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Investment subsidies and time-consistent environmental policy
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Abrego , Lisandro and Perroni, Carlo (2002) Investment subsidies and time-consistent environmental policy. Oxford Economic Papers, 54 (4). pp. 617-635. ISSN 0030-7653.
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Official URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3488768
Abstract
We describe a model of dynamic pollution abatement choices with heterogeneous agents where, due to the presence of a distributional objective and to the absence of incentive-compatible compensation mechanisms, the choice of a second-best level of emission taxation is time-inconsistent. In this model, we investigate whether investment subsidies can act as a substitute for policy commitment.
Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||
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Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions | ||||
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics | ||||
Journal or Publication Title: | Oxford Economic Papers | ||||
Publisher: | Oxford University Press | ||||
ISSN: | 0030-7653 | ||||
Official Date: | 1 October 2002 | ||||
Dates: |
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Volume: | 54 | ||||
Number: | 4 | ||||
Number of Pages: | 19 | ||||
Page Range: | pp. 617-635 | ||||
Status: | Peer Reviewed | ||||
Publication Status: | Published |
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