Investment subsidies and time-consistent environmental policy
UNSPECIFIED (2002) Investment subsidies and time-consistent environmental policy. OXFORD ECONOMIC PAPERS-NEW SERIES, 54 (4). pp. 617-635. ISSN 0030-7653Full text not available from this repository.
We describe a model of dynamic pollution abatement choices with heterogeneous agents where, due to the presence of a distributional objective and to the absence of incentive-compatible compensation mechanisms, the choice of a second-best level of emission taxation is time-inconsistent. In this model, we investigate whether investment subsidies can act as a substitute for policy commitment.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions|
|Journal or Publication Title:||OXFORD ECONOMIC PAPERS-NEW SERIES|
|Publisher:||OXFORD UNIV PRESS|
|Date:||1 October 2002|
|Number of Pages:||19|
|Page Range:||pp. 617-635|
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