what Santayana calls expressiveness:

"Expressiveness is...the power given by experience to any image to call up others in the mind; and this expressiveness becomes an aesthetic value, that is, becomes expression, when the value involved in the associations thus awakened are incorporated in the present object."(23)

An obvious corollary to this which Santayana might have mentioned but did not is that, on this definition, everything can be expressive, since every experience can initiate the recall of others to the mind.

One possible misunderstanding should be cleared up. It might be thought that, by making the perceiver the source of the expressed properties of the aesthetic object, Santayana had committed himself to a highly subjectivist theory which is false to the facts of aesthetic experience. The objection might be that, if the expressed properties of the aesthetic object are in fact associations it half-evokes in the mind of the perceiver, then it would be impossible to derive from the experience of an aesthetic object any feeling we have not already experienced. This, it could be argued, denies the possibility of one of the major sources of the value of art, namely that it furnishes us with awareness of more possibilities of life than one human being could normally come by in the course of one lifetime; moreover, among these possibilities of life are modes of feeling, moods and attitudes, which it is often the case that we learn of through art, by means of its power of expression. Santayana is not in fact
committed to the view here objected to, though this is not made clear in the text of "The Sense of Beauty" itself. In the course of his discussion of the nature and function of poetry (discussed fully in the next chapter), he asserts that poets can arouse feelings finer than any we have known, by skillfully evoking those objects associated with comparable feelings. He goes on,

"Expression is a misleading term which suggests that something previously known is rendered or imitated; whereas the expression is itself an original fact, the values of which are then referred to the thing expressed...So the charm which a poet, by his art of combining images and shades of emotion, casts over a scene or an action, is attached to the principal actor in it, who gets the benefit of a well-stocked mind."(24)

Santayana does not therefore wish to say that what we take to be expressed in an aesthetic object is always something we have experienced before. The poet, and there is no reason why he should not extend the doctrine to the other arts, can combine elements in his works so as to express new feelings.

Turning to criticism of this theory, it is now to be argued that the major difficulty in Santayana's theory of expression is that it makes the perceiver the source of the expressed properties of the aesthetic object, since, though on Santayana's view these properties appear to be in the object, they are in fact alleged to be projected by the perceiving subject. In opposition to this, it is argued that a more economical hypothesis is that the expressed properties are in the expressive object, arousing feelings in the perceiver by their analogy to certain features of human beings. It is also argued that this same difficulty is fatal to another well-known type of expression theory involving the notion of projection, i.e. the "Einfühlung" theory. (Both Santayana's view and that of the "Einfühlung" theorists appear to have been foreshadowed to some degree
In conclusion, a synoptic account of the meaning of statements ascribing expressive properties to aesthetic objects is put forward, a subject Santayana omits to consider, though it is an omission for which it would unhistorical to blame him.

The most extreme form of "Einfühlung" view is that of Lipps. He contends that it is the defining property of aesthetic experience that the distinction between the perceiving subject and perceived object in some sense collapses:

"Aesthetic satisfaction consists in this: that it is satisfaction in an object, which yet, just so far as it is an object of satisfaction, is not an object but myself; or it is satisfaction in a self which yet, just so far as it is aesthetically enjoyed, is not myself but something objective. This is what is meant by Empathy: that the distinction between the self and the object disappears or rather does not yet exist." (26)

This identity of subject and object is to be taken absolutely literally: "...it comes about that I feel myself carrying out the movement in the other's movement..." (27) and this identity extends even to the sense of spatial location:

"...I am absolutely incorporated in the moving body. I am even spatially in its position, so far as the self has a spatial position; I am transported into it. So far as my consciousness goes I am absolutely identical with it." (28)

Further, a distinction is to be drawn between the practical and contemplative selves. The inner imitation I allegedly experience in the aesthetic state is indeed mine, yet it is not experienced by the self of humdrum, extra-aesthetic activity, but by my contemplative self, "which only exists in the lingering contemplation of the object." (29) He describes allegedly typical empathic experience as follows:

"There is a distinction between empathic feelings - those which I
have 'in an object' - and those which I have about an object....If I feel my effort in a column, my effort is that of the column, and this is quite different from my effort, for instance, to erect or ruin the column. Or again, if I empathically feel my gaiety or cheerfulness in the blue sky, then the blue sky smiles. My gaiety is in it, belongs to it."(30*)

Less radical in phraseology and contention is the principal British Empathist, Vernon Lee. She writes that there is a tendency in the mind to merge its activities as a perceiving subject with those of the perceived object, and it is this tendency which is the root of the phenomenon of expression. What is it, for example, that causes us to make a mountain the subject of a verb of action, as when we say, "The mountain rises?" To begin with, we have to raise our eyes to see it, and so an activity of rising is going on in us. Yet in so far as we contemplate the mountain, we cease to be aware of ourselves, and so of our activity of rising. The result is that we attribute our activity to the contemplated object.(31) However, what we transfer to the mountain is not merely our own present single act of rising, but rather the whole complex of memories and anticipations of these activities, what Lee calls the "general idea of rising".(32) All this is transferred to the mountain.

There is no shortage of difficulties with these views. To begin with, it is plain that they are not, as they purport to be, exhaustive descriptions of aesthetic experience. At best, they would serve as theoretical explanations of certain rather hectic experiences. They will not account for pleasure in material and form, the point which the Earl of Listowel makes in criticism of "Einfühlung" views:

"Our disinterestedness and detachment from practical and ideal interests in the contemplation of beauty, the glow of pleasure with which it suffuses the heart, the immediate joy of the senses in the delicate perfume and brilliant colouring of a flower, the
calm delight we feel in a balanced, harmonious and symmetrical structure, these, after all, are vital aspects of our aesthetic experience for which artistic sympathy offers no substitute and no explanation. *(33*)

Yet this is not all. Not only will Empathy theory not explain pleasure in material and form, but it will not explain calm expressed properties either. The third movement of Beethoven's last quartet, op.135, is extraordinarily serene. How can Lipps account for this — am I to be said to project my inactivity into the work of art? This leaves Empathy theory as at best an explanation of a sub-class of a sub-class of aesthetic experiences, those of dynamic expression.

Yet even in this limited area, there is a fact of experience which Empathy theory cannot account for, the same fact to which Santayana's theory of expression is also inadequate, namely that, even where a work of art is intensely expressive of passions which might without strain be called dynamic — paintings by El Greco and Goya are ready examples — it is possible to recognise the expression and yet not share it. There are two replies which the determined projection theorist can make, the first being that anyone who is thus unmoved is aesthetically speaking as insensit ive as a block, and has never had a genuine aesthetic experience. Such a reply runs the risk of rendering the theory irrefutable, since nothing will be admitted as counter-evidence against it. Alternatively, the projection theorist can adopt another psychological premiss, namely that projection is not only involuntary and instantaneous, but also unconscious; hence it would be possible for the conscious mind to remain detached. The objection to this is that it infringes a rule for the construction of theories, namely that the explicans be identifiable independently of the explicandum. The only evidence for the postulated process would be the fact it is alleged to account for; nothing else could either confirm or disconfirm it.

In view of the difficulties involved in views which make the perceiver
the source of expressed properties in aesthetic objects, especially over the fact that it is possible to recognize expression and yet remain detached from it, a more economical hypothesis to adopt is that expressed properties are in some sense in the aesthetic object. The next step, therefore, is to consider explanations of how this is possible. One obvious thesis which suggests itself is that there are elements of works of art such that they have an intrinsic significance. A variety of this style of explanation of expression is extensively explored by Deryck Cooke, in "The Language of Music."

Cooke's theory, simply enough, is that music is, as has often been claimed, the language of emotion, whereby a composer communicates a given feeling or group of feelings to an audience. The feelings communicated constitute the meaning of the work in question. The basic terms of the vocabulary of the language of music are the notes of the major, minor, and chromatic diatonic scales, which each have an inherent emotional character. (34) This conclusion is established, in Cooke's view, by a survey of the usage of notes, intervals, and certain phrases by European composers of the last four centuries. For example, the major third always expresses pleasure, (35) while the minor third always expresses the wrongness of grief. (36) Again, the phrase, 1-(2)-3-(4)-5 (major) has consistently been used to express an active, outgoing emotion of joy (37), whereas 5-(4)-3-(2)-1 (minor) expresses a yielding to grief, passive suffering and despair. (38) All these inherent significances are modified by other musical elements: volume, time, timbre, pitch, and texture, to produce a language of marvellous subtlety. (39)

For present purposes, it is enough to note the main difficulty with so simple a version of the inherent significance view, namely that there are cases where the modification by other features is so great as to remove any justification for saying that there are elements with a significance anything like so constant as Cooke maintains. Hanslick points out that,
"many of the most celebrated airs from 'The Messiah', including those most of all admired as being suggestive of piety, were taken from secular duets, (mostly erotic) composed in the years 1711-12..."

The importance of context is evidently much greater than Cooke thinks.

Curiously enough, there are views on the significance of colour in Lipps's work which bear some resemblance to those of Cooke on music — of course, for Lipps, the 'constant significance' must come from the invariant projection of the same feeling onto the same colour, but in any case the feelings he associates with colours are commonly so associated, and whether the significance be intrinsic or projected, his views are worth rebutting. Yellow, he says, is full of joy; dark blue of deep seriousness, and violet full of longing. (41) Counter-examples once again demonstrate the importance of context. It is hard to find the alleged profundity and seriousness in "The Blue Boy"; and again, much of the canvas area of "L'Embarquement pour l'Île de Cythère" of Watteau is yellow, yet the pervasive feeling, as so often with Watteau, is serious and sad: life is ephemeral, and so the pursuit of pleasure must be taken seriously.

It seems, then, that while expressed properties are objective, their nature and the experience of them is of some degree of complexity. With regard to the question of context, Combrich has pointed out how important it is to take note of the limits of the style in which a work of art is conceived — what might be the extreme of anguish in Haydn might be a mild irritation in Bartók. There is indeed a problem here, pointed out by Wollheim (42), namely that even granting Combrich's claims about the need to know an artist's repertoire, yet there still remains the question of why the repertoire is as it is. The most reasonable answer seems to be that there must ultimately be some natural basis in the elements of a work of art for expression — the alternative is to claim that repertoires are set up entirely by convention, which is about as plausible as to find the historical origin of aristocratic government in a social contract. To
deny any natural foundation to expression is to create very grave problems in explaining why ultimately the conventions are as they are. It is to be committed to denying the thesis advanced below, that (for example) sad works of art are sad either because they represent or because they resemble sad people in some respect. While it may not be easy to specify the relevant respects of resemblance, to deny any role to resemblance is surely to leave the conventions unexplained. While this is so, however, it does not involve a commitment to a naive 'intrinsic significance' account such as that of Cooke. Historically it seems that, however naturally based expressive procedures may be, they can and do become conventional, or almost so. Knowledge of the repertoire is vital; and this has the corollary that a large number of beliefs about the history of art are relevant to the experience of expression.

The next question to face is this: granted that expressed properties are objective features of aesthetic objects, how in general do works of art express? After all, emotions, attitudes, beliefs and so forth, all the types of property expressible in art, are primarily predicated of human beings. How do they get into works of art? As has been indicated, there seem to be two major ways in which this can be explained. Where representation is involved, the mechanism of expression does not seem so mysterious or problematic: save for the important complications introduced by the distanced attitude, and the relevance of knowledge of the history of art, we can react to represented people and events as we can to their real life counterparts.

More mysterious are the cases of non-representational art, primarily architecture and music. The most economical hypothesis is surely that we find expression where there is some resemblance or analogy to human beings (not forgetting also the probable physiological aspect of the response to architecture). Perhaps this is what Wittgenstein meant when he said: "If I say of a piece of Schubert's that it is melancholy, that
is like giving it a face."(43) Arnheim takes exception to this well-worn view. He considers that expression in human beings can only be a special case of a more general phenomenon. A weeping willow is sad not because it resembles a sad person in some respects; this comparison imposes itself only secondarily. His claim is that expressed properties are intrinsic to lines and shapes which are expressive in people when they happen to instantiate these lines and shapes with their bodies.(44) If this were true - if the comparison with human beings were as adventitious as Arnheim claims - then it is difficult to explain why our entire vocabulary for describing expression should assimilate objects to persons, and not vice versa. If what Arnheim says is true, then it is in principle as likely that the comparisons would be the other way round - we should be just as likely to say that a weeping person is like a willow as to say that the willow is weeping.

If the above is an acceptable outline of the mechanism of expression, there still remains a major philosophical problem regarding this feature of aesthetic experience: what analysis is to be given to propositions in which expressive properties are ascribed to works of art? In view of the fact that I can remain detached from an expressive object while regarding it as expressive, it is clear that analyses which make such propositions overt or covert references to the emotional condition of the perceiver must be rejected. One such is that of Hospers. For him, to say, "This composition expresses melancholy" is to make an incomplete statement, since I always mean, "expresses melancholy to me."(45) Equally unacceptable are analyses which replace, "to me" with "to me on most occasions", or "to most experienced listeners."(46)

The correct analysis must in some way allow for the objectivity of expressed properties. Granted this, it is immediately obvious that the predication of emotions, beliefs, and so forth, of works of art, cannot be a literal usage, but must diverge in some way from the paradigm ascriptions
of such predicates to persons. Wittgenstein at one point believed that the
difference in usage lay in the transitivity or otherwise of the verb. In
"The Brown Book" he writes that the logical grammar of, "Every one of these
colour patterns says something" is different from that of, "Every one of
these men says something". Moreover, musical expression differs from that
of words. He wishes to say, not that music conveys feelings to us but that,
"Music conveys to us itself!" This is different again from, "The whole
face expresses bewilderment", where the verb "expresses" is used transitive­ly. (47) This suggestion as to the difference in usage must be rejected.
Were Wittgenstein's suggestion true, then it would be considered linguisti­cally very odd to use the verb "express" transitively with a work of art
as its subject. For example, it would be considered strange to say that
Mozart's fortieth symphony expresses a state of deep dejection; or that
many of Wilfred Owen's poems express bitter disillusion and horror of
war. All such uses ascribing expressed properties must be considered
aberrant on Wittgenstein's view; yet such uses are surely commonplace and
intuitively free from any sense of linguistic unease. Later on, it is only
fair to add, Wittgenstein came to doubt his earlier view. In the
"Investigations", he puts a question to himself: "What would it mean to
say, "What this musical theme tells me is itself"?"(48)

The most plausible account of propositions ascribing emotional
qualities to works of art seems to be that of Goodman, i.e. that to
express p is metaphorically to possess p. The final problem, then, is to
give an account of what it is for a property to be possessed metaphorically.
Possession is swiftly dealt with: for any subject of qualities x, and any
property p, x possesses p if and only if "p" truly applies to x. Possession
is literal or metaphorical according as "p" is used literally or meta­
phorically. (49) Goodman, believing that a work of art must symbolize, i.e. denote, considers metaphorical possession only a necessary condition for
expression, a further necessary condition being jointly sufficient: this
second necessary condition is that the work of art must denote what it
expresses. The double relation which results is called exemplification. (50)

There seems to be no reason, however, to accept the second necessary condition: the last movement of Beethoven’s ninth symphony does not denote joy (only the word "joy" does that), it embodies it. Is metaphorical possession then both necessary and sufficient for expression in art? The question rests on whether a work of art metaphorically possesses any qualities it does not also express. If there are any such properties, then the analysis can be completed by the addition of a second necessary condition, which would be sufficient in conjunction with the first, specifying classes of properties which are expressed, e.g. beliefs, attitudes, world-views, etc. The list would be open-ended, to allow for changes of usage.

Goodman is illuminating on the question of what makes a usage metaphorical. (51) To begin with, to apply a predicate metaphorically is to defy a tacit or explicit prior denial of the applicability of the predicate to the object. Secondly, there must be attraction as well as resistance; a metaphorical predicate must have two ranges of application: emotion-predicates like 'gay' and 'sad' have two such ranges, to persons, and to inanimate objects. Moreover, the application in the metaphorical range must be guided by the application in the literal range. Habit is at once deferred to and departed from. Agreed, "guided by" is a vague phrase, but its presence is justified in the present context, in that no exactly statable rules govern all metaphorical applications. Clearly, objects to which predicates apply metaphorically must have some properties which are shared by or which resemble those of objects to which the predicates apply literally. The common features can be few, and a metaphor can be recherché without our protesting; conceits are a species of metaphor of this kind.

This concludes the present very brief sketch of a theory of expression intended as an alternative to that put forward by Santayana. Much of what he says on expression is perfectly acceptable; his theory can
accommodate more of the data concerning expression in art than many others
which have been put forward on this subject. He is justly emphatic on the
at least apparent objectivity of expressed properties; and can account for
the variety of things which can be expressed. He is moreover free from any
tendency to use expression in an over-simple description of the psychology
of creativity. That it should have been necessary to correct his views on
one point and expand them in another direction is therefore not so serious
a defect as it seems. Moreover, the definition of expression is only a
part of what he has to say on the subject. Other valuable doctrines are put
forward in later sections of the argument.

III: Types of Value in the Second Term: Varieties of Positive Value

It is easiest to take up again the thread of Santayana's argument by
recollecting his major claim so far: expression consists in the embodiment
of a blurred association in a present perception. The present perception
he calls the first term of the expression; the blurred association, the
second term. The second step in the argument is the affirmation that
the second term can have any one of several kinds of value. The most
striking fact about the phenomenon of expression, in Santayana's view, is
that, "the value acquired by the expressive thing is often of an entirely
different kind from that which the thing expressed possesses." (48) (There
is a slight difficulty here. Santayana's arguments, it will be seen,
hardly justify the claim that entirely disparate things can express and
be expressed by one another.) According to Santayana, beauty is value
positive, intrinsic, and objectified; yet the value of the second term
(that which is expressed) is often physical, practical, or even negative.
In cases of expression, these non-aesthetic species of value are meta-
morphosed into aesthetic values. The most striking of these transformations
is that of negative into positive values, which has,

"given rise to various theories of the comic, tragic, and sublime.

For these three species of aesthetic good seem to please us by the
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"given rise to various theories of the comic, tragic, and sublime.
For these three species of aesthetic good seem to please us by the
suggestion of evil; and the problem arises how a mind can be made
happier by having suggestions of unhappiness stirred within it;
an unhappiness it cannot understand without in some degree sharing
in it."(53)

Granted that the aesthetic effects produced by the suggestions of evil in
tragedy, comedy, and the sublime are amongst the most profound of all
aesthetic effects, philosophers have not been slow to use this paradox as
an argument to demonstrate the necessity of evil, and have used it to
prop up their theodicy.(54)

Santayana has no patience either with the theodicy or with the
aesthetic which attempts to demonstrate the inevitability (in some sense)
of the evil in the world. This is one aspect of his opposition to
Romanticism, at the philosophical heart of which he perfectly correctly
discerned the belief that the 'rerum natura' is inherently contradictory
and disturbed by strife or discord of some kind. As Isaiah Berlin once
put it, in the Enlightenment, it was assumed that the answers to all
correctly formed questions would be compatible; the Romantics repudiated
this view. Santayana's rejection of Romanticism (as he understands it) is
evident right from the first chapter of "The Sense of Beauty", in his
stipulation that one of the differentiae of aesthetic value is that it is
always positive, i.e. aesthetic experience is always the consciousness
of something good.

He is well aware that this belief involves him in serious difficulties
over tragedy, comedy and the sublime, where it seems evident that
suggestions of pain and terror - negative values in his terminology -
play a major role in the aesthetic effect. He is committed to explaining
away the apparent indispensability of these negative values. Adoption of
a psychical distance view, which does not include the stipulation about
positive value, eases the problem somewhat; there is no need to explain
how pain becomes pleasure. It can continue to be painful, though mitigated
by the distanced attitude.

However, this is to anticipate slightly. Before dealing with these cases of negative value in the second term, Santayana deals with species of positive value. Throughout his discussion he deliberately neglects the first term, since, in his view, it does not contribute to the expression, though it may contribute greatly to the beauty of the object. (55)

It is possible for the value of the second term to be itself aesthetic. The Homeric poems are expressive objects of this kind. Of course, the Greek verse itself (the first term) is of great beauty, but "the tendency of his poetry is nevertheless to fill the outskirts of our consciousness with the trooping images of things no less fair and noble than the verse itself. The heroes are virtuous....The palaces, the arms, the horses, the sacrifices, are always excellent. The women are always stately and beautiful." (56)

Aesthetic value in the second term is also the reason for the demand that stories and comedies should end well, that hero and heroine should be young and handsome, and so forth. (57)

Santayana somewhat overestimates the purity of the Homeric world – is it so noble and pure that Agamemnon should steal Briseis, or that Achilles should sulk about it? But more important than this is a logical difficulty involved in his proposition that the second term can have aesthetic value. Aesthetic value is positive, intrinsic, and objectified, and according to Santayana has three species: material, formal, and expressive. Therefore, if the second term in an instance of expression has aesthetic value, it must be one of these species. It is hard enough to make sense of the idea that a blurred halo of association, a mental content, has formal or material beauty, or again that pleasure may be projected onto it. Moreover, if the value of the second term is itself expressive, there must be a third term, an association of the association (because all expressions have two terms) and so on. In order to stop the
regress, Santayana must claim that all values in this third term are practical or negative, not aesthetic. Yet he seems committed in some cases to this bizarre hierarchy of at least two associations. These consequences are unwieldy.

He continues with a less objectionable piece of psychological generalization. The expression of pure, unalloyed beauty very quickly becomes cloying to us:

"...as contemplation is actually a luxury in our lives, and things interest us chiefly on passionate and practical grounds, the accumulation of values too exclusively aesthetic produces in our minds an effect of closeness and artificiality." (58)

The charm of such idealization is undeniable,

"but the other important elements of our memory and will cannot long be banished. The thoughts of labour, ambition, lust, anger, confusion, sorrow and death must needs mix with our contemplation and lend their various expressions to the objects with which in experience they are so closely allied." (59)

Cases in which the second term has aesthetic value, however, are rare; more frequently the value is practical or utilitarian. Practical value is expressed,

"whenever the second term is the idea of something of practical value to us, the premonition of which brings satisfaction; and this satisfaction prompts an approval of the presented object...The tone of our consciousness is raised by the foretaste of a success; and this heightened pleasure is objectified in the present image, since the associated image to which the satisfaction properly belongs often fails to become distinct." (60)

The case which most resembles this is that in which the second term is an interesting piece of information, a theory, or other intellectual datum. Usually our interest in such things is practical; but curiosity can become
disinterested and ideas come to be prized for their own sakes. (One notes again how in unguarded moments Santayana tends toward the equation of the aesthetic attitude with the disinterested attitude, an equation ostensibly rejected in the first chapter of "The Sense of Beauty".)

Santayana gives an example of this. Suppose we have before us a map, giving details of climate, population, and so forth. Usually we would not regard the map as an aesthetic object, but only as a mere symbol; in the contemplation of it, the mind might be filled with imaginings of its scenery and inhabitants. No objectification of pleasure occurs in such a case:

"And yet, let the tints of it be a little subtle, let the lines be a little delicate, and the masses of land and sea somewhat balanced, and we really have a beautiful thing; a thing the charm of which consists almost entirely in its meaning, but which nevertheless pleases us in the same way as a picture or a graphic symbol might please."(61)

If the symbol has aesthetically pleasing form, line and colours (Santayana asserts) the values of whatever facts it symbolizes will be projected onto it, and it will come to have value as an example of aesthetic expression. The difficulty with this is the apparent assertion that a picture and a graphic symbol please in the same way. Santayana does not define either of the key terms "picture" or "graphic symbol". What he has in mind in making the distinction is presumably that a picture may represent, whereas a symbol does not. If so then it follows from the conclusions arrived at in the preceding section that the response aroused by the one will be aroused in a different way from that occasioned by the other. A symbol will be aesthetically expressive by virtue of its analogy to human beings, a representation by virtue of its resemblance to them.

The paradigm instance of practical value is surely cost, and Santayana believes that it too can contribute to aesthetic effect. He is well aware
of going against received opinion in making such a claim, and has an argument to support his thesis. The reason why cost is usually considered not to be an element of aesthetic effect (he contends) is not that it is unaesthetic but that it is abstract. The mind of the economist works with numerical abstractions. In order to convert cost into an aesthetic effect, one should convert the cost back into the factors which account for it: rarity of material, amount of labour expended, and the distance from which the object is brought. All these features appeal greatly to the imagination, and supply the object with picturesque associations. Our daily experience contains examples of cost as an element of effect: gems, great as is their sensuous beauty, are the more distinguished by our attention by virtue of their rarity and price, than they would ever be if they were cheap.

There is only a small element of truth in this. High cost might make us more ready to stop and contemplate an object, if only to find out why it cost as much; but beyond this, cost is not an element in aesthetic effect, and indeed this is so by definition. If what Santayana says were true, then, "x is beautiful because it costs a lot" would be an aesthetic judgment, whereas such a judgment does not contain an aesthetic term of appraisal. Santayana would have done better to repeat a distinction he had made in an earlier paper: "It is vulgar to esteem things for their cost, but not vulgar to esteem them for the qualities which make them costly."(63) The predicate "costly" can be used in aesthetic judgment, especially as a favourable comment on the quality of materials. Again, the example of gems is a poor one. They are not distinguished by our attention simply because they are expensive. Santayana should have asked himself more closely why they come to be expensive in the first place. Sheer rarity, distance and so forth will not explain why bits of coloured mineral are so relentlessly pursued. The sensuous beauty which Santayana dismisses as subordinate is of the first importance, though even this alone
will not explain their appeal. Perhaps as Huxley wrote (in "Heaven and Hell") they remind us of the landscape of dream and visionary experience; certainly the avidity with which they are sought invites some such explanation. Finally, one may note that some of the aesthetic judgments which would result from the adoption of Santayana's view would be strange indeed: "This diamond expresses the labour of slaves in an African mine, and a series of crimes."

Cost, in Santayana's view, contributes to aesthetic experience by furnishing a background of associations to the present object; the same principle explains the effect which evident cleanliness, security and economy have on us, what Santayana calls the expression of economy and fitness. This Dutch charm (as he calls it) hardly needs explanation; waste is so extremely discomforting to the mind, and its visible manifestation offensive. The manifestation of its contrary is reassuring, and the force of our approval of practical fitness becomes half aesthetic, when the fit form becomes embodied in a type, to the lines of which we are accustomed.

This piece of informal psychology is expanded by Santayana into a generalisation about the relation of aesthetic to non-aesthetic interests in our lives. (The pleasure we take in economy and fitness is an example of the intrusion of the non-aesthetic into the aesthetic sphere.) In order to survive, our lives must be ordered to a certain degree. The heart and the belly demand constant satisfaction. What we term our higher instincts, those of the understanding, are in tension with these dominant lower instincts, and if allowed free rein, would disorder our lives:

"For this reason, utility keeps close watch over beauty, lest in her wilfulness and riot she should offend against our practical needs and ultimate happiness. And when the conscience is keen, this vigilance of the practical imagination over the speculative ceases to appear as an eventual and external check." (65)
Any work or object in which there is a suggestion of luxury, waste, or impurity, which threatens disorder, seems to us horrible and no beauty can ever be discovered in it. The practical imagination dominates the aesthetic.

This whole passage is oddly optimistic. The conclusion is patently false, and one wonders how, in the 1890's, Santayana could have written it. If the conscience were active in the way he describes, then it is impossible to explain why Beardsley's drawings, or "Les Chants de Maldoror", or even perhaps the "Satyricon" of Petronius are regarded as works of art, let alone classics.

While on the subject of the relation of aesthetic and non-aesthetic interests, Santayana discusses briefly the relation of moral considerations to aesthetic ones. He states here briefly the normative ethical doctrine which nine years later was to form the fundamental principle of "The Life of Reason". The function of practical reason is "to compare, combine, and harmonise all our interests, with a view to attaining the greatest satisfactions of which our nature is capable."(66) The rational position to adopt with regard to aesthetic pleasures - the amount of time, effort, and sacrifice we should devote to them - varies from person to person, proportionately with the amount of pleasure the individual obtains from them. The harmonisation of all interests in order to maximize pleasure is the Life of Reason. Aesthetic interests are treated in principle exactly like any other human interest in the rational life. This is one way in which moral interests dominate those of aesthetics.

There is a second way, equally obvious, for, "Our sense of practical benefit not only determines the moral value of beauty but sometimes even its existence as a moral good."(67) The point is this: if the centre of consciousness is occupied by urgent and compelling practical matters, then aesthetic features which would be a delight in a state of contemplation are merely an irritant: "If things of moment are before us, we cannot
stop to play with symbols and figures of speech." (68) This is an 
undoubted fact of psychology. It accords perfectly with the psychical 
distance view which Santayana rejects.

Santayana once again generalises on the place of art in life: "(the 
arts) appear only as unstable, superadded activities, employments of our 
freedom, after the work of life is done and the terror of it allayed." (69) 
Yet though they are thus precarious, it does not follow that art and the 
aesthetic attitude are insignificant features of existence:

"There is no situation so terrible that it may not be relieved 
by the momentary pause of the mind to contemplate it aesthetically... 
by finding grandeur in our disasters, and merriment in our mishaps, 
the aesthetic sense thus mollifies both, and consoles us for the 
frequent impossibility of a serious and perfect beauty." (70)

Santayana thus arrives at the idea of the contemplation of painful 
experience, a feature of the aesthetic experience of the tragic, comic and 
sublime. To these he turns next.

IV: Types of Value in The Second Term: Negative Values: (1) Tragedy and the 
Sublime

The major topics in the theory of tragedy were set up almost entirely 
by Aristotle: the definition of tragedy; the nature of the tragic hero; 
the nature of the response to tragedy; the need or lack of it for chorus 
and unities, for 'peripetiae', 'anagnorisis' and suffering. To these 
Hegel, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche added the notion that tragedy might be 
allied to a fairly restricted set of presuppositions. If to have views on 
all these topics is to have a complete theory of tragedy, then Santayana 
does not have a complete theory in this sense. In "The Sense of Beauty", 
he addresses himself solely to the description of the tragic response; 
elsewhere he makes fairly brief comments on a few of the matters from the 
list above.

Nearest to a description of the tragic hero is a passage in a 1936
Santayana sees the origin of tragedy in the conflict of ideas with the truth, or, put in another way, in maladaptation of the man to his environment. Life is adventurous and combative, and where this is so, "Ideas, however spontaneous, will then claim to be knowledge of ulterior facts, and will be in constant danger of being contradicted by the truth. Experience, from being lyrical, will become tragic; for what is tragedy but the conflict of inspiration and the truth?" This is the core of the tragic situation: we run our lives according to beliefs or passions which blind us to the true circumstances, and eventually these circumstances take their revenge:

"From within, or, as we may fancy, from above, some passionate hope takes shape in the mind. We fall in love or hear a voice from heaven; new energies seem to leap within us; a new life begins crowding the old life out, or making it seem dreary or wicked...Yet not for long, nor for ever...The more profound and voluminous that first inspiration was, the more complete at last will be our astonishment and despair." This description might be stretched to fit the cases of Lear, Othello and Macbeth, but not Hamlet: it is hardly true to say that new energies leapt within him, making his old life seem dreary or wicked. The truth in his case is more nearly the exact reverse of this: he lacks energy and longs for his old life in Wittenberg. Moreover, Santayana's description fits several of Moliere's 'maniaques' quite as well as tragic heroes - Monsieur Jourdain and the 'femmes savantes' are as much in the grip of false beliefs in the way described as are Lear, Othello or Macbeth. Santayana has picked a feature neither necessary nor sufficient for a tragic hero.

Lass wide of the mark is an earlier passage (in "Reason in Art") in which he seems to make some sort of inner conflict, resulting in the wasteful destruction of what is valuable, a characteristic of the tragic situation:
"Death and change acquire a tragic character when they invade a mind which is not ready for them in all its parts, so that those elements in it which are still vigorous, and would maintain somewhat longer their ideal identity, suffer violence at the hands of others, already mastered by decay and willing to be self-destructive." (74)

This is 'a fortiori' true of Hamlet, and certainly it is the weak or wicked aspects of Othello, Lear and Macbeth which destroy them and consequently what is good in them. Yet this description hardly suits the protagonists of some Greek plays. It is hardly weakness or wickedness which leads to the death of Antigone, rather her devotion to her brother's memory, matched against Creon's devotion to Thebes. This is perhaps the only situation which fits Hegel's thesis that the tragic situation consists in the conflict of right with right.

With regard to the presuppositions of tragedy, Santayana is squarely in the tradition which argues that the universe in which a tragedy occurs must be indifferent to man. There must be no suggestion of an after-life and of consolations beyond the grave; a truly Christian tragedy is impossible:

"Tragedy must end in death; for any immortality which the poet or hero may otherwise believe in is irrelevant to the passion that has absorbed him...The possibility of ulterior lives or alien interests destined in future to agitate the world makes no difference to the drama in this soul; and the mention of those irrelevant sequels to this ruin, would tinkle with a ghastly mockery at this supreme moment, when a man is entering eternity, his measure taken and his pride entire." (75)

That is why Seneca and Shakespeare, though Platonism was at hand for the one and Christianity for the other, both stuck fast to a disillusioned philosophy. Again, that is why in the seventeenth century, when Christian orthodoxy was dominant, severe, and intellectual, Christianity was nevertheless banished from the stage;
"Both Christian and pagan personages talked and felt throughout like thoroughly unregenerate mortals. To have allowed religion to shift the scenes, override the natural passions of men, and reverse the moral of the story, would have seemed an intolerable anti-climax." (76*). 

If Santayana is at fault here, it is only through omission. What is true of Christianity is also true of Marxism, a point made by George Steiner, for example, in his, "The Death of Tragedy". (77*) For the Marxist, tragedy must be a relic from the museum of the moral past. There is no such inevitable disaster as true tragedy portrays: Necessity is blind, said Marx and Engels, only where it is not understood. To encompass both Marxism and Christianity, the point about presuppositions needs to be generalised: tragedy is impossible within any world-view which is in a certain sense optimistic, i.e. which regards human life as other than futile, whether the reason for this be the possibility of salvation, or a conviction of the inevitable progress of society toward moral perfection. For Christian and Marxist alike, death has no sting.

Turning to Santayana's main interest in the theory of tragedy, the nature of the aesthetic experience it provides, it is clear by implication that, while he apparently accepts the doctrine of catharsis, he regards it as only a small part of the complete description of the tragic response. There is no analysis of the catharsis theory in "The Sense of Beauty", and only a brief passage in "Reason in Art". Acceptance of the views in this latter passage depends largely on acceptance of the epiphenomenalist theory of the mind, and objectification theory which it so clearly reflects: "...a man whose physiological complexion involves more poignant emotion than his ideas can absorb - one who is sentimental - will yearn for new objects that may explain, embody, and focus his dumb feelings; and these objects, if art can produce them will relieve and glorify those feelings in the act of expressing them. Catharsis is nothing more." (78*)
In "The Sense of Beauty", Santayana begins by pointing out that it has been found paradoxical that human beings should take pleasure in the contemplation of tragedy, where what is portrayed would be acutely painful in a non-aesthetic context. It has also been said — and the paradox is thereby increased — that we are pleased by the suggestion of evil. Santayana begins by denying the second claim (and surely he is right to do so): the fact of the matter is that we do not feel pleased in the contemplation of tragic suffering. If we are pleased, it is in spite of and not because of the suffering portrayed. Rather, the experience of tragedy is a complex one, "it must contain an element of pain overbalanced by an element of pleasure; in our delight there must be a distinguishable touch of shrinking and sorrow..."(79*) This is made possible by the painful nature of the subject-matter being offset by various compensatory factors, aesthetic, moral, and intellectual, and it is these which must be studied if the full complexity of the tragic experience is to be properly understood. Before going on, it is as well to be clear about the position Santayana is defending. As has been pointed out above, he must sustain his position that all aesthetic values are positive, i.e. an aesthetic experience is always the experience of something good. He is not so naive as to wish to hold that any and every aesthetic experience is of unalloyed delight; but what he must prove is that no aesthetic experience is more painful (on the whole) than it is pleasant; and further that where there is a painful element — a negative value, in his terms — it is never in any way essential to the aesthetic effect. He must prove this three times over: for tragedy, the sublime, and for comedy. He himself reviews his position at the end of his whole argument; and a consideration of this major issue of internal consistency is reserved for that point.

There is one theory of the tragic response (Santayana begins) which would obviate the need for any detailed investigation of the components of that response. This theory holds that all moderate excitement is pleasant,
and therefore, since in the aesthetic experience of tragedy, evil is seen from a distance and is therefore not painful, it is not surprising that we should find tragedy pleasant. Santayana's perfectly just rejoinder is that anyone who does not feel pain when watching tragedy is like a child who watches a shipwreck and, ignorant of the pain and suffering involved, merely feels pleasantly excited. The sympathy of the observer must be aroused:

"The intensity of the impression must not be so slight that its painful quality is not felt; for it is this very sense of pain, mingling with the aesthetic excitement of the spectacle, that gives it a tragic or pathetic colouring."(30)

The first of the compensatory factors which in Santayana's view conjoin to make the portrayed suffering bearable is the aesthetic value of the first term itself, the expressing object:

"...while we are saddened by the truth we are delighted by the vehicle which conveys it to us...if ever the charm of the beautiful presentation sinks so low, or the vividness of the represented evil rises so high, that the balance is in favour of pain, at that very moment, the whole object becomes horrible."(81)

Santayana records in his autobiography an instance of such a deficiency in the expressing object, an experience which stayed in his memory for over sixty years. As a young man of nineteen or twenty, he had watched a performance of Victorien Sardou's "La Tosca";

"...in the scene where Mario is being tortured, I found the strain intolerable, and slipped out...for fear of fainting. This experience led me to understand that there is a limit to the acceptable terror and pity that tragedy may excite. They must be excited only speculatively, intellectually, religiously; if they are excited materially and deceptively, you are overcome and not exalted."(82)
To see how important is the effect of the first term in tragedy, one need only imagine the following experiment:

"Remove from any drama—say from 'Othello'—the charm of the medium of representation; reduce the tragedy to a mere account of the facts and of the words spoken, such as our newspapers almost daily contain; and the tragic dignity and beauty is entirely lost. Nothing remains but a disheartening item of human folly..." (83)

Further, the more terrible the experience described, the more powerful is the art needed to transform it into an aesthetic object. For this reason, Santayana believes, verse is more necessary in tragedy than in comedy. Metre, rhyme, and so forth,

"enable the mind swept by the deepest cosmic harmonies, to endure and absorb the shrill notes which would be intolerable in a poorer setting...The afflatus of rhythm, even if it be the pomp of the Alexandrine, sublimates the passion, and clarifies its mutterings into poetry." (84)

There is a good deal of truth in this. In tragedy, perhaps above all other art-forms, the attitude of psychical distance is vital, and at the same time, because of the subject-matter of tragedy, more fragile. The artificiality of verse is one of the features which helps to preserve it, as also do the conventions of staging. The buskins and masks of the Greeks, with their origins perhaps as much in the configuration of the Greek theatre as anything else, must also have helped to maintain the necessary distance.

A second compensatory feature in tragedy is that no tragedy is entirely without the suggestion of beautiful things; and indeed this suggestion is continual. This is why, "we have palaces for our scene, rank, beauty, and virtue in our heroes, nobility in their passions and in their fate, and altogether a sort of glorification of life..." (85) Too wicked a character or too unrelieved a situation we would find revolting and not tragic. Even the scene of the storm in 'King Lear', one of the very
bleakest episodes in tragedy, is not entirely without its suggestions of
goodness. Lear says to his loyal Fool: "Art cold? There is a part of me
sorry for thee yet." (86*) "King Lear" exhibits another, rather different
principle: so manifold are the miseries portrayed that the mind cannot
become too absorbed in any one of them.

There is some truth in this also; yet to attribute the fact that
tragedy is usually concerned with men and women of high rank to simple
aesthetic necessity is unhistorical; the choice of subject-matter is
related to the prevailing class-structure of society, the extent of
literacy, the conditions of patronage of artists, and accepted beliefs
about which classes of society are of importance. It is fairly well
accepted that by the end of the nineteenth century, tragic vision in
European literature had ceased to be cast in the form of dramas and
instead appears in the novel. The heroes and heroines needed no longer
to come from the aristocracy, quite the reverse in the obvious cases of
Hardy and Melville, especially the latter's Billy Budd.

Third and more important among compensatory features is the fact
that tragedies express truths, sad and painful but truths nonetheless,
and human beings would rather know the truth than be subject to the
torment of ignorance. Santayana points out that this craving for truth
is not an aesthetic pleasure, and that other conditions for beauty must
be fulfilled:

"But the satisfaction of so imperious an intellectual instinct
insures our willing attention to the tragic object, and strengthens
the hold which any beauties it may possess will take upon us.
An intellectual value stands ready to be transmuted into an
aesthetic one..." (87*)

Closely related to this is the compensation which follows on recognition,
I.e. of situations portrayed in tragedies which we take to be similar to
incidents in our own life. Thus in the response to tragedy there is, "the
sentimental (pleasure) of nursing our own griefs and dignifying them by assimilation to a less inglorious representation of them. (83) There is surely a good deal to be said for at least the first of these points. It is hard to see why an audience will undergo the experience of "King Lear" if its members do not believe that it is profoundly relevant to their own lives, and it is hard to see how it could be relevant (in this instance) if not in respect of dramatising some important truths, especially about the movements of feeling, and human motivation. (It should be noted also that the passing comment Santayana makes in this context about the non-aesthetic nature of the desire to know the truth is by no means all he has to say about the question of truth in art. His various more substantial comments on this subject are considered in Chs. V and VII, below.)

Santayana continues that all the factors so far advanced neither exhaust the experience of tragedy, nor provide a full explanation of why for centuries human beings have written and watched them. The response as so far described might be occasioned by a work which was merely pathetic, and it is,

"far too passive and penitential to contain the louder and sublimer of our tragic moods. In these there is a wholeness, a strength, a rapture, which still demands an explanation." (89)

The first step in this explanation is to examine the idea of the self. Hume's introspective discoveries had evidently not been lost on Santayana:

"The impulses, memories, principles, and energies which we designate by that word (i.e. the self) baffle enumeration; indeed, they constantly fade and change into one another; and whether the self is anything, everything, or nothing depends on the aspect of it we momentarily fix, and especially on the definite object with which we contrast it." (90)

The most remarkable fact about the experience of beauty is that it so harmonises these numerous and diverse mental contents as to bring
harmony to the soul. But there are two methods of attaining harmony; the
first is to harmonise all the elements present; the second is to exclude
whatever refuses to be so harmonised. Unity by inclusion produces the
experience of beauty; unity by exclusion, opposition and isolation gives
us the sublime. The experience of beauty identifies us with this world; the
sublime raises us above it. (91)

With this in mind, it becomes easier to see, Santayana claims, how the
presentation of what is evil or painful can produce the rarer aspects of
the experiences produced by tragedy. The evil is felt, yet at the same
time, the sense that it cannot touch us may stimulate extraordinarily the
sense of our own wholeness. Another condition for sublimity is the
impossibility of action; the evil must be beyond our power to correct.
When this is so, "a strong spirit has the sublime resource of standing
at bay and of surveying almost from the other world the vicissitudes of
this." (92)

When these conditions are fulfilled, tragedy occasions one of the
profoundest and enriching of all the varieties of aesthetic experience. It
is a state of mind in which we feel lifted above the vicissitudes of
existence, out of the grip of the interests in the pursuit of which we
consume most of our lives. We attain, however temporarily, a view of
experience at once elevated, detached and comprehensive. Santayana calls
this state the liberation of the soul or self:

"There remains little in us...but the intellectual essence,
which several great philosophers have called eternal and identified
with the Divinity...This comprehensive and impartial view, this
synthesis and objectification of experience, constitutes the
liberation of the soul and the essence of sublimity...Our pity and
terror are indeed purged; we go away knowing that, however tangled
the net may be in which we feel ourselves caught, there is liberation
beyond, and an ultimate peace." (93)
The experience has a quasi-mystical character:

"The surprised enlargement of our vision, the sudden escape from our ordinary interests and the identification of ourselves with something permanent and superhuman, something much more inalienable than our changing personality, all this carries us away from the blurred objects before us, and raises us into a sort of ecstasy." (94)

In thus doing full justice to the complexity of the tragic response, Santayana concludes by making use of one of the traditional doctrines from the aesthetics of the sublime, i.e. the doctrine that there is an aesthetic experience at once elevated, comprehensive and ecstatic. This idea is present in the treatise ascribed to Longinus, who writes that, "...by some innate power the true sublime uplifts our souls; we are filled with a proud exaltation and a sense of vaunting joy, just as though we had ourselves produced what we had heard." (95) Or again: "...sublimity carried one up to where one is close to the majestic mind of God." (96)

The idea of elevation is much stressed also by Schopenhauer, by whom Santayana was greatly influenced at the time when he wrote "The Sense of Beauty". For Schopenhauer, the sublime is the supreme illustration of freedom from bondage to the will, for here a man is conscious of events and objects which stand in a hostile relation to his will and which normally would inspire intense fear. Yet he is able, "through a free and conscious transcendence of the will and the knowledge relating to it", to contemplate them in complete calm, "raised above himself, his person, his willing, and all willing." (97)

While he can retain that part of the traditional doctrine which specifies exaltation as one of its differentiae, the doctrine that all aesthetic values are positive demands that Santayana reject and indeed refute those other central doctrines which make pain or fear a necessary condition for the experience of sublimity. Burke sets out a variety of
"Whatever is fitted in any sort to excite the ideas of pain, and
danger, that is to say, whatever is in any sort terrible, or is
conversant about terrible objects, or operates in a manner
analogous to terror, is a source of the sublime: that is, it is
productive of the strongest emotion which the mind is capable of
feeling." (98)

Or again, the experience of the sublime is, "not pleasure, but a sort of
delightful horror, a sort of tranquillity tinged with terror; which, as
it belongs to self-preservation, is one of the strongest of all the passions." (99) Again, Kant makes pain and fear necessary conditions for the experience
of the mathematical and dynamic sublime respectively. (100)

Santayana's objection is that to make pain, fear or terror a necessary
condition for sublimity is to confuse the sublime with its usual cause.
The true sublime consists in the state of liberation and detachment
described above; the suggestion of terror merely makes us withdraw into
ourselves, and when consciousness of our own safety supervenes, we
experience the feeling of the sublime. (101) In order to reinforce this
view, he specifies other causes of the same experience.

For example, the immense is sublime as well as the terrible. Infinity,
like hostility, makes us conscious of our independence of things. "The
simultaneous view of many things, innumerable attractions felt together,
produce equilibrium and indifference, as effectively as the exclusion of
all... In this suspense, the mind soars into a kind of heaven, benevolent
but unmoved." (102) This is at best a very incomplete description; it is
an obvious fact of psychology that the simultaneous experience of many
stimuli is quite as likely to cause confusion, to be overwhelming, as it
is to be liberating. Consequently, the presence of innumerable stimuli
can only be a necessary condition for the experience of exaltation here
under discussion. Moreover, not just any collection of objects will do:
the objects of this experience of sublimity must have attractive formal
and material properties. (Perhaps Santayana has something like this in
mind, indicated by the choice of the term, "attractions"). The starry
night sky is the best example of the type of aesthetic object Santayana
is looking for here. There is surely no need to dispute that it can
occasion the type of elevated detachment of which he speaks.

More dubious is the third route to the sublime, which Santayana calls
the Epicurean route to detachment and perfection. This approach consists
in,

"the mutual cancelling of the passions in the breast that includes
them all, and their final subsidence beneath the glance that
comprehends them...It is thus possible to be moved to that self-
enfranchisement which constitutes the sublime, even where the
object contains no expression of evil."(103*)

The difficulty here is to see how this process of cancelling can produce
the exaltation which Santayana has retained as a defining property of the
sublime. Surely it must rather produce calm.

This is all Santayana has to say about the sublime. What in effect
he does is to redefine the word - it is obvious that for many previous
writers, the presence of some sort of pain or fear in the mind figures
in the very definition of the term "sublime". Whether this conceptual
legislation saves his consistency is a question to be considered below.

V: Types of Value in the Second Term: Negative Values (ii) The Comic and
Related Concepts

The theory of comedy is in a more confused state than that of
tragedy, perhaps because Aristotle either failed to write about it in
detail, or because what he wrote has been lost. It is clear enough,
however, what a theory of comedy would contain: (i) an investigation of
the situations we find comic, to look for common features which might
serve as necessary and/or sufficient conditions. Remarks on incongruity,
degradation, the presupposition of ideals, the castigation of error, happy endings, and so forth, come under this branch of the theory; (ii) a theory of laughter: its place in the economy of human nature and the relation of laughter to the comic. Human beings do not laugh solely at comic situations. We laugh when we are tickled, or sometimes when we are simply happy, this last being presumably what Hobbes means when he gives as one of the causes of laughter in people, "some sudden act of their own, that pleaseth them." (104)

In both departments of this projected investigation, Santayana's treatment consists in individual insights rather than a complete theory. Taking the second part first, he records in various places the varied causes of laughter: tickling (as will be seen below) and again, in "Soliloquies in England and Later Soliloquies" he finds a second cause in sheer high spirits:

"The clown is the primitive comedian. Sometimes in the exuberance of animal life a spirit of riot and frolic comes over a man; he leaps, he dances, he tumbles head over heels, he grins, shouts, or leers, possibly pretends to go to pieces suddenly, and blubbers like a child. A moment later he may look up wreathed in smiles, and hugely pleased about nothing. All this he does hysterically, without any reason, by a sort of mad inspiration and irresistible impulse." (105)

Of course such laughter is not laughter at what is comic; nor is the clown (in his sense of the term) a comedian. Santayana sees perfectly correctly that the species of laughter occasioned by what is comic presupposes reflection and rationality, both on the part of the spectator and on the part of the comedian. When this happens, "the muse of reflection follows in the train of Dionysus, and the revel or rude farce passes into humane comedy." (106*)

The question of what it is that a rational animal laughs at, when it laughs at what is comic, involves an investigation of what features, if any,
comic situations have in common. In his autobiography, Santayana writes:

"The happy presence of reason in human life is perhaps better exemplified in comedy than in tragedy. In comedy we see no terrible sub-human or super-human fatality to render reason vain. Reason can therefore make its little runs and show its comic contradictions and clever solutions without disturbing the sound and vegetative substance and free flowerings of human society. In comedy we laugh at our foolish errors, correct them with a word, and know no reasons why we shouldn't be happy ever after."(107*)

This is in effect to specify some presuppositions of comedy, and its subject-matter. Quite absent from comedy is the sense of fatality or determinism which pervades tragedy; there is no suggestion that the 'rerum natura' is internally strife-ridden, and there is no reason why the happy state arrived at in the denouement should not be indefinitely prolonged. What is portrayed and mocked in comedy is "foolish error", rather, one supposes, than crime, or any disorder which involves serious pain. By implication, Santayana is committed to the further position that a comic figure is comic partly because he fails to fulfil an ideal or come up to a standard, since an error, folly, or mild vice, involves such a failure by definition.

This is surely quite acceptable - it is hard to think of a play by the Greek or Roman writers, or by Shakespeare, Jonson, or Molière, for example, to which these descriptions do not apply. Yet these views are hardly original. Some of them are put forward by the dramatists themselves. For example, in the Prologue to the 'Captivi', Plautus bans serious and painful matters from the comic stage: "...I did mention that Aetolia and Elis are at war; but don't let that frighten you; the battles all take place off stage. Well, it would be practically cheating, wouldn't it, for a comedy company to present you with a tragedy without warning?"(108)

And Ben Jonson tells the audience that they will find, in "Every Man in His Humour";
"...persons, such as comedy would choose,
When she would show an Image of the times,
And sport with human follies, not with crimes."

(Prologue, ll. 22-4)

Again, the idea that no serious harm is involved in what is comic (and consequently in comedy) is present in the theory of comedy from Plato onwards. In the "Philebus", Socrates argues that the ridiculous is a defect which consists in vain self-deceit in a weak person - the last proviso is needed, since in a strong person such a feeling occasions hatred and fear. ("Philebus", 48-9) Aristotle writes in a similar way:

"As for Comedy, it is...an imitation of men worse than the average; worse, however, not as regards any and every sort of fault, but only as regards one particular kind, the ridiculous, which is a species of the ugly. The ridiculous may be defined as a blunder or deformity not productive of harm to others..."(109)

In his later writings, then, Santayana is happy to accept some well-worn beliefs about comedy; in the concluding sections of "The Sense of Beauty", he cannot allow himself a parallel concurrence with the equally well-worn thesis that comic effects result from situations involving incongruity and degradation. (By implication, therefore, he presumably could not have accepted Bergson's idea that situations are comic when they exhibit, "le mécanisme plaqué sur la vie," for this is only a sophisticated variant of the incongruity/degradation thesis.(110 *)) To accept this view would be to allow that some unpleasant suggestion, a negative value, is a necessary condition for the experience of beauty.

He approaches the problem via several preliminary points describing further features of comedy and the comic response. In the first place, comedy puts before us scenes which are not entirely impossible and yet which could not occur in ordinary life. If a scene of this kind is agreeable,
"we allow ourselves to dream it true. We forget its relations; we forbid the eye to wander beyond the frame of the stage, or the conventions of the fiction. We indulge an illusion which deepens our sense of the essential pleasantness of things." (III)

Again, the situations of comedy, thus impossible in daily life, administer shocks to our habits of apperception, stimulating the imagination. After the shock, returned to common sense and reality, we feel, "cheated, relieved, abashed, or amused, in proportion as our sympathy attaches more to the point of view surrendered, or to that attained." (II) This is an unenlightening remark: the variety of states specified makes it true of the responses induced by modes of drama other than comedy.

As to incongruity and degradation themselves, Santayana's first point (which can be allowed him) is that they are at most necessary conditions for amusement, since contradiction and deterioration are not always amusing. However, he seems in this early work to want to say that to make incongruity and degradation necessary conditions for amusement is, as is allegedly the case with pain and sublimity, to confuse cause and effect.

We may laugh without any reason at all, when we are tickled, or laugh in sympathy with others, or at the simple repetition of something not itself amusing. Therefore, he concludes, there must be some nervous state on which amusement depends, an excitement generally set off by incongruity or degradation. (II) This is hardly consistent with the later passages quoted above, differentiating the varieties of laughter. The later view is surely the better one: the quality of the experience occasioned by the causes of the fairly mindless varieties of laughter Santayana here specifies is surely markedly different from that produced by the highest of comedies, works which, as Donneau de Visé said, "font rire dans l'âme". (II*) Cause and effect are not so independent as Santayana here wishes to maintain.

He continues that certain crude cases of the comic seem to consist of little more than a shock of surprise: a pun, an accident to a dignified
person, the casting off of a disguise, wild exaggeration. Yet such
stances of comedy are of the briefest duration, and (he maintains)
leave an uncomfortable after-taste, an impression of foolishness.
Santayana thinks it quite obvious why this should be so: the comic incident
is an absurdity; it starts a wrong analogy in the mind; but, "man, being
a rational animal, can like absurdity no better than he can like hunger
or cold."(115) In all cases, "the qualm remains, and the pleasure is never
perfect."(116)

The reason for this optimistic and perhaps questionable psychology
appears in the following paragraph. The absurd is good (i.e. pleasant)
only when it spoils nothing better; the best place for it is in the midst
of other absurdities: "Things amuse us in the mouth of a fool that would
not amuse us in that of a gentleman; a fact which shows how little
incongruity and degradation have to do with pleasure in the comic." (117)
The incongruous and degrading are always unpleasant; it is not they which
please in comedy. They may indeed stimulate a pleasant passion, such as
scorn or cruelty or self-satisfaction, for the sense of fun has a good
deal of malice in it. Yet, Santayana claims (as he has to) the main
pleasure in comedy, "comes from the inward rationality and movement of
the fiction, not from its inconsistency with anything else."(118) The
consistency of this manoeuvre is considered below.

Santayana continues, less contentiously, to analyse wit, where he
claims we have the greater satisfaction of comedy without incongruity. Wit
has been said to consist in quick association by similarity. But with
wit the substitution must be valid, the similarity real: it is the
unforeseen justness which makes wit. This is linked with the fact that
wit is serious: "It is characteristic of wit to penetrate to the hidden
depths of things, to pick out there some telling circumstance or relation,
by noting which the whole object appears in a new and clearer light."(119)
The reason why wit is so often said to be malicious is that in an example
of wit, it is usually the case that the categories of common sense are juxtaposed in unaccustomed ways. A witty analysis,

"in discovering common traits and universal principles
assimilates things at the poles of beings: it can apply to cookery
the formulas of theology, and can find in the human heart a case
of the fulcrum and lever." (120)

Yet wit need not be destructive: it belittles one thing only to dignify another. The only difficulty with this analysis is why Santayana should consider that incongruity and degradation are absent from wit, for on his own analysis, they are obviously present, e.g. in the cookery/theology case.

He correctly differentiates humour from wit or the merely comic:

"...the essence of what we call humour is that amusing weaknesses should be combined with amiable humanity. Whether it be in the way of ingenuity, or oddity, or drollery, the humourous person must have an absurd side, or be placed in an absurd situation. Yet this comic aspect, at which we ought to wince, seems to endear the character all the more." (121)

Once again, consistency demands that Santayana claim that, as with tragedy, we are not pleased by the painful suggestions, but in spite of them. The painful suggestions are felt as painful, but the pain is overbalanced by the pleasant aspects of the experience. These are themselves of two kinds: the aesthetically pleasing aspects of the work, and the sympathetic reaction to the character.

Last among the concepts related to comedy to be considered by Santayana is the grotesque. He considers that the grotesque is an effect, "produced by such a transformation of an ideal type as exaggerates one of its elements or combines it with other types." (122) Such recastings of form can become accepted - the centaur and the satyr are no longer regarded as grotesque. If the new form is pleasing enough, we will disregard the discrepancy from the natural which first makes us call it
grotesque. When we first perceive it, however, the new form requires effort of the imagination to grasp its unity. Hence the grotesque is, "the half-formed, the perplexed, and the suggestively monstrous." (123) The stress Santayana lays on the eventual acceptance of the grotesque leads him to find a strong analogy between it and the witty: "Good wit is novel truth, as the good grotesque is novel beauty". (124) There is surely not much evidence to justify so persistent a stress on the eventual acceptance of the grotesque as beautiful; the gargoyles of the Gothic style are grotesque by definition; but they are by no means universally regarded as beautiful, even now.

Finally, it is now appropriate to review the argument of the last two sections, to consider the important point of internal consistency defended in them: has Santayana shown that, "no aesthetic value is really founded on the experience or suggestion of evil," (125)? In fact, it is clear that Santayana has not made out his case. With regard to tragedy, it is plain that unless the subject-matter were of a painful kind, the aesthetic experience it produces would be quite different; in the case of the sublime, he himself admits that fear is the main route to the experience of sublimity (as he conceives it), even if not the only one, and therefore, experiences such as these must be 'founded on' the experience or suggestion of pain. Again, it is obvious that in the experience of comedy we can and do take pleasure in the pain of another — he himself admits that the sense of fun has a good deal of malice in it. To claim as he does that incongruity and degradation are always unpleasant, and that we are pleased in spite of and not because of them is simply not true.

This conclusion comes as no surprise. The classification of aesthetic experience under the single heading 'pleasant' is rather too simple to cover all the varied and subtle varieties of experience by
which art enriches life. Moreover, it is quite clear that Santayana responded to art with much greater sensitivity than his theoretical commitment to pleasure would alone suggest - in his discussion of tragedy, comedy, and the sublime, he refutes himself. Doing more than usually full justice in most cases to the states of mind he describes, he shows the inadequacy of his own theoretical scaffolding. It seems that at this stage of his career, two elements in his intellectual make-up conflicted with one another: he was too fine-grained and reflective not to respond fully to art, and yet also so eager to refute the style of Romantic pessimism he encountered especially in Royce's philosophy that he was willing to impose the simple category of pleasure on to aesthetic experience. Hence the presence of his fine introspective reports together with an important inconsistency in his arguments on values in the second term of expressions.

VI: Conclusion

The foregoing remark about fine details in an over-rigid framework can be generalised to cover the whole of "The Sense of Beauty" and Santayana's other scattered remarks on the subjects he considered in that book. Several of his major claims have been found to be questionable, e.g., two of the proposed differentiae of the experience of beauty, positiveness and objectification, have been rejected. While this is so, however, it should be emphasized that Santayana fits many fine insights into his theoretical framework: his views on the material of a work of art, his ability to accommodate many of the data of the problem of expression, and his treatment of the response to tragedy, for example. Most refreshing of all the characteristics of this first book is its freedom from the essentialism which takes one aspect of the work of art and in the teeth of counter-examples makes this aspect the defining property of art. Santayana's sane and clear-sighted vision, which does justice to all the properties of a work of art, has not been all that widely shared in the history of aesthetics.
Chapter V: Poetry and Religion

I: Introduction

Santayana’s views on beauty, the materials of a work of art, form and expression, are located mainly in one place, the four chapters of "The Sense of Beauty". It is otherwise with his views on religion and poetry, which are the subject not only of two full length books ("Interpretations of Poetry and Religion", 1900, and "Three Philosophical Poets", 1910) but also of a number of scattered essays and sections of other books, dating from 1892 onwards. Moreover, there is a plainly visible development in these views, falling into three phases: (i) adumbrations of the mature view, 1892-1896, (ii) full statement of the mature view, 1900-1913; and (iii) a major revision of the doctrine of phase (ii), in 1921. These considerations make it desirable to separate exposition and criticism in dealing with this subject; otherwise the argument would straggle.

A further reason for this procedure lies in the full emergence, in the second phase of the development, of a doctrine only adumbrated in "The Sense of Beauty", i.e. that the principal activity of the imagination is to idealize. This doctrine plays a major role in Santayana's theory of religion, his interpretation of Platonic philosophy in all its varieties, and his doctrines of poetry and on art in general. Curiously enough commentators on Santayana do not give this doctrine the place it deserves in their expositions of his philosophy. His numerous but scattered remarks need to be brought together and ordered.

In the following exposition, the mature doctrine of phase (ii) is set out in six sections, and this is followed by a statement of the early and late variants on it.

II: Exposition of the Mature Doctrines

(1) Mental Faculties and their Relations

The most important presuppositions of Santayana’s theory of poetry and religion are in the philosophy of mind. Representationalism in the philosophy of perception is assumed throughout, and so accordingly is some
version if the distinction between immediate, unconceptualised data, and the mind's construction on them. It is also assumed that no comparison of data and stimuli is possible in principle; the only guarantee of truth of beliefs or veridicality of perception which is logically possible is a pragmatic one: beliefs and perceptions which lead us to deal successfully with the environment (itself a posited existent) are the ones we accept as true and veridical.

Considering the limitations of the human mind, and its few channels of contact with reality (Santayana begins) it is surprising that reason has done as well as it has in the construction of ideas. Of the senses, sight is the best for forming permanent notions, yet before satisfactory conceptions can be extracted from the data of this the most informative of senses a good deal of analysis and correction is needed. Fortunately, as the senses, sight is the best for forming the most informative of data and stimuli is possible in principle; the only guarantee of truth of beliefs or veridicality of perception which is logically possible is a pragmatic one: beliefs and perceptions which lead us to deal successfully with the environment (itself a posited existent) are the ones we accept as true and veridical.

Considering the limitations of the human mind, and its few channels of contact with reality (Santayana begins) it is surprising that reason has done as well as it has in the construction of ideas. Of the senses, sight is the best for forming permanent notions, yet before satisfactory conceptions can be extracted from the data of this the most informative of senses a good deal of analysis and correction is needed. Fortunately, we have the right tool for this, understanding. This term is defined by Santayana only via an imprecise list of functions: "We have memory and we have certain powers of synthesis, abstraction, reproduction, invention..."(1) Understanding has hardly begun its work, however, when it is distracted by another faculty, imagination. The mind is no mere passive receptor, receiving impressions like the wax from the seal. On the contrary, "...perceptions fall into the brain rather as seeds into a furrowed field or even as sparks into a keg of powder. Each image breeds a hundred more, sometimes slowly and subterraneously, sometimes (when a passionate train is started) with a sudden burst of fancy."(2)

With this small equipment, the mind tries to fulfil its enormous ambition, which is nothing less than to construct a complete picture of the universe, and of its own origin. The mind is inadequate to this ambition, which, however, it cannot abandon. Granted this, all we can do is to take care with our ideas, "to arrange them according to their derivation and measure them by their applicability to life."(3)

The inadequacy of each of our faculties is what occasions the intrusion of some other faculty into its field. Thus it is that imagination is made
to serve sense and instinct, and made to do the work of intelligence. The substitution is easily made, for imagination and intelligence (a synonym for 'understanding' in Santayana's vocabulary) differ only in validity, not in origin:

"Understanding is an applicable fiction, a kind of wit with a practical use. Common sense and science live in a world of expurgated mythology...a world where the objects are imaginative in their origin and essence, but useful, abstract, and beneficent in their suggestions." (4)

Conceptions which, "prove serviceable in practice, and capable of verification in sense" (5) we call ideas of the understanding; others are ideas of the imagination. Granted Santayana's philosophy of perception, this attempt to distinguish the products of imagination from the products of sensation by characteristics other than their causes is inevitable.

Usually it is the profounder minds that yield to the imagination, for they feel the greatness of the problems of life, and the inadequacy of the understanding, with its present resources, to cope with them. Such a mind can take refuge from its dissatisfaction only by making use of the imagination, the only faculty left to invoke. It is the imagination which provides the materials for poetry and religion.

(ii) The Imagination and its Activity of Idealising

Human beings are almost never in complete accord with their environment. To be fully in accord with the environment would consist in that state in which the environment satisfied all human interests. We have concepts and beliefs which embody our notions of what this state of total accord would be like. They are our ideas of perfection, of a better state of things: our ideals. Ideals cannot be products of the understanding, since by definition, ideas of the understanding are those which most accurately record what is the case, rather than what we would prefer to be the case. Therefore, ideals must be products of the imagination. It is evident from all that Santayana writes on this subject that he regards
the formation of ideals as the most important function of the imagination. He regards idealising as a constant and healthy feature of human mental life. He speaks thus of "man's indomitable idealism." (6a)

Our ideals are determined by our interests:

"We can have no pleasure or pain, nor any preference whatsoever, without implicitly setting up a standard of excellence, an ideal, an ideal of what would satisfy us there. To make these implicit ideals explicit, to catch their hint, to work out their theme, and express clearly to ourselves and to the world what they are demanding in the place of the actual— that is the labour of reason and the task of genius." (7)

The formation of ideals is thus frequent and natural. The nearest Santayana gives to a description of the process of their formation is as follows:

The imagination,

"generates as well as abstracts; it observes, combines, and cancels; but it also dreams. Spontaneous syntheses arise in it which are not mathematical averages of the images it receives from sense; they are the effects of diffused excitements left in the brain by sensations." (8)

Ideals are general ideas modified by pleasure: "We know what the ideal is because we observe what pleases us in the reality." (9) Thus to refuse to modify an ideal in the light of what pleases us in new experiences would be to substitute ideas for feelings: "Ideals have their uses, but their authority is wholly representative. They stand for specific satisfactions, or else they stand for nothing at all." (10)

From the doctrine that ideals are general ideas modified by pleasure follows the claim that the ideal is the union of all we prize in all creatures. Once conceived, the ideal forbids total allegiance to any imperfect instance of it: "...the mind that has once felt the irresistible compulsion to create this ideal and to believe in it has become incapable
A tendency to impersonality is essential to ideals: they could not fulfill all their functions if they retained too many of the traits of one individual. Too much subjection to another personality, for example, makes the expression of our own impossible, and the ideal is nothing but a projection of the demands of the imagination. If the imagination is overpowered by too strong a fascination, we form no ideal at all. (12)

The adequacy of ideals is to be measured solely by their fidelity to our interests: this is the sole ground of their authority. Hence the further doctrine that existence, strictly speaking, is irrelevant to an ideal, i.e. an ideal gains nothing, in Santayana's view, by the attribution to it, by hypostasis, of an imagined reality. (13) (The relevance of this doctrine will become clearer later on.)

All moral life and moral judgment involve idealising, for in making a moral judgment, we "assert a private ideal in the face of an intractable and omnipotent world." (14) Some moralists feel the attraction of "untasted and ideal perfection" (15). Plato is an example of such a moralist, who is apt to despise this world. Others rebel against some particularly galling aspect of reality, and frame more fragmentary ideals, such as liberty, equality, and fraternity. They possess no visions for life as a whole, as is to be found, by contrast, in Plato's "Republic." (16)

Granted the divergencies of human temperament, ideals will be many and varied; but not so varied, Santayana thinks, as to preclude all hope of co-operation:

"I talk a great deal about the good and the ideal, having learned from Plato and Aristotle (since the living have never shown me how to live) that, granting a human nature to which to appeal, the good and the ideal may be defined with some accuracy. Of course, they cannot be defined immutably, because human nature is not immutable; and they cannot be defined in such a way as to be transferred without change from one race or person to another, because human nature is
various. Yet any reflective and honest man, in expressing his
hopes and preferences, may expect to find many of his neighbours
agreeing with him, and when they agree, they may work politically
together."(17)

Our ideals are not continually present to us, at the front of the mind;
but this does not in any way militate against their reality and authority.
The most important elements of our life are subject to the brevity of our
attention"...we are not uninterruptedly conscious of ourselves, our physical
environment, our ruling passions, our deepest conviction."(18) Yet the
ideal implied by our desires always exercises its authority over our lives:
"...our whole life is an act of worship to this unknown divinity; every
heartfelt prayer is offered before one or another of its images."(19)

Schopenhauer's view that a good once attained loses all its value is
nonsense. The instability of our attention, and the need of rest and repair
in our organs, does indeed bring it about that we do not long at a time
contemplate even our most cherished possessions. Yet the actions of these
high points on our lives is not for that reason as ephemeral as Schopen­
hauer would have us believe. We do not lose their benefit in those
intervals between contemplating them:

"The tone of the mind is permanently raised; and we live with that
general sense of steadfastness and resource which is perhaps the
kernel of happiness. Knowledge, affection, religion, and beauty are
not the less constant influences in a man's life because his
consciousness of them is intermittent. Even when absent, they
fill the chambers of the mind with a kind of fragrance. They have
a continual efficacy, as well as a perennial worth."(20)

Moreover, so long as we have the same organs and desires, so must we
pursue the same goals. The ideal is forever immanent in us, and realisation
of it constitutes perfection. This ideal is not the abstract vision of a
metaphysician, but, "the natural vision of the imagination, and the
To be without ideals is to live an irrational life, to fail to realize the highest possibilities of human attainment, which in Santayana's view are dependent on the exercise of reason:

"Were no ideal conceived at all, men would be the horses harnessed to their own chariot, docile perhaps and hardworking, but neither knowing where they go, nor indeed going anywhere. All life in the world is also, if rational, life in the ideal..."(22)

Hence, as he says elsewhere,

"No atheism is so terrible as the absence of an ultimate ideal, nor could any failure of power be more contrary to human nature than the failure of moral imagination, or more incompatible with healthy life. For we have faculties, and habits, and impulses. These are the basis of our demands. And these demands, although variable, constitute an ever-present intrinsic standard of value by which we feel and judge. The ideal is immanent in them; for the ideal means that environment in which our faculties would find their freest employment, and their most congenial world. Perfection would be nothing but life under these conditions."(23)

The finest moments of our lives are those in which our ideals are attained.

These views on ideals are taken from works written between 1896 and 1922. Santayana retained them until the end of his life. In the first volume of his autobiography, "Persons and Places" (1944) he expresses the same opinions in the vocabulary of his metaphysical system, "The Realms of Being". By 'psyche', he means the definitely organised human body with its various wants and needs, physical and emotional; by 'spirit', consciousness, which is capable, in favoured moments, of contemplating the entire universe, including its own psyche, with detachment. ('The use of the term 'spirit' does not imply a new allegiance to dualism in the philosophy of mind. Spirit is an epiphenomenon of bodily states.) He
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writes that it is easy to discover what it is that one loves— one has only to enumerate one's hatreds and infer the contrary. He goes on, a proposal of psyche and spirit: "Hatred and love are imposed on the spirit by the psyche.\textsuperscript{(24)} and the good, the object of love, when elicited by the process of self-inspection just noted, "when discovered to the spirit will become an ideal.\textsuperscript{(25)}"

(iii) The Hypostasis of Ideals in Philosophy and Religion

While existence is in a strict sense irrelevant to the appropriateness and authority of an ideal, very few human beings (Santayana believes) are emotionally equipped to accept this truth. Human beings have almost always found it more satisfying to believe that their ideals have some sort of existence. By definition, they cannot be instantiated in the world as it is; therefore, if they are to be both real and contemporary with us, they must exist in another world. This is Santayana's explanation for the widespread occurrence of religious beliefs in another world, and of all two-world metaphysics. Both styles of thought he regards as the result of the hypostasis of the ideals of the imagination. As so often with Santayana, a great deal of argumentation is absent, and philosophically important conclusions are merely assumed to be true. In his theory of religion, he assumes the truth of atheism as a premise, and in his view of Platonism (for example) he assumes the falsity of this metaphysic, as literally interpreted. It will be clear that his views on religion do not constitute a philosophy of religion as that subject is now conceived, i.e. in terms of the analysis of the logical properties of predicates and statements in religious discourse. Rather, his theory is more in the manner of Feuerbach, a psychological account of why religion should be so persistent a feature of the human condition, an account in which the falsity of religious beliefs is assumed as a datum.

Plato's idealism is a product of the idealising activity of the imagination, together with the postulated tendency to hypostatize. What
Plato does is to formulate, "myths that present the ideal suggestions of human life in pictures. These he sometimes leaves general and pale, calling them ideas; but at other times he embodies them in deities, or in detailed imaginary constructions, like that of his 'Republic'."(26) The concepts of absolute beauty and love, for example, are perfectly natural ideals: "...the imagination and the heart behold, when they are left free to expand and express themselves, an absolute beauty and a perfect love."(27) Granted his views on the centrality of idealising in the life of the imagination, it is no surprise that Santayana should regard Platonism, in an extended sense of the term, as a common attitude of mind: "The Platonic idealist is the man by nature so wedded to perfection that he sees in everything not the reality but the faultless ideal which the reality misses and suggests."(28)

Plotinian neo-Platonism is dealt with in the same way: "It is a system of morals inverted and turned into a cosmology."(29) Once again, the Ideas are ideals hypostatised: "Those Ideas which the psyche is able and predestined to discern are such as are illustrated or suggested by its own life, or by the aspects which nature presents to it. Each Idea will be the ideal of something with which the psyche is naturally conversant; but the good of all these psychic labours will lie precisely in clarifying and realizing that ideal."(30) As an example of hypostasis, Santayana takes the Plotinian notion of the One, that which lends excellence to the Ideas. This is "the mythical counterpart of moral harmony in the spirit."(31)

The great religions of the world are likewise made up of hypostatized ideals: "When natural phenomena are conceived as the manifestation of divine life, human life itself, by sympathy with that ideal projection of itself, enlarges its customary bounds, until it seems capable of becoming the life of the universe. A god is a
conceived victory of the mind over nature. A visible god is the consciousness of such a victory momentarily attained. The vision soon vanishes, the sense of omnipotence is soon dispelled by recurring conflicts with natural forces; but the momentary illusion of that realised good has left us with the perennial knowledge of good as an ideal. Therein lies the essence and function of religion."(32)

Regarded scientifically, religion is false; but it is justified if regarded as, "a kind of poetry that expresses moral values and reacts beneficently upon life."(33) A religion is to be judged by the quality of its moral doctrines. "Moral significance, while not the source of religions, is the criterion of their value and the reason why they deserve to endure."(34) Those who create and believe in religious doctrines do not think of themselves as merely projecting moral ideals and hypostatising them; they consider themselves to be making, for example, factual statements about the divinity. "Good religions are therefore the product of unconscious rationality, of imaginative impulses fortunately moral."(35)

Santayana gives examples of hypostases from several religions; two from Christianity are enough to illustrate his views. Of what reality is Christian eschatology the imaginative rendering? What was it in the lives of men that made them think of themselves as hanging between eternal bliss and eternal perdition? Partly, in Santayana's view, the desire to make ideal values stand out starkly in contrast with real values; but deeper than this was the genuine moralist's sympathy with a philosophic and logical view of immortality rather than with a superstitious and sentimental one. (36) Again, the doctrines of Heaven and Hell, and that what one does now helps to decide one's eternal destiny are an imaginative projection of the belief in the absoluteness of moral distinctions. The moral decisions we make can in a few years affect our lives irrevocably, and therefore the
ideal form of this doctrine, in terms of eternal salvation or damnation, is justified. (37*)

(iv) The Elements and Function of Poetry

The doctrines of the preceding three sections are all presupposed in Santayana's most important thesis concerning the nature and function of poetry: "...poetry and religion are identical in essence, and differ merely in the way in which they are attached to practical affairs. Poetry is called religion when it intervenes in life, and religion, when it merely supervenes upon life, is seen to be nothing but poetry." (38*) To be strictly internally consistent, Santayana should have said here that the best poetry is identical in essence with religion. His view is that there are three types of poetry, composed (confusingly enough) from four elements, in varying combinations. It is only the third and finest type of poetry, in which all four elements are present, which is identical in essence with religion.

The first level of poetry, that of, "mere sound and virtuosity" (39) is distinguished by the presence of metre, rhyme, and other devices which maximize the effect of the purely material properties of words. These devices are included by Santayana under the heading of Euphony, the first of the four elements of poetry.

Measure or metre is a condition for perfection, since perfection requires that not only the whole before us should have a form, but that every part of it should have a form, and that the parts should be co-ordinated among themselves. Thus if in despair of giving a serious definition of poetry, a critic says that it is metrical discourse, the account, while inadequate, is not one he need be ashamed of. If language is to be made perfect, its materials must be made beautiful by being themselves subjected to a measure, and endowed with a form. (40)

Earlier, in "The Sense of Beauty", Santayana had written that the justification of rhyme seems to be not only that it contributes to melody, but it also gives an artificial relationship to the phrases between which
it obtains, which, but for it, would run away from each other in a rapid and irrevocable flux. In the sonnet, for example, a real unity is forced on the thought — or at least, if it is not, the poem has no excuse for being a sonnet. The sonnet, by virtue of this inter-relationship of parts, is the 'non plus ultra' of rhyme. (41)

Thus Santayana writes:

"A tolerable definition of poetry, on its formal side, might be found in this: That poetry is speech in which the instrument counts as well as the meaning — poetry is speech for its own sake and for its own sweetness. As common windows are intended only to admit the light, but painted windows also to dye it, and to be an object of attention in themselves as well as a cause of visibility in other things, so, while the purest prose is a mere vehicle of thought, verse, like stained glass, arrests attention in its own intricacies, confuses it in its own glories, and is even at times allowed to darken and puzzle in the hope of casting over us a supernatural spell." (42)

It will be objected at once that this doctrine would be better cast as a definition literary as opposed to non-literary language, rather than merely as a means of distinguishing poetry from prose. In "Reason in Art", Santayana does recast the doctrine in this way. Literary prose, he says, has a double allegiance: "It must convey intelligence, but intelligence clothed in a language that lends the message an intrinsic value, and makes it delightful to apprehend apart from its importance in ultimate theory or practice. Prose is in that measure a fine art. It might be called poetry that had become persuasively representative..." (43) Poetry would then be differentiated from artistic prose by its metrical structure.

The sensuous beauty of words and their utterance in measure suffice for the first type of poetry. There is no definite meaning, but only speech euphonious and measured. Such euphony is a necessary condition for
the greatest achievements in poetry, "and even without an intelligible superstructure these sensuous qualities suffice to give that thrill of exaltation, that suggestion of an ideal world, which we feel in the presence of beauty."(44)

The second level of poetry is that of, "fancy, of observation, and of passion"(45). Two more elements of poetry are present in works in this second class, euphuism, and the re-categorisation of experience.

By euphuism, Santayana means, "the choice of coloured words and rare and elliptical phrases."(46) In euphuistic poetry, there is more than mere euphony, "there is the colour and choice of words, the fanciful, rich, or exquisite juxtaposition of phrases."(47) Such euphuism, "would seem to be necessary as well as metre, to the formal essence of poetry."(48) The argument to establish this consists in the assertion that euphuism is absent from the verse of Pope, that on this ground we hesitate to call such writing poetic, and that therefore euphuism is a necessary condition for poetry.(49)

The second feature of the second level of poetry is the re-categorisation of experience. The poet, Santayana contends, has the innocent eye. He is closer to the data of experience than most of us ever are, we who use only the practical abstractions of daily language, and ignore half our experience, as we must if the world is to be intelligible: "Poetry breaks up the trite conceptions designated by current words into the sensuous qualities out of which these conceptions were originally put together. We name what we conceive and believe in, not what we see; things, not images; souls, not voices and silhouettes."(50) The poet, by contrast, "disintegrates the fictions of common perception into their sensuous elements, gathers these together again into chance groups as the accidents of his environment or the affinities of his temperament may conjoin them." (51)

The poet restores to notice those elements of perception which are ignored in ordinary, humdrum existence. These neglected elements include
thoughts and images, but also and more importantly, emotions. All perception, Santayana claims, is accompanied by emotion, and this emotion is the first thing that is ignored by the intellect: "The link that binds together the ideas, sometimes so wide apart, which (the poet's) wit assimilates, is most often the link of emotion; they have in common some element of beauty or horror."(52)

Emotion is of the first importance in poetry:

"The poet's art is to a great extent the art of intensifying emotions by assembling the scattered objects that naturally arouse them...As the guiding principle of practical thinking is some interest, so that only what is pertinent to that interest is selected by the attention...so in poetic thinking the guiding principle is often a mood or a quality of sentiment."(53)

Moreover, as has been indicated in Ch. IV, above, by this union of objects disparate except for a common overtone of feeling, the poet can create new feelings: "Poets can...arouse sentiments finer than any which they have known, and in the act of composition become discoverers of new realms of delightfulness and grief."(54)

As a result of this restoration to experience of those elements in it commonly ignored, "the outer world is bathed in the hues of human feeling, the inner world expressed in the forms of things," a state which according to Santayana, "is the primitive condition of both before the intelligence and the prosaic classification of objects have abstracted them and assigned them to their respective spheres."(55) The poet, then, reminds us of the primitive state of our experience, before the rejection of those elements of it which are useless for the understanding of material reality. This reminder is beneficial: "...we see more and feel the more for that exercise; we are capable of finding greater entertainment in the common aspects of nature and life."(56)

As so far described, poetry would be nothing to us but a relaxation; no spiritual discipline could be obtained from it, and therefore the
The greatest function of poetry is yet to be found. The poetry which fulfills this function is that of the third kind, "the poetry of creative reason". Poetry on this highest plane embodies a comprehensive worldview or vision of the universe and the place of man in it, a vision which is moreover congenial to the mind. In other words, the greatest poetry embodies a comprehensive and worked-out set of ideals. Referring back to the re-categorisation of experience, Santayana continues: "Our descent into the elements of our being is then justified by our subsequent ascent toward its goal; we revert to sense only to find food for reason; we destroy conventions only to construct ideals." (59*)

In connexion with this third type of poetry, Santayana spends some time discussing the relative importance of characterisation and plot. The construction of characters, he maintains, is not the ultimate task of poetry. The reason is that a character can never exhaust its own materials: it exists by idiosyncrasy. In order to do justice to the profusion of our observations, we must put the characters in their setting. The great poet must render all nature, the circumstances which surround his characters: "the poet of larger mind envelops his characters in the atmosphere of nature and history, and keeps us constantly aware of the world in which they move." (60)

Equally important is the dramatic situation in which the characters are involved. The substance of poetry is emotion, and this is in no way surprising. The passions are the chief basis of all interests, even the most ideal, and the passions are seldom brought into play except in the contact of man with man. Hence the importance of the dramatic situation. (61)

The greatest satisfaction provided for us by fiction is that which arises from vicarious experience. There is a certain disorder in our psychical organisation. We have, in a sense, an infinite will, but only a limited experience, "an experience sadly inadequate to exercise that will either in its purity or its strength." (62) The main device by means
of which the poet furnishes us with vicarious experience is the plot:

"If (the poet) gives us a good plot, we can readily furnish
the characters, because each of them will be the realisation of
some stunted potential self of own own. It is by the plot,
then, that the characters will be vivified, because it is by
the plot that our own character will be expanded into its latent
possibilities."(63)

It is not the case, Santayana claims, that the description of an alien
character can supply vicarious experience as efficiently as a good plot,
since "the presentation of the circumstances in which that character
manifests itself will make description unnecessary, since our instinct
will supply all that is requisite for the impersonation."(64*)

Returning to the general description of the highest form of poetry,
Santayana argues that poetry is not at its best when, as is the case
with Romeo's love, it describes a single passion, life in one of its
phases. It is at its best when it gives meaning to the passions it
describes, by virtue of a commanding and unified vision of the entire
order of things.(65)

The highest example of this kind of poetry is religion. It is often
misunderstood by literal-minded men, who, thinking thereby to establish
the importance of their beliefs, attribute to them literal truth, and
hypostatise their ideals. Here they fall into error, for, "value lies
in meaning, not in substance; in the ideal which things approach, not in
the energy which they embody."(66) Moreover, when poetry,

"comes to the consciousness of its highest function, that of
portraying the ideals of experience and destiny, then the poet
becomes aware that he is essentially a prophet, and either devotes
himself, like Homer and Dante, to the loving expression of the
religion that exists, or like Lucretius or Wordsworth, to the
heralding of one which he believes to be possible."(67*)

If poetry is to be of the greatest kind, "the experience imagined should
be conceived as a destiny, governed by principles, and issuing in the
discipline and enlightenment of the will."(68*)

Santayana draws two conclusions from these doctrines, the first of
which is his complete definition of poetry: "we may say that poetry is
metrical and euphuistic discourse, expressing thought which is both sensuous
and ideal."(69) Secondly, it follows that,

"Religion is poetry become the guide to life, poetry substituted
for science or supervening upon it as an approach to the highest
reality. Poetry is religion allowed to drift, left without points
of application in conduct and without an expression in worship and
dogma; it is religion without practical efficacy and without
metaphysical illusion."(70)

(v) Barbarism: Some Critical Verdicts, and Doctrine on the Length of Poems

It has been pointed out (in (ii) above) that for Santayana the
possession of a comprehensive and thoroughly worked-out set of ideals is
an index of mental health and rationality. His special term for the state
of humanity in which there are either no ideals or only few and fragmentary
ones is barbarism:

"For the barbarian is the man who regards his passions as their
own excuse for being; who does not domesticate them either by
understanding their cause or by conceiving their ideal goal. He
is the man who does not know his derivations or perceive his
tendencies, but who merely feels and acts, valuing in his life
its force and its filling, but being careless of its purpose
and its form...His delight is in abundance and vehemence; his art,
like his life, shows an exclusive respect for quality and
splendour of materials. His scorn for what is poorer and weaker
than himself is only surpassed by his ignorance of what is higher."  

(71*)

The barbarian has a characteristic morality: he conceives of life as
an adventure, not a discipline; and the exercise of energy is the absolute
good, irrespective of motives or consequences. The barbarian is unwilling
to learn from experience, has contempt for rationality, carelessness about perfection, and admiration for mere force. It will come as no surprise, in view of the dislike of the romanticism expressed in 'The Sense of Beauty', to find that for Santayana the romantic and the barbarian are identical figures. Goethe's Faust is in Santayana's view a perfect instance of barbarism, a worshipper of willing for its own sake. 

The theory of the elements and function of poetry of the preceding section is used by Santayana as the underpinning for his criticism of poetry. Poets are classified and evaluated by him according as their work falls into the three classes of poetry he has distinguished.

Walt Whitman's poetry is that of a rich, spontaneous and absolutely lazy fancy. It is the most sincere confession of the lowest (i.e. the most primitive) type of perception. We find the swarms of men and objects rendered as they might strike the retina in a sort of waking dream:

"This abundance of detail without organisation, this wealth of perception without intelligence and of information without taste, makes the singularity of Whitman's genius." He portrays common life absolutely without any standard of judgment by which to evaluate it. Whitman's poetry is barbarian in Santayana's sense, and must fall into the lowest of the three classes he distinguishes.

Also an example of barbarism, but this time in the second of the three classes of poetry is that of Browning. Browning is indeed a writer of genius, a master of the expression of emotion; but his thought and art are inchoate and ill-digested. He fails to approach even a recognition of the traditional ideals of poetry and religion. In Browning, there is no description of passion from the vantage ground of the intellect; on the contrary, his art is all self-expression and satire. His art was inspired by ends less simple and universal than the ends of imagination itself:

"No conception could be farther from his thought than the essential conception of any rational philosophy, namely, that
feeling is to be treated as a raw material for thought, and that the destiny of emotion is to pass into objects which shall contain all its value while losing all its formlessness. The transformation of sense and emotion into objects agreeable to the intellect, into clear ideas and beautiful things, is the natural work of reason..."(75*)

By contrast, Dante is the type of the consummate poet, and the "Divine Comedy" is a successful example of the highest species of poetry: in it, Dante gives a unified rendering of the whole of life. He is the supreme poet of the supernatural, the unrivaled exponent, after Plato, of that phase of thought and feeling in which the supernatural seems to be the key to nature and to happiness. He presents the most complete idealisation and comprehension of things yet attained by human beings.(76)

Apart from Dante, Santayana accords the highest praise to Homer, Lucretius and Goethe (as the author of "Faust"). One obvious feature which their works have in common is substantial length; indeed to put forward a comprehensive world-view of the kind Santayana admires, a long poem is a necessity. Consequently, he can have no sympathy with the doctrine that a long poem is a contradiction in terms, or at least, that long poems by nature tend to be patchy and bad. He argues against this view in "Three Philosophical Poets."(1910) The three poets in question are Lucretius, Dante, and Goethe.(77*)

Each of these poets is typical of an age, and taken together, (in Santayana's view) they sum up all European philosophy. Lucretius adopts materialism in natural science and humanism in ethics; because of this he typifies Greek, Renaissance, and contemporary philosophy. Dante, as has been said, is the superlative poet of supernaturalism, a view which regards happiness as impossible here and only to be hoped for in a future life. Goethe's "Faust" is the greatest monument to yet another spirit, that of Romanticism. The will summons all dangers and all opportunities out of nothing, to feed its appetite for action; and in that
ideal function lies their sole reality. Once attained, these things are transcended like the episodes of a spent dream. The spirit that created them remains undefiled and passes on to new fictions.(78)

Is it an accident, Santayana continues, that the most adequate and lasting expositions of these philosophies are by poets? Is philosophy in the end nothing but poetry? If one considers philosophy as an investigation into truth, or reasoning upon truths already discovered, there is nothing in philosophy akin to poetry. But in philosophy, investigation and reasoning are only servile and preparatory stages to the attainment of the final sublime vision, "theoria", "a steady contemplation of all things in their order and worth. Such contemplation is imaginative. No one can reach it who has not enlarged his mind and tamed his heart. A philosopher who attains it is, for the moment, a poet; and a poet who turns his practised and passionate imagination on the order of things, or on anything in the light of the whole, is for that moment a philosopher."(79)

Those, therefore, who maintain that the poet is of necessity short-winded, simply testify to the inadequacy of their own imaginative powers: "If it be a fact, as it often is, that we find little things pleasing and great things arid and formless, and if we are better poets in a line than in an epic, that is simply due to lack of faculty or our part, lack of imagination and memory, and above all to lack of discipline."(80) The difficulty, after having the experience to symbolise, lies only in having enough imagination to hold and suspend it in thought.(81) Far from short-windedness being a necessary condition for poetry, poetry is all the more poetry for having breadth and range. The argument of "Three Philosophical Poets" is designed to back up this theoretical argument by a critical consideration of "De Rerum Natura", "The Divine Comedy", and "Faust".

III: Variants on These Doctrines, Early and Late

In the May, 1890 number of the "Harvard Monthly" (i.e. ten years before
the publication of "Interpretations of Poetry and Religion"), Santayana published, "Walt Whitman: A Dialogue". The interlocutors, Van Tender and McStout, argue about the merits and demerits of Whitman's poetry. The gist of Van Tender's argument is that Whitman's poetry conveys a unique emotion, "It is the voice of nature crying in the wilderness of convention." (83) The mere enumeration of objects gives a sense of space, of a multiplicity of things spread endlessly around. (34) By not passing any verdict on the things he names, Whitman does justice to their intrinsic life and nature. (35)

Neither interlocutor is clearly victorious in this dialogue, indicating perhaps that Santayana had not at the time arrived at a general view of poetry. The opinions here put into the mouth of McStout, however, can be construed as admittedly imprecise foreshadowings of the mature doctrines. McStout objects, for example, that Whitman's lists of names have nothing to do with poetry, since poetry deals with illusions, not facts: "It seems to me that the illusion is poetic, and the fact is so only when in fancy we assimilate it to the fiction...Poetry deals with sensuous attractions found nowhere on the map. To see them you must have a passport into fairy land." (36) This passage is consonant with the later doctrines that the poet can create new feelings by uniting objects of identical emotional overtone, and that poetry ought to be informed and indeed is informed by ideals: in both these cases, poetry deals with things not to be found 'on the map'. Again, McStout objects that, "It is immoral to treat life as a masquerade, as a magic pantomime in which acts have no consequences, and happiness and misery don't exist." (37) McStout clearly thinks that poetry should be informed by a set of moral beliefs, and in Santayana's later theory, having moral beliefs involves having ideals.

In, "The Sense of Beauty" (1896), Santayana puts forward a two-fold division of poets into musicians and psychologists. The musicians are, "masters of significant language as harmony; they know what notes
to sound together and in succession; they can produce, by the
marshalling of sounds and images, by the figure of passion and
the snap of wit, a thousand brilliant effects out of old
materials." (38)

The psychologists, on the other hand, gain their effect not by the
mastery of the intrinsic properties of language, but by a closer adaptation
of it to things. In the class of musicians, Santayana includes the
Ciceronian orator, and epigrammatic, lyric, and epic poets. Dramatic
poets, by contrast, are the natural example of the psychologists. (39)
This distinction is quite incidental to the argument of "The Sense of
Beauty", and is not mentioned again by Santayana. Nor is it a loss; as
if Shakespeare were not a musician as well as a psychologist.

Twenty-seven years after, "The Sense of Beauty", Santayana published
his essay, "On My Friendly Critics" ("The Journal of Philosophy", v.18,
no.26, Dec. 22nd, 1921; subsequently reprinted in "Soliloquies in England
and Later Soliloquies", 1922) In this essay he makes an important
modification to the theories of "Interpretations of Poetry and Religion"
and "Three Philosophical Poets":

"So anxious was I, when younger, to find some rational justification
for poetry and religion, and to show that their magic was signifi­
cant of true facts, that I insisted too much, as I now think, on
the need of relevance to fact even in poetry...I maintained that
the noblest poetry also must express the moral burden of life and
must be rich in wisdom. Age has made me less exacting, and I can
now find quite sufficient perfection in poetry, like that of the
Chinese and Arabians, without much philosophic scope, in mere grace
and feeling and music and cloud-castles and frolic." (90)

This revision does not follow merely from a change of taste, but
from a change in Santayana's philosophy of mind. In the version of the
theory of Section 2, above, it is assumed that the mind is only, "a
system of successive ideas, the later ones mingling with the survival
of the earlier, and forming a cumulative experience, like a swelling musical movement." (91) This is accompanied by the further assumption that, "an idea could have depth and richness only if somehow redolent of former experiences of an overt kind." (92) The rest of the argument to the conclusions of the mature view would then presumably be this: significant ideas are those with multiple associations. In order to be great, poetry must be significant, and to be significant, it must embody these ideas, and the more of them, the better. The wider the range of experience covered, the greater will be the significance of the poetry. Hence the greatest poetry has the scope of a complete philosophy.

By 1921, Santayana had adopted an additional belief in the philosophy of mind, which he states, however, only with great inexactness: "I have learned...to rely more on the substructure, on the material and psychical machinery that puts the conscious show on the stage, and pulls the wires". (93) This leads him to adopt a second, alternative condition for poetic significance: "When living substance is thus restored beneath the surface of experience, there is no longer any reason for assuming that the first song of a bird may not be infinitely rich and as deep as heaven, if it utters the vital impulses of the moment with enough completeness." (94) This new position does not involve a denial of the former one. The change of view can be summed up as follows: In the "Interpretations of Philosophy and Religion"/"Three Philosophical Poets" period, Santayana believed that the greatest poetry has philosophic scope; by 1922, he believed that the greatest poetry is either of philosophic scope, or fully expressive of the present condition of the organism.

Santayana thus has a theory of the nature and function of poetry and of religion from which it follows that poetry and religion have in common the property of expressing ideals, and differ only in our attitude towards them. The following assessment of his views is organized in three sections:
Firstly, a consideration of his necessary conditions for poetry; secondly, a review of his theory of religion, and finally, in the light of these, an examination of his conclusion as to their relation.

IV. Necessary Conditions for Poetry

(1) Meter, Rhyme, and Meter on the Nature of Literary Language

Santayana contends that meter is a necessary condition for poetry. He considers it to be a necessary condition for perfection of form: only if meterically organised can every part of the whole poem have a form, and all the parts be co-ordinated.

This doctrine of the necessity of meter has been long contested, and is denied in some historically important essays in poetics. Thus for example, Sir Philip Sidney, in his "Apologie for Poetrie" (1581) writes: "...it is not ryming and versing, that maketh Poesie. One may bee a poet without versing, and a versifier without Poetry."(95) Rather, he contends, following Horace, "it is that saying notable images of vertue, vices, or what els, with that delightfull teaching which must be the right describing note to know a poet by..."(96) On the other hand, equally important writers take up the contrary stance. Sir Walter Scott ("On Ballad Poetry", 1820), writing of poetry in general, claims that poetry is formed by refining ordinary speech. It has, "A more ornate diction, modulated by certain rules of rhythm, cadence, assonance of termination, or recurrence of sound or letter...and it is) a dialect more solemn in expression"(97) than ordinary speech. Or again, Coleridge ("Biographia Literaria", 1817) stipulates that in a poem, all the parts should be organically related, none should be dispensable, and each should act upon the others: "...all in their proportion harmonising with, and supporting the purpose and known influences of metrical arrangement."(98)

The cause of this debate seems to be a shift in the meaning of the term, 'poetry'. Writers, such as Sidney, for whom the Greek root of the term determined its meaning, use 'poetry' in what now appears as an extended
sense to cover most of all of imaginative literature. Equally classically
minded was Ben Jonson, who answers the question, 'what is a poet?' as
follows: (Discoveries upon Men and Matter", posth., 1641) "...the word poet signifies to make or fayne. Hence he is called a Poet, not hee which
writeth in measure only, but that fayneth and formeth a fable, and writes
things like the truth. For the Fable and Fiction is, as it were, the
forme and Soule of any Poeticall work or Poeme."(99) This etymology is
clearly reflected also, of course, in the Middle English noun "maker"
for poet, and the verb, "to make" in the sense of to compose or imitate.
(100) Since the Renaissance, the term seems gradually to have changed
its meaning, and now denotes only a sub-class of the class of works of
literary art, i.e. literary works metrically organised. This shift is
indicated in the existence of terms like "prose-poem" to refer to
literary works which are non-metrical and yet share properties typically
associated with poems, e.g. lyrical intensity, and highly metaphorical
language. Nor is the change in meaning restricted to English. Mallarme
felt the need to refer to one of his works as "Poèmes en Prose".

Granted the present meaning of "poem" in English, then, one can accept
Santayana's first necessary condition for poetry, i.e. that a poem should
be in metrical language. For the sake of completeness, it is to be noted
that being metrical is not of course a sufficient condition for poetry;
failed poems are commonly denigrated by the description, "mere verse".
Verse must have certain aesthetic virtues, before it qualifies for the
title, "poem". (The implications of this for the logical grammar of the
term 'poem' and its cognates are taken up below.)

With regard to rhyme (not of course a necessary condition for poetry),
Santayana says merely that it contributes to melody, and acts as a binding
agent for the phrases between which it obtains. These views are not
untypical. In his classic "Defence of Ryme" (1602) Daniel argues in
favour of the mnemonic value of rhyme. It gives, "both to the Eare an
Echo of a delightfull report and to the Memorie a deeper impression of
what is delivered therein". (101) Again, he claims emotive power for rhyme, as one of its three functions, which are, "delighting the eare, stirring the heart, and satisfying the judgement in such sort as I doubt whether euer single numbers will do in our climate.\textsuperscript{(102)} In general, "...Rhyme (which is an excellencie added to this worke of measure, and a Harmonie, ferre happier than any proportion Antiquitie could euer show us) dooth add more grace and hath more delight than euer bare numbers, howsoever they can be forced to runne in our slow language, can possibly yield." (103) In a modern work, Wellek and Warren distinguish three functions for rhyme: (i) it has a merely euphonious function in the repetition or near-repetition of sounds, (ii) it signals the end of a line of verse, and can organise stanzaic patterns, and (iii) it has a semantic function - words are brought together by rhyme, and either linked up or contrasted. (104) Some of these arguments are obviously too imprecise and subjective to be tested or worth testing (rhyme gives more 'delight' than blank verse), and others claim only trivial virtues for rhyme (mnemonic power). To the claims that rhyme adds to euphony, and has an organising function, one need only add the qualification that these are properties of successful rhyme, rather than automatic benefits which follow from its use. Santayana's views on rhyme are correct, if not especially original.

The aesthetic doctrine which Santayana associates with these first reflections on poetry, i.e. that poetic language is language whose intrinsic properties are an object of aesthetic interest, is surely acceptable. One of the features of the aesthetic as opposed to the instrumental or utilitarian attitude is that one contemplates features of an aesthetic object which would be passed over in a non-aesthetic context. Common to our attitude to the non-aesthetic uses to which language is put is our minimal regard for its intrinsic properties, such as sound and formal arrangement, and it is precisely these which are noticed in the distanced state. This, is not, obviously, to imply that in literature, semantic
properties are of secondary interest or of no interest at all, simply that our interest in literary language embraces both its semantic and its intrinsic properties.

To neglect the intrinsic properties, to treat literature as a means solely of obtaining information, is to impoverish the aesthetic response, and to diminish the pleasure which literature can give. One man who must have suffered from impaired aesthetic experience in this way was Lamotte. Everything good in a poem, he believed, delights the reason, and reason does not need verse. He wrote a prose version of the first scene of Racine's "Mithridate", which he claimed was in no way inferior to the original. He felt justified in doing so by his critical beliefs:

"Qu'est-ce qui constitue la solide bonté d'un ouvrage, si ce n'est pas la justesse des pensées, liées entre elles par le meilleur arrangement...et le choix des expressions le plus propres à faire passer dans l'esprit des autres, des idées qu'on veut leur donner. Voilà la raison, voilà l'éloquence, voilà la connaissance parfaite et le seul usage légitime d'une langue. Après cela, que resterait-il à estimer dans un ouvrage du côté de l'intelligence?" (105)

The perversity of this doctrine, omitting as it does so many distinctive features of literature and the full aesthetic response to it, points up by contrast the rightness of the contrary doctrine, embraced by Santayana.

(ii) 'Euphuism'

The very choice of this term, having the historical reference it does, and Santayana's definition of it ("the choice of coloured words and rare and elliptical phrases") suggest that this imprecise doctrine is to be interpreted as a claim that the vocabulary and syntax of poetry is and ought to be markedly different and remote from that of non-poetic language.

If this is so, then two comments are in order. In the first place, Pope is by no means the happiest choice as an example of a non-euphuistic writer. Whatever might be one's evaluation of this style, the artificiality
of the heroic couplet and conventional periphrases surely separate this
type of poetry from the language of ordinary speech.

Secondly, this doctrine, like that of the necessity of metre, has been
contested by writers on poetics. Daniel, for example, holds the contrary
position:

"Next to this deformity stands our affection, wherein we alwayes
bewray our selves to be both unkind, and unnaturall to our owne
native language, in disguising or forging strange or un usuall wordes,
as if it were to make our verse seem an other kind of speach out of
the course of our usuall practice, displacing our wordes, or
investing new, onely upon a singularitie: when our owne accustomed
phrase, set in the due place, would expresse us more familiarly
and to better delight, than all this idle affectation of antiquitie,
or noueltie can euer doe." (106)

Again, Wordsworth gives what is historically the most celebrated statement
of the same view "...every good poem, even of the most elevated character,
must necessarily, except with reference to the metre, in no respect differ
from that of good prose...there neither is nor can be, any essential
difference between the language of prose and metrical composition." (107)

There is surely no reason to accept either Santayana's view, or that
of Daniel and Wordsworth, all three of whom are guilty of that sort of
parochialism of taste (on this point) which so often attends change of
fashion in the literary world. Neither euphuism nor plainness is necessary
for poetry, nor for good or great poetry. It is a commonplace that poems
and indeed good and great poems have been written in both plain and exotic
styles.

(iii) The Poet and the Data of Experience

Santayana accepts a representational theory of perception. He holds
that there are perceptual ultimates, irreducible data immediately given and
known by acquaintance, out of which the mind constructs the sensible world.
He accepts a distinction between the immediately given, and our mediate
constructions out of it. In his description of the creative process he relies on this distinction, holding that the poet is able in some way to approach the immediately given, and to recombine the data in ways other than those with which we operate in almost all our activities. The 'innocent eye', in Santayana's use, is the eye which is acquainted with immediate data.

The difficulty with this doctrine is that the immediatemediate distinction on which it rests is untenable. One way of showing its untenability is to examine one of its consequences: from Santayana's position, it follows that in any experience where I see something as something else, the experience is in a certain sense complex, and analysable into two sub-experiences, namely, (i) apprehending the data, and (ii) interpreting them, i.e. in some way fitting them into a coherent pattern of knowledge. The falsity of this analysis has been shown by Wittgenstein.

In the "Brown Book", Wittgenstein gives the example of a square with both diagonals drawn in. This might be seen, not only under the description of a square with both diagonals drawn in, but also as a swastika. His point is that in each case, there is no comparison made between what I see and something else in my mind which I subsequently see it as. He considers the very form of words, "seeing as" to be misleading, inviting us as it does to think that we are making a comparison: "seeing dashes as a face" does not involve a comparison between a group of dashes and a real human face; and, on the other hand, this form of expression most strongly suggests that we are alluding to a comparison"(108) In other words, when I see something as something else, there is only one thing that I do, i.e. see it; I do not both see something and compare it with an inner entity.

Other lines of argument emerge in the "Philosophical Investigations". Just before introducing the duck-rabbit, Wittgenstein gives as an example a perspective drawing of a glass cube. We can see it as a glass cube, an
inverted open box, a wire frame, or three boards forming a solid angle; and we see it as we interpret it. Someone might want to say that the description of what is got immediately, i.e. the visual experience, is arrived at indirectly. Thus, 'I see the figure as a box' would on this view mean, 'I have a particular visual experience which I have found that I always have when I interpret the figure as a box or when I look at a box.' Yet, he points out, if this were really what were meant, then I ought to know it. I ought to be able to refer to the experience directly, not only indirectly, as I can speak of red without calling it the colour of blood. The nerve of the argument is: if the experience of seeing as is complex, then it is curious that we should not be far better able than we are to refer to the alleged components. (109)

Again, suppose I experience the change of aspect of the duck-rabbit. What is different? Is it my impression or my point of view? Wittgenstein comments: 'I describe the alteration like a perception; quite as if the object had altered before my eyes.' (110) The point is that I do not describe the change as a change of the interpretation of the same datum; rather I describe two different perceptions. Or, as Wittgenstein himself puts it: "If you search in a figure (1) for another figure (2), and then find it, you see (1) in a new way. Not only can you give a new kind of description of it, but noticing the second figure was a new visual experience." (111) The experience changes, not the interpretation of something common to two experiences.

At one point, Wittgenstein seems to hint at the most telling argument against the immediate/mediate distinction, i.e. that the hypothesis that there are immediate data is unverifiable and redundant. In sense-datum talk about 'Gestalt'-switches such as those produced by the duck-rabbit, it is perfectly legitimate to ask: "And is it really a different impression?" Wittgenstein comments: "In order to answer this I should like to ask myself whether there really is something different there in me."
But how can I find out? - I describe what I am seeing differently."(112) The syntax is ambiguous, but this passage will bear interpretation as saying that, even if there were data, we could never be aware of them, for whatever we experience, we experience as something, i.e., under some description. The very description, "immediate experience", as it is used by sense-datum theorists, is oxymoronic. (113) The 'innocent eye' as Santayana conceives it, is an incoherent suggestion.

This part of Santayana's theory of poetry is therefore unacceptable as it stands. Yet it would be unjust to dismiss it completely. Ehrenzweig has shown that a certain re-ordering of experience is indeed a part of the process of artistic creation in general, and perhaps Santayana had some idea of this. Or, on the other hand, in comparison with Ehrenzweig, his description of the process is much too brief: there is no hint that the process might be as complex as that described in Ehrenzweig's schizoid-manic-re-introjection schema. (114) Nor is Santayana precise as to whether the creative process is conscious or unconscious.

(iv) Great Poetry and the Expression of Ideals

Santayana holds that it is a necessary condition for greatness in a poem that it express a comprehensive philosophic vision of the universe, that it be informed by a fully worked-out set of ideals for life. In, "Soliloquies in England and Later Soliloquies", he introduces an alternative condition, that of being a complete expression of the present state of an organism.

The difficulty with this later alternative is that it is so imprecise: we are given no detailed description of what it is fully to express that state of an organism. Even so, however, it is clear that the change of opinion represented by the later doctrine is considerable. Santayana's later view is compatible with the ascription of greatness to short, lyrical poems, which the earlier doctrine, with its demand for philosophic comprehensiveness, would exclude from the highest rank of poetic attainment.
It is surely impossible to legislate 'a priori' about which theory of poetic greatness is to be preferred, if any. Our ascription of greatness to poetry depends ultimately on the aesthetic satisfaction which it affords us; whether this satisfaction be derived from philosophic breadth or lyric intensity is a matter for the individual to settle.

With regard to the early doctrine itself, there is undoubtedly some truth in it. It is a commonplace of the criticism of poetry, as of some other arts, that breadth of vision is a virtue in a work of art; and it would be difficult to find a critic to disagree with Santayana in finding comprehensiveness in the poets whom he rates most highly: Homer, Dante, Lucretius and Goethe. There are however, certain difficulties. Firstly, though it is properly a question of criticism, it should at least be indicated that this thesis that Shakespeare lacks a philosophy is highly questionable. The tragedies and late plays at least may be said to imply world views; moreover, as is indicated in the preceding chapter, above, Santayana maintains that tragedy necessarily involves certain metaphysical assumptions. Again, Santayana assumes that a great poet must be a philosopher of some stature; or, put in another way, that greatness in a poem depends on certain properties of its subject-matter. Yet this is surely not the case; unless a thinker were able to present his views in a fine style and in a well-ordered sequence (for example), he would hardly be called an artist at all. Artistry is displayed in treatment, rather than content. (Cf. Ch.VII, below, where Santayana makes the same assumption in discussing rational poetry) This point is closely related to the question of truth in poetry, a problem discussed in the next section.

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If the foregoing remarks are correct, then Santayana's final definition of poetry, as metrical discourse expressing thought that is at once sensuous and ideal, must be rejected, only the assertion that metre is a necessary condition for poetry being acceptable as it stands. Obviously,
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If the foregoing remarks are correct, then Santayana's final definition of poetry, as metrical discourse expressing thought that is at once sensuous and ideal, must be rejected, only the assertion that metre is a necessary condition for poetry being acceptable as it stands. Obviously,
this leaves almost everything in the aesthetics of poetry still to be
said. The following section is an attempt at an outline of an analytic
aesthetics of poetry, incorporating what is acceptable in Santayana's views.

Analysis and the Nature and Function of Poetry

(a) "Poem" an honorific term. In 4 (i) above, it has been argued that
verse is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for poetry. In order
to qualify for the title, "poem", a piece of verse must have certain
aesthetic virtues in a sufficient degree. This is one way of saying that
"poem" is an honorific term: to call a piece of verse a poem is to say
that it has certain aesthetic excellences. To call a poem a good or great
poem is to say that it has certain aesthetic excellences to a high or
superlative degree.

The aesthetic virtues which verse must have in order to qualify as
poetry make up a familiar set: organic form; blending of form and content;
authenticity; expressiveness; originality; appropriateness of diction to
subject, and so on. Great poems, as has been said, can exhibit these
virtues to a superlative degree.

Just how much importance is attributed to each virtue, and in what
degree each is thought desirable in poetry, varies with time, taste, and
individual: one could draw up a history of taste by listing which virtues
were most highly regarded in which epoch. Cultural conditioning applies
here as elsewhere as a major factor determining aesthetic response.

"Poem", then, is an honorific term, whose ascription is bound by the
necessary condition of being composed in versified language, and by the
possession by the verse of any combination of a limited number of
aesthetic virtues.

(b) Poetry and truth. One term omitted from the above list of aesthetic
virtues is truth, which demands separate consideration. It has been
denied, by Eisenberg for example, not only that truth is an aesthetic virtue
at all, but also that questions of truth and falsity even arise in the
evaluation and interpretation of poetry. The following arguments
attempt to establish these conclusions: that considerations of truth and falsity do arise in the interpretation of poetry; that some statements in poetry are truth-functional and are naturally interpreted as such; that some groups of statements in some sense imply general truths which are taken to be such; but that where a poem states or implies a world-view, it is comprehensiveness lending unity to vision, rather than truth, which is valued aesthetically.

Some writers deny that a poem can be concerned with truth on the grounds that no poem can be truly creative which refers to anything which exists before its composition. Hepburn easily refutes this view: a poem can refer, for instance, to the poet's birthplace. Here the referent does exist, and what is said of it may be true or false. Yet the poet may still say many highly individual things about it, linking it, for example, with the idea of men-in-general and their birthplaces. Such a work can be creative and still be made up of truth-functional statements. One need not say that truth and falsity are matters of the internal relations of its elements.(116)

Again, R.K. Elliott gives the following example from Donne's, "Love's Growth":

"As princes do in times of action get
New taxes, and remit them not in peace,
No winter shall abate the spring's increase." (II. 26-8)

If as a matter of fact princes tended to abolish taxes in wartime and not to re-introduce them in times of peace, the meaning and emotional character of the poem would be drastically changed. We would, in that case, have to regard the poet as intending the insincerity of the last line. Thus our interpretation of these lines depends on how we estimate the truth or falsity of the first two of them. Further, on the no-truth view, the first two lines must be satire merely on the possible behaviour of possible princes; but if they are not a satire on the actual behaviour of actual princes, they lose most of their pungency.(117)
Further, Elliott points out, the no-truth theory cannot accommodate an activity which critics accept as poetic, namely that of stating neatly, economically, and intelligently what is the case. Thus the lines:

"No well-bred spaniels civilly delight
In mumbling of the game they dare not bite,"

give pleasure not only because of their neatness and economy. The poet has accepted truth as an additional norm - one need only envisage how different would be the reaction if the poet had written "wolfhounds" rather than "spaniels". (118)

This same example can be used to rebut one of Isenberg's assumptions, namely that understanding the meaning of a poetic statement is in all cases independent of the method of its verification. (119) In this example, we admire the term "civilly" because in its context it hits off exactly the quality of the ingratiating demeanour which spaniels tend to display in the situation described. We extrapolate from the ordinary contexts in which 'civilly' is used, and so we admire the poetic use insofar as we recognise its aptness. Meaning and method of verification are here one and the same. (120)

In view of Santayana's interest in ideals, it is relevant to consider a special class of propositions in poetry, i.e., optatives: statements about how we wish the world were, rather than how we think it is. According to Hepburn, the appropriate questions to ask in appraisal of an optative are: does the poet persuade us of the attractiveness of the ideal? Is he open to the objection of one-sidedness? (121) This requires only a little filling out for it to become clear how truth is involved in optative-appraisal, for how can an ideal fail to be persuasive except by being incompatible with, or failing to take account of, important relevant truths about the condition of the evaluator - truths about his nature and circumstances?

Some of the statements in a poem, then, are truth-functional, and our opinion of their truth-value affects our interpretation of the poem.
Poetry and truth are related in another way. In narrative poems, for example, there occur descriptions of individuals, their inner life, and the circumstances in which they find themselves, and these descriptions we often take to be typical. Using them as instances, we formulate universal propositions, usually referring to human psychology. These general beliefs we regard as valuable. It must be stressed, however, that implying truths is not properly speaking an aesthetic merit. Certainly knowledge of human psychology is valuable, but not aesthetically so: if it were aesthetically valuable, then surely psychological textbooks would be highly regarded as works of art. We esteem the works which imply these truths, but this type of esteem is not aesthetic.

(It should be stressed in this connexion that it is the implied beliefs only which are considered truth-functionally. The propositions describing fictional persons and places, propositions containing proper names void of referents, are not so treated. The reader does not allow the questions of truth and falsity to arise; the test applied to these propositions is that of internal consistency.)

The same distinction between types of esteem is involved where what is implied, or indeed stated, in a poem is not merely an isolated generalization about the inner life, but a complete philosophy, a view of the universe and of the place of human life in it. If a belief in the truth of the world-view stated or implied in a poem were a necessary condition for a rich aesthetic experience of that poem, then all readers of poetry would be able to gain rich aesthetic experiences only from poems which express their own philosophy. Yet this is not what happens. Readers, like Santayana himself, may gain rewarding experiences from great poems expressing the most varied philosophies, Christian or atheistic, Epicurean or Romantic. What lends power to great works like "The Divine Comedy" or "Faust" is not the truth of the philosophy expressed, but the comprehensiveness of the vision necessary to view life and the world on this level of generality. This comprehensiveness lends wholeness or unity — an aesthetic
merit - to the work. This is a point of view which Santayana himself
takes up on one occasion:

"...what is required for theoretic wholeness is not this or that
system but some system. Its value is not the value of truth, but
that of victorious imagination. Unity of conception is an
aesthetic merit no less than a logical demand. A fine sense of
the dignity and pathos of life cannot be attained unless we conceive
somehow its outcome and its relations. Without such a conception
our emotions cannot be steadfast ad enlightened. Without it the
imagination cannot fulfill its essential function or achieve its
supreme success." (122)

(c) Logical character and identity conditions of individual poems. An
individual poem is not identical with any of its copies, i.e. it is not
a physical object or class of them. If it were, then it would follow
that, if any copy of the poem were lost, then the poem itself would be
lost. (This applies where the copy lost is the author's manuscript copy.)
Anticipating the success of the arguments of the next chapter, it is
necessary for completeness' sake to point out that an individual poem is
a logical type, copies of it being tokens.

As is also the case with pieces of music, for example, identity
conditions for poems are imprecise. One can imagine cases where changes
to a few words would make one say that one was dealing with a different
poem; suppose that, for example, instead of "O rose thou art sick", Blake
had written, "O rose thou art well", likewise reversed the sense of the
last line, "Does they life destroy", and changed the title of the poem.
On the other hand, if a new manuscript of this poem were found, with a
thematically consistent third stanza, one would perhaps say that this would
be a copy of the same poem. With longer poems, the number of lines which
could be added or deleted while identity remains intact is impossible to
gauge 'a priori'; once again, however, thematic consistency would be an
important test.
(196)

(d) Definition of Poetry: its Function. While considerations such as these perhaps go some way to clarifying some points in the aesthetics of poetry, yet the most important problem remains: that of saying what poetry is and what it does for us.

It is easy enough to provide a definition of poetry which isolates it both from all non-arts and from the other arts: poetry is the art-form whose medium is versified language. To fill this out, it is once again necessary to assume dogmatically the success of arguments in the next chapter. The term "art" is bound by one necessary condition (the other non-necessary grounds for its ascription are irrelevant at present): whatever is a work of art is an object of aesthetic interest. Aesthetic interest is defined non-circularly as the attitude of disinterest or psychical distance. Granted this, in conjunction with the above partial account of the logical grammar of 'poem' as an honorific term, the following emerges as a complete account of the conditions governing the use of this term: firstly, it is bound by two necessary conditions; whatever is a poem is both in the medium of versified language and is an object of aesthetic interest. And secondly, the further grounds for the ascription of the term 'poem' are a range of specifications of aesthetic virtues.

Finally, there is the question of why poetry is regarded as valuable, of what poetry does for us. The answer involves several points. There is aesthetic pleasure to be had from the properties of the material, enhanced by the devices referred to by Santayana as euphony; again, there is aesthetic pleasure given by the form. Expressive properties and subject-matter, in so far as they are separable from one another and from the form and the material, not only give aesthetic pleasure, but can expand one's knowledge of feeling, of ideas, and of oneself. Such learning can be accompanied by a sense of release. The effects and benefits of poetry are in this way complex.

Perhaps it will be objected that this is merely to restate Horace's doctrine: poetry is "dulce et utile". Yet this is surely to play on the
imprecision of Horace's terms. The notion of psychical distance is quite absent from Horace's idea of what it is to be "dulce"; and when he speaks of poetry as "utile", he has in mind explicit didacticism: the poet should provide useful maxims to help us on the hard road of living. No doubt the knowledge to be gained from poetry can be and is in a sense useful, yet it is hardly necessary that it be presented by explicit didacticism. A poet is expected to and can provide something much subtler than worldly maxims.

With these views on poetry in mind, it is now appropriate to turn to Santayana's views on religion.

V: Santayana and Religion

It is evident that for Santayana, the centrally important feature of any religion is its corpus of dogma. He regards dogmas as statements of ideals: moral recommendations and optative beliefs about an imagined state of perfect happiness. Ideals are evaluated solely according as they are an adequate formulation of the interests which underly them. There is nothing to suggest that religion should provide any satisfactions other than those which are rational and imaginative.

This account of religion is obviously defective in two ways. In the first place, not all religious beliefs can be plausibly regarded as hypostatisations of moral recommendations and descriptions of a state of bliss. Some beliefs are intended to give an intellectually cogent account of the origin of the universe, i.e. cosmogonies. It is hard to believe that such doctrines are projections of imagined satisfactions for a better life.

More important is the omission of what is to many the most important type of religious satisfaction, i.e. mystic experience. In fact, it is more appropriate to speak of rejection than omission, since Santayana regards mystic experience as a betrayal of rationality. It is worth
repeating two fundamental beliefs in Santayana's ethical theory: firstly, that happiness is the good; and secondly, that happiness is to be secured by the maximal harmonisation of one's interests, a harmonisation which is attained by the use of reason. To cultivate non-rational states of mind is therefore for Santayana a rejection of our primary means of securing happiness.

It will be recalled that, in Santayana's view, the ambition of the mind is to construct a complete account of the nature of things; that the understanding is inadequate to this task, and is supplemented by the imagination. Some imaginative constructions are false starts and in fact hinder the progress of reason in its domination over nature. In some, such setbacks produce a certain discouragement and sense of the hopeless relativity of human thought. He finds the origin of mysticism in this discouraged state. (123)

Those who still wish to attain absolute truth and who are also convinced of the relativity and inadequacy of human constructions abjure these constructions, and pursue only the One, which, according to the mystics, is that in comparison to which everything else is nothing. Thus for Santayana, mysticism is the exact opposite of the ideal of reason. Instead of perfecting human nature, the mystic seeks to abolish it. Instead of seeking to extend the mind, the mystic aspires to return to the condition of protoplasma (Santayana claims), the blessed consciousness of unutterable reality. Mysticism is thus a tendency to obliterate the distinctions won by reason, and consequently for Santayana a rejection of what in his view is our most valuable faculty.

It is instructive to compare this view with that of Henri Grémond, whose doctrines on religion and its relation to poetry are almost exactly opposed to those of Santayana. For Grémond, mystic experience is central to religion; and it is experience of a non-rational kind: "Profane ou surnaturelle, la vie mystique diffère essentiellement de notre vie
intellectuelle, ou littéraire, ou même morale. Active, sans doute, et prodigieusement active, elle nous semble un repos. Elle ne s'agit, elle ne bouillonne jamais."(125*) While Bremond thus affirms the non-rationality of mystic states, he is as far as can be from sharing Santayana's disvaluation of such states; moreover, he regards poetry as valuable precisely insofar as it can evoke quasi-mystical experience in the reader.

Bremond's central argument is that there are "analogies de forme et communautés de mécanisme" (126) between mystic and poetic experience. He adopts as a premise Claudel's distinction between two elements of the self, the Animus and the Anima. The Animus is the area of reason and passion, "le moi de surface"; the Anima is the "moi profond", "la demeure la plus cachée et la plus intime...la pointe extrême et le sommet, la moelle de l'âme, le centre du cœur."(127) At the moments of mystic elevation and of poetic inspiration, the operations of the Animus are temporarily suspended, while the Anima penetrates the veil of appearance and is united with the realities beyond. The difference between the poet and the mystic is this: while the mystic has access to God, the ultimate reality, the poet has access only to created realities: "...la connaissance poétique atteint des réalités, unit le poète à des réalités. Non pas à la réalité souveraine, Dieu lui-même...Le lyrisme serait la saisie du moi profond, la poésie dramatique et narrative la saisie, par le moi profond, des autres réalités."(128)

After the quasi-mystical moment of inspiration, the Animus revives with renewed vitality. "Mutatis mutandis", the following description of the mystic applies to the poet also: "A mesure que se desserre la possession, réelle mais obscure, qu'il avait de l'Être des êtres, les puissances du mystique, intelligence, imagination, volonté, semblent recevoir des forces nouvelles, prennent leur vol, assiègent, atteignent elles aussi à leur manière cet Être des êtres avec une vivacité singulière."(129) After the moment of inspiration, everything becomes easy; history gives numerous
examples of the gigantic labours which have followed such experiences.

The mystic experience and the quasi-mystical moment of poetic inspiration are strictly speaking ineffable; yet the poet is impelled to try in some way to communicate his experience to us. "Le miracle de la poésie" is that he can in fact succeed to some degree. Since the inspirational experience is ineffable, it is not the literal sense or content of a poem which conveys to the reader the quality of the moment of inspiration. The situation is more mysterious: "À travers ces mêmes mots qui, pris en eux-mêmes, c'est-à-dire, comme signes des idées qu'ils représentent, comme moyen de communication intellectuelle, appartiennent exclusivement à l'enseignement ou à l'éloquence, à travers ces mots, l'Anima du poète pénètre jusqu'à l'Anima du lecteur...elle ébranle ce moi profond, elle l'élève, elle l'associe à sa propre expérience de poète."(130)

It is this arousal of the Anima which is for Brémond the central element in the aesthetic experience of poetry, and the most valuable one. (The statement of a comprehensive set of ideals in poetry would on this view be valuable only insofar as such a statement could help in the communication of the experiences of the Anima.) Brémond construes the doctrine of catharsis in accordance with these doctrines: "La catharsis, en effet, n'est pas autre chose que ce que les mystiques appellent le passage de la méditation à la contemplation, que ce que nous avons appelé la substitution des activités d'Anima aux activités d'Animus; bref le passage de la connaissance rationnelle à la connaissance réelle et poétique." (131)

It will be clear from all this that the relation which Brémond conceives to exist between poetry and religion is quite other than that which is suggested by Santayana. Religious and aesthetic experience have it in common that both furnish valuable, non-rational states of mind: "(elles) appartiennent par leur mécanisme psychologique au même ordre de connaissance - une connaissance réelle, non immédiatement conceptuelle, unitive..."(132)

More precisely, "L'activité poétique est une ébauche naturelle et profane
de l’activité mystique..." (133) Poetry does not provide true mystical experience, but invites us to seek it: "Chez le parfait poète lui-même, l’expérience poétique tend à rejoindre, mais ne rejoint pas la prière; chez nous, elle la rejoint sans peine, et grâce au poète." (134)

Two comments are appropriate here. In the first place, Santayana’s assumption as to the higher value of rational over mystical experience is hard to swallow: to a mystic it would appear as the foolish gesture of a man deprived of the rarest possibility of experience. To those who have had mystical experiences, their value is unsurpassable and unquestionable. In the face of the absolutely consistent reports from mystics on this point one must conclude that the evidence is against Santayana’s evaluative assumption.

Secondly, by common consent, a feature of all worthwhile aesthetic experience is oblivious contemplation (the term ‘contemplation’ itself, of course, belongs to the vocabulary of the mystic): one becomes oblivious of everything but the aesthetic object — oblivious of one’s surroundings and of the passage of time. It is arguable that, though infinitely less intense in degree, the best aesthetic experience is of the same kind as mystical experience. Moreover, in these experiences a good deal of what Santayana would want to call our rational apparatus is in abeyance, and he is therefore committed to disvaluing these experiences. It would be easy enough for him to maintain his consistency in the face of such a criticism, by stressing the subjectivity of his value theory: his high estimation of reason, he might say, is purely personal, and he does not maintain or demand that others share it. Yet to retreat to this point removes almost all the bite from his philosophy; instead of having something important and impersonal to tell us about experience, it would instead be merely an exhibition of idiosyncrasies, an intellectual curiosity, and no more.

VI: Conclusion

If the foregoing criticisms are just, then there are faults both in Santayana’s view of poetry, and in his view of religion. It follows that
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VI: Conclusion

If the foregoing criticisms are just, then there are faults both in Santayana's view of poetry, and in his view of religion. It follows that
his thesis as to their relation is unacceptable. Santayana mistakenly makes features of subject-matter a necessary condition for greatness in poetry, confusing artistic greatness with greatness as a philosopher. Moreover, to disvalue the non-rational satisfactions of religion is to denigrate those experiences which have been for many the most valuable in life; these are not to be written out of any account of what is "essential" to religion. The links between poetry and religion are rather different from those suggested by Santayana: possibly the very much weakened form of Brémond's view put forward above can be defended, i.e., that poetry and religion can both provide suprarational experiences differing vastly in degree but not in kind; and on the most obvious level, religious beliefs can become the subject-matter for poems, and in this way become an object of aesthetic interest. But where the religion is a living force, such interludes will be felt definitely as interludes: the difference in attitude to poetry and religion, which Santayana makes very little of, is of the first importance. The practical repurcussions of religion on the lives of sincere believers are too many and too obvious to need comment. For these reasons, then, Santayana's view of the nature and relations of poetry and religion must be rejected.

This is not to say, of course, that Santayana's theory of poetry is to be considered as of little value. His views are philosophically more satisfying than a good deal of what passes for classic in this area of aesthetics. He is systematic, and does present a set of necessary conditions for poetry; and again, he is well beyond all the crude forms of the "dulce et utile" view which dominated poetics for so long. This part of his aesthetics deserves to be better known than it is.
Chapter VI: The Nature of Art

I: Introduction

The next three chapters of the present thesis deal with *Reason in Art* (1905), the second full-length book by Santayana devoted to aesthetics. *Reason in Art* is the fourth volume of a five volume work collectively titled "The Life of Reason", the most ambitious project of the early part of Santayana's career. In order fully to understand the aesthetics of "Reason in Art", it is necessary to spend some time on making clear what "The Life of Reason" is about, and on the philosophical beliefs which are assumed as premisses in the aesthetics.

"The Life of Reason" is an evaluative survey of major human institutions from a certain ethical standpoint. Santayana adopts as evaluative premisses the beliefs that happiness is the good for man, and that it is best secured by the harmonisation of human interests by the use of reason. From this standpoint, he surveys society (Vol II), religion (Vol III), art (Vol IV), and science (Vol V), estimating which - if any - of the forms of these institutions exhibited in history have promoted the rational life; he also sketches alternative, rational, ideal forms of these institutions. These surveys are prefaced in the first volume, "Reason in Common Sense", by an account of the birth of reason: the process whereby the buzzing, booming confusion of the immediate flux of experience is gradually mastered by the mind. From the flux, the mind constructs the picture of the world accepted by common sense, composed of physical objects and minds. Moreover, in this process, the mind becomes aware of its own identity, and progresses from blind, instinctive action to the self-conscious pursuit of ideals. Hence, Santayana says that the subject of "The Life of Reason" is progress. He asks himself what answer would be forthcoming if men were to ask themselves where they would acknowledge a gain in mastery over experience:

"What themes would prevail in such an examination of the heart?"
In what order and with what emphasis would they be recounted? In which of its adventures would the human race, reviewing its whole experience, acknowledge a progress and a gain? To answer these questions, as they may be answered speculatively and provisionally by an individual, is the purpose of the following work. (1)

In a note preserved in a copy of one of the early editions of "The Life of Reason", Santayana describes the genesis of the work:

"The first impulse to write this book came to me in 1889, on reading Hegel's 'Phaenomenologie des Geistes'. There, it seemed to me, was a great idea spoiled by the sophistry and mythology that encumbered it. The great idea was to review the history of the human mind, picking out certain crucial episodes in it, and showing how insights and habits then gained had contributed to our present moral constitution. The project, however, took shape slowly, and it was not until 1896, under the influence of my first Platonic studies, that I made a beginning in actual composition." (2)

The Greek influence on the doctrines of "The Life of Reason" is not confined to Plato; Santayana is unusually explicit about his further debts to Socrates and Aristotle. Socrates provided him with the principle that self-knowledge is the key to the rational life; and Aristotle's ethics, when filled out with details from Plato, is for Santayana the classic explication of the life of reason. (3) (Santayana always refers to the central doctrine of the work by means of capital letters) The only fault Santayana finds with Aristotelian ethics is its reliance on false physics. Since knowledge in this field has advanced, and since the accidental circumstances of life have changed, the essential Aristotelian doctrines need to be restated in modern terms:

"What we can adopt from Greek morals is only the abstract principle of their development; their foundation in all the extant forces of human nature and their effort towards establishing a perfect harmony
among them. These forces themselves have perceptibly changed, at least in their relative power. Thus we are more conscious of wounds to stanch and wrongs to fight against, and less of goods to attain. The movement of conscience has veered; the centre of gravity lies in another part of the character."(4)

In an essay written in 1930, Santayana confesses:

"...I have never been a diligent student of either science or art, nor at all ambitious to be learned. I have been willing to let cosmological problems and technical questions solve themselves as they would or as the authorities agreed for the moment that they might be solved. My pleasure was rather in expression, in reflection, in irony..."(5)

This avowed lack of interest in technicality accounts for what is undoubtedly the greatest flaw in "The Life of Reason" as a whole: the tendency to state conclusions without argument, allied to the habit of omitting definitions of key terms and disregarding the logical sequence of exposition. (These are the commonest and most just of the criticisms brought against this work)(6)

II: Metaphysics

The least developed of the philosophical positions which are adopted in "The Life of Reason" are those concerning metaphysics. Santayana avoids any questions about creation; he begins with nature as it exists. He insists that existence is irrational in the sense that we can never find any reasons or grounds for it, grounds that might lie beyond or behind nature. Nevertheless, it is quite clear that Santayana adopts the two following metaphysical beliefs: (i) materialistic monism; and (ii) causal determinism.

He gives no detailed arguments to support his adoption of monism. In a letter of 1906, however, he makes it clear that he would defend this position with two types of argument: pragmatic and transcendental. He
explains that his nature compels him to believe in,

"material nature with its animation on the one hand, and logical or mathematical forms on the other. These are discovered by us, starting from sensation, and, in the first case, tested by pragmatic sanctions. But we look to them in order to understand the origin of our experience (or its standard in signification) and I, for one, heartily accept them in that role."(7)

In, "Reason in Common Sense", Santayana expands these views:

"The Life of reason is not concerned with speculation about gratuitous 'realities'; it seeks merely to attain those conceptions which are necessary and appropriate to man in his thinking. The first of these, underlying all arts and philosophies alike, is the indispensable conception of permanent external objects, forming in their congeries, shifts, and secret animation the system and life of nature."(8)

There is no more detailed argumentation to establish that a materialistic physical object hypothesis is either that which enables us to cope best with the world, or that it is in some sense a pre-condition of the possibility of experience.

It is assumed throughout the "Life of reason" that matter is in a flux. Thus for example, Santayana writes: "In truth......man is an animal, a portion of the natural flux; and the consequence is that his nature has a moving centre..."(9) Further properties are ascribed to matter in a comparison Santayana makes between his concept of matter and that of certain other philosophers. "Matter" is an ambiguous term. Sometimes, it is used to mean merely a group of objects in space; in Aristotle, by contrast, "matter" means something to make other things out of. Matter in this sense is merely a constituent or aspect of existence, and cannot exist by itself. For Santayana himself, "Matter" is the term used for the surd or unconditional element in existence:

"In truth, the surd conditions not merely the being of objects but
their possible quantity, the time and place of their appearance, and their degree of perfection compared with the ideals they suggest. These important factors in whatever exists are covered by the term matter and give it a serious role in describing and feeling the world."(10)

It is not made clear whether the link between matter and the qualities it is said to determine is logical or causal or of some other kind.

It is clear, however, that matter is governed by causal laws. Santayana holds that all events are caused, including mental events. He does not justify this principle of universal causation pragmatically or transcendentally. Rather, he argues that, granted the evidence, it is the most probable explanation of events:

"The most inclusive movements known to us in nature, the astronomical, are calculable, and so are the most minute and pervasive processes, the chemical. These are also, if evolution is to be accepted, the earliest processes upon which all others have supervened and out of which, as it were, they have grown. Apart from miraculous intervention, therefore, the assumption seems to be inevitable that the intermediate processes are calculable too, and compounded out of the others. The appearance to the contrary present in animal and social life is easily explicable on psychological grounds. We read inevitably in terms of our passions those things which affect them or are analogous to what involves passion in ourselves; and when the mechanism of them is hidden from us, as is that of our own bodies, we suppose that these passions which we find on the surface in ourselves, or read into other creatures, are the substantial and only forces that carry on our part of the world. Penetrating this illusion, dispassionate observers in all ages have received the general impression that nature is one and mechanical."(11)

The conjunction of this strict causal determinism with his epiphenomen-
alism commits Santayana to a denial of traditional doctrines on the freedom of the will; he thus holds a version of the position commonly referred to as incompatibilism. On the traditional view, the soul is autonomous and has the power to initiate action: "A man will therefore be no helpless slave of his body; his acts will not be predetermined physically without his soul's leave; they will be determined by the interplay of the physical with the spiritual forces in him."

This is incompatible with epiphenomenalism, which has the following corollary with regard to the will:

"...nothing can be less absolute or more precarious than the living will in its existence. A living will is the flexible voice of a thousand submerged impulses, of which now one and now another comes to the surface; it is responsive, without knowing it, to a complex forgotten past and a changing, unexplored environment."

Santayana regards a belief in causal determinism as evidence that the mind has progressed some distance on the path of rationality. Causal laws lend unity to nature; what enables men to perceive the unity of nature is the unification of their own wills: "...let some sobering passion, some serious interest, lend perspective to the mind, and a point of reference will immediately be given for protracted observation."

He continues: "Belief in indeterminism is a sign of indetermination. No commanding or steady intellect flirts with so miserable a possibility, which in so far as it actually prevailed would make virtue impotent and experience, in its pregnant sense, impossible." This curious view is obviously unacceptable, since it entails that all indeterminists are irrational, a belief which it is difficult to credit.

III: Philosophy of Mind

Materialistic monism in metaphysics commits Santayana to a denial of all forms of two-substance dualism in the philosophy of mind. He also rejects Spinoza's monistic parallelism. Mind is very far from representing, point for point, the determinations of material being.
"Mind (at least what I am calling so) is no impartial accompaniment of matter, whether in motion or at rest, dead or living; it is a rare, local, and fragile expression of animal life...If it is parallel to anything that thing is not matter or space, but morphological units or biological processes."(16)

Of the remaining possibilities, Santayana chooses epiphenomenalism, and in doing so explicitly acknowledges his debt to Aristotle:

"I think no other philosopher has conceived the relation of the body to the mind that animates it so fairly and squarely. He saw that spirit was something spiritual, an expression and not a substance; and as a part of that view he saw that spirit was altogether separate from body, and relative to the vital functions it was to express."(17*)

Stating his own view, Santayana writes:

"A mind seems to be a consciousness of the body's interests, expressed in terms of what affects the body...In other words, mind raises to an actual existence that form in material processes which, had the process remained wholly material, would have had only ideal or imputed being."(18)

Or, using another vocabulary, "...a mind is the entelechy of an organic body."(19) It follows that, "The mind is itself ethereal and plays about the body as music about a violin, or rather as the sense of a page about the print and paper. To look for it within is not to understand what we are looking for."(20)

The most important consequence of this position is that mind plays no part in the direction of action; all mental events and states are caused by bodily states, especially brain states; but no causal links operate in the other direction:

"...views and intentions (names for mental entities in Santayana's vocabulary) have a brief and inconsequential tenure of life and their existence is merely a sign for certain conjunctions in nature,
where processes hailing from afar have met in a man, soon to pass beyond him. If they figure as causes in nature, it is only because they represent the material processes that have brought them into being."(21)

The truth of this doctrine is alleged to be evident to introspection: "That thought is not self-directive appears best in the most immaterial processes...My hand, guided by I know not what machinery, is at this moment adding syllable to syllable upon this paper, to the general fulfilment, perhaps, of my felt intent, yet giving that intent an articulation wholly unforeseen, and often disappointing. The thoughts to be expressed simmer half-consciously in my brain. I feel their burden and tendency without seeing their form, until the mechanical train of impulsive association, started by the perusal of what precedes or by the accidental emergence of some new idea, lights the fuse and precipitates the phrases."(22)

This argument from introspection is the only type of support brought forward for the doctrine of ephphenomenalism. Manifestly, it is quite inconclusive, for these psychological commonplace are compatible with all the serious contenders in the philosophy of mind.

Santayana makes several claims about mental events, the first being that,

"Mental events synchronise with their basis, for no thought hovers over a dead brain, and there is no vision in a dark chamber; but their tenure of life is independent of their objects, since thought may be prophetic or reminiscent and is intermittent even when its object enjoys a continuous existence."(23) This is presumably to be construed as a straightforward consequence deducible from the claim that mind is the entelechy of the body, i.e., because presumably mind as the form of material events must by definition be simultaneous with the events of which it is the form. If on the other hand, this doctrine is meant to be logically independent of the initial definition of mind, then Santayana is guilty
once again of introducing a conclusion without an argument.

Again, he claims that:

"Mental facts are similar to their objects, since things and images have, intrinsically regarded, the same constitution; but images do not move in the same plane with things and their parts are in no proportionate dynamic relation to the parts of the latter." (24) The difficulties with this claim are manifest: 'similarity' is the vaguest of relations; and moreover, granted Santayana's representationalism in the philosophy of perception, he can in principle have no possible evidence to support this position, for this would demand a comparison of mental contents and their objects which is 'ex hypothesi' impossible.

Emotions cannot be for Santayana processes in an immaterial mind. Instead, he regards them as bodily states. When we are afraid, it is because we tremble, and not vice versa:

"Fear is a sensation of actual nervousness and disarray, and confidence a sensation of actual readiness; they are not disembodied feelings, existing for no reason, the devil Funk and the angel Courage, one or the other of whom may come down arbitrarily into your body and revolutionise it. This is childish mythology, which survives innocently as a figure of speech, until a philosopher is found to take that figure of speech seriously." (25)

Again, it is clear that epiphenomenalism commits Santayana to a denial of all beliefs in the existence of an immortal soul. He expresses this point clearly in a later work, in the vocabulary of his metaphysical system:

"All is determined by the animal psyche breeding experience; for consciousness is no substance, no concrete particular force, but only a new status and intensity of being which certain terms of animal life assume on occasion. Spirit, then cannot be disembodied..." (26*)
This theory of the mind involves Santayana in what are the gravest difficulties concerning "The Life of Reason" in general. In the first place, as has been said, Santayana is committed to holding that all mental events are causally inefficacious; yet, as one of the reviewers of "The Life of Reason" - Professor A.V. Moore - pointed out, very often Santayana writes as if the opposite were the case, and so is guilty of a serious inconsistency. For example, Santayana claims that, "Vital impulse, when it is modified by reflection and varies in sympathy with judgements pronounced on the past, is properly called reason." (Moore's italics). Or again: "The life of reason will, then, be a name for that part of experience which perceives and pursues ideals, all conduct so controlled..." (Moore's italics) (27) Santayana was disturbed enough by this review to write a reply to it, "The Efficacy of Thought". (1906) He claims that passages apparently inconsistent with epiphenomenalism, such as those quoted by Moore, are to be construed as metaphorical, he having assumed that, "their metaphorical character would be obvious to the reader." (28) He goes on to defend his position by what is in effect a reaffirmation of the claim that epiphenomenalism can be verified by introspection:

"One may well say that 'reason is vital impulse modified by reflection.' It is certain that when a man 'reflects' his action changes in consequence, just as he turns aside when he 'sees' an obstacle in front of him; but as his seeing was an impression on his organs, without which his fancy would have pictured nothing, and his turning was an instinct or habit of his organism, without which the image would have signified no danger; so the pause in reflection was a physical event, accompanied by an oscillation of projects in the mind (for reflection cannot decide when reflection shall arise, nor how long it shall last, nor what course it shall take)."

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(29*)

By construing apparently inconsistent passages as metaphorical, one
may save Santayana's internal consistency; but there are further difficulties connected with the consistent doctrine that remains. One of these is pointed out by John Iachs: Santayana omits to provide any rule or set of rules governing the change of specific kinds of physical state into specific kinds of mental state. This omission constitutes one of the greatest lacunae in Santayana's early philosophy.

Again, it seems that, granted the conjunction of determinism and epiphenomenalism, the whole enterprise of writing "The Life of Reason" is self-defeating. Just as there is a certain absurdity in the Spinozistic attempt to put forward moral recommendations or rules for the improvement of the understanding (i.e. granted Spinoza's logical determinism), so it is absurd for Santayana to recommend the Life of Reason as a moral code, since it follows from his metaphysics and his philosophy of the mind that we are powerless to accept it or to choose to live it. If ever the Life of Reason is lived by any human being or group, conscious effort will have played no part in bringing this about. This most perfect of possible lives must, on Santayana's premises, be merely an epiphenomenon of the processes of blind matter causally determined.

This point is allied to the most paradoxical of the consequences of epiphenomenalism. If all mental events - it is strictly speaking improper to refer to them as 'acts' - are causally inefficacious, then it follows that it is in principle possible that, even if no mental event ever occurred, the world would be in exactly the same state as it now is. The absence of consciousness would make no difference whatever to the causal sequences which occur in the flux of matter.

IV: Epistemology: The Birth of Reason

Santayana holds a representationalist theory of perception. A distinction is presupposed between the immediate data of experience, known by acquaintance, and the mind's construction upon them. He accepts the Hobbesian position that, "No discourse whatsoever can end in absolute
knowledge of fact,"(31) since absolute knowledge is of the immediate, whereas 'discourse' by definition includes the notion of the mind's constructions out of the data.(32) of the nature of the immediate, apart from its being in a flux, Santayana says very little. He does claim that it is not entirely undifferentiated:

"it is not quite true that the immediate has no real diversity. It evidently suggests the ideal terms into which we divide it, and it sustains our apprehension itself, with all the diversities this may create. To what I call right and left, light and darkness, a real opposition must correspond in any reality which is at all relevant to my experience; so that I should fail to integrate my impression, and to absorb the only reality that concerns me, if I obliterated those points of reference which originally made the world figured and visible."(33)

This argument is at best incomplete: in order to justify these ascriptions of epistemic priority to the qualities named, it would have to be shown that they are conditions for intelligible experience; as usual, Santayana assumes rather than proves that this is the case.

Santayana does not discuss the identity conditions of the immediate data; and it would be unhistorical to expect him to discuss problems such as the logical relations between statements referring to data and physical object statements. The difficulties in this type of philosophy of perception are now common coin. One such difficulty, the untenability of the immediate/mediate distinction, is discussed in Chapter V, above.

Using these philosophical presuppositions, Santayana gives an account of the birth of reason, the process whereby the mind comes to dominate the manifold of perception, and to construct out of it the common sense world-view of an external world of relatively stable physical objects and minds; at the same time, the mind becomes self-conscious and aware of its own wants and needs. Santayana's most often repeated definition of the function of reason is precisely that it is a harmony of these wants and needs.(34)
"Reason in Common Sense" can be construed as a prolonged analysis of what it is to be rational. Santayana in effect puts forward three jointly sufficient necessary conditions. In order to qualify as rational, a creature must (i) have memory (a precondition of the remaining two conditions); (ii) be self-conscious, which includes awareness of its own wants and needs, and a deliberate attempt to harmonise them; and (iii) have representative knowledge of the world, which presupposes having and applying concepts, and holding common sense beliefs about the world. Condition (ii) involves the central recommendation of Santayana’s early ethics, and is considered more fully in the next section.

Both self-consciousness and knowledge of the external world presuppose memory, since both require that certain items of experience be retained and reapplied to the flux. Unless certain experiences were retained, it could never come about, for example, that spatially contiguous data came to be regarded as representative of the same object:

"Such complications...involve the gift of memory, with capacity to survey at once vestiges of many perceptions, and to feel their implication and absorption in the present object, and to be carried, by this sense of relation, to the thought that those perceptions have a representative function. And this is a great step...It illustrates those transformations of consciousness the principle of which, when abstracted, we call intelligence." (35)

In the attainment of representative knowledge of the external world, the mind employs two main devices. The first is to construct concepts, or what Santayana calls concretion in discourse, terms employed in thought and language; the second is to separate from the flux what we call things, complexes of spatio-temporal qualities having definable dynamic relations and a traceable history. These Santayana calls concretion in existence. (36) Following ancient usage, studies dealing with the meaning and relations of concretions in discourse Santayana calls dialectic, while those dealing with concretions in existence are referred to as physics.
He recognises that physics may be said to presuppose dialectic, for before concretions in existence can be discovered, the qualities which compose them must be arrested by the mind and noted, i.e. concretions in discourse are logically prior to concretions in existence. Yet he insists, that, conversely, every item which dialectic uses, i.e. every concept, is, "originally given embodied; in other words, it is given as an element in the actual flux, it comes by illustration."(37) This last point surely cannot be true; in what sense can general concepts be "given embodied", except by so stretching the meaning of this phrase as to rob it of all clarity and definiteness?(38*)

The formation of concretions in discourse and existence is explained by the postulation of two fundamental habits or operations of the mind: association by similarity and association by contiguity, of which the former is the more fundamental, being logically prior to the latter. Santayana describes association by similarity as follows. Immediate data, "fall together by virtue of their qualitative identity even before their spatial superposition; for in order to be known as repeatedly simultaneous, and associable by contiguity, they must be associated by similarity and known as individually repeated. The various recurrences of a sensation must be recognised as recurrences, and this implies the collection of sensations into classes of similars and the apperception of a common nature in several data."(39)

A "spontaneous reconstruction" occurs (40), producing the relevant universal or concretion in discourse: "Such a living concretion of similars succeeding one another in time, is the idea of a nature or quality, the universal falsely supposed to be an abstraction from physical objects, which in truth are conceived by putting together those very ideas into a spatial and permanent system."(41)

The major principle followed in this putting together is association by contiguity;

"...when several disparate sensations, having become recognisable in
their repetitions, are observed to come and go together, or in a fixed relation to some voluntary operation on the observer's part, they may be associated by contiguity and merged in one portion of perceived space... (A physical object) is a concretion of my perceptions in space..."(42)

From this position, Santayana draws the consequence that the concept of a spatial object is posterior to the concepts of its qualities, and an abstraction from these qualities. A physical object,

"is a far higher and remoter thing than the elements it is composed of and that suggest it... These (i.e. its elements) are themselves the true particulars. They are the first objects discriminated in attention and projected against the background of consciousness."(43)

The difficulty with this view is that it entails that there logically could be a quality not a quality of a thing, whereas the concepts of thing and quality mutually imply one another.

One concept to which Santayana gives special attention is that of space. He claims that the assumption that there is one homogeneous space is one of the finest achievements of reason:

"This principle, axiomatic as it has become, is in no way primitive, since primitive experience is sporadic and introduces us to detached scenes separated by lapses in our senses and attention. These scenes do not hang together in any local contiguity. To construct a chart of the world is a difficult feat of synthetic imagination, not to be performed without speculative boldness and a heroic insensitivity to the claims of fancy."(44*)

This description highlights one of the major weaknesses of the preceding account of concept formation, since it is by no means clear how the concept of homogeneous space is to be explained by either of the specified types of association. The point may be generalised: Santayana's account of concept formation will at best cover concepts of physical objects. It is difficult to see how it can be stretched to cover metaphysical categories such as
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formation will at best cover concepts of physical objects. It is difficult
to see how it can be stretched to cover metaphysical categories such as
space and time, or syncategorematic terms. The process of association by similarity itself presupposes the concepts of unity, sameness, and difference, of whose origin Santayana says nothing. In general, Santayana's account of the formation of concepts, an important part of the enterprise of giving a speculative biography of the human mind such as is supposed to be provided by "Reason in Common Sense", is marred by incompleteness and lack of system. There is no attempt at comprehensiveness in the description of the formation of concepts, such as is found in the great empiricists. (cf. Ch. III, above. Santayana had as little success in his earlier theory of the formation of types or concepts as he does here.)

Among the stable particulars to be found in the external world is the special subclass of those which have minds. Santayana spends some time on the justification of the belief in their existence. Two theories are put forward, he claims, in order to explain and justify our belief in other minds: (i) we infer the existence of other minds by analogy with our own, and (ii) we are immediately aware of them, "we evoke them by dramatic association." (45) (Santayana nowhere explains what he means by this phrase: on the face of it, it is hard to see how he could allow immediate acquaintance with another mind.) To the first view he objects firstly that we do not in fact associate our feelings with the behavior that accompanies them, and secondly that the gestures of others reveal passions we have never had. To the second theory he objects that it leaves our recognition of other minds unintelligible and without justification; it does not explain how we come to make the effort of imagination. His own view is that our belief in other minds is a relic of primitive animism, i.e., the projection of our own experiences onto external objects as qualities of those objects. Belief in other minds is an example of pathetic fallacy which is correct. (46) The difficulty here is that while Santayana might have provided an explanation for the belief in other minds, he has certainly not provided a logical justification for it; to assert that the belief is correct is merely to beg the question. His own view is therefore open to the same objection.
as he himself levels at the second of the theories he criticises.

The belief discussed so far in connexion with the birth of reason are all descriptive, concerning general properties of the external world. The possession of these descriptive beliefs, however, is only a part of what it is to be rational, for reason is concerned not only to describe the world but also to evaluate it. This leads to the final set of presuppositions, those in the theory of value and ethics.

Vi: Theory of Value and Ethics

Santayana's interest theory of value is considered in Chapter I, above. For the sake of coherence, however, the main points may be briefly reiterated here.

The theory of value is designed to answer the question: why is it that evaluation, as opposed to description of the world, ever occurs? Santayana's answer is that objects are valued because human beings have interests which they seek to satisfy. It is a necessary and sufficient condition for the occurrence of the activity of evaluation that there exist beings with both consciousness and emotions. Goodness is not an objective property of particulars in the world; evaluative predicates indicate the relation to our interests of that to which they are applied. In adopting this subjectivism, Santayana acknowledges the influence of Spinoza.

Santayana embraces the consequence, unacceptable to philosophers such as Moore and Russell, that, when people disagree about goodness, they need not really be contradicting one another. (47)

As one might except, Santayana does not analyse the meaning of propositions containing ethical predicates, nor deal with questions as to their truth-functionality. On the question of the relation of moral to non-moral beliefs he contents himself with the observation that values have a natural 'basis'. He does not elaborate on the exact logical relation between the two types of belief. (48*)

In Santayana's ethics, the good is happiness. He is an ethical but
not a psychological eudaemonist:

"Happiness is the only sanction of life; where happiness fails, existence remains a sad and lamentable experiment. The question... what happiness shall consist in, its complexion if it should once arise, can only be determined by reference to natural demands and capacities." (49)

It might appear from the last sentence of this quotation that in Santayana's view, there is no activity which is the good for all men; yet he has sufficient faith in the constancy of human nature to claim that there is one such activity. Betraying once again the influence of Aristotle, his view is that this activity is contemplation; the state of complete satisfaction,

"when anything is loved, understood, enjoyed. Synthetic power is then at its height; the mind can survey its experience and correlate all the motions it suggests. Power in the mind is exactly proportionate to representative scope, and representative scope to rational activity. A steady vision of all things in their true order and worth results from perfection of function and is its index; it secures the greatest distinctness in thought together with the greatest decision, wisdom, and ease in action, as the lightning is brilliant and quick." (50*)

The objects of contemplation, at least in Santayana's early philosophy, are drawn from areas of practical activity:

"...while the reward of action is contemplation or, in more modern phrase, experience and consciousness, there is nothing stable or interesting to contemplate except objects relevant to action in the natural world and the mind's ideals." (51*)

Maximal happiness, Santayana claims, is attained by the harmonisation of interests by the use of reason. That there should be a need for such harmonisation indicates a certain disorder in the human constitution. Man's instincts, "in becoming many, became confused, and in growing permanent, grew
(221)

feeble and subject to arrest and deviation."(52) The multiplicity of interests brings conflict among them, and hence there is a need for discipline and order.

The function of reason is to impose this order. To live by this rule, attempting to impose maximal harmony on one's interests, is to live the Life of Reason:

"Reason as such represents or rather constitutes a single formal interest, the interest in harmony. When two interests are simultaneous and fall within one act of apprehension the desirability of harmonising them is involved in the very effort to realise them together. If attention and imagination are steady enough to face this implication and not to allow impulse to oscillate between irreconcilable tendencies, reason comes into being. Henceforth things actual and things desired are confronted by an ideal which has both pertinence and authority."(53)

One prerequisite of living the life of reason is knowledge of the world in which one lives, obviously necessary in order to gauge how propitious it is to the satisfaction of one's interests. Equally important is self-knowledge, the Socratic first principle of ethics. Before one can gauge the propitiousness of the environment to one's interests, it is necessary to know what these interests are:

"This method, the Socratic method, consists in accepting any estimation which any man may sincerely make, and in applying dialectic to it, so as to let the man see what he really esteems. What he really esteems is what ought to guide his conduct..."(54)

Having become aware of his interests, and of their compatibilities, the rational man must attempt to decide which actions to perform. Here there is a difficulty which Santayana points out: to compare pleasures or pains, we must do so in their absence, by representing them to ourselves. This process never reproduces exactly the emotional tone as it is felt on
the pulse. There is an injustice inherent in representation. However, there is no escape from this predicament. The best that can be done is scrupulously to collate all the evidence there is, and on this ground to measure values in reflection:

"..reason, by attending to all the evidences that can be gathered and by confronting the first pronouncement by others fetched from every quarter of experience, has power to minimise the error and reach a practically just estimate of absent values."(56)

The interests thus weighed in reflection need not and should not be exclusively one's own. Santayana both recommends altruism as a desideratum and believes in its psychological possibility. Genuine altruism is natural self-expression: "Sympathy and justice are simply an expansion of the soul's interests, arising when we consider other men's lives so intently that something in us imitates and re-enacts their experience, so that we move partly in unison with their movement."(57)

Santayana varies in his opinion as to the degree to which the ideal of the Life of Reason is realisable. In "Reason in Common Sense" he argues that natural goods are attainable and compatible in principle,

"for every particular ideal, being an expression of human nature in operation, must in the end involve the primary human faculties and cannot be essentially incompatible with any other ideal which involves them too..To adjust all demands to one ideal and adjust that ideal to its natural conditions - in other words to live the life of Reason - is something perfectly possible..."(58)

This is barely consistent with certain other passages in "The Life of Reason". A very different tone is evident in some remarks in the last of the five volumes, "Reason in Science":

"A truly rational morality, or social regimen, has never existed in the world and is hardly to be looked for...A rational morality would imply perfect self-knowledge, so that no congenial good should be needlessly missed..Such knowledge, such definition of purpose, and
such perfection of sympathy are clearly beyond man's reach. All that can be hoped for is that the advance of science and commerce, by fostering peace and a rational development of character, may bring some part of mankind nearer to that goal; but the goal lies, as every ultimate ideal should, at the limit of what is possible."

It is the second of these views which came to dominate Santayana's opinions as he grew older. In a piece written during the first war, the establishment of the Life of Reason is made to depend on the chance collocation of creatures with similar interests. Knowledge is only half of virtue, for one might fully know the interests of another creature and set about exterminating it. The remaining part of virtue is beneficence:

"Your virtue will be beneficent only in so far as your nature is 'good', that is, fundamentally harmonious with other natures it affects. Beneficence is not obtainable by rational discrimination among the impulses of each soul; it presupposes a natural co-operation among all the souls concerned. This harmony must pre-exist." (59)

It will become clear in Ch.IX, below, that Santayana came to feel the need to supplement the Life of Reason with the ethic of the spiritual life. Periodically, human beings need relief from the pressure of rational pursuits in a form of disinterested contemplation.

VI; The Purpose of the Aesthetics of "Reason In Art"

It will be clear from what has been said above that Santayana's conception of the business of philosophy is of a traditional, non-analytic kind: the philosopher deals with facts of a general kind, not merely concepts. His evident if inexplicit view of aesthetics is perfectly consonant with this general standpoint. In "Reason in Art", he puts forward a definition of art, or 'fine art' as he prefers to say, a general psychological account of how each of the arts arose from basic instincts and reactive habits of men, and concludes with an estimate of the extent to which fine art in general helps or hinders the realisation of the Life of Reason. (cf. Introduction, above.)
This last theme is present throughout the book, and serves as a reminder that the governing aim of "The Life of Reason" is a moral one. It is principally a work of ethics. "Reason in Art" is Santayana's most comprehensive work on aesthetics; yet the most important function of the aesthetical doctrines put forward in it is to serve as premises from which to make judgments on the possible contributions of the arts to the good life. (61*)

VIII: Art: Industrial Art, and Fine Art

Nowhere does Santayana set out a formal definition of fine art; yet in the course of the first three chapters of "Reason in Art", he makes general observations which evidently state his views on its defining properties. The argument of these chapters is arranged on the following plan: a discussion of 'art' in a very general sense, in which the term is used to mean any purposive activity in which man modifies his environment to suit his own ends; a discussion of the species industrial art (also called 'servile' and 'mechanical'), and finally a discussion of the emergence of fine art.

Life is an equilibrium maintained now by accepting modification and now by imposing it. Man must sometimes accept a change in his environment; at other times he may succeed in changing it in accordance with his own interests. Santayana calls any operation which thus rationalizes and humanizes the environment, "art", in a very broad sense of the term. No doubt the Greek concept 'technē' influenced him in this usage. (62*)

Art (in the broad sense) has an instinctive source and a material embodiment. This second requirement entails that a work of fine art (one species of art in the general sense) always has a material embodiment, a consequence which at once differentiates Santayana's aesthetic from that of Croce and Gollingwood, for whom the work of art is a state of mind of the artist. (63)

While art (in the broad sense) has its source in the pressure of
instinctive drives seeking satisfaction, it is not merely instinctive. It is a necessary condition for any activity being an art that it be deliberate:

"If the birds in building nests felt the utility of what they do, they would be practising an art, and for the instinct to be called rational it would ever suffice that their traditional purpose and method should become conscious occasionally." (64)

Santayana is not precise as to the description under which it is necessary that the activity become conscious in order to qualify as an art, i.e., whether this description must include the clause, "and this activity is an art", or whether some more specific description stating a purpose is all that is required.

Most art (in the broad sense) is experimental. We do not know exactly what we want to produce before we produce it; yet we recognise it if and when we do produce it. Santayana's epiphenomenalism leads him to stress the well-attested experience of the involuntariness of creative thought:

"The ideas come of themselves, being new and unthought-of figments, similar, no doubt, to old perceptions and compacted of familiar materials, but reproduced in novel fashion and dropped in their sudden form from the blue. There is a painful pregnancy in genius, a long incubation and waiting for the spirit, a thousand rejections and futile birth-pangs, before the wonderful child appears, a gift of the gods, utterly undeserved and inexplicably perfect. Even this unaccountable success comes only in rare and fortunate instances. What is ordinarily produced is so base a hybrid, so lame and ridiculous a changling, that we reconcile ourselves with difficulty to our own offspring and blush to be represented by our fated works." (65*)

Experiment in art (in the broad sense) is by no means, then, always successful. A successful experiment results in a product which has utility,
which is accordingly an eventual product of art and not its ground. If the useful art actually discovered is to be repeated, two conditions must obtain: (i) the artist must have skill and perseverance, and (ii) the material on which he works must maintain its plasticity. Useful works can be repeated; repetition reinforces itself and becomes a habit; and a clear memory of the benefit once attained by fortunate action, representing as it does the trace left by the action in the system, and its harmony with man's impulses (for the action is felt to be beneficial) constitute a strong presumption that the act will be repeated automatically on occasion. When this occurs, we say that the action has been learned. (66)

Clearly, art (in the broad sense) is of vital importance to the realisation of the life of reason:

"What makes progress possible is that rational action may leave traces in nature, such that nature in consequence furnishes a better basis for the Life of Reason; in other words progress is art bettering the conditions of existence. Until art arises, all achievement is internal to the brain, dies with the individual, and in him spends itself without recovery, like music heard in a dream." (67)

Further the process of art is teachable; each generation may profit from the experience and art-products of the generation before. (68)

From art in this very broad sense Santayana turns to consider one species of it, which he calls variously industrial, mechanical and servile art. These terms, evidently synonymous in his usage, are not defined. The contexts of their use make it perfectly clear, however, that an industrial art is an art which is cultivated as a means, not as an end, and whose value is consequently instrumental, not intrinsic.

It is impossible at present (he begins) to give an accurate estimation of the value of art (in the broad sense) to the Life of Reason; history supplies us with insufficient data. In the meantime, however, it is
possible to say something about the ultimate interests by which industrial arts and their products have to be evaluated. One might think that industrial art served two aims: (i) to produce an abundance of products, and (ii) to diminish the labour needed to produce them. This second aim at least, however, is not ultimate. To diminish toil is good only if it liberates energies which can be used in other fields:

"Thus one ideal - to diminish labour - falls back into the other - to diffuse occasions for enjoyment. The aim is not to curtail occupation but to render occupation liberal by supplying it with more appropriate objects." (69)

The ultimate goal of industrial art is to facilitate a liberal life, a term by which Santayana evidently means the life composed as nearly as possible of activities which are ends in themselves.

Some philosophers would argue that happiness arises out of work and that compulsory activities, dutifully performed, underlie freedom; and from this it follows that a life of instrumental activities may be happy. Yet, Santayana replies, to arrest attention on a means is illiberal, not so much by what such an interest contains, as by what it ignores:

"Happiness in a treadmill is far from inconceivable; but for that happiness to be rational the wheel should be nothing less than the whole sky from which influences can descend upon us. There would be meanness of soul in being content with a smaller sphere, so that not everything that was relevant to our welfare should be envisaged in our thoughts and purposes. To be absorbed in the incidental is the animal's portion; to be confined to the instrumental is the slave's." (70)

The objection claims that instrumental activities may result in happiness. Without denying this, Santayana invokes in reply a principle supplementary to pure eudaemonism. Happiness is the good, but there is a distinction to be drawn between irrational and rational happiness. The latter is occasioned by a life in which liberal as well as instrumental pursuits are
engaged in. A rational life, in which all interests are satisfied as best as is practically possible, is assumed to be superior to a life in which relatively few interests are harmonised. The difficulty in Santayana's reply is to justify the supplementary principle. This is a species of the difficulty pointed out by Stephen Pepper and noted in Chapter I, namely, that to make harmony of interests the good is arbitrarily to make one interest (that in harmony) more important than the others. No justification is offered for this assumption.

Santayana continues that an instrumental art is by definition not an end in itself, and that therefore, insofar as a man is occupied by such arts, he is obviously a slave and his art at best an evil necessity: "Thus all instrumental and remedial arts, however indispensable, are pure burdens; and progress consists in abridging them as much as is possible without contracting the basis for moral life."(71) This needful abridgment of servile art can take place in either or both of two ways. The art may become instinctive, unconscious of the utility that backs it and conscious of the solicitation that leads it on. Thus hunting and the nursing of children have become automatic to human beings. The second way in which the industrial arts may be abridged is by a lapse of the demand which required them.(72)

One condition of the rationality of industrial art, then, is that it ministers to liberal activity. A second, Santayana continues, is that the environment and the interests of the creature be in imperfect harmony. If perfect harmony obtained, then action would be futile:

"All objects envisaged either in vulgar action or in the airiest cognition must first be ideal and distinct from the given facts, otherwise action would have lost its function as the same moment that thought lost its significance. All life would have collapsed into a purposeless datum."(73)

Art (in the broad sense) in order to exist presupposes a problem to solve (an ideal to realize) and a material on which to operate in order to solve
the problem. A further condition of the possibility of the rationality of industrial art is that this material be other than entirely refractory: "Absolute chaos would defeat life as surely as would absolute ideality." (74) Santayana does not notice the difference between the two conditions for industrial art which he discusses. The condition that industrial art minister to liberal activity is indeed a condition of the rationality of industrial art; the conditions concerning the state of the environment, however, are not so much conditions for rationality as preconditions of the possibility of industrial art in the first place. Moreover, it is hard to see why Santayana should consider that a perfect life should be 'a purposeless datum': one would still act, even in an ideal environment. The difference between such actions and those in an imperfect environment is simply that the former always produce exactly the desired result.

Santayana proceeds to his doctrines on fine art by noting that all art has two stages, the first servile or industrial, the second liberal. In industrial art, "untoward matter is better prepared, or impeding media are overcome." (75) In liberal art, "perfectly fit matter is appropriated to ideal uses and endowed with a direct spiritual function." (76) The spiritual function "consists in the activity of turning an apt material into an expressive and delightful form, thus filling the world with objects which by symbolising ideal energies tend to revive them under a favouring influence and therefore to strengthen and refine them." (77) Santayana goes on, changing terminology, to note that all fine art contains an element of industry and all industry an element of fine art, for every proximate end, in being attained, satisfies the mind; and before any product can attain its ideal function, problems as to its transparency and fitness have to be removed.

The proximity of occurrence of the terms 'liberal' and 'fine' in the text is important. Santayana does not state whether these terms are intended as synonyms, or whether fine art is a species of liberal art. The
unannounced change of usage, and the absence of any discussion of a second species of liberal art suggest the former. Whichever alternative is the case, all that is built into the definition of liberal art must apply also to fine art. It is important to be clear at the outset as to the relations of these terms, since Santayana's usage has caused considerable confusion. (78*) To recapitulate, art in general is any deliberate manipulation of the environment to further a human interest; industrial art is that species of art which is carried on as a means to a further end, and liberal art is art which is an end in itself. Both industrial and fine art can be rational or irrational, depending on whether or not they maximize the harmonious satisfaction of interests.

The remarks on liberal or fine art need to be considered at more length. A work of fine art has a spiritual function, an expressive and delightful form, symbolizes ideal energies, and stimulates and strengthens these energies in its observers. Santayana provides no definitions or explanations of these terms. We are not told explicitly of what fine art is expressive, though presumably it is expressive at least of ideal energies. We are not told what it is for a work to symbolize ideal energies, nor what sort of delight the work is supposed to give (presumably aesthetic delight), nor what ideal energies are. However, some of these gaps can be filled by reference to other remarks by Santayana. It has been shown in Chapter V, above, that an ideal is the idea of an imagined state of perfection, in which some interest or group of interests is perfectly satisfied. All moral beliefs, in Santayana's view, state or imply ideals. Perhaps, then, Santayana conceives it to be the function of fine art to symbolize imagined states of perfection, or to express ideals: in view of his doctrines on poetry, this is at least a safe conjecture.

If Santayana considers it to be a necessary condition for art — and the fact that he puts forward other conditions makes it plausible to read his remarks as a set of jointly sufficient necessary conditions — that the
work in question express or in some sense symbolise what can without strain be called an ideal, then surely he is wrong. Some works of art, perhaps all great ones, do have this property; but equally, many do not, e.g. poetry of pure sound, or paintings designed to give pure optical delight and no more. What Santayana has done is to pick an aesthetic virtue which, as his views on poetry have made clear, he holds in high estimation, and builds it into his definition of art.

A further remark interpretable as a statement of a necessary condition for art is Santayana's doctrine that works, "in which an aesthetic value is or is supposed to be prominent take the name of fine art." (79) This must be approached via his definition of aesthetic value in terms of the imagination.

Imagination is,

"a region of deployed sensibility or synthetic representation", (80) which is in some sense between abstract discourse and pure sensation. It is,

"a region where more is seen at arm's length than in any one moment could be felt at close quarters, and yet where the remote parts of experience, which discourse reaches only through symbols, are recovered and recomposed in something like their native colours and experienced relations." (81)

The last clause here recalls the doctrines on the poet and the data of experience discussed in Chapter V, above: the poet has the ability to decompose the unities imposed on the data of experience by reason. Here, the doctrine is extended to cover all artistic creation, not merely that of poetry.

Aesthetic value is defined in terms of imagination: "The values inherent in imagination, in instant intuition, in sense endowed with form, are called aesthetic values." (82). There is no expansion of this definition in the text, though it is by no means difficult to supply at least a part of the needed explanation by reference to Santayana's other
doctrines. He seems here to mean that aesthetic value is value in the immediate, or at least, in perception conceptualised to a lesser degree than obtains in ordinary, humirum activities. This is consistent with the remark in "The Sense of Beauty", that aesthetic judgments are "necessarily intrinsic and based on the character of immediate experience."(33) To what degree and in what ways precisely aesthetic perception is conceptualised differently from ordinary perception is not clear. It is tempting to interpret him as saying that aesthetic perception is perception in which the object is experienced under descriptions which contain no reference to the satisfaction of practical interests. Such a view is speculative, though it is consistent with his remarks, and is consonant with the distinction between immediate and mediate experience. It is at least open to him to argue that the mediate conceptualisation of data is directed by and towards the satisfaction of practical interests.

This is the sense, then, in which the term, "aesthetic value" is used in the second necessary condition for art, i.e. having or being supposed to have a prominent aesthetic value. At the risk of repetitiveness, it is relevant to note that one difficulty with this condition is the untenability of the doctrine of aesthetic value, which follows as a consequence of the collapse of the immediate - mediate distinction. Again, the second disjunct of this condition must be rejected: works merely intended to have aesthetic value but failing to attain it are not classed as art, but at best as failed art or would-be art. The first disjunct can be retained, provided it is liberally interpreted, i.e. provided that Santayana's imperfect definition of aesthetic value is not insisted on; it is to be argued below that a work is called a work of art partly in virtue of its possession of certain aesthetic virtues; and whatever has aesthetic virtues has aesthetic value.

Santayana goes on to assert that to define a work of art as that which has prominent aesthetic value is in a way misleading, for, "the work so defined is almost always an abstraction from the actual object, which has
many non-aesthetic functions and values." (84) Aesthetic and non-aesthetic values are in Santayana's view very closely connected. Art (in the broad sense), he argues, is that element of the Life of Reason which consists in modifying the environment in order to secure the maximal satisfaction of all human interests. Nature is wont to satisfy these interests together, and works simultaneously in every ideal direction. No one direction is good if it leads to estrangement from all other interests: "The aesthetic good will be accordingly hatched in the same nest with the others, and incapable of flying far in a different air." (85) Thus to separate out the aesthetic element for special attention,

"is an artifice which is more misleading than helpful; for neither in the history of art nor in a rational estimate of its value can the aesthetic function of things be divorced from the practical and moral." (86) Aesthetic values are so nebulous and so very intimately connected with other types of value that to take them out of context is to make oneself liable to appraise the object in question irrationally:

"An aesthetic fragrance, indeed, all things may have, if in soliciting man's senses or reason they can awaken his imagination as well; but this middle zone is so mixed and nebulous, and its limits are so vague, that it cannot well be treated in theory otherwise than as it exists in fact - as a phase of man's sympathy with the world he moves in." (87)

This conclusion is surely unjustified, at least in such an extreme form. It is just to assert that, in order to understand works of art, it is necessary almost invariably to employ a large number of beliefs about life, as well, often, as beliefs about art and its history. What is unjust is to assert that to consider the aesthetic properties of works of art alone is always to risk misunderstanding the work in some important way. It is an evident fact that in advanced societies, works of art are produced to serve as objects for contemplation. The aesthetic virtues of
these objects are their most important properties. Under these circum-
stances, it would be to misunderstand such objects to regard them as other
than objects whose value is almost or entirely aesthetic. It is to over-
state the case to assert that aesthetic values are always "mixed and
nebulous."

A further point arises from the definition of aesthetic value as value
in the immediate. It seems that there is some tension between this
doctrine and the first condition for art, namely that a work of art must
express an ideal. If aesthetic perception is perception which is
conceptualised to a lesser degree than is the case in ordinary practical
perception, then to experience a work of art aesthetically involves putting
a good deal of conceptual apparatus in abeyance. This is possibly in
tension with the doctrine that a work of art must express an ideal, for
to do so presumably requires us to think of the work of art under fairly
complex descriptions; this must be so in the case of those poems most
highly regarded by Santayana, which express a complete philosophy. To
save his consistency, Santayana would have to accept the paradox that the
most important feature of a work of art, its ideal meaning, is not
appreciated aesthetically, and by definition cannot be so appreciated. Yet
it must be stressed that this objection rests on a conjectural interpretation
of Santayana, turning on exactly what degree of conceptualisation he has in
mind when he speaks of value in immediate experience.

More general points about fine art emerge as Santayana discusses its
emergence in the life of men. Art, including fine art, is so to speak
between two extremes of action, pure spontaneity and pure utility. The
former type of action is unreflective and entirely undeliberated; while
utilitarian action is devoid of all ideality, and expresses only the
necessities to which man is subject. Spontaneous action leads to art
when it acquires a rational function; utility leads to art when its
vehicle acquires intrinsic value and becomes expressive. A good way of
studying the fine arts is to see how they grow, now out of utility, now
out of automatism. Their goal can be nothing but the complete superposition of these two characters:

"The meanest arts are those which lie near the limit either of utility or of automatic self-expression. They become nobler and more rational as their utility is rendered spontaneous or their spontaneity beneficent."(88)

These doctrines are difficult to estimate as they stand, since they are ambiguous. Santayana appears to make it a necessary condition for art that the object be in some degree self-expressive and have a beneficent effect on those who encounter it. Self-expression is a slippery term; it has a trivial sense in which it is necessarily the case that whatever the artist does is self-expressive, merely because the artist himself does express it. But this tells us nothing distinctive about art or the process of creation. Again, to evaluate this claim properly, it would be necessary to know what sort of beneficent effects Santayana has in mind.

He continues that the spontaneous arts are older than the useful, since man must live and act before he can devise instruments for living and acting better. There is accordingly a vast amount of irresponsible play and loose experiment in art, before these gropings acquire a settled habit and function, and rationality begins.(89) Santayana describes the change from automatism to art in the case of gesture. When rationality is born,

"Grimace and gesture and ceremony will be modified by a sense of their effect; they will become artful and will transform their automatic expressiveness into ideal expression. They will become significant of what it is intended to communicate and important to know; they will have ceased to be irresponsible excuses and vents for passing feeling, by which feeling is dissipated, as in tears, without being embodied and intellectualised, as in a work of art."(90)

Before commenting on this, one can notice some remarks by George Boas in his critical essay on Santayana's aesthetics. Boas asserts that Santayana classifies the arts on the basis of their materials rather than
on the basis of their purpose. (91) Further, this view is said by Boas to have the consequence that the only critical standard relevant to the appreciation and evaluation of art is that of technical competence:

"...the defining of arts on the basis of their materials, while telling us something of great technical interest, incurs the danger of setting up standards of workmanship which are in the long run only a part of the story." (92)

In Boas's view, a full appreciation of a work of art presupposes that we can grasp the artist's purpose or intention, and therefore Santayana's view is rejected by him as inadequate. Boas's universal claim about the need to know the artist's intention is to say the least debatable; more important at present is the injustice in his exposition of Santayana, who is at pains to stress precisely the purposiveness which Boas claims that he neglects, as is made clear by the passage quoted in the preceding paragraph.

Returning to that passage, Santayana can there be taken as asserting that for an object to be a work of art, it must satisfy the further conditions of (i) being intended as a communication; and (ii) that it embody intellectualised feeling. The second of these requires two comments. Firstly, the sentence in which the remark occurs is ambiguous. Santayana may not here be stipulating that all works of art are expressive of feeling, but merely that when a work is expressive, the feeling is embodied and intellectualised. The ambiguity remains. The second point is what meaning is to be attached to the undefined terms 'embodied' and 'intellectualised'. Embodiment need not present a problem. There is no reason to believe that by the time he wrote "Reason in Art", Santayana had rejected any of the doctrines put forward eight years earlier in "The Sense of Beauty". This being the case, an embodied feeling will be an emotion stimulated by an aesthetic object, projected back into the object, and regarded as one of its properties. As to the meaning of 'intellect-
ualised' one can only guess, though it is by no means difficult to attach some meaning to the term. It is a familiar enough experience in contemplating a work of art to be able to recognise and as it were savour the quality of an expressed feeling without experiencing the feeling as it would be experienced in a non-aesthetic context; one way of pointing to this quality of emotion felt in a state of psychical distance is to describe it as intellectualised. Possibly it is this aspect of the experience of art which Santayana has in mind.

There are difficulties with both proposed conditions. It is hard to accept that all objects in the class of works of art are intended to communicate a message which would satisfy the description of being 'important to know'. A work might be intended to stimulate delicate or violent sensory experience and no more, as is the case with some paintings. To do this is not quite to convey a message. Again, it is not true that all works of art express intellectualised feeling. This is not even true of music, where the theory might be thought to be most plausible, for many pieces of music which are works of art do not express feeling, intellectualised or otherwise, e.g. much of the 'tafelmusik' of the classical period.

If the foregoing conjectures and arguments are correct, then Santayana's definition of art provides only one acceptable, but trivial, insight, i.e. that a work of art must have a prominent aesthetic value. It is appropriate at this point to consider briefly an analytical alternative view of the nature of art.

VIII: Analysis and Art

One of the implicit assumptions made by Santayana in "Reason in Art", and one which he shares with almost if not every other writer in the history of aesthetics, is that it is in principle possible to define art; or, put in another idiom, that it is in principle possible to specify necessary and/or sufficient conditions which govern the use of the terms 'art' and 'work of art'. This assumption has itself been questioned by
analytical writers, notably Morris Weitz in "The Role of Theory in Aesthetics"; J.A. Passmore in "The Fearsomeness of Aesthetics", and W.E. Kennick in "Does Traditional Aesthetics rest on a Mistake?" (y)

One line of argument in support of the negative thesis that 'art' cannot be defined is to note that none of the definitions proposed so far has revealed a property common to all works of art. Thus Weitz briefly surveys and criticises Formalism, Voluntarism, Emotionalism, Intellectualism, Intuitionism and Organicism, and, having produced the standard objections to these views, remarks that, "even if art has one set of necessary or sufficient properties, none of the theories we have noted or, for that matter, no aesthetic theory yet proposed, has enumerated that set to the satisfaction of all concerned." (94) There is undoubtedly a good deal of truth in Weitz's contentions. The classic theories of art can now be seen to be deeply unsatisfactory. For example, there are obviously objects called works of art which are not in any non-veeuous sense of the term imitations of anything, e.g. abstract painting, and the vast majority of buildings. Expressionist views have of course differed widely, and the unity conferred on them by the classification is more apparent than real. However, many expression views state or entail that all art expresses feelings; yet, as has been said in the previous section, this is not true even of music where the theory might be thought to have most plausibility. Again, to maintain that significant form, in the sense of the term used by Clive Bell (cf. Chapter III, above) is necessary for art is no less difficult, since, although Bell does not define significant form in terms of the aesthetic emotion, yet the occurrence of this feeling is the only sure indication that significant form is present in a work; moreover, it is surely false to maintain that there is one emotion common to all aesthetic experience.

Yet while this much might be conceded to Weitz, it should be noted that all that is established by his argument is that no feature common
to all works of art has yet been found; no 'a posteriori' argument of this kind can prove that no such quality can be found.

In order to establish this stronger claim, an 'a priori' argument is needed, and Weitz attempts to provide one by making use of Waismann's notion of the open-texture of certain concepts. A concept is open if its conditions of application are amendable and corrigible, i.e., if a situation can be imagined or secured which would call for some decision on our part to extend the use of the concept to cover this, or to close the concept and invent a new one to deal with the new case. If necessary and sufficient conditions can be stated, the concept is a closed one. Descriptive and normative concepts are open, unless arbitrarily closed by stipulation. (95) "Art" is an open concept; new art forms have emerged and continue to emerge, demanding decisions on whether the concept is to be extended or not to suit these cases. (96) To know what art is, we do not need to know any postulated essence of art; we need only to be able to use the term 'art' correctly. (97)

One can attempt to show the falsity of a part of this doctrine - i.e., that no necessary condition binds the terms 'art' or 'work of art' - by considering the following aspect of the logic of these terms: when an object (used in a sense broad enough to cover pieces of music, ballets, etc.) is included in the class of works of art, this judgment is supported by advancing reasons which specify the possession, by the work of art, of aesthetic virtues. A few examples will make this clear. Suppose, for example, that someone makes the claim that a certain book is a work of art. In support of this judgment, he may produce any combination of reasons such as the following: that it is original; that its characters are entirely credible and convincing; that the episodes arise inevitably from one another; that the style is always appropriate to the episode; that it has a beginning, a middle, and an end; or that it is deeply felt and authentic.
Again, suppose someone says of a piece of music, that it is both moving and exciting; that the themes and harmonies are beautiful; that they develop as if inevitably; that the form of the work (in the sense in which sonata, fugue, etc., are forms) is a strength, and does not cramp its evolution; that the composer's orchestration is impeccable, and so on. These are among the typical reasons which would be advanced in support of the claim that the piece of music is a work of art. Not much ingenuity is required to work out parallel lists for works of painting, sculpture, architecture, and ballet.

While it can be readily conceded to anti-essentialists such as Weitz that none of these aesthetic virtues is itself a necessary condition governing the use of 'art' or 'work of art', yet an important point follows merely from the fact that these reasons specify aesthetic virtues. An aesthetic virtue is a property of an object such that the possession of it enhances aesthetic experience in some way. If it is the case that the uses of the terms 'art' and 'work of art' are always supported by specifications of aesthetic virtues, then it follows that all art is an object of aesthetic interest; for clearly, an object whose properties enhance aesthetic experience must be an object of aesthetic interest. In other words, being an object of aesthetic interest is a necessary condition binding the use of 'art' and 'work of art'. These findings vindicate two of the positions adopted by Santayana, i.e. that 'art' is a condition-governed term (and so is open to definition to some degree), and that all art has a prominent aesthetic value - to say this is not to say anything relevantly different from the claim that being an object of aesthetic interest is a necessary condition for art.

A further point in the logical grammar of 'art' and 'work of art' follows from the fact that their use is supported by specifications of some combination of a range of aesthetic virtues, namely, that these terms are honorific. To call any object (in the present extended sense of the term)
a work of art is to pay it a compliment. Which aesthetic virtues are most prized varies with cultural background, time, place, and individual. The history of taste is the history of vicissitudes in preferences among aesthetic virtues. A work of art is great art when it possesses aesthetic virtues to a superlative degree, and possibly sometimes when it possesses very rare aesthetic virtues, such as expressing an advanced state of spiritual development (Beethoven's late quartets and piano sonatas, Rembrandt's late self-portraits). The terms 'good art' and 'great art' are therefore doubly honorific: the work of art possesses far more than enough aesthetic virtues, (or has them to a superlative degree) to gain it a place in the class of works of art.

Again, it follows that, if certain qualities possessed by an object fell so into disrepute that they cease to be counted as aesthetic virtues, or if for any other reason it becomes impossible to take an aesthetic interest in it, then that object will for the time being pass out of the class of works of art; and conversely, objects at one time excluded from the class may enter it, if the conditions opposite to those just specified come to obtain.

A different logical problem arising from the use of the term 'work of art', and one to which Santayana pays no attention, is that of the logical status of the work of art. That there is such a problem quickly becomes clear in connexion with those works which have copies or performances, for in these cases, the work itself cannot be identified with any spatio-temporal particular or process (or however one chooses to describe a performance). If this were the case, then it would follow that if any particular copy of the work were lost, then the work itself would be lost; or again, one might say of any particular performance that this is the work the artist set out to create. The same objections apply to privileged copies or performances, e.g. the manuscript copy; or the first performance, or a performance overseen by the artist.
These difficulties are eluded by the use of Peirce's distinction between a logical type and its tokens. The work of art is a logical type, while copies or performances of it are tokens. Peirce introduces the distinction while discussing the word 'the':

"In another sense of the word 'word'...there is but one word 'the' in the English language; and it is impossible that this word should lie visibly on a page or be heard in any voice, for the reason that it is not a Single thing or a Single event. It does not exist; it only determines things that do exist. Such a definitely significant Form, I propose to term a Type. A Single event which happens once and whose identity is limited to that one happening or a single object or thing which is in some single place at any one instant of time, such event or thing being significant only as occurring just when and where it does, such as this or that word on a single line of a single page of a single copy of a book, I will venture to call a Token."(99)

The relations between a type and its tokens can be indicated by considering to what extent the same properties can be predicated of each. Some properties can be intelligibly predicated only of tokens, e.g. those specifying its spatio-temporal location; while others can be properties only of a type, e.g. having been invented by someone. Where the type is a work of art, aesthetic virtues and vices can be predicated of it: the work can be said to have organic form, to be expressive, to be authentic, and so on. Token-performances can have these properties predicated of them; or they can be criticised for obscuring or failing to do justice to the properties of the type; or conversely they can be praised for revealing a new property hitherto unnoticed but now regarded as a property of the type. In general, it is clear that the relations between a type and its tokens are close, since many properties can be shared (intelligibly predicated of both) and transmitted between them. (A property is transmitted from token to type,
for example, if the type is p because the token is p)

It might be thought that the type-token distinction is applicable only where the work of art has copies or performances, and fails to apply where there is a plausible physical-object candidate for the title, 'the work of art,' as is the case with most statues, buildings, and paintings. But the situation is not so simple as this. Ruby Meager has pointed out that a physical object work of art, a token-thing in her vocabulary, has a type-function. Michaelangelo's 'David,' for example has this function: there is a replica of it at Forest Lawn Funeral Park, California, and this replica is a replica of it only insofar as it reproduces the block which Michaelangelo worked on and which is in Florence. (100) Michaelangelo's 'David' is thus, "the defining model of a class of things, more or less imperfect copies of it, which take their identity as works of art (though not as blocks of marble) from it." (101)

Miss Meager raises this point in the context of a discussion of a further general issue which has exercised analytical philosophers, i.e., the doctrine that a work of art is in some important sense unique, and further, that this has the consequence that to apply general standards to a work of art is merely inappropriate. In some way, a work of art is said to propose its own standards and is appropriately judged by them alone. (102*) The difficulties with these views are chiefly (1) to give an acceptable sense to 'unique', and (2) to square them with the common procedure of comparing certain works of art with one another, a practice which is not accompanied by such a sense of logical absurdity as ought to be present, granted the truth of the uniqueness doctrines.

It might be said that a particular work of art is the only one of its kind; yet in exactly the same sense, everything can be said to be unique. Moreover, all works of art have it in common that they are works of art. Another view is that differences matter more than similarities in talking of works of art; yet in order for things to be different they must be similar in some respects. Moreover, it is hard to see what is valuable
about sheer difference. Margaret Macdonald (103) holds that in principle, no two works of art can tie for first place in a competition. Yet this is just false: film and dance festivals would be impossible and absurd if this were the case. Nor again is it acceptable to say that works of art are unique in respect of content, for, in the first place, this property is not distinctive of works of art, being shared by psychological case histories, and secondly, it is not clear in what sense works of architecture and abstract art can be said to have content.

Perhaps the most acceptable sense which can be given to 'unique' with regard to works of art is that they are to some degree original, not wholly predictable from prior knowledge or specification. This much one might concede to the uniqueness theorists, but it is questionable whether such a concession precludes the possibility of comparison between works of art. Miss Meager follows Wittgenstein in pointing out how in fact a variety of paradigm case argument can be invoked in aesthetical reasoning (104*). It is assumed that, in arguing about a work of art, the work has a general point, in terms of which its features can be assessed as contributing or the reverse. It is neither necessary nor usual for this point to be completely or explicitly stateable. Evaluative comparisons of features of works and of works as wholes can be made by reference to what is taken as a successful use of a criticised feature (or work with a similar point), indicated in its own successful work. Since such comparisons are common and intuitively unproblematic, there is surely good reason to regard with suspicion any doctrine which claims their logical absurdity.

It might seem that this point is not relevant to Santayana; yet in fact the possibility of judging the arts by general standards is a crucial presupposition of the whole of "Reason in Art".

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IX: Conclusion

"The Life of Reason", including "Reason in Art" is now a neglected philosophical work. It is hoped that the foregoing sections go some way to
showing that such a neglect is unjust, especially with regard to "Reason in Art". Santayana is usually dismissed as a writer of poetic prose from which philosophical technicalities and sequential argument are absent. It must be admitted of course that there is some justice in this claim; the lack of technicality is a defect. Yet it is surely not a fatal one, certainly not grave enough to justify the neglect into which Santayana's work has fallen. A close degree of attention reveals doctrines consonant with more recent analytical studies, or at least supportable by analytical techniques. Moreover, it is to be noted once again that every crude species of essentialism - the 'one word answer' theories of art - is quite absent from Santayana's text: this in itself is an unusual virtue.
Chapter VII: The Fine Arts

I: Introduction

The first three chapters of "Reason in Art" set out Santayana's theories on the evolution of art from unintelligent behaviour. Chapters V - VIII are given over to generalised accounts of some of the fine arts: music, literature, architecture, sculpture and painting, treatment of the last two being preceded by a theory of the nature of representation. Writers on Santayana's aesthetics have in the past either ignored these chapters completely or accorded them only a brief and uncritical treatment. The other remarks and related papers considered below are also ignored. It must be admitted that, in general, the value of what Santayana has to say about the fine arts is impaired by the extreme generality of his treatment; but this is no justification for omitting to give his views serious examination. It is argued in the present chapter that in some areas at least - on music, architecture, and the nature of representation - his remarks deserve to be better known.

II: Music

In his autobiography, Santayana makes it clear that his experience of music was by no means extensive. Describing some time spent in old age in Venice, he writes:

"The public seems to think that to hear music is to see the musicians fiddle and blow. I preferred not to see them. Here, and on the Pincio in Rome, I had my only taste of instrumental music: shocking confession, no doubt, for a person supposed to relish the fine arts. But music bores me if I am sitting penned in among a crowd in a hot place, with bright artificial lights, and a general pretence at intelligent interest, whether such interest exists or not." (1)

Nevertheless, in his views on musical aesthetics, Santayana avoids these varieties of essentialism which have often characterised works on this subject.
The majority of writers on musical aesthetics have put forward some version of the same theory: that music is in some sense the language of the emotions - Hanslick gives a short list of twenty-two writers who hold some variant of this point of view. (2) This most general formulation covers in practice a large number of variations. The composer could be said to be unburdening himself in music, or expressing himself, or communicating his feelings to us. It could be said that music appeals only to the emotions, not to the intellect, or that it is its most important function to do this; or it could be said simply that music arouses the emotions. More sophisticated versions of the theory attempt to deal with the problem of how precisely sound can embody or arouse feelings. Notably among recent writers, Deryck Cooke in "The Language of Music" (1959 and reprints) holds that the notes and intervals of the major, minor and chromatic diatonic scales have an intrinsic emotional significance. (3) Susanne Langer attempts to account for the same phenomenon with her theory that music shares the same morphology or logical form as feeling, and allows us to articulate an area of human experience in articulable in any other way. (4)

While theories which thus in their various ways stress the expressive qualities of music have dominated and still dominate musical aesthetics, other writers have drawn attention to the formal properties of music, notably of course Hanslick - though this is most emphatically not to say that Hanslick was a thorough-going formalist; such a classification of his position would be as unjust as the same interpretation of Wolfflin, for example. Hanslick allows that music can represent the dynamic properties of emotions: their strength, weakness, intensity, speed, and slowness. (5) Yet while this is so, he is at pains to stress that to use music as a stimulant to emotional reverie is to miss a great deal that is present in the music, notably its formal properties, their relations and development. To ignore these is not to respond as fully and richly as it is possible to do.
These generalities serve as a framework within which to place Santayana’s approach to music. It has been argued in several previous chapters that one of the more unusual and praiseworthy features of Santayana’s aesthetics is its freedom from all simplistic varieties of essentialism. The positive aspect of this negative virtue is his awareness of the role of each type of property of the work of art in aesthetic experience: materials, form, expression, and subject-matter. It is therefore not surprising to find, as has been indicated, that a general and impressive feature of his musical aesthetics should be an avoidance of both formalism and expressionism. Instead, he attempts to do justice to both the formal and expressive properties of music. A further virtue of his treatment of music is the beauty and delicacy of his descriptions of the effects music can have and the benefits it can confer. The general defect of his views, as so often with him, is a lack of detail and rigour. Positions are taken up which might be tenable or not, depending on the detailed explanations which should have been used to support them.

Santayana considers that all the fine arts originate in activities which are either spontaneous or utilitarian, the goal of fine art being the complete superposition of both (cf. Ch. VI, part VII, supra.). In accordance with his belief that a good way of studying the fine arts is to examine their emergence from one or other of these types of behaviour, he begins his treatment of music with some generalised psychological history. A Spanish commentator, Señor Raimundo Lida, criticises this step in Santayana’s argument on the grounds that it is not clear, “whether it is a question of historical genesis, or a process of individual psychology, or both at once.”(“...si se trata de génesis histórica, o de un proceso de psicología individual, o de ambas cosas a la vez,”(6)). The difficulty with Señor Lida’s comment is to see what “historical genesis” might be which is other than an account of what took place, in the last analysis, in the minds of individuals. It is abundantly clear that Santayana’s account is intended to be a true reconstruction of processes which did
occur to certain individuals in the distant past. The unclarity which Lida finds is of his own making.

Music (Santayana begins) emerges from spontaneous activity. Having just described the process whereby the dance progresses from undeliberated, instinctive expression to art, he goes on:

"The same explosive forces that agitate the limbs loosen the voice; hand, foot, and throat mark their wild rhythms together...human music is performed long before it is listened to, and is at first no more an art than sighing."(7*)

Music passes from spontaneous self-expression to fine art as follows: what occurs once on a given occasion will recur when a similar situation obtains. The impulse, reinforced by its own remembered expression, passes into convention. These automatisms, in their repeated performances, are not without certain retroactive effects: they leave the system exhausted or relieved, and they have meantime played more or less agreeably on the senses:

"The music we make automatically we cannot help hearing incidentally; the sensation may even modify the expression, since sensation too has its physical side. The expression is reined in and kept from becoming vagrant, in proportion as its form and occasion are remembered."(8)

It is a necessary condition for fine art, in Santayana's view, that the work be intended as a communication.(cf.Ch. VI, loc. cit. supra.) Accordingly, the more the musical performer comes to control his performance by reflection and criticism, the more he becomes an artist (one notes in passing Santayana's tendency to use verbs like 'to control', which give the misleading impression that he believes in the causal efficacy of mental acts, which in fact he is committed to deny.):

"...he (i.e. the musical performer) trains himself to be consecutive, impressive, agreeable; he begins to compare his improvisation with its subject and function, and thus he develops what are called style and taste."(9*)
From these unobjectionable if not specially informative generalisations, Santayana proceeds to his first group of aesthetic doctrines, gathered under the heading, "Music is a world apart". His use of this subtitle might produce the misleading impression that he is about to put forward an autonomist or purist aesthetic, i.e., the doctrine that any link between music and emotion is purely incidental, and that music rather consists of sounds whose whole meaning is internal to themselves, deriving none of its value from any connexion with the experiences of life. In fact, Santayana merely begins by emphasizing those qualities of music in respect of which it can plausibly be said to be a world apart, going on later to state its relations with the world outside music.

Sounds (Santayana continues) readily acquire ideal values. Sound has the power in itself to engross attention, and at the same time may be easily diversified, so as to become a symbol for other things. It has a structure of its own, so that to hear is almost to understand. Sound approaches that type of ideality which is a property of logical and dialectical thinking: "it presents to sense something like the efficacious structure of the object" (10) 'Dialectic' is Santayana's term for the study of the meaning of terms and their relations. (11) Logic and dialectic have in common that both deal with 'a priori' statements, true independently of whatever is the case, by assimilating music to these disciplines, Santayana wishes to stress the commonplace that musical sounds are such that they must be arranged in accordance with certain rules in order to be pleasing and effective. As one says, they have a logic of their own; in the majority of cases, their internal relations are independent of any non-musical event or process. (An exception would be the production of overtones by a given note.) To say this is surely to say what is true; but it is of course only a first step.

Music is comparable not only to logic and dialectic, but also to mathematics. Like mathematics, in Santayana's view, it gains its adequacy at the cost of being abstract.
"...while it discloses point by point one strain in existence, it leaves many other strains, which are in fact interwoven with it, wholly out of account. Music is accordingly, like mathematics, very nearly a world by itself; it contains a whole gamut of experience, from sensuous elements to ultimate intellectual harmonies. Yet this second existence, this life in music, is no mere ghost of the other; it has its own excitements, its quivering alternatives, its surprising turns; the abstract energy of it takes on so much body, that in progression or declension it seems quite as impassioned as any animal triumph or any moral drama."(12)

The exact meaning of these remarks becomes clear only later on. By saying that music is abstract, Santayana means no more than that music does not represent or embody spatio-temporally unique situations in the world; it is a world in itself because of the variety of meanings it can contain. No more definite claims than these are being put forward, and these are surely indisputable. Music alone cannot specify spatio-temporal co-ordinates; and that music can express a great variety of feelings is a mere commonplace.

He continues that at least a part of the power music has over us is a result of an analogy between its rhythms and movement and that of life itself:

"...what gives music its superior emotional power is its rhythmic advance. Time is a medium which appeals more than space to emotion. Since life itself is a flux, and thought an operation, there is naturally something immediate and breathless about whatever flows and expands. The world of sound...insinuates itself into our very substance, and it is not so much the music that moves us as we that move it. Its rhythms seize upon our bodily life, to accelerate or deepen it; and we must either become inattentive altogether or remain enslaved."(13)

Several comments are appropriate. The informal psychological claim that time appeals more than space to emotion is surely very dubious (and
unnecessary to the argument: he need merely say that time has an important emotional effect.) There are obvious examples of the emotive power of vast spaces, for example, the night sky discussed by Santayana himself in "The Sense of Beauty". Moreover, while it is possible that there is a link of some kind between the rhythms of music and those of life, merely to indicate this in a general way as Santayana does is to leave a great deal yet to be explained. Why should what is rhythmic appeal to us? How precisely to the rhythms 'insinuate' themselves into us? There are both physiological and psychological strands of explanation needed here; Santayana should acknowledge this much at least.

However, it is certainly true that music can have a powerful physical effect, and because of this (Santayana continues) it has been given functions far from aesthetic. It can be used, for example, to keep men's efforts in unison, as with sailors. Returning to the theme of the unreflective nature of early musical performances, Santayana adds the new point that what eventually causes the performers to notice what they are doing, to cease to be purely expressive and to become artists, is the inherent quality of each of the sounds they make:

"...an inherent value exists in all emitted sounds, although barbaric practice and theory are slow to recognise it. Each tone has its quality, like jewels of different water; every cadence has its vital expression, no less inherent in it than that which comes in a posture or a thought."(15)

Santayana does not expand on this remark, and the first comment it demands is to note to how little he has committed himself. He does not say, most obviously, that what is expressed in each sound is always emotion, though equally he does not deny it, and in view of his later remarks would presumably want to say in some cases at least that the 'inherent value' of sound is an emotional value. The key terms he uses, 'inherent value' and 'vital expression' can be interpreted to include expressions which are
of something other than pure feeling, if need be, though Santayana makes no suggestion as to what music expresses besides emotions.

What he is committed to saying, however, is that the value a sound has is at least in part natural, not wholly the result of the elaboration of conventions. The acceptability of this doctrine in musical aesthetics depends on how extensively it is used, how large a role is given to it in the explanation of musical response. Certain features of the response to sound are such as are best called natural: for example, an elementary feature of a sound on which pleasure in the hearer in part depends is volume. The sound must occur above the threshold of hearing and below the threshold of pain. Again, it is surely the most plausible account of the origin of early instruments that they were discovered by accident (blowing through a horn, perhaps) and cultivated because the sounds were naturally pleasing in some degree. The difficulties of the intrinsic significance view begin when the attempt is made, as by Cooke, to use it to account for far more complex features of the musical response. It has been shown in Ch. IV, above, that certain difficulties vitiate Cooke's theory; in general, it becomes implausible to maintain in many cases that there is any significance possessed by individual notes and phrases which cannot be completely obliterated by other features of the musical context. The number and subtlety of the variables in the encounter with music is daunting: the state of mind of the listener; his musical knowledge, sensitivity and emotional maturity; the conditions of listening, which can so importantly affect the quality of the sound; the calibre of the performer and the instrument used. Again, there is the question of cultural milieu: the dominant style with its conventions, conventions which may figure importantly in the mental set with which the listener approaches a piece of music. All these factors are operative in the encounter with music, and all are relevant to an explanation of why a given experience is as it is. There is a role for the 'intrinsic significance hypothesis in such an explanation;
but it is by no means a prominent role. It should be made clear that Santayana does not try to make extensive use of this hypothesis; the difficulty with his position is rather that it is a little unclear just how much use he does want to make of it.

He continues that the whole technique of music is derived from one principle: "It displays a sensuous harmony by a sort of dialectic, suspending and resolving it; so that the parts become distinct and their relation vital." (16) A note, which has its individual value, receives a heightened quality when it figures in a phrase, a phrase in a longer passage, and so on. The heightened effect,

"comes of course from the tensions established and surviving in the sensorium...The mind has been raked and set vibrating in an unusual fashion, so that the 'finale' comes like a fulfilment after much premonition and desire, whereas the same event, unprepared for, might hardly have been observed." (17)

This is surely quite uncontroversial; Santayana says no more than that the effect of musical sounds is due in the largest part to their combination and formal arrangement. The difficulty with this assertion, as with the preceding claim concerning the intrinsic value of sounds, is a lack of detail: a more elaborate discussion of the modification of intrinsic significance by musical context would be preferable to the bare assertion that such modification occurs. Not untypically, Santayana buys truth at the expense of real informativeness.

Equally uncontroversial is the claim that the amount which it is possible to hold in the mind varies greatly from person to person:

"What is tedious and formless to the inattentive may seem a perfect whole to one who, as they say, takes it all in...A musical education is necessary to musical judgment. What most people relish is hardly music; it is rather a drowsy reverie relieved by nervous thrills." (18)

Santayana shifts his ground at this point, turning to discuss the formal
qualities of music:

"Out of simple chords and melodies, which at first catch only the ear, he (i.e. the musician) weaves elaborate compositions that by their form appeal also to the mind. This side of music resembles a richer versification; it may be compared also to mathematics or to arabesques. A moving arabesque that has a vital dimension, an audible mathematics, adding sense to form, and a versification that, since it has no subject-matter, cannot do violence to it by its complex artifices - these are types of pure living, altogether joyful and delightful things. They combine life with order, precision with spontaneity; the flux in them has become rhythmic and its freedom has passed into rational choice, since it has come in sight of the eternal form it would embody." (19*)

Santayana does not deal explicitly with the question of how it is appropriate to respond to music; his position, however, can be extrapolated from this passage. Hanslick (20) maintains that it is inappropriate merely to use music as a stimulant; the appropriate response is actively to follow the nuances of the performance and the unfolding of the form. By implication, Santayana would presumably not wish to disagree significantly with this view. Having drawn attention to the formal qualities of music, he presumably recommends attention to them as a necessary condition for a response which is to count as complete. Moreover, the recommendation is surely quite acceptable; perhaps the gravest consequence of a serious acceptance of formalist and expressionist views in aesthetics is an impoverishing of the aesthetic response by over-concentration on one set of features of a work of art. Since music has formal properties capable of providing pleasure, it is obviously irrational to ignore them.

The form of music gives more than pleasure; in Santayana's view, this aspect of aesthetic experience is morally beneficial in a subtle way - it accustoms us to ideal perfection:

"Such excursions into ultra-mundane regions, where order is free,
refine the mind and make it familiar with perfection. By analogy the ideal form comes to be conceived and desiderated in other regions, where it is not produced so readily, and the music heard, as the Pythagoreans hoped, makes the soul also musical."(21)

Remarks such as this are dealt with more fully in the following chapter, on art and morality. For the present, it is enough to note that this claim clarifies and is consistent with one of Santayana's necessary conditions for fine art, i.e. that fine art stimulates and strengthens our ideal energies.

While the formal qualities of music are thus delightful and beneficial, it must be admitted that if these formal properties were the only properties possessed by music, then it would not interest human beings for long. This most ethereal of arts is brought down to earth by the emotions it arouses:

"For sound, in sweeping through the body and making felt there its kinetic and potential stress, provokes no less interest than does any other physical event or premonition."(22)

The claim that music would not be of interest for long were it without emotional impact is a consequence of Santayana's interest theory of value. If any phenomenon is to be valued, it must satisfy human wants and needs. Since emotional wants and needs are prominent and urgent, any art which is to hold that attention for long must engage the emotions in some way.

Music (Santayana continues) can produce emotion as directly as fighting or love; what affects the soul is the condition of the body at the moment (a consequence of ephiphenomenalism), and this is altered no less truly by a musical impression than by a protective or reproductive act. It cannot be objected that music causes a psychical commotion which is purely imaginary; for dreams and delirium (equally imaginary) can cause tremendous emotional upheavals.(23)

There is perhaps no emotion incident to human life that music cannot render in its abstract medium by "suggesting the pang of it".(24) What music cannot do is to make the feelings precise, since:
"Occasions define feelings; we can convey a delicate emotion only by delicately describing the situation which brings it on. Music, with its irrelevant medium, can never do this for common life, and the passions, as music renders them, are always general." (25*)

Yet music has its own substitute for conceptual distinctness:

"It makes feeling more specific, nay, more delicate and precise than association with things could make it, by uniting it with musical form." (26*)

Moreover, music can create new feelings:

"We may say that besides suggesting abstractly all ordinary passions, music creates a new realm of form far more subtly impassioned than is vulgar experience. Musical refinement finds no limit but its own instinct, so that a thousand shades of what in our blundering words, we must call sadness or mirth, find in music their distinct expression....These fine emotions are really new; they are native to the passing cadence, absolute postures into which it throws the soul." (27*)

These remarks demand several comments. It might appear that there is some tension between the claims on the one hand that the passions conveyed by music are always general, and on the other that they are precise to a degree quite impossible in words. Yet it is easy enough to construe these remarks as consistent. "General" can be taken as meaning "not linked by the meaning of the description to some spatio-temporally unique event or situation." In this sense, it is true that musically expressed emotions are general, for, without verbal help, the elements of music cannot specify such events or situations. Again, it is not difficult to think of situations Santayana might have had in mind such as would lead him to claim a unique degree of precision for musical expression. It is a familiar enough experience for a music lover to feel an attitude or emotion such that no other way of indicating its precise tone exists other than to refer any questioner to a given piece of music.
What is dubious is to say that this precision is to be accounted for wholly in terms of musical form. It is easy to see that all elements of music contribute to this phenomenon; one has only to imagine a well-known theme played on an unusual instrument (and so changed in timbre, and perhaps also in pitch), in a differing rhythm, at a different tempo, at a different volume, or at a different degree of prominence in an ensemble. Minute changes in any of these respects can change the expressive content of a piece or a performance. Cooke acknowledges this point briefly (28) and it is crisply stated by Hanslick:

"The rhythm, the volume of sound, or the timbre — each alters the specific character of a theme entirely; in fine, every single musical factor necessarily contributes to a certain passage assuming just this particular aspect, and affecting the listener in this particular way." (29)

Santayana continues that, while the feelings embodied in music are thus often of a kind not exactly exemplified in life, yet these musical feelings are similar enough to those of life to help us cope with the latter in a certain way. The privilege of music is "to give form to what is naturally inarticulate, and express those depths of human nature which can speak no language current in the world." (30) Much emotion remains objectless and unaccounted for; it may impede right actions or generate illusions. When music succeeds in tapping this fund of suppressed feeling, it accordingly gives relief to an important need: "it co-operates with us and helps to deliver us from dumb subjection to influences which we should not know how to meet otherwise." (31) Music is therefore a valuable resource when we are oppressed by feelings, which are usually persistent and formless. Music is such that,

"Without attempting to remove a mood that is perhaps inevitable, it gives it a congruous filling. Thus the mood is justified by an illustration or expression which seems to offer some objective and ideal ground for its existence; and the mood is at the same
What is dubious is to say that this precision is to be accounted for wholly in terms of musical form. It is easy to see that all elements of music contribute to this phenomenon; one has only to imagine a well-known theme played on an unusual instrument (and so changed in timbre, and perhaps also in pitch), in a differing rhythm, at a different tempo, at a different volume, or at a different degree of prominence in an ensemble. Minute changes in any of these respects can change the expressive content of a piece or a performance. Cooke acknowledges this point briefly (28) and it is crisply stated by Hanslick:

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"Without attempting to remove a mood that is perhaps inevitable, it gives it a congruous filling. Thus the mood is justified by an illustration or expression which seems to offer some objective and ideal ground for its existence; and the mood is at the same
time relieved by absorption in this impersonal object." (32)

The most abstract of arts serves the dumbest of feelings:

"Those elementary substances the musician can spiritualise by his special methods, taking away their reproach and redeeming them from blind intensity." (33)

There is a certain obvious though limited similarity between these views and the elaborately developed doctrines of Susanne Langer; both writers hold that music in some way articulates or gives form to feelings not articulable in any other way, and it is worth pausing to note a difficulty to which this type of theory about music is liable, that of self-refutation. Mrs. Langer, for example, insists repeatedly that works of art symbolise (in her technical sense of the term) elements of experience which are not formulable in verbal concepts. (34) It follows from this that the emotional content of a piece of music cannot be formulated in words, and from this in turn it follows that her theory of music is undiscussable. (35) No verbal evidence either for or against the thesis can be advanced, since 'ex hypothesi' such evidence is inevitably a distortion of the truth. All the interpretative criticism of music ever written is an attempt to do what cannot be done. Thus when Mrs. Langer writes that different feelings have similar logical forms (36), that every factor in our conscious sense of passage is replaced by a musical elements (37), that inexact repetitions occur in organic forms and in music (38), each of these remarks is an attempt to say what cannot be said. Whether Santayana would have avoided this difficulty is not clear; he nowhere offers any expansion of the bare conclusions announced above.

Santayana moves on to a rather different point. He regards it as a consequence of his interest theory of value that, considered in themselves, all things could be said to be good; it is only by conflict with other things that they come to be regarded as bad. Thus, if each element in the human economy were freed from oppressive competition with the other elements it would develop exuberantly into its ideal form. (39) There is surely an
inaccuracy in the claimed consequence: if all things are called good or bad solely in relation to human interests, then considered 'in themselves', i.e., independently of this relation, then rather than being good, they have no value whatever, and so are neither good nor bad.

These generalities are the preamble to some informal psychology. Because of the number and variety of human interests, feelings cannot long continue in a state of purity. For example, man has a native capacity for joy, incapable, however, of being long sustained:

"...cross currents of lassitude or anxiety, distracting incidents, irrelevant associations, trouble its course and make it languish, turning it before long into dullness and melancholy."(40)

Language cannot express a pure feeling, since such an expression demands that nothing be named which carried the least suggestion of sadness with it, and this, Santayana assumes, cannot be done. Music, by contrast, can express feelings pure and unalloyed:

"The joy condemned by practical exigencies to scintillate for a moment uncommunicated, and then, as it were, to be buried alive, may now find an abstract art to embody it and bring it before the public, formed into a rich and constant object called a musical composition."(41)

The difficulty with this view is to see what grounds Santayana has for discriminating between music and literature in respect of capacity for unalloyed expression. The argument with regard to literature turns on the premises that (i) all named objects are capable of sad associations, and (ii) when named, the sad associations will be revived in the mind and constitute an alloy in the predominant expression. Yet obviously it is equally true that any piece of music can have sad associations which can be revived during a performance, and constitute an alloy in the listener’s contemplation of the joy expressed in the music. In this respect, there is no relevant difference between music and literature.
Santayana turns finally to another psychological benefit which music can confer. By imposing a form on painful feeling, it renders the feeling more bearable:

"All utterance is a feat, all apprehension a discovery; and this intellectual victory, sounding in the midst of emotional struggles, hushes some part of their brute impertinence." (42)

Meditation and expression are valuable activities in themselves; and this complex reaction has a double value when its subject matter is painful:

"At first, in its very act, it will suffuse and mollify the unwelcome experience by another, digesting it, which is welcome; and later, by the broader adjustment which it will bring into the mind, it will help us to elude or confront the evils thus laid clearly before us." (43*)

Once again, Santayana articulates a truth without detail. Music can indeed confer the benefits he describes; but his metaphorical psychology does not provide any real insight into how this occurs.

It should be noted further that he was by no means always inclined to allow music to have the effects he here accredits to it. Nine years later, in "Winds of Doctrine", he dismisses music as always a means of escaping one's problems, rather than a means of coming to face and understand them. When for any reason (he writes) human life is forbidden to express itself fully and openly in words, man are driven to abstract arts,

"where human circumstances are lost sight of, and human problems dissolve in a purer medium. The pressure of care is thus relieved, without its quietus being found in intelligence. To understand oneself is the classic form of consolation; to elude oneself is the romantic. In the presence of music or landscape human experience eludes itself." (44*)

It is difficult to see how Santayana could argue for this wholesale dismissal of music. It would follow from what he says that great ages of musical expression would not occur in history simultaneously with flowerings of
literature, an art which - because it is not abstract, in Santayana's sense - enables man to understand rather than elude himself; yet the Romantic period itself refutes this corollary.

The only point remaining in the text of "Reason in Art" concerning music is a re-affirmation of certain points in Santayana's value theory. The order of values inverts that of causes; it is only by supporting a liberal, i.e. self-justifying, delight that causal chains come to have any value whatever. Without the existence of delightful states of consciousness to be pursued, and painful ones to be avoided, there would be no values. Delight in music is liberal; it makes useful those ends and processes which subservie it.(45) This is surely quite uncontested.

Music is a fine art and so an object of the aesthetic attitude. This attitude is disinterested, and aesthetic contemplation an end in itself.

III: Language, Poetry, and Prose

Music is for Santayana one type of rationalisation of sound; language is another. In his view, language emerges from self-expressive vocal noise, developing gradually into a medium which in some sense represents the world. It is of the first importance as a means to the domination of the flux of experience by reason. Poetry is that use of language in which sound is only incompletely adjusted to its representative function; in prose, language is as transparent as it can be; the refracting properties of the medium are minimised, and the structure of the world mirrored more clearly. Rational poetry, an as yet unrealised ideal, would embody the best properties of both poetry and prose.

It will be clear from this synopsis that the doctrines on poetry in "Reason in Art" do not duplicate those of "Interpretations of Poetry and Religion", discussed in Chapter V, above. Rather than discussing its elements and function, Santayana here attempts to place poetry in an evolutionary perspective, and to sketch its possible ideal extension. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the two chapters in which these
views are expressed are the most disappointing in the corpus of Santayana's aesthetics. They are gravely marred by omission of argument and by internal inconsistency: the apparatus of presuppositions discussed in Ch.VI, above, is both appealed to and flouted.

Much of language (Santayana begins) still remains - what it must all have been originally - useless and without ulterior significance. The musical side of language is its primary and elementary side. Yet sounds are well fitted to be symbols. "Man's vocal chords are capable of making a great range of sounds and his ear of registering them. Thus man, "can begin to use his lingual gamut to designate the whole range of his perceptions and passions". To use sounds as symbols for things is a great gain to the mind. Once given names, "things could...be carried over mentally into the linguistic system; they could be manipulated there ideally, and vicariously preserved in representation." Things themselves are of course quite unchanged by being named; but nevertheless, "their...reduction to words rendered them comparable and memorable, first enabling them to figure in discourse at all."

These uncontentious opening generalities are succeeded by a far less acceptable doctrine which runs right through the discussion of language, prose, and poetry. Language has a structure independent of things. It was music before becoming a symbolic medium:

"What makes terms correspond and refer to one another is a relation eternally disparate from the relation of propinquity or derivation between existences...The vocal and musical medium is, and must always remain, alien to the spatial." Once a sound is made the symbol for an object or event,

"The object's quality passed to the word at the same time that the word's relations enveloped the object; and thus a new weight and significance was added to sound, previously nothing but a dull music. A conflict at once established itself between the drift
proper to the verbal medium and that proper to the designated things;
a conflict which the whole history of language and thought has
embodied and which continues to this day."

This doctrine involves Santayana in serious difficulties. In the first
place, to claim that the structure of the world is different from the
structure of language, and that therefore description of the former by
means of the latter necessarily involves distortion, is to presuppose that
the structure of the world can be known by some means other than linguistic.
It must be possible to step outside language, to take off our linguistic
spectacles, so to speak, and to compare the structures of language and
reality. Yet, in Santayana's stated view, it is precisely by the use of
language that reason comes to dominate the flux of immediate experience.
There is no suggestion in "The Life of Reason" that Santayana countenances
the possibility of a non-linguistic mode of knowledge which at the same
time has the common-sense world as its object. Moreover, Santayana is
guilty here either of speaking loosely, or of making unverifiable claims
to knowledge. He speaks in the foregoing quotations of "the designated
things", not of our experience of them. It follows from his representation-
alisim that the causes of our experiences, things as they are, are in
principle unknowable by acquaintance, and, therefore, in claiming to know
that language distorts their structure, he is either making a claim to
knowledge which is on his own premises impossible, or is guilty of slipshod
writing. Construed consistently, i.e. as concerning our experience of
objects, the doctrine becomes open to the first objection given above.
Again, as will become clearer below, Santayana claims to be able to state
in language some of the ways in which language distorts the facts, and
therefore makes a further assertion which on his own premises is
unverifiable.

He proceeds to an equally unacceptable argument to show that an animal
with a language will conceive of the world in terms of stable objects which
persist through change. Suppose an animal without language goes in winter
to a river which he had previously visited in the summer, and finds it
frozen. Santayana asserts without argument that the animal would conclude
that the river had vanished. If on the other hand the animal has language,
and in particular the world 'river',

"he would have repeated its name on seeing it even when it was
frozen, for he had not failed to recognize it in the guise...An
identical word, covering all the identical qualities in the
phenomena and serving to abstract them, would force the inconsistent
qualities in those phenomena to pass for accidents; and the useful
proposition would be framed that the same river may be sometimes
free and sometimes frozen."(51)

This is at best the framework of an argument rather than the argument
itself. Why should not the linguistic animal conclude that the river had
vanished? Why should he conclude the contrary because words have the
property of immutability? Santayana gives no reason to accept the premiss
on which the argument turns: that the immutability of words will be
transferred as a property to their referents, a premiss which has only
to be stated for its falsity to become clear.

Further on the theme of the disparity of structure between language and
the world, Santayana gives his first example of the alleged differences.
Experience is a constant flux, while,

"Notions, taken alone, would allow no lapse, but would merely
lead attention about from point to point over an eternal system
of relations...(Words) have dialectical relations based on ideal
import, or tendency to definition, which makes the essence of their
signification; yet they can be freely bandied about and applied for
a moment to the ambiguous things that pass through existence."(52)

These remarks are open to at least two objections. In the first place, as
has been said, they are internally inconsistent, being a linguistic statement
of what 'ex hypothesi' cannot be said; secondly the thesis that language
taken alone does not involve the idea of change, is nonsensical, for what
ideas are involved in the definition of the term 'change' itself?

Literature is defined by Santayana by means of this doctrine of the disparity of structure between language and the world. The categories of discourse (he continues) are in part merely representative (i.e. of the world), partly merely grammatical, partly attributable to both spheres. Euphony and phonetic laws govern language without reference to meaning; here speech is still a sort of music. At the other extreme is telegraphic speech, where nothing is rhetorical and speech is denuded of every feature not indispensable to its symbolic role ($53^*$). In between is the field of poetry or imaginative expression:

"...where the verbal medium is a medium indeed, having a certain transparency, a certain reference to independent facts, but at the same time elaborates the fact in expressing it, and endows it with affinities alien to its proper nature...language habitually wrests its subject-matter in some measure from its real context and transfers it to a represented and secondary world, the world of logic and reflection." ($54^*$)

This is partly acceptable, partly not. It is acceptable insofar as it restates the doctrine discussed in Ch. V, above, that in the aesthetic encounter with literature, the properties of the medium are an object of aesthetic interest; it is unacceptable as a further statement of the doctrine of the discrepancy of structure between language and the world.

Further on this last theme, he continues that, when the structure of language passes beyond the phonetic level, it "begins at once to lean upon existences and to imitate the structure of things. We distinguish the parts of speech, for instance, in subservience to distinctions we make in ideas." ($55$) An adjective, in Santayana's view, represents a "feeling of quality", a verb indicates a relation, and a noun indicates a "substance or concretion of qualities", and these are "diversities growing up in experience, by no means attributable to the mere play of sound. The parts
of speech are therefore representative. "(56) Before commenting on this, it is appropriate to note that Santayana nowhere in his early writing on language develops a theory of meaning at any length. Such remarks as there are - like those just quoted - seem to indicate that he inclined to some variety of denotation theory of meaning. In, "Reason in Science", he writes that language is made up of two elements: the meaning or sense of the words on the one hand, and the sensuous vehicle of that meaning on the other. This sensuous term (the sound, sign or gesture), "becomes the sign for an essence or idea, a logical hypostasis of perceptions which is called an external thing."(57) Santayana seems to be committed to holding that the meaning of a term is its referent, a view now so well refuted by Frege and Wittgenstein as to make comment here superfluous.

As to the claim that grammatical and metaphysical categories co-incide, this too is now well refuted. To take up only the most obvious objection, not all nouns denote substances, Santayana himself is committed by his ethical subjectivism to holding that 'goodness', for example, does not denote a particular or a quality.(58)

Santayana continues that, while grammatical categories are thus representative to a degree, language also vitiates what it represents. His second example of this kind of distortion is gender in language, which, "extends much farther than sex, and even if by some subtle analogy all the masculine and feminine nouns in a language could be attached to something suggesting sex in the objects they designate, yet it can hardly be maintained that the elaborate concordance incident upon that distinction is representative of any felt quality in the things."(59)

Rather, gender is, "non-representative and purely formal...it merely emphasizes the grammatical links in the phrases and makes greater variety possible in the arrangement of words."(60) Once again, it is hard to see in what sense language distorts the structure of reality if it is possible to indicate the distortion by linguistic means.
A third variety of distortion, on a plane of far greater generality, is described by Santayana as the foreshortening of experience by language. Just as consciousness in general foreshortens the confusion of immediate sensation by condensing it into synthetic ideas, so language: "acquires scope in the same way, by its kindly infidelities... (it) vitiates the experience it expresses, but thereby makes the burden of one moment relevant to that of another." (61)

Language transforms events into ideas (62*). By way of comment, it is enough to note that this doctrine is no more than a consequence of the theory of the birth of reason discussed in Ch.VI, above, and is itself vitiated by the unacceptability of Santayana's epistemology.

The doctrine of foreshortening is a preamble to some general remarks about literature:

"To turn events into ideas is the function of literature...
(Literature) tries to subdue music, which for its purposes would be futile and abstract, into conformity with general experience, making music thereby significant." (63)

This is a simple consequence of what has already been said in conjunction with a suppressed premiss to the effect that the language used in literature is at least partially representative of the world.

Literary art, Santayana continues, needs a subject-matter other than literary impulse itself; the writer must have experience and mastery of human affairs:

"His art is half-genius and half-fidelity...(literature) cannot long forget, without forfeiting all dignity, that it serves a burdened and perplexed creature, a human animal struggling to persuade the universal Sphinx to propose a more intelligible riddle. Irresponsible and trivial in its abstract impulse, man's simian chatter becomes noble as it becomes symbolic; its representative function lends it a serious beauty, its utility endows it with
Santayana thus commits himself to holding that a serious subject-matter is a necessary condition for impressiveness in a work of literature. He supports this view by means of the ethical presuppositions of the Life of Reason: happiness is to be attained partly through self-knowledge, partly through knowledge of the environment. If language is to contribute to the maximisation of happiness, it must learn to symbolise the facts:

"Discourse that absolved itself from that observant duty would not be cognitive; and in failing to be cognitive it would fail to redeem the practical forces it ignored from their brute externality, and to make them tributary to the Life of Reason. Thus its own dignity and continued existence depend on its learning to express momentous facts, facts important for action and happiness; and there is nothing which so quickly discredits itself as empty rhetoric and dialectic, or poetry that wanders in dim and private worlds." (65)

That it is a necessary condition for impressiveness in a literary work that it deal with some serious issue from life is surely undeniable - it is easily tested by the exercise of trying to think of any accepted literary work of any stature which fails to satisfy this test. Equally, however, it must be stressed that this condition is merely necessary, not sufficient. Were it sufficient, it would follow that the trashiest of love stories would rank as serious literature. This consequence indicates how dominant a role is played by the treatment of the subject-matter in determining the stature of a literary work of art. In an analytic idiom, the work must also possess a conjunction of material, formal and expressive aesthetic virtues in order to qualify as significant art.

The foregoing doctrines concerning language are presupposed in Santayana's discussion of poetry and prose. He begins by considering the proposition that primitive poets (among whom he classes the writer(s) of
the Book of Genesis, for example) are sublime. Conceding their sublimity, he finds two reasons for it. In the first place, primitive men used language, "with singular directness to describe the chief episodes of life, which was all that life as yet contained. They had frank passions and saw things from single points of view." (66) Secondly, as has been said, language is an act before it is an expression. It gives vent to emotion before it represents the world. Nothing is so thrilling as an expression which approaches this primitive elementality. The Hebrew prophets are an example:

"An intense, inhospitable mind, filled with a single idea, in which all animal, social, and moral interests are fused together, speaks a language of incomparable force. Thus the Hebrew prophets, in their savage concentration, poured into one torrent all that their souls possessed or could dream of." (67)

Yet such sublimity, in Santayana's view, should not be regarded with unmixed admiration. This sublimity is the result of defect or at least disproportion: "...such a will is sadly inexperienced; it has hardly tasted or even conceived any possible or high satisfactions." (68) The primitive poet merely expresses animal feelings and the thoughts they provoke.

Several difficulties arise in connexion with these opening remarks. In the first place, Santayana is relying on a qualitative distinction between types of satisfaction, presumably in accordance with his moral preference for rational satisfaction, i.e. satisfaction which follows from the maximal harmonization of interests. The arbitrariness of this distinction has already been discussed in Ch.VI. Moreover, he seems here to be evaluating poetry according to the rationality of its subject-matter (a point to re-emerge later in his discussion of rational poetry), and this is surely unacceptable. As has been argued, a certain seriousness of subject-matter is merely a necessary condition for impressiveness in literature; and again, Santayana surely cannot maintain that the poets he has in mind discuss a subject-matter which is other than serious.
Primitive poetry, he continues, is a species of incantation or charm. He explains this remark by repeating doctrines dealt with above (in Ch. V). Beneath conventional sanity there is always present the "seething chaos" of primitive, unconceptualised experience. It is possible for a man to "abandon himself" to this chaos. Words might be carried down into the chaos, and, if written down, would surely have some quality which makes them memorable:

"and moreover the words will probably show, in their connotation and order, some sympathy with the dream that cast them up. For the man himself, in whom such a dream may be partly recurrent, they may consequently have a considerable power of suggestion, and they may even have it for others, whenever the rhythm and incantation avail to plunge them also into a similar trance."(69*)

Such in Santayana's view are the circumstances of the origin of poetry. He adds, consistently with his epiphenomenalism, that the process of creation is not under the poet's control.(71)

The contrast which Santayana wishes to draw between poetry and prose is derived from this doctrine of the association of the poet with the data of experience, and the thesis that language has uses which vary in the degree of accuracy with which the world is represented. Poetry is a use of language which is in a certain sense irrational. Before it is mastered by reason and thereby made representative of the world,

"...experience remains a constantly renovated dream, as poetry in the end conspires to keep it. For poetry, while truly poetical, never loses sight of initial feelings and underlying appeals... By creating new signs, or by recasting those which have become conventional, it keeps communication massive and instinctive, immersed in music, and inexhaustible by clear thought."(71*)

By contrast, a distinctive property of prose is that it is composed of conventional signs which colour their referents as little as possible with irrelevant, subjective associations:
"When use has worn down a poetic phrase to its external import, and rendered it an indifferent symbol for a particular thing, that phrase has become prosaic; it has become, by the same process, transparent and purely instrumental." (72)

Again, "In prose the vehicle for communication is a conventional sign, standing in the last analysis for some demonstrable object or controllable feeling." (73)

In the same vein, he writes: "lying is a privilege of poets because they have not yet reached the level on which truth and error are discernible. Veracity and significance are not ideals for the primitive mind..." (74)

Prose, on the other hand, is responsible, i.e., it seeks to reflect the state of things accurately in order to allow men to dominate the world:

"Prose is in itself meagre and bodiless, merely indicating the riches of the world. Its transparency helps us to look through it to the issue, and the signals it gives fill the mind with an honest assurance and a prophetic art far nobler than any ecstasy." (75)

Santayana recognises that on this view, he is committed to the consequence that, "literary prose owns a double allegiance...It must convey intelligence, but intelligence clothed in a language that lends the message an intrinsic value, and makes it delightful to apprehend apart from its importance in ultimate theory or practice." (76)

The difficulty with this distinction, which is the central thesis of the chapters of "Reason in Art" devoted to literature, is that what is acceptable in it is unoriginal, while certain of its presuppositions and consequences are unacceptable. What is acceptable is that, where language is used poetically, and in literary prose, the medium is itself an object of interest; while in examples of non-literary prose, the language is a means only, and not an object of interest in itself. Less acceptable is the apparatus of doctrine which Santayana uses to support this distinction: his central claim in the psychology of creativity, that the poet re-acquaints
himself with the data of experience; the epistemological presuppositions that there is immediate experience of this kind and that it is logically possible to be acquainted with it; the thesis that language in some sense represents the world and yet does so only incompletely. In connexion with the last, it is also notable that Santayana completely omits all the metaphysics which ought to be present; there is no rigorous definition of "represent", nor a theory of what the world must be like if representation is to be possible, such as is present, for example, in a work like the "Tractatus". Moreover, Santayana would seem to be committed to holding that statements in poetry are always false or at least inaccurate to a degree, a consequence which has only to be stated for its inaccuracy to appear. (Cf. Ch.V, above, on the links between poetry and truth.)

He continues that poetry is an interest proper to youth, which fades with age and experience. With experience, and a knowledge of which ideals are realisable, the wild idealisms of youth come to seem cheap and hysterical:

"To dwell, as irrational poets do, on some emotion without representative or ulterior value, then seems a waste of time. Fiction becomes less interesting than affairs, and poetry turns into a sort of incompetent whimper, a childish foreshortening of the outspread world."(77*)

It is difficult to see why Santayana should indulge in such vast and untenable generalisation. His remarks entail that everyone interested in poetry is immature in some sense, a condemnation which would include himself as the author of several volumes of poetry and poetics criticism.

Santayana insists on the inaccuracy of 'poetic' notions, their falsity to the structure of the world. Any use of language which is in this epistemological sense inaccurate he describes as poetical, making inaccuracy a defining property of poetry. Thus he writes:

"A novel, a satire, a book of speculative philosophy, may have a
most prosaic exterior; every phrase may convey its idea economically; but the substance may nevertheless be poetical, since these ideas may be irrelevant to all ulterior events, and express nothing but the imaginative energy that called them forth. On the other hand, a poetic vehicle in which there is much ornamental play of language and rhythm may clothe a dry ideal skeleton. So those tremendous positivists, the Hebrew prophets, had the most prosaic notions about the goods and evils of life. 

(78)

These remarks involve a difficulty additional to those noted above. Poetic ideas are said to be "irrelevant to all ulterior events"; the difficulty is to see what could possibly satisfy this criterion and so count as poetic. It is unlikely that any given idea will be irrelevant to all events in the world; and of course, "relevance" is one of the vaguest and slipperiest of relational terms.

Having dwelt on the inaccuracy of the representation of the world alleged to be a defining property of poetic ideas, Santayana next insists that, despite this inaccuracy, poetic ideas are not to be condemned. The cognitive function of ideas is an ulterior one to which they are not obliged to conform:

"If we abstract, then, from the representative function which may perhaps accrue to speech, and regard it merely as an operation absorbing energy and occasioning delight, we see that poetic language is language at its best. Its essential success consists in charming sounds or in metaphors that shine by their own brilliance." (79)

There can be a positive value in the misrepresentations contained in poetry. Santayana considers that it is in principle impossible that poetry should have nothing but truth in its import and nothing but beauty in its form, for the former depends on factors external to poetry; the truth is uncongenial because the world is the way it is. Thus,
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"It might seem as if the brilliant substitutions, the magic suggestions essential to poetry, would necessarily vanish in the full light of day. The light of day is itself beautiful; but would not the loss be terrible if no other light were allowed to shine?"(80)

The difficulties in these remarks are obvious. Santayana dismisses the cognitive function of ideas quite lightly at this point, and this dismissal is difficult to reconcile with his earlier remarks on the value of prose, (valuable precisely because it is representative) and with the ethical presuppositions of the life of reason: if happiness depends in part on knowledge of the environment, then whatever misleads on this subject is surely to be disvalued. Moreover, the reason given for valuing poetry is vague. He seems to suggest that misleading ideas are valuable merely because they are different; but on his own principles, it is difficult to see what is valuable about mere difference.

Santayana concludes his consideration of literary aesthetics with a statement of his ideal of rational poetry. In the first place, rational poetry would exclude much now thought poetic. The demands of the human imagination, as it is at present constituted, include irrational elements; "The given world seems insufficient; impossible things have to be imagined, both to extend its limits and to fill in the vivify its texture."(81)

As examples of 'irrational' elements, Santayana gives Homer's mythology, Dante's allegories and 'mock science', Shakespeare's 'romanticism' and the symbolic characters and artificial machinery of Goethe.

Elements of this kind would be excluded from rational poetry because they are inaccurate. The rational poet, by contrast, bases his poetry on "ultimate scientific notions of nature and life".(82) He would present the truth about the totality of things; scientific truth and great scope are important properties of the projected ideal: 

"(Rational poetry) would present in graphic images the total
efficacy of real things... Such a poetry would represent more thoroughly than any formula the concrete burden of experience; it would become the most trustworthy of companions."(83)

Further features of the ideal of rational poetry and its creator are mastery and idealisation:

"...mastery, to see things as they are and dare to describe them ingenuously; idealisation, to select from this reality what is pertinent to ultimate interests and can speak eloquently to the soul."(84)

To see things as they are, i.e. rationally, is in Santayana's view to see them scientifically and in their relations to everything else:

"A real thing, when all its pertinent natural associates are discerned, touches wonder, pathos, and beauty on every side; the rational poet is one who, without feigning anything unreal, perceives these momentous ties, and presents his subject loaded with its whole fate, missing no source of worth which is in it, no ideal influence which it may have."(85)

Though the rational poet has not yet existed, some features of the Homeric poems are considered by Santayana to embody the ideal. Homer was the heir to generations of discipline in life and in art, and this appears, "in his perfect prosody, in his limpid style, in his sense for proportion, his abstentions, and the frank pathos of his portraits and principles, in which there is nothing gross, subjective, or arbitrary."(86)

On a more detailed level, when Homer mentions an object, he often uses an epithet, and the epithet,

"is very likely a patronymic, the name of some region or some mythical ancestor. In other words, it is a signal for widening our view and for conceiving the object, not only vividly and with pause, but in an adequate historical setting."(87)

This projected ideal demands several comments. With regard to the
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This projected ideal demands several comments. With regard to the
development of Santayana's thought, it is clearly an elaboration of the
doctrine from "Interpretations of Poetry and Religion" (discussed in Ch.V,
above), that philosophic comprehensiveness of vision is a necessary
condition for greatness in poetry. The philosophical difficulty with the
ideal is that it makes greatness in poetry dependent on certain features
of subject-matter, rather than on properties which are appropriately called
aesthetic: material, formal, and expressive. All the remarks describing
the ideal refer to subject-matter: scientific truthfulness, historical
perspective, descriptions which locate an object in the nexus of all its
important relations (and it is by no means entirely clear which relations
are important, in Santayana's view). Clearly, a writer might have an
intellect of the calibre demanded by this ideal and yet fail to be an
artist, let alone a great one. To qualify as an artist, the writer would
so have to treat his subject-matter as to endow it with aesthetic virtues
in at least one of the classes noted above.

II: Architecture

In his autobiography, Santayana writes that,

"Architecture, especially Gothic, was a passion of my youth, when
I searched and analysed everything of the kind that I spied anywhere,
and a pinnacle or the tracery of a window arrested my eye as if it
had promised to be Helen in all her glory."

He adds elsewhere that he constantly studied such architectural works as he
could obtain (89), and moreover would have taken up a career in architecture
had he been unable to find a post teaching philosophy (90). The number of
passages of architectural criticism, both in his autobiography and other
works, makes it clear that his interest in the art was lifelong (91). In
view of this avowed deep interest, it is surprising that he says relatively
little about architecture in "Reason in Art". He confines himself to broad
and undetailed remarks about the origins of architecture, the relations of
structure and ornament, and the relative merits of Greek and Gothic
styles. (92)
Typically of his remarks on the various fine arts, Santayana opens his discussion of architecture with generalized speculation as to its origins. The arts considered in the preceding sections develop from automatic self-expression. Other activities of animals, such as burrowing or collecting, "are not less spontaneous than the others, and no less expressive; but they seem more external because the traces they leave on the environment are more clearly marked."(93) Thus some instinctive and self-expressive activities produce changes in the environment, and,

"If the impulse that has thus left its indelible mark on things is constant in our own bosom, the world will have been permanently improved and humanised by our action. Nature cannot but be favourable to those ideas which have found an efficacious champion." (94)

Such plastic impulses have an immediate sanction in that sense of dominion over the environment which they bring with them. A second and more important sanction is that by changing the environment by automatic action, it becomes possible that man should promote his own welfare. Consistently with his definition of 'art' in the broad sense, (cf. Ch. VI, supra) Santayana observes that, as soon as the agent perceives the benefit of any action to himself, and the act is done with knowledge of this benefit, the act becomes an art. For example, man depends on things for the aesthetic quality of his perceptions:

"If he happens, by a twist of the hand, to turn a flowering branch into a wreath, thereby making it more interesting, he will have discovered a decorative art and initiated himself auspiciously into the practice of it."(95)

Self-criticism, a second incipient artistic impulse, may to some extent modify the next performance:

"If life is drawn largely into this deepening channel, physical proficiency and its ideal sanctions will develop more or less harmoniously into what is called a school of art."(96)
It is difficult to object to these opening generalities, but a part of the reason for this is that Santayana has said so very little. Certainly one can concede that some instinctive actions lead to changes in the environment which are in one way or another beneficial, and presumably the beginnings of architecture lie in some such changes. Yet to say this is to convey next to no information about the early forms of building. The same is true of the remark that deliberate action may ultimately develop into a school of art. Santayana passes in silence over all the stages of the evolution of the creative process, discussed, for example, by Tombrich.

Santayana continues that primitive art is extremely conservative, and comments that this is a sign of stupidity. For the savage mind, only the standard form will do. Art can make no progress in such a situation:

"Plastic impulse, as yet sporadic, is overwhelmed by a brute idolatrous awe at mere existence and actuality. What is, what has always been, what chance has associated with one person, alone seems acceptable or conceivable."

In Santayana's usage, 'art' and 'idolatry' are contrary attitudes. The idolater blindly worships his idol, whereas art by definition is designed with reference to human interests and ideals: "The noblest art will be the one, whether plastic or literary or dialectical, which creates figments most truly representative of what is momentous in human life." (98)

The charge here levelled against primitive art is to say the least sweeping, and the implied low evaluation of it would not of course be widely accepted today. Philosophically, it is appropriate to note that this argument is incompletely stated. On Santayana's own premises, good art is art which in some sense represents or expresses (he uses both terms) important features of life and the ideals implied by human wants and needs. Primitive art is therefore only to be condemned, firstly, if it fails to do this at its first conception, or secondly, if the wants and needs of
its creators change without a corresponding change occurring in their art products. Santayana must be assuming, without argument, that one or both of these conditions obtain.

Conservatism, he continues, rules not only in primitive art, but also in "those manufactures which are tributary to architecture and the smaller plastic arts." (99) Utility makes small headway against custom. Inertia is "a general law of the brain" (100) and can be distinguished into two kinds, technical and social.

Santayana suggests that certain technical habits and limitations are inevitable, simply because the capacities of any one human being are limited:

"Conception and imagination are themselves automatic and run in grooves, so that only certain forms in certain combinations will ever suggest themselves to a given designer. Every writer's style, too, however varied within its limits, is single and monotonous compared with the ideal possibilities of expression. Genius at every moment is confined to the image it is creating." (101)

Once again, it is difficult to quarrel with such a generality; but equally, it is so obvious a point as to approach the truistic.

The same might be said of Santayana's remarks on social inertia or inertia in appreciation, the result of the same factors operating in the community at large. For example, landscape was for a long time not allowed to exist without figures, though the old masters showed clearly enough that they could love landscape for its own sake:

"when one link with humanity has been rendered explicit and familiar, people assume that by no other means can humanity be touched at all; even if at the same time their own heart is expanding to the highest raptures in a quite different region." (102)

Santayana considered this conservatism in appreciation to be deeply pernicious:
"Irrational hopes, irrational shames, irrational decencies make
man's chief desolation. Art has an infinite range; nothing shifts
so easily as taste and yet nothing so persistently avoids the
directions in which it might find most satisfaction."

Turning from these initial generalities to consider architecture in
more detail, Santayana advances some informal psychological generalisations
about the order in which features of a building come to be appreciated.
Construction comes to be rational only gradually, and therefore it is to
be expected that superficial merits will be the first to be admired:

"Ultimate beauty in a building would consist, of course, in
responding simultaneously to all the human faculties affected: to
the eye, by the size, form, and colour of the edifice; to the
imagination, by its fitness and ideal expression."

Of all the grounds there are for admiration, the most easily grasped are
size, elaboration and splendour of materials, and difficulties or cost
involved. Precious material, for example, will be admired as evidence
of wealth and wilfulness. A degree less irrational, in Santayana's view,
is admiration aroused by the great bulk or difficulty of a work. For
example,

"Roman bridges and aqueducts...gain a profound emotional power
when we see in their monotonous arches a symbol of the mightiest
enterprise in history, and in their decay evidence of its failure.
Curiosity is satisfied, historic imagination is stimulated, tragic
reflection is called forth."

The central claim here - that admiration of architecture means for
many people admiration of features such as size and cost, rather than,
for example, form - can surely be admitted. What needs to be made clearer,
however, is that the species of response described by Santayana are either
not aesthetic at all, or are aesthetic responses of an impoverished kind.
In the example of admiration of material given by Santayana, what is
admired is not any property of the material or set of such properties such as might be specified in reasons supporting an aesthetic judgment (e.g., texture or colour); the object of admiration is rather a certain combination of personal qualities imputed to the owner of the building. The example of the aqueduct may or may not be an example of an aesthetic response, depending on the interpretation adopted. Undoubtedly associated beliefs of the kind Santayana specifies can be and are stimulated by impressive ruins. Whether such reverie is to be classified as aesthetic will depend on how this reverie is related to properties of the object which can be uncontentiously classed as aesthetic themselves, e.g. of material, form and expression. In the example given, Santayana refers to monotony, which can perhaps be classed as a property of the form of the aqueduct. Whether or not the presence of this property as an object of judgment is sufficient to justify classing the entire reaction as aesthetic is surely simply left unclear by the usage of "aesthetic". It is safe enough to assert, however, that since only one property which is a typical object of aesthetic judgment is specified, the response in question is an impoverished one.

Santayana continues with a plea for authenticity in style. He criticises attempts to create architecture by copying a style which was undoubtedly successful in its own epoch:

"A perruque cannot bring back courtly manners, and a style of architecture, when revived, is never quite genuine; adaptations have to be introduced and every adaptation, the bolder it is, runs the greater risk of being extravagant."

Too often, a self-styled connoisseur will attempt to live in a house all of one period, and congratulates himself for his fine sensibility in so doing. Such attempts to revive past styles are ridiculous:

"...for the objects (the connoisseur) has collected or reproduced were once used and prized in all honesty, when life and inevitable tradition had brought them forth, while now they are studied and
exhibited, relics of a dead past and evidences of a dead present." (107*)

This is not to say that an idea or a form from the past must inevitably end as a mere curiosity, in the way just described; rather,

"Incorporated into a design that calls for them, traditional forms cease to be incongruous, as words that still have a felt meaning may be old without being obsolete. All depends on men subserving an actual ideal and having so firm and genuine an appreciation of the past as to distinguish at once what is still serviceable in it from what is already ghostly and dead." (108)

The accuracy of these views is surely incontestable. What happens when slavish respect for the past takes over from genuine response to the problems of the present as the factor controlling architectural design is a major theme of the protests of Lloyd Wright and Le Corbusier, discussed briefly in Ch.II, above. All three writers, however, were anticipated by Viollet-le-Duc, a few of whose persuasive remarks can be quoted in support of the position Santayana takes up. Commenting on the practice of copying the forms of ancient buildings, Viollet-le-Duc writes:

"Are we compelled to this course by respect for art? If so, for what art? For a false and denaturalised one, reduced to the condition of a language which no-one understands, and deprived even of the benefit of the very rules out of which the precedents which we worship were first developed...when Greek Doric columns are engaged between the arches of a Roman arcade in the second story of a railway terminus, covered with mortar or plaster and smoothed down, with lintels of jointed masonry, there is certainly neither reason, utility, common-sense, nor object in such an inconsistency. Instead of being a mark of respect for art, is it not rather an indication of disrespect or contempt? Who would engrave a verse of Homer upon the walls of a warehouse?" (109)
Santayana continues with generalities about what he calls 'barbaric' architecture, a type of building which is opposed to what he calls the 'rational' style. Characteristically, he defines neither term. It becomes clear gradually in the course of his remaining arguments that rationality in architecture consists in the subordination to the whole of details which are in themselves exquisite. By implication, barbaric architecture is any style of building in which this principle is ignored.

Barbaric architecture employs two main methods to achieve beauty: ornamentation and mass. The latter is generally more successful. The engineer cannot afford to be extravagant, as the decorator can, for the concern of the former is to design a self-sustaining structure; hence, "(the engineer) becomes accordingly more rapidly civilised and his work acquires, in spite of itself, more rationality and more permanent charm." (110) Once tested and found to be reliable, a given structure will ingratiate itself with the observer: "Whatever beauty its lines may have will become a permanent possession and whatever beauties they exclude will be rejected by a faithful artist, no matter how sorely they may tempt him." (111) Santayana postulates a psychological process to account for this process of ingratiation: "affinities (the form) may have in his (i.e. the engineer's) memory or apperceptive habits will come to light, they will help him to assimilate the new vision and will define its aesthetic character." (112) This is not to say that those features excluded from a building as a result of this process are not in themselves beautiful, merely that, "if appended to a structure they have no function in, these excellences will hardly impose themselves on the next builder." (113)

This passage is illuminated by comparison with remarks from "The Sense of Beauty". By 'apperception' (cf. Ch.III, above), Santayana seems to mean the mingling, thanks to association and recollection, of the image or representation given immediately in perception with other representations derived from past experiences of the observer. Even granted this additional psychological detail, however, it is clear that Santayana's
alleged psychological process is insufficiently described: 'affinity' is an imprecise term, and it is left quite unclear precisely how form and apperceptive habits can have affinities. Comparison with "The Sense of Beauty", and with other remarks in the present chapter also make it plain that, in the passages just quoted, Santayana is not to be interpreted as embracing any form of the doctrine of functionalism. He does not hold that always and only functional constructions are beautiful; rather, useful structures form the basis of ideals of beauty, simply because successful functional structures tend to endure, and becoming used to them, we naturally take them as the starting point for the construction of ideals of beauty.

Santayana's rejection of functionalism becomes clearer in his remarks on the relation of structure and ornament. He rejects the view that wherever a structure is necessary, it is also beautiful. Both plain and ornamented styles can be beautiful. Some structures are such that the artist may need merely to "emphasize the structure in the classic manner and turn its lines into ornament, adding only what may help to complete and unite its suggestions."(114) On the other hand, certain structures need to be disguised, and moreover, "The veil that conceals natural imperfections may have a perfection of its own."(115) This rejection of functionalism is here given as an instance of a general principle:

"Beauty is something spiritual and, being such, it rests not on the material constitution of each existence taken apart, but on their conspiring ideally together, so that each furthers the other's endeavour. Structure by itself is no more beautiful than existence by itself is a good. They are only potentialities or conditions of excellence."(116)

In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is to be assumed that the objectification theory of "The Sense of Beauty" is presupposed here.

Some further remarks on the structure-ornament relation are best set out before comment. Some structures, Santayana continues, are designed for
display. When his main structure is uninteresting, the architect may have recourse to a subsidiary construction, such as a facade. In such cases, two separate monuments occupied the architect:

"Structure may appear in each independently and may be frankly enough expressed. The most beautiful facades, even if independent of their building, are buildings themselves, and since their construction is decorative there is the greater likelihood that their decoration should be structural." (117)

In such an extreme case as this, however, "the facade...would be an abstract ornament; and so, though the ornament be structural within its own lines, we have reverted to the style of building where construction is one thing and decoration another." (118) There is little reason in trying to reason about such applied ornament. The only general principle which in Santayana's view can be appropriately put forward by a philosopher is that, "Everything is true decoration which truly adorns, and everything adorns which enriches the impression and pleasantly entertains the eye." (119)

Certain phrases here are careless - the remark that structure in itself is only a necessary condition for beauty is only dubiously consistent with the prior assertion that classicism consists typically in turning the lines of the structure itself to ornament. Yet the central idea - that no general rules can be given specifying the degree and type of ornamentation acceptable in a building - is sound, and doubly so when considered in conjunction with the principle of stylistic authenticity put forward above. The only demand which can appropriately be made of ornament is that whatever decoration there is - and there need not be any - is both pleasant to look at and coherent with the style of the building as a whole.

Writers on architecture have in general by no means been inclined to accept this tolerant point of view. For Alberti and Palladio, for example, ornament means the classic vocabulary of orders, and while the latter complains of abuses of ornament, it never occurs to him to envisage the use of any other type than the one he advocates. Thus he objects to the use of
"...as it is requisite to uphold a great weight with something solid, and fit to support it; so such non-sensical things as cartouches, are altogether superfluous, because it is impossible that the Joyns, or any other Timber whatsoever, could really perform what these represent; and since they are feign'd to be soft and weak, I know not by what rule they can be put under anything heavy and hard." (120)"

At the opposite pole, Durand illogically rejects the use of the orders altogether. Having argued against the Vitruvian view that the proportions of the orders were derived originally from those of the human body, he feels at liberty to infer that therefore the orders give no pleasure whatever, and are to be abandoned. The architect must design only functional structures:

"The architect...must concern himself with arrangement alone; even the one who values architectural decoration will give real pleasure only to the extent that it has been produced by the most sensible and economical arrangement, since decoration itself cannot be considered beautiful." (121)

If what Durand claims were true, it would follow that only structurally necessary elements of a building are found to be beautiful, a thesis which becomes implausible in the light of certain counter-examples: in the fan vaulting of King's College, Cambridge, not all the ribs of each fan carry the weight of the roof, and it is most implausible to maintain that these ornamental ribs look uglier than those which are structurally necessary. (122) If what Palladio says were true, it would follow that every non-classic building must be ugly. The sanity of the position adopted by Santayana on this question of ornament is emphasized by comparison with these views.

Notwithstanding his avowed tolerance for all styles, Santayana's own preference is characteristically for classic restraint. He goes on to
equate a taste for profuse ornament with a state of barbarism:

"Nothing is so much respected by unintelligent people as elaboration and complexity. They are simply dazed and overawed at seeing at once so much more than they can master. To overwhelm the senses is, for them, the only way of filling the mind."(123)

It takes cultivation to appreciate what is simple, finite, and fits its office perfectly: "Intelligence and elegance naturally exist together, since they both spring from a subtle sense for absent and eventual processes. They are sustained by experience, by nicety in foretaste and selection."(124) There is a certain degree of truth in what Santayana has to say here: it is truistic to note that a certain degree of sophistication can manifest itself in a taste for what is apparently simple. What is very hard to swallow is the gratuitous rider that only those with this degree of taste are intelligent and elegant. An air of snobbery hangs about such remarks.

Santayana goes on to emphasize that, while a taste for profuse ornamentation may be barbarous, he does not wish to deny that the ornate may be very beautiful, and moreover asserts that what is to be completely beautiful needs to be somehow rich. He uses his epistemology to argue for this conclusion. Experience is initially mere feeling; its representative function is a late addition:

"Decoration, by stimulating the senses, not only brings a primary satisfaction with it, independent of any that may supervene, but it furnishes an element of effect which no higher beauty can ever render unwelcome or inappropriate, since any higher beauty, in moving the mind, must give it a certain sensuous and emotional colouring."(125)

Decoration is fundamental in design, "for everything structural or significant produces in the first instance some sensuous impression and figures as a spot or pattern in the field of vision."(126)

Two major difficulties arise in connexion with this argument. Firstly,
it is difficult to see what justification Santayana has for singling out decorative features of a building: structure 'stimulates the senses' quite as much as ornament and 'figures as a spot or pattern' in the same way. Thus structure must bring the same 'primary satisfaction' with it.

Secondly, a distinction between higher and lower beauty is assumed. No definitions or elaboration are forthcoming, but from the context and in conjunction with Santayana's presuppositions, it is possible that he would have elaborated the distinction in the following way: reason is the most valuable of human faculties, and reason must be employed to appreciate certain features of aesthetic objects. Such rational satisfactions one might call higher than those which are merely sensuous. If this interpretation is correct, then this version of the higher-lower beauty distinction falls together with the unacceptable immediate/mediate distinction.

Santayana concludes his treatment of architecture in "Reason in Art" with general comments on Greek and Gothic styles. In Greek architecture he finds the perfect alliance of structure and ornament. The Greek temple, "if we imagine it in all its glory, with all its colour and furniture, was a type of human art at its best, where decoration, without in the least restricting itself, took naturally an exquisitely subordinate and pervasive form; each detail had its own splendour and refinement, yet kept its place in the whole."(127)

By contrast, Gothic architecture in general, in Santayana's view, was not "well grounded enough in utility to be a sound and permanent basis for beauty."(128) The architects strained feverishly after effects which were never satisfactory even when achieved:

"The structure, in becoming ornament, ceased to be anything else, and could be discarded by anyone whose fancy preferred a different image...The true magic of that...architecture lay not in its intelligible structure but in the bewildering incidental effects which that structure permitted...The structure was but the inevitable underpinning for the desired display."(129)
It is almost unnecessary to add that this sweeping relegation of Gothic "in toto" to the rank of the merely interesting is neither widely shared, nor especially consonant with Santayana's principle of stylistic authenticity. Viollet-le-Duc and others since have been disinclined either to dismiss Gothic so easily, or to patronise the technique of the architects to the degree here indulged in by Santayana.

A further general point of architectural theory is put forward in an essay of 1916, "The Human Scale". No definition of the term 'human scale' is offered, but the context makes it clear that a building on the human scale is no larger than is necessary comfortably to serve the needs of the human mind and body. It is assumed that buildings on this scale will be moderate in size. The human scale is ignored, for example, when the door of a building is so large that a smaller door has to be cut into it. The effect, in Santayana's view, is always unsuccessful:

"Here is the human scale reasserting itself in the midst of a titanic structure, but it reasserts itself with an ill grace and in the interests of frailty; the patch it makes seems unintended and ignominious."

The tone of his remarks makes it quite clear that Santayana wishes to condemn colossal architecture in general. "The human scale irrepressibly reappeared in enormous buildings, "but for the moment without its native dignity, because it had been stretched to compass a lifeless dignity quite other than its own."(131)

The opposite view is put forward by other writers on architecture. Thus Friedrich Gilly: "...architecture is the only art form, the works of which can become colossal without detriment. Only reduction in size makes them in their total effect a plaything."(132) Or again, Quatremère de Quincy, writing on Chalgrin:

"Let us not be afraid to repeat that physical grandeur is one of the principal causes of the value and the effect of architecture. The reason is that the greatest part of the impressions produced
by this art belong to the sense of admiration...how much more

(291)

by this art belong to the sense of admiration...how much more

by this art belong to the sense of admiration...how much more

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by this art belong to the sense of admiration...how much more

The fault of which Santayana, Silly and de Quincy are alike guilty is that

of over-generality. Santayana assumes that all enormous buildings are

ungrateful to the eye, and that it is always unpleasant to feel dwarfed;

Silly and de Quincy assert the opposite. It is surely quite obvious that,
in such a general form, both positions are alike untenable. It seems as

unwise to legislate generally about the size of a building as it is about

its ornamentation.

V: Representation, Sculpture and Painting

From the plastic constructions of architecture, Santayana turns to

consider plastic representation in sculpture and painting. He precedes his

remarks on these fine arts by general considerations which can be

construed as a set of jointly sufficient necessary conditions for mimetic

representation.

(1) The Nature of Representation

Construction and representation (Santayana begins) have in common the

property that both can be decorative:

"It is in their decorative function that construction and representa-
tion meet; they are able to conspire in one ideal effect by virtue of
the common appeal which they unwittingly make to the senses. If
construction were not decorative it could never ally itself
imaginatively to decoration; and decoration in turn would never be
willingly representative if the forms which illustration requires
were not decorative in themselves."(13)

Anything is decorative, in Santayana's view, which entertains the eye and

enriches the impression (cf. the previous section) and the imprecision of
this definition guarantees the truth of this opening remark: no-one would wish to deny that both structures and representations can entertain the eye and enliven the impression; but equally, this is to say very little.

Illustration - a term which Santayana uses as a synonym for 'representation' - differs from structure, however, in having a certain 'intellectual function':

"...the essence of illustration lies neither in use nor in beauty. The illustrator's impulse is to reproduce and describe given objects. He wishes in the first place to force observers - overlooking all logical scruples - to call his work by the name of its subject-matter; and then he wishes to inform them further, through his representation, and to teach them to apprehend the real object as, in its natural existence, it might never have been apprehended. His first task is to translate the object faithfully into his special medium; his second task, somewhat more ambitious, is so to penetrate into the object during that process of translation that this translation may become at the same time analytic and imaginative, in that it signalises the object's structure and emphasises its ideal suggestions."(135)

A consequence of this position to which Santayana draws attention is that, in illustration, "The aesthetic element in art has begun to recede before the intellectual; and sensuous effects, while of course retained and still studied, seem to be impressed into the service of ideas."(136a)

What is true in these remarks is that the illustrator seeks to make the spectator apprehend the object in a new way. It is necessarily true that a mimetic representation (to anticipate a distinction to be clarified below) does not share all the properties of that which is represented, for any object which did satisfy this description would be a replica and not a representation. The representational artist copies some of the properties of the object (etc.) to be represented, with any one of several general ends in view: he may wish to emphasise the form, or a certain aspect of it; he
may wish to bring out a certain property of the object which could otherwise be overlooked; he may wish to convey an idea, and so on. Santayana is close to this position with his claim that the general purpose of representation is to emphasize the structure and ideal values of that which is represented.

Less acceptable are the accompanying doctrines that the value of representation is neither aesthetic nor instrumental (its essence lies neither in use nor in beauty), and that illustration is in a sense uneesthetic. A representation brings to our notice the structure and ideal values of that which is represented. Santayana does not explain at this point why awareness of these factors should be valuable, though, by extrapolating from the presuppositions of the Life of Reason, it is not difficult to supply an interpretation. Ideals are the goals of action and the objects of desire. It is advantageous to have as clear a knowledge of them as possible, in that this will contribute to self-knowledge and help us to estimate their attainability in practice. The difficulty with such an interpretation — for which the whole apparatus of the Life of Reason is evidence — is that such a value must surely be instrumental. Knowledge of ideals contributes ultimately to the maximization of happiness. It is more difficult to guess why Santayana should consider knowledge of structure to be valuable. Perhaps it contributes to knowledge of the environment; but such a value would again be instrumental. On the other hand, if the contemplation of structure is valuable intrinsically, then Santayana can hardly avoid admitting that this aspect of representation provides aesthetic pleasure. (It will be remembered that he associates value in immediate experience, the term he uses to define aesthetic value in "Reason in Art", with intrinsic value; cf. "The Sense of Beauty", where he says that aesthetic judgments are "necessarily intrinsic and based on the character of immediate experience." (137) Admittedly such interpretations are conjectural; but Santayana omits any consideration of a third species of
value which is neither aesthetic nor instrumental.

The definition of aesthetic value as value in immediate experience (cf. Ch.VI, above) is the cause of the difficulty in the doctrine that, in illustration, the aesthetic element in art has begun to recede before the intellectual. It is because of his belief that aesthetic experience and immediate experience are very closely related if not identical that Santayana considers detailed reticulation to be incompatible with contemplation. The untenability of this doctrine of aesthetic experience has been argued above; it is enough here to point out that a psychical distance view has no such corollary.

Santayana continues by shifting his ground, for the moment, from representation or illustration in art, to consider the psychology of imitation, a term which he uses to encompass both artistic and non-artistic copying of gesture or object. Imitation in this sense is a widespread phenomenon, explicable in terms of the psychology of perception. Every sensation of an external object he considers to be an imitation of that object. Every mental image, he asserts, is to some degree a motor image, "so that no idea ...can occupy the mind unless the body has received some impulse to enact the same" (138). Since in a motor image, "the mind represents prophetically what the body is about to execute," it follows for Santayana that,

"The plastic instinct to reproduce what is seen is therefore simply an uninterrupted and adequate seeing...imitative art is simply the perfection and fulfilment of sensation. The act of apperception in which a sensation is reflected upon and understood is already an internal reproduction. The object is gone over in the mind, not without quite perceptible movements in the limbs, which away, as it were, in sympathy with the object's habit." (139)

This account of the psychology of imitation must be rejected. Santayana apparently assumes that all action is preceded by a mental image of it, and ignores the fact that the occurrence of mental imagery varies greatly from
person to person. Moreover, the general principle that no idea can occupy
the mind unless the body has received some impulse to enact it, is absurd;
what would count, for example, as enacting the idea of a triangle or a
mathematical equation or a logical relation such as entailment?

Imitation in this general sense (and in art, as will become clear below)
does not consist merely in similarity, "nor does its ideal function lie in
bringing a flat and unmeaning similarity about. It has a representative
and intellectual value because in reproducing the forms of things it
reproduces them in a fresh substance to new purpose."(140) For example,
when one man deliberately imitates others, he does not merely copy to no
purpose; rather, "He enacts what he understands, and his understanding
consists precisely in knowing that he is re-enacting something which has its
collateral existence elsewhere in nature."(141) In Santayana's view,
deliberate imitation is in a certain way beneficial:

"...if I imitate (mankind) under proper inhibitions and in the
service of my own ends, I really understand them, and, by represent­
ing what I do not bodily become, I preserve and enlarge my own being
and make it relevant ideally to what it depends upon...to make the
accretions which time brings to your being representative of what
you are not, and do not wish to be, is to grow in dignity. It is
to be wise and prepared. It is to survey a universe without ceasing
to be a mind."(142)

The difficulty with all this seems to be not so much that it is false, but
rather that it is simply a florid and rhetorical way of stating banal truths;
he seems to be saying very little more than that to imitate features of
the behaviour of others which are advantageous to my own purposes is to
show understanding, to a degree, of both the others and of myself; and that
such imitation is beneficial to myself. This is merely trite.

From this account of imitation in a broad sense, Santayana turns finally
(in these preliminary remarks) to that species of imitation which is of
interest in aesthetics, i.e. plastic imitation. Referring back to the
psychology of imitation given above, he advances a theoretical account of
the origin of plastic imitation. When the stimulus to imitation is not
pervasive (as a habit, for instance, might be said to be pervasive), and
touches mainly a single sense, "when what it arouses is a movement of the
hand or eye retracing the object, then the response becomes very definitely
cognitive. It constitutes an observation of fact, and acquaintance with a
thing's structure amounting to technical knowledge..." (143) This process,
"leaves an efficacious idea", and,

"In an idle moment, when the information thus acquired need not be
put to instant use, the new-born faculty may work itself out
spontaneously. The sound heard is repeated, the thing observed is
sketched, the event conceived is acted out in pantomime. Then
imitation rounds itself out; an uninhibited sensation has become
an instinct to keep that sensation alive, and plastic representation
has begun." (144)

In addition to the difficulties in the presupposed psychology of imitation,
it can be objected that this final step in the explanation is too undetailed
to be helpful as a psychology of creativity. Santayana does little more
that assert that plastic imitation does happen. Again, it is not easy to
see why the fact that a stimulus affects mainly one sense should alone
stimulate the response of detailed attention to structure which Santayana
asserts to occur universally.

Far more promising, however, is his synoptic account of plastic
imitation, which can be construed as a set of jointly sufficient necessary
conditions. Imitation does not result in the literal repetition of the
represented object; rather, the copy, "reproduces the form (of the represent-
ed object) in a new medium and gives it a different function. In these
latter circumstances lies the imitative essence of the second image: for one
leaf does not imitate another nor is each twin the other's copy." (145) This
statement contains three necessary conditions. In any plastic imitation (1)
the copy reproduces the form of that which is copied; (ii) the copy is in a medium different from that which is copied, and (iii) the copy has a different function from that which is copied. It is convenient to consider these conditions in reverse order.

The reasons for the acceptability of the third condition—a plastic representation has a different function from that which is represented—have been indicated above. A representation in art is by definition not a replica of its subject-matter. It shares only some of its properties, and not only does not but cannot usually fulfil the same function. A picture of apples is not to be eaten. What the general purposes of representation in art are has already been said: to emphasize some property of form, or material, or expression, or 'meaning' in some sense. For example, a portrait painter will select a given pose and point of view in order to maximize the beauty of his sitter, or to exhibit his or her character and experience, or to bring to our attention the play of light and shade on the planes of the face, and so forth, in various combinations. A landscape painter will select his point of view and lighting to secure a good composition, a satisfying set of colour relationships, to emphasize a mood of nature (hostile, indifferent, friendly to man) and so forth. A sculptor will choose scale, material, and pose to emphasize line and to endow the statue with the mood he seeks to convey (if any) and so on. Patently, these functions of representation are quite different from those of the subject-matter represented.

With regard to the medium, while it is almost always the case that a representation is in a medium different from that of its subject-matter, there are exceptions: for example, a painting may include a representation of another painting. Such cases are scarce, however, and it is not difficult to see why: a change in the medium will make it easier to take up the distanced attitude, as Bullough pointed out (cf. Ch.II, above).

The thesis that a plastic representation reproduces the form of its subject-matter requires a slightly longer consideration. If true, it
entails that resemblance in at least formal respects is a necessary condition for representation, the denial of which is entailed by Goodman's general thesis that resemblance is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for representation. In Goodman's view, for anything A to represent another thing B, A must be a symbol for B, stand for B, refer to B. Denotation is the core of representation and is independent of resemblance. Resemblance is not a necessary condition for reference; almost anything can stand for anything else. (146)

It can be granted to Goodman that resemblance is not a sufficient condition for representation. Everything resembles itself more than anything else does. Again, resemblance is a symmetrical relation, while representation is not. Moreover, one picture resembles another picture more than it resembles its subject-matter. The denial that resemblance is a necessary condition for representation, however, is quite another matter. Father D.C. Barrett cites Monroe Beardsley's counter-example: if someone were to paint a picture which resembled a cow in a field, and called it, "Derby Winner, 1936", one would conclude that he was being ironical, or that he was an incompetent painter, or that he did not know what a horse looked like, or did not know that the Derby was a horse race and not a cattle show, or that the title had been misplaced. (147) To say so much - that resemblance is a necessary condition for representation - is of course to say very little. There remains the difficult problem of attempting to find conditions for the varying standards employed at different times for what counts as the necessary degree of resemblance. The limits of resemblance are among those factors in the response to art which are culturally determined.

Granted support for this corollary of Santayana's third condition, is it the case that reproduction of form in particular is a necessary condition for representation? The condition can be accepted provided that it is not interpreted in too stringent a way. There can be few
representations in art in which the form of what is represented, or an aspect or view of it, is identically reproduced, on whatever scale. (Santayana is presumably to be interpreted as allowing change of scale). However, that formal likeness within the culturally determined limits of the time is a necessary condition for representation in art is true. Form in plastic representation means shape, and since shape is of the first importance in the identification of objects, formal similarity is clearly necessary for representation. It is truistic to point out the close relation between the form of an object, and its identity.

It is worth adding that Santayana's three necessary conditions for representation can be used to preserve the distinction which Bernheimer makes between categorical, legal, and mimetic representation. As it stands, this distinction is defective. All mimetic representations are "likenesses which represent by virtue of similarity, natural or conventional." (143) The difficulty is that the first two types of representation, given Bernheimer's definitions, collapse into the third. A categorical representation (i.e. a specimen of a class) resembles the rest of its class and represents in virtue of this natural resemblance, while in legal representation (e.g. the relation of a lawyer to his client) the representative resembles his principal in sharing his interests, by agreement or convention. By defining mimetic representation in terms of Santayana's three conditions, this distinction, manifestly worth preserving, can be saved. The stipulation that a mimetic representation has a function different from that of its subject-matter differentiates mimetic from categorical representation, for a sample, to be a good sample, must share the function of the members of the class of which it is a sample. Equally, the stipulation that a mimetic representation be almost always in a different medium from its subject-matter precludes any confusion with legal representation, where the notion of change of medium does not apply.
Finally, granted that two of Santayana's three conditions are
necessary for representation in art, is their conjunction sufficient?
It seems in fact it is not, since an object might satisfy them both but
not count as a representation, simply because it is not seen as a
representation. The notion of seeing as must therefore figure in a further
necessary condition, though some care is needed in its framing. Wollheim
speaks of the possibility of 'elucidating' the notion of representation
in terms of seeing as. (149) This is inexact, but can naturally be
interpreted as meaning that, if \( x \) is to be a representation of \( y \), then \( x \)
must be seen as \( y \). As it stands, however, this is too simple. It is
natural to assume, as Charlton does in his criticism of Wollheim, that to
see \( x \) as \( y \) entails taking \( x \) for \( y \), and he very justly points out that this
very rarely occurs when an observer contemplates a representation. It
occurs only in the cases of 'trompe l'oeil' works or freak lighting. (150)
Wollheim's suggestion entails that to see a representation as what it
represents is to undergo an illusion; yet hardly anyone is ever deceived.

It might be objected that Charlton fails to distinguish between types
of illusion: firstly, that in which \( x \) is both seen as and taken for \( y \);
secondly, a controlled, voluntary 'Gestalt' switch, and thirdly, involun-
tary visual seeing-as, where \( x \) is seen as \( y \) but not taken for \( y \). This
last, it might be said, is what happens in representational art. Yet this
objection is open to counter-moves similar to those which Ziff employed
against Samuel Alexander. (151) It is hard to see what justification there
is for using 'illusion' at all in the third sense suggested, since, in its
central use, it is a necessary condition for the occurrence of an illusion
that someone is deceived. The introduction of the term 'illusion' is
likely to cause confusion, inviting a mis-identification of the work of
art with a mental entity of some sort.

It is advisable, therefore, to differentiate the sense in which \( x \) is
seen as \( y \) when \( x \) mimetically represents \( y \), from that in which \( x \) is seen
as y and taken for y. As has been said, when a spectator contemplates a mimetic representation, he is not deceived. The reason for this must surely be that he is acquainted with the notion of image-making. It is a necessary condition for seeing x as a mimetic representation of y that the spectator is in some sense aware of this practice. This awareness need not take the form of explicit verbal formulation on the lines of this condition, since a child might be aware of the difference between an image and that of which it is an image, while lacking the vocabulary to make this awareness explicit. But some sort of awareness there must be; otherwise, the image will be incomprehensible, or mistaken for its subject-matter.

(11) Sculpture

Santayana's remarks on sculpture in "Reason in Art" are restricted to a few generalisations.

Perception (he begins) divides the world into many patterns. If the single man or hero is "the unit and standard in discourse", (152) then his image will preoccupy the arts. This subject is best represented in sculpture, since sculpture is the most complete of representations:

"Sculpture retains form and colour, with all that both can suggest, and it retains them in their integrity, leaving the observer free to re-survey them from any point of view and drink in their quality exhaustively." (153)

Of course, the stage can supply the movement and speech which are omitted in sculptural representation, but reproduction by acting has the great disadvantage of ephemerality. Since the effort of art is to keep what is interesting in existence, acting must be considered an art inferior in dignity." (154)

There are several difficulties in this opening statement. Firstly, the fact that the centrally important moral concept of a given epoch is that of the hero does not of itself entail that a complete representation
is required in art; a good deal of argument has been omitted here. Again, the example of the concept of the hero indicates that Santayana is thinking of the ancient world; and in that case, it is difficult to see how he can square his current claim about the superiority of sculptural representation in general with his high praise of Homer, whose portraits of Achilles and Hector he would presumably not wish to denigrate. Moreover, the dismissal of drama is absurd; as if a play cannot be re-performed (not to say, now, recorded) and thus have a repeated effect. That it might be more difficult to have repeated access to a play in performance than to a statue in a gallery is trivial and irrelevant.

Santayana continues that, being so adequate a rendering of its subject, sculpture demands a perfect mastery over it, and is correspondingly difficult. In his view, it requires taste and training above every other art,

"for not only must the material form be reproduced, but its motor suggestions and moral expression must be rendered; things which in the model itself are at best transitory, and which may never be found there if a heroic or ideal theme is proposed."(155)

The view that sculpture is in some way especially difficult is not peculiar to Santayana. Cellini, for example, held the same view, and for roughly comparable reasons; unlike other art products 'based on design', sculpture is to be viewed in the round:

"I maintain that among all the arts based on design...sculpture is seven times the greatest, because a statue must have eight show sides and all should be equally good."(156)

The objection to which this type of argument is surely open is that there is nothing which could count as a unit of difficulty or other ground of comparison between the various arts. It is not clear how the relative difficulties of creating a form in stone (say) and creating a unified temporally extended form in sound are to be compared. Moreover, Santayana gives almost no reasons for this view which apply solely to sculpture;
the painter equally faces the difficulty of rendering features of his model which are transitory, including (of course) expression.

Further on the theme of difficulties unique to sculpture, Santayana maintains that the sculptor is especially dependent on his model:

"If the statue is to be ideal, i.e., if it is to express the possible motions and vital character of its subject, the model itself must be refined. Training must have cut in the flesh those lines which are to make the language and eloquence of the marble." (157*)

Once again, it is not easy to see why Santayana should consider this problem peculiar to the sculptor. If a dignified and noble model is a precondition for dignity and nobility in a work of art, then the representational painter of the human form faces exactly the same difficulty. Moreover, Santayana entirely ignores the possibility that an artist might envision an ideal of nobility by means of imagination alone. To discount this possibility is not only implausible in itself, but also in tension with the doctrines on the imagination put forward in "Interpretations of Poetry and Religion", where the main activity of the imagination is said to be idealising. (Cf. Ch.V, supra) To idealise in this sense is to work out the hints of the ideal given in the world as it is.

The alleged dependence of the sculptor on his model, in conjunction with Santayana's belief in the superiority of the Greek way of life to all others, are the grounds for a sweeping dismissal of all mediaeval, Renaissance, and modern sculpture. Only in Greece, in Santayana's view, was sculpture an authentic and fully successful art. (158*) Greek sculpture answered to a genuine need in the Greek personality, and never again in the history of sculpture has this condition been satisfied. Of the Renaissance, for example, Santayana writes:

"If several great temperaments, under the auspices of fashion, could then call up a magic in the world in which bodies still
spoke in a heroic language, that was a passing dream. Society
could not feed such an artificial passion, nor the schools trans­
mit an arbitrary personal style that responded to nothing permanent
in social conditions."(159*)

It is difficult to comment on so absurdly sweeping a generalisation, which
entails that every item of post-Greek European sculpture is in some way
second rate. One can only suppose that Santayana's passion for the Greeks
temporarily distorted his judgment.

The 1908 paper, "Sculpture" is a discussion of the issue what value
representational sculpture has for the community at large: what benefit is
to be derived from the contemplation of sculpture? Santayana's answer to
the question is twofold: sculpture offers moral stimulation and historical
insight:

"The force of sculpture is primarily moral....The sight of what
human nature might be in its purity and freedom thaws us, as it
were, and causes the genuine ideal to stir again within....

(Moreover) this moral renewal has, incidentally, an intellectual
function, when the freedom and simplicity expressed in sculpture
are the record of what a less encumbered civilization may have
allowed men to approach in some past age."(160)

The argument to support these conclusions rests mainly on informal
psychological generalisations about the aesthetic experience of sculpture.

A statue, Santayana begins, speaks to us largely by gesture. ('largely'
only, because Santayana acknowledges the role of the material, cf.Ch.II,
above.) He professes not to know how psychologists might explain this
silent communication; but experience attests that it does occur: "we feel
currents of influence, sympathetic reactions, in the presence of images."
(161) The response a statue induces is less powerful than that produced
by a real person; but it gains over the person in persistence, since a
statue is always in the same mood:
"In time, therefore, the companionship of a plastic form can become a positive and appreciable influence; it can exercise a hypnotic power over our organs and bid them operate under its control; we shall imitate and render it over...we shall reproduce in ourselves by this means the very physiological process, and generate the very mood, which filled the artist in the quick moment of creation, when chisel in hand, he stepped back from his work and cried, 'That's it at last; it is finished!'(162)

Santayana is presumably to be interpreted at this point, when speaking of inward imitation, as taking for granted the psychology of imitation discussed in part (i) of the present section. Not only is this presupposition dubious, but so also is the general psychological claim that a consistent feature of the response to sculpture is an exact reconstruction (so to speak) of the mood, presumably of satisfaction, aroused in the artist by the successful completion of his work. For is it clear why it would be valuable to recapture such a mood; what moral or historical insight need it offer?

Gesture (he continues) is the first language, and the most moving; man reverts to it, abandoning the artifice of language, whenever he has his whole self to express, and is too full of feeling to know or care whether he is expressing anything. As a consequence, the plastic arts have this advantage over literature; they express something profounder, more elemental, and they express it all at once. Speech is necessarily intermittent; plastic expression, on the contrary, is perpetual; it costs no effort; it makes no noise; it does not fatigue the beholder; and it continues to exert its force when it works unawares: forms and movements of bodies, Santayana asserts, work on us constantly, even when we are not aware of it.(163)

As so often with Santayana, the difficulties in this argument are a result of the gaps in it. He assumes that no verbal description of an elemental feeling can produce an aesthetic experience as intense as can a
plastic representation of the gesture in which that feeling is expressed. Moreover, in order to carry through an argument to prove this principle itself, it would be necessary to find some way of measuring the intensities of aesthetic experiences, and showing in accordance with laws of psychology why it is that represented gestures make more impact than verbal description. This entire set of problems is not so much as hinted at by Santayana.

The foregoing thesis as to the capacity of sculpture to express the elemental has two important consequences, in Santayana's view. Firstly, the form and attitude of a sculpture "express vital habit, and second, that they do so by tending to melt and recast in us our own ethics, our own possible actions, our own vital habit." (164) Sculpture is a veracious historical document. Granted sensitiveness on our part, it will introduce us to the moral life and disposition of past ages. The alleged 'recasting' of our inner life is described further by Santayana: "...it is the sense of this renewal within us, of this impulse and budding capacity to be stronger, straighter, simpler, calmer and bolder than we ordinarily are, that reveals to us what the statue expresses." (165) In this way, sculpture, apparently the most solid and material of the arts, turns out to be deeply and directly moral. It does not fill us with ready made ideas; rather, "sculpture affects the sub-soil of ideas within us; it modifies by a sort of invisible irrigation, the ideas we are henceforth able to breed, to love, or to adopt." (166)

Several of these contentions are questionable. In the first place, it is not clear why the appreciation of expressed 'vital habit' should always involve 'recasting' of the spectator's own ethics. So far as one can attach any clear meaning to this, Santayana seems to be committed to the thesis that in the contemplation of any expressive piece of sculpture, the moral beliefs of the spectator must undergo some change; but as a psychological generalisation this is surely false. Secondly, he assumes that all representational sculpture expresses noble feelings of the kind he lists. Not only is this in itself dubious, but it is barely consistent with his
dismissal as inauthentic of all European sculpture since the Greeks: if only obedience to the Greek ethic (i.e. in Santayana's view, the Life of Reason) produces noble human beings, and if the sculptor is especially dependent on his model, then it must follow on Santayana's own premisses that whatever is expressed by post-Greek sculpture is ignoble in some way. Finally, such remarks as are here made about the aesthetic experience furnished by sculpture are vague and metaphorical: one wonders what level of consciousness or sub-consciousness he means to refer to by the term 'sub-soil', or what psychological process by 'irrigation'.

Santayana alleges it to be a consequence of the foregoing claim concerning the moral effects of sculpture that details and accessories are not important in sculpture; rather, they are dangerous and disturbing. Virtuoso technique cannot save a sculptor from triviality; whereas, where sculpture is informed by a noble life-style, "a steady habit of life and an uncrossed artistic tradition,"(167) it is not hindered in its force by want of technical accomplishments.

One can concede to Santayana that technical brilliance is not a sufficient condition for greatness in sculpture; but, on the ground that minute differences in a work of art can produce major differences in effect it is difficult to concede further that such brilliance is not a necessary condition. Inconsistently, Santayana admits this much himself. A few pages further on, he writes that the significance of sculpture is not communicated by indirect symbols such as words, "but by physical contagion the significance of sculpture is like that of natural bodies."(168) Because of this fact, the form of sculpture is vitally important: there must not be, "a wrong or ambiguous stroke anywhere, not a detail too much" (169); otherwise, the sculpture will not define our reaction unequivocally. Looseness in sculpture is more fatal than in the other arts, where the medium is rich, or where adventitious associations are easy to pick out. Sculpture, by contrast, has little to offer unless it has a supremely fine form.
Not only is this inconsistent with the foregoing remarks on technique but it is also implausible in itself. It is difficult to believe that 'looseness' is less important in the other arts than in sculpture. Santayana gives no good reason in support of his thesis that form is more important in sculpture than in the other arts. The fact that gesture is largely responsible for the expressive properties of a representational sculpture does not entail that the forms of works of the other arts are in some way less crucial. It is a mere commonplace that formal flaws in musical and literary forms are quite as disturbing as errors in carving or modelling.

Santayana moves on to a different point. Sculptures in a collection are at a disadvantage: like systems of philosophy, they are far more impressive if met with singly. A sculpture must be fathomed slowly:

"It is a seed, rather than a flower; to understand it we must let it sink into us, unfold itself in us; we must give it time to start all the tendencies to ordered motion it epitomizes; and then, in its familiar presence, we shall feel the whole world opening out again before us, but now, in consequence of the single and central attitude we shall have learned to assume, that world will wear a new order, a marvellous harmony; it will seem, in fact, to consist of sheer contributions to this one image, to this consummate symbol." (170)

The difficulty here lies in the fact that the reasoning Santayana gives does not support his conclusion. One can readily agree that the aesthetic experience provided by a sculpture might - if the work is good enough - deepen and become richer with the passing of time and the coming of familiarity. But Santayana gives no reasoning to show that the coming of familiarity is precluded by exhibition in museum or gallery conditions; as if the spectator were obliged to pass quickly from work to work. The initial generalisation is simply careless.
The final point made by Santayana in this paper is a contrast of the aesthetic responses to literature on the one hand, and sculpture on the other. A playwright or novelist begins with a general feeling, or some character, or some incident, and makes this the starting point in a process of elaboration. Such artists pass from the one to the many. The reader must reverse this labour, bringing the detail together in his mind so that the integral idea and supreme sentiment become clear. In sculpture by contrast, this labour of synthesis is performed by the artist:

"In sculpture the parts work, or ought to work, only in the whole. The sculptor meets us, as it were, at the journey's end; he gives us, through a form and attitude which enlist our involuntary sympathy, a single impression, as direct and poignant as a smell. Out of this one impression we must pass to its submerged justification: to the acts, the words, the endless situations, in which such a sentiment might be manifested in real life." (171)

The major difficulty with this final point is that there is no reason to adopt the general claim that every representational sculpture produces initially a 'single impression', in any strict or informative sense of the term. To take an obvious example, Bernini in his "Apollo and Daphne" has captured both Apollo's surprise and dismay when he realises that he is about to lose Daphne, Daphne's own distress, and the extreme poignancy of the whole situation. Is apprehension of this multiple expression preceded by a 'single impression' of any importance? If Santayana means merely that a casual glance will reveal, perhaps, only a vague impression of form and colour, then, while this can be granted, it is also true that the point is trivial. The opposition between the apprehension of spatially and temporally extended forms collapses into banality.

(iii) Painting

The 1908 paper, "Sculpture" is one of the many pieces by Santayana which still await collection in an authoritative edition of his works. Also awaiting collection is his brief review of the first edition of Jerenon's,
"The Florentine Painters of the Italian Renaissance, with an Index to their Works", which appeared in 1896.

Santayana declared the relevance of psychology to aesthetics in "The Sense of Beauty", and made extensive use of psychological theories in that work. (Cf. Chs. I-IV, above). It is to be expected, therefore, that he should be sympathetic to the psychological style of aesthetics exemplified in Berenson's theory of tactile values. Santayana welcomes Berenson's willingness,

"to trace aesthetic pleasures back into the primary processes of sense and imagination. Such an attempt is...an encouragement to the psychologist who might fear to miss the essence of the higher artistic feelings while digging in the psychological field." (172)

While praising the psychological approach, however, Santayana finds several details of the theory of tactile values unconvincing. In the first place, Berenson asserts that the third dimension is perceived by association of the visual image with tactile sensations, or "muscular sensations in my palm and fingers." (173) The influence of other feelings of movement, apparently in the arms, is once mentioned, but - and this is Santayana's point - the other possibilities of the case are ignored.

Secondly, Berenson asserts that aesthetic pleasure consists in stimulating to "an unwonted activity psychical processes which are in themselves the source of most (if not all) of our pleasures, and which here, free from disturbing physical sensations, never tend to pass over into pain." (174) A work of art, for those capable of enjoying it, heightens the intensity of the act of perception. It "overwhelms them with the sense of having twice the capacity they had credited themselves with; their whole personality is enhanced" (175) and they feel better prepared for life.

This second point Santayana regards as "arbitrary and hasty" (176), but gives no reason for this verdict other than that Berenson presents no adequate evidence for his thesis.

The value of Santayana's review is impaired by its brevity; he simply
omits to give reasons for his criticisms, or an alternative view. One supposes that he attacks the thesis of the prominence of tactile sensations in aesthetic experience from the standpoint of his objectification view: he considers that the sense of touch has only a small role in aesthetic experience, contributing very few objectified ideas. (cf. Ch. II, above) Why he should attack the thesis that in aesthetic experience ordinary psychical processes are intensified, is simply not clear. He does not take up the matter elsewhere.

His remarks on painting in "Reason in Art" are only a little less brief.

Santayana begins by asking why some subjects are better rendered in a painting than in a sculpture, producing some uncontentious answers:

"The isolated figure or simple group may seem cold apart from its natural setting. In rendering an action you may need to render its scene, if it is the circumstance that gives it value rather than the hero. You may also wish to trace out the action through a series of episodes with many figures." (177)

More contentious is the thesis with which he follows up this opening remark:

"It may be said that any work is essentially a picture which is conceived from a single quarter and meant to be looked at only in one light. Objects in such a case need not be so truly apperceived and appropriated as they would have to be in true sculpture. One aspect suffices: the subject presented is not so much constructed as dreamt." (178)

The difficulty here attaches to the alleged consequence: that the painter need not know his subject as well as the sculptor. Granted the meaning of the term 'apperception' in Santayana's philosophy (cf. section IV, above) there is no ground for him to assert, without further argumentation,
that the painter need not apperceive so accurately as the sculptor. Why he should say that an object represented in a painting is "dreamt", whatever that may mean, is not clear.

He continues with some very general remarks on the history of representational painting. Archaic painting is discursive and symbolic: "each figure is treated separately and stuck side by side with the others upon a golden ground". But vision is richer than discursive reports record it. At a later stage, decoration is left to take care of itself, while, "painting goes on to elaborate the symbols with which it begins, to make them symbolise more and more of what their object contains... The event will be rendered in its own language; it will not, to be recognised, have to appeal to words." Repeating his doctrine that all perception is accompanied by an emotion normally ignored, Santayana argues that progress in representational painting consists in a restoration to the image of those elements of perception ignored in archaic painting:

"...to restore life without losing significance, painting must proceed to accumulate symbol upon symbol, till the original impression is almost restored, but so restored that it contains all the articulation which a thorough analysis had given it." In the course of this development, Santayana claims, the painter, noticing what he has missed, adds colour to outline, modelling to colour, and finally renders tints and values. Representation passes from the statuesque to that in which the objects lie in their own atmosphere:

"They tend accordingly to lose their separate emphasis, in order to be like flowers in a field or trees in a forest. They become elements interesting chiefly by their interplay, and shining by a light which is mutually reflected." In favour of these historical generalisations, it might be advanced that they can be stretched to fit European representational painting from the Middle Ages to Impressionism, though their acceptability is bought at
the price of extreme vagueness. The presupposed and very undetailed
psychology of creation has been commented on before. Gombrich's theory
of schema and correction will explain the development of representation
in art far more adequately than Santayana's few generalizations.

When the process described above is completed, the resultant painting,
in Santayana's sense of the term, is a landscape, (133) whether the scene
it depicts is indoors or not. In a landscape,

"...the observer, even in the presence of men and artificial
objects, has been overcome by the medium in which they swim. He is
seeing the air and what it happens to hold."(134*)

Perception and art, in this phase, easily grow mystical. Objects lose
their individuality:

"All becomes light and depth and air, and those particular objects
threaten to vanish which we had hoped to make luminous, breathing,
and profound...There cease to be fixed outlines, continuous colours,
or discrete existences in nature."(135)

This dissolution is never complete, however, and this for two reasons.
Art exists for the mind, and the mind is articulate. Thus an artist must
introduce units and divisions into his work. Secondly (as pointed out in
Ch. VI, above) it is not the case that the immediate has no diversity:
there must be a basis in the immediate for the distinctions of right and
left, light and shade. Thus, "a landscape cannot be so much as vaporous
unless mists are distinguishable in it, and through them some known object
which they obscure."(136)

It is difficult to see what Santayana was seeking to gain by redefining
the term 'landscape' as he does. Writers like Clark and Friedländer agree
that, in the earliest landscapes, nature is treated symbolically. Objects
are thought of in isolation and composed into a decorative pattern. Only
later in the development of landscape is the fusion of these elements
achieved by the perception of light.(137) The epistemology presupposed in
the talk of the immediate and its diversity has been sufficiently discussed
Santayana concludes his remarks on the fine arts in "Reason in Art" with the comment that, becoming impatient with the restraints imposed by representation, the painter may revert to pure decorative design. This reversion cannot be said to be in any sense illegitimate. Sensuous life has a value within itself. Beauty and expression arise when an outer image agreeably strikes an organ, arousing a sustained image in which the consciousness of both image and reaction is embodied. Abstract design can occasion this experience as easily as can a representation. (133*)

The objectification theory of beauty here adumbrated has been discussed in Ch. I, above. The remark that an abstract design can be beautiful is truistic.

**VI: Conclusion**

Hopefully, it is now clear that the commentators who ignore these doctrines on the fine arts are by no means justified in their omission. On music, for example, Santayana once again shows freedom from essentialism, and an awareness of the contribution of formal and expressive properties to musical experience; his remarks on architecture show tolerance, and an appreciation of stylistic authenticity. His analysis of representation, never referred to in the literature on the subject, is as illuminating as any of the more fashionable accounts. Like so much else considered above, this analysis deserves better than its present neglect.
Chapter VIII: Art and Morality

1. Introduction: Santayana and Some Classic Views on the Relations between Art and Morality.

"The Life of Reason" is primarily a work of ethics. The views on epistemology and metaphysics, and on the various institutions of human life, are elaborated subject to a guiding moral aim: to work out the contribution of each institution to the good life. Accordingly, having put forward his views on the nature of fine art together with special doctrines on the fine arts, it is entirely to be expected that Santayana should devote the final chapters of "Reason in Art" to just such a consideration of art from the standpoint of the morality of the rational life.

The aims of the present chapter are to make clear the type of stance Santayana takes on the relation of art and morality by a brief comparison with two classic views on the subject; to give a detailed, critical account of his views, and finally to estimate the value of what he has to say in relation to current analytical methods in aesthetics.

Debates on the relations of art and morality which can claim to be philosophically interesting have centered classically around two opposed positions, which can be labelled utilitarian and autonomist respectively. The utilitarian claims that art is subject to moral evaluation in the following way: the moral content of a work of art is a feature relevant to the determination of its value as a work of art. The view was held by Utilitarian critics in the nineteenth century, and a similar position is put forward by Tolstoy in "What is Art?" The autonomist by contrast holds that the moral content of a work of art is irrelevant to its aesthetic merit, and quite often adds the logically independent rider that art is and ought to be quite unconnected with morality in every way, and (in some cases) with life also. The supporters of art for art's sake, both in England and on the Continent, accepted views of this kind. (Wilde is used as an example in what follows). A brief discussion of these opposed opinions serves as a framework within which to locate Santayana's views.
Though post-dating the works of the Utilitarian critics against whom Gautier, Wilde and other aesthetes reacted, Tolstoy's views in "What is Art?" are utilitarian in spirit and share the major defects of the views of less important writers. Tolstoy defines art as the deliberate communication of feelings between men by means of external signs. (1) He continues that art,

"is a means of union among men joining them together in the same feelings, and indispensable for the life and progress towards well being of individuals and of humanity." (2) The important point for present purposes is that Tolstoy here builds a variety of utility into the definition of art: any work which fails to have the beneficent consequences he mentions is not art, no matter what aesthetic virtues it might possess.

This becomes clearer in remarks made later on in the same essay, e.g.

"...to say that a work of art is good but incomprehensible to the majority of men, is the same as saying of some kind of food that it is very good but most people can't eat it...Perverse art may please the majority of men, but good art always pleases every one." (3) Or again: "Great works of art are great because they are accessible and comprehensible to every one." (4) The assimilation of art to food is indicative of the confusion of moral and aesthetic values central to the theories of Tolstoy and the Utilitarian critics. The value of food is almost entirely instrumental. Though it is possible to contemplate certain aspects of food aesthetically (e.g. its decoration, if any), and to have aesthetic experiences of taste (cf. Chapter II, above), such aspects and experiences are of secondary importance. The primary value of food lies in its consequences, i.e. keeping us alive and well. By contrast, it has been argued above (cf. Chapter VI) that it is a necessary condition for an object's being a work of art that it be an object of the aesthetic attitude, i.e. a psychically distanced or disinterested attitude. The value of an object of this attitude, while an object of the
attitude, if it has any, is by definition intrinsic, not instrumental. (It is to be noted in passing that this is compatible with the view that a work of art \textit{may} have an instrumental value, e.g. by conveying information, cf. Section III, below). The value of a work of art while contemplated as a work of art is therefore intrinsic. Granted this, there is no reason to accept Tolstoy's thesis that good art is by definition intelligible to all. Some art-education is necessary if works of art are to be fully appreciated, and in certain cases the knowledge required for full appreciation will be extensive, e.g. in the case of works of art produced by artists with beliefs about art and the world radically different from our own. That this is so is no fault of the work of art; if any blame is to be assigned concerning the unavailability of a great deal of art to a large number of people, that blame must lie with the social system which deprives the majority of its members of the chance of the art-education required. What makes a work of art great is the possession by it of aesthetic virtues to a high degree, a matter independent of its general comprehensibility.

His confusion of moral and aesthetic values results in Tolstoy's proposal of a criterion for the evaluation of the subject-matter of art from a moral, not an aesthetic, point of view. Since in his view art consists in the deliberate transmission of feelings, it is feelings which his criterion must evaluate. Good feelings are those which help men along the road to perfection, which for Tolstoy is equivalent to a state of universal brotherhood. Hence he concludes that kindness should be transmitted by art, and all unkind feelings excluded. Were this injunction obeyed, he considers, the feelings of men would progress toward perfection. It is the function of art to further this progress.(5)

The difficulty here is that Tolstoy is arguing, in effect, that a certain subject-matter guarantees good art, whereas, as has been argued above (Ch. VI), the treatment of the subject-matter is of far greater importance in determining the aesthetic quality of a work of art. (This is not to say, as certain members of the aesthetic movement did, that subject-
matter is of no importance whatever. Bradley is surely right to
distinguish between the thesis (i) that subject-matter guarantees or
settles nothing with regard to the quality of a work of art, and the
thesis (ii) that the subject counts for nothing, i.e. no subject-matter
is more promising than any other; the former is true while the latter is
false. (6)

Wilde and other members of the aesthetic movement saw the confusion
central to views such as these: no feature of the subject-matter of a work
of art, including the moral views advocated, guarantees aesthetic merit in
that work. The difficulty with the views of the aesthetes is that they are
marred by over-reaction to Utilitarian criticism: thus it was held that
there is not and ought not to be any relation between art and life. More­
over, in Wilde's case at least, this reaction included the retention of
some of the ethical presuppositions of the Utilitarians.

The crudity of these presuppositions emerges in some remarks by Wilde
in his essay, "The Critic as Artist" (collected in "Intentions", 1891).
Elaborating his ideal of the critic (in his special sense of the term),
Wilde maintains that he (the critic) cannot possess the qualities of
sincerity and fairness, for such qualities border on the moral, "and the
first condition of criticism is that the critic should be able to recognise
that the sphere of Art and the sphere of Ethics are absolutely distinct
and separate." (7) He continues:

"Art is out of the reach of morals, for her eyes are fixed upon
things beautiful and immortal and ever-changing. To morals belong
the lower and less intellectual spheres." (8)

It becomes clearer elsewhere that, in Wilde's view, ethics deals only with
action, and therefore is unconnected with the occupation of the aesthetic
critic, contemplation. Hence he writes:

"while, in the opinion of society, Contemplation is the gravest
sin of which any citizen can be guilty, in the opinion of the
highest culture it is the proper occupation of man." (9)
Moreover, since art is concerned to stimulate "exquisite sterile emotions" (10) for their own sake, not for the sake of action, Wilde considers that art and the aesthetic life are immoral, though he considers this more a recommendation than a drawback. (11)

It is curious that Wilde should hold so crude an opinion of the subject matter of ethics in view of the high praise he lavishes on the Greeks in general and Aristotle in particular, in the course of this same essay. "Theoria" is the highest activity of man in Aristotle's ethics: why, therefore, Wilde should restrict the subject-matter of ethics to action alone is not clear.

While this is so, it of course remains true that the central thesis put forward by Wilde is accurate: the morality of a work of art is not an aesthetic virtue of that work, and it is irrelevant to advance this morality as a reason for rating the work highly as art. This is the point behind the aphorisms in the preface to "The Picture of Dorian Gray": "No artist has ethical sympathies. An ethical sympathy in an artist is an unpardonable mannerism of style." (12) Or again: "All art is quite useless" (13)

Far less acceptable are the doctrines which in Wilde accompany this central thesis, firstly that art ought not to be related to life (and so not to morality, either). Realism as a method is a complete failure and can result only in ugliness. The reason given is that, since real life is ugly and formless, any artistic depiction of it must be so too:

"Don't let us go to life for our fulfilment or our experience. It is a thing narrowed by circumstances, incoherent in its utterance, and without that fine correspondence of form and spirit which is the only thing that can satisfy the artistic and critical temperament." (14)

This protest against realism is the central theme of the essay, "The Decay of Lying." The difficulty with this view is that it presupposes a principle which is merely another version of that used by Tolstoy. Whereas the latter holds that a certain subject-matter guarantees good art,
Wilde holds that a certain subject-matter guarantees bad art. This latter view is open to the same objection as the former, and indeed Wilde states it, inconsistently, in his remark, "The treatment is the test." (15)

Closely related to this is the thesis that the subject-matter of art, which Wilde opposes to its style, should not concern us:

"The only beautiful things, as somebody once said, are the things that do not concern us. As long as a thing is useful or necessary to us, or affects us in any way, either for pain or for pleasure, or appeals strongly to our sympathies, or is a vital part of the environment in which we live, it is outside the proper sphere of art. To art's subject-matter we should be more or less indifferent." (16)

There is no need, at this stage of the present thesis, to work out a lengthy rebuttal of this view: Santayana would agree that any aesthetics which advocates neglect of some aspect of the aesthetic object is unacceptable, since it must lead to an impoverished aesthetic response. Moreover, Wilde's view (which Gautier had put forward earlier) entails that no functional object can be beautiful, a position which is obviously false - witness many items of domestic utility, the finest examples of which are beautiful: Wilde commits himself to finding the work of Chippendale and Wedgwood ugly. (This is not of course to embrace the contrary fallacy of functionalism, i.e. that these objects are beautiful because they are useful. Cf. Ch. VII, section iv, on functionalism)

Santayana, it will be seen, generally avoids the confusions of both views. He rejects the thesis that art is in no way subject to moral censure, holding that, like all other human institutions, its contribution to the Life of Reason must be assessed, and that this enquiry is a moral one. Equally, he usually avoids the Utilitarian confusion of moral and aesthetic virtues; but his position on this point is vitiated by internal inconsistency. His more frequently expressed position is that aesthetic experience is self-justifying, and moreover provides a glimpse of what
the Life of Reason would be like if it were realised, yet at one point, he seems to fall into the Utilitarian confusion, holding that fine art is improved as art if it has a variety of uses.

The only classic discussion of art and morality with which Santayana deals explicitly is that of Plato (in "The Republic", Bks. II, III and X). Art, Santayana begins, demands the time and effort of artists. It demands that men devote their lives to it. This involves expense, and impedes some possible activities while imposing others:

"On this ground, from the earliest times until our own, art has been occasionally attacked by moralists, who have felt that it fostered idolatry or luxury or irresponsible dreams."(17)

Plato was one such moralist. In Santayana's view, he overestimates the effect of myths. Homer's stories about the gods (he asserts) can hardly have demoralised the youths who recited them. Santayana adds the generalisation that, "No religion has ever given a picture of the deity which men could have imitated without the grossest immorality."(18)

Having thus briefly dismissed the criticisms of the early books of "The Republic" with the bare statement that they are false, Santayana turns to the argument of the tenth Book, which he considers to be more powerful, granted his own interpretation of Plato. The Utopia described in "The Republic" is in Santayana's view a church militant, a fallen state coming sadly short of perfection. Plato therefore banished sensuous pleasures until life should be redeemed from baseness. The good for him was efficiency in a military state. Hence he condemns music and the drama; to excite passions idly was to enervate the soul. Again, representations in art lack utility value, and so must be excluded from the Republic.(19)

Plato wished to erase from the world everything productive of discord:

"This was done in the ultimate interest of art and beauty, which in a cultivated mind are inseparable from the vitally good. It is mere barbarism to feel that a thing is aesthetically good but morally evil, or morally good but hateful to perception...if a thing were
ugly it would thereby not be wholly good, and if it were altogether
good it would perforce be beautiful."(20)

These comments on Plato are contestable in several ways. In the first
place, Santayana's interpretation of the criticism of mimesis in the tenth
Book presupposes his own highly contestable thesis that Plato did not regard
the Forms as existent entities.(21*) Secondly, there is no reason to
accept Santayana's remarks on the relation of goodness and beauty. If what
he says were true, then it would be impossible to apply certain combinations
of predicates meaningfully to the same person or thing: no human being could
be both beautiful and evil, or ugly and yet morally good. Such a corollary
has only to be made explicit for its falsity to become apparent.

III: Santayana on Art and Morality

Central to any discussion of the moral value of the effects of art is the
presupposed theory of the nature of aesthetic experience. Santayana's view,
as has been made clear in several of the preceding chapters (e.g. Chs. I and
VI) is that aesthetic experience is immediate experience, i.e. acquaintance
with the unconceptualised flux of sense-data. This doctrine is defective in
that the presupposed distinction between immediate and mediate experience
is untenable (cf. Ch. V, above); and moreover, it is difficult to reconcile
this view with other doctrines Santayana holds, e.g. that great works of
art express ideals, since an ideal is inconceivable without extensive
conceptualisation. (Also cf. Ch. VI) This thesis as to the nature of
aesthetic experience is used in several of the arguments which follow, each
of which is thereby rendered unsound. Its untenability is noted here to
avoid repetition of criticism.

A development is observable in the views on art and morality put
forward by Santayana in his early period. In "The Sense of Beauty", as
is noted above (Ch. I), he holds that all intrinsic values are aesthetic.
Consequently, all intrinsically valuable activities provide aesthetic
enjoyment. Describing the ideal life, the life made up of intrinsically
valuable activities, he writes:

"The variety of nature and the infinity of art, with the companionship of our fellows, would fill the leisure of that ideal existence. These are the elements of our positive happiness, the things which, amid a thousand vexations and vanities, make the clear profit of living." (22)

Thus in "The Sense of Beauty", Santayana commits himself to the view that art (which in the terminology of that book means fine art) provides intrinsically valuable experiences, and would form part of the ideal life. These views are consonant with some of those expressed in "Reason in Art", e.g. that the experiences provided by art are liberal (i.e. self-justifying.) On the other hand, the earlier views are difficult to reconcile with the later condemnations of aesthetic experience as superficial and of most works of art as inauthentic. Thus the line of development in this early period was in general one of increasing severity. As he developed the ethics of the Life of Reason, Santayana became more sceptical of the power of fine art to be an effective agent in bringing about the good life. None of these reservations occur in "The Sense of Beauty", and there is no general condemnation of fine art from the moral point of view in the early work.

Santayana's initial thesis in "Reason in Art" is that art is subject to criticism from the moral point of view. The only way in which art could elude being subject to moral criticism is by disclaiming any serious role in life. If it does claim seriousness, then,

"If an artist's inspiration has been happy, it has been so because his work can sweeten or ennoble the mind and because its total effect will be beneficent. Art being a part of life, the criticism of art is a part of morals." (23)

The function of ethics, in Santayana's view, is to determine which combination of satisfactions maximizes happiness. His enquiry into the
relationship of art and morality accordingly takes the form of answers to the following questions about art:

"What direct acceptable contribution does it make to the highest good? What sacrifices, if any, does it impose? What indirect influence does it exert on other activities? Our answer to these questions will be our apology for art, our proof that art belongs to the Life of Reason." (24*)

These opening generalities have a certain vagueness; no hint is given of the force of qualifications such as "direct" or "acceptable". Otherwise, Santayana's standpoint is unassailable. He is not confusing moral and aesthetic values, merely setting out to investigate whether aesthetic enjoyment harmonises well with other goods in the Life of Reason. Three lines of argument are put forward in Chs. IX - XI of "Reason in Art" in defence of art and aesthetic value. (25*)

Santayana seeks to establish firstly that artistic activity is both innocent and liberal. He begins from a general premise in his theory of value.

No natural mood or impulse is bad in itself; it is only in their contact and mutual interference that they come to have disastrous consequences. Moralists who deprecate passion do so, if they are rational, only because passion causes havoc in the world. An innocent activity, in Santayana's sense of the term, is one which, if it does not concern itself with the world, at least does not interfere with it:

"Now art, more than any other considerable pursuit, is abstract and inconsequential. Born of suspended attention it ends in itself. It encourages sensuous abstraction and nothing concerns it less than to influence the world." (26*)

Nor does art do so in any notable degree. Social changes no sooner reach expression in art than the sentiment changes and the style comes to look empty and ridiculous.
Moreover, in the individual, "art registers passions without stimulating them; on the contrary, in stopping to depict them it steals away their life; and whatever interest and delight it transfers to their expression it subtracts from their vital energy."(27) This is clearly the case, Santayana contends, in erotic and religious art. Though the artist's purpose here is to arouse a practical impulse, he will fail to do so precisely insofar as he is an artist.

"for he then will seek to move the given passions only through beauty, but beauty is a rival object of passion in itself. There is a high breathlessness about beauty that cancels lust and superstition."(28)

When erotic and religious subject-matter are treated in art, they are transfigured: they become "altogether intellectual and sublime".(29)

To say that aesthetic experience is innocent is to say that such experience has no effect on the conduct of the remainder of one's life. This thesis is both false and inconsistent with other views held by Santayana. (It also presupposes the untenable view of aesthetic experience referred to above.) It is inconsistent firstly with the view put forward in the 1908 paper, "Sculpture", that, in the aesthetic experience of sculpture, the spectator undergoes a species of moral regeneration: his own moral views are 'melted down' and 'recast'. It is difficult to see how any force could be attached to these terms if Santayana maintains also that the experience has no practical repercussions in extra-artistic activities. (Cf. Ch. VII on sculpture) The same criticism applies to the more general doctrine of which the view on sculpture is a special case, namely that art expresses ideals. An ideal is a goal of action, and any artistic expression of them must be nugatory if aesthetic experience is ineffectual. Moreover, it surely is the case that some works of art do express ideals - of action, of beauty, of feeling, and so forth - and that this is one of the ways in which aesthetic experience manifestly does have repercussions...
in other areas of life. (Cf. Section III, below.) Again, the remarks on the 'high breathlessness' of beauty are seemingly quite 'ad hoc'. They are unsupported, and logically independent of the objectification theory of "The Sense of Beauty". Finally, the generalisations concerning the lack of vitality of emotional reaction in aesthetic experience are manifestly false. Writings on art frequently contain descriptions of experiences of quasi-mystical intensity occasioned by the aesthetic encounter. Since Santayana rejects the disinterest/distance account of aesthetic experience, there is no good reason to construe him here as making the valid but different point that emotions felt during an aesthetic experience are subject to the modifications undergone in the distanced state.

He continues this first major line of argument with the thesis that aesthetic experiences are not only innocent but also liberal:

"In aesthetic activity we have...one side of rational life; sensuous experience is dominated there as mechanical or social realities ought to be dominated in science and politics. Such dominion comes of having faculties suited to their conditions and consequently finding an inherent satisfaction in their operation." (30)

In other words, aesthetic experience is self-justifying or intrinsically valuable; and since the ideal life consists in such intrinsically valuable experiences, aesthetic experience affords a glimpse of what this ideal existence is like. Beauty is the best hint of ultimate good which the experience of men has yet to offer:

"...art in general is a rehearsal of rational living, and recasts in idea a world which we have no present means of recasting in reality. Yet this rehearsal reveals the glories of a possible performance better than do the miserable experiments until now executed on reality." (31)

Again, in art there is no rivalry. The ambitions of artists are compatible with one another: "Art supplies constantly to contemplation what nature seldom affords in concrete experience - the union of life and peace" (32*).
Acceptance of this claim depends largely on acceptance of the major assumptions involved: Santayana's theory of aesthetic experience, and the ethic of the life of reason. It might seem that there is another difficulty, one of internal consistency. In, "Interpretations of Poetry and Religion" and "Three Philosophical Poets" (cf. Ch.V, above), Santayana condemns Romantic art for its irrationality. Thus he regards Goethe's 'Faust' as a paradigmatic example of irrational ethics: the will to live intensely, refusing to learn from experience. It might be objected that he cannot consistently commend all art as a rehearsal of rational living. The problem is not serious, however, later in his argument, he distinguishes between the basis of aesthetic experience, which is fleeting and deceptive, and its form, which is complete. To circumvent the present difficulty, Santayana would need only to draw a parallel distinction between the subject-matter of art and its form: the former might be irrational, while the latter might by its perfection afford a glimpse of the ideal. Again, had he continued to speak of aesthetic experience rather than art as affording a glimpse of the ideal, the difficulty would not have arisen.

The second major line of argument defending the place of art in the Life of Reason begins from the thesis, discussed in Chapter V, above, that the religion, manners, language and art of a society are all in large measure products of the imagination. Language, for example, does not provide a neutral and accurate report of the external world. Rather, it provides an abbreviated report, the abbreviations being largely determined by practical needs, but also by the genius of its formulators: "Forms of poetry are forms of human life. Languages express national character and enshrine particular ways of seeing and valuing events."(33) The importance of these imaginative productions is recognised by mankind, who have preferred death to life under conditions imposed by alien imaginations.

It has been said that, apart from practical needs, language, religion, and so forth, are determined by the genius of their formulators. Santayana
adds the thesis that this second, non-representative facet of human perception may be its most important side:

"because it represents, or even constitutes, the man. After all, the chief interest we have in things lies in what we can make of them or what they can make of us. There is consequently nothing fitted to colour human happiness more pervasively than art does, nor to express more deeply the mind's internal habit. In educating the imagination art crowns all moral endeavour, which from the beginning is a species of art, and which becomes a fine art more completely as it works in a freer medium."(34*)

Once again, the presuppositions employed by Santayana lead to a major difficulty in his position. He holds that religions, languages, and so forth, are all symbol-systems, largely constructed in response to human needs, and that these systems are partial, providing a biased and incomplete picture of the external world. He also holds that only sense-data are known by acquaintance, the external world being a hypothetical posit whose existence can never be conclusively established. The difficulty is that, granted the second thesis, he cannot in principle establish the first. He cannot hope to prove the partiality of the symbol-systems of the imagination. The consistent position for him would be to hold that it is impossible in principle to know whether the symbol-systems are exact or not. Moreover, it is difficult to reconcile this argument in justification of art with its predecessor. Santayana is committed to holding that artistic activity is innocent, i.e. has no repercussions in practical life; here he maintains that nothing is fitted to colour human happiness so much as art. Art, and so presumably its species fine art, is said to educate the imagination; and since in Santayana's view the imagination occupies a central position in the formation of concepts used in practical life, the present argument commits him to holding that fine art has practical repercussions, via its effect on the imagination.
A third major line of argument stresses the ubiquity of aesthetic values in experience. It relies heavily on the premise that aesthetic experience is of the immediate, and is therefore vitiated by the untenability of this view.

A factor which complicates the calculation of the effect of art in the life of Reason (Santayana begins) is the fact that what must be dealt with is not merely art, separable as one phenomenon in life among many, but aesthetic values in general, which are present everywhere:

"Aesthetic sensibility colours every thought, qualifies every allegiance, and modifies every product of human labour...there is an element of poetry inherent in thought, in conduct, in affection; and we must ask ourselves how far this ingredient is an obstacle to their proper development."(35)

Sense is "the substance of experience" (36), and has its own value. Reason, in organising data, and making the burden of one moment relevant to that of another, may transform aesthetic judgments, but it owes its value to the material it organises:

"...what could relevance or support be worth if the things to be buttressed were themselves worthless? It is not to organise pain, ugliness and boredom that reason can be called into the world."(37)

The materials of reason, "are the perceptions which if full and perfect are called beauties."(38)

There is a difficulty in this position beyond that of the untenable epistemology which is presupposed. It is not the case, on Santayana's own principles, that reason would be valueless were its sensible material also without positive value. It is logically possible that existence could be unrelievedly ugly and painful, and moreover that this state could be mitigated but not eradicated by maximization of the harmony of interests by the use of reason. In this case, there would be a state of affairs in which the sensible materials of reason would still have only negative value (which is presumably what Santayana means when he says, 'worthless') yet,
contrary to Santayana's assertion, reason itself would surely have a positive value.

Continuing this third line of argument, Santayana maintains that,

"A right observance of aesthetic demands does not obstruct utility or logic; for utility and logic are themselves beautiful, while a sensual beauty that ran counter to reason could never be in the end pleasing to an exquisite sense."(39)

To pursue beauty to such an extent that we derange theory and practice is to deprive ourselves of a double beauty: (1) "the unlooked-for beauty which a genuine and stable system of things could not but betray"(40); and (ii) "the coveted beauty itself, which, being imported here into the wrong context, will be rendered meretricious and offensive to good taste," (41) e.g. rhetoric in diplomacy.

Even ignoring the presuppositions involved, these remarks lack cogency. In the first quotation in the preceding paragraph, Santayana appears to maintain that whatever is useful is beautiful; and in the second that any "stable system of things", whatever that might mean, must be beautiful also. He gives no argument whatever in favour of these propositions; nor does he link them to the objectification theory of "The Sense of Beauty". Again the example of rhetoric in diplomacy is a bad one, since he is evidently trying to give an example of a juxtaposition of elements both unusual and inept.

Santayana adds two concluding points on the ubiquity of aesthetic values. Not only are aesthetic values present before the organisation of data by reason, but afterwards reappear in rational products, e.g. "A mechanical system, such as astronomy in one region has already unveiled, is an inexhaustible field for aesthetic wonder."(42) Secondly, "an aesthetic sanction sweetens all successful living," since "whatever is to be representative in import must first be immediate in experience; whatever is transitive in operation must at the same time be actual in being."

(43)
The second of these points is a mere consequence of Santayana's epistemology, and falls with it. The first is a contingent truth, but one which is independent of Santayana's principles. It is not clear how he wishes to relate this proposition to his earlier claim that the value of reason is entirely a consequence of the value of its data. There is some tension between these two positions, since it must follow from the latter thesis that the beauty revealed in a rational construction is dependent on reason for its revelation. If reason can thus reveal beauty not apprehensible in its data, then reason must have a value of its own. Without the organisation imposed by reason, the particular beauty referred to would not be revealed.

Using his ethical and epistemological presuppositions, Santayana adds to these arguments some general reflections on the place which fine art ought to occupy in the life of the individual. No general stipulation as to the amount of time to be spent on fine art can be given; the rational position to adopt is that this amount of time should depend on the degree to which contact with art promotes the happiness of the individual concern. Santayana describes the type of temperament to which he thinks fine art most necessary and congenial:

"A mind at once sensuous and mobile will find its appropriate perfection in studying and reconstructing objects of sense. Its rationality will appear chiefly on the plane of perception, to render the circle of visions which makes up its life as delightful as possible. For such a man art will be the most satisfying, the most significant activity, and to load him with material riches or speculative truths or profound social loyalties will be to impede and depress him." (44*)

The artistic temperament is Bohemian.

These remarks furnish a further example of the difficulties into which Santayana is led by his identification of aesthetic with immediate experience. It is a consequence of the above that no artist qua artist
can be interested in social or philosophical problems. This is not only false but inconsistent with other views Santayana holds. He maintains, for example, that philosophic comprehensiveness is a necessary condition for greatness in poetry (cf. Ch.V, above), and it is difficult to see how this is to be achieved unless the poet does occupy himself with what Santayana calls "speculative truths".

The three arguments considered so far - to show that artistic activity is innocent and liberal; that imaginative constructs are vital to man; and that aesthetic values are ubiquitous and primary - are all in defence of fine art and aesthetic experience. The points of view set out in the two final chapters of "Reason in Art" are in varying degrees condemnatory of both. As a result, it is by no means easy to see clearly just what position Santayana is inclined to allow to art in the life of Reason.

The great obstacle which art finds in attempting to be rational, Santayana begins, is its functional isolation. To approach the ideal of rationality, art must diffuse its processes and no longer confine them to "a set of dead and unproductive objects called works of art".\(45\) He claims, without argument, that works of art are in general lacking in vitality and do not minister to needs felt on the pulse:

"Why art, the most vital and generative of activities, should produce a set of abstract images, monuments to lost intuitions, is a curious mystery... Why should mind, the actualisation of nature's powers, produce something so inferior to itself, reverting in its expression to material being, so that its witnesses seem so many fossils with which it strews its path?\(46\)

It is difficult to see why Santayana should indulge in such vast and untenable generalisation: if what he says were true, it is a mystery why the art of the past ever survived, and why it is an object of concern on any scale at present. Moreover, these remarks bring further difficulties of internal consistency. His first argument in defence of aesthetic activity, above, contains the proposition that this activity is liberal or
self-justifying; yet here he condemns fine art, the cause of such liberal experiences. Again, in the quotation above, he appears to regard matter as in some way inferior to mind, a view doubly absurd in view of his materialistic monism on the one hand (mind is the form of matter, in his view, not another type of substance), and his stress on the importance of the materials of a work of art on the other. (cf. Ch. II, above, on this last point.)

Santayana continues that, the more numerous the rational harmonies present to the mind, the more sensible movements will be going on there to give immediate delight; the expectation of an ulterior good is a present good also. A richer complex of emotions is produced by what is humanly necessary than by what is idly conceived. If the products of fine art can fulfil "practical exigencies," they will thereby be provided with "moral functions which it is a pleasure to see them fulfil." (47) Hence Santayana notes with approval that, "Architecture may be useful, sculpture commemorative, poetry reflective, even music, by its expression, religious or martial." (48) Some generalised informal psychology is introduced to support this claim:

"The truth is that mere sensation or mere emotion is an indignity to a mature human being...Any absolute work of art which serves no further purpose than to stimulate an emotion has about it a certain luxurious and visionary taint...Art, so long as it needs to be a dream, will never cease to prove a disappointment. Its facile cruelty, its narcotic abstraction, can never sweeten the evils we return to at home; it can liberate half the mind only by leaving the other half in abeyance." (49)

It is at this stage of the argument that Santayana appears to fall into the confusion of moral and aesthetic virtues referred to in Section I, above. He maintains here that architecture is better art for its utility, sculpture better art for being commemorative, and so on, attempting to
support these views with the informal psychology quoted. Yet it is quite clear that the mere fact that a piece of sculpture is commemorative, or that a piece of music is of martial expression, is entirely unconnected with its merit qua work of art. On the principle here put forward by Santayana, it follows that the most derivative of marches is more valuable than, say, a late Beethoven piano sonata, granted that the latter expresses neither of the types of feeling to which Santayana here gives his blessing. Moreover, the informal psychology itself involves difficulties. In the first place, the thesis that mere sensation is in some sense an indignity to a mature human being is inconsistent with Santayana's later ethic of the spiritual life, discussed in the following chapter. Secondly, the claims here put forward are left unsupported and do not cohere closely. Santayana merely asserts that most so-called works of art are simply narcotic in effect; and then adds the seemingly gratuitous rider that these works share the quality of 'facile cruelty'—why this quality in particular is not at all clear, possibly just an association of ideas private to Santayana.

He continues by indicating what, in his view, is needed so to modify art as to remove it from its present irrational and narcotic state so that it should become "a truly rational activity" (50). In order for this to come about,

...we should have to knit it more closely with other rational functions, so that to beautify things might render them more useful and to represent them most imaginatively might be to see them in their truth." (51)

Occasionally, such a state of affairs obtains, as in the work of artists such as Leonardo or Sophocles. To bring this ideal about, two things are necessary: more knowledge and better taste.

Knowledge would alter what is found satisfying in the arts, for a man cannot relish pictures of the world which wantonly misrepresent it.
"Myth and metaphor remain beautiful so long as they are the most adequate or graphic means available for expressing the facts, but so soon as they cease to be needful and sincere they become false finery." (52)

In the eventuality of art being brought round to expressing reality, it would still have to satisfy the senses:

"...but this study would now accompany every activity, taste would grow vastly more subtle and exacting...All arts would be practised together and merged in the art of life, the only one wholly useful or fine among them." (53)

These remarks demand several comments. Firstly, the notion that art in some sense provides a picture of the world can hardly be extended to architecture, whose ideal form should therefore be specified separately by Santayana. Secondly, the thesis about mythology may be acceptable or not, depending on exactly what is meant. It is true if all that is intended is that myth cannot be used authentically as a true description of nature at any point in history when it has ceased to be a genuine option to the mind in that role. It is false to experience if what is meant is that it is impossible to take aesthetic pleasure in works of art which contain authentic expositions or uses of beliefs which one believes to be false - otherwise a great deal of art from the past would have no interest for spectators of the present day. Finally one notes again, in the final quotation of the preceding paragraph, the presupposition concerning aesthetic experience; Santayana considers that it is the business of the fine arts to please the senses alone.

The preceding arguments condemnatory of fine art occur in Chapter X of "Reason in Art". The tone of the final chapter is not so condemnatory as this, but on the other hand not so much in favour of fine art as Chapter IX.

The aim of the life of reason is the maximization of happiness by the use of reason to harmonise human wants and needs. The greatest enemy harmony can have (Santayana begins) is a premature settlement in which
some essential force is wholly disregarded. The excluded element will bring disorders until it is recognised. Of all premature settlements, the most premature is that usually established by the fine arts:

"A harmony in appearance only, one that touches the springs of nothing and has no power to propagate itself, is so partial and momentary a goal that we may justly call it an illusion... A lovely dream is an excellent thing in itself, but it leaves the world no less a chaos and makes it by contrast seem even darker that it did."(54)

For this reason, the fine arts are seldom an original factor in human progress.

Yet while it is true that aesthetic harmony is so incomplete in its basis as to be fleeting and deceptive, it is also true that it is complete in its form:

"This so partial synthesis is a synthesis indeed, and just because settlements made in fancy are altogether premature, and ignore almost everything in the world, in type they can be the most perfect settlements."(55*)

The artist may urge - and justly so, in Santayana's view - that appearances are alone actual, and that to bring about a perfect appearance is, "to have justified for the first time whatever may underlie appearance and to have put reality to some use."(56) The cumbersome instrumental activities practised on the world are vain by comparison.

Further on this theme, Santayana considers the pros and cons of what he calls "detached indulgences". It is quite conceivable that a moment of perfect happiness should prove a source of lasting unhappiness, for it may be that the impulse satisfied in the happy moment is incompatible with a majority of others. Hence,

"That art, also, should often be an indulgence, a blind that hides reality from ill-balanced minds and ultimately increases
their confusion, is by no means incompatible with art's ideal essence. On the contrary, such a result is inevitable when ideality is carried at all far upon a narrow basis. The more genuine and excellent the vision the greater havoc it makes if, being inadequate, it established itself authoritatively in the soul."(57)

These remarks are largely consequences of the conjunction of Santayana's theory of aesthetic experience, the ethic of the Life of Reason, and some informal psychological generalisations. It is surprising, however, that Santayana should consider that the artist provides any real justification for his activity with the claim that appearances are alone actual. The theme of "Reason in Common Sense" as a whole is precisely that the progress of rationality consists in extension of knowledge of self and the world; reason in various ways dominates the flux of experience, constructing the common-sense view of the world. Santayana is therefore committed to regarding any regression to mere appearances as a decline from rationality. He ought therefore to maintain that the justification here attributed to the typical artist is no justification at all.

He continues by drawing consequences from his presuppositions which outline the form art would take in the context of a more rational life. The ideal artist (i.e. the rational artist) is one who learns to love what conduces to his own development. He would be happy, not in having now and then a happy moment, but, "in having light and resource enough to allow him to cope steadily with real things and to leave upon them the vestige of his own mind."(58)

Presumably this ideal artist would only be interested in what Santayana refers to as 'real things', since it is a characteristic of the rational man that he finds what is unreal uninteresting:

"The conditions of existence, after they are known and accepted, become conditions for the only pertinent beauty. In each place, for each situation, the plastic mind finds an appropriate ideal. It need not go afield to import something exotic."(54)
In other words, a happy result in art, as in life, can only be secured by intelligence:

"We fail in practical affairs when we ignore the conditions of action and we fail in works of imagination when we concoct what is fantastic and without roots in the world." (60)

A rational pursuit of happiness would involve every fine art and would render the world pervasively beautiful:

"The closer we keep to elementary human needs and to the natural agencies that may satisfy them, the closer we are to beauty...the more unfelgingly human happiness was made the test of all institutions and pursuits, the more beautiful they would be, having more numerous points of fusion with the mind, and fusing with it more profoundly." (61)

The first part of this sketch of the ideal form of art is marred by a difficulty of omission. It is not clear why closeness to human needs should render any object beautiful, as opposed to satisfying or pleasant. On the objectification theory of "The Sense of Beauty", an aesthetic object will be beautiful only if it is such that the pleasure produced by looking at it, listening to it, etc., is projected back onto the object and regarded as a quality of it. Santayana gives no reason to connect either of the qualities specified with objectification. His talk of points of fusion with the mind is unclear and unexplained. The present remarks on beauty do not cohere adequately with those of the earlier work.

He continues that art cannot be rational until society is so too - he considers that art is in some sense a symptom or result of the state of society, not a cause of it; as he has said, artistic activity is innocent. At present, art is neither genuine, native, nor inevitable; its coming to be so would demand a radical re-organisation of society:

"We should have to abandon our vested illusions, our irrational religions and patriotisms and schools of art, and to discover instead our genuine needs, the forms of our possible happiness." (62)
At present, our ideals are artificial, demanding artificial institutions to keep them up.

If art is an aberration from rational practice, it is no marvel that the irrational artist himself should be in a certain sense a vagrant:

"...such an erratic workman does not deserve the name of artist or master; he has burst convention only to break it, not to create a new convention more in harmony with nature."(63)

The artist ought rather to conduct himself so as to contribute to the ideal of "giving practice everywhere the greatest possible affinity to the situation, the most delicate adjustment to every faculty if affects."(64)

That it should seem natural to identify the artist with the dreamful eccentric is a scandal.

Like the great majority of sweeping generalisations put forward by Santayana, those above involve him in difficulties. The thesis that all contemporary ideals are confused entails, granted Santayana's premises, that all contemporary art is inauthentic, a statement which hardly needs to be falsified at length. Moreover, Santayana has maintained above that aesthetic experience affords us our best glimpse of the ideal: why then deny the name of artist to the producer of the objects which occasion these experiences?

Santayana concludes with a point concerning art in his broad sense of the term (any activity which modifies the environment in a manner advantageous to the agent). If happiness is the ultimate sanction of art, art in turn is the best instrument of happiness:

"In art more directly than in other activities man's self-expression is cumulative and finds an immediate reward; for it alters the material conditions of sentience so that sentience becomes at once more delightful and more significant...the emergence of arts out of instincts is the token and exact measure of nature's success and of mortal happiness."(65)

This point is a simple consequence of the conjunction of the definition of
While dealing with art and morality, Santayana puts forward his views on taste. The Life of Reason is the life of harmonious interests. As many features of life as possible must be made to contribute to this harmony, and taste is no exception. Hence Santayana's definition of 'good taste' as:

"that taste which is a good possession, a friend to the whole man. It must not alienate him from anything except to ally him to something greater and more fertile in satisfactions." (66)

Good taste results from experiences: from having discovered which satisfactions tend to maximize the harmony of human interests. The views on taste which follow are an elaboration of this notion of rational taste. He does not discuss major classic issues connected with taste, such as the logic of the judgment of taste, which had occupied Kant.

Dogmatism in matters of taste is in Santayana's view inevitable, but it may be enlightened. It is inevitable, and initially justified by sincerity, because taste is a systematic expression of a man's preferences. Dogmatism becomes absurd when its basis in a particular disposition is ignored, and it pretends to have an absolute or metaphysical scope. It is enlightened when a man asserts his preferences, aware as he does so of their "necessary ground in his nature" (67), and of the no less legitimate feelings of others.

Since taste is an exposition of preferences, a criterion of taste (Santayana continues) is no more than taste itself in its deliberate and more circumspect form:

"The very instinct that is satisfied by beauty prefers one beauty to another; and we have only to question and purge our aesthetic feelings in order to obtain our criterion of taste." (68)
sympathy with all rational life. Consequently, there is the greatest possible difference in authority between taste and taste:

"...while delight in drums and eagle's feathers is perfectly genuine and has no cause to blush for itself, it cannot be compared in scope or representative value with delight in a symphony or an epic." (69)

As so often, Santayana misses out many of the assumptions on which the acceptability of his remarks depends. For example, from the single thesis that taste has been rationally integrated into life as a whole, it does not follow that one taste differs in authority from another. A supplementary principle for evaluating taste is assumed in an undeveloped premise: that the greater the 'scope' or 'representative value' of taste, the greater its authority. One can make sense of this by referring to the ideal of rational poetry (cf. Ch. VII), since rational poetry is distinguished by its truth and scope. To take genuine pleasure in works characterised by these qualities is to be more fully rational, and to stand a better chance of happiness, for to be rational is to have knowledge of self and environment and to act on it.

Yet even when filled out in this way, Santayana's remarks involve difficulties. In the first place, the objects of taste in his sense are not aesthetic properties of an aesthetic object, but its truth and scope: this is another form of the difficulty mentioned in Chapter VII in connexion with the ideal of rational poetry, i.e. that Santayana makes greatness in poetry dependent on properties of its subject-matter. Secondly, he seems to assume here that to reflect and formulate one's criterion of taste is 'ipso facto' to bring taste into sympathy with all rational life. Yet on Santayana's own premisses there is no reason to assume that this should be so: I might formulate my aesthetic preferences fully and explicitly, but indulge them to an irrational degree, i.e. in such a way as to cause disruption among my other interests.

Santayana's remaining remarks on taste consist of a survey of four ways
in which tastes can be said to differ. The first and entirely uncontentious way is in respect of volume, i.e. aesthetic feeling, in different people, may make up a different fraction of life and vary greatly in quantity. Even among those who are devotees of beauty (Santayana asserts) intense aesthetic experience is a rarity:

"To beauty men are habitually insensible, even while they are awake and rationally active. Tomes of aesthetic criticism hang on a few moments of real delight and intuition."(70)

Tastes differ secondly in respect of vivacity of feeling. Santayana introduces the point via some psychological generalisations on the origins of standards of taste:

"Taste is formed in those moments when aesthetic emotion is massive and distinct; preferences then grown conscious, judgments then put into words will reverberate through calmer hours; they will constitute prejudices, habits of apperception, secret standards for all other beauties."(71)

Such moments usually occur in youth, which in this respect governs maturity.

"From these unsupported generalisations, Santayana turns to equally generalised and unsupported historical views: a race which genuinely loves beauty has the same place in history as the authoritative moments just referred to in the life of the individual. Hence, in Santayana's view, we should accept, on authority, the aesthetic verdicts of the Greeks. For example, we should accept that, "imitation is a fundamental principle in art, and that any rational judgment on the beautiful must be a moral and political judgment, enveloping chance aesthetic feelings and determining their value."(72)

By contrast, what most German philosophers have written on art and beauty is of minimal importance: "it treats artificial problems in a grammatical spirit, seldom giving any proof of experience or imagination."(73)

The second passage quoted in the preceding paragraph is of special
interest as revealing clearly the extent of the Greek influence on Santayana. The importance of the notion of imitation in Greek aesthetics explains why Santayana should consider only representational painting and sculpture in "Reason in Art", and why he should take the view, in the present chapter, that art is subject to moral censure. The wholesale dismissal of German thought (Kant included, one supposes) merely repeats Santayana's usual position on the subject. Acceptance of the remarks on the authority of the Greeks depend very largely on the prior acceptance of the whole apparatus of the Life of Reason, and of the unargued for assumption that the Greeks more nearly lived this life than any other race.

The third respect in which tastes differ is that of purity or consistency, i.e., they may be "inwardly confused or outwardly confusing."(74) A thing's attractions may be "partly at war"(75) with its ideal function. In such a case, what we initially found beautiful becomes hateful on a second view, and according to the "key" of our dissatisfaction we call the effect meretricious, harsh, or affected: "These discords appear when elaborate things are attempted without enough art or refinement; they are essentially in bad taste."(76) Rudimentary effects, by contrast, never have an intrinsic defect, and can disappoint only in comparison with the expectation of something else which is richer. To cease to be able to enjoy rudimentary effects is to show a certain sophistication and disease.

Vulgarity Santayana considers to be a different matter, and finds its essence in contradiction:

"An old woman in a blond wig, a dirty hand covered with jewels, ostentation without dignity, rhetoric without cogency, all offend by an inner contradiction."(77)

Barbaric art displays this sort of confusion and absurdity: the artist piles up splendour on splendour, driven by blind impulse or tradition, producing only chaos.

To remove these defects, all that is needed, in Santayana's view, is "quickened intelligence". Monstrosity consists in being composed of
elements which are incompatible, and a quickened intelligence will notice
the incompatibility:

"Let him (i.e., the person with quickened intelligence) but enact
his sensations, let him pause to make explicit the confused hints
that threaten to stupefy him; he will find that he can follow out
each of them only by rejecting and forgetting the others." (73)

A quickened intelligence will either abandon what is barbarous as confused,
or will disengage its compatible elements and turn them into a number of
rational beauties.

The difficulty with this third feature of taste - if 'difficulty' is
not too strong a term - is that a good deal of rhetoric is being used to
clothe a view which, even if true, is quite commonplace, namely that it is
a necessary condition for good taste that one be able to judge whether the
elements of an aesthetic object are mutually appropriate, and cohere without
clashing. The examples given of both impurity and inconsistency of taste
can be analysed in terms of the more basic concept of appropriateness: both
the over-complex object, and the examples given of vulgarity involve elements
which do not cohere in the manner in which those of a successful aesthetic
object have long been noticed to do. Moreover, little elucidation of the
concept of vulgarity is provided by introducing the notion of contradiction.
Since, in its basic usage, only propositions can be contradictory, its use
here must be in some extended sense; but Santayana does not say what this
sense is. Why introduce an undefined third concept when the notion of
appropriateness will do just as well?

Fourthly and finally, tastes differ in pertinence and width of appeal.
Once purified, taste has a further progress to make. A criterion of taste
must truly represent the interests over which it would preside. Even a
rational ideal may not be permanent:

"It needs a material basis, a soil and a situation propitious to
its growth. This basis, as it varies, makes the ideal vary which
is simply its expression; and therefore no ideal can be ultimately fixed in ignorance of the conditions that may modify it."(79)

There are many undiscovered ideals; and many ideals once embodied are now lost, because their material basis has changed. Perfect ideals once realised may vanish:

"The achievement may have been perfect; nature will not on that account stop to admire it. She will move on, and the meaning which was read so triumphantly into her momentary attitude will not fit her new posture."(30)

Nature has no ideal of her own. In lieu of an ideal, she has a constitution, of which ideals must take account. If a work of art is to be impressive, it must have significance for humanity at large or to whatever audience it is addressed. Hence the following are the questions the critic should ask of the work of art:

"Has it...the affinities needed for such intercourse? Is it humane, is it rational, is it representative? To its inherent incommunicable charms it must add a kind of courtesy. If it wants other approval than its own, it cannot afford to regard no other aspiration."(81*)

This scope, this wide appeal, is necessary to good taste:

"All authority is representative; force and inner consistency are gifts on which I may well congratulate another, but they give him no right to speak for me. Either aesthetic experience would have remained a chaos - which it is not altogether - or it must have tended to conciliate certain general human demands and ultimately all those interests which its operation in any way affects."(82)

Most of these remarks are straightforward consequences of the presuppositions of the Life of Reason. It need only be noted in conclusion that once again, in his stress on the scope and representative quality of good taste and good works of art, Santayana is making aesthetic merit dependent on qualities of subject-matter. At least, this is so if he is consistent in doctrine throughout "The Life of Reason". No hint is given
that 'representative' and so forth, have a different meaning here than elsewhere in the work.

### III: Analysis, Art and Morality

What Santayana has to say about art and morality can be described as an enquiry of the following kind: the working out of a normative moral evaluation of the contribution of art, aesthetic value, and aesthetic experience to the good life, using an apparatus of philosophical presuppositions in conjunction with informal psychological generalisations. A great deal of what is said would now be considered to border on the unphilosophical, and this style of enquiry not to be the business of the analytic philosopher. An analyst who ventures an opinion on such subjects speaks not qua philosopher, but qua moralist, sociologist and psychologist.

In view of this change of opinion as to what enquiries are properly philosophical, two subjects must be briefly considered: firstly, to consider what is involved in an analytical consideration of the relations of art and morality - to attempt to full analytical view would require a thesis to itself. Secondly, to suggest briefly, by means of avowedly informal psychology and a normative moral position, an alternative to some of the substantive views put by Santayana. Once again, the immense complexity of the issues involved quite precludes the working out of a developed alternative in the present context.

The difference between the conceptual and substantive enquiries on this subject emerges clearly if one considers a group of questions, each of which is obviously relevant to the question of how art and morality are related:

1. **does art convey a moral content?**
2. **If so, is the moral content of a work of art a relevant factor in evaluating it as a work of art?**
3. **should a work of art convey a moral content?, i.e. is having a moral content a necessary condition for good or great art? (In**
the present usage, 'good' and 'great' are both aesthetic verdict terms, the latter giving a higher ranking than the former.)

(iv) does the experience occasioned by works of art lead to either an enhancement or a deterioration in the moral state of the spectator?

(v) does art make life better or worse, and in what ways?

The first three questions can be treated analytically while the last two are substantive—they involve psychology, sociology, and a normative ethical position.

In order to answer the analytical questions, a position must be taken up on some complex conceptual issues: on the logical grammar of the term 'art' and on the definition of the notions of the aesthetic and the moral. The first question is equivalent to: is it a necessary condition for art that the object designated have the property of in some way conveying a moral belief? The second question presupposes some definition of what it is for a property to be aesthetic; and the third presupposes an answer to the second.

From the analytic positions sketched out in the present thesis, in reply to Santayana, it follows that the answer to each of the conceptual questions is negative. The only necessary condition for the use of the terms 'art' and 'work of art' is that the object so designated be an object of aesthetic interest, and it is not therefore a necessary condition for art (etc.) that the object convey a moral content. This is made clear by counter-examples: it would be difficult to extract a moral recommendation, positive or negative, from some of Iabo's sculptures, or from musical cameos such as the triffles composed by Kreisler.(83*)

Nor is the moral content of a work of art, if it has one, an aesthetic virtue or vice, in the normal usage of the term 'aesthetic'. If it were, it would be commonplace and legitimate to claim that the Homeric epics are great partly because they describe heroic morality; or "The Divine Comedy" great partly because it describes Christian morality; or "A Rebours" great partly because it describes a decadent aestheticism; or, on the other hand,
to dismiss "Samaux et Gamées" because Gautier abjures moral content.

Again, it follows from this that it is not a necessary condition for either goodness or greatness in art that the work of art convey a moral content. Although manifestly many works of art do satisfy both descriptions, the latter is not a reason for the former. "Good (great) work of art" is a description bound by an indefinite set of predicates specifying aesthetic virtues possessed in a high degree. (cf. Ch.VI, above, on the logical grammar of the term 'work of art' etc.)

The substantive questions (iv) and (v) are no less complex than the conceptual ones. To answer them, one must not only work out a normative ethical stance, but also survey descriptions of the various types of aesthetic experience, and collect evidence as to their repercussions in ordinary conduct. The debates on censorship, and on violent and pornographic subject-matters in art are of course of this kind.

Much of the faultiness of Santayana's account derives from his untenable thesis that aesthetic experience is experience of the immediate flux of sensations. His recurrent condemnation of aesthetic experience as superficial derives from this presupposition. The psychical distance view assumed in the present thesis has no such consequence, and can accommodate the facts of aesthetic experience as Santayana's view manifestly cannot.

This is not the place to try to develop a comprehensive ethic. One must be content here to adopt dogmatically some general beliefs, some identical with those of Santayana: that happiness is good in itself, and that knowledge of self and the world are good as means to that end. Again, pleasure other than that taken in the unfeigned suffering of another is a prima facie intrinsic good.

Granted this, it is surely obvious that works of art and the experiences they provide can be both intrinsic and instrumental goods. For example, the materials of works of art give pleasures that can be classified as sensuous: visual and aural colour and texture please (or ought to) in this way. Again, one might produce evidence for the calm of mind and consolation
which a well-formed work of art can bring: the complex of emotional and intellectual pleasure caused by the progress of feeling in a good piece of music, for example. Equally, works of art can supply vicarious experience, psychological insight, and suggest ideals of conduct and of feeling. Thus for example, late works of Rembrandt and Beethoven give insight into rare and advanced states of spiritual development. Finally, in the encounter with art, the individual can gain self-knowledge by comparison and reflection, by stopping to consider what he finds he really likes and dislikes, approves and disapproves of, agrees with and disagrees with.

A full study of these substantive issues would involve an investigation of the different ways in which the different arts enhance or vitiate life; and of the ways in which the capacity of the individual concerned — his intelligence, experience, sensitivity, artistic knowledge and so forth — modify or condition his aesthetic experiences and their consequences. Anything like definitive answers to these questions must await progress in psychology and sociology as yet in the future. To try, as Santayana does, to settle the issue with a few unsupported generalisations, with no acknowledgement of the complexities omitted, borders on the useless.

IV: Conclusion

While wrong in some of the detail of his arguments, Santayana's central view on art and morality is unavoidable, i.e. that art and aesthetic experience are subject to moral scrutiny in respect of their contribution to the good life. He almost completely avoids the fallacies which vitiate utilitarian and autonomist arguments on this subject, e.g. that the moral content of a work of art is a factor relevant to its aesthetic evaluation; or that art and morality are entirely unrelated. Again, some of his mistakes are partly due to the time of writing, e.g. his assumption, so difficult to reconcile with his materialism, that mind is more valuable than matter; he was reacting strongly against the absolute idealism of the generation of Royce, yet did not succeed in freeing himself from all its doctrines. Santayana's general position on the relation of art and morality is one which would now be widely accepted. He should be allowed
credit for having put forward this point of view when he did.
Chapter IX:

Aesthetics and The Realms of Being: Later Writings on Aesthetics

1. Introduction

The last volume of "The Life of Reason" appeared in 1905. It is evident from the exposition given in Ch. VI, above, that Santayana's chief interest in this work is ethical, and that the metaphysical and epistemological doctrines on which he relies are merely adumbrated, not developed in the detail which the subject demands. (1*) For the greater part of his remaining life, Santayana was occupied with the working out of his philosophical system, The Realms of Being. This is set out in the four volumes of "The Realms of Being" (1927-40) itself, each volume dealing with one of the four Realms of Being held to be irreducibly different: essence, matter, truth, and spirit. These works were preceded by "Scepticism and Animal Faith" (1923), and several philosophical papers (2*) setting out the epistemology which accompanied the metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and ethics of The Realms of Being. Whether the system set out in these works is compatible with the doctrines of "The Life of Reason", particularly as regards ethics, is a central question in Santayana scholarship.

"Reason in Art" was the last full-length book by Santayana devoted to aesthetics. During the composition of "The Realms of Being" and associated works, he wrote relatively little on the philosophy of art. What he did write, however, is of importance not only for a study of Santayana's aesthetics - which would be badly incomplete without reference to these works - but also because of its intrinsic philosophical interest. These late works on aesthetics all presuppose an acquaintance with the system of the Realms of Being and are couched in its vocabulary. The central concepts and doctrines of the system are therefore set out briefly in the following sections. (3*)

The need to grasp these late doctrines is the reason why the late pieces on aesthetics, sometimes thematically related to earlier works, are
here treated independently.

Characteristically, Santayana denies any claim to finality, even to absolute truth, for his system:

"Such an articulation of thought has nothing compulsory about it; and it can be neither complete nor exclusive, and other animal minds may come to clearness differently." (4)

He describes himself as merely wishing to put forward a minimum corpus of belief, formed largely by criticism of other philosophies:

"...my endeavour in putting it into words has been to retreat to the minimum beliefs and radical presuppositions implied in facing a world at all or professing to know anything: beliefs and presuppositions that it is impossible for me to deny, although I may seldom or never have conceived them clearly." (5)

The two quotations in the preceding paragraph are clearly in tension with one another. In the second, Santayana seems to claim quasi-categorical status (in the Kantian sense) for his fundamental concepts, as if essence, matter, truth, and spirit were logically presupposed by the claim that there is a world to be known. Yet the first quotation avows a species of relativism: the system of the Realms of Being is merely one system among many possible and equally valid systems. This initial ambiguity is never cleared up.

II: The Realms of Being: The Presuppositions of the Later Writings on

Aesthetics

(a) Essence

The fundamental thesis advanced by Santayana in "The Realms of Being" is that what there is can be divided into four irreducibly different categories called by his essence, matter, truth, and spirit. Each of these is one of the Realms of Being. The first in his exposition is that of essence.

An essence is a character or quality; in traditional terms, to distinguish between essence and existence is to indicate the difference
between what a thing is, and that it is, between its character and its occurrences. Essences have the ontological status of being, which Santayana distinguishes from existence. To exist, in Santayana's view, is to stand in external relations. Thus, while a spatio-temporal particular exists, the essences or characters that it exemplifies are non-existent, having mere being.

The being of every essence is completely exhausted by its definition, not its definition in words, "but the character which distinguishes it from any other essence. Every essence is perfectly individual."(6) This inalienable individuality of each essence also renders it universal:

"...for being perfectly self-contained and real only by virtue of its intrinsic character, it contains no reference to any setting in space and time, and stands in no adventitious relations to anything." (7)

Any essence may be repeated or reviewed any number of times. It is the essential universality of these characters which makes any fact - Santayana's term for a state of affairs in the existent world - insofar as it exhibits them, distinct and knowable.

All essences taken together make up the realm of essence. Santayana holds that essences are infinite in number.(8)

Essences are instantiated by matter, which is in flux. The essences traversed in change make mutation possible and describable; without their eternal distinctness, no part of the flux could differ from any other part.(9)

All essences are eternal. This eternity is merely the self-identity proper to each of the forms which existence may instantiate, or very likely never illustrate at all.(10) They are outside space and time.

While insisting that essences are both universal and individual, Santayana denies that they are general. An essence is universal not because there are repeated instantiations of it - for there need be no
manifestations whatever - but because it is individuated internally (and eternally) by its character, not externally by its position in the flux of nature.

"and no essence is general for the same reason. However it may be related to particular existences, its own nature is complete and intrinsic; whereas a term can be said to be general only if it happens to be predicatable of a number of scattered things, none of which, perhaps, it defines intrinsically." (11)

Essences may be either simple or complex. Since Santayana wishes to maintain both that essences are indivisible individuals, and (as is shown below) that all essences are equally primary, he has to describe a species of complexity compatible with these other properties. The complexity of a complex essence is not material,

"it is not the factual co-existence of elements themselves self-centred and self-existent. It is the essential complexity of a form, in which the relations of the parts are internal relations in the whole; so that both the total unity and the contrasting parts are pure essences." (12)

There is no limit to the degree of complexity of complex essences: the whole realm of essence is one essence, and therefore there is one essence of absolutely infinite complexity. Santayana holds that other essences are infinitely complex in particular respects, as number is.

In one sense, the being of any essence implies that of every other, for if any one essence is assured of its being because it is a distinguishable something, obviously every other distinguishable something is assured of its being on the same ground, so that an infinite multitude of essences is implied in the being of any essence. (14) Yet Santayana insists that essences have no consequences. Every essence is completely self-contained and has no external relations whatever. (15) As Santayana sees it, this position entails a denial that logical relations obtain between essences.
He explains the basis of dialectic—his term for the study of a priori relations—empirically. In the system of the Realms of Being, the only factor which has any dynamic properties is matter; essences are totally inert. The basis of dialectic is therefore said to be material; a priori logic expresses physiological preformations. When an organ is formed, it imposes certain responses on the body and—consequence of epiphenomenalism—certain ideas on the mind. The implication of ideas is a sign of this vital bias. What is normally referred to as logical necessity is on this view merely a subjective function of the structure of the human body and mind. Alternative laws of logic are possible.

Essences may be instantiated or exemplified or manifested in existence: Santayana uses these terms indifferently. Any type of manifestation involves a sort of alienation from essence. In existence, in sense, in thought, essence has become impure; its essential character now figures in a substance, a medium, or a context which is alien to it. Nevertheless, whenever an essence is manifested, it is manifested perfectly. This follows from the infinity of the realm of essence, in which all possible forms of being have been from all eternity. One mode of manifestation of essence is embodiment in a material particular; another is being imagined by spirit, (i.e., consciousness) Indeed, some essences are such that they can only be exemplified in spirit, e.g., any type of pain.

Santayana re-iterates the doctrines that complex essences are not compounded, and that all essences are equally primary. In the realm of essence, the true has no priority over the false, nor the natural over the unnatural. Truth, complexity, deformity, and so forth, are categories relative to human capacities and interests. In the realm of essence, the greatest complexity and the greatest simplicity have being eternally. Again essences which have been exemplified in existence have no priority over those which are not exemplified.

This insistence on the equal primacy of all members of the realm of essence is in tension with the further doctrines of the special properties
which Santayana attributes to one essence in particular, the essence of
pure Being. He insists that this essence is not to be identified either
with matter, with God, or with nothing. (21) Pure Being supplies, as it
were, the logical or aesthetic matter which all essences have in common.
There is evidence that the essence of pure Being is intuitable alone to
the human intellect only at the most advanced stages of spiritual develop­
ment. It may, however, be discerned analytically in any essence whatever.
(22) The sense in which pure Being is pure is different from that in
which any other essence may be said to be pure, i.e. when considered only
in its proper character, absolutely unconnected with exemplification and
human interests. What is meant by calling pure Being "pure" is rather
that pure Being is related to any other essence very much as any essence
is related to its existing manifestations. (23)

Pure Being in a certain sense may be said to be the totality of all
essences, when the latter are regarded not in their distinction — in which
they form the realm of essence — but in their continuity and in their
common latency within the essence of pure Being itself,

"because we may say (though the language is figurative and
inaccurate) that pure Being contains all essences within itself
virtually or eminently, since, though it cannot be any of them,
it requires each of them to be what it is." (24)

The contemplation of pure Being is the last phase of spiritual progress,
and has always been the goal of any seriously cultivated spiritual life. (25)

(The stress which Santayana places on the notion of pure Being and
its contemplation is of historical interest in indicating the distance he
had travelled from his position in "The Life of Reason", in which work he
would have dismissed any such mysticism as irrational. cf. Chs. V and VI,
above.)

The concept of essence is of the first importance in Santayana's later
writings on aesthetics. In his late period, he retains his thesis that
aesthetic experience is to be equated with immediate experience. Essences are not only individual and universal, but are also the data of immediate experience, whether the experience be of sensation or thought. (26)

Aesthetic experience is therefore identified by Santayana with awareness— or to use his term, intuition— of essences considered in themselves, not as signs for objects or events in the external world. The position is complicated by the further thesis that spirit (i.e., consciousness) is naturally addressed to the contemplation of essence, and returns to this state of detachment when not harassed by animal wants and needs. What he calls the spiritual life is the life of detached contemplation of essence. Since for him aesthetic experience and intuition of essence are descriptions of the same state, the spiritual life and the aesthetic life are for him one and the same. His later ethic of the spiritual life must therefore be considered in a survey of his writings on aesthetics.

The concept of essence has been extensively discussed, and the difficulties in it are now well established. It is sufficient for present purposes to indicate a few central points. Santayana maintains that essences have no external relations, and it follows that they are therefore unrelated to existence. This entails, however, that it is logically possible for there to be a quality which does not imply a subject of qualities; indeed, every essence satisfies this description. Yet it makes as little sense to speak of a quality which is not and need never be a quality of anything as it does to speak of a thing which has no qualities. The concepts of quality and subject of qualities mutually imply one another.

Again, the axiom that all essences are equally and perfectly determinate entails that no essence is intrinsically general. The general is the partially indeterminate, and therefore the intrinsically general is the intrinsically partially indeterminate. Santayana agrees that the order of decreasing definiteness is the order of increasing generality,
but adds the thesis that pure Being is quite as determinate as any other essence. This has the consequence that to say of something that it 'is', is to say something as definite as to say exactly what qualities it has. This is plainly false in the ordinary sense of 'definite' (27).

Again, some of the doctrines of the theory of essence are in tension with one another. Santayana maintains that there is evidence for the detachability of essence from existence in the experience of repetition. If the identical character can appear in more than one thing or event, at least it does not depend on that thing or event. Yet Santayana also holds that it is highly doubtful that any essence is exactly repeated in human experience. From this it follows that, so far as perception is concerned, we have no direct evidence that essences, as determinate, are detachable from their substances, not to mention all existence (28*)

(b) Matter and Truth

"The realm of Matter" (1930), the second volume of "The Realms of Being", sets out Santayana's philosophy of nature (29*). Santayana holds that belief in an external world is logically unjustifiable but psychologically inevitable. The task of natural philosophy is therefore not to attempt to provide a foundation for belief in nature, but rather to try to arrive, "at a conception of nature by which the faith involved in action may be enlightened and guided." (30)

The most fundamental concept in the philosophy of nature is that of substance: it is presupposed in action that nature is substantial. If this belief is not an illusion, then substance necessarily has certain properties. (31) By analyzing what he claims are the presuppositions of the notion of action, Santayana arrives at the conclusion that there are five indispensable properties of substance: a world in which action is to occur must be external (to the thought that posits it), spatial, temporal, and having both unity and variety. A substance with these qualities has a familiar name: matter. The field of action is therefore the realm of matter. (32) Santayana provides no argument to show that there either is
Matter is the only active principle among the realms of being. All change and existence is grounded ultimately in matter. It is the flux of matter which explains why those essences are embodied which are embodied, and which accordingly determines the content of the realm of truth. Again, spirit or consciousness is an epiphenomenon of matter.

A central concept in Santayana's philosophy of nature is that of a trope, defined as the essence or form of an event. A trope is the essence of an event seen under the form of eternity and belongs to the realm of truth. This concept is important in part because it is used in the definition of an equally important notion in Santayana's philosophy of mind, that of the psyche. Santayana denies that spirit has any causal efficacy, being an epiphenomenon of matter. He therefore has to posit a material agent to determine the course of the life of both body and spirit, and this agent he terms the psyche. He is emphatic in his distinction between spirit and psyche:

"By spirit I understand the actual light of consciousness falling upon anything - the ultimate invisible emotional fruition of life in feeling and thought. On the other hand, by the psyche I understand a system of tropes, inherited or acquired, displayed by living bodies in their growth and behaviour. This psyche is the specific form of physical life, present and potential, asserting itself in any plant or animal." (34)

The operations of the psyche are mysterious to us, and we have only indirect knowledge of them, i.e. we can only be aware of the effects of psychic operations, not of those operations themselves. Consciousness and its contents are the most important of the indirect indices we have to the operations of the psyche. Because consciousness and its contents are epiphenomena of psychic operations, every event is significant of what is occurring in the psyche. (35)
A few of the leading difficulties in this philosophy of nature may be mentioned here. They are the problems over epiphenomenalism discussed in Ch. VI, above; and there is the absence of any argument to show why the concept of a non-extended substance is incoherent, conceptually uneconomical, or in some other way unacceptable. Equally serious are the frequent claims to knowledge unobtainable on his own principles. As has been said, Santayana holds that the thesis that there is an external world in principle cannot be established; its necessity is psychological. Moreover, it follows from his thesis that only essences can be known directly in intuition that matter itself can never be the object of any intuition. We can therefore never know whether our experience is an accurate record of the flux of matter or not. Thus when, in the course of his discussion of the question of the properties of substance Santayana sets himself the problem of discovering which essences truly pertain to the essence of substance, he is pursuing an inquiry which is on his own principles impossible.(36) Again, he maintains that some of the essences exhibited to human intuition fit the dynamic movement of nature tightly and consecutively, and can be guides to action, whereas others are less trustworthy.(37) On his own principles, this assertion is unverifiable.

The shortest of the four volumes of "The Realms of Being" is the third, "The Realm of Truth". Disappointingly, it is difficult to find in this work any doctrine new to Santayana or to philosophy in general, and many of the views which are put forward are unargued for and not stated with a proper degree of completeness.(38*)

Santayana holds a variety of the correspondence theory of truth. A truth-functional proposition is true if what it asserts to be the case is the case:

"...the abstract relation of correctness, by virtue of which any opinion is true, is easily stated. An opinion is true if what it is talking about is constituted as the opinion asserts it to be constituted...it is a question of identity between a fact asserted and a fact existing."(39)
The theory is not developed beyond bald assertions of this kind. There is no analysis of what a fact might be, nor any investigation of the exact nature of the correspondence between fact and assertion.

The sum of all true propositions is called by Santayana "the truth". It is, "what omniscience would assert, the whole ideal system of qualities and relations which the world has exemplified or will exemplify. The truth is all things seen under the form of eternity." (49)

Again, he maintains that there is a comprehensive description of every fact which is "the truth" about that fact. This description is obtained by taking the fact in question as central and considering everything else in relation to it. The comprehensive description, for every fact, is infinite. (41)

Finally, the realm of truth is a segment of the realm of essence; it is "that segment of the realm of essence which happens to be illustrated in existence." (42)

(c) Spirit

The fourth realm of being is that of spirit. The book dealing with this division of Santayana's system, "The Realm of Spirit" (1940) sets out in detail a deterministic epiphenomenalism of the kind presupposed in the earlier "Life of Reason", considered and criticised in Ch. VI, above. To cut down repetition to a minimum, the following exposition is restricted to essential propositions and certain items of technical vocabulary.

Santayana offers many definitions of spirit, of which the following is typical:

"What I call spirit is only that inner light of actuality or attention which floods all life as men actually live it on earth. It is roughly the same thing as feeling or thought; it might be called consciousness..." (43)

It is a confusion of thought, Santayana maintains, to regard spirit as
an agent or power in the universe. The only power in the universe is matter; and in human action, the moving force, as has been said, is exercised by the material part of the person, i.e. the psyche. The myth of the causal efficacy of spirit in action is promoted by false beliefs on the relation of mind to body. The mind is not an entity separable from the body. Showing plainly a debt to Spinoza - whose philosophy of mind he is elsewhere at pains to abjure (cf. Ch. VI, above) - Santayana contends that there are not two facts, spirit and body, incongruously juxtaposed. Spirit and body are realizations of the same fact in incomparable realms of being. Spirit and body are logically incomparable; the former is a moral integration and dignity accruing to body when body develops a certain degree of organisation and responsiveness to distant things. (44)

An important consequence of this position is that Santayana must deny the possibility of disembodied existence for spirit; being a form of the body not a separate entity, spirit can only exist incarnate. Moreover, animal interests direct the course of thought, generating particular images and categories. (45) This itself has a consequence the importance of which will become clearer in the next section. The consequence is that contemplation can never be in a strict sense entirely disinterested and yet remain contemplation by an individual. It follows from Santayana's premisses that, by definition, any spirit which attained absolute disinterest in the sense of ceasing to be directed by any impulses from the psyche would cease to be incarnate, and would become identical with the realm of essence.

Spirit has a vicarious sympathy with its native psyche and the world of that psyche, which it cannot bear to feel dragged hither and thither in confusion. Spirit craves to see its psyche and world everywhere well-ordered and beautiful, so that that they may be better seen and understood. This, in Santayana's view, is the specific function of spirit, which it lives by fulfilling and dies if it cannot somehow fulfill. (46)

On the question of the distribution of spirit in nature, Santayana
maintains that spirit is the consciousness proper to an animal psyche, and, as has been said, is incarnate by nature and not by accident. If this were not the case, spirit would not possess its impassioned character. Perception, impulse, conscience, and hope, in Santayana's view, all indicate the roots of spirit in matter. It cannot imagine or love what is not somehow native to its own climate. (47) These assertions presuppose Santayana's interest theory of value. (cf. Ch. I, above) In the vocabulary of the alms of being, pure spirit would have no values. The human spirit has the values dictated by the interests of its psyche.

Spirit is defined as the inner light of attention. Attention is by definition transitive, i.e. it has an object, and a particular instance of awareness, it may be repeated, is an intuition. The object given in intuition is an essence. When an essence is interpreted as a sign of an object or event in the world outside the spirit, the intuition is said to be impure (in a non-derogatory usage), and knowledge of the external object said to be symbolic. When, by contrast, the essence is considered merely in itself, as an immediate datum — and this for Santayana is to consider the essence aesthetically — the intuition is said to be pure, and our knowledge of the essence literal. (49)

The notion of pure or aesthetic intuition is of the first importance in Santayana's later ethic of the spiritual life. He asks the question: what is spirit naturally fit to do? What is the free and native life of spirit, which it enjoys more and more when conditions are favourable? His answer is that the perfect function of spirit is pure intuition. Intuition tends to become pure in virtue of the very impulse which generates it:

"It is the movement of apprehension by which anything is given to consciousness; and there is a natural joy in it, whenever it can live unimpeded by fatigue or pain, and not harrassed by care, fear doubt, desire or any other obsession about the not given." (49)

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intuition is pure.

Santayana is careful to say that pure intuition is possible only when
conditions are favourable. It is his view that conditions are only very
rarely sufficiently favourable for spirit to enjoy any notable degree of
purity in intuition. Almost all the time, the spirit is directed by the
psyche to attend to the environment; virtually all intuition is designed to
give symbolic knowledge and is therefore impure.(51) As he says:

"The pure joy and knowledge that should come to (spirit) can come
only in snatches, or in ultimate concentration and solitude."(52)

III: later Writings on Aesthetics
(a) The Spiritual Life: A Variety of Aestheticism

In "The Realm of Spirit" and several other late works, Santayana
develops the ethic of the spiritual or aesthetic way of life. It is
appropriate to consider it as a part of his aesthetics for reasons outlined
in section II (a) above, and now made clearer in section II (d): the
perfection of spiritual life is pure intuition. Pure intuition is
contemplation of the immediate. Since for Santayana, the realm of the
immediate and the realm of the aesthetic are one and the same, it follows
that for him the spiritual man is identical with the aesthete.(53*)

It has been noted above that pure intuition is only rarely possible.
The reason is that spirit is usually harrassed in some way by its psyche,
the world, and even on occasion, by itself. This state of harrassment
Santayana refers to as the state of distraction. He describes distraction
as,

"the alien force that drags the spirit away from the spontaneous
exercise of its liberty, and holds it down to the rack of care,
doubt, pain, hatred, and vice."(54)

In the state of distraction, the spirit cannot enjoy pure intuition.

There are three major agents of distraction, for which Santayana retains
Christian terminology: the Flesh, the World, and the Devil. Distraction by
The flesh consists in being deflected, confused, and deceived by the demands of psychic impulses which are in discord. (55) The emotions of love and hatred are powerful agents of distraction of this kind. It is seen at its purest, however, in the experience of pain, the essence of evil to the spirit, for painful existence is pure waste. (56) The World is all that is external to the individual psyche with its epiphenomenal spirit. The World, both man-made, and non-man-made, is antithetical and distracting to spirit in a fundamental respect: it is unstable, being constantly in flux. It is of the essence of spirit, Santayana holds, that it wishes to transcend the flux and keep all moments present, as it tries to do in memory and prophecy. Spirit finds the World treacherous: it is not as it looks; it leaves memories which it stultifies, and excites hopes which it betrays. (57) The Devil is any enemy of spirit internal to spirit. Bedevilment is the state which results when the different passions of the psyche make their impulses felt in the spirit. Contrary thoughts and impulses cross the spirit, but the latter cannot synthesize them or fuse them into a single vision. The essence of bedevilment is to make impossible harmony either within a man, or between man and nature. (58)

The first step towards living the spiritual life (the life of pure intuition) is to escape distraction. To have done so is to attain the state Santayana calls liberation. Liberation does not consist in the passage of spirit into another world or form of life; such a view is precluded for Santayana by his denial that spirit can exist disembodied. Liberation consists rather in detachment from our own impulses. This attitude coincides with the occurrence of spontaneous, disinterested, pure intuition. (59) Outwardly, nothing is changed by this spiritual metanoia; but inwardly, the whole natural world, and our own persons in it, will be removed to a distance.

The ways to attain liberation from the flesh, the World, and the Devil are diverse. It is not the flesh alone in its simple animal functions that
imprisons spirit, but the world and the mind, complicating those impulses or compelling them to hide. The spirit could be liberated from the Flesh if the Flesh could be liberated from all that, as Flesh, distorts it, starves and degrades it. Liberation from the World does not consist in removal from it, which is in any case impossible. Spirit, in the measure in which, by attentive study and sympathy, it may have understood the World, is liberated from it, i.e. from distraction by it. Santayana is very imprecise as to the method of achieving liberation from the Devil. He states that it may be achieved by a retreat to a state he describes as "perfect health and simple knowledge"(60), which can be achieved only after long discipline.(61)

To attain the state of liberation is merely a precondition for the spiritual life: Santayana regards liberation as a negative state; it would bring no positive benefit were it not a preliminary to the final stage or goal of the spiritual life, union. It is to be emphasized at once that spiritual union does not consist in the fusion of the substance of spirit with anything; there can be no union where there are not at least two things to be united. Union in both prayer or love requires the persistent separateness of the two beings united. Union consists in a perfect unanimity:

"The union sought by a liberated spirit is no fusion of its substance with any other substance, but a moral unanimity or fellowship with the life of all substances in so far as they support or enlarge its own life."(62)

Spirits can be united only by thinking alike.(63)

The object with which the liberated spirit is united is called by Santayana the Good.(64) The Good for the spirit is impartial understanding, and love of all things. This follows from Santayana's own premisses: the goal of spirit itself - not of its psyche - is to understand all things, and it may approach as near to this state as is possible for a finite spirit
in the state of liberated detachment. (65) Thus Santayana can write that to
the spirit that has renounced all things, all things are restored. (66)

It will be asked how such a state may be realized by a finite spirit:
how can we be united, even in spirit, with an absent good or be at peace
with a power that may be always destroying us? Santayana maintains that
we may do so by means of prayer, a term which, as will become clear, he
uses in a special sense. Prayer is not a petition made with the aim of
changing the will of the divinity; it is not a means, but an end. All
preferences are as it were suspended and neutralized by the sense of
dependence and by the virtual acceptance of the perhaps contrary fact:

"We are recollecting, digesting, purifying our conscience...Even when
we are expressing a wish, we are doing so in the face of the truth,
or of fate impersonally, considering how excellent it would be if
fortune came to our assistance." (67)

The goal of spirit, as has been said, is not only to understand the
world, but to love it. The love of the liberated spirit for the World
Santayana calls charity, a term which, once again, he uses in a special
sense. Charity is sympathy with all there is; it is a doubly chastened
sympathy, chastened by understanding and renunciation (i.e. of the particul­
ar goals of the psyche). The World is seen to be in a sense innocent; its
sin is that of being a spontaneous world, self-contradicting and ignorant
of its destiny. (68) Union for the spirit consists in presence (emphatically
not physical possession), and this presence will hardly if ever be
uninterrupted. Spiritual love is accordingly not anxious, and is entirely
free from desire. It lives in the virtual presence of all the fulfilments
and all the possibilities that nature pursues. (69)

Finally, it is to be emphasized why this state of spiritual detachment
is to be classified as an aesthetic state, in Santayana's usage. He
stresses that spirit is raised to this final state, not by knowledge, but
by intuition. (70) Knowledge, as Santayana uses the term, is by definition
transitive, i.e. it involves correct interpretation of essences as signs of objects, events, etc., in the external world. If spirit is concerned to gain knowledge, it is therefore to some degree distracted, since to be concerned with finding out about the external world is not to be detached from it, and so by definition not to be liberated. In the states of liberation and union, therefore, intuition is pure, i.e. aesthetic contemplation of essences in themselves as essences, not as signs. Santayana accordingly speaks of the spiritual life as follows: spirit is addressed to essence, and can rest only in what is necessary; in the form that a form has, and in the inevitable relation of that form to others. More deeply, therefore, than with truth, spirit is concerned with conceiving, loving, or hating what might have been true. (71)

Granted Santayana's premisses, this is equivalent to saying that, when living the spiritual - aesthetic life, spirit is a detached spectator of whatever essences are presented to it by the flux of matter. Being entirely detached, it has no interest in interpreting these essences as signs of the external world, or of manipulating the order in which they occur; its sympathy is universal. Since for Santayana, immediate experience is aesthetic experience, this spiritual life is a variety of aestheticism.

The spiritual life is one of the most discussed aspects of Santayana's philosophy; an extensive consideration of it here is accordingly unnecessary. The following comments are deliberately restricted to a few central points. (72*)

It should perhaps be emphasized initially that aestheticism as here ascribed to Santayana obviously differs in several important respects from other ethical theories which go by the same name. Santayana's aestheticism is not a cult of beauty in particular: beauty is one essence among infinitely many essences, and has no privileged status. Again, the ideas of cultivating intense sensual experience - Pater's hard, gem-like flame - and of the cult of artificiality in everyday experience (Wilde) are quite absent from
Santayana's aesthetic way of life. In comparison with nineteenth century varieties of aestheticism, Santayana's recommendations emerge as fairly ascetic.

A repeated criticism of the aesthetic-spiritual way of life is that it involves Santayana in internal inconsistency with the ethic of the Life of Reason (cf. Ch. VI, above). It must be conceded that those who take this view can find evidence for their thesis without great difficulty, since the Life of Reason and the spiritual life differ markedly in certain respects. (73) It may be pointed out that the Life of Reason involves effort to modify nature to suit the needs of men; whereas the spiritual life involves no effort whatever to control nature, being rather an escape from the mundane realm. Again, the goal of the Life of Reason is the harmonization of desires by reason, while a condition for the spiritual life is maximal freedom from desires. Again, the spiritual life is concerned with essence and eternity, while the Life of Reason is concerned with existence and time. Again, the Life of Reason is a temporal career in pursuit of ideal goods, while the spiritual life is a withdrawal from time and indifference to goods as much as to evils, indifference to all existence of whatever moral quality.

Santayana was sufficiently disturbed by such criticisms to devote a part of his "Apologia pro mente sua" (his reply to criticisms in the Schilpp volume) to a response to them. One reply he makes is that rational and spiritual lives should not be separated, since, "the two may be lived together and in the same moment..." (74) In the first place, the spiritual life presupposes either the Life of Reason or some other form of non-spiritual reality:

"You cannot be detached without being previously attached; you cannot renounce or sacrifice anything significantly unless you love it. Your detachment will not be spiritual unless it is universal; it will then bring you liberation at once from the world and from yourself. This will neither destroy your natural gifts
and duties nor add to them; but it will enable you to exercise them without illusion and in far-seeing harmony with their real function and end."(75)

The difficulty with this proposed solution is that, at best, it provides only for the compatibility of the Life of Reason with the first stage of the spiritual life, i.e. liberation or detachment. The state of union, or contemplation of the immediate flux of essences, is manifestly incompatible with carrying out the demands of the Life of Reason.

The text of the "Apologia", however, suggests a way of mitigating the charge of inconsistency. At one point of his discussion, Santayana suggests that a retreat from the World such as is recommended in the spiritual life is a safety-valve for the spirit which it is necessary to keep open, for,

"The spirit in men cannot live for man alone, and man is never happier than when the spirit carries him beyond himself."(76)

The charge of inconsistency might be mitigated, by being turned instead into merely a charge of addition. Santayana may be construed as having added to his philosophy the thesis that man cannot be happy unless the spirit in him is at times able to retreat to the non-human. Periodical indulgence in the spiritual-aesthetic way of life would then be a necessary condition for remaining sane and unbent by the pressure of the world, where life would at all other times be lived in accordance with the principles of the Life of Reason. This interpretation is corroborated by Santayana's insistence that the pure intuitions of the spiritual life are possible only at privileged moments in life, a point re-iterated in the "Apologia":

"Spirituality...is only an attribute in the air, and I doubt that it can be discerned with any clearness except in those moments of life that have a transporting quality."(77)

On this view Santayana is to be construed as having changed his mind to the extent of coming to regard the Life of Reason as an incomplete ethic; yet this is far less grave a charge than that of inconsistency. He is guilty, however, of not relating his early and late views as exactly as he might:
it should not be necessary to construct defences for him.

The above defence provides a reply to two criticisms put forward by Professor Lachs. (78) The first is that it is not clear to what extent Santayana regarded the spiritual life as livable; the second that, as an ideal, this way of life is both unattractive and virtually impossible to attain:

"...the spiritual life, desiccated angelic existence that it is, seems utterly remote from and unattractive to human nature as we generally know it...No-one would care to, and for that matter no-one could, live spiritually for forty or fifty years of one's adult life." (79)

Santayana would reply that the spiritual life is to be regarded as a way to live only in rare and privileged moments, and would therefore agree with much of what Lachs has to say.

The difficulties which most seriously vitiate the philosophy of the spiritual life lie in its presuppositions: in the concept of essence, in the distinction between immediate and mediate experience, and in the identification of the aesthetic with the former. Much of what Santayana says about detachment and contemplation is, as he would admit, well-known from the lives and writings of spiritual people, and is not problematic. The real difficulty over Santayana's philosophy of the spiritual life is that the technical framework in which he places these acceptable truths is philosophically defective, for reasons already given in this and the preceding chapters.

(b) "Proust on Essences" (1929)

Santayana was an omnivorous reader, and when he came across corroboration of his views in another author, liked to give notice of this fact to the world. In "Le Temps retrouvé", he came across a passage which indicated to him that Proust had grasped the concept of essence, and valued the spiritual-aesthetic way of life. The short paper, "Proust on
Essences", subsequently reprinted as an appendix to later editions of "The Realm of Essence", announces this discovery. He assumes throughout that the views of the Narrator of "À la recherche du temps perdu" are the views of Proust himself.

Santayana begins by referring to a remark of Desmond MacCarthy that no novelist has ever done such complete justice to the fact that all things pass and change as has Proust. Yet, Santayana comments, Proust, apparently so absorbed in the flux of things, finally arrived at,

"a very remarkable perception: that the flux of phenomena is after all accidental to them, and that the positive reality in each is not the fact that it appears or disappears, but rather the intrinsic quality which it manifests, an eternal essence which may appear and disappear a thousand times."(30)

Moreover, "all that was intrinsically real in past time is accordingly recoverable" (81), for intrinsic reality is a property only of essences manifested, not of the material occasions on which essences recur.

Having given a substantial quotation from "Le Temps retrouvé" to support this view that Proust had grasped the concept of essence, Santayana comments that, granted Proust's "exquisite" and "voluminous" sensibility, it is no surprise that he could be "rescued from distraction" only by finding certain repetitions in his experience: he required two phenomena to reveal a single essence.(82) By contrast,

"A mind less volatile and less retentive, but more concentrated and loyal, might easily have discerned the eternal essence in any single momentary fact."(83)

Santayana continues that Proust seems remarkably detached from worldly interests. He is not attracted to some essences in particular and repelled from others by his own human wants and needs. He is content simply to perceive without direction by his interests. This fact (in Santayana's
view) makes his testimony to the reality of essences all the more remarkable:

"We could not have asked for a more competent or a more unexpected witness to the fact that life as it flows is so much time wasted, and that nothing can ever be recovered or truly possessed save under the form of eternity which is also, as he tells us, the form of art." (84)

By way of comment, it should be noted that, in view of his remarks on the spiritual life, it is curious that Santayana should think it remarkable that a detached spirit should recognize the eternal essences given in experience. As has been made clear in the preceding section, detachment is made a condition for the pure intuition of essence: what type of spirit more likely, then, to discern essence than a liberated spirit of the kind Santayana takes Proust to be?

Santayana continues that Proust's style bears witness to his great power of intuition. Any adequate rendering of intuition in words must necessarily be diffuse and many-sided, and must invite many a postscript and reconsideration:

"The evanescent and immediate cannot be defined or traced or analysed; it must be re-evoked by suggestion." (85)

His point here - made also in "The Realm of Essence" - is that an essence cannot be recalled to intuition simply by fiat; it must be evoked by a description of the situation in which it originally occurred. (86)

A psychological critic (Santayana goes on) might object that it is extremely unlikely that the same essence will ever be given twice in intuition; and that even if one believes that a given essence has recurred, this belief is no evidence of recurrence. Santayana does not rebut the 'psychological critic': indeed, since he himself makes the same point in "The Realms of Essence", he cannot consistently do so. (87*) His comment is rather that the criticism is unimportant:

"The important point...is not how intuition is reached, but that
when reached it reveals an essence belonging of itself neither here nor there, but undated and eternal. Such essences are set over against existence everywhere and at all times..a living spirit finds a great joy in conceiving them, not because they are all beautiful or true, but because in conceiving them it is liberated from the pressure of ulterior things, energises perfectly, and simply conceives."(88)

This concluding remark is simply an affirmation of one of the doctrines of the philosophy of the spiritual life. It is not a criticism of this short paper to note that it does not introduce any new doctrines into Santayana's aesthetics, or indeed develop any to which he already subscribes. He fulfils his very limited purpose, which is to note an agreement with his doctrine.

Santayana's remaining pieces on aesthetics are less closely linked to the realms of being than those discussed on the preceding sections, though the apparatus of the system is always in evidence. In the absence of thematic links, the following discussions follow their order of publication.

(c) "Penitent Art" (1922)

In the short paper, "Penitent Art", Santayana uses the conceptual framework of the "Realms of Being" in some generalised description and analysis of then contemporary movements in the visual arts, indicating briefly that he considers his remarks applicable to the other arts also.(89)

It is presupposed throughout the paper that cycles can be discerned in the history of art, each cycle being made up of a series of phases. Santayana begins by comparing these phases in the evolution of art with the stages in the life of a woman. As a child, a girl may be beautiful without knowing it, and wholly absorbed in what she is doing. In her prime, when she has discovered her beauty, she dresses herself in finery and invents all sorts of fashion to keep admiration alive. Finally, when past
her best and in decline, she puts on rouge, false hair and too much scent. Sometimes, however, during this phase of decline, she hears a call to repentance, and thinks of being converted. Henceforth, in thoughtful and reflective hours, she upbraids herself for the hollowness of her old airs and graces. Art exhibits corresponding phases in its history.

Santayana considered the art contemporary with his time of writing to have reached the stage of decline and repentance: hence the title: penitent art. (90)

Penitence in the visual arts consists in a retrenchment of pretensions: the artist no longer seeks to give an exact representation of external objects, or indeed any representation at all. The penitent artist relinquishes interest in the forms of external objects and instead directs his attention to mere appearances: sensations, or the very incomplete signs we take to be a sufficient indication of the presence of external objects. In the vocabulary of "The Realms of Being", the penitent artist has retreated from a consideration of the external world to concentrate on the way things appear to spirit:

"The more we transform things in seeing them, the more we seem to spiritualise them and turn them into forms of our own sensibility, regarding the living image in us as the dramatic essence of the object. It is the business of science to correct this illusion; but the penitent artist - who has taken refuge in the spirit and is not striving to stretch his apprehension into literal truth, since the effort to depict things discursively has proved a vain and arid ambition - the penitent artist is content with the rhythms, echoes or rays which things awaken within him." (91)

Santayana is careful to point out that not all the works of art of the period can be said to fall into this class, since, "somebody must still manufacture official statues and family portraits, somebody must design apartment houses, clubs, churches, skyscrapers, and stations." (92) Yet in
spite of all the paraphernalia of professional artistic expertise, works of art are produced which are unmistakably penitent. The two forms of art which he discusses, and which he regards as unmistakably penitent, are pure colour (Cubism) and caricature.

These forms of art are to be regarded as penitent, "because it is only disappointment in other directions that drives artists back to these primary effects. By austere and deliberate abstinence from everything that naturally tempts them, they achieve in this way a certain peace."

They would much rather regain this peace by genuinely recovering their naivete:

"Sensuous splendour and caricature would then have seemed to them not the same of abstract art, but the obvious truth of things." The difficulty with this endeavour is that the notion of recovering innocence is self-contradictory. This fact, in Santayana's view, vitiates the revivals of art in the nineteenth century: the revived styles, at the time of their conception, could not have been thought of as historical styles:

"Romanticism thought it was exquisitely sensitive to the spirit of remote things, but in reality it was sensitive only to material perspectives, to costume and stage setting; it grew sentimental over legends and ruins, and being moonstruck, thought it was imbibing the past. But the past had not been consciously romantic..."

At the time of writing, however, Santayana observed that the age of revivals had passed, and artists were instead seeking to recover the genuineness and freshness of vision, the unselfconsciousness of children. Cubism is an example of this striving. It demands expertise and is far from meaningless, since,

"Before you can compose a chaos or paint the unnamable, you must train yourself to a severe abstention from all practical habits of perception; you must heroically suppress the understanding."
This is one kind of aesthetic repentance. Santayana suggests that the grounds for this type of repentance might be as follows (using the vocabulary of the spiritual life): art cannot rival Nature in its urgency; and in any case, the mutability and confusion of existence is valueless to the spirit. Representation of material objects is a species of preoccupation with the world and so of distraction. It was never the objects depicted which were of importance in art:

"It is always the play of sensibility, and nothing else, that lends interest to external themes; and it was an evil obsession with alien things that dragged sensibility into a slavery to things which stifled and degraded it: salvation lies in emancipating the medium."(97)

What the medium is emancipated from, is representation.

The second form of penitent art discussed by Santayana is caricature. In this form of repentance, it is not maintained that the medium can be sufficient unto itself, and no attempt is made to avoid the impulse to observe and express external things. What is abjured is rather any attempt at exhaustiveness. It is held by the caricaturist that, so to speak, all that is worth saying can be said in words of one syllable. Once again, Santayana suggests generalised grounds which might be put forward in justification of this position:

"...nothing is more important than an abstract posture, an immovable single gesture. Let art abandon reproduction and become indication. If it threatens thereby to become caricature, know that profound art can never be anything else...salvation lies in caricature."(98)

In conclusion, Santayana makes a handful of evaluative remarks. Penitent art is not a revival of primitive art, as some critics have maintained. Savages were never rudimentary on purpose. They were not experimenting with the simplification or distortion of form, much less abjuring representation in order to deepen sensibility for the medium.
Penitent art is not crude or incompetent. Its defects are rather to be ascetic, morbid, and sometimes vulgar:

"because one of the forms of caricature and self-revelation is to be brutal, to flaunt what is out of place, what spoils the picture. Tragedy used to be noble; there is a new refinement in seeing how often it is ignoble; there is a second tragedy in that." (99)

By way of commentary, it should be noted first that Santayana deserves credit for pointing out that a style cannot be revived wholly as it was, for the logical reason that, when first conceived, the style was not thought of under the description of a revived style. Every trick of form may be imitated; but its former novelty logically cannot. Two closely related points, however, need to be added. In the first place, revivalist art is not by definition inferior: there is no reason 'a priori' why it should not answer a genuine need felt at the time of revival. Secondly, Santayana does not mention the point that revivalist art has qualities of its own period which tend to be ignored when its revivalist aspects are emphasized.

While they include this insight, Santayana's views on penitent art involve certain important difficulties. The first of these concerns the applicability of the doctrine to the other arts. It is clear that Santayana wishes to extend the application of the idea of penitence beyond the visual arts. The penitent artist is content with the inner echoes aroused by external objects,

"and in proportion as these reverberations are actually renewed, the poem remains a cry, the story a dream, the building a glimpse, the portrait a caricature." (100)

In the light of Santayana's definition of penitence, it is not difficult to see how he intends the doctrine to be applied to literature. Concentration on the world within rather than the world outside leads to lyricism in poetry and to stories becoming fantastic. The real difficulty lies in applying the doctrine to architecture: to say that the building remains a
glimpse is no help. Since the architect has no representation to abjure or simplify, it is not clear how he is to manifest penitence. Santayana makes no mention whatever of applying the doctrine to music.

Again, it is doubtful whether caricature is a tenable candidate for the position of a form of art especially typical of the forty years or so (say) before Santayana wrote - clearly, if the doctrine of the cyclical view of the evolution of art is to be tenable, the alleged leading features of a given phase should not appear in others. It is clear from the text that Santayana regards the Romantic era as a period of decline in art, with Cubism and caricature as recent forms of penitence in this period of decline. The difficulty is that caricature as we know it emerged considerably before the Romantic period, and indeed flourished before that time. Annibale Caracci is credited with the invention of caricature, and by 1700 the form was established and sophisticated, witness the works of Pierleone Ghezzi. Again, the use of caricature as a political weapon emerged by the middle of the eighteenth century, in the works of George, Third Marquess of Townshend. There is no indication in the text that Santayana wishes to extend the phase of decline as far back as the time of Ghezzi, to say nothing of Caracci. The choice of caricature as a distinctive feature of the period of decline seems ill-advised.

Thirdly, it is contestable whether Cubism fits the description of a penitent form of art as well as Santayana maintains that it does. In order for what Santayana says to be correct, the Cubist must satisfy the description of retrenching his pretensions, ceasing to aim at exact and exhaustive representation of the world, instead taking an interest in external objects only as appearance. If Gleizes' and Metzinger's "Du Cubisme" is taken as an authoritative statement of the Cubist credo, it appears that while there is some truth in Santayana's claims, the Cubists themselves would disagree with him importantly on certain issues. They would appear to agree with him insofar as he asserts that they have a special interest in the world within, i.e. the world of spirit.
"There is nothing real outside us; there is nothing real but the coincidence of a sensation and an individual mental direction. It is not our intention to cast in doubt the existence of objects which affect our senses; but there is reasonable certitude only in regard to the image which these call forth in our minds."(102)

While this is so, the Cubist is still concerned with the external world, and indeed with the "expression" on canvas of aspects of objects which, in the opinion of Gleizes and Metzinger, it had not been thought possible to express before:

"Oil painting today permits the expression of notions (heretofore) deemed inexpressible, those of depth, density and duration, and it incites us to represent according to a complex rhythm and in a restricted space a veritable fusion of objects."(103)

Again, for the Cubist, the object is not any one of the views taken of it; it is the fusion of all its appearances. It is this fusion which the Cubist tries to render on canvas:

"We are sure that the least sagacious will soon acknowledge that the pretention of making the weight of body apparent and the time spent in numbering its diverse aspects is as legitimate as that of imitating the daylight by the shock of a blue and an orange. Then the fact that the object is moved about in order to have its many successive appearances caught, when these appearances blend into a single image and reconstitute the object in duration, will no longer rouse the indignation of reasonable people."(104)

There are grounds therefore for holding that the Cubist attempts a more exhaustive rendering of the object than an artist working in geometrical perspective. This being so, Cubism does not wholly conform to Santayana's analysis of penitence in art.

(d) "The Mutability of Aesthetic Categories" (1925) and Related Passages in "The Realm of Essence"

The paper, "The Mutability of Aesthetic Categories" is of special
interest among Santayana's later writings on aesthetics for two reasons. Firstly, it contains his analysis of the types of disagreement which can occur in aesthetics, a topic he does not deal with elsewhere. Secondly, in an important footnote, he presents an amended view of beauty. This note, in conjunction with two passages in "The Realm of Essence" sketch a theory of beauty which differs in certain respects from that put forward in "The Sense of Beauty" (of. Ch.I, above). This is one of the few issues in aesthetics on which Santayana significantly changed his mind.

In the following critical exposition, a passage on expression is omitted. It is dealt with in Ch.IV, above.

The paper was suggested by Henry Rutgers Marshall's book, "The Beautiful", and, as its title suggests, is concerned with aesthetic categories or concepts. Santayana contends, against Marshall, that mutability of meaning is a more radical and notorious feature of these categories than of those used in other speculations. The principle of mutability is however extensible to other areas of inquiry, e.g. physics, psychology, and logic.

In Marshall's view, the Real may be exhaustively divided into the Beautiful, the Valid or Factual, and the Moral Good. Of these, the concept of the Beautiful alone is unambiguous (Marshall contends); of course, the word is applied to a great variety of objects, and in contradictory ways; yet this by no means implies ambiguity in the concept.

Before proceeding to argue against this assertion, Santayana brings forward views which Marshall might have advanced in support of the thesis of the non-ambiguity of 'beautiful'. Santayana does not argue against these views, and the context indicates that he regards them as possible truths which Marshall might use to support his case. It is therefore safe to attribute these views to Santayana himself.

No two aesthetic judgments (Santayana contends) can be contradictory unless the same category is applied in both. With this in mind, he proceeds to analyse two types of disagreement which can occur over the aesthetic
properties of an object:

(1) merely verbal disagreement:

"if the beauty which one party found in a thing was not at all the same beauty which the other party missed in it, the quarrel would be merely verbal, the paucity and vagueness of words not being able to mark clearly the variety of things and of men's perceptions."(106)

(ii) where the disputants agree about the aesthetic qualities of an object, but disagree as to whether these are to be approved of or disapproved of:

"..if the quarrel is more than verbal, it is political and moral, turning on the sort of men and the sort of culture which are desirable; it is not about the aesthetic character of given objects. Two men may see exactly the same characteristics in the Venus de Medici, yet one may turn his back on it, while the other's mouth waters. It is a moral question what kind of beauty we shall love."(107)

This is surely an acceptable analysis of types of disagreement about aesthetic properties of objects, so far as it goes. Santayana's views may be restated in analytic idioms as follows:

(1) disputes occur in which the disputants agree over what condition or conditions govern the use of the term "beautiful", but disagree as to whether the given object satisfies these conditions. (An aesthetic disagreement.)

(2) disputes occur in which the disputants agree over what condition or conditions govern the use of the word "beautiful", and agree as to whether it is morally desirable to like or dislike an object of this kind. (A moral disagreement.)

Santayana omits, however, to consider a third possible type of disagreement:
(iii) disputes occur in which the disputants agree over the aesthetic properties of the given object, but disagree as to whether these constitute necessary or sufficient conditions for the predication of the term "beautiful". (An aesthetic disagreement.)

While Santayana's views can therefore be accepted as they stand, though they are incomplete, it is difficult to see how they buttress Marshall's contention that the term "beautiful" is univocal. They will do so only on the addition of a premiss which is not stated: that the meaning of the term "beautiful" is distinct from the sets of sufficient conditions for its ascription. It is implicit in the formulation of the types of dispute he analyses that Santayana recognises that there are various sets of such criteria. However, it is to be doubted whether he was aware of the need to establish it. In the absence of any argument on the point, Santayana can hardly be said to have succeeded in supporting Marshall's case.

Having attempted to support Marshall, Santayana turns to criticism of his views, and to the main aim of the paper, i.e. to establish the thesis that "beautiful" and other aesthetic terms have a variety of different meanings. He first considers some of the senses which have been given to the term, "beautiful". Marshall himself (Santayana reports) notes that for the Greeks, the Beautiful was not an aesthetic category at all, but a moral one:

"it meant, in the most typical instances, the 'honestum', the noble, excellent, admirable, or rightly constituted."(108)

The modern usage of "beautiful" as an aesthetic term therefore involves a shift in meaning and, even in modern philosophy, the term is not unambiguous:

"...as Croce observes, it is a hybrid concept which covers the attractive, the 'simpatico', as well as the expressive..."(109)

"Expression" is another central aesthetic category which has a diversity of meanings. Platonic idealists claim that a being of the lowest order may express the highest; a worm may express the inexpressible. This is the opposite of Romantic expressiveness: for the Romantic, the world is the creat-
ion of his own consciousness or Will, and its whole merit is that it expresses him. Santayana's criticism of this latter point of view, it will be clear by now, is wholly typical of him:

"This which he (i.e. the Romantic) calls his spirit or Will is something vital but distracted; little as he suspects it, it is matter in him speaking without self-knowledge."(110)

Marshall maintains that beauty consists in stable pleasure. Santayana quotes him as follows: "Beauty is relatively stable, or real, pleasure. Any pleasant element may become part of the field that is relatively stable. We call an object beautiful which seems always to yield pleasure in impression, or contemplative revival."(111) Santayana agrees with this insofar as what is asserted is that pleasure is the substance of the sense of beauty:

"The one thing that beauty, as actually revealed, can never be, is indifferent; it cannot be divorced from living preference and ineffable charm. The soul must be drawn out by it; an inner commotion and a clear apparition on which the commotion centers are equally essential."(112)

He disagrees, however, with Marshall's assertion that, in order to qualify as beautiful, a thing must seem beautiful over and over again. In Santayana's view, this stress on stability indicates that Marshall is thinking not so much of the sense of beauty, but of the reasons why given works of art are publicly esteemed or said to be masterpieces. It is possible that the fitness to occasion repeated pleasure should figure among these reasons,

"but the esteem in which works of art are held by cultivated opinion depends on all sorts of considerations: date, rarity, typical character, workmanship, significance in the history of art or religion or sentiment."(113)

Santayana maintains that collectors and connoisseurs do not look for
beauty in the arts; what they look for are the qualities just listed. He goes on to separate the love of art from the love of beauty:

"The fine arts have to be studied like any other department of nature; and that study, with much fatigue and waste of spirit, will yield some pleasures and a larger view of the world; it will refine a man's taste and enrich it with all sorts of sidelights, qualifications, and ironies; but I think a lover of beauty will soon turn his back on concert halls and museums, and take to the fields." (114)

Even the love of beauty in nature can be disappointing, if it is not genuinely felt; it must be spontaneous if it is to enrich life.

By way of commenting on these assertions, it is to be noted first that the thesis that beauty cannot be indifferent is a corollary of Santayana's interest theory of value: it is asserted that values arise only as the result of felt preferences, and therefore by definition cannot be objects of indifference. Secondly, Santayana is surely wrong to quibble at the suggestion that a beautiful object can be repeatedly beautiful, although he is right to maintain that it is not a necessary condition for beauty. He seems to have in mind the view that, if an object is repeatedly found to be beautiful, the reason must be that taste has ceased to be spontaneous and has degenerated into what he calls 'obligatory raptures' (115), i.e. mere subscription to received opinion, without any genuine aesthetic pleasure being felt. The difficulty with this thesis is that it is over-generalised, as are those dissociating love of art from love of beauty. Certainly it would be foolish to deny that mindless repetition of what it is thought ought to be said before accepted classical works of all the arts is by no means an unknown occurrence; but it is not universally the case that all examples of repeated pleasure in a work of art are of this kind. Again, while beauty has perhaps no special place among aesthetic virtues, it is false to suggest that it is not among the possible reasons why works of art are esteemed.
Santayana continues by referring to Marshall's view that artists, when at work, do not aim at foregone effects but obey a spontaneous impulse. Santayana's comment is that it may well be that certain aspects of the creation of a work of art are inspired, appearing involuntarily in the mind of the artist,

"but his art begins where his inspiration ends. Art is something that can be learned and taught; and in the fine arts, as in all human achievements, that which is most admired, that in which merit is measurable, is precisely this element of success in accomplishing an assignable task."

Marshall's account of the creative process is certainly one-sided, and stands in need of a supplementary stress on technique. It is well-established that, in the creative process, the deliverances of inspiration are scrutinised and manipulated by the conscious mind of the artist. Again, the extent of material provided by inspiration varies considerably from artist to artist. It is well known that Beethoven, for example, drew very little on inspiration, creating most of his works by relentless working-over of small phrases. Yet Santayana goes too far in his correction of Marshall's views in suggesting that the quality of inspired aesthetic material is not an object of aesthetic judgment, and that only its conscious fashioning is. Indeed, it is surely the quality and fecundity of an artist's inspiration which ultimately determines his stature; all the technique there is will not disguise poverty of material. If what Santayana says were true, no distinction would be drawn between the technically proficient in the arts, and those who are proficient and more besides.

Santayana goes on to deny that it is the function of the fine arts to create beauty; or at least, that this suggestion as to their function will not serve to differentiate them from useful objects or natural objects. To say that works of art are (by definition) beautiful,

"by no means implies that such boastful or playful works will give
more pleasure or possess more actual beauty than useful or natural objects — but they will attract and hold public attention and if there is any real beauty in them it will be easier to name and to point to than the thousand intangible beauties which a poet finds in rambling through the world.” (117)

Further against the view that the function of the fine arts is to create beauty, he maintains that the artist usually has a technical task set for him in advance, a task which will measure his skill and power. Twice in the history of European art, in Greece and at the Renaissance, this task has been to represent things as they look. This is a legitimate ambition:

“but it was not a search for greater beauty. Beauty cannot be searched for; and if a subtler sense for beauty had then been driving men to new types of composition, they might have refined their calligraphy, multiplied the harmonies of design or of sentiment, without becoming more realistic; both decoratively and poetically the archaic arts, as we see today, were the more beautiful.” (118)

Again, modern artists have the technical ambition of emphasizing single characteristics or single emotions in violent abstraction. Like the representational ambitions of earlier artists, this aim has no special connection with beauty.

Insofar as Santayana is here denying that the possession of beauty is a necessary condition for art, then what he says is surely incontestable, and accords with the analysis of the usage of the term “art”, put forward in Ch. VI, above. It is far fetched, however, to maintain that beauty is as unspecial to artists as he seems to imply here; there is no reason to assume that the goals of either representational or abstract art are incompatible with or were historically dissociated from a wish to create beautiful works.

In conclusion, Santayana epitomises his own views by using Marshall’s terms in different senses. Happiness is the true Good, and if Moral Good means noble habit become second nature, the Moral Good is part of the Useful
being a means to that end. The Beautiful, as actually felt, would be a part of the Good; "being a sublimation of pleasure and an ingredient in a complete happiness" (119) Santayana thinks that, in so twisting the meanings of these terms, he is not false to Marshall's intentions,

"so variable are all these categories, themselves creatures of passing intuition, and so little do they mark any permanent lines of cleavage in the living world." (120)

As a general comment on this paper, it is to be stressed that it is to Santayana's credit to insist as he does on the variability in meanings of terms in aesthetics. This view might now seem obvious; but if so, that is largely due to the linguistic insights provided by Wittgenstein and the analytic school of aesthetics. Santayana worked alone and insisted on this point years before it became the truism of analysis it now is.

It is in a long footnote to this paper that Santayana makes some general remarks on beauty which indicate a change of view from that expressed in "The Sense of Beauty" (cf. Ch.I, above). In the course of his discussion of Marshall, Santayana has occasion to use the term, "objectify", and introduces the note to differentiate this new usage from that of "The Sense of Beauty". The term, "objectified" in the phrase, "objectified pleasure" (the definition of beauty in "The Sense of Beauty") was 'a fortiori' not intended to indicate any hypostasis of beauty, i.e. he did not wish, in the early work, to put forward an objectivist theory of beauty, but on the contrary a subjectivist one.

The adoption of the metaphysics and epistemology of the Realms of Being led Santayana to modify these early views in certain ways. The most important emendation to the earlier doctrine is that pleasure does not need to be objectified because it is not intrinsically subjective. This is a consequence of the distinction between intuition of essence and the essence intuited; the intuition is subjective, the essence intuited neutral.
"Nothing is subjective in experience except experience itself, the passing act of intuition or feeling; the terms distinguished during that experience, such as specific qualities of colour or pleasure, are neither objective nor subjective, but neutral...Pleasure therefore does not need to be objectified in order to be fused into an image felt to be beautiful: if felt at all, pleasure is already an object of intuition; and the beautiful image is never objective in any other sense."(121)

The experience of pleasure, on this analysis, is of a universal essence, which is neither objective nor subjective, but neutral.

Nevertheless, Santayana maintains, with regard to the view expressed in "The Sense of Beauty", "I am far from disowning my old view in its import." (122) He was making an effort to describe what he felt within himself whenever he experienced beauty. Again, the phrase, "objectified pleasure", was not intended as a definition of beauty, "a visionary essence utterly indefinable"(123); rather,

"it was an indication of the conditions and manner in which the momentary apparition of beauty arose and vanished. If I tried now to give such an indication I might perhaps say that beauty was a vital harmony felt and fused into an image under the form of eternity. I add the last five words...in order to emphasize the fact that beauty, as I feel it, transports us altogether into the realm of essence, and that no pleasure, interest, or admiration becomes a sense of beauty unless it does so."(124)

This later opinion can be paraphrased as follows: the experience of beauty is an aesthetic experience, i.e. it involves a contemplation of essences for their own sake, not as signs of the external world. Essences are eternal: hence the references to eternity and to the realm of essence. Like all mental events, this contemplation must be epiphenomenal. It involves freedom from distraction and therefore presupposes a harmony within the organism, and between organism and environment; hence the reference to
vital harmony as a condition for contemplation. This position diverges from that of "The Sense of Beauty" in the following way: in the early work, the experience of beauty is of an object in the external world, since beauty is pleasure regarded as a quality of an object. In the later view, aesthetic experience is by definition not of the external world, but of essences considered as immediate data.

More modifications in the theory of beauty are evident in two passages in "The Realm of Essence". He begins the first of these passages by reiterating that, when an essence appears to us to be beautiful, it is because it is harmonious with our nature. He goes on to develop the notion of the individual essence, beauty: clearly, in his system there must be such an essence, since beauty is a discernible character:

"The beautiful is itself an essence, an indefinable quality felt in many things which, however disparate they may be otherwise, receive this name by virtue of a special emotion, half wonder, half love, which is felt in their presence." (126)

This passage makes clear a further divergence with Santayana's earlier views: formerly, the experience afforded by beauty was said to be simply pleasure; in the later writings, it is a complex of awe and love. It is highly questionable on introspective grounds whether the presupposition common to both views is justified, i.e. that there is one feeling common to the experiences occasioned by all beautiful objects.

Santayana continues by making explicit an aesthetic corollary of the doctrine of essence: since beauty is an essence, beauty itself can be contemplated. He is careful, however, to distinguish this view from certain classic opinions with which it might be confused:

"The essence of the beautiful, when made an object of contemplation by itself, is rather misleading; like the good and like pure Being, it requires much dialectical and spiritual training to discern it in its purity and in its fulness." (127)

Mired by it, philosophers have sometimes converted it into a causal agent
in teleological explanations; others have buried it under massive
descriptions of the circumstances of its occurrence.

That contemplation of the essence of beauty itself is possible in the
later philosophy is evidence of how great a development, in the direction
of Platonism, had taken place in Santayana's beliefs. In the earlier
theory, it is impossible for there to be an experience which has for its
object beauty 'tout court', simply because beauty must be regarded as quality
of an object. There is no hint in the early works that the object can
disappear from contemplation and pure beauty be left. Whether the later
view is an improvement on the earlier is surely highly questionable; even
if it is intelligible to speak of an experience of beauty where the beauty
is not a quality of anything whatever, it is certain that states approxi-
miting to this are of extreme rarity, and therefore Santayana can hardly
be said to have contributed to the understanding of less esoteric
encounters with beauty.

He concludes this passage with the assertion that the beautiful,
"is a great liberator of other essences. The most material thing,
in so far as it is felt to be beautiful, is instantly immaterial-
ised, raised above personal relations, concentrated and deepened in
its pure being, in a word, sublimated into an essence..."(128)

What Santayana appears to mean is simply that an object regarded as beautiful
is contemplated; in which case, all its qualities are contemplated; the
essences normally taken to be indices of properties of the object are
regarded as pure essences. It is in this sense that the object may be said
to be "immaterialised". This view is objectionable as a corollary of the
thesis that aesthetic experience and immediate experience can be
identified. (Cf. Ch.V, above)

The second passage on beauty in "The Realm of Essence" occurs as part
of an argument designed to show that, however complex the physiological
(i.e. in Santayana's sense, psychic) causes of intuition may be, the essence
intuited may be perfectly simple.

Suppose a Chinaman in the Louvre is invited to admire the Venus of Milo. The admiration expected of him is a spiritual emotion; and no amount of intellectual preparation will induce this state in him. Used to works of his own tradition, he will be unmoved by the Greek statue:

"He will remain cold, because he will miss here the things which in his case can work the miracle and entrance the mind: things minute, ornate, parti-coloured, fragrant, incidental" (129)

This passage demonstrates clearly Santayana's grasp of what has since come to be called cultural conditioning, which hardly needs comment here. He continues by specifying what he takes to be the factors contributory to forming the sense of beauty in any individual:

"The sense of beauty is not a feeling separable from some intuition of form; on the other hand, it is a feeling, not a verbal or intellectual judgment. It arises by the convergence in the psyche of many assaults and many reactions, from far and near." (130)

He specifies morality, literature, erotic sensibility, "familiarity", "lucidity", and "harmony with other esteemed things", as his list of these "assaults and reactions". (131)

From the philosophical, as opposed to the psychological point of view, the chief interest of this passage lies in the emphasis on form, which is new in Santayana's theory of beauty. In the light of the doctrine of essence, however, this new stress is not surprising. Why this is so becomes clearer in the light of a further passage, in which the emphasis on form is reiterated. Santayana is arguing that the notion of essence has several important properties in common with a beautiful form:

"In a form felt to be beautiful an obvious complexity composes an obvious unity; a marked intensity and individuality are seen to belong to a reality utterly immaterial and incapable of existing otherwise than speciously... his divine beauty is evident, fugitive, impalpable, and homeless in the world of material fact; yet it is
unmistakably individual and sufficient unto itself, and although perhaps soon eclipsed is never really extinguished: for it visits time, but belongs to eternity."(132)

Santayana is slightly inexact here: he should restrict his analogy between essence and beautiful form to complex essences: on his own premisses, simple essences definitionally cannot possess any complexity whatever, and therefore cannot exhibit the unity in multiplicity of which he speaks. As has been said, however, the main interest of this passage lies in the formalism in the theory of beauty which it reveals. In, "The Sense of Beauty", Santayana argued that material and expressive properties of the aesthetic object contribute to its beauty. However, since in his later philosophy he is committed to holding that the aesthetic experience is experience of essences alone, not objects, it is hard to see how he can accommodate his earlier remarks on material and expression. An essence is immaterial, and it is not an object in the sense of the earlier theory with which feelings, thoughts, etc., can be associated, and so cannot satisfy the earlier conditions for expression. Hence, Santayana is left only with form of which to predicate beauty. For reasons already given in Ch.I, the theory of beauty of "The Sense of Beauty", where room is allowed for contributions by material and expression, is preferable to the restricted formalism of the later theory.

The doctrines of the Realms of Being explain his remarks to the effect that beauty is fugitive and eternal, but a visitor in time. Beauty is an essence, and so eternal; but it is periodically instantiated in matter, and so "visits time."

The aim of this second passage in "The Realm of Essence", it may be repeated, is to show that complex psychic events may result in a simple intuition. Santayana maintains that the effect of all the experiences which contribute to cultural conditioning is not reflected in the actual intuition of beauty. All this conditioning, "occurs underground; it is physical and merely preliminary to the
beauty realised in intuition. This realised beauty is not compounded of those miscellaneous extinct impressions...it is a fresh flower, with its own form, its own scent, and its own naughtiness."(133)

He adds that for this reason, beauty cannot be preserved, as it were mummified, in any external object, "it can belong to things only by being attributed to them by some living soul."(134)

The difficulty with the whole argument over complex causes producing a simple intuition is that many stages are omitted. Santayana is striving, in effect, to make his epiphenomenalism consistent with some obvious facts of experience. What he asserts is that there is not a one to one correlation of psychic to spiritual events: a group of psychic events can produce one spiritual event. Entirely absent is any detailed account of how this comes about, e.g., it is not clear what he counts as one psychic event - is the arousal of memories by a present stimulus one event or, as he appears to assume, a complex of events? Quite typically of him, all detail is absent.

Drawing together the main ideas from these passages from "The Mutability of Aesthetic Categories" and "The Realm of Essence", it emerges that Santayana changed his mind considerably about the theory of beauty in his later period. Beauty is no longer pleasure considered as a quality of an object, but an eternal essence which can be contemplated alone; pleasure is no longer objectified, because it is not subjective, but a neutral, eternal essence; aesthetic experience is not of external objects but of immediate data; and finally, beauty of material and expression can no longer be accommodated within the theory, leaving Santayana committed to a variety of formalist account. Because of the difficulties over the concept of essence, and for reasons given in Chapter I and the present section, the earlier view, though itself imperfect, is preferable to the latter.

(a) "An Aesthetic Soviet" (1927)

The paper, "An Aesthetic Soviet" states Santayana's fundamental
criticisms of the Aesthetic Movement. Characteristically, he does not refer to specific persons or texts; the views he attacks, however, are not relevantly different from those of Wilde, set out in Ch. VIII, above. Santayana's own position is the consequence of the conjunction of several of his own doctrines: the interest theory of value; epiphenomenalism; the theory of intuition, and the identification of aesthetic with immediate experience. These premises have all been discussed in this chapter or the preceding ones. To avoid repetition, therefore, only doctrines new to Santayana's aesthetics are commented on.

For reasons which will become clear, Santayana regards the members of the Aesthetic Movement as forming a Soviet; hence the dominant image and title of the paper. A Soviet is a caucus of comrades, joined by a bond which is both spontaneous and spiritual. It is the perfect ideal of a free society. While each member of the Soviet is an independent spirit, "grounded in itself and responsible to itself only", yet each also transcends this isolation to feel,

"the exhilaration of living and thinking in unison with a legion of kindred spirits, each no less free and absolute than itself". (135) If a Soviet attempts to enforce its authority in any way, it forfeits spontaneity and thereby ceases to be a Soviet in the proper sense.

Aesthetic feeling and invention would by their very nature seem to be the least liable of human states or pursuits to be subject to authoritarianism. The aesthete is he who takes pleasure in the intuition of essence, i.e., of immediate data. Santayana stresses that the realm of essence is an infinite field for pleasure, including every possible form which experience can take. In this sense of the term, the aesthete is he who is likely to elude authority, for,

"What could be more spontaneous and incontrollable than living intuition, and at the same time more innocent?" (136)

The aesthete is to be distinguished from the artist: "Artists are
craftsmen working under the patronage of industry, religion, custom, sentiment, or pride. They are not aesthetes..."(137) Yet they need much aesthetic sensibility if they are to excel in their crafts. A particular aesthetic bias will be visible in their works:

"Silently, and almost without knowing it, they will subject everything to special optical or manual rhythms, and will impose a thousand technical tricks, distortions, or inventions upon their subject-matter."(138)

It is this personal element which the aesthete, who in effect considers that everything ought to be made for his contemplative satisfaction, exalts into the sole virtue of works of art. The aesthetic soul in the artists themselves takes this view. Because of it they may come to find conformity to patronage and natural models a monstrous imposition. They may be tempted to rebel, to proclaim the independence of the "free imaginative element" in their works. They may well establish an aesthetic Soviet, i.e. become aesthetes, in the sense defined.

In favour of this proposal, Santayana points out that a Soviet of aesthetes does not run the risks of political or industrial Soviets, where interests conflict, and dangers must be faced from outside. The brotherhood of aesthetes is not one of blood or of interests, but purely of affinity, and can accordingly break up harmlessly at any moment.(139)

If this is the case, however, why bother to form a Soviet at all? Santayana's reply is that emancipated and free spirits are naturally gregarious. Even in the matter of spiritual vision, men prefer to think themselves part of a group:

"The truth and beauty which we profess to love would leave us profoundly disconsolate, if we could not dance before them holding hands and assuring ourselves, by saying so in chorus, that this beauty is really beautiful and this truth really true."(140)

This fact is evidence of the psychic ground of spirit, which, however
much it might think itself so, is never absolute or free: "down to its
innmost depths it expresses the life of some material organism, formed
and buffeted by circumstances." (141) Reiterating a doctrine first put
forward in "The Sense of Beauty", Santayana insists on the subjectivity of
values and their ground in our animal interests. Without these, there would
be no sense of beauty:

"Beauty...is not intrinsic to any form: it comes to bathe that form,
and to shine forth from it, only by virtue of a secret attraction,
agitation, wonder, and joy which that stimulus happens to cause -
not always but on occasion - in our animal hearts." (142)
(The stress on form as the vehicle of beauty peculiar to Santayana's later
works appears here once again, cf. the previous section.)

These remarks are not so speculative as they sound, since they are
relevant to the fate of all Soviets. There cannot be a Soviet unless the
spontaneous impulses of its members are unanimous and specific. They come
to be so by the combined influence of animal nature and external circum-
stances. The continued existence of any Soviet depends on the constancy of
these two factors:

"A common competence or a common hatred or hope is first bred by the
very institutions on which it reacts, and cannot long survive them." (143)

The only stability which an aesthetic Soviet can possess is the result
of these factors remaining constant. Were the spirit absolutely free,
and the artist a pure aesthete, he would be unable to begin creating
works of art, since, being without the bias supplied only by interest,
"pure taste is not creative, it contains no principle of initial choice,
no radical motifs." (144) That this state of affairs does not obtain is
due to the artist's having a definite human nature which he cannot escape
or put into abeyance:

"...as nature supplies his (i.e. the artist's) initial notions, so
she alsosteadies his hand, and lends depth to his final alle-
lances...why that effect rather than another? For some humble, non-aesthetic reason: familiarity, facility, contrast, affinity, chance. The spark of spirit requires the contact of arterial forces not only to kindle it but to give it direction, and fashions become styles only when they are anchored in necessity."(145)

The truth of this thesis is illustrated by the fate of the art of stained glass. Though an intensely and exclusively aesthetic pursuit, this art was not developed until non-aesthetic reasons were found for so doing in civil life. When this state of affairs ceased to obtain, when religion became puritan, the art declined.(146)

The aesthete (in Santayana's sense) is "essentially an amateur, a poetic spirit listening rather than composing."(147) In the modern world, however, it has come about that the aesthete poses as an artist. He assumes himself competent to do anything he may choose, and do it better than those who are slaves of routine:

"This is improbable: and in fact the most interesting work done by the aesthetic Soviet is that of old regimental artists who have passed to the revolutionary camp, and who can laugh at their own experiments and revert from them, on occasion, to traditional ways." (148)

This reversion is no recantation: "Pure creation, absolute music, has always been the aesthetic essence of the arts..."(149) But this creation cannot be creation out of nothing. This is the flaw in the aesthetic Soviet; its members announce that art is to be made independent of life; yet if they succeeded in performing this emancipation, the resultant art would cease to be of interest as soon as it were created. The theory, however, cannot even be executed:

"The prophets of the aesthetic Soviet announce that art must be emancipated from nature, and appreciation of art from literature. This is possible (though by no means exclusively right) if by literature we understand romantic history or fiction, and by nature
visual appearances; but there is a mother-nature deeply hidden from the eye, and there is a moral world of which literature is the verbal expression; and from these no human art can be emancipated.\(^{150}\)

A human being has animal interests, which are the ground of values which psychologically cannot be ignored. If a work of art is to endure, it must in some way satisfy these interests:

“If (a work of art) is to be permanently esteemed it must continue to enrich the sympathetic observer with some emotion which exalts him, or with some perception that he is glad to renew. Otherwise the work abdicates that aesthetic quality which was its original essence, and says nothing to intuition.”\(^{151}\)

Santayana concludes that artists might join an aesthetic Soviet, i.e. become aesthetes, periodically with benefit. The exercise would be a holiday, and they would return to their normal pursuits with a refreshed conviction of the necessity that their works be relevant to human needs:

“They have discovered afresh how mighty is any technical medium, and how varied are the methods of pure composition; none compulsory and none illegitimate, if only they minister to the life which intuition draws from nature, but enjoys for its own sake.”\(^{152}\)

In summary, from the standpoint of his own philosophical position, Santayana puts forward two fundamental criticisms of the dogmas of the Aesthetic Movement: firstly, that if the emancipation of art from life could be carried out, any works of art produced on this principle would be as good as valueless; and secondly, that in any case this programme cannot be carried out. Spirit is merely an epiphenomenon whose desires and needs are inescapable, and which prevent indulgence in pure aesthetic intuition for any but the shortest periods.

These conclusions can be reinforced by reference to the case of Wilde himself. His works obstinately endure, and, despite his aesthetic disclaimers in “Intentions” and elsewhere, exhibit a constant concern with matters of conduct, witness, “Dorian Gray”, “Lady Windermere’s Fan”, and
"An Ideal Husband", to mention only a few leading examples. There is no need to emphasize that, in "A Profundis", Wilde's concern with the ethic of love is profound and desperate. His works endure precisely because his artistic practice deviated so markedly from his aesthetic theory. He deals with matters of wide concern, involving deep human interests, so satisfying Santayana's necessary conditions for successful art.

(f) Passages in "Dominations and Powers" (1951)

"Dominations and Powers", Santayana's longest single book, is primarily a work on politics. It is considered here because certain passages in it contain his last remarks on aesthetics, and develop some themes he does not consider elsewhere.

To live the Life of Reason, it is necessary to have self-knowledge, and knowledge of the environment. To live rationally is to harmonise one's interests in accordance with this knowledge. Santayana never lost interest in these views which form the ethical presuppositions of "The Life of Reason". From the period of the First World War to within two years of his death, he composed essays and notes on these same themes, coming eventually to the conclusion that he had omitted, in "The Life of Reason", to consider some important features of the world with which the individual has to cope, particularly political factors. The Second World War seemed to him evidence of the truth of his revised views, and caused him to undertake the task of ordering his vast quantities of notes. This revision produced his last major work, "D ominations and Powers: Reflections on Liberty, Society and Government."(153)

"The Life of Reason" had been largely inspired by the ethics of Plato and Aristotle, Santayana having assumed that their views were in all important respects still relevant. Later on in his life, however, Santayana became convinced of the relativity of moral recommendations to the circumstances under which they are formulated:

"I have become aware that anyone's sense of what is good and
beautiful must have a somewhat narrow foundation, namely, his circumstances and his particular brand of human nature; and he should not expect the good or the beautiful after his own heart to be greatly prevalent or long maintained in the world." (154)

Plato and Aristotle spoke for the type of ancient city then in decline, "but they hardly consider non-territorial powers, such as universal religions, nor the relation of the State to the non-political impulses of human nature." (155)

To correct the deficiencies of his earlier analysis, Santayana introduces several new concepts, most importantly those of Dominations and Powers themselves. All Dominations involve the exercise of a Power, but not all Powers are Dominations. The difference between them is drawn from the point of view of a given person or society. This person or society has, "initial interests of their own, but surrounded by uncontrollable circumstances: circumstances that will at once be divided, by that person or society, into two classes: one, things favourable or neutral, the other, things fatal, frustrating or inconvenient: and all the latter, when they cannot be escaped, will become Dominations." (156)

Santayana does not define the term "Power". His usage indicates that it is to be understood to cover all forces in the individual's environment, human and non-human, with which he has to reckon, and forces he exercises himself.

The Dominations and Powers to which the individual is subject are grouped into three broad classes, to which Santayana refers as the Orders of Society. The Generative order of Society consists of those Dominations and Powers on which the individual is most radically dependent: parental authority and local custom. This Generative Order may be deliberately modified by a group within the community, seeking to impose a new order on it. This new order will appear criminal to society at large, but
deeply honourable to those who seek to establish it. Such activities constitute the Militant Order of Society,

"understanding that it includes all voluntary associations that cross the generative order of society; not military bands only, but all political parties, religious sects, and parasitical arts."(157)

Thirdly and finally there is the National Order of Society, consisting of those arts which are parasitical in a material sense, but most important for human happiness.(158)

Included in the treatment of the Generative Order of Society is a section on the arts, which, while briefer than the corresponding chapters of "Reason in Art", and not markedly different from them in doctrine, is of interest as being the nearest Santayana comes to a discussion of the relation of art and politics, a topic he does not face so clearly elsewhere in his works.

Certain doctrines are common to both the early and the late work. In "Dominations and Powers", Santayana draws a distinction between art in general, economic art, liberal art, and fine art: the same distinction appears in "Reason in Art", except for a change in vocabulary. (The terms, 'industrial', 'servile', and 'mechanical' are used in the earlier work instead of 'economic') Art in general is any modification of the environment by the psyche, to further its own purposes.(159) Liberal arts are those the practice of which is an end in itself, and which are not necessary solely as a means of making life possible or less unpleasant.(160) Economic or useful arts, it is implied, are those which are practised under the constraint imposed by the environment. Finally, it is evident from Santayana's usage in "Dominations and Powers" that the fine arts are to be regarded as a sub-class of the liberal arts - a point not clear in "Reason in Art" - but regrettably this is all that is clear. No definition of "fine art" is given in the text, and it is therefore not certain how Santayana wished to discriminate it from liberal art.(161*)
New in "Dominations and Powers" are certain pessimistic assertions about human motivations in the arts. All arts are stimulated by an interest which becomes the criterion of their excellence. All rely on some need in the psyche to be relieved by some specific eventual attainment. Not surprisingly, therefore, fierce proprietary feelings are to be found throughout the economic arts, and may overflow into the liberal and even into the fine arts. Santayana considers greed to be the main motive for economic labour, and takes this to explain the irrationalities to be found in the economic arts, even so closely controlled as they are by the potentialities of matter. All arts are powers in danger of becoming dominations, because, necessarily having organs in the psyche, and many of them organs in the public world, they are rivals, and each tends to monopolise the energies of life at the expense of other developments or even at the price of life itself. (162) These remarks in effect show Santayana more dubious about the possibility of rational living, because of the competitiveness of human beings and the practical incompatibility of certain goals.

Of the fine arts, Santayana considers only music and architecture in "Dominations end Powers". Music, he begins, is born in idleness. It began vocally, in that the first impulse to train vocal powers was accidental, through the delight felt in mimicking natural sounds. The root of the emotional impact of music lies in its analogy to bodily rhythms: in Santayana's terms, the source of music is "measure in motion". (163) The whole of nature is full of repetitions, among which are those of the human psyche: "the heart, the passions, and the ages of life". (164) Music appeals to these vital analogies, and "through these it diffuses the atmosphere of the various passions without representing their occasions."

(165)

Santayana goes on to reiterate in a synoptic form the thesis that music is a world apart, a view also to be found in "Reason in Art".
"the technical precision of its own medium, when artistically developed, lends to these climates of passion a non-natural form, so that the passions themselves seem to be rendered metaphysical and unworldly, all their ardour and trepidation being embodied in the apparently bodiless torrents of sound." (166)

Peculiar to "Dominated and Powers" is a statement of the value of music in the vocabulary of Santayana's later system. Music used to be considered primarily as an accompaniment to words, but now it has come to seem almost profane to dwell on this aspect of it. Pure music has become the most transporting of arts:

"It is therefore a signal proof of the unexpected fertility of the generative order in the liberal dimensions for all this science, all this art, all this unfeigned pleasure and exaltation, comes to us, as it were, from nowhere, serves us for nothing ulterior, and yet seems to us the elixir and finest flower of the spirit." (167)

Comparison with Santayana's earlier views on music reveals that all that is new in these brief remarks are the concepts of the later system. The views that music is a world apart, is transporting, and so forth, are all to be found in earlier works.

In his views in architecture, by contrast, Santayana lays a new stress on the importance of political factors in artistic creation.

Pater's view that all the arts aspire to the condition of music is clearly illustrated and in a sense corrected by the example of architecture. Architecture is fundamentally an economic art, and more dominated than any other by materials, costs and practical use.

"Yet its chief masterpieces have been always temples and palaces, triumphal gates and monumental tombs: edifices that a cynic might pronounce to be scandalously useless. Royal vanity and pious zeal have evidently taken possession of these means of expressing their militant passions and of giving to their social dominations the
powerful help of wearing an imposing and bewildering aspect."(168)

This is one obvious way in which political dominations impinge on artistic creation. Santayana continues with more remarks in the same vein. The eye is, so to speak, an artist that has to paint pictures in order to convey facts. It is this pictorial aspect of the perception of objects that first endears the world to the spirit. These appearances nowhere catch the eye more quickly than when they present themselves in the work of the artisan: every detail of construction, Santayana asserts, can be made an aesthetic delight. Again, in communal works, providing safety against raids and seiges, more aesthetic possibilities present themselves. They offer a splendid opportunity for heraldry, for example. Thus the harsh necessities of existence unwittingly let loose a passion for plastic and decorative art.(169)

The marriage of artistic impulse with moral and political powers certainly gives the liberal arts a prominent place in history and society. Does it, however, run counter to the aspiration to pure music which Pater discerned in them? Santayana certainly thinks that in this enrichment there is a temptation:

"What happens to a hermit when he is made a great abbot or bishop happens to the pure artist when he figures as a wit or a prophet in the popular mind."(170)

The suggestion is clearly that the artist ceases to be fully authentic, to be fully true to his inspiration, and instead toadies to the demands of the world. Typically, Santayana provides no examples to back up this generalisation: its truth is in any event a matter of art history rather than aesthetics.

He continues with the example of the Gothic style, whose fate he regards as typical of the relations of free inspiration to the world. The Gothic style failed when it did because the conditions in the world around it changed:

"The perfect scorn with which the seventeenth century treated every--
thing mediaeval was an economic scorn; and the new architecture with its regularity, symmetry, and quiet dignity, embodied good sense and good order no less than the rational appeal of its human scale and private convenience."

Thus Santayana suggests that changes in society - its moral and political structure, for example - govern the fate of styles. The inspiration to create Gothic came to be out of place in the changed world:

"Inspiration comes from the heart, and is always initially as blameless and courageous as life itself. This is its inalienable privilege; but it is born in ignorance, and cannot count either on permanent youth for itself or on a place for it in the world." (172)

Santayana concludes with some general remarks about the arts and the spirit. The arts, even the economic ones when they become liberal (as periodically they do), liberate the spirit. This is not the artist's intention; his intention is normally directed on some specific technical problem. The artist liberates spirit by providing it with the objects to which it is naturally addressed, i.e. essences. What spirit is liberated from are the "obstacles and inner confusions" (173) that render it, in some adventure, bound and not free.

What is new in these remarks, as has been noted, is the stress on the importance of political factors in the creation of art. Put at its simplest, political factors influence what is commissioned, and to understand a style or work fully, (it is implied) some grasp of the political background is necessary. Quite characteristically, Santayana is inclined to deny the autonomy of the work of art. His interest theory of value commits him to denying that art, if it is to be satisfying, can be independent of important human interests. Hence his criticism of the doctrines of the Aesthetes, his views on art and morality, and finally his views on art and politics. A work of art can only be valuable, and can only be understood, if it satisfies important human needs. This doctrine is one to which Santayana is committed.
throughout his career, from "The Sense of Beauty" onwards. It receives its final emphasis in these passages in "Domination and Powers".

IV: Conclusion

While Santayana's later works on aesthetics are few and brief, it will be clear that they have a certain importance, firstly because he here considers issues not treated in other works, and secondly because they include important developments in certain doctrines. In the first class come the views on Cubism and caricature ("Penitent Art"), on Aestheticism ("An Aesthetic Soviet"), art and politics ("Domination and Powers"), and the types of disagreement in aesthetics ("The Mutability of Aesthetic Categories"). In the second group come the philosophy of the spiritual life, and the revised theory of beauty. These works exhibit the range of Santayana's interests in aesthetics. That they form part of a substantial metaphysic is a credit to his stature as a philosopher, and evidence of the injustice of the neglect to which he is subject.

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Santayana is now a philosopher little read. The reasons why are summed up very accurately by Professor Passmore:

"...his (i.e. Santayana's) claim to be considered a philosopher of any consequence would certainly not, in Great Britain, go undisputed. Certainly, if philosophy is defined as the 'analysis' or 'clarification' of everyday concepts Santayana is only occasionally a philosopher. One naturally classed him with Schopenhauer...or with Nietzsche, rather than with either Moore or McTaggart. For all that his works are conceived on a grand scale, he is an episodic thinker, remarkable for his 'aperture' rather than for a sustained philosophical effort."(1)

(To be fair, it should be pointed out that Passmore excludes aesthetics from his sphere of reference in the work from which the above quotation is taken. His remarks, however, are a fine summary of received opinion on all aspects of Santayana's thought.)

It can hardly be denied that there is some foundation for this type of opinion. For example, it has been necessary to call attention repeatedly to Santayana's tendency to announce conclusions without argument; to his neglect in not providing definitions for many of his key terms; and to his tendency to use a good deal of metaphorical rhetoric to clothe ordinary insights. This accounts for the tendency to regard Santayana as a philosopher notable as much if not more for stylistic excellence than for rigour and 'sustained philosophical effort'. Moreover, what is true of his philosophy in general is also true of his aesthetics. For example, he does not provide definitions for key terms like 'art', 'industrial art', as 'fine art'; nor does he make it exactly clear what he means by immediate experience, the central term in his theories of aesthetic experience and the psychology of creativity.

The conclusion to which the arguments of the present thesis point,
however, is that, so far as Santayana's contribution to aesthetics is concerned, the style of evaluation summarised by Passmore is far too severe and sweeping. Certainly there is a lack of argument in Santayana's aesthetics; certainly there is imprecision; but equally there are important good qualities ignored by current opinion. In the first place, Santayana has a far more comprehensive set of doctrines to offer in the philosophy of art than the usual reference to 'The Sense of Beauty' would suggest. Again, he has many opinions which can either be supported analytically, or, more importantly, suggest lines of analytical argument. Again, he has some very modern ideas, and some insights which are ignored by almost all other aestheticians.

Santayana's aesthetics is usually identified with the theories of beauty as objectified pleasure and of expression as vague association, both from 'The Sense of Beauty'; both views are still referred to and commented on. After these, probably the most influential of his views in the philosophy of art has been the theory of rational poetry which, as has been indicated, appealed to several leading American poets. The remainder of his aesthetics has passed now largely into neglect. There is no mention of the theory of poetry and religion from 'Interpretations of Poetry and Religion'; of the theory of fine art, or of his writings on each of the fine arts. Nor is Santayana mentioned in current work on the relation of art and morality, despite his eminently reasonable position on this issue. Quite neglected are his views on the Aesthetic movement, on the varied meanings of terms in aesthetic discourse, and his own variety of aestheticism, the spiritual life. Santayana either states or implies an opinion on a wide spectrum of problems in aesthetics. This breadth of vision - a quality of Santayana's oeuvre as a whole - is a feature of his aesthetics for which Santayana does not usually receive full credit.

One of the major findings of philosophical analysis, in aesthetics as elsewhere, has been the exposure of the difficulties involved in essential-
Ism. Perhaps the most modern feature of Santayana’s aesthetics is his freedom from essentialism in almost all departments of aesthetic theory. His early theory of beauty shows an appreciation of the contribution made to aesthetic experience by formal, material, and expressive features of the aesthetic object; equally, in his remarks on fine art, he is not tempted to try to isolate formal or expressive properties as its essence. Again, he avoids formalism and expressionism in his theory of music, doing more than usual justice to the role of both types of property in the effect of this art. The negative virtue of avoiding the difficulties involved in many other types of aesthetic theory has a positive side; it stems from an awareness of the complexity both of works of art and of aesthetic experience, an awareness most clearly demonstrated in his discussion of the response to tragedy.

Again positively, Santayana’s aesthetics suggests profitable lines of analysis on at least two major topics: the early theory of beauty suggests the analysis of the reasons given for judgments of beauty which is put forward in Chapter I, above; equally useful suggestions emerge in his theory of representation, an area in which his ideas are never cited.

Among the most modern of his ideas in his insistence on stylistic authenticity: revivals of the externals of a style does not bring with it a revival of the authenticity it possessed as a response to genuine needs. Again, and finally, Santayana is one of the few aestheticians to have stressed the contribution made to aesthetic experience by the material of a work of art, an area of aesthetic theory which still awaits an examination as full as it deserves.

These observations invite a new evaluation of Santayana’s stature as an aesthetician, and at the same time of his relation to analytical aesthetics. He has much more to offer to a contemporary reader than received opinion would allow: the rich and metaphorical style expresses points of view which respond well to analytic treatment. Santayana is already
assured of a permanent place in the history of aesthetics. Hopefully, it has been shown that this place is more elevated than many philosophers now think.
Interest in Santayana's philosophy, in the English-speaking world at least, is probably now at its all-time low. The publication two years ago of a special issue of 'The Southern Journal of Philosophy', dedicated exclusively to Santayana, constituted an island in a sea of indifference. Nor are the chief reasons far to seek: Santayana not only wrote metaphysics but wrote it in a highly poetic style, both features which would hardly endear his work to philosophers of an analytic persuasion, or at any rate those inclined to a fairly narrow conception of the province of analysis.

In recent years, Santayana has been dismissed as hardly a philosopher at all, notable, to be sure, for a beautiful style, but hardly distinguished by tough philosophical argument.

Dr. Sprigge's book comes as a much-needed corrective to this prevailing opinion. Most of what he has to say is taken up with an examination of Santayana's philosophical system, set out in 'Scepticism and Animal Faith' and the four volumes of 'The Realm of Being'. Fairly lengthy treatment is accorded to Santayana's views on scepticism, the all-important doctrine of essence, philosophy of mind, substance, matter, and truth. Though concerned in the main with ontology and epistemology, Dr. Sprigge devotes two chapters to Santayana's ethics, and in the first of these gives some consideration to the masterpiece of the first part of Santayana's career, the five volumes of 'The Life of Reason'. Dr. Sprigge deliberately excludes any reference to Santayana's political philosophy and philosophy of religion, and, again deliberately, spends only a few pages on the branch of philosophy in which Santayana is best remembered, aesthetics. The material selected for commentary is very definitely slanted towards...
Santayana's later writings.

Dr. Spriggs does not set out to be exhaustive. In each chapter, he expounds the major points of the subject in question, defending or rebutting Santayana's views - usually the former - from the standpoint of contemporary philosophy. The aim of the book as a whole is to show that Santayana still has considerable relevance to philosophy, and in one area at least - the attempt to fit a theory of spiritual life on to a materialist metaphysic - an almost unique relevance.

Typical of the style of conclusion to which Dr. Spriggs is led is that concerning scepticism and animal faith. (The latter is Santayana's term for the irresistible impulse to believe in the external world.) While he objects to details in the argument, Dr. Spriggs thinks that Santayana has demonstrated that there is no satisfactory resting point between a solipsism of the present moment (the inevitable result, in Santayana's view, of doubting consistently all that is dubitable) and trusting in animal faith. The attempt to find certainty in anything beyond my present experience can only be the result, Santayana argues, of failing to apply the sceptical doubt with sufficient rigour. The great virtue of Dr. Spriggs's book, which sadly cannot be established in a brief review, is the skill and sympathy with which he shows repeatedly how Santayana's doctrines are at least defensible by modern techniques, and not infrequently offer positive insights.

The faults which the present writer finds in the book are fairly slight in comparison with its good points. Dr. Spriggs hardly does full justice to the doctrine of literal and symbolic knowledge, of great importance in Santayana's late epistemology. Again, he is occasionally too kind to Santayana. While he very justly censures Santayana for an unsatisfactory theory of truth, very little is said by way of criticism of epiphenomenalism. Dr. Spriggs does not discuss the well-known paradoxes in this philosophy of mind; nor is there any discussion of Santayana's attempts to
extricate himself from an important attack over inconsistency in the philosophy of mind (an attack which rattled him considerably) by A.W. Moore.

Again, the little Dr. Sprigge has to say about Santayana's aesthetics is highly contestable. Dr. Sprigge thinks it regrettable that the most widely read of Santayana's books is still, 'The Sense of Beauty', his first published philosophical work, Dr. Sprigge preferring some late remarks on beauty in 'The Realm of Essence'. While it is true that the thesis that beauty is pleasure objectified (from 'The Sense of Beauty') is difficult to defend, Santayana in this early work does show a keen awareness of the role of each of the major classes of property of an aesthetic object in aesthetic experience, i.e. formal, material and expressive properties. In other words he is quite free from the varieties of essentialism which mar most of the classic theories of beauty. It is by no means clear whether he could defend such a view, granted his theory of essence. Both the passages in 'The Realm of Essence' which Dr. Sprigge considers, and others in a later paper, 'The Mutability of Aesthetic Categories', show a tendency to formalism.

The most surprising remark in the book is Dr. Sprigge's claim that 'The Life of Reason' can hardly be regarded as an essay in rational ethics, since it is lacking in positive recommendations. In 'The Life of Reason', Santayana's central concern is to evaluate certain human institutions - society, religion, art, and science - to see which forms of each have contributed most to the Life of Reason, i.e. the life in which the good is taken to be maximal harmony of desires. His recommendations are implied in everything he says about the subjects he considers. Certainly no set of moral maxims is to be found in this work, but this is for a reason of which Dr. Sprigge is perfectly aware, i.e. that there is no one mode of life which is the Life of Reason; there are as many ways of living rationally as there are sets of individual desires to be harmonised. The central recommendations of the Life of Reason are to know oneself and to know one's environment, to
be aware of one's desires and the extent of their possible satisfaction. Beyond that, in Santayana's view, no positive recommendations of a general kind can be given. Santayana gives as much in the way of positive recommendation as his beliefs concerning the variability of desires allow.

It is to be stressed once again in conclusion that these adverse criticisms are fairly minor. Dr. Sprigge does a fine job of exposition and defence. It is not too much to say that his book is the best introduction to and commentary on Santayana's later philosophy available in English. It is to be hoped that the book has the effect which Dr. Sprigge would hope for, to stimulate a general revival of interest in a most unjustly neglected philosopher.
Abbreviations used in the following notes:

Full details of the editions used are given in the Bibliography.

(i) Works by Santayana, or including contributions by him.

AFSL : Animal Faith and Spiritual Life, ed. John Lachs
BR : The Birth of Reason and Other Essays, ed. Daniel Cory
Cous : Character and Opinion in the United States
DL : Dialogues in Limbo
DP : Dominations and Powers
EGP : Egotism in German Philosophy
HW : My Host The World (Volume three of autobiography)
ICG : The Idea of Christ in the Gospels
IHW : The Idler and His Works and Other Essays, ed. Daniel Cory
IPR : Interpretations of Poetry and Religion
Letters : The Letters of George Santayana, ed. Daniel Cory
LSP : Lotze's System of Philosophy, ed. P.G. Hunta (Santayana's thesis for the degree of Ph.D. at Harvard.)
MS : The Middle Span (Volume two of autobiography)
OS : Obiter Scripta (Essays)
PP : Persons and Places: The Background of My Life (Volume one of autobiography.)
PSL : Platonism and The Spiritual Life
RA : Reason in Art (Volume four of "The Life of Reason")
RCS : Reason in Common Sense (Volume one of "The Life of Reason")
RE : The Realm of Essence (Volume one of "The Realms of Being")
RM : The Realm of Matter (Volume two of "The Realms of Being")
RR : Reason in Religion (Volume three of "The Life of Reason")
RS : Reason in Society (Volume two of "The Life of Reason")
RSc : Reason in Science (Volume five of "The Life of Reason")
RSp : The Realm of Spirit (Volume four of "The Realms of Being")
(419)

RT: The Realm of Truth (Volume three of "The Realms of Being")
SA: George Santayana's America, ed. James Ballowe (Essays)
SAR: Scepticism and Animal Faith
SB: The Sense of Beauty
SOLS: Soliloquies in England and Later Soliloquies
STTMP: Some Turns of Thought in Modern Philosophy
TPP: Three Philosophical Poets
WD: Winds of Doctrine

(ii) Commentaries on Santayana
Arnett: Willard E. Arnett: "Santayana and The Sense of Beauty"
Ashmore: Jerome Ashmore: "Santayana, Art, and Aesthetics"
Duron: Jacques Duron: "La Pensée de George Santayana: Santayana en (Amérique"
Ferre: Luis Ferre: "Vida y Pensamiento de Jorge Santayana"
Lida: Raúl Tida: "Belleza, Arte y Poesía en la Estética de Santayana"

(iii) Other Abbreviations
Elton: William Elton: "Aesthetics and Language"
Margolis: Joseph Margolis: "Philosophy Looks at the Arts"

Works not referred to by abbreviation are referred to by author and title; details of publisher, etc. are given in the bibliography.
Notes to the Introduction

(1) 'Sonnets and Other Verses', 1394; 'A Hermit of Carmel and Other Poems', 1901

(2) 'Lucifer: A Theological Tragedy', 1399


(4) LSP, p.219.

(5) op. cit.,pp.4-5.

(6) 'A General Confession', Schilpp,p.11; Santayana's views on German philosophy are developed at length in EDP.

(7) 'A General Confession', Schilpp,p.10


(9) Letter to William James, 21/2/1837, Letters,p.23


(11) 'A General Confession', Schilpp,p.13; cf. HW, Ch. Two.

(12) Bike,A,p.77

(13) 'A General Confession', Schilpp, p.15

(14) Ibid.

(15) op. cit.,p.17

(16) op. cit.,p.20

(17) MS,p.165

(18) 'What is Aesthetics?', OS,p.28

(19) op.cit.,OS,p.25; cf. S9 Introduction,pp.6-8

(20) 'What is Aesthetics?', OS,p.23

(21) S9,p.8

(22) ibid

(23) op cit,p.9
Notes to Chapter I: The Nature of Beauty

(1*) e.g. by A.J. Bahm, 'Beauty Defined'. Acknowledging the joint influences of Santayana and DeWitt H. Parker, Bahm defines beauty as 'pleasure objectified, involving either sensation, pattern, or combination of these, and involving some degree of organic unity', (op cit., p. 532).

Bahm does not significantly alter the doctrine of objectification, and his view succumbs to the difficulty involved in that notion set out later in the text of the present chapter.

(2*) Soes's paper in Schilpp, pp. 250-1. He follows Santayana's first biographer, G.W. Howgate. See his, 'George Santayana', pp. 97-9. For reviews of SB, cf. entries of section III of the bibliography under Alfred Hodder and J.D. Logan. The piece by B.I. Gilman listed in the same section of the bibliography is a reply to Logan.

(3*) Other discussions of the objectification theory can be found in commentaries on Santayana as follows: (i) Arnett, ch. Two; (ii) Singer, Ch. Two; (iii) Duron, pp. 295-310; (iv) Ashmore, pp. 7-11; (v) Lida, pp. 29-47

(4) 'A General Confession', Schilpp, p. 7
(5) op.cit., p. 9
(6) SB, p. 143
(7) e.g. 'A General Confession', Schilpp, p. 18
(8) SB, p. 22
(9) op. cit., pp. 37-40
(10) op. cit., p. 34
(11) op. cit., p. 179

(12*) Among those who use this vocabulary are Singer, op. cit., ch. Three, passim, and Stephen C. Pepper, 'Santayana's theory of Value', Schilpp, pp. 219 sqq.

(13*) In his doctoral thesis, feeling his way towards his own later position, Santayana writes: '....moral values are feelings and emotions, prior to all theories and unchangeable by them.' ISP, p. 208
(14) SB, p. 41
(15) op. cit., p. 31
(16) op. cit., p. 18
(17) op. cit., p. 7; same point in RC3, pp. 173-4
(18) cf. note (12*), above.
(19) 'the most recent analytic studies': cf. J. J. Warlock, 'The Object of Morality', where stress is laid on the relation between morality and wants and needs.
(20) Pepper, op. cit., Schilpp, p. 230
(21) RC3, pp. 183, sqq
(22) Schilpp, p. 233
(23) 'Apologia pro mente sua', Schilpp, p. 577
(24) SB, p. 22
(25) op. cit., p. 41
(26) ibid.
(27) op. cit., p. 22
(28) op. cit., pp. 23-5
(29) op. cit., pp. 25-7
(30) Edward Bullough: 'Psychical Distance as a Factor in Art and an Aesthetic Principle' in his 'Aesthetics'.
(31) SB, p. 31
(32) ibid
(33) op. cit., pp. 32-3
(34) op. cit., p. 33
(36) SB, p. 35
(37) ibid.
(38) op. cit., p. 37; cf RA, pp. 325-6, where the same view is assumed.
(39) SB, p. 39
(40) Nelson Goodman: 'Languages of Art', p. 243
While Santayana does escape the usual varieties of essentialism in the theory of beauty, there are passages, it must be admitted, in which he veers towards formalism without logically committing himself to it. This is of interest in the light of the formalistic development of his theory, discussed in Chapter IX, below.

In 'Reason in Art', he writes that to understand something unpleasant is 'ipso facto' to curb its unpleasantness a little; hence, peace is a triumph of the spirit. From this he draws the consequence:

"Melancholy can in this way be the good of art; and it is no paradox that such a material may be beautiful when a fit form is imposed upon it, since a fit form turns anything into an agreeable object; its beauty runs as deep as its fitness, and stops where its adaptation to human nature begins to fail."(RA, p.252)

Certainly, form is here given pre-eminence among the properties of an aesthetic object. A similar stress on form is found also in this passage from 'Interpretations of Poetry and Religion':

"The stuff of language is words, and the sensuous material of words is sound; if language is therefore to be made perfect, its materials must be made beautiful by being themselves subjected to a measure, and endowed with a form."(IPR,p.176)

The idea is borrowed from R.M. Hare: 'The Language of Morals'.

In recent ethics, the meaning/criteria distinction is developed by Hare, op.cit., and by J.O. Urmson in his paper, 'On Grading'.

There are many corroborative references which could be given. Two which figure in important works on aesthetics are Clive Bell, 'Art', pp.30-1; and Roger Fry, 'Vision and Design', pp.29aqq and 45aqq.

J.O. Urmson: 'What makes a situation aesthetic?'

op.cit., in Margolis,pp.22-4

Notably, of course, 'Symposium', 210-11
(49) 'Metaphysics', 1078b1 sqq.
(50) 'Poetics', 1450b34 sqq.

(51) St. Augustine: cf. 'De Vera Religione', Chs. 30-32, and Letter 18 to Caelestinus.

(52) Lessing: 'Laocoon', ch. XX


(54) In the English tradition, for example, both Hutcheson and Coleridge are formalists. Passages from the former's 'An Enquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty' and from the latter's, 'On the Principles of Criticism' are reprinted in Carritt,E.F., ed., 'Philosophies of Beauty'.

(55*) Plotinus, 'Ennead' I,vi,1. In Carritt, op.cit.,p.4. Santayana himself remakes this point: '..there may be an interesting object without any perceived structure, like musical notes, or the blue sky'(38,p.83)

(56*) 33,pp.200-1. The same thought is set out in Santayana's paper, 'Philosophy on the Bleachers', published two years before 'The Sense of Beauty', i.e. in 1894:

"A few moments of enjoyment and intuition, scattered throughout our lives, are what lift the whole of it from vulgarity. They form a background of comparison, a standard of values, and a magnet for the estimation of tendencies, without which all our thought would be perfunctory and dull. Enthroned in those best moments, art, religion, love, and the other powers of the imagination, govern our character, and silently direct the current of our thoughts." ('Philosophy on the Bleachers' in SA,pp.124-5)

Cf. also 'Interpretations of Poetry and Religion',p.179, where a new element is introduced into the analysis. Beauty (he writes) suggests a world more closely in harmony with our desires, i.e. an ideal world.

Santayana writes that the sensual qualities of words and their utterance in measure, "suffice to give that thrill of exaltation, that suggestion of
(56*, cont.) an ideal world, which we feel in the presence of beauty"(cf. also IPR, p.169, for the same point). Santayana's views on the construction of ideals by the imagination are discussed at some length in Chapter V, below.

Notes to Chapter II: The Materials of Beauty

(1*) SB, p.44. This section of 'The Sense of Beauty' is discussed in the commentaries as follows: (i) Arnett, pp.32-4; (ii) Ashmore, pp.12-14; (iii) Duron, pp.310-12; (iv) Singer, pp.133 sqq.

(2) SB, p.45

(3) ibid

(4) op.cit., p.46

(5) op.cit., p.45

(6) ibid

(7) ibid

(8*) op.cit., p.49. Santayana is here drawing on Stendhal's 'De L'Amour', the crystallisation theory of which is of course congenial to him, holding as he does that beauty is pleasure objectified. Both theories involve the projection of thoughts or feelings of the perceiving subject onto an object.

(9) SB, p.50

(10) op.cit., pp.51-3


(12) BA, pp.228-9

(13) Nelson Goodman: 'Languages of Art', p.243


(15*) Maurice Guayau: 'Les Problemes de L'Esthetique Contemporaine', p.63; cf. Edward Bullough, 'Aesthetics', p.119. It is worth noting that Croce rejects the doctrine that only the so-called 'higher senses' are aesthetic. His view is that "all impressions can enter into aesthetic expressions or
"(15*:otd.) formations, but that none are bound to do so." ("Aesthetic as Science of Expression and General Linguistic", p.18)

(16) ibid, p.56
(17) ibid
(18) ibid
(19) ibid
(20) ibid
(21) op.cit., pp.57-8
(22) op.cit., p.59
(23) op.cit., p.61
(24) op.cit., p.62
(25) ibid
(26) RA, p.261 (and 263-4, for other remarks in the same vein.)
(27) Letter to Arthur Davison Fiske, 18/7/1913, Letters, p.127
(29) op.cit., p.402
(30) Bullough, op.cit., pp.113-4
(32) 'The Future of Architecture', pp.27-8
(34) 'The Future of Architecture', p.324
(35) op.cit., p.213
(36) 'The Natural House', pp.47-8; cf. p.51
(37) op.cit., p.151
(38) 'The Future of Architecture', p.94
(39) 'The Natural House', p.175
(40) 'The Future of Architecture', p.86
(41) op. cit., p. 166
(42) Le Corbusier: 'Towards a New Architecture', p. 13
(43) op. cit., p. 61
(44) op. cit., p. 266
(45) Pier Luigi Nervi: 'Aesthetics and Technology in Building', Preface (pages of this section of the book unnumbered.)
(46) 'Henry Moore on Sculpture' ed. Philip James, p. 69. This piece dates from 1933, part of the manifesto of the group Unit One.
(47) Jack C. Rich: 'The Materials and Methods of Sculpture', p. 3
(48) Philip James, ed., op. cit., p. 113. This remark by Moore dates from 1951.
(49) Le Corbusier, op. cit., p. 9
(51) Lloyd Wright: 'The Natural House', p. 53
(52) op. cit., p. 52
(53) op. cit., pp. 36-7
(54) op. cit., p. 52
(55) Nervi, op. cit., pp. 4 and 11
(56) op. cit., pp. 4-5
(57*) op. cit., p. 10. It is to be noted that remarks of this kind are not restricted to twentieth century writers. Viollet-le-Duc, for example, repeatedly emphasizes the need for the architect to understand not only the physical properties of materials, but also their aesthetic potential:

"To know the nature of the materials we are to employ is not only to know the strength and texture of stone, the pliability and toughness of forged iron, the rigidity and brittleness of cast iron, etc., but it is to be able to anticipate the effects these materials are capable of producing under certain conditions; it is to comprehend thoroughly, for example, the essential differences of expression between a monostyle set up on end and a pair built up of courses of masonry" (From the Tenth of the 'Discourses on Architect-
Philip James, ed., op. cit., pp. 113-4. Santayana agrees with Moore on the important relation between form and material in sculpture. In his 1903 paper, 'Sculpture', Santayana maintains that the chief importance of the material in representational sculpture is precisely that it should render the form with sufficient subtlety and elasticity. ('Sculpture', p.110. This paper is discussed more fully in Chapter VII, below.) The difficulty with this point of view is one of omission: curiously, Santayana does not point out in this paper the importance of the intrinsic properties of the medium. A remark in 'Reason in Art' to the effect that, in representational art, a good medium is one which makes possible a good rendition, escapes this criticism, but only because of its imprecision. It is not clear whether a 'good rendition' does or does not make maximal use of the intrinsic properties of the medium. (RA, pp.316-7)


'The same red...takes on different properties, not only according to its use in distemper, tempera, fresco, or oil, but also a different property according to the manner of its application in each one of these various processes' (op. cit., p.34)

Again, he points out that materials are no less important in drawing than in painting. Not only is there a great range of materials - ink, wash, lead-pencil, charcoal, sanguine, crayon - but they are not interchangeable. Imagine the impossibility of a sanguine by Watteau copied by Ingres in lead-pencil. (ibid.) Finally, he comments on the relation of volume to material:

'Is it not strange that a volume may change, as it assumes shape in
(61**, ctd.) marble, bronze, or wood, as it is painted in distemper or oil, engraved with a burin or lithographed?" (op.cit.,p.35)

So, because volume depends on the light that models it, and the light is affected by the surface that receives it. The light may flow easily or come to rest; it can penetrate the surface to a greater or less degree; it may receive a dry or oily quality from it:

"In painting it is more than plain that the interpretation of space is a function of matter, which sometimes limits space, and sometimes destroys its limits. Then, too, a given volume varies according to whether it is painted in full impasto or in superimposed glazes" (op.cit.,p.35)

(62) SB, p.64

Notes to Chapter III: Form

(1) cf. e.g. P.A.E. Hutchings: 'Organic Unity Revindicated'.
(3) Le Corbusier and Amédée Ozenfant: 'Purism', p.71
(4) Suzanne K. Langer: 'Philosophy in a New Key', ch.8 and 'Feeling and Form'.
(5) Eve Schaper: 'Significant Form', p.33
(6) Bell, op.cit., pp.22-3; Fry, op.cit., pp.236-7; Whistler, op.cit., p.127
(7) Whistler, op.cit., pp.127-8 and 145
(8) Bell, op.cit., pp.33-7; Whistler, op.cit., p.127
(9) Bell, op.cit., pp.21-2
(10) Fry, op.cit., p.235; cf. Whistler, op.cit., pp.127-8
(11*) Bell, op.cit., p.15; cf. his remarks on Michelangelo. The description of Rembrandt as 'a typical ruin of his age' (op.cit., p.156) is worth remembering as a reminder to the lengths to which he was prepared to go in defence of his views.
(12) SB, p.65
(13) Ibid
(14) op.cit., p.148
(15) op.cit., p.66
(16) Ibid
(17) op.cit., p.67
(18) Ibid
(19) op.cit., p.75
(20) Dorothy Vernon: "The Psychology of Perception", p.45
(21) SB, p.76
(22) Ibid
(23) Boas' paper, Schilpp, p.254
(24) ibid, "Critique of Judgment", p.63
(25) Discussed by Michael Podro: "Formal Elements and Modern Theories of Art"
(26) Aristotle, "Poetics", ch.7; cf. Van Meter Ames, "What is Form", p.27
(28) SB, pp.76-7
(29) cf. Podro, op.cit.
(30) SB, p.77
(31) Ibid
(32) Ibid
(33) op.cit., p.78
(34) Ibid
(35) Ibid
(36) Ibid
(37) Ibid
(38) op.cit., p.79
(39) op.cit., p.80
(40) op.cit., p.81
(41) ibid
(42) ibid
(43) ibid
(44) op.cit., p.86
(45) op.cit., p.37
(48) SS, p.48
(49) ibid
(50) ibid
(51) op.cit., p.102
(52) op.cit., p.103
(53) op.cit., p.104
(54) op.cit., pp.104-5
(55) op.cit., p.105
(56) op.cit., p.106
(57) op.cit., pp.107-10
(58) op.cit., p.111
(59) op.cit., pp.112-3
(60) George Steiner: 'Tolstoy or Dostoevsky', p.11
(61) Daron, p.316
(62) Quoted in Bosanquet, 'History of Aesthetic', pp.319-20
(63) SS, p.113
(64) op.cit., p.114
(65) ibid
(66) op.cit., p.116
(67) op.cit., p.68
(68) op.cit., pp.67-8
(69) op. cit., pp. 68-9
(70) op. cit., p. 69
(71) op. cit., p. 70
(72) op. cit., p. 73
(73) op. cit., p. 3 (Preface to SH)
(74*) Hermann Lotze: 'Medizinische Psychologie', Leipzig, Weidmann, 1852
French tr. by A. Panjon: 'Principes Généraux de psychologie physiologique'
(75) cf. Robert Thomson, 'The Pelican History of Psychology', pp. 33-4
(76) 33, p. 70
(77) op. cit., pp. 73-1
(78) op. cit., p. 71
(79) op. cit., p. 72
(80*) Hermann Weyl, 'Symmetry', passim. Señor Farré, in his commentary on
Santayana, sees here the influence of Aristotle: "De acuerdo con Aristoteles,
(Santayana) cree que la simetría es un elemento que necesariamente integra
la belleza..." (Farré, p. 86. Trans: "Santayana, in agreement with Aristotle,
regards symmetry as a necessary component of beauty"). He refers us to
Aristotle's 'Metaphysics' 1037a-b: "The chief forms of beauty are order
and symmetry and definiteness". (tr. Ross) It is hard to say whether so
brief a passage on so common a theme was the determining influence on
Santayana's mind at this point.
(81) 33, p. 72
(82) op. cit., p. 73
(83*) op. cit., p. 73; cf. Henri Bogillon, 'The Life of Forms in Art', p. 9:
'The logic of the eye, with its need for balance and symmetry..'
(84) 33, p. 73
(85) op. cit., p. 74
(86*) Dorothy Vernon, op. cit., pp. 50 sqq. Desmond Morris reports a preference
for balanced and symmetrical forms among apes, and so the need for symmetry.
(86*, ctd.) is not restricted to human beings. (Morris: 'The Biology of Art')

(87) Wolfgang Köhler: 'Gestalt Psychology', p. 104

(88) Rudolf Arnheim: 'Gestalt Psychology and Artistic Form', pp. 201-2; cf. the same author's 'Art and Visual Perception', Ch. 1, passim.

(89) Köhler, op. cit., p. 35 and more generally Chs. V and VI; cf. also Robert Thomson, 'The Pelican History of Psychology', Ch. 13.

(90) For philosophical criticism, cf. e.g. W. Charlton, 'Aesthetics', p. 43; and D.W. Hamlyn, 'The Psychology of Perception', Routledge, 1961, Ch. 4.


(92*) cf. Aristotle, 'Poetics', Ch. 7.

(93) SB, p. 75

(94) op. cit., pp. 127-8

(95) cf. M.H. Combrich: 'Meditations on a Hobby-Horse' and 'Art and Illusion'.

(96*) SB, p. 38. It is presumably with some such doctrines as these in mind (i.e. concerning the psychology of the perception of form) that Santayana makes the following isolated generalisation about form in the second volume of his autobiography: '...there is a subjective root to immediate pleasure in form and harmony just as profound as the roots of the arts in the public world.' (MS, p. 150)


On Herbert, cf. The Earl of Listowel, 'Modern Aesthetics: A Historical Introduction', p. 52. It is presupposed in Herbert's usage of the term, 'apperception' that apperception is individually biased, since it makes use of individual memories and experiences. (Perhaps this is itself a trace of the Leibnizian and Kantian usages, where apperception is used to refer to self-consciousness.) This individual element in apperception is stressed by Santayana in a passage in 'Reason in Art' (pp. 285-6) headed 'All apperception modifies its object'. The point made in this section is
that all thought has a point of view: reason views the world from the standpoint of some specific interest or moral aim. This same point is reaffirmed considerably later in 'Scepticism and Animal Faith' (p. 251). Pure spirit (i.e. consciousness), Santayana argues, need never apperceive at all. Apperception is an animal exigency, imposed on animals by the world. The force of the technical terms used here is explained in Ch. IX, below. For present purposes, it is enough to note the reiteration of the idea of an individual point of view in Santayana's usage of 'apperception'. This is the only point of explanation of what he means by this term which I have been able to trace in his own writings.

S3, pp. 88-9

op. cit., p. 89

ibid

Singer, pp. 139-40

In Singer's view, Santayana singles out two kinds of form as especially unsuited to aesthetic enjoyment: (i) forms of indeterminate organisation; and (ii) forms of 'overly-determinate organisation' (a phrase I cannot locate in Santayana's text). These are said to be contrasted with (iii) forms in which the elements inevitably suggest the scheme of their unity; Singer takes the cloud as camel and then whale to be an example of this third type of form. These remarks are misleading and confused. Santayana's classification of forms as it appears in the text of 'The Sense of Beauty' is set out in the present chapter, and in it the second class of forms alleged by Singer to belong to Santayana's classification does not appear. What Singer has in mind are a few incidental remarks Santayana makes in one paragraph during his survey of landscape painting. Santayana opposes to the Impressionistic manner what he calls the discursive style of landscape painting, by which he evidently means the technique of exhaustive realism. This school of painting "collects so many glimpses and gives so fully the sum of our positive
(102o, otd.) observations of a particular scene, that its work is sure to be perfectly intelligible and plain."(SB, p.105) Having said this, Santayana lets the subject drop. Singer is wrong to suggest that this is one of the main classes of forms which Santayana discriminates.

(103) Duron, p.314
(104) SS, p.89
(105) ibid
(106) op.cit., p.90
(107) op.cit., p.92
(108) op.cit., p.93
(109) op.cit., pp.92-3
(110) op.cit., p.93. cf. Locke, 'An Essay Concerning Human Understanding', Bk,IV, Ch.VII. section 9; and Berkeley, 'Principles of Human Knowledge', Introduction, section XIII.
(111) Robert Thomson: 'The Psychology of Thinking', chs. 4 and 5.
(112) W. Grey Walter: 'The Living Brain', chs. 6 and 7.
(113) SS, p.116
(115) SS, pp.95-6
(116) op.cit., p.94. Probably Santayana had in mind Kant's judgment of perfection and concept of adherent beauty. According to Kant, human beauty is an example of the latter: 'human beauty...presupposes a concept of the purpose which determines what the thing is to be, and consequently a concept of its perfection.' (Critique of Judgment', p.66)
(117) SS, p.96
(118) op.cit., p.98
(119) 'A General Confession', Schilpp, p.10
(120) Bosanquet, op.cit., p.365
(121) SS, p.98; cf. HA, pp.300-1
(122) SS, pp.98-9. This objection to the mystical view of beauty is a
(122*, ctd.) special form of Santayana's general distaste for mysticism, a feature of his thought fairly prominent in his early works. In 'Interpretations of Poetry and Religion', he accuses the mystic of wishing to abolish human nature, rather than wishing to perfect it, this latter being what Santayana calls the 'ideal of reason', (IPR, p.16; cf. also pp.74 and 158-9. Also, W.B., pp.73-4

(123) SS, p.99
(124) op.cit., pp.100-1
(125) op.cit., p.100
(126) op.cit., p.118
(127) ibid
(128) ibid
(129) PP, p.155
(130) SS, p.119
(131) op.cit., p.129
(132) op.cit., pp.120-1
(133) op.cit., p.122
(134) ibid
(135) op.cit., p.121
(136) op.cit., p.122
(137) op.cit., p.124
(138) ibid
(139) ibid
(140) op.cit., p.125
(141) ibid
(142) op.cit., p.126
(143) op.cit., p.127
(144) op.cit., p.128
(145) op.cit., p.127
(146) C.H. Waddington: 'The Character of Biological Form', pp.43-56.
Several critics of the doctrine of expression of 'The Sense of Beauty' seem to have failed to notice how emphatic Santayana is on the point that beauty of expression is as inherent in the aesthetic object as beauty of form or material. Santayana has been taken to task for giving an untrue description of aesthetic experience of expression, in that he is taken to assert that the expressing thing and the thing expressed are in some way separate, whereas in fact they are one thing.
Katherine Gilbert put forward one version of this criticism:

"Santayana's specific doctrine of the connection of presentation and expression in art by the fortuitous link of association is simply his whole system writ small. As in reality in the gross the psyche has to create spirit to bring into the cosmic process meaning and value, so in the aesthetic experience, the immediate imaginal content is forced to suggest for itself a logically alien import". ('Studies in Recent Aesthetic', pp.135-6)

There seems to be no justification in Santayana's text for the assertion that what is expressed is 'logically alien' to that which expresses it. Again, why the verb 'forced', as if the association of ideas were a rare occurrence or one difficult to stimulate?

Vincent Tomas argues that Santayana's analysis of expression as involving two terms must be wrong, since the aesthetically expressive object is one thing, not a distinguishable fusion of two. (Tomas: 'The Concept of Expression in Art', pp.32-3 and 39 sqq. Page refs to Margolis.)

Santayana would reply that, while the two terms can be distinguished in analysis, yet as actually experienced, expressed properties appear to be in the expressing object, i.e. it does appear to be one thing, not a distinguishable fusion of two. (This line of reply is also suggested by Louise Mabel Roberts in her paper: 'In Defense of Santayana's Theory of Expression', pp.34-93.) Santayana's objectification theory entails that expressed properties appear objective. Whether this is an acceptable account of how they come to appear objective, and so of how the object comes to appear to be one, i.e. by projection is, however, another matter.

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(23) SB, p.151
(24) IPR, p.184
(25*) In 'Modern Painters' (1843-60), Ruskin writes:

"Examine the point in question — namely the difference between the ordinary, proper and true appearances of things to us; and the extraordinary, or false appearances, when we are under the influence
(25", etc.) of emotion, or contemplative fancy; false appearances, I say, as being entirely unconnected with any real power or character in the object, and only imputed to it by us...so long as we see that the feeling is true, we pardon, or are even pleased, by, the confused fallacy of sight which it induces." (op.cit., p.179)

Cf. also the empirical empathy or empathy in nature of Lipps ("empirische oder Naturerfahrung") by which we transform and humanise the objects that surround us in nature, so that we seem to hear the groaning of trees, howling of storms etc. On Lipps, cf. the Earl of Listowel, 'Modern Aesthetics, An Historical Introduction', pp.62-3

(26) Carritt, op.cit., p.253. From Lipps paper: "Empathy", "Inward Imitation" and Sense Feelings in 'Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie', 1903

(27) Carritt, op.cit., p.255

(28) op.cit., p.254

(29) op.cit., p.255

(30) op.cit., p.257. From Lipps: 'A Further Consideration of "Empathy"' in 'Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie', 1905. Carritt refers us to a passage in Lord Kames's 'Elements of Criticism' (1762), in which one element of Lipps' theory is present, i.e. the possibility of some sort of conformity or congruence between an object and an emotion: "Many emotions have some resemblance to their causes...When force is exerted with any effort, the spectator feels a similar effort, as of force exerted within his mind. A large object swells the heart. An elevated object makes the spectator stand erect." (Carritt, op.cit., p.94)


(32) op.cit., p.65

(33) Listowel, op.cit., p.71; Carritt makes a similar point in his 'The Theory of Beauty', pp.190-1:

"I cannot attach any precise meaning to such phrases as 'being active in a pillar' nor find any truth in the statement that when I
(33*) enjoy a seagull's flight or the plunge of a cataract, 'I feel myself actually executing these movements.' I do not see how either my 'practical' nor my 'contemplative' self could do so, still less do I see how such a formula could plausibly be applied to a sunset, a fugue, or the smell of a clover field."

(34) Deryck Cooke: 'The Language of Music', p.xii
(35) op.cit., p.51
(36) op.cit., p.57
(37) op.cit., p.115
(38) op.cit., p.133
(39) op.cit., pp.95-112
(40) Eduard Hanslick: 'The Beautiful in Music', p.35; cf. also Hanslick's examples from the 'Christmas Oratorio', p.36
(41) Lipps quoted in Tistowel, op.cit., p.63
(42) Richard Wollheim: 'Art and Its Objects', section 28
(44) Rudolf Arnheim: 'Art and Visual Perception', pp.433-4
(45) John Hospers: 'Meaning and Truth in the Arts', Ch.3, passim.
(46) Such views are considered and rejected by Ronald Hepburn in 'Emotions and Emotional Qualities' in Barrett, p.189
(48) Wittgenstein: 'Philosophical Investigations', I, section 523
(50) Goodman, op.cit., p.52
(51) ibid., pp.71 sqq.
(52) ibid., p.154
(53) ibid.
(54) op.cit., p.156
(55) op.cit., pp.156-7
This discussion of cost as an aesthetic element is taken almost verbatim from an earlier (1882) paper by Santayana: 'What is a Philistine?' in SA, p.138.

'Shakespeare and the Stoicism of Seneca', now in his 'Selected Essays'.

Curiously, Santayana takes a somewhat different view in a brief passage in
(73*), etc.) his autobiography. In these late remarks there is no suggestion that the tragic hero or heroine is in the grip of an illusion. The free spirit, Santayana argues, rebels against social conventions, expediencies and taboos:

"...and there I see the secret of tragic strength being often mixed with an extraordinary fatalistic weakness. You are tossed by every wave, and yet something in you observes your plight and fundamentally despises you. Most of the heroes and heroines of Racine suffer from this intellectual elevation in moral helplessness, Phèdre especially....it was this complete helplessness that Racine felt to be tragic..." (HW, p.31)

While these remarks are incompatible with his earlier views, they are arguably an improvement, since the Racinian characters he mentions do furnish a counter-example to his earlier views. It need not be the case that the tragic hero or heroine is blind to important circumstances.

(74) RA, p.252
(75) 'Tragic Philosophy', p.286
(76*) op.cit., p.287. The same argument concerning Shakespeare is put forward, from a different point of view, much earlier in the essay: 'The Absence of Religion in Shakespeare' (in IPR, 1900). Santayana is there concerned to criticize Shakespeare for allegedly lacking a total world-view, such as is to be found (Santayana contends) in Lucretius. Curiously, however, while in this early essay Santayana regards the absence of a religious world-view as a defect in Shakespeare, in 'Tragic Philosophy', he finds this absence to be a necessary presupposition for the writing of tragedy. For the reasons given in the text of the present chapter, the later view is an advance on the earlier.

Van Meter Ames reports a remark by Santayana (made some time in the 1930's, the context suggests) to the effect that he wished to revise his views on tragedy, though not to any great extent:

"I didn't discuss tragedy as much as I should have in 'The Sense of Beauty'. What I said was weak and I'd like to put an appendix correcting that. I said that tragedy pleases, not on account of the pain in it, but on account of the elements that outweigh the pain. Now I think people like a certain amount of fright and suffering, within limits of course, although I think people might be refined beyond the enjoyment of tragedy" (Ames: 'Proust and Santayana', p.65)

This remark is not developed by Santayana. What little he does say suggests that he came to have more sympathy with the view he refers to as 'paradoxical' in the text of 'The Sense of Beauty'.

Santayana makes complementary remarks on this subject of the desire to know the truth in the course of his discussion of Lucretius in 'Three Philosophical Poets'. Even if the truth is sad, he contends, a rational mind desires to know it. One such truth is that nature, while it often fosters life, often also condemns it to extinction:

"It is a truth with a melancholy side; but being a truth, it satisfies and exalts a rational mind, that craves truth as truth,
whether it be sad or comforting, and wishes to pursue a possible,
not an impossible, happiness". (TP, p.17)

What is new here, as is to be expected after the completion of 'The Life
of Reason', is the restriction of the desire for truth to the rational
mind. The qualification is surely welcome: the unrestricted generalization
of 'The Sense of Beauty', that everyone desires the truth, is decidedly
optimistic.

Santayana reiterates the theme of the ecstatic
nature of the response to tragedy in a passing comment on catharsis which
he makes in his autobiography. The context is the description of a
profound change of heart which he underwent at the age of thirty, a change
of allegiance from the existent and transitory to the eternal and ideal:

"This transition may be called philosophic metanoia. Like the
tragic catharsis, it turns disaster into a kind of rapture without
those false comforts and delusions by which religious metanoia is
often cheapened." (HN, p.10)

The further themes of the elevation and the panoramic view of life
occasioned by tragedy are repeated in a passage in 'Interpretations of
Poetry and Religion':

"This is the essence of tragedy: the sense of the finished life,
of the will fulfilled and enlightened: that purging of the mind so
much debated upon, which relieves us of our pent-up energies,
transfers our feelings to a greater object, and thus justifies and
entertains our dumb passions, detaching them at the same time for a
moment from their accidental occasions in our earthly life...the
enlightenment by which tragedy is made sublime is a glimpse into the ultimate destinies of our will." (IPR, p.195)

One further point needs to be made on this subject. These descriptions of the experience furnished by tragedy almost duplicate Santayana's later descriptions of the state which he claims is happiness. One such passage, from 'The life of Reason' is quoted in Chapter VI, section v, below. A further passage from the much later 'Genteel Tradition at Bay' reinforces the parallel. Happiness (he argues) consists in an intuition of very comprehensive scope; and therefore the nature of happiness is intellectual. This scope,

"distinguishes happiness from carnal pleasures, for although happiness, like everything else, can be experienced only in particular moments, it is found in conceiving the total and ultimate fruits of life." (op. cit., p.165)

When this view is even partially attained,

"it raises the mind to a contemplation which is very far from cold, being in fact ecstatic; yet this ecstasy remains intellectual in that it holds together the burden of many successive and disparate things, which in blind experience would exclude one another..." (op. cit., pp.165-6.)

So far as I know, Santayana never remarked on the similarity between the two descriptions: the important elements of contemplation, elevation, ecstasy, and comprehensiveness being common to both. After, 'The Sense of Beauty' he rarely mentions sublimity, and, when writing his first book, he evidently did not have a fully worked out theory of happiness. The occasion for a comparison probably never occurred.

(96) op. cit., p.147
(97a) Schopenhauer: 'The World as Will and Representation', tr. Haldane and Kemp, Routledge, v.I., p.261. Elevation is stressed also in Hegel, whom
(97*, ctd.) Santayana also admired in the earlier part of his career. Hegel divides art into types according to the relations of subject-matter (i.e., spirit) and form. The first type is Symbolic art, that in which no true form has been found to embody the Spirit; rather, there are only strivings toward such a form:

"Owing to this inadequacy of the two sides to each other, the relation of the spiritual reality to its objectification becomes one of contrast, for the former, as something inward, despises any such externalization. As being the inward universal import of this host of inadequate forms, it elevates itself above them all as Sublime. In this sublimity, natural objects and the human form and its experiences are no doubt accepted and tolerated as they are; but they are recognised as inadequate to a meaning which is exalted above all things in heaven and earth." (Introduction to the 'Aesthetik', 1835. In J.L. Carritt, ed: 'Philosophies of Beauty', p.163.)

(99) Burke, op.cit., IV,vii, in Carritt,op.cit.,p.93
(100*) In Kant's view, the mathematical sublime is an experience of alternating pleasure and pain:

"The feeling of the sublime is...a feeling of pain arising from the want of accordance between the aesthetical estimation of magnitude formed by the imagination and the estimation of the same formed by the reason. There is at the same time a pleasure thus excited, arising from the correspondence with rational ideas of this very judgment of the inadequacy of our greatest faculty of sense, in so far as it is a law for us to strive after these ideas": (Critique of Judgment, p.96)

If nature is to be regarded as dynamically sublime, it must excite fear in
Jacques Duron claims that Kant is the origin of this doctrine that
the sublime is the name of a state of mind and not an object: "Il commence...
...per établir entre eux (c'est-à-dire le beau et le sublime) une dist-
inction qui rappelle celle de Kant..." (Duron, p.325) Kant argues that the
sublime is that which is absolutely great; yet nothing is absolutely great;
greatness and smallness are merely comparative predicates introduced by
human beings. Therefore, "it is the state of mind produced by a certain
representation with which the reflective judgment is occupied, and not the
object, that is to be called sublime". (Kant, op.cit.,p.89) The similari-
ity to Kant, however, must not be overstressed, since he and Santayana
differ precisely over what the state of mind is. Kant includes fear and
pain; Santayana excludes them.

The few remarks Santayana makes on the sublime out-
side 'The Sense of Beauty' are inconclusive and do not amplify what he
says in the early work. In 'Reason in Art' he notes that poetic invention
may "buffet old associations" so as to "enlarge them to cover, with
unexpected propriety, a much wider or more momentous experience,"(RA,pp.
276-7) and this experience is sublime. In "The Realm of Truth", he notes
merely that sublimity can include the distressing and the ugly, and that,
if the sublime is regarded as part of the beautiful, this unpalatable truth
will be beautiful to us. (RT,pp.116-7) These remarks clearly do not add
to what is said in 'The Sense of Beauty'.

In the system of the Realms of Being, laughter
figures in the ethical context of the spiritual life. Pure laughter,
Santayana maintains, is not malicious or scornful; it is not a triumph of
one self over another self, but of spirit over all selves. It is a joyous
form of union with our defects, in which the spirit is victorious. (SPE,
(106*, ctd.) pp.247-3). This spiritual laughter differs from laughter as described in Santayana's earlier works. It occurs in a state of spiritual liberation, i.e. a state in which consciousness is free from the need to occupy itself with the organism of which it is the epiphenomenon. To accept this analysis, it is necessary to accept the whole apparatus of the spiritual life. Cf. Ch.IX, below.

(107) NW, p.131

(108) Plautus: 'Captivi' in 'The Pot of Gold and Other Plays', tr. E.F. Watling, p.59

(109) Aristotle: 'Poetics', ch.5.

(110*) Carritt, in 'The Theory of Beauty', gives the following quotation from Lotze in a footnote to his remarks on Bergson, but unfortunately omits to give a reference: "The comic is a joke played by the mechanism of nature on the freedom of the spirit".

(111) S3, p.187

(112) ibid

(113) op. cit., p.183

(114*) A similar indication of the peculiar, elevated effect of high comedy is Musset's comment on *le Misanthrope*:

"Quelle âme gâtée, si triste et si profonde,
Que lorsqu'on vient d'en rire on devrait en pleurer."

(115) S3, p.189

(116) ibid

(117) ibid

(118) op. cit., p.190

(119) ibid

(120) ibid

(121*) op. cit., p.193. Similar ideas on the distinction between the humourous and the comic are put forward in a short passage in Santayana's essay, 'Dickens'. (1921) Dickens, in Santayana's view, points out foibles
which are ignored in polite society. In such society, we put masks on the weaknesses Dickens exposes,

"so that a conventional world, a world of masks is superimposed on the reality and passes in every sphere of human interest for reality itself. Humour is the perception of this illusion, the fact allowed to pierce here and there through the convention, whilst the convention continues to be maintained, as if we had not observed its absurdity. Pure comedy is more radical, cruder, in a certain sense less human, because comedy throws the convention over altogether, revels for a moment in the fact, and brutally says to the notions of mankind, as if it slapped them in the face, There, take that! That's what you really are!" (op. cit., p.263)

Common to these views and those put forward in 'The Sense of Beauty' are the comparative gentleness of humour, and the harshness of comedy (indicated in the remark that there is a good deal of malice in the sense of fun) The notion that both the humourous and the comic are concerned to expose conventions is a later addition to Santayana's views, not surprising in view of the fact that he is writing about Dickens.

(122) SB, p.195
(123) op. cit., p.196
(124) ibid
(125) ibid

Notes to Chapter VI: Poetry and Religion

(1) IPR, p.7
(2) op. cit., p.8
(3) op. cit., p.9
(4) ibid.; cf. IV, p.216: Imagination is "a region of deployed sensibility or synthetic representation" between sensation and abstract discourse.
(5) IPR, p.9
(6) op. cit., p.58. The theme of idealisation by the imagination is of
(6*), std.) importance not only in the present context of the theory of poetry, but also in Santayana's philosophy as a whole. Royce once said to Santayana that the gist of his (Santayana's) philosophy is the separation of essence from existence, i.e. the discrimination between that which exists and that which has merely ideal status. (Royce's remark is reported by Santayana in his 'Apologia pro mente sua', Schilpp, p. 497) In his theory of Idealisation Santayana is insistent that Platonic and religious concepts have only ideal status, and do not denote existent entities. Royce's remark, made shortly after the publication of IPR, turned out to be prophetic, as is amply shown in the philosophy of the Realms of Being. (Cf. Ch. IX, below.) In his system, Santayana maintains that only two of the realms he distinguishes, those of matter and spirit, are existent. The realms of essence and truth are ideal only.

(The problem of the relation of the real and the ideal, it may be repeated, was probably deeply impressed on Santayana's mind by his study of Lotze. Cf. the Introduction to the present thesis)

(7) IPR, p. 148
(8) SB, pp. 139-40
(9) op. cit., p. 97
(10) ibid., cf. CONS, p. 101, for the same point; also HM, p. 159
(11) IPR, p. 92
(12) op. cit., pp. 93-4
(13) op. cit., pp. 55-6
(14) 'Shelley, or The Poetic Value of Revolutionary Principles', p. 231
(15) ibid
(16) ibid. Cf. 'What is Aesthetics?', OS, pp. 26-3
(17) SLS, p. 258
(18) SB, p. 200
(19) ibid
(20) op. cit., pp. 200-1
(21) op. cit., p. 202
(6a, stfd.) importance not only in the present context of the theory of poetry, but also in Santayana's philosophy as a whole. Royce once said to Santayana that the gist of his (Santayana's) philosophy is the separation of essence from existence, i.e. the discrimination between that which exists and that which has merely ideal status. (Royce's remark is reported by Santayana in his 'Apologia pro mente sua', Schilpp, p.497) In his theory of idealisation Santayana is insistent that Platonic and religious concepts have only ideal status, and do not denote existent entities. Royce's remark, made shortly after the publication of IPS, turned out to be prophetic, as is amply shown in the philosophy of the Realms of Being. (Cf. Ch.IX, below.) In his system, Santayana maintains that only two of the realms he distinguishes, those of matter and spirit, are existent. The realms of essence and truth are ideal only.

(The problem of the relation of the real and the ideal, it may be repeated, was probably deeply impressed on Santayana's mind by his study of Lotze. Cf. the Introduction to the present thesis)

(7) IPS, p.148
(8) SB, pp.139-40
(9) op.cit., p.97
(10) ibid.; cf. CONS, p.101, for the same point; also IHN, p.159
(11) IPS, p.92
(12) op.cit., pp.93-4
(13) op.cit., pp.55-6
(14) 'Shelley, or The Poetic Value of Revolutionary Principles', p.231
(15) ibid
(16) ibid. Cf. 'What is Aesthetics?', OS, pp.26-8
(17) SLS, p.258
(18) SB, p.200
(19) ibid
(20) op.cit., pp.200-1
(21) op.cit., p.202
The first trace of this interpretation of Plato is to be found in Santayana's marginalia to Yotze's 'System der Philosophie', where he (Santayana) describes the Ideas as 'goals of thought'. (LSP, p.100) It was an opinion Santayana did not change: cf. SAF, pp.198–200; RM, pp.376–7 (29) SELS, p.266 (30) op.cit., p.277 (31) op.cit., p.228 (32) IFR, pp.38–9; cf. SB, pp.142–6, for a less developed form of this view. (33) IFR, p.77 (34) op.cit., p.79 (35*) op.cit., p.30; cf. also: SB, pp.142–6; SA, p.93. 'The Last Puritan', 'Triton Edition', v.XII, pp.38–40; 210–211; 259. It is said of this novel that all the characters in it speak like Santayana. Certainly three of them, Peter Alden, Oliver Alden, and Mr. Barnley, accept his views on religion. The same view is retained in Santayana's autobiography: PP, p.247; HW, pp.3–5, p.108; and it is presupposed in Santayana's full length work on Christology, 'The Idea of Christ in the Gospels'. (36) IFR, p.71 (37*) op.cit., p.76. For more examples, cf. the early essay, 'Moral Symbols in the Bible', in IHM, pp.152–78 (38*) IFR, p.3. In his autobiography, Santayana relates that the publication of 'Interpretations of Poetry and Religion' in 1900 was the result of a transformation in his religious sentiments. Not that he had ever practised or believed in the literal truth of the religion into which he was born (Catholicism); rather, he had come to believe that religion should
(38*, etd.) be regarded not as history and cosmology, but as symbolic myth. (HW, pp.4-6) A comment reported by his friend and biographer Daniel Cory is more deprecatory: "he (Santayana) merely remarked that the issues he discussed in that work were very much 'in the air' at the turn of the century" (Cory: 'Santayana: The Later Years', p.17) However that may be, Santayana did not change his mind on the question of the relation between poetry and religion during his life: cf. the late works SAF, p.16; RE, pp. xiv-xvi.

Commentators have repeatedly pointed out that Santayana's doctrine on the relation of poetry and religion almost certainly owes a great deal to the works of Matthew Arnold and to Mill's 'Three Essays on Religion' (Commentators: cf. e.g. Howgate: 'George Santayana', p.134; Ashmore, pp.26 and 114, note 3) To Ashmore's references to 'Culture and Anarchy' and 'Literature and Dogma', one might add Arnold's essay: 'The Study of Poetry', where he maintains that poetry will take over the functions of religion: "We should conceive of (poetry) as capable of higher uses, and called to higher destinies, than those which in general men have assigned to it hitherto. More and more mankind will discover that we have to turn to poetry to interpret life for us, to console us, to sustain us." (op. cit. in the Everyman's Library edition of Arnold's "Essays in Criticism", p.235) The parallel with Mill is extremely striking: "Religion and poetry address themselves...to the same part of the human constitution: they both supply the same want, that of ideal conceptions grander and more beautiful than we see realized in the prose of human life" (Mill, op. cit., p.103)

Though Santayana had read Mill, he does not mention the 'Three Essays on Religion', nor indeed does he mention Mill with anything like the frequency of his references to Arnold. Of the latter, at different times he both affirms and denies a debt to him. Discussing 'Interpretations of Poetry and Religion' with Van Meter Ames, Santayana remarked: "I got the idea from Matthew Arnold who had a great influence on me when I was young" (Ames: 'Proust and Santayana', p.76) On the other hand, Cory reports that
(38*, ctd.) Santayana, "denied that he himself had been influenced very much by either Arnold or Pater; it was rather to the French writers that he was indebted — men like Renan and Taine" (Cory, op. cit., p. 72). However that may be, it must surely be true that at least Arnold and Mill implanted in Santayana's mind the idea that there is some close and profound affinity between poetry and religion.

(39) IPH, p. 139
(40) op. cit., pp. 175-6
(41) SB, p. 133
(42) IPH, p. 178; cf. HA, pp. 277-8
(43) UA, p. 231
(44) IPH, p. 179
(45) op. cit., p. 189
(46) op. cit., p. 179
(47) ibid
(48) op. cit., p. 180
(49*) op. cit., pp. 179-80. Santayana says that euphuism is a device exploited especially by the Symbolists. (op. cit., p. 179) This is presumably the ground for Philip Clair Rice's claim that the reason why Santayana should consider euphuism at all as an element of poetry was the influence of Symbolist aesthetics on advanced American literary opinion in the late nineteenth century, and therefore during Santayana's student years and early professional career. (And during the time when Santayana himself was well known as a poet.) Rice refers us to René Taupin: "L'Influence du Symbolisme Français sur la Poésie Américaine de 1910 à 1920". It follows from what Taupin reports that Santayana was certainly conversant with the Symbolist movement in America. It was two Harvard students, Stone and Simball, who founded the Symbolist periodical, 'The Chap Book' in 1894, a journal to which Santayana contributed poems. The aim of the periodical was to provide a showcase for American Symbolist poets. (cf. Taupin, op. cit., pp. 32-4) Whether it is safe to infer a deep influence on Santayana
by Symbolist doctrine is, however, another matter. Cf. note 51*, below.

The thesis that the poet has access to the data of experience is repeated by Santayana in works which span his whole career: RE, pp. 270-1; SA, p. 230; IE, pp. 153-4; RS, pp. 103-9, and the essay 'Human Symbols for Matter' in IHW, p. 136.

Inspiration is regarded by Santayana as a psychic phenomenon: by 'psyche' he means the human body with its structure of wants and needs, of which spirit or consciousness is an epiphenomenon. His materialism and epiphenomenalism commit him to explaining inspiration as follows:

"The occasion and the ambient influences merely vivify the spirit, by stimulating the organism to fuse scattered impressions, to revive and transform forgotten images, to invent, as in dreams, scenes that justify ripening emotions, and to feel affinities or equivalence in apparently disparate things." (ICG, p. 7; cf. RS, pp. 5-6; DP, p. 96)

While his epiphenomenalism allows Santayana to do full justice to the well-attested involuntary character of creative thought, he does not discuss the process of creation in great detail - the above quotation from 'The Idea of Christ in the Gospels' is the most detailed I have come across.

Blair Kie (Schilpp volume, p. 268) once again sees here the influence of the Symbolists. This doctrine, he argues, is similar to the "dérèglement raisonné" of Rimbaud and Corbière, and to the dissociation preached by Rémy de Gourmont.

Rimbaud wrote: (Letter to Paul Demeny, 15/5/1871): "Je dis qu'il faut être voyant par un long, immense et raisonné dérèglement de tous les sens. Toutes les formes de l'amour, de souffrance, de folie; il cherche lui-même, il épuise en lui tous les poisons, pour n'en garder que les quintessences". Perhaps Santayana was influenced by this doctrine to some extent; but his remarks in 'Interpretations of Poetry and Religion' clearly lack the urgency and violence of those of Rimbaud. There is no mention in
(51*, ctd.) Santayana's text of the belief that, in order to reach the data of experience, the poet must derange and disorder himself as much as Rimbaud insists. Moreover, Rimbaud sought to discover things hitherto unknown, and to do so he chose deliberately to cultivate hallucination.

Baudelaire had written, at the end of 'Voyage':

"Nous voulons, tant ce feu nous brûle le cerveau,
Plonger au fond du gouffre, Enfer ou Ciel, qu'importe?
Au fond de l'Inconnu pour trouver du nouveau."

Rimbaud, of course, chose 'L'Enfer'. These doctrines of discovery are not echoed in Santayana, for him the poet restores to experience elements present but unnoticed. At best he is a re-discoverer of these neglected elements. It seems best not to make too strong an assimilation between Santayana and the Symbolists.

(52) IPR, p.183
(53) ibid
(54) op.cit.,pp.183-4, same point :Sp.,p.129, footnote.
(55) IPR, p.185
(56) ibid
(57) op.cit., p.136
(58) op.cit., p.139
(59*) In view of this long and explicit three-fold division of poetry by Santayana, it is a mystery how Arnett can write in criticism: "It is surprising that Santayana, with his very keen sensitivity and wide experience, should not have perceived more sharply and elaborated more precisely the fundamental difference between poetry and art of the ilk that is concerned largely with the sensuous qualities of its own medium and the more profound sort (both within and without religions) which professes to be seriously concerned with the problems of men." (Arnett: 'Santayana and the Poetic Function of Religion', p.785)
(60) IPR, p.191
(61) op.cit., p.192
It is evident from the value he sets on ideals that Santayana was as Platonistic in his philosophy as his materialism would allow (cf. on this Ch. IX, below, on the spiritual life): had he been born at a time when Platonistic metaphysics were a possibility for a philosopher he would most assuredly have accepted that philosophy. In view of this, it is hardly surprising that his doctrines on poetry should on some points resemble those of Shelley. For example, in his 'Defence of Poetry', Shelley writes, relating poetry and ideals (in his full Platonic sense of the term): "The tragedies of the Athenian poets are as mirrors in which the spectator beholds himself, under a thin disguise of circumstance, stript of all but that ideal perfection and energy which everyone feels to be the internal type of all that he loves, admires, and would become." (Shelley, op.cit. in Ernest Rhys, ed., 'The Prelude to Poetry', p.220) Or again, relating poetry and religion in a way similar though not identical with that of Santayana: "Poets according to the circumstances of the age and nation in which they appear were called, in the earlier epochs of the world, legislators or prophets: a poet essentially comprises and unites both characters. For he not only beholds intensely the present at it is, and discovers those laws according to which present things ought to be ordered, but he beholds the future in the present, and his thoughts are the germs of the flower and the fruit of the latest time". (Rhys, ed., op.cit., p.210)

It is impossible to say for certain whether these doctrines influenced Santayana in the formulation of his own views. Certainly, he had the highest
regard for Shelley as a poet, as is evident in his essay, "Shelley, or The Poetic Value of Revolutionary Principles" (1913). The most one can say without speculation is that Santayana would have found Shelley's doctrines deeply congenial.

IP, p.200. Cf. Letter to Robert Bridges, 29/3/1920, for the same view, which Santayana thus retained for at least twenty years. Of Homer, Virgil, and Dante, Santayana writes: "My contention is...that their dignity as poets would fall immeasurably if they had had no geography, astronomy, theology, or agriculture; in other words, if they had not attuned their minds to the world as they conceived it, but had conceived no world and—to be quite frank—had had no mind." Letters, p.183. There are closely related remarks also in 'Lesson in Art', where Santayana specifies, as one of the ways in which art may become classic, that of expressing, "ultimate truths, cosmic laws, great human ideals," (WA, p.355). Virgil and Dante are classic poets in this sense (he repeats), and a similar classic quality belongs to Greek sculpture and architecture: "Such eminence is the reward of having accepted discipline and made the mind clear anagram of much experience." (ibid)

IP, p.200

op. cit., p.201

op. cit., pp.125-6. The tone of this passage is far from sympathetic to barbarism. Santayana’s attitude had therefore mellowed considerably when he wrote to Cory, twenty-eight years later:

"When people despise that which exists, in language, in vocabulary, or morals, and set up the sufficiency of their unchastened impulses, they are barbarians. But...that may be the beginning of a fresh civilization. It is only at first that it seems crude and unnecessarily wasteful...I am therefore far from contemptuous when I use the word." (Letter in Cory: 'Santayana: The Later Years', p.30)

This passage is exceptionally tolerant among Santayana's remarks on barbarism.
Earlier, Santayana had used the term 'philistine' instead of 'barbarian'.

(72\textsuperscript{*}) cf. TPP, Ch. IV, passim; and EGP, Ch. IV, passim; on Goethe and 'Faust'.

(73) IPP, p.126

(74\textsuperscript{*}) op. cit., p.126. For the same view of Whitman, cf. WD, pp.140-1

(75\textsuperscript{*}) IPP, p.140. Señor Lida in his commentary on Santayana's aesthetics reports on the literary historical background to these remarks on Browning. Santayana was very much in opposition to the received critical and popular opinion of the day. So great was Browning's popularity that his works were even printed as edifying appendices to tourist guides to North America, not to mention their use in religious contexts such as the sermon. Browning was regarded as a sage. (Lida, p.129) As Lida also reports, Browning did not lack defenders. One of the reviewers of 'Interpretations of Poetry and Religion', Hutchins Hapgood, while allowing Santayana brilliance of intellect and consummate style, criticises him for coldness and asceticism, finding him "lacking in warmth, in humanity, and in robust intellectual impulse." (Hapgood: Review of IPP, p.191.) Helen Dryer Woodard argues that the opposition between Santayana and Browning is that between a pessimistic and an optimistic view of the universe, and questions the justice of Santayana's analysis of Browning's attitude and beliefs. (Woodard: "Santayana on Browning: A Pessimist Criticism") Notably, neither Santayana nor his critics concern themselves with Browning's technical abilities, but rather with his beliefs. Both parties to the dispute assume the inseparability of poet and thinker, and that the views a poet expresses in his poetry are relevant to the evaluation of his stature as a poet. (The thesis that truth is an aesthetic virtue is discussed in the text of the present chapter.)

(76) cf. TPP, Ch. III, passim.

(77\textsuperscript{*}) As is customary with him, Santayana gives no indication of who it is
In the essay, 'The Poetic Principle' (1850) Poe writes: "I hold that a long poem does not exist. I maintain that the phrase 'a long poem' is simply a flat contradiction in terms." (Poe, op.cit., in "Works", v. V, p. 101) This is supported by the further claim that: "a poem deserves that title only inasmuch as it excites, by elevating the soul. The value of the poem is in the ratio of this elevating excitement." (ibid.) Since all such excitements are of physical necessity transient, there cannot be a long poem; when the excitement fails, Poe argues, what we are reading ceases to be a poem. This view is to be found also in his earlier essay, "The Philosophy of Composition," 1846.

(78) T/P, p. 6
(79) op.cit., p. 10
(80) op.cit., p. 11
(81) ibid
(82) op.cit., pp. 12-13
(83) SA, p. 99
(84) op.cit., p. 100
(85) op.cit., p. 102
(86) op.cit., p. 100
(87) op.cit., p. 103
(88) SA, p. 100
(89) ibid
(90) SLS, p. 254
(91) ibid
(92) ibid
(93) ibid
(94*) op.cit., p. 255. These remarks are similar in tone to views expressed in another late work, 'The Realm of Essence'. Santayana argues that any attempt at the communication of experience by poetry can never have more
than the most limited success, since essences given in one experience are rarely if ever repeated. (Cf. Ch.IX for an explanation of the term essence, and the background of doctrine to this assertion.) This fact, however, does not in the least impair the value of poetry, "for the function of poetry is not to convey information, not even to transmit the attitude of one mind to another, but rather to arouse in each a clearer view of its own experience, longings, and destiny." (P.109) Once again, the development of Santayana's epistemology leads him to suggest a less strenuous ideal for poetry. The notion that the function of poetry is to promote self-knowledge is, however, not developed by Santayana. The idea of the clarification of experience by poetry is mentioned in passing in 'The Realm of Matter' (p.229). Otherwise he remains silent on this subject.

(95) Rhys, op.cit., p.33
(96*) Rhys, op.cit., p.18. Cf. Horace: 'The Art of Poetry'; "The man who has managed to blend profit with delight wins everyone's approbation, for he gives his reader pleasure at the same time as he instructs him." Tr. T.S. Dorsch, 'Classical Literary Criticism', p.91
(97) Rhys, op.cit., p.153
(98) op.cit., p.204
(99) op.cit., p.112
(100*) 'Make' and 'maker' used in this sense: cf. eg Chaucer: 'The Legend of Good Women', l.69; 'Romeunt of the Rose', l.41. (Text ed. Skeat, O.U.P.)
(101) Rhys, op.cit., p.39
(102) op.cit., p.91
(103) op.cit., p.39
(106) Rhys, op.cit., p.111
(107) Preface to 'Lyrical Ballads'; in Rhys, op.cit., pp.175-6
(108) 'The Brown Book', p.164
(109) 'Philosophical Investigations', II, xi, p.193
(110) op.cit., p.195
(111) op.cit., p.199
(112) op.cit., p.202
(113) cf. Singer, Ch.I, passim.
(114) Anton Ehrenzweig: 'The Hidden Order of Art', Ch.7: The Three Phases of Creativity'.
(115) Arnold Isenberg, 'The Problem of Belief'.
(116) W.W. Hepburn: 'Poetry and Concrete Imagination', p.4
(117) A.K. Elliott: 'Poetry and Truth', pp.79-80
(118) Elliott, op.cit., pp.30-1
(119) Isenberg, op.cit., pp.129-31
(120) Elliott, op.cit., p.31
(121) Hepburn, op.cit., pp.3-9
(122) IPR, pp.117-8
(123) op.cit., pp.13-16
(124) ibid
(125) Brémond, op.cit., p.102. So far as I have been able to trace, Santayana refers to Brémond only once, in a letter to his friend Cory. (Letter dated 27.11.1953) Brémond had recently died, and Santayana had come across an article about him in a Spanish periodical. His comments are entirely what one would expect from a philosopher who is a materialist in metaphysics: "...You know (Brémond) had a theory about pure poetry which attracted a good deal of attention...Why is,

'La fille de Minos et de Pasiphaé'

a wonderful line, and ravishing poetry, whereas

'La fille de Pasiphaé et de Minos'

would be dull prose from a school-book? L'Abbé Brémond said that it was the Holy Ghost blowing where it listeth - or something to that effect; but I suspect there are tropes that let the currents through in the brain, and
(125*, ctd.) tropes that don't and that it is a matter of little orgasms in the nervous system." (In Cory, 'Santayana: The Later Years', pp. 119-20).

Santayana, as one would expect, will have no truck with mysticism.

(126) Bremond, op.cit., p.123

(127) op.cit., pp. 114-5 (Bremond is citing the mystic Brabangon.)

(128) op.cit., p.143

(129) op.cit., p.158

(130) op.cit., p.172

(131) op.cit., p.130

(132) op.cit., p.207

(133) op.cit., p.208

(134) op.cit., p.218

Notes to Chapter VII: The Nature of Art

(1) RS, p.13

(2) The note, dated, 'Cambridge, April 13, 1907,' is printed in JPPSM, v.15, no.13, (1913), pp. 32-3

(3) RS, pp.27-8

(4) op.cit., p.29

(5) 'A Brief History of My Opinions', repr, as part of 'A General Confession', Schilpp, p.12

(6*) Critics have repeatedly commented on this, e.g. H. Barker, review of 'The Life of Reason', pp. 126-32; for a recent example, cf. Thomas Samsom (I.X., 'A Propos de la Théorie Morale de George Santayana', p.386:

"...on constate chez Santayana un grand manque de précision tant dans la définition que dans l'emploi de la terminologie de base...Ce qui est encore plus grave, c'est la gratuité avec laquelle il prend certaines positions sans en donner la moindre preuve."

(7) Letters, p.76

(8) RS, p.97; similar remarks in 'A General Confession', Schilpp, pp. 9-10

(9) RS, p.227
Possibly Santayana is here confusing Aristotle's distinction between primary and secondary matter. Prime matter has no qualities whatever: its function is solely to be the potentiality for any kind of form. Secondary matter is material, with weight, density, and so forth. Possible quantity, time, and place would be determined by prime matter. Santayana's report of Aristotle's views on matter is rather too simple, and his debt to him on this point more extensive than he appears to allow.

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(11) WD, p.60; same point RSc., pp.54-7
(12) ConS, p.151
(13) op.cit., p.127; same point RSc, p.168
(14) RIS, p.102
(15) op.cit., p.103
(16) 'Comparison with Other Views of Spirit', ASSL, pp.280-1
(17*) op.cit., p.280. The agreement of doctrine is not of course complete.

Aristotle is willing to allow at least the possibility of disembodied existence to that part of the soul which thinks: "We have no evidence as yet about mind or the power to think; it seems to be a widely different kind of soul, differing as what is eternal from what is perishable; it alone is capable of existence in isolation from all other psychic powers. All the other parts of the soul...are, in spite of certain statements to the contrary, incapable of separate existence though, of course, distinguishable by definition." ('De Anima' 413b, tr. J.A. Smith)

(18) RSc., pp.106-7
(19) op.cit., p.108; cf. also RSc., pp.160-2,166-7; WD, pp.9-11, p.75
(20) RSc, p.118
(21*) op.cit., p.72; cf. also RSc, pp.165-6; 'A General Confession', Schilpp, pp.17-18. Epiphenomenalism is stated poetically in the last six lines of Santayana's Sonnet 20:

"The soul is not on earth an alien thing
That hath her life's rich sources otherwhere;"
She is a parcel of the sacred air.
She takes her being from the breath of Spring,
The glare of Phoebus is her fount of light,
And her long sleep a draught of primal night."

(Triton edn., v.I, p.224)

(CS, p.169)
(Sc, p.105)
(op.cit., pp.105-6)

(COT, p.53. Santayana is here adopting the James-Lange theory of emotion. James's paper, 'What is an emotion?' appeared in 'Mind' in 1884, and became very influential, in conjunction with a similar doctrine of the Danish psychologist Lange. James had argued against the view that an emotion is a mental state which induces the physical states which are its manifestations. He maintained that, "the bodily changes follow directly the PERCEPTION of the existing fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion." (James, op.cit., in Magda B. Arnold, ed, 'The Nature of Emotion', p.19.) James maintained that the viscera are the chief sources of emotion. The difficulties in this view were established by physiologists like W.B. Cannon. Cannon presented experimental evidence on five important points: (i) operations on animals showed that total separation of the viscera from the central nervous system does not alter emotional behaviour; (ii) the same visceral changes occur in very different emotional states (e.g. fear and rage), and in non-emotional states; (iii) the viscera are relatively insensitive structures; (iv) visceral changes are too slow to be the source of emotion; emotional reactions occur three or four times faster than visceral muscle can react; and (v) artificial induction of the visceral changes typical of strong emotions (e.g. by adrenalin injection) does not produce the emotions.

Cannon's objections are accepted as having routed the James-Lange theory.
There are difficulties not only in the theory of emotion Santayana adopts but also in that which he attacks: which philosopher ever maintained that emotions exist for no reason?

(26*) 'Comparison with Other Views of Spirit', APSL, p.286. There is more on consciousness per se, of which Santayana says very little in 'The Life of Reason' in 'Character and Opinion in the United States', p.84. He there claims that (a) consciousness has what he calls a synthetic and transitive function, i.e. it colours events with memories and facts with emotions; and (b) that by inspecting consciousness, one cannot find consciousness itself as a positive datum, because consciousness is cogitation. One can only take note of the immediate objects of consciousness, in such private perspective as sense or imagination may present.

(27*) A. W. Moore, review of 'The Life of Reason', in APSL, pp.243-4. The objection is made also by Milton K. Munitz in his book 'The Moral Philosophy of Santayana': "Santayana's epiphenomenalism is inconsistent with the practical role he assigns to intelligence in the life of reason. One cannot deny all instrumental efficacy to thought, and still maintain that 'man's rational life consists in those moments in which reflection not only occurs but proves efficacious. (I,1,2).'' (Munitz, op. cit., p.35)

(28) 'The Efficacy of Thought' in APSL, p.248

(29*) op. cit., p.249. This controversy had a third and final stage in Moore's discussion of Santayana's reply. (A. W. Moore: 'The Function of Thought'; see Bibliography for details.) Moore maintains that he finds the non-epiphenomenalistic passages in 'The Life of Reason', "so numerous, so convincing, and so vital to so much of his doctrines, that the reader will find Professor Santayana's instruction to take them in a Pickwickian sense a very difficult one to execute." (Moore, op. cit., p.522)

(30) John Lachs: 'Santayana's Moral Philosophy', repr. in APSL, p.334

(31) NS, p.370
One of the leading themes of Munitz's book (cited in note 27, supra) is that this representationalist theory of perception is inconsistent with Santayana's naturalistic metaphysics. Following Santayana, he refers to this style of philosophy of perception as transcendentalism, and to its consequence - that only data and not objects are known by acquaintance - as agnosticism. In Munitz's view, Santayana's philosophy at the time of 'The Life of Reason' includes a strain of common-sense philosophy or naive realism, (Munitz, op.cit., pp.10-12) inconsistent with his transcendentalist epistemology. He produces passages from 'The Life of Reason' which are alleged to support this view, e.g. from 'Reason in Science': "Appearances are the qualities of reality, else realities would be without place, time, character, or interrelation...Appearances define the constituent elements of...reality, which could not be better known than through their means." Yet this passage, like the others which are allegedly naively realistic, can be construed without strain as consistent with transcendentalism and agnosticism. Santayana can be regarded as saying here: 'We can know only immediate data by acquaintance; we can know reality no better than through them, because there is no other way of so doing.' In a manner of speaking, then, appearances are the constituents of reality, in the sense that they are the only reality we can in principle ever know." Whatever may be one's opinions of such views, Munitz's allegation of inconsistency is possible only on an over-stringent principle of interpretation. Adopting the more charitable view that one should interpret a writer consistently if possible, this particular alleged inconsistency disappears.

Munitz further alleges that, in 'The Life of Reason', Santayana advances the doctrine that knowledge of the external world is possible by some means other than sense-perception: "Instead of retaining sense-experience as the basis for all trustworthy knowledge, such experience is rejected in favour of an insight into the hidden mechanism of objects, an insight revealing the real and efficacious structure of these mechanisms." (Munitz, op.cit., p.30) Munitz considers that Santayana has here been in-
fluenced by Locke. This misunderstanding arises from Munitz’s interpretation of another passage from ‘Reason in Science’: ‘Science...passes...beyond the dreamlike unities and cadences which sense discloses: only, as science aims at controlling, its speculations by experiment, the hidden reality it discloses is exactly like what sense perceives, though on a different scale.’* Woolf admits that the ‘insight’ of which he speaks is thus to be arrived at by sense-perception, an admission which contradicts his first remark. Moreover, this passage can be construed quite easily as compatible with Santayana’s philosophy of perception, as the model suggested above.

The doctrine of concretions in discourse and existence is foreshadowed in ‘The Sense of Beauty’, p.97: ‘...the whole machinery of our intelligence, our general ideas and laws, fixed and eternal objects, principles, persons and gods, are so many symbolic symbolic expressions. They stand for experience; experience which we are incapable of retaining and surveying in its multitudinous immediacy. We should flounder hopelessly...did we not keep ourselves afloat and direct our course by these intellectual devices.’ cf. the same work op.107-10.

It is perhaps worth pointing out that these claims to knowledge of what primitive experience is like are possible only if Santayana’s distinction between mediate and immediate experience is presupposed. If this presupposition is denied on the Wittgensteinian grounds advanced in Ch.V, above, then Santayana’s claim becomes unverifiable, since we have no way of describing primitive experience (in his sense of the term).


1. op. cit., p.230; cf. Also, p.272: ‘...man can have no life save in occupation, and in the exercise of his faculties; contemplation itself can deal only with what practice contains or discloses.’ The development of the theory of essence in the philosophy of the ‘denial of evil’ led Santayana to change his views on contemplation. In the later philosophy, the objects of contemplation are not objects relevant to action in the external world, but essences, the immediate data of experience, contemplated for themselves, not as signs of objects in the external world, cf. Ch.II below on essence, spirit, and the spiritual life.


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(53a, cit.) 182-3 and Ch. IX, passim; 'Dickens', p.268; BFP, p.239; and 'The
Last Puritan', Triton edition, v.XII, p.253. (The hero of the novel Oliver
Alden, arrives at the morality of the Life of Reason.)

(54) HSc, p.173

(55) WCS, pp.186-9

(56) op.cit., p.189

(57) HSc, p.178

(58) HCS, pp.205-6

(59) HSc, pp.172-3

(60a) 'Two National Moralists', in APSI, p.358. Santayana's friend and
literary executor Cory thinks that the First War had a far more consider­able
effect on Santayana's philosophy than is usually realised. It led
him to consider the possibility of anyone's living the Life of Reason as
more and more remote. Cory, Introduction to Letters, p.xxx.

(61a) One of Santayana's Spanish commentators, Señor Farré, is completely
wrong about this. Morality, he asserts, is only a peripheral interest for
Santayana, and considered by him only when this is made necessary by other
problems: "No estamos, de acuerdo con aquellos estudiosos de las les
doctrina de Santayana, John Dewey entre ellos, que pretendan adivinarle
tendencias preferentemente moralistas. Dice Dewey que 'The Life of Reason'
es la más adecuada continuación que América ha proporcionado a la filosofía
moral desde los días de Emerson. Las preferencias de nuestro pensador y
sus directas preocupaciones, a mi parecer, son de orden especulativo y
estético; sólo como un complemento, tan necesario que no podía excusarse
su estudio, se preocupa por lo moral." (Farré: 'Vida y Pensamiento de
Jorge Santayana', p.74. Tr: 'We do not agree with those student-s of
Santayana's doctrines, John Dewey among them, who claim to be able to find
a preference for moral philosophy in his work. Dewey claims that 'The Life
of Reason' is the best American contribution to moral philosophy since the
days of Emerson. It seems to me that the preference of our thinker, and
his immediate preoccupations, are of a speculative and aesthetic kind; he
(61*, ctd.) occupies himself with moral philosophy only as a complement, so important that its study cannot be ignored." His argument to show this is nothing more than to point out that Santayana is a subjectivist in ethics. Needless to say, such a view rests on a complete misreading of 'The Life of Reason', the very title of which specifies a moral recommendation.

(62*) ibid., pp.207-8. Much later, in 'The Realm of Matter', Santayana points out a feature of his definition of art, i.e. that, in his usage, the term 'art' is an achievement word: "Art implies moral benefit; the impulsive modification of matter by man to his own confusion and injury I should not call art, but vice or folly", (RM, p.347)

For uncritical expositions of the early chapters of 'Reason in Art', cf. Duron, pp.335-40; Passmore, ch.IV, and Arnett, ch.II.

(63) ibid., p.208

(64) ibid.

(65*) op.cit., pp.210-11; for the same point, cf. note 50* to Chapter V, above.

(66) ibid., pp.212-13

(67) op.cit., p.214

(68) op.cit., p.215

(69) op.cit., p.220

(70) op.cit., p.221

(71) op.cit., p.222

(72) op.cit., p.223

(73) op.cit., p.226

(74) op.cit., p.227

(75) op.cit., p.228

(76*) ibid. These remarks on the emergence of fine art seem to be in conflict with some remarks in the Preface of 'The Realm of Essence', where Santayana claims that fine art is older than servile labour, since, "Poetic,
(76*, ctd.) Creative, original fancy is not a secondary form of sensibility, but its first and only form. (16E, p.xv.) The difficulty is aggravated by the confusion of these later remarks. Santayana can consistently say that poetic fancy is the earliest form of sensibility: this is a reference to his theory that the poet (or, one may safely add, any artist) is acquainted with the data of experience. Yet he cannot equate this type of perception with fine art: as he says (cf. Ch.V, above), the descent to the data of experience is justified only if new structures are built upon them, structures expressive of ideals, and so forth. The descent to the data of experience is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the creation of fine art. That poetic fancy is the fundamental form of sensibility does not therefore entail that fine art is prior to servile labour.

(77) MA, p.329

(78*) Just how much confusion this usage has caused is shown by Jerome Ashmore's essay, 'Santayana's Mistrust of Fine Art'. This paper has the distinction of being wrong in almost every assertion about what Santayana said. For example, Ashmore asserts that, in Santayana's view, fine art is without moral commitment - yet, as has been shown in Chapter V, above, and will shortly reappear in the present chapter, all great art (Santayana argues) expresses moral ideals. Again, Ashmore asserts that for Santayana, fine art lacks the utility of rational art - yet Santayana affirms that the goal of fine art is the complete superposition of spontaneity and utility, which entails that a work of art has beneficial consequences of some kind. Again, it is alleged that for Santayana, "fine art being predominantly involved with imagination, makes an abstraction from the real object in the environment and rational art does not." (Ashmore op.cit., p.340) This is Ashmore's version of the following passage in "Reason in Art": "Productions in which an aesthetic value is or is supposed to be prominent take the name of fine art; but the work of art so defined is almost always an abstraction from the real object, which has many non-
(78*, etc.) aesthetic functions and values." (p. 216) The distance between the text and Ashmore's paraphrase is obvious; Santayana asserts that to consider aesthetic values in isolation is likely to lead to a misunderstanding of them. (See text of the present chapter on this.) Again, Santayana asserts that fine art can be rational; moreover, there is in Santayana no dispraise of the imagination such as Ashmore's paraphrase implies.

Ashmore's mistakes were thoroughly refuted by Willard E. Arnett in a reply: "Santayana and The Fine Arts" (see bibliography for details). Ashmore undaunted retained his opinions. Cf. his Letter to the Editor, 'Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism', 16 (Dec. 1957) and his commentary on Santayana's aesthetics, p. 58: "...it is clear that in Santayana's view fine art sometimes lies outside the domain of art and, judged by the standards of the Life of Reason, commands no great respect."

It is important to note finally that in Santayana's last philosophical work, 'Dominations and Powers', the art/industrial art/liberal art/fine art terminology reappears, and in this late text, Santayana's usage makes it clear that fine art is a species of liberal art. Yet this is little help, since he provides no definitions for these terms. Cf. Ch. IX, section III (f), below.

(79) ibid, p. 216
(80) ibid
(81) ibid
(82) ibid
(83) ibid, p. 22
(84) ibid, p. 216
(85) ibid, p. 217
(86) ibid, p. 216
(87) ibid, p. 217
(88) ibid, p. 232
(89) ibid, pp. 232-3
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(79) MA, p. 216
(80) ibid
(81) ibid
(82) ibid
(83) SR, p. 22
(84) MA, p. 216
(85) op. cit., p. 217
(86) op. cit., p. 216
(87) op. cit., p. 217
(88) op. cit., p. 232
(89) op. cit., pp. 232-3
(90) op.cit., p.233
(91) Schilpp, p.257
(92) op.cit., p.259
(93) Morris Weitz: 'The Role of Theory in Aesthetics' (in Margolis); John Passmore: 'The Breastness of Aesthetics' (in Elton); W.T. Kennick: 'Does traditional Aesthetics Rest on a Mistake?' (in Barrett)
(94) Weitz in Margolis, p.52; cf. Passmore in Elton, pp.43-5
(95) Weitz in Margolis, p.54
(96) Weitz in Margolis, p.55; cf. Kennick in Barrett, p.7
(97) Weitz in Margolis, p.53; cf. Kennick in Barrett, p.6
(98*) The 'locus classicus' for this distinction is C.S. Peirce: 'Collected Works', Vol.IV, paras 537 sqq. There is some considerable use of it in analytic aesthetics, e.g. in Margaret Macdonald: 'Some distinctive Features of Arguments used in Criticism of the Arts'; R. Rudder: 'The Ontological Status of the Aesthetic Object'; G.I. Stevenson: 'On "What is a Poem?"'; Joseph Margolis: 'The Language of Art and Art Criticism' and Richard Wollheim: 'Art and Its Objects'. (See bibliography for full details of these works.) The present discussion is indebted to Wollheim.
(99) Peirce, loc. cit.
(100) Ruby Meager: 'The Uniqueness of a Work of Art', in Barrett, esp., pp.26-8
(101) op.cit., p.28
(102*) op.cit. She discusses the views put forward in three of the papers in Elton's anthology: (i) W.B. Gallie: 'The Function of Philosophical Aesthetics'; (ii) Margaret Macdonald: op.cit., (cf. note 98*, above); and (iii) Stuart Hampshire, "Logic and Appreciation".
(103) Margaret Macdonald, op.cit., pp.124-5
(104*) Meager, op.cit., in Barrett, pp.42-5. Wittgenstein's lectures were reported by G.E. Moore in 'Mind', 1955. A short extract, including Wittgenstein's suggestions on the structure of reasoning in aesthetics, is repr. in Harold Osborne, ed., "Aesthetics", pp.36-8
Notes to Chapter VII: The Fine Arts

(1*) HM, p. 162, cf. also the section of Ch. IX, below, dealing with 'Dominations and Powers', for a few late remarks on music. Almost all Santayana's remarks on music are collected and exposited without criticism by William Austin: 'Santayana as a Critic of Music'. (See bibliography for details).

(2) Eduard Hanslick: "The Beautiful in Music", pp. 16-19

(3) cf. the brief discussion of Cooke in Ch. IV, supra.

(4) cf. especially her 'Philosophy in a New Key' (hereafter PKK), ch. 8; and 'Feeling and Form', chs. 7-9. (hereafter FF).

(5) Hanslick, op. cit., p. 24

(6) Lida, p. 97

(7*) HA, p. 235. It is superfluous to stress how deeply Santayana was impressed by the theory of evolution. To study the fine arts by investigating their emergence from other types of behaviour is to set them in an evolutionist perspective. It is more than likely, therefore, that Santayana was acquainted with Herbert Spencer's essay, 'The Origin and Function of Music' ('Fraser's Magazine', October, 1857.) Spencer puts forward a version of the speech theory of the origin of music: "...what we regard as the distinctive traits of song are simply the traits of emotional speech intensified and systematized. In respect of its general characteristics, we think it has been made clear that vocal music, and by consequence all music, is an idealisation of the natural language of passion." (op. cit., "Hincker's Library repr., pp. 60-1) Emotional speech, Spencer argues, is characterised by greater loudness than ordinary speech, different timbre, pitch, and a use of greater intervals. Initially, these changes are the automatic result of muscular contraction following instinctively from an emotional state. (op. cit., pp. 49-50) In music, each of these factors is exploited systematically. As the technique of music becomes more elaborate, it becomes possible to express feelings not felt in life: "And thus we may understand in some measure how it happens that music not only so strongly excites our more familiar feelings, but also produces feelings we never
(7*, ctd.) had before—arouses dormant sentiments of which we do not know the meaning; or as Richter says—tells us of things we have not seen and shall not see."(op.cit.,p.66) He speaks elsewhere of "Those vague feelings of unexperienced felicity which music arouses—those indefinite impressions of an unknown ideal life which it calls up..."(op.cit.,p.75)

It will be seen from the present section that Santayana accepts views remarkably close to some of these: music is originally automatic, then deliberate, and can come to express new feelings. The only point on which he is ambiguous is that on which Ernest Newman quarrelled with Spencer, i.e. whether music originated from speech, or whether, as Newman contended, primitive man had a musical sense independent of speech and probably earlier in time. This musical sense, Newman contended, gives rise to what the French musicologist Jules Combarieu described as 'thinking with sounds' as distinct from 'thinking with words'. (Newman: 'A Study of Wagner', 1399; 'Musical Studies', 1905) There is no clear indication in the text where Santayana would stand on this point.

(3) RA,p.236

(9) ibid. Santayana retained these unobjectionable opinions until the end of his life. They occur again in a letter to Corliss Lamont, (dated 6/1/1950) Letters,p.389

(10) RA,p.237

(11) cf. 4Sa,pp.21-2

(12*) RA,p.237. The doctrine that music is a world apart is put forward by Santayana, in less detail, in several other works of dates both before and after that of 'Reason in Art'. In 'Interpretations of Poetry and Religion', (1900) Santayana writes that a vision of the ideal is momentary, and has all its value in itself; yet such a vision does remind us that perfection is possible: "It reminds us, like music, that there are worlds far removed from the actual which are yet living and near to the heart."(IPR,p.19)

Thirteen years later, in his essay, 'Shelley, or the Poetic Value of Revolutionary Principles', he writes: "(Music) is relevant to life
(7*, ctd.) had before - arouses dormant sentiments of which we do not know the meaning; or as Richter says - tells us of things we have not seen and shall not see." (op. cit., p. 66) He speaks elsewhere of "Those vague feelings of unexperiences felicity which music arouses - those indefinite impressions of an unknown ideal life which it calls up..." (op. cit., p. 75)

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Thirteen years later, in his essay, 'Shelley, or the Poetic Value of Revolutionary Principles', he writes: "(Music) is relevant to life
(12*, etc.) unmistakably, for it stimulates by means of a torrent of abstract movements and images the formal and emotional possibilities of living which lie in the spirit. By so doing music becomes a part of life, a congruous addition, a parallel life, as it were, to the vulgar one. ("Shelley", p.249). And in 'Persons and Places', (1944) he describes the Church music he heard as a young man: "It transports; the means may be at times inferior, but the end is attained. The end is to escape into another world, to live freely for a while in a medium made by us and fit for us to live in." (p.p., p.172)

Possibly, and one must stress the tentativeness of the suggestion, Santayana had first come across the assimilation of music to mathematics in Lotze: "We often hear quoted the saying that architecture is frozen music; hence I have some hope of gaining a modicum of undying fame by taking a step further and calling mathematics dessicated music. For what element of music does mathematics lack except the living sound?" ('Microcosmus', v.2, p.442)

(13) sA,p.239
(14) cf. SB,pp.79-83
(15) sA,p.240
(16) op.cit.,p.241
(17) ibid
(18) op.cit.,p.242
(19*) op.cit.,p.243. The delightfulness of the formal properties of music is a theme foreshadowed in 'Interpretations of Poetry and Religion':

"...music, for all that it contains nothing of a material or practical nature, offers a field for the development of human faculty and presents laws and conditions which, within its sphere, must be obeyed and which reward obedience with the keenest and purest pleasures." (IPt,p.66)

(21) sA,p.244
(22) Ibid

(23) op.cit.,pp.244-5

(24) op.cit.,p.245

(25*) Ibid. Very much the same point had been made earlier by Hanslick, cf. op.cit.,pp.20sqq.

(26*) RA,p.245. Much the same point is made in 'Egotism in German Philosophy': "...music is the means of giving form to our inner feelings without attaching them to events or objects in the world. Music is articulate, but articulate in a language which avoids, or at least veils, the articulation of the world we live in." (E3P,p.244)

(27*) RA,pp.245-6. Much the same point, it will be recalled, is put forward by Santayana a propos of poetry. By uniting elements disparate except for a common overtone of feeling, the poet can create new feelings: "Poets can...arouse sentiments finer than any which they have known, and in the act of composition become discoverers of new realms of delightfulness and grief." (IPN,pp.133-4)

(28) Cooke,op.cit.,p.112: 'The Characterising Agents'.

(29) Hanslick, op.cit.,p.54

(30) RA,p.246

(31) op.cit.,p.247

(32) op.cit.,pp.247-8

(33) op.cit.,p.248


(35) This point is made also by W. Charlton: 'Aesthetics', Hutchinson, pp.26-7

(36) Langer,PNK,p.238; cf. FF,p.55 on the variable emotional colourings taken on by folk songs and hymn tunes.

(37) Langer, FF,p.113

(38) op.cit.,p.129

(39) RA,pp.248-50

(40) op.cit.,p.250
Duron points out that, in general, "La notion santayanienne de la musique est ainsi à l'opposé de celle qui soutenait le pessimisme schopenhauerien," (Duron, p. 365) since for Santayana the material of art is life as it is, and the function of art is to make that life better.

Another dismissal of music occurs in 'The Sense of Beauty'. There he writes that music, while the purest and most impressive of the arts, is the least human and instructive of them. While the world of sound can stir us deeply, yet, "it has proved the less serviceable and constant apparition." (SB, p. 56) No expansion is provided for this most sweeping of condemnations.

The doctrine here assumed - that language was initially undeliberated self-expression - is applied by Santayana in his theory of prayer: "...the fund of words and phrases latent in the mind flow out under stress of emotion; they flow because they belong to the situation, because they fill out and complete a perception absorbing the mind; they do not flow primarily to be listened to." (RR, p. 30) Santayana considers prayer to be such a use of language. Its nature is misconceived, in his view, if it is assimilated to dialogue.

As to the influences on Santayana's view of language, commentators disagree. Duron considers that views such as Santayana puts forward have been common in psychology since Condillac and Hamilton, (Duron, p. 341), while Señor Lida, on the other hand, asserts a debt to Wilhelm von Humbolt, and claims similarity of views with Bergson (in 'Matière et Mémoire'), Landsberg, Cassirer, and Weisberger. (Lida, pp. 85-6; p. 96)

(41) op. cit., p. 251
(42) op. cit., p. 252
(43*) op. cit., p. 253
(44*) WD, pp. 138-9
(45) BA, p. 238
(46*) op. cit., p. 255. Cf. pp. 264-5 for the same point, and ICG, p. 65. The doctrine here assumed - that language was initially undeliberated self-expression - is applied by Santayana in his theory of prayer: "...the fund of words and phrases latent in the mind flow out under stress of emotion; they flow because they belong to the situation, because they fill out and complete a perception absorbing the mind; they do not flow primarily to be listened to." (RR, p. 30) Santayana considers prayer to be such a use of language. Its nature is misconceived, in his view, if it is assimilated to dialogue.

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(47) BA, p. 255
(48) op. cit., p. 256
(49) ibid
The same views are put forward in later works, indicating that Santayana did not change his mind on the point: cf. 'Some Meanings of the Word "Is", p. 279; SAF, pp. 198-9; 'Cries and Names', POM, pp. 107-8; HE, pp. 109-10 and DP, Bk. I, Pt. 3, chs. 3 and 4, passim.

(Santayana, p. 257)

(Santayana, p. 258)

(Lida appears to suggest the influence of Vico on these doctrines:
"El hombre - dice Santayana con palabras que recuerdan las de la 'Scienza Nuova' - empieza por imaginar poéticamente el mundo, y analiza después y comprueba científicamente lo imaginado." (Lida, p. 92) Tr. "Man - remarks Santayana in words which recall those of the 'Scienza Nuova' - begins by conceiving the world with a poetic imagination, then analyses and verifies what has been imagined."

(Santayana, p. 260. These doctrines are foreshadowed in 'The Sense of Beauty', Ch. III, sub-section, 'Form in Words'. Music is the primary side of language, which has to be controlled by utility if it is to be helpful in coping with experience. Though representative to a degree, it always colours its subject-matter with its own properties:"...language is primarily a sort of music, and the beautiful effects which it produces are due to its own structure, giving, as it crystallises in a new fashion, an unforeseen form to experience." (Santayana, p. 130)

(Santayana, p. 262)

(Santayana, p. 263-3)

(Santayana, p. 132)

The non-coincidence of grammatical and metaphysical categories is noted also by Lida, p. 93, note 1.

(Santayana, p. 263. The same point is remade much later in 'The Realm of Truth' (p. 33). As so often, Santayana did not modify his views on language.

(Santayana, p. 264)

(Santayana, p. 265)

The same idea of the foreshortening of experience by language recurs
"Every idea of sense or science is a summary sign, on a different plane and scale altogether from the diffuse material facts which it covers: one unexampled colour for many rays, one indescribable note for many vibrations, one picture for many particles of paint, one word for a series of noises or letters. A word is a very Platonic thing: you cannot say when it begins, when it ends, how long it lasts, nor where it ever is; and yet it is the only unit you mean to utter, or normally hear. Platonism is the intuition of essences in the presence of things, in order to describe them: it is mind itself." (SKLS, p.252) And more generally, the intuition of essences is assumed in the doctrine of literal and symbolic knowledge, the central doctrine of the epistemology of Santayana’s later philosophy in the Realms of Being.

The phrasing of this passage, far more so than of the corresponding passages in ‘Interpretations of Poetry and Religion’ (cf. Ch. V, above) suggest an analogy with Nietzsche’s analysis of the Dionysiac and Apollonian components in Greek thought. In Nietzsche’s view, the Apollonian consciousness of the Greek, the ordered world of individuals, was merely a thin veil hiding from him the whole Dionysiac realm. There is an obvious similarity between Apollonian consciousness, and what Santayana would call ordinary experience on the one hand, and Dionysiac intoxication and the chaos of immediate experience on the other. (cf. Nietzsche: ‘The Birth of Tragedy’, esp. ch. II) Santayana almost certainly knew Nietzsche’s work by this time. Whether there is a debt is impossible to say with certainty; but the similarity is notable.
The same theme of the falsity of poetic language is present in several late works. Yet again, Santayana did not change his opinion on this point: cf. SELS, no. 45, 'Occam's Razor'; SAF, pp. 130 and 220-1; RA, p. 306.

The same point that poetry is an interest of youth reappears again in the late 'Realm of Essence', p. xxi.

Santayana expresses the same point six years later in the conclusion of 'Three Philosophical Poets' (1910). The ideal of rational art consists firstly in having a comprehensive knowledge of the world, and secondly in expressing the ideals implied by our actions. The ideal rational poet, "should live in the continual presence of all experience, and respect it; he should at the same time understand nature, the ground of that experience, and he should have a delicate sense for the ideal echoes of his own passions, and for all the colours of his possible happiness." (TPP, p. 142)

A good deal of work remains to be done on the influence which this ideal of poetry, and Santayana's philosophy in general,
(482)

(87*, ctd.) had on some major American poets, notably Wallace Stevens and William Carlos Williams. That Stevens had a great respect for Santayana is common coin among scholars of the poet; and parallels in belief and imagery have been drawn between the writings of the two men. (cf., e.g., Frank Doggett: 'Steven's Poetry of Thought', passim and A. Walton Litz: 'Introactive Voyager: The Poetic Development of Wallace Stevens', pp. 275 sqq.) Again, Stevens' admiration for Santayana is evident in his poem, 'To an Old Philosopher in Rome.'

In a yet unpublished paper, Professor Richard Kuhns argues that Stevens was specifically influenced by the ideal of rational poetry. For Stevens, the perfect poet is the man who has mastered reality: he has had time enough to think, and to sum us up. The feeling which attends mastery of reality is peace and quiescence. Certainly, Stevens shared with Santayana the notion of the breadth of vision of the supreme or rational poet; and Stevens' general admiration for Santayana lends probability to the claim of influence here. (Kuhns: 'The fiction that Results from Feeling')

As Kuhns would be the first to admit, however, the subject demands a detailed investigation which it has not yet received; and the same is true in the case of Williams.

(88) PP, p.118
(89) op. cit., pp.152-3
(90) MS, p.16

(91*) Passages of architectural criticism in Santayana's works, (i.e. as distinct from remarks on the aesthetics of architecture.)


MS, p.8: baroque and rococo in Dresden

(91*) cathedral at Syracuse; pp.59-62: Egyptian architecture and the
Pyramids; pp.71 sqq.: The Parthenon, the Erechtheum, and then the cathedral
at St. Sophia; pp.160-1: contrast of the spirits of Venice and Rome, via
their architecture.

Also: 'English Architecture' (SLS, no.20) for generalised history and
description of that subject; and 'Towers' (written between 1912 and 1920; in
BR) - praise for the tower of the Palazzo Vecchio in Florence, and a
comparison of Giotto's campanile for Florence cathedral with the Jiralda of
Seville, to the advantage of the latter.

It should be added that a few further points of architectural aes­
thetics - presupposing the philosophy of the Realms of Being - are dealt
with in Chapter IX, below.

(92*) Writers on Santayana's aesthetics either pass over the section on
architecture in silence, or content themselves with the briefest of crit­
icisms. Duron condenses all Santayana's remarks on painting, architecture,
and sculpture into four pages of uncritical exposition (pp.305-8); Ashmore
devotes one paragraph to architecture (p.62), and there is no systematic
discussion of architecture in either Arnett or Singer.

(93) HA, p.290
(94) op.cit., p.291
(95) op.cit., p.292
(96) ibid
(97) op.cit., p.293
(98) op.cit., p.294
(99) ibid
(100) ibid
(101) op.cit., p.195
(102) op.cit., p.195
(103) op.cit., p.196
(104*) ibid. Several of the themes of this chapter on architecture are
adumbrated in 'The Sense of Beauty', (1896): (1) that adventitious effects
(104**, etc.) are appreciated first; and (ii) that structure and ornament are differently emphasized in different styles, Cf. SB, pp.126-9

(105) RA, p.297

(106) op. cit., p.299

(107*) ibid, cf. Ch.IX, section (c), below, for closely related remarks on revived styles in Santayana's paper, 'Penitent Art', (1922)

(108) RA, pp.299-300

(109) Viollet-le-Duc: 'Discourses on Architecture'. In Holt, III, pp.22 sqq. This discourse contains many passages expressing the same view.

(110) RA, p.298

(111) ibid

(112) ibid

(113) ibid

(114) op. cit., p.300

(115) ibid

(116) op. cit., p.301

(117) op. cit., p.302

(118) ibid

(119) ibid


(122) A point made by Father D.C. Barrett.

(123) RA, p.303

(124) ibid

(125) ibid

(126) op. cit., p.304

(127) ibid

(128) op. cit., p.305
It is worth pointing out, in view of Santayana's change to formalism in the theory of beauty (cf. Ch.I above and Ch.IX, below), that these remarks on illustration would be sympathetically received by formalists like Bell and Fry. Bell, for example, regards representation as a drawback in art, for obvious reasons: in representational art, the spectator is likely to look at the form as an image, rather than for itself. He would therefore agree with Santayana's view that in illustration, the intellectual element dominates the aesthetic in art. Whether these remarks in 'Reason in Art' are the first indication of a change in Santayana's attitude to formalism is however very doubtful: they are quite isolated, and not paralleled by remarks in works produced in the years between 'Reason in Art' and the formalist paper, 'The Mutability of Aesthetic Categories.' (1925) (Once again, cf. Ch.IX, below)
(145*) op.cit., p.312. Cf. 'Literal and Symbolic Knowledge' (1918): "Were a representation a complete reproduction — did the statue breath, walk, and think — it would no longer represent anything; it would be no symbol, but simply one more thing, intransitive and unmeaning, like everything not made to be interpreted." (op.cit., p.321)

(146) Nelson Goodman: 'Languages of Art', pp.3-5


(150) W. Charlton: 'Aesthetics', pp.55-6


(152) W, p.317

(153) ibid

(154) op.cit., pp.317-3

(155) op.cit., p.318


(157*) W, p.318. The same point is made in Santayana's paper, 'Sculpture', (1908) p.108.

(158*) Winkelmann earns Santayana's praise for having grasped the authenticity of Greek sculpture, which responded to a genuine need in the Greek mind: "...if his sense for the chained monsters in the Greek soul was inadequate, (he) was at least in real sympathy with what had inspired Greek sculpture, love and knowledge of the human body in the life, made gentle by discipline and kept strong by training." EGP, p.231, footnote.

(159*) ibid, p.319. The same dismissal of all but Greek sculpture occurs in pieces written both before and after 'Reason in Art'. In 'The Sense of Beauty' all post-Greek sculpture is classified as part of a decline into either empty convention or tasteless and unimaginative technique. In the
(159*, otd.) paper, 'Sculpture', all modern sculpture is condemned as
inauthentic.

(160) ibid
(161) op. cit., p. 105
(162) ibid
(163) op. cit., pp. 105-6
(164) op. cit., p. 106
(165) ibid
(166) ibid
(167) ibid
(168) op. cit., p. 109
(169) ibid
(170) op. cit., p. 108
(171) op. cit., p. 109
(172) Santayana: Review of Bernard Berenson: 'The Florentine Painters of
The Italian Renaissance', in 'The Psychological Review', (1896), p. 678
(173) Berenson: 'The Italian Painters of the Renaissance', p. 53
(174) Berenson, op. cit., p. 55
(175) ibid
(176) Santayana, Review of Berenson, p. 678
(177) ibid, p. 320
(178) ibid
(179) op. cit., p. 321
(180) ibid
(181) op. cit., p. 322
(182) op. cit., p. 323
(183) ibid
(184) ibid. Santayana's attitude to landscape had mellowed a little by
the time he came to write 'Reason in Art'. In his discussion of landscape
In "The Sense of Beauty", discussed in Ch.III, above, he condemns 'in toto' both realistic and impressionistic landscape. He mellowed further in this respect as he grew older. In his autobiography, he writes: "It is not true...that aerial effects in Turner's landscapes are exaggerated and melodramatic. Nature in England and elsewhere - for instance in Venice - is often like that, or even more emphatic; and the delicacy with which Turner preserves the special character and melody of the parts in the midst of that violent ensemble, shows a sincere love of nature and life and a devout imagination." (PP,p.243)

It is perhaps worth asking why Santayana should spend so comparatively little time and space on the discussion of painting. The reason may be nothing more than that he was rather near-sighted, and could not see well enough to enjoy paintings properly. His friend Cory reports a remark of Berenson, to the effect that, "Santayana was as blind as a bat and never saw a picture." Cory is inclined to agree with this and writes of Santayana, describing the limitations imposed on him by his sight: "My old friend could enjoy large patterns of vivid colour - stained-glass windows, for example, in the twilight of great cathedrals. Perhaps the visual world for Santayana was more like the canvas of a Monet: splashes of light on vague blocks of seductive colour." (Cory: 'Santayana: The Later Years',p.51.)

Notes to Chapter VIII: Art and Morality
(1) Tolstoy: 'What is Art?',p.123
(2) ibid
(3) op.cit.,p.176
(4) op.cit.,p.177
(5) op.cit.,p.231

(7) Oscar Wilde, 'The Critic as Artist', Page refs. to the text of 'Intentions' in Richard Ellman, ed.: 'The Artist as Critic: Critical Writings of Oscar Wilde', p.393

(8) op. cit., p.394

(9) op. cit., p.381

(10) op. cit., p.380

(11) ibid

(12) Oscar Wilde: Preface to 'The Picture of Dorian Gray' in Ellman, op. cit., p.236

(13*) ibid. Gautier had made the same point in 1835: "...un livre ne fait pas de la soupe à la gélatine - un roman n'est pas une paire de bottes sans couture; un sonnet, une seringue à jet continu; un drame n'est pas un chemin de fer, toutes choses essentiellement civilisantes, et faisant marcher l'humanité dans la voie du progrès." 'Preface' to 'Mademoiselle de Maupin', p.28


(15) op. cit., p.364

(16) op. cit., p.299

(17) HA, p.333

(18) op. cit., p.334

(19) op. cit., pp.334-5

(20) op. cit., pp.335-6

(21*) In the text, Santayana writes, of the 'Republic', Bk.X: "This reasoning has been little understood, because Platonists so soon lost sight of their master's Socratic habit and moral intent. They turned the good into an existence, making it thereby unmeaning. Plato's dialectic, if we do not thus abolish the force of its terms, is perfectly cogent..." (HA, p.335)
Santayana retained this view on the propriety of a moral evaluation of art of this kind until at least 1916. In a review published in that year ('Two Rational Moralists') Santayana praises John Erskine (in the latter's work: 'The Moral Obligation to be Intelligent', Duffield and Co., New York, 1915) for correcting "another error of the recent past... (i.e.) the notion that the aesthetic realm is absolute and sacrosanct and that there a man must reduce himself to an abstract sensuum, without intellect, conscience, or a right to be deafened, bored, or disgusted. A work that is merely aesthetic is indeed esthetic, but that grammatical assignation to its class is no title of honor. The esthetic may not be worth looking at, and the man who in certain instances thinks it worth looking at may not deserve to be alive." (op.cit., in APSL, pp.352-3.)

Writers on Santayana's aesthetics have in general confined themselves to uncritical exposition of the closing chapters of 'Reason in Art'; cf. Duron, pp.368-73; Ashmore, pp.65-9; Lida, Pt.II; Arnett, ch.VII. So far as I know, the only writer to stress adequately Santayana's insistence that the value of art is in principle subject to moral scrutiny is Professor Andrew J. Reck, in his paper 'The Authority of Morality over Aesthetics in Santayana's Philosophy'. While he quite correctly exposit Santayana's views on the matter, Professor Reck does not, however, provide any commentary.

It will become clear from the text of the chapter that Santayana is far from maintaining internal consistency in his views on art and morality. It is paradoxical that his first argument supposedly defending art consists in effect in the assertion that at least art can do no damage to life since it has no influence on it. Such a view is reminiscent of Gautier, op.cit., p.26: "Je ne sais qui a dit je ne sais où, que la littérature et les arts influenaient sur les moeurs. Qui que ce soit, c'est indubitablement un grand sot... La régence a fait Crébillon, ce n'est pas
Crébillon qui a fait la régence..."

RA, p.330

op.cit., pp.330-1

op.cit., p.331

ibid

op.cit., p.332

op.cit., p.333. Same point: pp.365-6 and 371-2. Related points occur elsewhere in 'Reason in Art', e.g. the thesis, discussed in Ch. VII, above, that music is a world apart, and that the experience it provides makes us familiar with perfection. Perfection then comes to be desired in other areas of life.

ibid, p.338

A remark in a letter written very late in Santayana's life indicates that he continued to maintain, not only that art is subject to moral scrutiny but that the pursuit of the morally good is in some sense an art: "I should not destroy anything aesthetically good. The beautiful is a part of the moral; and the truly moral is a part of the beautiful; only they must not be mixed wrong, any more than sweets and savouries." (Letter to Martin Birnbaum, 22.1.1947. Letters, p.365.)

ibid, pp.340-1

op.cit., p.341

op.cit., p.342

op.cit., p.341

op.cit., p.342

ibid

ibid

ibid

ibid

op.cit., p.339. The point concerning the amount of time it is rational to allot to art in the life of each individual is remade in 'Scepticism and Animal Faith' (1923): "Which arts and sciences are worth pursuing, and how far, is a question for the moralist, to be answered in each case in
(492)

(44*, std.) view of the faculties and genius of the person concerned, and
their opportunities." (op.cit., p.273)

(45) ibid, p.358

(46) ibid

(47) op.cit., p.359

(48) ibid

(49) op.cit., pp.360-1

(50) op.cit., p.361

(51) op.cit., p.362

(52) ibid

(53) op.cit., p.363

(54) op.cit., p.364

(55*) op.cit., p.365; cf. also pp.361 and 371-2. The theme that aesthetic
harmonies are real enough but not integrated into the Life of Reason is
taken up briefly in 'Reason in Religion'. Santayana writes that sense is
"capable of many refinements by which physical existence becomes its own
reward. In the disciplined play of fancy which the fine arts afford, the
mind's free action justifies itself and becomes intrinsically delightful." (RS,p.155) But these episodes are all too often episodes in a life which
is irrational, i.e. a life which is disorganised, and from which self-
knowledge is absent.

(56) ibid, p.365

(57) op.cit., p.366

(58) op.cit., p.367

(59) op.cit., pp.367-8

(60) op.cit., p.368

(61) op.cit., p.369

(62) op.cit., p.370

(63) op.cit., p.372

(64) ibid
(44⁰, et al.) view of the faculties and genius of the person concerned, and their opportunities." (op. cit., p. 273)

(45) ibid, p. 358

(46) ibid

(47) op. cit., p. 359

(48) ibid

(49) op. cit., pp. 360-1

(50) op. cit., p. 361

(51) op. cit., p. 362

(52) ibid

(53) op. cit., p. 363

(54) op. cit., p. 364

(55*) op. cit., p. 365; cf. also pp. 361 and 371-2. The theme that aesthetic harmonies are real enough but not integrated into the Life of Reason is taken up briefly in 'Reason in Religion'. Santayana writes that sense is capable of many refinements by which physical existence becomes its own reward. In the disciplined play of fancy which the fine arts afford, the mind's free action justifies itself and becomes intrinsically delightful." (ibid, p. 155) But these episodes are all too often episodes in a life which is irrational, i.e. a life which is disorganised, and from which self-knowledge is absent.

(56) ibid, p. 365

(57) op. cit., p. 366

(58) op. cit., p. 367

(59) op. cit., pp. 367-8

(60) op. cit., p. 368

(61) op. cit., p. 369

(62) op. cit., p. 370

(63) op. cit., p. 372

(64) ibid
(65) op.cit., pp.373-4
(66) op.cit., p.357
(67) op.cit., p.346
(68) op.cit., p.347
(69) op.cit., pp.346-7
(70) op.cit., p.347
(71) op.cit., p.348
(72) op.cit., p.349
(73) ibid
(74) ibid
(75) ibid
(76) op.cit., p.350
(77) ibid
(78) op.cit., p.351
(79) op.cit., p.352
(80) ibid
(81*) op.cit., p.353. Similar views on criticism appear in the 1904 paper:
'What is Aesthetics?', OS, pp.28-9. (See the Introduction to the present
thesis, where part of the relevant passage is quoted.)
(82) RA, p.353.
(83*) There is a sense in which moral terms can be predicated of these
works, e.g. it is perfectly proper to say that they are sincere, honest,
authentic, etc. But this does not affect the point in hand. Sincerity, for
example, is not a moral content conveyed by these works.
(84*) At one point in 'Scepticism and Animal Faith' (1923), Santayana makes
claims along these lines. The " mainspring of fiction, and its popular
charm" lies in the fact that it releases "capabilities in one's own soul
which one's personal fortunes may have left undeveloped...The illusion of
projecting one's own thoughts into remote or imaginary characters is only
half an illusion; these thoughts were never there, but they were always
here, or knocking at the gate; and there is an indirect victory in reaching
(494)

(84*, ctd.) and positing elsewhere, in an explicit form, the life which accident denied me, and thereby enjoying it 'sub rosa' in spite of fate. And there are many experiences which are tolerable only in this dreamlike form, when their consequences are negligible and their vehemence is relieved by the distance at which they appear, and by the show they make." (SAF, p. 231) But this is not a thought which Santayana develops.

Notes to Chapter IX: Aesthetics and the Realms of Being: Later Writings on Aesthetics

(1*) It is interesting to note in this connexion that Santayana is reported to have said that he wrote his books in the reverse order to that which a systematic exposition demands: "I should have written my last ones first and the first ones last...I should have dealt with cosmic things first, because they are not as difficult as human problems which I could handle better now that I have read more and had more experience." (Quoted by Van Meter Ames: 'Proust and Santayana', p. 71)

(2*) Major papers on the later epistemology (full details in bibliography): (a) 'Literal and Symbolic Knowledge', (1913); (b) 'Three Proofs of Realism', (1923); (c) 'The Unknowable', (1923) and (d) 'Some Meanings of the Word, "Is"', (1924).

(3*) A synoptic statement of these doctrines by Santayana himself was brought to light by Cory. Cf. Santayana's essay: 'On Metaphysical Projection,' in IHN.

(4) Intro. to 1942 one vol. edn. of R3, p.xxvi; cf. K7, pp. 47-8

(5) One vol. edn. of R3, p.xxvii

(6) K5, p. 19

(7) op. cit., pp. 19-20

(8) op. cit., pp. 21-2

(9) op. cit., pp. 24-5

(10) op. cit., pp. 24-5

(11) op. cit., p. 36; cf. pp. 39-90

(12) op. cit., p. 70
This experiential theory of the 'a priori' possibly shows the influence of Herbert Spencer and/or William James. Spencer's very similar view is set out in his 'The Principles of Psychology', eg. section 197, discussing Kant's doctrine of the forms of perception. James argues for the physiological ground of logical necessity in ch. XXVIII of his 'Principles of Psychology', a point Santayana noted in his review of the work. (Cf. repr. of the review in IHW, pp.100-1) It is worth adding that as early as his doctoral student days, Santayana had espoused the view that logical principles have a psychological origin, cf. his marginalia on Lotze's 'Logik': "Logic forces us to admit the psychological nature of logic." (LSP, p.99)

It is perhaps worth adding a brief note to explain why Santayana should assert, apparently nonsensically, that pure Being could be misidentified with nothing. The problem disappears if nothingness is taken to be the same as non-existence. Essences are non-existent, and so in this sense could be identified with nothingness. The point Santayana wants to make is that essences, while non-existent, yet have being, and so are not nothing in the strict sense of that term, which would exclude them from any ontological status whatever.
(26) cf. 'Three Proofs of Realism' in AFSL, pp.175-6, footnote 3
(27) From Hartshorne, 'Santayana's Doctrine of Essence', Schilpp, pp.168-9
(28*) Hartshorne, op.cit., p.156. Cf. other criticisms of essence in the following (see bibliography for details): (i) review of 'The Realm of Essence' by Collingwood; (ii) Dewey: 'Philosophy as a Fine Art' (another review of the same work.); (iii) Donald C. Williams: 'Of Essence and Existence in Santayana'; (iv) Mary W. Calkins: 'On Certain Difficulties in the Modern Doctrine of Essence'; (v) for a defence of the doctrine of essence, cf. D.W. Prall: 'Essences and Universals'. Recently unearthed MSS fragments, uncollected papers and rejected draft passages on the concept of essence by Santayana are now available in Lachs AFSL, Pt.III and POML, Pt.III.
(29*) Rough drafts and MSS fragments relating to Santayana's concept of matter and associated natural philosophy are now available in Lachs, POML, Pt. II. Among these are several rejected chapters on causation, a subject on which there is no chapter in the published version of 'The Realm of Matter'. There are further pieces on natural philosophy by Santayana in AFSL, Pt.II; also the essays (1) 'Human Symbols for Matter' (in IHW) and (ii) 'Appearance and Reality' (in BR). Santayana was defending the concept of matter as early as his thesis on Lotze, cf. LSP, pp.161-2. Santayana's materialism is discussed by W.K. Dennes (in Schilpp); John Lachs, 'Matter and Substance in the Philosophy of Santayana' and J.H. Randall, jr., 'The Latent Idealism of a Materialist' (a review of 'The Realm of Matter').
(30) RM, p.192
(31) op.cit., p.199
(32) op.cit., pp.231-2
(33) op.cit., pp.289-90
(34*) op.cit., p.324. The notion of the psyche is discussed also in the essay 'The Psyche' in SELS, Cf. also TSp., pp.15-16
(35) RM, p.343
(36) op.cit., pp.214-5
(37) op. cit., pp. 217-8

(38*) It took Santayana eight years to produce 'The Realm of Truth', the shortest of the four volumes of 'The Realms of Being'. The brevity and lack of novelty of the book, together with the absence of MSS and other essays on the subject, suggest that truth was a problem to which Santayana found it difficult to address himself. It is worth remembering also that, as originally conceived, 'The Realms of Being' was to consist of three volumes only. The decision to include a volume on truth came relatively late in the working out of the system.

(39) RT, p. vi. Quoted from C O O S.

(40) RT, p. vi. Quoted from C O O S.

(41) RT, p. viii. Quoted from SAP

(42) RT, p. viii. Quoted from RE

(43) RS, p. vii; cf. PSL, pp. 188-90, and 'The Prestige of the Infinite', p. 241. On spirit in general, cf. also the MSS recently printed in POM, Pt. IV.

(44) RS, pp. 9-11

(45) op. cit., p. 11

(46) op. cit., pp. 13-14

(47) op. cit., pp. 42-4

(48*) This is the doctrine of literal and symbolic knowledge, set out in the paper with that title (cf. note 2*, above,) and presupposed throughout the volumes of the Realms of Being.

(49) RS, p. 92

(50) ibid

(51) op. cit., pp. 109-11

(52) op. cit., pp. 106-7

(53*) The other late writings referred to are: 'Platonism and the Spiritual Life' (1927); 'A Long Way Round to Nirvana' (1923); 'The Prestige of the Infinite' (1932); 'Ultimate Religion' (1933) and 'The Idea of Christ in the
(53*, ctd.) Gospels (1946). Cf also the MS3 fragments in APSL, pt. VI and POML, pt. VII

(54) op.p.119; cf. 'A long way round to Nirvana', pp.223-4

(55) op.p.122-3

(56) op.cit.,pp.224-5

(57) op.cit.,pp.139-43

(58) op.cit.,pp.165-6

(59*) op.cit.,pp.187-8, cf. p.210, where Santayana interprets the Christian thesis that Christ may come and dwell within us as a mythopoetic formulation of the spiritual truth that peace and salvation can be attained only through detachment from the world. He later devoted an entire book to interpreting the gospels in this way: 'The Idea of Christ in the Gospels.' On liberation, cf. also PST, pp.178-81; DI, pp.145 sqq.

(60) op.p.195

(61) cf. op.cit.,pp.193-5, on the method of liberation.

(62) op.cit.,p.220

(63) op.cit.,pp.253-4

(64) op.cit.,pp.215 sqq., cf. also e.g. pp.256-7 and 'Ultimate Religion', pp.253-4

(65) cf. op.p.268-9

(66) op.cit.,p.271

(67) op.cit.,pp.245-6

(68) op.cit.,pp.230-1

(69) op.cit.,pp.232-3; cf. PST,p.214; DI, pp.139 sqq.

(70) op.p.251

(71) loc. cit.

What follows is a synopsis of the case put forward by Munitz and Lampherecht in the works referred to in the preceding note. Cf. also Lampherecht's paper in the Schilpp volume, 'Animal Faith and the Art of Intuition'.

'Apologia pro Mente Sua', Schilpp, p.571
loc. cit.
op. cit., p.566
op. cit., p.569
John Lachs: 'Santayana's Moral Philosophy'.
Lachs, op. cit., p.349
'Proust on Essences', p.175
op. cit., p.176
op. cit., p.177
op. cit., p.178
ibid
ibid
ibid
E, pp.67-8
Santayana came across similar ideas many years earlier in James's, 'The Principles of Psychology'. Association is there described as a purely physiological matter, accountable for in terms of brain processes. James contends that brain processes never exactly duplicate one another, and in consequence, neither do the ideas produced in consciousness by these processes. Cf. Santayana's review of James's work, 'James's Psychology' in IHW, pp.103-4
'Proust on Essences', p.179. The genesis of this paper is discussed briefly by Cory in his, 'Santayana: The Later Years', pp.51-2
This paper is exposited briefly in Ashmore, pp.71-4
'Penitent Art', pp.219-20
op. cit., pp.219-20
op. cit., p.220
(94) Ibid
(95) op.cit.,p.221
(96) op.cit.,p.222
(97) op.cit.,p.223
(98) op.cit.,p.224
(99) op.cit.,p.225
(100) op.cit.,p.226
(101*) Art-historical data from E.H. Gombrich: 'The Cartoonist's Armoury' in 'Meditations on A Hobby Horse', pp.134-5. (In making the present objection to Santayana's views, it is assumed that by 'caricature' he means what is ordinarily meant by the term in art-historical discourse. If he is using it in a private technical sense, then it is simply quite unclear what he means by it. The remarks he makes descriptive of caricature are compatible with its ordinary art-historical usage.)
(103) Gleizes and Metzinger, op.cit., in Jauess, op.cit., p.71
(104) Gleizes and Metzinger, op.cit., in Jauess, op.cit., p.76
(105) 'The Mutability of Aesthetic Categories', pp.418-9
(106) op.cit., p.419
(107) Ibid
(108) op.cit., p.420
(109) Ibid. Same point in a letter to C.J. Ducasse, Letters, p.235
(110) 'The Mutability of Aesthetic Categories', p.424
(111) op.cit., p.425
(112) Ibid
(113) op.cit., p.426
(114*) Ibid. Santayana maintains that he himself never found the fine arts to be the chief source of beauty, e.g. in the 'Apologia pro Mente Sua':
"... nor has my love of the beautiful ever found its chief sustenance in the arts. If art transports, if it liberates the mind and heart, I prize it; but nature and reflection do so more often and with greater authority. If ever I have been captivated it has been by beautiful places, beautiful manners, and beautiful institutions..." (op.cit., Schilpp, p.501)

Similar remarks occur in a letter written at very much the same time. He had met Berenson by chance, and the latter had enthused over the manner in which certain Viennese painters capture the harmonies of light peculiar to Venice. Santayana comments:

"...I don't really know or care who painted or who saw those harmonies most perfectly. Each probably saw a different effect, and painted it according to his own convention. What I care about is the harmonies themselves, which can't be had at second hand; they are strictly momentary and incommunicable..." (Letter to Mrs. Crawford H. Toy, 10.10.1919. Letters, p.342.)

Whether these remarks made late in life are true of Santayana in his earlier years is to be doubted. It is hard to believe that he did not find great beauty in the poets he praised so highly, notably Dante; and he took immense pleasure in architecture. (cf. Ch.VII, section iv, and note 91* to that chapter.) Possibly, late in life, a lifelong acquaintance with art had made it seem a little stale to Santayana; but this is only speculation.

(116) op.cit., p.427
(117) ibid
(118) ibid
(119) op.cit., p.429
(120) ibid
(121) op.cit., p.422. The same point about pleasure is made in 'The Idler and his Works', IHW, pp.11-12
(122) 'The Mutability of Aesthetic Categories', p.422

(123) ibid

(124) ibid. For another interpretation of this passage cf. Arnett, p.30

(125) ibid, p.9

(126) op.cit., p.10

(127) ibid

(128) ibid

(129) op.cit., p.149

(130) op.cit., p.150

(131) ibid

(132) op.cit., p.151

(133) op.cit., p.150

(134) ibid

(135) 'An Aesthetic Soviet', p.187

(136) op.cit., p.188

(137) op.cit., p.189

(138) ibid

(139) op.cit., pp.190-1

(140) op.cit., p.192

(141) ibid

(142) ibid

(143) op.cit., p.193

(144) op.cit., p.195

(145) op.cit., p.196-6

(146) op.cit., p.196

(147) ibid

(148) ibid

(149) op.cit., p.197

(150) ibid

(151) op.cit., pp.197-8

(152) op.cit., p.198
The distinction between the liberal and the fine arts is implied in remarks such as the following. The economic arts are animated by an intense proprietary passion. This same feeling "overflows illegitimately into the liberal arts also, even into what we call fine art." (op. cit., p. 93)

The same thought concerning the fate of the artist too involved in the world occurs in Santayana's, 'Marginal Notes on Civilization in the United States' (1922). Santayana is writing about a comment by Deems Taylor to the effect that the American Musician works in a vacuum; he is out of things and knows it. Santayana's comment is that a true musician would not mind that, since music is a world apart. The real difficulty lies in,

"a divided allegiance: the musician will not live on music alone, he is no true musician. Snobbery, the anxiety to succeed, and a
sort of cowardly social instinct stand between the artist and his work. It is because he wants 'to be in things' that he fails, and deserves to fail. *(op.cit., in SA, p.172)*.

(171) DP, pp. 170-1
(172) op. cit., p. 170
(173) op. cit., p. 137

**Note to the Conclusion**

(1) John Passmore: 'A Hundred Years of Philosophy', p. 287
Bibliography

Introductory Note

The following bibliography does not claim to be exhaustive. A complete list of works by and about Santayana (not to mention other reading on the subjects considered in the present thesis) would require another volume equal in size to the present one. What follows is limited to works consulted in the preparation of this thesis.

I: Bibliographies

(1) The most exhaustive bibliography of works by and about Santayana is:

(2) The following is a chronological list of Santayana's works up to 1940, with an index:

(3) Less complete but useful lists of works by and about Santayana are included in the commentaries by Duron and Munson, full details of which are given in section III, below.

II: Works by Santayana

Note: In the following list of Santayana's works, details are given of the first date and place of publication of each title. Where, as is most often the case, the edition used is other than the first edition, details are given after the rubric, "Edition used". The edition used is the one to which page references are given in the foregoing notes. There is no complete edition of Santayana's works: the nearest to this ideal is the Triton Edition, 1936-40, 15 vols., and I have used this text wherever possible. Many pieces were however left out of this edition, and others appeared after its publication had been completed. For these there is as yet no standard edition.

(1) 'An Aesthetic Soviet', 'The Dial', 82, May, 1927,361-70
(1, ctd.) Edition used: "Obiter Scripta". (q.v.)

Edition used: "George Santayana's America", q.v.

(3) 'Alternatives to Liberalism', 'The Saturday Review of Literature',
10, (June 23, 1934), pp. 761 sqq.
Edition used: "The Birth of Reason and Other Essays", q.v.

Edition used: "The Idler and His Works", q.v.

Edition used: "George Santayana's America", q.v.

(6) "Animal Faith and Spiritual Life: Previously Unpublished and Uncollected
Writings by George Santayana with Critical Essays on his Thought", ed.

(7) 'Appearance and Reality', in "The Birth of Reason and Other Essays",
pp. 142-4

(8) 'Apologia pro Mente Sua' in P. A. Schilpp, ed, "The Philosophy of George
Santayana", Northwestern University Press, Evanston and Chicago, 1949,
pp. 495-605

(9) 'Apology for Snobs', 'The Athenaeum', no. 4661, Aug. 29, 1919, pp. 905-6

(10) 'Atmosphere', in "Soliloquies in England", pp. 11-13

(11) 'Aversion From Platonism', 'The Athenaeum', no. 4645, May 2, 1919, p. 297

(12) 'Berenson's Florentine Painters', 'The Psychological Review', 3, Nov,
1896, pp. 677-9 (Review of Bernard Berenson: "The Florentine Painters of the
Italian Renaissance with an Index to their Works", 1896.)

(13) 'Bertrand Russell's Searchlight', 'The American Mercury', 37, March,
1936, pp. 377-9
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(14) 'The Birth of Reason', 1950; in "The Birth of Reason and Other Essays".

(16) 'Bishop Berkeley', in Dobree, Bonamy, ed.: 'From Anne to Victoria: Essays by Various Hands.' London, Cassell, 1937, pp. 75-88


(18) 'The British Character', 'The Athenaeum', no. 4643, April 25, 1919, pp. 231-2


(20) 'Classic Liberty', 'The New Republic', 4, Aug. 21, 1915, 65-6

(21) 'The Comic Mask', 'The Dial', 70, June 1921, pp. 629-32

Edition used: 'The Idler and His Works', q.v.

(23) 'A Contrast with Spanish Drama', 'The Athenaeum', no. 4737, Feb. 11, 1921, pp. 146-7

(24) 'Croce's Aesthetics', 'The Journal of Comparative Literature', 1, April, 1903, pp. 191-5.
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(27) 'Dialogues in Limbo, With Three New Dialogues', New York, Scribner's, 1948

Edition used: Reprint by Ann Arbor Books: University of Michigan Press, 1957. (This work was first published in 1926, minus three of the dialogues of the second, 1948, edition. It is the first edition which is reprinted in the Triton Edition, v. X. Because the Triton text in this instance omits important material, the Ann Arbor text has been preferred.)

(28) 'Dickens', 'The Dial', Nov. 1921, pp. 537-49


(31) 'Dons', 'The Dial', 71, Aug. 1921, pp. 143-5


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(34) 'Emerson's Poems Proclaim the Divinity of Nature, with Freedom as his profoundest Ideal', 'The Boston Daily Advertiser', Emerson Centenary
(34, ctd.) Supplement, May 23, 1903, p. 16
Edition used: 'George Santayana's America', q.v.

(35) 'Empiricism', 'The Athenaeum', no. 4672, Nov. 14, 1919, pp. 1178-9

(36) 'Enduring the Truth', 'The New Adelphi', n.s. 3, 1929-30, pp. 120-4

(37) 'The Ethical Doctrine of Spinoza', 'The Harvard Monthly', June 2, 1886, pp. 144-52
Edition used: 'The Idler and His Works'


(40) 'Friendship', in 'The Birth of Reason and Other Essays', pp. 78-89

(41) 'A General Confession', in Schilpp, P.A., 'The Philosophy of George Santayana', pp. 3-30, (cf. no. 3, above.)


(44) 'German Philosophy and Politics', 'The Journal of Philosophy', 12, 1915, pp. 645-9
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(47) 'Grisaille', 'The Athenaeum', no. 4644, May 2, 1919, p. 262

(48) 'Hamlet', 'Life and Letters', 1, June, 1928, pp. 17–38

(49) 'Hamlet's Question', 'The Athenaeum', no. 4645, May 9, 1919, pp. 296–7

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(51) 'Hellenism and Barbarism', 'Greek Heritage: The American Quarterly of Greek Culture', I, Winter, 1963
Edition used: 'The Birth of Reason and Other Essays'

(52) 'Hermes the Interpreter', 'The London Mercury', 5, Feb. 1922, pp. 374–7

(53) 'My Host the World' (Volume III of Santayana's autobiography):


(55) 'Human Symbols for Matter', in 'The Idler and His Works', q.v.

(56) 'The Idea of Christ in the Gospels; Or, God in Man. A critical Essay'
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(57) 'On Idealistic Historians', in 'The Birth of Reason and Other Essays', pp. 135–6

Edition used: 'The Idler and His Works and Other Essays', q.v.

(59) 'The Idler and His Works and Other Essays', ed. with Introduction by Daniel Cory. New York: Braziller, 1957

(60) 'The Indomitable Individual', 'The New Republic', 3, May, 22, 1915
(61) 'Insoluble Antinomy', 'The Southern Journal of Philosophy', 10, Summer 1972, no. 2, pp. 107-8


(63) Introduction to 'The Life of Reason' and 'Reason in Common Sense'


Edition used: Triton Edition, Vol.III (This includes the text of the Preface to the second, 1922, edition.)

(64) 'The Irony of Liberalism', 'The Dial', 71, Oct, 1921, 407-17


(65) 'James's Psychology', 'The Atlantic Monthly', 67, April, 1891, pp. 552-6

(Review of William James: 'The Principles of Psychology')

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(66) 'John Hull and His Philosophies', 'The Athenaeum', no. 4666, Oct. 3, 1919, pp. 969-70


(70) 'The Lion and The Unicorn', 'The Athenaeum', no. 4712, Aug. 20, 1920, pp. 231-3

(71) 'Literal and Symbolic Knowledge', 'The Journal of Philosophy', 15, 1918, pp. 421-44


(73) 'A Long Way Round to Nirvana; or Much Ado about Dying', 'The Dial', 75, Nov. 1923, pp. 435-42

(74) 'Lotze's Moral Idealism', 'Mind', 15, April, 1890, pp. 191-212.

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(76) 'Low Visibility', 'The Athenaeum', no. 4640, April 4, 1919, pp. 133-4

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(78) 'Masks', 'The Athenaeum', no. 4716, Sept. 17, 1920, p. 366

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Vol. XIII. 'Scepticism and Animal Faith'/ 'Some Meanings of the Word, "Is"'/ 'Literal and Symbolic Knowledge'/ 'The Unknowable'.

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(21) Brett, J.S.: 'The Achievement of George Santayana', 'The University of Toronto Quarterly', 9, (1939), pp. 22-37

(22) Brownell, Baker: 'Santayana, the Man and the Philosopher' in Schilpp, 'The Philosophy of George Santayana', pp. 33-61

(23) Buchler, Justus: 'One Santayana or Two?', 'The Journal of Philosophy', 51, 1954; pp. 52-7

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