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THE RESTORATION AND FALL OF ROYAL GOVERNMENT IN NEW GRANADA 1815-1820

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Ph.D
Warwick University
1994
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The Restoration and Fall of Royal Government in New Granada 1815-1820

Rebecca A. Earle

Thesis submitted in accordance with the requirements of the University of Warwick for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History

September 1994
Francisco Goya, *Los Desastres de la Guerra*: "Y no hai remedio"
Summary

This thesis studies Spain's failure to halt the revolution which led to Colombia's independence in 1822. After Napoleon's occupation of the Spanish peninsula in 1808, most of Spain's South American colonies removed themselves from European control and functioned as sovereign states. The thesis explores, first, the activities of royalists in the Viceroyalty of New Granada during this period. It then turns to events after 1815. In that year, following the defeat of Napoleon, Spain's restored monarchy despatched a substantial army to Venezuela and New Granada, in an effort to return the viceroyalty to Spanish control. This expedition, while initially successful, failed ignominiously in its task.

The thesis examines the reasons for Spain's defeat, which was more the result of Spanish error than Colombian patriotism. To begin with, Spain's policies for solving the American problem suffered from several fundamental defects. All attempts at ending the American insurgencies were based on an inadequate understanding of American realities. Moreover, the only policy to which Spain committed itself wholeheartedly, namely military reconquest, was seen by many as merely exacerbating the problem, and was further restricted by financial considerations.

Spain thus lacked a coherent policy for counter-revolution, and failed to carry through those plans it succeeded in putting into operation. New Granada saw the effects of this non-policy. Colonial officials there, like officials in Spain, disagreed profoundly in their proposed cures for the insurgency. Furthermore, mutual distrust between members of the civil administration and the royalist army at times overshadowed efforts to defeat the insurgents. Disagreement over policy was but one strand of the royalist crisis in New Granada. Equally serious was the chronic shortage of money suffered by both the army and the civilian administration. Their continual demands for food, funding and supplies wore away Neogranadans' initial support for Spain's reconquest, as did the arrogant and offensive behaviour of royalist troops. Perennially short of cash, the army and the administration relied on forced loans and confiscation to keep afloat. These proved an unstable base for a re-imposition of Spanish control. The effect was that the inhabitants of New Granada, most of whom had welcomed the royalist army in 1816, by 1819 gave enthusiastic support to Simón Bolívar's campaign against Spain's General Morillo.

The thesis examines these issues, setting them in the context of Spain's effort to restore its authority in New Granada. It then charts the consequent collapse of royal government from 1819 to 1822. It concludes with an assessment of the Spanish response to the loss of the American colonies.
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Many individuals assisted me in preparing this thesis, but there is no one whom I take greater pleasure in thanking than my supervisor, Anthony McFarlane. I continue to feel honoured that he accepted me, first as a master's student, and then as a doctoral candidate, and that he so unstintingly shared his time and knowledge with me. I could not have wished for a better supervisor. I need hardly add that this thesis owes a tremendous debt to Dr. McFarlane, and that any errors that remain in it are, without doubt, the consequence of my obstinate refusal to heed every piece of his good advice.

Other debts, too, must be acknowledged. The British Academy kindly provided me with a studentship, and also funded an extra trip to Madrid. In Madrid, the staff of the Biblioteca de la Real Academia de Historia were affable and very helpful, once they overcame their suspicion of someone who claimed to be a British resident, yet had an American passport, and, to confuse things, a recommendation from the British Council. In Seville, the staff at the Archivo General de Indias, from the archivists to the photocopiers, all did much to make my research in their archive pleasant and fruitful. In Oxford, the librarians at the Bodleian Library have proved remarkably willing to check references over the telephone. To all of them I am very grateful.

Finally, there remains the happy task of thanking my family. Both my husband David and my parents have provided every sort of support, indeed, perhaps, more than they realise. Little Gabriel, too, has contributed in his own way. I thank them all with great sincerity.
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Introduction

In “Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage”, Lord Byron’s 1812 travelogue cum political commentary, the poet remarks on the ironic culmination of Spain’s three hundred years as a imperial power. Byron was struck by the coincidence of Napoleon’s invasion of the Iberian peninsula with the outbreak of insurrection in Spanish America. Harking back to the defeat of “Quito’s sons”, the Incas, he wrote:

Strange retribution! now Columbia’s ease
Repairs the wrongs that Quito’s sons sustain’d,
While o’er the parent clime prowls murder unrestrained.¹

Indeed, as Byron suggests, the years from 1808 to 1825 were truly difficult ones for Spain. During these eighteen years Spain was invaded, and indeed conquered, by the troops of Napoleonic France, and furthermore lost virtually all of its overseas colonies. The peninsula experienced four entirely different types of government during the period, and Spanish troops participated in some five different wars of liberation, yet triumphed in only one, namely the fight against Napoleonic France. By 1820, Spain was widely regarded as a spent force. This thesis will explore one of these crises: the war of independence in New Granada.

Following the capture of Ferdinand VII and Napoleon’s invasion of the Spanish peninsula in 1808, most of Spain’s American colonies separated themselves from the remnant of Spanish government and began to function as autonomous states or statelets. In some regions this was accomplished with relative ease. The Viceroyalty of Río de la Plata, for example, effectively

¹George Gordon Byron, “Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage”, canto 1, lxxxi.
freed itself from Spanish control in 1810, and from then on most of its provinces remained outside the Spanish sphere. In others the period from 1810 to 1815 was a time of bloodshed. The Viceroyalty of New Spain in particular experienced a violent attempt at social revolution. In yet other areas, the customary order was less disturbed. The government in Lima, although threatened on all sides by revolution, remained loyal to the crown until the 1820s. In New Granada events followed a still different course.

The creoles in the Viceroyalty of New Granada at first responded to the French invasion of Spain with concern. Cabildos across the region collected donations for the defeat of the French, and public outrage over Napoleon’s actions ran high. Within a year, however, the surface unity had shattered. In the city of Quito a governing junta was established, in competition with those already existing in Spain, and soon other cities formed separate juntas intended to govern in the absence of the Spanish monarch. These bodies, although ostensibly loyal to the imprisoned Ferdinand, were immediately perceived as revolutionary, and by 1812 most had indeed declared independence from Spain. The unifying role played by Spain was not, however, occupied by any other entity. Efforts to create a central government in Santa Fe failed. New Granada instead acquired several competing governments, which soon declared war on each other. Thus, when Ferdinand returned to the throne in 1814, there was no independent ‘New Granada’, but rather a disunited collection of smaller states.

The rebellions in New Granada and the other American states had attracted the concern of successive governments in
Spain itself, although only very inadequate responses had been essayed prior to the defeat of the French. In 1814, however, Spain determined to stamp out the spark of overseas revolution. A considerable military force was assembled, and the Viceroyalty of New Granada was chosen as the destination. This army, commanded by General Pablo Morillo, a veteran of the Peninsular War, arrived in Venezuela in April 1815. Finding the Captaincy-General already virtually restored to royal control, Morillo moved his army to Cartagena, perhaps the most important city in New Granada. After a siege of 106 days, Cartagena surrendered to the Spanish, and the army soon recaptured the remainder of the country, thus completing the 'Reconquest' of New Granada. Quito itself had already been regained for the Spanish by an army of local royalists under the leadership of Juan Sámano and Toribio Montes. Thus, by mid-1816, the situation of the Spanish in New Granada looked promising. The interior of the country had been recaptured with only derisory resistance, and Spanish officials appeared to be well on the way to reestablishing the colonial government. By 1817, however, the state of affairs had altered considerably. A growing opposition to the royalist military was making life difficult for the Expeditionary Army, and by 1818 General Morillo was predicting catastrophe. In 1819 republican troops routed royalist forces north of the capital, and within a year Spanish control was confined to the northern and southern margins of the country. In 1822 the last Spanish troops withdrew from the viceroyalty, and New Granada became truly independent.

This study will examine the process by which Spain lost New Granada. The wars of independence have, of course, already
attracted a great deal of scholarship, which has sought to answer a variety of questions and has pointed in a number of different directions. José Manuel Restrepo’s great work, which remains the keystone for most subsequent research, is concerned fundamentally, as Germán Colmenares has noted, with the development of the Colombian state. Dozens of books explore the ideas and writings of Simón Bolívar. Others study the causes underlying the move for independence. John Lynch locates its origins in the economic and social crises confronting Bourbon Spanish America. Indalecio Liévano Aguirre attributes the collapse of the First Republic to the unresolved social conflicts raging between Neogranadans, while Jorge Domínguez’s jargon-laden study attempts to correlate indicators of ‘social mobilisation’ with revolt. Much of the interesting recent work has explored the symbolism and ideology of the independence movements, in an effort to trace the origins of Colombian nationalism.

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3 See, for example, Víctor Andrés Belaunde, Bolívar y el pensamiento político de la revolución hispanoamericana, Ediciones Cultura Hispánica (Madrid, 1959); Cristóbal Mendoza, Los escritos del libertador, Editorial Arte (Caracas, 1968); David Bushnell, The Liberator Simón Bolívar. Man and Image, Alfred A. Knopf (New York, 1970); Germán Carrera Damas, El culto a Bolívar, Universidad Central de Venezuela (Caracas, 1973); and Indalecio Liévano Aguirre, Bolívar, Editorial Oveja Negra (Bogotá).


6 See, for example, Problemas de la formación del estado y de la nación en hispanoamérica, Inge Buisson, Günter Kahle, Hans-Joachim König, and Horst Pietschmann (editors), Lateinamerikanische Forschung 13, Böhlau.
that most of this research concerns the victorious insurgents and their supporters. Yet, to paraphrase Timothy Anna’s remark about Mexico, the “vast bibliography devoted to the process of rebel victory tells only half the story of how Spain lost political control”. The war was not only won by the insurgents; it was lost by Spain. Bolívar and his allies did not defeat Morillo’s Expeditionary Army solely because the former were better patriots, nor did the only battles take place in the realm of ideology. Rather, the reasons for Spain’s defeat must be sought, first, in Spain itself, and then in the destructive dynamics within New Granada’s royalist camp.

This thesis provides a new explanation of how and why Spain lost New Granada. The fall of Spanish government in New Granada will be traced to specific Spanish weaknesses. In the first place, Spain never developed a coherent strategy for responding to its revolted colonies, and attempted to pursue a collection of often contradictory policies at the same time. Indeed Timothy Anna, whose work sheds much light on this aspect of Spain’s failure, suggests that his study of Spanish policy towards the American insurgencies might be subtitled, “Lessons in How to Lose an Empire”. This institutional crisis lies at the centre of Spain’s failed response.


Events in Spain must, however, be considered together with events in New Granada itself. There royalists suffered not only from the effects of administrative disunity in Madrid, but also from other problems that had long plagued colonial administrators. Juan Friede has drawn attention to the continuing obstructiveness that characterised both the colonial administration and the reconquest government set up during the war. Conflict between civil and military authorities, slow responses, and the persistence of the old “se obedece pero no se cumple” mentality were typical of both periods.9 In New Granada, as elsewhere in Spanish America during the wars of independence, mutual distrust between members of the established colonial structures, such as the Audiencias, and the military bodies, at times overshadowed efforts to defeat the insurgents. Furthermore, colonial officials, like officials in Spain, disagreed profoundly in their proposed cures for the insurgency. Some, such as Quito’s President Toribio Montes, advocated a policy of forgiveness, while others, such as New Granada’s last viceroy, Juan Sámano, believed that only severe punishment would deter the rebels. Proponents of these different policies clashed openly, and on occasion devoted more time to undermining the opposing view than to defeating the insurgents. At the highest level, General Morillo and Viceroy Francisco Montalvo came to loathe each other, and each plotted the other’s downfall. Further conflicts developed in 1820, after the liberal revolution in Spain. With the return of the Constitution of 1812 came a renewed

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outbreak of factionalism in New Granada, which led to the overthrow of Viceroy Juan Sámano.

Disagreement over policy was but one strand of the royalist crisis in New Granada. Equally serious was the chronic shortage of money suffered by both the army and the civilian administration. Spain, itself hard-pressed for cash, was unable to provide an adequate level of funding for Morillo’s Expeditionary Army, which as a consequence looked to New Granada’s population for sustenance. The continual demands for food, funding and supplies wore away New Granada’s initial support for the reconquest, as did the arrogant and offensive behaviour of royalist troops. By 1817 irritation with the reconquerers was running high. The army’s dependence on the populace might not have pressed so heavily had the administration been able to restart the colonial economy. Despite efforts to re-establish the state monopolies, and to revive trade, the reconquest economy remained stalled, unable to generate even a fraction of the income routinely provided for the state two decades earlier. Perennially short of cash, the army and the administration relied on forced loans and confiscation to keep afloat. These proved an unstable base for a re-imposition of Spanish control.

Finally, the Expeditionary Army itself was scarcely secure. From the moment of its first landing in Venezuela, the army began to suffer from the ill health that would ultimately reduce it to a state of virtual nullity. British forces fighting in the Caribbean were unhappily familiar with the deadly effects of tropical disease, and Spanish troops too soon learned to dread service in the colonies. Dysentery, yellow fever, infection, and a myriad of other ills had, within a year of its arrival in the
Americas, already reduced Morillo’s army by nearly a third. Despite considerable recruitment in New Granada and Venezuela itself, General Morillo was unable to restore his army to full size. Moreover, this continual and necessary recruitment proved another source of irritation to Neogranadans, who came increasingly to view the royalist army as an enemy rather than a friend. Forcing civilians to act as unpaid labourers for the army, as well as confiscating their money and possessions, could hardly have been expected to assuage local opinion. The effect of this catalogue of royalist errors was that the inhabitants of New Granada, most of whom had welcomed the expeditionaries in 1816, by 1819 gave enthusiastic support to Bolívar’s campaign against Morillo.

Spain, then, not only lacked a coherent policy for counter-revolution, but also failed to carry through the plans that it succeeded in putting into operation. New Granada saw the effects of this non-policy. Under-funded and disunited, royalists in New Granada did not present a convincing picture of the virtues of unity with Spain. The process by which New Granada gained independence was itself an illustration of Spain’s failure as a colonial power. The “systemic dysfunction” in Spanish government noted by Anna impeded a royalist victory, and the destructive behaviour of royalist administrators and officers in New Granada itself virtually secured a republican victory. Spain lost the war as surely as the republicans won it.

The details of this failure form the subject of this thesis. This study, moreover, seeks not only to explain how Spain lost New Granada, but also to throw new light on a neglected portion

10Anna, Spain and the Loss of America, p. xv.
of Colombian history. In studies of the War of Independence, the reconquest is usually dismissed with a few paragraphs. In this work we will see that the period of the reconquest is of critical importance to a serious evaluation of New Granada’s War of Independence, and to Spain’s loss of its American colonies.

The principal sources used in this thesis are contained in the Archivo General de Indias. I spent nine months in Seville collecting material from the archive there, and the documents consulted during this period form the backbone of the study. In total, thirteen different sections (133 legajos) were examined. Particularly extensive use was made of the ‘Papeles de Cuba’ section, which contains a wealth of information about the reconquest. The reconquest documents in ‘Papeles de Cuba’ consist primarily of military records and correspondence between military officials. Other important material was also found in the ‘Audiencia de Santa Fe’ section, specifically, records of the Council of the Indies relating to New Granada, and correspondence of the viceroys. The sections ‘Audiencia de Quito’, ‘Audiencia de Panama’ and ‘Audiencia de Caracas’ also yielded information about the course of the war in these regions; ‘Audiencia de Quito’ in particular shed light on the presidency of Toribio Montes, one of the royalists’ more interesting officials. Finally, eight other

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11 For a recent work on independence which virtually ignores the years from 1816 to 1819, see Rafael Gómez Hoyos, La independencia de Colombia, MAPFRE (Madrid, 1992).

12 While it might appear surprising that material relating to New Granada is filed under the heading ‘Cuba’, there is in fact a good reason for this. Most of the reconquest material in ‘Papeles de Cuba’ was brought to Havana from Cartagena when that city surrendered to the republicans in 1821. In 1898 this material was transferred from Havana to Spain, where it was naturally classified as originating in Cuba.
sections, including ‘Estado’, ‘Indiferente General’, and ‘Diversos’, were consulted as well.

I also visited several other Spanish archives. The Archivo de Simancas, outside Valladolid, contains useful correspondence between the Spanish ambassadors in London and Spanish officials in both Spain and New Granada. The Archivo Histórico Nacional in Madrid houses the Colección Torrepando, the collected papers of Miguel de la Torre, the high-ranking Spanish officer who replaced General Pablo Morillo as royalist commander-in-chief. This collection is thoroughly catalogued, and access to particular documents is thus easy. Also in Madrid is the Biblioteca de la Real Academia de Historia. This library proved to be the location of General Morillo’s papers, and it was here that Morillo’s biographer Antonio Rodríguez Villa found most of his sources. These papers are in the process of being catalogued, and I was able to study many documents that Rodríguez Villa did not include in his biography.

Finally, a few areas of this study employ material collected for my master’s thesis in the Public Record Office (London), the British Library (London), the Archivo Histórico Nacional de Colombia (Bogotá), and the Archivo Central del Cauca (Popayán).

A number of primary printed sources have also been used. Firstly, many participants in the war left memoirs. The “memoirs” of Pablo Morillo himself are, in fact, an edited version of a manifesto published by the general in 1820, and are not particularly useful. On the other hand, José Manuel Restrepo,

13 Marqués Ernesto de Blosserville and Pablo Morillo, Mémoires du Général Morillo, Conte de Carthagène, Marquis de la Puerta, relatifs aux principaux événemens de ses campagnes en Amérique de 1815 a 1821, suivis de deus précis de don José Domingo Díaz et du Général don Miguel de la Torre, P.
whose magnificent history of the Colombian revolution provides a fair and insightful (if pro-Bolivarian) assessment of the war, also wrote an interesting autobiography which includes an expanded section on events in 1816. New Granada’s other great republican historian, Daniel O’Leary, likewise left a readable account of the war. Royalist officer Rafael Sevilla wrote a fast-paced thriller of a memoir, while Neogranadan José María Caballero kept a more laconic diary of the war. Several Venezuelans also left first-hand accounts of the war; Caraqueño official Francisco Xavier Arámbarri, for example, wrote a bitter denunciation of Morillo’s tenure in Venezuela.

Secondly, various collections of printed documents were consulted. Overall, the most important printed primary source proved to be Rodríguez Villa’s biography of General Pablo Morillo. Rodríguez Villa, an unabashed Morillo apologist, published, in addition to his one volume biography, a three volume documentary appendix that contains many of the most important letters written by Morillo. This is thus an essential source for

Rafael Sevilla, Memorias de un oficial del ejército español, campañas contra Bolívar y los separatistas de América, Editorial América, (Madrid, 1916); and José María Caballero, Diario, Editorial Villegas (Bogotá, 1990).
Antonio Rodríguez Villa, El Teniente General Don Pablo Morillo, primer Conde de Cartagena, Marqués de la Puerta (1778-1837), 4 vol., Real Academia
all studies of the reconquest. Aside from Morillo’s life, the subject best served by collections of published documents is the campaign of 1819. Juan Friede has edited a collection of documents about the Battle of Boyacá, and the Fundación Francisco de Paula Santander has also published several volumes of official correspondence from 1818 and 1819. Roberto Arrazola’s collection of documents relating to the trial and execution of Cartagena’s nine republican heroes in 1816 reveals much about the attitudes of these early revolutionaries. For information about Britain’s involvement in the war, C.K. Webster’s classic *Britain and the Independence of Latin America* is a useful primary source.

Finally, one must consider the secondary sources. Until recently there have been virtually no substantial studies concerned specifically with the royalist army in New Granada; Oswaldo Díaz Díaz’s two volume *La reconquista española*, burdened with excessively long citations from uninteresting documents, was perhaps the only work to examine closely the
period of the reconquest. Diaz, however, is concerned to document the extensive popular participation in the revolutionary movement, rather than to examine the royalist forces in themselves. Juan Friede's study of Spanish views towards independence is in essence an extended essay, which describes the conflicts that raged between the different royalist leaders. It draws heavily on material in the Archivo de Indias. The commemoration of the quincentenary of Columbus' landing has, however, brought a new outpouring of books on Spain's participation in the war of independence. The MAPFRE series contains several books on the royalist army, most notably Juan Marchena Fernández's latest work, as well as a less distinguished study of the Spanish navy. Julio Albi has written an interesting general study of the royalist army's participation in the American wars of independence. There also exist several works of military history which study the various campaigns in the War of Independence. Among the most interesting of these is Jorge Mercado's 1919 analysis of Morillo's campaign. Mercado, an officer in the Colombian army, produced an interesting and accessible description of events in 1815-16. Various

22 Oswaldo Díaz Díaz, La reconquista española, 2 vol., Historia Extensa de Colombia, vol. 6, Ediciones Lcmer (Bogotá, 1967).
23 Friede, La otra verdad.
24 Juan Marchena Fernández, Ejércitos y milicias en el mundo colonial americano, MAPFRE (Madrid, 1992); José Cervera Pery, La marina española en la emancipación de Hispanoamérica, MAPFRE (Madrid, 1992); and Julio Albi, Banderas olvidadas: el ejército realista en América, Ediciones de Cultura Hispánica (Madrid, 1990). The last two books both make unnecessary mistakes with dates and figures.
biographical studies also assisted me in drawing up a picture of the period, although Stoan’s biography of Morillo proved disappointing. In this work Morillo’s tenure in Venezuela is whitewashed and his sojourn in New Granada is discussed only briefly. Altogether more red-blooded is Margaret Woodward’s much-cited article on Spain and the loss of the Americas. Woodward paints a vivid picture of the despair that permeated royalist forces and which goes a long way toward explaining their defeat. (Laura Ullrick’s study of Morillo, often mentioned at the same time as Woodward’s, is entirely outdated and consists of little more than an enumeration of facts.)

Secondary sources were used most extensively in the sections dealing with events in Spain itself. There are, to begin with, four classic works studying Spain’s response to the American crisis. These are Melchor Fernández Almagro’s study of Spanish opinion, José Luis Comellas García Llera’s fine work, Los primeros pronunciamientos en España, and two rather similar studies of the Spanish press by Jaime Delgado and Luis Miguel Enciso Recio.

26Stephen Stoan, Pablo Morillo and Venezuela, 1815-1820, Ohio State University Press (Columbus, 1974); Sergio Elias Ortiz, Franceses en la independencia de la Gran Colombia, Biblioteca Eduardo Santos, vol. 1, Editorial ABC (Bogotá, 1971); and three works by José María Restrepo Saenz: Gobernadores de Antioquia, 1571-1819, vol. 1, Imprenta Nacional (Bogotá, 1932); Gobernadores y próceres de Neiva, Biblioteca de Historia Nacional, vol. 63 (Bogotá, 1941); and Biografías de los mandatarios y ministros de la real Audiencia (1671-1819), Biblioteca de Historia Nacional, vol. 84, Editorial Cromos, (Bogotá, 1952).


28Laura Ullrick, “Morillo’s Attempt to Pacify Venezuela”, HAHR, vol. 3 (1920).

29Melchor Fernández Almagro, La emancipación de América y su reflejo en la conciencia española, Instituto de Estudios Políticos (Madrid, 1954); José Luis Comellas García Llera, Los primeros pronunciamientos en España, 1814-1820, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (Madrid, 1958); Jaime Delgado, La independencia de América en la prensa española, Seminario de Problemas Hispanoamericanos (Madrid, 1949); and Luis
have employed all four of these texts, but my account of the political turmoil in Spain during and following the French invasion is drawn primarily from three more recent works, which themselves make use of these earlier studies: Edmundo Heredia’s *Planes españoles para reconquistar hispanoamérica*, Michael Costeloe’s *Response to Revolution*, and Timothy Anna’s *Spain and the Loss of America*. All of these works examine the response of Spain’s various governments to the American insurgencies; none deal in any detail with events in the Americas. Of these three, I have found Costeloe’s book the least convincing. Costeloe describes Spain as deeply concerned about the insurgencies, and insists that great (although ineffective) efforts were made to contain the revolutions. He further asserts that at no time did Spain become complacent about the war. These assertions do not accord with my own observations about the period. I am more inclined to agree with Heredia and Anna that Spain’s governments were slow to recognise the seriousness of the American revolts, and never succeeded in giving the war sufficient attention. All works however contain a wealth of information about Spanish politics during the war. The various studies by Catalan Josep Fontana further illustrate the sorry state of Spanish political life during the years of the war.

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Finally, there are the comparative and general works. Timothy Anna’s homonymous studies of the fall of royal government in Mexico and Peru, while not offering explicit comparisons with the situation in New Granada, nevertheless illustrate the many similarities, in particular, the disunity at the highest levels of royalist command.\textsuperscript{32} There are also many general studies of New Granada’s revolution. Indalecio Liévano Aguirre’s work on social conflict contains several interesting chapters on independence, in which he debunks myths and blackens the reputations of many traditional prôceres.\textsuperscript{33} Miguel Izard’s study of the Venezuelan revolution similarly tarnishes republican reputations in its exploration of class conflict in Tierra Firme.\textsuperscript{34} Finally, there are scores of other, more specialized studies of specific events and regions, which I will not attempt to enumerate. These items appear in footnotes throughout the text and do not need to be described separately.

Lastly, it is, perhaps, necessary to clarify the term ‘New Granada’. In 1808, the Viceroyalty of New Granada was an amorphous space, which included the Kingdom of New Granada, the Audiencia of Quito, and the Captaincy-General of Venezuela. The Kingdom of New Granada, in turn, included present-day Colombia, as well as Panama. All these regions were under the


\textsuperscript{33}Liévano Aguirre, \textit{Los grandes conflictos}; and also Eduardo Pérez, \textit{Guerra irregular en la independencia de la Nueva Granada y Venezuela, 1810-1830}, Publicaciones de la Universidad Pedagógica y Tecnológica de Colombia (Tunja, 1982).

\textsuperscript{34}Miguel Izard, \textit{El miedo a la revolución: La lucha por la libertad en Venezuela, (1777-1830), Editorial Tecnos (Madrid, 1979).
nominal rule of the viceroy in Santa Fe de Bogotá, but, in practice, the Captain General of Venezuela and the President of Quito’s Audiencia functioned in virtual autonomy. We will here follow contemporary usage by employing the term ‘New Granada’ when referring to the territory now comprising modern Colombia. The term ‘viceroyalty’ refers to the entirety of Venezuela, New Granada, Panama and Quito. The terminology is somewhat complicated by the fact that in 1812 the Viceroyalty of New Granada was demoted to Captaincy-General, and its viceroy replaced by a captain general. (This decision was reversed in 1816, when the region was again promoted to viceroyalty.) Thus, when referring to the period from 1812 to 1816 we will speak of the ‘Captaincy General of New Granada’, but this should cause no confusion. This study is concerned with New Granada itself, and, to a lesser degree with Panama, and the Presidency of Quito, which shared jurisdiction with the Audiencia of Santa Fe over the southern portions of New Granada. We will, moreover, often refer to events in Venezuela, whose history was intimately linked to that of New Granada.
PART I: WAR
Chapter 1: War in Spain and America

The first section of this thesis surveys the period from 1808 to 1815. These years were for Spain and New Granada a time of warfare and uncertainty. An understanding of this period is necessary for a proper study of both General Morillo’s reconquest and the colonial government’s subsequent collapse. Moreover, the period of New Granada’s First Republic, the so-called Patria Boba, has been understudied. Chapter 2 will outline the activities of Neogranadan royalists during this pivotal period. Here, we examine the opening moves of the independence years: Spain’s Peninsular War, and the formation of insurgent juntas in New Granada.

§ 1 The Peninsular War

The fall of Spain’s overseas empire began in 1807. In the autumn of that year, Napoleon decided to invade Portugal to ensure that Britain did not evade his Continental System, or blockade, by trading with the Portuguese. Passage through Spain for 28,000 French troops was easily arranged. Manuel de Godoy, the de facto head of Spanish government, granted the French permission to march through Spain, in return for the promise of kingdoms in the about-to-be conquered Portugal. Godoy was to become the Prince of the Algarve.\(^1\) However, Charles IV’s son

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\(^1\) Extracts of the 1807 Treaty of Fontainebleau and many other important documents from the years 1807-1813 may be found in Spain under the Bourbons, 1700-1833: A Collection of Documents, W.N. Hargreaves-Mawdsley (editor), University of South Carolina Press (Columbia, 1973), pp. 196-243. For a thorough account of the Peninsular War, see Gabriel Lovett, Napoleon and the Birth of Modern Spain, 2 vols, New York University Press (New York, 1965).
Ferdinand, fearful that Godoy would entirely eclipse him, determined to come to his own arrangement with Napoleon. He thus began secret negotiations with the emperor, to whom he confided his own ambitions and from whom he requested help in overthrowing Godoy. Napoleon thus became the arbiter of the Spanish succession. Various governmental configurations were then essayed. On learning of his son’s secret contacts with Napoleon, Charles IV arrested Ferdinand for treason, then pardoned him, in late 1807. Following popular rioting in Aranjuez in March 1808, Godoy was dismissed by Charles IV, and Ferdinand elevated to the throne. Napoleon, convinced of the ineptitude of the Spanish royalty, contemplated offering the Spanish throne to his brother Louis, and then, on 16 April 1808, invited both Charles IV and Ferdinand to Bayonne to discuss the events of the past few months. French troops had meanwhile occupied most of Spain and all of Portugal. In Bayonne, during a busy three days, Ferdinand was induced to return the throne to his father, who then signed a treaty with Napoleon recognising the Corsican as emperor of Spain and the Indies. Napoleon appointed his brother Joseph to rule in Spain, and the entire Spanish royal family was imprisoned, Charles IV, María Luisa and the inimitable Godoy in the chateau of Compiègne, and Ferdinand and his brothers in Talleyrand’s chateau, Valençay.

2Napoleon was unimpressed by Ferdinand. In a letter to Talleyrand he remarked, “the Prince of Asturias is a brute, a bad lot, and an enemy of France. You can imagine that, with my experience of managing men, his twenty-four years quite failed to impress me: indeed my mind is so clear about him that nothing less than a long war would induce me to recognise him as King of Spain.” See Napoleon to M. Talleyrand, Bayonne, 1 May 1808, in Napoleon’s Letters, J.M. Thompson (editor), Everyman’s Library, (London, 1964), pp. 198-199.

An amusing account of Godoy’s life may be found in Jacques Chastenet, Godoy, Master of Spain, 1792-1808, Batchworth Press (London, 1953).
The detention of the Spanish monarchs proved a fatal error for Napoleon, who had failed to recognise the extraordinary enthusiasm felt across Spain for Ferdinand. Indeed, Ferdinand's mere decision to travel to Bayonne had already caused a popular anti-French uprising in Madrid on 2 May 1808. The cruelty with which this revolt was repressed by General Murat further aroused anti-French feeling. When news of Ferdinand's imprisonment reached Asturias, the province rose in revolt. A general summons to arms was issued on 24 May 1808; "to arms, to arms, Asturians! . . . let us hasten to throw this treacherous and execrable nation out and to wipe them from the face of our peninsula," urged the newly-created 'Supreme Junta' of Asturias, formed to govern Asturias in the absence of Ferdinand.3 These sentiments were soon echoed by other 'Supreme Juntas', set up in Santander, La Coruña, Segovia, Zaragoza, Valencia, Seville, and elsewhere, to defend the rights of the imprisoned Ferdinand. When the unfortunate Joseph I entered Spanish territory in July 1808, he found a populace widely opposed to his rule and increasingly in revolt. Patriotic armies were quickly mobilised, and, in the same month, French forces suffered their first serious defeat since 1804. Some 30,000 irregular Spanish troops under General Francisco Xavier Castaños defeated two French divisions at Bailén.4

This Spanish success did not end the hostilities. The French army, recovering from its defeat at Bailén, enjoyed victory after

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3Proclamation of the General Council of the Principality of Asturias, Oviedo, 24 May 1808, Hargreaves-Mawdsley, Spain under the Bourbons, pp. 211-212.

victory. Madrid was recaptured in December 1808, Zaragoza fell to a 42-day French siege in February 1809, Ocaña was captured, with heavy Spanish losses, in November 1809, and by the spring of 1810 most of Andalucía was in French hands. Meanwhile Spanish guerrilla forces harassed the French across the country, and civilians assassinated and spied on French troops. Confronted with perhaps the first guerrilla war in Europe, the French responded with attacks on civilian populations.5

Most of the regional juntas formed to oversee the resistance to Napoleon decided in 1808 to unite into a single body, generally known as the Junta Central. (The junta in Seville did not accept the authority of the Junta Central until March 1809.) This new entity first met in Aranjuez on 25 September 1808, under the presidency of the Count of Floridablanca. Confusion reigned, according to Timothy Anna: “the Junta Central was wracked by political disagreements between conservatives and reformers, and the authority to create such a national government was openly doubted by the Council of Castille, to say nothing of many American creoles”.6 Many of Spain’s American colonies were, by this stage, also in a state of considerable uncertainty. The juntas of Asturias and Seville had each sent their own delegates to major American cities to explain events in Spain, and to canvass support for their conflicting claims of authority, an action that merely resulted in greater confusion. Mexico City was visited in quick succession by representatives of both the juntas. The evident lack

5Napoleon was as unimpressed by the Spanish guerrillas as he had been by Ferdinand. He noted that “in all my military life I have never come across anything so despicable as these Spanish bands and troops”. (Napoleon to Joseph Napoleon, Bordeaux, 31 July 1808, Napoleon’s Letters, pp. 204-205.

6Timothy Anna, Spain and the Loss of America, University of Nebraska Press (Lincoln, 1983), pp. 30, 42-46. The Council of Castille was a Bourbon governmental council which briefly survived the Napoleonic invasion.
of unity between the different bodies prompted Viceroy Iturriagaray to assert that, “Spain is now in a state of anarchy, there are Supreme Juntas everywhere, and we should therefore not obey any of them”.

The effects of this display of disunity were to be further exacerbated by the Junta Central. In January 1809 the Junta Central, by this time resident in Seville as a consequence of the French recapture of Madrid, issued an important document summoning regional delegates to attend its sessions. The summons invited not only the Spanish provinces, but also the American viceroys to send delegates, and declared that these latter regions would no longer be considered colonies, “sino parte esencial e integrante de la monarquía española”.

This remarkable statement, far from inciting the unity of feeling intended by the Junta Central, merely served to engender further American resentment. To begin with, gross inequality governed the election of deputies. The peninsular provinces, with a population of some 10,000,000, were to elect 26 deputies, while the 17,000,000 inhabitants of Spanish America were initially allocated a mere 9. This inequality increased the following year, when the Cortes were summoned; Spain was granted some 250 deputies, while the Americas were allowed only 30. This obvious proof of America’s continued inferior status immediately became a source of complaint and resentment.

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7 Anna, Spain and the Loss of America, p. 32.
9 See, for example, Guerra, “La independencia de México”, p. 32; and also the discussion of the Memorial de Agravios in Sergio Elías Ortiz, Génesis de la revolución del 20 de julio de 1810, Biblioteca Eduardo Santos, vol. 19, Editorial Kelly (Bogotá, 1960), pp. 45-74, esp. pp. 50-51.
The war was meanwhile going exceptionally badly for Spain's patriotic resistance; by the spring of 1810 virtually all Spain lay in French hands. Moreover, the Junta Central had received little support from the population of Seville, and was forced to flee the city when the French invaded Andalucía in early 1810. They set up residence first in Cádiz, and subsequently on the Island of Leon. On 29 January 1810 the Junta Central dissolved itself and established a separate governing body, the Council of Regency. The Regency, confined as it was to Cádiz, became, as Anna notes, “a kind of hostage to the business and political interests of Cádiz,” and in particular to the Junta Superior de Cádiz, a local governing council, and the Comisión de Reemplazos.¹⁰

Prior to its self-dissolution, the Junta Central had resolved to convocate a Cortes, to be attended by deputies from both Spain and the Americas. Preliminary orders had already been issued to cities throughout Spain's dominions to elect delegates. Then, on 14 February 1810, the Regency distributed an additional statement, in which it affirmed that, “desde este momento, españoles americanos, os veís elevados a la dignidad de hombres libres. . .vuestras destinos ya no dependen ni de los ministros, ni de los virreyes, ni de los gobernadores; están en vuestras manos”. This announcement, according to José Manuel Restrepo, caused “la

¹⁰Anna, Spain and the Loss of America, p. 60-62, 80-84. The Comisión de Reemplazos is discussed in Chapter 8.
más profunda sensación” across the Americas. The first meeting of the Cortes occurred on 24 September 1810, and was attended by 104 deputies. The Cortes immediately declared itself the natural repository of sovereignty, an act which was to provoke the resignation of the entire membership of the Council of Regency. For the next three and a half years, until the return of Ferdinand in 1814, Spain was governed by the extraordinary Cortes of 1810-1813 and the ordinary Cortes of 1813-1814, together with the Regency. The Cortes issued a series of decrees intended to reform government and society in both Spain and America, and, most importantly, drafted Spain’s first written constitution, the Constitution of 1812. This limited the role of the king, and introduced a number of controversial reforms both to Spain and to the colonies. It established a constitutional monarchy; authority was to reside essentially with the Cortes. America was declared an integral part of Spain, not a colony. The judicial system was reorganised, a single, universal tax was introduced, the military was restructured, and freedom of the press was decreed. The document was promulgated in the royalist-controlled regions of Spanish America with varying degrees of sincerity.

12 New members were soon appointed. See Anna, Spain and the Loss of America, pp. 66-67.
13 For a fine summary of the provisions of the 1812 Constitution, see Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Revolution in Spain, Greenwood Press (Westport, 1975), pp. 57-61; or, for a more recent assessment, Mario Rodríguez, The Cádiz Experiment in Central America, 1808 to 1826, University of California Press (Berkeley, 1978), pp. 75-100.
14 The application of the Constitution of 1812 in Mexico has been comparatively well-studied. See, for example, Antonio Annino, “Pratiche creole e liberalismo nella crisi dello spazio urbano coloniale: il 29 novembre 1812 a Città del Messico”, Quaderni Storici: Notabili Elettori Elezioni, no. 69 (December 1988), pp. 727-763; Nettie Lee Benson (editor),
Meanwhile, the fortunes of the French army were waning. The continued popular uprising, "the Spanish ulcer", as Napoleon called it, proved a fatal drain on French military resources. Furthermore, Portugal had revolted against Napoleon in 1808, and with British help had forced the French to withdraw into Spain. This provided Wellington with a military base from which to attack the French, while Spanish irregulars whittled away at the large armies of Soult and Masséna. In May 1813, French troops were forced to abandon Madrid, while allied British and Spanish troops marched through Castile. Then, on 21 June 1813, Wellington struck the fatal blow. French troops at Vitoria were defeated in a major battle which virtually ended their control of the peninsula. Ferdinand was released from captivity in December 1813, and reentered Spain on 22 March 1814. He was

Mexico and the Spanish Cortes, 1810-1822, Institute of Latin American Studies, University of Texas (Austin, 1968); and Virginia Guedea, "El pueblo de México y la política capitalina: 1808 y 1812", (17th International LASA Congress). For Central America, see Rodríguez, The Cádiz Experiment in Central America.

In New Granada, the constitutional reforms were implemented only in areas of royalist domination, and, even there, had limited impact. See Restrepo, Historia de la revolución, vol. 1, pp. 241-242; and Anna, Spain and the Loss of America, p. 95. In Panama, elections to the Cortes were held in August 1812, but the failure of Viceroy Pérez to implement certain articles of the Constitution became fodder in the Audiencia's long-running battle with Pérez and the Panama City cabildo. (See Benito Pérez to Minister of Grace and Justice, Panama, 16 November 1812; Joaquín Carrión, Manuel Igarrió(?), and Tomás de Arechaga to Council of the Indies, Panama, 6 February 1813; both in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 668; Juan Domingo de Iturralde to Minister of Overseas, Santiago de Veragua, 3 August 1813, AGI, Audiencia de Panama, legajo 265; and Francisco Montalvo to Minister of Overseas, Santa Marta, 9 November 1814, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 668 (this letter is also contained in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631.)

The constitutional system appears to have implemented most fully in Quito, during the rule of Toribio Montes. There elections to constitutional bodies of some sort were held, to the disgust of absolutists (See Pedro Pérez Muñoz, Historia de la rebelión de América, Guayaquil, 31 December 1815, carta 29, AGI, Diversos, legajo 42.) President Montes, however, suspended the two most important elections, those to the Cortes and to the Provincial Deputation, until late 1813. (See Toribio Montes to Minister of Overseas, Quito, 7 October 1814, AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 260.)

15See Rudé, Revolutionary Europe, pp. 264, 267.
greeted everywhere with great popular acclaim. "When Ferdinand entered Valencia, on April 16, 1814, 'the joyous people yoked themselves to his carriage'. . . From Aranjuez to Madrid Ferdinand's carriage was drawn by the people," recorded Marx with disgust.\textsuperscript{16} Although Ferdinand initially approved the establishment of the Cortes and the Regency, and appeared willing to accept their requirement that he swear loyalty to the Constitution, he soon decided to ignore the demands of these two bodies. Immediately surrounded by the group of friends or camarilla that was to dominate his political life from then on, Ferdinand resolved instead to effect an absolutist coup. Leading liberal members of the Cortes and Regency were arrested, and on 4 May 1814 Ferdinand issued a decree ordering all aspects of Spain's government to return to their status in 1808, prior to the surrender at Bayonne. In particular, the Cortes were dissolved and their actions declared illegal. Absolutism was thus restored to Spain. Napoleon was meanwhile experiencing difficulties on other fronts. His invasion of Russia had failed spectacularly, and nationalist sentiments in Austria and Germany aroused increasing opposition to French rule. On 6 April 1814 Napoleon abdicated and accepted confinement on the Island of Elba. By this stage, however, war with France had inflicted huge damage on Spain's authority in its empire. While Spaniards struggled against the French in the Peninsula, the framework of imperial government had been ruptured by rebellion in the American colonies. The first cracks had appeared in 1810, when many of Spain's American colonies had broken with central government.

\textsuperscript{16}Marx, \textit{Revolution in Spain}, p. 71.
embarking on a process remarkably similar to the peninsular war.\textsuperscript{17}

\section*{§ 2 American Juntas}

Spain’s grip on New Granada had weakened during the preceding two decades. Since 1793, Spain had been almost constantly at war with either France or Britain, and, as a result, Spanish trade with its colonies had declined precipitously.\textsuperscript{18} Furthermore, Spain’s consistent bad luck in the field of European politics could have done little to bolster its reputation as a powerful metropolis. Nonetheless, as Anthony McFarlane has argued, New Granada showed few signs of being a society ripe for revolution. The occasional attempts at revolutionising the viceroyalty had been resounding failures, and increased conflict between creoles and peninsulars did not at first prevent Neogranadans from rallying to Spain’s defence after Napoleon’s invasion. Indeed, it was events in Spain, rather than conflicts within New Granada, which propelled the viceroyalty into revolt. Only when the breakdown of royal authority appeared complete did several of New Granada’s provinces strike off on their own.

In doing so, they mirrored the actions of Spain’s own provinces. The dissolution of the Spanish state, and the creation of the various governing juntas in Spain itself, was both an

\textsuperscript{17}Nineteenth-century Spaniards did not fail to notice the similarities between the Peninsular War and the Spanish American wars of independence. See, for example, Melchor Fernández Almagro, La emancipación de América y su reflejo en la consciencia española, Instituto de Estudios Políticos (Madrid, 1954), p. 93.

opportunity and a model for Spanish America. By 1810, Spain was no longer a unified entity. Sovereignty was divided unevenly between the French, who controlled most of the country, and the resistance juntas that sprang up in many cities. This state of division was soon mirrored by New Granada. First in Quito, then in Caracas, Cartagena, Santa Fe, and elsewhere, governing juntas were established, in competition with the Junta Central and the Regency in Spain. The American juntas all initially claimed to be patriotic bodies, formed to govern New Granada only during the absence of Ferdinand, but virtually all eventually declared in favour of complete independence from Spain. As the Junta Central retreated first to Andalucía, and then to a small island off Cádiz, its claims to represent the entire Hispanic world began to look exceedingly unconvincing. When in 1810 the Council of Regency sent out representatives requesting the American colonies to recognise that body as the official voice of free Spain, many regions refused. Indeed, in the Viceroyalty of New Granada’s principal cities, it was the arrival of the Regency’s Royal Commissioners, Carlos Montúfar and Antonio de Villavicencio, that provoked an overt rupture with Spain.

The breakdown of royal government within the Viceroyalty of New Granada began in the city of Quito. Soon after the arrival from Spain of news announcing Ferdinand’s imprisonment, a group of eminent Quiteño creoles overthrew the president and created its own governing junta on 10 August 1809. President Ruiz de Castilla was arrested, and the junta declared its support for Ferdinand VII and undying opposition to the intruder.
Napoleon. The Quito junta was thus in no sense a radical body.\textsuperscript{19} It was nonetheless immediately labelled heretical by opponents; in southern New Granada it was denounced as a collection of "herejes insurgentes" and "traidores".\textsuperscript{20} The junta did, however, enjoy initial support from the city's population. This was, in part, because in Quito, as elsewhere, the leading colonial officials were accused of being French sympathisers. Rumours had circulated throughout Quito that President Ruiz de Castilla and his allies intended to deliver the city into the hands of the French, and that a general massacre of Americans was imminent.\textsuperscript{21}

Efforts to attract support from the region's other cities were less successful. Although some of the smaller towns around Quito threw in their lot with the innovators, Cuenca, Guayaquil and Popayán, not to mention Lima and Santa Fe, all declined to recognise the junta, and the Quito junta itself became bogged down in pointless discussions concerning the type of uniform its members should wear. The junta made the further error of attempting to attack the city of Pasto, to the north. Pasto, long an economic competitor of Quito, had refused to recognise the new


\textsuperscript{21}Restrepo, \textit{Historia de la revolución}, vol. 1, pp. 109, 112. See also Marie-Danielle Demélas and Yves Saint-Geours, \textit{Jerusalen y Babilonia: Religión y política en el Ecuador, 1780-1880}, Biblioteca de Ciencias Sociales, vol. 21, Corporación Editora Nacional (Quito, 1988), chapters 5-6, for further discussions of Quito's two juntas.
junta. Quito’s elite seized this opportunity to vanquish a rival, and sent a large but untrained army northwards. This army was entirely defeated by the Pastusos in October 1809. Quito’s junta, already suffering from self-doubt, took this opportunity to dissolve itself, thus ending its brief existence.

The junta’s members arranged a ‘surrender’ with President Ruiz de Castilla, who promised that no reprisals would be taken. This promise was swiftly broken, and over 70 supporters of the former junta were thrown into jail in early December 1809. Some 800 pardo troops were sent north from Lima to assist Ruiz de Castilla in maintaining control. These troops rapidly earned the hatred of Quito’s citizenry, either by their reportedly uncontrolled pillaging or by their dark skins.22 Matters came to a head on 2 August 1810, almost exactly a year after the creation of the Quito junta. On that day an organised attempt was made to free the pro-junta prisoners and to attack the Limeño troops. The attempt failed, and in response the Limeño troops went on a rampage through the city. Many of the juntista prisoners were massacred, and perhaps as many as 80 civilians were killed as well.23

Following this attack, Ruiz de Castilla and his supporters felt it necessary to make some gesture of conciliation. They accordingly recommended dropping the criminal cases against surviving members of the junta, and ordered the pardo troops to return to Lima. This in no way dispelled the growing hostility towards Ruiz de Castilla’s government, and when in late 1810 the

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22 See Restrepo, Historia de la revolución, vol. 1, p. 118, for ambiguous comments about the Limeños’ defects.
23 Restrepo, Historia de la revolución, vol. 1, p. 110-121, describes these events. One Quitoño estimated that 140 civilians were killed (Pedro Pérez Múñez, Historia de la revolución de América en 35 cartas, Quito, 31 December 1815, carta 16, AGI, Diversos, legajo 42), while Minchom cites a figure of 300 (Minchom, The People of Quito, p. 249).
Regency’s commissioner, Carlos Montúfar, arrived in the city, he easily convinced Ruiz de Castilla to permit the formation of a new, quasi-official, junta, headed by Ruiz de Castilla himself. The remaining posts were filled by the surviving members of the original junta. This odd situation continued until October 1811, when Ruiz de Castilla resigned and was replaced as president by Quito’s insurgent bishop, José de Cuero y Caicedo. During this period the junta came increasingly to favour separation from Spain, and indeed declared independence on 11 December 1811.

More or less simultaneously with the formation of Quito’s second junta, Joaquín Molina landed in Guayaquil, having been appointed by the Regency to replace Ruiz de Castilla. Molina, basing himself in Cuenca, opened negotiations with the new junta, which had once again failed to win the support of the province’s other large cities. These negotiations went nowhere, and open hostilities broke out in early 1811 between the royalist troops of Molina and Cuenca’s Governor Melchor Aymerich, and the army assembled by Quito’s Pedro Montúfar. The troops of Quito’s now openly insurgent junta were also enmeshed in fighting against Popayán’s governor Miguel Tacón, as will be discussed in the next chapter.

President Molina led Quito’s royalist resistance during 1811 and 1812. He was then replaced by Toribio Montes, one of Spain’s more controversial officials. Montes, building on earlier royalist victories, launched an attack on Quito itself, and recaptured the city on 7 November 1812. After their defeat in Quito, Carlos

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24 Ruiz de Castilla remained in Quito, where he was assassinated in June 1812 during a riot. See Restrepo, *Historia de la revolución*, vol. 1, p. 234.
25 Toribio Montes to Minister of Overseas, Quito, 7 October 1814, AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 260.
Montúfar and his insurgent allies fled north to Ibarra, where they were besieged by Juan Sámano, and in the end agreed to capitulate. Montes took up residence in Quito, proclaimed the Constitution of 1812, and began instituting a highly controversial policy of ‘reconciliation’, described by some as venal capitulation to the insurgents. Quito’s Audiencia refused to return to Quito, however, remaining instead in Cuenca, as a consequence of disagreements with President Montes. Thus, by the autumn of 1812, Quito’s brush with revolution had ended. The presidency had been restored to royalist hands with a minimum of bloodshed, and no further attempts at revolutionising the region enjoyed success until 1822. Movements against Spain continued, however, in other parts of the Viceroyalty of New Granada, where events evolved in a substantially different way.

In Venezuela, various dissident movements had already hatched plots to overthrow Spanish authority, and in 1808, after news of the capture of the Spanish monarchs reached Caracas, attempts were made to form an independent junta in the capital. The move was stifled, as were similar attempts in late 1809 and early 1810. When, however, news of the virtual collapse of Spain’s anti-French resistance was brought to Caracas by the Regency’s special commissioner, Antonio de Villavicencio, matters came to a head. Ignoring the views of Captain General Vicente Emparán, a group of creoles composed mainly of members of the Caracas cabildo, formed a Junta Conservadora de los Derechos de Fernando VII. Emparán was deposed, and the junta

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26 See Toribio Montes to Juan Sámano, Quito, 22 November 1812, AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 257.
27 See Lynch, The Spanish American Revolutions, pp. 193-199, for a description of events in Caracas. See also Antonio de Villavicencio to Cortes, Cartagena, 29 May 1810, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 747.
took over government of Venezuela. Outright independence from Spain was declared on 5 July 1811. The Junta, and the Congress that succeeded it, represented the interests of the country’s creole, landowning class. It abolished legal distinctions between whites and pardos, yet preserved the social structures that permitted de facto discrimination. As John Lynch comments, “independence, then, simultaneously raised and frustrated [pardo] expectations”.28

This fatal error proved the downfall of Venezuela’s first republic. Crypto-royalists encouraged Black revolt, and soon won a series of victories over the precarious republic. Within six weeks of the earthquake that destroyed much of Caracas on 26 March 1812, the city surrendered to the royalist commander Domingo Monteverde. Venezuela’s republican leaders were swiftly imprisoned, although some, including Simón Bolívar, the future libertador, managed to escape. By the end of 1812, Caracas, like Quito, was again in royalist hands. Unlike Quito, which was to remain royalist for the next decade, Venezuela soon exploded into a civil war.

Meanwhile, in New Granada, Spain’s authority was also challenged in several places. In Cartagena, hostility between the city’s conservative cabildo, Governor Francisco Montes, and the peninsular merchants resident in Cartagena had been increasing throughout 1808 and 1809.29 The conflict had, at first, centred on the desirability of legalising trade with the Caribbean, but, by late 1809, events in Spain itself came to play a central role in the dispute. Although the city’s cabildo had already recognised the Junta Central, the junta’s flight from Madrid and the depressing

29See McFarlane, Colombia before Independence, pp. 338-344 for an overview of events in Cartagena.
military reports began to have a discouraging effect. Members of Cartagena’s cabildo demanded permission to form a junta of their own, and responded angrily when Governor Montes tried to pack the cabildo with his own supporters. Montes, allegedly fearful of a repeat of events in Haiti, was unwilling to allow the city’s creoles a greater share of local power. When the Regency’s special commissioner, Antonio de Villavicencio, arrived in May 1810 with news of the total dissolution of the Junta Central, Montes’ position became completely untenable. Montes allegedly prohibited Cartagena’s creoles to carry weapons, while at the same time encouraging peninsulars to train in their use. His supporters were moreover said to have covered the city with anti-cabildo pasquinades and “cartas inflamatorias”. He had furthermore lost the support of the city’s peninsular merchants, who, as representatives of the Cádiz-based Americas trade, were eager to recognise the Regency, tied as it was the Consulado de Cádiz. On 14 June 1810 a ten hour “cabildo pleno” voted to remove Montes from office and replace him with the province’s lieutenant governor, Colonel Blas de Soria. This act was of primarily symbolic importance, as Montes refused to accede to the cabildo’s demands. The special cabildo was, however, followed five days later with an attack on the house of Governor Montes, led by members of the Regimiento Fijo de Cartagena and various

30 See, for example, Observaciones sobre el estado presente de la España, sobre los males que amenazan a la América, y sobre las medios de precaverlos, (written by José María García de Toledo?) Cartagena, 28 April 1810, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 1011.
31 Antonio de Villavicencio to Cortes, Cartagena, 29 May 1810; and Antonio de Villavicencio to Antonio Amar, Cartagena, 30 May 1810; both in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 747.
32 Antonio de Narváez y la Torre to Antonio Amar, Cartagena, 19 June 1810, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 1011. See also Antonio de Villavicencio to Cortes, Cartagena, 29 May 1810, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 747.
“hombres del pueblo”\textsuperscript{33} This latter event appears to have persuaded Governor Montes to permit the establishment of a junta, which was formed on 22 May 1810\textsuperscript{34}. Montes remained a member of this junta only briefly. He and his secretary were arrested on 14 June 1810 and sent to Havana\textsuperscript{35}

Cartagena’s new junta was a conservative body\textsuperscript{36}. Its members were peninsular merchants and representatives of Cartagena’s creole elite, and it voted immediately to recognise the Regency in Spain. Nonetheless, in Spain the junta was instantly perceived as a radical installation. Many officials in New Granada itself were equally disturbed. Indeed, within a few months of the junta’s formation, the governor of Panama reported to the Cortes that Cartagena was in a state of insurrection\textsuperscript{37}. Moreover, the junta began planning a complete restructuring of New Granada’s government. It advocated the formation of a national federal assembly, which would govern New Granada during the captivity of the king. Despite the junta’s claim that this federal system would be only a temporary measure, it designed a full-scale government, including ambassadors to foreign countries, and the virtues of federal republicanism were extolled\textsuperscript{38}. The new junta

\textsuperscript{33}Antonio de Narváez y la Torre to Antonio Amar, Cartagena, 19 June 1810, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 1011.

\textsuperscript{34}Bando de Francisco de Montes et al., Cartagena, 23 May 1810, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 747.

\textsuperscript{35}Restrepo, \textit{Historia de la revolución}, vol. 1, pp. 128-129.

\textsuperscript{36}McFarlane, \textit{Colombia before Independence}, p. 341.

\textsuperscript{37}Juan Antonio de la Mata to Cortes, Panama, 1 September 1810, AGI, Audiencia de Panama, legajo 262.

\textsuperscript{38}See La Provincia de Cartagena de las Indias a las demás de éste nuevo Reyno de Granada, Cartagena, 19 August 1810, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 745; and also Gabriel Jiménez Molinares, \textit{Los mártires de Cartagena de 1810 ante el consejo de guerra y ante la historia}, vol. 1, Edición Oficial (1948), pp. 164-173.
thus began a difficult balancing act between loyalty and independence.

Nor did the removal of Governor Montes restore calm in Cartagena itself. In Spain, the patriotic juntas had been beset by outbreaks of rivalry and local factionalism. Cartagena too was plagued by regional rivalry and local power struggles. In early November 1810, the arrival of José Dávila, appointed by the Regency to replace Governor Montes, provoked a brief riot, which was quelled only when Dávila left the city.39 Then, in early February 1811, another uprising occurred. Troops from the Regimiento Fijo de Cartagena, as well as members of the city’s white and pardo militias and the “pueblo”, launched an attack on the junta which was defused only with difficulty.40

The revolt had been sparked by the appointment to an important position of José María Moledo, an unpopular officer who supported the revolutionary junta in the capital. This led some contemporaries to view the Cartagena uprising as a simple attempt at counter-revolution, intended to overthrow Cartagena’s junta and restore royalist authority.41 The revolt was clearly led by individuals opposed to the junta, but they were not a unified group of proto-royalists.42 Indeed, the account provided by José Manuel Restrepo makes clear that the revolt was, rather, an

40José María del Real to Secretary of Despacho Universal, Cartagena, 7 February 1811, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 1011. The Fixo de Cartagena and the pardo and white militias were considered opponents of the junta. See Junta de Cartagena to Regency, Cartagena, 20 November 1810, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 747.
41Both Restrepo and the royalist Carrión y Moreno referred to the riot as a counter-revolution. See Restrepo, Historia de la revolución, vol. 1, pp. 155-160; and Joaquín Carrión y Moreno to Secretary of State(?), Havana, 10 March 1811, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 747.
42Miguel Gutiérrez to Captain General de Cuba, Havana, 3 March 1811, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 747.
internal struggle between the supporters of José María García de Toledo, Antonio de Narváez, and Tomás Andrés Torres, all members of the provincial elite who had participated in forming the Cartagena junta. The revolt thus illustrates more than anything else the intensive factional struggles that broke out in Cartagena after the formation of the junta.

Meanwhile, the level of social unrest in Cartagena was increasing. The junta, perched as it was on an exceedingly narrow base, formed largely by the city's merchant elite, turned to the populace for support. Rumour and counter-rumour circulated, and money and alcohol were dispensed freely by the competing factions. Moreover, several members of the junta had become disillusioned with the Regency in Spain. The Regency, distrustful of the new junta, had ordered its dissolution, and the unequal representation of Americans in the Cortes had angered the city's elite. Eventually those members of the elite who favoured complete independence gained the upper hand. On 11 November 1811, "los pardos del barrio Getsemani" and a section of the city's garrison marched into the city and obliged the junta to swear complete independence from Spain, one month ahead of Quito's junta.

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43 See Restrepo, Historia de la revolución, vol. 1, pp. 189-191, 203-204. See also Indalecio Liévano Aguirre, Los grandes conflictos sociales y económicos de nuestra historia, vol. 2, Tercer Mundo (Bogotá, 1985), pp. 559-561 for a discussion of the class and racial conflicts stewing in Cartagena at the time.

44 See Junta de Cartagena to Regency, Cartagena, 20 November 1810, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 747, for the junta's angry reaction to the Regency's disapproval.

instituted (limited) male suffrage, expelled the Inquisition, and enacted other reforms.46

These actions were viewed with universal disapproval by Cartagena’s neighbours. Cartagena had already gone to war with Mompós the previous year after that city refused to recognise either the Regency, or, more importantly, the new junta in Cartagena.47 Cartagena’s attempt to form itself into an independent sovereign state merely aroused further hostility. None of the surrounding regions wished to become a province of the Republic of Cartagena, and the city found itself isolated. New Granada’s internal provinces refused to continue sending the traditional transfers of money needed to support Cartagena’s garrison, thereby causing tremendous financial hardship for the new government.48 Moreover, many of those Cartageneros opposed to independence had emigrated to Santa Marta, which soon became a centre for opposition to the Republic of Cartagena, and remained in a state of continual hostility with Cartagena until the arrival of General Pablo Morillo’s expedition in 1815. Thus Cartagena, unlike Quito or Caracas, remained separate from Spain after the initial creation of its junta. No army of reconquering royalists overthrew Cartagena’s junta during the years of the Peninsular War, and Cartagena became one of the bastions of insurgency in New Granada.

The other bulwark of revolt was located in the interior of New Granada, towards which the Regency’s commissioner Antonio

46 The text of the 1812 Constitution of the State of Cartagena is printed in Constituciones de Colombia, Manuel Antonio Pombo and José Joaquín Guerra (editors), Biblioteca Popular de Cultura Colombiana (Bogotá, 1951), pp. 93-176.
de Villavicencio was making his way. After participating in the formation of the junta in Cartagena, Villavicencio stopped briefly in Mompós, which likewise established an independent junta. He then journeyed on toward the capital. Meanwhile, anti-Spanish revolts broke out in several towns in the interior. In Pamplona an independent junta was formed on 4 July 1810, and on 9-10 July 1810 the town of Socorro rebelled against its corregidor and established a sovereign junta independent of the viceroy in Santa Fe. Further south, the city of Cali deposed its cabildo and established a junta on 3 July 1810. All these bodies, while proclaiming loyalty to Ferdinand VII, emancipated themselves from the central authority in Santa Fe.49 The Viceroyalty of New Granada began to disintegrate.

In the capital, this process of dissolution was watched with interest by members of the creole elite. Since 1809, when news of the junta in Quito had reached Santa Fe, the city had been in a state of excitement and anxiety, with rumours about imminent disasters abounding.50 Tensions between creoles and peninsulars in the capital had increased over the last decades, and several revolutionary plots had already been hatched.51 These had all failed, but the next would prove successful. On 20 July 1810 a group of creole conspirators staged a riot in the centre of Santa Fe.52 That evening, crowds poured onto the streets, unhindered by the militia, whose creole officers sympathised with the

49See Ortiz, Génesis de la revolución, pp. 136-139; and Restrepo, Historia de la revolución, vol. 1, pp. 130-131.
50See José María Caballero, Diario, Biblioteca de Bogotá, Editores Villegas, (Bogotá, 1990), pp. 63-75.
51See McFarlane, Colombia before independence, pp. 272-338.
52For a blow-by-blow description of the July 1810 revolution see Ortiz, Génesis de la revolución. A summary may be found in McFarlane, Colombia before Independence, pp. 341-346.
conspirators. Then, following this demonstration of popular anger, the city’s cabildo persuaded Viceroy Amar to form, and preside over, a junta. Amid popular unrest, the new junta met on 21 July 1810, and swore loyalty to the Regency. The junta further declared itself the supreme representative of New Granada, and summoned provincial representatives to participate in the formation of a provisional federal government. This call received a cold welcome from the other juntas so recently established in the provinces.

This was not the end of the coup d’etat. In the succeeding days, members of the Audiencia, together with prominent peninsulars, and then, on 25 July 1810, the viceroy and vicereine themselves, were arrested amid popular rioting. The next day, the junta revoked its recognition of the Regency, although it continued to protest its loyalty to Ferdinand VII. The junta, however, found itself again challenged in early August 1810. Restrepo reports that “el pueblo soberano hacía diariamente nuevas y extravagantes peticiones”, and on 13 August “la hez del pueblo” transferred the viceroy and his wife from house arrest to the city’s public prisons. This proved too much for the junta. Several individuals believed to be the intellectual authors of the transfer were arrested by the junta’s recently formed militia, and the viceroy and vicereine were freed and sent to Cartagena. The now-unchallenged junta set about forming a government, and proceeded with its plans to hold a congress of national deputies.

53 Restrepo, Historia de la revolución, vol. 1, p. 140.
54 For Viceroy Amar’s version of events, see Antonio Amar to Regency, La Coruña, 13 January 1811, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 747. This letter is published in Mario Herrán Baquero, El Virrey Don Antonio Amar y Borbón. La crisis del régimen colonial en la Nueva Granada, Banco de la República (Bogotá, 1988), pp. 305-310.
This congress met in late December 1810, but was attended by very few delegates from outside Santa Fe. Within a few months the congress had dissolved itself, to be replaced with a series of different leaders and organisations. Meanwhile, ever-greater fragmentation, rather than increased unity, was the order of the day. Mompós and Cartagena had already gone to war over the former's refusal to recognise Cartagena's junta, and soon Cartagena clashed with Santa Fe over the most suitable form of government for New Granada. In the succeeding months separate juntas were formed in Quibdó, Neiva, Nóvita, Antioquia, Mariquita, Casanare, Girón, Santa Marta, Popayán, and Tunja, and various provinces split into contending sections. Santa Fe itself attacked Ocaña, Socorro and, later, Tunja in an effort to incorporate these latter into the capital's system of centralised rule. It was later itself besieged by forces representing a new congress in Villa de Leiva. Restrepo remarked that, "apenas hubo ciudad ni villa rival de su cabecera, . . . que no pretendía hacerse independiente y soberana". Only in the south did insurgents in Cali succeed in forming a union of regional juntas, which for the next few years alarmed royalists in Pasto and Popayán.

In Spain, and indeed in New Granada itself, the dramatic events in Caracas, Cartagena, Quito and Santa Fe were regarded as frankly revolutionary. The oaths of loyalty to the imprisoned

55See Caballero, *Diario*, pp. 83-110; Restrepo, *Historia de la revolución*, vol. 1, p. 142-150; Junta provisional de gobierno de Santa Marta to the Regency, Santa Marta, 22 September 1810, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 746; and Bando on formation of junta in Antioquia, 11 October 1810, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 747.
56See Tomás de Acosta to Council of the Indies, Santa Marta, 29 November 1811, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 746; and Caballero, *Diario*, p. 95, 109.
Ferdinand notwithstanding, contemporaries realised that the formation of juntas constituted a de facto declaration of independence. José Acevedo Gómez, who had played a key part in the formation of the Santa Fe junta, acknowledged this when on 25 July 1810 he wrote to his cousin, “la España en lo venidero será nuestra aliada, pero ya no nos dará leyes”.58 Indeed, within days of the Santa Fe junta’s formation, Oidor Joaquín Carrión y Moreno was referring to it as a realisation of “las antiguas ideas de independencia”.59

Among royalists recriminations and finger-pointing started almost immediately. Carrión y Moreno for his part complained that Viceroy Amar had mishandled Santa Fe’s uprising, and asserted that the revolt could have been nipped in the bud by an opportune deployment of the militia. He further suggested that a military force be sent from Spain to defeat the insurgent juntas.60 This suggestion was soon seconded by officials in Spain. By the end of 1811 over 1,000 troops had embarked for America. By 1820 over 40,000 Spaniards had been despatched. In subsequent chapters we will examine the fate of these men and explore the reasons for their failure to suppress the revolutions which broke out in 1810. First, however, we must consider those elements within New Granada which favoured and facilitated the restoration of royal government. It is to this that we now turn in the next chapter.

59Extract of letter by Joaquín Carrión y Moreno to Regency, Cartagena, 28 August 1810, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 746.
60Joaquín Carrión y Moreno to Regency, Havana, 10 March 1811, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 747.
Chapter 2: Royalist Enclaves in New Granada

It has long been observed that, after the dissolution of viceregal government in 1810, cities and provinces in New Granada fought with their neighbours as much as with Spain itself.1 Provinces fought to maintain their colonial unity, smaller towns tried to free themselves from domination by larger cities, and pre-existing regional rivalry fuelled conflict. In this, New Granada mirrored the peninsula, where the extremely regional nature of the initial resistance to Napoleon led to rivalry and dissension. But internecine struggle was not confined to New Granada’s insurgent-controlled areas. Those regions that recognised the Regency fought with those that had not, and different factions within royalist-controlled areas fought each other. Factional struggle crippled the royalist government-in-exile established in Panama, while Santa Marta and Pasto, the two strongly royalist provinces of New Granada, were quickly submerged in bitter conflicts with their insurgent neighbours. While Santa Marta and Pasto kept alive a semblance of imperial control in New Granada, the problems facing the new viceroy, Benito Pérez, combined with the Regency’s failure to provide any guidance, meant that Pérez contributed little to the fight against insurgency. We will first survey the period of Pérez’s tenure in office, and will then examine the royalist enclaves in Santa Marta and Pasto.

1 For a concise statement of this view, see Hermes Tovar, "Guerras de opinión y represión en Colombia durante la independencia (1810-1820)", Anuario Colombiano de Historia Social y de la Cultura, no. 11 (1983). For comments on regionalism in Peru, see John Fisher, “Royalism, Regionalism and Rebellion in Colonial Peru, 1808-1815,” HAHR, vol. 59 (1979).
§1. Benito Pérez in Panama

Although it is tempting to think Antonio Amar’s career as viceroy of New Granada was ended by Santa Fe’s insurgents, the Regency had, in fact, already decided to replace Amar with Benito Pérez before July 1810.2 Pérez, who was 61 years old, had served in the Americas for over 30 years, and, like most of New Granada’s viceroys, was a military man.3 Pérez was appointed viceroy in August 1810, but did not take up his post until early 1812. It was by this stage impossible for the viceroy to reside in Santa Fe, as the capital, and indeed most of the country, was in the hands of the insurgents. Pérez accordingly took up residence in Panama, which was one of the few remaining royalist strongholds. The Audiencia of Santa Fe moved to Panama in late March 1812, at the same time that Benito Pérez was installed as viceroy, and the Tribunal de Cuentas also settled in Panama.

The arrival of the viceroy and establishment of a quasi-capital in Panama disturbed the existing balance of power in the province. Panama’s Governor Juan Antonio de la Mata had been governing the isthmus in complete autonomy since the collapse of central government in July 1810. With the arrival of Pérez and the Audiencia, both the governor and Panama City’s cabildo were dislodged from their positions at the top of the region’s hierarchy. Neither accepted this change without struggle. Bitter arguments

2Amar was retired on 20 February 1810, perhaps because he was suspected of being too pro-French. See Mario Herrán Baquero, El Virrey don Antonio Amar y Borbón, La crisis del régimen colonial en la Nueva Granada, Banco de la República (Bogotá, 1988), pp. 72-73. The Regency’s original plan had been to replace Amar with Francisco Xavier Venegas, who was subsequently named viceroy of Mexico.

3For details about Pérez’s career, see José María Restrepo Sáenz, Biografías de los mandatarios y ministros de la Real Audiencia (1671 a 1819), Biblioteca de Historia Nacional, vol. 84, Editorial Cromos (Bogotá, 1952), pp. 245-249.
soon broke out between the Audiencia on one hand, and the cabildo and governor on the other. The Audiencia complained that the cabildo refused to carry out its duties, while the cabildo alleged that the Audiencia, which by early 1814 was reduced to one member, was not properly constituted, and refused therefore to recognise its authority.4 Viceroy Pérez took the side of the cabildo. He refused to release funds to pay the salaries of Audiencia officials, and complained that it was the Audiencia, rather than the cabildo, which failed to carry out its official duties. Moreover, he stated, on those occasions which Audiencia members did attend public ceremonies, they did not observe the expected decorum. Oidor Manuel García, for example, had appeared before the bishop “sin insignia alguna, en un frac poco decente y aun sin espada”.5 The Audiencia countered that the viceroy was old, infirm, and had a “natural repugnancia a la observación de las leyes”.6

At the heart of the conflict was the Audiencia’s claim that the cabildo was a haven for smugglers. Viceroy Pérez allegedly aided and abetted the contraband trade, and himself profited from it. The cabildo’s efforts to unseat the Audiencia and to deny it authority were merely attempts to derail prosecution of smugglers, the Audiencia asserted.7 This view was supported by

4Benito Pérez to the Regency, Panama, 17 September 1812, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 746; and Joaquín Carrión y Moreno to Minister of Grace and Justice, Panama, 25 August 1814, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 580 (this letter may also be found in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 665).
5Benito Pérez to Minister of grace and Justice, Panama, 1813, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 580. See also the many other documents in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajos 580 (ramo 3) and 665.
6Act of the Audiencia de Santa Fe, Panama, 14 November 1812, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 746.
7Joaquín Carrión y Moreno to Minister of Grace and Justice (?), Panama, 19 July 1813, 22 June 1814, and 31 October 1814, all in AGI, Audiencia de Santa
the bishop of Panama. He too accused the members of the cabildo of being confirmed contrabandists. The cabildo, in turn, claimed that the bishop’s manners were “propio de un hombre sin cuna”, and accused him of being the smuggler.

Further conflicts emerged. Governor Mata was also drawn into the fighting between Viceroy Pérez, the cabildo, and the Audiencia. Pérez reportedly favoured the same men as Mata, and generally continued Mata’s style of governing, namely winking at smugglers and insurgents. Mata therefore supported Viceroy Pérez and the cabildo, which brought the governor into conflict with both the Audiencia and the bishop. Mata indeed became submerged in a prolonged struggle with Bishop Manuel, which was due in part, it was whispered, to the governor’s protection of a renegade canon who was having an affair with his wife.

Regional rivalries also surfaced, as Panama City and Portobelo struggled for supremacy. Portobelo’s cabildo complained that Panama City was trying to take over command of the entire isthmus, and alleged that the viceroy had originally intended to reside in Portobelo, but had been lured to Panama City with false promises of a healthier climate.

None of these conflicts did anything to reaffirm royal authority in New Granada, and Panama sank into a mire of local
infighting. Yet it was during this period virtually the only part of New Granada completely free of insurgents. Although Santa Marta and Pasto, the two other bases for royalists, fought dogedly against the insurgency, both were in continual danger of defeat. Pérez was in little position to assist either city militarily or financially, but hard-line royalists were nonetheless bitter at the paucity of Pérez’s efforts. No funds or expeditions were sent to either Santa Marta or Pasto by Pérez during his rule, and Pérez enraged hard-liners by receiving republican envoys from Cartagena as if they were ministers of a recognised state.11

Pérez was in poor health, and asked to resign in late 1812. His resignation was accepted and Francisco de Montalvo was appointed to replace him. Montalvo, who was directed to settle in Santa Marta, rather than Panama, took up office in early 1813. Pérez died in Panama in August of the same year.12 Pérez’s inactivity might suggest that for royalists, the years from 1810 to 1813 were a virtual lacuna, but this would be a misconception. On the contrary, these years formed a critical period of royalist resistance to revolution, although the real action took place not in Panama, but further south and east, in Pasto and Santa Marta. In the next two sections we will examine the rivalries and dissensions that marked these two regions’ involvement in the movement for independence. For Santa Marta, the city’s long-standing commercial rivalry with Cartagena was at the heart of its rejection of independence. For Pasto, too, economic rivalries

11 Audiencia de Santa Fe to Regency (?), Panama, 20 November 1812; Declaration of Tomás de Bajo, Panama, 18 November 1812; both in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 746; and Gabriel Jiménez Molinares, Los mártires de Cartagena de 1816 ante el consejo de guerra y ante la historia, vol. 1, Edición Oficial (1948), p. 303.
12 See Restrepo Suárez, Biografías de los mandatarios, p. 251.
underscored opposition to the insurgents. There, the new philosophy of republicanism arrived via Quito, a city which had for many years been Pasto’s economic rival. The elite of Pasto rejected independence as an attribute of Quito, invented to facilitate an assault on their province’s territorial, political and economic integrity. These conditions placed Santa Marta and Pasto in perhaps inevitable conflict with their insurgent neighbours.

§ 2. Royalist Santa Marta

Cartagena, as we saw in the last chapter, had, in 1810, formed a junta to govern the city during the French occupation of the peninsula. Aware that a hostile Santa Marta would jeopardise its existence, Cartagena’s junta had invited Santa Marta to form a similar junta and ally itself with Cartagena. And indeed, on 10 August 1810, a “tribunal de seguridad, con el título de junta provincial” was set up in Santa Marta. It did not, however, align itself with Cartagena. The junta’s stated purpose was to keep a close eye on the public good, and, Cartagena’s hopes notwithstanding, Santa Marta’s junta appears to have had little revolutionary intent. The majority of its members were firm opponents of republicanism. Indeed, on several occasions members of the junta were forced to resign after they were accused of supporting the insurgents. The junta moreover had

13 Junta provisional de gobierno de Santa Marta to the Regency, Santa Marta, 22 September 1810, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 746.
14 Junta Provisional de Santa Marta to Consejo de Indias, Santa Marta, 20 March 1811, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 746; and Jiménez Molinares, Los mártires de Cartagena, vol. 1, p. 185-186. More detailed information about the junta’s tenure in Santa Marta may be found in Ernesto Restrepo Tirado, Historia de la Provincia de Santa Marta, vol. 2, Ministerio de Educación Nacional, (Bogotá, 1953), pp. 310-342.
no intention of disobeying orders from Spain. It had in September 1810 informed the Regency of its establishment, but, as the junta did not receive approval from Spain, it dissolved itself in July 1811.15

The junta’s failure to develop into a revolutionary body may be largely ascribed to the negative influence of Cartagena. Santa Marta was, to begin with, already Cartagena’s principal commercial rival. During the Anglo-Spanish wars of 1796-1808, Santa Marta had attracted a greatly increased share of trade with the Caribbean, and Cartagena’s trading profits had declined substantially. Complaints about the unrestrained smuggling encouraged by the residents of Santa Marta had long been voiced in Cartagena, where Santa Marta’s inhabitants enjoyed little esteem.16 After the establishment of Cartagena’s junta in June 1810, a large number of peninsular merchants left Cartagena and took up residence in Santa Marta. This merely strengthened the city’s already well-developed contraband links with the British Caribbean. It is thus perhaps not surprising that the junta of Cartagena soon developed plans to attack and annex Santa Marta.17 In the course of the next few years the inhabitants of Santa Marta were subjected to repeated attacks from Cartagena. Consequently, Santa Marta’s pre-existing hostility with Cartagena

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15 Acta del Ayuntamiento de Santa Marta, Santa Marta, 5 July 1811, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 745.  
and its inhabitants became yet more entrenched. Already, by November 1810, Santa Marta’s population was reportedly in favour of exiling all supporters of Cartagena’s junta.\(^{18}\) (Cartagena, incidentally, took the opposite approach, impeding a royalist exodus by refusing to issue passports to areas held by the Spanish.\(^{19}\))

The assault on Santa Marta started soon after the formation of Cartagena’s junta. In retaliation for Santa Marta’s illegal monopolisation of coastal trade, in January 1811, Cartagena had imposed a 12% tax on all goods from Santa Marta, and a $1 per fanega tax on salt. This was followed, in March 1811, with the threat to suspend all commercial relations between the two cities.\(^{20}\) Throughout 1811, the cabildo of Santa Marta complained that Cartagena was trying to destroy the province’s commerce, because Santa Marta refused to “unirse a su sistema de gobierno”.\(^{21}\) Cartagena further fomented separatist tendencies in the towns of Santa Marta Province, and gave every sign of intending to invade Santa Marta itself. By mid-1811, open war had broken out. Armed companies from both Cartagena and Santa Marta clashed along the River Magdalena.\(^{22}\) In view of Cartagena’s aggressions, the government of Santa Marta wrote regularly to Spain asking to be provided with weapons, soldiers,

\(^{18}\) José María Martínez de Aparicio to Regency, Santa Marta, 25 November 1810, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 746.
\(^{19}\) Tomás de Acosta to Consejo de Indias, Santa Marta, 10 December 1811, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 746.
\(^{20}\) Report by Junta de Santa Marta, Santa Marta, 4 June 1811, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 745; and Jiménez Molinares, Los mártires de Cartagena, vol. 1, pp. 202-204, 208-209. Santa Marta responded by imposing trading restrictions of its own. See Acta capitular de la ciudad de Santa Marta, Santa Marta, 22 August 1811, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 745.
\(^{21}\) Report by Ayuntamiento de Santa Marta, Santa Marta, 7 September 1811, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 745.
and money. In 1812, the Regency responded. 308 troops were despatched to Santa Marta, followed in 1813 by a further 214, who this time were accompanied by a battleship. Perhaps as a result, by late 1812 Santa Marta had successfully occupied much of the eastern side of the Magdalena River, and had expanded its dominion into the region around Tolú. Foreshadowing later disasters, the royalist commander in San Benito Abad, Antonio Fernández Rebustillo, managed to provoke a resurgence of support for the republicans by imposing huge financial contributions on the population and by permitting the rape of local women.

Cartagena at last retaliated. On 6 January 1813, insurgent forces led by the Frenchman Pierre Labatut captured the city of Santa Marta. This victory evidently did not require great military prowess on the part of Labatut. The cabildo of Santa Marta complained that the town surrendered without a fight, and one royalist officer affirmed that:

Santa Marta no se perdió por la fuerza de los enemigos, que en número, disciplina y valor era muy inferior de la nuestra, sino por el desorden, arbitrariedad, colusiones, despotismo y malversión de caudales de casi todos los funcionarios públicos y de los que tuvieron comisiones o tenían mando y

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23 José María Martínez de Aparicio to Regency, Santa Marta, 25 November 1810, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 746; and Junta of Santa Marta to Regency, Santa Marta, 4 June 1811; Francisco Pérez Dávila to Regency, Santa Marta, 3 July 1811; and Tomás de Acosta to Council of the Indies, Santa Marta, 29 November 1811; all in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 745.
The governor and military commander fled, as did Santa Marta's military installation and most of the inhabitants. The forces sent from Spain in 1812 had apparently become disaffected after the city's repeated failure to pay their salaries, and because local officers had subjected the peninsulares to humiliating treatment. Only a few priests, including the bishop, remained during the insurgent occupation, not out of any republican sentiment, but in order to carry out their religious duties. These, as a result of their opposition to independence, were placed under arrest and taken to Cartagena, "pasando indecibles trabajos".

Republican control over Santa Marta was short-lived, however, largely because Labatut antagonised its inhabitants. He harassed even the "pocos e ilustrados" supporters of independence, imposed heavy financial contributions on the populace, and introduced a paper currency. The introduction of paper money was viewed as particularly objectionable. According to the cabildo of Santa Marta, the paper money caused such inconvenience among the province's Indians that the Mamatocos tried to murder Labatut when he visited their village. Inspired by this action, the inhabitants of Santa Marta themselves rebelled.

27 Miguel de Bustillo y Colina to Cortes, Kingston, 12 March 1813, in Jiménez Molinares, Los mártires de Cartagena, vol. 1, pp. 312-319; and Ayuntamiento de Santa Marta to Minister of Grace and Justice, Santa Marta, 16 September 1813, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 746.


29 Santiago Martínez to Minister of Grace and Justice, Madrid, 11 March 1814; Josef Eulalio Ziosi to Council of the Indies, Santa Marta, 31 March 1813; Ayuntamiento de Riohacha to Council of the Indies, Riohacha, 6 May 1813; and Ayuntamiento de Santa Marta to Minister of Grace and Justice, Santa Marta, 16 September 1813; all in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 746.
and, together with local Indians, drove out Labatut and the Cartageneros on 5 March 1813.

Two months later the city was again attacked by forces from Cartagena, this time unsuccessfully. Troops led by another Frenchman, Colonel Louis Bernard Chatillon, attacked Santa Marta on 10 May 1813. Although they were accompanied by 7 warships, the republicans were defeated, again with the help of the Mamatoco Indians, and Chatillon was killed, along with some 400 insurgents soldiers.30

Shortly after Chatillon’s defeat, Santa Marta’s role as a royalist enclave was strengthened by the arrival of New Granada’s new captain general. In June 1813, Francisco Montalvo, the replacement of Benito Pérez, reached Santa Marta. Montalvo came not as viceroy, but as captain general, following the Regency’s decision to demote New Granada from a viceroyalty to a captaincy-general, in what appears to have been a cost-cutting measure. Montalvo, a rich hacendado living in Cuba, had left Havana for New Granada in late April 1813, and landed in Santa Marta on 1 June 1813. He arrived, to the disgust of the inhabitants, accompanied by only 300 troops. He wrote immediately to Spain, expressing the hope that they would soon send more soldiers, as “no era de creer se hubiese persuadido que con solo mi presencia se había de pacificar o sugetar el Nuevo Reino de Granada”.31

30See Sergio Elías Ortiz, Franceses en la independencia de la Gran Colombia, Biblioteca Eduardo Santos, vol. 1, Editorial ABC (Bogotá, 1971), pp. 102-112, 115-119; Ayuntamiento de Santa Marta to Minister of Grace and Justice, Santa Marta, 16 September 1813, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 746; and Miguel de Bustillo y Colina to Cortes, Kingston, 12 March 1813, Jiménez Molinares, Los mártires de Cartagena, vol. 1, pp. 312-319.

31Francisco Montalvo to Minister of State, Santa Marta, 25 February 1815, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 580.
Montalvo’s rule extended but little outside of Santa Marta itself. Even in areas under royalist control his authority was openly challenged. President Toribio Montes of Quito initially refused to recognise Montalvo, commenting that he had received no order to recognise the, as he put it, “Captain General of Santa Marta”. Montalvo was of course Captain General of *New Granada*, but Montes’ version of his title more accurately expressed the spread of his authority. Alexander Hore, the governor of Panama, similarly resisted recognising Montalvo, while in Venezuela Montalvo’s authority was purely nominal.

Montalvo’s stay in Santa Marta did little to improve Spain’s dwindling authority in New Granada. This was partly because he soon fell out with Santa Marta’s governor, Pedro Ruiz de Porras, a hard-line absolutist who enjoyed considerable popular support. Montalvo was thus subjected to abuse from the “clases bajas” who supported the governor. The situation was evidently bad enough to prompt Montalvo to leave Santa Marta temporarily on 3 December 1813. Although he stated publicly that he had gone to Fortaleza del Morro in order to recover his health, he privately informed the governor that the “mumuraciones vulgares del

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32 Toribio Montes to Minister of Overseas, Quito, 7 October 1814, AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 260; and also Toribio Montes to Manuel Bernardo Alvarez, Quito, 27 September 1814, Archivo Nariño 1812-1813, vol. 5, Biblioteca de la Presidencia de la República (Bogotá, 1990), pp. 379-380.


34 Francisco Montalvo to Minister of Grace and Justice, Santa Marta, 4 March 1814, and Rafael de Zúñiga to Francisco Montalvo, Santa Marta, 12 January 1814, both in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631; Reflections on the Loss of Santa Marta, 10 November 1820, AHNM, estado, legajo 8733, fol. 26; and also Restrepo Tirado, *Historia de Santa Marta*, vol. 2, pp. 370-371.
número de facciosos” had been the real reason for his absence.  

The economic situation in Santa Marta was meanwhile miserable in the extreme. By 1814, the province’s small agricultural output had been almost completely halted by the war, as had much of its trade, since its only saleable products, cotton and cocoa, were no longer grown. Food was scarce, and there were shortages of rice, maize and plantains, the region’s staple diet. In addition, although after Captain General Montalvo’s arrival Santa Marta served as a capital city, it lacked many of the basic requirements of a capital. There was, for example, no printing press, which meant that all decrees and orders had to be copied out by hand for distribution to governors and cabildos. There was moreover a shortage of trained lawyers and judges, the lack of which was particularly serious given the large number of insurgent prisoners held by the government. The only lawyer in the province was completely unable to keep up with the work-load, and in any event did not enjoy Montalvo’s trust as he was a creole.  

The state of the army caused Montalvo great concern. Not only was it inadequately small, but, even worse, he found upon his arrival that: 

Se había armado con los fusiles que había en ello a los indios de los pueblos inmediatos, los que siendo inútiles en mucho para el momento de la acción tienen bastante audacia para manifestar oposición a los ordenes superiores. Robar imprudentemente las haciendas de los ciudadanos ricos, y

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35 Pedro Ruíz de Porras to Minister of Grace and Justice, Santa Marta, 7 January 1814, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 746.
36 Francisco Montalvo to Minister of Hacienda, Santa Marta, 23 June 1814, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631.
37 Francisco Montalvo to Minister of Grace and Justice, Santa Marta, 22 August 1813, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 746.
calumniarlos con este objeto, llamándoles ‘jacobinos’, que según ellos, quiere decir ‘discidente’, es el efecto de aquella inmediata providencia.38

Indeed, the possibility of a Black or Indian uprising alarmed Montalvo almost as much as the war with Cartagena. He commented that while he was impressed with the dedication with which Santa Marta’s Black and Indian population fought the insurgents, he was petrified by “el ascendiente que se les ha dejado tomar”.39

Following his appointment in 1813, Montalvo was instructed by the Cortes to open discussions with the rebels in Cartagena. Montalvo was sceptical about the probable success of this approach, but nonetheless from July 1814, he and the republicans of Cartagena exchanged a series of letters in which they discussed the possibility of opening talks. Neither side appears to have put very much faith into the idea of negotiating. The discussions continued until mid-September, when they ended, sunk under the weight of their own pointlessness. On 23 December 1814, Montalvo reported to the Council of the Indies that the republicans were not interested in an armistice and still intended to attack Santa Marta. He insisted that he needed an army, not a negotiating team.40

38 Francisco Montalvo to Minister of Overseas, Santa Marta, 21 August 1813, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631.
39 Francisco Montalvo to Minister of Overseas, Santa Marta, 21 August 1813, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631. Sadly, I have found no more information on these class and racial conflicts in Santa Marta.
40 Francisco Montalvo to Minister of Overseas, Santa Marta, 23 December 1814; and Camilo Torres to Francisco Montalvo, Tunja, 6 September 1814; both in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631 and 747; and Francisco Montalvo to Council of the Indies, Santa Marta, 19 September 1814, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 747, ramo 1. Montalvo’s reports contain copies of the insurgents’ letters.

This is not to imply that Montalvo believed diplomacy had no role to play in the pacification of New Granada. One of his moreimaginative
Meanwhile, various towns and villages on the Caribbean coast quietly separated themselves from the jurisdiction of Santa Marta. The towns of Chiriguaná, Banco, and the whole region of Valledupar broke away from Santa Marta in 1811.\textsuperscript{41} We have already noted that such splits were often motivated by local politics, rather than by ideological differences, and events in Ríohacha illustrate this truth particularly well. Ríohacha separated from Santa Marta, yet both regions remained firmly royalist. The local elite in Ríohacha had, for some years, been in conflict with the authorities in Santa Fe, and, in 1806, Ríohacha’s Governor, Josef de Medina y Galindo, had been deposed by Viceroy Antonio Amar, who substituted Juan Sámano.\textsuperscript{42} Sámano had left Ríohacha in early 1810, and during the outbreak of junta-formation that summer, Ríohacha too formed a junta. It was headed by the alcalde, Pedro Pérez Prieto. Ríohacha’s junta refused to recognise the authority of the juntas in Cartagena and Santa Fe. Moreover, in 1811, former governor Medina y Galindo returned to Ríohacha. He was then attacked by a group of Guajiro Indians, led by Pérez Prieto. Medina fled, but later returned to Ríohacha, accompanied by a group of armed men. He threatened

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\item initiatives was his recruitment of Gregorio Nariño, the son of Antonio Nariño, as a royalist ambassador. This occurred in 1813, at a time when Montalvo was also considering direct negotiations with Antonio Nariño himself. Montalvo hoped that Gregorio would succeed in convincing his insurgent father to reconcile himself with Spain. In the end this plan came to nothing, in part because Gregorio was himself arrested by General Morillo, who mistakenly believed him to be involved in the 1810 revolution in Santa Fe. (See Francisco Montalvo to Minister of Overseas, Santa Marta, 17 April 1814; and Francisco Montalvo to Minister of Grace and Justice, Cartagena, 20 May 1817; both in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631; and Report by Council of the Indies, 28 November 1819, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 551.)
\item This was perhaps because of Medina y Galindo’s involvement in smuggling. See Juan Marchena Fernández, \textit{Oficiales y soldados en el Ejército de América}, Escuela de Estudios Hispano-americanos (Seville, 1983), p. 15.
\end{itemize}
the cabildo, demanding that he be restored as governor. Medina indeed regained control of the province, which by this time had separated itself from the authority of Santa Marta. Santa Marta’s Governor Tomás de Acosta complained in November 1811 that “Ríohacha se halla en el mayor desorden con su gobernador intruso quien me ha negado sus auxilios.”43 In 1813 Medina, still governor, continued his attempt to build up his regional authority. The village of San Juan de César placed itself under Ríohacha’s protection, as did the towns of Fonseca and Barranca. The three towns moreover formed their own cabildo in San Juan de César, although it was rapidly forced to disband.44 This was, however, no republican uprising. Both Pérez Prieto and Medina were staunch defenders of the Spanish monarchy, and Ríohacha furthermore resisted Labatut’s attempts to conquer the city for Cartagena, its citizenry making the traditional promise to “derramar la última gota de nuestra sangre,” rather than submit.45 Ríohacha was instead freeing itself of its subordination to Santa Marta and Cartagena, its elite seizing the opportunity to exercise greater power.

§3. Royalist Pasto

The other bastion of Neogranadan royalism lay in the south, in the Province of Pasto. There the role played by Cartagena was

43 Tomás de Acosta to Council of the Indies, Santa Marta, 29 November 1811, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 746. See also Restrepo Tirado, Historia de Santa Marta, vol. 2, pp. 330-332, 352-356.
44 Representación de los vecinos del sitio de San Juan de César to cabildo of Ríohacha, San Juan de César, 13 March 1813; Ayuntamiento de Ríohacha to the Council of the Indies, Ríohacha, 6 May 1813; and Francisco Montalvo to Minister of Overseas, Santa Marta, 4 November 1813; all in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 746.
45 Ayuntamiento de Ríohacha to Council of the Indies, Ríohacha, 6 May 1813, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 746; and Restrepo Tirado, Historia de Santa Marta, vol. 2, p. 355.
filled by Quito, with which Pasto had long been at odds. In 1825, the British consul in Guayaquil, H. M. Wood, remarked on the "rivalry and hatred which has always existed between Quito and Pasto".46 This rivalry was partly if not entirely economic in origin; the two regions competed with each other for markets for their principal export, woollen cloth. Thus, when, in 1809, the cabildo of Pasto received a letter from the newly-formed Supreme Junta of Quito, suggesting that Pasto recognise the junta and sever its links to the colonial authorities in Bogotá, they reacted with suspicion. Indeed, they correctly interpreted the letter as a threat of invasion, and prohibited all unauthorised movement in and out of Pasto.47 Quito's separatism appeared simply a guise for an attack on Pasto's independence, and the Pastusos would have none of it. On 16 October 1809, the city of Pasto was indeed attacked by 1,000 insurgent troops from Quito. An ill-equipped and rapidly assembled Pastuso army led by Tomás de Santacruz nonetheless defeated the Quiteños at Funes, south of the city of Pasto.48

Pasto's cabildo not only sent to Spain the traditional report detailing the battle, but also enclosed an appeal for greater privileges. The contents of this and subsequent appeals are interesting, for they illustrate well the quest for autonomy so

46H.M. Wood to George Canning, Popayán, 30 June 1825, PRO, F.O. 18/21, ff. 86-91. Also see Francisco Zuluaga, José María Obando: de soldado realista a caudillo republicano, Biblioteca Banco Popular, (Bogotá, 1985), p. 28 for a discussion of the traditional rivalry between Quito and Pasto.
47Sergio Elias Ortíz, Agustín Agualongo y su tiempo, Editorial ABC, (Bogotá, 1958), p. 82.
48Cabildo de Pasto to Ferdinand, Pasto, 13 June 1814, BL, Egerton, 1809 (this document is also contained in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 549 and AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 276.) See also Cabildo of Pasto to Pablo Morillo, Pasto, 13 October 1816, printed in Gustavo Guerrero, Documentos históricos para los hechos ocurridos en Pasto en la guerra de la independencia, Imprenta del Departamento, (1912), pp. 136-142.
typical of New Granada's First Republic. The appeals served one purpose: to plead for greater autonomy for Pasto. In 1809, the cabildo asked for judicial independence from Quito, and the erection of a college in Pasto, because "due to the poverty of Pasto as well as the rivalry of the Quiteños, the youth of Pasto are unable to instruct themselves for the good of the public and the monarchy"; it also called for the construction of fortifications on the frontier between Quito and Pasto, and for good measure requested that a new Audiencia be established in Pasto, although the cabildo must have recognised the fantastical nature of this request.49

None of these requests were met; so, in 1814, following their defeat of Antonio Nariño, the cabildo of Pasto again wrote to Spain, requesting that Pasto be granted a bishop, a cabeza de gobierno político, and better schools, as well as that certain taxes be eliminated.50 Similar pleas were repeated throughout the war, and at one point the city went to the effort of appointing a special envoy to travel to Lima to present their case. The envoy succeeded only in extracting a congratulatory letter praising Pasto's loyalty from the colonial authorities in Guayaquil. This being the only thing available, the cabildo determined that the congratulations from Guayaquil be "printed and many copies distributed to all the cities in the Americas".51 Such schemes were discussed regularly by Pasto's cabildo. Every effort was made to acquaint the world with Pasto's merit, as the city's authorities

49Ortíz, Agustín Agualongo, p. 99
50Cabildo of Pasto to Ferdinand, Pasto, 13 June 1814, BL, Egerton, 1809, f. 442.
51Ortíz, Agustín Agualongo, p. 339. The cabildo's efforts bore some fruit; Pablo Morillo himself championed the cause of Pasto, commenting the city's loyalty made it "un lugar muy distinguido en la historia del mundo" (Pablo Morillo to Minister of Grace and Justice, Barcelona, 30 May 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 549).
hoped the outbreak of war would provide Pasto with an opportunity to increase its importance within the colonial structure. While other cities, such as Quito and Cali, hoped republicanism would allow them to achieve a more prominent place within regional hierarchies, Pasto placed its faith in royalism. In this respect, their goals were very similar.

The threat from the first junta in Quito was short-lived, as the junta had collapsed by the end of 1809. However, Pasto continued to face military threats from another source. Insurgent troops from Santa Fe, led by Antonio Baraya, marched south, and in March 1811 defeated the royalists at Bajo Palacé, outside Popayán. This insurgent victory, the first in the war of independence, was a humiliation for Miguel Tacón, governor of Popayán and commanding royalist officer. Tacón’s troops refused to obey his orders to attack, and some royalist soldiers even opened fire on their own side, causing considerable damage.52

Once Popayán was in the hands of the republicans, Governor Tacón fled down the Patía River towards Barbacoas, and eventually moved to Pasto. (Remaining in republican Popayán was Ana María Polonia García de Tacón, Tacón’s wife. Following her husband’s defeat at Bajo Palacé she was detained by the insurgents, who sent threatening letters to Governor Tacón warning that if he did not return to Spain immediately he would never see his family alive again. She was later released

52Miguel Tacón to Joaquín Molina, Pasto, 14 May 1811, AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 235. The evidence provided by Tacón himself contradicts the claim made by some Colombian historians that the governor was a highly skilled politician, who enjoyed great popular support. See Margarita Garrido, Reclamos y Representaciones: Variaciones sobre la política en el Nuevo Reino de Granada, 1770-1815, Banco de la República (Santafé de Bogotá, 1993), pp. 272-274.
unharmed, and became something of an advocate of her former captors.)

These events caused great alarm in Pasto, and many felt surrender to the insurgents was the only option, particularly as they again faced attack from Quito, following the establishment of Quito’s second junta in April 1811. To meet this new threat, Governor Tacón, by then resident in Pasto, organised a force of nearly 1,000 men. These troops faced an invading army of some 5,000 Quiteños, who not surprisingly captured Pasto on 22 September 1811. They then sacked the city. "Los quiteños no dejaron ni claves," stated Mariano Medina, who witnessed the attack. The insurgent forces from Quito remained in Pasto for some months. A British diplomat recorded that, during this period, the Pastusos "felt heavily the miseries of war, . . . suffering much from the excesses of the independent troops". The Pasto cabildo had evidently been correct in viewing with suspicion the protestations of fraternal feeling expressed in 1809 by the first Quito junta.

In the light of the unfortunate situation in Pasto, the revolutionary Junta of the Confederate Cities of the Cauca, under the leadership of Dr. Joaquín Caycedo y Cuero, began negotiations with the forces from Quito, whom they somehow convinced to return to their own city. A Pastuso historian has asserted that the Caleños were unhappy with the presence in New Granada of ‘foreign’ intruders, and for this reason pressured the Quiteños to

53See Manuel Santiago Vallecilla et. al. to Miguel Tacón, Popayán, 11 April 1811; Antonio Baraya to Miguel Tacón, Popayán, 11 April 1811; and Miguel Tacón to Manuel Santiago Vallecilla, Pasto, 28 April 1811; all in AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 235.
54Ortíz, Agustín Agualongo, p. 162.
55H.M. Wood to George Canning, Popayán, 30 June 1825, PRO, F.O. 18/21.
withdraw.\textsuperscript{56} In any event, the troops from Quito left Pasto, and Caycedo y Cuero established a new republican government there, linking the town to the other Confederate Cities of the Cauca.

This, unlike Quiteño republicanism, enjoyed the support of many prominent citizens.\textsuperscript{57} Indeed, on 13 October 1811, the city held a cabildo abierto presided over by Caycedo y Cuero, and attended by members of the regular cabildo, the clergy, and other local notables, at which those attending declared that "they recognised the Junta Suprema de Santa Fé de Bogotá; that they united themselves with the Junta of Popayán; and that the cabildo members, along with the secular and regular clergy and the people of the town, embraced the patriot cause and from then on would defend it".\textsuperscript{58}

Pasto's conversion to insurgency was short lived. First, in early 1812 Caycedo y Cuero travelled to Quito, and several prominent royalist \textit{disafectados}, including the former mayor of Pasto, led an unsuccessful rebellion against the temporarily leaderless insurgent government. Caycedo y Cuero returned to Pasto, but was soon the victim of a more successful revolt. On 20 May 1812, royalists from the Patia marched into Pasto at the invitation of the disaffected Pastusos and defeated the republicans.\textsuperscript{59}

The Patianos, Blacks from the scorchingly hot Patía Valley, were to remain royalist until the last days of the war. Most were escaped slaves who lived from banditry. The clientelistic

\textsuperscript{56}Edgar Bastidas Urresty, \textit{Las guerras de Pasto}, Ediciones Testimonial (Pasto, 1979), p. 56.
\textsuperscript{57}Ortíz, \textit{Agustín Agualongo}, pp. 180-182.
\textsuperscript{58}Ortíz, \textit{Agustín Agualongo}, p. 181.
\textsuperscript{59}Cabildo of Pasto to Ferdinand, Pasto, 13 June 1814, BL, Egerton, 1809.
networks developing out of their system of brigandage led easily to the formation of guerrilla bands following the outbreak of the War of Independence. The Patianos’ royalism is traditionally attributed to the provocative behaviour of Baraya’s republican troops, who marched through the Patía in 1811. The republican troops sacked houses, confiscated cattle, and burnt the church of the small town of Patía. This, José María Obando asserted, was positive proof as far as the Patianos were concerned of the impious sentiments of the revolutionaries.

The Patianos captured both Pasto and Dr. Caycedo y Cuero. When news of the attack reached Popayán, which was at the time also under the control of the junta of Cali, republican reinforcements rushed to Pasto, but they arrived too late to be of service to the beleaguered Caleños. The republicans, led by José María Cabal and the American volunteer Alexander Macauley, were forced to retreat to Popayán, "dejando el camino señalado con su sangre, y el [Río] Juanambú cubierto de sus cadáveres", in the words of the Pasto cabildo. Two months later, Macauley and Cabal returned to Pasto. The Pastusos, suffering from a shortage of ammunition, were forced to surrender. They released Caycedo y Cuero, and an armistice was signed.

It is not entirely clear what happened next. According to the cabildo of Pasto, the republicans were unwilling to abide by

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63 Cabildo de Pasto to Ferdinand, Pasto, 13 June 1814, BL, Egerton 1809.
the terms of the armistice. The republicans accordingly returned, violating the armistice. They lost their way, however, and were defeated by the Pastusos. Macauley and Caycedo y Cuero were then shot.64 H. M. Wood, the British consul to Guayaquil, provides the republican version of events. According to Wood, who probably heard this version from Popayán republicans, the shooting of Macauley and Caycedo y Cuero occurred immediately after the signing of the armistice. He writes:

At the moment of signing the articles of the convocation by Dr. Caysedo on the part of the independents, and by Juan de Paz on the part of the Pastucians, the latter by a concerted plan suddenly attacked the independents’ army, which thus surprised in a disadvantageous position was obliged to surrender. The perfidy of the Pastucians gained them a complete victory which they followed up with the greatest cruelties. A few days after this event Colonel Macauley and Dr. Caysedo with their officers were publicly shot.65

In either event, the end result was the death of Caycedo y Cuero and Macauley, and the defeat of the republicans in Popayán and Pasto. Royalists recaptured Popayán on 30 June 1813, Cali on 6 July 1813, and successful expeditions were launched against remaining insurgents in the Cauca Valley. The Junta of Quito had furthermore already been suppressed by Toribio Montes, and republicanism was thus temporarily eliminated from the south of the viceroyalty.

64 Cabildo de Pasto to Pablo Morillo, Pasto, 13 October 1816, printed in Guerrero, Documentos históricos, pp. 138-139. See also Cabildo de Pasto to Ferdinand, Pasto, 13 June 1814, BL, Egerton 1809.
With the suppression of the second Junta of Quito and the defeat of Caycedo y Cuero came a lull in hostilities, but the calm was not to last. Several matters served to disrupt the reestablished colonial order. To begin with, Colonel Juan Sámano was appointed commander of the royalist troops stationed in Popayán, and within a very short period he managed to irritate major sections of the Popayán citizenry. Brian Hamnett asserts that Popayán’s creole elite resented the presence of Sámano and his Peruvian troops, whom they felt to be culturally inferior, and Sámano’s arbitrary and abrasive manner drove many back into the insurgent camp. He allowed his troops to loot outlying haciendas, arrested a number of important citizens on suspicion of collaboration with the republicans, and detained several parish priests on the same grounds. Sámano, it seems, did not even get on well with his own troops.66

This became a matter of importance, for in September 1813, Antonio Nariño, President of “Cundinamarca”, the insurgent government in Santa Fe, marched south with 1,200 infantry soldiers and over 200 cavalry, well supplied with ammunition and other necessities, with the intention of bringing republicanism to the south. Nariño had only recently emerged victorious from a protracted dispute with proponents of federalism over the proper form for an independent New Granada. After thus consolidating his position in the central provinces he embarked on an attack of the royalists in the South, who were the most obvious danger to the precarious republican government in Bogotá.

66 Brian Hamnett, “Popular Insurrection and Royalist Reaction: Colombian Regions, 1810-1823”, Reform and Insurrection; Cabildo de Pasto to Ferdinand, Pasto, 13 June 1814, BL, Egerton, 1809, f. 439; and Toribio Montes to Francisco Montalvo, Quito, 21 June 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631.
The republican offensive began well. Unlike Macauley, Nariño had no problem attracting Indian guides; most of the work of transporting heavy artillery over the mountains was done by Indian porters. A number of local priests also assisted. The commander of Nariño's advance guard, José María Cabal, successfully defeated Sámano on 30 December 1813 at Alto Palacé. Sámano withdrew from Popayán to Pasto, after having detonated all the gunpowder stockpiled in the city, causing 13 deaths. Again demonstrating his poor leadership, Sámano was defeated at the hacienda of Calibío on 14 January 1814 by Nariño's army, which grew as Sámano's troops deserted. The republicans occupied Popayán until the end of March 1814, and then marched on Pasto.

En route they were subjected to frequent guerrilla attacks by royalist Indians. José Hilario López, who participated in the campaign, commented that the region around Pasto was infested with guerrillas; throughout the campaign artificial rock slides and showers of stones rained down on the republicans, leaving them demoralised, if not dead. There was talk of returning to Popayán, and general gloom reigned in the republican camp. Matters were exacerbated, according to López, by Nariño's bad temper and inflexibility. The republicans nevertheless defeated the royalists in a number of confrontations, despite the fact that Sámano had been replaced by Melchor Aymerich, who was less unpopular.

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69 The most important royalist defeat was at the Juanambú River on 9 April 1814. See Cabildo de Pasto to Ferdinand, Pasto, 13 June 1814, BL, Egerton 1809; and Toribio Montes to Ministers of State and War, Quito, 7 July 1814, AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 260.
In Pasto itself, preparations for the attack were underway. The cabildo and Nariño exchanged a series of withering letters, which served only to inflame further passions on both sides. The cabildo’s final communication with Nariño concluded, "En suma, nosotros nos ponemos en manos de aquel Soberano Señor, que con una pierdecilla en los pies de barro, como los de usía, sabe reducir a polvo los colosos más orgullosos y elevados". They stressed the fact that Nariño was the aggressor, and repeatedly noted that he led an invading army of outsiders, intent on perturbing their customary tranquillity. They had stockpiled large quantities of arms, and an engineer was commissioned to construct fortifications around Pasto. Furthermore, messages were sent to the surrounding resguardos, requesting help from the Indians. Consequently, many of Pasto’s Indians arrived from the outlying villages around Pasto, armed with axes and machetes.

Nariño had been expecting reinforcements from the north, but these failed to arrive. He nevertheless insisted, against advice, on attacking Pasto without the additional troops. The battle began on 10 April 1814 and lasted for an entire day. Royalist commander Aymerich played little part in the conflict, which was fought by the inhabitants of Pasto and Nariño’s troops. The Pastusos resisted fiercely, and thousands of men and women poured into the streets to fight. The Indians who had been summoned to the city also acquitted themselves well. As the Pasto cabildo put it, "los indios mismos, estos hombres degredados, tan cobardes e incapaces de empresas grandes, con el fusil en el

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70 Cabildo de Pasto to Antonio Nariño, Pasto, 8 April 1814, Archivo Nariño, vol. 5, pp. 319-320. See also the other letters in this volume, pp. 311-320.
71 Cabildo de Pasto to Ferdinand, Pasto, 13 June 1814, BL, Egerton 1809, f. 440.
mano presentan con denuedo el pecho a las balas, y hacen pródigo de valor".73

The inhabitants of the city and the Indians of the resguardos repelled Nariño's forces, and Nariño was separated from his troops during the chaotic withdrawal. He hid for several days in the forests, then, driven by hunger and thirst, surrendered without giving his name to some Indians, promising to reveal to them the location of General Nariño. On his arrival in Pasto a large and unruly crowd gathered to learn the hiding-place of the general. Nariño, after fortifying himself with some soup, stepped onto the balcony of the house in which he was being held to address the crowd. "Pastusos", he cried, "Si queréis al General Nariño, aquí lo tenéis!". This revelation was greeted with calls for his immediate death, but Aymerich, who had been impressed with the intelligence of the previously-unidentified prisoner, intervened.74

Despite his eloquence, Nariño was imprisoned for thirteen months in Pasto under unpleasant conditions. Nariño later described his stay as follows:

Figuraos, señores, por unos momentos, que me veis encerrado en una pequeñísima pieza, tendido sobre una mala cama, cubierto con una ruana, con un par de grillos en mis pies ulceradas, sin un amigo, sin un libro para distraerme y esperando de hora en hora correr la suerte de Caycedo y Macauley.75

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73 Cabildo de Pasto to Ferdinand, Pasto, 13 June 1814, BL, Egerton 1809, fol. 441; López, Memorias, p. 59; and Testimonio sobre la campaña del General Nariño en Pasto, 21 April 1814, Archivo Nariño, vol. 5, pp. 321-324. Volume 5 of the Archivo Nariño contains much information about Nariño's campaign.

74 See Liévano Aguirre, Los grandes conflictos, vol. 2, pp. 830-832, Nariño, Escritos políticos, pp. 139-140, and Cabildo de Pasto to Ferdinand, Pasto, 13 June 1814, BL, Egerton 1809, fol. 442.

75 Nariño, Escritos políticos, p. 145.
Nariño exaggerated slightly, as he was certainly not without friends in Pasto. On the contrary, his sojourn was enlivened by the undisguised admiration shown to him by Pasto’s royalist commanders. Nariño chatted openly with royalist officers about his plans for New Granada, and was on such good terms with them that rumours circulated that he was plotting a general republican uprising from his cell in Pasto.  

Nariño was eventually sent to Spain, where he languished for four years in the prison in Cádiz, before being freed in the wake of Spain’s constitutional revolution in 1820. Aymerich, in disgrace after his behaviour during the battle of Pasto, did not regain President Montes’ confidence, and Juan Sámano was once again appointed to command royalist troops. Even after the defeat of Nariño, some 1,000 insurgents remained in the Cauca Valley, and Popayán itself was still in republican hands.

In 1815, southern New Granada, like the Caribbean coast, was in a state of uneasy equilibrium. The two regions had been the only parts of New Granada where resistance to independence had enjoyed some successes, but while Santa Marta and Pasto did not succumb to republicanism, neither succeeded in eliminating it from their domains. The royalist enclaves had served two principal purposes during New Granada’s first republic. They had blocked the expansionist ambitions of their powerful neighbours, Cartagena and Quito, thereby weakening the movement for independence in these cities. The capture of Nariño in Pasto

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76 See Thomas Blossom, *Nariño, Hero of Colombian Independence*, University of Arizona Press, (Tucson, 1967), p. 127; Declaration by Francisco Arıeta, Palmira, 19 May 1815, BRAH, sig. 9/7648 (legajo 52), fols. 147-151; Declaration by José Brandenberg, Quito, 29 June 1815; and Declaration of Juan Guerra, Quito, 4 July 1815, both in AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 275. Nariño further carried on a correspondence with the Congress in Tunja during his stay in Pasto. See *Archivo Nariño*, vol. 5, pp. 363-368.
similarly deprived the capital of one of its ablest leaders. Secondly, the survival of two staunchly royalist centres encouraged the belief in Spain that many Neogranadans opposed independence. The absence of any such royalist foci in the Viceroyalty of Río de la Plata was partially responsible for Spain's decision not to send military reinforcements there. The presence of reliable bases in New Granada and Venezuela, on the other hand, made the viceroyalty a much more attractive destination. The royalist resistance of Santa Marta and Pasto was thus much more than a bulwark against insurgency. It helped attract the military support from Spain necessary for a royalist reconquest. The next section of this thesis will detail the success of Spain's reconquering expedition, sent in 1815 under the command of General Pablo Morillo.

General Morillo arrived to find a polarised society in New Granada. Many regions had been in a state on continual warfare for five years. Some, like Cartagena, had tasted real autonomy for the first time, and were unwilling to return to the former diet of subservience. Others had grown tired of the fighting and disorganisation, and were disillusioned with the advocates of independence. These rifts were not healed by the arrival of Morillo's Expeditionary Army. Centres for royalism such as Santa Marta and Pasto, which had withstood the onslaught of republicanism, expected to receive preferential treatment. Individuals who had tacitly supported independence expected to be pardoned, and the republican elite expected to be treated with respect, rather than the disdain previously felt by peninsulars.

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towards creoles. All these expectations were to be dashed by General Morillo and his officers, as we shall see.
PART II: RECONQUEST
Chapter 3: The Reconquest of New Granada

The demise of New Granada’s incipient independence movements may have owed something to internal political dissensions, regional rivalries, and continuing resistance from the royalist enclaves in Santa Marta and Pasto, but the principal agent of their military defeat was the Spanish Expeditionary Army led by General Pablo Morillo, which was sent to ‘pacify’ Venezuela and New Granada. This section will examine the reconquest itself, and the response of royalists in Spain and New Granada to the reimposition of royal authority. We begin, in this chapter, with an account of the organisation of Morillo’s expedition and the campaign of 1816.

§1. The Organisation of the Expedition

Plans to organise a substantial expedition to relieve royalist forces in the Americas were first discussed by Spain in June 1814, following Ferdinand VII’s return to the throne. Ferdinand’s government did not at first reveal that it intended to send such an expedition to Venezuela, and instead let it be known that the destination would be Río de la Plata. This ruse was intended to mislead the Comisión de Reemplazos, the privately-run agency that was bankrolling the expedition. The Commission, which was composed primarily of Cádiz-based merchants, had been agitating for an army to be sent to Buenos Aires, in order to regain control of the viceroyalty’s trade. The Commission had relatively little interest in preserving trade to Venezuela and New Granada. The
destination of the expedition was thus kept secret from the Commission, and from the participating officers.\(^1\)

The troops enlisted in the Expeditionary Army, although unaware of their true destination, were nonetheless extremely unhappy. Few wished to risk their lives fighting in the colonial war. Many attempted to desert before the ships embarked, and officers had to be bribed to remain in their posts. Rumours of barracks uprisings abounded.\(^2\) The expedition was intended to set sail in December 1814, but various delays forced the troops to remain in Jérez de la Frontera until February 1815. In the end, the expedition left from Cádiz on 17 February 1815 with 20 warships, 59 transport vessels, and 12,254 men, of whom 2,500 were designated to go to Panama.\(^3\) It was not until they had been at sea for over a week that the true destination of the expedition was revealed to the troops. The news caused general consternation. "Todos sabemos," recorded Rafael Sevilla, the nephew of Navy Commander Pascual Enrile and a volunteer officer in the Expeditionary Army, "que en Buenos Aires y Montevideo los rebeldes estaban divididos, que uno de sus bandos esperaba las tropas del Rey, para pasarse a ellos y auxiliarlas, y que en la Costa Firme, la guerra se hacía sin cuartel y con salvaje

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\(^3\)Costeloe, "The Comisión de Reemplazos", p. 229, and Antonio Rodríguez Villa, El Teniente General Don Pablo Morillo, Primer Conde de Cartagena, Marqués de la Puerta (1778-1837), vol 1, Editorial América, (Madrid, 1920), p. 120. Rafael Sevilla, Memorias de un oficial del ejército español, campañas contra Bolívar y los separatistas de América, Editorial América, (Madrid, 1916), p. 23, gives slightly different figures for the number of ships.
ferocidad”. General Morillo, the commander in chief, tried to overcome the discontent by sending a personal message to the troops, reminding them of the honour they were about to win for themselves, and of the fact that Venezuela was much closer to Spain than was Buenos Aires. Sevilla reports that Morillo organised a little ceremony in which the boats passed by the flag ship as he shouted ‘¡Viva el Rey! ¡Viva España!’ ‘¡¡¡Viva!!!’, contestaban los pobres soldados, agitando sus gorras en el aire. Con este acto solemne volvió la alegría y el entusiasmo a los expedicionarios,” adds Sevilla, rather unconvincingly.4

Pablo Morillo, the expedition’s commander, was 37 years old at the time he was appointed. Morillo had first joined the Spanish army as a humble soldier in 1791, at age 13. Although he had accumulated some military experience before the French invasion of Spain in 1808, it was in the Peninsular War that he rose to prominence. He was appointed field marshal in 1813, and won several notable victories against the French. In 1814, he was named to lead an expedition to the Americas, and was promoted to general.

The commission to command the Expeditionary Army was Morillo’s first political appointment. Ferdinand probably found Morillo an acceptable candidate because he had refused to swear loyalty to the liberal Constitution of 1812. It should be noted that this refusal does not reveal Morillo’s true political beliefs. Although he had been a protegé of General Francisco Castaños, the hero of the Peninsular War and later member of the Regency, and although Morillo had refused to swear loyalty to the Constitution, which suggest conservative leanings, he developed more liberal

4Sevilla, Memorias p. 24.
sentiments in the following years. Indeed, before the Expeditionary Army left Cádiz in 1814, rumours circulated that Morillo was not only a liberal but also a freemason. Conscious of the damage such a rumour could do to his reputation in newly absolutist Spain, Morillo immediately joined a religious cofraternity, hoping thereby to establish his credentials as a conservative. Such posturings aside, Morillo retained an essentially liberal outlook, remaining throughout his life a moderado, or moderate liberal. He nonetheless enjoyed the confidence of Ferdinand VII, who not only appointed him commander of the Expeditionary Army in 1814, but expected Morillo to participate in an anti-constitutional coup planned for 1821. Although Morillo did not involve himself with this plot, he opposed the more anti-monarchical liberalism of the constitutional trienio and helped restore Ferdinand's absolute power in 1823, an action which he immediately regretted, once the regressive and vindictive nature of Ferdinand's restored regime became apparent. He then chose exile in France to further public duties in absolutist Spain, and returned only after the "ominous decade" of triumphant absolutism ended.

A professional soldier, Morillo was widely respected for his military talents, which even republicans such as Daniel Florencio

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5Stephen Stoan, Pablo Morillo and Venezuela, Ohio State University Press (Columbia, 1974) p. 65; and Rodríguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol 1 (1920), p. 117. Stoan further reports that the Venezuelan historian Juan Uslar Pietri "insists that his own grandfather had a death penalty commuted personally by Morillo after giving the general a secret Masonic sign". See Stoan, Pablo Morillo and Venezuela, p. 65.

6See Manifiesto a la Nación Española de José Moreno de García, Cádiz, 16 February 1822, Iris Zavala, Masones, comuneros y carbonarios, Siglo XXI (Madrid, 1971), for a (partisan) discussion of moderados; and Antonio Rodríguez Villa, El Teniente General Don Pablo Morillo, Primer Conde de Cartagena, Marqués de la Puerta (1778-1837), vol 1, Real Academia de la Historia. (Madrid, 1910), p. 498.
O’Leary acknowledged. In his personal manner Morillo was described as blunt, not to say rude. His manners particularly angered royalists in Venezuela, where he was regarded as arbitrary and insulting; one official even described him as “un hombre sin principios, . . . de caracter y genio violento”. This negative view was not universal; Captain General Juan Manuel de Cajigal regarded Morillo as “honrado, franco, activo y generoso”. Nonetheless, the overall picture is of a man with little social grace and little desire to acquire any. “Jamás olvidó que había sido un sargento que rozaba con las ínfimas clases del ejército”, commented José Manuel Restrepo.

The commander in chief of the Navy, who was Morillo’s second in command, was of altogether different social extraction. Pascual Enrile was the son of the Marqués de Casa-Enrile, and had grown up in Havana. He served initially in the navy, although during the Peninsular war he returned to Spain and joined the army. The republican Restrepo comments that Enrile had a good reputation, but the royalist Captain General Cajigal described him as “con demasiado amor propio, invariable en opinión, seco, despreciado, y todo esto sobre una figura poco recomendable”. Both agreed that he enjoyed great influence over Morillo. This influence was to prove largely counter-productive, as Enrile was

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9 Juan Manuel de Cajigal, Memorias del Mariscal de Campo Don Juan Manuel de Cajigal sobre la revolución de Venezuela, Biblioteca Venezolana de Historia (Caracas, 1960), p. 149.
10 José Manuel Restrepo, Historia de la revolución de Colombia, vol 2, Ediciones Bedout (Bogotá, 1969), pp. 137, 139.
11 Cajigal, Memorias, pp. 149, 158; and Restrepo, Historia de la revolución, vol 2, pp. 135-136.
even more uncompromising than Morillo, and many felt he
brought out the worst aspects of the general’s nature.\textsuperscript{12}

\textsection{2. Morillo in Venezuela}

Venezuela’s First Republic had fallen in 1812, but its
collapse had not ended the war. The same Blacks who had fought
with the royalists against their republican masters rebelled again,
this time against the restored royalists, once it became clear that a
return to Spanish rule would bring them no benefits. Within
three months of Monteverde’s triumph, an anti-royalist revolt had
broken out on the coast, and \textit{pardo} bands, “half-brigands, half-
revolutionaries”, ranged across the country, robbing and
pillaging.\textsuperscript{13} Meanwhile, the creole revolutionaries, led by Simón
Bolívar, planned a comeback. Returning from Cartagena, where he
had taken refuge after the fall of the First Republic, Bolívar
marched a force of some 700 men from New Granada into
Venezuela in mid-1813. He won a series of victories in his
“Campaña Admirable”, capturing Caracas in August 1813. The
royalists, however, were a far from spent force.

One royalist leader was particularly responsible for the
revival of Spain’s fortunes. José Tomás Boves, a Spaniard resident
in the Venezuelan Llanos, appeared on the military stage in
February 1814. Leading a band of nominally royalist Llanero
horsemen, Boves enjoyed victory after victory over the
republicans, recapturing Caracas on 16 July 1814. Ignoring the

\textsuperscript{12}For alleged comments by Morillo himself, see Simón Bolívar to Francisco
de Paula Santander, Trujillo, 29 November 1820, in \textit{Selected Writings of
Bolívar}, vol 1, Vicente Lecuna (editor), The Colonial Press (New York, 1851),
pp. 244-247.

\textsuperscript{13}John Lynch, \textit{The Spanish American Revolutions, 1808-1826}, W.W.
Norton, (New York, 1986) p. 200. For a description of the war in Venezuela, see
Lynch, pp. 190-207.
existing royalist administrative hierarchy, he declared himself
governor of Caracas, president of the Audiencia, captain-general of
Venezuela and commander of the royalist army. As by this stage
he commanded some 12,000 men, few were in a position to
disagree.¹⁴

Boves distinguished himself by the savagery of his attacks
and lack of interest in differentiating between combatants and
civilians. His troops routinely sacked the cities and towns that fell
to them. He was widely accused of instituting a reign of terror in
Caracas after its capture; secret nocturnal executions awaited
those who had not already fled.¹⁵ Forced contributions and
seizures of valuables followed. Among the republicans the name
of Boves became a byword for atrocity, but the royalist
commanders were often lukewarm in their condemnation of
Boves’ activities. Captain General Montalvo praised his valour,
and merely criticised his “imprudence”; other royalist supporters
appear to have regarded Boves as a hero.¹⁶

Boves had many followers. According to Venezuela’s
Captain General Cajigal, this was because Boves had granted his
troops

¹⁴Boves’ force was the largest to fight in Venezuela’s war of independence. See German Carrera Damas, Boves, aspectos socio-económicos, Colección Vigilia (Caracas, 1968), p. 35.
¹⁶Francisco Montalvo to the Regency, Santa Marta, 27 June 1814, Los últimos virreyes de Nueva Granada, Relación de Mando del Virrey Don Francisco Montalvo y noticias del Virrey Sámano sobre la pérdida del Reino (1813-1819), Eduardo Posada and P.M. Iháñez (editors), Biblioteca de la Juventud Hispano-Americana, Editorial América, (Madrid, n.d.), pp. 47-48. For the views of a royalist civilian, see Josef González Llorente to Juan Bautista Sacristan, Kingston, 14 April 1815, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 549.
los dos puntos de atracción más poderosos: el malo encontraba el camino de saciar su depravación con el permitido robo (bajo el voz saqueo), asesinatos, fuerzas y toda clase de depredaciones; el bueno no hallaba otra seguridad por la garantía de su persona que la de alistarse en el ejército de Boves.17

There were of course other reasons for the Llaneros’ anti-republicanism. Since the First Republic, Venezuelan creoles had been attempting to reduce the Llaneros to a “regimented peon class”.18 The ‘Ordenanzas de los Llanos’ issued in 1811 prohibited virtually all the activities previously carried out by the Llaneros. The plainsmen were not to travel without a passport, or they would be lashed, the rounding-up of wild cattle was outlawed, and all Llaneros were to obtain permanent employment, or they would be forced to work on a ranch. As Miguel Izard observed, the Ordenanzas by themselves explain the ease with which Boves recruited the Llaneros to his cause.19

Venezuela, then, had been virtually restored to the royalists by Boves’ troops during 1814. Boves was killed in December 1814, but his place was taken by Francisco Tomás Morales, a man cut from the same cloth as his predecessor. On 15 March 1815, the Expeditionary Army of General Pablo Morillo landed in

17 Cajigal, Memorias, p. 133.
19 See Miguel Izard, El miedo a la revolución: la lucha por la libertad en Venezuela (1777-1830), Editorial Tecnos (Madrid, 1979), pp. 132-133.

Other factors served to further alienate many Venezuelans from the republican cause. Restrepo reports that within a few months of Bolívar’s triumphant entry into Caracas, the inhabitants of Venezuela grew tired of the continual drafting of men into the army, the forced contributions demanded by the republicans, and the destruction of property committed by poorly controlled republican troops. (See Carrera Damas, Boves, p. 77.)
Venezuela with a force of 10,500 men, equipped with thousands
of guns, swords, and other weapons. Morillo’s intention was to
reestablish Spanish control, but he soon learned that this had
already been accomplished by Boves. Indeed, the only remaining
military objective was the recapture of the Island of Margarita,
which had become the base of republicans under the leadership of
Juan Bautista Arismendi. This was accomplished with great speed
and efficiency by Brigadier Francisco Tomás Morales. Morales
regained the island with a battalion of zambos, “que era el terror
del enemigo”. Morillo pardoned Arismendi, contrary to all
advice, and a military governor was placed in charge of the island.

The capture of Margarita effectively completed the
reconquest of Venezuela. Few insurgents had survived Boves’
terrible slaughter of 1814, and those remaining were quickly
captured by Morillo’s troops in the months that followed. Indeed,
the arrival of Morillo’s army in Venezuela initially altered little
the course of the conflict, as the royalists were everywhere in
military ascendancy. The army of Boves was not, however, used
to best advantage by Morillo, as it suffered from several great
defects. To begin with, even the most cold blooded royalists had
to admit that Boves’ troops had committed some “excesses”, and
were perhaps not model soldiers. More importantly, this army
was composed mostly of pardos, to whom, Stephen Stoan writes,
“Boves had made promises . . . that [none] in Spain were disposed
to honor”. Morillo, like the Venezuelan creoles, feared he was
witnessing the start of a caste war. Rather than rewarding Boves’
pardos for their defeat of the insurgents, Morillo demoted many

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21 See Stoan, Pablo Morillo and Venezuela, pp. 71-73.
and retired more. Such disaffected men became ready converts to Bolívar’s cause.

The royalists were thus hoist on their own petard. Unable to learn from their experiences in 1812, when disgruntled pardos had deserted Monteverde’s royalist government, the triumphant royalists again failed to acknowledge pardo demands. Particularly after the death of Boves in December 1814, the Llaneros’ contribution to the survival of Venezuelan royalism went unappreciated by other royalist leaders. When Morillo dismissed and demoted llanero leaders, what followed was a repeat of events in 1812. The Llaneros first returned to the plains of Casanare and Apure, and then raised the banner of independence, “que era la voz con que podían robar”, commented Morillo dryly.22 Thus republicanism, which had been virtually eliminated from Venezuela in 1814, enjoyed ever-greater popularity after the arrival of Morillo’s army.

After Morillo’s entry into Caracas, a military government was established. Morillo set up courts to try suspected traitors and reorganised the city’s bureaucracy, in particular suspending the Audiencia, and action that was to generate years of controversy. He also irritated virtually the entirety of the city’s existing civilian government. He demanded unreasonable quantities of food for the troops, and was gratuitously rude to government officials. Captain General Cajigal claimed that one official was so badly insulted that he fell into a coma and went mad.23 This claim, while no doubt exaggerated, illustrates the

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22 Pablo Morillo to Ministry of War, Cura, 26 February 1818, Rodríguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol 3, pp. 510-518.
strength of anti-Morillo feeling among Caracas royalists. Outside Caracas, the army confiscated vast amounts of food, livestock and seeds. In everything they behaved, Cajigal reported enigmatically, “con el desenfado que facilita unos grandes bigotes”.24

By May 1815 Morillo had completed the reorganisation of Caracas, and in July he left Venezuela for New Granada, leaving Brigadier Salvador Moxó in charge of administering the Captaincy General. Moxó, whom Stephen Stoan regards as the true villain of the Venezuelan reconquest, was thus responsible both for the day-to-day running of the dictatorship, and for supplying the Expeditionary Army. Serious disagreements were soon to develop between Moxó and Morillo over the latter aspect of Moxó’s duties. Morillo repeatedly accused Moxó of failing to respond to his orders with sufficient alacrity, and in the end Moxó was replaced.25

§3. The Siege of Cartagena26

On 22 July 1815, Morillo arrived in Santa Marta, accompanied by some 8,000 troops, of whom over 3,000 were

24Cajigal, Memorias, p. 157.
25See Stoan, Pablo Morillo and Venezuela, esp. pp. 88-89, 111-115; Pablo Morillo to Salvador de Moxó, el campo del Paso del Frío, en el Río Apure, 2 February 1817, Rodríguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol 3, p. 265; Pablo Morillo to Salvador de Moxó, Chaparro, 27 May 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Caracas, legajo 386; Pablo Morillo to Salvador de Moxó, Cumaná, 8 June 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Caracas, legajo 110 (and 386); and Salvador de Moxó to Ministers of State and Universal de Indias. Caracas, 30 June 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Caracas, legajo 110.
26The following section is drawn, where not otherwise indicated, from the following sources: Restrepo, Historia de la revolución, vol 2; Gabriel Jiménez Molinares, Los mártires de Cartagena de 1816 ante el consejo de guerra y ante la historia, vol. 2, Imprenta Departamental (Cartagena, 1950); and Gabriel Porras Troconis, La magna epopeya de Cartagena: el sitio del año 1815, Editorial Temis (Bogotá, 1965); Indalecio Liévano Aguirre, Los grandes conflictos sociales y económicos de nuestra historia, vol 2, Ediciones Tercer Mundo, (Bogotá, 1984).
Venezuelan. From Santa Marta, he began to plan the recapture of Cartagena. At the time of Morillo’s arrival in New Granada, Cartagena had only recently survived Simón Bolívar’s siege: disagreements between Simón Bolívar and Manuel del Castillo y Rada, the leader of Cartagena’s insurgents, had led the future liberator to blockade the city. His efforts failed, and on 9 May 1815 Bolívar had departed for Jamaica. At the time, Cartagena contained one or two thousand insurgent troops. Perfect trust had not, however, been established between Castillo and the Venezuelan troops left behind by Bolívar. This distracted the insurgent leaders from concentrating on the royalist threat, which they indeed largely discounted until it was too late.

Many of the towns and villages surrounding Cartagena were quickly captured by the royalists, and thousands of their inhabitants swore loyalty to Ferdinand VII. The division of Brigadier Morales, as well as Morillo’s Venezuelan vanguard, were sent ahead from Santa Marta towards Cartagena, and Brigadier Pedro Ruíz de Porras, governor of Santa Marta, marched towards Mompós with 1,000 men. The general royalist headquarters was established at the hacienda de Torrecilla (now Parenquillo). The siege began on 22 August 1815, although a blockade was established some weeks earlier, and foreign governments in the Caribbean were told to warn their subjects against trying to reach Cartagena. Morillo did not at first attempt to negotiate with the insurgents in Cartagena, nor did he offer any conditions other than

27See Restrepo, Historia de la revolución, vol 2, pp. 51-52.
28Restrepo, Historia de la revolución, vol 2, p. 61.
29See Oath of Loyalty and Lists of those swearing loyalty, August-September 1815, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 717.
30See Pablo Morillo to Admiral Douglas, the Captain General of the Antilles, Santa Marta, 30 July 1815, Rodríguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol 2, pp. 573-574.
complete surrender. He did, however, issue numerous proclamations urging the Cartageneros to submit to Spain's gentle yoke.

The effects of the siege were soon felt. Inside the city walls, Cartagena was reduced to terrible misery and hunger, despite the periodic shipments of flour and other foods they received from English vessels able to evade the Spanish blockade. The Spanish had several times captured funds intended for the purchase of food in the Antilles, and towards the end of the siege those Cartageneros who survived were reduced to eating boiled leather. Moreover, thousands of people from the surrounding countryside had swarmed into Cartagena, placing even greater strains on the food supply. The city's leaders nonetheless did not wish to surrender. Indeed, in October Castillo was removed from office in a coup organised by individuals who suspected him of negotiating secretly with Morillo to arrange the city's capitulation. José Francisco Bermúdez, a Venezuelan who had fled from the Island of Margarita after its recapture, was then elevated to commander. Bermúdez tried to reorganise the city's meagre food reserves, and ordered all "bocas inútiles" to leave the city.

Meanwhile, the Spanish troops were themselves suffering. Thousands of soldiers died from infectious diseases during the siege. Morillo reported in October 1815, two months into the siege, that "sufrimos una baja considerable de españoles [a causa de] este perverso clima que es fatal para los europeos". By December the royalists has lost over 3,000 troops to death and

31 See Testimonios contra los insurgentes en Cartagena, December 1815-January 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 891A.
32 Pablo Morillo to José de Abascal, Torrecillas, 21 October 1815, AGI, Diversos, legajo 4, ramo 1. See also Restrepo, Historia de la revolución, vol. 2, p. 78.
desertion. In an attempt to bring the siege to a close, the royalists tried in November 1815 to storm the city. They did not succeed, and the blockade continued.

Although Cartagena’s insurgent leadership was expecting the arrival of help from the interior, no assistance arrived. The misleading and unrealistic propaganda about the small size of Morillo’s army and the false reports of their own strength circulated by Cartagena’s republican leaders had redounded to their detriment; few in the interior realised the desperate state of Cartagena’s republicans, and those who did apparently shared the unfounded confidence in Cartagena’s ability to survive. Accordingly no reinforcements were sent, and one of New Granada’s manor cities was left to defend itself. Increasingly desperate, Cartagena’s leaders considered plans to place Cartagena under British protection. Moreover, a mass exodus of over 2,000 people attempted to leave the city in late November 1815. This prompted Morillo to warn the insurgents on 4 December 1815 that he would forcibly return any émigrés to Cartagena if they did not agree to surrender. A last flotilla of escapees put to sea on 5 December. The next day, on 6 December 1815, the city capitulated to the Spanish.

The siege had lasted 106 days. The long blockade had reduced the city to a pitiful state. Morillo reported that Cartagena after the surrender was “el espectáculo más doloroso de mi vida”. Over 7,000 people had died of hunger and disease; more

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35 Rodríguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol 1, p. 447
than a third of the city’s total population perished in the siege.\textsuperscript{36} Corpses lay unburied in the houses and the streets. Those who had survived “no eran hombres, sino esqueletas; hombres y mujeres vivos retratos de la muerte,” recorded Rafael Sevilla.\textsuperscript{37} Those who survived had “un semblante cadavérico en que manifiestan las necesidades y miserias que han sufrido”.\textsuperscript{38} The Spanish immediately began fumigating the city, prohibited the sick from entering, and opened large communal graves into which the dead were thrown. This latter action was strongly criticised by the government in Madrid, which, with its typical concern for pointless detail, decreed that all the dead, whether royalist or insurgent, should be given a Christian burial.\textsuperscript{39} Public soup kitchens were also established, and by all accounts the Spanish troops were generous in sharing their rations with the starving citizens of Cartagena.

The army was less generous in its treatment of captured emigrés. At the time of the surrender rumours had circulated that Morillo intended to “pasar todos los habitantes de . . . Cartagena de Indias a cuchillo”. Accordingly, hundreds of


\textsuperscript{37}Sevilla, \textit{Memorias}, p. 68. See also Gabriel de Torres to Ferdinand, Cartagena, 15 July 1819, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8725, doc. 9 (this document is also printed in Bossa Herazo, \textit{Cartagena independiente}, pp. 69-76).

\textsuperscript{38}Juan José Oderiz to Minister Universal de Indias, Cartagena, 28 December 1815, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 747, ramo 2.

\textsuperscript{39}See the various Bandos of Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, December 1815, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 717; and Ruling by Ferdinand, Madrid, 16 April 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 742.
frightened Cartageneros had attempted to escape the royalists by putting to sea in small, overcrowded boats, but without pilots many lost their way and the passengers either died of hunger or were captured by the Spanish off the coasts of Panama and New Granada.40 One survivor reported that he and about 100 other people had left Cartagena in early December 1815; when he was picked up by the Spanish a few weeks later only about 20 people remained alive.41 Dozens of captured emigrés were executed. Restrepo further reports that over 400 men, women and children from Cartagena were massacred in cold blood near Bocachica after having surrendered to Brigadier Morales.42

The blockade of Cartagena was extended to the entire Atrato River region on 20 December 1815 and was not lifted until mid-August 1816.43 From its recapture on 6 December 1815 until Juan Sámano became viceroy in 1818, Cartagena served as the administrative capital of royalist New Granada. Francisco Montalvo, who had been promoted to viceroy on 28 April 1816, set up residence in the city, where he was joined by the Audiencia, the Tribunal de Cuentas, and a variety of other officials. Morillo also established a permanent court martial to try infidentes, and restored the Inquisition to its former dwellings. The relationship between Morillo and Montalvo, the courts martial, and the other reconquest institutions will be considered in the next chapter.

40Porras Troconis, La magna epopeya, p. 60, 68, lists many of the emigrés 41Testimonios contra los insurgentes en Cartagena, December 1815-January 1816, AOF, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 891A. 42See Pablo Morillo to Ministry of War, Cartagena, 16 February 1816, Rodríguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol 3, pp. 131-132, for a partial list of those shot; and Restrepo, Historia de la revolución, vol 2, p. 86. 43Pablo Morillo to Luis de Onis, Santa Fe, 1 July and 17 August 1816, Rodríguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol 3, pp. 24-26.
§ 4. Consolidating the Conquest

The arrival of Morillo’s army greatly alarmed the inhabitants of New Granada. In his diary, José María Caballero recorded the increasing anxiety and sadness that enveloped Santa Fe after the fall of Cartagena.44 Moreover, faith in the republican Congress had plummeted, despite a change of leader. Camilo Torres, who in 1815 had been forced to accept the presidency in spite of his belief that “la república se hallaba expirante”, resigned, and José Fernández Madrid took office.45 Madrid, well liked and eloquent, was considered more energetic than Torres, but he proved unable to restore confidence in the government. Indeed, when in early 1816 he asked for new volunteers to enlist in the army, no more than six individuals responded to his plea.46 Little hope remained for the young republic.

Meanwhile, following the successful recapture of Cartagena, the Expeditionary Army began to move toward Santa Fe, with the exception of the Regimiento de León, the Batallones del Rey, de Puerto Rico, de Albuera (later Valencia), and de Granada, and several smaller companies. These were left in Cartagena as a garrison, and numbered some 2,500 troops. Morillo himself left Cartagena on 16 February 1816, but already some officers who had not participated in the blockade of Cartagena had begun working their way into the interior.

44 See José María Caballero, Diario, Biblioteca de Bogotá, (Editorial Villegas, 1990).
45 Restrepo, Historia de la revolución, vol 2, p. 73.
These expeditions took several routes. First, Pedro Ruíz de Porras and Vicente Sánchez Lima went directly to Mompós in September 1815. Sánchez Lima soon captured various insurgent leaders, such as Pantaleón Germán Ribón and Martín Amador. (Sánchez Lima subsequently assisted Francisco Warleta in capturing Antioquia, where he remained as governor until removed from office by Morillo for being excessively conciliatory.) A second force led by Lieutenant Colonel Julián Bayer had also left Cartagena for the Chocó, going by boat up the Atrato River in December 1815. Leading a force of 200 men, he captured 150 insurgents who, having managed to flee Cartagena, had been shipwrecked and were starving. Although initially obliged to withdraw from the Chocó, he returned and, in June 1816, opened communications with Colonel Francisco Warleta in Antioquia.

Finally, Colonel Sebastián de la Calzada had been working his way into New Granada from Barinas.

Sebastián de la Calzada, an uneducated and illiterate fighter, whose troops were regarded by Morillo as “unos guerrilleros sin disciplina”, played an important part in the reconquest of New Granada. In late 1815, he had assembled a force of over 2,000

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47 There are several secondary sources which describe the military campaigns of 1816-1818. See, for example, Julio Albi, Banderas Olvidadas: el ejército realista en América, Ediciones Cultura Hispánica (Madrid, 1990); and Jorge Mercado, Campaña de invasión del Teniente General Don Pablo Morillo, 1815-1816, Ejército de Colombia, Estado Mayor General (Bogotá, 1919). José Cervera Pery, La marina española en la emancipación de hispanoamérica, MAPFRE (Madrid, 1992), gives an account of the naval actions in the Caribbean.

48 For information about the capture of Cartagenero insurgents, see Expedición del Río Atrato en Diciembre de 1815 por el Teniente Coronel Don Julián Bayer, In AGI, Mapas y Planes: Panama, ff. 313-318.

49 Borrador de Ystoria del Cuartel General, desde 30 de Mayo de 1816 a 18 de Agosto del mismo, entry for 8 June 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 759A.

50 Pablo Morillo to Miguel de la Torre, Ocaña, 25 March 1816, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8717, doc. 48. See also Restrepo, Historia de la revolución, vol 2, p. 77.
men in Venezuela, and began marching into New Granada through the Llanos de Casanare. He had suffered one defeat at the hands of Joaquín Ricaurte, but managed to arrive in Cúcuta with about three-quarters of his force intact. He there defeated first Rafael Urdaneta, and then the combined force of Custodio García Rovira and Francisco de Paula Santander at Cachirí on 21-22 February 1816 in a bloody battle that cost the republicans over 1,500 men. This latter victory effectively destroyed the republican resistance in New Granada; henceforth nothing stood between the royalists and the capital. Calzada then joined Miguel de La Torre and their two forces entered Santa Fe on 6 May 1816. They faced no resistance, as the republican reserves and indeed the republican government had fled on 3 May. After occupying the capital, Calzada pursued the republican General Serviez, who had fled south towards Cáqueza. Serviez was defeated on 11 May, and the image of the Virgin of Chiquinquirá, which Serviez had taken from its shrine, was recovered and returned to Chiquinquirá.

Colonel Miguel de la Torre, in charge of the Second Division, had meanwhile been proceeding towards Santa Fe via Ocaña, Bucaramanga, Girón, Socorro, and Vélez, where he was to join the Fifth Division led by Calzada. Girón distinguished itself as a centre of royalism, and the city indeed organised a ball for the troops, but all towns in this region, including the once fervently insurgent Socorro, welcomed Calzada. Tunja was captured in April 1816, and the republican Congress was obliged to dissolve itself. La

51 For reports on the battle of Cachirí, see Sebastián de la Calzada to Pablo Morillo, Suratá, 23 February 1816, Rodríguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol 3, p. 30; and Pablo Morillo to Francisco Montalvo, Mompós, 9 March 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 717. The Spanish reportedly gave no quarter. See Liévano Aguirre, Los grandes conflictos, p. 917
Torre advanced uneventfully towards Santa Fe, which he entered together with the troops of Calzada. Although Calzada and La Torre worked in unison, the two disliked each other intensely.

Morillo himself went toward Santa Fe, via Mompós, Ocaña, Girón, San Gil, Socorro, San Benito and Zipaquirá. On 16 May 1816, he entered Santa Fe without a battle, amid triumphal arches and festivities. Far from participating in these celebrations he retired immediately to a house that had been prepared for him. All efforts to convince him of the sincerity of the Bogotanos’ conversion to royalism failed, and he rebuffed a collective plea for mercy delivered to him soon after his arrival by a party of upper class women. He did however agree to pardon lower-ranking soldiers.53

Meanwhile, Colonel Francisco de Paula Warleta, who had already proceeded from Cartagena to Antioquia, was on his way up the Cauca River to Nechí and Zaragosa. On 22 March 1816, he defeated Andrés José Linares at Ceja Alta, south of Remedios. The battle lasted four days, and involved over a thousand troops, although Warleta reported that the insurgents tended to flee rather than fight.54 This important victory sealed Spanish control of the region, and by early April 1816, Warleta was in command of all Antioquia.55 In August 1816, he moved south to Cali, and in September was named commander of royalist forces in Popayán.

53 The delegation of Bogotanas is described in Sevilla, Memorias, p. 95, and Caballero, Diario, pp. 214-215.
54 For official reports of the battle of Ceja Alta, see the two letters of Francisco Warleta to Pablo Morillo, Cancan, 23 March 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 707 (also in legajo 717).
55 Information on the royalist campaign in Antioquia may be found in José Manuel Restrepo, Autobiographia, con apuntamientos sobre la emigración que hizo en 1816 de la provincia de Antioquia a la de Popayán, Biblioteca de la Presidencia de Columbia, vol 30 (Bogotá, 1957), pp. 65-69 of Apuntamientos and Autobiographia, p. 17.
Both in Antioquia and in the south he arrested and executed large numbers of people, often for the most minor offences. Indeed, Warleta aroused great hostility even among royalists, who accused him of undermining attempts at reconciliation.56 (He remained in New Granada until 1820, when he left Cartagena in order to avoid having to swear loyalty to the Constitution of 1812.)

Colonel Donato Ruíz de Santa Cruz, in turn, left Cartagena to join Brigadier Juan Sámano in Pasto, going via the Magdalena River to Honda, and thence to La Plata. He captured Nare in late April 1816.57 Meanwhile, Juan Sámano, commander of the Third Division, marched north from Quito to destroy the remaining insurgent forces in the Cauca region. Sámano, commanding some 1,300 troops, defeated insurgents troops at the battle of the Cuchilla del Tambo, outside Popayán, on 29 June 1816. The insurgent troops, who had numbered some 700, lost all their heavy artillery, and most of their officers were killed.58 This important victory delivered Popayán into Spanish hands and secured the south for the royalists. The remaining republican forces, led by Pedro Monsalve, fled east to La Plata, where they were defeated by Carlos Tolrá on 10 July 1816. (Tolrá had fought at the battle of Cachirí, and then proceeded south to Popayán as commander of the Second Batallón of Numancia. He remained there, terrorising the inhabitants and angering the civilian

56 See José María Restrepo Saenz, Gobernadores de Antioquia, 1571-1819, Imprenta Nacional (Bogotá, 1932) vol 1, pp. 289-304; Francisco Warleta to Juan Sámano, Cali, 22 August 1816, BRAH, sig. 9/7665 (leg. 22), fols. 60-61; and Pablo Morillo to Miguel de La Torre, Barquisimeto, 17 December 1819, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8717, Doc. 281.
58 Borrador de Ystoria del Cuartel General, desde 30 de Mayo de 1816 a 18 de Agosto del mismo, entry for 27 July 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 759A; and Juan Sámano to Toribio Montes, Cuchilla de Tambo, 30 June 1816, BRAH, sig. 9/7665 (leg. 22), fols. 18-19.
authorities, until, in 1817 he was sent to the Llanos to defeat the insurgency led by the Almeida Brothers. This he did, with much loss of life.\(^{59}\)

Thus, with the exception of the Llanos de Casanare, to which a handful of republicans had escaped, all New Granada was again in royalist hands. The entire reconquest was completed by the end of July 1816, one year after Morillo’s landing in Santa Marta, and seven months after the end of the siege of Cartagena. After examining the Spanish reconquest of New Granada, the military historian Jorge Mercado concluded:

Nada militar se opuso en pureza de verdad a la realización [del plan de Morillo]. El país estaba en completa anarquía y el ejército independiente--si podemos dar tal nombre a las montanerías que aquí y allá se decoraron con apelativos militares—reproducían fielmente ese estado de confusión y de desorden.

The reconquest, he concluded, was a mere “paseo militar”.\(^{60}\) This evaluation, while perhaps exaggerated, does draw attention to the relative ease with which the Spanish recaptured New Granada. While the insurgents offered real resistance at the battles of Cachiri, Ceja Alta, and the Cuchilla del Tambo, and during the siege of Cartagena, the inhabitants of New Granada did not oppose the invaders en masse. The capital itself surrendered without a battle, and indeed welcomed the reconquerers. The reasons for this are not difficult to discover. By 1816 the inhabitants of New Granada were deeply disillusioned with their new republican leaders. Independence had brought civil war and conflict, “fatigas

\(^{59}\)Biographical material on Tolrá is contained in Restrepo Saenz, Gobernadores de Antioquia, pp. 343-367.

\(^{60}\)Mercado, Campaña de invasión, p. 201.
y penalidades”. Morillo benefited from what Juan Friede has called a “protest vote” against the republicans. Moreover, the defeat of Napoleon in Spain and the return of Ferdinand to the throne further discouraged republican troops. A captured insurgent officer reported in 1815 that the news of Ferdinand’s return was having a terrible effect on his troops: “ha notado mucho abatimiento, y . . . diariamente se experimentan renuncias de los oficiales y empleos”. Morillo’s task was an easy one. Sent to reconquer a populace ready to be reconquered, he profited from the divisions and ineptitude of the governments of the Patria Boba. Restrepo speculated that even had the republicans succeeded in uniting their disparate forces, the populace itself would have risen up to welcome the Spanish. Under such circumstances, Morillo’s early success is easy to understand.

§5. The Composition of the Army

Despite its initial successes, the Expeditionary Army was not an unfailing bulwark protecting the restored royal regime. On arriving in America, it had consisted mostly of veterans of the Peninsular War. This did not necessarily mean they were well disciplined, and in any event the stock of veterans was soon exhausted. Indeed, in 1818 Morillo was obliged to request that greater care be exercised in selecting soldiers:

61Restrepo, Historia de la revolución, vol 2, pp. 105, 156.
63Declaration of Vicente Vanegas, Pasto, 25 October 1815, AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 275. See also Oswaldo Díaz Díaz, La reconquista española, vol 1, Historia Extensa de Colombia, vol 6, Ediciones Lerner (Bogotá, 1964), p. 64.
64Restrepo, Historia de la revolución, vol 2, p. 132.
Las tropas que se destinen a América deben en mi concepto ser compuestas de hombres honrados y de buena conducta, y no de la multitud de desertores y malos soldados que suelen reunir en los depósitos de ultramar, . . . cuyos hombres aquí hacen más daño que los mismos enemigos. No pueden oírse sin horror los excesos cometidos por el extinguido batallón de Granada, compañías sueltas americanas, y los llamados Curros de Monteverde. Estos cuerpos, compuestos por la mayor parte de desertores, ladrones, presidiarios y los soldados más perversos de todo el ejército, cometieron toda clase de crímenes cuando llegaron a estas provincias. . . .

“Con este clase de pacificadores,” warned Morillo, “crea vuestra excelencia que jamás las provincias sublevadas de América se reducirán a sus deberes”. Recruitment of Americans produced equally undesirable troops. It is telling that Morillo regarded it as merely desirable, rather than essential, that recruits be well behaved and support the royalist cause.

Numerically, Morillo’s forces and those opposing him were fairly evenly matched when Morillo arrived in America, although some Colombian historians have preferred to describe the Expeditionary Army as an invincible war machine. The Colombian military historian, Jorge Mercado, reported that at the time of the

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66Pablo Morillo to Minister of War, Caño de Atamayca, 28 February 1819, Rodríguez Villa, *Pablo Morillo*, vol 4, pp. 10-14.

67 Valentín Capmany to Gabriel de Torres, Mompós, 4 April 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 712.
reconquest the insurgent armies in New Granada numbered roughly 6,000. These were spread across New Granada, with the largest group concentrated in Cartagena, where about 1,600 troops were garrisoned. Many of the insurgent soldiers had previously been members of the royal army, and had thus received some military training, although this of course did not mean they had gained any actual experience of warfare. The great difference with the royalists was that the insurgent forces were not united under a single command, and were scattered across New Granada under different political entities.

While the Expeditionary Army numbered some 10,500 troops at the time of its arrival in Venezuela, only about 5,000 of these accompanied Morillo to New Granada. The remainder stayed in Venezuela under the command of Salvador de Moxó. A further 3,000-odd Venezuelan troops followed Morillo to Cartagena as well. After the siege of Cartagena, royalist forces were reduced by some 3,000, although new recruits from New Granada increased numbers considerably. By mid-1817, Morillo had some 7,000 to 8,000 men in New Granada, while a further 3,000 to 4,000 remained in Venezuela. Bolívar, Páez, and their allies had by this time recruited an estimated 14,000 troops.

68 Mercado, *Campana de invasión*, p. 26
71 Ministry of State to Ministry of War, Madrid, 15 March 1817, Rodríguez Villa, *Pablo Morillo*, vol 3, pp. 646-648; Bartolomé de Azparren to Director General of Correos, Caracas, 28 August 1817, AGI, Estado, legajo 64; and Ejército Expedicionario, Resumen histórico de las operaciones y movimientos de las columnas y tropas . . . desde el mes de noviembre de 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 759B.
The Expeditionary Army was rapidly creoleized. Already in early 1815, 2,500 Venezuelan troops participated in the assault on the Island of Margarita, and thousands of Americans were recruited to accompany Morillo to New Granada. Moreover, many new units were formed in both New Granada and Venezuela. Following Sámano’s victory at the Cuchilla del Tambo, for example, Morillo requested permission to form a ‘Batallón del Tambo’. Both officers and soldiers were preferably to be from Pasto, in order to reward the bravery of the Pastusos. In 1817, Lieutenant Colonel Simón Sicilia attempted to form a regiment of gente de color in the Chocó, but was stopped by Viceroy Montalvo. Montalvo’s intercession was greeted with “una general alegría”, which gives some indication of the level of enthusiasm for military service. A battalion of slaves was, however, formed by Morillo himself in Venezuela in 1818.

While new battalions were formed, others were dissolved, either because the majority of the troops had died or deserted, or because they were guilty of misdeeds. The latter was the fate of

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73 Pablo Morillo to Ministry of War, Santa Fe, 17 September 1816, Rodríguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol 3, pp. 216-217. The Third Battalion of Numancia was composed entirely of Americans. See Pablo Morillo to Ministry of War, Valencia, 22 April 1818, Rodríguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol 3, pp. 563-567. A battalion of Cachiri was formed in 1816 to commemorate the royalist victory (see Sevilla, Memorias, p. 124); and an Esquadrón del Chocó was formed by Julián Bayer in the Chocó in 1816. See Julián Bayer to Pascual Enríquez, Citaré, 1 July 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 897. See also Diary of the Primer Batallón del Regimiento Infantería de Numancia, July 1817, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 759A, for details of much recruitment in the south.
74 Pablo Morillo to Ministry of War, Caracas, 5 October 1817, Rodríguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol 3, pp. 448-450. Sicilia also attempted to form a cavalry company in the Patía in July 1817. See Ruperto Delgado to José Solís, Popayán, 14 July 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631.
the Third Batallón del Rey, for example. Virtually all branches of the Expeditionary Army suffered terrible losses during the years of the war. The Second Batallón del Rey, for example, contained 750 soldiers in February 1816. By October 1821, it had been reduced to a mere 3 men. Similarly, the Regimiento de León, stationed in Cartagena, started 1816 with some 1,000 troops. By 1819, numbers had declined to roughly 800, and when the city was evacuated in October 1821, only about 500 soldiers remained alive. From April to December 1819, the 10th Ligero de Valencia declined from 715 men to 625. Overall, by 1817, there were reportedly no European troops at all in New Granada, with the exception of the Regimiento de Leon in Cartagena. This implies that over 4,000 expeditionaries had died, a loss of 80% in two years.

There were two principal causes of this decline in troop numbers. The first, and most important, was the high mortality suffered by the soldiers. Death did not result only from injury during armed conflict. Thousands of royalist troops, Spanish and American, died of disease while serving in the army. The army’s health will be discussed in Chapter 9; it is, however, worth noting that disease, and not battle, was the primary cause of death during the War of Independence. A small inkling of the medical problems that were to confront royalist troops, not only in New Granada, but indeed in all of Spanish America, may be gained from the fate of the 5,000 Spanish troops sent to Río de la Plata in 1813. Over 800 (16%) had already fallen sick before the ships

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77 Francisco Montalvo to Minister of Grace and Justice, Cartagena, 24 September 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631.
even docked in Montevideo. Comparatively, this is a high sickness rate for a transatlantic crossing.\textsuperscript{78}

The other great cause of falling troop numbers was, as always, desertion. During the war against their own revolted American colonies, the British had lost nearly 30\% of their soldiers to desertion.\textsuperscript{79} Four decades later, the magnitude of this insoluble problem had in no way diminished. Desertion plagued the Expeditionary Army even before it left Cádiz. There, many conscripts tried to desert, and the garrisons were constantly guarded to prevent escapes.\textsuperscript{80} The problem merely worsened on arrival in the Americas. In May 1816, Morillo complained that in Caracas royalist troops were “deserting in flocks”.\textsuperscript{81} By 1817 roughly a fifth of the Battalion de Infantería de Tambo had deserted.\textsuperscript{82} By 1819, entire battalions were deserting.\textsuperscript{83} Neither repeated orders that soldiers caught deserting would be shot, nor offers of generous prizes for those apprehending deserters appear to have had much effect.\textsuperscript{84} Problems with desertion were, of

\begin{footnotesize}

\textsuperscript{79}See Mackesy, \textit{The War for America}, p. 176.

\textsuperscript{80}See Comellas, \textit{Los primeros pronunciamientos}, p. 307.

\textsuperscript{81}Woodward, “The Spanish Army and the Loss of America,” p. 590.

\textsuperscript{82}List of individuals who have deserted the Battalion de Infantería de Tambo, 1817, AHNC, Archivo Anexo, Guerra y Marina, tomo 152, ff. 218-219.

\textsuperscript{83}Woodward, “Spain and the Loss of America,” p. 591 See also Toribio Montes to Ministers of State and Overseas, Quito, 22 July 1815, AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 275; Valentín Capmany to Gabriel de Torres, Mompós, 17 October 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 712; Minister of State to Minister of War, Madrid, 15 March 1818, Rodríguez Villa, \textit{Pablo Morillo}, vol 3, pp. 646-648; Pablo Morillo to Minister of Overseas, Barquisimeto, 31 October 1820, AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 1568; List of deserters from 27 August 1821 to 8 October 1821, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 717.

\textsuperscript{84}Bando de Pablo Morillo, Cumaná, 2 May 1815, BRAH, Sig. 9/7651 (leg. 8); Circular of Francisco Montalvo, Torrecillas, 20 September 1815, AGI, Papeles
\end{footnotesize}
course, not confined to Morillo’s expedition; President Montes of Quito complained in 1814 that troops under Juan Sámano were deserting at such a rate that in six months the number of soldiers had fallen from 1,700 to 300. This level of desertion compares very poorly with those found in the insurgent armies in Río de la Plata during the same period.\(^8\)

Morale among Spanish troops appears to have been generally poor. Few Spanish soldiers wanted to be in the Americas in the first place. Few had volunteered; most were conscripts, and the prospect of death far from Spain had little appeal. “[The] lusty spirit of the conquistadores was nowhere to be seen”, Margaret Woodward comments harshly.\(^8\) Certainly the reports on life in the Americas that reached Spain were often alarming. Woodward records that soldiers “brought back to Spain hair-raising descriptions of dense jungles, of deserts ‘like petrified seas’ and tales of ‘putrefying corpses, impenetrable forests, man-eating reptiles,’ and of tigers ‘roaring in the night’”.\(^8\) Moreover, it soon became clear to the troops that they would see little material

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\(^8\) Toribio Montes to Ministers of State and War, Quito, 7 July 1814, AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 260. For comparative figures from Río de la Plata, see Hans Vogel, “The Wars of Independence in Northwest Argentina, 1810-1814,” 4th Spanish-Dutch Historical Colloquium (Avila, 1991).


benefit from their hardships. Salaries were not paid, and even during the heady successes of 1816 food and supplies were in short supply.

In the autumn of 1816, after the completion of the reconquest in New Granada, the majority of the royalist army returned to Venezuela. The royalist forces remaining in New Granada consisted of the Second, Third and Fifth Divisions of the Expeditionary Army. The Second Division was led by Miguel de la Torre, the Third Division by Juan Sámano, and the Fifth Division by Sebastián de la Calzada. The First and Fourth Divisions, in Venezuela, were commanded respectively by Pascual Real and Ramón Correa (later replaced by Tomás de Ciras). Only the Third Division remained in New Granada for the duration of the war. The Second and Fifth Divisions were sent to Venezuela in 1817 and 1818.

Of the divisions operating in New Granada, the most important units were the First and Second Numancia Battalions, the First Battalion of the Regimiento del Rey, the Cazadores del Tambo, and the Regimiento de Leon, which formed the garrison in Cartagena. The Numancia Battalions and the Cazadores del Tambo were new units; only the Regimiento del Rey and the troops in Cartagena’s garrison had come with Morillo from Spain. By 1817 there were virtually no Spanish troops remaining in New Granada; the royalist army was composed entirely of creoles, with the exception of the garrison in Cartagena. This situation alarmed Morillo, who predicted disasters would result from leaving the

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88 See Orden General del 28 al 29 de Noviembre de 1816, del 13 al 14 de Febrero de 1817, and del 21 al 22 de Junio de 1818, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 759B.
defence of the colony in creole hands. He and other royalist officials sought consolation in history; Cortés had conquered Mexico with an army of natives, and the Romans had enjoyed their greatest military successes using foreign troops. Philosophical musings aside, however, most Spanish officers retained the greatest distrust for their American troops. “Una fuerza efímera,” Morillo called them.

Moreover, the relationship between the members of the newly-arrived Expeditionary Army and New Granada’s existing Spanish military did not always run smoothly. Prior to the outbreak of the war, New Granada, and indeed all of Spanish America, had been defended by the Army of the Americas. In New Granada this force consisted of garrisons in Santa Fe, Cartagena, Santa Marta, Rióhacha, the Chocó, Antioquia, Popayán, and Panama. Various local militia forces also existed, although many observers had doubts about their effectiveness and loyalty. Of the regular troops, the most important were the Batallón Auxiliar de Santa Fe, The Regimiento de Infantería Fijo of Cartagena (the “Fijo de Cartagena”), and the Batallón Fijo de Panamá.

Difficulties between these and Morillo’s troops arose for several reasons. At one extreme were the units of the Army of

89 Rodríguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol I (1920), pp. 240, 300. See also Ejército Expedicionario, Resumen histórico de las operaciones y movimientos de las columnas y tropas . . . desde el mes de Noviembre de 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 759B.
90 See Juan Sámano to Pablo Morillo, Santa Fe, 29 August 1818, BRAH, sig. 9/7665 (leg. 22), fols. 607-609; and González García, “El aniquilamiento del ejército expedicionario de Costa Firme ”, pp. 138-139.
the Americas that supported the movement for independence and joined the insurgents. These units, which had to be struck from the list of official Spanish forces, included some of the most important in the colonial army. The Fijo de Cartagena was heavily implicated in the outbreak of revolution in Cartagena in 1810, and ceased to exist as a royalist unit. (A later ‘Fijo de Cartagena’ was in fact an entirely new battalion formed by Francisco Montalvo in 1815.) The Batallón Auxiliar de Santa Fe became the backbone of the Republic of Cundinamarca’s army, and, after the recapture of the capital by Morillo, it was replaced by the Batallón del Tambo, a new unit formed in 1816. Various other units were dissolved for similar reasons. The shortage of royalist soldiers, however, made it necessary to recruit members of these extinguished units back into the Expeditionary Army in late 1816. This measure simply filled royalist ranks with republican supporters.

An additional problem, which has already been mentioned, was the profound lack of respect for Americans troops felt by Spanish soldiers. The widely-held Spanish view that the Americans were bad soldiers with no understanding of military discipline did not endear the expeditionaries to Neogranadan troops. Morillo did little to counter the prevailing prejudices when in 1815 he issued orders that Spanish troops were under no circumstances to ridicule the native troops, despite their obvious and evident backwardness. Spanish officers further distrusted

92 See Albi, *Banderas Olvidadas*, p. 52.
93 Francisco Montalvo to Juan Sámano, Cartagena, 30 January 1818, *Los últimos virreyes*, pp. 94-100.
94 *Bando de Gabriel de Torres*, Cartagena, 22 November 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 717.
95 *Instrucciones particulares a los jefes del ejército*, by Pablo Morillo, aboard the San Pedro, 1 April 1815, AHN, Estado, legajo 8717, doc. 16.
the Blacks, mulattos and castas who made up a large part of the royalist army in Venezuela. These men, prone to insubordination, alarmed royalist officers, who, like their republican colleagues, came to fear race war. This mistrust of the section of Venezuela's population most ready to support the royalists was a grave mistake on the part of the Spanish. The Venezuelan llanero and casta troops increasingly joined the republican army, to devastating effect.

Another problem for the royalist forces arose over the question of who retained supreme command over troops in New Granada. Officers from the Expeditionary Army claimed authority over all other commanders who might already be in the Americas. These officers, who had defended the rights of the crown from 1810 to 1815, resented and resisted the expeditionaries’ attempts to appropriate the command. Viceroy Abascal of Peru, for example, apparently attempted in 1815 to convince the newly-arrived Morillo to place his soldiers under the viceroy’s command. The question of command proved particularly vexing in Venezuela. Before 1815, virtually all royalist successes had been due to José Tomás Boves, Francisco Morales, and their guerrilla allies. None of these men held official posts in the royalist army, and indeed held that institution and its commanders in the greatest contempt. With the arrival of Morillo’s army came the restoration of a more professional structure, and Boves’ guerrilla leaders were demoted, demobilised, and dismissed. They were then replaced by Spanish officers.

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96Instructions to Francisco González de Linares and Pedro José Mijares, Caracas, 18 January 1821, AHN, Estado, legajo 8733, doc. 24.
97Pablo Morillo to José de Abascal, Torrecillas, 21 October 1815, AGI, Diversos, legajo 4.
guerrilla leaders, who believed with reason that the recapture of Venezuela had been their doing, were deeply offended, and many joined the insurgents.\textsuperscript{98} The conflicts between the guerrillas and the professionals were typified by Morillo’s disagreements with Francisco Tomás Morales, Boves’ successor. Although Morillo retained Morales as an officer, against the advice of many civilian officials, he did not immediately award Morales the authority he might reasonably have expected. Bitter disagreements broke out during the recapture of the Island of Margarita, and their relationship never fully recovered.\textsuperscript{99} Similar conflicts developed between Miguel de la Torre, the young commander of the Expeditionary Army’s second division and eventual replacement to Morillo, and various royalist guerrilla leaders, in particular Sebastián de la Calzada and Francisco Tomás Morales. La Torre regarded both Calzada and Morales as uncultured hooligans, while these latter viewed La Torre as a rule-bound incompetent.\textsuperscript{100} That these disagreements were serious and important should not be doubted. The disastrous royalist defeat at Carabobo in 1821, which effectively ended the war in Venezuela, has been attributed by some to the personal incompatibility of La Torre and Morales, the two participating royalist officers.\textsuperscript{101}

Poor troops and personal divisions among the royalist officer corps were not, however, the sole problem facing the reconquest

\textsuperscript{99}Lievano Aguirre, Los grandes conflictos, vol. 1, pp. 894-895; and Cajigal, Memorias, p. 148. Morillo did, however, retain considerable respect for Morales, as his correspondence with him shows.
\textsuperscript{100}See letters of Pablo Morillo to Miguel de La Torre, February-March 1816, AHN, Estado, legajo 8717, docs. 42, 45, 48.
\textsuperscript{101}See Sebastián González García, “El aniquilamiento del ejército expedicionario”, p. 140.
regime. It also faced serious political challenges, not least of which was the need to deal with supporters of the independence movements of 1810-1815, and to win back loyal supporters from New Granada’s population. The way in which Spanish officials confronted these tasks is the subject of the following chapter.
Chapter 4: Conciliation or Conflict?

After the successful reconquest of New Granada in 1816, the royalist government had to decide how it would view the preceding six years of independence. One of the most divisive questions was how Spain would regard people who had supported the revolution. Should overt supporters of independence be punished, or should they be pardoned? Should punishment be exemplary, with principal insurgents being either imprisoned or executed, or should it be corrective, and consist mainly in fines or temporary dismissal? Officials in New Granada and Spain took various views on this issue, which occasioned much disagreement within the royalist camp.

These questions were of course not unique to New Granada in 1816. Many countries have been confronted with similar dilemmas following a change of government or civil war. One intriguing twentieth-century parallel to the situation in New Granada in 1816 concerns the Allied treatment of Nazi supporters after the Second World War. While some individual Nazis were indicted for specific crimes at the Nuremberg Trials, large numbers of Nazi supporters were “de-Nazified” through the payment of a small fine or through temporary dismissal. Although no one would suggest that the Neogranadan insurgents in 1816 were similar to the German fascists, the process of de-Nazification does bear comparison to the royalist campaign against infidencia in New Granada. There, as we shall see, the leaders of the revolution were executed (usually after trials considerably less rigorous than those carried out at Nuremberg). As for rebel
sympathisers, many were “purified” by the payment of a fine, and some were also removed from public office. However, as was the case in post-Nazi Germany, many Neogranadans escaped with no punishment at all, to the great annoyance of those in government who wanted a wider purge.

Perhaps the greatest difficulty in deciding what to do with the supporters of the revolution was determining who had supported the revolution in the first place. Were colonial officials who remained in their posts after 1810 by definition traitors? Were individuals who accepted non-political posts in the new insurgent government traitors? What other actions indicated support for the rebels? Nevertheless, the re-established royal government was determined to do something to punish the disloyal and the disaffected. To accomplish this, it created new institutions and new laws, the workings of which we shall now outline in greater detail.

§ 1. Spain and the Infidentes

The question of what to do with government officials who had held posts during the years of republican rule was particularly vexing. After the arrival of Morillo’s Expeditionary Army in Cartagena, and the pacification of New Granada, the royalists set about reestablishing the colonial bureaucracy. To begin with, and as a matter of course, individuals who had served under the insurgents were removed from their posts until they presented a justification of their behaviour. This invariably caused difficulties. The problem was that, by early 1816, there

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1 Bando de Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 28 December 1815, AGI, Papelos de Cuba, legajo 717.
were often at least two and perhaps three individuals who could lay claim to any given job. Royalists who had held posts in 1810 and who had been forced to leave New Granada during the Patria Boba naturally hoped to get their old jobs back, while those who had been appointed by the republicans to hold non-political posts argued that there was no reason for their removal. (Of course there were not always competing candidates for a post. When Morillo appointed a new administrator to the salt mines in Zipaquirá, the general could be certain that the former administrator would not petition to retain his post, as he had been shot on Morillo’s orders some time previously.2) On many occasions the matter was further complicated because General Morillo or Viceroy Montalvo preferred to appoint their own candidate to important posts, thus introducing a third claimant.

An illustrative case was the appointment of a postal administrator in Cartagena. In July 1816 Antonio García y Nieto petitioned the government to ask for employment as the first post-insurgent administrator of Correos in Cartagena, as he had held that post until 1811, when he was removed by the insurgents. From 1811 until 1816 he had been in royalist territory drawing 2/3 of his salary, with the understanding that he would be returned to his post when this became possible. Unfortunately, by the time García y Nieto made his request,

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2See Pablo Morillo to Ministry of War, Santa Fe, 12 November 1816, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 549 and Relación de los principales cabezas de la rebelión . . . que han sufrido . . . la pena capital, Santa Fe, 4 September 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 1901.

Sometimes the royalists restored to their posts officials who had been removed by the republicans not for political reasons, but because the officials had been corrupt. For an example, see Margarita Garrido, Reclamos y representaciones. variaciones sobre la política en el Nuevo Reino de Granada, 1750-1815, Banco de la República (Santafé de Bogotá, 1993), pp. 298-301.
Viceroy Montalvo had already appointed Toribio del Villar y Tatis to the post (on a supposedly temporary basis), as a reward for Villar’s assistance during the reconquest. Montalvo was thus unwilling to consider García y Nieto’s claims to the post. To further complicate matters, Ramón de Herrera, who had held the post during the years of insurgent rule, argued that he was a loyal subject of the crown and ought to be allowed to continue exercising his office. The matter was referred to Spain, where it dragged on for years, without any official conclusion being reached.³ It appears that in the interim Montalvo decided, independently, to return the job to Herrera, a decision strongly criticised by Montalvo’s successor Juan Sámano, who took the view “once an insurgent, always an insurgent”. (Sámano had had a long career as an officer and an absolutist. During the reconquest, he was in his late 70s, unmarried, and reportedly going deaf.⁴) Sámano regarded Herrera as an unreformed traitor. He had, Sámano announced, “con una simple información de la que en estos países son tan fáciles de adquirirse, y tal vez por el respeto de alguna poderosa recomendación, consiguió... aparentando sinceridad de conducta la reposición de su empleo”.⁵ Herrera, it need hardly be said, was rapidly removed from office on Sámano’s elevation to viceroy in 1817.

³Material on this case may be found in AGI, Correos, legajo 72A.
⁴See, for example, Pablo Morillo to Minister of War, Santa Fe, 31 August 1816, Antonio Rodríguez Villa, El Teniente General Don Pablo Morillo, Primer Conde de Cartagena, Marqués de la Puerta (1778-1837), Real Academia de la Historia (Madrid, 1908-1910), vol. 3, pp. 190-191; Francisco Montalvo to the Ministry of Grace and Justice, Cartagena, 24 September 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631; and Juan Sámano to Minister of War, Santa Fe, 29 May 1818, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 720A.
⁵Juan Sámano to Ministry of State, Santa Fe, 29 May 1818, AGI, Estado, legajo 53, Doc. 44.
This one example illustrates the considerable disagreements within the royalist camp over both the appropriate treatment of suspected insurgents, and the best definition of insurgency. Viceroy Montalvo regarded Ramón de Herrera as a reliable subject, while Juan Sámano considered him a traitor. Clearly some more codified system was needed, and various efforts were made to classify the different levels of insurgency.

One of the earliest classifications was produced by the Junta de Secuestros in Caracas, which in June 1815 described three different classes of individuals. The first were the leaders of the insurgency, people so well known for their support of independence that the junta did not even regard it as necessary to try them. The second class consisted of people who had passively supported the revolution without taking any active role in it. The third class contained those who fled the advancing royalist army. The junta considered members of the first and third classes fair game, and decreed that their goods could be embargoed at will, although the belongings of members of the third class might possibly be returned to them later. Members of the second class had the right to a judicial hearing that would investigate their behaviour, as would wives of insurgents, minors and especially orphans, and those whose family had been awarded special honours in the past. This distinction between active and passive support for the insurgency remained the touchstone of royalist justice, although other modifications were introduced. In November 1817, for example, Ferdinand decided that even individuals who had voluntarily served in the insurgent

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6Plan de Gobierno de la Junta Superior y Tribunal Especial de Sequestros de Caracas, Caracas, 2 June 1815, AGI, Audiencia de Caracas, legajos 109, 386.
governments should not automatically be considered traitorous. This was complemented by a decision of the Council of the Indies, taken in May 1818, that clear distinctions ought to be made between leaders of the insurgency and those who had merely followed.\(^7\)

After the Spanish decided which activities were treasonous, they still had to determine who had carried out such activities. The manner in which the royalists collected names of possible insurgents was itself open to all sorts of distortions. Juan Manuel de Cajigal, Captain General of Venezuela at the time of Morillo's arrival, complained that he and other royalists were continually presented with anonymous denunciations of suspected insurgents. He reported that the accuracy of these denunciations was not always examined.\(^8\) Such anonymous accusations could be used to settle private quarrels and to exact vengeance. In 1819, for example, former corregidor José Joaquín de la Mota complained from prison that he had been falsely accused of treason by a couple whom he had earlier prosecuted for living in concubinage.\(^9\) Similarly, Rosario Armenta, the repartidor de carnes in Ríohacha, suggested that the charge of treason levelled against him might have originated with "uno de los ricos a quien no quiso darle ración".\(^10\) Viceroy Montalvo himself admitted that denunciations

\(^7\)Report by the Council of the Indies, Madrid, 18 May 1818, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 549.
\(^8\)Juan Manuel de Cajigal, Memorias del Mariscal de Campo Don Juan Manuel de Cajigal sobre la revolución de Venezuela, Biblioteca Venezolana de Historia (Caracas, 1960), p. 142, 163. See also Lista de los individuos que en la ciudad de Santa Marta opinan terriblemente contra la legitimidad de la autoridad suprema del Real y Supremo Consejo de Regencia, Santa Marta, 24 November 1810, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 746.
\(^9\)Report by the Council of the Indies, 14 February 1819, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 551.
\(^10\)Investigation into Rosario Armenta, Ríohacha, 13 November 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 890A. See also Denunciations in Lorica, Lorica, 12
were often based on nothing more than malice, commenting that “nadie ignora que semejantes denuncias han sido muchas veces medios encubiertos de venganza, valiéndose así de la justicia como de instrumento para tan vil objeto”.11

§2. Political Repression and Punishment

One model for colonial authorities seeking to purge and punish sedition from the body politic was provided by Spain itself. In 1814, “juntas of purification” had been established in Spain after the return of Ferdinand VII to investigate the conduct of government officials during the French occupation. As the name suggests, the juntas were concerned to ‘purify’ those contaminated with infidencia, a favourite word of the Fernandine period. Collaborators and afrancesados were removed from their posts, while those found to be “pure” were returned to their positions. All those investigated were subjected to a long and harassing scrutiny. The wisdom of exacerbating hostility between Spaniards by these trials was questioned by such ministers as José García de León y Pizarro, but Ferdinand was committed to removing all collaborators from office.12 It was not always easy to identify collaborators, and it was, in any event, impossible to arrest everyone who had supported either the intrusive King Joseph or

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11 Bando de Francisco Montalvo, Santa Marta, 26 August 1814, AGI, Audiencia de Caracas, legajo 109.
the more radical of the liberals, who also fell under suspicion. Balancing retribution, reconciliation and realism proved to be a dilemma which, together with the juntas de purificación, followed the royalist armies to the Americas. Tribunals and juntas de purificación were established in Mexico, Venezuela and New Granada and possibly elsewhere. As in Spain, they proved both controversial and difficult to operate.

The unavoidable fact was that very many Neogranadans had continued to exercise their professions during the Patria Boba, and many had served, with varying degrees of political fervour, on the various new committees and organisations set up by the insurgents. General Morillo himself recognised this fact. On 31 May 1816 he wrote to the Minister of War, that:

Siendo innumerables las personas de este Reino que se hallan envueltos en la insurrección y pretendida independencia, de modo que apenas se puede contar familia que no tenga algún individuo tildado de este delito, entre los cuales se hallan muchos que se han comprometido, ya por la necesidad de seguir ciertos destinos para subsistir, ya seducidos de personas mal intencionadas que han tenido ascendente sobre el pueblo, y los más, por ignorancia de su verdadero interés, obsesados de la malicia y de la mentira, de que resulta que si se fuese a proceder contra ellos, sería preciso poner en prisión una parte muy considerable del pueblo, imposible de juzgar.13

It was obviously not possible to arrest all these people for insurgency, but neither was it clear who should be excused and

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13Pablo Morillo to Ministry of War, Santa Fe, 31 May 1816, Rodríguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol 3, p. 159.
who should be tried. Soon after the capture of Cartagena, Morillo tried to draft into the Expeditionary Army everyone who had served in the republican army up to the grade of sergeant, but was dissuaded from doing so by Viceroy Montalvo, who pointed out that, were Morillo to do this, the effect of the city's work-force would be catastrophic. Everyone, down to the shoemakers and blacksmiths, had fought for the republicans, Montalvo noted.\footnote{14 Francisco Montalvo to Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 6 February 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 707.} Nonetheless, one of the first acts of the restored Spanish government in Cartagena was to suspend from their posts all government employees who had remained in Cartagena during the period of republican rule.\footnote{15 Francisco Montalvo to Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 13 December 1815, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 707. Identical measures were taken in Caracas in 1815 after the arrival of the Expeditionary Army, in violation of the Armistice of San Mateo signed in June 1812. See Francisco Xavier Arámbarri, \textit{Hechos del General Pablo Morillo en América}, Ediciones de la Embajada de Venezuela en España (Murcia, 1971) p. 27.}

The matter came to a head following the trial of the nine prominent Cartagenan republicans. The fate of these nine individuals, regarded by republican supporters as \textit{mártires}, and by the Spanish at the time as \textit{reos}, generated a bitter debate within the royalist camp, although this debate had little immediate effect on the fate of future martyrs or criminals. All nine men were shot in February 1816, even though some had surrendered after the royalists had issued a pardon, and in spite of the fact that six of the nine men roundly denied being insurgents. No real trials were held, although the accused were allowed to submit statements in their defence. The death sentence was issued jointly by Montalvo and Morillo. The technical defects of these cases roused great alarm within the
royalist camp. Particularly vociferous in their objections were the members of the Audiencia. Under normal circumstances the Audiencia would have overseen the trial and sentencing of these men, and the oidores were incensed by this denial of their rights. The matter was referred to Spain, the first in a long line of appeals (in this case posthumous) against the royalist crackdown on insurgents.

The procedural defects of the case and the lack of any established procedure to trying cases of treason led General Morillo and Viceroy Montalvo to establish a Consejo de Guerra Permanente, or Permanent Court Martial, as had been done in Caracas, which was responsible for trying cases of infidencia, a term that included virtually all forms of support for the republic. These Courts-Martial aroused great hostility, both among the public and among the members of the civil bureaucracy. The usual complaints by members of the public were procedural. The cases were heard verbally, that is, without simultaneous written records being made, and defendants were allowed little chance to defend themselves. This in itself was, not surprisingly, unpopular. When, for example, Pantaleón Gutiérrez y Quijano was sentenced by the Consejo de Guerra Permanente to five years in Omoa fortress, his wife complained that he had been condemned “sin oirle sus defensas con arreglo de

16 Leaflet by the Ministry of War, Madrid, 28 July 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 665. This document is also contained in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 748.

17 See Carlos Cortés Vargas, “De la época del terror,” BHA, vol. 29 (1942), p. 89. It appears that a brief written record summarising the trial was made at the end of the hearing, in cases where the accused was a royalist soldier. See Proclama de Pablo Morillo, Santa Fe, 5 August 1816, Rodríguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol 3, p. 98-101.
las leyes”, and asked that his case be reopened. Similar complaints were made by the relatives of Jorge Tadeo Lozano (Nariño’s successor as president of Cundinamarca), who was shot on 6 July 1816, following a hearing by the Consejo de Guerra Permanente. In many cases the accused was not even permitted to present witnesses in his defence.

The conditions of the trials were, moreover, hardly conducive to reasoned deliberation. Juan Manuel Arrubla, a resident of Santa Fe tried by the Consejo de Guerra Permanente, described his trial: “Fui juzgado en medio de la confusión más horrorosa, pero a la verdad inevitable por atumultarse en el consejo de guerra permanente excesiva número de causas, que toda se substantiaban a un tiempo se determinaban y se ejecutaban las sentencias inmediatamente después de su pronunciamiento”. The sentences of the Consejo de Guerra were, as Arrubla notes, usually carried out “sin dilación”. In addition, many civilians objected to being tried by a military council in the first place. Camilo Manrique, for example, complained to the Council of the Indies in 1818 that he had been

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18 Representation by Doña Francisca Morena e Isabella, Santa Fe, 19 October 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 549. Also see José María Caballero, *Diario*, Biblioteca de Bogotá, Editores Villegas, (Bogotá, 1990), p. 219.
19 Report on the case of Jorge Tadeo Lozano, 1818, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 551. Also see Caballero, *Diario*, p. 218; and Report by the Minister of War, Palace, 1 October 1818, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 580.
21 Petition by Juan Manuel Arrubla, Valencia, 4 October 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 549.
22 Report by the Fiscal de Perú, Madrid, 7 April 1818, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 665.
tried by the Consejo de Guerra, despite the fact that he had been a civilian official.  

Such complaints about the violation of existing immunities were not confined to the Viceroyalty of New Granada. When in 1812 Viceroy Venegas of Mexico attempted to abolish the ecclesiastical *fuero*, which prevented suspect priests from being tried in secular courts, his decision was universally condemned. The Council of the Indies indeed referred to the order rather extravagantly as “the most inhuman, illegal, and pernicious document to appear in this unhappy epoch”. In neither Mexico nor New Granada were the public eager to see the colonial government replaced by a military one.

Further conflicts over the Consejos de Guerra developed in 1817, after General Morillo had left for Venezuela. On 5 July 1817, he wrote from Cumaná to Juan Sámano, the acting governor of Santa Fe, granting him permission to try cases of *infidencia* in Consejos de Guerra. Sámano’s new powers were not welcomed by the judges of the Audiencia, which believed that their court, rather than Sámano, ought to try cases of *infidencia*, although they were prepared to accept a compromise tribunal run by the Audiencia, with Sámano granted the right to inspect the results.

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26 Various documents relating to Juan Sámano’s right to try cases, Santa Fe and Cartagena, 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 748. Juan Friede discusses the conflict between the Audiencia and Sámano in *La otra verdad. La independencia americana vista por los españoles*, Editorial Tercer Mundo (Bogotá, 1972), pp. 35-39.
The Audiencia’s members immediately protested “las tristes resultados que debían producir esta medida confiada al General Sámano”. They wrote, first, to Sámano himself, asking him to renounce his new authority. Sámano consulted a lawyer, but, ignoring his advice, refused to renounce his new powers, claiming he was subordinate only to Morillo. The Audiencia then turned to the fiscal, and, ultimately to Viceroy Montalvo, who was in Cartagena. The matter was referred to the Council of the Indies, but by the time it considered the matter, Sámano had been named viceroy, which settled the issue in his favour. The question of how cases were to be tried was nonetheless debated, and in the end, new guidelines were established for the treatment of political prisoners, including former republican officials.

These guidelines were issued on 28 July 1817 in the form of a leaflet, which specified how different types of prisoners were to be tried. Eight different classes of criminal were established, and the appropriate method of trial for each was listed. The most serious crimes were to be tried by court-martial: either a consejo de guerra ordinario or a consejo de guerra de oficiales generales, depending on whether the offender was a soldier or civilian, or an officer. If the individual wanted to appeal, the viceroy and oidores would rehear the case. The sentence would otherwise be carried out immediately. Less serious crimes committed by civilians would be tried by the civil authorities. The sentences would still be carried out immediately, preferably on the very spot of the supposed crime.

27 Report by the Fiscal del Perú, Madrid, 7 April 1818, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 665; and Díaz Díaz, La reconquista española, vol. 1, p. 344.
28 Leaflet by the Ministry of War, Madrid, 28 July 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 665. This document is also contained in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 748.
Trial by court-martial was thus reserved for specific types of prisoner. The first was spies; the second was deserters from the royal army who recognised the republicans, even if they had not joined them. A third category consisted of officers in the insurgent army. A fourth type was those who “se han ejercitado o ejerciten en conmover y excitar a la rebelión a los pueblos tranquilos y aún se han puesto o pongan al frente de ellos, quemando, talando o destruyendo aquellos lugares de que perciben su subsistencia los ejércitos de Su Magestad”. Finally, all members of the colonial armed forces who served in the republican army were to be tried by court-martial. Other types of offence would then be tried by civil authorities. In particular, non-military trial was permitted for those who had worked for the insurgent bureaucracy; and for those who “en sus proclamas, escritos u opiniones públicas se han dedicado o dediquen a encender o sostener el fuego de la revolución”. Also to be tried by civil authorities were those who, “abusando de la anarquía de un gobierno revolucionario han asesinado, persiguido, denunciado o sequeado a los vasallos tranquilos y fieles a Su Magestad”. Government officials who had remained in their post after the revolution of 1810, “jurando y reconociendo” the republican government were also to be accorded a civil trial. Thus, following the promulgation of these guidelines, no one who had served the republican government in a non-military capacity should have been tried by court-martial, although it remained possible for the viceroy to detain individuals without trial at his discretion.

Estimates for the number of people tried by the Consejos de Guerra vary considerably. Viceroy Montalvo reported in his Relación de Mando of 1818 that 7,000 people “de las principales
familias del virreinato” had been sentenced to death by the consejos, while Pascual Enrile insisted in 1817 that at most 90 men had been executed by Morillo’s troops. Stephen Stoan has calculated that 101 men lost their lives in the Santa Fe “terror” of 1816, while in his diary entries for 1816 José María Caballero recorded 53 executions and another 62 arrests, giving a total of 115 detainees.29

The consejos de guerra could not try everyone who had remained in republican territory during the Patria Boba, but the leaders of the royalist army were mistrustful of anyone who had been involved in any way with the insurgent authorities and forces. They were prepared to consider the merits of former republican employees only after the latter had “purified” themselves before a Consejo de Purificación. This institution was first established in New Granada on 30 May 1816 in Santa Fe. On that day General Morillo issued a limited pardon to soldiers and some officers who had served in the republican army. Those individuals encompassed in the pardon were to be enlisted in the Expeditionary Army as common soldiers for a period of time proportional to their earlier support for the republicans. In order to determine the length of time each individual was to serve, as

29 Francisco Montalvo, Relación de Mando, 30 January 1818, Los últimos virreyes de Nueva Granada, Relación de Mando del Virrey Don Francisco Montalvo y Noticias del Virrey Sámano sobre la pérdida del Reino (1813-1819), Eduardo Posada and P.M. Iháñez (editors), Biblioteca de la Juventud Hispano-Americana, Editorial América (Madrid, n.d.), p. 158; Exposition by Pascual Enrile, Madrid, 19 June 1817, AGI, Estado, legajo 57, Doc 35-c (2a) (This document is also contained in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 748); Stephen Stoan, Pablo Morillo and Venezuela, 1815-1820, Ohio State University Press (Columbus, 1974), p. 141; and Caballero, Diario, pp. 210-228.

For other reports on executions, see Relación de los principales cabezas de la rebelión . . . que han Sufrido . . . la pena capital, Santa Fe, 4 September 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 1901; an extended version of which is published in Díaz Díaz, La reconquista española, vol. 1, pp. 119-25. Restrepo reported 125 deaths. See José Manuel Restrepo, Historia de la revolución de Colombia, vol. 2, Ediciones Bedout (Bogotá, 1969), p. 142.
well as to decide whether the pardon applied at all to a given case, Morillo decided to establish “un consejo de purificación”, along the lines of those already operating in Spain.\(^{30}\)

The consejo began operating on 16 June 1816, and consisted of a committee of six men. Individuals from not only the capital, but also Tunja, Mariquita, Neiva and Socorro were expected to appear before the consejo to purify themselves. (The establishment of a separate council for Antioquia was approved in December 1816).\(^{31}\) The consejo de purificación appears to have operated in conjunction with the consejo de guerra permanente, and began to consider the cases not only of those individuals specifically mentioned in the pardon of 30 May 1816, but also of those tried in the consejo de guerra for non-capital offences.\(^{32}\)

The usual form of “purification” for republicanism was either a spell in the royalist army or the payment of a large fine. Primo Groot, for example, was tried by the consejo de guerra in January 1817 and was sentenced to pay a fine of $4,000. This sum was equivalent to more than the annual salary of a member of the Audiencia, and Groot complained in 1818 that because of this fine he was unable to support his family of six children.\(^{33}\) An alternative punishment was enlistment in the royalist army. Not everyone, of course, was found guilty. Some were found innocent.

\(^{30}\)Pardon by Pablo Morillo, Santa Fe, 30 May 1816, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 551.

\(^{31}\)Borrador de Ystoria del Cuartel General, desde 30 de Mayo de 1816 a 18 de Agosto del mismo, 15 June 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 759A, and Report by Audiencia de Santa Fe, Cartagena, 17 December 1816, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631.

\(^{32}\)In Venezuela some individuals were allegedly purified first in the consejo de purificación, and then charged with other offences in the consejo de guerra permanente. See Arámburri, Hechos del General Pablo Morillo, p. 91.

\(^{33}\)Representation by Primo Groot, 9 August 1818, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 748.
of any crime, and these were issued with a certificate of purification, signed by the president and fiscal of the consejo.34

Guillermo Hernández de Alba has calculated that at least 449 individuals were investigated by the consejo. Of these, roughly 60% were found guilty of involvement with the insurgency. Those found guilty were sentenced to serve in the royalist army, or to pay a fine ranging from 25 to 2,000 pesos, or both. The majority of those undergoing purification were public officials obliged to submit to examination in order to retain their post.35

Priests, who by virtue of their special fuero could not be tried in secular courts, were not tried in these consejos. Instead, those suspected of insurgency were tried by the army’s head chaplain, an unpopular man himself charged with various misdeeds.36 Despite the Catholic church’s later reputation as a bastion of royalism, it seems that many of New Granada’s priests in fact supported the insurgents. The participation, both active and passive, military and monetary, of Neogranadan clergy in the movement for independence is chronicled by Roberto Jaramillo in El clero en la independencia, which documents the activities of hundreds of clerics from all parts of the viceroyalty.37 By 1818,

34 See Certification of the Purification of Martín Urdaneta, Santa Fe, 27 June 1816, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631.
36 Rodríguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, (1920), vol 1, pp. 234-235.
37 Roberto Jaramillo, El clero en la independencia, Universidad de Antioquia (Medellín, 1946). Brian Hamnett has also written an article which contains, in addition to many errors, some useful information about the attitudes of Neogranadan clerics. See “The Counter Revolution of Morillo and the Insurgent Clerics of New Granada, 1815-1820,” The Americas, vol. 32 (1976).

Royalist commanders certainly displayed a striking distrust of New Granada’s clergy. During the royalist occupation of Popayán in 1813, Colonel Juan Sámano suspected many local clergymen were collaborating with the republicans and initiated disciplinary action against several.
the problem of delinquent clergy was perceived to be severe enough to warrant a special report by the Council of the Indies detailing the course of action to be taken when a priest left his post to join the republicans.\textsuperscript{38}

It seems unlikely that many republican priests were removed from office as a consequence of the Council of the Indies' recommendations, as the procedure they advocated was complicated and slow. Some priests, however, did lose their seat because of their revolutionary activities. Morillo arrested a number of clerics in 1816, including several prominent churchmen.\textsuperscript{39} Other insurgent priests were not removed officially from office at all. Rather, they were simply hounded into exile. Domingo Belcianario Gómez, the priest of the small town of El Trapiche, for example, was forced to abandon his parish after having been detained on charges of insurgency. He had been absolved by President Montes of Quito, but, on his return home,

Brian Hamnett remarks that "such conflicts point to the evident tendency on the part of the royalist military to blame the American clergy for the outbreak and sustenance of the insurrection in New Granada". (See Brian Hamnett, "Popular Insurrection and Royalist Reaction: Colombian Regions, 1810-1823", \textit{Reform and Insurrection in Bourbon New Granada and Peru}, John Fisher, Allan J. Kuehe, and Anthony McFarlane (editors), Louisiana State Press (Baton Rouge, 1990), pp. 306-307) Royalist suspicions of priests worsened as the war progressed. Morillo complained that, in all of New Granada, "ni uno parecía adicto a la causa del Rey". (See J.C. Mejía Mejía, "El clero de Pasto y la insurrección del 28 de octubre de 1822," \textit{Boletín de Estudios Históricos}, vol. 4 (1932), p. 353.) Similarly, during the campaign of 1819, General Barreiro complained regularly on the behaviour of New Granada's priests. "Por lo que respeta a los sacerdotes," he observed, "la mayor parte son sospechosos, unos por desear nuestro exterminio, y el triunfo de los rebeldes, y otros por ser verdaderos egoístas que estan al partido que mas puede, y por cuya razón huyen de cuanto les pueda compromesa, afectado todos con una hipocrasia religiosa". (See José María Barreiro to Juan Sámano, Paipa, 19 July 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 747. See also, for example, José María Barreiro to Juan Sámano, Molinos, 10 July 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 747.)

\textsuperscript{38}Report by Council of the Indies, 31 May 1818, AGI, Estado, legajo 57, doc. 37.

\textsuperscript{39}See Morillo's list of insurgent clerics from New Granada, Santa Fe, 23 October 1816, in Hamnett, "Morillo and the Insurgent Clerics," pp. 615-617.
was unable to occupy his post. During his absence, the cura of Almaguer had spread such terrible rumours about Gómez’s revolutionary activities that he was unable to continue in office.\textsuperscript{40}

§3. Conciliation and Pardon

The question of what to do with individuals of doubtful loyalty was complicated by the many indultos and olvidos del pasado that were issued between 1810 and 1820. During this period more than twenty pardons were decreed by Ferdinand and the royalists in New Granada.\textsuperscript{41} Some of these were directed specifically at “los reos americanos”, while others included Spain’s own afrancesados and similar dubious types. While the pardons were supposed to clarify the circumstances in which an individual could be regarded as innocent, as often as not they muddied the waters further. The terms of the various pardons were frequently contradictory, and often failed to spell out the details of their application. Nonetheless, the promulgation of a pardon always raised hopes. Although a pardon rarely allowed officials who had served under the insurgents to return to their jobs, it might

\textsuperscript{40}Report by Council of the Indies, 22 August 1819, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 551. See also Hamnett, “Popular Insurrection and Royalist Reaction”, p. 306.

\textsuperscript{41}Pardons were issued as follows: 15 October 1810 by the Cortes, 25 May 1812 by President Toribio Montes (for Quito), 24 May 1814 by Ferdinand, 14 October 1814 by Ferdinand, 23 September 1815 by General Pablo Morillo (for Cartagena), 9 April 1816 by Viceroy Francisco Montalvo (for Cartagena), 24 April 1816 by General Morillo (for Ocaña), 17 April 1816 by Ferdinand (this pardon was approved by the Council of the Indies on 3 October 1816 and its scope extended on 10 December 1816), 31 May 1816 by General Morillo (for Santa Fe), 24 January 1817 by Ferdinand, 7 May 1817 by Governor Vicente Sánchez Lima (for Antioquia), 12 June 1817 by General Morillo (for Cariaco), 8 November 1817 by Ferdinand (for those under military fuero), 1 March 1818 by General Morillo, 24 April 1818 by General Morillo (for Valencia), 18 and 22 September 1818 by General Morillo (for Caracas), 9 November 1819 by Ferdinand, 20 December 1819 by Ferdinand, 15 January 1820 by Ferdinand, 9 March 1820 by Ferdinand, 19 July 1820 by Ferdinand, 27 September 1820 and 10 October 1820 by the Cortes.
commute imprisonment or other punishment inflicted for treason. Thus there was always a flurry of interest following the promulgation of each pardon.

The precise terms of these pardons were often little understood, and this in itself led to great confusion. On 9 April 1816, for example, Francisco Montalvo issued a pardon intended specifically for the inhabitants of the province of Cartagena.\(^{42}\) Within a few months further clarifications had to be issued, as individuals not living in the province had been applying, and as people living in Cartagena had been applying in the name of others not resident in the province. These practices were explicitly ruled out on 7 June 1816. Furthermore, it was often unclear who was supposed to determine whether the pardon applied to a given individual. Cases were on occasion referred to the Council of the Indies, and hence to the king, and sometimes people even applied directly to the Secretary of State for individual pardons tailored to their particular case.\(^{43}\)

It was often believed that an *olvido del pasado* was precisely that, and that anyone who took advantage of it would be treated as if they had never supported the republicans. Very often this was not the case. The usual sticking point was whether a pardon allowed the *indultado* to return to his job. José María Castillo, for example, who survived the 1816 massacre of upper-class insurgents, asked Viceroy Sámano in 1819 to be allowed to

\(^{42}\) \textit{Indulto de Francisco Montalvo, Cartagena, 9 April 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 747} (also AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 747). See also Francisco Montalvo to Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 7 June 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 707.

\(^{43}\) See, for example, \textit{Report by the Secretary of State, the Palace, 6 September 1818, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 549}; Pedro Groot to the Council of the Indies, Santa Fe, 19 March 1818, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 549; and \textit{Representation by Primo Groot, 9 August 1818, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 748}. 

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resume practising as a lawyer, since his wife had obtained a pardon for him. The matter was referred to the Council of the Indies, which determined that the pardon in question (probably the royal pardon of 24 January 1817) simply commuted sentences, and did not involve the restoration of jobs. However, an 1819 royal order affirmed that while a pardon did not guarantee the restoration of jobs, having been pardoned was not to count against an applicant either.\(^4\)\(^4\)

A more fundamental problem with the various pardons was perhaps that the military authorities were often unwilling to release known insurgents, whatever the terms of a given pardon. During the course of the war Morillo in particular became increasingly distrustful of the expediency of issuing *indultos*. In November 1816, for example, he complained that Viceroy Montalvo’s pardon of 9 April 1816 for Cartagena had simply resulted in *malvados* emigrating from Santa Fe and elsewhere to Cartagena, where they would be pardoned.\(^4\)\(^5\) The military’s general mistrust of pardons echoed the divisions left by war in Spain itself. In 1816, for example, various moderate government ministers proposed issuing an amnesty for Spaniards who had supported the French after 1808. The Minister of War Francisco Eguía objected, however, on the grounds that all amnesties were treasonous; the Council of the Indies was similarly opposed to

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\(^4\) Report by the Council of the Indies, 22 August 1819, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 551; and Francisco Xavier de Manzanos y Castillo to Minister Universal, Quito, 22 April 1820, AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 236. See also Report on Francisco Xavier de Torres y Roxas, 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba legajo 888.

\(^5\) Rodríguez Villa, *Pablo Morillo*, vol 3, pp. 239-241. See also Valentín Capmany to Gabriel de Torres, Mompox, 16 July 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 712; and Ignacio Romero to Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 30 April 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 710A, for examples of military unwillingness to regard *indultados* as innocent.
issuing pardons. Although the idea of issuing such a pardon was abandoned, it continued to fester. Minister of State José García de León y Pizarro, one of the prime advocates of a pardon, believed that the failure to pardon liberals and supporters of the French was one of the principal causes of Spain’s 1820 revolution.

In New Granada, pardons were honoured grudgingly. On the occasions when Morillo felt compelled to honour a particular pardon, he did his best to enforce it in the narrowest sense. The case of Miguel Ibáñez provoked particular concern. Ibáñez, a former government official in Ocaña, had been arrested in 1816 for treason, but had fled before being executed. He then apparently obtained a personal pardon from the Audiencia in Cartagena. This made it impossible for Morillo to have him executed, but it was still possible, under the terms of the pardon issued, to send him to Spain. Morillo wrote innumerable letters about Ibáñez, who was finally remitted to Spain by Viceroy Sámano in December 1818.

On other occasions, Morillo felt able simply to ignore the terms of a pardon altogether. In 1818, various individuals who had been imprisoned in the fortress in Puerto Cabello petitioned to be released, on the grounds that Morillo had issued an olvido del pasado at some unspecified point in the past, and that, in any event, the king himself had issued a pardon on 24 January 1817.

47 See Anna, Spain and the Loss of America, pp. 153-4.
48 See Pablo Morillo to the Council of the Indies, Barquisimento, 16 July 1818, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 551; Juan Sámano to Ministry of War, Santa Fe, 19 December 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 720A; José María de Alos to Ministry of War, 9 October 1819, AGI, Estado, legajo 57, Document 40.
It is not clear to which of the several indultos issued by Morillo the prisoners referred, but the 24 January 1817 Royal Pardon most certainly applied. The pardon, which covered crimes committed in both Spain and overseas, stated explicitly that it included “los reos [americanos] procesados o no procesados, presentes o ausentes por delito de insurrección cometido antes de la publicación de este indulto en dichas capitales”.49 This pardon was promulgated in Caracas on 21 September 1817, and was in effect at the time the prisoners made their petition. Nonetheless, Morillo refused to honour it. On 10 July 1819, the general wrote from Calabozo that he had already released those prisoners he considered to be reformed, but that those who weren’t would remain in prison. He furthermore dismissed their petition as “incierta”.50

The application of the royal pardon of 24 January 1817 was in fact rather complicated. It was issued by Ferdinand in honour of his and his brother’s marriages to the Portuguese princesses María Isabel and María Francesca. The double wedding took place in September 1816, but the actual pardon was not promulgated until January 1817, after a delay of over four months. Moreover, the cédula announcing the pardon was itself delayed in arriving in New Granada. This caused confusion, as everyone was expecting the arrival of a pardon after the royal wedding, and all were at a loss to explain the delay. Viceroy Montalvo eventually verified from the 11 March 1817 issue of the Gaceta de Madrid that the pardon had indeed been issued, but by the summer of 1817 he

50 Report by the Council of the Indies, 20 June 1818, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 549; and Pablo Morillo to the Council of the Indies, Calabozo, 10 July 1819, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 549.
still had not received an official copy. As the *Gaceta de Madrid* had printed the text of the pardon in full, he decided to publish that version. The text as printed in the *Gaceta*, and indeed the actual pardon itself, left unclear several important questions, most notably whether the pardon mandated the all-important *restitución de empleos*. Montalvo decided not to permit banned individuals to return to their posts, but specified that this interpretation of the pardon was provisional, and would remain in force only until further instructions and an official copy of the pardon arrived from Madrid. A number of other technical modifications were also made. The viceroy had begun applying his version of the pardon to the prisoners in Cartagena when an official copy arrived. Montalvo then published the original without any restrictions, although this left unsettled the question of whether pardoned individuals would be returned to their posts. Meanwhile, both the Audiencia and Morillo’s supporters had begun complaining about Montalvo’s modifications, not, it appears, because they objected to the actual details of Montalvo’s changes, but because they disapproved in principle of his altering a royal pardon. The whole matter had to be referred to the Council of the Indies, which eventually backed Montalvo.51

The return of a liberal government in Spain in 1820 resulted in the promulgation of yet more pardons. Both Ferdinand and the newly-installed Cortes issued various *indultos* to political prisoners and insurgents. Copies of the king’s March 1820 pardon

51 For copies of Montalvo’s pardon, see Pardon, Cartagena, 18 June 1817, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 717 and AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 708. See also Report by the Council of the Indies, 18 April 1818, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 549.
reached Cartagena in early September 1820, but it is unlikely that
they were put into effect.\footnote{See Royal Order of 9 March 1820, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 888; and Gabriel de Torres to Ministry of Overseas, Cartagena, 7 September 1820, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 580.}

\section*{4 The Viceroy and the Generals}

Disagreements about the causes of the war, and different
opinions on how to end it, caused great friction both in Spain and
in the Americas. This friction tended to widen an already-existing
split within colonial society, as civilian and military officials in
New Granada generally took very different views on the nature of
the insurgency. Juan Friede has observed correctly that conflict
between civil and military authorities was a standard feature of
colonial life, and we will see that disagreements about the war
exacerbated such conflicts.\footnote{Friede, \textit{La otra verdad}, p 39.} While the civil authorities resisted
the army’s efforts to dominate them, the consequence of this
resistance was a bitter internecine struggle which damaged
Spanish effectiveness and interfered with the reconquest. The
most serious, open, and immediate rift developed between
General Pablo Morillo and Viceroy Francisco Montalvo, and it is to
this conflict that we will turn first.

Morillo’s Instructions from Ferdinand express the hope that
the newly-appointed general would work in harmony with the
newly-elevated viceroy. Conflicts between the two nonetheless
surfaced soon after their first meeting in Santa Marta in 1815.
General Morillo claimed that Viceroy Montalvo had refused to
make the necessary preparations for the army prior to its arrival,
while Montalvo, for his part, asserted that Morillo’s arrival had
caught everyone by surprise, and complained that Morillo had not given him any advanced warning of the army’s impending arrival and of its vast food requirements.\textsuperscript{54} The initial conflict between the two revolved around the question of authority. Each man believed himself to be the supreme commander in New Granada, and regarded the other as a troublesome interloper. Morillo based his claims on the secret Instructions issued to him by the king. These, he claimed, granted him complete authority over all aspects of the reconquest.\textsuperscript{55} Montalvo, on the other hand, complained regularly that Morillo acted without his approval and interfered with the viceroy’s own actions. He further expressed doubt about the very existence of the Instructions, commenting on...

\textsuperscript{54}Pablo Morillo to Ministry of War, Santa Fe, 17 September 1816, Rodríguez Villa, \textit{Pablo Morillo}, vol 3, pp. 218-223. Such disagreements were at first covered up. In October of 1815 Morillo wrote to Viceroy Abascal of Peru that he got on excellently with Montalvo. See Pablo Morillo to Francisco de Abascal, Torrecilla, 21 October 1815, AGI, Diversos, legajo 4.

\textsuperscript{55}See Pablo Morillo to Ministry of War, Santa Fe, 17 September 1816 and Calahazo, 22 December 1817, Rodríguez Villa, \textit{Pablo Morillo}, vol 3, pp. 218-223, 469-474; and Pablo Morillo to Juan Sámano, Santa Fe, 6 September 1816, BRAH, Sig. 9/7665 (legajo 22), fol. 76. The instructions are printed in Rodríguez Villa, \textit{Pablo Morillo}, vol. 2, pp. 437-448. A copy may also be found in AGI, Estado, legajo 64, Doc. 18. The Instructions will be considered further in Chapter 8.

\textsuperscript{56}Francisco Montalvo to Ministry of Grace and Justice, Cartagena, 24 September 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631. See also Francisco Montalvo to Pablo Morillo, Cartagena, 19 August 1816, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8739, Doc. 139; and Report by the Council of the Indies, 14 February 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 549.
Morillo was in fact no longer in possession of a physical copy of his Instructions, as it had been lost in the fire on his flagship, the San Pedro Alcántara, earlier in 1815. His inability to produce any document verifying his claims about the extent of his authority did not enhance his position in Montalvo's eyes.

Matters came to a head over the Tribunal de Cuentas, the body responsible for auditing the viceroyalty's accounts. The institution played an essential role in managing the government's finances, and thus the location of the Tribunal was an important matter. During the years from 1810 to 1813, when royalist government was confined to Panama, the tribunal apparently ceased to function altogether. The royalist enclaves of New Granada remained without a Tribunal de Cuentas until 1816. Upon his arrival in Santa Fe in May of that year, General Morillo decided that the Tribunal de Cuentas ought properly to reside in the capital. This decision was to cause immense problems, as a provisional Tribunal had already been set up in Cartagena by Montalvo. Montalvo refused to allow this provisional Tribunal to move to the capital, and Morillo therefore set up a second, rival Tribunal in Santa Fe. He furthermore appointed a second Asesor, Faustino Martínez, a man regarded by Montalvo as incompetent. Montalvo refused to allow the original Tribunal to move to Santa Fe because he disliked Morillo and did not want to surrender control of this important institution to him. He feared that once in the capital, the Tribunal would fall under the control of the

\[57\text{Stoan, } Pablo Morillo and Venezuela, p. 74.}\]
\[58\text{Council of the Indies to Juan Antonio de la Mata, Cádiz, 26 December 1811.}\]
\[59\text{Pablo Morillo to Francisco Montalvo, Santa Fe, 13 July 1816; Pablo Morillo to Francisco Montalvo, Santa Fe, 9 August 1816; Francisco Montalvo to Pablo Morillo, Cartagena, 9 August 1816; Francisco Montalvo to Pablo Morillo, Cartagena, 20 August 1816; Francisco Montalvo to Pablo Morillo, Cartagena, 30 August 1816; all in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631.}\]
Expeditionary Army, which would then take for its own uses
money which should have gone to the civil government. Montalvo
moreover objected that Morillo was overstepping the limits of his
mandate, which Montalvo stressed was to reconquer the rebel
provinces, not to reorganise the viceroyalty’s infrastructure.
However, the effect of Montalvo’s intransigence was to multiply
administrative disorder, which had already reached dangerous
levels. The conflict was referred to Spain, and was not settled
until 1817, when it was decided to abolish Morillo’s new tribunal
and to transfer the old one from Cartagena to Santa Fe.60
Montalvo similarly refused to allow the Audiencia to move to
Santa Fe until Morillo had left the capital.61

The conflict over the Tribunal de Cuentas was but one battle
in a struggle that lasted until Montalvo was replaced by Juan
Sámano, Morillo’s protégé and friend. The continual battles over
authority convinced Viceroy Montalvo of the advantages of having
a single figure in charge of both political and military matters, and
he frequently tried to convince the government in Madrid of
this.62 A divided command, he stressed, caused confusion and
interfered with the smooth running of either branch. Naturally he
hoped that, should his suggestions be taken up, he and not Morillo
would be granted supreme control. The viceroy’s complaints
eventually yielded fruit: in 1818, the crown sent a series of
condemnations to Morillo and to his second-in-command Pascual
Enrile, deploring their refusal to carry out Montalvo’s orders. The

60 Report by Council of the Indies, 14 February 1817, AGI, Audiencia de
Santa Fe, legajo 549.
61 Francisco Montalvo to Ministry of Hacienda, Cartagena, 11 August 1817,
AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 549.
62 See, for example, Francisco Montalvo to the Ministry of Grace and Justice,
Cartagena, 20 August 1816, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 747.
crown furthermore revoked Morillo's *mando absoluto*. (The *mando absoluto*, which Morillo had been granted on his departure from Cádiz, and which had already been revoked twice before, granted Morillo vague but substantial powers to appropriate funds from the civilian government.63)

Morillo too complained bitterly of the limitations placed on him by the civilian government, and longed to be able to act unhindered. He felt that the various laws dictated to protect civilians from arbitrary arrest handicapped his army unfairly, as the republicans were not bound to observe any such restrictions. He further regarded Montalvo as a whining and paranoid incompetent.64

The question of whose authority was supreme held such urgency precisely because Montalvo and Morillo differed greatly in their understanding of the insurrection. The two took entirely different views on the pacification, and this difference in approach was one of the major obstacles to greater co-operation between Morillo and Montalvo. Montalvo was deeply opposed to Morillo's handling of the war. The viceroy favoured a generally pacific approach, typified by his issuing of a pardon on 9 April 1816. Montalvo deluged the court in Madrid with denunciations of Morillo's misdeeds. He denounced Morillo's harsh treatment of those suspected of treason, his confrontational manner, his failure to control his subordinates, and his rapacious requisitioning of

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63 The Crown to Pascual Enrile, Madrid, 13 January 1818; and The Crown to Pablo Morillo, Madrid, 13 January 1818; both in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 549. Also see Sloan, *Pablo Morillo and Venezuela*, pp. 134-135.

goods and money from the populace. The consequences of this behaviour were serious, Montalvo charged:

De aquí han resultado infinitos males; males que sólo el tiempo y mucha prudencia en los que gobiernen estos países pueden ir sanando con lentitud. La real hacienda ha quedado destruida; las fuentes de donde sacaba su ser y sus incrementos, o están exhaustas, o tan arruinadas que apenas rinden la décima parte de su producto; los que se mantuvieron afectos al Rey entre los insurgentes, y por lo mismo expuestos a sus persecuciones, se hallan resentidos, agraviados y quejosos por el desprecio con que los ha mirado; los que creían encontrar el perdón de sus yerros, burlados en sus esperanzas, ofendidos y deseosos de venganza, o prófugos y desconfiados de indultos y ofrecimientos, y todo el Reyno destruzado... Buen exemplo es Venezuela asolada por partidos llenos de furor, y que siendo la primera que se pacificó todavía arde y se abrá en el fuego de la guerra civil.65

General Morillo, on the other hand, came to favour a complete eradication of all traces of insurgency. To Morillo, Montalvo’s conciliatory approach was practically treasonous. Indeed, in December 1817, he informed the Ministry of War that Montalvo was sheltering known insurgents, thus tacitly accusing the viceroy of corruption, if not treason.66 Montalvo’s attempts to curb the army’s worst abuses in the south were similarly viewed

65Francisco Montalvo to Ministry of Grace and Justice, Cartagena, 24 September 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631.
66Pablo Morillo to Ministry of War, Calabozo, 22 December 1817; and Caracas, 9 October 1818, Rodríguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol 3, pp. 469-474, 614-619.
as part of a plot to undermine the army.\footnote{Juan Sámano to Pablo Morillo, Santa Fe, 22 March 1818, BRAH, Sig. 9/7665 (leg. 22), fol. 565.} (It was not however until Morillo’s protégé Juan Sámano became viceroy that these accusations of treason were made openly.\footnote{See, for example, Juan Sámano to Pablo Morillo, Santa Fe, 7 September 1817, BRAH, Sig. 9/7665 (leg. 22), fol. 466.}) Morillo moreover disliked Montalvo intensely on a personal level. He regarded Montalvo as inept and inexperienced with both nature of the country he headed and with warfare in general; Montalvo’s sword, Morillo commented sarcastically in 1818, was “todavía virgen en la larga carrera de sus servicios, no tendrá otro mérito que el de haber pertenecido a un dueño que ha vivido muchos años”.\footnote{Restrepo Saenz, \textit{Biografías de los mandatarios y ministros}, p. 258. See also Pablo Morillo to Ministry of War, Santa Fe, 31 May 1816, and Calabozo, 22 December 1817, Rodríguez Villa, \textit{Pablo Morillo}, vol. 3, pp. 164-169, 469-474; and Report by Pascual Enríquez, Madrid, 18 May 1819, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8739, Doc. 139.}

Indeed, at an early stage he had begun a surreptitious campaign to remove Montalvo from office. In late August 1816, he wrote to the Ministry of War, informing them that Montalvo wanted to resign, and recommending Juan Sámano as his replacement. As Montalvo himself had given no indication of wanting to resign in any of his own correspondence, one can be confident that Morillo invented this story simply in order to eliminate a rival.\footnote{Pablo Morillo to Ministry of War, Santa Fe, 31 August 1816, Rodríguez Villa, \textit{Pablo Morillo}, vol 3, pp. 190-191.}

The bad feeling between Morillo and Montalvo was widely known, and various mysterious plots were attributed to Morillo’s dislike of Montalvo.\footnote{See, for example, Anselmo de Biema y Maza to Ministry of Grace and Justice, Cartagena, 17 October 1816, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 551; Report by Pascual Enríquez, Madrid, 18 May 1819, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8739, Doc. 139; Report by Council of the Indies, 18 April 1818, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 549; and Juan Sámano to Pablo Morillo, Santa Fe, 7 April 1817, BRAH, Sig. 9/7665 (leg. 22), fol. 246.} In 1818, for example, the governor of
Cartagena, Gabriel de Torres, complained to the Council of the Indies that a certain Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Javier Cerberiz had arrived in Cartagena on a secret mission from Morillo. Cerberiz refused to reveal to the governor the details of his mission, but, Torres commented, “el comisionado tiene en su casa a puertas cerradas continuas conferencias con personas desafectos de Montalvo”. The governor feared that the supporters of Morillo were engaged in some plot which would destabilise the province. (As it turned out, Cerberiz was indeed investigating Morillo’s and Sámano’s charges that Montalvo and his secretary José María Ramírez had sold offices to known insurgents.)

If Viceroy Montalvo was a moderate conciliator, the president of Quito, Toribio Montes, represented the extreme wing of the party of conciliation. Montes governed Quito from 1812 until 1817, and had thus been responsible for restoring royal order after the defeat of Quito’s second independent junta. Montes adopted an exceedingly conciliatory approach, and very few republicans were prosecuted during his tenure in office. Montes, however, attracted considerable opposition. Many believed that, far from having wooed former insurgents back into the loyalist camp, Montes had capitulated to the republicans. Complaints were made regularly that he sheltered unreformed insurgents and indeed appointed them to important posts. Montes apparently felt this was the best way to reconcile former republicans to Spain. He stressed in virtually every letter written

72Gabriel de Torres [the document is erroneously attributed to Ignacio Torres] to Council of the Indies, Cartagena, 23 July 1818, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 551. Also see Juan Sámano to Pablo Morillo, Santa Fe, 29 August 1818, BRAH, Sig. 9/7665 (leg. 22), fols. 607-609; Report on Cerberiz, 12 August 1814, AGI, Audiencia de Caracas, legajo 386; Juan Sámano to Ministry of War, Santa Fe, 19 September 1818, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 720A; and Restrepo, Historia de la revolución, vol. 2, p. 173.
to Spain that the Audiencia de Quito was the only part of New
Granada untroubled by revolution, and that this was due entirely
to his good government and political wisdom. Montes objected
strongly to Morillo’s approach to the reconquest, and complained
to Spain about its bad effect. He stated openly that Sámano’s
despotic rule in Popayán in 1812-1813 had driven the city back
into the republican camp, and was similarly dismissive about
Peruvian Viceroy José de Abascal’s approach to the reconquest.
Montes was not without allies. He got on well with Viceroy
Montalvo, and the cabildo of Quito indeed petitioned for Montes to
be granted the title of Marqués de la Conciliación for his efforts to
end the war. Nonetheless, many people objected strongly to his
approach to the reconquest. To begin with, Montes had been
appointed by the Regency, and had been responsible for the
implementation of the Constitution of 1812. Many absolutists did

73Report by Toribio Montes, Quito, 7 April 1813, AGI, Audiencia de Quito,
legajo 257; Proclama de Montes, Quito, 1 July 1817, BRAH, Sig. 9/7665 (leg.
22), fol. 470; Toribio Montes to Ministry of State, Quito, 26 July 1817, AGI,
Audiencia de Quito, legajo 259; and Juan Ramírez to Ministry of Hacienda,
Quito, 21 November 1818, AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 260.
74José de Abascal to Toribio Montes, Lima, 7 December 1813, AGI, Audiencia
de Quito, legajo 258; Toribio Montes to Ministers of State and War, Quito, 7
July 1814, AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 260; Toribio Montes to Ministry of
Overseas, Quito, 7 October 1814, AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 260; Toribio
Montes to Ministry of State, Quito, 22 May 1815, AGI, Audiencia de Quito,
legajo 258; Toribio Montes to Francisco Montalvo, Quito, 21 June 1817, AGI,
Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631; and Report by Ministry of War, 29
January 1818, AGI, Estado, legajo 57, Doc. 35C.
75Joaquín Miguel de Araujo to Juan Sámano, Quito, 21 November 1816,
BRAH, Sig. 9/7665 (leg. 22), fol. 146; and Suplica particular del
Ayuntamiento de Quito, n.d., AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 275.
For Montalvo’s relations with Montes, see Francisco Montalvo to
Ministry of Grace and Justice, Cartagena, 24 September 1817, AGI, Audiencia
de Santa Fe, legajo 631. See, however, Montes’ complaints about Montalvo
in Toribio Montes to Ministry of Overseas, Quito, 7 October 1814, AGI,
Audiencia de Quito, legajo 260; and Montalvo’s criticisms of Montes in
Francisco Montalvo to José de Abascal, Torrecilla, 21 October 1815, AGI,
Diversos, legajo 4. It seems that Montes and Montalvo agreed in their
approach to the reconquest, but not on more specific matters.
not forgive the president for his liberal past. Secondly, he was frequently accused of openly protecting insurgents. One such case involved Mariano Guillermo Valdivieso, the vice-president of Quito's short-lived independent junta. Valdivieso had loaned $80,000 to the insurgent army to fund an attack on Cuenca in 1812, and was repaid by Pedro Montúfar with gold taken from the Casa de Moneda in Popayán. Montes' asesor, León Pereda de Sarabia, tried to initiate proceedings in 1815 against Valdivieso, whom he wanted to return the money, but Pereda complained that Montes obstructed his attempts. It was even difficult for the asesor to get a private appointment with Montes. Montes, he claimed was trying to prevent Spain's government from discovering his cosy relationship with Quito's insurgents. He alleged that the president was surrounded by insurgents all day long: "son los que dominan al gobierno y disfrutan de toda su protección". A former government employee even stated that

76 Montes, of course, later denied having felt any enthusiasm for the Constitution. See Toribio Montes to Despacho Universal de Indias, Quito, 7 November 1815, AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 275. Interestingly, the Quito insurgents of 1812 accused Montes of being an afrancesado. See Carlos Montúfar to Toribio Montes, Quito, 6 November 1812, AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 257.

77 León Pereda de Sarabia to Despacho Universal de Indias, Quito, 20 February 1815, AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 275; Various documents relating to the case of Mariano Guillermo Valdivieso, AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 258; and Juan Ramírez to Ministries of State and Hacienda, Quito, 19 August 1818, AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 260.

Valdivieso, along with other alleged insurgents accused in the same case, themselves accused Pereda of misconduct. This accusation was, in turn, dismissed by Montes' successor, Juan Ramírez de Orosco, who claimed the accusation was made simply in order to deflect attention away from their own cases. See Juan Ramírez to Ministries of State and Hacienda, Quito, 22 October 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 275.

78 León Pereda de Sarabia to Pedro Macanas, Quito, 7 December 1814 and León Pereda de Sarabia to Cristóbal de Góngora, Quito, 20 December 1814, AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 275. Also see Juan Ramírez to Ministry of Hacienda, Quito, 21 December 1818, AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 260; Andrés, Bishop of Cuenca to Toribio Acebal, Cuenca, 14 January 1813, AGI, Diversos, legajo 3.
Montes "declaró a favor de los insurgentes".\textsuperscript{79} This is surely untrue, but illustrates well Montes’ reputation. Moreover, Montes and the Quito Audiencia (resident in Cuenca) had been in conflict since early 1815. The Audiencia, which was reduced to two members, accused Montes of displaying an “irregular conducto y arbitrario modo de proceder”, and of sheltering insurgents and other evil-doers.\textsuperscript{80} Montes’ unpopularity with certain royalists was such that periodic attempts were made to engineer his removal from office. The most dramatic and complicated incident occurred in 1815.

On 7 November 1815, Montes wrote to the Secretary of the Despacho Universal de Indias, to inform him that an attempted military coup had occurred in Quito on 27 June 1815.\textsuperscript{81} He described how at 2pm, as he was sitting down to lunch, his secretary announced that “una conmoción popular” was about to begin. Montes ignored this warning, as such rumours of impending revolt circulated constantly in Quito. He did, however, hear a noise in the plaza, and so looked out from the balcony, from which he could see no sign of disorder. At that moment he observed that someone had sounded the alarm, and that troops

\textsuperscript{79}Complaint by Manuel María de Guevara y Paz, Cuenca, 8 June 1814, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631. Of the many complaints about Montes, see Silvestre Collar to Marqués de Casa Calderón, Madrid, 25 February 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 251; and Fernando Dávalos to the king, Riobamba, 3 January 1814 and 20 April 1814, AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 276.

\textsuperscript{80}Silvestre Collar to Marqués de Casa Calderón, Madrid, 25 February 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 251. The members of the Audiencia were friends of Montes’ distrusted asesor, León Pereda de Sarabia. Pereda and most of the Audiencia were from Buenos Aires. The Regent of the Audiencia was furthermore a particular friend of Pereda de Sarabia, and was married to a Porteña. See also Historia de la Rebelión de América en 35 Cartas, by Pedro Pérez Muñoz, Quito, 6 May 1815, AGI, Diversos, legajo 42.

\textsuperscript{81}Toribio Montes to the Despacho Universal de Indias, Quito, 7 November 1815 and 7 December 1815, AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 275. Also see Historia de la Rebelión de América en 35 Cartas, by Pedro Pérez Muñoz, Quito, 6 May 1815, AGI, Diversos, legajo 42.
were streaming onto the street from the garrison. The city was entirely calm, however, and Montes could discern no signs of unrest. Montes described how members of the military (including future viceroy Juan Sámano) rushed through the streets of Quito, arresting the townspeople, all despite the absence of any unrest. Various members of the nobility were detained, including several who had served on the revolutionary junta of 1809, some in the presence of Montes himself. In particular, the Marqués de San José (Manuel Larrea), Colonel Joaquín Sánchez Orellano, and Alcalde Ordinario Manuel Mateu (brother of the Conde de Puñorrostro, one of Ferdinand’s ministers) were arrested.82

Montes was then pressured by the army into initiating proceedings against those arrested, despite the fact that he was certain they were innocent of any wrongdoing.83 He appointed his asesor, León Pereda de Sarabia, to investigate their cases. Pereda subsequently drew up a report that affirmed that a republican uprising had indeed been underway, and that swift action by the royalist garrison had prevented a general republican revolt. Antonio Nariño, imprisoned in Pasto, was pinpointed as the revolt’s leader.84 Montes, however, did not trust Pereda. (He had indeed already appointed his own, unofficial asesor, until complaints from Pereda forced Montes to dismiss the unofficial

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82 Both the Marqués de San José and Joaquín Sánchez Orellano (a relative of the Marqués de Villa Orellano, Jacinto Sánchez de Orellano) had been involved in the 1809 revolutionary junta. The Conde de Puñorrostro petitioned vigorously for the release of his brother; see Petition by Conde de Puñorrostro, Madrid, 6 September 1816, AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 275.
83 Toribio Montes to the Despacho Universal de Indias, Quito, 7 November 1815, AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 275.
84 See the various volumes of testimony, Quito, June-July 1815, AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 275.
one. Montes therefore commissioned his own private report on events. Montes found that Pereda’s investigation had been deeply flawed. Witnesses had been threatened into testifying that a republican uprising had taken place, and many testimonies had been altered by Pereda when the report was drawn up. Those questioned for Montes’ report all agreed that no unrest had occurred, and that the royalist army had rampaged through the town for no apparent reason. Montes concluded that the entire incident had been planned by the city’s military leaders. Its purpose, he felt, was to remove him from office and to detain certain members of Quito’s nobility.

Montes sent several letters to Spain describing these events, and naming the officers he regarded as responsible, but of the various individuals named by him as ringleaders, only one was subjected to a legal investigation. This was Colonel Juan Manuel Fromista, who was accused of being the motor of the revolt. On 18 February 1817 a Real Cédula was issued ordering that he be tried. By this time, however, Montes had been replaced as President of Quito by Juan Ramírez, who belonged to the anti-Montes faction.

85 Various people complained about Pereda. The Canonigo Magistral de Quito, Francisco Rodríguez Soto, and Mariano Guillermo Valdivieso, the former insurgent vice-president, together wrote to Spain to praise Montes, and to accuse his successor, Juan Ramírez, of corruption. They moreover accused Pereda of being “lleno de crímenes los más horrendos, ... productos de la moral y corazón más corrompidos.” (See Ministry of Overseas to Ministry of Grace and Justice, Palace, 16 January 1821, AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 275.) The Bishop of Quito, José Ysidoro Camacho, likewise condemned Pereda as “turbulento, incivil y sanguinario”, and further accused him of being behind the 1815 revolt. (See Report by José Ysidro Camacho, Bishop of Quito, Quito, 20 May 1818, AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 275.) Similar accusations were levelled against Pereda by Montes himself. On the other hand, the Ayuntamiento de Quito, the new president Juan Ramírez, and Juan Sámano himself all praised him, and recommended he be appointed to a more influential post.

86 See Montes’ investigation into the supposed riot, Quito, January-February 1816, AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 275, and Representations by relatives of those detained on 27 June 1815, Quito, June-July 1815, AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 275.
It was Ramírez who carried out the investigation into Fromista's behaviour, and he came to the conclusion that there had in fact been a genuine conspiracy afoot in 1815, and that only the prompt action by the military had averted it. Fromista was thus acquitted of any wrongdoing and no further action was taken against him.87

It seems highly unlikely that a genuine anti-Spanish conspiracy had been planned in Quito. What is clear is that Quito's royalist officers did not trust Montes; on the contrary, they apparently plotted to remove him from office. Moreover, it is striking that whether or not a real republican uprising was underway, none of the officers involved in fighting the alleged conspiracy chose to take Montes into their confidence, and no one provided the president with any information about the nature of the supposed conspiracy. He was evidently distrusted by most of the military establishment. Montes' claims that through conciliation he had kept the province at peace were dismissed, and his approach was regarded by the army as little short of treasonous.

Other advocates of reconciliation were similarly tarred. Vicente Sánchez Lima, appointed governor of Antioquia in June 1816, soon attracted the displeasure of Morillo by failing to carry out orders to arrest a large number of Antioqueños, and by favouring a soft line.88 He attracted further hostility by issuing a pardon. This led hard-liners like Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Tolrá, the military commander of Popayán, to complain that Sánchez

87 Folder on Don Juan Fromista, 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 275.  
88 José Manuel Restrepo, Autobiografía, Biblioteca de la Presidencia de Colombia, vol. 30, (Bogotá, 1957), p. 19; and Vicente Sánchez Lima to Francisco Montalvo, Medellín, 4 August 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631.
Lima had pardoned “todo el mundo”.\textsuperscript{89} Morillo ordered Sánchez Lima to resign in October 1816, but he refused to step down until Viceroy Montalvo had been consulted. Montalvo initially supported Sánchez Lima, but, under continual pressure from Morillo, he too eventually backed the dismissal. Sánchez Lima in fact remained in office for some months, but then fled to Jamaica to escape arrest for disobeying orders. Following this escape, Sámano accused Montalvo of having provided the governor with the necessary passport and papers.\textsuperscript{90}

The most serious conflicts between military and civilian officials occurred in the south, and there too, the approach to the war was usually the principal source of contention. In the province of Popayán in particular, the governor and local officials complained continuously that the army was running riot. The army’s arbitrary extractions of money, matériel and food incensed these officials because they believed such behaviour made the reconquest more difficult. José Solís, the governor of Popayán, stated bluntly, “si acaso hay algún pueblo . . . en que se disfrute reposa, sin chispa de la anterior revolución, es aquel en que no existen tropas [expedicionarias]”.\textsuperscript{91} Governor Solís complained repeatedly to the viceroy about the counter-productive effect of the army in his province, but, although Montalvo agreed wholeheartedly with the governor’s analysis, he was powerless to intervene. Officers refused to recognise any authority other than Sámano and Morillo, who both supported the actions of the

\textsuperscript{89}Restrepo Saenz, \textit{Gobernadores de Antioquia}, p. 358.
\textsuperscript{90}Restrepo Saenz, \textit{Gobernadores de Antioquia}, p. 314-322; and Juan Sámano to Pablo Morillo, Santa Fe, 7 April 1818, BRAH, Sig. 9/7665 (leg. 22), fols. 567-569.
\textsuperscript{91}Report to Ministry of War, 29 January 1818, AGI, Estado 57, Doc 35C; and José Solís to Francisco Montalvo, Popayán, 20 June 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631.
army.92 While Governor Solís condemned the army's harsh reign, many officers doubted that insurgents sympathisers might be won back by gentler treatment. Those who advocated pardons were either dupes or traitors; Ruperto Delgado, the Commander of the First Battalion of Numancia and one of the most important officers in the south, alleged that Governor Solís was "poseído de egoísmo o infidencia" because he had tried to stop the army from requisitioning goods and men to work on the construction of the road to Anchicayá.93

The Audiencia also came into conflict with the hard-liners, in particular Juan Sámano, over the handling of the war. As with the problems that developed between Viceroy Montalvo and General Morillo, the conflict between the Audiencia and Sámano involved the dual questions of approach to the reconquest and administrative authority. A particular bone of contention was the special authority to try cases of treason that Morillo had in 1817 granted Sámano, then serving as governor of Santa Fe.94 As we saw, the Audiencia considered this as a threat to its own power; normally it, and not the governor, had jurisdiction over such cases. Moreover, the Audiencia, while not itself in favour of indiscriminate pardons, disliked Sámano's vengeful approach to treason trials. This new authority, they feared, would further alienate the populace from Spanish rule. In a report on Sámano to the Council of the Indies the Audiencia complained, "un conato por

92 See Vicente Romero to José Solís, Anserma, 22 May 1817; Ruperto Delgado to José Solís, Popayán, 13 July 1817; and Francisco Montalvo to José Solís, Cartagena, 18 August 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631.
93 Ruperto Delgado to Juan Sámano, Popayán, 20 July 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631. Also see José María Barreiro to Juan Sámano, Molinos, 10 July 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 747.
el terrorismo le devora y, negado de las artes de ganar el corazón humano, solamente emplea el rigor y la aspereza, que causan la desesperación, en lugar de la afición y confianza en el gobierno”.95 Sámano, for his part, regarded the Audiencia as a refuge for traitors. Its members, he alleged, were well-known insurgents, and “a todos pone en libertad”.96

Sámano and the Audiencia then became embroiled in a bitter legal wrangle that overshadowed far more serious threats to Spanish control. While the Audiencia and the governor fought over jurisdiction and their respective approaches to the war, a wide-reaching and daring plan to expel the Spanish from Santa Fe was maturing. Led by a Santafereña named Policarpa Salavarrieta, the plan was to incite a revolt in the royalist barracks in the capital. Co-conspirators in the Llanos would then join the revolted troops in an assault on the very heart of Spanish government. Days before its execution the plot was discovered, and its leaders arrested.97 The discovery of this serious outbreak of insurgency simply fuelled the Audiencia’s conflict with Sámano. The tribunal instantly claimed jurisdiction over the case, and its long report (138 folios) on the plot contains only a handful of references to the planned uprising. The virtual entirety of the report concerns Sámano’s noxious influence on administration of justice in the capital, and the Audiencia’s efforts to retain its traditional prerogatives.98 The case was eventually referred to

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95 Díaz Díaz, *La reconquista española*, vol. 1, p. 344; and Report by the Fiscal del Perú, Madrid, 7 April 1818, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 665.
96 See Juan Sámano to Pablo Morillo, Santa Fe, 22 May 1817, BRAH, Sig. 9/7665 (leg. 22), fols. 292-294.
97 For details see Díaz Díaz, *La reconquista española*, vol. 1, pp. 233-263, 341-381.
98 Audiencia’s report on the uprising in the barracks of Santa Fe, August 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 748.
the Council of the Indies, and led to the establishment of guidelines for trying cases of treason discussed above.

While this conflict with Sámano was the most dramatic example of the Audiencia’s problems with the army, the issue was much more wide-reaching. The Audiencia had, for example, supported Viceroy Montalvo’s efforts to keep the tribunal in Cartagena, and to prevent its transfer to Santa Fe. The reason for this was that the Audiencia feared the army. In the capital, the Audiencia claimed, “no teniendo a su disposición la fuerza, se vería desairado por la oficialidad del Ejército Expedicionario que no conoce otra autoridad que la del General Morillo, y el jefe [Sámano] que dejó en Santa Fe”.

The continual conflicts erupting between the army and the civilian authorities, the ongoing distrust of advocates of a different approach to the war, the constant sabotaging of the work of conciliators, and the unrelenting legal attacks on the army’s attempt to rule by decree all took their toll on the effectiveness of Spain’s effort to retain its hold on New Granada. The royalists did not constitute a unified force, nor could they agree on a unified plan for reconquering New Granada. In this they merely reflected the confusion present in Spain itself, for there too no single policy won the unqualified support of any government, and no agreement was ever reached on the causes of the war. It is to this division in Spain itself that we now turn.

99 See the various documents on the Audiencia’s conflict with Sámano in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 748.
Spain never developed a coherent strategy for defeating the insurgents in the Americas, principally because it lacked a coherent understanding of the causes of the rebellion. Unable to decide why its subjects were in revolt, the crown was incapable of designing a realistic response. In this chapter we will examine the different measures taken by Spain to end the insurgency, and will contrast these with the advice and interpretations given by royalists in New Granada. The divergent views on the origin of the war limited Spain’s effectiveness in responding to it. We have already seen that Montalvo and Morillo differed in their attitude towards the insurgency. We will here see that this split was general. Different wings of colonial government disagreed profoundly about the causes of the war, and this disagreement crippled its response to revolution.

§1. Spain’s Response to the War

The first steps taken by the rump of the Spanish government to stop the war in the Indies came in July 1810. In that month the Council of the Indies first debated the causes of the newly-developing insurgencies, and proposed various half-baked plans for ending them. No decisive action was taken, however, and by the end of the year the Cortes in Cádiz had come to the conclusion that it was too ill-informed about the state of affairs in the Americas to be able to make reasonable decisions about how to end the war. It accordingly established a special junta to study the matter. The junta first met on 26 January
1811, when it discussed several proposals concerning Mexico. In the same month the Council of the Indies began work on an investigation into conditions in the Americas. It was not, however, until April 1812 that the Regency began to meet regularly with representatives from the Americas to gather information. By this time the Cortes had already drafted its great achievement, the Constitution of 1812, intended to unite both hemispheres in peace. Although regular debates were held on the American problem, American delegates grew angry with the Cortes’ failure to listen to their views and the ignorance of their Spanish counterparts. Under these circumstances, it is perhaps not surprising that the Cortes proved unable to come up with an adequate response to the war. Proposals submitted by the American deputies were generally rejected, and the debates on the war contributed little to the delegates’ understanding of events there. Furthermore, the leisurely pace with which proposals were considered meant that the Cortes, like the colonial administration before it, were ineffective in responding to urgent crises.¹ (The restored Cortes of the 1820s was equally slow. In 1821, one deputy was moved to complain that “al paso que llevamos, para mí no sería extraño que los disidentes concluyasen su obra antes que el Ministerio haya podido, no tomar, pero ni aún proponer, medidas al Cuerpo legislativo”.²)


Little changed after the return of Ferdinand VII in May 1814. Ignorance, and an inability to decide on any consistent course of action, characterised Ferdinand’s tenure as much as it had that of the Cortes. Ferdinand did recognise the need for sound information about Spanish America, and made regular efforts to learn more about events there, but the results of these exercises were seldom happy. One of his first actions on resuming command was to appoint several special consultants to inform him about affairs in Spanish America. The Quiteño Conde de Puñonrostro, a personal friend of Ferdinand and a delegate to the 1812 Cortes, was appointed consultant on New Granada. The Count reported that New Granada was largely pacified, but did suggest that dishonest and corrupt officials be removed from office. Advice of this sort was worse than useless, for it denied the seriousness of the situation facing the Spanish in New Granada.3

Various committees were also established to formulate policy regarding the war: in 1815, Ferdinand formed multiple juntas to study the possibility of British mediation, and a unified Junta de Pacificaciones was created in October 1816. Further committees, established in 1816 and 1817, considered the issuing of pardons and other war-related issues. Special colonial offices were set up within each ministry, a Junta de Generales met from July 1814, and the royal councils of war, treasury, the admiralty, and the state also considered matters relating to the war. Lobbyists from the consulados met regularly with treasury officials to discuss the financial aspect of the war. Then, in November 1818, a combined committee composed of

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representatives from the ministries of war, the admiralty and the Council of the Indies also began meeting. Although Michael Costeloe argues that the many ad-hoc committees formed to discuss the American question show that the Spanish government cared a great deal about the war, these various separate committees contributed very little to the evolution of a unified plan of attack. The different juntas and councils proposed different solutions, all of which were applied partially, sometimes simultaneously, and never consistently. Not surprisingly, this scatter-gun approach produced few positive results for Spain.

Not least of the problems was the tremendous number of (often conflicting) reports produced by the many different councils. Ferdinand’s Minister of the Navy, José Vásquez Figueroa, complained in December 1816 that decisions were being lost in “una verdadera lucha de papeles”. Ferdinand himself proved another obstacle to effective policy-making. Encouraged by his unofficial cabinet of friends, the camarilla, Ferdinand embarked on policies without discussing them with his appointed ministers, occasionally with disastrous results. A particularly notable example of the danger of this approach occurred in 1817, when, at great expense, Ferdinand arranged the purchase of several Russian warships. The navy minister was not involved in the purchase, as it had been arranged entirely through Ferdinand’s

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5 See Heredia, *Planes españoles*, p. 284; Anna, *Spain and the Loss of America*, pp. 149-152; and Lino [de Pombo?] to Simón Bolívar, Philadelphia, 16 June 1816, AGI, Audiencia de Caracas, legajo 109. Bolívar’s correspondent comments that in Spain the government has been “hecho una babilonia con tanto ministro nuevo a cada paso”.

personal links to the Russian ambassador. At the time the navy minister was himself engaged in negotiating the purchase of French warships. This purchase would have been made unnecessary by the king’s acquisition of the Russian ships, had most of the Russian vessels not proved to be completely unseaworthy. The Spanish government was nonetheless required to pay the full sum agreed for the Russian ships, and indeed for the repatriation of their Russian crews. The incident illustrates well the danger of maintaining two parallel policies, one official and one informal.7

This failure of communication continued during the liberal trienio, when the king was hostile towards his own government, and disinclined to assist them. The Marqués de las Amarillas, a friend of the king and a minister during this period, described Ferdinand’s manner during ministerial consultations:

El rey estaba . . . ocupado en abrir libros o folletos que recibía de París o en liar y desliar un rollo de cinta para legajos que tenía sobre su mesa; siempre con un aire afable, pero entrando muy poco o nada en materia, y contestando sólo: “Bien, sí; como te parezca . . .”, de modo que, al acabar la tarea, era difícil saber la opinión que Su Magestad había formado (si es que había formado alguna) de cada negocio, o del modo de presentarlo cada ministro.8

The lack of direction so evident in Ferdinand’s policy towards Spanish America was characteristic. As Federico Súarez remarked, the fundamental feature of Ferdinand’s government

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was precisely its lack of clear policies. This vagueness was recognised by Ferdinand’s own mother, who in 1808 wrote with exasperation, “De Fernando no podemos esperar jamás sino miserias y persecuciones . . . no tiene carácter alguno”. Ferdinand’s indecision irritated other observers as well; British diplomats complained that Spain never committed itself decisively to any course of action.

The many bodies established under Ferdinand to study the matter failed to produce a unified recommendation for ending the war. Instead, several different and, on occasion, mutually exclusive policies were employed, often at the same time. There was, however, a certain consistency in Spanish policy towards America throughout the independence period. The consistency lay in the persistence of three, sometimes contradictory, approaches to ending the war, all of which were employed by every government in power from 1810 until the mid-1820s. These were the use of military force, conciliation, and negotiations, either mediated or direct.

Military force was tried most consistently. It is worth noting that it was not the absolutist Ferdinand, but rather the Cortes that sent the first troops. In 1811, a total of 1,068 troops were sent to four different destinations, and in 1812 some 5,800 soldiers set sail for the Americas. By 1813 Spain was able to organise rather larger forces. In that year 9,200 soldiers were

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9Luis Miguel Enciso Recio, La opinión pública española y la independencia hispanoamericana, 1819-1820, Universidad de Valladolid (Valladolid, 1967), p. 34.
10José Luis Comellas García Llera, Los primeros pronunciamientos en España, 1814-1820, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (Madrid, 1958), p. 78.
despatched to five different cities in Spanish America. In 1814, after the defeat of Napoleon, Spain was not only politically ready to throw itself frontally on the insurgents, but also had a large population of unemployed soldiers. Thus 1814 was spent organising Morillo’s Expeditionary Army, which left in February 1815, with over 10,000 men. Three smaller expeditions totalling about 4,000 men altogether also left Spain that same year. Spain was not able to match this show of military muscle in the succeeding years, and only some 4,300 soldiers were sent annually for the next two years. By 1818, the number had fallen to only some 2,000. Another great expedition was prepared for 1820, but the January revolt of Colonel Rafael Riego crippled this attempt at a military reconquest. In total, Spain sent some 41,000 peninsular soldiers to fight in the Americas. Of these approximately 11,000 fought in New Granada.\textsuperscript{12}

In the context of contemporary warfare these figures are small. Four decades earlier, the British had recruited 171,000 men to fight against their American insurgents; and even the French, hard pressed by other militar commitments, had been able to raise over 60,000 soldiers to fight Haiti’s revolted slaves.\textsuperscript{13}


In European terms, the 41,000 soldiers Spain scattered across Spanish America might have constituted a respectable force for a single encounter, but not for an entire imperial army; in comparison, Spain lost over 35,000 men at the Battle of Ocaña alone. The 10,500 men who arrived with Morillo, while constituting the largest force ever sent by Spain to its colonies, scarcely formed an impressive army in European terms.

The military solution to the war was supported by a broad coalition of interests in Spain and the Americas. First, many Spaniards, both in the government and in the public, believed that the war was the result of the malicious influence of a few hombres oscuros. These malefactors, doubtless creoles, had incited the fundamentally loyal populace to revolt, perhaps by circulating false or distorted rumours about the true state of affairs in Spain. This view implied that at the very least the revolt had no popular base, and suggested that a military force, possibly even a small military force, might easily defeat the rebels. “Send a few troops from the peninsula and total pacification is certain,” proclaimed one Spanish newspaper in 1811. This was the opinion of the commercial consulados and


15 See Costeloe, Response to Revolution, pp. 28-41 for comments on this theory. Also see the Royal Order of 1 June 1814, where Ferdinand states that most people in the Indies are loyal, AGI, Papeles de Cuba legajo 718; and the Instructions for the Peace Commissioners, 1820, AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 1569, for persistence of this view until 1820.

16 El Redactor General, 7, 19 September 1811, quoted in Costeloe, Response to Revolution, p. 53. This view, similar to the attitude taken by British ministers in the early years of the American Revolution, was shared by some officials in the Americas. See Joaquín Carrión y Moreno to Regency, Havana, 10 March 1811, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 747; and for
of their mouthpiece, the Comisión de Reemplazos. The Consulado de Cádiz was one of the most persistent supporters of armed intervention, and one of the most inflexible opponents of commercial reform, which would invariably reduce its control over the Atlantic trade. The Comisión thus encouraged the belief that it was only through force that Spain might retain its colonies. The insurgencies were supported only by "la hez de la plebe" and were led only by self-seeking traitors.\textsuperscript{17} Other observers, particularly those with some direct experience of the American war, maintained that, on the contrary, the rebellion had deep popular roots. Paradoxically, this view led some of its adherents to advocate the same military solution advanced by those who believed the revolts had little popular base. Men such as Pablo Morillo came to believe that military force was the only way to defeat the rebellion. It was, he believed, impossible to convince the Americans to remain Spanish, as the populace wanted only independence. A decisive military victory was, in his view, Spain's only hope.\textsuperscript{18}

Military force was not the only solution considered. Other, more conciliatory approaches were also advocated. To begin with, some who believed the revolutions were the result of republican rumour-mongering and deception (the so-called "seduction theory"), maintained that the insurgents might be defeated simply

\textsuperscript{17}See La Comisión de Reemplazos representa a la Regencia del Reino el estado de insurrección en que se hallan algunas provincias de ultramar, Cádiz, 1 March 1814, AGI, I.A. 5/20.

\textsuperscript{18}For a concise statement of this view, see Pablo Morillo to the Ministry of Overseas, Valencia, 26 July 1820, AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 1568. An extract of this letter is also printed in Anna, Spain and the Loss of America, p. 240.
by an information campaign about events in Spain. Consequently, when in 1810 the Council of the Indies made its first attempt at suffocating the revolt in Caracas, it determined to send nothing more than a special commissioner, charged with informing the public of the true state of affairs in Spain. (The government’s total lack of cash also influenced this choice of response). Similarly, in 1814, the government commissioned leading colonial officials to write pamphlets “en estilo sencillo” which were to explain and correct the mistaken beliefs that had caused the war. The consistent failure of this approach did not dampen the enthusiasm of its adherents, as Edmundo Heredia has observed:

Así a la confianza en que se producirá la autopacificación cuando se conozca la instalación de un gobierno legal (Consejo de Regencia), sucederá la esperanza de que la paz sobrevendrá cuando se sepa de la instalación de las Cortes, lo mismo que dos años más tarde la ilusión será puesta en los efectos de la Constitución sancionada en Cádiz.

Of course, some observers believed the war was neither the result of misinformation campaigns nor soluble only through military force. Many Spaniards, both in government and out, blamed Spain itself for the outbreak of war. Although some conservatives insisted that a decline in absolutism had cleared the way for

19 See Woodward, “The Spanish Army and the Loss of America”, for comments on the seduction theory. See also Anna, Spain and the Loss of America, p. 47; Jaime Delgado, La independencia de América en la prensa española, Seminario de Problemas Hispanoamericanos (Madrid, 1949), pp. 223-225; and, for an example, Report by the Council of the Indies, 3 October 1814, AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 1568.

20 Francisco Montalvo to Ministry of War, 22 November 1816, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631.

21 See Heredia, Planes españoles, p. 19. Heredia is referring here specifically to the revolution in Río de la Plata, but the observation applies equally well elsewhere.
sedition, many others, both liberals and conservatives, agreed that Spain’s inept administration of the colonies was to blame. Advocates of this view suggested that the war might be ended through a combination of reform and conciliation; the colonies were to be made to feel a part of Spain, and the grossest abuses were to be ended. It should be immediately clear that this approach would combine poorly with a military one; announcements that the Americas constituted an integral part of Spain, accompanied by the despatch of thousands of troops, would convince few that Spain did not regard America as its colony. Nonetheless, this was exactly what the Cortes attempted from 1809 to 1813. Both in 1809, with the opening of the Cortes, and in 1812, following the publication of the Constitution, equality was proclaimed between peninsulars and creoles, yet from 1811 to 1813, nearly 16,000 troops were sent to Spanish America.

This example illustrates the flaw in the conciliatory approach. No Spanish government was willing to commit itself solely to conciliation, which meant that the symbolic actions intended to assure Americans of Spain’s concern for their well-being fell rather flat. Thus in 1820, the Cortes, while refusing to recognise the de facto independence of Río de la Plata, nonetheless voted to establish a university in Córdoba. This university would never be built, but the vote authorising it was intended to illustrate the Cortes’ benevolent attitude towards the viceroyalty. Similarly, the very selective applications of the

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22 Costeloe, *Response to Revolution*, pp. 7-8, 42-44.
more than 20 pardons issued between 1810 and 1820 dampened faith in Spain’s administration of justice.

Proposals for genuine commercial reform were an entirely different matter, compared to the tender declarations in favour of hispanic unity mouthed by both the Cortes and Ferdinand. Plans of real substance were advocated even by such bodies as Ferdinand’s Junta de Pacificaciones, which was set up in late 1815 to discuss ways of ending the insurgency. In 1817, the Junta recommended that Spain offer the rebels a package of reforms, including free trade, affirming “it is necessary and urgent to change the system”. The Junta’s proposal, which was linked with Minister of State José García de León y Pizarro’s ill-fated reform package, illustrates the depth of support for altering Spain’s mercantilist system. In the end, however, no commercial reforms of any substance were ever enacted.

The most problematic of the suggestions for reform concerned Spain’s commercial monopoly. Many proposals outlining such reforms as the abolition of the state monopolies and the licensing of free trade in the Americas were presented in the Cortes, and many were considered by Ferdinand’s government. The most persistent advocate of reform was José García de León y Pizarro. In September 1817, Pizarro proposed a grand plan for ending the insurgency. This plan involved liberalising trade with the Americas and restarting the stalled British mediation. Although it was backed by many government bodies, Pizarro’s proposal was blocked by the ministers of war and justice, and in the end little came of it. Moreover, Pizarro was dismissed from

office in September 1818, leaving the government in the hands of the hawks. Pizarro’s plan, like all earlier proposals for commercial reform, foundered on the rock of consular opposition. The Consulado de Cádiz in particular was determined to block any change to trading legislation. As the major source of funding for the government’s war effort (via the Comisión de Reemplazos), the Consulado de Cádiz was in a good position to dictate terms. During the Cortes of 1810-14, when the delegates were actually confined to Cádiz itself, the influence naturally made itself felt most directly, but the Consulado continued to influence policy after 1814. The effect of both the consulados and ministerial opponents of free trade was that no real reforms of Spain’s commercial policy were undertaken, although many were considered.26

The third strand in Spain’s response to the war concerned the role played by other countries in fomenting the insurgency. Behind it lay a suspicion that the revolt was the product of foreign intervention in Spain’s dominions. Spain’s successive governments knew that other countries were aiding the insurgents; Ferdinand in particular was much concerned that his supposed allies were assisting the rebels. All commented on the number of foreigners, especially British, fighting for the rebels, and the persistence of the insurgency was repeatedly attributed to the aid and support given to foreign mercenaries by their perfidious governments.27 Indeed, many expeditions did leave

27 See for example Timothy Anna, *The Fall of the Royal Government in Mexico City*, University of Nebraska Press (Lincoln, 1978), p. 194; Pablo Morillo to Ministry of State (?), Cartagena, 31 December 1815, AGI, Estado, legajo 57; José García de León y Pizarro to Joaquín Campuzano, Madrid, 24
Great Britain to fight with the insurgents and the role of British battalions in many of Bolivar's battles is well known. "Los ejércitos ingleses parece que quieren transladarse todos a este continente," remarked General Pablo Morillo in May 1819. General Morillo was, indeed, so concerned about the increasing numbers of British mercenaries that he went to the unprecedented step of issuing a proclamation in (rather fetching) English:

To the British chiefs, officers and soldiers now serving with the insurgents... Englishmen: to you I address myself who are already acquainted with that famous personage whom you no doubt (while in England) compared to a Washington at least, but now, having seen the Hero of this despicable republic, his troops, his Generals, and the Wiseacres who compose his government, you must be convinced of having been most shamefully imposed upon. You are serving under the command of a man in every respect insignificant, and have joined an horde of banditti who are famed for the exercise of the most barbarous cruelties, which are so averse to your national character, that you must abhor them. He who retains the least spark of honour and justice cannot remain united with such a band of ragamuffins, who are abhorred by the very country that gave them birth whose soil they have sullied with crimes of all descriptions. The

May 1817, AGS, Estado, legajo 8287; and Pablo Morillo to the Duke of San Carlos, Caracas, 8 January 1819, AGS, Estado 8223.

people of Venezuela only wish for peace and for the extermination of those monsters. I know that many of those misled Englishmen and other foreigners were prevented from separating themselves from this unjust cause for want of means. I therefore offer and guarantee to those who may present themselves to the army under my command, personal security, they will either be admitted in the service of H.C.M. or be sent free to the country of their own choice. . . This offer of security tendered to you by a Spanish General who fought at your side for the liberty of Europe I trust you will consider as sincere and inviolable.29

The involvement of British mercenaries and volunteers in the wars of independence, as well as Britain’s obvious commercial interest in an independent Spanish America, overshadowed all attempts at ending the war through diplomacy. Britain was the only country really interested in assisting Spain in negotiating with the insurgents, but the Spanish government was too suspicious of Britain’s intentions to give full support to any plan for a mediated settlement. Neither was Spain willing to grant Britain any commercial privileges in return for diplomatic assistance. In the end, Spain’s well-justified doubts about the impartiality of the British undermined all attempts at a mediated settlement of the war. The first round of British mediation, initiated by the Regency, reached a dead end by the middle of 1812, although directionless discussions continued until mid-1813. As the Conde de Toreno remarked, the continued negotiations “served only to add to the number of documents in

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the archives that time casts into oblivion". For their part, the insurgents would at first have been very willing to enter into negotiations. Participation in attempts at mediation gave the rebels a certain respectability, and also put pressure on Spain at least to appear flexible.

In July 1815, the newly-reestablished Council of the Indies advised the newly-restored Ferdinand to reopen discussions with Great Britain about British mediation, which the Council believed was Spain's only real hope. The Council urged Ferdinand to support a mediated settlement, even if it obliged Spain to grant Britain special trading rights. Ferdinand approved this recommendation, and established several committees to investigate the matter. Plans to cede American territory in return for aid were also discussed, and other European powers were invited to assist Spain. Discussions wandered aimlessly until early 1817, when Ferdinand decided to restart the discussion of British mediation. By September 1818, mediation was again abandoned.

Negotiations foundered because of Spanish distrust of the British. It was widely believed that Britain would benefit more from an independent America than from a colonial one. Moreover, the flow of legionnaires from Britain to the Americas

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30 Anna, Spain and the Loss of America, p. 110. Anna, Spain and the Loss of America, pp. 104-110 contains details of the negotiations, as do Heredia, Planes españoles, pp. 74, 83, 193-225; and John Rydford, "British Mediation between Spain and her Colonies, 1811-1813", HAHR, vol. 21 (1941).
31 Report by José María del Real, London, 7 December 1814, AGI, Estado, legajo 57, Doc. 34A, letter 2. The reports by Real, the Neogranadan insurgent representative to London, may also be found in AGS, Estado, legajo 8287.
32 See Heredia, Planes españoles, p. 193-206, 377; and AGI, Estado, legajo 88, Document 10, which contains much information on the British mediation. For the British side of the negotiations, see Webster (editor), Britain and the Independence of Latin America, vol 2, pp. 309-442.
did little to convince the Spanish of Great Britain’s neutrality. The British government, conscious that the presence of so many Britons in the insurgent armies discredited its offers to mediate, at various times prohibited its citizens from participating in the war, but these prohibitions did not staunch the flow of arms and men. Attempts at mediation were also hampered by Spain’s unwillingness to grant Britain the commercial concessions it wanted in return for help. It was not until the 1820s that Spain became willing to grant Britain trading privileges, and by then Spain was not in a position to deliver on any offers related to its colonies.

Direct negotiations with the insurgents were little tried until 1820, when, under the influence of the liberal revolt in Spain, authorities in the Americas were instructed to open discussions with the insurgent leaders. Special commissioners were also sent to the Americas to assist these efforts. The outcome of the 1820 peace commission will be considered in Chapter 12. It is sufficient to note here that these efforts played little role in ending the war, and merely provided Morillo with a graceful exit from the conflict in Venezuela.

§2. Royalists in New Granada.

While Spanish ministers deluded themselves in believing that the insurrection arose from American misunderstandings about events in Spain, Spain’s governments were themselves sadly ill-informed about events in the Americas. This problem, evident from the earliest years of the Cortes, grew proportionately as the war progressed. In 1817, Pascual Enríquez, Morillo’s Naval Commander, ended a visit to Madrid disillusioned and irritated, asserting that no one at the court understood what was happening overseas.34 Worse, the ministers appointed to end the war often lacked even a rudimentary grasp of American realities; a deputy to the 1821 Cortes lamented that the Minister for Overseas, Ramón Pelegrín, believed the Mexican city of Valladolid, the site of the execution of over 400 Spaniards by Hidalgo’s troops in 1810, was located in New Granada.35 (The same deputy later complained that, with regard to Spanish America, “se sabe más en las tabernas de Londres que en el Congreso de España.”36) By 1821, the Junta de Conciliación established in Caracas was prepared to admit that the prevailing ignorance in Spain about events in America had in the past “contribuido eficazmente a la prolongación de los males”.37

Unfamiliarity with events in the war cannot be blamed on the Americans themselves. Large numbers of Spanish Americans, both creole and peninsular, wrote to the government to acquaint

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34 Heredia, Planes españoles, pp. 45, 348.
35 Manifiesto a la Nación Española, by José Moreno de García, Cádiz, 16 February 1822, Zavala, Masones, comuneros y carbonarios, p. 261.
37 Instructions to the royalist commissioners, Junta de Conciliación de Venezuela, Caracas, 18 January 1821, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8733, doc. 24.
them with recent events in the colonies, and some even visited Spain to present their views in person. Edmundo Heredia has documented many such reports in his fine volume *Planes españoles para reconquistar hispanoamérica*.38

The fate of the Regency’s special commissioner to New Granada, Antonio de Villavicencio, illustrates particularly well the problems facing those who tried to enlighten ministers to the American reality.39 Villavicencio had been sent by the Regency to inform the viceroyalty about the establishment of the Cortes and the Regency, and to obtain oaths of loyalty to these bodies. He arrived in Caracas in March 1810, passed through Cartagena, and reached Santa Fe on 1 August 1810. He thus witnessed the first outbreaks of revolt in the viceroyalty’s three most important cities. Throughout his period as commissioner he sent frequent reports that described in ever more urgent language the impending crisis that loomed before Spain. Yet, on reaching Spain, his letters languished in total oblivion. Indeed, the only response he ever received from Spain was an order issued in August 1810 terminating his commission and commanding him to return to Spain.40 Villavicencio, a native of New Granada, grew so frustrated with Spain’s behaviour that he remained in Santa Fe.

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38See Heredia, *Planes españoles*. Other reports not mentioned by Heredia may be found in AGI, Diversos, legajo 42.
39Antonio de Villavicencio to Antonio Amar, Cartagena, 20 May 1810; Antonio de Villavicencio to the Cortes, Cartagena, 28 May 1810; Antonio de Villavicencio to the Cortes, Cartagena, 29 May 1810; Antonio de Villavicencio to Antonio Amar, Cartagena, 30 May 1810; all in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 747; Antonio de Villavicencio to Minister of State, Cartagena, 24 May 1810, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 629; and José María Caballero, *Diario*, Biblioteca de Bogotá, Editorial Villegas, (Bogotá, 1990), p. 81.
40Antonio de Villavicencio to President of the Consejo de Regencia, Santa Fe, 9 February 1811, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 747.
and indeed joined the republicans. He was shot by Morillo’s troops in June 1816.  

The most marked contrast in Spanish responses to the war is not between the attitudes of officials in New Granada and in Spain. It is rather between the recommendations of officials in New Granada and the actions of the government in Spain. Although the Spanish government rarely tailored its actions to fit the recommendations expressed by its officials in New Granada, the views advanced by these officials did not differ dramatically from those put foreword in Spain itself. For example, after 1817 the opinion grew in Spain that Morillo’s cruelty was at least in part responsible for the continued insurgency in Venezuela and New Granada. Newspapers denounced the brutality of the reconquest, and even some government ministers argued that military intervention had done more harm than good.  

José García de León y Pizarro put this view succinctly: “since the arrival of the expedition of Captain General Pablo Morillo everything has gone from bad to worse,” in Venezuela. Indeed, when in 1820 Spain’s new liberal government reopened negotiations with the insurgents, the Council of State urged that Morillo and Sámano be recalled to Spain prior to beginning the talks, as a demonstration of the government’s good faith. As we shall see, this view was widely shared by royalists in the viceroyalty itself. Nonetheless, no effective action was taken to curb Spanish abuses, and the

41 Relación de los principales cabezas de la rebelión . . . que han sufrido . . . la pena capital. Santa Fe, 4 September 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 1901. Also Heredia, Planes españoles, p. 63.  

42 Delgado, La Independencia de América, discusses the opinions advanced by newspapers of the period.  

43 Anna, Spain and the Loss of America, pp. 184-5.  

44 Report by the Council of State, Palace, 22 April 1820, AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 1568.
pleas of royalist officials in New Granada for restraint went unheeded.

Many officials in both New Granada and Venezuela believed that the continuation of the insurgency was a direct consequence of the despotism of the royalist armies. This belief was especially widespread in Venezuela. Captain General José Manuel Cagigal, for example, repeatedly warned of the bad effects of Morillo's behaviour. He believed the only way to pacify Venezuela was to attract support, rather than to destroy the opposition. His views were echoed by several regents of the Audiencia in Caracas, who claimed that the rapacity of Morillo's army had made “execrable el nombre español”. Similar sentiments were expressed by officials in New Granada. Many felt that the behaviour of Morillo's army was responsible for the resurgence of insurrection after 1816. Andrés Rosillo, former insurgent and canon of the cathedral in Santa Fe, described in a commissioned report the causes of the revival of insurgency. He blamed the reign of terror inaugurated by Morillo in the capital: “La multiplicación de arrestos, la ligereza, precipitación e ilegalidad de

45 Juan Manuel Cagigal, Memorias del Mariscal de Campo Don Juan Manuel de Cajigal sobre la revolución de Venezuela, Biblioteca Venezolana de Historia (Caracas, 1960), p. 145,158-159. See also Report by the Council of the Indies, 3 October 1814, AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 1568.
46 José Francisco Heredia, Memorias del Regente Heredia (de las Reales Audiencias de Caracas y México), Editorial América, (Madrid, n.d.), p. 278. Heredia, it should be noted, was a notorious soft-liner, who during the five years he was in office did not convict anyone of treason. Monteverde complained that Heredia had not even prosecuted a certain Navarrete, “who was urinating on the royal bust of Ferdinand VII at the same time that I was proclaiming him in the plaza”. See Stephen Stoan, Pablo Morillo and Venezuela, pp. 100-101.

This view of the effect of the royalist army was general. See Woodward, “The Spanish Army and the Loss of America, 1810-1824”, p. 588; and Report on letters of Regent Cecilio O'Doardo of 4 December 1816, 5 February 1817, 27 November 1819, and 19 February 1820, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 1017. See also Miguel de La Torre to Ministry of Overseas, Puerto Rico, 16 September 1822, AGI, Audiencia de Caracas, legajo 55.
los juicios y el extraordinario número de víctimas realizaron los
prognósticos de los papeles revolucionarios, que predecían estas
escenas del terror, y destruyeron toda la idea que los realistas
hicieron formar del gobierno de V.M.” Such an interpretation was
not unusual; Rosillo’s report was dismissed by the Council of the
Indies as containing “pocas ideas nuevas”.47 As we saw in the
preceding chapter, Viceroy Francisco Montalvo concurred with
Rosillo; in his view, “la conducta nada regular” of Morillo and his
army was the origin and cause of all continued unrest in the
viceroyalty. Montalvo stressed that not only had Morillo reduced
New Granada to a pitiful state, but, worst of all, he had not had the
slightest success in stopping the rebellion. The remarkable thing,
Montalvo felt, was not that insurrection continued in parts of the
viceroyalty; it was that some parts were at peace.48

Associated with the view that the continued insurgency was
a result of Spanish mishandling was the belief that the war itself
had been caused by poor government. In the Americas, as in
Spain, many liberal royalists blamed absolutism and corruption
for having pushed the inhabitants of Spanish America into revolt.
In Peru, for example, future viceroy José de la Serna as one of a
number of younger army officers who believed that intransigent
absolutism was responsible for the revolution.49 Indeed,
awareness of the extent of misrule reached even into the ranks of

47Report on letter by Andrés Rosillo, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo
1017; and Report on letter of Andrés María Rosillo to Ministry of Grace and
Justice of 13 July 1818, AGI, Estado, legajo 57, Document 36. Also see
Celestino Bruguera, Paris, 12 July 1820, AGI, Indiferente General, legajo
1568; and Reports of the Tercera División del Primer Batallón del
Regimiento de Infantería de Numancia, January to October 1817, AGI,
Papeles de Cuba, legajo 759A.
48Francisco Montalvo to the Ministry of Grace and Justice, Cartagena, 24
September 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631.
(New York, 1986), p. 172
the most extreme absolutists. Conservative royalists in Quito, who condemned insurgents and liberals alike, nonetheless suggested many reforms which they believed would help restore order. Such suggestions usually centred on removing from office all officials found guilty of misrule, and limiting the number of lawyers.\(^{50}\)

The most widely held view on the causes of the war was, however, much more simpleminded. The vast majority of royalists in New Granada felt the war was the result of an entirely inexplicable desire for independence, which they were able neither to understand nor to analyse. This wish for independence was regarded by some as the result of contamination by European subversives; the Baron Alexander von Humboldt was singled out as a particular source of contagion.\(^{51}\) Napoleon was also blamed for inciting revolt; Peru’s conservative Viceroy José Fernando de Abascal felt Bonaparte had activated revolutionary sentiments in “hombres destinados por la naturaleza a solo vegetar en la obscuridad.”\(^{52}\)

This view begs the question of the real role of the French Revolution and Napoleonic wars in causing the Spanish American wars of independence. To royalist observers, however, such complicated influences were often reduced to a simple form of infection. Insurgents had either been infected with the germ of revolt, or it had generated itself spontaneously within them.

\(^{50}\)See Carlos Lagomarsino to Ferdinand, Guayaquil, 13 May 1816, AGI, Estado, legajo 72, Doc. 69; and Historia de la rebelión de América en 35 cartas, by Pedro Pérez Muñoz, Quito, 6 May 1816, AGI, Diversos, legajo 42.

\(^{51}\)See, for example, Historia de la rebelión de América en 35 cartas, by Pedro Pérez Muñoz, Quito, 6 May 1816, AGI, Diversos, legajo 42.

\(^{52}\)Proclama by José Fernando de Abascal y Sousa, Lima, 13 July 1810, AGI, Audiencia de Panama, legajo 262. Suspicion of the French of course predated the emergence of Napoleon. Concern about the subversive role of Frenchmen in the Americas was rife during the 1790s. See, for example, Christon Archer, *The Army in Bourbon Mexico, 1760-1810*, University of New Mexico Press (Albuquerque, 1977), pp. 82-84.
producing revolutionaries. Others ascribed the revolts to “la natural ingratitude de los hombres”.  

Of course, it was not always easy for the Spanish to gain an accurate impression of the motivations of their opponents. Captured insurgents rarely defended their beliefs. Most denied hotly any accusations of republicanism, and instead affirmed their support for the crown. Even well-known leaders of the revolt tried this approach. José María García de Toledo and Manuel del Castillo y Rada, both leaders of the insurgent movement in Cartagena, claimed during their trials that they had never supported independence, and expressed “sentimientos de amor, obedientia, y lealtad a nuestro rey el señor Don Fernando VII”. On those occasions where denial was clearly impossible most stressed that they had supported the insurgents only after having been threatened, or because of the financial loss entailed in emigrating to royalist-controlled areas. Tomás Vásquez of Cartagena was typical in claiming after his capture in 1816 that he had remained in Cartagena during the period of insurgent rule only because he had been harassed into staying by the insurgent government, and had needed to support his large family. Naturally, those detained by the royalists had powerful motives for denying insurgency, as those openly admitting to supporting

54 See Roberto Arrazola, *Los Mártires responden. . .*, Ediciones Hernández (Cartagena, 1973), pp. 9-35, for transcripts of the trials. See also, for example, the Sumario contra Gabriel Chimunla, Almaguer, November 1817, ACC, Independencia M1-3j, signatura 4393; and Confession of Miguel Rodríguez, Quito, (1813?), AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 259.
55 See Interrogation of Tomás Vásquez, Havana, 15 February 1816; and Interrogation of Andrés Padilla, Riohacha, 13 November 1819; both in AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 891A; Representation of Doña Francisca Morena e Isabella, Santa Fe, 19 October 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 549; and Marqués de Selva Alegre to Ferdinand, Chillo, 18 March 1815, AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 258.
the revolution were generally shot. Moreover, Viceroy Montalvo had announced in 1814 that the royalists should not regard as traitors those who had remained in rebel territory “por el fundado temor de ser maltratados”, which made this line of defence particularly attractive.56

One effect of this was that royalist officers had little opportunity to hear the republican position presented with conviction. Royalist officers typically regarded their insurgent counterparts as motivated solely by ambition and greed. After the republican capture of Ríohacha its royalist governor reported that the insurgents had lost over 200 men, “que el cobarde, vil y desnaturalizado [General] MacGregor ha sacrificado a su perfidia y brutalidad”.57 The cabildo of Pasto encapsulated the logic of this attitude in 1814, when it remarked of the republicans in Cali, “la buena fe no es la virtud de estos hombres; si lo fuese jamás hubieron pensado en ser insurgentes”.58 Choosing to support the insurgents, an iniquitous act, proved that the individual was vile, and this villainy explained their initial support for the insurgents.

Overall, the royalist in New Granada whose views on the reconquest most mattered was General Pablo Morillo. Morillo was confronted with the dilemma of evaluating the nature of the war soon after he arrived in Venezuela. In April 1815 royalist forces defeated the insurgents on the Island of Margarita and captured their leader, Juan Bautista Arismendi. Morillo, at this early stage in the war, retained great faith in the regenerative power of

56Bando de Francisco Montalvo, Santa Marta, 26 August 1814, AGI, Audiencia de Caracas, legajo 109.
57José Solís to Gabriel de Torres, Ríohacha, 4 October 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 709.
58Cabildo of Pasto to Ferdinand, Pasto, 13 June 1814, BL, London, Egerton, vol. 1809. This document is also contained in AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 276.
mercy, and, contrary to all advice, pardoned and released Arismendi, who had been responsible for various massacres of royalists. The occasion of Arismendi’s pardon was witnessed by Rafael Sevilla, a young Spanish officer, who described the event in his memoirs:

El día 11 ya en la ciudad de Asunción, capital de la isla, ... se presentó a Morillo el sanguinario Arismendi. ...

"Señor," le dijo, "soy un hijo pródigo que vuelve temblando a tocar la puerta del hogar paterno. Yo he sido un malvado, le confieso, pero prometo a Vuestra Excelencia que si me concede la vida que le imploro, la dedicaré entera en adelante al servicio de España." ... 

En los ojos del Brigadier [Francisco Tomás] Morales, que estaba presente, brilló un relámpago de ira mal comprimido por les deberes que impone la disciplina. "Mi General," dijo Morales apuntando con el índice al famoso cabecilla, "mi General, no haga usted semejante cosa. Este hombre que tiene usted a sus espaldas no está arrepentido; le está engañando a usted miserablemente. Este hombre que ve usted arrastrándose como un reptil, no es un hombre, es un tigre feroz, salido de las selvas o del infierno. ... Con esta misma lengua con que ahora pide perdón ha mandado, el miserable, quemar vivos a quinientos pacíficos comerciantes españoles, vecinos que eran de Caracas y la Guayra ... En nombre de sus manes, mi General, yo pido que se haga justicia; que se castige ejemplarmente como mandan las leyes, no al insurgente sino al reo de delitos comunes, que ha estremecido de horror a los mismos insurrectos."
"No importa," contestó el General Morillo, "con todo esto le perdono; así quedará más obligado y comprenderá cuán sincero y grande tiene que ser su arrepentimiento para que iguale mi generosidad. Arismendi levántase Ud. y sea leal en adelante".

El cabecilla se levantó y salió echando una mirada de odio sobre el Brigadier. "Mi General," le dijo Morales a Morillo, "desde ahora le predigo que fracasará usted en su expedición. Al decretar el indulto de Arismendi y demás cabecillas que alberga esta Isla, ha decretado usted la muerte de millares de peninsulares y de venezolanos leales que por ellos han de ser asesinados. . . Mi General, se pierde estos dominios para España y usted pierde su fama de sabio político y de valiente militar si sigue el sistema que acaba de inaugurar en Margarita."

"Señor Brigadier, no le he pedido a usted consejos," contestó algo irritado Morillo.

"Es verdad, mi General, y en adelante me abstendré de dárselos. . . El tiempo, mi General, el tiempo dirá cuál de los dos se equivoca."59

Arismendi rebelled soon after Morillo left Venezuela, which Brigadier Morales felt vindicated his position. In fact, the rebellion of Arismendi illustrated the complexity of the problem. Arismendi, whose wife and children had earlier been killed by the royalist governor of Margarita, rejoined the insurrection only after the commanding officer stationed on the island by Morillo

59From Rafael Sevilla, Memorias de un oficial del ejército español, campañas contra Bolívar y los separatistas de América, printed in Indalecio Líevano Aguirre, Los grandes conflictos sociales y económicos de nuestra historia, Editorial Tercer Mundo, (Bogotá, 1985),vol 2, pp. 894-895. I have altered the punctuation somewhat, in the interests of clarity.
attempted to extract a forced contribution of over $40,000 from the inhabitants, and began to confiscate their belongings. The regent of the Audiencia of Caracas alleged that it was only then, driven by desperation, that the inhabitants rebelled against the royalist garrison.60 Events on the Island of Margarita thus left unresolved the broader question of whether pardon or punishment was more effective. What should have been clear was that a combination of the two was unsuccessful.

Morillo had learned of Arismendi’s revolt by June 1816. According to Indalecio Liévano Aguirre, the news of Arismendi’s uprising provoked a great change in Morillo’s approach to the pacification. Rejecting explicitly his earlier faith in pardons, Morillo wrote to Madrid that “es preciso que la Corte se desenganche, pues no cortando la cabeza de todos los que han sido revolucionarios, siempre darán qué hacer; así que no debe haber clemencia con estos pícaros”.61 In fact, a fundamental change had already began to occur in Morillo’s attitude toward the war itself. Morillo became ever more convinced that the great mass of the population in Venezuela and New Granada wanted independence, not a reconciliation with Spain.62 This conviction deeply affected

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60Report on letters of Regent Cecilio O’Doardo of 4 December 1816, 5 February 1817, 27 November 1819, 19 February 1820, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 1017.
62Morillo rapidly came to this conclusion in regard to Venezuela. By early 1816 he had decided that “el deseo de todas las clases se dirigen al mismo objeto de la independencia”. See Pablo Morillo to Ministry of War, Mompox, 7 March 1816, Rodriguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol 3, pp. 134-138. This view was not shared by all royalist leaders. See Miguel Izard, El miedo a la revolución. La lucha por la libertad en Venezuela (1777-1830), Editorial Tecnos, (Madrid, 1979), pp. 146, 173.
Morillo’s attitude towards insurgents. If the populace wanted independence, no amount of generosity would alter their position. Clemency was thus pointless. Only during his last year in the Americas did an increasingly fatalistic Morillo waver in his rejection of conciliation. Many events combined to lead Morillo to the conclusion that pacification could be achieved only by force. Already in April 1816, on his arrival in Zipaquirá, he was forced to recognise the flimsy foundation of the reconquest. When asked by Morillo why the town had not treated Viceroy Antonio Amar with the same veneration which was now being shown to the Expeditionary Army, “un jefe viejo en el país” responded, “Es muy sencillo. Aquellos no tenían a su disposición tantas bayonetas como Ud.”63 Victory depended on military strength, not on winning the hearts and minds of the public.

Indeed, it is unlikely that this change in attitude was brought about, as Liévano suggests, by Arismendi’s revolt. Already in December 1815, after the defeat of Cartagena, Morillo had begun systematically to execute captured insurgent leaders. This behaviour was to culminate in the infamous execution of nine leading republicans on 24 February 1816.64 Some of the nine men had surrendered to the royalists, believing themselves to be covered by a pardon issued by Morillo on 23 September 1815 from the royalist camp in Torresillas. Despite this pardon, and in spite of the (admittedly disingenuous) protestations of loyalty made by virtually all of the nine men, the prisoners were executed.65 Morillo did not attempt to repeat his Margaritan

63Scvilla, Memorias, p. 87.
64See AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 707 for much information on the execution of insurgents in the months following Cartagena’s recapture.
65They were José María García de Toledo, Manuel del Castillo y Rada, Antonio José de Ayos, Miguel Díaz Granados, Pantaleón German Ribón,
clemency in Cartagena. This change in behaviour in part reflects Morillo’s anger over the long siege of Cartagena. He had repeatedly warned the city’s leaders that he would not pardon them if they prolonged their resistance. When, defeated by hunger, the city at last surrendered, the royalists were shocked by what they saw. Corpses lying unburied in the streets, and skeletal figures scarcely able to stand greeted the conquerors. Morillo vented his distress on Cartagena’s republican leadership, whose obstinate resistance he blamed for the city’s state. The nine “martyrs” served as scapegoats, absolving the royalist army of any responsibility for Cartagena’s nightmare.

Executions continued after Morillo’s arrival in the capital in late May 1816, and for the remainder of 1816 the execution of prominent creoles was a daily event in Santa Fe. The initial entry of the Expeditionary Army into Santa Fe had not been accompanied by mass arrests, however, as Field Marshal Miguel de La Torre, who arrived in the capital before Morillo, preferred a more conciliatory approach. He had urged refugees to return, issued a general pardon, and arrested only a few notorious insurgents. This behaviour was at variance with that ordered by Morillo, whose now entirely uncompromising attitude may be seen in his letter to La Torre of 19 May 1816:

Mi estimado La Torre,

Sin duda que ha salido Listed de las Batuecas, se ha vuelto bobo, o no conoce aún los americanos. Me dice Usted en su carta que los pocos malos que hay estan arrepentidos. Lo mismo se decía de los de Margarita y nos han jeringado

Martin Amador, José María Portocarrero, Santiago Stuart, and Manuel Anguiano. See Roberto Arrazola, Los Mártires responden, for transcripts of their trial.
muy bien y falta el rabo por desollar. Entonces era otro tiempo, porque el ejército acababa de llegar a América, pero ahora estamos en otro caso y es preciso proceder como el Rey manda. Esto es, castigar las cabezas o motores de la revolución más que digan que están 80,000 veces arrepentidos, y su general deber de Usted luego que ocupa la capital era haberlos puesto presos inmediatamente. . . .

Amigo mío, desenganése Usted y abra el ojo con esta canalla que solo desean que los soldados se vayan minorando e inutilizando con las llagas y otras bajas, para echarse encima, en cuyo caso quizá sería Usted el primero a quien como tan clemente colgasen.66

Morillo continued to advocate extensive and severe punishment of all insurgents until the last year of his mandate. During the autumn and winter of 1819, evidence of the depth of support for independence became overwhelming; in October 1819 Morillo reported on the great outpouring of support for Bolívar in New Granada, "lo que prueba de un modo evidente hasta donde llega el entusiasmo con que han abrazado la insurrección los habitantes del reino, que eran los que nos parecían más dóciles y

66See Two letters of Pablo Morillo to Miguel de La Torre, Guadalupc, 19 May 1816, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8717, Docs. 68 & 69 (doc. 69, quoted here, is also printed in full in Oswaldo Díaz Díaz, La reconquista español, vol. 1, Historia Extensa de Colombia, vol. 6, Ediciones Lerner (Bogotá, 1964), pp. 76-77); Pablo Morillo to Salvador de Moxó, Santa Fe, 24 June 1816, AGI, Audiencia de Caracas, legajo 386; and Report on letter by Andrés Rosillo, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 1017.

The views expressed by Morillo in these letters are not entirely consonant with those put forward in a letter to Miguel de La Torre dated 24 July 1816, which is reprinted in Stephen Stoan, Pablo Morillo and Venezuela, p. 232. In this letter Morillo urges La Torre to employ gentleness in order to win back insurgents, and asserts that rigour must be used only with "the principal leaders". This distinction between leaders and followers was not to be formalised until some time later, although Morillo did differentiate between the two when he issued a pardon on 31 May 1816 for those imprisoned in Santa Fe.
en quienes teníamos mayor confianza”. It became increasingly clear to Morillo that Spain would lose New Granada. As his pessimism about the war grew Morillo did not however become ever more sanguinary. Towards the end of his mandate he began to reconsider the virtue of clemency, and indeed criticised fellow officers whose “terrorismo” had lost the royalists support.

Morillo’s changing views on the causes of the insurgency encapsulate the various positions adopted in both Spain and New Granada by officials and observers. They also mirror the profound lack of direction characteristic of the attempted reconquest. Morillo’s reconquest was perhaps inevitably an uneasy mix of conciliation and coercion. The tension between these two approaches was not resolved, and in the years after 1816 the reconquest slowly unravelled. It remains, however, to examine one final element of the reconquest: the attempt to restore the Real Hacienda to its pre-revolutionary state, and at the same time revive government income. It is to this matter that we now turn in Chapter 6.

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67 Pablo Morillo to Ministry of War, Tinaco, 10 October 1819, Rodríguez Villa, *Pablo Morillo*, vol 4, p. 80. Morillo frequently asserted that the inhabitants of New Granada were more docile than the Venezuelans.
68 Pablo Morillo to Miguel de La Torre, Barquisimeto, 17 December 1819, AHN, Estado, legajo 8717, Doc. 281.
Chapter 6: The Reconquest of the Economy

The permanence of Spain’s military reconquest in New Granada depended in part on the success of the royalists’ fiscal reconquest. This reconquest was necessary for two reasons. Firstly, many the viceroyalty’s prime sources of funds had been mismanaged, or, on occasion, abolished during the years of the First Republic. The royalists thus needed to revive the state monopolies and return taxation to central control, if they were to generate sufficient income to allow the colonial bureaucracy to function and to cover the costs of the military reconquest. Secondly, political motives impelled the Spanish to seek the restoration of colonial fiscal structures, as on his return to the throne in 1814, Ferdinand VII had ordered that all aspects of Spanish government be returned to their precise condition in 1808. Thus, one of the first actions taken by Viceroy Montalvo after Morillo’s arrival in New Granada was to issue an order restoring the “administración pública y el sistema de rentas” to their status in 1808.1

In the same document, Viceroy Montalvo lamented that, during the years of insurgent rule, colonial financial structures had been overturned. Before the outbreak of revolution, he asserted, New Granada had been governed “por un sistema conocido, todos sus ramos de administración en el pie más floreciente, pagados sus empleados, y con sobrantes en las cajas matrices para sus gastos extraordinarios, y todo en fin anunciando

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1Circular by Francisco Montalvo, Torrecilla, 30 November 1815, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 707.
la mejor harmonia, que es el efecto de la regularidad de las leyes”.

This happy picture was, however, a distortion of the state of affairs during the colonial period. While during the previous decades income from state monopolies had increased, at the cost of much civil unrest, trade with Spain had declined vertiginously since the 1790s, and subsidies from Peru and Mexico had played a vital role in viceregal finance. Thus Montalvo was confronted with a contradictory task: he was required to coax New Granada’s economy into yielding sufficient income to finance the reconquest and the restoration of the colonial bureaucracy, but obliged to do this by reintroducing fiscal structures that had never been wholly adequate, and which were, moreover, very often unpopular. This chapter will examine the royalists’ success in reconciling these goals.

It is difficult to form a complete picture of the state of government finances during the years of the war. To begin with, it seems little fiscal information was actually produced during the period. What information is available often lacks continuity, making longer-term analysis difficult. Moreover, some material was simply destroyed during the war. Finally, book-keeping procedures appear to have relaxed somewhat. In royalist-controlled areas, for example, governors sometimes failed to make the customary reports on financial affairs in their province.


3 Juan Ramírez to Minister of Hacienda, Quito, 6 February 1819, AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 261.

4 José María Ramírez to Francisco Montalvo, Cartagena, 30 August 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631. See also Manuel Alonso Velasco to Juan Samaño, Popayán, 20 May 1819, AHNC, Visitas del Cauca, tomo 4, ff. 741-745, for comments on the breakdown of book-keeping during the war.
Unclear, or downright contradictory fiscal reports abound, and the historian must tread carefully to avoid sinking into a morass of irreconcilable figures. With these limitations in mind, we will first consider the conditions of New Granada’s economy during the years of the war, and will then turn to the royalists’ attempts to restore the colonial fiscal structures and generate income.

§ 1. The Effect of War on New Granada’s Economy

There is little agreement on whether New Granada suffered an economic collapse as a consequence of the War of Independence, and we do not intend to delve too deeply into this matter. We will, however, attempt a brief survey of the state of certain key areas of New Granada’s economy, namely mining and agriculture, during the years of the war.

Gold was New Granada’s most important export, and the presence in New Granada of accessible gold was the prime motive for Spain’s interest in the region. Neogranadan gold mining was a low-tech activity. Most gold was extracted by the most primitive methods; gold dust was separated from the surrounding mud by sifting gold-bearing sand in a wooden bowl, or by running a stream of water across an area of deposit. Neogranadan mining thus required little infrastructure or expense, aside from the gangs of slaves who performed much of the work. Throughout the eighteenth century, state revenue from mining increased steadily. Placer mining in the Chocó accounted for much of this increase, and indeed for the region’s importance. Significant gold reserves were also to be found in Antioquia and the Cauca Valley. By the
last years of the eighteenth century, New Granada’s mines were yielding at least two million pesos worth of gold each year.5

During the years of the war, however, very little mining was carried out. Indeed, Hermes Tovar has estimated that from 1811 to 1820 mining activity declined by 40% from the level immediately before the war. In the Cauca Valley, in particular, mining activity had declined precipitously, as slaves either escaped or were seized by the royalist military to work on road-building projects.6 The natural consequence of this was that very little gold was brought to the Casas de Moneda to be minted. In Popayán’s Casa de Moneda during the whole of 1817 and 1818, only $10,920 worth of coins were minted.7 In contrast, in 1800 alone Popayán’s Casa de Moneda had minted coins worth over $920,000.8 The mint’s comparative poverty, the administrators stated, was due to several factors. First, the republicans had emptied the city’s reserves when they occupied the city. More importantly, little new gold was submitted for minting. Only a small amount was being extracted in the first place, and it was not brought to the mint. Miners were choosing to smuggle any gold out of the country rather than face the very real risk having it be seized by the royalist army while en route to Popayán.9

5See McFarlane, Colombia before Independence, pp. 71-95, for information about mining in New Granada. (Figures for gold production are on pp. 81-89.) Anne Twinam discusses mining in Antioquia; see Ann Twinam, Miners, Merchants, and Farmers in Colonial Colombia, University of Texas Press (Austin, 1982).
6Hermes Tovar Pinzón, “La lenta ruptura con el pasado colonial (1810-1850)” Historia económica de Colombia, José Antonio Ocampo (editor), Siglo Veintiuno (Bogotá, 1987), pp. 103-104; and Toribio Montes to Francisco Montalvo, Quito, 21 June 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631.
7José Manuel Restrepo, Historia de la revolución de Colombia, Ediciones Bedout (Medellín, 1974), vol. 1, p. 25.
8McFarlane, Colombia before Independence, p. 365.
9See Francisco Gregorio de Angulo to José Solís, Popayán, 16(7) July 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631; and, for similar comments about gold
The fact that little gold was mined or minted does not of necessity indicate that the country’s mining infrastructure had been demolished, particularly as placer mining requires little by way of infrastructure in the first place. Indeed, both Anthony McFarlane and Malcolm Deas have argued that mining was at most disrupted by the war, rather than destroyed. However, while mines themselves were not destroyed as they were in Mexico, the effect on Neogranadan mining of the flight, or requisitioning, of slaves should not be ignored. Much of the growth in mining production in the eighteenth century had been due to an increased supply of slaves; in the Chocó, in particular, the use of slaves had expanded considerably. Slaves were thus an essential element of the mining system. Where slaves escaped from the control of their masters, or were seized by the royalist army to assist in building roads, mining became difficult. Thus, for example, mining in the Vega de Supía, near Anserma, stopped altogether after the workforce fled in 1817. The loss of labour prevented a rapid development of the ‘industry’ after smuggling in Mompós, see Report on the state of the real hacienda, Mompós, 24 July 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 712.


11 McFarlane, *Colombia before Independence*, pp. 75-79.

independence; it was not until the middle of the nineteenth century that production levels reached those attained in the late eighteenth century.\(^{13}\)

To turn now to New Granada’s agricultural base, there is disagreement about how badly it was damaged by the war. Anthony McFarlane asserts that relatively little damage was wrought. Miguel Izard, on the other hand, stresses the sad state of New Granada’s agriculture by the 1820s, and claims that by the end of the war the country was unable to feed itself.\(^{14}\) The extent of damage surely varied considerably from region to region, but some areas were affected quite severely. Although New Granada was not damaged as extensively as was Venezuela, and although the population did not decline as precipitously as it did there, the condition of New Granada’s agricultural base after the war was far from vibrant.

Many sources attest to the devastating effect of military forces on the countryside in southern New Granada. Leaving aside the deliberate destruction of farmland by troops, other factors combined to disrupt the agricultural cycle. To begin with, the requisitioning of farm animals meant that agricultural labour was continually interrupted. In the area around Anserma, for example, the Third Division of the royalist army in 1817 requisitioned all horses for its own use, and moreover ate all the cattle in the vicinity. This, combined with the fact that slaves were constantly being removed from their owners’ farms to

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\(^{13}\) Bushnell, *The Making of Modern Colombia*, p. 80.

labour in the various road-building projects, meant that little work was accomplished on the region’s haciendas. Similar situations obtained elsewhere in the Cauca Valley. Already in 1815, the haciendas of Pilamo and Jagual, for example, were described as “enteramente destruidas y reducidas a sólo terrenos, sin ninguna vaca ni otras bestias”. In Popayán, agriculture was described as being at a standstill by 1817, and the region’s sugar-mills were said to be completely abandoned. Miguel de Letamendi, a royalist military commander stationed in the Cauca Valley, summed up the situation in a report from March 1817:

La situación en el Valle de Cauca es en el extremo lastimosa, y al mismo tiempo terrible. Los pueblos están casi desiertos, los vecinos han formado su morada en los montes, los campos no se cultivan, una salida del madre del Cauca ha destruido las pocas labranzas que se habían verificado, no hay más bestia que algunas yeguas flacas, y todo, todo parece que camina a su destrucción.

15 See, for example, Vicente Romero to José Solís, Anserma, 22 May 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631; and also David Bushnell, The Santander Regime in Gran Colombia, Greenwood Press (Westport, 1970), pp. 127-128.
16 Zamira Díaz de Zuluaga, “La fuerza de trabajo en el Cauca grande: 1810-1830,” La independencia: ensayos de historia social, Germán Colmenares et al., Instituto Colombiano de Cultura (Bogotá, 1986), p. 57. Díaz de Zuluaga appears to be quoting from 1815 document listed in José María Arboleda Llorente (editor), Catálogo general detallado del Archivo Central del Cauca (época de la independencia), Universidad del Cauca (Popayán, 1975), vol. 4, p. 87. See also Díaz de Zuluaga, “La fuerza de trabajo en el Cauca grande”, pp. 52-67 for further evidence of agricultural crisis in the Cauca.
17 Asesor Carvajal to José Solís, Popayán, 8 July 1817; Cabildo of Buga to José Solís, Buga, 30 June 1817, both in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631; and also Zamira Díaz de Zuluaga, “El Cauca Grande en la independencia; estructura económico-social (1800-1830), Raíces Históricas, Academia Nariñense de Historia (Pasto, 1987), p. 99-100.
18 Diary of the Primer Batallón del Regimiento de Infantería de Numancia, March 1817, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 759A. For comments from a republican source, see the report from Toro in 1820 cited in Arboleda Llorente (editor), Catálogo del Archivo Central del Cauca, vol. 3, pp. 327-328.
Further evidence of decline was provided in August 1817 by Governor Vicente Sánchez Lima of Antioquia. Sánchez Lima sent Viceroy Montalvo a collection of personal letters from an anonymous hacendado in Popayán. The writer, who also complained that the postal service no longer functioned and that criminals roamed the country, worried that his relatives would be drafted into the army, that his slaves and animals would be requisitioned to work on the new roads, and that he would be unable to feed his large family. In short, he wrote, “aquí es que todo es un desorden y que tiran a la ruina de este pobre vecindario.”

In Pasto, further south, the situation was equally serious. Many observers noted the damage to farmland wrought by the presence of troops in the heavily contested province. The British traveller John Hamilton, for example, described the Province of Pasto as “almost a desert waste” in 1825. Not only were farms burned by republican armies, but the troops themselves, both royalist and republican, placed a major strain on the capacities of the local economy. This was, of course, a standard consequence of warfare. As the military historian John Keegan has noted, troops and their animals usually eat their way through more food than any region can support. That is why armies prefer not to remain too long in any one area. Simón Bolívar recognised this as well, commenting in the early 1820s that:

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19 Anonymous hacendado to Vicente Sánchez Lima, Vicente Sánchez Lima to Francisco Montalvo, Medellín, 4 August 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631.
Pasto no tiene recursos para mantener un grande ejército y [. . .] hace muchos años se está destruyendo el sur de Colombia por la guerra y muy particularmente el sur de Popayán y el norte de Quito. . . En esos países de sierra un ejército de 2,000 hombres se come en un año todo el ganado de toda una población.22

The presence of troops had similarly destructive effects in the Llanos, although there damage tended to be concentrated around the region’s few towns. Lieutenant Colonel Donato Ruíz de Santa Cruz, writing from Chita, commented in 1817 on “la miserable situación de estos pueblos inmediatos agotados de todo recurso por el considerable tránsito de tropas”.23

Agricultural activity was also affected by the war in other areas. When the Spanish army first arrived in Antioquia in 1816, they were impressed by the region’s fertility and by the abundance of food.24 Within a few years this had changed; by 1818, officials were commenting on the “notable decadencia de la agricultura”.25 Agricultural output in Panama, on the other hand, had been in crisis long before the war broke out. Little altered with the mainland’s separation from Spain.26 In Santa Marta, decline in agricultural production was primarily a consequence of the war with Cartagena, and had been serious since 1811. When

23 Diario de operaciones de la Columna Volante del Primer Batallón del Regimiento de Infantería del Rey, 17 August 1817, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 759A.
24 Plano de observaciones topográficas de la provincia de Antioquia, 12 May 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 897.
26 Report on letter of Benito Pérez to Minister of Hacienda, Panama, 30 March 1812, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 579.
Viceroy Montalvo arrived in the city in 1813, he reported that virtually all food production had ground to a halt, and that the inhabitants were able to stave off starvation only by fishing.\(^{27}\) Cartagena, in addition to suffering many years of warfare up to 1815, was subjected to the added burden of serving as the royalist capital through much of the war. The region’s agriculture declined catastrophically; by 1819, it was reduced to small-scale production of sugar-cane and cotton.\(^{28}\) The city’s cabildo lamented in that year that “no hay en todo el reino una provincia tan atrasada y pobre”.\(^{29}\)

Further problems were caused by the displacement of people that accompanied troop movements. The arrival of the royalist army often prompted entire villages to flee to the hills, leaving their houses and fields abandoned. This occurred particularly in the greater Cauca, where the royalist army’s many road-building projects were the main reason for flight. However, civilian emigration was not confined to the south, and contemporaries across New Granada recorded seeing whole villages retreating into the hills.\(^{30}\) In the area around Mompós,

\(^{27}\)Francisco Montalvo to Minister of State, Santa Marta, 25 February 1815, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 580; and Francisco Montalvo to Minister of Hacienda, Santa Marta, 23 June 1815, Santa Fe, legajo 631.
\(^{28}\)Gabriel de Torres to (?), Cartagena, 15 July 1819, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8725, doc. 9.
\(^{29}\)Report by Martín de Pando, Cartagena, 29 July 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 750.
\(^{30}\)See José Manuel Restrepo, *Apuntamientos sobre la emigración que hice en 1816 de la provincia de Antioquia a la de Popayán*, Biblioteca de la Presidencia de Colombia, vol. 30, (Bogotá, 1957), p. 65; Rafael Sevilla, *Memorias de un oficial del ejército español, campañas contra Bolívar y los separatistas de América*, Editorial América (Madrid, 1916), p. 87; Eusebio Pirón to Gabriel de Torres, Turbaco, 19 January 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 712; Francisco Warleta to Juan Sámano, Cali, 22 August 1816, BRAH, sig. 9/7665 (leg. 22), fols. 60-61; Bando de Francisco Warleta, Cali, 25 August 1816, BRAH, sig. 9/7665 (leg. 22), fols. 67-68; Francisco Ximénez to Juan Sámano, Apiay, 6 January 1817, BRAH, sig. 9/7665 (leg. 22), fols. 199-200; Diary of the Primer Batallón del Regimiento de Infantería de Numancia.
for example, the population appears by 1816 to have fallen to roughly half its size in 1780. In addition to fleeing from fighting itself or from the ransacking by soldiers that came in its immediate aftermath, many civilians decamped to avoid being recruited into the army. Large numbers of people reportedly fled when Colonels Francisco Warleta and Antonio Plá attempted to recruit soldiers into the royalist army in the Cauca Valley. In royalist strongholds such as Pasto or Santa Marta, the situation was reversed; the inhabitants generally fled at the approach of the republicans. The effect was the same: the abandonment of villages and a decrease in agricultural productivity. The British traveller J.P. Hamilton noted during his visit to Pasto in the early 1820s, "farms once well cultivated [are] deserted, and nearly all the population is extirpated". Flight was on this occasion the result of republican attacks. Whatever its cause, the effect of this

April 1817, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 759A; José Solís to Francisco Montalvo, Popayán, 20 June 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631; Toribio Montes to Francisco Montalvo, Quito, 21 June 1817; AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631; Report by Cabildo of Buga, Buga, 4 August 1817, AGI, Estado, legajo 57, doc. 35-D (1b); José María Ramírez to Ferdinand, Cartagena, 30 August 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631; José Antonio Arias to (?), Magangué, 2 September 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 750; and Manuel Fiallo to Juan Sámano, Sitio Nuevo, 19 February 1820, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 747.

31 Compare population figures given in Estado que manifiesta la población y recursos de esta jurisdicción, Mompós, 16 September 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 712; and McFarlane, Colombia before Independence, pp. 357-378. For other comparisons of population, see Hamnett, "Popular Insurrection and Royalist Reaction", p. 301.

32 See, for example, Diary of the Primer Batallón del Regimiento de Infantería de Numancia, March 1817, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 759A.

33 Hamilton, Travels through Colombia, p. 90; López, Memorias, vol. 1, p. 58; Bishop of Santa Marta to Council of the Indies(?), Santa Marta, 14 November 1814, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 549; Cabildo of Santa Marta to Ferdinand, Santa Marta, 28 July 1814, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 580. Similar flight from the republicans occurred in Ríohacha in 1820, when the insurgents invaded the city. See Proclama de Luis Brion, Ríohacha, 13 March 1820; and Mariano Montilla to Francisco de Paula Santander, Valledupar, 5 April 1820; both in AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 745.
displacement was, as Charles Griffin has noted, "muy desfavorable para la agricultura, la ganadería y la minería".34

The general condition of New Granada's economy, and of New Granada itself, after years of war was deplorable. Commercial agriculture was abandoned, mining had virtually ceased, and whole villages lay deserted. It was on this fragile base that the restored royalists sought to rebuild their administration. Not surprisingly, the administrators were unable to generate an adequate income for the state. The crown monopolies failed to provide the accustomed revenues, direct forms of taxation proved difficult and unpopular, and trade suffered a further decline.

We will now turn our attention to the sources of income available to the reconquerers, and to their attempt to re-establish New Granada's colonial fiscal structures.

§2. Reestablishing Colonial Fiscal structures

The first and most ready source of cash available to the royalists was the possessions of suspected or convicted insurgents. These goods could be confiscated to swell royalist coffers. The role of forced contributions in funding the army itself will be discussed in Chapter 8. Here we will concern ourselves with the role played by confiscation and forced contributions in funding the civil government. Confiscation of goods was an easy punishment for "infidencia", and indeed the goods of royalists had been similarly confiscated by the insurgents during the First

34Griffin, Los temas sociales, p. 16. Also see Tovar Pinzón, "La lenta ruptura con el pasado", p. 90-94; and for the comments of the Swedish traveler Severin Lorich, see Carlos Vidales, "El agente diplomático sueco Severin Lorich y su misión en la Gran Colombia (1823)," Informes de Investigación, Instituto de Estudios Latinoamericanos (Stockholm, 1991), pp. 9-10.
Republic.\textsuperscript{35} As we saw in Chapter 4, confiscation was imposed by the Junta de Purificación in Santa Fe. Fines of considerable size were imposed. José María Caballero recorded in his diary that, “el que menos culpado sale, tiene que dar $200, $300 o $500, y el que no los da, a las tropas, para el norte”.\textsuperscript{36} Numerous court appeals (“un torbellino de reclamos particulares”) and great quantities of paperwork were the inevitable result of the decision to confiscate private monies and belongings.\textsuperscript{37} While most of the appeals revolved around the simple issue of whether the victim had in fact supported independence, a few raised separate and, at least to the Spanish government, interesting legal dilemmas. The most complicated of these centred around the confiscation of the belongings of José María de Toledo in February 1816. Toledo was executed on 24 February 1816 in Cartagena for his involvement in that city’s revolutionary Junta, and left several young children. These were cared for after his death by Toledo’s brother-in-law Joaquín de Mosquera y Figueroa, a member of the Council of the Indies. Mosquera y Figueroa, acting as a responsible guardian, attempted to have Toledo’s goods disembargoed, and, in his attempt, resorted to an ingenious legal nicety. Mosquera y Figueroa claimed that Toledo’s children should not be penalised for their father’s errors, as they had been born before he “comenzó a andar en la traición”.\textsuperscript{38} Only those children born \textit{after

\textsuperscript{35}See Tovar Pinzón, “La lenta ruptura con el pasado”, pp. 92-93.


\textsuperscript{37}Plan de Gobierno de la Junta Superior y Tribunal Especial de Sequestrros de Caracas, Caracas, 2 June 1815. AGI, Audiencia de Caracas, legajos 109 and 386.
this should suffer the effects of a confiscation. This claim evidently struck a chord in Ferdinand’s government, as the matter was discussed at the highest levels, where it generated inexplicable amounts of paperwork.

It was simple enough to confiscate money; confiscating belongings proved to be more difficult. After belongings were confiscated, the state was left with the problem of converting them into cash. This was not always easy, and generally such goods were placed in a government warehouse for auction. Further problems resulted from keeping goods warehoused for long periods awaiting sale. Theft of embargoed goods was a continuing problem. Confiscated haciendas in turn had to be administered if they could not be sold. In order to deal with these matters the Junta de Secuestros was established in Santa Fe after the city was recaptured. Its primarily purpose was to oversee the sale or administration of confiscated good, although it could also order confiscations. Viceroy Montalvo felt that similar juntas ought to be established in each major town, although it is not clear whether any were.

While confiscation provided an easy source of money, it was not a firm base on which to rebuild government finances.

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38 See Report by the Council of the Indies, Madrid, 16 August 1816; and Report by Council of the Indies, Madrid, 18 March 1817; both in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 549; and Silvestre Collar to Juan Luzano de Torres, Palacio, 10 September 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 551.
39 Francisco Montalvo to Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 29 February 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 707.
40 Francisco Montalvo to Pablo Morillo, Cartagena, 13 July 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 707.

Other forms of confiscation also generated income for the state. In particular, the seizure of suspect boats off the Caribbean coast provided an irregular but still sizeable income for the government. On occasion the value of contraband goods seized exceeded $30,000. See Reports by the Council of the Indies on capture of suspect boats, 21 October 1815, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 549.
Moreover, Ferdinand VII had ordered all aspects of government to return to their condition in 1808. The royalist administration thus made efforts to restore the institutions which had provided the bulk of New Granada's income prior to 1808. The most significant of these was the tobacco monopoly. The tobacco monopoly had been introduced into New Granada in 1764 by the Marqués de Esquilache, and it rapidly became the single most important contributor to the viceregal treasury. Following changes introduced in the 1780s, the monopoly regularly generated between $80,000 and $100,000 each year in the Department of Cartagena alone. Nationally, it had produced an annual yield of some $300,000 for the crown. The war brought changes to the monopoly and its administration.

The monopoly had always been unpopular, and its abolition often accompanied the first outbreaks of independence; Quito's Supreme Junta simply abolished the monopoly in 1809. Even in royalist Panama, the tobacco monopoly was abolished by gubernatorial decree in 1813, because of the "absoluta falta de tabacos". (The monopoly was, moreover, abolished by the Cortes in March 1814, but this decree was rendered obsolete by the

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41 Allan J. Kuethe, "The Early Reforms of Charles III in the Viceroyalty of New Granada, 1759-1776", in Reform and Insurrection, p. 31.
43 McFarlane, Colombia before Independence, pp. 222-223. Restrepo gives the figure of $470,000 annually. See Restrepo, Historia de la revolución, vol. 1, pp. 28-29.
44 Restrepo, Historia de la revolución, vol. 1, pp. 112, 150.
45 Carlos Meyner to (?), Panama, 29 November 1813, AGI, Audiencia de Panama, legajo 262.
return of Ferdinand.\textsuperscript{46} The insurgents in Cartagena did not abolish the tobacco monopoly outright, although in 1814 they combined it with several other monopolies to create the “Rentas Unidas”.\textsuperscript{47} During this period, tobacco was sold at a higher price than previously, but monopoly officials reported that income from tobacco actually fell during the years of insurgent rule. The various monopolies were disaggregated as soon as the royalists recaptured Cartagena, although monopoly officials were unable to occupy the Casa de Tabacos, as it was being used to house part of the Regimiento de León.\textsuperscript{48} The tobacco monopoly was officially reestablished in the department on 20 August 1816, and local trade in tobacco slowly picked up during the remainder of 1816. That year the monopoly produced a net yield of some $7,800 in the department of Cartagena. Gross income had exceeded $15,000, but many expenses ate away the profits.\textsuperscript{49}

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\textsuperscript{47}Report on the Tobacco Monopoly by Ramón de Herrera, Cartagena, 12 February 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 717. The Rentas Unidas combined the tobacco monopoly with the aguardiente and playing-card monopolies, along with Alcabalas and Correos.
\textsuperscript{48}Francisco Montalvo to Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 22 June 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 707. Similar problems confronted the newly appointed administrators of the Aduana in Cartagena in January of 1816. They found the Aduana building full of soldiers who were billeted there; see Administrators of the Cartagena Aduana to Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 19 January 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 715.
\textsuperscript{49}A lot of money had to be spent in early 1816 on new equipment. See Josef María de la Verga to Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 21 March 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 717. See also Estado general que demuestra los productos de utilidad liquida que ha rendido la real renta de tabacos del Departamento de Cartagena desde el día 20 de agosto de 1816 . . . hasta del día 31 de diciembre del año pasado de 1818, Cartagena, 22 April 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 715; and Various documents related to tobacco monopoly in AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 707.

Furthermore, income from the monopoly was always at risk of being confiscated by the army, as regularly happened in Venezuela. (See German Carrera Damas, \textit{Bases, aspectos socio-económicos}, Colección Vigilia (Caracas, 1968), pp. 118-125.)
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During 1817 and 1818 revenues improved considerably, despite the loss of over 17,000 pounds of tobacco from Girón which fell into a stream near Mahates. In Cartagena the monopoly generated some $45,000 net each year. Nonetheless, overall income in the department reached only half the average in the years before the war, and in some of the smaller estanquillos income was only about 7% of the average during the colonial period.\textsuperscript{50} Other regions were slowly reincorporated into the estanco's orbit. One of the most important was Mompós, where the monopoly was reestablished on 17 May 1817. For the next two years it produced a respectable annual income of some $50,000.\textsuperscript{51}

In order to function, the monopoly needed a steady supply of tobacco. In some areas, especially around Ambalema, cultivation of tobacco had continued uninterrupted throughout the war, although this was not the case everywhere. Private, illegal production of tobacco also continued in many regions, especially around Valledupar.\textsuperscript{52} After the battle of Boyacá and the loss of Santa Fe in 1819, the tobacco monopoly generated virtually no income for the royalists, as the areas around Mompós and Ambalema, where most of the tobacco was produced, had been

\textsuperscript{50}Estado general que demuestra los productos de utilidad liquida que ha rendido la real renta de tavacos del Departamento de Cartagena desde el día 20 de agosto de 1816 . . . hasta del día 31 de diciembre del año pasado de 1818, Cartagena, 22 April 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 715. See Izard, \textit{El miedo a la revolución}, p. 117, for comments about the tobacco monopoly in Venezuela, where income declined by more than 80%.

\textsuperscript{51}See Monthly and annual reports from cajas reales de Mompós, 1817-1818, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 715. I have only very limited information about the restoration of the monopoly elsewhere.

\textsuperscript{52}See Griffin, \textit{Los temas sociales}, p. 34; and Report on Tobacco in Valledupar, Cartagena, 15 October 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 742.
captured by the republicans. Tobacco then had to be imported from Cuba to supply the addictions of royalist Neogranadans.

In the South, both the tobacco and aguardiente monopolies were reestablished in 1817, but neither appears to have produced any income of significance. The monopolies continued, however, to attract the same unwanted attention they had suffered in the previous century. In September 1819, after the battle of Boyacá, tobacco factories in the Cauca Valley were the first targets of resurgent republican guerrillas. The administrator of the tobacco monopoly in Popayán reported that, on 29 September 1819,

Se quitó la máscara el pueblo de Santa Ana y el de Llanogrande, y lo primero que hicieron fue entrar en la factoría [de tabaco] echando sus puertas por tierra, y distribuir o robar todo el tabaco, que justamente era mucho, pues estaban llenos todos los almacenes. Afirmán varios que después de haber saqueado dicha factoría, la han quemado, pero no se nada de cierto.

The factory had indeed been burned, and the administrator of the factory was killed, along with several other monopoly officials.

53 Gabriel de Torres to Alejandro Ramírez, Cartagena, 5 June 1820, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 714; and Report by administrador de tabacos, Cartagena, 24 September 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 742.
54 Report by administrador de tabacos, Cartagena, 24 September 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 742. Excess tobacco from other royalist regions was also sent to Cartagena to augment the city’s supply; see Report by contador general de tabacos, Cartagena, 18 November 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 742.
55 Isidro Villareal to Contador general de tabacos, Popayán, 21 September 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 742; and José Solís to Simón Sicilia, Popayán, 16 July 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631.
56 Isidro Villareal to José Rodríguez, Popayán, 8 September 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 742. See also Isidro Villareal to contador general de tabacos, Popayán, 21 September 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 742.

For information on eighteenth-century opposition to the tobacco monopoly, see McFarlane, *Colombia before Independence*, pp. 214-215; and, for example, Pedro de Becaría to Crown, Popayán, 2 October 1781, BL, Egerton 1807, fol. 572.
The other great arm of colonial finance was the aguardiente monopoly. Always unpopular, it had been abolished by Santa Fe’s insurgent Congress. It was, however, reestablished by the royalists even before the recapture of Cartagena, so important was it considered.57 At the time some slight, temporary, changes were made in its administration. In particular, Francisco Montalvo decreed that individual distillers would be allowed to set up personal contracts with the government for the production of aguardiente.58 (Since 1780 all distillation was to be carried out only by government distillers.) This liberalisation was, however, only temporary. On 11 May 1816, the monopoly was reopened in all its original glory. No more individual distillation was permitted, an administrator was appointed, and the governor ordered haciendas to begin growing sugar-cane.59 Problems immediately became apparent. By 11 June 1816 not a single producer had presented himself to Governor Torres to state how much sugar-cane he intended to grow, and a shortage of excise guards prevented vigorous prosecution of illegal production.60

57 Griffin, Los temas sociales, p. 44; and Circular by Francisco Montalvo, Torrecilla, 30 November 1815, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 707.
58 Circular de Francisco Montalvo, Torrecilla, 30 November 1815, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 717.
59 Circular de Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 11 May 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 717; and Orders relating to the reestablishment of the aguardiente monopoly, Cartagena, May 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 707.
60 Bando de Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 11 June 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 717; and Lorenzo Hangauez(?) to Francisco Montalvo, Cartagena, 11 June 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 707.

Importation into New Granada of Peruvian aguardiente, "muy estimado allí", according to Viceroy Montalvo, also reduced the sale of the Neogranadan product. Finally, in Cartagena much of the equipment used to make aguardiente had been destroyed and had to be replaced.

The reconstructed aguardiente monopoly thus got off to a slow start. In 1816, it produced less than $600 net in the department of Cartagena. This situation led Governor Torres in early 1817 to repeat the order reestablishing the monopoly and outlawing private production. Income seems to have improved, but, even in 1818, the monopoly generated a net income in Cartagena of only about $8,000. This was a far cry from the $40,000 to $50,000 routinely produced in the province in the years before the war. Contraband and illegal production continued to be a problem until the end of the war. In 1819, for example, the administrator of the aguardiente monopoly in Cartagena complained of the flagrant violations of monopoly law occurring in the town of Chiriguaná. There, he reported, all

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62 Report by Council of the Indies, 14 February 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 549.
63 Bando de Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 27 January 1817, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 717.
64 See Report by Ventura Ferrer, Cartagena, 1 September 1817, and Various reports on the cajas reales de Cartagena; all in AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 715.
65 See Report by Ventura Ferrer, Cartagena, 1 September 1817, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 715; and Report on income in Cartagena in 1809, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 717. The figures for the aguardiente monopoly are less contradictory than those for tobacco.
aguardiente was supplied by private clandestine distilleries, which operated with the full knowledge of the town’s officials.66

The aguardiente monopoly was, if anything, more unpopular than the tobacco monopoly, and even royalist officials tried to use the war as an excuse to abolish it.67 In Panama, the monopoly had been abolished outright by Viceroy Pérez, ostensibly to reward the province for its loyalty.68 In Cartagena, the city’s cabildo complained that the reestablishment of the aguardiente monopoly had caused “males incalculables” to the province, and suggested that the complete elimination of the monopoly would be the best way to revive the region’s stagnant economy. Cartagena’s Governor Torres supported this view, and added his voice to the call for deregulation. Indeed, in early 1819 Viceroy Sámano himself was considering whether the monopoly served any useful purpose, and appointed a committee of experts to consider the issue.69 In the end, however, no changes were sanctioned.

66Report by contador general de aguardiente, Cartagena, 29 October 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 742. See also Estado que manifiesta el consumo de caudales, Cartagena, 20, April 1819, nota 1, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 715.

67For eighteenth-century opposition to the aguardiente monopoly, see Gilma Lucía Mora de Tovar, Aguardiente y conflictos sociales en la Nueva Granada durante el siglo XVIII, Universidad Nacional de Colombia (Bogotá, 1988).

68This measure was criticised by the Audiencia, which asserted that the treasury could not withstand the loss of income. See Michael Costeloe, Response to Revolution, Imperial Spain and the Spanish American Revolutions, 1810-1840, Cambridge University Press (1986), p. 122. Similarly, the city of Cuenca petitioned to be allowed to practice free trade in aguardiente. See Report by Council of the Indies, 8 November 1819, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 549.

69Report by Martín de Pando, Cartagena, 29 July 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 750; Juan Sámano to Gabriel de Torres, Santa Fe, 29 March 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 708; and Gabriel de Torres to Ferdinand, Cartagena, 15 July 1819, AHN, Estado, legajo 8725, doc. 9. This last document is also printed in Donaldo Bossa Herazo, Cartagena independiente: tradición y desarrollo, Ediciones Tercer Mundo (Bogotá, 1967), pp. 69-76.
Other branches of the exchequer were similarly affected by the oscillating forces of the royalists and insurgents. Indian tribute, for example, was repeatedly abolished, and restored by succeeding regimes. By 1810 its fate appeared to have been sealed. In that year it was abolished by both the insurgent Junta Suprema de Santa Fe and the Cortes in Spain.70 Tribute was, however, far from finished as a fiscal force. For both the Junta and the Cortes, abolition had been based on philosophical principles; no advice was given on how to replace the revenue previously provided by tributes. This was not a serious problem in areas like Cartagena, where tribute generated a minute income, but it did pose difficulties for the authorities in Santa Marta, who still depended on tribute to pay its clergy.71 As a result, the suppression was effectively ignored in such areas both in New Granada and elsewhere. In Peru, where tribute accounted for one-third of all government revenues, Viceroy Abascal simply continued collecting it, merely changing the name to “special contribution”.72 The problem of replacing income derived from tribute was rendered academic after Ferdinand’s return to the

71 Tomás de Acosta to Regency, Santa Marta, 23 August 1811, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 745; and Ernesto Restrepo Tirado, Historia de la Provincia de Santa Marta, vol. 2, Ministerio de Educación Nacional, (Bogotá, 1953), p. 336.
72 Edmundo Heredia, Planes españoles para reconquistar hispanoamérica 1810/1818, Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires (Buenos Aires, 1874), p. 120; and Anna, Spain and the Loss of America, p. 94.

In Popayán and Quito, tribute was collected continuously throughout the First Republic, although the level of tribute payments oscillated greatly. See Brian Hamnett, “Popular Insurrection and Royalist Reaction”, p. 310; Cabildo of Pasto to Ferdinand, BL, Egerton 1809, fol. 442; Sergio Elias Ortiz, Agustín Aguadango y su tiempo, Editorial ABC (Bogotá, 1958), p. 141; and the documents cited in Arboleda Llorente (editor), Catálogo del Archivo Central del Cauca, vol. 3, p. 87, and vol. 5, pp. 39-41.
throne. The king announced tribute’s reestablishment under the new name of “contribución” in March 1815, and this order was repeated in New Granada in November 1815, during the siege of Cartagena. It was not until August 1817, however, that the viceregal government in New Granada set about reassembling the lists of tribute payers for those regions where they had been lost. It is not clear how much money the royalists collected in tributes after its reinstitution.

§3. Specie and Sorteos

Thus far we have discussed the restoration of certain branches of the colonial administration, and their success in generating income for the royalist administration. Spain’s governments were also prepared to consider other methods for producing capital. One of the more ingenious ideas for raising money for New Granada’s royalist government was considered by the Council of the Indies in 1818. In that year the Council discussed a proposal to establish a national lottery in New Granada. State lotteries already existed in Mexico City and Havana, as well as in Spain itself. The Mexico City lottery was itself relatively new and distinctive, in that the purchase of tickets was obligatory. Viceroy Calleja had established the forced lottery in 1815 to raise money for royal administration, but it was later

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73Circular de Francisco Montalvo, Torrecilla, 30 November 1815, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 717; and Francisco Montalvo to Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 30 August 1817, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 708. See also Ots y Capdequi, Las instituciones del Nuevo Reino de Granada, p. 383.
74See Report by the Council of the Indies, 21 August 1818, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 549. Similar plans to establish a monthly lottery in Caracas had already been examined; see Martín de Garay to (?), Palacio, 13 March 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Caracas, legajo 386.
abolished by his successor, Viceroy Apodaca. When the proposal for a (non-obligatory) lottery in New Granada was considered, the Council of the Indies was enthusiastic, as the plan seemed a painless way of raising money. In the end, nothing came of the proposal, as an exclusive right to establish lotteries in the Americas had already been granted to Gaspar Rico y Angulo, an honorary minister of the Cajas Reales in Lima. Rico had proposed extending the existing Lima-based lottery (known as the 'suerte') to all of South America. He predicted that the income from this lottery could be increased from the current level of $40,000 per year to $80,000. The government in Spain, completely ignorant of the existence of the Lima suerte, had at first been slightly suspicious of the plan, but in the end it was approved. Rico, however, did not exercise his right to set up a lottery in New Granada, and so the idea of a national lottery was abandoned until the republicans came to power.

A further feature of royalist fiscal policy during the war years was a constant concern with the supply of specie. Cash had been in short supply throughout the colonial period, primarily because most of New Granada's supply of gold and silver was remitted to Spain. The unavailability of liquid assets hampered economic expansion, and frequently rebounded to the government's disadvantage. In the 1770s, for example, the crown had been unable to sell many of the recently-confiscated Jesuit properties in southern New Granada precisely because potential

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76 See Martín de Garay to José Manuel de Aparici, Palacio, 30 December 1816, AGI, Audiencia de Lima, legajo 1618; and also Juan Sámano to Comandante of Mompós, Santa Fe, 28 February 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 708.
buyers could not lay hands on enough cash.77 This problem continued to plague New Granada during the war, which itself increased the financial pressures on governments and also encouraged the clandestine export of specie. One response was the printing of paper money. This measure, always wildly unpopular, was tried by the insurgents during the Patria Boba in Cartagena. There the paper currency immediately underwent tremendous inflation.78 The forced introduction of this inflated paper money into Santa Marta and the Guajiro Peninsula particularly incensed the royalists there79 Paper money was again printed in Cartagena during the years of royalist rule, when it too lost value to inflation.80

In addition to the disliked paper money, there were also various coins. Before the outbreak of the war, several debased coinages had circulated in New Granada; the most well known of these was a silver coin called 'macuquina'. These were joined during the war of independence by a collection of other unofficial coins minted by both insurgents and royalists. 'Chinas' and 'Cascarillas', copper and silver coins, circulated throughout New Granada, while 'Chipichipe' and 'Morillera' (named after Morillo)

78From December 1813 to December 1815 the paper currency allegedly underwent a 100% inflation. See Ramón de Herrera to corregidor intendente de Cartagena, Cartagena, 15 December 1814; and Report by Juan Ramón de Irujo on currency in Cartagena, Cartagena, 1 May 1817; both in AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 889B
79 Ayuntamiento de Santa Marta to Minister of Grace and Justice, Santa Marta, 16 September 1813, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 746.
80Report by Martín de Pando, Cartagena, 29 July 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 750. Paper money was also printed in Caracas by the republicans during the first and second republics. It was equally unpopular there. See Carrera Dumas, *Boves*, pp. 126-140, for a discussion of the fiscal crisis in Venezuela.
were used in Venezuela. These coins were known collectively as *moneda provisional*. They were minted in very small denominations, and thus filled the gap that had existed during the colonial period. Unfortunately, the quality of these coins was extremely poor, and their weights varied tremendously. For this reason, as soon as the Spanish began the siege of Cartagena they ordered that the circulation of all provisional money be limited to the Province of Cartagena. This measure met with great opposition; immediately after the recapture of Cartagena, for example, the governor of Santa Marta asked to be allowed to continue circulating *moneda provisional* in his province, as there were no other small coins available. Accordingly, the restrictions on the coins’ circulation was lifted in May 1816. The matter was nonetheless brought to the attention of King Ferdinand himself, who instigated plans to eliminate the *moneda provisional* entirely. Serious efforts began in mid-1818, and, on 18 January 1819, the order abolishing all *moneda provisional* was

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81 See Aviso al público, Cartagena, 28 September 1821, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 717; and Izard, *El miedo a la revolución*, p. 122.
82 In some areas the *moneda provisional* underwent great inflation. In Antioquia it lost over 50% of its value in the course of a few days in 1818. See José María Restrepo Saenz, Gobernadores de Antioquia, 1571-1819, vol. 1, Imprenta Nacional (Bogotá, 1932), p. 338. Pascual Enríquez similarly asserts that, by 1817, insurgent-coined money had lost 78% of its face value. See Exposition by Pascual Enríquez, Madrid, 19 June 1817, AGI, Estado 57, Doc 35-c (2a).
83 Francisco Montalvo to Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 27 April 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 707. The silver *macuquina* had been introduced into Santa Marta province in 1813 by Montalvo, who regarded the currency as extremely useful. See Francisco Montalvo to Juan Sámano, Cartagena, 30 January 1818, in Los últimos virreyes, pp. 19, 24, 125; also Juan Friede, *La otra verdad. La independencia americana vista por los españoles*, Editorial Tercer Mundo, (Bogotá, 1972), p. 51.
84 Bando de Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 2 May 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 717.
85 Council of the Indies to Ferdinand, Madrid, 12 December 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 551; and Royal Order, Madrid, 12 December 1817, BRAH, Sig. 9/7665 (leg. 22), fols. 575-577.
All such money was to be surrendered to the government, which would not offer any compensation.

This plan naturally proved extremely unpopular. By June 1820 a “disgusto general” reigned in Cartagena province because of the extinction of the macuquina and other provisional coins. To begin with, many people and institutions lost money, as no compensation was offered for surrendered coins. Moreover, the elimination of these coins deprived the country of a coinage in small denominations. This meant, for example, it was difficult to pay salaries or conduct business unless large amounts of money were owed. In response, the provincial government decided in mid-June 1820 to reissue the coinage with a different stamp; thus effectively reversing the withdrawal. The fate of the moneda provisional was emblematic of the royalists’ economic policies during the years of the reconquest. In an effort to restore some sort of order to New Granada’s economy, royalist administrators introduced policies which were guaranteed to be unpopular, were only partially implemented, and were ultimately unsuccessful.

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86 Council of the Indies, Palace, 14 July 1818, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 551; Petition by eight employees of Consulado de Cartagena, Cartagena, 1 December 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 711; and the various documents related to the extinction of the macuquina in Arboleda Llorente (editor), Catálogo del Archivo Central del Cauca, vol. 3, pp. 32-33, 102-103, vol. 4, p. 2; Actual collection of coins did not appear to begin until some time later.

87 Gabriel de Torres to Ferdinand, Cartagena, 16 June 1820, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 709.

88 See First declaration of Gabriel de Torres, Havana, 2 November 1824, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 2136A, fol. 28; and Petition by Estebana Zeballos, Cartagena(?), 28 December 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 711.

89 See, for example, Gabriel de Torres to (?), Cartagena, 15 July 1819, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8725, doc. 9; and Report by Tomás de Lara on the real administración de alcabalas de Cartagena de Indias, Cartagena, 31 December 1819, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 1017.

90 Report by junta general de tribunales, Cartagena, 17 June 1820, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 717.
§4. The Free Trade Dilemma in Cartagena

Intimately connected to New Granada’s financial viability, and hence to the royalists’ survival, was the status of external trade. We will here examine the royalists’ success in stimulating commercial activity in New Granada, looking specifically at the viceroyalty’s main port, Cartagena.

Cartagena had long been in economic difficulty. The underlying problem was a steady and long-term decline in trade. Once the mainstay of the economy, commerce had in fact been shrinking since the mid-eighteenth century, while contraband steadily increased further up the coast in Santa Marta and Ríohacha. Various efforts had been made at reviving the city’s commerce, but the most fundamental revolved around the question of free trade.

The question of whether to permit completely free trade between Spain’s remaining colonies and other countries remained unresolved throughout the years of the war. As might be expected, the measures advocated by Spain’s governments and the behaviour of individuals in New Granada did not always converge. In Spain itself, there was little agitation for freer trade. As the merchants in Cádiz played the principal role in raising money for royalist troops via the Comisión de Reemplazos, their opposition to any commercial reforms weighed especially heavily. Moreover, the Consulado de Cádiz was extremely unwilling to

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relinquish its virtual monopoly on the American trade. Indeed, the very formation of the Comisión de Reemplazos had been in part motivated by the desire to block moves toward free trade with friendly countries. The Cortes and the Regency consequently showed slight interest in enacting free-trade legislation, and it was not until February 1823 that Ferdinand belatedly sanctioned free trade in the Americas.

In the Americas, on the other hand, a considerable number of viceregal and local officials favoured free trade with friendly colonies. Viceroy Pezuela of Peru, for example, repeatedly urged the metropolis to legalise neutral trade, and permitted foreign ships to sell goods in Peru. In New Granada, merchants had been agitating for permission to trade with friendly colonies in the Caribbean for decades, and in 1808 Viceroy Antonio Amar had at last granted Cartagena’s traders the right to do business with foreigners. During the First Republic, Cartagena’s trading links with the Caribbean and the United States were further strengthened. Then, after Morillo’s capture of Cartagena, the general imposed a total blockade on Cartagena’s ports, thus ending all trade with these regions. However, there were soon calls for the blockade to be lifted. In view of the catastrophic economic situation in Cartagena, exacerbated by the royalist blockade, government officials recommended that the ports in Cartagena, Santa Marta and Riohacha be reopened, and that trade with friendly colonies be permitted according to the terms agreed in

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92 For comments about the attitude to free trade of Spain’s governments during the war, see Costeloe, *Response to Revolution*, pp. 119-148.

93 See Timothy Anna, *Spain and the Loss of America*, University of Nebraska Press (Lincoln, 1983), pp. 229-231; and also Gabriel de Torres to (?), Cartagena, 15 July 1819, AHN, Estado, legajo 8725, doc. 9.

94 For Viceroy Amar’s introduction of free trade in 1808, see McFarlane, *Colombia before Independence*, pp. 338-339, and also pp. 298-307.
1808 by Viceroy Amar. Morillo agreed to open Cartagena’s port two months later, in August 1816, and trade with the British colonies in the Caribbean was then permitted. This decision to reintroduce limited free trade was made without consulting Spain, which would doubtless not have approved. Considerable restrictions were nonetheless placed on this trade. In particular, an import tax of 21% was imposed on goods brought into New Granada, and duties between 2% and 7% were levied on exported goods. All trade had to be carried out via Spanish agents, and merchants who imported more goods than they exported were penalised. Moreover, certain imports were still restricted; the sale of cotton cloth produced outside the Spanish colonies, for example, remained prohibited. Nonetheless, this very partial liberalisation seems to have had a beneficial effect on Cartagena’s trade. Income from the Cartagena customs house roughly doubled from 1816 to 1817.

These alterations to the trading laws did not attract much praise from New Granada’s neighbours; on the contrary, the high import duties levied at Cartagena and Panama City were strongly criticised. In September 1819, Sir Home Popham, the Admiral of Jamaica and a great advocate of free trade, wrote to Viceroy Sámano to express his worries about the incredibly high taxes imposed.

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95 Bando de Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 3 September 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 717; and Pablo Morillo to Luis de Onís, Santa Fe, 17 August 1816, Antonio Rodríguez Villa, El Teniente General Don Pablo Morillo, Primer Conde de Cartagena, Marqués de la Puerta (1778-1837), Real Academia de la Historia (Madrid, 1908), vol. 3, p. 26.
96 Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 3 September 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 717.
97 Bando de Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 16 February 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 717.
98 See Various reports on the Aduana in Cartagena, 1816-1817, in AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 715.
being charged on British goods imported into New Granada.\textsuperscript{99} He pointed out that British goods imported into Panama paid a tax of 24\% of their value (increased to 36\% if not paid in advance). On leaving Panama, British goods were charged an additional 2\% export tax. Further taxes were then levied at the next port of arrival. In Lima an import tax of 42\% was levied on British goods. British goods imported into Lima via Panama were thus taxed at 68\%. This figure increased to a staggering 80\% if the import tax in Panama had not been paid in advance. Further taxes were levied on any cash exported from Panama. These sums were obviously excessive, and Popham observed that, under these circumstances, contraband was inevitable. He suggested that import taxes in Panama be lowered from 24\% to 17\%, which had been the level charged during Benito Pérez’s tenure as viceroy. Governor Torres of Cartagena concurred, and remarked that under current circumstances smuggling was merely a form of speculation.\textsuperscript{100}

Popham’s suggestions met with no success. Viceroy Sámano did not share Governor Torres’ views on freer trade. He claimed that the undeniable decline in trade with the British Caribbean was, rather, the result of republican piracy, and did his best to reduce, rather than expand, the size of Anglo-Spanish trade.\textsuperscript{101} He regarded free trade as an open door to fraud, and felt it was inherently disadvantageous to Spaniards. It was not until 1820 that trade with the Caribbean colonies was again permitted. In

\textsuperscript{99} Home Popham to Juan Sámano, Jamaica, 21 September 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 741B. Sir Home Popham was the leader of the disastrous British invasion of Río de la Plata in 1806.

\textsuperscript{100} See Gabriel de Torres to (?), Cartagena, 15 July 1819, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8725, doc. 9. See also similar comments on contraband in McFarlane, Colombia before Independence, p. 154n.

\textsuperscript{101} Juan Sámano to Gabriel de Torres, Santa Fe, 29 March 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 708.
July 1820, the republican General Mariano Montilla laid siege to Cartagena, cutting off the city’s supply of food from the mainland. Even before the official establishment of the blockade Montilla’s troops had advanced steadily into the province, and, as a consequence, food had been rationed since April 1820. The blockade intensified the city’s comestible and financial difficulties, and increasing amounts of government money had to be spent on purchasing food from abroad. In an attempt to stave off total collapse, Governor Torres decided to abolish all taxes on the importation of food, and to allow food-bearing ships to import an additional amount of non-edible merchandise tax-free. Although these measures were initially successful, they did not provide enough food to supply the city, and, in any event, by early 1821 the government was unable even to pay for food already purchased. In September 1821 the city surrendered to General Montilla “por falta de víveres”. Spanish officials during the war of independence thus continued the traditional practice of loosening restrictions on trade in times of exceptional crises. By 1820 this approach succeeded neither in stimulating

102 Lorenzo Corbacho and Carlos Joaquín de Urisorri to Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 5 April 1820, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 715.
103 See Gabriel de Torres to Alejandro Ramírez, Cartagena, 19 August 1820; and José María Ramírez to Juan Sámano, Havana, 7 November 1819; both in AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 714.
104 Merchants could import up to 1/3 the value of the food in other merchandise. See Proclama de Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 13 September 1820, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 714.
105 Marcos de Caz to Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 3 January 1821, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 715. The treasury contained only $1,500, all of it moneda provisional, which had become worthless after the extinction of this coinage; see First declaration of Gabriel de Torres, Havana, 2 November 1824, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 2136A.
106 Declarations of Ramón Pérez and Francisco Pérez Dávila, Havana, 11 November 1824, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 2136A. See also the lengthy investigation into the reasons for Cartagena’s surrender contained in AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajos 2136A-D.
much commercial activity in Cartagena, nor in solving the grave alimentary problems that confronted the city.

Indeed, the royalist fiscal management of Cartagena, their quasi-capital, was plagued with difficulties throughout the reconquest period. Within months of the Spanish occupation, Cartagena was suffering from considerable inflation.\textsuperscript{107} Moreover, by June 1816, the city was reportedly spending over $46,000 each month, while monthly income was less than $5,000.\textsuperscript{108} As a result of the city’s ever-decreasing financial reserves, drastic cuts were made in the government’s staffing levels.\textsuperscript{109} For example, the customs-house, which in 1810 had employed nine men, was combined with the offices of Contaduría and the Treasury, which in 1810 had employed eleven. This new, combined office was then staffed by only seven employees. The work-force of the three branches was thus reduced by nearly two-thirds.\textsuperscript{110}

Provincial income rose somewhat in 1817. The introduction of trade with friendly colonies seems to have permitted a doubling of receipts in the Aduana, but few of the other branches

\textsuperscript{107}Francisco Montalvo to Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 29 February 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 707; and also Pedro Rodríguez and Vicente Colorete to Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 23 May 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 717.

\textsuperscript{108}Report by Junta in Cartagena, Cartagena, 28 June 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 707. Most of the city’s income was spent on military salaries and expenses. See Sumario de los valores de los ramos de cargo y data de las reales cajas de Cartagena . . . en el año corrido desde 1 de enero hasta 31 de diciembre de 1816, Cartagena, 1 January 1817, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 715.

\textsuperscript{109}Francisco Montalvo to Minister of Grace and Justice, Cartagena, 2 August 1816, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631. Also see Pedro Rodríguez and Vicente Colorete to Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 23 May 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 717.

\textsuperscript{110}Complaint by officials at the Aduana, Cartagena, 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 717. Similar job losses occurred elsewhere. The governor of Ríohacha, José Solís, was obliged in 1819 to make a number of state employees redundant in an effort to save money; see José Solís to Juan Sámano, Ríohacha, 10 November 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 745.
of the exchequer showed similar growth. None of the royal monopolies generated income even remotely approaching that yielded before the war. Moreover, military expenses continued to rise. By 1818 the Cajas Reales de Cartagena reported a deficit of $220,659.111 Various treasury officials drew attention to the decline in income. In a report from 1819, for example, Tomás de Lara, an administrator in the Renta de Alcabalas, compared the income from alcabalas during the three year periods from 1805 to 1808, and from 1817 to 1819. His report is a litany of decline: "Ramo de Tiendas de Pulperías: no puede producir como entonces, por haber demolido el gobierno muchas, y las mejores, que se hallaban situadas en el Camellón del Puente. Ramo de Mercaderes: tampoco puede producir tanto, por haberse cerrado muchas en razón a la pobreza del comercio. . ."112 Average annual income from the Renta de Alcabalas in Cartagena had by 1819 fallen to nearly half the level before the war.

The financial strain on Cartagena’s citizenry was increased by the army’s continual demands for food and money, and by the various taxes and forced contributions extracted from the public, which will be detailed in subsequent chapters. At first, forced contributions were imposed on suspected republicans, but this source of money eventually dried up. Cartagena’s royalists then found themselves obliged to dig deeply into their own pockets. Starting in February 1819, a forced loan of $22,000 was levied

111 The economic data on Cartagena is extremely contradictory; other figures appear to show the Cajas to be $225 in credit. (See the many documents in AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 715). The figures offered here seems to me the best interpretation of the wildly differing figures available, but are certainly not definitive.
112 Report by Tomás de Lara on the real administración de alcabalas de Cartagena de Indias, Cartagena, 31 December 1819, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 1017.
monthly on the province.\textsuperscript{113} This was predictably unpopular, but, contrary to all expectations, was paid regularly. The forced loan was followed swiftly in March 1819 by a new tax. From that month a $1\frac{1}{2}\%$ tax was levied on all properties in the province. The alcabala was, moreover, raised from 2\% to 5\%.\textsuperscript{114} Cartagena’s property-owners regarded this as the final blow. The cabildo denied roundly any possibility of paying the tax, and suggested that instead efforts should be made to end the “inmoderado y criminal” contraband trade based in Ríohacha and Santa Marta. They also advised eliminating the aguardiente monopoly, a suggestion which was ignored.\textsuperscript{115}

Such measures proved wholly inadequate to Cartagena’s desperate financial state. By August 1820, the public treasury had been reduced to “una absoluta nulidad”. “Una nulidad,” Governor Torres added:

De que no podrá salir en muchos años, aún suponiendo se consiguiese muy pronto la total pacificación de estos paises, porque las rentas, el comercio, y la agricultura han desaparecido de ellos casi enteremente por consecuencia de la guerra encarnizada y destructora que sufre hace diez años.\textsuperscript{116}

\textsuperscript{113}Gabriel de Torres to Ferdinand, Cartagena, 16 June 1820, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 709.
\textsuperscript{114}Report by Martín de Pando, Cartagena, 29 July 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 750; and Juan Sámano to Gabriel de Torres, Santa Fe, 19 June 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 708.
\textsuperscript{115}Report by Martín de Pando, Cartagena, 29 July 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 750. There were also complaints about the manner in which property-values were assessed; see Representation by Juan Berenguer and Juan Simó, Cartagena, 30 October 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 747; and also Various requests for exemptions from the $1\frac{1}{2}\%$ tax, Cartagena, August 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 711.
\textsuperscript{116}Gabriel de Torres to Minister of Hacienda, Cartagena, 18 August 1820, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 1017. See also Gabriel de Torres to Juan Sámano, Cartagena, 20 March 1819, \textit{Los ejércitos del Rey}, 1819, vol. 2,
Cartagena's fate illustrates the insufficiency of the royalists' efforts to restore New Granada to the flourishing pre-revolutionary state lauded by Viceroy Montalvo in 1815. While attempts were made to restore the royal monopolies, and to revive trade, these efforts failed. Profits from the royal monopolies, which in the later years of the eighteenth century had been reckoned in hundreds of thousands of pesos, fell to a few thousand, or at most, tens of thousands of pesos during the years of the reconquest. Similar declines occurred in most other areas of imperial receipts. By the time of its surrender to the republicans in 1821, the quasi-capital city of Cartagena was bankrupt. The economic reconquest was a failure. It was not, however, the only failure. In the following section, we will examine the increasing air of crisis that enveloped the reconquest, as the state of military finance, the troops' health, and their relations with Neogranadans deteriorated.

Alberto Lee López (editor), Biblioteca de la Presidencia de la República, (Bogotá, 1989), pp. 18-21; and Ventura Ferrer and Vicente Colorete to (?), Cartagena, 9 September 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 747.
PART III: CRISIS
Chapter 7: Spaniard and Reinoso

In 1816, while the Spanish army was winning military victories in New Granada, the republicans were enjoying a comeback in Venezuela. In May 1816, Bolívar returned to the mainland, and Arismendi recaptured Margarita. Consequently, in November 1816, Morillo returned to Venezuela, leaving Juan Sámano as governor of Santa Fe. Some 5,000 royalist troops remained behind in New Granada, although various of these units left New Granada in the ensuing months. All had to march across the Llanos of Casanare and San Martín, and many experienced considerable difficulties in obtaining sufficient food, despite the efforts Morillo had made to ensure that the routes were stocked with provisions.1

After Morillo’s return to Venezuela, the royalists’ military hold on New Granada slowly weakened. Small uprisings in Purificación, Vélez, Natagaima, and Prado in 1816 were suppressed without great difficulty, but matters soon took a dramatic turn for the worse. In March 1817, the insurgent Nonato Pérez and local Indians killed Lieutenant Colonel Julián Bayer and captured Chire and Pore. Meanwhile, Pamplona rose in revolt, and forces led by José Hilario Mora harassed royalists across the Cauca Valley. Guerrilla groups around Socorro, protected by Antonia Santos, engaged in small-scale operations until the execution of

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1See Proyecto de marcha para la vanguardia de la division de los Llanos para su movimiento desde Pore a Guasdualito, December, 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 897
Santos in July 1819. The Almeyda brothers of Cúcuta briefly occupied Chocontá, less than fifty miles north of Santa Fe. In the capital itself, Policarpa Salavarrieta organised an ambitious (and unsuccessful) plot to subvert royalist troops in the city’s garrison. Throughout 1817 and 1818 continuing insurgence, particularly in the Llanos de Casanare, occupied the army’s attention. In the Llanos and elsewhere, small groups of guerrillas launched attacks on royalist troops and then retreated, defying capture. None of these groups enjoyed any lasting success, but all succeeded in alarming the royalists and obliged them to spend months chasing small forces across large distances. Royalist officers, making little headway, lashed out at civilians, burning villages and arresting indiscriminately. The uprising in the Llanos led by the Almeyda brothers met with particularly fierce repression from Carlos Tolrá, the royalist officer in charge of the counter-insurgency campaign. Tolrá did not, however, succeed in crushing the revolt, and, by

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2On the death of Bayer, see Pablo Morillo to Minister of War, Chaguarama, 8 May 1817 and Cumaná, 28 August 1817, Antonio Rodríguez Villa, El Teniente General Don Pablo Morillo, Primer Conde de Cartagena, Marqués de la Puerta (1778-1837), Real Academia de Historia (Madrid, 1980-1910), vol 3, pp. 379-385 and 430-439. (Restrepo reports that it was Francisco Rodríguez, and not Nonato Pérez, who captured Bayer. See José Manuel Restrepo, Historia de la revolución de Colombia, Ediciones Bedout (Medellín, 1969), vol 2, pp. 163-164.) Bayer’s mother did not learn of her son’s death until the winter of 1820. See Viuda de Bayer to Miguel de la Torre, Isla de Bugén [Bol hin?], 9 October 1820, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8739, doc. 41.

For the 1816 uprisings in Purificación and elsewhere, see Oswaldo Díaz Díaz, la reconquista española, Historia Extensa de Colombia, vol. 6, Ediciones Lerner (Bogotá, 1967), vol 1, pp. 171-178; and Rafael Sevilla, Memorias de un oficial del ejército español, campañas contra Bolívar y los separatistas de América, Editorial América (Madrid, 1916) pp. 86-87. For information on Mora, see Díaz Díaz, la reconquista española, vol 1, pp. 149-168, and Noticias sobre José Ylario Mora, Cartagena, 21 July 1817, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 717. For details about Santos and Salavarrieta, see Díaz Díaz, La reconquista española, vol. 2, pp. 230-256; and vol. 1, pp. 335-395, respectively. Much information about the many small republican guerrillas may be found throughout Díaz Díaz, la reconquista española.
early 1818, the royalists had been forced to withdraw entirely from the Llanos.\textsuperscript{3} The republican capture of Angostura in July 1817 further weakened Spain’s hold on Venezuela.\textsuperscript{4}

From 1817 onwards, then, the populace that had once welcomed the Spanish now turned against them. The Expeditionary Army was unable to win back the confidence of New Granada’s population. This was due in large part to Morillo’s approach to ‘pacification’. While military force enabled Spain to reassert its authority in the region and to re-erect the system of viceregal government, the activities of the armed forced inflicted considerable damage on relations between government and its colonial subjects. Leaving aside the behaviour of troops during actual military engagements, their actions off the battlefield occasioned much complaint and soured the reconquest years even for ardent royalists. Royalist soldiers were accused of virtually every possible crime, from theft to murder. As Viceroy Montalvo put it, “en todos estos partes [se] verá las enormes contribuciones impuestas y exigidas violentamente, el maltrato, las vejaciones con que [las tropas han] oprimido a los pueblos, el desorden y licencia con que se han apoderado de bestia, ganado, alajas y cuanto han

\textsuperscript{3}For information about the guerrilla war in the Llanos, see Díaz Díaz, \textit{la reconquista española}, vol 2, pp. 29-112; and Jane Rausch, \textit{A Tropical Plains Frontier: the Llanos of Colombia, 1531-1831}, University of New Mexico Press (Albuquerque, 1984), Chapter 7. For further information, see Pablo Morillo to Minister of War, Cura, 26 February 1818, Rodríguez Villa, \textit{Pablo Morillo}, vol 3, pp. 510-518; Simón Bolívar to José Félix Blanco, San Miguel, 1 July 1817, \textit{Escritos del Libertador}, vol 10, Sociedad Bolivariana de Venezuela, (Caracas, 1973), pp. 277-279; Simón Bolívar to Luis Brion, San Fernando, 15 May 1818, and Simón Bolívar to José Leandro Palacios, Angostura, 11 July 1818, both in \textit{Selected Writings of Bolívar}, vol 1, pp. 153-155, 161-162.

\textsuperscript{4}See Sevilla, \textit{Memorias}, pp. 171-200 for a royalist account of the siege.
creido convenirles". After receiving a generally warm reception during their triumphant campaign of 1816, the royalists were to wear out their welcome in the years of military occupation that followed, so that, when challenged by republican forces in 1819, they found scant support from New Granada's population.

Relations between royal government and its Neogranadan subjects were disrupted by several factors, but the behaviour of the army must be counted among the most important. Antagonism between the civilian population and crown forces, both regular troops and militias, was not new to New Granada. Allan J. Kuethe has shown that, after the reform of the military following the Comunero rebellion of 1781, the higher ranks of officer were reserved for peninsulars, and, to make desertion more difficult, recruits were usually posted far from their homes. As a consequence, the troops were regarded more as "a foreign army of occupation" than as an legitimate native institution. However, these earlier problems paled into insignificance compared to those generated by Morillo's invading troops when the Spanish army entered New Granada in force after 1815. The royalists arrived as a conquering army, charged with defeating what they were told was a group of traitors and 'egoists'. These infidentes, the troops were told, were to be regarded as common criminals, not enemy combatants entitled to any rights under the

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5 Francisco Montalvo to Minister of Grace and Justice, Cartagena, 24 September 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631.
6 Allan J. Kuethe, Military Reform and Society in New Granada, 1773-1808, University of Florida Press (Gainsville, 1978), p. 102; and, for comments about the unpopularity of military service in Mexico, see Christon Archer, The Army in Bourbon Mexico, 1760-1810, University of New Mexico Press (Albuquerque, 1977), pp. 223-253.
laws of war. Second, the army was consistently under-funded, as we will see in Chapter 8. It was thus forced to live off the land, which in practice meant living off New Granada’s populace. This inevitably caused conflict. Finally, the royalist soldiers who arrived in Venezuela with Morillo in 1815 were Spanish, not American. Spanish officers found New Granada surprisingly different from Spain and generally distrusted Americans, and they communicated these views to their peninsular troops in the early years of the war, before the army was largely creolised. These facts coloured the royalist army’s interactions with Neogranadans, and set the sharply confrontational tone that was to characterise the entire reconquest and its aftermath. Continually in search of supplies and labour, and inherently suspicious of the populace, the royalist army perhaps inevitably abused both republican troops and local inhabitants.

§1. Soldiers and Civilians

The geography of South America was quite unlike anything the Spanish soldiers had seen before, and it made a deep impression on the expeditionaries. Surprised officers commented on the unfamiliar landscapes in their official reports and private communications. The vast size of the Llanos de Casanare particularly impressed the Spanish, while the region north of Santa Fe struck several officers as very attractive. The wildlife

7See, for example, Sevilla, Memorias, p. 84; Francisco Ximénez to Juan Sámano, Apiay, 6 January 1817, BRAH, sig. 9/7665 (leg. 22), fols. 199-200; Ejército Expedicionario, Resumen histórico de las operaciones y movimientos de las columnas y tropas . . . desde el mes de Noviembre de 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 759B; Description of route past Mogotes,
was also unfamiliar. Tigers, armadillos, snakes, and many species of birds confronted Spanish troops. Like travellers everywhere, Spanish soldiers collected souvenirs of the unusual sights; officer Rafael Sevilla brought home some alligator teeth as a memento.8

Many expeditionaries regarded Neogranadans themselves as equally different. Hostility between creoles and peninsulars had increased markedly in the last decades of the eighteenth century. The impact of the enlightenment and Bourbon reforms had fed tensions which were heightened by the outbreak of revolution. The movement for independence was led by creoles; this merely confirmed Spanish suspicions about creole loyalty. Nor were the Spanish prepared to view Indians with a more favourable eye. Centuries of prejudice encouraged peninsulars to find Indians docile, unthinking and submissive.9 Official military communiqués reinforced these views; army reports on New Granada tended to classify civilians into various uncomplimentary categories. The inhabitants of Rionegro, for example, were described as being “de genio altivo, delicados, apáticos, inconstantes, rencillosos, murmuradores”. Worse, the women

couldn’t keep secrets and didn’t go to church. Moreover, many Spaniards were quite unprepared for the racial heterogeneity of both New Granada and Venezuela. Sevilla, on his arrival in Venezuela, was shocked by the appearance of the first Black woman he saw: “el pelo erizado de aquella mujer, sus miembros demacrados y su desaseo me hicieron volver la cara de puro asco. Parecía la estampa de la herejía”. Such low opinions about Venezuela’s Black population extended to the Black or mulatto soldiers fighting for Spain, whom Spanish officers compared to desert Arabs, a designation that was not intended as a compliment.

The Spanish were by and large no more impressed by New Granada’s creole population. Indeed, the arrogant behaviour of young Spanish officers, and their open contempt for middle-aged creoles incensed the latter, who expected to be treated with some measure of respect. The Spanish officers, who were often quite young, lorded it over the Americans and displayed what can at best be called a lack of tact. Old age was certainly not respected; Francisco Xavier Arámburi, an official in Caracas, commented that royalist officers generally believed that, “los que pasamos de 40 años de edad, somos una pobre y despreciable

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10Plano de observación topográfica de la Provincia de Antioquia, 12 May 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 897. See also Morillo’s Instrucciones particulares a los jefes del ejército, aboard the San Pedro, 1 April 1815, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8717, doc. 16.
11Sevilla, Memorias, p. 38.
gente que para nada sirve". In the Cauca Valley, the military was said to be occupying private homes, leaving the owners to sleep in the street. "Somos tratados peores que esclavos y mulas," complained one wealthy landowner from southern New Granada. Indeed, the entire cabildo of Cali was allegedly thrown into prison when it failed to provide requested goods.

Moreover, the crude and abrasive manner of some members of the Spanish military upset the American gente decente; even Viceroy Montalvo was offended by the "maneras irritantes" displayed by Morillo and his subalterns. Spaniards were widely perceived as rude and vain; "la soberbia de esta nación," commented José María Caballero, "compete con la de Lucifer".

The army's arrival in Santa Fe was accompanied by open and daily harassment of the Santafereños. Caballero added that panic reigned in the capital, caused, not merely by the arrests and executions, but also by "los insultos y robos que a cada instante se recibían, tanto de los negros y mulatos como de los españoles".

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14 This quotation is taken from a series of letters from an anonymous Cauca Hacendado to Vicente Sánchez Lima, 1817. These letters, which were forwarded by Sánchez Lima to the viceroy, were clearly written by a well-to-do slaveowner. See Vicente Sánchez Lima to Francisco Montalvo, Medellín, 4 August 1817; and Sala Capitular de Buga to José Solís, Buga, 30 June 1817; both in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631, doc. 64.
15 Francisco Montalvo to Minister of Grace and Justice, Cartagena, 24 September 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631.
16 Francisco Montalvo to Minister of Grace and Justice, Cartagena, 24 September 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631.
17 Caballero, Diario, p. 192.
18 Caballero, Diario, p. 213. Large groups of young men, especially when provided with weapons, rarely remain entirely decorous, and the soldiers of the royalist army were no exception. It was quite common for civilians to complain about the undisciplined behaviour of troops. In Mexico City, for example, efforts were made in 1814 to prohibit the royalist military from entering the Alameda park, as soldiers were said to be vandalising the
Indeed, one of the criticisms frequently levied against the expeditionaries in 1816 was that both officers and troops used excessively vulgar and insulting language. Agustín de Velasco, a regidor in Popayán’s cabildo, complained that in July 1817, following a quarrel with an officer, he was arrested and taken to the barracks. There he was insulted by the commander, Miguel de Letamendi, who shouted "palabras groseras y indecentes", and furthermore beat Velasco with a stick.19 This demeaning treatment deeply offended the regidor, who complained vigorously to the viceroy.

Complaints about the behaviour of royalist troops in New Granada extended far beyond their use of offensive language. These complaints ranged widely over the manner in which the army supplied itself, the arbitrary nature of military justice, the violent behaviour of individual officers, the disruptive effect of park’s statues and benches. See Timothy Anna, The Fall of the Royal Government in Mexico City, University of Nebraska Press (Lincoln, 1978), pp. 90-91. See also Archer, The Army in Bourbon Mexico, pp. 255-258.

19 Sala capitular de Popayán to Francisco Montalvo, Popayán, 5 July 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631. See also Cabildo of Buga to José Solís, Buga, 9 August 1817; Cabildo of Buga to José Solís, Buga, 11 August 1817; and Cayetano Sarmiento to José Solís, Llanogrande, 19 August 1817; all in AGI, Estado, legajo 57, doc. 35-D (ib); and the letter of Pablo Morillo in Horacio Rodríguez Plata, La antigua provincia del Socorro y la independencia, Biblioteca de Historia Nacional, vol. 98 (Bogotá, 1963), p. 411, in which Morillo complains about the "palabras poco decentes" used by the troops in the Fifth Division.

One may speculate that the expletives used by the Spanish military differed from those commonly in use in New Granada, where terms such as 'picaro' or 'hijo de puta' were the insults of choice. Many examples of Neogranadan insults are contained in the criminal investigations pursued in Santa Fe in the late eighteenth century. See, for example, Investigation into the murder of Atanacio Silva, Santa Fe, 1794, AHNC, Juicios Criminales, tomo 45, ff. 534-670; and Investigation into abuses in Ocaña, Ocaña, 1775, AHNC, Juicios Criminales, tomo 45, ff. 372-411, esp. 390. Comparative material on insults in colonial Mexico may be found in William Taylor, Drinking, Homicide and Rebellion in Colonial Mexican Villages, Stanford University Press (Stanford, 1979), pp. 41, 82-83.
troop movements, and military engineering projects. A particularly large body of complaint emerged from southern New Granada in 1817 and 1818, and concerned the Third Division of the Expeditionary Army, which was under the nominal command of Juan Sámano. The Third Division numbered some 1,000 men and had been stationed in various towns in the Cauca Valley from late 1816. These troops were deeply unpopular, and many observers, both in Spain and America, claimed that the arrival of the Expeditionary Army had jeopardised the very pacification of New Granada.

It was generally agreed that the troops were eating all the cattle, had requisitioned all the horses, and had taken all the slaves to work on the army’s various road-building projects. It was thus extremely difficult to carry out any work on the numerous haciendas in the Cauca Valley, and work in the gold mines in the Vega de Supía had also been abandoned. The presence of the troops had furthermore led to an outbreak of smallpox and dysentery in the province.20 The cabildo of Anserma expressed the matter succinctly:

A nadie han presentado [las tropas] más orden que el fusil, y todo se les ha obedecido, y obedecen, por fuerza. Piden cuanto quieren, y todo en el momento; castigan a su arbitrio, y hacen cuanto es de su voluntad por precio en sus marchas.

. . . Se ha hecho una injusta recolección de toda bestia, no solo

20 On occasion the presence of belligerents led more directly to outbreaks of disease. President Toribio Montes allegedly fired rockets filled with smallpox-infected material into Quito during the royalist siege of 1812. See Pedro Pérez Muñoz, Historia de la revolución de América en 35 cartas, Guayaquil, 31 December 1815, carta 18, AGI, Diversos, legajo 42.
con fin de servicio del Rey, sino de que muera la mayor parte de dichas bestias y perjudican a todo hombre.21

The cabildo’s suspicion that the army was collecting animals not only for their own uses, but also to punish the inhabitants, was probably well founded. Anserma, like Cali, Buga, Cartago, and Toro, which also complained of royalist oppression, had been a member of the insurgent Confederate Cities of the Cauca during the Patria Boba, and was thus regarded with suspicion by the royalist army. The army indeed considered willingness to provide for the troops as a good loyalty test.22 Forced contributions, appropriations of goods, and demands for labour tended to fall heaviest on those individuals or regions most heavily implicated in the insurgency, although the army did not necessarily admit this. Pasto, a noted bastion of royalism, was generally exempted from forced extractions of goods and provisions. It was for this reason that known loyalists responded with outrage when asked to assist the troops; they regarded themselves as exempt from such demeaning requirements. Indeed, many regarded it as practically an accusation of treason. When, for example, María Manuela de Angulo of Popayán complained of the insulting manner in which she had been ordered to sew uniforms for royalist troops, she drew attention to the fact that she was a member of an illustrious family which had distinguished itself in

21 Sala capitular de Anserma to José Solís?, Anserma, 7 July 1817; AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631; and Tomás de Heres to Ruperto Delgado, Cali, 20 May 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631.

loyalty to the crown. In Angulo’s view it was not for royalists like her to sew uniforms.23

One of the principal sources of dissatisfaction with the army in the Cauca Valley, and indeed throughout New Granada, arose from its penchant for roadbuilding. Various projects of military engineering were undertaken after 1816, but the road-building projects were probably the most unpopular. New roads were opened from Sonsón to Mariquita, from Zapatoca to the Magdalena, from Honda to Santa Fe, from Santa Fe to the Llanos, from Cali to Buenaventura, from the Valle de Osos to Cáceres, and from the Cauca Valley to Anchicayá. Pre-existing roads were improved as well. There is no doubt that new roads were needed; complaints about the poor quality of the roads and of transport in general were made regularly throughout the eighteenth century.24 The royalists’ plans were, however, overly ambitious. José Manuel Restrepo, himself placed in charge of one of the road-construction projects in Antioquia, listed in his autobiography the orders a fellow overseer had been given:

Primero de que el camino tuviera 25 varas de ancho,
segundo que los puentes fueran el mismo ancho, tercero que todo el camino de Sonsón se cubieren de cascajo, quarto en fin, que se arrancan de raíz todos los arboles cortados. Son

23 Testimony of María Manuela de Angulo to Sala capitular de Popayán, Popayán, 19 June 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631.
24 McFarlane, *Colombia before Independence*, pp. 137-138, 162, 261, 312, 317-320. See also Francisco Warleta to Pablo Morillo, Remedios, 17 March 1816, BRAH, sig. 9/7658 (legajo 15), fols. 38-39, where Warleta comments, “¡Que caminos tan fatales! Más se rueda por ellos que se anda.”
tan disparatas estas instrucciones que no merecen analizarse.\textsuperscript{25}

It proved impossible to build roads to these standards, but, perhaps as a result, most of the new roads were swallowed up by undergrowth within a year of construction.\textsuperscript{26} The construction of these roads placed heavy demands on local labour supplies, and the royalists resorted to requisitioning slaves and labourers to work on the roads. Notable insurgents were placed in charge of overseeing the construction, and heavy fines were levied on overseers who allowed labourers to escape. Slave owners were also fined if their slaves fled the roadworks.

The road being built from the Cauca Valley to Anchicayá, south of Buenaventura, under the supervision of Ruperto Delgado and Francisco Warleta, was an object of particular complaint.\textsuperscript{27} “Cuando se habla del camino de Anchicayá. . . solo [el] nombre infunde un terror en todo el valle difícil de explicar”, wrote one officer.\textsuperscript{28} The military requisitioned slaves from haciendas in the Cauca Valley to work on the road, thereby bringing agricultural work to a standstill. Moreover, when the requisitioned slaves began to escape into the backlands, the army started imposing

\textsuperscript{25}\textit{José Manuel Restrepo, Autobiographia, con apuntamientos sobre la emigración que hice en 1816 de la provincia de Antioquia a la de Popayán, Biblioteca de la Presidencia de Colombia, vol. 30 (Bogotá, 1957), p. 20. See also Pablo Morillo to Miguel de la Torre, San Gil, 16 May 1816, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8717, where Morillo orders that the road from Honda to Santa Fe must be built in one week and must be as good as the camino reales of Spain.}

\textsuperscript{26}\textit{Restrepo, Historia de la revolución, vol. 2, pp. 143-144.}

\textsuperscript{27}\textit{Much information about the opposition to the road to Anchicayá, including reports by local cabildos, army officers, and private citizens, may be found in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631, ramo 64.}

\textsuperscript{28}\textit{Diary of the Primer Batallón del Regimiento de Infantería de Numancia (Third Division), March 1817, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 759A.}
fines of $30 per escaped slave on the slave-owners, who were expected to prevent their slaves from running away. 29 The cabildo of Buga, for example, complained that, in the two years from 1815 to 1817, slaveowners in the town had paid some $5,000 in such fines, which implies that on average one slave from Buga fled the roadworks every five days. The town also had been obliged to provided 343 additional unpaid labourers and 13 foremen. 30 Throughout 1817, constant complaints about the road poured into government offices. Cabildos across the Cauca Valley protested against the project, and the governor of Popayán added his name to the protests. Eventually Viceroy Francisco Montalvo himself ordered construction to halt, but his command was entirely ignored. All efforts at stopping work on the road ran up against the brick wall of army intransigence. The officers involved refused to recognise the authority of civilian officials to stop the road, and brazenly rejected viceregal orders to halt construction. 31 The matter was eventually referred to Spain, and all further road construction was forbidden. 32 By this time, however, civilians throughout the Cauca Valley had come to fear and loathe the road to Anchicayá, and the royalist officers in charge of it.

29 Vicente Romero to José Solís, Anserma, 22 May 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631.
30 Sala Capitular to Buga to José Solís, Buga, 30 March 1817 and 30 June 1817, both in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631.
31 Ruperto Delgado to José Solís, Popayán, 13 July 1817; Ruperto Delgado to Juan Sámano, Popayán, 20 July 1817; both in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631. See also Report by Pascual Enrile, Madrid, 18 May 1819, AHNIM, Estado, legajo 8739, doc. 139.
32 See Council of the Indies to Pablo Morillo, and to Pascual Enrile, Madrid, 13 January 1818, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 549.
Physical labour was not the only resource requisitioned by the army. Large quantities of money were also required to keep the forces afloat, and these funds were by and large provided by the inhabitants of New Granada. While royalist troops in the south numbered at most 2,000, they caused a disproportionate drain on the region’s resources. There were several reasons for this. To begin with, even a small army requires substantial logistical support to carry food and supplies. John Keegan indeed notes that during one Russian campaign in 1874, 8,800 camels were needed to carry food for 5,500 men. Secondly, stationary troops soon eat their way through much of an area’s food reserves, as Bolívar well knew. The troops of the Third Division, while relatively few in number, thus required considerable quantities of food and money. The continual demands for financial support further soured relations between the royalist army and Neogranadans. Various towns submitted complaints detailing the enormous amounts of money demanded by the army.

The cabildo of Popayán calculated that its royalist garrison absorbed nearly $5,000 a month in supplies alone, without taking into account the troops’ salaries, which the city also provided. Altogether, the cabildo estimated that its inhabitants provided over $7,000 a month to the garrison of 265 men stationed there. In comparison, a top government functionary would earn an

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35 This works out to be about $1 per day per soldier.
official salary of $3,300 annually.\textsuperscript{36} In addition to this, Popayán had paid Colonel Francisco Warleta a forced contribution of $500,000, a truly enormous sum more than thirty times the annual salary of the viceroy.\textsuperscript{37} The huge amount of money being extracted from a city that had been invaded many times by both republicans and royalists prompted the cabildo to appeal to the viceroy in May 1817.\textsuperscript{38}

The cabildo of Buga similarly reported that it was being asked to provide outrageous sums of money to the army. The cabildo calculated that in the two years from 1815 to 1817 the town had given the army over $90,000, plus hundreds of horses and mules and 50,000 meals for the troops.\textsuperscript{39} Analogous complaints emerged from Cali, Toro, Cartago and Anserma.\textsuperscript{40} In addition to demanding cash, royalist troops further requisitioned cloth and food at will, and regularly demanded that civilians transport luggage and run errands. Viceroy Francisco Montalvo

\textsuperscript{36}See descriptions of salaries of fiscales and oidores of the Audiencia de Santa Fe in 1807, 1812, 1816 and 1817 in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 549.

\textsuperscript{37}Viceroy Montalvo earned $14,000 annually. See Francisco Montalvo to Minister of State, Santa Marta, 25 February 1815; Francisco Montalvo to Minister of War, Havana, 30 May 1818; and Minister of War to Interim Secretary of the Ministry of Hacienda, Palace, 21 December 1818; all in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 580; and also Francisco Montalvo to Consejo de Indias, Havana, 15 July 1819, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 549.

\textsuperscript{38}Sala Capitular de Popayán to Francisco Montalvo and José Solís, Popayán, 3 May 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631.

\textsuperscript{39}That is, Buga provided 68 meals each day for two years.

\textsuperscript{40}See, for example, Acta of the Cabildo of Buga, Buga, 11 December 1816; Cabildo of Buga to Francisco Montalvo, Buga, 30 March 1817; Cabildo of Buga to José Solís, Buga, 30 June 1817; and the many other extracts from the Actas of the Cabildo of Buga; all in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631.
outlawed the use of unpaid transport in January 1817, but it is unlikely that this or any other such order was observed. As one official put it, every officer considered himself a governor, and, unlike the real governor, had the weapons necessary to enforce his will. Indeed, when it came to disobeying administrative decisions, the army had several powerful advantages. In addition to using brute force, officers could blackmail civilians by threatening that their troops, made desperate by deprivation, might rebel and go on the rampage. Alternatively, the troops might desert, which would probably amount to the same thing.

Another potent source of unhappiness with the army stemmed from its demand for recruits. We have already noted that hostility towards the Spanish army had existed long before the outbreak of revolution in 1809; military service was unpopular, and desertion had always been a problem. The arrival of Morillo's army in 1815 aggravated these pre-existing hostilities. From almost the first moment of his arrival in Venezuela, Morillo began recruiting Americans to fill gaps in the Expeditionary Army left by death and desertion. Initially, the traditional exemptions

41 See José María Ramírez to Francisco Montalvo, Cartagena, 30 August 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631, for Montalvo's order outlawing unpaid transport.
42 See Vicente Romero to José Solís, Anserma, 22 May 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631.
43 Ruperto Delgado to José Solís, Cali, 25 May 1817; Ruperto Delgado to José Solís, Popayán, 14 July 1817; and Simón Sicilia to José Solís, Popayán, 16 July 1817, all in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631; and Diario de operaciones de la columna volante del primer batallón del regimiento de infantería del rey, by Donato Ruiz de Santacruz, entry for 24 August 1817, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 759A. For comparisons with Venezuela, see the comments about Boves' troops in Germán Carrera Damas, Boves: aspectos socio-económicos, Colección Vigilia (Caracas, 1968), p. 41.
enjoyed by married men, the very young, and very old were
honoured. As the war progressed, however, the depleted royalist
ranks were increasingly filled by anyone fit enough to shoulder
arms. This occasioned many bitter complaints both from those
recruited and from civilian officials. The president of Quito,
Toribio Montes, complained in 1817 that Colonels Sámano and
Warleta were in Pasto recruiting indiscriminately from the
married and the single, the old and the young.44 (‘Young’ recruits
might have been very young; it was not unknown for ten year
olds to participate in fighting.45) Moreover, on occasion even the
elites were forced to take arms; in 1817, rumour circulated in
Popayán that the royalists were preparing to recruit 400 men, “sin
excepción de clases”.46

In short, the army expected civilians to supply it with food,
shelter, money, horses, labour, and recruits. All these demands
alienated New Granada’s inhabitants. Rather than act as unpaid

44Toribio Montes to Francisco Montalvo, Quito, 21 June 1817, AGI, Audiencia
de Santa Fe, legajo 631. See also Juan Sámano to Pablo Morillo, Popayán, 19
August 1816, BRAH, sig. 9/7665 (leg. 22), fols. 55-58; Manuel Ficillo to
Agirra, Sitio Nuevo, 17 February 1820, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 747; and,
for efforts at drafting students, see José Más and Santiago de Lecuna to
Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 16 March 1818, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo
716.
45See Ayuntamiento de Rióhacha to Council of the Indies, Rióhacha, 6 May
1813, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 746; Cayetano Sarmiento to José
Solís, Llanogrande, 12 August 1817 and Cayetano Sarmiento to José Solís,
Llanogrande, 19 August 1817; both in AGI, Estado, legajo 57, doc. 35-D (lb);
and also Eduardo Pérez, Guerra irregular en la independencia de la Nueva
Granada u Venezuela, 1810-1830, Publicaciones de la Universidad
Pedagógica y Tecnológica de Colombia, Ediciones La Rana y el Aguila (Tunja,
46Vicente Sánchez Lima to Francisco Montalvo, Medellín, 4 August 1817,
AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631. For many complaints about
recruitment of soldiers in Buga in 1817, see the numerous letters from the
Cabildo de Buga to the military commander of Buga, Buga, 1817, AGI, Estado,
legajo 57, doc. 35-D (1b). For comparisons with the royalist military in
Mexico, see Timothy Anna, in The Fall of Royal Government in Mexico City,
University of Nebraska Press (Lincoln, 1978), pp. 84-86, 89-90.
labour for the army, civilians fled to the woods and hills, and, increasingly, joined the insurgents. Numerous reports alleged that it was precisely these heavy demands for cash and resources that fuelled the recrudescence of insurgency. Santander, for example, asserted that the forced contributions imposed by the Spanish had been the principal cause of the royalists' declining support. The forced loans and extortions had been much more unpopular than the executions of over 500 people in 1816, he believed. This view was shared even by many royalist officers, who urged that sensitivity and a measure of diplomacy be employed in all dealings with Americans. Indeed, in an attempt to reassure Neogranadans of the royalists' good intentions, Morillo in 1816 issued a proclamation asserting that, "Los soldados del Rey son el ejemplo de la disciplina, y sus jefes no se separan un punto de cuanto les ordeno". Unfortunately, Morillo's statement did not very accurately describe the actual behaviour of royalist troops, as Morillo himself knew.

47 Francisco de Paula Santander to Simón Bolívar, Santa Fe, 1 October 1819, in Cartas Santander-Bolívar, vol. 1, Biblioteca de la Presidencia de la República (Bogotá, 1988), pp. 133-135. See also Francisco de Paula Santander to Simón Bolívar, Santa Fe, 17 October 1819, Cartas Santander-Bolívar, vol. 1, pp. 154-156.

48 See, for example, José Solís to Francisco Montalvo, Popayán, 20 June 1817, and Toribio Montes to Francisco Montalvo, Quito, 21 June 1817, both in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631; Matías Escuté to Miguel de la Torre, Socorro, 19 March 1816, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8739, doc. 151; and Toribio Montes' correspondence with Juan Sámano, 1814, in Oswaldo Díaz Díaz, La reconquista española, vol. 1, Historia Extensa de Colombia, vol. 6, (Bogotá, 1967), pp. 84-85.

49 Bando de Morillo, (1816?), AHNM, Estado, legajo 8740, doc. 40
§ 2. Royalist Atrocities

Despite Morillo's claim that his troops were discipline itself, civilians suffered considerably from the depredations of the royalist army, not only through the loss of horses, money or free time, but also from many "excesos" of one sort or another. Unprovoked attacks on innocent civilians, public brawls, acts of drunkenness, and unspecified "desórdenes" were regularly denounced to the authorities. Captain José Oliva, for example, was deported to Spain in late 1816 for bad behaviour.

"Continuamente en su tránsito a esta capital [comitio] mil bajesas y desórdenes en los pueblos," commented Morillo. Some army units were more notorious than others. Venezuelan troops were regarded by all as troublemakers, while the Battalion of Granada was actually dissolved as a consequence of the 'excesos' committed by its members. This battalion, Morillo commented, was composed primarily of thieves, deserters and convicts, and he was not surprised that its soldiers committed innumerable crimes.

50 See, for example, Miguel de la Torre to Sebastián de la Calzada, Mompos, 14 March 1816, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8721, doc. 86; Pablo Morillo to Miguel de la Torre, Ocaña, 25 March 1816, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8717, doc. 48; Two letters of Pablo Morillo to Gabriel de Torres, Ocaña, 22 April 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 709; Lorenzo Josef Noriega to Gabriel de Torres, Fragata Atocha, 4 April 1816; AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 707; Pablo Morillo to Miguel de la Torre, Bucaramanga, 13 May 1816, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8717, doc. 64; Pablo Morillo to Francisco Montalvo, 29 July 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 707; Investigation into Lieutenant Juan José Guevara, Cartagena, 1 December 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 739; the various complaints from the Cauca Valley in 1817 in AHNC, Archivo Anexo, Guerra y Marina, tomo 152, fols. 226-241; Orden General del Día, 5 February 1817, BRAH, sig. 9/7651 (legajo 8); Pablo Morillo to Miguel de la Torres, Calabozo, 8 November 1817, AHNM, Estado 8171, doc. 147; the many complaints recorded in AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 719B; and Rodríguez Plata, *La antigua Provincia de Socorro*, pp. 412-415.

51 Pablo Morillo to Gabriel de Torres, Sogamoso, 20 December 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 709. See also Pablo Morillo to Miguel de la Torre, Santa Fe, 4 October 1816, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8717, doc. 98.
Indeed, Morillo asserted that royalist ranks were routinely filled by the dregs of society, who inevitably committed atrocities.\textsuperscript{52} Thus Morillo, unlike the insurgents, did not blame the royalist army’s misdeeds on deep-seated contempt for Americans, but rather on the poor quality of the men recruited into the army. This view was echoed by other officers, who regarded the troops’ excesses as a standard consequence of their inadequate pay.\textsuperscript{53} However, such interpretations did not fully explain the frequent complaints about the behaviour of royalist officers. The repeated reports of unacceptable behaviour by officers led some members of the government to call for a serious examination of the quality of individuals appointed as officers, especially in Venezuela.\textsuperscript{54} Nonetheless, little practical quality control was undertaken.

Not surprisingly, these ‘desórdenes’ and acts of violence served to alienate the populace and increase support for the republicans. José María Barreiro conceded in early 1819 that the royalists enjoyed no support whatsoever in the Llanos as a consequence of the “excesos que habrán cometido algunos oficiales.” “Todos sus moradores son enemigos decididos nuestros,” he added.\textsuperscript{55} Similarly, the excesses committed by Colonel Juan Sámano’s troops in Popayán were held to be directly


\textsuperscript{53}See, for example, Instructions to Francisco González de Linares and Pedro José Mijares, Caracas, 18 January 1821, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8733, doc. 24.

\textsuperscript{54}Report on Francisco Xavier Cerberiz, Madrid, 12 August 1814, AGI, Audiencia de Caracas, legajo 386.

\textsuperscript{55}Díaz Díaz, \textit{La reconquista española}, vol. 2, p. 326.
responsible for that city's republican uprising in 1813. Sámano's troops, who were stationed in Popayán during 1812-1813, had repeatedly been accused of offensive behaviour, in which they moreover had plenty of opportunity to indulge, as they allegedly spent much of their time "circulan[do] por las calles sin destino". The "desórdenes" of the troops extended far beyond the occasional drunken brawl. During the war, the royalists, like the republicans, committed terrible atrocities and acts of inhumanity. These ranged from the massacres, extra-judicial executions, and acts of torture committed by individual officers and men, to the official policies of the commanders-in-chief. The bloody effects of Bolívar's War to the Death and Boves' reign of terror in Venezuela are well known; what we will here consider is the situation in New Granada, which has been less well studied.

To begin with, Morillo's official policies towards New Granada, although generally acceptable to royalist officers, were to republican eyes a catalogue of abuse and horror. The execution of over 100 prominent republicans, usually after highly arbitrary trials, the revival of the ancient and repellent custom of dismembering and displaying corpses in wire cages throughout the capital, the deliberate harassment of the relatives of suspected republicans, and the arbitrary behaviour of royalist officers all served to fulfil the worst predictions of New Granada's revolutionaries. Daniel Florencio O'Leary expressed this bluntly:

"The conduct of Morillo in Santa Fe did more damage to the

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56 Cabildo de Pasto to Ferdinand, Pasto, 13 June 1814, BM, Egerton, 1809 (this document may also be found in AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 276); Toribio Montes to Minister of Overseas, Quito, 7 October 1814, AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 260.
royalist cause than the most disastrous defeat.\textsuperscript{57} The most appalling cases of abuse did not, however, take place in the capital under the auspices of Morillo or Sámano themselves. They occurred, rather, in the provinces, where there existed more resistance to the royalists, and where the moderating influences of Viceroy Montalvo and the Audiencia did not reach. In the provinces truly bloodthirsty officers such as Carlos Tolrá enjoyed free reign. During his 1817 'pacification' campaign in the Llanos, Tolrá authorised the summary execution of all suspected insurgents, and indeed of anyone even suspected of assisting them. Oswaldo Díaz Díaz calculates that over one hundred individuals were executed by Tolrá's troops.\textsuperscript{58} Furthermore, in the Llanos and elsewhere, the army regularly burned houses and villages in insurgent areas, and destroyed food supplies in order to prevent either the insurgents or anyone else from using them.\textsuperscript{59} (Of course, when the republicans burned villages, the royalists did not hesitate to condemn them.\textsuperscript{60})

\textsuperscript{57}O’Leary, Bolívar and the War of Independence, pp. 93-94.
\textsuperscript{58}See Díaz Díaz, La reconquista española, vol. 2, pp. 53-112, for details of the campaign. See also Bando de Carlos Tolrá, Chocontá, 23 November 1817, Díaz Díaz, La reconquista española, vol. 2, p. 101; and Carlos Tolrá’s Instructions for Simón Sicilia, Tibiritá, 26 November 1817, BRAH, Sig. 9/7665 (leg. 22), f. 517 (this document is also printed in Díaz, La reconquista española, vol. 2, p. 104.)
\textsuperscript{59}See, for example, Diary of the Primer Batallón del Regimiento Infantería de Numancia (Third Division), 1 January 1817, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 759A; José María Barreiro to Juan Sámano, Tunja, 2 January 1819, Los Ejércitos del Rey, vol. 1, Alberto Lee López (editor), Biblioteca de la Presidencia de la República, (Bogotá, 1989), pp. 131-132; and Restrepo, Historia de la revolución, vol. 2, p. 182.
\textsuperscript{60}Diario de operaciones de la Columna Volante del Primer Batallón del Regimiento de Infantería del Rey, by Donato Ruiz de Santacruz, 20 August 1817, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 759A.
Republican prisoners were not treated well during captivity. Many were obliged to march across great distances from their place of capture to Santa Fe or Cartagena. Worse, their chances of surviving the march often depended entirely on the whim of their captors. Court cases attest to the frequency with which royalist officers murdered republican captives en route to their place of trial. In late 1818, for example, Sub-lieutenant Vicente Ruíz was transporting 45 republican prisoners from Santa Fe to Cartagena. Of these, 6 died en route. One was beaten to death when he became too tired to walk further; another was beaten, then shot and left unburied at the side of the road, because there had been a difficulty with the rope with which he was bound; a third, described as very ill, was beaten severely and then shot because he had fallen exhausted to the ground. The remaining three died in similar circumstances.\textsuperscript{61} It must be said that such abuses were often investigated, and officers and men found guilty of gross abuse were usually disciplined. A three year confinement to a presidio was a standard army punishment for rape, for example. Nonetheless it was not a punishable offence merely to execute suspected republicans. It was only when the execution took place in irregular circumstances that the judicial authorities might intervene. Even then, judicial investigations were not inevitable. Republican prisoners were sometimes massacred with impunity

\textsuperscript{61}Investigation into deaths of 6 prisoners, Cartagena, 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 719B. See also Summary of letter by Pablo Morillo, Calahozo, 28 July 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 742; Orden General, 9-10 September 1816, BRAH, sig. 9/7658 (legajo 15); Carlos Cortés Vargas, "De la época del terror," BHA vol. 29 (1942), p. 92; and Restrepo, Historia de la revolución, vol. 2, p. 147.
on reaching the royalist camp under the very eyes of the royalist commanding officers.62

The royalist army, like armies everywhere, on occasion resorted to torture in its attempt to obtain information and punish captives. A few examples will suffice. In 1816 Manuel José Castrillón of Popayán allegedly had his fingernails torn off and replaced by sharp thorns, his feet burned with a hot iron, and was then left for three days in a sealed room without food. Colonel Francisco Warleta ordered this treatment because he believed Castrillón was feigning insanity in order to avoid revealing information about the insurgents.63 Nor was the army alone in its employment of torture; members of the rural police force, the Santa Hermandad, were also accused of torturing republican detainees. Not surprisingly, the information obtained on these occasions was often unreliable. Several individuals arrested by the Hermandad in February 1820, accused of participating in a republican plot, stated that their confessions had been obtained through torture. One of these, Pedro Martínez, affirmed that he had been suspended by the hands until he confessed, on which occasion “dijo lo que se le vino a la boca”.64

It should be noted that the majority of the examples cited above and in the footnotes are drawn from royalist sources. Certainly plenty of evidence attesting to royalist atrocities was produced by the insurgents. They regularly complained about

62 See José María Barreiro to Juan Sámano, Molinos, 10 July 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 747. See also Francisco Warleta to Pablo Morillo, Canacan, 23 March 1816, BRAH, sig. 9/7658 (legajo 15), fols. 49-50.
63 Restrepo, Historia de la revolución, vol. 2, pp. 146-147, 149-150.
64 Investigation into an alleged conspiracy in Mompós, February 1820, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 719A.
royalist cruelties, and republican sources refer to events not mentioned by the royalists. José Manuel Restrepo, for example, describes a massacre of over 400 men, women and children which allegedly occurred on the beach outside Cartagena in 1816. Royalist sources make no mention of the massacre. While there is no reason to regard such an event as inherently impossible, the constant use of propaganda by both royalists and republicans does make the evaluation of atrocity stories problematic. It is for this reason that this section concentrates on material originating from within the royalist camp. The royalists had no reason to exaggerate the number of 'excesos' committed by their own side, and one may consider the examples cited above as a minimal count of royalist misdeeds.

§3. Women and the Royalist Army

This is not the place to detail the participation of women in the effort to oust the Spanish from New Granada. Those who wish to explore this subject are directed to Oswaldo Díaz Díaz’s La reconquista española. We offer here a brief sketch of the non-military interactions between New Granada’s female population and the royalist army. To begin with, in the absence of regular funding, the army relied on New Granada’s women to provide many of the services needed to maintain an army. In particular, royalist officers expected women to assist by sewing clothing and providing food. And, it seems, some women were indeed happy to

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assist; the Marquesa de Torre Hoyos organised groups of women to sew sheets for the troops, and offered hospitality to Warleta and other officers. In return for her help Warleta proposed to give a ball in her honour, which, he remarked, “se ha de denominar el baile de las hilas”.

The Marquesa de Santa María surpassed the Marquesa de Torre Hoyos in supporting the royalists: she reportedly married a lowly Spanish cadet in early 1816.

Interactions between Neogranadan women and the royalist army were not always so happy. Those who did not volunteer to help the troops were obliged to do so by force; as Colonel Francisco Warleta stated, “el bello sexo jamás deja en ninguna parte del globo de acceder a nuestras suplicas”. To this end, the army established in Santa Fe a so-called Sociedad de Beneficencia y Caridad. Suspect women were ‘enrolled’ in this club, and then obliged to oversee the production of clothing and bed-linen. These seamstresses were of course not paid; on the contrary, women forced to join the sociedad were required to make an additional donation to the army. Women also suffered in other ways. Many were detained by the army for questioning, on which occasion they were likely to be ill-treated; Colonel Warleta, for example, was said routinely to beat female prisoners.

68 Sevilla, Memorias, p. 74.
69 José María Restrepo Saenz, Gobernadores de Antioquia, 1571-1819, vol. 1, Imprenta Nacional (Bogotá, 1932), pp. 291-292. See also Testimony of Doña María Manuela de Angulo to Sala Capitular de Popayán, Popayán, 19 June 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631.
70 See Díaz Díaz, La reconquista española, vol. 2, pp. 157-158.
suspected of supporting the insurgents were likely to be imprisoned or exiled. (Sometimes such women were instead confined to convents.) On occasion, women were imprisoned not because they were themselves suspected of insurgency, but in order to prevent their from communicating with their insurgent husbands, or in order to extract information about their relatives’ location. It was moreover apparently standard practice for the female relatives of notable insurgents to be exiled from their homes and confined to remote villages. Restrepo reports that many women were given only 48 hours to leave their homes, and were obliged to travel on foot if they did not themselves own

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72See, for example, Arámbarri, *Hechos del General Pablo Morillo*, p. 92; Diary of the Primer Batallón del Regimiento Infantería de Numancia, April 1817, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 759B; Historia de la Rebelión de América en 35 Cartas, by Pedro Pérez Muñoz, Quito, 6 May 1815, carta 18, AGI, Diversos, legajo 42; and Vicente Sánchez Lima to Francisco Montalvo, Medellín, 4 August 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631.

One general consequence of the war seems to have been to liberate large numbers of nuns from their convents. In 1812, for example, among the terms of the surrender offered to insurgents in Ibarra was the following: “Las monjas de Carmen Alto y del Bajo que han sido inducidas a quebrantar la clausura sean entregadas y remitidas inmediatamente a sus monasterios, como lo han executado por si 5 de Santa Clara a instancias mías”. (Toribio Montes to Juan Sámano, Quito, 22 November 1812; and Report by Toribio Montes, Quito, 7 April 1813; AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 257.) It was apparently not uncommon for nuns to flee their cloisters before an army attack. They, like many of their secular compatriots, feared being raped or murdered by the invaders. (In Quito, the nuns of the convents of Carmen and Santa Clara fled on the orders of the bishop, who told them they were likely to be raped. See Historia de la Rebelión de América en 35 Cartas, by Pedro Pérez Muñoz, Quito, 6 May 1815, carta 18, AGI, Diversos 42.) On other occasions women fled to convents in order to escape from the soldiers. The wife of royalist Governor Miguel Tacón of Popayán, for example, was too ill to travel and so retired to the city’s carmelite convent in 1811 when Popayán was abandoned by the royalists. (Miguel Tacón to Joaquín Molina, Pasto, 14 May 1811, AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 235.)

73Manuel Carmona to Gabriel de Torres, Mompox, 10 March 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 712; and Arámbarri, *Hechos del General Pablo Morillo*, pp. 93, 95. Also, see Restrepo, *Historia de la revolución*, vol. 2, p. 146, for information about the detention of the relations of José María Cabal. They were sent to Sámano in chains.
horses. Similar detentions evidently occurred in Mexico as well, where female relatives of insurgents were arrested or expelled from royalist regions.\textsuperscript{74}

Women were, moreover, subjected to all types of sexual harassment and violence by both the insurgent and royalist armies. This fact was widely recognised by Spanish officers; the royalist commander in Venezuela Cajigal reported that the royalist Boves recruited every class of person into his army, with the exception of priests, because they were Christians, and women, “porque el jefe y su ejército las destinaba a otros usos, que contradecían aquel principio”.\textsuperscript{75} Similar practices occurred in New Granada. To begin with, women were generally treated as a form of booty. Following the recapture of Ríoahacha by the Spanish on 11 October 1820, royalist soldiers, who were supposed to be collecting abandoned enemy rifles, instead abducted several “mugeres de los enemigos”, whom they took to a nearby house.\textsuperscript{76} Furthermore, Restrepo reports that royalist soldiers regularly

\textsuperscript{74}Restrepo, \textit{Historia de la revolución}, vol. 2, pp. 142-143; and Díaz Díaz, \textit{La reconquista española}, vol. 1, pp. 131-132. For Mexico, see Hamnett, “Royalist Counterinsurgency,” pp. 29-30.


\textsuperscript{76} The soldiers’ behaviour was later criticised by their superiors, but it is not clear whether their crime was having assaulted the women, or merely having failed to carry out the order to collect the rifles. See Investigation into Mateo Llorens and Francisco de Paula Orive, Ríoahacha, September 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 745. See also Miguel de la Torre to Sebastián de la Calzada, Mompós, 14 March 1816, AHNM, Estado 8721, doc. 86; and comments about the behaviour of royalist troops in Venezuela in Carrera Damas, \textit{Boves}, p. 55.
accused innocent men of insurgency in order to gain access to
their wives and daughters.77

Condemnation of the sexual abuses carried out by the
opposing side were a regular occurrence throughout the war. In
1814, for example, the Sala Constitucional de Cali issued a
condemnation of the behaviour of Sámano's troops in their city.
Their complaints included the (not uncommon) charge that women
had been raped inside the church, where they had probably
gathered to escape the fighting. "Todos saben," they asserted,
"que el templo del Señor se ha profanado y que en su honor ha
padecido la viuda y la doncella".78 Such practices were not
confined to royalists. A particularly alarming case of mass rape
occurred outside of Cartagena in 1821, during the republican siege
of the city. Sebastián Díaz, the royalist commander of the castle of
San Felipe de Barajas, reported to Governor Gabriel Torres that
groups of women who had left the besieged city were being
detained, beaten, robbed, and then raped by the republican
troops.79 The royalists protested vociferously to the republicans,
who replied that it was well known that inhabitants of a besieged
city would not be permitted to leave. With regard to the alleged
rapes, the republican commander Luis de Rieux remarked that he
had no doubt his troops had committed some excesses, as always

77 Restrepo, Historia de la revolución, vol. 2, p. 149-150.
78 Sala Constitucional de Cali to Congress, Cali, 30 January 1814, AGI, Papeles
de Cuba, legajo 897. See also Restrepo, Historia de la revolución, vol. 2, p.
148; Díaz Díaz, La reconquista española, vol. 2, p. 163; Rodríguez Plata, La
antigua Provincia de Socorro, p. 471; and the complaints against Carlos
Tolrá and Simón Sicilia in Hermes Tovar Pinsón, "Guerras de opinión y
represión en Colombia durante la independencia (1810-1820), Anuario
79 Sebastián Díaz to Gabriel de Torres, Castillo de San Felipe de Barajas, 24
August 1821, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 717.
happened when troops were some distance away from their commanders.\textsuperscript{80} Rape, Rieux thus acknowledged, was an expected companion of war.

Prostitution was also prevalent. Indeed, Pascual Enrile, in a report on the reorganisation of government undertaken by the army in New Granada, made the enigmatic comment that “hasta las mugeres públicas se recogieron y trabajaban para el ejército”.\textsuperscript{81} It is difficult to find much information about prostitution, as very little tends to be said about it in official documents. It does appear, as might be expected, that prostitutes routinely accompanied both armies, and were identified as supporters of the side they followed.\textsuperscript{82} Associating with enemy prostitutes was frowned upon; in 1817, the royalist cabildo of Popayán complained about the “prostitutas del partido insurgente”, with whom royalist soldiers were allegedly consorting.\textsuperscript{83} Prostitutes were also regarded as a health menace. Several prostitutes, arrested by locals in the Llanos de Casanare in September 1817, were brought to the royalist commander of the

\textsuperscript{80}Luis Francisco de Rieux to Gabriel de Torres, Turbaco, 27 August 1821, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 717. See also Orden General, 9-10 September 1816, BRAH, sig. 9/7558 (legajo 15); and, for general remarks, Susan Brownmiller, \textit{Against our Will, Men, Women and Rape}, Bantam Books (1986), chapter 3.

\textsuperscript{81}Exposition by Pascual Enrile, Madrid, 19 June 1817, AGI, Estado, legajo 57, Doc. 35-c(2a). (This document may also be found in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 748.)

\textsuperscript{82}See, for example, Matías Escuté to Miguel de la Torre, Socorro, 19 March 1816, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8739, doc. 151.

\textsuperscript{83}Sala capitular de Popayán to Francisco Montalvo, Popayán, 5 July 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631. See also Report on a republican prostitute, AHNC, Archivo Anexo, Guerra y Marina, tomo 152, f. 240.
garrison in Chita, who blamed them for the outbreak of venereal disease afflicting his troops.84

The question that naturally needs to be asked is what effect royalist atrocities had on the stability of the reconquest regime. Did royalist abuses help swing public opinion back towards the republicans, and was it indeed the critical factor in reviving the insurgency? Certainly many observers commented on the link between royalist excesses and revived support for the republicans. It was widely alleged that the royalist army’s excessive demands for labour and supplies led many Neogranadans to flee their homes and hide in the hills. Once outside the royalist-controlled villages, they were easily recruited by republicans. (It was for this reason that the royalists issued innumerable decrees forbidding civilians to abandon their homes and villages.) Further, much of New Granada’s initial support for the reconquest had arisen from the widespread disillusion with the insurgents. The movement for independence had meant death and hardship for many, and it was hoped that with a return to royalism would come peace. As Restrepo put it, “los pueblos de la Nueva Granada estaban cansados de la guerra, y anhelaban por disfrutar de su antigua quietud bajo el Gobierno español”.85 When the arrival of the Spanish brought, instead, more suffering and punishment, the royalists lost their one great advantage over the republicans. It is noteworthy that the areas that remained most

84 Diary of the First Battalion of the Regimiento de Infantería de Numancia, Third Division, entry for 21 September 1817, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 759B.
staunchly royalist throughout the war were precisely those that experienced least harassment from royalist troops. Pasto, and to a lesser degree Santa Marta, both of which had initially supported the crown for specific local reasons, were by and large exempted from providing supplies and money for the troops, and were moreover spared many of the atrocities committed elsewhere by royalists. These two regions remained in royalist hands until the conclusion of the war. Similarly Quito, which was for some years governed by the conciliatory Toribio Montes, remained tranquilly royalist until the battle of Pichincha in 1822. The royalist governor of Popayán, José Solís, expressed the matter concisely: “Si acaso hay algún pueblo de aquellas provincias en que se desfrute reposo, sin chispa de la anterior revolución, es aquel en que no existen tropas”. It would be difficult to attempt to separate the loss of popular support which the royalists undoubtedly suffered, from the military difficulties and lack of direction which characterised Spain’s attempted reconquest. Nonetheless, the grave errors and abuses committed by the royalists alienated potential supporters and redoubled the resolve of committed republicans. The irony of Morillo’s title of “Pacifier” was not lost on his contemporaries, and the fatal effect of his scorched earth policies were widely condemned both at home and abroad.

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86Report to the Secretary of War, 29 January 1818, AGI, Estado, legajo 57, doc. 35c
87For contemporary comments about Morillo’s title of ‘Pacifier’, see the remarks by an anonymous royalist officer about Morillo in the Correo General de Madrid, Arámbarri, Hechos del General Pablo Morillo, p. 86; and José Manuel Groot, Historia eclesiástica y civil de Nueva Granada, vol. 4, Editorial M. Rivas (Bogotá, 1893), p. 111.
Chapter 8: The Cost of Reconquest

The loss of support suffered by the Expeditionary Army, discussed in the previous chapter, was in part a consequence of the financial difficulties that confronted Morillo’s troops. Spain’s effort to re-impose royal authority in New Granada was consistently under-funded, and inadequate funding of the reconquest was a major impediment to royalist victory. We will now examine the ways in which Spain attempted to defray its military expenses, and will explore the destructive consequences of these methods.

§1. Paying for a War

Spanish participation in the American wars of independence was tremendously expensive, and placed enormous burdens on a system of government finance that had already been under great strain before 1808. (In the decades preceding the outbreak of war in the Americas, Spain’s Tesorería General had been running an average annual deficit of over $15,000,000.) The sheer scale of the fiscal burden created by Spain’s determination to rebuild its empire can be gauged from global estimates of Spain’s expenditures on military matters in the decade after 1811. Michael Costeloe has calculated that during these years the Peninsula spent over $25,000,000 on fighting the American insurgencies. This sum, which does not include the expenses of royalist governments in the colonies, implies that each royalist

soldier sent to the Americas cost the government between $150 and $400.2 (For Morillo’s expedition the per capita cost was nearer to the higher figure.) This estimate is supported by the figures given in 1817 by the Spanish Minister of War and the Navy, the Marqués de Campo Sagrado. He placed the per capita cost at around $320 per soldier, an amount which he considered to be grossly excessive.3

Figures given by army officers in New Granada and Venezuela confirm the immense expense entailed by the reconquest. General Pablo Morillo estimated in mid-1817 that the garrison in Cumaná consumed $250,000 each year in food alone.4 The troops and sailors stationed in Cartagena, which remained the most important military base in New Granada during the war, absorbed similarly large amounts of money. In 1818, the city spent over $300,000 on the garrison and navy. This amount would have been considerably greater had the mortality rates in the military had been lower. If all vacant posts in the army had been filled, over $500,000 would have been needed each year to cover expenses.5

5Estado que manifiesta el consumo de caudales que aproximadamente originan anualmente las atenciones de la plaza y provincia de Cartagena de Indias en la actualidad, el que causarían si los cuerpos de la guarnición
These large sums of money were required to cover the many costs incurred by the Expeditionary Army once it reached its destination. Food, for one thing, was expensive. The commander of the navy stationed in Cartagena estimated that it cost 2 reales per day to feed one sailor, which meant that each sailor consumed $36 a year in meals alone. Clothing damaged by battles or marches had to be replaced, and salaries had in theory to be paid. The necessary works of military engineering also cost money. Sums had to be found to pay for rented housing for officers. Furthermore, equipment was regularly destroyed or lost during the many long marches undertaken by the Spanish troops, and needed replacing.

Funds to cover these expenses had to be found in New Granada itself. The Spanish, unlike the British forty years earlier, made little effort to maintain transatlantic supply lines. On the contrary, very little cash and virtually no supplies were remitted from Spain to New Granada’s royalist army. The crown’s reliance on local funding to support royalist troops was predictably unpopular with Neogranadans. Indeed, the ways in which the Expeditionary Army’s costs were defrayed played an important role in alienating support for the crown, as we have already seen.

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estuvieron con sus fuerzas y dotaciones completas . . , Cartagena, 20 April 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 715. The navy stationed in Cartagena, meanwhile, received an annual grant from the Cajas Reales of $36,000, but treasury officials estimated that something on the order of $150,000 would be required to bring the navy into a reasonable condition.

6Manuel de Cordero to Juan Sámano, Cartagena, 12 November 1819 and 16 December 1819; both in AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 747.

7See, for example, Juan Sámano to Minister of Hacienda, Santa Fe, 19 December 1818, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 632; Juan Sámano to Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 15 January 1820, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 708; and Pablo Morillo to Francisco Montalvo, Cartagena, 22 January 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 707.

8For comments about British military funding during the American Revolution, see Piers Mackesy, The War for America, 1775-1783, Longmans (London, 1964), pp. 65-69, 118-120, 222-224.
in the previous chapter. Here we will examine the sources of funding available to Morillo’s army, the inadequacy of these sources, and the effects of chronic under-funding on the royalist army itself.

**Funds from Spain**

Spain’s initial response to colonial rebellion was crippled by political and financial crises at home. When the Regency first resolved to act against the outbreak of revolt in the Americas in 1810, it decided to adopt “las medidas más enérgicas y eficaces para contener, reprimir y castigar excesos tan trascendentales”.9 The Council of the Indies, on the other hand, recommended that peaceful means, rather than military force, be employed. This approach, as Edmundo Heredia has noted, was dictated by the complete lack of money to fund military expeditions, rather than by diplomatic or strategic considerations. The war with Napoleonic France absorbed all available funds. Only in late 1811 was the Regency in a financial position to mount any assault on the insurgents, as a result of the creation of the Comisión de Reemplazos.

This body, formed in Cádiz in September 1811, provided a means of raising funds for the war. Michael Costeloe has made an interesting study of the Comisión, and the following remarks about its role are based on his work.10 The Comisión developed

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10For details about the Comisión de Reemplazos, see Costeloe, “The Comisión de Reemplazos”; and Costeloe, *Response to Revolution*, pp. 101-116. Also see “La Comisión de Reemplazos representa a la Regencia del Reyno el estado de insurrección en que se hallan algunas provincias de ultramar; la urgente necesidad de enérgicas medidas para la pacificación; clase y extensión de las que deben adoptarse con este objeto, y males que amenazan a la Nación Española, si el gobierno no remite los auxilios que se reclaman”, AGI, I.A. 5/20.
out of discussions between the Minister of the Navy and the Cádiz merchants. It was an essentially private organisation, not directly controlled by the government, but permitted to levy taxes as if it were a governmental entity. The Cádiz merchants, who were perhaps the loudest advocates of military intervention in the Americas, were the principal contributors to Comisión funds. In 1811, they promised to raise $400,000 for a military expedition to the Indies, to be used to pay for uniforms, transport, and other necessities. The Comisión also undertook to recruit soldiers. The merchants themselves promised to come up with a substantial portion of the total sum. Any remaining money would be generated by a series of special taxes. These included a 1% tax on agricultural produce and general merchandise entering or leaving any Spanish port; a 1% tax on all gold imported into Spain; a 2% tax on imported silver; and a 3% tax on all other American goods brought into Spain. At first the Comisión was stunningly successful. Costeloe writes that “within twelve weeks on its formation, the Comisión had recruited, equipped and transported 1,068 men at the cost of 3,197,825 reales [roughly $159,891].”\footnote{Costeloe, “The Comisión de Reemplazos”, p. 228. The commission was thus spending some $150 per soldier, much less than the overall average for the war.} In 1812 and 1813, twelve more expeditions were organised, two of which went to New Granada.\footnote{Overall, 522 soldiers and officers were sent to Santa Marta, and 1,668 to Venezuela, in 1812 and 1813. Considerably more troops were sent further south. See Heredia, Planes españoles, pp. 79, 94.}

As time went by, new measures were needed to raise money. In 1813 the Comisión was given control over the sale of mercury from the mine at Almadén, and by 1820 had generated $1,500,000 from this source. Various old taxes were revived, new
ones were invented, and a tax of one real was levied on tickets to the bullfight in Madrid. Forced loans were also extracted, primarily from Spain’s merchants. The largest of these forced loans was for some $1,200,000, to be repaid over ten months at 8%. None of these measures proved popular, and some were hard to enforce. Moreover, the Comisión earned few friends with the snail-like pace with which it paid off its creditors. In the end, the Comisión resorted to the standard approach of previous Spanish governments: deficit financing. This method was initially very successful. The credit notes issued by the Comisión raised some $1,300,000 between 1817 and 1820. However, such practices merely postponed the day of reckoning. When the Comisión was effectively abolished in 1826, it left a debt of over $5,500,000.

In 1814, the Comisión began work on raising money for what was to become Morillo’s Expeditionary Army. The Comisión, which believed the expedition was intended for the Comisión-approved destination of Río de la Plata, provided virtually all of the funding for the large army of over 12,000 men and 79 ships. The Expeditionary Army and the three other, smaller expeditions sent in 1815 cost over $5,280,000, or about a third of the Comisión’s total expenditure from 1811 to 1820. After this climax of fund-raising, the Comisión began to experience difficulties in raising money. In 1818, however, planning began for the doomed expedition to Río de la Plata, in which the Comisión was to play a critical financial role. A further $6,000,000 was rounded up. Most of this was spent on shipping costs, and very little of it was recovered after the liberal revolution of 1820 dismantled the

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13For general comments on Spain’s financing of the late eighteenth century wars, see Barbier, “Peninsular Finance and Colonial Trade”.

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planned expedition. Costeloe estimates that from its creation in 1811 to its effective dissolution in 1820, the Comisión spent over $17,529,000. This considerable amount of money was generated without the direct intervention of any of Spain’s governments. Spain’s financial contribution to the American wars was thus funded by an essentially private and independent institution.14 The Comisión, however, did not provide money for troops once they had reached their destination. In particular, Morillo’s Expeditionary Army received very little money from Spain after its arrival in Venezuela in 1815.

Although the Comisión de Reemplazos was providing substantial sums for counter-revolutionary forces from 1811, it was not until the defeat of Napoleon that Spain could spare sufficient troops to launch a concerted attack on American insurgents. Until then, Spain’s military effort focused largely on the Peninsula and it was only when Ferdinand returned to the throne in 1814 that military manpower was available for expeditions to America. The new government favoured a two-pronged approach to funding this and all subsequent expeditions. Money was raised in Spain itself, via the Comisión de Reemplazos, and Spain’s overseas colonies were also expected to contribute to the costs of the war.15 This approach was only moderately successful in New Granada. Although some of the other colonies did contribute substantial amounts of money, by 1813 most were themselves so hard-pressed that they were unable to make a

14This was not the first time that important governmental policy had been effected by a private agency. The Caja de Consolidación de Vales Reales, whose actions played an important role in the outbreak of revolution in Mexico, was “generally an independent agency”. See Barbier, “Peninsular Finance and Colonial Trade,” p. 22.
15See, for example, Report by Hacienda de España y Ultramar, 1820, AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 1568.
significant contribution to defeating the insurgency in New Granada.\textsuperscript{16}

Nonetheless, in 1815 Morillo's Expeditionary Army left Spain well-supplied and well-funded. The expedition departed from Cádiz in February 1815 equipped with thousands of guns, uniforms, pesos and other necessities. Much of this money and equipment was, however, lost before the army even arrived in Caracas. On 24 April 1815 a fire of suspicious origins broke out at sea on board the San Pedro de Alcántara. The vessel, one of the principal transport ships, was completely destroyed, and with it over $1,000,000, thousands of guns, uniforms, and much more.\textsuperscript{17} This loss was a terrible blow to the army, and caused an immediate and serious shortage of food.\textsuperscript{18} Despite this setback, on

\textsuperscript{16}See Pablo Morillo to Minister of War, Santa Fe, 9 November 1816, Rodríguez Villa, \textit{Pablo Morillo}, vol. 3, pp. 223-234. See also Francisco Montalvo to Juan Sámano, Cartagena, 30 January 1818, \textit{Los últimos virreyes de Nueva Granada; Relación de mando del Virrey Don Francisco Montalvo y noticias del Virrey Sámano sobre la pérdida del reino}, (1813-1819), Eduardo Posada and P.M. Ibáñez (editors), Biblioteca de la Juventud Hispanoamericano, Editorial América (Madrid, n.d.) p. 18.

\textsuperscript{17}Rafael Sevilla, \textit{Memorias de un oficial del ejército español, campañas contra Bolívar y los separatistas de América}, Editorial América (Madrid, 1916), p. 44; and Pablo Morillo to José de Abascal, Torrecillas, 21 October 1815, AGI, Diversos, legajo 4. Jorge Mercado disagrees with Sevilla's figures, and estimates that at most $250,000 and some 1,000 weapons were destroyed. See Jorge Mercado, \textit{Campaña de invasión del Teniente General Don Pablo Morillo, 1815-1816}, Ejército de Colombia, Estado Mayor General (Bogotá, 1919), p. 82. See Historia de la rebelión de América en 35 cartas, by Pedro Pérez Múnoz, Quito, 31 December 1815, letter 33, AGI, Diversos, legajo 42, for report that the fire was the result of an accident with a cask of aguardiente.

\textsuperscript{18}It also led to a highly unsatisfactory encounter with the Jamaican firm of Bogle and Company. After the loss of the San Pedro de Alcántara Morillo sent envoys to the Caribbean to purchase food for the army. Bogle and Co. contracted to supply 352,707 pounds of salt cod. The codfish arrived on 21 August 1815 in Venezuela, where it immediately aroused suspicions about its freshness. The port authorities embargoed the fish and set about locating "experts" who could attest to the fish's unsuitability. Appropriate experts were not found until 10 September, by which time most of the fish was "enteramente perdido". Periodic checks were made until 6 December 1815, when it was decided that none of the fish was edible, and the entire shipment was thrown into the sea. The army then refused to pay Bogle and Co, who responded by petitioning the Council of the Indies. The matter
its arrival in Venezuela the army still retained enough equipment to impress the inhabitants. The Regent of the Caracas Audiencia commented that Morillo’s troops were “equipados completamente y con magnificencia nunca vista en nuestros ejércitos”.19

Ferdinand’s government encouraged its colonies to contribute to the overseas war effort because it was itself poised on the edge of bankruptcy throughout the years of the war. The situation in 1817 was summed up by the Junta de Pacificación, which reported that Spain “had no money, no navy, no useful treaties with influential powers, no credit, and no concerted plan for defeating the rebels”.20 Ferdinand himself was resistant to these facts, and consistently maintained that there was enough money to fund further expeditions. His insistence that the war could be won without money, friends or policies puzzled the French ambassador to Spain, who remarked in 1818:

I never cease to be surprised at the calm with which they view the future here and the confidence which they have in their armies. On the basis of these, they isolate themselves, scorn the advice of friends, and clash with those whose friendship they ought to be seeking to preserve. And what resources do they count on to sustain such arrogant language and confront events? They have a cabinet lacking in unity where each member is daily exposed to the risk of being sacked; an army callous and extremely discontented; a navy that cannot put to sea, despite the acquisition of the new fleet, because the stores are empty, their arsenals

19Heredia, Planes españoles, p. 299
20Costeloe, Response to Revolution, p. 73.
without work, their sailors without rations and their ports unprotected. Added to this, the treasury is completely empty.21

Spain’s inability to cover the costs of its overseas campaigns inevitably caused great reliance on local sources of funding. This in turn provoked serious conflicts between the military and locals in New Granada itself, as we saw in Chapter 7. Here we will focus on the effects of this policy on the royalist army itself. Often unable to pay for basic necessities, the condition of Morillo’s proud army would deteriorate to such an extent that, in the later years of the war, officers would complain that their men were marching naked, and its commander-in-chief would describe himself as being rich “sólo en miserias, trabajos y peligros”.22

Funds from New Granada

Prior to his departure from Spain, General Morillo was issued with secret instructions from the king which detailed the approved conduct for the war.23 These Instructions granted Morillo sweeping powers to appropriate money, but provided little guidance on how these powers were to be employed. Morillo was first of all empowered to confiscate funds from the royal monopolies in order to cover “urgencias de la guerra”. Although he was urged to take only what was strictly necessary, leaving the remainder for the civil government, no prescribed limit was set on the amount that could be diverted to the army.

22Pablo Morillo to Miguel de la Torre, Guanaparo, (1819?), AHNM, Estado, legajo 8717, docs. 205-206.
23Instrucciones dadas a Morillo para su expedición a Costafirme, Madrid, 18 November 1814, Rodriguez Villa, *Pablo Morillo*, vol. 2, pp. 437-448. The Instructions may also be found in AGI, Estado, legajo 64, doc. 18.
Military expenses in New Granada, and particularly in Cartagena, had always been high. One treasury official estimated that before 1810 military salaries in Cartagena alone had cost the local treasury $454,000, roughly half its total expenses. Military salaries and gastos del ejército in fact never reached this level after 1816. Annual military expenses in Cartagena varied instead between about $160,000 and $380,000, although other related expenses, such as hospital costs, did rise from their pre-war level. The great difference from the pre-war years was, however, that the viceroyalty’s income had fallen catastrophically. As Viceroy Montalvo commented, “la real hacienda ha quedado destruida; las fuentes de donde sacaba su ser y sus incrementos o estan exhaustas, o tan arruinadas que apenas rinden la décima parte de su producto”. This left the treasury even less able to cover military expenses than it had been before the outbreak of war.

The right to appropriate unlimited treasury funds for war expenses granted to Morillo in his Instructions distressed civilian officials. Viceroy Montalvo, for example, complained regularly to the crown about the free hand with which Morillo helped himself to treasury monies. More explosive, however, was the power granted to Morillo to “exigir empréstitos, [y] buscar fondos,

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24List of estimated expenses from before the war, Cartagena, n.d., AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 715.
25See Sumario de los valores de los ramos de cargo y data de las reales cajas de Cartagena de Indias, Cartagena, 31 December 1816; Report from cajas reales de Cartagena, Cartagena, 31 December(?) 1817; Sumario de cargo y data de las cajas reales de Cartagena, Cartagena, 31 December 1818; and estado de todos los ramos que ingresan y egresan en estas reales cajas, Cartagena, 31 December 1819; all in AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 715.
26Francisco Montalvo to Minister of Grace and Justice, Cartagena, 24 September 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631.
27See for example Report by Council of the Indies on various letters of Montalvo, 30 November 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 549.
viveres y efectos para pagar las tropas de Su Magestad. y empleados, además de hacer frente a todos los gastos”. This power to extract forced loans, which the army employed to the full during its years in New Granada, alienated most of the viceroyalty’s population and created great hostility.

The imposition of a “contribution” or forced loan, a technique often previously used in wartime, became a standard way of raising revenue following Morillo’s arrival. The military authorities would determine the amount of money needed to keep the army afloat, and then would simply demand that the sum be raised. Specific individuals might be designated to provide particular quantities of money, or a town’s governing body, such as its cabildo, might be required to find contributors. Timothy Anna claims that in Mexico forced direct contributions were simply a form of income tax, but in the Viceroyalty of New Granada the procedure for assigning contributions was considerably less formal.28 The Captain General of Venezuela, Juan Manuel de Cajigal, provided a lively description of the process at work. Explaining how Morillo and Pascual Enrile raised $100,000 in Caracas, he reported Morillo in conversation with Enrile:

“Fulano, seis mil pesos; zutano, cuatro mil; tal, ocho; cual, cinco, etc. Sume V.: ya está ochenta y cinco mil pesos.”

“No, es necesario cien mil; añádase fulano, tres; a zutano, dos, etc. Ya está completa la suma, enhorabuena... Señor, al Prior del Consulado que inmediatamente venga aquí... Ahí viene el Prior del Consulado; mi amigo: muy

bien, vea V. esta lista y lo que asigne a cada sujeto; al momento que entreguen las cantidades."

"Señor, eso no está arreglado, hay quien puede dar más, y algunos que nada tienen."

"Pues bien, V. arreglelo a su arbitrio; el asunto es que vengan los cien mil pesos."29

Both republicans and royalists resorted to forced contributions throughout the war. For example, following the capture of Pasto in 1822, Bolívar extracted a loan of $30,000 from suspected royalist leaders in the city.30 This sum, although large, was dwarfed by the contribution imposed on Cartagena after its recapture in December 1815, when Morillo forced the city to pay a total of $630,000 to the army.31 On this occasion the amount was divided between various known or suspected republicans, who were forced to supply cash payments. María Amador y Pombo, the wife of José Ignacio de Pombo (a member of Cartagena's

29Quoted in German Carrera Damas, Boves, aspectos socio-económicos, Colección Vigilia (Caracas, 1968), pp. 58-59. I have altered the punctuation somewhat.
31Report by Council of the Indies, 30 November 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 549. Further forced loans were imposed in January 1816. Goods confiscated from insurgents were used to secure the loans. See Pablo Morillo to Francisco Montalvo, Cartagena, 22 January 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 707. An additional contribution of $16,000 was imposed on the province of Cartagena in June 1816, in order to provide a steady supply of meat for the army. The sum of money was divided between the various towns in the province. See Circulares de Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 25 June 1816 and 29 July 1816; both in AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 717. For other examples of forced loans imposed by royalists, see Julián Bayer to Pascual Enrile, Citaré, 1 July 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 897 (for a donativo imposed on the Chocó); Matías Escuté to Miguel de la Torre, Socorro, 19 March 1816 and 25 March 1816; both in AHNMD, Estado, legajo 8739, docs, 151, 155 (for contributions of $10,000 were levied on Bucaramanga, Girón and Pie de Cuesta); and Germán Colmenares, “Castas, patrones de poblamiento y conflictos sociales en las provincias del Cauca, 1810-1830,” La independencia: ensayos de historia social, Germán Colmenares et al., Instituto Colombiano de Cultura (Bogotá, 1986), p. 142 (for contributions on Socorro and Cali).
insurgent junta), for example, was assigned to pay $1,000.\textsuperscript{32} On other occasions the army demanded goods or services, rather than cash.

The primary sources of funding for the Expeditionary Army, once it had reached the colonies, were forced contributions and simple confiscations. This was necessary because neither Spain itself, nor the viceregal treasury in New Granada was able to provide enough money for the army. In Santa Fe, confiscations were carried out via the Junta de Purificación and the Junta de Secuestros. Morillo explained their operating procedure to the minister of war in November 1816: "No era dable hacer frente a los gastos [del ejército] con las rentas de un Estado dislocado y sin comercio, por cuya razón era preciso recurrir a un sistema económico uniforme y decidirse a un expediente para cubrir el gasto." Morillo had therefore organised special committees, whose task was to determine the amount of money individuals should contribute to the army, and to oversee the confiscation of goods from convicted insurgents. With the funds thus generated, he had equipped the troops, purchased supplies and built army barracks.\textsuperscript{33}

As Morillo stated, the possessions of suspected republicans were routinely embargoed by the royalist army. In June 1816, for example, Rafael Sevilla, a young royalist officer stationed in Santa Fe, was sent to locate the savings of the Rubias family. The family was known to support the insurgents, which was regarded as sufficient reason to confiscate their belongings. Sevilla

\textsuperscript{32}Francisco Montalvo to Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 12 December 1817, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 708.

\textsuperscript{33}Pablo Morillo to Minister of War, Santa Fe, 9 November 1816, Rodríguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol. 3, pp. 223-234.
discovered some $7,000 and a large quantity of weapons, all of which were appropriated by the royalist army.\footnote{Sevilla, \textit{Memorias}, p. 98ff.} Similarly, after their arrival in the capital, Morillo and Pascual Enrile, the commander-in-chief of the navy, confiscated the belongings of the Lastra family, supporters of the insurgent Congress. The jewels and silver seized were allegedly worth over $1,800,000, an enormous sum.\footnote{José María Caballero, \textit{Diario}, Biblioteca de Bogotá Editorial Villegas (Bogotá, 1990) pp. 222-223.}

Confiscations and forced contributions were not imposed solely on the rich. All sectors of society were subject to involuntary donations to the royalist army. These extractions of money and goods were one of the chief sources of dissatisfaction with the royal army, and in particular the Third Division, stationed in southern New Granada. The heavy demands placed on the inhabitants of the Cauca Valley prompted many cabildos and private citizens to complain to the civilian authorities, as we saw in Chapter 7. These complaints reveal that the Expeditionary Army relied almost entirely on the public to provide for its needs. The town of Cartago, for example, was asked to provide a regular income of $600 per month for troops stationed nearby.\footnote{See Request enclosed in José Solís to Francisco Montalvo, Popayán, 17 June 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631.} The city of Popayán was obliged to cover all the costs of the local garrison, including the unitized ‘expenses’ of the garrison’s commander.\footnote{See List of monthly expenses of the troops in Popayán enclosed in José Solís to Francisco Montalvo, Popayán, 17 June 1817; and Daily expenses of troops in Popayán enclosed in Vicente Romero to José Solís, Anserma, 22 May 1817; both in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631.} Buga likewise was expected to cover the expenses

\footnotetext[34]{Sevilla, \textit{Memorias}, p. 98ff.}
\footnotetext[35]{José María Caballero, \textit{Diario}, Biblioteca de Bogotá Editorial Villegas (Bogotá, 1990) pp. 222-223.}
\footnotetext[36]{See Request enclosed in José Solís to Francisco Montalvo, Popayán, 17 June 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631.}
\footnotetext[37]{See List of monthly expenses of the troops in Popayán enclosed in José Solís to Francisco Montalvo, Popayán, 17 June 1817; and Daily expenses of troops in Popayán enclosed in Vicente Romero to José Solís, Anserma, 22 May 1817; both in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631.}
of Colonel Francisco Warleta's troops. Even small towns like Toro were assigned regular contributions to the army. The army furthermore relied on locals to transport equipment and the injured.

These demands incensed local cabildos, which urged that some other source of funding be found. For example, in May 1817 the cabildo of Popayán appealed to Viceroy Montalvo to end the large amounts of money being extracted from its citizenry through forced contributions. The city had already suffered a forced contribution of $500,000, a substantial figure by any measure. The inhabitants of Popayán, like the inhabitants of other towns occupied by royalist troops, were particularly distressed by the completely arbitrary nature of these contributions, which were imposed at entirely unregulated intervals. The cabildo wanted rules to be drawn up to regularise the whole procedure. These complaints were supported by Viceroy Montalvo, who forwarded them to Spain. There the matter was reviewed by Ferdinand's government, and both Morillo and Pascual Enrile were roundly condemned for condoning such arbitrary behaviour. The Council of the Indies further asserted that, as viceroy, Francisco

38See Acta of the Cabildo of Buga, Buga, 11 December 1816; Cabildo of Buga to Francisco Montalvo, Buga, 30 March 1817; Cabildo of Buga to José Solís, Buga, 30 June 1817; all in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631.
39Cabildo de Toro to José Solís, Toro, 27 June 1817; and Tomás de Heres to Ruperto Delgado, Cali, 20 May 1817; both in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631. See also Cabildo de Anserma to José Solís(?), Anserma, 7 July 1817; Cabildo de Anserma to Francisco Montalvo, Anserma, 27 June 1817; and Ruperto Delgado to José Solís, Popayán, 14 July 1817; all in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631.
40See, for example, Cabildo of Anserma to Francisco Montalvo, Anserma, 27 June 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631.
41See Cabildo of Popayán to José Solís and Francisco Montalvo, Popayán, 3 May 1817; Dictamen of Anselmo de Bierna y Mazo, Cartagena, 29 August 1817, José Solís to Francisco Montalvo, Popayán, 17 June 1817; and also Cabildo of Buga to José Solís, Buga, 30 June 1817; all in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631.
Montalvo’s authority was superior to Morillo’s in all matters except the purely military.42

This ruling, which was completely at variance with the position set out in Morillo’s Instructions, was typical of Ferdinand’s government. Unable to fund the army itself, and yet unwilling openly to sanction abuses in New Granada, the crown was caught in a difficult dilemma. This problem was repeated in New Granada itself. There too officials were unwilling to grasp the nettle of military funding. In response to the complaints from Popayán’s Governor José Solís about military excesses in the south, the Auditor de Guerra Anselmo de Bierna y Mazo decreed that the army should be paid purely from government income. Only when this was impossible should the shortfall be provided by the inhabitants of the region where the troops were posted, and even then no one should not be forced to pay more than they could afford. Instead, the army should reduce its expenses. This, Bierna y Mazo suggested naively, could be done by eliminating unnecessary jobs and reducing salaries.43 These suggestions did nothing to increase the amount of money actually available to the troops, and provided no guidance on how the already small number of royalist troops should be further reduced.

Bierna y Mazo’s ideas did not find a sympathetic audience within the royalist army. General Morillo himself initially advocated a fairly cavalier approach to funding the army. In June 1816, for example, he had ordered the Captain General of

42 Council of the Indies to Pablo Morillo, Madrid, 13 January 1818; and Council of the Indies to Pascual Enríquez, Madrid, 13 January 1818; both in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 549.
43 Dictamen de Anselmo de Bierna y Mazo, Cartagena, 29 August 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631; also Francisco Montalvo to Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 6 September 1817, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 708.
Venezuela to begin collecting supplies in Caracas "sin consideración con persona alguna". When individual officers hesitated to seize private belongings and savings, they merely turned their attention to local governmental bodies, particularly cabildos, and to government revenues. In June 1817, for example, Ruperto Delgado, the commander of Third Battalion of the Numancia Regiment, seized over $7,000 paid in alcabalas in Buenaventura. This sum, on route to be deposited in the Cajas Reales in Cartagena, was confiscated by Delgado with the evident intention of using the money for military expenses. Such behaviour was not new, of course. Already in 1814, royalist officers in Venezuela had pillaged the funds of the tobacco monopoly in order to meet their needs. Morillo’s Instructions moreover permitted him to appropriate funds from the viceregal treasury for the army’s use. This privilege, although spelled out in black and white in the Instructions, was generally resisted by

44Pablo Morillo to Salvador de Moxó, Santa Fe, 24 June 1816, AGI, Audiencia de Caracas, legajo 386. Also see Pablo Morillo to Francisco Montalvo, Cartagena, 22 January 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 707; Pablo Morillo to Miguel de la Torre, Mompós, 29 February 1816, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8717, doc. 42; Pablo Morillo to Sebastián de la Calzada, Mompós, 29 February 1816, Rodríguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol. 3, pp. 30-32; and Pablo Morillo to Minister of War, Santa Fe, 31 August 1816, Rodríguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol. 3, pp. 175-188.

45See, for example, Diary of Primer Batallón del Regimiento de Infantería de Numancia, March 1817, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 759A; and Ruperto Delgado to Juan Sámano, Popayán, 20 July 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631.

46José Solís to Francisco Montalvo, Popayán, 17 June 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631. Similarly, Montalvo complained that in 1816 Morillo had emptied the treasuries in Cartagena and Santa Fe, and had reallocated the income from the rentas estancadas "sin atención a las leyes" (Report by Council of the Indies, 30 November 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 549); and in 1820 officers in Cartagena took to helping themselves to whatever money was available in the Cajas Reales (Report from Cajas Reales, Cartagena, January 1820(?), AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 749).

47See Carrera Damas, Boves, pp. 118-123.
civilians authorities, who felt the treasury was already contributing more than enough to the army.

§2. The Effect of Chronic Underfunding

Minimal state backing and a haphazard system of confiscation and forced loans was not a stable base on which to finance an army. This is evident from an examination of the salaries paid to royalist troops. Soldiers fighting for the crown were supposed to receive a basic annual salary of about $100.48

On top of this soldiers could, in theory, earn additional bonuses for exceptional feats of military prowess, and those joining Morillo’s expedition in 1814 were to be paid an extra amount as an inducement to enlist.49 The reality of the situation was quite different. For months, sometimes years on end, troops were paid nothing at all, or only a fraction of the full amount owed.50 (Such a situation was certainly not unknown in Spain itself.51)

48See Noticia de los sueldos que disfrutan en esta plaza las tropas de la guarnición, Cartagena, 26 August 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 715; and List of daily expenses of troops in Popayán, enclosed in Vicente Romero to José Solís, Anserma, 22 May 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631.

49Costeloe, Response to Revolution, pp. 114, 245.

50 See various soldiers’ wills in AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 759B. Some individuals had not been paid for 8 years. See also Pablo Morillo to Francisco Montalvo, Cartagena, 22 January 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 707; Francisco Montalvo to Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 6 August 1817, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 708; Francisco Igrica to Minister of War, 6 June 1818, AGI, Estado, legajo 57, doc. 35E; José María Barreiro to Juan Sámano, Sogamoso, 23 March 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 747 (also in Los ejércitos del Rey, 1819, vol. 2, Alberto Lee López (editor), Biblioteca de la Presidencia de la República (Bogotá, 1989), pp. 31-33); Francisco Gascón, Juan Otalora and others to Manuel Cordero, Cartagena, 23 November 1819; and Antonio Cano to Juan Sámano, Cartagena, 22 September 1819, both in AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 747; Pablo Morillo to Minister of Overseas, Valencia, 26 July 1820, AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 1568; Gabriel de Torres to Minister of Hacienda, Cartagena, 18 August 1820, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 1017.

51Karl Marx described the normal state of the Spanish army as being “no pay, no food, no clothing”. See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Revolution in Spain, Greenwood Press (Westport, 1975), p. 159; Lino(?) to Simón Bolívar, Philadelphia, 16 June 1816, AGI, Audiencia de Caracas, legajo 109;
Occasional efforts were made to overcome the army's complete inability to pay troops' wages, by, for example, declaring that a ration of food counted as a half-real. Thus in the course of a year soldiers would automatically be credited about $27 towards their salary, regardless of whether they received any cash or not.\(^52\) (This is assuming that they received their rations regularly, which was not always the case.) Moreover, officers frequently complained that their troops were obliged to march without adequate clothing or even "desnudos".\(^53\) In one unit in 1816, for example, there were only 32 pairs of shoes to be shared between over 300 recruits.\(^54\)

The royal navy, stationed in Cartagena, seems to have suffered particularly from shortages of money. Morillo noted in 1816 that the navy was supposedly supplied directly from Spain, rather than locally, "que es lo propio que destinarla a carecer de todo".\(^55\) The navy, which was certainly not supplied from Spain, appears moreover to have been less successful than the army in compelling civilians to provide food and money.\(^56\) The situation

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52 Francisco Montalvo to Juan Sámano, Cartagena, 30 January 1818, Los últimos virreyes, p. 104.
53 See, for example, Pablo Morillo to Minister of War, Santa Fe, 9 November 1816, in Rodríguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol. 3, pp. 223-234; Simón Sicilia to José Solís, Popayán, 16 July 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631; and José María Barreiro to Juan Sámano, Tunja, 3 July 1819 and 7 July 1819, in Los ejércitos del Re, vol. 2, pp. 216-217, 238-242, respectively; and Andrés Delgado to Juan Sámano, Magangué, 23 April 1820, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 747.
54 Relación de la prendas que se hallan, Mompós, 26 November 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 712.
55 Pablo Morillo to Minister of War, Santa Fe, 31 August 1816, Rodríguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol. 3, pp. 195-207.
56 In February 1820, for example, the commander of the navy in Cartagena complained that, contrary to orders, the townspeople were not bringing the sailors their breakfasts until 11.00am. He blamed this on "la morosidad o acaso mala intención contra la marina por la repugnancia con que este pueblo la han mirado y miran" (Manuel Cordero to Juan Sámano, Cartagena,
grew so bad that an appeal was made to Spain, and Ferdinand himself intervened to order Viceroy Montalvo to provide more money. The king commented that there was no point having a navy if it had no funds, a sentiment with which virtually every officer stationed in New Granada agreed.\(^57\) Ferdinand did nothing, however, to increase the amount of money actually available to Montalvo for use by the navy.

Shortages of money were of course not confined to Spain’s armed forces. Paying salaries to officials in New Granada’s civil administration also proved difficult. Many restrictions were made. Government employees in Cartagena were not paid a regular salary at all during 1816. Instead they were supported by the local population, which was obliged to provide them with food.\(^58\) Even the highest officials were obliged to accept smaller salaries during the early years of the war. Francisco Montalvo, during his tenure as Captain General, and later Viceroy, was paid $14,000 annually. Previous viceroys had earned as much as $40,000 per year, and even Juan Sámano, who succeeded Montalvo in the post, was paid $25,000. The reduction in Montalvo’s salary was motivated by the tight financial situation in Spain itself. When Montalvo’s constant requests for a retrospective salary increase were finally approved in 1820,

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1 February 1820, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 747). See also Francisco Montalvo to Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 28 February 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 707; Pablo Morillo to Minister of War, Santa Fe, 31 August 1816, Rodriguez Villa, \textit{Pablo Morillo}, vol. 3, pp. 195-207; Various letters of Manuel Cordero to Juan Sámano, Cartagena, 1819-1820, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 747; Complaints against Manuel Cordero, Cartagena, 9 June 1821, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 719B; and Heredia, \textit{Planes españoles}, pp. 253-255, for arguments in Fernando’s government about funding the navy; .

57Report to Minister of Hacienda, Palace, 12 December 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 580.

58See Francisco Montalvo to Minister of Grace and Justice, Cartagena, 2 August 1816, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631.
officials in Cartagena were unable to find any funds to pay him with.\textsuperscript{59}

The effect of this overall shortage was to increase competition for funds, and to aggravate conflicts between the military and civilian wings of government. Morillo, for his part, blamed civilian officials for failing to put the army first. Viceroy Montalvo, he complained, was more willing to pay the salaries of civilians than to "vestir a la única tropa que lo había de sacar de riesgo y por la cual mandaba aquel corto cantón".\textsuperscript{60} He was equally critical of Venezuela's Captain General Salvador Moxó, whom he accused of gross negligence in failing to provide the army with food and supplies.\textsuperscript{61} Nonetheless, for all his differences with Morillo, Viceroy Montalvo consistently supported Morillo's claims that the army needed more money. He merely thought funds should come from Spain, rather than New Granada. Montalvo opposed the requisitioning of food and supplies, and urged the government in Spain to provide a regular source of money to avoid the "violencias irremediables" invariably accompanying confiscations.\textsuperscript{62}

\textsuperscript{59}See documents related to Montalvo's request for a salary increase, 1815-1820, particularly Gabriel de Torres to Minister of Hacienda, Cartagena, 18 August 1820; in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 580. This latter document is also contained in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 1017.

\textsuperscript{60}Pablo Morillo to Minister of War, Santa Fe, 9 November 1816, Rodríguez Villa, \textit{Pablo Morillo}, vol. 3, pp. 223-234. See also Report by Council of the Indies, 30 November 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 549; and also Francisco Montalvo to Juan Sámano, Cartagena, 30 January 1818, \textit{Los últimos virreyes}, p. 153.

\textsuperscript{61}See Pablo Morillo to Salvador de Moxó, Chaparro, 27 May 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Caracas, legajo 386. See also other letters of Pablo Morillo to Salvador de Moxó, 1817, in AGI, Audiencia de Caracas, legajos 110, and 386; Pablo Morillo to Duke of San Carlos, Caracas, 16 November 1818, AGS, Estado, legajo 8223; Rodríguez Villa, \textit{Pablo Morillo} (1920), vol. 1, p. 303; and Pablo Morillo to Salvador de Moxó, el campo del paso del Frío, en el Río Apure, 2 February 1817, Rodríguez Villa, \textit{Pablo Morillo}, vol. 3, p. 265.

\textsuperscript{62}See Francisco Montalvo to Minister of Grace and Justice, Cartagena, 2 August 1816, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631; and Francisco Montalvo
It rapidly became clear to General Morillo that the Expeditionary Army was inadequately funded. Indeed, by January 1816, the army’s poverty had, in Morillo’s view, “llegado a un caso extremo”.63 From then on, he became increasingly bitter about the shortages his troops were forced to endure. Morillo summed up the situation in November 1819: “el numerario es socorro olvidado por nosotros todos”.64 His claim was supported by the republicans, who, after the capture of Santa Fe, gained access to royalist documents. Santander was shocked to learn of the financial hardships which had confronted Morillo, and commented that, according to the royalists’ own documents, “la tercera división no se pagaba”.65 Nor was Morillo alone in bemoaning the army’s poverty. Virtually every officer complained about shortages of essentials.66 These complaints served two purposes. First, and most importantly, they were genuine appeals for aid; second, they were insurance against later reproof. If an officer could demonstrate that he had asked for help, he was less likely to be accused of incompetence should he

63Pablo Morillo to Francisco Montalvo, Cartagena, 22 January 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 707. For complaints about Montalvo’s failure to supply the army, see Pablo Morillo to Minister of War, Santa Fe, 17 September 1816, Rodríguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol. 3, pp. 218-223.

64Pablo Morillo to Gabriel de Torres, Barquisimeto, 20 November 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 709. See also Pablo Morillo to Minister of Overseas, Barquisimeto, 31 October 1820, AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 1568.

65Francisco de Paula Santander to Simón Bolívar, Santa Fe, 7 January 1820, Cartas Santander-Bolívar, vol. 1, Biblioteca de la Presidencia de la República (Bogotá, 1988) pp. 263-265.

66Resumen histórico de las operaciones u movimientos que ha hecho la tropa de [la Tercera División], 21 December 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 759A; José María Barreiro to Juan Sámano, Sogamoso, 23 March 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 747; and Francisco Warleta to Pablo Morillo, Ruinas de Remedios, 17 March 1816, Rodríguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol. 3, pp. 34-35.
suffer a defeat. Thus, on 20 December 1816 Lieutenant Colonel José María Herrera asserted that if he did not get the extra 25 riflemen he had requested, he would regard himself as “releva[do de] toda responsabilidad, si como era de creer, le atacaban, y no se hallaba con el resfuerzo pedido”.67

The effect of this chronic failure to pay and equip the troops was both predictable and disabling for the army. Desertion, always a problem, grew worse when the troops were not paid on time. By 1820 the navy in Cartagena was owed over a year’s back pay. “Es consecuente una deserción extraordinaria,” remarked its commander.68 Moreover, when there was no prospect of ever being paid, desertion became even more tempting. The royalist officers were well aware of this problem. They regularly begged the government to send more money, and threatened civilian officials that entire regiments would desert if money were not forthcoming.69

The third division’s reliance on confiscation as a chief source of income was, furthermore, a direct consequence of the Spanish government’s failure to provide regular salaries to the troops. The continual requisitioning of food, money and goods was highly unpopular, and deeply detrimental to the royalist army’s

67Resumen histórico de las operaciones u movimientos que ha hecho la tropa de [la Tercera División], 20 December 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 759A.
68See Manuel Cordero to Juan Sámano, Cartagena, 1 February 1820, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 747. See also Miguel de Bustillo y Colina to Cortes, Kingston, 12 March 1813, printed in Gabriel Jiménez Molinares, Los mártires de Cartagena de 1816 ante el consejo de guerra y ante la historia, Edición Oficial (Cartagena, 1948), vol. 1, pp. 312-319, esp. p. 316.
69See Simón Sicilia to José Solis, Popayán, 16 July 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631; Pablo Morillo to Minister of War, Santa Fe, 31 August 1816, Rodríguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol. 3, pp. 195-207; José María Barreiro to Juan Sámano, Sogamoso, 23 March 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 747 (this document may also be found in Los ejércitos del Rey, pp. 31-33.); and, for remarks about the troops in Spain, see Lino (de Pombo?) to Simón Bolívar, Philadelphia, 16 June 1816, AGI, Audiencia de Caracas, legajo 109.
popularity. Many observers commented on the link between military extractions and revived support for the insurgency. Governor José Solís predicted that peace would never be restored in the northern Cauca Valley unless the army reduced its expenses. Quito’s President Montes similarly attributed the resurgence of republicanism in the Llanos, the Chocó, and the Socorro region on the excessive fines imposed by the Junta de Purificación and the Junta de Secuestros. These views received support from the highest level of civilian officials in New Granada. Viceroy Montalvo himself stated that the uncontrolled financial demands of junior officers were directly responsible for the continued unrest in the south.

It is difficult to decide whether the war would have developed any differently if the royalist army had received more money at certain critical times, but this difficulty should not obscure the demonstrable fact that the army did not receive reinforcements at crucial moments. The catastrophic defeat of José María Barreiro’s forces at the battle of Boyacá is perhaps the most notable example. General Morillo regarded the loss of Santa Fe as a sad vindication of his earlier pleas for reinforcements and funding. Shortly after the defeat he reminded the Ministry of War that, as early as April 1816 he had warned them what would happen if he did not receive more troops and more money, and

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70José Solís to Francisco Montalvo, Popayán, 20 June 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631.
71Toribio Montes to Francisco Montalvo, Quito, 21 June 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631.
72See Order by Francisco Montalvo, Cartagena, 18 August 1817, and Francisco Montalvo to Minister of Grace and Justice, Cartagena, 24 September 1817; and Francisco Montalvo to Minister of Grace and Justice, Cartagena, 2 August 1816; all in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631.
that he had been entirely correct. Perhaps even more important than these particular incidents was Spain’s long-term failure to provide for its army. By 1820 Morillo’s army was in a hopeless state. It is most unlikely that the royalists would have been able to defeat the republicans in 1821, even if huge reinforcements had been sent. If, however, the army had been adequately funded in 1816 and 1817, the war might have developed quite differently.

We will now, in the final chapter of this section, examine a further factor impeding royalist success. This was the health of the Expeditionary Army.

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73 Pablo Morillo to Minister of War, Valencia, 12 September 1819, Rodríguez Villa, *Pablo Morillo*, vol. 4, pp. 49-55.
Chapter 9: Health and Disease in the Army

Continual shortages of money, and the consequent harassment of New Granada's population, proved to be substantial obstacles to royalist success in New Granada. There were, however, others. We will here examine a further impediment: disease. This factor is rarely granted sufficient importance, yet was a major hindrance to royalist plans. The Expeditionary Army suffered terrible losses to disease, and the resultant decline in troop strength was a constant limitation on Morillo's actions. This chapter will consider, first, the effect of disease on Morillo's forces. We will then survey briefly the available forms of healthcare in New Granada, and the efforts of royalist officers to counter the ravages of smallpox and other infirmities on their troops.

§ 1. Disease and Mortality

Prior to the twentieth century, European soldiers were much more likely to die of disease than to fall in battle. This was the case whether the troops fought in Europe itself, or elsewhere, such as in the Americas.\(^1\) Certainly the losses suffered by British troops fighting in the Caribbean are well known; Michael Duffy, for example, notes that during Britain's fight against Revolutionary France, nearly 67% of the British soldiers stationed in Santo Domingo died of disease.\(^2\) Spanish troops fighting in the

\(^2\) See Michael Duffy, *Soldiers, Sugar and Seapower: The British Expedition to the West Indies and the War against Revolutionary France*, Oxford University Press (1987), Chapter 14 (pp. 326-367); Richard Harding, *Amphibious Warfare in the Eighteenth Century: The British Expedition to the West Indies, 1740-1742*, The Royal Historical Society (Ithlingborough,
Americas, particularly those stationed in coastal regions, also died in large numbers from yellow fever and other diseases. Indeed, during Cuba’s war of independence in the 1890s, five times as many Spanish soldiers died from disease than were killed in battle.³

Spanish losses to disease during the earlier wars of independence on the mainland, while less well known, appear also to have been substantial. It was ill-health, rather than military engagements, that carried off the majority of General Morillo’s army. Already on 5 December 1815, Morillo could report that in the six months since the army left Puerto Cabello, out of a total force of some 7,000, over 3,000 soldiers had either died or deserted.⁴ As the army’s only military engagement during this period had been a handful of skirmishes outside Cartagena, it is clear that large numbers of soldiers were falling victim to the region’s notorious climate. Reports of the terrifying death rate from disease in the Spanish camps spread during the siege; in March 1816 the Royal Gazette and Bahama Advertiser stated that an enormous number of Spanish soldiers had died, not from battle-wounds, but from disease. The Gazette blamed “las excesivas lluvias, y . . . el excesivo calor”.⁵ Of course, Cartagena,

⁵Translation from the Royal Gazette and Bahama Advertiser, 27 March 1816, AGI, Estado, legajo 57, doc. 32. See also Pablo Morillo to José de Abascal, Torrecillas, 21 October 1815, AGI, Diversos, legajo 4, ramo 1.
with its tropical climate, had long been a grave for soldiers; in 1764, for example, a full 30% of the city’s garrison were ill.6 Throughout the war, the Atlantic coast was the region most afflicted by disease, and it was there that Spanish troops suffered the greatest loss.

The overall effect on Morillo’s army of the loss of so many soldiers to disease was difficult to counteract. The army grew progressively smaller despite the efforts of its commanders. After the capture of Cartagena, Morillo complained that the army had been reduced to “un número muy limitado”, because of “las muchas y penosas enfermedades” suffered by the troops during the blockade.7 In May 1816, Morillo noted that since he left Spain he had been unable to recruit enough new soldiers to replace those dead from disease; by November 1816, there remained only one regiment composed entirely of Europeans.8

The actual recapture of Cartagena presented the Spanish with an additional medical crisis. Thousands of people died of starvation-related diseases, and of hunger itself, during the siege, and, when the army entered the city, they found heaps of rotting cadavers lying unburied in the streets. Morillo immediately ordered mass graves to be dug, and efforts were made to fumigate the city in order to prevent the further spread of disease. See José Manuel Restrepo, Historia de la revolución de Colombia, vol. 2, Ediciones Bedout (Bogotá, 1969), pp. 65, 81; Rafael Sevilla Memorias de un oficial del ejército español, campañas contra Bolívar y los separatistas de América, Editorial América, (Madrid, 1916), pp. 69-70; Rodríguez Villa Pablo Morillo, (1920), vol. 1, p. 177; and Bando de Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 12 December 1815, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 717. The sick and infected were, moreover, prohibited from entering the city. See Bando de Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 28 December 1815, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 717.

6Marchena Fernández, Oficiales y soldados, pp. 210, 213, 214.
7 Pablo Morillo to Francisco de Montalvo, Cartagena, 5 February 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 707. Also see Francisco Montalvo to Juan Sámano, Cartagena, 30 January 1818, Los últimos virreyes de Nueva Granada, Relación de Mando del Virrey Don Francisco Montalvo y noticias del Virrey Sámano sobre la pérdida del Reino (1813-1819), Eduardo Posada and P.M. Iñáñez (editors), Biblioteca de la Juventud Hispano-Americana, Editorial América, (Madrid, n.d.), pp. 94-95.
8 Pablo Morillo to Minister of War, Santa Fe, 31 May 1816; and Pablo Morillo to Minister of War, Santa Fe, 9 November 1816, both in Antonio Rodríguez Villa, El Teniente General Don Pablo Morillo, Primer Conde de Cartagena, Marqués de la Puerta (1778-1837), vol. 3, Real Academia de la Historia, (Madrid, 1908), pp. 164-169, 229, respectively.
The mortality rate from disease continued to grow throughout the remainder of the war, particularly in the area of the Atlantic coast. Already in early 1816 in Mompós, nearly 1 in every 7 men in the Second Battalion of Albuera was sick.\(^9\) In Cartagena during 1818 and 1819, nearly one in ten officers appears to have been ill at any given moment.\(^{10}\) By 1820, the situation was even worse. In Ríohacha, officers estimated that only one third of the troops were in even “mediana salud”. Commanding officer Vicente Sánchez Lima lamented that “últimamente la desnudez, el hambre, y el horroroso espectáculo de la fiebre forman hoy el triste y melancólico carácter del soldado”.\(^{11}\) By the start of the republican siege of Cartagena in 1820, over 300 men from the Regimiento de León were in hospital. The total force of the regiment consisted in little over 500 men, so nearly two-thirds of the regiment were ill. Blame again fell on the “estaciones muy calurosos o muy húmedas”.\(^{12}\)

The loss of army members to disease and illness had other knock-on effects as well. Antonio Cano, the Commander of the Infantry Regiment of León, stationed in Cartagena, lamented in January of 1816 that almost all of the officers under his command were ill. This was particularly problematic as not only these officers, but also all the soldiers who knew how to write were also ill. He thus had no one to help him complete the enormous amount of paperwork the army demanded. See Antonio Cano to Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 5 January 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 711.

\(^9\)Reports on the Second Battalion of Albuera, Mompós, 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 738.
\(^{10}\)See Vicente Villete to Subinspectador General, Cartagena, 31 December 1819; and also Report by Ignacio de La Ruz, Cartagena, 3 February 1819, for comments about troop mortality in Santa Marta, both in AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 738.
\(^{11}\)Vicente Sánchez Lima to Comandantes Militares de la Hacha, Moreno, 26 November 1820, AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 1568.
\(^{12}\)First Declaration of Gabriel de Torres, Havana, 2 November 1824, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 2136A.

The local diet, regarded as unsuitable for European troops, was frequently blamed for causing illness. See Francisco Montalvo to Juan Sámano, Cartagena, 30 January 1818, Los últimos virreyes, p. 40.
Illness, however, afflicted troops across New Granada. In January 1816, half the troops stationed in Zaragosa were ill, and, in late 1817, outbreaks of smallpox struck troops stationed in various places. In the Llanos de Casanare, royalist troops were being sent to hospital at the rate of about one a day.¹³ From Venezuela, Morillo wrote to the Minister of War that between April 1815, when the Expeditionary Army had landed on the Island of Margarita, and September 1817, the army had lost one third of its members to disease. "La simple picada de un mosquito," he wrote:

priva a veces de la vida a un hombre o se le origina una úlcera que después de tenerlo impedido mucho tiempo, le deja inutilizado. El dormir al sereno en los campamentos, acaba de producir una multitud de ciegos en la división del Brigadier Canterac. Los alimentos del país causan a los europeos enfermedades de toda especie, y hay muy pocos que resistan a su fatal influjo. Los inmensos desiertos en que se hace la guerra, la falta de auxilio en todo género, las aguas encharcadas que por precisión han de beberse en muchas ocasiones, y la fatiga extraordinaria del soldado en distancias tan considerables por estaciones tan diversas y

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¹³See, for example, Vicente Sánchez Lima to Pedro Ruiz de Porras, Zaragosa, 8 January 1816, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8745; Antonio Meléndez to Gabriel de Torres, Mompós, 5 April 1817, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 712; Cabildo de Anserma to Francisco Montalvo, Anserma, 27 June 1817, AGI, Santa Fe, legajo 631; Diary of the Primer Batallón del Regimiento Infantería de Numancia, 15 December 1817, AGI, Papeles de Cuba legajo 759A; Rodríguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, (1920), vol. 2, p. 31; and José María Caballero, Diario, Biblioteca de Bogotá, Editores Villegas, (Bogotá, 1990), p. 217.

For an "especie de peste" in 1816, see Francisco Montalvo to Juan Sámano, Cartagena, 30 January 1818, Los últimos virreyes, p. 95; and Pablo Morillo, Description of the 1816 attack on the interior of New Granada, BRAH, sig. 9/7651 (legajo 8). In 1818, many troops in Santa Fe fell ill with smallpox, as well; see José María Barreiro to Juan Sámano, Santa Fe, 2 August 1818, Los ejércitos del Rey, 1818-1819, vol. 1, Alberto Lee López (editor), Biblioteca de la Presidencia de la República (Bogotá, 1989), p. 39.
variadas, todo contribuye a nuestra destrucción y a la aniquilación de las tropas.14

Various diseases afflicted both the Spanish and insurgent troops. The most common seem to have been dysentery, smallpox, scurvy, and a variety of tropical illnesses. Yellow fever and sexually transmitted diseases were also a problem, the latter particularly among officers.15 Soldiers of course also suffered from other types of infirmity. For example, troops stationed in the Llanos in 1817 were struck with some sort of haemorrhaging disease (perhaps tuberculosis) that left them spitting blood.16

Injury also took a terrible toll, as infections were difficult to cure. Ulcerated wounds of all kinds tormented officers and troops alike.

14 Pablo Morillo to Minister of War, La Guaira, 10 September 1817, Rodríguez Villa, *Pablo Morillo*, vol. 3, p. 442-443. Also see Miguel de La Torre to Pablo Morillo, Guayana, 4 May 1817, AHN, Estado, legajo 8718, docs. 51-52; and Pablo Morillo to Minister of War, Caño de Atamayca, 28 February 1819, Rodríguez Villa, *Pablo Morillo*, vol. 4, pp. 10-14.

By 1820, Morillo himself was very ill from scurvy and haemorrhoids, as well as from a wound received during the battle of La Puerta on 16 March 1818. See Rodríguez Villa, *Pablo Morillo*, (1920), vol. 2, p. 88.

15See Pablo Morillo to Minister of War, Maracay, 1 April 1817, Rodríguez Villa, *Pablo Morillo*, vol. 3, p. 369; Tomás de Heres to Ruperto Delgado, Cali, 20 May 1817, AGI, Santa Fe, legajo 631; Diary of the Primer Batallón del Regimiento Infantería de Numancia, 13 November, 15 December 1817, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 759A; Lists of sick officers in Venezuelan hospitals, 1820, AHN, Estado, legajo 8728, docs. 379-408; Miguel de La Torre to Minister of Overseas, Caracas, 22 March 1821, AGI, Audiencia de Caracas, legajo 55; Juan de la Cruz Mourgcon to Minister of Overseas, Panama, 28 August 1821, AGI, Santa Fe, legajo 668; and Sevilla *Memorias*, p. 124.


16 Reports of Carlos Tolrá, Chocontá, November 1817, BRAH, sig. 7665 (leg. 22), fol. 512. See also Juan Sámano to Pablo Morillo, Santa Fe, 29 August 1818, BRAH, sig. 7665 (leg. 22), fols. 607-609; and Cabildo de Anserma to Francisco Montalvo, Anserma, 27 June 1817, AGI, Santa Fe, legajo 631.
Wounds in the feet, in particular, were notoriously fatal, and amputation was often the only viable option.\textsuperscript{17}

Troops and officers also suffered from various mental disorders. In early 1816, for example, Morillo reported that Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Machado had been sent to Spain, as he was suffering from “demencia”.\textsuperscript{18} This was evidently not an unusual occurrence, as in 1800, and again in 1802, Charles IV had issued orders about the treatment of soldiers, and officers who suffered mental breakdown.\textsuperscript{19} Morillo’s forces were, however, generally spared one illness which decimated republican troops. Unlike Bolívar’s army, who was led across páramo after páramo from Venezuela to Bolivia, royalist troops in New Granada did not often fall ill from soroche, apunamiento, or mal de páramo. This altitude sickness, which causes nausea, respiratory difficulties, lassitude, and, potentially, death, devastated republican troops both in 1819 during Bolívar’s crossing of the Colombian Andes, and in the 1820s during the campaign in Peru.\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{17}See Marchena Fernández, \textit{Oficiales y soldados}, pp. 219-220; List of invalids in Puerto Cabello, 20 November 1815, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 897; Francisco Warleta to Pablo Morillo, Remedios, 17 March 1816, BRAH, sig. 9/7658 (legajo 15), fols. 38-39; Pablo Morillo to Miguel de la Torre, Santa Fe, 23 June 1816, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8717; Diary of the Primer Batallón del Regimiento Infantería de Numancia, 15 December 1817, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 759A; Pablo Morillo to Minister of War, Barquisimeto, 22 July 1818, Rodríguez Villa, \textit{Pablo Morillo}, vol. 3, p. 598; and Antonio Van Halen to Miguel de la Torre, Caracas, March 1821, AGI, Audiencia de Caracas, legajo 55.

\textsuperscript{18}Francisco Montalvo to Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 21 February 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 707.

\textsuperscript{19}Royal Orders of 12 July 1800 and 31 May 1802, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 739.

§ 2. Health Care

Soldiers tried various remedies for the diseases that attacked them. One of the most common illnesses seems to have been ‘calentura’, a general term for feverish, heat-related illnesses, and possibly also malaria. Rafael Sevilla, who fought with General Morillo during most of the campaign, recorded several different ways of treating calentura. A sufferer could try eating a cubarro fruit cooked in water, or could engage in other, more prolonged, treatments. One such consisted in drinking a cup of rum, then, one hour later, a cup of orangeade (naranjada) boiled with spirit of nitrate, then, an hour after that, another cup of rum, etc., combined with a cup of broth every four hours. Another possible treatment, invented by Sevilla himself, was to go on a long and vigorous walk as soon as the fever began. After this one rested and drank a cup of tea. This would bring on a 48-hour attack of high fever, followed by a complete cure. Sevilla found all of these methods effective. On one occasion, however, he was given quinine, which had no positive effect at all. Sevilla also fell ill with “el bicho”, a disease that caused nausea and fever, plus headache and pain in the bones. He was cured of this by a reportedly very unpleasant treatment involving lemons, the details of which were not spelled out in his memoirs.

It was very common for soldiers (and indeed the public at large) to resort to folk remedies of this sort. Throughout the

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21 Sevilla, Memorias, p. 144, 166., 198. The effectiveness of quinine in treating even malaria was uneven. The amount of actual quinine in the chinchona bark-based remedies varied to such an extent that it could not be relied upon to effect a cure. See Duffy, Soldiers, Sugar and Seapower, p. 359.

22 Sevilla, Memorias, p. 45. For information about ‘treatment’ of yellow fever in Mexico, see Archer, The Army in Bourbon Mexico, pp. 42-44; and for treatment of soroche, see Julio Albi, Banderas Olvidadas: el ejército realista en América, Ediciones de Cultura Hispánica (Madrid, 1990), p. 162.
eighteenth century, doctors had complained about the prevalence of curanderos, and in 1815 Viceroy Montalvo reported that in Cartagena “la medicina y cirugía yacen en el mayor abandono, teniendo los vecinos que ponerse en manos de curanderos del país, a quienes prefieren por su práctica y conocimientos locales a los facultativos europeos que existen aquí, en lo que no dejan de tener razón, por la ignorancia de los últimos”.23

Not all popular treatments involved the use of folk medicine; some were matters of simple hygiene. To prevent the potentially fatal infections of the feet that were crippling the Spanish army, soldiers were advised to wash their feet daily in aguardiente, or, failing that, warm water. Morillo likewise urged his men to keep clean and to wash as regularly as possible. Efforts were made to control the size of the dog population in Cartagena, in order to protect the troops and the public at large from the dangerous diseases supposedly spread by canines.24 Sensibly, soldiers were

23 Francisco Montalvo to Juan Sámano, Cartagena, 30 January 1818, Los últimos virreyes, pp. 136-137; and Memorial de Francisco Flórez Moreno, Cádiz, 10 January 1811, AGI, Ultramar, legajo 811, for remarks by Spanish doctor about that state of health care in the Americas in 1789. See also Marcelo Frías Núñez, “Enfermedad y sociedad en la crisis colonial del antiguo régimen: Nueva Granada en el tránsito del siglo XVIII al XIX. Las epidemias de viruelas”, Tesina de Licenciatura, Centro de Estudios Históricos (Madrid, 1991), p. 66; and Duffy, Soldiers, Sugar and Seapower, p. 374, for comments about British sailors’ use of “folk-medicine” (i.e. rum) in the West Indies.

24 Bando de Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 12 October 1818, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 717.

Torres reported that “se han multiplicado los perros y los males que traen a la población, en términos de no poderse transitar por la ciudad”, and complained that this was an “abuso manifestamente peligroso a la seguridad personal por la natural ferocidad de estos animales, a la salud pública por las enfermedades funestres a que están sujetos, al aseo, comodidad y decencia del público, y una carga inútil y aún dañosa al consumo general de los artículos para la subsistencia común”. He accordingly ordered that all dogs found roaming the streets would be killed within eight days by presidarios. The size of Cartagena’s dog problem is unclear. Mexico City, on the other hand, was struck by a real plague of wild dogs in 1813 and again in 1819. Packs of wild dogs roamed the streets, attacking people and animals, and digging up graves. As a result, dog patrols analogous to those formed in Cartagena were established in Mexico
frequently advised to avoid drinking water; aguardiente itself, or water mixed with aguardiente, was the preferred beverage.\textsuperscript{25} Moreover, as the climate, or more specifically the humidity, was felt to be responsible for much of the ill health, the royalist army took measures to construct barracks that prevented the soldiers from coming into contact with the damp ground and protected them from the warm air. Soldiers were also advised to keep out of the rain.\textsuperscript{26} Various other more experimental methods for preserving the soldiers’ health were also tried. In late 1815 Morillo noted that few soldiers fell sick while their division was out on manoeuvres. He therefore ordered that all troops under Miguel de la Torre’s command be sent out daily on a lengthy circular march with full rucksacks. This measure was intended to improve the dismal health record of La Torre’s division.\textsuperscript{27}

\textsuperscript{25}\textcopyright{}Beaujón, “La medicina en la Campaña del Sur,” pp. 720-721; Pascual Enríque to Miguel de la Torre, Santa Fe, 10 August 1816, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8724, doc. 55; and Morillo’s Instrucciones para la marcha de los cuerpos, Caracas, 30 May 1815, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8717, doc. 17.

\textsuperscript{26}\textcopyright{}Morillo to Miguel de la Torre, Santa Fe, 23 June 1816, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8717, Doc. 78; Orden general del 19 de Agosto 1818, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 759B; Ejército Expedicionario, Resumen histórico de las operaciones y movimientos de las columnas y tropas ... desde el mes de Noviembre de 1816, entry for 30 December 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 759B; Pablo Morillo to ?, 1815?, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8717, doc. 14.

\textsuperscript{27}\textcopyright{}Pablo Morillo to Miguel de la Torre, Torrecilla, 4 October 1815, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8717, doc. 33.
In December 1815, the king issued a directive to government officials urging them to provide good care for injured soldiers. As a consequence, following the reconquest, the government in each province was requested to produce a report on the state of health care in the region, detailing in particular the availability of hospitals. Unfortunately for historians, no reports were submitted from Quito, Cuenca, Mariquita, Panama, Tunja, Socorro, the Llanos, and Darién, but Viceroy Montalvo asserted that it was well known that these regions were too poor to construct any hospitals. The governments of Pamplona, Popayán and Antioquia all reported the existence of hospitals run by charitable institutions, which they claimed could cope with the few soldiers who sought admission. The low demand for hospital places was, Montalvo felt, the result of the poor care provided in the hospitals, rather than an indication of the good health of the population. The only hospital in Panama was the Hospital de San Juan de Dios in Portobelo, which Montalvo described as antiquated and expensive. Nor were there any hospitals in the Chocó or in Neiva.

There was one hospital in Santa Marta (the Hospital de San Juan de Dios), but it was not equipped to deal with the huge influx of patients that occurred after the arrival of Morillo’s army. In 1817 the hospital in Popayán was spending $40 per day, which suggests that it was not so tiny as Montalvo believed. See Daily army expenses in Popayán, 1817, AGI, Santa Fe, legajo 631.

This attitude towards hospitals was shared by many of the Viceroy's contemporaries. See Duffy about hospitals in the British Caribbean: Duffy, Soldiers, Sugar and Seapower, pp. 348-349.

Francisco Montalvo to Juan Sámano, Cartagena, 30 January 1818, Los últimos virreyes, pp. 113-137.

Montalvo described it as a place “en donde falta médico, medicina, y se puede decir de todo”. Francisco Montalvo to Juan Sámano, Cartagena, 30 January 1818, Los últimos virreyes, p. 114.
response, an entirely new hospital was constructed there for the army. The most important new hospitals, however, were built in the vicinity of Cartagena. The principal one was the Hospital Militar de San Carlos. This could comfortably hold 500 patients, and in extreme cases up to 500 more could be accommodated in the hospital's corridors and hallways. There were, however, only 440 beds. Patients suffering from dysentery, which, Morillo reported "tanto ha afligido a este ejército", were held in separate accommodations in the Convento de San Diego, where there was room for 72 patients.32 The hospitals were divided into various sections, and officers, sergeants, "enfermos putridos", and enemy prisoners were all housed separately. These two hospitals were run at government expense, and each patient cost the hospital approximately 2 reales per day. Doctors received $500 per year as salary; non-medical staff received meals in lieu of pay. There was also the hospital of San Lázaro, in Cartagena, and another military hospital in Sabanalarga, which held over 150 patients.33

Meals for the hospital of San Carlos was provided in part by the surrounding towns and villages, which on rotation supplied food and money. Considerable amounts were needed; the hospital's 97 non-medical staff alone consumed 126 pounds of bread, 126 pounds of meat, and some 20 pounds of rice every day. The patients themselves were fed either ordinary rations, which consisted of a breakfast of bread and soup, and a lunch and

32 Pablo Morillo to Minister of War, Santa Fe, 9 June 1816, Rodríguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol. 3, p. 174; and Pablo Morillo to Miguel de la Torre, Torrecillas, 4 October 1815, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8717. By the end of March 1816 there were already over 500 patients in the two hospitals. See Estado de enfermos cn cl hospital de San Carlos. Cartagena. 31 March 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 715.
33 See various documents about hospitals in AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 714.
dinner, each consisting of some 8 ounces of meat, plus bacon, rice, bananas and bread, or, depending on their health, on half-rations, one-and-a-half-rations, or “racioness de gallina”, in which a quarter chicken replaced the meat of the ordinary ration. Those suffering from “enfermedades pereaguadas” were offered only a bread or rice porridge, which was served every three hours.

The official hospital diet created problems of public order. Complaints about its poor quality were frequent. Indeed, on 13 May 1816 an order was issued that “el soldado cualquiera que sea que arroge la comida a pretexto de que está malhecho contra el asistente o asistenta, tratandole con voces indecorosas e indecentes e impropias a todo hombre de bien y honrada proceder será castigado con 15 días de cepo”. Moreover, on occasion the hospital assistants actually sold to villagers the food intended for the patients. Food was evidently so scarce in the hospital of Sabanalarga that patients began slaughtering their own pigs in the patio of the hospital, “con detrimento de su salud”, according to hospital staff. Attempts to outlaw this behaviour met with opposition from patients, who complained of the “despotismo y arbitrariedad” of the hospital staff.

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34Strangely, in the hospital of Sabanalarga bananas were strictly forbidden, and staff who brought bananas into the hospital compound were reprimanded. See Orden no. 1 for Hospital in Sabanalarga, 13 May 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 714.
35Orden no. 1 for Hospital in Sabanalarga, 13 May 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 714.
36Orden no. 1 for Hospital in Sabanalarga, 13 May 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 714; Dictamen de Anselmo de Bierna y Maza, Cartagena, 24 April 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 707; and Estado de enfermos en el hospital de San Carlos, Cartagena, 31 March 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 715, for comments about the hardness of the bread.
37Antonio María Díaz to Gabriel de Torres, Sabanalarga, 17 May 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 714.
The ambience in these hospitals was, not surprisingly, disagreeable. Hostility reigned between the patients and the staff. The “Cabos de Sala”, or orderlies, complained of continual harassment, and the patients reportedly made their frequent criticisms with an excess of “altanería”.38 The overall atmosphere of a hospital was summed up by a hospital inspector in July 1816. He commented that in a hospital:

La humanidad sufre muchas veces más que las dolencias de sus males, la privaciones de la comodidad y subsistencia, los efectos de la corrupción de una atmósfera no renovada, las nauseas del desalio, la horrible compañía del vecino moribundo, y la dureza del mal trato, . . . no contando con la carestía de ropa y sábanas, cuyo defecto redunda directamente en perjuicio del enfermo.39

Such was the lethal atmosphere of most hospitals that in 1818 a woman afflicted with leprosy pleaded not to be confined to one as, if she were, she would certainly die from “una melancolía”.40

Despite the presence of the new hospitals, health care still left a great deal to be desired, even by contemporary standards. To begin with, the hospitals, particularly the one in Sabanalarga, suffered regularly from shortages of medical supplies. As a consequence, in 1817, the Junta de Hospitales in Cartagena, which had been created to supervise the running of the military hospitals, proposed setting up a medicine factory, where the

38 Orden no. 1 for Hospital in Sabanalarga, 13 May 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 714.
39 Informe sobre hospitales militares de la Plaza de Cartagena de Indias, Cartagena, 29 July 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 714.
40 Josef Alvarez to Gabriel de Torres, Mompós, 13 May 1818, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 712. See also Archer’s comments about military hospitals in Mexico in Archer, The Army in Bourbon Mexico, pp. 261-267.
necessary remedies could be manufactured. As noted, the quality of the doctors practising in New Granada was also regarded as poor. Their lack of skills had already been causing concern before the outbreak of the war, which did nothing to improve matters. Viceroy Montalvo, commenting on the high mortality suffered on the coast, remarked that on the rare occasions when a disease did not prove fatal, “no es por la asistencia de unos hombres que carecen de experiencia y nociones científicas, sino por alguna reacción o espontáneo esfuerzo de la naturaleza”. Of course, during this period doctors were often held in no higher esteem in Europe itself, and for good reason.

Construction of hospitals nonetheless continued throughout the years of the reconquest. Indeed, even on the eve of the Spanish defeat at Boyacá, work on new hospitals was continuing. General José María Barreiro reported in late 1818 and early 1819 that great progress had been made in the construction of new hospitals in Chita and Sogamoso. Moreover, these had not cost the

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41 See various documents in AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 714; Antonio María Díaz to Gabriel de Torres, Sabanalarga, 27 March 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 714; and various letters of Francisco Morales, BRAH, sig. 9/7660 (legajo 17), fols. 561, 569, 345.

42 See Memorial de Francisco Flórez Moreno, Cádiz, 10 January 1811, AGI, Ultramar, legajo 811.

43 Francisco Montalvo to Juan Sámano, Cartagena, 30 January 1818, Los últimos virreyes, p. 137.


45 For example, in 1816 a new hospital was established in Mompós. It had, however, closed, by 1817. (See Antonio Meléndez to Gabriel de Torres, Mompós, 26 May 1817, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 712; and Miguel de la Torre to Pascual Enríquez, Mompós, 2 January 1816, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8724, doc. 4.) Plans to construct a hospital in Mompós had been underway since 1803, but had been interrupted by the war. (See Report on hospital in Mompós, Madrid, 3 August 1803, AGI, Santa Fe, legajo 549.)

In 1816, Morillo ordered the construction of various hospitals at intermediate points between Santa Fe and the Llanos. See Resumen histórico de las operaciones y movimientos de las columnas y tropas, desde el mes de noviembre de 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 759B.
government a penny. This was possible because of the cooperative attitude of the local residents, who reportedly donated both money and time to help in the completion of the hospitals.46

It is worth recalling that the republican forces also erected many hospitals along their routes of travel, and several hundred doctors are thought to have assisted the insurgent troops.47 Troops of either band might be accommodated in a given hospital. As hospitals appear generally not to have employed guards, prisoners well enough to do so could escape from them with little difficulty, as happened in Mompós in 1817.48 Following the regularisation of the war agreed between Morillo and Bolívar in 1820, the safety of troops in enemy hospitals was to be guaranteed, but the royalists, at least, did not always respect this agreement. Republican convalescents in the hospital of Miraflores were attacked and killed by the royalists in 1822.49

§3. The Smallpox Vaccine

During the colonial period, smallpox had probably been the most lethal epidemic disease in the Americas.50 Unfortunately, until the discovery of Robert Jenner's vaccine in 1798, there was no effective treatment. Prior to Jenner's discovery, variolation, or inoculation with the live smallpox virus (as opposed to the cowpox

46Oswaldo Díaz Díaz, *La reconquista española*, vol. 2, Historia Extensa de Colombia, vol. 6, Academia Colombiana de Historia, Editorial Lerner (Bogotá, 1964), p. 285; and José María Barreiro to Juan Sámano, Tunja, 16 October 1818; and Juan Sámano to José María Barreiro, Santa Fe, 19 November 1818, both in Los ejércitos del Rey, vol. 1, pp. 68-70, and 97-98.


48Josef Alvarez to Gabriel de Torres, Mompós, 27 November 1817, AGI, Papeles de Cuba. legajo 712.


50Morillo commented in 1816 that in New Granada smallpox was "la única calamidad pública que se sufre". Pablo Morillo to Minister of War, Santa Fe, 31 August 1816, Rodríguez Villa, *Pablo Morillo*, vol. 3, p. 205.
virus) was thought to provide protection, but the method was largely ineffective. Variolation had been introduced into New Granada in the 1780s, where it was generally well received, although the Indians around Santa Fe reportedly refused to be inoculated. When, however, news of Jenner’s vaccine arrived in New Granada, immediate efforts were made to obtain the necessary cowpox-pus, and various expeditions were organised to locate an infected cow. These efforts met with no success, and it was not until the arrival of a Spanish vaccinating expedition in 1804 that vaccination got underway in New Granada. Once vaccination was introduced, all interest in inoculation disappeared, and within a year Juntas de Vacuna had been established, many individuals had been trained in administering the vaccine, and thousands of Neogranadans had been vaccinated. According to Marcelo Frías Núñez, by 1805 the use of the vaccine was firmly rooted in New Granada.

The war of independence appears to have disrupted all vaccination programmes, and, by November 1816, Morillo could describe these programmes as being in a state of “abandono y

51 Frías Núñez, “Enfermedad y sociedad en la crisis colonial”, p. 45. In Mexico too, Indians were sceptical of the European approach to the treatment of smallpox. Donald Cooper reports that Mexican Indians preferred a herbal remedy consisting of borage and poppy tea. See Donald Cooper, Epidemic Disease in Mexico City, 1761-1813: an Administrative, Social and Medical Study, University of Texas Press (Austin, 1965), pp. 91-92. Interestingly, Morillo reported that smallpox epidemics struck particularly hard in Indian communities. See Pablo Morillo to Minister of War, Santa Fe, 9 November 1816, Rodriguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol. 3, p. 225.


52 See Frías Núñez, “Enfermedad y sociedad”.

The arrival of the Expeditionary Army seems, however, to have injected new energy into the anti-smallpox campaign. Indeed, at the same time that Morillo was lamenting the abandonment of the vaccine, the military commander of Ocaña, Francisco Tamariz, was engaged in a personal campaign to revive it. In November 1816 he wrote to Gabriel de Torres, the governor of Cartagena, requesting equipment and personnel trained in administering the vaccine. Governor Torres agreed to provide the necessary equipment, as in his view “la vacuna [era] uno de los más grandes beneficios conocidos para la humanidad”. From his base in Ocaña, Tamariz revived the smallpox vaccine not only in Ocaña itself, but also in the surrounding region. He was later transferred to Socorro, where he continued to take an interest in the propagation of the vaccine. In May 1817, he reported excitedly to Governor Torres that in Ocaña the vaccine was being administered from cultures grown under glass. This, he pointed out, disproved claims made by doctors that in New Granada the only way to obtain more vaccine was to extract material from the arms of people infected with cowpox.

Plans were also underway to introduce the vaccine in Cartagena, Santa Marta, Antioquia and Mompós. In June 1816, Gabriel de Torres wrote to Cuba to request the necessary materials (namely the culture from which the vaccine was...
propagated, and glass dishes in which to grow it). These arrived in Cartagena in mid-December 1816, and more materials were required by August of the next year. On 8 August 1817, enough of the vaccine was sent from Santa Fe to vaccinate 12 people, the intention most likely being to cultivate more of the vaccine in Cartagena itself, using the material from Santa Fe as a starter. By January 1817 the “pus vacuno” arrived in Santa Marta, where it was immediately cultivated.57 In Antioquia, Governor Vicente Sánchez Lima supported the introduction of the vaccine in 1816, but the attempt to introduce the vaccine into Mompós failed, “por carecer [esta villa] de facultativos para su descubrimiento y conservación”.58 A vaccination campaign was also begun in Popayán by Brigadier Juan Sámano in August 1816, although it too seems to have met with little success.59

Until 1817, the dissemination of the vaccine appears to have depended on the zeal of individual officers, but, by August 1817, a special Commissioner for the Propagation of the Vaccine had been appointed.60 Francisco Domínguez, the first commissioner, was responsible for distributing the culture, which was cultivated in Santa Fe, and also for explaining the method of vaccination.61

57 See the many documents in AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 712.
58 See José María Restrepo Saenz, Gobernadores de Antioquia, 1571-1819, Imprenta Nacional, (Bogotá, 1932) Vol. 1, p. 312; and Antonio Meléndez to Gabriel de Torres, Mompós, 5 April 1817, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 712.
59 Juan Sámano to Pablo Morillo, Popayán, 19 August 1816; and Jaime Serra to Juan Sámano, Popayán, 31 August 1816; both in BRAH, sig. 7665 (leg. 22), fols. 52-53, 75, respectively.
60 This thus revived the disbanded Juntas Centrales de Vacuna first established in 1804, which had overseen the propagation and administration of the vaccine. See Frías Núñez, “Enfermedad y sociedad”, pp. 118-121.
61 Juan Sámano to Gabriel de Torres, Santa Fe, 8 August 1817, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 709.
The methods of administering the vaccine were indeed complicated, and individual doses of the vaccine often proved to be ineffective. The vaccine apparently had to be used within a week of its culture, since its effectiveness declined as it aged.62 The vaccine also suffered when exposed to severe changes in temperature, and Francisco Tamaríz pointed out that it was important that the lancet used for the vaccination "al diluir la materia no se oxide, lo cual produciría su alteración y de consiguiente la falsa vacuna".63 The most reliable method was to vaccinate with material taken directly from an infected pustule on an earlier vaccinee. This method of course made it difficult to introduce the vaccine into new areas, as the immunising team had to take with them someone who had recently been vaccinated. Some vaccinations were thus performed simply in order to cultivate the vaccine. Indeed, although normally a fee was charged for vaccination, in 1805 Viceroy Amar had ordered that individuals vaccinated merely in order to propagate the vaccine should not be charged.64

During the last years of the war, the king himself took an interest in the development of vaccination programmes in New Granada. In January 1821, the Minister of Overseas wrote to Gabriel de Torres, instructing the harassed and busy governor to report to the king on whether it had ever been necessary to re-vaccinate anyone, and if so, whether this had been because the vaccine failed to take, or because the fluid used had deteriorated;

62 Juan Sámano to Pablo Morillo, Popayán, 19 August 1816; and Jaime Serra to Juan Sámano, Popayán, 31 August 1816; both in BRAH, sig. 7665 (leg. 22), fols. 52-53, 75, respectively.
63 Francisco Tamaríz to Gabriel de Torres, Ocaña, 22 and 27 November 1816, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 712
64 Frías Núñez, "Enfermedad y sociedad", p. 130.
whether anyone who had been vaccinated had ever developed smallpox, and if so whether the illness had been less virulent; whether the vaccine worked in adults as well as children; whether vaccination speeded up the process of teething in infants and whether it made the discomfort of teething greater or less; whether the smallpox vaccine worked on any other diseases as well; whether the vaccine had any effect on the vaccinated person’s physical constitution; and whether smallpox had been eradicated anywhere. Governor Torres does not appear to have responded to this early health survey.65

§4. Health and the Population at Large

The army was certainly not the only sector of the population to suffer from disease. Many of the officials employed by the crown complained of ill-health, and the population of New Granada itself could not remain immune from the many infectious diseases spread by the army and by the deprivation caused by the war. In Cartagena in early 1816, for example, civilian mortality was running at a rate of 70 per day.66 The deadly royalist siege had ended, but these deaths were almost certainly a consequence of the blockade and resulting food shortage; during famine more deaths result from opportunistic disease than from starvation itself. The presence of the royalist army surely assisted the spread of infections disease as well. Soon after his

65 Minister of Overseas to Gabriel de Torres, Madrid, 30 January 1821, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 741A. Following the introduction of the vaccine to Cartagena in May of 1804, reports had circulated that the vaccine not only reduced the discomfort of teething, but also cured intestinal worms and prevented menstrual disorders. See Friaś Núñez, “Enfermedad y sociedad”, p. 118.

66 Pablo Morillo to Duke of Manchester, Mompós, 15 March 1816, Rodríguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol. 3, pp. 4-5.
arrival in Cartagena, the viceroy commented on the unhealthy and unpleasant “inmundencias” that filled the city’s streets, and added, “no se me esconde que las referidas inmundencias pueden ser efecto de excesos de la tropa”.

Of course, not all ill-health was a direct consequence of the war. In September 1819, for example, the Contador General de Tabacos in Cartagena expressed concerns about the health threats posed by his office, which he described as “oscura, llena de mosquitos, y excesivamente cálida, en términos que los empleados están expuestos a caer enfermos”.

Furthermore, various officers and important government officials fell victim to the tropical climate of coastal New Granada. For example, Field Marshal Alejandro Hore, the Governor of Panama, died suddenly on 8 July 1820 of “una maligna fiebre que le devoró en cortas días” at the age of 41 or 42. Many of those who survived the war returned to Spain with ruined health. Morillo’s successor Miguel de la Torre left office after seven years of service with his formerly robust health entirely “quebrantada”.

On occasion, of course, ill health would be used...
as an excuse to resign from unwanted posts. Both Francisco Montalvo and Juan Sámano claimed on stepping down as viceroy that their health was “gravemente quebrantada”. Numerous other suspect reports of ill health similarly poured into government offices during the years of the war.

It should be clear that disease played an important role in the defeat of Morillo’s forces. Thousands of soldiers died in the epidemics of dysentery, smallpox, and other illnesses, and, as a consequence, the royalist army shrank irreversibly in size. Julio Albi has calculated that Spanish troops fighting in Venezuela and New Granada suffered a fatality rate of between 90% and 96%. This astonishingly high figure is attributed by Albi in large part to “el clima, las enfermedades, la dificiente alimentación y los primitivos servicios de sanidad”. Other factors, such as the protracted length of the war, surely contributed as well, but the role of disease in defeating the Expeditionary Army cannot be ignored. In 1818, Morillo had compared himself to Cortés, who,

who had also enjoyed robust health, fell sick with scurvy in 1818; see Report on Francisco Warleta, Cahudare, 14 February 1818, BRAH, sig. 9/7658 (legajo 15), fol. 91. Vicente Sánchez Lima, “y casi todos los oficiales y mucha parte de la tropa” were very sick from fevers and infections in early 1816; see Francisco Warleta to Pablo Morillo, Remedios, 17 March 1816, BRAH, sig. 9/7658 (legajo 15). The royal commissioner Juan Barry developed an “enfermedad gástrica” in Curaçao; see Juan Barry to Minister of Overseas, Curaçao, 4 September 1822, AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 1571.

71 See Francisco Montalvo to Council of the Indies, Havana, 9 April 1818, AGI, Santa Fe, legajo 580; and Juan Sámano to Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 9 June 1820, both in the Resumen Documentado ..., by Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 1 August 1820, AGI, Santa Fe, legajo 1011 and also in AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 890B.

72 Juan Ramírez, the president of Quito, for example, bolstered his requests for a transfer to a different post with the claim that the climate in Quito was unhealthy; see Juan Ramírez to José de Abascal, Quito, 6 September 1818, AGI, Diversos, legajo 5. Similarly, José Sartorio, the royal commissioner to Venezuela, claimed to suffer from all sorts of infirmities when he was appointed to a new, unwanted, commission in Santa Fe; see José Sartorio to Minister of Overseas, Havana, 31 May 1823, AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 1571.

73 Albi, Banderas olvidadas, pp. 403-405.
like him, had relied on native troops to achieve Spanish successes. He could as accurately have drawn a comparison with Montezuma, whose forces were destroyed by smallpox and other diseases.

Civilians, too, caught and died of the many diseases spread by the armies. Inadequate health care and inept doctors did little to prevent deaths. The use of the few truly effective medical treatments, such as the smallpox vaccine, was disrupted by the war, and the widespread vaccination programmes operating before the outbreak of war were reconstructed only partially and on a very small scale. Although the War of Independence did not achieve the terrifying death rates suffered by the British in the Caribbean two decades earlier, when whole regiments had died from disease, the Spanish, like the British before them, correctly regarded warfare in the Americas as “fatal para los europeos”.

In this section of the thesis, we have studied a number of factors which weakened Spain’s hold on New Granada. Now, in the last section, we turn to the final collapse of royal authority, beginning with the Battle of Boyacá in 1819.

74 Juan Sámano to Pablo Morillo, Santa Fe, 29 August 1818, BRAH, sig. 9/7665 (leg. 22), fols. 607-609.
75 See Duffy, Soldiers, Sugar and Seapower, pp. 326, 337-338; and Pablo Morillo to José de Abascal, Torrecillas, 21 October 1815, AGI, Diversos, legajo 4, ramo 1.
PART IV: COLLAPSE
Source: Juan Friede (editor), *La Batalla de Boyacá, 7 de agosto de 1819, a través de los archivos españoles, Banco de la República* (Bogotá, 1969)
Chapter 10: The Battle of Boyacá

From 1819, the royalists began to reap the fruits they had sown. New Granada's increasingly hostile population gained the opportunity to reject the Spanish when Bolívar led his forces into New Granada in July 1819. Royalist troops, sick, underpaid, ill-supplied and divided, proved no match for the invaders. Then, in 1820, events in Spain dealt a final blow to New Granada's royalists. After the liberal revolution of 1820, political divisions in New Granada prevented royalists from concentrating on the republican threat. By 1822, no serious royalist presence remained in New Granada. This final section of the thesis will chart the collapse of royal authority in New Granada.

We begin with events in 1819. In that year, the problems of the restored royal government stemming from financial difficulties, lack of co-ordination between civil and military powers, and the evaporation of the army, were compounded by a new threat. The republican army of Simón Bolívar launched a vigorous attack on royalist New Granada, which delivered a fatal blow to a reconquest government which, weak and divided, could neither withstand Bolívar's assaults nor regroup its forces to protect royal authority.

§1. The Campaign of 1819

The royalist campaign that would culminate in disaster on 7 August 1819 in the Battle of Boyacá began inauspiciously at the end of 1818. The year began moderately well for the royalists. Although Bolívar enjoyed a phryric victory over royalist forces at
Calabozo on 12 February 1818, in March 1818, Morillo had won an important battle at La Puerta, in Venezuela. Within a month, Bolívar had captured San Fernando de Apure, but other royalist victories followed at Sombrero, Maracay, and elsewhere. By November 1818, however, Morillo reported that although the troops were in good spirits, the “absoluta falta de recursos en un país arruinado” was crippling the entire army and impeding the start of the new campaign.1 The army’s shortages of money and supplies had in no way diminished. Morillo’s primary concern was to eliminate the many bands of republican guerrillas in the Llanos between New Granada and Venezuela. The Llanos de Casanare had long served as a refuge from colonial justice, and republican partisans were following tradition when they retreated to the Llanos in 1816, after Morillo’s reconquest.2 Throughout 1817 and 1818, small bands of guerrillas harassed royalist troops, and occasionally penetrated into the interior of New Granada. General Francisco de Paula Santander had reorganised the rather chaotic republican troops into various companies, but they continued to fight an essentially guerrilla war. A number of royalist outposts had already been established in the Llanos, but control of the Llanos proved elusive.

From 1819, the royalist campaign in the Llanos de Casanare was led by General José María Barreiro. Neither General Morillo nor the Viceroy Juan Sámano appear to have known Barreiro personally, but Sámano in particular displayed a touching

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1 Pablo Morillo to Duque de San Carlos, Caracas, 16 November 1818, AGS, Estado, legajo 8223.
2 For details of the republican guerrillas in the Llanos, see Oswaldo Díaz Díaz, La reconquista española, Ediciones Lerner (Bogotá, 1967), vol. 2, pp 279ff; and Jane Rausch, A Tropical Plains Frontier: the Llanos of Colombia, 1531-1831, University of New Mexico Press (Albuquerque, 1984), Chapter 7.
confidence in his capacity. “Estoy esperando con impaciencia la llegada de Don José Barreiro,” he wrote to Morillo in April 1818. The mere fact that Barreiro was Spanish filled Sámano with hope. Nonetheless, reality soon dawned, and Barreiro was revealed to be an unimaginative officer and a disastrous general.

Barreiro soon began to experience difficulties in the campaign in the Llanos, which began in March 1819. By early April, he was obliged to report that in the past few weeks “se nos desertaron la mayor parte de los indios y bien pronto siguieron su ejemplo los restantes, quedando sólo con nosotros 2 tenientes y 304 del partido de Támara”. The desertion eventually became so extreme that Barreiro was forced to withdraw completely from the Llanos into New Granada’s interior. The 1819 royalist campaign in the Llanos was, in short, a complete failure.

Santander reported to Simón Bolívar on 29 April 1819 that:

La deserción que han sufrido [las tropas de Barreiro] es numerosa; nuestros batallones de infantería han recibido con ella notable aumento; sus caballos han quedado inútiles con las marchas, contramarchas y continuas alarmas; el hambre que han padecido sus tropas es increíble, pues la mayor ración que recibía el soldado era de dos onzas de carne; no

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3Juan Sámano to Pablo Morillo, Santa Fe, 7 April 1818, BRAH, sig. 9/7665 (legajo 22), fol. 567-569.
4Camilo Riño, *La campaña libertadora de 1819*, Editorial Andes (Bogotá, 1969), p. 52. See also Díaz Díaz, *La reconquista española*, vol. 2, p. 287-288, for problems with the weather; and José María Barreiro to Juan Sámano, Sogamoso, 23 March 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 747 (also in *Los ejércitos del Rey, 1819*, vol. 2, Alberto Lee López (editor), Biblioteca de la Presidencia de la República (Bogotá, 1989), pp. 31-33).
5Juan Sámano to Minister of War, Cartagena, 26 September 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 720A (also in *La Batalla de Boyacá, 7 de agosto de 1819, a través de los archivos españoles*, Juan Friede (editor), Banco de la República (Bogotá, 1969), pp. 284-288). See also Díaz Díaz, *La reconquista española*, vol. 2, p. 299.
han sido dueños de otro terreno que aquel que ocupaban sus columnas.  

Moreover, in late June 1819, Barreiro, like so many soldiers before him, fell ill and was unable to undertake any work at all. Viceroy Sámano prepared to substitute Sebastián de la Calzada, but before Calzada could take command, Barreiro declared himself fully recovered, and resumed control. Had Calzada taken over command of the Third Division, events might have proceeded rather differently.

Meanwhile, a fundamental change had occurred in the military strategy of the republicans. Rather than try to capture Caracas, they decided to concentrate on the recapture of New Granada, and in particular of Santa Fe. This decision was motivated by a desire to capitalise on Santander’s organisation of the Llaneros, and to open a new front while Morillo was immobilised by bad weather in Venezuela. Efforts were made to co-ordinate the planned attack on the capital with invasions of the Caribbean coast, and Bolívar set about moving his Llanero troops from Venezuela into the Neogranadan interior.

The royalists were aware of this change. On 17 June 1819 Colonel Antonio Tobar wrote to Barreiro from Barinas to warn him that Bolívar and Páez, accompanied by 1,400 soldiers, were

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7José María Barreiro to Juan Sámano, Tunja, 28 June 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 747 (also in La Batalla de Boyacá, pp. 25-26; and Díaz Díaz, La reconquista española, vol. 2, p. 361); Juan Sámano to José María Barreiro, Santa Fe, 6 July 1819 and the exchange of letters between Calzada, Barreiro and Sámano, Los ejércitos del Rey, vol. 2, pp. 231, 244-246; Juan Sámano to Minister of War, Cartagena, 26 September 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 720A (also in La Batalla de Boyacá, pp. 284-288); and Díaz Díaz, La reconquista española, vol. 2, p. 361.
marching westward. This warning was followed by a virtual flood of reports about the republican advance; on 5 July 1819, Sergeant Juan Figueroa y Ladrón informed Barreiro that:

Santander y Arredondo han entrado para el reino, que sus disignios es tomar a Santa Fe, que su primer paso es ir a encontrarse con Páez que viene por Piedecuesta, que Bolívar, Donato Pérez y un colonel llamado Moreno están en Paya, que esperan dos batallones que el jueves 1 del corriente salieron de Pisba para Socotá.

The royalists were thus well informed about the progress of the republican army across the Andes. Some of their intelligence was flawed; Barreiro was supplied with inaccurate information about the difficulty of crossing the flooded Llanos, but these errors were corrected. Indeed, the Colombian military historian Camilo Riaño comments on “el magnífico servicio de inteligencia de Don Pablo Morillo”. The Spanish furthermore began preparations for the coming encounter. Both Viceroy Sámano and General Morillo set about trying to acquire additional armaments for use in the

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9 Antonio Tobar to José María Barreiro, Barinas, 17 June 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 747 (also in La Batalla de Boyacá, pp. 53-54).
10 Juan Figueroa y Ladrón to José María Barreiro, Labranzagrande, 5 July 1819, Los ejércitos del Rey, p. 229. See also José María Barreiro to Juan Sámano, Tunja, 25 June 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 708. (also in La Batalla de Boyacá, pp. 22-24, and Los ejércitos del Rey, vol. 2, pp. 162-163); Juan Figueroa y Ladrón to José María Barreiro, Labranzagrande, 2 July 1819, Los ejércitos del Rey, vol. 2, p. 204; 2 letters of Juan Sámano to José María Barreiro, Santa Fe, 3 July 1819, Los ejércitos del Rey, vol. 2, pp. 205-206, 207; José María Barreiro to Juan Sámano, Tunja, 3 July 1819, Los ejércitos del Rey, vol. 2, p. 217; Pablo Morillo to Juan Sámano, Calabozo, 12 July 1819, BRAH, Colección Morillo, sig. 9/7664 (legajo 21), ff. 80-83 (also in Los ejércitos del Rey, vol. 2, pp. 267-268, and AHNM, Estado 8717; and Antonio Plá to Juan Sámano, Sesquilé, 24 July 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 742.

11 José María Barreiro to Juan Sámano, Tunja, 3 July 1819; and José María Barreiro to Juan Sámano, Tunja, 5 July 1819, Los ejércitos del Rey, vol. 2, pp. 218-219, 225-226, respectively.

12 Riaño, La campaña libertadora, p. 85.
campaign. Stocks of weapons within New Granada were
distributed to places felt to be in particular need, and both men
wrote to the Captain General of Cuba to request guns from the
stockpiles there. Unfortunately for the Spanish, Cuba did not
provide any weapons until December 1819, by which time they
were too late to be of help.13

The republican march from the Llanos to the Andean
highland stretched Bolivar’s troops to the utmost limits. The
Llanos were flooded, which made progress across them slow and
unpleasant, but the crossing of the Páramo de Pisba, to the north
of Sogamoso, on 5 and 6 July 1819, is regarded as the most
gruelling feature of the march. Most of the Llanero soldiers had
never before experienced either the cold or the thinner air of the
sierra. Nonetheless, Bolivar succeeded in getting some 2,000
troops over the mountains into New Granada.

As Bolivar’s army crossed into New Granada, news of its
arrival spread to republican guerrillas throughout the provinces of
Tunja, Socorro and Pamplona. Guerrilla groups had been
operating in these regions since 1816, but had usually succeeded
only in harassing small royalist detachments and in intercepting
communications.14 During the spring and summer of 1819 these
guerrilla groups increasingly became a real problem for Barreiro’s
troops. Barreiro commented frequently on their apparently
growing number, complaining that the country was plagued by
“bandidos, protegidos por los pueblos”, or, in other words,

13José María Barreiro to Juan Sámano, Tunja, 25 June 1819, AGI, Papeles de
Cuba, legajo 708 (also in La Batalla de Boyacá, pp. 22-24). See also Juan
Sámano to José Cienfuegos, Santa Fe, 14 July 1819; Alejandro Ramírez to
Intendente (del Ejército?), Havana, 19 August 1819, both in AGI, Papeles de
Cuba, legajo 1945; and Juan Sámano to Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 18
December 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 708.
republican guerrillas. Barreiro found it necessary to establish military outposts in Tunja, Ventaquemada, Chocontá and elsewhere, and even finding couriers for official communiqués proved difficult. Barreiro was bitter about the behaviour of the alcaldes and priests he had encountered. Most of them, he complained, were republican, and provided great help to the republicans, “sin comunicarnos el menor parte”. Overall, it is evident that Barreiro enjoyed very poor relations with the civilians in the area of conflict. The Expeditionary Army was thus reaping the fruits of earlier errors. The very regions which had welcomed Morillo in 1816 during his triumphal journey to Santa Fe now rose against his army, providing invaluable support to Bolívar.

Nonetheless, as the summer progressed, Barreiro’s confidence about the campaign increased. Although the royalists suffered several defeats at the hands of republican forces, they also won several victories in July 1819, and Barreiro reported to Viceroy Sámano that after an encounter on 10 July, “los soldados se han llenado de tal emulación, que necesito mucho trabajo para calmar sus impetus, pues todos quieren batir los primeros, y tener parte en el destrozo de los rebeldes”. Barreiro, however, greatly underestimated the capacities of the republican troops. After his arrival in New Granada, Bolívar had drafted large numbers of men

15José María Barreiro to Juan Sámano, Tunja, 3 July 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 747 (also in La Batalla de Bogotá, pp. 33-34; and Díaz Díaz, La reconquista española, vol. 2, p. 319). See also La Batalla de Bogotá, pp. liii-lv.  
16José María Barreiro to Juan Sámano, Molinos, 10 July 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 747 (also in La Batalla de Boyacá, pp. 63-65). See also José María Barreiro to Juna Sámano, Paipa, 19 July 1819; and Juan Sámano to José María Barreiro, Santa Fe, 14 July 1819, Los ejércitos del Rey, vol. 2, pp. 290, 321-322; and Díaz Díaz, La reconquista española, vol. 2, p. 327.  
17José María Barreiro to Juan Sámano, Molinos, 10 July 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 747 (also in La Batalla de Boyacá, pp. 63-65, and Los ejércitos del Rey, vol. 2, pp. 261-262).
into the army, which came to be composed of Llanero and British soldiers, and local conscripts, in roughly equal proportions. Barreiro was dismissive of these soldiers, particularly the “indios muy flojos”, but in reality, those fighting with the royalists were no more professional. Barreiro reported that after the battle at Gameza on 10 July, most of the enemy prisoners were killed as soon as they arrived at the royalist camp. This occurred with Barreiro’s permission, as “la clase de soldados que tenemos necesita ensangrentarlos para enardecerlos”.18

During the last week in July 1819, several encounters took place between the Spanish and Bolívar’s vanguard, but for the first six days in August no fighting took place. Barreiro appears to have written no letters after 31 July 1819, so it is difficult to know what his intentions were during this period.19 On 5 August he received news that Bolívar was marching on Tunja, and so set off immediately towards that city.20 He encountered Bolívar’s army at the Puente de Boyacá on 7 August.

The republicans had approximately 2,800 troops, “muchos de ellos ingleses y negros de la Isla de Santo Domingo”, according to the Spanish.21 These were the soldiers Bolívar had brought at

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18José María Barreiro to Juan Sámano, Paipa, 31 July 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 708 (also in La Batalla de Boyacá, pp. 100-104, and Díaz Díaz, La reconquista española, vol. 2, p. 287). See also Francisco de Paula Santander to Simón Bolívar, La Trinidad, 19 January 1819, Cartas Santander-Bolívar, vol. 1, pp. 44-46; José María Barreiro to Juan Sámano, Molinos, 10 July 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 708 (also in La Batalla de Boyacá, pp. 63-65); and La Batalla de Boyacá, pp. liv-lv.

19Juan Sámano to Minister of War, Cartagena, 26 September 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 720A (also in La Batalla de Boyacá, pp. 284-288). Friele reports that Barreiro did write a report on 6 August 1819, but that it has been lost (see La Batalla de Boyacá, p. lvii).

20Declaration of Manuel Martínez de Aparicio, Santa Fe, 8 August 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 747.

21Riaño, La campaña libertadora, pp. 226-228, 270. The royalists estimated 4,000. See Gabriel García Vallecillos to Ferdinand, Cartagena, 10 October 1819, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 748 (also in La Batalla de Boyacá, pp.
such cost over the Andes. The royalists had perhaps 2,700.\footnote{See also Antonio Rodríguez Villa, El Teniente General Don Pablo Morillo, Primer Conde de Cartagena, Marqués de la Puerta (1778-1837), Real Academia de la Historia, (Madrid, 1908), vol. 4, p. 80.} The Spanish were not immediately aware that they were confronting Bolívar’s entire army, but they were soon disabused of this error. When the republican cavalry charged the royalist columns, the Spanish army simply disintegrated. The royalist captain Manuel Martínez de Aparicio, who survived the battle, described the chaos that followed the successful republican charge: “los infantes volvieron caras y desordenaron como no fue posible creer”.\footnote{Ríaño, La campaña libertadora, pp. 226-228, 270. Bolívar reported that the royalists had 4,000 to 5,000 troops. See Simón Bolívar to Francisco Antonio Zea, Bogotá, 14 August 1819, Selected Writings of Bolivar, Vicente Lecuna (editor), The Colonial Press (New York, 1951), pp. 205-206.} The battle was fairly short (some 2 hours); indeed one member of the Audiencia wrote that there had been “[ni] batalla ni mortandad”.\footnote{Gabriel García Vallecillos to Ferdinand, Cartagena, 10 October 1819, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 748 (also in La Batalla de Boyacá, pp. 289-291).} Over 1,600 royalist prisoners were taken, and the bulk of the Spanish officer corps was captured.\footnote{Declaration of Manuel Martínez de Aparicio, Santa Fe, 8 August 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 747.} It was the end of Spanish control of New Granada’s interior.

After this royalist catastrophe, there was effectively nothing to stop the republican advance on Santa Fe, as the capital was less than 75 miles from the site of the battle. It was thus essential for the Spanish to warn the viceroy of the impending attack as quickly as possible. Indeed, “la infausta noticia de que la [Tercera] División había sido enteramente derrotada” reached Santa Fe the
following day.26 Several officers who had survived the defeat arrived in the capital between 8.00pm and 9.00pm on 8 August 1819, and informed the viceroy of the imminent occupation of Santa Fe. Sámano decided to leave the capital immediately. The night of 8 August 1819 was spent arranging for his departure: boats were to be waiting at Honda, and news of the impending invasion was circulated to other government officials.27 At 9.00pm Sámano wrote to Morillo that he intended to go to Poyayán, but in fact he set off toward Cartagena at 6.00am the next morning, on 9 August 1819. He reported left the capital disguised in a green ruana and a large hat.28 He left behind virtually all of his belongings and papers.29 The Audiencia also fled to safety in Cartagena, but the years of bad feeling between Sámano and the Audiencia were reflected in the fact that the viceroy delayed some hours in informing the Audiencia of the state of affairs. Its members were thus obliged to depart with even less preparation than the viceroy. Some of the oidores were for this reason unable to provide themselves with horses.30

It is not at all clear that Sámano made the right decision in choosing to leave. Contemporary opinion was divided, and some observers, in particular the governor of Cartagena, were

26 Juan Sámano to Pablo Morillo, Santa Fe, 8 August 1819, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 742 (also in Díaz Díaz, *La reconquista española*, pp. 375-376).
27 Juan Sámano to Minister of War, Cartagena, 26 September 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 720A (also in *La Batalla de Boyacá*, pp. 284-288).
28 Juan Sámano to Pablo Morillo, Santa Fe, 8 August 1819, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 742 (also in Díaz Díaz, *La reconquista española*, pp. 375-376). See also Melchor Aymerich to Minister of War, Quito, 6 September 1819, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 748 (also in *La Batalla de Boyacá*, pp. 257-260); and Riaño, *La campaña libertadora*, p. 287.
29 Juan Sámano to Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 13 September 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 708; and Gabriel de Torres to Ferdinand, Cartagena, 18 October 1819, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 748 (also in *La Batalla de Boyacá*, pp. 296-303).
30 Riaño, *La campaña libertadora*, p. 287.
extremely critical of the decision to abandon Santa Fe. Governor Torres commented that “aunque había previsto la ruina del Reino, jamás me había figurado que de una pequeña acción resultase la pérdida de la capital y cerca de 300 leguas, pero ello ha sucedido”.

Others believed the withdrawal to have been the only possible response. The capital had a garrison of some 400 troops, which would clearly not have been enough to resist the entire republican army. In the event, Bolívar entered Santa Fe unchallenged on the evening of 9 August 1819, some three years after Morillo’s arrival in May 1816. In addition to seizing the money left behind by Sámano, the republicans further acquired a substantial quantity of weapons, although the departing Spanish had set fire to the royalists’ stores of gunpowder.

Defeat of the Spanish reconquering army at the centre of New Granada had an immediate and profound effect on the regime it supported. Royalist troops took the opportunity to desert, and several provincial governments in the interior collapsed. The Governor of Antioquia, for example, fled, and the governor of the Chocó was captured and shot by the republicans. Further problems were caused by the breakdown in the chain of

31 Gabriel de Torres to Ferdinand, Cartagena, 18 October 1819, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 748 (also in La Batalla de Boyacá, pp. 296-303); and Díaz Díaz, La reconquista española, vol. 2, p. 378.
32 Gabriel García Vallecillos to Ferdinand, Cartagena, 10 October 1819, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 748 (also in La Batalla de Boyacá, pp. 289-291).
33 Juan Sámano to Minister of War, Cartagena, 26 September 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 720A (also in La Batalla de Boyacá, pp. 284-288).
34 Riaño, La campaña libertadora, p. 287; and Sebastián de la Calzada to Melchor Aymerich, Paso de Flandes, 12 August 1819, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 748 (also in La Batalla de Boyacá, pp. 231-232).
35 See Francisco de Paula Santander to Simón Bolívar, Santa Fe, 3 December 1819, Cartas Santander-Bolívar, vol. 1, pp. 249-252; Gabriel García to Faustino Martínez, Antioquia, 29 August 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 745 (also in La Batalla de Boyacá, pp. 319-320); and Juan Sámano to Miguel de La Torre, Cartagena, 18 November 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 742.
command resulting from the rapid retreat from Santa Fe and the capture of so many officers. Royalist forces were divided, and old rivalries resurfaced. Particular difficulties occurred in the south, where Sebastián de la Calzada and Melchor Aymerich argued over who inherited Sámano's powers after the viceroy's flight.36

Sámano himself arrived in Cartagena in early October 1819. He was accompanied by large numbers of royalists from Santa Fe, many of whom arrived penniless at the coast. Governor Torres informed the king that, following the emigration to Cartagena, "vasallos de V.M. que antes contaban con una fortuna de más de $200,000, han quedado reducidos a la mendicidad".37 The Audiencia itself also set up in Cartagena, where it was to remain until 1820, when, as a consequence of the republican siege, it moved to Jamaica. Safe within Cartagena, Sámano claimed to be organising the recapture of the capital, but he was never again to return to Santa Fe.38 Indeed, from the moment of his arrival in Cartagena he ceased to play any significant role in the military campaign. Governor Torres complained that, despite the critical state of the affairs in Cartagena and his own efforts to engage the viceroy, "hasta ahora [Sámano no ha] hecho otra cosa que reducir a

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36 Melchor Aymerich to Minister of War, Quito, 6 September 1819; and Melchor Aymerich to Sebastián de la Calzada, Quito, 6 September 1819; AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 748 (also in La Batalla de Boyará, pp. 257-260, and 240-242, respectively).
37 Riaño, La campaña libertadora, p. 289; and Gabriel de Torres to Ferdinand, Cartagena, 18 October 1819, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 748 (also in La Batalla de Boyará, pp. 296-303). See also the 1820 letter by Sámano cited in José María Arboleda Llorente (editor), Catálogo general detallado del Archivo Central del Cauca (época de la independencia), vol. 3, Universidad del Cauca (Popayán, 1975), pp. 110-111.
38 Juan Sámano to Minister of War, Cartagena, 26 September 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 720A (also in La Batalla de Boyará, pp. 284-288).
expedientes complicados las operaciones más sencillas del arte de la guerra, con el enemigo casi a la vista.”

News of the momentous event rapidly spread throughout New Granada, but did not immediately reach Morillo in Venezuela, who in mid-August was still complaining that he had heard nothing from the luckless Barreiro. Morillo appears not to have learned of the battle until early September, although Sámano wrote to him immediately before leaving Santa Fe on 8 August. When Morillo did at last hear the news, he immediately determined that General Miguel de la Torre should take command of the surviving troops and lead a guerrilla war against the republicans, but this did not happen, as we shall see. He further appointed La Torre to replace Sámano in the event of the latter’s death or capture. It was not until some days later that Morillo learned that Sámano was safe in Cartagena.

§2. Military Repercussions

Following Bolívar’s victory at Boyacá, the prospects of the Expeditionary Army worsened considerably. Groups of republican guerrillas that had been lurking in the background came out into the open all at once. For some months the situation looked quite hopeless for Spain. In Socorro alone, various republican leaders managed to assemble a force of over 2,000 in just three days, and

39 Gabriel de Torres to Ferdinand, Cartagena, 18 October 1819, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 748 (also in La Batalla de Boyacá, pp. 296-303). See also Gabriel de Torres to Pablo Morillo, Cartagena, 8 July 1820, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 714.
40 Pablo Morillo to Miguel de la Torre, Valencia, 16 August 1819, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8717, doc. 256.
41 Pablo Morillo to Miguel de la Torre, Valencia, 6 September 1819, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8717, doc. 261.
42 Pablo Morillo to Miguel de la Torre, Valencia, 7 September 1819, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8717, doc. 261.
the city was occupied by republicans, who executed some 15 Spaniards. In Pamplona, the entire garrison of El Tambo, the prisoners, and the population at large rebelled. Ríohacha, meanwhile, was invaded by republicans led by General MacGregor on 4 October 1819. They were driven out within a week, but not all revolts were as short lived. On 10 November 1819, royalist troops in Ocaña rebelled, killed three officers and one soldier, and fled from the barracks. This resulted not only in the loss of Ocaña to the republicans, but also to the cessation of all communication between Sámano in Cartagena and Morillo in Venezuela. In Mompós an attempted uprising broke out on 17 November 1819. From Cartagena, Sámano made a slight attempt to coordinate a counter-attack, but his efforts were viewed as derisory even by his own allies. Governor Torres reported that:

Con respecto a operaciones militares se han mandado cerca de 80 hombres al gobernador de Antioquia para que reconquiste una provincia levantada casi en masa; se han enviado cerca de otros 100 al punto de Ocaña, que allí subsisten sin poder operar de modo alguno, por más que el punto sea como es militar e interesante, por hallarse

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43 List of Spaniards executed in Socorro, Ocaña, 12 October 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 749.
44 Juan Sámano to Miguel de La Torre, Turbaco, 15 September 1819, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8719, doc. 267.
45 See the extensive documentation of the republican invasion of Ríohacha in AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 745. The majority of this legajo consists of documents related to the siege and recapture of the city. Many other legajos in the AGI also contain information about its capture and recapture.
46 Juan Sámano to Miguel de La Torre, Cartagena, 17 November 1819, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8719, doc. 272; and Sumario contra Geronimo Caro, Camilo Almansa, y Julián Carhnelo, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 743.
47 The plan had been for various townspeople to assault the barracks and capture the garrison, but one plotter informed on his co-conspirators, and the plan thus collapsed. The majority of those arrested were artisans. See Proceso criminal contra [various], Mompós, 17 November 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 741A.
incomunicados con el interior, y se han reunido fuerzas sutiles para dominar el Río Magdalena. Este es el todo de las operaciones visibles que se han dispuesto en más de 2 meses, que en mi pequeño concepto prometen pocos o ningunos progresos".48

The Cauca Valley was thrown into immediate upheaval by the events to the north. We saw in Chapters 7 and 8 that the behaviour of the Third Division had provoked widespread opposition in the Cauca Valley. The collapse of royal authority in Santa Fe provided an opportunity for the Vallecaucanos to act on their anger. The *Contador de Tabacos* in Popayán reported in early September 1819 that the loss of the capital had had a considerable impact on the region, "que siempre ha sido decidido por la insurrección". He went on to say that, on 29 August 1819, a republican uprising had broken out in Llanogrande and Santa Ana, and then spread throughout the region. Various tobacco *estanquillos* were destroyed, and it was subsequently learned that governor Pedro Domínguez, along with various officials of the tobacco monopoly and several other Spaniards had been killed.49

It is noteworthy that among the first targets of popular hatred were the royal monopolies. The opposition to the state-run tobacco and aguardiente monopolies went back decades, and remained unaltered by the war, as we noted in Chapter 6. The identity of the individuals involved in these uprisings was

48Gabriel de Torres to Ferdinand, Cartagena, 18 October 1819, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 748 (also in *La Batalla de Boyacá*, pp. 296-303).
49Isidro Villareal to José Rodríguez, Popayán, 8 September 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 742. See also Brian Hamnett, "Popular Insurrection and Royalist Reaction: Colombian Regions, 1810-1823," *Reform and Insurrection in Bourbon New Granada and Peru*, John Fisher, Allan J. Kuehne and Anthony McFarlane (editors), Louisiana State University Press (Baton Rouge, 1990), for information about the republican uprising in the Cauca Valley.
analysed by the Bishop of Popayán. He reported in early September 1819 that:

La Valle de Cauca ha habido alguna conmoción no por parte de mis curas, ni de las personas honradas, y de bienes de los pueblos, sino por los desertores y otros malvados, que de resultas de la revolución pasada, estaban escondidos por los montes, a causa de la enormidad de sus crímenes, y obstinación en su errado sistema, les había hecho no querer aprovecharse de los indultos que se le habían dispensado por el más benigno de los monarcas.

In other words, the revolt was led by individuals in the Cauca Valley who had not been reconciled to Spain during the years of royalist occupation.

Despite the uprising, the royalist commander in the south, Sebastián de la Calzada, who had marched from Santa Fe with the city’s garrison, was nonetheless fairly optimistic about royalist prospects. He reported on 8 September 1819 from Popayán that although the news of the Battle of Boyacá had caused great concern in the city, his assurances that “no [era] nuestra pérdida tan grande como la ponderaban” had restored calm. Bishop Salvador de Enciso of Popayán was equally hopeful. Although he viewed the majority of the population of Valle with distrust (“un pueblo con el que no se podía contar para nada”), he reported in September 1819 that Popayán itself had remained entirely loyal.

50 Salvador de Enciso to Juan Sámano, Popayán, 8 September 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 743. See also Salvador de Enciso to Minister of State, Popayán, 8 September 1819, AGI, Ultramar, legajo 811; and Sebastián de la Calzada to Juan Sámano, Popayán, 8 September 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 747.

51 Sebastián de la Calzada to Juan Sámano, Popayán, 8 September 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 747.
and predicted that within four months Calzada would have recruited enough men to recapture Santa Fe.\footnote{Salvador de Enciso to Juan Sámano, Popayán, 8 September 1819; and Salvador de Enciso to Juan Sámano, Popayán, 14 September 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 743.}

Events in the end were not so simple, and, following the desertion of many of his troops, Calzada was forced to withdraw from Popayán to Pasto. Popayán was then occupied by republicans.\footnote{Ramón Zambrano to Melchor Aymerich, Sapuyes, 31 August 1819, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 748.} Calzada’s only hope lay in the Pastusos, who had up to this point been reliably royalist.\footnote{See Melchor Aymerich to Ramón Zambrano, Quito, 5 September 1819, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 748.} The Pastusos, and in particular the “fieles naturales”, assembled a sizeable army which enabled Calzada to drive the republicans from Popayán on 24 January 1820.\footnote{Sebastián de la Calzada to Melchor Aymerich, Popayán, 24 January 1820, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 1945.} When he learned of Popayán’s recapture, Bolívar was livid. "I am going to give orders for the chief leaders, rich, noble, or plebeian, to be hanged in Pasto, and the rest of the population to be transported away to Venezuela, so that no one is left but women and children, who can do no harm to us for the present and may change their minds", he wrote to Santander.\footnote{Salvador de Madariaga, \textit{Bolívar}, Hollis and Carter (London, 1952), p. 417.} Calzada, meanwhile, continued planning an attack on Santa Fe itself, and assembled several thousand men, armed with 1,300 guns.\footnote{Sebastián de la Calzada to Juan Sámano, Popayán, 8 September 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 747; and Melchor Aymerich to Minister of State, Quito, 6 September 1819, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 748 (also in \textit{La Batalla de Boyacá}, pp. 257-260).} Instead, Popayán was recaptured by the republicans in June 1820, and the royalists were forced to retreat once again to Pasto, never to regain Popayán.
The royalist troops that survived the battle of Boyacá scattered in various directions. Governor Torres of Cartagena explained that “unos se presentaron al enemigo, tomando partido, otros se fueron a sus casas y de toda la [Tercera] División sólo unos 200 hombres de Infantería y Caballería lograron salir, reunidos a las orillas del Magdalena, en donde hallándose sin buques se han salvado construyendo balsas que los han traído hasta Mompós”. According to Torres’ calculations, over 90% of the Third Division was captured or killed at Boyacá.

The royalist officers captured by the republicans were taken to Santa Fe in early September 1819. They included Barreiro himself, whom Santander claimed, “tuvo la bajeza de ofrecer sus servicios a la República como simple soldado”. If this is true, Morillo’s and Sámano’s suspicions about Barreiro were amply justified. Barreiro’s alleged willingness to change sides notwithstanding, on 11 October 1819, Barreiro and his fellow officers were shot on Santander’s orders, much to the annoyance of Bolívar.

Captured royalist soldiers, however, were for the most part not executed. They were instead incorporated into the republican army. This was the standard practice, and Morillo expected it would be done. Given that many, or perhaps most, of Barreiro’s...
troops were actually Americans, one might imagine that these troops would be happy to enlist in the republican army. This does not appear to have been entirely the case. In December 1819, in any event, Morillo claimed that the soldiers conscripted into the republican army after Boyacá were deserting in droves.61

In early September 1819, Bolívar proposed to Sámano that the two armies exchange prisoners, and offered to release officers captured after Boyacá in return for republican troops captured during the royalists’ retaking of Portobelo in April 1819. This offer was sabotaged by Santander’s execution of the captured royalist officers. Neither Morillo, nor, it appears, Sámano, were aware of this for some time, as in late November 1819 Morillo was still considering an exchange of prisoners. Morillo told Sámano that he was interested in obtaining the release of any officers or soldiers who had survived “la desgraciada acción de Boyacá”. He was clearly in favour of the idea, and pointed out that the viceroy of Peru had accepted similar offers on various occasions in the past.62 As it happened, no exchanges of prisoners of any sort took place until the signing of the armistice in 1820.

§3. Spain’s Institutional Response

There was at the time little agreement about the importance of the battle. On one hand, the republican Boletín del Ejército Libertador reported that “no son calculables las ventajas que ha conseguido la República con la gloriosa victoria [de Boyacá]”, and the profound importance of the battle was not lost on General

61 Pablo Morillo to Miguel de la Torre, Barquisimeto and Sarare, 13-31 December 1819, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8717, docs. 281-288.
62 Pablo Morillo to Juan Sámano, Barquisimeto, 20 November 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 742.
Morillo.63 In October 1819, he described himself as being in “una situación la más crítica en que me he visto desde que llegué a este continente”.64 He further informed the Ministry of War that “el fatal éxito de esta batalla ha puesto a [la] disposición [del sedicioso Bolívar] todo el reino... de donde sacará lo que necesite para continuar la guerra en [Venezuela]”.65 Governor Torres likewise felt that the battle and subsequent loss of the capital were a turning point in the war.66

Other royalist officials were more hopeful. Viceroy Sámano expressed apparently genuine confidence that with 3,000 additional troops the Spanish could end the war once and for all.67 Miguel de la Torre, more optimistic than Morillo, suggested in late October 1819 that the republicans in New Granada were in a very weak position, and vulnerable to attack.68 Moreover, Sebastián de la Calzada was, as we saw, convinced that Santa Fe could be recaptured, as were Bishop Gregorio of Cartagena and several other officials.69

63 Declaration of Manuel Martínez de Aparicio, Santa Fe, 18 August 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 747. See also Santander’s comment in December 1819: “Morillo está lo que se llama un hombre apurado” (Francisco de Paula Santander to Joaquín Paris, Santa Fe, 6 December 1819. BHA, vol. 2 (1904), p. 734.)
64 Pablo Morillo to Juan Sámano, San Carlos, 10 October 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 742.
65 Pablo Morillo to Minister of War, Valencia, 12 September 1819; Rodríguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol. 4, pp. 49-50 (also in La Batalla de Boyacá, pp. 260-267).
66 Gabriel de Torres to Ferdinand, Cartagena, 18 October 1819, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 748 (also in La Batalla de Boyacá, pp. 296-303).
67 Juan Sámano to Minister of War, Cartagena, 26 September 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 720A (also in La Batalla de Boyacá, pp. 284-288).
68 Miguel de La Torre to Juan Sámano, San Antonio de Cúcuta, 29 October 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 742.
69 See, for example, José María Ramírez to Juan Manuel Cajigal, Havana, 14 September 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 1945; and Pamphlets of Bishop Gregorio of Cartagena, 18 August 1819, 3 September 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 743.
Although royalist opinions differed as to the importance of the battle of Boyacá, everyone agreed that it was a defeat, and that it probably could have been avoided. Almost immediately after the actual battle on 7 August 1819, royalists in New Granada began casting about for explanations of the unexpected defeat. In no way was the republican victory viewed as evidence of Bolívar’s skill. Sámano described the former as “un enemigo tan importuno que ha debido su ventaja a un accidente el más inádito e inesperado”.

Responsibility was instead felt to lie with the Spanish themselves. Patterns of blame were established early; already on 8 August 1819, Viceroy Sámano was implicitly blaming the defeat on General Barreiro’s incompetence, and this trend became the dominant one in the following months.

Both Sámano and Morillo had been unhappy with Barreiro for some time prior to Boyacá. On 20 June 1819, Morillo had blamed the entire advance of Bolívar and Páez on “la indolencia y apatía del Señor Barreiro”. Moreover, Barreiro had not been conscientious about sending reports to Morillo; in mid-July 1819, Morillo complained that he hadn’t received any news from Barreiro in months. Morillo had, by this stage, decided to replace Barreiro with Miguel de La Torre, but, unfortunately for the Spanish, by the time La Torre arrived in New Granada,

70 Juan Sámano to Minister of War, Cartagena, 26 September 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 720A (also in La Batalla de Boyacá, pp. 284-288).
71 Juan Sámano to Juan Manuel Cajigal, Cartagena, 22 December 1819; and Juan Sámano to Pablo Morillo, Santa Fe, 8 August 1819; AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 742; Juan Sámano to Minister of War, Cartagena, 26 September 1819, 27 April 1820, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 720A (the former document may also be found in La Batalla de Boyacá, pp. 284-288); and Díaz Díaz, La reconquista española, vol. 2, p. 375.
72 Pablo Morillo to Miguel de la Torre, Calabaço, 20 June 1819, AHNMen, Estado, legajo 8717, doc. 245.
73 Pablo Morillo to Miguel de la Torre, Calabaço, 12 July 1819, AHNMen, Estado, legajo 8717, doc. 249.
Barreiro's army no longer existed. 74 Ironically, the republicans described Barreiro as one of the "más hábiles del ejército expedicionario". 75

Viceroy Sámano, for his part, also blamed Carlos Tolrá, the military commander of Antioquia, for the loss of much of the Neogranadan interior. Tolrá abandoned his province in late August 1819, claiming that all Antioquia, with the exception of Medellín and Rionegro, supported the republicans, and that the royalist had had no realistic chance of defeating them. "Veo todos, todos los pueblos de la provincia dispuestos a dar el grito de independencia", he wrote to Sámano on 24 August 1819. 76 Moreover, he pointed out that in February 1819 he had been ordered to send all his weapons to Santa Fe, and that he was thus completely unequipped for resistance, with a mere 86 troops under his command. 77 He was, nonetheless, severely criticised by Sámano, who believed that, had Tolrá remained, the republicans would not have gained control of Antioquia. Sámano indeed described the withdrawal as having been motivated "sin otro motivo urgente que su sobrecogimiento por noticias vagas o dadas por sospechosos". 78

74 Pablo Morillo to Juan Sámano, Calabozo, 12 July 1819, BRAH, Colección Morillo, sig. 9/7664 (legajo 21), ff. 80-83 (also in Los ejércitos del Rey, vol. 2, pp. 267-268, and AHN, Estado 8717); and Juan Sámano to Minister of War, Cartagena, 26 September 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 720A (also in La Batalla de Boyacá, pp. 284-288).


76 Carlos Tolrá to Juan Sámano, Bambosa, 24 August 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 745.

77 Carlos Tolrá to Juan Sámano, 15 November 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 745.

78 Juan Sámano to Pablo Morillo, Cartagena, 16 November 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 742; and Carlos Tolrá to Juan Sámano, Magangué, 18 September 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 745 (also in La Batalla de Boyacá, pp. 158-161).
Sámano of course had a personal motive for blaming Barreiro and Tolrá. He wished to head off criticism that he had behaved unwisely in having fled to Cartagena rather than take command of the remaining royalist troops. Attacks on Sámano’s behaviour came principally from Gabriel de Torres, the governor of Cartagena, who was extremely critical of the viceroy’s rapid flight. Disagreements between Torres and Sámano were never resolved, and Sámano’s relationship with the governor deteriorated steadily during the succeeding months.

Torres, indeed, had much to say about the defeat at Boyacá, and his analysis provides a concise summary of the many errors of the reconquest. An astute observer, he laid the blame primarily at the door of the Expeditionary Army. He had already warned that the mistreatment and excessive contributions imposed on the populace by the army would cause the loss of New Granada. In October 1819 he again wrote to the king, lamenting that his predictions had come true:

¿Pero cómo podía suceder otra cosa? La fuerza moral de los pueblos destruida; estos vejados; despojados en el mayor desorden de sus frutos, de sus ganados y de cuanto podía formar su subsistencia, sin satisfacerles jamás el importe de estas exacciones, y la justicia con su balanza inclinada siempre a favor de los que cometían estas vejaciones...

Sámano also complained that he hadn’t been provided with enough troops. He claimed that, had he been given additional troops immediately after the defeat, he could have reconquered the entire viceroyalty. See Juan Sámano to Minister of War, Cartagena, 27 April 1820, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 720A

79 Juan Sámano to Minister of War, Cartagena, 26 September 1819, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 720A (also in La Batalla de Boyacá, pp. 284-288).

80 Gabriel de Torres to Ferdinand, Cartagena, 18 October 1819, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 748 (also in La Batalla de Boyacá, pp. 296-303). See also Pablo Morillo to Ministry of War, Valencia, 29 March 1820, Rodriguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol. 4, pp. 165-172.
Todas estas causas reunidas podrían producir afecto al servicio de V.M., a cuyo nombre se han hecho tantos infelices . . . La fuerza física por otra parte estaba en la mayor licencia; destruida la disciplina militar, o a lo menos enervada, acostumbrados los soldados a ser mandados por jefes de valor si se quiere, pero sin casi otra virtud militar, arrancados por la fuerza sin orden, sin un repartimiento igual y sin discreción alguna de la agricultura, de las artes y del seno de las familias, conducidos siempre a desolar su misma patria. ¿Podría esperarse que fuesen jamás soldados subordinados, y que lograsen victorias y honor para las Reales armas de V.M.?81

There was, however, one more blow to be struck at Spain's pretensions in New Granada, which even Torres had not been able to predict, and which was to deliver the coup de grâce to the Spanish regime in the region. This was the 1820 liberal revolution in Spain, to which we now turn our attention.

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81 Gabriel de Torres to Ferdinand, Cartagena, 18 October 1819, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 748.
1820 was a year of great significance for Spaniards in both Spain and the Americas. The year opened with a revolution in Andalusia that prevented the despatch of troops to Río de la Plata, and moreover plunged Spain into a period of increased political strife. Crisis at home was succeeded by crisis in America. The year ended with virtually the entirety of Spain's American empire in ruins; by December 1820, only Peru, a few Caribbean islands, and a very reduced portion of New Granada remained in royalist hands, and within five years all but Cuba were to become independent. This chapter will examine the effect of Spain's 1820 revolution on the war in New Granada.

§1. Revolution in Spain

The roots of the 1820 crisis in Spain itself must be traced to the political polarisation that came in the wake of the French invasion of 1808. The capture of the Bourbon monarchs, the coronation of Joseph Napoleon as king of Spain, and the creation of the various Spanish resistance juntas had led to increasing political polarisation among Spaniards, and the rise of partidos. The different groupings coalesced around the so-called liberals, themselves divided into subfactions, and the absolutists. The precise nature of these nascent parties need not detain us here, nor are finer dissection into moderados, exaltados, doceañistas, tragalistas, afrancesados, ultramontanos or serviles necessary for
our purposes. The division between liberals and absolutists gathered momentum during the years of Ferdinand VII’s captivity in France, a period of liberal ascendancy.

After Ferdinand’s return, hostility between the king and liberals of all stripes simmered ominously until 1820, when an open rupture occurred. On New Year’s Day, 1820, an historic uprising began in the Andalucian town of Las Cabezas de San Juan. On that day Colonel Rafael Riego, the leader of the revolt, pronounced in favour of the Constitution of 1812, and troops stationed in Las Cabezas rebelled. Over the next few days Riego marched through other towns in Andalucia, and then to Cádiz itself, where Colonel Antonio Quiroga attempted an assault on the city’s military warehouses. This attack on Cádiz was unsuccessful, and initially the revolt aroused little support. The rest of the army, however, did nothing to stop the unrest, and in the ensuing months pro-constitutional uprisings broke out across Spain. Three months later on 7 March 1820 the king was forced to re-convene the Cortes and proclaim the Constitution of 1812. On 9 March 1820, Ferdinand was himself obliged to swear loyalty to the very constitution which he had personally overthrown in 1814. These events ushered in a three-year period of liberal, constitutional, rule in Spain.

The causes of the revolution of 1820 have been much discussed. It is clear that dissatisfaction with Ferdinand’s government had increased throughout 1819, and various anti-

1See Timothy Anna, Spain and the Loss of America, University of Nebraska Press, (Lincoln, 1983) p. 115; Iris Zavala, Masones, comuneros y carbonarios, Siglo XXI (Madrid, 1971), p. 46; and Josep Fontana, La crisis del antiguo régimen, 1808-1833, Editorial Crítica (Barcelona, 1988), pp. 141-153, for more detailed discussions of these various factions.
government plots had already been hatched.2 Certain features, however, distinguish the revolt of 1820 from previous conspiracies. In particular, the uprising was supported by the troops not out of liberal sentiment, but because of their profound disgust with the army. The first troops to rebel were new recruits about to be shipped to Buenos Aires to fight the insurgents. They joined the revolt to avoid being sent to fight in the unpopular colonial war; Antonio Alcalá Galiano indeed asserted that the revolt was entirely due to “the repugnance of the rank and file against embarking for America”.3 Nonetheless, their participation in the revolution was critical to events not only in Spain but also in the Americas. The effect of the revolt was expressed intemperately by one officer, who complained that “the Spanish continent of America, [which was] discovered, conquered and civilised at a time when God and the Patria were respected, was lost because of [scandalous uprising of the army in Andalusia, whose authors] later called themselves patriots”.4 Because of the uprising, the 1819 expedition to Río de la Plata never left Spain, thereby guaranteeing the independence of Buenos Aires. The

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2See José Luis Comellas García Llera, Los primeros pronunciamientos en España, 1814-1820, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (Madrid, 1958); and also Josep Fontana, La crisis del antiguo régimen, pp. 127-140.
3Raymond Carr, Spain 1808-1939, Oxford University Press (Oxford, 1975) p. 127; and also Melchor Fernández Almagro, La emancipación de América y su reflejo en la consciencia española, Instituto de Estudios Políticos (Madrid, 1954), pp. 97-98. See also Comellas, Los primeros pronunciamientos, pp. 303-309. The recruits were also unhappy with the choice of officers and the terms of recruitment. Although liberalism was not the motor driving army unrest, liberal sentiment in the Spanish army had grown during Ferdinand's rule. Francisco Egüa, minister of war during much of the period, was violently anti-liberal and cashiered many liberals and heroes of the resistance. This stimulated anti-government, anti-conservative feeling within the officer corps. See E. Christiansen, The Origins of Military Power in Spain, 1800-1954, Oxford University Press (Oxford, 1967), p. 19.
4Comellas, Los primeros pronunciamientos, p. 304.
royalist enclaves in Peru, New Granada and Venezuela were also deprived of essential reinforcements.

Equally importantly, the return of the liberals in Spain threw the surviving royalist governments in America into turmoil. Royalist officials were just as influenced by Spanish politics as their peninsular cousins, and political division was just as virulent among royalists in Spanish America as it was in Spain. Indeed, in Peru, the political splits within the royalist camp were so great that in the evacuation that followed the royalists' defeat at Ayacucho, liberals returning to Spain would not even sit in the same section of the ship as absolutists. Constitutionalists and anti-constitutionalists remained segregated throughout the return voyage. With the dramatic return of the liberals in Spain, political hatreds that had festered since the establishment of the Cortes burst open. As a consequence viceroys were overthrown in Mexico, in Peru, and in New Granada, as royalists in Spanish America sank into a mire of political infighting. We will here examine the reception of the restored Constitution in New Granada.

§2. The Constitution in Cartagena

The first colony to learn of the liberal revolt was Cuba. News of events in Spain arrived on 15 April 1820, and was greeted immediately with great enthusiasm. The Captain General of Cuba, José Manuel Cajigal, published the information without

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delay, and on 16 April the entire government of Havana swore loyalty to the Constitution amidst general rejoicing. By the next day the Lotería Real of Havana had changed its name to the Lotería Constitutional.  

Despite the appearance of order, this transfer to the constitutional system was not accomplished without discord. In fact, Captain General Cajigal had been forced to accept the Constitution by liberals who threatened to depose him if he did not. They intended to replace him with the liberal Francisco Montalvo, New Granada’s former viceroy, who was in retirement in Cuba. The reception of the Constitution in Cuba presaged its welcome on the mainland. There too the change of government in Spain was used to effect changes in the colonial administration, and there too these changes were accomplished through intimidation and threat.

It took several months for news of the Riego revolution to reach the surviving royalist government of New Granada in Cartagena. Rumours had been circulating for some time about political divisions in Spain, and there were fears that the metropolis might be enveloped in another civil war. The first reports of the reinstitution of the 1812 Constitution were, however, dismissed as republican propaganda by Cartagena’s
Governor Gabriel de Torres. Then, in early May, Governor Torres learned unofficially from sources in Cuba that the king had indeed sworn loyalty to the Constitution. Torres, although a liberal, did not immediately publicise the news. Although he recognised that it would be difficult to prevent word from spreading throughout New Granada, he felt inclined to keep quiet, at least until further instructions from Spain arrived. Torres wrote to Viceroy Juan Sámano to ask for advice. Sámano immediately urged suppression of the news. In fact, the viceroy had already learned in April of the revolution in Spain, but had not informed Governor Torres, preferring the keep the information under his hat as long as possible. He had however been no less astonished than the governor, and had sent an envoy to Spain to learn more.

Definitive news that Ferdinand had sworn loyalty to the Constitution, and of its adoption in Cuba, was brought to Cartagena from Havana in early June 1820. Viceroy Sámano deeply opposed

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10 See Gabriel de Torres to Gabriel García Vallecilla, Cartagena, 23 March 1820, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 742.

Gabriel de Torres had accompanied General Pablo Morillo to Venezuela in 1815 as a brigadier in the Expeditionary Army. He was appointed governor of Cartagena in 1816, soon after its recapture from the insurgents, and remained in this post until the city’s surrender to the republicans in 1821. He would have been 39 years old in 1820, and, according to General Morillo, was extremely ambitious. He was married to a criolla, the daughter of Oidor Juan Jurado. (See Pablo Morillo to José María Barreiro, Barquisimeto, 20 July 1818, Los ejércitos del Rey, 1818-1819, Alberto Lee López (editor), Biblioteca de la Presidencia de la República (Bogotá, 1989), Vol. 1, pp. 25-28; Oswaldo Díaz Díaz, La reconquista española, Historia Extensa de Colombia, Ediciones Lerner (Bogotá, 1964), vol. 1, pp. 353-354; and Hoja de Servicio de Gabriel de Torres, AGI, papeles de Cuba, legajo 2136B.)

11 Gabriel de Torres to Juan Sámano, Cartagena, 10 May 1820, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 580; José María Ramírez to Juan Sámano, Havana, 19 April 1820, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 580; and Report on letter by Juan Sámano from 30 May 1820, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 580. See also the comments about Torres’ reaction in José Manuel Groot, Historia eclesiástica y civil de Nueva Granada, vol. 4, Editorial M. Rivas (Bogotá, 1893), p. 104.
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to the Constitution, and was still not willing to make the news public, so he placed under house arrest a passenger who had actually witnessed the oath in Cuba. This measure proved completely ineffective, as within days other ships arrived with news confirming the earlier notices.

The news caused considerable uproar in the city, and matters came to a head on 7 June 1820. Around 4.30 in the afternoon the members of the Artillery Brigade, under the leadership of its commander Ignacio Romero, and the Regimiento de León, led, not by its commander, but by another officer, presented themselves at the Palacio de Gobierno to demand the immediate promulgation of the 1812 Constitution. The troops brought four cannons with them, and some reports state that the soldiers were accompanied by “el pueblo”. The crowd called for Governor Torres, who informed them that, although he supported their demand for the restoration of the Constitution, he could take no action without the support of the other commanding officers and the viceroy. Viceroy Sámano had, however, already made his opposition to the Constitution known.

At this juncture, the commander of the Regimiento de León, Brigadier Antonio Cano, arrived in the plaza and made public his complete opposition to any adoption of the Constitution. This, Governor Torres reported, nearly caused an armed confrontation between the members of the Artillery Brigade and Cano’s troops. Tension mounted further when Cano’s supporters thought they heard voices calling for his imprisonment, and it was only with

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12 José Santa Cruz to José Cienfuegos, Portobelo, 29 June 1820, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 1945.
great effort that Governor Torres succeeded in getting some of the troops to return to barracks.

Aware that swift action was necessary, Torres convoked a cabildo extraordinario and a junta militar. Both meetings agreed that Torres should send Sámano all the available documentary evidence confirming that the king had indeed embraced the Constitution, in an effort to convince the viceroy to support the new system. It was further agreed to send a deputation to the bishop of Cartagena to enlist his support. All of this was done immediately, and the cabildo decided to remain in session until a reply from Sámano was received, despite the fact that it was by then midnight.

While these groups were meeting, Sámano allegedly sent agents throughout Cartagena to arrest everyone who had demonstrated in favour of the Constitution that afternoon. Most liberals, suspecting something of this sort would take place, had already gone into hiding, but Sámano was able to detain two officers and an official from the city’s customs house. These arrests provided Sámano with the confidence to inform Torres at 3.00am on the morning of 8 June that there was no urgent need to implement any changes to the government, as Cartagena had returned to a state of complete calm, and as he in any event needed to study the matter. In fact, Cartagena was far from being calm; the troops by this stage no longer remained in even minimal subordination; in particular, one company of grenadiers had spent the entire night “sobre las armas” in the Plaza de la Merced, deaf

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13 The cabildo extraordinario was attended by the members of the cabildo, the governor, the asesor general de gobierno, and the lieutenant governor. The junta militar was attended by most senior officers from the garrison, and Governor Torres. Brigadier Antonio Cano did not attend.
to the orders of Brigadier Cano to return to barracks. The
townspeople were also reported to be in a state of extreme
"efervescencia".

Another cabildo extraordinario was held the next day on the
morning of 8 June, and the viceroy was again urged to accept the
new Constitution. Sámano, supported by the Audiencia,
responded by denouncing the previous cabildo extraordinario as
unnecessary and illegal, and deprived Torres of the authority to
convolve any more meetings without written permission from
Sámano himself.

Meanwhile unrest in Cartagena continued to grow, and
began to take on an anti-Spanish nature: members of the
Compañía de Granaderos de León tried to expel all the Spaniards
from the garrison. Violence was necessary to compel the troops to
sleep in the barracks on the night of 8 June, but by the morning of
9 June order could no longer be maintained. Soldiers leaving the
barracks that morning openly disobeyed their officers and seized
control of the Baluarte de Santo Domingo, where they were joined
by more troops, who had overthrown their officers and forced
open the barracks doors. Both the bishop and Brigadier Cano tried
to persuade the men to return to barracks, and both were
"groseramente desatendido".14

The members of the Artillery Brigade and the Regimiento de
León then set off in an orderly fashion toward the Plaza de la
Inquisición with the intention of proclaiming the Constitution. The
soldiers also demanded the back-pay owed to them. Members of

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14See Resumen Documentado . . by Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 1 August
1820, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 1011. The Bishop himself makes no
mention of this in his own report on events. See Bishop Gregorio José to
the Ministry of Grace and Justice, Guanahacoa, 4 October 1820, AGI,
Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 748.
the public, in an attempt to avoid further unrest, began
distributing money ($20 per soldier), and Viceroy Sámano, on
learning of the gathering in the Plaza de la Inquisición, supplied
an additional amount. The distribution of cash lasted well into the
afternoon, but did not succeed in diverting the troops from their
principal demand of the establishment of the Constitution, and
further messages were sent to Sámano to this effect.

Viceroy Sámano then made a quite extraordinary decision.
He wrote to Governor Torres that afternoon that; “Hallándome
gravemente enfermo, he resuelto transladarme al pueblo de
Sabanalarga . . ., dejando encargado el mando político con arreglo
de las Reales Ordenes que rigen en el asunto, al Señor Oidor
Decano de la Real Audiencia, y el militar a V.S.”. Sámano thus
chose to resign temporarily. Governor Torres, invested with this
new authority, immediately convoked another junta
extraordinario, which was attended by the military commanders,
and by civil and ecclesiastic authorities. The junta approved the
adoption of the Constitution, and this resolution was put into
effect immediately thereafter in front of the assembled troops,
who greeted the oath with “las mayores demonstraciones de
alegría”. The troops then returned to barracks in an orderly
fashion.

The following day (10 June), the adoption of the Constitution
was formally announced, and orders to swear loyalty were sent to
the remaining Spanish officials throughout the province. At

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15See Juan Sámano to Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 9 June 1820, printed in
the Resumen Documentado . . . by Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 1 August
1820, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 1011 and also in AGI, Papeles de
Cuba, legajo 890B. See also Gabriel de Torres to Juan Sámano, Cartagena, 10
June 1820, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 890B; and Anselmo Bierna y Maza to
Juan Sámano, Cartagena, 12 June 1820, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 890B.
11.00am on 10 June, government officials, civil and military, gathered in the cathedral to attend a Te Deum. Illuminations and public festivities were then held. Viceroy Sámano did not attend these celebrations. Consequently, on 12 June, various officers informed Governor Torres that, in their view, Sámano could not remain viceroy without himself swearing loyalty to the Constitution. After all, the Constitution itself, in Article 374, ordained that all officials swear loyalty to it before assuming office. A junta de guerra, attended also by some members of the town cabildo, was immediately held to debate this matter. The junta sent Sámano an ultimatum, informing him that, if he did not accept the new Constitution, he would be deprived of authority. The following day Sámano repeated that he could not accept the new Constitution until he received official orders to do so from Spain, and offered to leave the country. It was perhaps at this point that certain members of the junta suggested that the easiest way to solve the problem would be to assassinate Sámano. The Bishop of Cartagena tried to dissuade those in favour, pointing out that it was against the spirit of the Constitution itself to force Sámano to “morir o jurarla”. He was evidently successful, as no attempts were made on the viceroy’s life.

Furthermore, the junta did not abandon its attempts to compel Sámano’s obedience by peaceful means. On 13 June, the junta again petitioned Sámano to reconsider, but two days later, on 15 June, he reiterated that he did not accept the Constitution.

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16 No member of the Audiencia attended. In particular, the oidor decano whom Sámano appointed to exercise the mando político on 9 June did not attend. See both Resumen Documentado... by Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 1 August 1820, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 1011; and the Report on the junta, Cartagena, 12 June 1820, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 748.
17 Bishop Gregorio José to the Ministry of Grace and Justice, Guanabacoa, 4 October 1820, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 748.
and could not even contemplate accepting it without consulting the opinion of the governors of the other royalist provinces (which at this stage consisted of southern-most New Granada and little else). Such a consultation would take months. The junta sent a final deputation to Sâmano in a last attempt to obtain his oath of loyalty. The deputation made it clear to the viceroy that he would be removed from office if he did not accept the Constitution.

Within half an hour the delegation returned. Sâmano persisted in his refusal to accept the Constitution, and announced his intention of resigning, citing his poor health as the motive. The junta then formally removed Sâmano from office (something it had no real authority to do). Over the course of the next few days Oidor Decano Francisco de Mosquera y Cabrera resigned from exercising the *mando político* that he had been granted by Sâmano on 9 June, and Governor Torres took up political control for the province of Cartagena, an action which he claimed was supported by article 324 of the Constitution. Torres thus became the de facto viceroy.

The initial response of the public in Cartagena to these events seems to have been uniformly positive. Torres, at least, claimed that the troops were very pleased by Sâmano's overthrow, especially given his reputation for vengefulness. (Those who had taken part in the pro-constitutional uprising

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18 The junta de guerra also provided Sâmano with original copies of the reports from Spain and elsewhere, testifying to the introduction of the constitution. The junta was, by this stage, irritated by Sâmano's insinuations that its members had acted disloyally in having sworn the constitution before the arrival of official orders to do so. Its members pointed out that they had only accepted the constitution because of the reliable news that the king himself had done so.
feared they would be victimised if Sámano regained power.\textsuperscript{19)} Another officer also reported that immediately following the public oath of loyalty to the Constitution on 10 June, large numbers of enthusiastic individuals enlisted in the army to fight the republican Luis Brion in the nearby town of Sabanilla.\textsuperscript{20} The reintroduction of the Constitution to Cartagena also resulted in other formal changes; Cartagena’s cabildo began calling itself the “Ayuntamiento Constitucional”, and referred to Cartagena, not as “Cartagena de Indias”, but as “Cartagena de América”.\textsuperscript{21} There is, however, no evidence that the actual machinery of the Constitution was put into place. Elections for deputies to the Cortes, for example, do not appear to have been held.

No new upheavals occurred for the next week, but then, on 28 June, a ship arrived from Spain with official orders to swear loyalty to the Constitution. Sámano immediately offered to take the oath of loyalty, but it was too late. Torres reminded him that he was no longer viceroy.\textsuperscript{22} During the next few weeks Sámano made efforts to organise the anti-constitutional faction in Cartagena in order to regain command, but was unsuccessful. On 5 July 1820, he set sail for Jamaica, leaving Gabriel de Torres in command of royalist forces in New Granada.

\textsuperscript{19}Gabriel de Torres to Ministry of Ultramar, Cartagena, 27 July 1820, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 748.
\textsuperscript{20}José Santa Cruz to José Cienfuegos, Portobelo, 29 June 1820, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 1945. Nonetheless, not enough people signed up, and, on 14 June 1820, Governor Torres was obliged to issue a proclamation reminding the citizens of Cartagena that Article 9 of the Constitution obliged them to defend the Patria, and urging more to enlist. See Proclama de Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 14 June 1820, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 1945.
\textsuperscript{21}Report by the Cabildo, Cartagena, 31 December 1820, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 716.
\textsuperscript{22}Gabriel de Torres to Juan Sámano, Cartagena, 29 June 1820, printed in the Resumen Documentado . . . by Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 1 August 1820, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 1011 and also in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 748.
While this palace coup was occurring in Cartagena, the only important Neogranadan city remaining in Spanish hands, similarly fraught developments were taking place in Venezuela, where the royalists were in an equally disheveled state. General Morillo was in desperate need of the reinforcements he supposed were about to depart from Spain. Unaware that these very troops had rebelled, Morillo continued to await their arrival until late March 1820, when he at last learned of Riego’s revolution. News of Ferdinand’s adoption of the Constitution did not reach him until mid-May 1820. Morillo himself swore loyalty to the Constitution in Caracas on 7 June 1820. Not all officials were as enthusiastic, and in Venezuela, as in New Granada, news of the constitutional revolution in Spain provoked high-level splits. Francisco Tomás Morales, one of the highest-ranking royalist officers, indeed threatened to resign after learning of the reintroduction of the Constitution. Ramón Correa, the acting captain general of Venezuela, at first refused to publish the Constitution in Caracas, and it was only after a commission of Caraqueño notables prevailed upon Morillo to intervene that the document was promulgated. These manoeuvrings in Caracas were politically motivated, as they were elsewhere, although in Caracas the conflict seems to have revolved not around a liberal-absolutist split, but rather around the administrative effects of implementing the Constitution. Members of the Caracas Audiencia, who backed the Constitution, hoped it would reduce

23 See Morillo’s letters to Miguel de la Torre in BRAH, Colección Morillo, Sig. 9/7664 (legajo 21), fols. 104-157. See also Proclama de Pablo Morillo, Caracas, 8 June 1820, AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 1568; and Pablo Morillo to Antonio López de Mendoza, Valencia, 4 August 1820, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 759B.
24 Pablo Morillo to Francisco Tomás Morales, Valencia, 29 April 1820, BRAH, signatura 9/7662 (legajo 19), fols. 169-172.
the authority of the captain general, who would be demoted to a mere jefe político. Morillo, for his part, had doubts about the wisdom of implementing the Constitution in war-torn Venezuela, and repeatedly asked to resign following its promulgation.25

§3. The Anti-Constitutionalists

We have seen that the introduction of the Constitution into Cartagena revealed a major schism within New Granada's royalist government. This schism did not heal with the flight of the viceroy, for there remained in Cartagena many individuals opposed to the new liberal regime. Indeed, less than a month after the coup, Governor Torres was complaining that "personas afectando fidelidad al rey" were putting up offensive anti-constitutional pasquinades.26 The most important opponents of the new regime were two high-ranking officers, the commander of the Regimiento de León, Brigadier Antonio Cano, and Colonel Francisco Warleta. Warleta's attitude to the Constitution may be deduced from his behaviour on learning of its reintroduction:

Luego que supo en le sitio de Barranca donde se hallaba, haberse jurado la Constitución, se arrancó las divisas de su empleo, quemó los botones en que estaban inscripto el nombre del regimiento, abrió y hecho al fuego toda la


An uprising also occurred in Maracaibo. Morillo reported to the Ministry of War that a state of anarchy reigned in the province following the promulgation of the Constitution, and that the governor, Feliciano Montenegro, had been deposed. See Pablo Morillo to the Ministry of War, Caracas, 30 September 1820, Rodríguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol. 4, pp. 234-235.

26 Bando de Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 3 August 1820, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 717.
correspondencia en que se trataba de este asunto, y se
marchó bajo pretexto de enfermedad al pueblo de Soledad,
dejando abandonado su encargo.27

The effect of this high-level opposition was serious. Torres
reported that “El carácter anti-constitucional del virrey, del
Brigadier Colonel del regimiento de Leon Don Antonio Cano, y del
Colonel Don Francisco Warleta pusieron esta plaza en el estado
más aflictivo”.28 The public breach between the governor and the
viceroy led to a breakdown in discipline in the army, and a
general decline in respect for authority. Mariano Sixto, Governor
Torres’s representative to General Morillo, reported in early
December 1820 that, “La guarnición de la plaza de Cartagena . . . a
causa del malísimo ejemplo que la dieron el Brigadier don Antonio
Cano y el Colonel don Francisco Warleta cuando se juró la
Constitución Política de la Monarquía esta enteramente
relajada.”29 The breakdown in control permitted increasing
desertion from the royalist army in the months after the rift.30
Moreover, Colonel Warleta’s refusal to accept the constitutional
regime was directly responsible for the loss of the town of
Barranca, which was captured by republicans within days of the

27Gabriel de Torres to the Secretary of State, Cartagena, 10 July 1820, AHNM,
Estado, legajo 8725. Warleta left New Granada altogether, going first to
Jamaica, and thence to Spain. See José María Restrepo Saenz, Gobernadores
Also see Francisco Warleta to Juan Sámano, Barranca, 9 June 1820, AGI,
Papeles de Cuba, legajo 713B. Colonel Antonio Cano also left his post,
although the circumstances of his removal are not clear. See José Santa
Cruz to José Cienfuegos, Portobelo, 29 June 1820, AGI, Papeles de Cuna, legajo
1945.
28Gabriel de Torres to the Secretary of State, Cartagena, 10 July 1820, AHNM,
Estado, legajo 8725.
29Mariano Sixto to Pablo Morillo, Valencia, 11 December 1820, AHNM, Estado,
legajo 8725.
30Gabriel de Torres to Francisco Mosquera y Cabrera, Cartagena, 18 June
1820, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 742.
colonel's decamping. Most importantly, the struggle between the viceroy and the governor distracted the royalists from the real threat to the Spanish presence in New Granada: the republican army. While Sámano and Torres argued over politics, the republicans were preparing to lay siege to Cartagena. Four days after the defeated Sámano left the city, General Mariano Montilla began the blockade that resulted in Cartagena's surrender, as we shall see in Chapter 12. During the preceding weeks, Cartagena's royalist government had focused little attention on preparing for this siege. Royalist energies had instead centred on the struggle between Governor Torres and Viceroy Sámano, and on containing the army's pro-constitutional agitations.

Parenthetically, it might be noted that Sámano ended up not in Jamaica, but in Panama City, where he died the following year. Before his death he managed to stir up sufficient hostility to the isthmus' liberals to provoke a riot. Although the city had sworn loyalty to the Constitution on 3 July 1820, the constitutional system had not been implemented, and, as elsewhere, the Constitution remained more an ideal than an actual legal code. Sámano, and his ally, the equally absolutist former governor of Santa Marta Pedro Ruiz de Porras, allegedly so encouraged opposition to the Constitution that unrest broke out between supporters and opponents. Sámano's provocative behaviour, charged Panama's captain general, had placed the city "en el último estado de desesperación", and the captain general further urged that Ruiz de Porras be expelled from the isthmus as an anti-constitutional troublemaker.31

31 Report by the Cabildo of Panama, Panama, 29 July 1820, AGI, Audiencia de Panama, legajo 272; and Juan de la Cruz Mourgeon to Ministry of Overseas, Panama, 28 August 1821, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 668. Also see
The 1820 liberal revolution had several consequences for royalists in New Granada. To begin with, the restoration of the 1812 Constitution was directly responsible for the overthrow of Viceroy Sámamo. Secondly, Spain’s new liberal regime resolved to open direct talks with the insurgents, the results of which dialogue will be considered in the next chapter. Finally, it remains to make one general point. This concerns the broader effect of the politicisation of the Spanish bureaucracy. We have already mentioned the direct repercussions of the Riego revolution in New Granada. In addition, the division within the royalist camp greatly discredited the Spanish cause in America. Spanish authority, already wounded by the long sequence of events in Spain starting in 1808, was finally shown to be not only enfeebled, but indeed irrelevant to the Americas. O’Leary put it concisely: “el lazo que por muchos años había ligado el pueblo de Colombia a la nación española quedó al fin disuelto”.32 This remark might indeed be generalised to much of Spanish America. The Constitution had questioned the very basis of traditional Spanish government, and the fight within the royalist camp over its implementation accentuated this. As Timothy Anna has pointed out, it was simply not possible to present Spain as a unified entity.33 This situation was clear to the republican leadership in New Granada; Simón Bolívar wrote to Governor

Gabriel de Torres to the Ministry of Overseas, Cartagena, 27 July 1820, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, Legajo 748. Sámamo had insisted on his arrival in Panama on being treated as though he were still viceroy, and nominated Pedro Ruiz de Porras to succeed him.
33The loss of credit suffered by the royalist cause, as a result of the political rifts in Spain, has been noted by Timothy Anna, who has argued in several works that this increasing loss of prestige was one of the principal reasons for Spain’s loss of America.
Torres in August 1820, “Es el colmo de la demencia, y aún más de lo ridículo, proponerle a la República de Colombia su sumisión a la nación Española. . . ¿Cree Vs que la caduca y corrompida España pueda aún regir este mundo moderno?”. The inhabitants of New Granada could see that while the myth of imperial unity dissolved, the republican forces marched ever closer to victory. It was clear the royalists, with or without the Constitution, had little to offer.

However, this was not at all clear to Spain’s new liberal government. In Madrid, many officials remained convinced that the defeat of absolutism and the return of the Constitution of 1812 provided an ideal format for reconciliation with Spain. Plans were immediately formulated to send peace commissioners to the Americas, and for the first time, direct negotiations with the insurgent leadership were contemplated. These negotiations, and the subsequent surrender of royalist forces in Cartagena, form the subject of the next chapter.

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34Simón Bolívar to Gabriel de Torres, Turbo, 28 August 1820, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 1017.
Chapter 12: Armistice and Surrender

One of the immediate consequences of the 1820 revolution was a renewed commitment on the part of Spain’s government to end the American war by diplomatic means. In early April 1820, the new government announced a cease-fire in the overseas territories, and prepared to send commissioners to negotiate with rebel leaders. The goal of the commissioners was to convince the insurgents to accept the Constitution of 1812, as a first step towards reincorporation into the Spanish empire. Only if the insurgents failed to accept the Constitution was the war to continue. This decision to negotiate was, as Timothy Anna notes, “the first important policy breakthrough since 1814. Yet at its core was an idea that was not only not revolutionary but not even original.”¹ In 1812, officials in both Spain and the Americas had clung to the hope that the promulgation of the Constitution would in itself end the war, as it was felt that the Constitution corrected any errors in the administration of the colonies, and thus eliminated the need for independence.² In the face of considerable evidence, the liberals of 1820 again placed their faith in the Constitution. “La insurrección de la América calmará probablemente si se generaliza la Constitución,” proclaimed the

¹ Timothy Anna, Spain and the Loss of America, University of Nebraska Press (Lincoln, 1983), p. 225.
Evidently, no lessons had been learned from the past. The government’s official line, echoing the failed hopes of 1812, was that the insurgents no longer had any reason to continue fighting, as the Constitution provided an ideal format for reconciliation. This view was advanced publicly by Ferdinand in his May 1820 declaration to the Americans, in which he announced the readoption of the Constitution. In fact, Ferdinand was privately convinced the 1820 liberal revolution was intended to cause the loss of America, notwithstanding his official pronouncements to the contrary. He summed up his views in a letter to Tsar Alexander I of Russia: “The Constitution formed in Cádiz, and the revolution made in Spain, were the work of the machinations of those who desired to separate the Americas from the metropolis. Thus it has happened. Now they are lost, and only with difficulty can they be recovered.”

Ferdinand’s private scepticism was shared by many royalist officials. General Morillo himself put the matter succinctly:

Es un delirio, a mi entender, persuadirse que esta parte de la América quiere unirse a ese hemisfero, adaptando la Constitución Política de la Monarquía Española. . . . Ellos no quieren ser españoles; así lo han dicho altamente, desde que proclamaron la independencia, así lo han sostenido sin

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desmentir jamás su opinión en ningún circunstancia ni visisitud de la Península, eso repiten ahora sin dejar las armas de la mano, lo repiterán siempre, y sea cual fuese nuestra conducta, y nuestro gobierno, la absoluta independencia o la guerra es el sólo arbitrio que nos dejan a escoger.⁶

Nonetheless, the plans to send peace commissioners to the Americas progressed. Unfortunately for Spain, the commissioners proved to be too little, too late.

§1. The Peace Commission

In April 1820 the Council of State drew up a set of instructions for the special commissioners.⁷ These stipulated that, on arriving in the Americas, the commissioners were to form juntas of reliable royalists to discuss the situation in each region, and were to then open negotiations with the insurgent leaders. The commissioners were to offer a cease-fire and an “olvido eterno de lo pasado”, and to obtain oaths of loyalty to the


⁷See the documents related to the selection of the commissioners in AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 1568. See especially Instrucciones reservadas para los comisionados que van . . . a procurar la pacificación de los provincias disidentes de ultramar, [Palace, 15 April 1820], AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 1568; and Instrucciones reservadas, 9 June 1820, AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 1569.
Constitution from insurgent leaders. The commissioners were instructed to then begin negotiations over trade restrictions; Spain was prepared to permit trade with other countries, provided certain tariff differentials were maintained. This concession, which would have been welcomed in 1808, was to be entirely ignored during the actual negotiations, and in itself indicates the hopelessly slow pace with which Spain’s governments assimilated new ideas.

The commissioners had been named by early June 1820. Nine were appointed in total; Brigadier José Sartorio and Captain Francisco Espeluis were to go to Venezuela, while Captains Juan Barry and Tomás de Urrechea were to go to New Granada. The arrangements for their support were finalised, and a code for communicating secret reports was devised. Within weeks of being named, however, the commissioners began expressing doubts, and several, including Barry and Urrechea, tried to resign. Barry and Urrechea pointed out that everything they had read about the situation in the Americas suggested that the Americans were committed to independence, yet their instructions made no mention of this. The commissioners were clearly dreading their task; the adjective they used most frequently to refer to their commission was “espinoso”. Moreover, in a foretaste of events to come, prior to departure they were already owed months of back-

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8Selection of commissioners, Cádiz, 17 May 1820, AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 1568.
9Juan Jihat to Minister of Overseas, Palace, 22 June 1820, AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 1568; Ligeros apuntes en el expediente sobre . . . los comisionados . . . n.d., AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 1569; Juan Barry to Antonio Porcel, Cádiz, 25 August 1820; AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 668.
10Juan Barry and Tomás de Urrechea to Antonio Porcel, Cádiz, 13 October 1820, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 668.
salary. They were eventually persuaded to leave Cádiz, and set sail on 11 November 1820.

By the time the commissioners arrived in Caracas, events had left them behind. Morillo had already opened negotiations with Bolívar, and an armistice had been arranged, which will be considered in §2. The commissioners nonetheless soldiered on, although they still had not been paid. The commissioners destined to New Granada decided to remain in Venezuela, and Barry and Urrechea wrote to Bolívar to explain their presence. No answer was immediately forthcoming. Urrechea meanwhile fell ill and returned to Seville. Barry, Sartorio and another officer were eventually granted an audience with two Colombian officials, who politely rejected all of the Spaniards' proposals. Barry and Sartorio, disillusioned, informed the government that their commission was entirely pointless, and requested permission to return to Spain.

Far from being permitted to return to Spain, the government decided to keep the commissioners in the Americas, as part of a

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11José Sartorio to Minister of Overseas, Caracas, 26 April 1821, AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 1571; Juan Barry to Minister of Overseas, Caracas, 26 April 1821, AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 1571; Juan Barry to Minister of Overseas, Puerto Cabello, 30 May 1821, AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 1569; Juan Barry to Minister of Overseas, Puerto Cabello, 27 June 1821, AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 1569; and Juan Barry to Minister of Overseas, Puerto Cabello, 19 September 1821, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 668.
12Juan Barry and Tomás to Urrechea to Simón Bolívar, Caracas, 25 December 1820, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 668.
13Tomás de Urrechea to Miguel de la Torre, Caracas, 23 February 1821, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8719, doc. 83; Tomás de Urrechea to Minister of Overseas, Seville, 23 June 1821, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 668.
14Juan Barry to Minister of Overseas, Puerto Cabello, 27 July 1821, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 668.
15José Sartorio to Minister of Overseas, Puerto Cabello, 19 November 1821, AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 1569 (also AGI, Audiencia de Caracas, legajo 55, doc. 26); and Juan Barry to Minister of Overseas, Puerto Cabello, 21 November 1821, AGI, Audiencia de Caracas, legajo 55, doc. 36.
new commission established in 1821. (Espelius was permitted to accompany the republican peace commissioners to Spain in 1821.16) It was admitted that Spain had not been kind to its agents. The Cortes acknowledged that the 1820 commissioners had still received no pay, and "se sostienen en Puerto Cabello con la ración de un soldado, sin un real".17 The Cortes nonetheless insisted that the commissioners had a purpose, and drew up new orders for negotiations in 1821, 1822 and 1823. The commissioners themselves were not so sure. When, in 1821, Sartorio heard a rumour that another large military expedition was being organised to reconquer Mexico, under the command of the Conde de Abisbal, the disillusioned commissioner suggested, "lo mejor será dejar quietos los 11,500 hombres en Cádiz, o donde sea, [y] al Conde en Madrid, o donde fuese".18 Barry and Sartorio were kept in the Americas, lamenting their fate and accomplishing nothing, until 1824, when the restored Ferdinand cancelled the credentials of all "so-called commissioners" who asserted that Spain was about to recognise the independence of America and recalled them to Spain.19

17 Dictamen de la comisión de Cortes, 1821, AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 1569.
18 José Sartorio to Miguel de la Torre, Puerto Cabello, 23 December 1821, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8719.
See the pathetic letters of Juan Barry and José Sartorio from 1822-1824 in AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 1571.
§2. The Armistice of 1820

The peregrinations of the special commissioners might be taken as a metaphor for Spain’s futile efforts to restore peace in the Viceroyalty of New Granada. They came too late, had too little authority, and were unsure about the merits of their own mission. Moreover, they moved at the margins. While the commissioners were still in Cádiz, serious negotiations were already underway in Venezuela. At the same time as the special commission was being dreamed up, Ferdinand ordered Morillo to open direct negotiations with the insurgents, and, by June 1820, a special Junta de Conciliación had been established in Caracas. Morillo, responding to Ferdinand’s order, informed the republican commanders that he was instituting a unilateral cease-fire for the period of one month.\(^{20}\) He also appointed his own commissioners to negotiate with Bolívar and the republican Congress established in Guayana. Tomás de Cires and José Domingo Duarte were to negotiate with the Congress, while Francisco González de Linares and Ramón Correa were named to talk with Bolívar himself. Miguel de la Torre and Gabriel de Torres also began direct negotiations with Bolívar. Morillo was from the start sceptical about the likelihood of success, confiding to La Torre his belief that the republicans would accept nothing short of full independence.\(^{21}\)

\(^{20}\)The documents related to this announcement may be found in Rodríguez Villa, *Pablo Morillo*, vol. 4, pp. 258-268, 275-276. Duplicate documents may also be found in AHNM, Estado, legajo 8719, docs. 1-7; and additional material is contained in AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 1568. Some of the acts of the Junta de Conciliación are located in AHNM, Estado, legajo 8733, doc. 24. The junta’s records reveal that it took a very dim view of Blacks, *castas*, and insurgents in general.

\(^{21}\)Pablo Morillo to Miguel de la Torre, Valencia, 27 July 1820, and 19 August 1820, BRAH, Colección Morillo, sig. 9/7664 (legajo 21), ff. 276-278, 181-183. See also Pablo Morillo to Minister of Overseas, Valencia, 26 July 1820, AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 1568.
Preliminary contacts began in July 1820. Approaches were made to Simón Bolívar, José Antonio Páez, Mariano Montilla, and the Congress of Angostura, in Guayana. In their initial approach, the various commissioners asked that the republicans accept the Constitution of 1812, and suggested that an armistice be arranged. One prominent Neogranadan republican did believe that reunion with Spain under the constitutional system was possible. The great prócer Antonio Nariño allegedly told the Spanish ambassador to England that “si por el sólo fuera, en la misma tarde en que se hablaba, firmaría la sumisión de su país al rey bajo el sistema constitucional”. He added, however, that most people in America did not share his views, and that “primero se sujetarían los insurgentes al dominio de los moros, que al de los españoles”. Nariño’s prediction of republican uninterest was correct. All republican officials in New Granada flatly refused to accept the Spanish Constitution of 1812. All further objected that the royalists had not even offered to recognise the sovereignty of the Republic of Colombia. Bolívar moreover observed that, as Colombian forces were poised to recapture all of Venezuela and Quito, an armistice was not to their advantage. The Congress in Guayana and José Antonio Páez thus refused to open negotiations or even meet the royalist envoys, as the latter had failed to acknowledge the independence of Colombia. Bolívar, however,

22Duque de Frías to Evaristo Pérez de Castro, London, 23 September 1820, AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 1568.
23José Antonio Páez to Francisco Tomás Morales, San Juan de Payana, 13 July 1820; Fernando de Peñalver to Pablo Morillo, Palace of Soberano Congreso, Nueva Guayana, 13 July 1820; Pablo Morillo to Minister of Overseas, Valencia, 26 July 1820; Declaration of José Sánchez de Ron; and Pablo Morillo to Minister of Overseas, Valencia, 8 September 1820, all in AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 1568. See also O’Leary’s account of the negotiations in Daniel Florencio O’Leary, *Bolívar and the War of Independence*, University of Texas (Austin, 1970), pp. 178-184.
agreed to discuss a cease-fire, and appointed Antonio José Sucre, Pedro Briceño Méndez and José Gabriel Pérez to negotiate for the republicans.24

Despite thus expressing an interest in negotiating, Bolívar continued to manoeuvre his troops, and in the fall of 1820 attacked the royalist Third Division at Bailadores.25 The royalists were forced to withdraw towards Cúcuta, and Bolívar gained control of most of Maracaibo and Barinas Provinces. Furthermore, Bolívar failed to abide by an arrangement to meet the royalist negotiators in San Fernando de Apure. This behaviour enraged royalist negotiators, who had journeyed needlessly to San Fernando, and also convinced Morillo of the "perfidia de estos enemigos de la Nación Española".26 Negotiations nonetheless continued, and by November 1820 discussions about the armistice began in earnest. The negotiators at last met face to face in

24Simón Bolívar to Pablo Morillo, San Cristóbal, 21 September 1820; Pablo Morillo to Simón Bolívar, San Carlos, 20 October 1820; Simón Bolívar to Pablo Morillo, Trujillo, 26 October 1820; and Poder de Simón Bolívar, Trujillo, 20 November 1820; all in Rodríguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol. 4, pp. 271-272, 278-280, 290-291. A helpful summary of the negotiations may be found in Manifesto que de orden de la junta de conciliación hace don Josef Domingo Díaz . . . sobre lo obrado hasta la conclusión de los tratados de armisticio y regularización de guerra, Caracas, 24 December 1820, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 668. Many of the documents printed in this manifesto and in Rodríguez Villa are also in AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 1568. AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 1017, contains Simón Bolívar’s negotiations with Gabriel de Torres, July-August 1820. For a printed account of the negotiations, see José Manuel Groot, Historia eclesiástica y civil de Nueva Granada, vol. 4, Editorial M. Rivas (Bogotá, 1893), pp. 110-126.

Bolívar also entered into negotiations with Miguel de la Torre over the proposed armistice. See the letters exchanged between Miguel de la Torre and Simón Bolívar, July 1820- April 1821, AHN M, Estado, legajo 8723, docs. 4-24; and in AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 1568.

25See Pablo Morillo to Minister of Overseas, Barquisimeto, 31 October 1820, AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 1568.

26Pablo Morillo to Minister of Overseas, Barquisimeto, 31 October 1820, AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 1568. Bolívar had never intended to keep the appointment. In September 1820 he wrote to Santander that “the aim I had in view was to draw his attention away to San Fernando while our troops operated to the west”. See Salvador de Madariaga, Bolívar, Hollis and Carter (London, 1952), p. 380.
Trujillo in late November.\textsuperscript{27} There was some difficulty in agreeing to the length of the proposed armistice, but the real sticking point of the negotiations proved to be the demarcation of boundaries between the two forces. Discussions occupied several days of intense negotiation. Finally, on 25 November 1820, an accord was reached.\textsuperscript{28}

The accord granted many of the republican demands. Bolívar was referred to as the president of Colombia, not as the president of the Congress in Angostura, which had been the preferred (and inaccurate) Spanish formula.\textsuperscript{29} The length of the armistice was to be six months, not the year proposed by the Spanish. The terms for the exchange of prisoners classified spies as prisoners of war, contrary to Morillo’s wishes.\textsuperscript{30} However, a compromise was reached on the demarcation of limits. On the eastern border a slight variation of the royalist proposal was used, while on the western border the republican option was followed. Royalist territory thus included Caracas and the surrounding region bordered by the Unare, Guanape, Orinoco, Apure and Santo Domingo Rivers. At the same time, both sides agreed to a regularisation of the war, which stipulated that prisoners were to be exchanged, rather than killed, and that the war would be

\textsuperscript{27}Many documents related to the negotiations may be found in Rodríguez Villa, \textit{Pablo Morillo}, vol. 4, # 870, pp. 292-301, # 872, pp. 302-309. See also Francisco González de Linares to Pablo Morillo, Trujillo, 23 November 1820, Rodríguez Villa, \textit{Pablo Morillo}, vol. 4, p. 310.


\textsuperscript{29}In his private correspondence Morillo had been referring to the ‘Gobierno de Colombia’ for over five months. See, for example, Pablo Morillo to Vicente Sánchez Lima, Valencia, 22 June 1820, BRAH, Colección Morillo, sig. 9/7664 (legajo 21), ff. 5-6.

\textsuperscript{30}See Pablo Morillo to Minister of Overseas, Puerto Cabello, 16 December 1820, AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 1569.
conducted “como la hacen los pueblos civilizados”. Bolívar privately described the armistice as highly advantageous to the republic, and added, somewhat mendaciously, that the treaty “honours us greatly, for we proposed it”.

Despite the concessions made by Spain, Morillo was moderately pleased with the result, and even expressed the wish to meet Bolivar in person. This was arranged, and on 27 November 1820 Morillo and Bolívar met in the town of Santa Ana. The meeting was an emotional one, and both participants left written records. Morillo recorded that

No es posible dar una idea de las diferentes emociones, de la sensibilidad, de la franqueza, sinceridad y nobleza con que SS.EE. manifestaban de mil maneras la satisfacción de que gozaban en aquel momento, en que . . . se veían por la primera vez los que estaban antes destinados a un mutuo exterminio, no sólo como hombres, sino como amigos.

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31 See the copy of the armistice with the treaty regularising the war, printed in the Gaceta de Caracas, no. 19, 6 December 1820, AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 1568. Other copies may be found in AHN, Estado, legajo 8717, docs 5, 7.
33 Morillo’s description of his meeting with Bolívar. Rodríguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol. 4, pp. 320-323. Rodríguez Villa does not attribute this description to Morillo himself, but it is undoubtedly drawn for the autobiographical memoir begun by Morillo and preserved in the Biblioteca de la Real Academia de Historia in Madrid. Rodríguez Villa based his study of Morillo on documents in this library, and the style of this account accords entirely with the style of the other autobiographical fragments I have encountered in the library.

See also Morillo’s account of the meeting given in Groot, Historia eclesiástica, vol. 4, p. 134.
Bolívar too was enthusiastic about the meeting. In a letter to Santander he described both Morillo and La Torre as likeable and honest men, adding that the royalist negotiator Ramón Correa was “without question the best man who treads this earth”. Bolívar further recorded that:

... A report is being drawn up of what passed at our interview, which is certain to amaze and astonish even our friends. From Morillo down, the Spaniards vied with each other in the courtesies that they showed up and in their protestations of friendship. Their praise for our determination and for the valor that has distinguished the Colombians, their repeated toasts to the Army of Liberation, in short, all the manifestations of their desire for Colombian and Spanish friendship and of deep regret for past tragedies resulting from the strong feelings on either side, cost me a few tears and inspired in me a warmth of feeling toward more than one of them.

There were many courteous and clever toasts, but I was most pleased with those of Colonel [Juan] Tello and General La Torre. The former drank “to the victories of Boyacá, that brought freedom for Colombia”; and the latter “to the Colombians and the Spaniards, who side by side will march through Hell itself, if necessary, against despots and tyrants”. Morillo, among many other exuberant and liberal sentiments, toasted “the heroes who died fighting for their country and their country’s freedom.” Indeed, it would take a volume to record the toasts that were offered, for, as I have indicated, each Spaniard contended for the honour of eulogising us. We responded to their courtesies in kind.
with full measure and due modesty, to their complete satisfaction. . . Since this interview, it no longer seems proper to write against these gentlemen in our public prints. I have so proposed, and we must comply.\footnote{Simón Bolívar to Francisco de Paula Santander, Trujillo, 29 November 1820, in \textit{Selected Writings of Bolívar}, vol. 1, pp. 244-247.}

Shortly after this happy event, Morillo returned to Spain, handing on the post of commander-in-chief of the royalist army to Miguel de La Torre. In Spain, Morillo developed an amicable friendship with his erstwhile opponents, even describing the republican Generals Soublette and O’Leary as “buenos amigos y camaradas”.\footnote{Pablo Morillo to Francisco Martínez de la Rosa, La Coruña, 24 March 1834, AGI, Estado, legajo 69, Doc. 60. Morillo further assisted General O’Leary in writing his great biography of Bolívar. See O’Leary, \textit{Bolívar}, pp. xvi, 187.}

News of the armistice was greeted with joy in much of Venezuela. The royalist governor of Maracaibo, for example, reported in early December 1820 that everyone was delighted with the settlement.\footnote{Francisco Delgado to Pablo Morillo, Maracaibo, 6 December 1820, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8719, doc. 14.}

Disagreements, however, continued to arise. A particular source of difficulty concerned the question of whether particular cities could change sides. Maracaibo, for example, was included in royalist territory under the armistice, but in February 1821 a republican uprising occurred in the city. The royalists demanded that the city remain in Spanish hands, and hinted that the republican leadership had fomented the unrest. Bolívar, for his part, insisted that the uprising had been spontaneous, and maintained that there was no reason to return the city to the Spanish if its inhabitants had chosen to join Colombia.\footnote{See Simón Bolívar to Miguel de la Torre, Cúcuta, 19 February 1821, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8723, doc. 18; and also Justo Briceño to Manuel Landa, Santa Marta, 22 December 1820, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8723, doc. 38, for similar.
the republican side of the border, were allegedly heartbroken to be consigned to the Republic of Colombia. Antonio Van Halen, a royalist officer who was escorted through Trujillo in early 1821, reported that during his visit there:

Varios vecinos entre ellos algunos alcaldes, me manifestaron en los pocos momentos en que me dejaba solo el ayudante del General Urdaneta que me acompañaba, el grado de vejación en que estaban aquellos pueblos, el efecto del despotismo militar que sufrían y los deseos de que nosotros volvieramos a ocupar aquel país, libertándoles de aquellos pícaros (estas eran sus expresiones) y más de una vez con exclamaciones y lágrimas me han dicho ¿Será la España tan cruel que nos abandonará?38

Bolívar, meanwhile, arranged to send his own commissioners (José Revenga and José Echeverría) to Spain, and in early 1821 began discussing his conditions for extending the armistice beyond the initial six months. Miguel de la Torre, now leading the royalist forces, rejected Bolivar’s demand that the Spanish surrender much of the territory granted to them under the 1820 armistice, and in April 1821 discussions were suspended.39 Armed confrontations resumed, and, on 14 May 1821, Caracas fell to the republicans. Then, on 24 June 1821, Bolívar defeated the remaining royalist forces in Venezuela at the second battle of

problems in New Granada. See also Pablo Morillo to Minister of War, Caracas, 30 September 1820, Rodríguez Villa, Pablo Morillo, vol. 4, pp. 234-235, for remarks about republican sympathisers in Maracaibo.

38Antonio Van-Halcn to Miguel de la Torre, Caracas, March 1821, enclosed in Miguel de la Torre to Minister of Overseas, Caracas, 22 March 1821, AGI, Audiencia de Caracas, legajo 55, doc. 19.

39See the negotiations between Miguel de la Torre and Simón Bolívar in AHNMC, Estado, legajo 8723, docs. 23, 24ff; and Actos de la Junta de Conciliación de Venezuela, 1821, AHNMC, Estado, legajo 8733, doc. 24. See also Simón Bolívar to Fernando Peñalver, Barinas, 21 April 1821, Selected Writings of Bolívar, vol. 1, pp. 262-263.
Carabobo, virtually eliminating the royalists from the military scene in Venezuela. Survivors fled to Puerto Cabello, which held out for a further four and a half months.

Meanwhile, Spain attempted various last-minute bureaucratic reshuffles of colonial officials. To begin with, a new viceroy had been named for New Granada. On 9 September 1820, following Sánano’s resignation, Alejandro Hore, the commander general of Panama, had been named viceroy; he never held office, however, as he had in fact died two months earlier.\(^40\) Juan de la Cruz Mourgeon was then appointed to replace him.\(^41\) Cruz Mourgeon arrived in the midst of disaster. The entire royalist army in Venezuela was by this time reduced to 3,000 men, trapped in Puerto Cabello with Miguel de la Torre as a result of Bolívar’s victory at Carabobo. Like the peace commissioners Barry and Sartorio, who were also stuck in Puerto Cabello, the new viceroy insisted that his presence in the besieged city was entirely pointless, and took the first opportunity to retreat to Jamaica, from where he tried unsuccessfully to assemble an army.\(^42\) Then, in August 1822, General La Torre surrendered command of the remaining royalist troops to Francisco Tomás Morales. La Torre moved to Puerto Rico to take up the post of captain general of the island. Soon after arriving, he wrote a passionate denunciation of Morales, whom he condemned as a bloodthirsty tyrant. All chance of reconquering Venezuela was destroyed, he asserted, with the

\(^{40}\)Minister of War to Minister of Overseas, Palace, 9 September 1820, AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 1568; and Manuel de Urriola to Juan Sánano, Panama, 9 July 1820, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 742.

\(^{41}\)Order by Ferdinand, San Lorenzo, 31 October 1820, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 714A.

\(^{42}\)See Juan de la Cruz Mourgeon to Minister of Overseas, Puerto Cabello, 5 July 1821, AGI, Audiencia de Caracas, legajo 55; and Juan de la Cruz Mourgeon to Captain General of Cuba, Kingston, 7 August 1821, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 668.
appointment of Morales as commander in chief. Of course, there was by this stage little hope of reconquering Venezuela, with or without Morales.

§3. The Surrender of Cartagena

¿No es cosa bien resalada, y que a todos desatina
ver virgen nuestra Marina
y la plaza bloqueada?

Ella piensa no hacer nada
según demuestra y yo infiero
pués por poner un guerrero
para manegar la armada
hicieron la gran Cagada
de ponernos un Cordero.
[Manuel Cordero led Cartagena's navy]

La marina no es culpada
según lo dice milor
ni ninguno es comprendido
sino es el Gobernador

Su señoría no admitió
haciendo una gran Cagada
para que se este diciendo
que es cosa bien resalada.

As the pasquinade suggests, Cartagena was under blockade while the armistice negotiations were going on. Riohacha had already surrendered to Luis Brion in March 1820, and throughout May, June and July fighting had occurred in the villages surrounding Cartagena and in the bay. By 7 July 1820, the last

43Miguel de la Torre to Minister of Overseas, Puerto Rico, 16 September 1822, AGI, Audiencia de Caracas, legajo 55.
44Sacta, Cartagena, 1820, AGI, Pasquines y Loas, legajo 9 (underlinings as in the original). See also Complaints about Manuel Cordero, Cartagena, 9 June 1821, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 719B.
45For the fall of Riohacha, see Mariano Montilla to Francisco de Paula Santander, Riohacha, 22 March 1820; and other related documents, all in
Spanish outposts in the towns of Santa Rosa, Ternera and Turbaco returned to the city, defeated by the insurgents. Then, on 9-10 July 1820, naval forces, led by Luis Brion, and republican infantry under Mariano Montilla surrounded Cartagena and began a slow but effective strangulation of the city.\textsuperscript{46}

Even before the official start of the siege, lack of food had obliged Governor Torres to order all ‘bocas inútiles’ to leave the city.\textsuperscript{47} The Audiencia chose to leave as well, and its remaining members established themselves in Jamaica.\textsuperscript{48} The city’s government was in a continual state of crisis throughout the siege, and constant efforts at increasing the city’s supply of food were necessary.\textsuperscript{49} Lack of food, poor weather, and exhaustion soon reduced the royalist garrison to a mere 630 men fit for active service, plus an additional 550-man “volunteer” militia. The remaining 500 members of the garrison were incapacitated by ill health. Governor Torres was unable to determine precisely how many men the republicans had, as his spies inevitably deserted or were captured, but he estimated that the troops on land

\textsuperscript{46}See First declaration of Gabriel de Torres, Proceso contra Gabriel de Torres, Havana, 2 November 1824, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 2136A; Gabriel de Torres to Pedro Ruiz de Porras, Cartagena, 8 July 1820, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 709; and Francisco Warleta to Juan Sámano, Barranca, 9 June 1820, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 713B.

\textsuperscript{47}See Bando de Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 4 July 1820; Bando de Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 5 July 1820; and repeated order of 17 April 1821, all in AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 717; and various Bandos of Torres from July 1820 to April 1821, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 2136C.

\textsuperscript{48}Francisco de Mosquera to Minister of State, Kingston, 15 August 1820, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 665.

\textsuperscript{49}See, for example, the documents about Cartagena’s food supply in AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 715; Gabriel de Torres to Alejandro Ramírez, Cartagena, 19 August 1820; and Proclama de Gabriel de Torres, Cartagena, 13 September 1820; both in AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 714.
numbered perhaps 1,700. These numbers increased steadily as republican victories elsewhere freed men to join the blockade. Torres calculated that, by September 1821, republican forces had grown to over 4,000. By this time the total royalist force consisted in only 732 troops, many of whom were ill and unfit for service.\textsuperscript{50}

Meanwhile, Santa Marta fell to the republicans. It was captured by Luis Brion after a simultaneous naval and terrestrial attack on 11 November 1820.\textsuperscript{51} Governor Pedro Ruiz de Porras fled, and the surviving royalists regathered in Ríohacha, virtually the only remaining royalist holdout on the coast, with the exception of Cartagena.\textsuperscript{52}

The signing of the armistice in Venezuela, news of which reached Cartagena in late 1820, did not much alter the situation. Governor Torres had already been engaged in unsatisfying negotiations with the besieging insurgents since August 1820.\textsuperscript{53} (Torres was extremely unenthusiastic about the discussions, informing Morillo that he had entered into negotiations “por pura obediencia”.\textsuperscript{54}) Special republican and royalist commissioners

\textsuperscript{50}First declaration of Gabriel de Torres, Proceso contra Gabriel de Torres, Havana. 2 November 1824, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 2136A.
\textsuperscript{51}Miguel de la Torre to Minister of Overseas, Caracas, 21 December 1820, AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 1568.
\textsuperscript{52}See Vicente Sánchez Lima to Miguel José Gómez, Arroyo Cardón, 23 November 1820; Vicente Sánchez Lima to Military commanders in Ríohacha, Moreno, 26 November 1820; Miguel José Gómez to Vicente Sánchez Lima, Arroyo Cardón, 29 November 1820; and Vicente Sánchez Lima to Pablo Morillo, Maracaibo, 8 December 1820; all in AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 1568. Also see AHNM, Estado, legajo 8722, docs. 183-191.
\textsuperscript{53}See negotiations between Gabriel de Torres and Mariano Montilla, July 1820, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 1017.
\textsuperscript{54}Gabriel de Torres to Pablo Morillo, Cartagena, 18 August 1820, and 13 September 1820; both in AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 714; Gabriel de Torres to Minister of Overseas, Cartagena, 22 September 1820, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 1017; and Gabriel de Torres to Interim commander of Panama, Cartagena, 1 October 1820, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 717.
were nonetheless sent to Cartagena to explain the details of the Bolívar-Morillo armistice. As had been the case in Venezuela, in New Granada the major difficulty lay in establishing demarcation lines between the two camps. From December 1820, considerable effort was devoted to negotiating this point. The Spanish in Cartagena were unhappy about surrendering to the republicans any of the small amount of territory remaining in their hands, but they were not in a strong negotiating position.\textsuperscript{55} There was little royalist negotiator Manuel de Landa could do, aside from express disgust over "las proposiciones absurdas, ambiciosas y ofensivas a la dignidad de la monarquía" made by the republican negotiator Justo Briceño about the demarcation.\textsuperscript{56} By February 1821, Landa had given up, and Governor Torres resumed the post of royalist negotiator, much to his own regret.\textsuperscript{57} Despite the ongoing hostilities, efforts were made by both sides to conduct the war within the bounds described by the treaty regularising the war. That is, both sides complained energetically when they felt the

\textsuperscript{55}See discussions about line of demarcation, December 1820, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8719, docs. 9, 12; AHNM, Estado, legajo 8723, doc. 38; (for January-February 1821) AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 709; and Gabriel de Torres to Miguel de la Torre, Cartagena, 8 February 1821, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 714.

\textsuperscript{56}Manuel Landa to Miguel de la Torre, Sasaria, 20 February 1821, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8719, doc. 21. See also the subsequent documents in the same legajo, and also Manuel Landa to Miguel de la Torre, Caracas, 23 March 1821, AGI, Audiencia de Caracas, legajo 55, doc. 20.

Aside from agreeing to the demarcation, both sides had to inform their own forces of the suspension of hostilities. In the months following the suspension, numerous complaints were made over the failure of one or the other side to control their forces. (See Miguel Josef Gómez to Pablo Morillo, Ríohacha, 29 December 1820, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8722; Gabriel de Torres to Manuel Landa, Cartagena, 4 January 1821, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8725, doc. 14; Miguel de la Torre to Miguel José Gómez, Caracas, 24, 29 January 1821, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8722, doc. 183; Justo Briceño to Manuel Landa, Cartagena, 4 January 1821, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8719, doc. 38; Manuel Landa to Justo Briceño, Cartagena, 5 January 1821, AHNM, Estado, legajo 8719, doc. 40)

\textsuperscript{57}Gabriel de Torres to Miguel de la Torre, Cartagena, 8 February 1821, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 714.
other was violating the spirit of the accords. Thus, in May 1821, General Montilla protested vigorously that in a recent proclamation Governor Torres had referred to the republicans as "una horda de hombres sin patria, ley, gobierno, ni religión". Such language was entirely opposed to the spirit of the treaty regularising the war, Montilla observed. Torres' response to this complaint merely enraged the republican further, and communication between the two camps was temporarily suspended.

Meanwhile, republican military advances continued. By May 1821 republican troops controlled all of the bay of Cartagena. In early July 1821 the Castle of Bocachica fell to the republicans. Morale among the royalist troops declined alarmingly, and by the end of August 1821 the prospects for royalist victory were remote. Governor Torres proposed a month-long suspension of hostilities, supposedly to facilitate negotiations. This suggestion was rejected out of hand by the republican leadership, who correctly sensed imminent victory. Then, in early September 1821, Governor Torres began negotiating the capitulation of the only important city in New Granada remaining in royalist hands.

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58 Mariano Montilla to Gabriel de Torres, Turbaco, 29 May 1821, and 8 June 1821; Gabriel de Torres to Mariano Montilla, Cartagena, 23 June 1821; all in AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 709.
59 Gabriel de Torres to Minister of Overseas, Cartagena, 23 May 1821, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 668 (also AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 1568).
60 Surrender of the Castillo de Boca Chica, Turbaco, 7 July 1821, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 709.
61 First declaration of Gabriel de Torres, Proceso contra Gabriel de Torres, Havana, 2 November 1824, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 2136A.
62 Gabriel de Torres to Luis de Rieux, Cartagena, 29 August 1821; and Luis de Rieux to Gabriel de Torres, Turbaco, 31 August 1821, both in AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 717.
63 See the Proposals for the capitulation in AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 717.
the negotiations had been completed, and a generous surrender was arranged.64 The town was not to be sacked, an amnesty was offered to everyone who wanted to remain in the city, and those who did not wish to remain were permitted to leave. Cartagena was evacuated by the royalists on 10 October 1821. Over 1,300 people chose to sail to Havana with the royalist troops.

§ 4. Royalist Guerrillas in Pasto

Following the surrender to Cartagena, the only region of New Granada remaining in royalist hands was the Province of Pasto. Pasto thus became the prime target of republican attack after the fall of Cartagena. The armistice had not been warmly received in the region. In 1821 the Bishop of Popayán had attempted in vain to win support for it, and the republican commissioners charged with explaining the armistice had no success in selling its virtues. Indeed, the commissioners had been forced to flee Pasto under armed escort following a hostile reception. "En fin, por poco me lleva el diablo. Dios quiera sacarme bien de esta comisión," one allegedly exclaimed as he departed.65 The region thus remained entirely anti-republican, and in consequence Bolívar turned his attention to it.

He first attempted to win the supposedly influential Bishop of Popayán (then in residence in Pasto) to the republican cause, but, this at first failing, he prepared to lead a campaign against Pasto in person.66 Reports of the imminent arrival of the dreadful

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64The details of the surrender negotiations are contained in AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 709.
Bolívar sent the city into a flurry of frantic preparations. The army began holding exercises and the city organised a reasonable military force, under the command of Basilio García. García was widely regarded as both cruel and politically inept, but the morale of his troops was reportedly excellent. In April 1822, at Bomboná, these southern royalists were attacked by the republicans, who enjoyed a phryric victory. José María Obando commented that "ambos combatientes perdieron la batalla: [los republicanos] la fuerza, los españoles el campo". The popular classes of Pasto allegedly regarded the battle as a royalist victory. Nonetheless, the royalists were obliged to sue for surrender from Bolívar.

While negotiations were underway, the fate of Pasto's royalists was being decided 200 kilometres to the south. On 22 May 1822, José Antonio de Sucre scored a decisive victory over Melchor Aymerich at the Battle of Pichincha, above Quito. The royalists, however, controlled the roads, and hence the mail, from Quito, and so prevented reports of Sucre's tremendous victory from reaching Bolívar. Pasto's commander García was thus able to negotiate a surrender considerably more favourable than could have been obtained had Bolívar known of the royalists' defeat at Pichincha. The surrender was, however, viewed with hostility.

70 See Simón Bolívar to José de San Martín, 22 June 1822, *Selected Writings of Bolívar*, vol. 1, p. 52.
by many Pastusos, who were adverse to negotiations, and some of whom regarded the purported cause of the surrender, the Battle of Bomboná, as a royalist victory. The surrender appears to have caused a split in the Pastuso population. Indeed, from this point on, royalism became a primarily lower-class cause in Pasto. A series of royalist guerrillas attempted to rally support for the king, but these were invariably suppressed by the gente decente of Pasto itself.

The most important such uprising began in July 1822, when Benito Boves, a would-be imitator of the erstwhile terror of Venezuela, attempted to lead a royalist revolt in Pasto. Benito Boves (who was in fact a relative of José Tomás) was joined by Agustín Agualongo, a low-ranking Indian royalist officer, and together they led a lengthy but doomed resistance to republicanism. Boves and Agualongo, backed by a few wealthy Pastusos, for a time enjoyed considerable success. For several months Boves and Agualongo, commanding some 1,000 men (mostly royalist soldiers, Indians and labourers), controlled much of the province of Los Pastos, collecting weapons in small raids and interfering with the republicans' communications. In December 1822, however, Field Marshall Sucre marched toward Pasto, and after suffering an initial defeat in the hands of the Pastusos, recaptured the city after a terrible battle. Some 400 non-combatants (roughly 5% of the city's population) are reported

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72 See Francisco Zuluaga, José María Obando: de soldado realista a caudillo republicano, Biblioteca Banco Popular (Bogotá, 1985), p. 57.
to have been killed in the attack, which lasted several days.74
Following the battle Sucre exiled 1,300 royalists, many of whom
died while en route to Quito.75

Following the fall of Pasto to the republicans, Boves fled,
Agualongo went into hiding, and support for the royalists tailed
off dramatically.76 Agualongo, however, rallied, and led another
uprising in June 1823.77 Accompanied by some 600 Indian troops
armed with sticks and machetes, he captured Pasto, prompting
Bolívar to issue a proclamation announcing: “¡Quiteños! La infame
Pasto ha vuelto a levantar su odiosa cabeza de sedición, pero esta
cabeza quedará cortada para siempre... Esta vez será la última en
la vida de Pasto; desaparecerá del catálogo de los pueblos si sus
viles moradores no rinden sus armas a Colombia antes de disparar
un tiro”.78 Santander, by then president of the Republic of
Colombia, offered to send a delegation to Pasto to negotiate a
peaceful return to republicanism. He observed, “A fin debemos
triunfar nosotros, porque somos más y tenemos infinitos recursos.
¿Y qué ganarán ustedes de morir peleando, o... huyendo por las
montañas?... ¿Le dará recompensa el Rey de España?”.79
Santander met with no success in his attempt at negotiation, but
the royalist rebels were nonetheless expelled from Pasto.

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76For details about Agualongo, see Ortiz, *Agustín Agualongo*.
77See O’Leary, *Bolívar*, p. 223; and Simón Bolívar to José Antonio Sucre, 21 June 1823, in *Selected Writings of Bolívar*, vol. 1, p. 382.
Agualongo enjoyed a few more victories, and even succeeded in reoccupying Pasto for a third time, but in mid-1824 he was captured, taken to Popayán, and shot, reportedly crying "¡viva el rey!" as he died.80

After Sucre's victory over the royalists at Ayacucho on 8 December 1824, Spain's war in South America effectively ended. In New Granada, the royalist war effort was reduced entirely to bands of Indians and castas who roamed southern New Granada, ambushing groups of republican soldiers and committing acts of banditry.81 In Pasto, in particular, a number of royalist facciosos continued the attempt to drive the republicans out of the province. In 1824 there were reportedly over 2,000 such guerrilla fighters.82 Many guerrilla bands consisted of little more than a handful of men armed with a few rifles, but some of their members did have considerable military experience. In 1825, for example, a royalist guerrilla from the Patía named Pedro Galindez was captured by the republicans.83 Galindez, who was 22, was found to have served under five different royalist guerrilla leaders, including the famous Agualongo. Few of these

81 See Eduardo Pérez, Guerra irregular en la independencia de la Nueva Granada y Venezuela, 1810-1830, Publicaciones de la Universidad Pedagógica y Tecnológica de Colombia (Tunja, 1982), p. 337; Edgar Bastidas Urresty, Las guerras de Pasto, Ediciones Testimonio (Pasto, 1979), pp. 102-104; and Reports on Bandits, ACC, Independencia JI-15c, sig. 6099.
82 See Obando, Apuntamientos, vol. 1, p. 77-81; H.M. Wood to George Canning, Popayán, 30 June 1825; 12 August 1825; and 14 September 1825; all in PRO, F.O. 18/21, fols. 86-91, 98-100, 101-102, respectively; Report on unrest in Pasto, Quito, 21 September 1824; and List of executed royalist cabecillas; both in AHNC, Secretaría de Guerra y Marina, tomo 47, fols. 153, 155.
83 See Interrogation of Pedro Galindez, September 1825, ACC, Independencia MI-3j, sig. 4202.
desafectados, however, achieved anything approaching Agualongo’s degree of success. Royalism was acknowledged to be a lost cause by all but a minority of Indians and castas. The British Consul H.M. Wood commented on this fact, remarking that, "[They] who so late as 1822 were zealous supporters of the government of Spain, are now seen voluntarily bearing arms in support of Colombia, and gratuitously devoting their time to her service". Spain’s view of the war had been stood on its head. It was not independence which was supported only by the quixotic, the disloyal and the marginalised. It was royalism.

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84 H.M. Wood to George Canning, Popayán, 12 August 1825, PRO, F.O. 18/21, fols. 98-100.
Chapter 13: Spain and the Loss of New Granada

Spain’s surrender of Cartagena in October 1821 was followed by a pro-republican uprising in Panama in November 1821, which forced the royalists to withdraw from the Isthmus. Then, in May 1822, Sucre’s victory at the Battle of Pichincha ended Spanish control of southern New Granada. Bolívar and Páez’s defeat of royalist forces at Carabobo in June 1821 had already cleared Venezuela of a meaningful Spanish presence. Thus the war with Spain was effectively over by the end of 1821. The war at home, however, continued. As we saw in the previous chapter, the republicans faced a series of revolts and continued guerrilla warfare in various parts of the former viceroyalty, most particularly in the south. Annoying guerrilla war was not the only problem faced by the new republic. Creating a functional alternative to Spanish rule was perhaps the most pressing challenge to Colombia’s republican leaders, although this was far from being the most important task faced by most Colombians. For the majority, the principal occupations remained what they had always been: agricultural pursuits, local commerce and other activities of subsistence.

Much thought had already gone into question of constructing an independent state. Some members of the viceroyalty’s creole elite had perhaps been considering the most appropriate form of government for a hypothetically independent New Granada even before the outbreak of war in 1810, and the experiences of the First Republic had provided clear illustrations of the dangers to be
avoided. Thus the outlines of Colombia’s new government sketched at the Congress of Angostura in 1819 cannot be called a preliminary draft. The proposals were, however, extremely cursory. The Congress of Angostura proclaimed the unity of Venezuela, Colombia, and Quito, and proposed a presidential system, with separate vice-presidents governing Colombia and Venezuela. Much was left unspecified. In 1821, another constitutional congress was held in Cúcuta, and it was there that the details were filled in. The Constitution of Cúcuta confirmed the basic form given to the new government at Angostura. A centralised government was accepted, although in practice the division between the three units of the former colony were not eliminated. A number of other alterations were also introduced. Most importantly, the Constitution enshrined a law of free birth, liberating all slaves born in the future once they had reached a set age. Indian resguardos were also abolished, and various changes were made to the fiscal system as well. As the Spanish liberals had done in 1812, the delegates in 1821 abolished the Indian tribute, although they, like the Spanish, would chose to reinstate it when confronted with the fiscal consequences of abolition. No attempt was made to eliminate the tobacco monopoly, but the alcabala was ended, and the role of the church was somewhat limited. The man elected to oversee these policies in Colombia

1See Anthony McFarlane, Colombia before Independence, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 283-284, for information on colonial advocates of independence.

2The remarks which follow on the Congress of Cúcuta and Santander’s government are drawn from David Bushnell, The Making of Modern Colombia: A Nation in Spite of Itself, University of California Press (Berkeley, 1993). Further information may be found in David Bushnell, The Santander Regime in Gran Colombia, Greenwood Press (Westport, 1970).
was Francisco de Paula Santander, the country’s first vice-

president.

Santander was presented with a number of challenges
during his years in office. Among the more substantial were the
difficulties that arose in maintaining the unity of Gran Colombia.
This was in the end to prove impossible. In Venezuela, hostility
towards Colombia in general, and Santander in particular, led to
increasing demands for separation from Bogotá, which culminated
in revolt. When Venezuelan General José Antonio Páez was
summoned to Bogotá to stand trial for abuse of power, he instead
rose in rebellion.³ This initial move at separation was quelled, but
only temporarily. In 1829, Páez again rebelled; by 1830,
Venezuela was a separate country. Meanwhile, in Pasto, local
caudillo José María Obando began patiently to build up support for
an insurrection against the dictatorship of Bolívar, which began in
October 1828.⁴ This rebellion ended in Obando’s surrender in
December 1828, but proved to be but the first in a series of
revolts in the south.

Further complicating matters was the attempt by Juan José
Flores to separate the old presidency of Quito from Colombia. His
proposed new state of Ecuador was to include the Provinces of
Pasto and Popayán as well. The ensuing war was ended in 1831,
but the question of Colombia’s southern border was far from
resolved. There were almost immediate complaints that Ecuador

³For material on Páez, see John Lynch, Caudillos in Spanish America, 1800-
⁴For information about Obando, López, and their activities, see Francisco
Zuluaga, José María Obando: de soldado realista a caudillo republicano,
Biblioteca Banco Popular, (Bogotá, 1985); José María Obando, Apuntaminetos
para la historia, Editorial ABC (Bogotá, 1945); and José Hilario López,
Memorias, vol. i, Biblioteca Popular de Cultura Colombiana, Editorial ABC
(Bogotá, 1942).
was not respecting the agreed boundary, and border conflicts with Ecuador arose both in the 1840s during the Guerra de los Conventos/Supremos, and in 1860, during an uprising engineered by Tomás Cipriano de Mosquera.

Colombia, then, faced serious challenges from the moment of its birth. Moreover, in many ways life in the Republic of Colombia was little different from life in the old viceroyalty. Several historians have observed that the net effect of the war of independence was extremely limited in Colombia. The war did not bring any great reordering of society, and it was some decades before the economic possibilities of independence were acted upon. Yet, while many aspects of Colombian society remained unaltered, one fundamental change had occurred: Colombia was no longer a Spanish colony. Perhaps, as David Bushnell claims, Colombia was not yet a nation, but it was undoubtedly not a colony of Spain. This change, however, was not at all visible from Madrid. Indeed, while Colombia was launching itself into the difficult arena of nationhood, a very different process was discernible from Spain’s vantage point. Far from acknowledging the separation of its former colony, Spain’s governments refused even to recognise that Colombia was independent, much less that it had a moderately successful government and was not in a state of utter anarchy. We began this thesis with an examination of the events in Spain which triggered New Granada’s War of Independence. We will now end by exploring the legacy of the war in Spain itself.

§1. Spain and the Loss of America

No great outcry from the Spanish public greeted the fall of royalist New Granada. On the contrary, the wars of independence in the Americas had never aroused a great level of interest among Spaniards, nor did interest in the former colonies revive substantially after their loss. When the final defeat came at the battle of Ayacucho in December 1824, the reaction in Spain was muted. Contemporary newspapers scarcely mentioned the event. Indeed, the historian Melchor Fernández Almagro has asserted that most of his contemporaries would claim Spain lost its colonies in 1898 after the war with the United States, not in the 1820s. Overall, he stated, the loss of the Americas made but a faint impression on Spanish consciousness. However, while the loss of their colonies did not propel Spaniards into deep, collective soul searching, there were repercussions in Spain. Newspapers continued to insist on the importance of the American question, even if they did not recognise the extent to which it had already been settled, and a number of participants in the war published memoirs of their experiences. Moreover, during the 1820s

Spain’s governments were forced to confront the failure they had sown in America.

The most immediate reactions to the royalist defeats occurred, as might have been expected, within the military itself. We have seen that there were many officers who believed the war in New Granada was unwinnable, but not all were prepared to accept the end when it came. The surrender of Cartagena to the republican Montilla in 1821, which signalled the effective loss of New Granada, became the focus of discontent. The circumstances surrounding the surrender had attracted immediate attention, and criticism was soon directed at Governor Torres for his handling of it. Principally, critics objected that Torres had begun negotiations with the republicans prematurely, and that the city had surrendered earlier than was necessary. In particular, attention was drawn to the fact that, at the time of the surrender, the city’s food supplies had been sufficient for two more months. The real motive for this criticism, however, lay elsewhere. The surrender of Cartagena had been a blow to royalist hopes for New Granada, and there were those who could not accept that Spain had lost the war. In blaming Governor Torres for the surrender of Cartagena, critics were denying that the loss was inevitable. If the surrender had been premature or unnecessary, then perhaps royalism was not a dead letter in New Granada.

In order to refute these charges of poor leadership, Torres himself demanded that the case be tried by court-martial. This was agreed, and the trial began in September 1824, some three years after Cartagena’s surrender.9 The investigations lasted over

9The investigation against Torres filled four volumes of correspondence. See the Proceso contra Gabriel de Torres, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajos 2136A, 2136B, 2136C, 2136D.
two years. On 13 November 1826 a final verdict was at last given. The nine members of the tribunal concluded that Torres was innocent of wrongdoing. Three judges censured some of Torres’ actions, but all save one agreed that the surrender had been necessary and correct. As Brigadier Rafael Arze noted, the “ninguna esperanza” of surviving the blockade entirely justified the evacuation. The court-martial had thus been a trial not merely of Torres’ behaviour, but also of the viability of royalist resistance. The verdict of not guilty was a concession of defeat. The trial, however, did not lay to rest the ghosts of a betrayed royalist victory. While Torres’ trial was underway, the Spanish Council of State considered court-marshalling the officers involved in the defeat at Ayacucho.

Although the Council of State suspected royalist officers, especially liberal officers, of selling out to the republicans, many officers were themselves unwilling to accept the finality of the loss of America. Miguel de la Torre, for example, who had been appointed Captain General of Puerto Rico after his resignation as commander of the Expeditionary Army in 1822, remained ready to launch a reconquest of the mainland throughout most of the fifteen years he spent in Puerto Rico. He allegedly believed that he and the royalists émigrés who surrounded him would return in triumph to Venezuela.

10See votes in Proceso contra Gabriel de Torres, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 2136B.
11The planned court-martial was motivated by the suspicion that Spanish officer had agreed to capitulate before the battle was begun. See Salvador de Madariaga, Bolívar, Hollis and Carter (London, 1952), pp. 487-490; Costeloe, *Response to Revolution*, p. 115, and Fernández Almagro, *La emancipación de América*, pp. 132-133, 163-164.
Miguel de la Torre was far from alone in his belief that the Spain would eventually reconquer the Americas. The Spanish government itself took many years to admit that the colonies were irretrievably lost. While a few deputies to the Cortes insisted that Spain face reality, throughout the 1820s the government continued to act as though a royalist victory were possible. Indeed, Spain was unwilling to recognise that it had already been forced to compromise. Although the armistice signed by Morillo and Bolívar in 1820 had referred to the latter as the President of Colombia, in 1821 Spain’s government was still instructing its commissioners to refer to the republicans only as ‘dissidents’, and not as de facto heads of state. Even the decisive republican victory at Ayacucho was referred to in the Gaceta de Madrid as a “revés momentáneo”. Part of the difficulty was Ferdinand’s profound belief that the majority of Americans really wanted to remain Spanish. The king is indeed reported to have wept publicly during a reading of an ode affirming the undying Spanish heritage of the Americas. Ferdinand maintained to his dying day that the Americans would themselves demand a reunion with Spain, once the republican experiment revealed itself to be a failure. This attitude exasperated Spain’s European allies. British diplomats in particular complained about Spain’s obstinate belief that there was “still great attachment on the part

13For an admission that the colonies were lost, see José Moreno de García, Manifiesto a la Nación Española, Cádiz, 16 February 1822, Iris Zavala, Masones, Comuneros y Carbonarios, Siglo XXI (Madrid, 1971), pp. 258-259; and Luis Miguel Enciso Recio, La opinión pública española y la independencia hispanoamericana, 1819-1820, Universidad de Valladolid (Valladolid, 1967), pp. 147-149.
14Dictamen de la comisión de Cortes sobre la pacificación de América, 1821, AGI, Indiferente General, legajo 1569.
15Fernández Almagro, La emancipación de América, pp. 131-132.
16Fernández Almagro, La emancipación de América, pp. 148-149.
of the inhabitants [of Mexico in particular] to the Mother Country".17 This mistaken view led the Spanish to contemplate every type of scheme to recapture the Americas. Throughout the 1820s Spain's governments discussed the launching of military expeditions to Venezuela and elsewhere.18 Various other unlikely plans were also considered. The idea of installing Spanish princes as independent American monarchs was one of the more plausible. An official in Buenos Aires suggested that a reconquest of that region could be effected by a private mercantile company composed of merchants from across Europe, while attempts were made to interest the Rothschilds in funding an expedition.19 These plots found their last expression in the 1829 expedition which attempted unsuccessfully to invade Mexico, under the command of Isidro Barradas. Although Ferdinand continued to believe that the failure of this expedition was due to mismanagement, not flawed aims, no further attacks on Spain's former colonies took place. It was not, however, until the reign of Ferdinand's daughter Isabel II that Spain formally recognised American independence. The first former colony to be recognised was Mexico, whose independence was acknowledged in 1836. Ecuador was recognised in 1840, and Venezuela in 1845.


18See Report by the Council of State, 6 June 1821, AGI, Audiencia de Caracas, legajo 55; Report by ambassador to United States, 1821, AGI, Audiencia de Caracas, legajo 55; Costeloe, Response to Revolution, pp. 93-99; and Fernández Almagro, La emancipación de América, pp. 129-157.

while Colombia had to wait until 1881. The independence of Honduras was not acknowledged until 1895.  

It is one thing to lose a colony; it is another thing to grieve over its loss. Indeed, during the 1820s it became increasingly popular in Spain to claim that the American colonies had in fact been a burden to Spain. The debate over the value of the colonies had already been in full swing in the eighteenth century, and the loss of America proved an additional stimulus. The colonies, it was alleged, had stifled industry and enterprise in the peninsula. They had sapped Spain of its population. Moreover, they had diverted the crown’s attention away from the needs of the peninsula itself. “When all was said and done,” one writer commented in 1821, “what we received from America was venereal disease, yellow fever and the vomit.” Even some merchants asserted that Spain had little to gain from its colonies. The attractions of this thesis to Spaniards who had just lost the majority of their overseas possessions should be obvious.

Not everyone was sanguine about the prospect of losing the colonies. Gabriel de Torres commented in 1820 that while the

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20 For information about Spain’s recognition of its former colonies, see Mark Van Aken, Pan-Hispanism: its Origin and Development to 1866, University of California Press (Berkeley, 1959); William Spence Robertson, “The Recognition of the Spanish Colonies by the Motherland,” *HAHR*, vol. 1 (1918), pp. 70-91; and John Tate Lanning, “Great Britain and Spanish Recognition of the Hispanic American States,” *HAHR*, vol. 10 (1930), pp. 429-456.

For interesting comments on Spanish attitudes towards the former colonies during a later period, see Frederick Pike, *Hispanismo, 1898-1936*, University of Notre Dame Press (Notre Dame, 1971).


original discovery of the colonies had perhaps hindered Spain, “en el día sería su pérdida un golpe mortal para el comercio, agricultura, artes, e industria”.24 Many of Torres’ contemporaries seconded this view. The Spanish ambassador to the United States put it bluntly: “la pérdida de la América será la destrucción de la España”.25 While the ambassador perhaps exaggerated, it is now clear that the loss of the Americas was a dreadful blow to Spain’s overseas commerce.26 Spain’s trade with both the former colonies and the rest of the world shrank drastically after the war. Josep Fontana has shown that, in 1827, Spain’s total foreign trade had fallen by some 75% from its level in 1792.27 Certain American products, such as dye wood, vanished altogether from Spain’s markets, and the American raw materials, such as cotton, needed for Spain’s re-export trade ceased to be freely available. The effect was especially marked on Spain’s great ports, particularly Cádiz. The Spanish ambassador to the United States had in 1821 predicted that, with the loss of America, Cádiz would be reduced to nothingness, and so it nearly was. By 1824, only 20 of the city’s 300 ship-owners remained in business, a third of the merchant companies had gone bankrupt, and the population had been reduced by nearly a half. The other towns of Andalusia experienced proportional declines, while the fishing industry in

24Gabriel de Torres to Minister of Overseas, Cartagena, 22 September 1820, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 1017.
25Report by Spanish Ambassador to United States, 1821, AGI, Audiencia de Caracas, legajo 55. See also Costeloe, Response to Revolution, pp. 167-168; and Fernández Almagro, La emancipación de América, pp. 149-151.
26These remarks on Spain’s economy are drawn primarily from Costeloe, Response to Revolution, pp. 150-170.
271792 was, admittedly, a year of unusually high commercial profit, and so is perhaps a misleading point for comparison. See John Fisher, Trade, War and Revolution: Exports from Spain to Spanish America, 1977-1820, Institute of Latin American Studies Monograph 16, (Liverpool, 1992).
Galicia “languished for lack of trans-atlantic demand”.\textsuperscript{28} Despite its lesser dependence on American trade, Catalonia, too, suffered economically after the war, although losses were perhaps partially compensated for by the reinvestment in Spain of capital withdrawn from the Americas. Overall, it seems that the pessimists, rather than the optimists, were most accurate in their predictions for the future of an America-less Spain.

\section{Displaced Officials}

One further consequence of the loss of America was that virtually the entire Spanish colonial bureaucracy became redundant. During the 1820s large numbers of “cesantes”, or unemployed officials, returned to Spain from New Granada, Mexico, Central America, Peru, and elsewhere.\textsuperscript{29} Displaced colonial officials had, in fact, been a problem for Spain since the outbreak of the war, and considerable effort had already gone into defining the precise rights of individuals who had been forced by the war to leave their posts. In New Granada, after the outbreak of revolt in 1810, and again after the battle of Boyacá in 1819, a large number of royalist officials had been left without any real prospect of employment in the near future. These individuals poured into Cuba, in particular, where they were, at least in theory, entitled to draw part of their salary (the usual amount seems to have been $2/3$).\textsuperscript{30} The crown thus saw itself expected to

\textsuperscript{28}For Galicia, see Van Aken, \textit{Pan-Hispanism}, pp. 22-23.
\textsuperscript{30}Council of the Indies to Francisco Montalvo, Madrid, 14 November 1818, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 549. See also Juan Marchena Fernández, \textit{Oficiales y soldados en el Ejército de América}, Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos (Seville, 1983), pp. 15-16.
pay partial salaries to a large number of officials who were not engaged in any useful work. The matter was complicated by the fact that often the claimant had been imprisoned by the republicans, or at least had spent some time in republican-controlled territory before arriving in Havana. Most officials wanted to be paid back salary for this time, as well as for the time spent in Cuba awaiting new employment elsewhere. The Council of the Indies eventually decided that people who had actually been imprisoned could claim the standard 2/3 salary from the time of their imprisonment, but that those who hadn't been incarcerated could claim only from the moment they presented themselves to the colonial authorities in "países libres de insurrección". Many requests for pensions and back salary were nonetheless still dealt with on a case-by-case basis.

The fact that the crown was supposed to provide for the upkeep of displaced employees did not mean that it willingly doled out money to all penniless officials. Many unemployed minor officials complained of having been left completely poverty-stricken and without any means of earning a living. They petitioned the government in great numbers, asking to be given employment in some more tranquil part of the remaining Spanish dominions. A further drain on financial resources arose from the claims put forward by widows of government officials, who

31 See Report by Council of the Indies on a letter of Francisco Montalvo from 24 May 1814, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 549; and Representation by Juan Bastus y Faya, 1819, AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 261.
32 See Report by Council of the Indies, 16 August 1817, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 549.
33 See, for example, Representation by Pablo de Alhaida, Valledupar, 9 July 1815, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 551; and the many requests in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 631.
asked to be granted their husbands' pensions. As the war continued, the number of claimants rose steadily, putting ever-greater strains on the already limited capacity of the state pension funds. As compensation for the small size (or non-existence) of pensions, Ferdinand ruled on 23 February 1818 that widows of royalists killed by the insurgents be awarded a special medallion.

Even those officials whose jobs or lives were not directly threatened by the insurgents responded to the war by trying to leave the Americas as quickly as possible. In the early years of the war, many asked to be allowed to resign, often citing poor health as an excuse. Similar outbreaks of mass resignations occurred in Cartagena in 1820. Others simply never took up their posts at all. Juan Collado, for example, had been appointed regent of the Audiencia of Santa Fe on 19 July 1810, but he never travelled from Spain to New Granada to assume office. In 1820, Viceroy Sámano wrote to Ferdinand VII to point out that Collado still hadn’t arrived. By this time rumours were circulating that he was in fact dead, and Sámano advised to king to appoint a different oidor. Similarly, the bishop-elect of Popayán, Pedro

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34 See, for example, Report by Council of the Indies, 26 April 1818, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 551; and Juan Ramírez to Minister of Grace and Justice, AGI, Audiencia de Quito, legajo 261.
35 By April 1810, before the start of the war, the Monte Pío of Santa Fe declared that it was near bankruptcy, and requested an urgent transfer of $2,300 from the crown. See Cabildo of Santa Fe(?) to Minister of Hacienda, Santa Fe, 19 April 1810, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 549.
36 Decree of Ferdinand, Madrid, 23 February 1818, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 580.
37 See various requests for retirement in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajos 551, 631.
38 See various resignations from 1820 in AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 1017. Also see Margaret Woodward, "The Spanish Army and the Loss of America, 1810-1824", HAHR, Vol 48 (1968), p. 591.
39 List of Appointees to Audiencia de Santa Fe, 1816, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 747; and Juan Sámano to Ferdinand, Cartagena, 30 May 1820, AGI,
Alvarez, evidently preferred to continue drawing part of his salary in the relative safety of Panama, rather than travel south to assume his seat. According to Viceroy Pérez, the bishop-elect, después de haberse mantenido largo tiempo en Cartagena hace más de un año, se ha establecido pacíficamente en [Panama], y pasando una vida verdaderamente ociosa, sin haberse visto siquiera decir una misa en la iglesia, ni dedicarse a otras funciones de su ministerio, solo se ocupa en sostener en su casa una diaria tertulia sin tratar de dirigirse a Popayán, ni aún de aproximarse a aquel destino, cuando, por las noticias progresivas que han ido llegando, debe considerar que aquella su diócesis si ya no está pacificada, debe serlo bien prontamente.40

In response to this sort of behaviour, Ferdinand in 1818 ordered that officials who refused to take up their posts would not be entitled to draw any salary at all, unless their reasons were deemed convincing.41 The king specifically noted that he would not accept a refusal to work based on the petitioner’s belief that he deserved a better job. Clearly, few officials were attracted by the prospect of appointment to a war zone. Although Mark Burkholder and D.S. Chandler have suggested that the increased number of creoles appointed to serve in the Americas after 1814 reflects a deliberate policy by Ferdinand, in fact, it merely

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40 Benito Pérez to Minister of Grace and Justice, Panama, 22 March 1813, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 746; and Report on Bishop Alvarez, Cádiz, 22 October 1811, AGI, Audiencia de Santa Fe, legajo 748.
41 Royal Order of 14 November 1818, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 742.
illustrates the unpopularity of colonial service during the years of the war. Peninsulars preferred to stay at home.

Thus, by the 1820s, Spain’s governments had considerable experience with the difficulties posed by displaced officials. Like their predecessors, the cesantes of the 1820s expected to be provided with employment or pensions, and various efforts were made to accommodate them. A decision of 8 June 1822 established pensions of $1,500 for those who had earned over $1,000, and of 2/3 the former salary for those who had earned less than this amount. Then, in 1824, Ferdinand ruled that returning émigrés should be appointed to administrative posts in preference to other applicants. A similar decree had already been issued in 1817; its repetition suggests that the earlier order had not been implemented. Cesantes, like all other government appointees after the fall of the liberal government in 1823, were required to undergo purification before being appointed to vacant posts.

An important sub-set of the cesantes consisted of army officers with experience in the American wars. They became an important political force in Spain, where they were known as “Ayacuchos”. Particularly associated with the ‘liberal’ Baldomero Espartero, the Ayacuchos were influential in the various Carlist wars and enjoyed the distinction of having a novel written about them: Los Ayacuchos, by Pérez Galdós. The influence of

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42 See Burkholder and Chandler, From Impotence to Authority, pp. 142-143.
43 Costcloe, Response to Revolution, p. 251.
44 For the 1817 decree, see Royal Order of 19 June 1817, AGI, Papeles de Cuba, legajo 742.
45 Anna, Spain and the Loss of America, p. 292.
veterans of the American war on Spanish political life, and the impact of émigré royalists returning to Spain has, however, been little investigated.

Epilogue

I met a traveler from an antique land,
Who said “Two vast and trunkless legs of stone
Stand in the desert. Near them, on the sand,
Half sunk, a shattered visage lies, whose frown,
And wrinkled lip, and sneer of cold command,
Tell that its sculptor well those passions read,
Which yet survive, stamped on these lifeless things,
The hand that mocked them, and the heart that fed:
And on the pedestal these word appear:
“My name is Ozymandias, King of Kings:
Look on my works, ye mighty, and despair!”
Nothing beside remains. Round the decay
Of that colossal wreck, boundless and bare
The lone and level sands stretch far away.

—Percy Bysshe Shelley, Ozymandias

Spain’s legacy in the Americas was not so faint as that left by Ozymandias in the sands of that ancient land. Nonetheless, the Spanish experience from 1808-1824 provides much material for philosophising on the fall of kings and empires. Misguided from the start, Spain’s policy towards its revolted colonies suffered from the same contradictions as the United States’ policy towards Central America in the 1970s. A desire to improve relations was
accompanied by a stubborn unwillingness to countenance change. Pushed in (at least) two opposing directions, Spain’s governments oscillated between reconquest and reconciliation, never committing itself sufficiently to either. Worse, limited by financial restraints in Spain itself, and by the unpopularity of the colonial war, the metropolis failed to supply its armies with sufficient resources, with the inevitable result that the Expeditionary Army of Morillo became a burden on and an oppressor of the Americans they were sent to ‘pacify’. Alienated even from potential supporters, and continually undermined by disease, desertion and defeat, the Expeditionary Army dwindled away. While the fortunes of the royalist army trace out a steady decline from the heights of 1816, the history of the royalist administration during the war reveals few peaks at any time. Spanish administrators in New Granada appear never to have succeeded in restoring the colonial economy to its pre-war state. Finally, events in Spain itself outpaced the colonial administration. The liberal revolution of 1820 threw Spaniards into disarray, and highlighted the divisions within the royalist camp. Divided from the beginning, Spain’s colony in New Granada collapsed in on itself, a colossal wreck.
APPENDIX
Royal Officials, 1810-1822

**The Viceroys**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Official</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1803-1810</td>
<td>Antonio Amar y Borbón</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1810-1812</td>
<td>Benito Pérez de Valdemar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1812-1816</td>
<td>Francisco de Montalvo y Ambulodi (captain general)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1816-1817</td>
<td>Francisco de Montalvo y Ambulodi (viceroy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1817-1820</td>
<td>Juan Sámano y Uríbarri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1820-c.1822</td>
<td>Juan de la Cruz Mourgeón</td>
</tr>
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**Comandantes Generales de Panamá**

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<th>Period</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>c.1810-1812</td>
<td>Juan Antonio de la Mata</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.1813-c.1815</td>
<td>Carlos Meyner (jefe político)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.1817-c.1819</td>
<td>Alejandro Hore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.1819-c.1820</td>
<td>José Santa Cruz</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**The Audiencia de Santa Fe**

**Regentes:**

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<th>Period</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>c.1812-1816</td>
<td>Joaquín Carrión y Moreno</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Oidores:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Official</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1796-1821</td>
<td>Anselmo Bierna y Mazo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1809-1816</td>
<td>Juan Jurado de Laynez</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1808-c.1812</td>
<td>Joaquín Carrión y Moreno</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1790-c.1816</td>
<td>Juan Hernández de Alba y Alonso</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1810-c.1813</td>
<td>Manuel García</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1812</td>
<td>Tomás de Aréchaga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1814-c.1822</td>
<td>Francisco Mosquera y Cabrera</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1816</td>
<td>Miguel Agustín Novas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1This list is compiled from information in the AGI, and from José María Restrepo Saenz, *Gobernadores de Antioquia, 1571-1819*, vol. 1, Imprenta Nacional (Bogotá, 1932); José María Restrepo Saenz, *Gobernadores y próceres de Neiva*, Biblioteca de Historia Nacional, vol. 63 (Bogotá, 1941); José María Restrepo Saenz, *Biografías de los mandatarios y ministros de la real Audiencia (1671-1819)*, Biblioteca de Historia Nacional, vol. 84, Editorial Cromos, (Bogotá, 1952); Horacio Rodríguez Plata, *La antigua provincia del Socorro y la independencia*, Biblioteca de Historia Nacional, vol. 98 (Bogotá, 1963); and Mark Burkholder and D.S. Chandler, *From Impotence to Authority: The Spanish Crown and the American Audiencias, 1687-1808*, University of Missouri Press (Columbia, 1977).

The list includes only those officials who actually took office. Thus, for example, Alejandro Hore is not listed as a viceroy, for, although he was appointed to the post, he died before taking office.

C. is used when the precise dates of office are not available. It indicates that the individual was active during the period given, but may have been in office for considerably longer.
1816-c.1820: Gabriel Antonio García de Vallecillos
1816-c.1820: Pablo Hilario Chicha y Astudillo
1819-c.1820: José Barrio y Valle
c.1820: José Miguel del Castillo Fallado

Fiscales:
1803-c.1812: Manuel Martínez Mansilla
c.1813: José Váldez Posada
c.1820: Agustín de Lopetedi
1818-c.1820: Eugenio Miota y Maturana

The Audiencia de Quito

Presidents:
c.1811: Joachín Molino
1811-1817: Toribio Montes
1817-1819: Juan Ramírez de Orosco
1819-c.1820: Melchor Aymerich (interim)

Regentes:
1811: Francisco Cortázar y Labayen
1815-c.1818: Francisco Xavier de Esterrípa
1819-c.1820: Francisco Xavier de Manzanos y Castillo

Oidores:
1799-c.1810: Baltasar de Miñano y Lascasas
1802-c.1819: José Merchante de Contreras
1810-c.1813: Tomás de Arechaga
1811-c.1814: José Ramón de Ostolaza y Ríos
1811-1819: Francisco Xavier de Manzanos y Castillo
1810-c.1820: Juan Nepomuceno Muñez y Plaza
1814-c.1818: Pedro López de Segovia
1814-c.1815: Santiago Corbalán
1814-c.1822: Antonio María Izquierdo de la Torre
c.1814-c.1819: León Pereda de Sarabía
1816-c.1820: Juan Bastus y Faya
1818-c.1822: Juan López Tormaleo
1818-c.1822: Ascensio Manuel Montenegro

Fiscales:
1811-c.18113: José Joaquín Maroto
1812-c.1816: José Vásquez de Novoa
1814: Victor Félix San Miguel
c.1814-c.1815: Francisco Xavier Salvador
1815-c.1819: Vicente Rodríguez Romano
1818-c.1822: Diego Martín de Villodres
1819-c.1822: Eugenio Bastanero Carillo

Governors
Antioquia:
1804-1811: Francisco de Ayala Gudino
1816: Francisco de Paula Warleta
1816-1818: Vicente Sánchez Lima
1818: Pantaleón Arango (political)
1818: José Guerrero y Cabero (military)
1818: Miguel Valbuena
1818-1819: Carlos Tolrá
1819: Faustino Martínez

Cartagena:
1816-1821: Gabriel de Torres y Velasco

Chocó:
c.1810-1819: Juan Aguirre

Cuenca:
c. 1815: Melchor Aymerich

Neiva:
1807-1810: Anastasio Ladrón de Guevara (corregidor)
1816-1819: Anastasio Ladrón de Guevara (corregidor)
1816-1818: Carlos Tolrá (military)
1816: Diego Aragones
1816-1817: Ruperto Delgado
1817-1823: José Manuel Alvarez (corregidor)

Llanos:
c.1820: Juan de Salazar

Panama:
1813-1814: Francisco de Ayala (interim)

Popayán:
c.1810-c.1812: Miguel Tacón
c.1812-c.1815: Aparicio de Vidaurrázaga
c. 1816: José Solís (political)
1817-1818: Ruperto Delgado (military)
1817-1819: Pedro Domínguez
c.1820: Francisco Eugenio Tameriz (interim)

Ríohacha:
c.1805-c.1811: José de Medina y Galindo
1817-1820: José Solís

Santa Fe:
1816: Antonio María Cansano
1816-1817: Juan Sámano y Uribarrí

Santa Marta:
c. 1810-c.1811: Tomás de Acosta
1812-1819: Pedro Ruiz de Porras
1819-1821: Latino Fitz-Gerald

Socorro:
1809-1810: José Valdés Posada (corregidor)
1816: Sebastián de la Calzada
1816: José Silverio Pérez
1816-1819: Antonio Fominaya
1819: Lucas González

Veraguas:
c. 1810-c. 1818: Juan Domingo de Iturralde

**Bishops and Archbishops**

*Archbishop of Santa Fe:*
c. 1810-1817: Juan Bautista Sacristán
1819: Isidro Domínguez

*Bishop of Cartagena:*
c. 1818-c. 1820: Gregorio José Rodríguez Carrillo

*Bishop of Cuenca:*
c. 1811-c. 1813: Andrés

c. 1815-1818: Josef Igancio Cortázar

*Bishop of Panama:*
c. 1810-c. 1813: Manuel

c. 1817: Josef Hygenio

*Bishop of Popayán:*
1810: Pedro Alvarez

c. 1811-c. 1813: Manuel Mariano de Urrutia

c. 1816-c. 1822: Salvador Ximénez Padilla y Enciso

*Bishop of Quito:*
c. 1818: José Ysidoro Camacho

c. 1820: Leonardo

*Bishop of Santa Marta:*
c. 1814-c. 1815: José Eulalio Ziosi
1817: Antonio Gómez Polanco
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Audiencia de Santa Fe: legajos 549, 551, 579, 580, 629, 631, 632, 665, 668, 745, 746, 747, 748, 1011, 1017, 1203
Correos: legajo 72A
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