UNSPECIFIED (2002) Investment subsidies and time-consistent environmental policy. OXFORD ECONOMIC PAPERS-NEW SERIES, 54 (4). pp. 617-635. ISSN 0030-7653

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Abstract

We describe a model of dynamic pollution abatement choices with heterogeneous agents where, due to the presence of a distributional objective and to the absence of incentive-compatible compensation mechanisms, the choice of a second-best level of emission taxation is time-inconsistent. In this model, we investigate whether investment subsidies can act as a substitute for policy commitment.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
Journal or Publication Title:	OXFORD ECONOMIC PAPERS-NEW SERIES
Publisher:	OXFORD UNIV PRESS
ISSN:	0030-7653
Date:	1 October 2002
Volume:	54
Number:	4
Number of Pages:	19
Page Range:	pp. 617-635
Publication Status:	Published
URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/10543

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