Investment subsidies and time-consistent environmental policy
Abrego , Lisandro and Perroni, Carlo . (2002) Investment subsidies and time-consistent environmental policy. Oxford Economic Papers, 54 (4). pp. 617-635. ISSN 0030-7653Full text not available from this repository.
Official URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3488768
We describe a model of dynamic pollution abatement choices with heterogeneous agents where, due to the presence of a distributional objective and to the absence of incentive-compatible compensation mechanisms, the choice of a second-best level of emission taxation is time-inconsistent. In this model, we investigate whether investment subsidies can act as a substitute for policy commitment.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions|
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics|
|Journal or Publication Title:||Oxford Economic Papers|
|Publisher:||Oxford University Press|
|Official Date:||1 October 2002|
|Number of Pages:||19|
|Page Range:||pp. 617-635|
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