A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick

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THIS THESIS HAS BEEN REPRODUCED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED
SEXTANT IN DOGTOWN

a project by

ADRIAN GARGETT

A Thesis submitted in fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Philosophy
Univerisity of Warwick

August 1997
NUMEROUS ORIGINALS IN COLOUR

very dark colours on all plates.
THIS VOLUME HAS A VERY TIGHT BINDING
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In refusing to seek answers, and in continuing to pose questions as aporias, as paradoxes - that is, to insist that there may be no readily available solutions - is to confront the task, not of revolution, but continual negotiation, the equation of one’s presence now with struggle, a strenuous ideal but one perhaps that can make us less focused on any single conflict and more capable to counteract the relentless forces of sameness, more inventive in the kinds of subversion we seek, and more joyous in the type of combat we choose to engage in ......... to their memory - Deleuze, Genet, Camus.

Warwick Summer ‘97.
SUMMARY

"SEXTANT IN DOGTOWN"

The fundamental basis of the project concentrates upon an interactive manoeuvre involving Modern Continental Philosophy and the Postmodern Visual Arts. The primary components that structure the thesis conduct a Deleuzoguattarian "process" of action to produce a series of mechanisms designed to "open-up" a space in which to manifest a range of interpretations/translations that follow the developmentary trajectory of designated specific areas of art production. The primary aims concern the advance of the action to communicate an innovative/original set of expositions with a view to both "animate" and enhance these designated perspectives.

The structural framework of the project tracks through "passages"/"lines of flight" that occur/result from the impact of the Deleuzoguattarian mechanisms upon chosen materials.

- "Introduction" (Primary) sets forth some guiding themes (how to think knowledge without the presumption of the neutral interchangeability of the subject?). "Tours of the Black Clock" (Dark) elaborates the Nietzschean background that informs the philosophical basis of the complete project. "Electrolite" (Spin the Black Circle), "Where Angels Play" (In a Network of Lines that Intersect), "Not to Touch the Earth" (Elephant Stone) "Across" (Out of Time) are sections designed to trace a number of alternative pathways through the major texts of the Deleuzoguattarian enterprise.

"Becoming X" (Impact) initiates a secondary movement of experimentation. "Animal Nitrate" (The Image of Chance) effects "an encounter" with the work of painter Francis Bacon via the Deleuze text(s) "Logique de la Sensation" (1981), "Time and Again" (New Damage) introduces and articulates a number of instances from Deleuzian film-theory. "The Fountainhead" (Vision Machines) is the main section of the project which evolves a detailed process analysing the paintings of American painter David Salle. "The Mirror of Enigmas" (Numbers in the Dark) traces related Deleuzeoguattarian themes through...
the films of David Lynch, maintaining as a background an examination of Postmodern American culture/society. "Breaking into Heaven" (Elegia) returns to the more specific analysis of the late paintings of David Salle and uses the mechanics elaborated in Deleuze's book "Le Pli". "Final Cut"/"Last Exit"/"Memorial Beach" is an attempt at a series of concluding remarks within the project divisions are resolved within a comprehensive Deleuzoguattarian structural system - evolving to be primarily defined in terms of two "active" processes/movements which engage theory and explanation, practice and application respectively, being therefore both a philosophical /academic debate while incorporating a high-level of "creative" experimentation.

The first sections of the project detail an extensive series of explanatory "pathways"/"journeys" through the texts of Deleuze and Guattari with a view to indicating measures that can be deployed/utilized in a Deleuzoguattarian process of art/cultural analysis. Constructing the architectural pattern/"anatomy" of a series of interpretative surfaces to reflect the dimensions of the cultural material approached.

The sections in the second part of the project enact a number of experimental designs, dispatching Deleuzoguattarian mechanisms in the body of the chosen cultural material. An interpretative surface is never under the influence of a single differentiated flow it constitutes the mutual boundary of numerous adjacent flows. The same interpretative surface is therefore available to be understood in as many different ways as there are adjacent flows along its fractural surface.

This project is essentially a speculative enterprise, a philosophical experiment whose aim is to enhance, enlarge and intensify our "knowledge" of the area defined, through a synthesis, here labelled as a "Deleuzoguattarian process of Art analysis".

For Deleuze, thought creates what it thinks, as perception creates what it perceives (and therefore does not relate to it). The philosophical concept does not refer to the lived, but consists through its own creation, in setting up an event that surveys ("survole") the whole
of the lived no less than every state of affairs. Deleuzoguattarian philosophy does not establish a relationship “between” philosophy and other disciplines, other ways of making sure, but eliminates this relationship to the advantage of a type of “greater philosophy” Thought/Philosophy thinks the sufficient reason of the actual in this manner.

For Nietzsche, whose enterprise constitutes (I have suggested) the base/departure for the Deleuzoguattarian program, “the world” we know lies in our interpretation of it. However, the task of interpretation is not to discover “truth” but to “create” it. According to Nietzsche, there is no “world-in-itself”, no unconditioned and stable entities that await our discovery, but a dynamic and turbulent “becoming” in which the forms we perceive are not separate from our interpretations of them.

Because we are ourselves part of this becoming, there is no vantage point from which it is possible to gain the absolute/unconditioned knowledge that we have imbued with the idea of “truth”. The exercise merely becomes self-reflective. However, despite this skepticism, Nietzsche realizes that the game of truth is unavoidable, so therefore he, and in consequence we, departing/initiating the pathways through this project, have to cast in the role of the philosopher who knows what he invents and invents while he knows.

In Postmodern Art no style dominates. Alternatively we experience endless improvisations and variations on themes, parody/playfulness. Postmodern artists are unabashedly eclectic and call attention to it, combining traditions borrowing from rituals and myths. All the world’s cultural symbols are now available in the public domain - “SANTA CLAUS IS ON THE CROSS”.

The Deleuzoguattarian process of art delineated is a play with the game of “truth” and not an explanation of a “whole” a description of the network of the “dynamic/fluid nature of our transitional relationship to it. It is the flow of energy that encompasses what Deleuze/Nietzsche refer to as “the whole” A flow invokes the dynamic/fluid nature of becoming, while energy/activity implies a potentiality - the inherent capacity and growth
actuated by the will to power. The flows of energy are manifested into differentiated flows
within flows, "Ad infinitum" and powered by the parameters of state space - a potential
i.e. field defined by the characteristics of the subject flows associated. Nothing exists in
isolation. Differentiation exists only via relations to other flows in a dynamic/non linear
network of resistances.
FOREWORD (LITHIUM)

"C'est seulement ces sortes de vérités, celles qui ne sont pas démonstrables et même qui sont 'fausses', celles que l'on ne peut conclure sans absurdité jusqu'à leur extrémité sans aller à la négation d'elles et de soi, c'est celles-là qui doivent être exaltées par l'œuvre d'art" (Jean Genet) (1)

The initiation of the project necessarily must concern the conditions for the possibility of "truthful" narration, or, more specifically, about what kind of narrative technique is required in order to address/encompass contemporary art practice. The question then becomes: Can writing tell the "truth"? or must writing always exist within an economy of betrayal?

The blank page becomes crossed from top to bottom with small black characters - letters/words/commas/etc - and it is because of them that the page is said to be legible. However a kind of unease, an irresolution emerges/becomes apparent that leads one to question: do the black marks add up to a reality? Do these legible written signs of a narrative form/correspond to the reality which they are said to describe. The answer is emphatically in the negative. The reality/actuality/presence of art does not reside in the written signs that attempt to describe it, but rather that reality locates itself in the space between the written signs. The white space between the words contains more reality than the words themselves. The corollary of this is that we cannot claim to understand the experience of art within writing; alternatively, its reality is situated elsewhere, in an engagement, in a silence that exceeds the written sign.

Therefore at the outset we must confront the veridical inadequacy of the project itself. There will be no adequation between language and reality and no narrative technique will be able to relate an accurate "experience" of art. True narration is not a possibility. Writing must ultimately be regarded as a betrayal - by transforming experience into words/characters you create other facts that can never fully create the original one.

conversion/transfiguration of a "fact" into words does not/cannot be said to represent this "fact" in any way truthfully, but instead creates a new and different verbal fact that does not correspond with the one that was to be described. This is the Nietzschean claim which the project both presupposes/promotes and from which we commence/undertake the analysis.

It is possible to organize the Nietzschean programme coherently, but even if one assumes such a continuous discourse as a background to Nietzsche’s discontinuous writings, there is however a concomitant Nietzschean dissatisfaction apparent. His discourse is always already a step ahead of itself. Nietzsche formulates his philosophy in a completely different language, a language no longer assured of the whole, but consisting of fragments/points of conflict/division.

By acknowledging the fluidity with which Nietzsche uses language, appropriating concepts when necessary and then discarding them when no longer useful, one may utilize Nietzsche’s theories of language and metaphor, and track the way he activates these theories as concrete manifestations of theoretical insights into the world as a play of becoming.

“One is an artist at the cost of regarding that which all non-artists call “form” as content, as the “thing in itself”

(Friedrich Nietzsche (2)

The primary Nietzschean design/modus operandi of the project is orientated from a "question of style" - the relation between the "content" of Nietzsche’s thought and the way in which this content is presented. The point of departure concerns the Nietzschean insight into the inseparable unity of philosophical form and content. By attending to these theories of language/rhetoric/metaphor/myth/strategic deployment of different literary genre one may explore a range of new interpretative possibilities.

Nietzsche’s program affords a direct insight into a "new" kind of philosophy, a philosophy of the aesthetic self, and specifically Nietzsche’s complex attitude towards the human
condition/the world/philosophical-aesthetic discourse. The distance opened up between "knowledge" and "truth" - whose convergent identity had been since Plato philosophy's grounding discourse - in addition to the integral place of "art" in Nietzsche's schema operates in two ways: art displaces knowledge/truth as a grounding criterion for "world" consisting of association and fabrication and "self" like art, cannot be "itself". That is art must always be, and always is identified as, distanced and perpetually distancing from itself. For Nietzsche the world is arranged perspective - within Nietzschan philosophy the agency of art production/fabrication, of world-creation is the self, producing/produced by self-fabrication/self-imagining, and self-imagining that philosophy has become in Nietzsche.

This Nietzschan basis manifests a principally problematic and fundamentally self-contradictory notion of the self and art - Nietzsche acknowledges that the aestheticizing of life entails its inventive/stylish disappropriation, a free fall into metaphor and "un-self-ness". The creative/chimerical construction of the (un) self initiates the development of strategies of self-regulation, power over art and production, a convergence with the self at the "locus" of creation/interpretation of art and a complex/tendentious metaphorical disunifying of the artist-self. This move contains the internal dynamics of its own self-negation/denial - simultaneously announcing and cancelling its motion, that is, persistently re-opening a distance between the unity "self" implies and the primary disunity contained in the condition of perspectivism.

Nietzsche's philosophy/aesthetics reverberates not only with heavily ironized self-revelatory possibilities - mechanization/syntactic predeterminations and violently displaced narrative openings - not only does Nietzsche's nascent world create itself out of itself, but it does so according to no apriori set of aesthetic doctrines/principles, creating any such principles out of itself as well. Nietzsche's strategy is interrogative - all self-assertions are interrogations of the texts of selfhood, a distancing/undermining (the more Zarathustra affirms, the more we doubt). Interrogation implies both energy and doubt and this is the conundrum of the self that Nietzschean...
philosophy bequeaths to contemporary art/theory. Only in the view of the constant threat of reversal can Nietzsche's apparent categorical assertions be viewed/assimilated. This strategy of self-subversion/interrogation may subsequently be identified as postmodern - a so called disillusionment with action and indeed with value itself.

Nietzsche does not concur with any of the traditional relationships between artwork and artist, for Nietzsche art as such destroys the complacency/serenity of any possible aesthetic balance/closure. Nietzsche's conception of art is one where art cannot be controlled/cognatized but only sensed/experienced. In this vertiginous/inverted complex, (in which we term content, regarded as something merely formal, no more or less than a question of style lies the problem/value of art), and its power/capacity of/for self-creation. Nietzsche conceives the world in general as if it were a sort of artwork. Nietzsche points art as the sole agent for philosophy's chief function - to break the hegemony of pure knowledge, not from without but from within. Art attacks the panacea of knowing at its source, translating a false solution into a true one, acknowledging its incompleteness in a perpetual tumult of desire. This disruption of "knowledge" via art entails a transcendence of the state in which knowledge is/seems sufficient, it entails what Nietzsche calls "becoming creative".

According to Nietzsche the artist is caught within an animating but morbid dialectic: by becoming, the artist moves towards absence - by being the artist disappears. In this context the artist who can "truly" represent/present material causes it to cease to exist. The artist because he/she continues to live/exist continues to produce imperfectly/falsely/partially - the conundrum is that according to Nietzsche the closer the artist comes to the perfection of creation, the more "falsely" that production will be accomplished, given that the artist creates himself/herself as he/she produces works. For Nietzsche, the seemingly ironic mimetic power of art is precisely its ability to reproduce falsehood, "only" appearance.
"It is "art" which invents the lies that raise falsehood to this highest affirmative power, that 
turns the will to deceive into something which is affirmed in the power of falsehood. For the 
artist "appearance" no longer means the negation of the real in this world, but this kind of 
selection, correction, redoubling and affirmation. This truth perhaps takes on a new sense 
Truth is appearance."

(Gilles Deleuze) (3)

The artist is "truthful", according to Nietzsche, precisely in the recognition of 
illusion/falsehood for what they are, therefore he/she accesses a strategic affective freedom.

The work of Jean Genet provides an example of the themes that prevail upon this project. 
Genet's novels are formally overdetermined and semantically under-determined. In each there 
is a clear form (usually three plots interwoven/cinematically intercut). His method is to 
situate himself in the foreground in such a way to illustrate his ambiguous relationship to 
his material/highlight his power as a creator of a fictional universe. He is entirely in 
ultimate control of ambiguous narratives recounted - is this autobiography/fiction, 
chronicle/erotic fantasy, sociology/invention? Everything centres around Genet's 
caprices.

Genet's novels which integrate such diverse fictional structures as suspense/mystery/-
foreshadowing/character development/"progression d'effet"/yearning for closure - also 
suggest ethnological information/spiritual transfiguration and a complete Nietzschean 
transvaluation of all values - these are all dynamic tensions calling for resolution. One 
might suggest that they offer psychological/moral questions principally to serve formalist 
means, primarily to inject momentum to an essentially static world view.

Genet is semantically underdetermined, that is we are never entirely sure what his 
novels/plays mean - we are never able to fix upon a definite meaning, which is all the more 
surprising in view of the material presented.
One of the principle methods Genet adopts in order to ensure that his messages will remain ambiguous is via the construction of plots that undermine the narrative (he frequently fails to give us the conclusion of a scene, or relates it when we no longer want/need to know about it, or he will omit an obligatory scene. Often he favours the falling away of a sentence/"the feminine ending"/the dying of the voice). Genet's books are highly disciplined and orchestrated narratives, spectacular displays of formal exactitude. A sign of this essential purity is his inimical domination of every aspect of the narrative, the unfailing confidence of his tone/his inspired verbal invention. He never merely relates a single narrative or represents picturesque scenes. Structural clarity is however always contrasted with the ambiguity of what his books mean.

For Nietzsche there is no truth in the traditional sense of this word. The world of the will to power is in constant flux, a flux of shifting centres of power that increase and decrease, but never remain the same. Definitive knowledge of this world is not possible, in fact, it is incommensurate with the very nature of the world ("knowing" is simply a pragmatic falsification of the world for the purpose of dealing with it more effectively). There is no static/finished world to be known, meaningful activity in the world of flux/will to power becomes art, structuring the world, giving it "meaning" and "values". The only meaningful way to proceed is to create ("schaffen") (4).

It is precisely the fact that there is no predetermined mechanistic or teleological order in the world that enables us to be radically creative - because the world is not prestructured there is the space to shape the world and the self. In creating one is affirming the world by transforming it. Nietzsche suggests that there is no such thing as pessimistic/nihilistic art Art is affirmation.
FORWARD (LITHIUM)

NOTES

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<th>Jean Genet</th>
<th>&quot;Ce qui est resté d'un Rembrandt déchiré en petits carrés bien réguliers et roux aux chottes &quot;in&quot; Oeuvres Complètes&quot; Vol IV Paris: Gallimard (1968)</th>
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<td>Gilles Deleuze</td>
<td>&quot;Nietzsche et la philosophie&quot; Paris PUF (1962)</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>See the &quot;Three Metamorphoses of the Spirit&quot; in &quot;Thus Spoke Zarathustra&quot; - The Spirit changes from a camel, the load-bearing spirit who says &quot;you must&quot;, to the lion, the destroyer of old values who says &quot;I will&quot;, to the child who alone has the power to create something new. The key word is &quot;power&quot; in the sense of ability, of being able to do something, links the creating child to the artist, the &quot;Künstler&quot; who has the ability of enacting the desired procedure (It is possible that creativity &quot;creare&quot; is related to growth &quot;crescere&quot;, and this would lead to Nietzsche's idea of power as self-increasing ability)</td>
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INTRODUCTION (PRIMARY)

The fundamental basis of this operation is to conduct an analysis of the implications of the philosophically critical issues promoted by the application of, in the first instance the programme of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari to the art-practice of the contemporary postmodern age. Specifically, via the incorporation/through an operative enactment of these discourses it is the primary intention of the engagement to "open-up" a space/establish a mechanism designed to present an account of the art production/oeuvre of the American artist David Salle, following the trajectory of the developments expressed within this conceptual framework.

"A philosophical theory" commented Deleuze in an early work.

"...is a developed question and nothing else: by itself, in itself, it involves, not the resolution of a problem, but the development to the fullest extent of the necessary implications of a formulated question. To put things in question means to subordinate and submit things to the question in such a way that, in this forced and constrained submission, things reveal to us an essence, a nature."

(Gilles Deleuze) (1)

In addition to the ability to assimilate, Deleuze's work displays a transformative power, the capacity to reconstruct a body of thought by discovering, and working from within its animating centre, in an original and on occasion a disruptive manner, utilizing not only the basic surface of the field of inquiry/text but the secondary correlate or subordinate doctrines. Philosophies are in general characterized in terms of first principles, remarks Deleuze, however,

"...the first principle is always a mask, a simple image, it doesn't exist, things only begin to move and come alive at the level of the second, third, fourth principle, and these aren't even principles any longer. Things only start to live in the middle"

(Gilles Deleuze) (2)

These twin parallel interactions, assimilation/transformation do not merely constitute appropriation by Deleuze. What we discover as Deleuze's enterprise progresses, is
consistently a subtle shift in orientation from one project to the next, as if each one of his creative transformations of another's thought facilitated a consequent/analogous transformation within that of his own. In collaboration with Félix Guattari, Deleuze consciously induces a mutual metamorphosis, a productive coalescence in which each becomes other. There is a sense in which every work of Deleuze's is an encounter, a concordance that motivates a decentering shift in the object of thought and simultaneously in the thinker as well. An author, states Deleuze, "does not designate a subject, but something that happens, between at least two terms which are not subject, but agents, elements." (3)

Philosophy states Deleuze is an undertaking that tracks a pre-philosophical plane of immanence (reason) invents pro-philosophical characters (imagination) and produces philosophical concepts (understanding) It is within the invention of the conceptual characters that the creation of concepts and the tracking of the procedures that compromise the plane of immanence is induced (4)

Philosophy, like painting, is a form of creation, and to this extent it also similarly resembles aspects of science. In a 1985 interview, Deleuze said, "The true object of science is to create functions; the true object of art is to create sensible aggregates; and the object of philosophy is to create concepts" (5) Truth is not an element that is pre-existent, something to be discovered but which -

"...must be created in each domain... There is no truth which does not "falsify" pre-established ideas. To say "truth is a creation" implies that the production of truth passes through a series of operations which work and shape a material, a series of literal falsifications"

(Gilles Deleuze) (6)

Deleuze delineates specific modes of thought - philosophy/art/science - and their correspondent objects (concept/sensible aggregates/functions) but primarily thought remains for him both experimentation and creation, something that in operation structures materials and therein generates a form of truth. (7)
In this context Deleuze's notion of the function of singularities appears ambiguous. In the framework of the Deleuzian philosophy of difference singularities are identified with the chaotic forces that encroach upon thought, a view that emphasizes the experiential/experimental dimensions of thought. In an interview in 1980 (8) however he describes singularities as concepts that react with the ordinary fluxes of thought, an approach which highlights the creative force of difference within thought and that structure an individual philosophic convention. With singularity concepts are such components as rhizomes/abstract-machines/haecceities paradoxical elements that induce a disequilibrium within ordinary thought. The essential strategy of Deleuze and Guattari is to advance such paradoxical elements and disseminate their dissonant consequences across various disciplines. Similarly this practice informs Deleuze's philosophy of difference, except that within this model he utilizes an alternative range of paradoxical elements - aleatory points/incorporeal surfaces/simulacra/the pure and empty form of time etc. Therefore singularities can be interpreted in terms of their passive reception by thought or their active production within thought, but in both cases they act as forces of difference that compel thought to move outside the logic of identity.

Deleuze is philosophy is orientated towards inventing concepts within a system that is accessible and useful.

"In fact, systems have not lost any of their vital forces. There is today in science or in logic the complete beginnings of a theory of the so-called open systems based on various interactions. They repudiate purely linear series of causes and they transform the notion of time. What Guattari and I call a "rhizome", is precisely a case of an open system" (Gilles Deleuze) (9)

The essence of the Deleuzian project has been fundamentally orientated to avoid the formulation of a closed system. Deleuze and Guattari's enterprise could be paradoxically constructed in a dualistic correlation: in one respect their concepts must be correspondingly "rigorous and inexact", so that they can produce their own movement and can be utilized in different fields. In another respect the very coherence of these concepts within the
schizoanalytic machinery renders them problematic in characterization. Therefore each
reader/operator working with these concepts must re-define them within his/her own field of
inquiry, while they already present themselves as being in constant metamorphosis.

Deleuze has described his concepts:

“There are also notions that are fundamentally inexact and, however, absolutely rigorous.
Scientists cannot do without them. They belong at the same time to philosophers and to artists.
The problem indeed is to give these concepts a rigor that is not directly scientific and such
that, when a scientist uses them, he is a philosopher as well as an artist”

(Gilles Deleuze) (10)

Deleuze’s most recent work adheres closely to the “rigorous inexactitude” of schizoanalysis
as it metamorphoses itself according to its various objects of study in order to create new
concepts(11). Deleuze’s work is exceptional in the subtle networks of
differences/repetitions/metamorphoses that unify and diversify the project. It is this
perpetual transient metamorphoses within Deleuzian thought itself that indicates how it may
be employed within various fields of enquiry. The reader/operator must
apprehend/refute/confirm/ metamorphose Deleuzian concepts in order to unfold other systems
of signs, to reinforce and follow their own becomings.

The primary rationale that structures this undertaking concentrates upon the notion of a
philosophical thinking about art, how the nature of philosophy might address art, bringing
art criticism and contemporary philosophy into a close interaction. In the opening-up of this
process art will be inevitably concerned with the question of its own objectivity and thus its
own being as art. Part of the project will concern an operation that allows for the re-
positioning/re-working of the art object/painting As a preliminary move the art
object/painting will come to be regarded as sustaining a critical dimension. It will be
within the articulation of the work of the painting, within the terms/critical dimensions
established by a continual questioning of the artwork that we may perceive a site that resists
a synthesis. Tracing the operative movement of this factor will figure predominantly in the
proceeding discussions.
Within this process of a re-conceptualization/re-working it will be argued that the artwork will come to be re-formulated via an active engagement/through the articulation of philosophical texts, in which the effect of the work may be clearly discerned - the work constituting an integral component of the result itself. In the engagement, in the operative procedure, a point of departure is afforded - it is being maintained ensures that the project will constitute a working relation to the presence of an ineliminatable connection, a link with structured force (between pre-conditions and presentation) that illustrates a re-working of the relation/a re-thinking of the relation. In summary the present appositeness of these conditions, even though they may be essentially non-reducible, are nonetheless still intimately connected to that which is inscribed within a particular formulation of the emergence of the philosophical.

Postmodern/contemporary art and certain forms of philosophy necessitate an acknowledgement that the foundations of art/philosophy have been disrupted and that we can no longer assume that we understand precisely what might constitute art/philosophy. Art imposes a question/is in question, and the philosophical thus proves a vital mechanism, through the process of its own questioning to pursue the implications of the question/ing of art. Central to this undertaking are the presuppositions at stake in the problematics of presentation/representation - presentation comes to be linked to a mode of experimentation, it is this that the programme confirms the argument for a re-configuration of the artwork. This implies essentially a re-thinking, breaking loose from the conceptions that have long framed the discussion. As Gilles Deleuze would state to re-think a notion of abstraction both in the philosophy and art means to think another kind of theory to configure another picture of what it is to think abstractly.

In one sense the analysis involved in the project attempts to challenge the state/function assumed of art and aesthetics and to suggest the possibilities not only of other conceptions of art, but other configurations of art within the philosophical. In this situation the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze appears compellingly appropriate. In the fashion of another
prominent "anti-Platonist", Ludwig Wittgenstein, Deleuze proposes another image of, what he terms, abstraction in philosophy, more "empiricist", more "immanentist", more "experimental", (12) simultaneously he re-conceives what abstraction means in art, more "chaotic"/"formless" and no longer defined in the opposition to figure or image. These two types of abstraction interarticulate in numerous ways, forming a new procedure of conducting art-connected philosophy.

For Deleuze a sense of abstract consists in an impure mixing and mixing up, prior to Forms, a re-assemblage that moves towards an Outside, rather than a purification that produces essential ideals or addresses singularly the constitutive "forms" of a medium. In a Deleuzian scheme, philosophy itself becomes a practice of abstract mixing and re-organizing/re-assembling, a symptomatic/conceptual "And......." engaged with narratives and histories. Thus Deleuze would state that philosophy is muted when reduced to merely reflecting on art, on forms of judgement, for it has a much more incarnate function linking/interacting/intersecting with art prior to defined judgements. To transform the notion of what it is to think abstractly is concurrent to transforming the notion of the relations abstract thought might have with art/painting.

Much contemporary art (or what we might term postmodern art) radically questions the affirmative discourse of high art, the inadequacy of artistic categories (on art whose very pictorial means embodies a scepticism as to the possibility of high art, by internalizing this scepticism and making it thematic within the art practice itself) and undermines arts supposed autonomy/authenticity. We come to experience art not as a well defined notion with definite limits/criteria, but rather as an insecure shifting totality, where categories constantly interweave and are transformed. Postmodern art operates through a crossing/transgression of boundaries that consequently involves a struggle of location. A viewer may compare and contrast works to see how far they satisfy such and such a stylistic label, only to discover that through such an analysis the label itself now seems flexible and only of relative value. Thus the very basis which forms the notion of art is loosened/pulled apart - these works at their best, elucidate a struggle/site of conflict that shows the very
notion of art itself to be so complex as to strain imaginative and perceptual capacities to
the limit

Conducting a philosophical project in this vein implies raising philosophical questions -
questions that are philosophical in essence and that are about philosophy, it's pre-
suppositions/critical effects/limitations/possibilities. The programme to follow
incorporates a philosophical dimension that does not seek to institute itself in its means
of exercise and thus exclude or dominate others, rather the form of philosophical approach
on one level attempts via Deleuzian mechanisms to confront and utilize unexamined aspects of
the dominant critical strategies/analytical methods and to address contradictions/complexities inherent in traditional questions, and to initiate within this
procedure points of departure/lines of flight. In continuing we might promote different
kinds of questions or rather questions in a different manner, therefore to facilitate
alternative forms of philosophical/critical practice. The philosophical in this regard is
concerned to maintain an open critical process, of undermining/exceeding the state of
philosophy at any particular moment in addition to the states of the disciplines, formostly
art/painting, with which it intersects.

The Deleuzian programme is provocative. It is correspondingly enigmatic/difficult, on
occasion troubling and even paradoxical - located via philosophical concepts yet inimical
to philosophy's traditional/essential totalizing gestures. It is the heterogeneous
condition of the contemporary situation which Deleuze perceives as the interruption of the
traditional project. Deleuze's philosophical thinking is always a return to a philosophical
dilemma of the resolution of a state via conflict, the re-iteration of the possibility of a
state of heterology in philosophy and art that resists any delineation of the same. It is thus
that Deleuze's work affirms an-other philosophical project.
INTRODUCTION (PRIMARY)

NOTES

3. Ibid p.65.
5. Interview in "L'Autre Journal" 8 (October 1985).
6. Ibid.
7. It is necessary to identify two co-existent systems of thought, Deleuze's philosophy of difference and the Deleuzo-guattarian schizoanalytic philosophy of desiring production. Intrinsic to both models is primarily a Nietzschean conception of the Cosmos as the fundamental/pre-ordinated becoming of a multiplicity of reciprocal forces. The state of multiplicity is composed not of stable entities but "dynamic quanta" and therefore must be perceived in terms of difference rather than identity.

An essential requisite to the Deleuzian philosophy of difference and the Deleuzo-guattarian philosophy of desiring production is an extensive Nietzschean concentration on the problematic nature of "physis" - collectively as the becoming of a multiplicity of forces, and as the virtual realm of difference and the will to power/eternal return. The Nietzschean factor is determined by a rudimentary conception of thought as creation and experiment negating common sense/rationality/representation.

In the philosophy of difference Deleuze applies Nietzschean perspectivism and aestheticism proposing that all thought is prefigured by evaluation and interpretation, and that "truth" is created rather than discovered. Difference necessarily evades reason, since reason functions in terms of a logic of identity and the Same. The notion of a thought of difference must be initiated by a paradoxical factor/entity (an intensity/singularity) that resists rational comprehension and effects the state of disequilibrium. In consequence thought must articulate/express/unfold the impulse of difference embodied within the paradoxical factor/entity reciprocally inventing a perspectival truth and activating an incarnation of the virtual realm of difference via an experimentation of the real.

In their collaborative programme Deleuze and Guattari do not explicitly feature/demonstrate Nietzschean themes, (however the conception of the plane of consistency is presented as a pre-existent yet determined dimension of creation) but it is evident that the Nietzschean ideal/ensemble of thought sustains and informs their enterprise. (Deleuze and Guattari appreciate various Nietzschean motifs which they put to work in the development of their own critical project.)

"When one asks what painting is, the response is relatively simple. A Painter is someone who creates in the domain of lines and colours (even though lines and colours exist in nature). Likewise a philosopher is someone who creates in the domain of concepts, someone who invents new concepts. There again, thought obviously exists outside philosophy, but not in the special form of concepts. Concepts are singularities which react with ordinary life, with ordinary or everyday fluxes of thought." (Gilles Deleuze) ("Entretien 1980" L'Arc 49 (rev. edn. 1980))

10. Ibid.
11. Deleuze displays little interest in the hermeneutical tradition. Alternatively (departing from his interpretation of Spinoza - "Spinoza et le problème de l'expression" Paris: Minuit (1968)) he creates intricate systems of concepts that are arranged/functioning according to a self-contained logic/anti-logic of paradoxes. Deleuze has been termed a writer of "science fiction": (Deleuze says of Hume that his empiricism is before the term existed; a sort of science-fiction universe. As in science-fiction, one has the impression of a fictive, strange, foreign world,
seen by other creatures; but also the presentiment that this world is already ours, and these other creatures ourselves" - "Hume" in "Histoire de la philosophie: les lumières, ed. François Châtelet Paris: Hatchette 1972 (V 65-)

Alternatively Deleuze develops concepts in a procedure similar to a theoretical scientist, examining the logical consequences of such counter-intuitive notions as black-holes/in-dimensional space/particle-waves etc. He also constructs elaborate/triangulate imaginary worlds/alternative universes in the manner of Jorge Luis Borges illustrating how "reality" would appear if it were constructed upon simultaneous singularities/anonymous forces or formless bodies and incorporeal surfaces. He inverts paradoxically structured concepts and deploys them as a framework to establish an alternative world. Within this alternative cosmos, Deleuze identifies an incorporeal dimension of difference and advocates the necessary significance of such a dimension within any philosophy of language/theory of the proposition. He correspondingly asserts that difference manifests itself in sub-representative experience (for example, Proustian reminiscence or Masochian fantasy: See "Marcel Proust et les signes" Paris: PUF (1964) - Rev. edn. published 1970/1971/1976 as "Proust et les signes", and "Présentation de Sacher-Masoch" Paris: Minuit (1971)), and that non-discursive forces co-exist and interact with the incorporeal surface of difference.

In contrast to the deconstructive programme Deleuze does not regard philosophy as a form of exegesis wherein thought should be situated/grounded in a "traditional" philosophical discourse, in constant antagonistic/oppositional and reactive relationship with metaphysics. Deleuze initially creates a different fiction that facilitates the location of language within a wider non-discursive field of difference and forces.

The Deleuzian philosophy of difference does not solely restrict the focus of attention to language and its metastatic foundations yet neither does he explore directly the interconnection of discourse and forces. By maintaining a correlational dualism of incorporeal difference and formless forces, Deleuze adapts the "deconstructive" play of difference that embodies/typifies rational discourse from the exhilarating oscillation of word-shards and sonic-blocks that occurs within the schizophrenic field of body forces.

Within the parameters of Deleuze and Guattari's scheme of the philosophy of desiring-production the interconnection of forces to language and signs is prominently articulated. By the application of a monism of forces they explore the materiality of signs and open up an examination of semiosis as a mode of action.

In a manner similar to Deleuze, Wittgenstein does not adopt a theoretical attitude to language as if it were a construction for the purposes of communication. The human subject is not to be regarded as an observer who responds to things on the basis of his/her epistemic appropriation of the properties that are appropriate to desires. We cannot dis-connect our reactions from the bodily form which constitute their expressiveness, without losing sense.

With respect to art Wittgenstein wrote: "it is not only difficult to describe what appreciation consists in - it is impossible. To describe what it consists in we would have to describe the whole environment" (Ludwig Wittgenstein "Lectures and Conversations" ed. C. Barrett Oxford: Blackwell (1966)). Language is a practice, the meaning and syntax of language cannot be defined independently of the speech acts they presuppose.

An account of the understanding of language must induct from the actual understanding of language. There is no transcendent form of language/definition/understanding in themselves, because our actual understanding is always presupposed. It is never transceded. Our understanding is ungrounded, our account of it must begin with it. It cannot be explained, only described. The language game starts with understanding. Explanation can only occur after the language game has commenced, if we require it to avert misunderstanding. The sense of a sentence is "in" the sentence. Therefore the understanding of the sense of the sentence is not separate from our perceptions of it.

"Doesn't the theme point to something outside itself? Oh Yes! But that means - the impression made on me hangs together with things in its surroundings - e.g. with the existence of our language and its intonation, but that means, with the whole field of our language games". (Ludwig Wittgenstein "Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology" translated G.E.M. Anscombe Oxford: Blackwell (1980)).

The theme does not point to an independently existing text which transcends the actual theme and gives it sense. Sense is expressed. As Deleuze writes: "the significance of Spinozism seems to me this: it asserts immanence as a principle and frees expression from any subordination to emanative or exemplary casuality. Expression itself no longer emanates, no longer resembles anything" (Gilles Deleuze "Spinoza et le problème d l'expression" Paris: Minuit (1968)).

And to return to Wittgenstein: "we regard understanding as the essential thing, and signs as something inessential. - But in that case, why have the signs at all? If you think that it is
only to make ourselves understood by others, then you are very likely looking on the signs as the drug which is to produce in other people the same condition as my own.” (Ludwig Wittgenstein “Philosophical Grammar” trans. A. Kenny Oxford: Blackwell, 1974)

It is the signs as perceived that constitute the sense. Deleuze attempts to promote the suggestion that language can be regarded as a collective assemblage of acts/statements that can be utilized in the process of deterritorialization. Becomings belong to a geography, they are orientations/directions/entrees/exits. Deleuze initiates a language of becoming, that which is imperceptible, a veritable assemblage of enunciation. The form of expression of language can be translated into an almost infinite variety of substances. Not only is its form of expression alienable from its substance, but it can alienate the forms of its contents from their substances and translate them into its own substance/meaning. Additionally, it can re-translate those forms of content from its substance into other substances (incorporeal transformation). Language is highly deterritorialized/deterritorializing. It is active/transformational operating on many levels/superlinear.
TOURS OF THE BLACK CLOCK (DARK)

The opening of the project is initiated via an investigation transposing Nietzschean Philosophy, firstly with the work of Deleuze and secondly with the collaborative programme of Deleuze and Guattari. The foundational structure of the project is based upon Deleuze and Guattari’s attempt to articulate their own philosophy via a systematic engagement with Nietzsche. It is assumed that Nietzschean philosophy constitutes a primary framework that structures many of the central themes/concerns that inform and emanate from the Deleuzo-guattarian enterprise.

Deleuze identifies three major lines of strategy that orchestrate the symmetry of Nietzsche's philosophic design - the subversion of Platonism and consequent promotion of a philosophy derived from a physics of force; the replacement of the Hegelian notion of “negation of negation” with a philosophy of affirmation; and the completion of the Kantian scheme for a critical philosophy by directing it against the traditional principles of Western rationality. Similarly these modes of thought relate to the positions illuminated by Deleuze throughout much of his work.

In "Nietzsche et la philosophie" (1) Deleuze presents Nietzsche as an anti-Platonic philosopher who attempts to overturn Platonism by completing the Kantian project of a critical philosophy (2). Deleuze in situating Nietzsche within the history of philosophy is particularly careful to establish his relationship to Kant. Deleuze argues that in Nietzsche there is not merely “a Kantian heritage, but a half-avowed, half-hidden rivalry” (3).

Nietzsche’s programme in effect, attempts to complete the task of a Critical Philosophy, only imperfectly instigated by Kant. Kant according to Nietzsche fails to include “values” within his critical analysis (4). Kant assumes the value of Truth, Goodness and Beauty, and his critique is wholly subservient to these unexamined values. Nietzsche subsequently proposes to introduce the “question” of value into thought and to make the critique of value the centre of a new genealogical philosophy.
Nietzschean evaluations are not simply values, they become ways of being (modes of existence of those who evaluate). Deleuze states, "we have the beliefs, feelings and thoughts we deserve given our way of being or style of life." (5). A concentration upon the origins of values signifies exactly the differential element of their origin - which for Nietzsche is the distance/difference between high/low, noble/base.

The Kantian critique not only fails to be total, but it also fails to be positive - in effect the failure to be total excludes the possibility of being positive. The partial destructive impulse of the critique allows essential established values to endure and in this respect fails to clear the ground necessary for value-creating constructive power.

The Deleuzian attack on Kant's transcendental method, invoking perspectivism (Deleuze accepts no transcendental position external to the plane of forces that determines/legitimates absolute knowledge and universal values, it is necessary therefore to situate the perspective on the immanent plane and define the functions it activates. In consequence the only possible principle of a total critique is perspectivism) is allied to the Nietzschean attack on Platonic idealism.

Deleuzian analysis concentrates upon "the form of the question" that animates philosophical examination. The central question for the Platonic model, Deleuze says, is "Qu'est-ce que?" "What is beauty, What is justice?" Nietzsche alternatively changes the central question to "Qui?" Who is beautiful?" or more exactly, "Which one is beautiful?" (again the focus of attack is the transcendental method). "Qu'est-ce que?" is the principle transcendental question that seeks an ideal that is located above, as a suprasensible ordering element of the various material instantiations. "Qui?" is a materialist question that adheres to the movement of real forces from a specific perspective. In effect the two questions relate to different worlds for their answers. Deleuze in later work comes to term the materialist question "the method of dramatization" and claims that it is the fundamental basis of inquiry throughout the history of philosophy. The method of dramatization is essentially an elaboration of perspectivism as part of a critique of interest/value. It is not sufficient
to offer the abstract question “What is truth?” (“qu’est-ce que le vrai?”); in contrast one should pose “Who wants truth?” (“qui veut le vrai?”). Where/whom/how/how much?. “According to Nietzsche’s method the concept of truth must be dramatized” (Gilles Deleuze) (5).

The question “Qui?” brings us to the terrain of will and value and asks for an immanent dynamic of being, an internal efficient force of differentiation.

Deleuze conceives Nietzsche’s valuations/evaluations as both critical/creative and ethical/aesthetic, they constitute an affirmative difference at the origin point and therefore are active. The negation of Nietzschean judgements and the concentration on the ethical/aesthetic dimensions of Nietzsche’s thought characterizes Deleuze’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s texts and correspondingly form the basis of Deleuze’s re-thinking of philosophy. Deleuze identifies an “aesthetic form of joy” produced via affirmation/creation, (as opposed to the Kantian passive sensation of aesthetics) and additionally an “ethic of joy” derived from an evaluation of the origin/genesis of value.

Difference at the point of origin, as determined by Nietzschean affirmation/evaluation, may be the reason that not all evaluations are the effect of what Deleuze terms active force (most evaluations may be generated by revenge and caused by a base modes/ of living/reaction). Deleuze by tracing the singular history of a thing, illustrates how reactive forces have to date dominated the evaluative process.

The history of a thing is the product of the compound of reciprocating forces that constitute its existence, in addition to the conflict between those forces to attain superiority/superior influence (6). Nietzsche writes of how we mis-conceive the history of a thing in spite of its function.

“But purposes and utilities are only signs that a will to power has become master of something less powerful and imposed upon it the character of a function, and the entire history of a thing, an organ, a custom can in this way be a continuous sign-chain of ever new interpretations and adaptations” (Friedrich Nietzsche) (7)
In this regard, in view of the history, the reciprocating compound of independent/individual processes of subduing forces/resistances/reactions/counteractions, "the form (of a thing) is fluid, but the "meaning" is even more so" (Friedrich Nietzsche) (8). Therefore only a genuine critique can effect an analysis of the forces that constitute something, and as Deleuze proposes it is within the Nietzschean philosophical programme that such a critique operates. "In Kant, critique was not able to discover the truly active instance which would have been capable of carrying it through...it never makes us overcome the reactive forces which are expressed in man, self-consciousness, reason, morality, and religion" (Gilles Deleuze) (9). In contrast Nietzsche's fundamental genetic and plastic principles develop, "an account of the sense and value of beliefs, interpretations and evaluations" (Gilles Deleuze) (10). The Kantian critique simply subjectivized predominant values rather than proposing any evaluative process and therefore negated the possibilities of the creation of new values. Deleuze writes it is, "When we stop obeying God, the State, our parents, reason appears and persuades us to continue being docile because it says to us: it is you who are giving the orders" (11). This is why, Deleuze proposes, that thought must think against reason. Becoming a genealogist, the philosopher no longer affirms/integrates existing values but constructs alternative ones. He/She becomes a philosopher of the future, which Nietzsche characterizes as wanting to venture beyond/to overcome - in the respect that he/she is overcome in the construction of a new/different type of thinking/sensibility (12).

Thinking in opposition to reason and becoming a genealogist requires the derivation/activation of new principles, and in order to facilitate this state/occurrence Nietzsche utilizes the notion of force. Deleuze defines force as "the appropriation, domination and exploitation of reality" (13). Forces are comprised quantitatively and qualitatively - the difference in quantity between two forces is a "differential" element, a quantitative element of difference between two forces, and it generates the qualitative element of a force, that is the force as active/reactive. Forces are constituted differentially.
One of the important circumstances that determine the relational action between forces is the absence of dialectical negativity. (14). The force that dominates is not motivated by negation but via the affirmation and enjoyment of its own difference from other forces. This is the primary constituent of Nietzsche's empiricism: instead of negation there is difference as affirmation/enjoyment. "Dialectic is labor" but "(Nietzsche's) empiricism is an enjoyment" (15). Affirmation as a feeling of pleasure/power.

Deleuze argues that the final result of Nietzsche's completion of the Kantian critique is the foundation of a new image of thought. What Nietzsche identifies as absent in the Kantian critique of reason is a genealogy of reason - an analysis of the "genesis of reason itself" of "the will that hides and expresses itself in reason" (16). Kant is limited because of this missing genealogy - "Kant merely pushed a very old conception of critique to the limit, a conception which saw critique as a force which should be brought to bear on all claims to knowledge and truth, but not on knowledge and truth themselves" (17).

Nietzsche dramatizes the conception of truth discovering ultimately that the truth seeker strives above all not to be fooled. The world is deceptive/misleading, of "appearance", so in defence the man of truth opposes it to another world, a world beyond, a true world. Underlying this speculative opposition one positions a moral opposition of good knowledge and false life, and it is this opposition which is symptomatic of the will to correct life/make it confirm to knowledge. Consequently, this will to correct life is a nihilistic will, because the man of truth desires life that will become reactive/vengeful, as he is, in effect, to turn on itself, annihilate itself. Underlying the search for truth Nietzsche discovers a moral/ascetic/nihilistic will and proposes to replace the will to truth with an affirmative will to falsehood - an artistic will that would transform the will to deception into a higher creative will. Thought informed by such will would not stand in opposition to knowledge to life and would not confine life within the parameters of rational knowledge and consequently measure knowledge by the reductive standard of a reactive life - alternatively it would evolve an active force of thought, the affirmative power of life. "Thinking would then mean discovering, inventing new possibilities of life" (18).
For Deleuze, such a method of thinking entails a new conception of thought, antithetical to the traditional/dogmatic notion of thought. Thought is always interpretation and evaluation is noble or base, depending upon the forces that activate it. When thought is energized the resultant effect is a profound/excited destruction of the negative and the creation of new possibilities. Interpretation and evaluation consist of two dimensions, "the second also being the return of the first, the return of the aphorism or the cycle of the poem" (19). In its affirmative capacity, the return of interpretation and evaluation which Deleuze highlights is the eternal return, and the focus of its interpretation and evaluation is the will to power.

Deleuze identifies the rigorous consistency of Nietzsche's philosophy contained within his terminology. Nietzsche, he states, "uses precise new terms for very precise new concepts" (20). In the proceeding section in continuing to outline Deleuze's reading/appropriation of Nietzsche the tactical focus will concentrate upon the innovative interpretation of the will to power and the eternal return. The analysis in addition to demonstrating Deleuze's abilities to transform the thought/programme of another philosopher will also initiate the construction of the framework for a continuing survey of Deleuze's complete stratagem.

Deleuze acknowledges explicitly an anti-Hegelian polemic that motivates his reading of Nietzsche (21). In effect openly declaring war on Hegel, Deleuze attacks what he regards as mis-guided attempts to enact a compromise between the Hegelian dialectic and Nietzsche's genealogy. Within the interpretation of Nietzsche's philosophy Deleuze illustrates the erroneous nature of attempts to regard Nietzsche as a neo-Hegelian. Hegel's thinking is directed by the movement constantly towards some form of unifying synthesis. Nietzsche, in contrast is viewed as affirming multiplicity and diversity. (22). Essentially Deleuze interprets the Nietzschean programme as an immanent polemical reaction against the Hegelian dialectic, one which counters its own basis - "The negativity of the positive" - to the Hegelian proposition of the "positivity of the negative".

Deleuze approaches the notion of a Nietzschean synthesis via an affirmation of multiplicity.
and an attack on the Hegelian dialectic. Pluralism and multiplicity counteract the dialectic precisely because they are irreducible to unity.

Deleuze elucidates the concept of the will to power via the elements of force and the body. According to Nietzsche the world exists in a state of becoming, in constant flux/change in which no entities maintain a stable identity. The will to power is both a differential and a genetic object of thought, it is that which interprets; it "estimate(s) the quality of force that gives meaning to a given phenomenon, or event, and it measures the relation of the forces which are present" (Gilles Deleuze) (23). The will to power evaluates. "The will to power as genealogical element is that from which senses derive their significance and values and their value" (Gilles Deleuze) (24).

In Nietzsche's interpretational model of the world "no things remain but only dynamic quanta, in a relation of tension to all other dynamic quanta" (25). Nature is an interrelated multiplicity of forces, and all forces are either dominant or dominated. A body is evaluated by "this relation between dominant and dominated forces. Every relationship of force constitutes a body - whether it is chemical, biological, social or political... in a body the superior or dominant forces are known as active and the interior or dominated forces are known as reactive" (Gilles Deleuze) (26).

The Deleuzian Nietzsche is a "pluralist" ("Nietzsche's philosophy cannot be understood without taking his essential pluralism into account. And, in fact, pluralism (otherwise known as empiricism) is almost indistinguishable from philosophy itself" (Gilles Deleuze)) (27), that is for Nietzsche reality consists entirely of a plethora of unstable forces. These unstable forces, constantly come into existence, seek to assert themselves by dominating other forces and then pass out of existence. Furthering this model Deleuze contends that this conception of reality determines every aspect of Nietzschean thought - including the cultural analysis and moral vision. We might observe how in "Beyond Good and Evil" Nietzsche attempts to explain everything as derivative from the notion that the world consists of unstable forces constantly struggling to overcome other forces.
The will to power is internal to force, but not reducible to it, and Deleuze states, "force is what can, will to power is what wills" (La force est ce qui peut, la volonté de puissance est ce qui veut) (28) Deleuze defines the will to power as:

"the genealogical element of force, both differential and genetic. The will to power is the element from which we derive both the quantitative difference of related forces and the quality that devolves into each force in this relation. The will to power here reveals its nature as the principle of the synthesis of forces."

(Gilles Deleuze) (29)

The will to power determines the relationship between forces, in terms of both quantity (as the differential element that determines the difference between quantities) and of quality (as the genetic element that determines the quality of each force as either active/reactive). The will to power is a plastic principle which may be conceptually distinct from force but can never exist entirely divorced from the specific forces it determines in any single occurrence (it is neither a universal will nor an individual/self-identical will).

"The will to power is plastic, inseparable from each case in which it is determined, just as the eternal return is being, but being which is affirmed of becoming, the will to power is unitary, but unity which is affirmed of multiplicity" (Gilles Deleuze) (30).

The ordinary notion of force requires amendment/supplementation both in terms of something of the order of a will or inner centre that generates the relations between forces (31) and also with "senses", sensation-feelings that enable forces to "perceive" each other and be affected by each other (32).

The sensibility or affectivity of force is the product of the will to power, and the more affirmative the will to power, the more significant the power of being affected that is produced in force. Therefore the will to power incorporates a "feeling" of power and consequently all affectivity/sensation/emotion originate from it.
The will to power is the genealogical element of force that initiates differential relations of quantities of force, from which precipitate the qualities of each force active or reactive. The will to power functions as a type of internal focal point/core of force, a power of becoming active or reactive, whose quality is either affirmative or negative, and it emanates as the affectivity of force - the will of being affected. The will to power is the concept which stimulates/motivates/authorizes a theory of nature as relations of forces - dynamic (becoming-active/reactive), determined in quality (the genealogical element of force) and encompassing the reciprocal effect of each force upon the other (the affectivity of force).

Within this conception the will to power may be perceived as an interpretative and evaluative mechanism, that which catalyses thought and determines whether it is active/reactive, affirmative/negative. Interpretation estimates "the quality of force that gives meaning to a given phenomenon, or event, and from that to measure the relation of the forces which are present" (33). Evaluation determines "the will to power which gives value to a thing" (34). Interpretation and evaluation are, however, not disinterested activities but in themselves functions of the will to power. The will to power is the differential element of force, is that which determines the qualities of forces, and thus that which interprets. Nietzsche asks of the will to power in each case: Is it affirmative or negative? (creative/slavish). The signification of a sense and the value of a value can be derived or determined only in terms of the differential relations between forces, that is in terms of quantity and quality, and they are not a function of some underlying principle, nor some telos.

The will power, either as force of affirmation or force of negation is that which creates value, and thus that which evaluates. The will to power is the origin of meaning and value and, "the will to power is essentially creative and giving it does not aspire, it does not seek; it does not desire, above all it does not desire power. It gives." (Gilles Deleuze) (35). Evaluation is both ethical and aesthetic, in the sense of critical and creative.

With the will to power Nietzsche challenged all future dualisms - it would no longer be possible for understanding to proceed according to a model that operated in terms of a simple
binary logic. Alternatively Nietzsche constructs a polyvalent monism that distinguishes correspondingly both degrees and types of will to power. The world is much more complicated than dualistic thinking acknowledges, and Nietzsche’s claim "This world is a will to power - and nothing besides! And you yourselves are also will to power - and nothing besides!" (36) suggests that the radically contextual and contingent nature of all conceptual distinctions and renders suspect any rigidly hierarchized metanarrative of binary opposition.

The perspective of a pluralist/polyvalent monism which acknowledges differences without falling victim to conceiving these differences as representing inherently opposed subjects is one of the central points of contact between the projects of Nietzsche and Deleuze.

For Nietzsche, according to Deleuze, "There is no event, no phenomenon, word or thought which does not have a multiple sense". (Gilles Deleuze)(37). It is, however, not just meanings that are plural, objects are in themselves pluralities. Deleuze attributes to Nietzsche, as does Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, the view that the world comprises of an infinity of plural unstable forces constantly coming into existence and then being extinguished. Suggesting that forces are plural entails, for Deleuze as for Müller-Lauter, that they always exist in relationship to other forces. "Innocence" is one of the terms Deleuze adopts to illustrate this notion of pluralism - Innocence is the reality of the multiple, "la vérité du multiple".

"Everything is referred to a force capable of interpreting it, every force is referred to what it is able to do, from which it is inseparable. It is this way of being referred, of affirming and being affirmed, which is particularly innocent. Whatever does not let itself be interpreted by a force nor evaluated by a will calls out for another will capable of evaluating it, another force capable of interpreting it". (Gilles Deleuze)(38)

Forces are defined by their inter-relation rather than any inherent core. Determined by their confrontation with other forces, there is no agent behind the will, nor are they the expression of an inner essence. Additionally by "innocence of existence" Deleuze advocates that Nietzsche makes an affirmation out of becoming. This suggests that there is in affirming only enduring becoming - that is there is no substance/residual/substratum behind that which becomes - the affirmation of the being of becoming.
There is no being beyond becoming or beyond the multiplicity of becoming, nor are there multiple realities and eternities that are essences beyond the realm of becoming. Forces do not stand behind objects, in effect all that exists is in itself force. Extending this model, Deleuze says:

"A phenomenon is not an appearance or even an apparition but a sign, a symptom which finds its meaning in an existing force. The whole of philosophy is a symptomatology, and a nemeiology"  
(Gilles Deleuze) (39)

Deleuze's point is that the object/phenomenon is a network of forces, temporarily dominated by one force. The world is essentially pluralistic therefore the domination is only a temporary/unstable state and continual overcoming is the only constant. To perceive the meaning/sense of something ("le sens") is to recognise the force currently governing/dominating the unstable network of forces that constitutes the phenomena. Deleuze's pluralism is founded upon the notion of force, and force through the notion of the will/will to power - that is, a force in a relationship to another force.

"La volonté (volonté de puissance) est l'élément différentiel de la force (the will/ will to power) is the differential element of force)"  
(Gilles Deleuze) (40)

For Deleuze, via Nietzsche, the world is composed of forces constantly in flux and constantly in opposition with other forces and the determinant factor of these forces is the will to power.

In going beyond good and evil, beyond truth and error to claim that all is will to power, Nietzsche attempted to think relationally without substances, relations without relata, difference without exclusion.

Nietzsche conceives the history of the Western tradition as that of the triumph of reactive forces and the negative will to power - termed the triumph of nihilism. The central problem
confronting Nietzsche is to determine how reactive forces supplant active forces and to
discover a procedure/method to overcome nihilism and express the affirmative will to power.
In his interpretation of Nietzsche’s “On the Genealogy of Morals”, Deleuze details the
complex stages in which the reactive forces attain a dominating influence over active forces.
Reactive forces, he demonstrates always outmanoeuvre active forces via negative/imaginary
fictions the most prominent of which is “the fiction of a super-sensible world in opposition
to this world, the fiction of a God in contradiction to life” (41).

When a force becomes active it extends its power to its limit as an affirmation. When a force
becomes reactive, it does so as negative and nihilistic - its will to power is a will to
nothingness, and not a will to dialectic

“Mankind itself is still ill with the effects of this priestly naïveté in medicine...the entire
antisensualistic metaphysic of the priests that makes men indolent and overrefined...and
finally the only-too-comprehensible satiety with all this, together with the radical cure for
it nothingness.”
(Friedrich Nietzsche) (42).

Accordingly, following the Deleuzian interpretational scheme, it is not possible for
reactive force to extend its power to its limit and become more powerfully reactive. Reactive
forces are in accord with negativity and denial and they may, via the will to nothingness -
the ultimate extension of their force - only negate themselves (they negate their own reactive
force). This “active negation”/“active nihilism” is the method whereby reactive forces
become active, (negation never negates active force and affirmation, it only divides them
from its own power until subsequently weakened they become reactive). Similarly active
affirmation cannot become negative via an extension of its power to its limit. Within this
complicity between active forces and affirmation, such a becoming simply enhances the power
of active forces. However because of its reciprocal interaction within negation, reactive
force extends the full power of negation - the will to nothingness - to a further extent at
which point forces actively negate their own reactive negativity and become active.
Nietzsche writes describing nihilism: “It reaches its maximum of relative strength as a
violent force of destruction - as active nihilism." (43).

Deleuze argues that for Nietzsche "Nihilism is not an event in history but the motor of the history of man as universal history". (44). Humanity is essentially reactive, and human history is the universal history of becoming - reactive of force. The only means to attain the affirmation is the overcoming of the self to become something other than human ("the overman"). Definitive affirmation entails capriciousness - a freedom from reactive forces. The process enacted in which the affirmation may be attained, says Deleuze is the eternal return; which to be extensively comprehended must be interpreted as a physical/ethical doctrine and a doctrine of selective ontology.

One of the major themes that structure sections of Deleuze's later projects is a process he terms "becoming". The central feature that distinguishes "becoming" is the absence of any fixed terms:

"What is real is the becoming itself, the block of becoming, not the supposedly fixed terms through which that which becomes passes........ Becoming produces nothing, other than itself......becoming lacks a subject distinct from itself......Becoming is a verb with a consistency all of its own; it does not reduce to, or lead back to, "appearing", "being", "equating", or "producing".

(Gilles Deleuze/Félix Guattari) (45)

Evolutionary language concentrates attention on the beginning and endpoint of a process in a way that obscures the passage between them; in contrast the language of compound becoming focuses upon what occurs between these ever-receding endpoints. Becomings operate between poles, they are the in-betweens that pass only and always along a middle without origin or destination.

Within the Deleuzo-guattarian interpretative programme, anything appears as possible - the subject is a process of multiple becomings in which anything can be connected to anything else.
If applied to Nietzsche’s concept of the “Übermensch” the Deleuzo-guattarian model of “Becoming” experiments with how “Übermensch” functions in the Nietzschean text. As an alternative to a particular being or type of being. (46). ("Übermensch" does not designate an ontological state or way of being that a subject could/should instantiate). “Übermensch” is rather the name given to a certain idealized conglomeration of forces, what Nietzsche defines in "Ecce Homo", "a type of supreme achievement" (47). Nietzsche does not configure a philosophical complex for “Übermensch”, he provides suggestions for actions to be followed to “become” “Übermensch". Following a Deleuzo-guattarian procedure we can draw attention to an active process of assembling. Becoming "Übermensch" in the context of a human subject refers to a process of "life-enhancement", a selfovercoming, increasing the will to power. Experimenting with the different possibilities of becoming "Übermensch" we can read "Thus Spoke Zarathustra” (48) not as providing the outline for creating a centred super-subject called "Overman", but alternatively as a technique of experimentalism noting that one must derive one's own way, "for the way -that does not exist" (49). This method emphasises not a way of Being but the affirmation of self-overcoming and transvaluation that allows for the infinite process of becoming that can be termed "Becoming "Übermensch".

Nietzsche formulated the eternal return in "Ecce Homo" as “the highest formula of affirmation that is at all attainable” and as the key concept of “Thus spoke Zarathustra”. Nietzsche’s philosophy is an affirmation of becoming and if the eternal return is its “highest affirmation”; then, states Deleuze, the eternal return must be a return, not of being and the same, but of becoming and difference. Deleuze presents the thought of the eternal return as comprehensible in terms of two moments (a moment of absorption in the game/creative activity and a moment of distanced contemplation of the game/creative activity). Initially one participates in becoming and thereby affirms it, then subsequently one recognizes that all moments of the world are moments of becoming - that the very being of the world is becoming - and one affirms the fact that every instance is the return or coming anew of becoming. Therefore, says Deleuze, “return (revenir) is the being of becoming (devenir) itself, being which affirms itself in becoming” (50).
The World is in a constant state of change - it is "becoming" not "being". However, a "becoming" world cannot be "known", this is the conceptual basis of Nietzsche's denial of the possibility of knowledge - we can "know" only the simulacra of being which we ourselves have constructed.

"Continual transitions forbid us to speak of an "individual", etc., the "number of beings is itself in flux. We would know nothing of time or of motion if we did not, in a crude fashion, believe we observed "that which is at rest "beside" "that which is in motion". The same applies to cause and effect, and without the erroneous conception of "empty space", we would never have carried at the conception of space. The law of identity has as its background the appearance that there are identical things. A world in a state of becoming could not in a strict sense be "comprehended" or "known", only in so far as the "comprehending" and "knowing" intellect discovers a crude ready-made world put together out of nothing but appearances, but appearances which, to the extent that they are of the kind that have preserved life, have become firm - only to this extent is there anything like "knowledge", i.e. a measuring of earlier and later errors by one another."

(Friedrich Nietzsche) (51)

Thinking/Thought is conceivable only from the basis of an "assumption of beings... logic deals only with the formulas for that which remains the same": but this assumption "belongs to our perspectives". Because "the world is a state of becoming" is "unformulatable", and "knowledge and becoming exclude one another", "knowledge" must be something other than knowledge: there must first be a will to make knowable, a kind of becoming must itself create the illusion of beings" (Friedrich Nietzsche) (52)

There are two central notions that structure the Nietzschean Philosophical scheme: the will to power and eternal recurrence.

In saying that the world is the "will-to-power", Nietzsche sees the will to power as manifesting itself in multifarious ways. But the will to power as such in its general form is fundamental, and manifestations are modes of it. In many aspects we see the will to power characterized the drive to control/organize/overcome. Any attempt to bring under control our environment is a mode of the will to power, and one of the primary examples of this is knowledge itself.
Knowledge is "not to know" but to schematize - to impose upon chaos as much regularity and form as suffices for our practical requirements", in the derivation of reason what was important was "the requirement, not to "know", but to subsume, to schematize, for the purpose of intelligibility and calculation"; the development of reason is "adaptation (Zurechtmachung), invention, in order to produce similarity, identity - the same process every sense impression goes through" (Friedrich Nietzsche) (53)

"Knowledge both deductive and empirical is "a determining, designating, making-conscious of conditions" (Friedrich Nietzsche) (54)

The mechanics of knowledge concentrates upon abstraction/simplification - "directed, not at knowledge, but at obtaining possession of things: "end" and "means" are as remote from its essences as are "concepts". With "end" and "means" one obtains possession of the process (one invents a process which is graspable), with "concepts", however, of the "things" which constitute the process" (Friedrich Nietzsche) (55)

We come to see the truth of our claims to knowledge in all fields of activity for what they are, interpretations from certain perspectives. Humanity acquires the idea of becoming as its ruling idea - if everything develops then "truth" in accordance is in process (Everything develops comes to imply that "nothing is true"). Nietzsche characterizes this paradoxical formulation by articulating truth as a matter of perspective. A metaphysical/religious/moral/rational statement can only be called "true" from the perspective of the mind which views it. Since "there are no facts", all knowledge of facts are interpretations, "introduction of meaning - not "explanation"". (Friedrich Nietzsche) (56)

Any attempt to discern what we know thus resolves itself into an attempt to discover why we interpret as we do
Another way of presenting Nietzsche's perspectivism is that all truths/knowledge about the world are interpretations: a mode of organizing experience under concepts which render a world-view with the condition that no such view can possibly be complete because it is dependent upon qualifying reference to a point of view. Nietzsche is not arguing against any view because it is an interpretation - he objects only to the view being promoted as more than an interpretation, as an objective truth. This is applicable to various systems of metaphysics/Kantian "apriori" categories/natural science/common sense/logic. What Nietzschean philosophy counters is interpretations being viewed/regarded as absolute transcendental objective truths.

Nietzsche's position consists of a general attack on the notion of separating theories about the world from the world itself. There are no facts, only interpretations, and no world remains once all interpretations have been subtracted. Theories, considered in their entirety cannot be compared with reality because there exists no reality outside of interpretation which is in itself part of an interpretation. (There is no neutral ground to locate whereby interpretation can be compared with reality because to have a conception of reality with which an interpretation could be compared is itself to articulate an interpretation).

An alternative method of phrasing this situation in which all viewpoints are inherently interpretative is that the traditional philosophical dichotomy of the appearance/reality distinction is eliminated - the "real world" is negated because there is no single universal complete description possible and it cannot be constructed from amalgamating a summary of various different views. This does not however imply that what remains is a merely apparent world - "appearance" and "reality" are correlative/mutually reciprocating contrasting concepts, and when the "real world" is removed there remains no sense to support the supposedly contrasting "apparent world", so consequently that too is removed. The apparent world "is" the world - the world as construed under an interpretation "is" the world.

The doctrine of "the eternal return" is situated in the genesis of the notion that the world
is infinite in time, but finite in space/energy, and therefore states inexorably, allocated
sufficient time, repeat. Thus this world forms our eternity. Although Nietzsche does seem
to adhere to "eternal recurrence" being perceived as a scientific/cosmological theory, the
importance and main grounds of the view reside not there but, rather, in its significance as
a "myth" whereby our decisions are focused on this world.

Once the notion of an absolute/correct viewpoint, and even its pursuit, is eliminated, an
exploration of alternative modes of interpreting the world can be adopted. The mode of
exemplifying the world - all views are interpretations from a perspective - is analogous to
the relinquishment of habit/custom/a belief in absolute standards and promotes by contrast
the production of singular viewpoints in accord with their own values/purposes.

The will to power, both as an interpretative mechanism in a world of ontological flux with no
objective order, and as an account of the motivation of knowledge can be a disinterested
activity separable from specific values - knowledge is rather a means to support specific
values. The doctrine of eternal recurrence emphasizes the priority of choice and the creative
power to transfigure the world with new truths/values in a way that has no end.

The eternal return represents, for Deleuze, the affirmation of plurality - to affirm the
eternal return is to affirm one's willingness to roll the dice. Additionally, the affirmation
that Deleuze identifies in the eternal return includes the possibility of the construction
of a hierarchy in a world devoid of inherent ordering systems. It is here that Deleuze
transforms Nietzsche's thought for his own purpose, denying the possibility of an exact
return. (An exact return would imply that the forces that constitute the world are not in
constant transition. Exact repetition would counteract Deleuze's assertion that, for
Nietzsche, the world consists of the apparitions of forces, not their reappearance, for it
would signify that forces reappear). Pluralism, as Deleuze presents it, insists that the
world is constantly changing, every-renewing.
The will to power has a specific relationship to the eternal return: "the eternal return is the synthesis which has as its principle the will to power" (Gilles Deleuze) (58). Deleuze's perception of "synthesis" is integral to his analysis of becoming and its implications for an understanding of time. Deleuze exemplifies the eternal return as a "synthesis of time and its dimensions, a synthesis of diversity as its reproduction, a synthesis of becoming and the being which is affirmed is becoming, a synthesis of double affirmation" (59).

"The game has two moments which are those of a dice throw - the dice that is thrown and the dice that falls back. Nietzsche presents the dice throw as taking place on two distinct tables, the earth and the sky. The earth where the dice are thrown and the sky where the dice fall back...." (Gilles Deleuze) (60)

The two moments of the dice throw constitute the basic elements of Nietzsche's alternative to the dialectic of the one and the multiple. In the first moment of the game the throw of the dice is the affirmation of chance and multiplicity because it is the denial of control. It is the indeterminate/unforeseeable. In Nietzsche's terms this is the being of becoming - pure multiplicity. The second moment when the dice fall back is more complex.

"The dice which are thrown once are the affirmation of "chance", the combination which they form on falling is the affirmation of "necessity". Necessity is affirmed of chance in exactly the sense that being is affirmed of becoming and unity is affirmed of multiplicity." (Gilles Deleuze) (61).

The falling back of the dice is not simply a confirmation of the necessity of the given/of multiple reality because this would only be a determinism and would risk negating rather than affirming the first moment of the game. The falling back of the dice is a moment of the organization of unity, an active creation of being. To fully comprehend this it is necessary to relate the dice thrown metaphor to the concept of the eternal return.

"...the dice which fall back necessarily affirm the number or the destiny which brings the dice back... The eternal return is the second moment, the result of the dice throw, the affirmation of necessity, the number which brings together all the parts of chance. But it is
The return of the dice is an affirmation of the dicethrow in that it constitutes the original elements of chance in a coherent whole - an original organization. Not only does the first moment - of multiplicity and becoming - imply the second moment it is also the return of the first. The two moments imply one another as a perpetual series of fragmentation and recombination, as a centrifugal movement and a centripetal moment, as emanation and constitution.

The will to power is the principle of the synthesis of the eternal return, and the eternal return is the manifestation of the principle which functions as an explanation of diversity and its multiplication, of difference and its repetition. The will to power is the differential element which locates forces in relation, and the eternal return is the affirmation of difference characterized as multiplicity/becoming/chance. The will to power also operates as “the power of becoming active,” “becoming active”, personified or the power of becoming reactive, “a becoming reactive”. (Gilles Deleuze) (63). The eternal return is the synthesis of becoming, which incorporates this principle of a ubiquitous becoming of forces.

The conception of the eternal return as the synthesis of forces which affirms becoming/multiplicity/chance, Deleuze terms the physical doctrine of the eternal return. In the Deleuzian scheme the eternal return is also symbolized as an ethical doctrine, which affords the initial factors for humankind (essentially reactive) to transform/reincarnate themselves and stimulate within themselves the affirmative will to power.

As an ethical doctrine the eternal return comprises of a selective principle, expressed in the practical form: “whatever you will, will it in such a way that you also will its eternal return” (64). In conjunction a second selection, a selection of “being” rather than thought is required to engender full affirmation - the eternal return as selective ontology. The
double affirmation of the eternal return acquires a new sense of this second selection - the eternal return as a physical doctrine "affirms the being of becoming", but "as selective ontology, it affirms this being of becoming as the "self-affirming" of becoming-active" (65).

In the secondary stage of nihilism (reactive nihilism) the negative will discharges and the human subject as the becoming reactive of forces is correspondingly discharged. The possibility of one overcoming humankind and attaining the affirmation is confirmed. The negative will is divided from the reactive forces and subsequently inspires in humanity a new inclination for the destruction of the self, but in an active mode. The affirmation that inaugurates the "Übermensch" incorporates a double negation - an active self-destruction of all human faculties. Which is immediately preceded by affirmation, and an active destruction of all known values, which immediately follows affirmation. This process of affirmation catalyses the transvaluation of values - not simply the substitution of one set of values for another, but the construction of a new, active process of life, for the derivation of values. This new scheme is the essence of the eternal return- the affirmation of the being of becoming/the unity of multiplicity/the necessity of chance.

The logic of synthesis/constitution of being is the eternal return the logic of will.

"The synthesis is one of forces, of their difference and their reproduction; the eternal return is the synthesis which has as its principle the will to power. We should not be surprised by the word "will", "which one" apart from the will is capable of serving as the principle of a synthesis of forces by determining the relation of force with forces?".

(Gilles Deleuze) (66).

The will to power is the principle of the synthesis that demarcates the being of becoming, the unity of the multiplicity and the necessity of chance. Essentially therein it defines a role as a primary cause, comprising of the necessity and substantiality of being. Nietzsche's basics, however, transform this logical/ontological position into an ethics. The eternal return is an ethics in the fact that it constitutes a "selective ontology" (67). It is selective because not every will returns - negation comes only once, only affirmation
returns. The eternal return is the selection of the affirmative will as being. Being is not a given in Nietzsche, being must be willed (in this sense ethics comes before ontology in Nietzsche). The ethical will is the will that returns and the ethical will is the will that wills being. This is the manner in which the eternal return may be regarded as a temporal synthesis of forces - it necessitates that the will to power wills unity in time. Deleuze formulates the ethical selection of the eternal return as a practical rule for the will.

"As an ethical thought the eternal return is the new formulation of the practical synthesis.

whatever you will, will it in such a way that you also will its eternal return" (Gilles Deleuze)

(68)

The eternal return is not separate from the will but internal to it. The ethical will is whole, internal to its return. The principle of the eternal return as being is the efficient will as an ethical will. The fundamental notion of efficiency and internality may now be conceived - from the logical centrality of the efficient difference (the difference internal to the thing) to the ontological centrality of efficient power (the force internal to its manifestation) and to the ethical centrality of the efficient will, the principle of the eternal return. A Scholastic vein runs throughout this series as a guideline, affording a materialist/metaphysical basis - the internal formulation of the cause to its effect is what constructs the necessity/substantiality/singularity/univocity of being. This is the means via which one can interpret the eternal return of the efficient will as the ethical key-stone of the Nietzschean philosophy of being.

The dicethrow (the moment of becoming) is followed by the dice falling back (the selection of being) which consequently leads to a new dicethrow. The ontological selection is not a negation of the indeterminacy of the dicethrow, but an enhancement of it, an affirmation, just as the eternal return is an affirmation of the will.

With the ethical background of the efficient/affirmative will, Deleuze re-configurates the drama of the "critique" - in terms of a valuation/as "transmutation". Deleuze presents the
critique via a combination of reconditioned Kantian and Scholastic terms: In effect a transmutational move from Kantianism to Scolasticism that comprises of a move from a critique of knowledge to a foundation of being. (69). In the transformative moment there is a conversion from knowledge to creation, from negation to absolute affirmation, from inferiority to exteriority/"....creation takes the place of knowledge itself and affirmation takes the place of all negations. (Gilles Deleuze) (70). With the active completion of nihilism and the transmutation to affirmation and creation, negativity/interiority/consciousness are dismissed. Exteriority is the condition for the foundation of being - the "ratio essendi" of the will to power according to Deleuze is affirmation. Deleuze reformulates a statement of Zarathustra as an ontological ethics - "I love the one who makes use of nihilism as the ratio cognoscendi of the will to power, but who finds in the will to power a ratio essendi in which man is overcome and therefore nihilism is defeated" (Gilles Deleuze)(71). Being is primary over knowledge.

In working through Nietzschean concepts Deleuze is to a significant extent characterizing his own positions. (Deleuze is not however simply a disciple of Nietzsche, his analysis of Nietzsche's philosophy is selective/creative and clearly is orientated more towards the exposition of certain possibilities arising from Nietzschean texts/from a singular examination of a philosophical "architectural" structure). Deleuze similarly to Nietzsche views the object of philosophy as the "affirmation of difference", as the chaotic multiplicity of the becoming of the World. In addition Deleuze regards thought as directed against reason but without it ceasing to be thought - it must interpret/evaluate and ultimately create new horizons of contingency in life - it must discover its evaluation in the conflict of a force that confronts thought and impels it to think that which defines thought - and it must examine the body and the unconscious to reveal it's capabilities. Nietzsche and Deleuze both attempt a synthesis of critique and creation without reduction. Ultimately Deleuze derives from Nietzsche a process towards new forms of expression of thought - forms compatible with a philosophy of difference.

Nietzsche illustrates the limits of knowledge. He highlights the notion that judgement is
grounded in perspectivism and questions claims of objectivity. At the extreme Nietzschean thought might lead to solipsism - a sisyphian internal discourse where the lack of any universal truth becomes a justification for negating alternative values. The challenge of Nietzsche’s philosophy is the presentation of the possibility to develop an aesthetic vision conscious of the limits of subjective view-points and aware of contrasting views, in a condition where necessity may be located only in fictions.

The Deleuzian model of difference is grounded within/informed by a theory of forces/a physics. Differences are created through the interaction of one force with another. The world is composed as a network of forces in which signs are the symptoms, symptomatology of forces. Throughout Deleuze’s project, force/bodies/”physis” remain in essence irreducible to language. Through his exposition of the concept of thought, Deleuze questions the distinction between philosophy and art. Philosophy and art do not issue from separate positions of truth and fiction/objectivity and subjectivity, but are integrated within a single realm of thought, whose fundamental aim is the creation of new possibilities of life.

(72).

Establishing pluralism as the essential form of metaphysics Deleuze continues the structuring of his Nietzschean system with an explication of the derivation of values. Deleuze traces the interarticulation of pluralism and a philosophy of value. He suggest that by introducing the concepts of meaning/value (sens et valeur) Nietzsche constructs a purely critical enterprise. Philosophy should be a critical programme, according to Deleuze, and the institution of a philosophy of sense and value is the only way to initiate this critique.

Values presuppose evaluation, and evaluations are manners of being. The Deleuzian critical project investigates the origin of values. Thoughts/beliefs/sentiments are not accidental but rather defined by virtue of being/the condition of existence. For humans, to exist is to evaluate. It is not values that determine our being, but our being that determines values.
“Evaluations, in essence are not values but ways of being, modes of existence of those who judge and evaluate, serving as principles for the values on the basis of which they judge” (servant précisément de principes aux valeurs par rapport auxquelles ils jugent) (Gilles Deleuze) (73)

According to Deleuze, Nietzsche suggests that the manner of existence is pluralistic and therefore values should reflect a pluralism. The noble and the base are not values but represent “l’élément différentiel dont dérive la valeur des valeurs mêmes”. Deleuze argues that values are derived from an ever-changing reality. (Deleuze develops his model on the derivation of values from an analysis of the three-stage metamorphosis described in the first section of “Thus Spoke Zarathustra”, “On the Three Metamorphoses”. Where Dionysus is presented as the god who constantly changes - the authentic representation of a transitory reality). Pluralism shatters the image of a continuity of forces to reveal the existence of new forces. Affirmation becomes “la raison d’être” for the will to power. Nietzsche in affirming the world affirms the will to power. Deleuze assigns to Dionysus the function/role of developing an affirmation based on the “principles” of pluralism.

“It is still necessary for the will to power to be related to affirmation as its “raison d’être”. and for affirmation to be related to the will to power as the element which produces, reflects and develops its own “ratio”. This is the task of Dionysus”

(Gilles Deleuze). (74)

Deleuze paralleling Nietzsche’s thought interprets art as being founded upon two principles: firstly art is a “stimulant of the will power” - “something that excites willing” (75). Nietzsche demands an aesthetics of creation - an affirmation that is the product of a way of thinking which presupposes an active life as its condition and concomitant. With regard to the second principle of art, Deleuze presents it as the “highest power of falsehood” that magnified the “world as error” it in effect sanctions the deception - the will to deception is promoted to a superior ideal. The second principle is characterized as the converse of the first, what is active in life can only be animated in relation to a deeper affirmation. The activity of life is similar to a power of falsehood, disingenuous falsifying/seducing. But in order to be operative, this power of falsehood must be selected redoubled/repeated and in
consequence elevated to a higher power. "The power of falsehood must be taken as far as a
"will" to deceive, an artistic will which alone is capable of competing with the ascetic ideal
and successfully opposing it" (76). It is art which invents the untruth that elevated
falsehood to its highest affirmative power, that transforms the will to deceive into
something which is affirmed in the power of falsehood. For the artist, "appearance" no longer
implies a negation of the real in the world, but a kind of
selection/correction/redoubling/affirmation"... truth perhaps takes on a new sense. Truth
is appearance. Truth means bringing of power into effect, raising to the highest power, In
Nietzsche, "we the artists" - "we the seekers after knowledge or truth" - "we the inventors
of new possibilities of life" (Gilles Deleuze) (77).
TOURS OF THE BLACK CLOCK (DARK)

NOTES


2. In 1968 Deleuze gave a number of lectures on Kant. In this series Deleuze presents Kant as almost a Nietzschean, a resolutely anti-dialectical "inventor of concepts".

3. op. cit (1962)

4. Nietzsche evaluates values by tracking their lines of development to the point of origin. Values emanate from "ways of being, modes of existence of those who judge and evaluate". Nietzsche et la philosophie (1962)) and all modes of being are classified as relatively high/low, noble/base (the noble category is in essence active/affirmative as opposed to the base category which is reactive/negative).

At the origin of values is difference, but there is a division between two distinct possibilities in the modes of difference, one affirmative, one negative (the affirmative relates to the noble category while the negative is appropriate to the slave category - The noble/master affirms his difference, the slave denies that which differs). One makes distinctions via difference and affirmation, the other via contradiction and negation (approaching affirmation only through a "negation of the negation" Hegel).

Deleuze concentrates on the qualitative difference in Nietzsche between active and reactive forces. Deleuze proposes that the superiority of the "Ubermensch" emanates from his/her capacity to "actively" negate the slave's reactive forces, even though these reactive forces may well be quantitatively in excess of the active forces - the slave is motivated by a negative premise ("you are other/evil?" He/She is bad" (i.e. not good)) to the positive judgement, therefore I am good (i.e. not not-good)). The master in contrast works from the positive differentiation of self ("I am good") to the negative corollary ("therefore he is other and bad"). (See the First Essay of "On the Genealogy of Morals" trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage (1969)).

Deleuze argues that there is a qualitative difference at the origin of force, and it is the task of the genealogist to comprehend the differential/genetic element of force which Nietzsche terms the "will to power". Therefore, within the Hegelian dialectic of master/slave, the reactive negation of the other derives its consequence in the positive affirmation of self. Nietzsche re-composes/reverses this model - the master actively promoting the self is correspondent/resultant in a negation of the slave's reactive force. (See Alan D Schrift "Nietzsche and the Question of Interpretation", London: Routledge (1991)).

An examination of the values should initiate from the differential origin of values, together with in addition to a determination of the mode of life that permeates/activates those values. Such an examination necessarily includes interpretation because the values of a mode of life predetermine all things engendering their meaning.

Interpretation and evaluation correspondingly structure Nietzsche's critical programme, but that critique, states Deleuze, is not confined to the neutral or disinterested. Every evaluation expresses a mode of life/interpretation is symptomatic of that particular state of existence. Nietzschean thought is directed towards the enunciation of an affirmative and active project that counterposes the reactive/negative thought that has dominated Western philosophy. Active evaluation integrates correlatively a creation of values and the consequent affirmative negation of negative values.

5. Gilles Deleuze - op. cit (1962).

6. Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1962)


8. Friedrich Nietzsche - ibid P 78 (1969)

9. Gilles Deleuze - op. cit (1962)

Deleuze claims that rather than producing a critique of knowledge (reason)/morality/religion, Kant merely justifies them because he "trusts"/"maintains faith" in the prevailing structure of values. Kant's critique of pure reason, is enacted by reason, but from a position outside, from a traditional transcendental stance - that of conditions that are prior and external to the conditioned. Kant does not offer description of the evolution of reason/understanding and its
categories.
10. Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1962)
11. Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1962)
13. Gilles Deleuze - op. cit (1962). Though critics of Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche have attempted to reveal a hidden subtext of dialectics existing in differences, this is an impossible move in terms of Deleuze’s articulation of Nietzsche’s ontology/aesthetics/ethics.

The negative is not completely absent from Nietzsche’s theory of force but its role/status is entirely different here than they are within a dialectic. Superficially it appears that the negative is situated at the origin in difference (the difference between active and reactive forces, since it exists as a quality of the will to power - willing negation/willing denial etc.). Vincent Pecore claims, "Genealogy means "origin" but also "difference......in the origin"; and will to power is both the "differential element" through which values, like signs, define themselves and a motive of force behind the creation of values that is either active or reactive, affirmative or......dialectical" (See Vincent P Pecore, "Deleuze’s Nietzsche and Poststructuralism" Sub-Stance vol. 14 (3) No. 48). However, only active force interacting with affirmation, affirms difference. In the Deleuzian re-construction, reactive force acts by limiting active force, restricting it correlatively with negativity and denial and separating active force from what it can do. This is the central tenet, according to Deleuze, of sections of Nietzsche’s “On the Genealogy of Morals”. It is Nietzsche’s statements outlining an exposition of active justice that Deleuze regards as the purpose of Nietzsche’s work, in the sense that the question of affirmation is the question of existence that justifies via affirmation, as opposed to the reactive condemnation of existence. When Pecore argues that the differential nature of will to power (critical and creative) is dialectical at its origin, his reading succeeds only in separating will to power from its exercise - he reads its critical aspect as a negative force that in some way acts negatively without dissolving into nihilism, and not as merely a lesser quality of active force. From Deleuze’s configuration of the model it is Pecore’s own interpretation that is inclined to suffer from being reactive.
21. The anti-Hegeiian character of "Nietzsche et la philosophie" is examined in the second chapter of Michael Hardt’s "Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy" (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1993)).
22. Deleuze’s impact within the context of French post-structuralism is discussed in Vincent P Pecora’s "Deleuze’s Nietzsche and Post-Structuralism" (Substance Vol. 14 (3) No. 48 (1986). He notes that the aphorism deciphers the meaning of a phenomenon, and with the poem he determines the hierarchical value of various meanings. "But because values and senses are such complex notions, the poem itself must be evaluated; the aphorism interpreted. The poem and the aphorism are, themselves, objects of interpretation, an evaluation" (Nietzsche et la philosophie (1962)).
If the will to power is to interpret and evaluate the relation of forces and consequently to determine them, it must possess its own qualities by means of which it can designate forces. Affirmative and negative (affirmation and denial) designate the primordial qualities of the will to power: "... affirmation and negation extend beyond action and reaction because they are immediate qualities of becoming itself. Affirmation is not action but the power of becoming active, becoming active personified. Negation is not simple reaction but a becoming reactive." (Gilles Deleuze) (Nietzsche et la philosophie - 1962).

Deleuze positions the will to power as an inner centre of force - a general orientation of becoming that manifests itself in specific forces and goes beyond individual forces to link them in a line of development. "It is as if affirmation and negation were both immanent and transcendent in relation to action and reaction; out of the web of forces that make up the chain of becoming". The will to power is the power of becoming that plays through forces differentiating them and linking them both spatially and temporally.

Deleuze elaborates a distinction between the will to power's determining activity as a differential element and its manifestation as a power of affectivity. The will to power presents itself as "a capacity for being affected" (Gilles Deleuze - Nietzsche et la philosophie - 1962). It is a notion that Deleuze views as being closely parallel to the Spinozist conception that a body's force is a function derived from the numerous ways in which it can be affected, and correlative that a body's facility for being affected is an expression of its power. (See: Gilles Deleuze "Spinoza et le problème de l'expression" Paris: Minuit - 1968).
47. In "Ecce Homo". Why I Write Such Good Books" (Section 1):

"The word "Übermensch," as the designation of a type of supreme achievement, as opposed to "modern" men, to "good" men, to Christians and other nihilists - a word that in the mouth of a Zarathustra, the annihilator of morality, becomes a very pensive word - has been understood almost everywhere with the utmost innocence in the sense of those very values whose opposite Zarathustra was meant to represent - that is, as an "idealistic" type of a higher kind of man, half "saint," half "genius." Other scholarly oxen have suspected me of Darwinism on that account. Even the "hero worship" of that unconscious and involuntary counterfeiter, Carlyle, which I have repudiated so maliciously has been read into it. Those to whom I said in confidence that they should sooner look even for a Cesare Borgia than for a Parsifal, did not believe their own ears.


49. Friedrich Nietzsche - "Thus Spoke Zarathustra." "On the Spirit of Gravity" (Section 2).


52. Friedrich Nietzsche - ibid (1968).

53. Friedrich Nietzsche - ibid (1968).

54. Friedrich Nietzsche - ibid (1968).

55. Friedrich Nietzsche - ibid (1968).

56. Friedrich Nietzsche - ibid (1968).

57. In "Nietzsche - Seine Philosophie der Gegensätze und die Gegensätze seiner Philosophie" (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter (1971), Muller-Lauter interprets the will to power as a theory of force destructing the myth of unitary will to power. Basing his reading of the Wachlass he claims that in a way we can perceive a "will to power, constantly changing, a "ständig Änderndes Machtaufbauendes oder Machtabbauendes" (continually changing/augmenting/diminishing of power). Similarly Alphonso Lingis in "The Will to Power") similarly Alphonso Lingis in "The Will to Power" in "The New Nietzsche" ed. David B. Allison (New York: Dell (1977)) writes that the will to power is the differential element of time. This difference arises, according to Lingis, "in the self-affirmation of a force exercised against another force." It affirms itself and thereby affirms its difference. "For Nietzsche, the feeling of distinction - the pathos of distance - is the fundamental affect of power." Accordingly Muller-Lauter argues that Nietzsche does not assume fixed units (Einheiten) but rather an ever-changing quantum of will to power. Furthermore, the will to power is never "singular, isolated, but rather it consists in the plurality of opposing wills in relationship with each other" (Gegensätze).

The will to power is according to Muller-Lauter more than simply a human perspective, and more than the perspective of Nietzsche (see: Muller-Lauter "Nietzsche's Lehre von Wille zur Macht") Nietzsche Studien 3 (1974) 101). It evades the self-negating essence of perspectivism - differentiating itself from other systems by not contradicting itself. Viewed from the perspective of the truth criteria of his philosophy, it is the only constant "Weltdeutung" (interpretation of the world). If we observe merely the formal structure of this thought, then "the individual and radical nature of Nietzsche's interpretation will be hidden from us" (Muller-Lauter - "Wille"). To comprehend its individuality "it is necessary to go after its eminent presuppositions" (Muller-Lauter - "Wille"). Only by reflecting on these can we see how Nietzsche's thought fulfills its claim to be the most basic interpretation of reality ("grundlegende Deutung de Wirklichkeit"). The constantly evolving self is the key, according to Muller-Lauter, to understand how the will to power escapes the perspectives paradox. Human reality, like all other reality - both organic/inorganic - consists of an infinite number of unstable forces constantly overcoming one another. The subject has the capacity to have reflexive awareness of this process of flux, that is it has reflexive awareness of its constantly changing/adapting nature. It collects, via memory, and then internalizes the sifting of perspectives that it essentially is. The notion of reflexive awareness of perspectival interpreting ("perspektivischen interpretierens inne Werden") is the focal point of Muller-Lauter's interpretation. Muller-Lauter suggests that this memory of competing forces is no longer simply one perspective among many but rather a more direct awareness. The consistency of Nietzsche's theory stems from the fact that both the world and the subject are constantly
changing, and humans are capable of having reflexive awareness of this change.

Muller-Lauter contends that the will to power may provide a solution to the perspectivist dilemma - providing Nietzsche with a way to argue for the superior nature of the theory of the will to power, even though he does not believe in "truth". Muller-Lauter locates in the will to power, an answer to the question that Nietzsche's rejection of truth inevitably provokes - the criteria he adopts to perceive interpretation. Muller-Lauter finds a solution by means of the "virtue of its consistency". Nietzsche would advocate that the will to power is removed from any obvious contradictions that he observed in concepts such as the thing-in-itself. But Nietzsche did not always avoid contradiction. If is characteristic of philosophic thought to search for and value truth, but Nietzsche separates himself from this tradition by placing value in that which is appropriate for the moment. Having rejected the conception of a fixed truth, Nietzsche adopts/modifies his project to suit the context in which he is writing. Therefore, for Nietzsche, conceptual knowledge, once divorced from its pretensions to apprehend truth does not lose its functional capacities. For Nietzsche, the will to power represents a series of interpretations and not objective knowledge. Nietzsche is convinced that we can never arrive at objective knowledge of the world/definitive explanations, but this does not rule out suggestions offering interpretations of the world.

The will to power comprises the single most important doctrine of Nietzsche but it does not dominate/dictate his thought nor is it an entirely consistent system. There is consistency to Nietzsche but not exactly as Muller-Lauter argues. Although his doctrine represents Nietzsche's systematic heights the mechanism by which his thought functions operates is located elsewhere. There is according to Nietzsche a stylistic imperative to create unities to give one's thought a unity of style. (See "The Gay Science" trans Walter Kaufmann - New York: Vintage (1974).

Nietzsche justifies the superiority of certain tastes without concerning himself with the fact that this is directly his perspective. While his remarks on taste/style can never be entirely systematized, certain trends can be discerned Nietzsche repeatedly emphasizes the validity of formulating one's own values of creating one's views from multiple perspectives, and of correcting/idealizing the objects of investigation. Nietzsche suggests that in the absence of truth there are only pragmatic necessities and aesthetic considerations (that is necessary fictions and aesthetic reasoning). In this sense Nietzsche is profoundly un-Hegelian - he rarely provides a final synthesis, this does not imply that he neglected the attempt but one of the fundamental basis of his thought is its ability to contain contradictions.

The world of becoming is a world of flux/multiplicity but also of chance/chaos - the affirmation of the eternal return is integral to this supplementary aspect of becoming. Deleuze locates a metaphysics of flux in the Nietzschean image of the game of chance.

"(If) ever I have played dice with the gods at their table, the earth, so that the earth trembled and broke open and streams of fire snorted forth: for the earth is a table of the gods, and trembling with creative new words and the dice throws of the gods"

(Friedrich Nietzsche - Thus Spoke Zarathustra - trans R. J. Hollingdale New York: Penguin Books (1961)).

Existence should be understood, in Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche, as radically innocent and as just a game of chance. Consequently if existence is to be perceived as a game of chance, then it is also a game entailing serious implications because it is also a game of necessity of chance, a game conducted by gods with dice and the earth as their table.

"Above all things stands the heaven of chance, the heaven of innocence, the heaven of accident, the heaven of wantonness...you are to me a dance floor for divine chances, that you are to me a god's table for divine dice and dices!"

(Friedrich Nietzsche - Thus Spoke Zarathustra trans R. J. Hollingdale New York: Penguin (1961)).

Chance is played out on two tables, one on earth and one in heaven. Yet upon each occasion there is only a single dice throw. Each dice throw conducted on earth is an "affirmation of becoming" and in heaven as an "affirmation of the being of becoming". Each dice plays affirms chance, but the actual numbers represented confirm the "necessity" of chance as the being of becoming. The necessity of chance is the element contributing to its innocence - it effectively releases all things from having a purpose. Therefore, in this respect, the necessity of chance in the play of the dice is an affirmation, and force may be comprehended only in terms of an affirmative and exemplary nondialectical element. Affirmation in this form is the only mechanism directed towards producing chance/multiplicity (the being of becoming), in effect there is only one way.
to unite being and becoming so the resultant circumstances are innocent/necessary/multiple instead of simply probable

"Nietzsche identifies chance with multiplicity, with fragments, with parts, with chaos; the chaos of the dice that are shaken and then thrown... To abolish chance by holding it in the grip of causality and finality, to count on the repetition of throws rather than affirming chance, to anticipate a result instead of affirming necessity - these are all the operations of a bad player" (Gilles Deleuze - "Nietzsche et la philosophie" (1962)).

The skilled dice player affirms all chance in a single throw, accepting each result as the desired result. He/She affirms both chance and necessity, the chance of the throw and the necessity of the outcome. The player affirms the process, experiences every moment, every dice throw as good/valuable - as pleasure. The traditional problem of chance/necessity dissolves for the problem only issues via negative desires of controlling chance/escaping necessity. The affirmation of chance animates Nietzsche's contention of the greatness in a human being (see "Ecce Homo trans Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage (1969)) and active embracing of fate that forces one to will whatever occurs as the necessary product of chance.

60 Gilles Deleuze - op cit (1962).
61 Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1962).
62 Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1962).
63 Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1962).
64 Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1962).
65 Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1962).
66 Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1962).
67 Pierre Klossowski develops the notion of a selective ontology along different lines in his analysis (See: Nietzsche et le cercle vicieux. Mercure de France: Paris (1969) especially chapter entitled "Le cercle vicieux en tant que doctrine selective")
68 Gilles Deleuze - op cit (1962).
69 Jean Wahl "Nietzsche et la philosophie" Revue de métaphysique et de morale, no.3, 1963 athesms to Deleuze's notion of the will to nothingness as the "ratio cognoscendi" of the will to power, and the affirmation of the eternal return as its "ratio essendi". However he argues that it seems inappropriate in a Nietzschean context. Wahl is correct in suggesting that Deleuze is imposing an element external to Nietzsche's thought into the model, but with the reference to the Scholastics Deleuze attempts to extend the ontological foundation of Nietzsche's thought in the analysis of power/will/causality.
70 Gilles Deleuze - op. cit (1962).
71 Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1962).
72 The interpretative/evaluative processes of art criticism rather than existing simply as the secondary "by-product" of an unscientific/subjective approach to the art work, are at the centre of thought and correlated with the creative activity of the artist.
73 Gilles Deleuze - op cit (1962).
74 Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1962).
75 Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1962).
76 Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1962).
77 Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1962).
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ELECTROLITE (SPIN THE BLACK CIRCLE)

In the 1960's Deleuze developed various aspects of a Nietzschean philosophy of difference, presenting a formulation expressed in the works in "Différence et Répétition (1968) (1) and "Logique du sens" (1969) (2) (3).

"Différence et Repetition" is primarily an abstract and rigorous interrogation of the concept of difference-in-itself and repetition-for-itself, including a review of numerous major and minor Western philosophers, arranged in an apparently traditional interpretative framework, but objectively structured in the style of a topological enigma. Deleuze suggests it is part detective story part science fiction - the philosophical analogue of abstract art in its elucidation of conceptual concepts and imageless images of thought. With the treatment of the history of philosophy is comparable to a collage/eclectic technique in painting. "Logique du sens" is equivalently disciplined and stringently instructed, but a much more fluid/decentred analysis that connects an exposition of Stoic incorporeals with speculative discussions on the works of Lewis Carroll. A "logical and psychoanalytic novel" (4) organized in thirty-four series each concentrating upon the appraisal of a specific paradox, "Logique du sens" accommodates concurrent issues/themes to those located in "Différence et Répétition", but injects upon each level new and unexpected perspectives on earlier perceptions that counteract effortless assimilation.

"Différence et Répétition" and "Logique du sens" in synchronization essentially present an eloquent/vigorously inventive representation, but in a certain form they are not entirely discordant to a complete Deleuzian scheme - primarily they afford an inclusive/synthetic exemplification of themes that characterize his work.

"Différence et Rélépétition" appropriates a Nietzschean programme. In overturning Platonism, Deleuze's strategy is not simply to invert the hierarchy of essence and appearance, but to extract from Plato's texts a marginalized category that subverts both models and copies, both essence and appearance - that of the simulacrum. In transforming Kant the Deleuzian tactic...
is to propose a disjunctive use of the faculties, through which use the unconscious condition of each faculty is revealed, and to disclose a sensible realm of intensities and an ideal realm of problems (In two works "La Philosophie Critique de Kant" (1963) (5) and "Difference et Repetition" Deleuze presents both an analysis of Kant’s critical programme and the function of the faculties within the Kantian scheme together with an inventive articulation of the Kantian critique through the philosophy of difference) (6).

The appropriation by Deleuze of Plato and Kant is fundamentally designed to replace the philosophy of identity and representation with a philosophy of difference - both a physics and a metaphysics of the similacrum (From Socrates - (Socrates - "Republic" VII: 523)) - Deleuze takes the idea that the experiences that catalyzes thought are those of contradictory perceptions - however, instead of leading to essences as Socrates would argue, Deleuze offers them as evidence of the existence of simulcra, which compel thought towards its correct activity - such contradictory experiences facilitate/enable a critical examination of what Deleuze describes as a "transcendental empiricism".

What Deleuze ultimately suggests with "transcendental empiricism" is a disjunctive operating of the faculties, a determination of the limits of each faculty by itself, under the general "dereglement" of common sense. Within each faculty there exists an essential element/condition that is unique to it, something that may not be experienced under the regulation of common sense - this something is revealed in moments of disequilibrium, through contradiction/enigma, in the form of signs (exemplified in "Proust et les signes (1972)) (7). For instance, the reminiscence of Proust’s automotive memory is a "memorandum" of memory an element only experienced through memory divorced from common sense (a paradoxical element tangible not in the present, only the past). The fantasy is an "imaginadum", that which may only be imagined. The intensity is that which may only be apprehended by the senses. The examination of the faculties is experimental, their number/constitution may not be determined "a priori". Deleuze suggests a faculty of language whose transcendental object is meaning/sense, a faculty of vitality whose transcendental object is the animalistic_monstrous, a faculty of the social with a transcendental object of anarchy.
Deleuze's method is classified as empiricism because its object is experience (not the possible experience of Kant "capable of representation" but real experience "subrepresentative") equally it can be transcendental because empirical principles inevitably externalize the elements of their foundation, and in this respect need a transcendental analysis for their implicit conditions/presupposition.

In the overturning of Platonism, Deleuze proposes that one must simply illuminate what is latent in Plato: one must "deny the primacy of an original over the copy, of a model over the image" and "glorify the reign of simulacra and reflections" (8). Deleuze initiates the advancement of a new conception of philosophy derived from the basis of a rejection of Platonism. In addition he has specifically allied this alternate conception of philosophy with current tendencies in modern art.

"The theory of thought is like painting: it needs that revolution which took art from representation to abstraction. This is the aim of a theory of thought without image."

(Gilles Deleuze) (9).

The philosophical equivalent of abstract art/imageless thought is a non-representational conception of thought. Deleuze's interpretation of the task of philosophy, specifically in "Différence et répétition" is grounded within a critique of the prevalent representationalism that has to date defined philosophy. It is possible to conceive of a relational context between the abandonment of representationalism in painting and philosophy via Deleuze's discussions regarding Plato and contemporary art in the course of "Différence et répétition". The "overturning" of Platonism involves inverting the hierarchy identified by Plato between copies and simulacra, a reversal that intrinsically proposes the negation of the essential distinction in question. (These themes will again be articulated in Chapter 7).

In "Différence et répétition" Deleuze announces that "the task of modern philosophy has been defined to overturn ("renverser") Platonism" (10). In a manner similar to Nietzsche, Deleuze
proposes an overcoming that proceeds via an "inversion" of certain aspects of Platonism. (11). For Deleuze, the overturning of Platonism is correspondingly a section and a major element in the structural framework of "Différence et répétition" - the critique of the representational conception of thought (12) that has dominated the history/comprehension of philosophy since Plato and an explanation of an alternative model of "thought without image". Deleuze seeks to advance a notion of thought as an essentially creative activity: thought as the creation of concepts, where the concepts themselves are interpreted as functioning only in immediate relations with forces/intensities outside thought. (For Deleuze the domination of the prevailing representational model of philosophical thought is defined by the implicit suppression/exclusion of difference in favour of a logic based upon identity/resemblance/similitude).

In his analysis of Plato Deleuze identifies certain themes that suggest that Plato did not always accept the precedence of identity over difference, while he argues that metaphysics defined as a theory of conceptual representations should be allied with reference to Platonism. Deleuze advocates that Plato provides an incomplete version of the philosophy of representation. (The doctrinal basics of representation in Plato are confined to a theory of ideas/forms - as such they lack a systematic theory of categories (the conditions of possible experience) subsequently developed by Aristotle). Plato's notion of the theory of ideas does not propose a specification of objects in terms of their situation within a differential construct of genus/species but by contrast a selection among rival claimants, the separation of the true/authentic from the simply apparent/unauthentic by concentrating upon the lines of development coming from the initial conception. Therefore with Plato it is possible to discern difference/pure difference located in the intervals between founded/unfounded claimants or between things themselves and their simulacra.

The Deleuzian programme is initiated by the attempt to "think beyond" the terms of the dominant metaphysical tradition and incorporates a precise intention to develop a mode of thought capable of comprehending pure difference. Within this process, Deleuze utilizes certain elements of anti-Platonism that are integrated within the texts of Plato's dialogues
themselves. Deleuze proposes that the anti-representational motifs located in Plato's writing renders it correspondingly inevitable/necessary that the overturning of Platonism should remain to a certain degree parasitical towards Plato's project in general (13). To the extent that Deleuze's "overturning" of Plato proceeds from a reversal of sorts between conflicting elements present in Plato's thoughts, the technique is analogous to the strategy employed in the Deleuzian scheme in relation to the philosophy of representation.

In the "Sophist" Plato makes the distinction among images, between "likenesses" (copies) and "semblances" (simulacra). The former positively resemble the original, the latter only appear to be a likeness. The difference between likenesses (copies) and semblances (simulacra) is a case of the foundation of resemblance in each instance - identity of dimensions/proportions/tones on one instance; superficial/apparent resemblance on the basis of difference from the original in the other. Copies represent the Forms because they resemble them, they possess an intrinsic affinity/spiritual resemblance with the real entity itself. In contrast simulacra is based upon a disparity/difference, it incorporates a dissimilarity.

Deleuze argues, "the whole of Platonism ... is dominated by the idea of drawing a distinction between "the thing itself" and the simulacra" (14). This then, as opposed to the opposition between Forms and imitations/representations is the fundamental motivation of Platonism. Deleuze proposes that the primary concern of Platonism is not simply to discern the true claimant from the false, but to externalize the latter, in such a way as to establish the priority of well-founded copies and the disenfranchising of the simulacra. "Platonism as a whole is erected on the basis of this wish to hunt down the phantasms or simulacra which are identified with the Sophist himself, that devil, that insinuator or simulator, that always disguised and displaced false pretender" (Gilles Deleuze) (15). It is the desire to exorcise simulacra that ensures the primacy of identity and the repression of difference. In Plato's model, Deleuze says, "a moral motivation in all its purity is avowed: the will to eliminate simulacra or phantasms has no motivation apart from the moral. What is condemned in the figure of simulacra is a state of free, oceanic differences, of nomadic distributions and
crowned anarchy, along with all that malice which challenges both the notion of the model and that of the copy” (Gilles Deleuze) (16).

Upon this basis the Deleuzian technique in overturning Platonism is on the primary level a simplistic reversal: “Overturning Platonism then means denying the primacy of original over copy, of model over image; glorifying the reign of simulacra and reflections” (Gilles Deleuze) (17). To promote the sovereignty of the simulacra is to affirm a world in which difference as opposed to sameness is the primary relation. In such a situation there are no ultimate foundations/original identities - everything assumes the status of a simulacrum. Elements are composed/identified by the type/nature of the differential interactions they engage in, both internally and in relation to other elements. In this way, Deleuze's "overturning" of Platonism prefigures the technique which he employs in producing a conception of the world in which the play of difference as opposed to the interaction of identity and resemblance articulate the nature of things. Deleuze is careful to distinguish the formulation of the difference in nature between simulacrum and copy - it is not the same outline of difference in each instance. This notion is based upon the claim that Plato himself introduces a qualitative distinction between two types of imitation - good imitations (copies) or bad imitations (simulacra). The difference between them is reliant upon the nature of the similitude in each instance - for good copies, an exemplary similitude based upon a sameness of proportion or "internal resemblance" to the thing itself; for bad copies, simulacra, an apparent resemblance based upon difference in proportion, or difference in character from the thing itself.

The difference between these types of imitation affects the form of the difference between the imitation and the imitated in each instance. With regard to good copies, the difference between imitation/copy and original is a difference within resemblance, a difference between things that are in essential respects the same. Within the Platonic model of representation, difference is operative on a secondary/derived relation, the similarity of the copy to original (therefore their similitude or generic identity) being paramount. The difference between a simulacrum and what it simulates is constituted in an entirely contrasting fashion.
The simulacrum is not, in essential respects, the same as what it simulates but different. Although it does reproduce the appearance of the original, it does so as an effect. At this point the apparent identity of the two is the secondary derived relation, while it is their difference that it primary. Deleuze adopts this feature of simulacra as the basis for identifying another conception of difference, a "free difference" not regulated by the structure of representation that determines the Platonic model.

In the Preface to "La philosophie critique de Kant" (1963), Deleuze summarizes Kantian philosophy in four "poetic formulas", the first of which is Hamlet's proposition that "The time is out of joint". Time becomes "unhinged" in Kant, says Deleuze, with the effect of a revolution between time/space and time/movement.

"Time is no longer defined by succession because succession concerns only things and movements which are in time. If time itself were succession, it would need to succeed in another time, and on to infinity. Things succeed each other in various times, but they are also simultaneous in the same time, and they remain in an indefinite time. It is no longer a question of defining time by succession, nor space by simultaneity, nor permanence eternally"

(Gilles Deleuze) (18)

One intrinsic/defining constituent of the Postmodern condition contends that the present time is as it were, "out of joint", a secondary consideration in this relation highlights the convergence between many Eighteenth Century controversies and their re-emergence/reconsideration in the contemporary situation.

In early works Deleuze identified the virtual realm of ideas with the eternal return (19). It is therefore not surprising that he is in addition concerned with the question of the connection between repetition, the synthesis of time, and ideas (20). "Différence et répétition" combines/revises previous conceptual models and constructs a schema of what he terms the three passive syntheses of time. The first passive synthesis is that of the living present as a contraction of moments within a transient present, the founding (foundation) of time. The second synthesis (a Bergsonian/Proustian virtual past) is the foundation
(fondement) of time. The third synthesis that of the eternal return or Thanatos, a future onentated synthesis, the "unfounding" (éffondement) of time a complication of time (like the time of Proustian essences) which is "out of joint".

Deleuze approaches the third synthesis via Kant's reflection on the formula "cogito, ergo sum", from the first "Critique". Kant derives from a reading of the Cartesian formula a presence of two "I's" and two kinds of existence. The thinking "I" (Cogito) is self-present as the thought of itself, but the self that it knows, the object of its thought (ego sum) may only be comprehended as an object within the form of time. Deleuze extracts this moment from Kant's "Critique" and identifies it as the fractured "I" and the "pure and empty form of time" (events do not unfold with the pure and empty form of time but time itself unfolds and all identity self/world/God dissolve). "I is another", (Deleuze from Rimbaud). Kant explains that the Ego itself is in time and consequently in constant transition - it is a passive/receptive Ego which experiences changes in time. However, the "I" is an act which constantly administers a synthesis of time, dividing past/present/future in every occurrence. The "I"/"Ego" are therefore divided by the line of time which relates them to each other, under the condition of a fundamental difference (I am constituted as a passive ego which represents to itself only the activity of its own thought - the "I" as the other which affects it - I am separated from myself by the form of time, but I am one, because the "I" affects this form by acting out its synthesis and also because Ego is subsequently affected as content in this form).

The form of the determinable means that the determined ego represents determination as an other other. It is like adoube division of he I and he Ego in the time which elates them to each other, stitches them together. It is the thread of time" (Gilles Deleuze) (21).

For Kant it is the form of time which is the determining element, separating the act and the "I" and the ego to which the act is attributed, an infinite flexibility - time moves into a subject to distinguish the Ego and the "I" contained within (the form in which the "I" affects the Ego). In this respect time, as immutable form, appears as the form of interiority/inner
sense and space appears as the form of exteriority. The interiority of form represents not merely the way in which time is internal to us but more complexly that interiority constantly divides us from ourselves - a division with no ultimate conclusion, therefore a constant flux that "dramatizes" time.

The Deleuzian notion of the pure and empty form of time constitutes the transient form of time which catalyzes the foundation of time/virtual past, the founding of time/living present and the empirical time/common sense. The pure and empty form of time, is that of the eternal return, the time of ideas, the virtual time of co-existing, of differences without origin which is in continual repetition in the dimension of actual intensities.

Deleuze overturns Platonism by instigating the primacy of simulacra, replacing the opposition of appearance/essence with one of actual intensities/virtual problems: Kant offers Deleuze a framework for a critical examination of simulacra (22). In determining the derivation of origin, value plays an important role. Deleuze suggests a pluralistic model, the question of a thing's essence is a question of meaning and value. A thing has no essence apart from the one we give it. Essence is the product of the forces that have an affinity with the thing and by the will in infinity ("en affinité") with these forces. The production of an essence is a re-production/recovery of the meaning/value that the subject had added.

Deleuze illustrates this by comparing Nietzsche's genealogy to Kant's critical thought (the Deleuzian version). Deleuze claims that, for Kant, the philosopher is a judge who surveys the distribution of domains and the partition of established values. Kant's judge "legislates" decisions based upon his interpretation of the law. Both the transcendental laws of the "Critique of Pure Reason" and the universal moral laws of the "Critique of Practical Reason" are - by virtue of their universality - the basis upon which the tribunal of reason adjudicates disputes. For genealogists thinking is to an extent judging, but judging in this case means evaluation and interpretation on the basis of the laws that they themselves create. The genealogist in contrast declares a Kantian "critical peace" whereby reason adjudicates all disputes, foretells wars/conflicts of an intensity as yet unknown.
Nietzsche writes in "Beyond Good and Evil" that philosophers such as Kant and Hegel draw upon an extensive factual supply of evaluations ("Tatbestand van Wertschatzungen") that have become dominant over time and are therefore regarded as "truths".

"Real philosophers are commanders and creators of laws"
(Friedrich Nietzsche) (23)

In the Nietzschean design, Kant's concern for universal principles is replaced by the genealogist's sensibility for difference/distance. For Deleuze-Nietzsche the philosopher/genealogist is not simply a recorder of reality but a critic of established values and creator of new ones.

Deleuze advocates the existence of ideas, not in the Platonic sense as basic essences, but in the Kantian sense of "problems without solutions". Deriving a start point from the work of philosopher/mathematician Albert Lautman (24), Deleuze views problems as immanent within, but irreducible to their solutions - they establish "a space" of possible solution while maintaining transcendence to those/that solution (Lautman demonstrates this distinction through the study of singular points and the curves of differential equations). The problem may be illustrated as a disembodied structure of relations of singular points, and the specific values of the solutions of various equations as the essences of that problem (25). Only after the regular points of the curve have been determined can the singular points be identified. Despite this problematic character of ideas, they are not nebulous/undifferentiated masses, but the distributions of singular points fully determined as distributions. However, these points have no fixed identity/function/location only a differential relation to other singular points and a potential for a variety of types of embodiment. The realm of problems may be conceptualized as a plane of scattered points, centred around which is a nebulous vortex demarcating "a space" of possible actualization/embodiments of the problem.
Deleuze's transcendental empiricism subverts the architectural framework of the Kantian Critical programme. Sensibility no longer operates as the passive receiver of intuition, but as an element with the capacity to experience intensities. Departing from the presentation of intuitions within the "a priori" form of space/time, sensibility is confronted with the groundless conditions of space/time as the depth of a primal groundless space and the pre and empty form of time of the eternal return. The function of the schemata of the imagination as dynamic, spatio-temporal determinations is replicated by the internal dynamism of intensities (26) related to ideas not concepts, and the imagination locates itself a transcendental object in fantasy.

Concepts are discovered through the illusionary subjugations of difference to representation, and the understanding no longer legislates in cognition but is virtually absent as a faculty. Ideas are elevated, but only as problems experiencing a chaotic/perplexing realm of co-existing singular points. Reason comes to be replaced by a faculty of thought functioning to think that which is not apprehended by common sense. Deleuze constructs an anti-Kantian design of thought - a conceptual/non-representational/disjunctive/inchoate/unconscious - one that introduces the predominance of simulacra, and within itself is a perverse simulacrum of Kant.

In "Difference et repetition", Deleuze defines meaning as the "loguendum" of the faculty of speaking, the contradictory simulacrum within language that projects thought into a transcendental examination of the foundational structure of language. In "Logique du sens" (27) Deleuze instigates an extensive transcendental investigation of the "loguendum", although not via the virtual and actual but in terms of the Stoic dichotomy of incorporeals and bodies. Deleuze employs the Stoic system primarily because Stoic incorporeals are similar in identity/function to the simulacra and secondly because the Stoic notion of the "lekton" ("expressable") is a productive mechanism through which to interpret the relationship of words to things (28).
In the Deleuzian enterprise the utilization of the Stoic system enables an extensive analysis to be conducted of the relationship between surfaces/depts, problems/bodies. In addition the theory of the incorporeal allows Deleuze to survey the interaction of language.

The feature that enables a word to be comprehensible to one individual but not to another is its meaning, an incorporeal attribute which as a supplement to the word in no way affects the word's being as a body. Words and things are bodies upon whose surfaces incorporeal "lekta" insist/subsist - the surface effects of words being "meaning", and those of things "events".

Deleuze conceptualizes "events" or the surface effect of things, through the notion of simulacra and problems. The event is characterized in terms of the example of a military battle - the battle although a simple effect in one respect, in another is a vital entity, an aggregate of metastable states, a construct focusing the "loki" of potential energy of the possibilities of development. The "event as such", presented in terms of its transcendental condition, is a virtual entity, a problem/idea - a verbal infinitive displaying various actualizations (not "the battle" but "to battle"). The event is real but not present, ideal but not abstract - it is simultaneously a surface-effect and a vital potential energy of individualism "insisting"/"subsisting" in the past and future of "aion" (the pure and empty form of time).

The incorporeal surface of words is that of meaning. Meaning states Deleuze is the "ideal matter or "medium" (29). To define the nature of the "ideal matter" one has to proceed via indirection, illustrating what it is not in order to conceive what it is. If meaning precedes designation/manifestation/signification, therefore it must be independent of the determinations of these relations. It is indifferent to notions of truth/falsity, existence/non-existence (designation) it has no fixed/stable objects or subjects (designations/manifestation) and does not include any irreversible relations of implication. Deleuze throughout "Logique du sens" uses sections from the "nonsense works" of Lewis Carroll as examples of the theories of pre-logical meaning/shifting identities/reversible relations of causality/temporality, of contradicting realms in which real/imaginary,
material/conceptual, possible/impossible objects co-exist and interact. (Carroll's work is ordinarily classified as "nonsense", but this does not imply that it is devoid of meaning - it has sense but not in a "usual" mode it delineates and extend notions of meaning that include both logical and illogical impulses). However Carroll's work is not the ultimate encapsulation of the "ideal matter" of meaning as it is in itself, but as it insists and subsists within propositions, as it appears in language through paradoxes that transgress the logical relations of the proposition. The "ideal matter" of meaning shares the same features as the incorporeal event.

Within the fundamental nature of the "logique du sens"/logic of meaning, words phrase meaning, but that which is phrased is an accessory of things (an event). Meaning (the surface effects of words) and events (the surface effects of things) constitute a single surface with two sides, events expressed within words, and that which is expressed refers to things. The surface of meaning/events forms the surface between words and things as function of "the articulation of their difference" (30).

Deleuze defines meaning as a simulacrum, a paradoxical/contradictory entity that is resistant to common sense. Meaning is not contained within the genesis of the thing, nor in the thought of that origination, nor in the words written/spoken in conjunction with it. It is in the process leading from one to the other. Meaning is a correspondence between asymptomatic lines of causality which have no common form or coincidence but are composed of the infinity of forces. What brings these formations into an interaction is the "abstract machine".

The abstract machine is interpretation. It is the meaning process, from the point of view of a given expression. (The abstract machine behind the order-word, is itself a variable in continual variation, changing with each actualization. It is inscribed in language, but can only be identified by enacting a process of infinite regression. In conjunction there is a second type of the expression - the way in which meaning and events form a single surface.)
A transcendental analysis of the condition of the proposition reveals that meaning is the "ideal matter" of the proposition - an acategorical/pre-individual/alogical "medium" which can be thought of as an assemblage of virtual infinitives with each infinitive demarcating a range/group of possible interpretations which might be phrased in language. With the transcendental condition of physical occurrences as processes of becoming, events form a set of singular points or "loci" of possibility/metastable states of potential energy which are manifested in various ways, each singular point operating in the way of an infinitive that might locate in a number of embodiments. The "ideal matter" of words is not essentially a linguistic element and the singular points are not physical, they are more exactly centres of implicate/virtual difference as actualized before they are expressed/articulated in a specific form. Meaning and events, as a nucleus of implicate/virtual differences constitute a single transcendental area that may be dualistically interpreted as a plane of meaning/plane of events.

The conception of meaning/sense - the rational meaning of logical propositions - is essentially common sense/good sense. What is termed nonsense - the creative paradoxical/contradictory words found in a writer such as Lewis Carroll - may be presented as the full and unrestricted dimension of meaning/sense. In "Logique du sens" Deleuze promotes the notion of incorporeal nonsense (a chimeric and paradoxical entity that traverses the metaphysical surface of meaning and formulates a structure of singular points.) Incorporeal nonsense operates as the structuring influence upon the transcendental scene of singular points. From Lewis Carroll "Snark" and from Marcel Mauss and Lévi-Strauss "Mana" - both instances of incorporeal nonsense (zero signifiers, words with no established meaning, yet opposed to the negation/absence of meaning). (31). Deleuze defines them as linguistic expressions of the transcendental power that frames structures around singular points. (Deleuze conceives of minimal structures as the heterogeneous series of terms that are set in relation by and converge in a paradoxical element). These structures are embodiments of a transcendental structure, the two series in an empirical structure corresponding to two distributions of singular points and the paradoxical element (Snark/Mana) to an aleatory point.
"the "problem" is determined by "singular points" which correspond to series, but the
"question", by an "aleatory point" which corresponds to the empty slot or the mobile
element. The question is developed in problems, and problems are enveloped in a fundamental
question"  
(Gilles Deleuze) (32)

The aleatory point builds structures, however these constructions are not intrinsically stable. As it ranges through singular points the aleatory point establishes a "nomadic distribution" of singular points, the singular point adopting no pre-established/contrived configuration but occupying the maximum space, forming structural relationships and then proceeding, but without leaving any territorial demarcations or concrete frameworks. (33).

Deleuze conceives a construct as ultimately a composed/tectonic chaotic/chaos-structure - a nomadic distribution of singular points, each specific point undetermined within the scope of possible expressions, set in differential inter-relations with other points via connective conjunctive/disjunctive syntheses by an aleatory point that ranges over entire series in a process of enveloping all problems within a single question. Meaning can be shown to be produced by nonsense or the aleatory point in three ways; (i) the aleatory point produces the structure of the transcendental area of meaning/events, (ii) it creates the meaning/effects which shadow the surface of words/things, (iii) it engenders the common sense meaning articulated in the linguistic interaction of signifiers to signified, that which enables the primary relation of propositions (signifiers) to things (signified) in their mutual exemplification within the range of singular points which when expressed insist/subsist within the proposition as the formulation of meaning and impends upon/over things as surface events.

The schematic architecture of "Logique du sens" explicates the notion of the transcendental surface of meaning/events - a zone that fuses mental and physical phenomena without their subjugation to a unifying mechanism of a divine Being or transcendental form of consciousness. Deleuze acknowledges the necessity for the requisite of a transcendental grounding of the relation of consciousness to its objects, but however, he refutes the impulse
to anchor the ground to that which it constructs/founds. Alternatively, he depicts consciousness and its objects as products generated from an area recalcitrant to God and the self, "a World of impersonal and pre-individual singularities (singularities being used indifferently in "logique du sens" to refer to singular points and intensities)...of the will to power, free and unbound energy" (34).

The structural construction of "Logique du sens" allies language both to thought and to things, however there appears no intrinsic link between thought and language. Alternatively thought is initiated from the compulsion of a sign, a simulacrum that forces thought to examine that which resists consciousness/recognition/representation, whether it is the metaphysical surface of singular points or the iridescent "Ungrund" of depth. Language according to Deleuze is not the origin of the forms of thought, but the product of the interaction of singular points/intensities (singularities) and undifferentiated bodies that require investigation via the simulacra that shadow its surface and the sonic shards/blocks that resound throughout the corporeal depths.

Deleuze ultimately is concerned to stimulate innovation. Language instead of acting as a constraining framework around thought, can operate in a positive direction, actively functioning in the creation/generation of meaning and the examination of problems.

Kant divides the aesthetic into a theory of the sensible and the theory of the beautiful, with Deleuze's transcendental empiricism however, "the two senses of the aesthetic merge, at which point the being of the sensible reveals itself in the work of art, and the work of art simultaneously appears as experimentation." (35) "To think is to create" (36) (Gilles Deleuze), and only thought and art can comprehensively affirm difference, the cosmic play of chance of the eternal return - "And if one tries to play this game in any way other than in thought, nothing takes place, and if one tries to produce anything other than a work of art, nothing is produced". (37) (Gilles Deleuze)
The Deleuzian connective scheme/strategy is presented as a work of art and his thought as a nomadic distribution of singular points. Deleuze is not a systematic philosopher but he does construct multiple-system worlds. The synthesis of themes that traverse the individual projects in conjunction represents a creative propagation, a continuity in the production of interconnections as opposed to the establishment of an incorporated whole. Each work is an experiment, a mechanism devised to explore/extend/modify/transform ideas by situating them reciprocally within a defined conceptual scheme. In each work the structure of a problem unfolds, in each following work a metamorphosis of previous elements with an alternative problematic occurs, and across all the works in assimilation fluctuates the aleatory point of a single question (38).
ELECTROLITE (SPIN THE BLACK CIRCLE)

NOTES

3. In many respects the Deleuzian concept of difference parallels the deconstructive enterprise of Derrida, itself of Nietzschean derivation though mediated via Heidegger. In similar fashion both Deleuze and Derrida question the metaphysical pre-suppositions of traditional philosophy and the representational model of thought - through the employment of the term difference/differance/an "a conceptual concept"/"non-concept" that fundamentally subverts the certainties of Western rationality. In addition Deleuze, like Derrida, maintains an ambiguous relationship with the structuralist programme, incorporating the more progressive aspects of the scheme while systematically rejecting its claims to scientific objectivity. (For a coherent description of Deleuze’s relationship with/understanding of structuralism see “A qui reconnaît-on le structuralisme” in “Histoire de la philosophie: Vol II Le XXe Siécle” ed François Châtelet (Paris: Hatchette (1973)).

6. In “La Philosophie Critique de Kant” (1963) Deleuze summarises the essential themes contained in Kant’s three critiques and relates a clear and original account of their interrelation, demonstrating how problems that arise with the first two Critiques are recognised by Kant and in a manner reconciled in the third Critique. The “Critique of Judgement” is positioned as a keystone in the architectural framework of Kant’s Critical Philosophy.

The central tenets of the Deleuzian conception of “La Philosophie Critique de Kant” are contained within the section entitled “Problem of the Relationship between the Faculties: Common Sense”. The three active faculties, imagination/reason/understanding engage in certain relations, a function of speculative interest. Understanding legislates and judges, under the understanding, imagination synthesizes/schematizes, reason reasons and is symbolic in such a way that knowledge is afforded maximum systematic unity. Any accord between the faculties defines a "common sense" (a subjective condition of communicability). Knowledge has as its required "common sense", without which communication would not function and therefore no claim to universality would be possible. When a subject has experience the ground of that experience consists in a kind of complicity between what is experienced and the faculty of the imagination through which it is organized. Although the unity has an origin in the subject, it is attributed to an independent object. In experiencing the unity the subject additionally senses a harmony between the rational faculties and the object to which they are applied. The sense of harmony - subject/object is additionally an experience of pleasure and also a ground of universality.
This design, allowing the faculties to harmonize with each other and to form harmonious proportions in combination with the idea of a difference in nature between the faculties, constitutes one of the most original of Kant's approaches. Common sense in its speculative form (sensus communis logicus) expresses the harmony of the faculties in the speculative interest of reason, under the legislature of the understanding. From the perspective of an alternate interest of reason the faculties engage in another accord under the legislature of another faculty and as such form another common sense. Kant argues that the accord of the faculties is capable of several proportions depending upon which faculty determines the relationship (The most complete explication of this system is located in the third "Critique" - "The Critique of Judgement"). However, in each instance assuming the perspective of a relationship or an accord which is pre-determined it is inevitable that the common sense should be manifested as a type of "a priori fact" defining a boundary. In this respect the first two critiques do not resolve the problem of the functioning relationship between the faculties, they merely direct us towards its an ultimate scheme. Each pre-determined accord presupposes that the faculties can, at a deeper level, promote a free/indeterminate accord. "It is only at the level of this free and indeterminate accord (sensus communis aestheticus) that we will be able to post the problem of a ground of the accord or a genesis of common sense" (Gilles Deleuze - "La Philosophie Critique de Kant")

In the first two "Critiques" the various subjective faculties enter into rigorously regulated relationships with each other, to the degree that there is always a dominant/determining faculty imposing its rules on the others (e.g. in the "Critique of Pure Reason" understanding dominates because it determines inner sense through the intermediary of a synthesis of the imagination and even reason is subsumed and falls into the role assigned to it by understanding). From this, however, Kant developed his Critical programme - if the faculties have the capacity to engage in relationships which are variable, but regulated by one or other of them it should be possible for them to relate together within the context of relationships which are unregulated, where each defines its own limit but nevertheless displays a harmony with the others.

It is here that Deleuze demonstrates how the problems that arise within the first two Critiques are identified and subsequently resolved in the "Critique of Judgement" (The emphasis is now no longer directed towards the "Critique of Pure Reason" which regards the sensible as a quality that may be related to an object in space/time, it is no longer a logic of sensible nor even a new concept of logos which would be time. The emphasis switches to the "Critique of Judgement" - "It is an aesthetic of the Beautiful and of the Sublime, in which the sensible is valid and unfolds in a "pathos" beyond all logic, which will grasp time in its surging forth, in every origin of it's thread a giddiness. It is no longer the Affect of the "Critique of Pure Reason" which related the Ego to the I in a relationship which was still regulated by the order of time: it is a Pathos which leaves them to evolve freely in order to form strange combinations as sources of time, "arbitrary forms of possible intuitions"" (Gilles Deleuze - "La Philosophie Critique de Kant")

In the "Critique of Judgement", the various faculties enter into an accord which is no longer determined by any one of them and which is all the deeper because it no longer has any rule, and because it demonstrates a spontaneous accord with the Ego and the "T under the conditions of a beautiful Nature" (Gilles Deleuze - "La Philosophie Critique de Kant"). The conclusion of the "Critique of Judgement" proposes - within the Deleuzian reading - that the faculties are essentially confrontational, each extended to its limit, discovering an accord within a fundamental discord; a discordant accord is the great discovery of the "Critique of Judgement", the final Kantian reversal (Gilles Deleuze - "La Philosophie Critique de Kant"). Separation which re-unites was the initial theme of the first "Critique" but towards the end of his Critical philosophy Kant discovers a discord that promoted an accord - an unregulated exercise of all the faculties which came to define future philosophy.

In "Différence et répétition" Deleuze radicalizes his analysis while at the same time "maintaining faith" with the Kantian programme. The common sense of cognition under the legislature of the understanding and the concept, itself presumes a world subject to representation whose four elements Deleuze describes as "identity in the form of the 'undetermined' concept, analogy in the relation between ultimately 'determinable' concepts, oppositions in the relations between 'determinations' within the concept, resemblance in the 'determined' object of the concept itself" (Gilles Deleuze - "La Philosophie Critique de Kant").

Difference may only assume an object of representation, "in relation to a conceived identity, a judged analogy, an imagined opposition, a perceived similitude" (Gilles Deleuze - "La Philosophie Critique de Kant"), never in itself and may be only comprehended via common sense in the form of a recognizable identity (Difference in itself escapes recognition of the common sense and representation of concepts). Deleuze advocates being as difference, and in this respect, therefore being must be manifested in forms other than that of recognition/representation.

The Deleuzian conception of multiple faculties might initially appear as a destructive mechanism undermining the Kantian mental programme; however, Deleuze's intention in "Différence et répétition" is to operate within Kant's scheme of the mind and subvert Kantianism by presenting
thought, in the nature of ideas (which Kant works to subtract from cognition) and the intensities of sense experience (the existence of which Kant dismisses because he conceives of sensibility - the faculty interpreting sense experience - as passive determined by the "a priori" forms of space/time, which in Deleuzian terms are forms of "representable" experience). Thought, in Deleuze's scheme, manifested in terms of the ideal and the sensible on a primary level appears no more than conventional dualism, however, the opposition is situated between the virtual/actual not the essential/accidental and on a secondary level the opposition is more fundamental distinguishing between subrepresentative, unconscious and conceptual ideas/intensities and the conscious conceptual representations of common sense.

8. Gilles Deleuze - op. cit (1968)
For Deleuze's analysis of the simulacrum in Plato, see "Plato et le simulacre" appearing as an appendix to "Logique du sens".
10. What this implicitly means is dependent firstly on what one understands by Platonism and secondly what the operation of "overturning" incorporates. "Renverser" includes both a sense of "overturning" as well as that of "overturning/reversing". Both senses are adopted within the Deleuzian versions of the departure from philosophy's Platonic past.
11. For Nietzsche Platonism was both a moral and a metaphysical construct, and something to be overcome on both of these planes. From the metaphysical perspective Platonism is characterized by the distinction between the realm of ideas/that which truly is, and the realm of relative non-being/appearance. Platonism is founded upon a hierarchy within reality and a parallel hierarchy within ourselves which renders even the highest points of human life as merely copies/imitations of the truly real. Overturning Platonism at this level cannot simply consist of an inversion of the metaphysical order and an affirmation of the reality of the sensuous, for this merely involves a changing of the positions located within the same defining structure. What is necessary is the demolition of the structure itself.

The moral framework of Platonism, for Nietzsche, was the principle form of nihilism that had dominated Western thought - a devaluation of temporal and corporeal human existence by opposing to it a higher spiritual realm. From the metaphysical perspective Platonism is characterized by the distinction between the realm of ideas/that which truly is, and the realm of relative non-being/appearance. Platonism is founded upon a hierarchy within reality and a parallel hierarchy within ourselves which renders even the highest points of human life as merely copies/imitations of the truly real. Overturning Platonism at this level cannot simply consist of an inversion of the metaphysical order and an affirmation of the reality of the sensuous, for this merely involves a changing of the positions located within the same defining structure. What is necessary is the demolition of the structure itself.

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If the inversion of Platonism results in the sensuous remaining as that which truly is, then the realm of the true is also the realm of art. Art is promoted by Nietzsche as the supreme affirmation of the sensuous and therefore as a counter-movement to nihilism. In the inversion of Platonism both art and truth come to designate our relation to the sensuous. Art and truth engage in relation to one another in terms of a single guiding ambition that of re-animating and configuring the sensuous. This relation is an intrinsic combination/interaction in the realm of a new historical existence. However, this alliance is fundamentally unstable - where Platonism is inverted we might expect both art and truth to be conceived as a affirmation of the sensuous in a conjunction of univocity/concordance. And yet for Nietzsche it remains one of discordance.

Following the overcoming of Platonism there is a discordance in Nietzsche's scheme - Nietzsche's overcoming entails more than a straightforward reversal - it may not be read in terms of the reversal or inversion of a hierarchy (i.e. Plato asserts "truth is worth more than art" but Nietzsche expresses the opposite insight "art is worth more than truth") (Friedrich Nietzsche - "The Will to Power" trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J Hollingdale New York: Vintage Books (1968)). Evidently there is a discordance for Nietzsche, for the "Sache" Nietzsche - the work itself articulates it - the discordance is concealed in the statement (art is worth more than truth).
Nietzsche went beyond a mere symmetrical inversion of Platonism, an inversion in which the polarities of the true and the apparent would be exchanged yet precisely maintained as polarities. This is a "twisting free" from Platonism, whereby the polarities, and thus the oppositionality between them, are themselves abolished.

If, according to Nietzsche, being and truth enter into discordance, then they must primarily belong together in one. That one can only be being and our relation to being. Specifically the nature of the discordance for Nietzsche will depend upon the way in which negativity is thought with respect to being.

Nietzsche writing on the history of Platonism in "How the "true World" at last Became a Myth: The History of an Error" from "Twilight of the Idols" (trans R.J. Hollingdale, Harmondsworth: Penguin (1982)), recounts the development of Platonism from out of Plato's work, up to the abolition of the "true world" as a useless/superfluous idea. With the abolition of the true world, what remains is the sensuous - knowledge of which is supposed to be gained via positivism. However, Positivism merely represents the inversion of Platonism, in which the polarities of truth versus appearance are maintained and indeed maintained as determinative. What is required is an "Auseinandersetzung" with positivism in its foundations. What is necessary is a twisting away from Platonism.

"6. We have abolished the real world: what world is left? the apparent world perhaps? ... But not "with the real world we have also abolished the apparent world!"

(Friedrich Nietzsche - "Twilight of the Idols").

What remains when both the "true" suprasensuous world and the "apparent" sensuous world are abolished? Abolition does not imply a total annihilation/dissolution into nothingness, for Nietzsche seeks precisely to overcome nihilism in all its forms. The designations "true" and "apparent" merely represent an interpretation of beings as a whole in accordance with Platonism. It is this interpretation that is to be overcome/abolished, not the sensuous/non-sensuous in fact.

The sensuous and its intrinsic negativity still remain following the abolition of the "true" and the "apparent" following the first moment in twisting free from Platonism. But what remains also is a question. (What is the sensuous? How is it to be delimited? What are its parameters? - Where does the sensuous end and the nonsensuous begin? - What is the prevailing relationship sensuous to non-sensuous? What remains is the need for a new interpretation of sensuousness).

The new interpretation of sensuousness is considered from the perspective of being and of Nietzsche's understanding of being as will to power. Following the abolition of the true and apparent worlds the sensuous remains as that which is - as the sole reality. Reality being/life as will to power is displayed/presented as a perspectival shining forth, a coming into appearance within the multiple in addition to alternative/transitory perspectives allied to the bodying forth of organic life. Whatever appears in such a context - a coming into appearance - appears to be manifested as whatever it is within a momentary perspective in the flux of appearing.

The being of whatever appears "to be" is mere appearance ("Schein"). For Nietzsche such mere appearance or "error" is integrated with the conception of life as perspectival. Therefore he describes truth, being which appears to be true, that kind of "error" without which a certain type of living entity could not exist.

The ambiguous character of the term appearance/"Schein" for Nietzsche, corresponds to what remains following the inversion of Platonism - the true world/the world of being/meaning permanence no longer to be located in the suprasensuous, but in the sensuous itself. In the ambiguity/interpretation of the "logos" we perceive the basis for a "discordance" between truth as definitive appearance and the appearing/shining forth that is affirmed in art as the creative transformation of the sensuous into the beautiful.

The discordance between art and truth is one that emerges in Nietzsche's twisting free from Platonism. Art and truth are integral to the unity of being or reality conceived as the perspectival appearing/shining forth of the sensuous. It is in this same respect that they also function to counter-act one another and become dis-joined. The discordance which Nietzsche identified as prevalent in the relationship between art and truth is located not in the simple inversion of Platonism but in the process of a twisting free.

Existence can now only locate meaning in the creative activity of art (the collapse of any positioning of a suprasensuous defined meaning, the unfolding of nihilism in which the "true world" comes to nothing, there is no longer any meaning/directionality to existence) in which the sensuous is affirmed by being transformed/re-configured into its highest posibilities, the intensity of becoming shining forth. This transfiguration ultimately affirms the sensuous as what it essentially is - enabling becoming itself to appear in its highest form. Nietzsche in his conception of being as the will to power attempts to assimilate - in a relationship that is no longer oppositional but discordant - the traditional opposition between being and becoming.
For an elaboration of aspects of this interpretation see Martin Heidegger "Nietzsche" (trans. David Farrell Krell) (see Derrida "Plato's Pharmacy" in "Dissemination" trans Barbara Johnson, Athlone Press: London (1981)). Heidegger attempts to read what he refers to in the first lecture course as the "trace of discordance" in Nietzsche's telling of being. Throughout Deleuze's discussion of being in "Différence et répétition" one may discern certain themes that could possibly cohere with aspects of a Heideggerian reading. Heidegger claims, in the first series of lectures (1937), "The will to Power as Art" from "Nietzsche", that the will to power leads the way to the overcoming of conceptual knowledge. Heidegger regards the doctrine as prophetic to the overcoming of conceptual thought preparing the way for an experience of being itself. Certainly for both Heidegger and Nietzsche language is incapable of invoking true essences. But Nietzsche does not attempt the Heideggerian project of overcoming conceptual knowledge in order to return to some original preconceptual experience of Being. Heidegger claims that Nietzsche's thought prepares the way for his own project, however the Heideggerian "holophagy" often diverges significantly from Nietzsche's own thought.

Deleuze clearly absorbed Heideggerian insights from works not exclusively devoted to Nietzsche, and he does cite Heidegger's essay "The Word of Nietzsche, "God is Dead" in "Nietzsche et la philosophie". However it seems unlikely that Heidegger's work on Nietzsche directly influenced Deleuze's reading.

Thought presented as a process of representing some external reality is grounded within the notion that the distinctions articulated in thought are reflected back onto the object itself - an "objective articulation" of the object (Socrates - Phaedrus). In line with this conception, thought, derived from common sense, is presented as a fundamentally genial activity, the expression of a universal human faculty that has a natural affinity with truth. It is founded upon simple acts of recognition which involve the application of existing concepts to sense experience. Alternatively Deleuze proposes an image of thought provoked by phenomena that are unorthodox or by forces external to the habitual range of experience.

Plato's texts provide a conception of the world whose basic structure is that of a system of representation. Only the Forms are presented as ultimately/absolutely real. With Plato, Deleuze argues, we observe a philosophical principle of definitive significance being undertaken, that of the subordination of difference to the primary relations of identity/resemblance. However, because Plato was the first to identify the world of representation, and because he employs only the limited resources of the theory of Forms, this conceptual model does not remain unchallenged within the dialogues. The subordination of difference to identity in Platonism, is suggested by Deleuze as similar to the fate of recently captivated wild animals, whose resistance testifies to an untamed nature - soon to be the lost - better than would its behaviour in a natural state. (Gilles Deleuze - "Différence et répétition"). The ordered/hierarchical world of representation is persistently undermined by figures of another type/nature/state whose essence resides not in resemblance to the real nature of things, but in their capacity to simulate such natures.

It is possible to suggest that the ambivalence within the Platonic model with regard to representation emerges within the concept of imitation ("mimesis"), in terms of which the order of representation is defined, threatening the basic coherence of that concept. One could therefore proceed to subvert the Platonic order of representation from within by stating that the essential concept of imitation/representation is determined by a similar ambiguity/uncertainty that is apparent in other terms such as "pharmakon".

This analysis is developed by Derrida in his examination of the conception of imitation in "Plato's Pharmacy" (see Derrida "Plato's Pharmacy" in "Dissemination" trans Barbara Johnson, Athlone Press: London (1981)). Derrida suggests, not without irony, that writing, which Plato terms "a kind of image" of living speech, imitates speech perfectly because it no longer imitates at all. Imitation ("Mimesis") is therefore an inherently ambivalent concept, Derrida says, structurally similar to "pharmakon".

"Imitation affirms and sharpens its essence in effacing itself. Its essence is its nonessence. And no dialectic can encompass this self-inadequation. A perfect imitation is no longer an imitation.... Imitation does not correspond to its essence, is not what it is, imitation - unless it is in some way at fault or rather in default. It is bad by nature. Since (de) fault is inscribed within it, it has no nature. Nothing is properly its own. Ambivalent, playing with itself by hollowing itself out, good and evil at once - undecidably, "mimesis" is akin to the "pharmakon" (Jacques Derrida).

Deleuze, in contrast, however perceives the difference apparent existing between two types of imitation/copy only a simplistic/superficial distinction made within the realm of representation itself. In fact, it is a distinction between the elements that truly resemble what they appear to resemble and those which only on a primary level resemble that of which they are images. Between copies and simulacra there is no common factor, they are not conceived as two species of the same genus but two distinct/separate types of entity. Whereas the Demodean
strategy towards the primacy of identity within Platonism is to seek to reduce its stable elements/structures of opposition to transitory ambivalence/undecidability, the Deleuzian expedient continues to illuminate differences such as that between copies and simulacra to a point at which they become generic differences - the generic difference emerges with regard to the concept of difference itself.

14 Gilles Deleuze - op cit (1968).
15 Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1968).
16 Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1968).
17 Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1968).
19 In analysis of the Nietzschean programme Deleuze employs the image of the dice to illustrate the double affirmation of the eternal return - the affirmation of all throws into a single throw being the affirmation of the being of becoming. Deleuze subsequently modifies/elaborates this conception. The world of becoming is that of intensities, ideas/problems in the process of individuation/explication. The being of this becoming is the virtual area of co-existing/perplex ideas in correspondence. Deleuze in addition suggests that the distinction between being and becoming may be dramatized in Nietzschean terms as the distinction between the will to power and the eternal return - "the will to power is the scintillating world of metamorphoses, of communicating intensities, a world of intensive intentionalities, a world of simulacra and "mysteries", whereas the eternal return is to the being of this world" (Différence et répétition).
20 In "Nietzsche et la philosophie" Deleuze describes the eternal return as a synthesis of time, the co-existence of past/present/future in a single moment that enables time to pass. In "Proust et les signes" Deleuze presents a pure-virtual past, in which all events to co-exist, and a complex time of essences. In "Présentation de Sacher-Masoch" Deleuze indicates that Freudian repetition is a synthesis of time, and finds the condition of the pleasure principle in the living present of Eros, below which he situates the groundless time of Thanatos.
22 Socrates states that contradiction forms the basis of thought - Deleuze terms this experience as an interaction with the simulacrum, "... the simulacrum is the true character or form of that which is - "Télan" (Heidegger's "das Seiende", or individual existing being, as opposed to being in general "das Sein"). (Différence et répétition). The simulacrum has no intrinsic identity, it is difference in itself appearing by distinguishing itself. The intensity, the potential energetic content of metastable states, the power of individuation is perceptible only to the empirical experience of common sense as a masked difference, and is dramatized in a disjunctive functioning of the faculties as implicated difference (difference in itself and difference-from-itself). In both these contexts it manifests itself as a simulacrum.
24 See especially Launmann's "Essai sur les notions de structure et d'existence en mathématiques" (Paris: Hermann (1938)).
25 Problems are structures, but they should not be allied to actual structures - essentially they relate to the virtual not the actual and occupy a paradoxical space between existence and non-existence. Deleuze characterizes the situation in terms of ideas that subsist/insist rather than exist and that have extra-being rather than mere being. Additionally he says they have a problematic being which is expressed as a "non-being" or "questioned-being". Also problems transform their nature when they are integrated into actual structures.
26 The entity responsible facilitating the transition of virtual to actual is the "intensity" whose basic function is that of individuation. Deleuze's conception of intensity can be interpreted as an extension of theories developed by Gilbert Simondon in "L'individu et sa genèse physico-biologique" (Paris: PUF (1964)). Simondon uses information theory to illustrate individuation in physical/biological systems, highlighting that normal distinctions form/matter, individualism, animatism, animalism, specification/individuation must be re-worked in terms of information to incorporate the reality of the "process" of individuation.

At the primary level, all processes of physical individuation may be conceived of in terms of energy, and it is for this reason that Deleuze names that which individuates itself as an intensity. The intensity is not perceptible via the common-sense categories of the
understanding - it may be experienced from a disjunctive operation of the faculties in moments of disequilibrium. (The basic experience of intensities is that of a adimensional "profondeur" depth/depths which may be perceived as implicit in the construction of the dimensionality of space. (Deleuze cites specifically the work of Jacques Paliard and certain aspects of the work of Maurice Pradines and Jean Paget). The intensity is energy as difference-in-itself and explicates itself in qualities/quantities, revealing itself in physical systems generally as the transition of metastable states to stable states and in biological systems as a dual method of specification and individuation. (In Deleuzian terms a metastable substance is a difference in itself and individuation is a process in which difference differentiates itself) The intensity is not only a physical force but consists of a cognitive dimension, a dimension of the idea - that which within the idea catalyses the motion virtual to actual. The idea is composed of three dimensions.

i) singular points embodied in qualities/parts.
ii) Relations between singular points embodied in quantities/species characteristics.
iii) Intensities effecting the timespace actualization of singular points and their relations.

The intensity is alone experienced by the five senses (faculty of sensibility), however the idea, generally, is not associated with any distinct faculty. The idea is that which promotes a faculty into a disjunctive state communicating its energetic impulse from faculty to faculty. The provocation of the idea derives its basis in the intensity/seme experience and their proceeds to disrupt the other faculties.

The intensity indicates only a part of the idea - the form of that which is "das seiende" the individual being is the intensity, the form of being "das Sein" is the idea as a whole, virtual and actual. The intensity is constituted via an integrated difference but a fundemantal order structures the idea itself. All problems inter-communicate and may be regarded as expressions of a single proposition. Ideas/problems are located in a continuum/virtual realm grounded/unfounded/chaotic. The virtual is expressed in a chaos of chance which is articulated as an imperative (ideas as the motivation of thought) in the form of a question ideas/quesions/the imperative should be conceived of in the terms of the dice game.

27. Gilles Deleuze - "Logique du sens" Paris: Minuit (1969). "Logique du sens" is an extended meditation on the separation-connection of "being"/"states of things", thought, and language in the design Deleuze repeatedly expresses the autonomy of these "parallels" and their simultaneous imbrication. The relation between content and expression and things/thought/language is really distinct/ in reciprocal presupposition. They are overlapping moments of becoming that can be placed in continuity/disjunction depending on the point of view. Meaning is the articulation of their difference. The articulated differentiations constitute a meaning that can be multiplied indefinitely. "Language" is divisible into the autonomous planes of speech and writing and each of these is divisible, in turn, into distinct modes of discourse. Conversely, the planes can be simplified, for example, by words into collision with things and modifying the emphasis placed upon thought. What is of consequence is not the particular way in which any of these planes are defined, but rather the principle of their structuring as variations to one another and the pragmatic possibility of integrating the analysis of their structuring to a definite method/action.

28. The main source for Deleuze reading of the Stoics is Émile Bréhier's "La Théorie des incorporeals dans l'ancien stoïcien" (Paris Vrin (1928). Deleuze also uses Victor Goldschmidt's "Le Système Stoïcien et l'idée de temps (Paris: Vrin (1953)) and his remarks on the Stoic theory of time. In "Logique du sens" Deleuze writes referring to the Stoics: "Mixtures are in bodies, and in the depth of bodies, a body penetrates another and co-exists with it in all of its parts, like a drop of wine in the ocean, or fire in iron. One body withdraws from another, like liquid from a vase. Mixtures in general determine the quantitative and qualitative states of affairs, the dimensions of an ensemble - the red of iron, the green of a tree". As Deleuze suggests the Stoics are in the process of tracing out and forming a frontier where there had not been one before. In this sense events de-centre the subject and displace reflection. In this passage Deleuze addresses the focal point of the infinite identity of becoming and the whole question of loss of fixed meaning operating within the fixed and the possibilities of transformation and expansion, within the subject, shrinking and expanding simultaneously.

31. Marcel Mauss - "Sociologie et anthropologie" - "Introduction à l'œuvre de Marcel Mauss" (Paris: PUF (1950)
33. Deleuze utilizes this conceptual opposition of the nomadic to the sedentary, crucial to the development of much of his later work, from Étienne Laroche's "Histoi de la racine NEM - en grec ancien" (Paris: Klincksick (1949)).


35. Gilles Deleuze - "Différence et répétition" (1968)


38. This aleatory point is the force of the unconscious - that which evades consciousness and manifests itself as active/positive force. (In Nietzsche et la philosophie the force is the will to power conceptualized fundamentally in terms of a physics of becoming, in Proust et les signes, Différence et répétition and Logique du sens the force is located within a metaphysical surface of singular points).
WHERE ANGELS PLAY (IN A NETWORK OF LINES THAT INTERSECT)

Deleuze and Guattari’s project may prove fruitful for various forms of art analysis/research. I would wish to subsequently indicate what these continuities/points of overlap may be. Primarily however, this provisional and schematic overview of the Deleuzo-guattarian system, a first attempt to explore and navigate paths through the nomadic routes they traverse, is a necessary preliminary to the extensive examination into their work, in relation to contemporary art practice, which follows in the later sections.

The primary impulse of the Deleuzo-guattarian project is to challenge and displace the validity/dominance of the structure of binary logic that has pervaded Western philosophy since the time of Plato. They do not simply wish to advance alternatives with which to contest/subvert the metaphysical foundation of Western philosophy (“logocentrism” - the necessary presupposition of “givenness”/presence) but seek to re-align traditional metaphysical identities/theoretical models in a context that renders them merely effects/surface phenomena within a wider/differently constructed ontology/metaphysics.

Deleuze’s work on Bergson (1) presents a critique of negative ontology and offers alternatively an absolutely positive movement of being that is situated within/derives from an efficient/internal notion of causality. To the negative movement of determination, he opposes the positive movement of differentiation; to the dialectical unity of the One and Multiple, he opposes the irreducible multiplicity of becoming. Nietzsche enables Deleuze to transpose the results of ontological speculation to an ethical dimension to the field of forces, of sense and value, where the positive movement of being becomes the affirmation of being. The thematic of power in Nietzsche opens the theoretical passage that establishes a relationship between Bergsonian ontology and an ethics of active expression. Spinoza affords a similar transformative direction and extends it to practice. In the way Nietzsche proposes the affirmation of speculation, Spinoza promotes the affirmation of practice/joy as the focal point of an ontology. Deleuze suggests that the Spinozian system is an ontological conception of practice - Spinoza configures practice as constitutive of being.
In Deleuze's project, against a transcendental foundation we might discern an immanent one, and against a stable/teleological foundation we encounter a material/open one. Similar differentiations should be incorporated into the illustration of causal effect. Deleuze's critique of causal effect includes not only a significant/instrumental rejection of the final cause/formal cause, but additionally an equally vigorous affirmation of the efficient cause as intrinsic to his philosophical project. Deleuzian ontology includes the tradition of casual arguments and evolves conceptions of simultaneously being's "productivity" and its "producibility" - that is its capacities to produce and be produced. Efficient causality is the key-point to a coherent reading of Deleuze's complete discourse on difference. The distinction in the deployment of the terms "foundation"/"causal effect" may be illuminated by the differential between order/organization. The order of being/truth is the structure imposed as necessary/eternal from above/outside the material scene of forces. Organization, by contrast, designates the co-ordination/assemblage of accidental/non-necessary encounters/developments from below/within the immanent field of forces. Organization is not a planned model of progression/a proposed vision of an avant garde but instead an immanent creation/composition of a pertinent affinity between consistency/co-ordination. In this state organization, the complication of assembled creative forces is always an art.

Deleuzian ontology is based upon the concepts of difference and singularity derived from both Bergson and Spinoza.

Bergsonian difference defines primarily the principle of the positive "movement" of being, that is essentially the temporal notion of ontological articulation and differentiation, (Bergson does not ask what being is but how it moves). Bergson's difference, in contrast to the versions proposed by the mechanists/Plato/Hegel, is defined by a notion of efficient causality. The movement of being is a progression of internal differences in that the cause always inheres within its effect. In this way ontological movement is released from any play of negations and is posed instead as absolutely positive, as an internal differentiation.
With Spinoza, the positivity of being is characterized by its singularity and its univocal expression. The singularity of Spinoza's being is not defined by its difference from an other/from non-being, but alternatively by the fact that being is different in itself. "Disassociated from any numerical distinction, real distinction is carried into the absolute. It becomes capable of expressing the difference in being and consequently it brings about the restructuring of other distinctions." (Gilles Deleuze) (2). Spinozian being is different without any external reference, being is singular. Just as being is a cause of itself and therefore supported by an internal causal structure, so too being is different in itself and thus sustained through a notion of internal or efficient difference. The expression of this internal difference is precisely the movement of being. Expression is the initiation of being that identifies clearly its internal causal structure, its genealogy, and thus the expression of singular being cannot be anything other than univocal - Being is expressed always and everywhere in the same way. The singular and univocal expression of being is in the Spinozian model, the highest possible affirmation of being.

Deleuze displaces the centre of ontological speculation from negation to difference. In opposition to the Hegelian dialectical system Deleuze introduces the pre-critical world of Spinoza and the Scholastics therein demonstrating the weakness of Hegelian ontology. From Scholastic arguments regarding the "productivity"/"producibility" of being - its abilities to produce and be produced - a thing cannot be the necessary cause of something outside itself, and an effect cannot have more perfection/reality than its cause. The dignity of being is exactly its power/internal production, essentially the efficient causal genealogy that is derived from within, the positive singularity that demarcates its singularity. Real being is singular/univocal - it is different in itself. It is from this efficient difference constituting the central component of being that flows the real multiplicity of the world. In comparison the Hegelian notion that being requires an external support for its difference, the being that relies upon negation for its principle determinant, is no being at all. Hegelian being cannot construct a real unity nor a real multiplicity, it is therefore abstract in the sense that it cannot realise either its capacity to produce or its capacity to be produced.
It would appear as if materialism is the only adequate method by which to perceive this understanding of being. Materialism should be understood within this context as a polemical position that refutes any priority afforded to thought over matter/mind over body, not simply to invert the relationship and similarly to privilege matter, but instead to establish an equality between two realms. Deleuzian ontology necessitates a materialist dimension because any priority that is accorded to thought would weaken the internal structure of being. Materialism is not only a refusal to subordinate the corporeal to the mental but principally the elevation of being with respect to both realms. Deleuze refutes any idealistic notion that via some means subordinates being to thought. "The being of Hegelian logic is merely "thought" being, pure and empty, which affirms itself by passing into its own opposite. ... Hegelian being is pure and simple nothingness, and the becoming that this being forms with nothingness, that is to say with itself, is a perfectly nihilistic becoming; and affirmation passes through negation here because it is merely the affirmation of the negative and its products" (Gilles Deleuze) (3). The terms such as "being-in the world" would have no relevance in a Deleuzian design.

Deleuze's being is logically prior to/comprehensive of thought and extension equally. In Deleuze's ontology being is always already actual, it is always completely expressed in body and thought. It is a materialist approach that appears appropriate to account for both a superficial quality and its plenitude.

In contrast to the "metaphysical masterline" of speculation drawn out from Plato to Hegel and Heidegger, Deleuze suggests the "coherence" of an alternative tradition, from Lucretius and Duns Scotus to Spinoza and Bergson. To contest an idealist ontological system it is not required to move to an extreme opposite, to a de-ontological perspective, but rather to follow a materialist ontological tradition as an alternative. The desirability of constructing such a model is that it facilitates the promotion of productivity and producibility in nature and therefore the power to act and be affected - a positive materialist ontology in essence an ontology of power.
Similarly Deleuzian affirmation contests the Hegelian form of negation/critique. It does not however reject negation/critique, completely, but it enfranchises the nuances that constitute contrasting conceptions of negation and critique more suitable/expedient to his design. Affirmation is not opposed to critique, fundamentally it departs from a comprehensive critique that takes the forces of negation to their limit. Affirmation is intrinsically linked to antagonism. The basis of the Deleuzian critique is derived from the Scholastic philosophical method - an absolute non-dialectical form of the negative moment. This is the means via which Nietzsche "completes" the Kantian project, according to the Deleuzian reading. (4)

Deleuze's affirmative philosophical design does not reject/repudiate the dynamism/instrumentality of the negative, but in contrast affords a different concept of negation - a negation that advances the field of affirmation. The unrestrained destruction creates a space for free/original creative forces. The slave logic of the dialectic attempts to produce an affirmation from the supersession of the negation, but in this case the affirmation is already pre-figured in the negation - it is simply a repudiation of the same. In contrast the master logic engenders a positive affirmation, this negation involves no preservation but an inexorable débâcle, a transmutation. The subsequent affirmation relies then singularly on its own power. It is only via a positive utilization of powerful negation that a real affirmation may be confirmed. The negative of the total critique, the demonstration of an unrestrained negation is ultimately liberating.

"To affirm is not to take responsibility for, to take on the burden of what is, but to realise, to set free what lives. To affirm is to unburden: not to load life with the weight of higher values, but to create new values which are those of life, which make life light and active."

(Gilles Deleuze) (5)

For Deleuze affirmation is not the acceptance of being but alternatively is actually the creation of being. This conception of affirmation enables Deleuze to position the
instrumentality of his ontology into the arena of sense/value.

The Deleuzian scheme concentrates on the problems of practice - how to set in motion creative forces, how to make philosophy essentially "practical". Deleuze adopts an investigation of power. The transformative conception of being located in Bergson and Spinoza prepares the structural framework for this notion - Deleuzian ontology is based upon the movement of being/its genealogy of causal relations/its "productivity" and "producibility". The thematic of power and production occupies a crucial formative position. In Nietzsche, Deleuze identifies a distinction between two qualities of power - active and reactive, power linked to its capabilities/abilities and power separated from its capabilities/abilities.

In Spinoza the same significant distinction is afforded with a greater resonance with respect to the adequate and the inadequate. The adequate is that which expresses/envelopes/comprehends its cause; the inadequate is mute. Similar to the active, the adequate is connected forward to what it can achieve/manifest. Simultaneously it is also connected retroactively to its internal genealogy of affects, the genealogy of its own production. The adequate renders a comprehensive perspective to both the productivity and producibility of being. This is the fundamental connection that opens up the field of power to Deleuze - correspondingly to the power of being to act/exist is its power to be affected. This power of producibility initiates the communicating vector between ontology and practice.

With Bergson Deleuze develops an ontology, with Nietzsche he sets that ontology in motion to constitute an ethics, and with the addition of Spinoza we take a step forward in an evolution extending/creating further dimensions in the structural framework of a Bergsonian ontology/Nietzschean ethical trajectory. Deleuze's progress does not involve exchanging one theoretical position/perspective for another, but rather it is a process of accumulation and constitution. Each move/each new field of investigation is a consolidation and a construction that never abandons or negates, but alternatively re-proposes the terms of its predecessor.
Throughout "Spinoza et le problème de l'expression" we observe that Deleuze approaches the Spinozian system as two distinct moments, as two perspectives of thought, one speculative, the other practical (6). (This distinction between speculation and practice remains implicit in Deleuze's work and forms both a theoretical claim and an interpretative strategy. Deleuze presents Spinoza's "Ethics" as a double text. The first moment of the "Ethics" speculative/analytic proceeds in the centrifugal direction from God to the thing in order to discover and express the principles that animate the system of being; the second moment of the "Ethics", practice/synthetic, moves in the centripetal direction from the thing to God by forming an ethical method and a political line of action. The two moments are intrinsically linked. The moment of investigation "Forschung" prepares the ground for the moment of presentation/practice "Darstellung". The two moments range over the same constitutive ground of being but from divergent perspectives. As opposed to a destructive moment proceeded by a constructive moment proceeded by a speculative logical investigation followed by an ethical constitution - "Forschung" followed by "Darstellung". The two moments, speculation/practice form an essential relationship, but remain autonomous and distinct - each with its own method and animating principle. The affirmation of speculation and the joy of practice are the two elements that combine to produce the structural design of the "Ethics".

Incessantly in Deleuze's view of the "Ethics" we may discern the motivation to progress from the first moment to the second, from speculation to practice, from affirmation to joy. The catalyst that enables Deleuze to effect this transition is the Spinozian depiction of power. In the ontological arena, the analysis of the structure of power takes a fundamental position, because the essence of being is its productive/casual dynamic. Causation/causality is the primary construction block that supports being, in that being is characterized in its power to exist/produce. All questions regarding power/productivity/causality in Deleuze as in Spinoza revolve around this ontological foundation. The analysis of power however, is not only an element that returns to basic principles, it is also the passage that facilitates the examination to progress to new ground. In the reading of Nietzsche, Deleuze found that via a recognition of the distinction within power between the active/reactive he was able to
transform the ontological discussion into an ethics. In the Deleuzian analysis of Spinoza, the passage through power attains a more extensive function. Power is the essence of being that presents essence in existence. The intimate nexus in Spinoza that unites cause/power/production/essence is the dynamic core that makes his speculative system into a dynamic project. Here we may locate a complete system of gradations within power - between spontaneity/affectivity, between actions/passions, between joy/sadness. This analysis establishes the conditions/terms for a real conversion within the context/continuity of the theoretical framework. The examination of power forms the "conclusive" point of speculation and the initiation of practice. Power is the vital link, the point of "transmutation" from speculation to practice. The analysis of power operates as a point of conversion in Spinoza - it is the occasion upon which we terminate the process of attempting to think the world, and begin to create it.

Systems of thought derived from the centrality of the subject and the coherence of signification can be employed such that they no longer remain privileged/casual terms, but effects/consequences of processes of sedimentation/the congealing or coagulation of processes/interrelations or "machines" of disparate components, operating in provisional alignment with each other to constitute a functional assemblage.

"We employ a dualism of models only in order to arrive at a process that challenges all models. Each time mental correctives are necessary to undo the dualism we had no wish to construct but through which we pass".

(Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari) (7)

The Deleuzian philosophical programme emphasizes the necessity to re-define/re-figure/re-invent theoretical practice, and philosophy with it, in a mode that is not molar/reactive/sedentary but rather molecular/active/nomadic. The central concern that connects the project's elements is a crisis of the philosophical logos and the requirement to invent new images of thought to replace the classical/traditional representation of theoretical thought. Deleuzian analysis concentrates upon a re-definition of thinking, and especially of the theoretical process, as a non-reactive mode that accompanies a new theory of subjectivity.
The embodiment of the subject is according to Deleuze a form of bodily materiality, but not of the natural biological type. He alternatively presents the body as the complex interplay of refined constructed/developed social and symbolic forces. The body is not an essence and not a biological substance. It is an aggregate of forces, a surface of intensities - pure simulacra without originals. The embodied subject is a term in a process of intersecting forces/affects/spatio-temporal variables that are characterized by mobility/changeability/a transitory temperament.

Thinking for Deleuze is not the expression of in-depth inferiority, or the enactment of transcendental models; it is a mechanism to formulate connections among a multiplicity of impersonal forces. Deleuze's thought is precisely the attempt to imagine the activity of thinking differently.

In his enterprise to re-configurate the Western mode of theoretical thought, Deleuze moves beyond the dualistic opposition that inflects the monological discourse of logocentrism. The univocity of being - the One/the same, (asserting sameness through a series of hierarchically ordained differences) - expressed by the moral discourse of Western metaphysics is inherently a normative image of thought. Deleuze focuses upon the moment when this image collapses, opening the way to alternative forms of representation.

In defining his conceptual architecture, Deleuze traces a line of thinking that passes through Lucretius, the empiricists, Spinoza and Nietzsche, that highlights/engenders activity/joy/affirmation and dynamic becoming. Deleuze rejects the notion of inferiority and consequently subverts the foundations of psychoanalytic theory (the idea that desire is negative and the consciousness is a neo-metaphysical encapsulation of deep/inner truth) proposing in contrast an unconscious conceived in terms of displacement and production, and desire as affirmation. Deleuze emphasizes the necessity of thinking "difference" not as the reactive pole of a binary opposition structured to confirm the power and primacy of the same, but as the affirmation of difference in terms of a multiplicity of possible differences - difference as the positivity of differences. Subsequently Deleuze redefines the unconscious
not as an inner emblematic symbol of to-be categorized origins, but as demarcating the structural non-synchronization of the subject within his/her consciousness. This state of non-synchronization is a volatile disjunction that divides the thinking subject from the illusion of plenitude and self-transparency, the monolithic image of the self.

The negation of the conception of adequation to/identification with the logocentric image of thought is the central tenet of the nomadic vision of subjectivity that Deleuze's advances as the new post-metaphysical configuration of the subject. Deleuze stresses that the process of thinking should not be reduced to a reactive critique, thinking can be critical - an active/assertive practice of inventing new images of thought. Thinking is about conceiving new images. Thinking is about change and transformation.

The Deleuzian programme points to a re-definition of the practice of the philosophical enterprise, as the search for/convergence of new images of thought relative to a nomadic/disjunctive self. One re-configuration focuses upon the notion of an idea as a line of intensity, marking a certain degree/variation in intensity. An idea is an active state of high intensity that initiates previously unconceived indices of life/action. Deleuze's ideas are events, lines that direct thought along new routes. An idea elevates the affirmative power of life to a higher level. For Deleuze thought is composed of sense/value and it is the force/degree of intensity that defines the value of an idea. Philosophy promoted as a critique of negative/reactive values is in parallel a critique of the dogmatic image of thought - it exemplifies the force/the process of the thinking operation via a typology of forces (Nietzsche) or an ethnology of passions (Spinoza). Deleuze's model illustrates the primacy of the affective fundamental basis of the thinking actively. Deleuze re-defines ideas as nomadic forms of thought. Innovating upon Foucault's notion of the text as a toolbox (8), Deleuze regards the philosophical text as the "item" in an intensive process of fundamentally extra-textual activity. This activity concerns a displacement of the subject via flows of intensities and forces.
In their combined programme Deleuze and Guattari further advance their interest in the question of difference - a difference principally capable of operating and being conceived outside the dominance or regime of the One/the Self-same/the structure of binary pairs in which what is different can only be projected as a variation/negation of identity. Deleuze conceptualizes difference beyond the representations of identity/opposition/analogy/resemblance. In their elucidation of a difference in and of itself, a difference that is not an auxiliary to identity or the same, Deleuze and Guattari invoke two forms of energy and alignment - the process of becoming and the notion of multiplicity, a becoming that exceeds logic/constraints/ the parameters of being and a multiplicity that exceeds the simple doubling or multi-centering of proliferating subjects.

"It is only when the multiple is effectively treated as a substantive "multiplicity", that it ceases to have any relation to the One as subject or object, natural or spiritual reality, image and world... A multiplicity has neither subject nor object, only determinations, magnitudes and dimensions that cannot increase in number without the multiplicity changing in nature".

(Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari) (9)

A multiplicity is not conceived as a pluralized notion of identity but in contrast as a mutable/uniform/pluralistic collective, an assemblage defined not by its abiding identity/principle of sameness over time, but in terms of transformations - its dimensionality, "multicities are defined by the outside: by the abstract line, the line of flight or deterritorialization according to which they change in nature and connections with other multiplicities " (Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari) (10). The notion of becoming functions to provide non-teleological notions of direction/movement/process. In the Deleuzian scheme it has definitive associations with the pre-Socratics, Spinoza and Nietzsche.

The Deleuzo-guattarian programme promotes a conception of the body as a discontinuous/non-unified series of processes/organs/flows of energies/corporeal substances/incorporeal events/intensities and durations. Deleuze and Guattari provide a diverse alternative notion to the body to that which has proliferated in Western thought in terms of a defined connection.
of the human body to other bodies, human/non-human, animate/inanimate. In exchange, they link
organs and biological processes to material objects and social practices while counteracting
a subordination of the body to a unity/homogeneity from either the body’s submission to
consciousness or organic arrangement/organization. Following Spinoza the body is defined
neither as a focal point for a conscious subject nor as an organically conceived object,
amternatively the body is appraised and judged in terms of its operative possibilities; in
concrete terms, of the connections it stages, the transformations it effects/endures, the
machinic links it forms with other bodies, (what it can link with and how it can originate and
communicate its capacities) - an affirmative comprehension of the body:

"Spinoza’s question “What is a body capable of?” What affects is it capable of? Affects are
becomings: sometimes they weaken us to the extent they diminish our strength of action and
decompose our relations (sadness), sometimes they make us stronger through augmenting our force,
and making us enter into a vaster and higher individual (joy). Spinoza never ceases to be
astonished at the body: not having a body, but at what the body is capable of. Bodies are not
defined by their genus and species, nor by their organs and functions, but by what they can do,
the affects they are capable of, in passion as in action”.

(Gilles Deleuze) (11).

In a corresponding approach Deleuze and Guattari have re-interpreted the notion of
desire in active and affirmative terms. Desire as visualized by Deleuze - again following
Spinoza and Nietzsche - is immanent/positive/productive a fundamentally complete and fully
creative entity/relation. Desire is what produces/effects connections/develops
relations/produces machinic alliances. Desire is what produces the real, an actualization/a
series of practices/action/production/amalgamation/building machines/constructing reality.
Deleuze and Guattari focus on the “willing” of power - desire.

In “Nietzsche et la philosophie” Deleuze first connects the idea of desire with the will to
power. The notion that desire is productive evolves from this reflection on will to power in
terms of the productivity of, in conjunction, active and reactive forces. In “L’Anti-Oedipe:
capitalisme et schizophrenie I” (12), Deleuze and Guattari introduce the desiring machine
as a machinic functionalist translation of the Nietzschean will to power. A desiring machine is a functional assemblage of a desiring will and the object desired (13). The body is composed of various desiring machines - parts unrelated to any whole, which are connected to other desiring-machines within the body/the natural world/the social sphere. "Everything is a machine", a component combining with a second component, combining with a third component etc. in a binary, connective synthesis, constructing chains of machines through which pass flows/fluxes. Every machine is related to a continual material flow that cuts into it and each associative flow can be regarded as ideal, a continuous flux/universal continuum of unceasing production. Deleuze aims to locate desire within a functionalist vocabulary/a machinic index in order to by-pass the personification/subjectivation of desire in a substantive will/ego/unconscious/self. (14).

Deleuze and Guattari follow Spinoza and Nietzsche inverting the Platonic model - desire is primary and given as opposed to a lack; it is not produced, an effect of frustration/ontological blank, but primitive and primary, not opposed to or post dating reality, but productive of reality. Desire does not adopt a specific object whose adoption is necessary; alternatively it seeks nothing in particular in excess of its own proliferation/self-expression. It assembles elements from singularities, and destructs elements, assemblages into their singularities; "If desire produces, its product is real.
If desire is productive, it can be so in reality, and of reality". (Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari) (15). As production desire does not elaborate delineated strategies/models/ideals/aims, rather it experiments/functions - It is fundamentally aleatory.

For Deleuze desire forms a component part of an infrastructure, it is constitutive of the objects desire as well as the social field in which they are represented. Desire like Nietzsche's will to power is productive. As Nietzsche aimed to keep the will to power multiple, so too Deleuze wants desire to be multiple/polyvocal. Nietzsche emphasized the maximizing capacity of a puissant/assertive will to power while acknowledging the necessity/inevitability of the fragile/decadent will to power. Deleuze similarly advocates
that desire is productive while recognizing that desire will sometimes be destructive/repressed, and at other times appears to pursue its own repression. Analysing this occurrence/phenomena of desire seeking its own repression is one of the primary aims of Deleuzo-guattarian schizoanalysis. Indeed there is a structural coincidence between desire desiring its own repression and Nietzsche’s exemplification in “On the Genealogy of Morals” that would rather will nothingness than not will (16).

Generally we might define the “Nietzsche effect” in the Deleuzo-guattarian scheme as an action of appropriation. They appropriate Nietzsche’s will to power transforming it into a desiring machine: Nietzsche’s biologism becomes Deleuze’s machinism; Nietzsche’s “everything is will to power” becomes Deleuze’s “everything is desire”; Nietzsche’s affirmation of the puissant will to power becomes Deleuze’s affirmation of desiring-production.

The notions of rhizome/assemblage/machine/desire/multiplicity/becoming and the Body without Organs are concepts linked together as part of the Deleuzo-guattarian schizoanalytic project of rejecting/displacing prevailing centrisms/unities/rigid strata. In Deleuze and Guattari’s design the subject is not an “entity”/a thing/a relation between mind (interior) and body (exterior), it must be re-configurated as a series of flows/energies/movements/capacities, a series of fragments/segments with the aptitude/scope of being linked in ways other than those that form an identity. “Production” is a conglomeration of those processes that generate links between elements/fragments/fragments of bodies/objects and “machines” - heterogeneous/disparate/discontinuous assemblages of elements/fragments combined in conjunctions or separated through disjunctions and breaks. A “desiring machine” is opposed to the notion of unity or One - the elements/discontinuities that constitute it do not cohere either in an original totality that has been lost, (Plato/Freud) or one that finalizes/complete – a telos (Hegel). They are multiplicities of provisional alignments of segments. They do not “represent” the real, they “are” the real. Desire does not precipitate immutable multiplicities which would create a durability/self-identity the same. It experiments producing transitory new alignments/conjunctions/ linkages.
connections - marshalling rhizomatics/schizoanalysis does not specialize in the alignment of entities/ the compilation of diverse flows/intensities, but lines of flow/flight trajectories of territorialization/deterritorialization and subsequent reterritorializations.

In "Nietzsche et la philosophie" Deleuze comes close to escaping the parameters of the traditional philosophical discourse in so far as he develops Nietzsche's affirmation of difference as an alternative to the Hegelian paradigm for resolving opposition, the "Aufhebung". It is in subsequent works however, that Deleuze moves from the interpretation "of" Nietzsche to an experimentation with" Nietzsche - operating outside of the "traditional language" of philosophy, outside of the organizational rules that determine what can be articulated within philosophy.

In Deleuze and Guattari's later works, Nietzsche's texts exemplify a deterritorialization strategy in which all texts should aspire to presenting themselves as tools to be used as opposed to privileged objects to be understood. Deleuze comes to reject the entire project of "interpretation", opting alternatively for a process of "experimentation". In contrast to the hermeneutic project of interpretation which is directed towards a recovery of "sense" and the structuralist project which tracks the play of signifiers, Deleuze places an emphasis on codes of decoding/recoding. Nietzsche's originality. Deleuze claims is based in part in his having produced a new kind of text, one that resists codification insofar as his aphorisms transmit forces rather than signify meanings. (17). Ultimately "Nietzsche" for Deleuze comes to function as a metonymy for the possibility of thinking otherwise than logocentrically.

According to his most recent works, Deleuze's concepts allow one to indefinitely create others. Like the "desiring-machines" of "Anti-Oedipe" Deleuzian concepts are producers of production, they, "liberate the pleat, developing it to the infinite" (18). In doing so, these concepts do not produce a closed system but an open one which undergoes a process of metamorphosis itself in accordance with its various objects. As Deleuze wrote in "Proust et les signes": "One becomes a cabinet maker only through becoming sensitive to wood signs, or
a doctor, becoming sensitive to the signs of the disease” (19).

One method of illustrating the Deleuzo-guattarian system can derive from an explication/understanding of the relationship existing between “Mille Plateaux: Capitalisme et schizophrénie II” and “L’Anti-Oedipe: Capitalisme et schizophrénie”. Primarily Deleuze and Guattari set out a “destruction” or more precisely a “schizoanalytic destruction” in the second volume of any binary oppositions that remain at the end of the first. (20). The connective synthesis produces not a closed binary couple, “this and that” but rather an open-ended series, “this and then that and then this…….” Inclusive disjunction, similarly, generates not the closed binary alternative “either this or that” but an open ended series of alternatives, “this or that or this….” Deleuze and Guattari defy binary closure by multiplying terms. For example the binary pair molar/molecular from “L’Anti-Oedipe” is re-conceived in “Mille Plateaux” in terms of graduating series of segmentarity (from rigid to supple) and in connection with another term, the “ligne de fuite” (21). Despotic “overcoding” and civilized “de-coding” are re-written in terms of “signifying” and “post-signifying” regimes which exist in parallel to pre-signifying and counter-signifying regimes. The opposition fundamental to “L’Anti-Oedipe” - paranoia/schizophrenia is re-located in “Mille Plateaux” on the “Body without Organs” (22). Numerous concepts of schizoanalysis are located in various fields of inquiry/knowledge such as the physical/social sciences and philosophical systems. In “Mille Plateaux” these concepts are confronted and placed in relation to each other. The original meaning is fractured and re-distributed on a transversal line of reasoning, creating a new coda for thinking (heterogeneous classification). Deleuze and Guattari’s development of concepts follow two basic procedures: synchronizing notions that are superficially foreign to each other, and separating notions that are so integrated that their “relations” seem merely metaphorical.

The “Body Without Organs” is one of the most intriguing notions of “Capitalisme et Schizophrénie” (23) having two parallel definitions. “The Body Without Organs is an egg”, or “The Body Without Organs is the Spinozist Substance” (the immanent substance “in the most Spinozist conception of the word”) (24). The juxtaposition of these two notions creates a
shape that is empty because of an excess of meaning/excess of sense. What in "Logique du sens" is called a non-sense — two rigorous but incompatible definitions — in one respect there is the concrete definition of "an egg" in what "Logique du sens" calls the "depth of bodies" and in another respect there is the abstract conception of "the Spinozist substance" on a "metaphysical surface". The concept "Body Without Organs" will therefore be defined "in suspension" in between two heterogeneous series, located in a never-ending, "to and fro" motion between Deleuze's conception of an egg (from Francois Dalco) (25) and his conception of a Spinozist substance. In "Mille Plateaux" the "Body Without Organs" continues to be developed on the same transversal line on which it can never be limited to a single definition. It is neither one nor the other, but both simultaneously, in their heterogeneity itself:

"The "Body Without Organs" causes intensities to pass: it produces and distributes them in a spatiun that is itself intensive, lacking extension... It is non-stratified, unformed, insense matter... that is why we treat the Body Without Organs as a full egg before the extension of the organism and the organization of the organ, before the formation of a stratum the intensive egg that defines itself through axes and vectors, gradients and thresholds, dynamic tendencies with mutation of energy."

(Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari) (26)

Deleuze and Guattari describe the Body Without Organs as a "field of immanence of desire, the plane of consistency proper to desire" on which flow pure intensities, free, prephysical and pre-vital singularities (i.e. singular points). The "Body Without Organs" produces and distributes intensities.

"... in a "Spatiun" itself intensive, unextended... It is not space nor in space, but matter which will occupy space to this or that degree - to the degree which corresponds to the produced intensities... It is intense and non-formed matter, non-stratified, the intensive matrix intensity = O".

(Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (27) (28).
As a concept both "rigorous and inexact" the "Body Without Organs" is in constant transition/metamorphosis located in the "in-between space" that allows intensities and desiring flows to circulate before actualization in different shapes of thought and living organisms on a physical/mental level.

Deleuze and Guattari regard the "Body Without Organs" as a limit/a tendency/a becoming that resists centralized organisation or meaningful investment/a point or process to which all bodies, through their stratifications refer/a becoming that resists the processes of overcoding and organization according to the three great strata or identities it opposes - the union of the "organism", the unification of the "subject" and the structure of "significance" (29).

While it is neither a place nor a plane, a scene or a fantasy the "Body Without Organs" is a field for the production/circulation/intensification of desire, the medium of the immanence of desire. Although it structures a zone for the circulation of intensities and induces deterritorializations/lines of flight and initiates movements of becoming, there must remain at least a latent potential for a minimal level of cohesion and integration in the "Body Without Organs"- fragments of subjectivity/signification.

Destratification, the dynamic inspiration of lines of flight, the production of connections, the movement of intensities/flows through and beyond the Body Without Organs are effectively trajectories and calculations as opposed to fixed states/final positions. Deleuze and Guattari are not suggesting a complete dissolution of identity or a comprehensive destabilization and defamiliarization of identity but alternatively micro-destratifications (intensifications of selected interactions).

"Slaying stratified - organized, signified, subjected - is not the worst that can happen; the worst that can happen is that you throw the strata into demented or suicidal collapse, which brings them back down on us heavier than ever"

(Philippe Deleuze and Félix Guattari) (30).
The Body Without Organs may be appreciated as a field of becomings (31). Just as Deleuze and Guattari contrast the Body Without Organs against the body's organized/singular/unified organic and psychic totality so too they draw the distinction between molar and molecular forms of subjectivity. Becomings are always molecular, traversing and re-aligning molar unities. Molar unities, the division of class/race/gender attempt to form and stabilize concrete systems that function homeostatically encapsulating their component energies and intensities, in opposition molecular becomings traverse, create a route, destabilize, facilitate energy osmosis within/through molar unities.

The Body Without Organs is never specifically co-ordinated to a subject, nor operates distinctly as an object. It is intrinsically a “Body Without Organs”. Becomings are always defined as “becoming-something”, decisive/resolute movements, specified forms of motion/rest, speed/slowness, points/flows of intensity - always multiple, the movement/ transformation of one “state” to a dis-similar alternative. Deleuze and Guattari suggest that becomings involve a mediating third term, a relation to something else to which the subject relates, and through which relation it enters into connections with that something else. Becoming incorporates a series of processes and movements outside/beyond a fixed subjectivity, and the structure of stable unities. It is an escape from systems of binary polarizations that privilege one element at the expense of another.

Ultimately “Becoming” involves going beyond identity and subjectivity, fragmenting and releasing lines of flight, liberating identity that was subsumed under the One. There is a kind of “progression” in becomings a process of stages towards “becoming-imperceptible”. Indiscernibility/imperceptibility/impersonality remain the end points of becoming, their immanent direction or internal motivation, the releasing of absolutely minuscule micro-intensities to the nth degree.
WHERE ANGELS PLAY (IN A NETWORK OF LINES THAT INTERSECT)

NOTES

   Gilles Deleuze "La conception de la différence chez Bergson" "Les études bergsoniennes" No 4 (1956).


4 The Kantian critique remains partial and incomplete because it protects the privileged quality of the suprasensible, withdrawing it from the destructive potential of the forces of the critique. Kant may administer claims of truth/morality without endangering truth/morality themselves. This transcendental reserve preserves the basic order from any form of destruction/structuring. Nietzsche however suggests that the critical forces are afforded a more active function, to present them across an unlimited perspective so that the values of the static/established order would be rendered mutable/irregular. "One of the principal motifs of Nietzsche's work is that Kant has not carried out a true critique because he was not able to pose the problem of critique in terms of values" (Nietzsche et la Philosophie). The total critique is primarily transformative/convulsive, resolute bombardment of the established values and the system they support. The negation that comprises the basis of the total critique is non-dialectical essentially because it is fundamentally divorced from/opposed to the conservative diathesis of the dialectic, a pure and uncompromising antagonism. However, this is not to suggest that all is present is negated, but simply that, what is negated is confronted with irrepresible force.

5 Gilles Deleuze - op cit (1962).

6 Deleuze interprets the first two significant moves of the Spinozan system, the elaborations of substance and the attributes as an alternative logic of speculation in a completely autonomous form to that of the Hegelian progression. We can identify Deleuze's reading of Bergsonian virtuality with that of Spinozian substance in that both provide singular conceptions of being animated by an absolutely positive and internal difference. Once we recognize this common ground of the singularity of becoming, Spinoza's conception of the attributes emerges as the consequential departure and a profound contribution. The real distinction is not a numerical distinction, or, in Bergsonian terms that a difference of nature is not a difference of degree. With Spinoza's theory of the attributes Deleuze extends the argument beyond Bergson in order to highlight that the real distinction is in addition a formal distinction. Via an examination of the formal distinction of the attributes Deleuze configurates a supplementary dimension to the Spinozian principle of ontology - the principle of the univocity of being. The Spinozian attributes, according to Deleuze, are the expressions of being. Traditionally the problem of the attributes of God is allied to that of divine names. Spinoza transforms this notion by confirming upon the attribute the active role in divine expression. In this case the attribute is no longer attributed, but in a sense "attributive". Each attribute expresses an essence and in this turn attributes it to substance. The question of divine names becomes a problematic of divine expression.

In Deleuze's study of Nietzsche, he separated his own thought from the dialectical terrain through the theory of the total critique. Even though there is no explicit reference to Hegel in "Spinoza et le probleme de l'expression" one many construct a comparison with Hegelian ontology for the purpose of demonstrating the important conceptual autonomy illustrated by Deleuze's Spinozian programme. From a Hegelian perspective it is possible to observe the radical departure initiated by Deleuze's reading of the singularity of substance and the univocity of the attributes in Spinoza.

The Deleuzian history of philosophy entirely by-passes the Hegelian and dialectical tradition by concentrating upon only positive ontological processes. Spinoza's ontology is a philosophy of immanence. The essential equality of immanence requires a univocal being. What Deleuze's explication draws out is that Spinoza's ontology is a combination of immanence and expression. Deleuze's analysis presents Spinoza as an alternative logic of ontological speculation but in addition provides the mechanisms with which to counter a Hegelian critique of Spinoza.

Deleuze's reading of the opening of "Ethics" presents a logical constitution of substance, a composition in which there is nothing physical. The development of this logical constitution consists of two principles: singularity and univocity. What Spinoza has brought out is primarily the fundamental genetic principles: singularity and univocity that guide the production and constitution of being. The opening of "Ethics" is a speculative development of the genetic sequence of being - a genealogy of substance. When Deleuze says that the passage represents a
genetic definition he means, explicitly, that the principles of being are active/constructive and from these principles being unfolds.

However speculation does not elaborate the world/construct being, it only provides the basic principles by which being is formulated. Spinoza’s real constitution of being occurs in another field of activity - an ontological practice. Deleuze provides an alternative reading of the Spinozan attributes - an objectivist/ontological interpretation. It is necessary to recognize Deleuze’s philosophy in its difference from both the idealist ontological tradition and any de-ontological approach. Deleuze counters an idealist account of being not only in order to valorize the material world, but more precisely to preserve the coherence of the ontological perspective. The intellectual and the corporeal are equal expressions of being (this forms the basic principle of a materialist ontology). Through the interpretation of the attributes Deleuze elaborates upon the dimensions of a materialist ontology.


In "L'Anti-Oedipe: Capitalisme et schizophrénie I", Deleuze and Guattari argue that all desire is social as opposed to familial and that the interpretation of social desire is centred around the schizophrenic not the neurotic-ego - a "schizo-analysis" focusing on sub-individual body components and their supra-individual social interconnections within a Freudian/ Marxist theoretical sphere of desiring-production overlaid by a Nietzschean framework, enabling ultimately the development of a critique of an history/politics of social/libidinal activity.

The most vital elements of "L'Anti-Oedipe" comprise the Deleuzoguattarian history of representation and social desiring production. Within the history, signs are treated as integral components of shifting social configurations of power/desire, configurations that radically alter the functioning of signs and the structure of representational systems from one mode of social organization to another. Deleuze and Guattari present an immediate physical/social model of desire and in the longest section of "L'Anti-Oedipe" they advance a universal history of social desiring-production concentrating on the relationship between the "socius" and its related network of desiring machines.

The Deleuzoguattarian universal history is a history informed by a general tendency, albeit a contingent one, towards a concomitant intensification of schizophrenic deterritorialization and paranoid reterritorialization in social desiring production. The history of desiring-production may be most significantly, interpreted as a social history of the interrelationship of desire and power.

Technical machines, machines in the usual definition of the word are different from desiring-machines in that technical machines combine dependent components into a unified whole that either functions or malfunctions, whereas desiring-machines involve heterogeneous/independent parts and function only when they break down and are continually breaking down. Deleuze and Guattari propose a "functionalism" but one that does not include aims/efficiency/systematic unity, a cybernetics that promotes equally differences that are dynamic and static.

In by-passing the organismal implications of a discrete subject presented within a realm of interiority in the context of which desire will be situated, Deleuze can avoid the paradox Nietzsche confronted when utilizing the will to power without a subject effecting the willing or implying that the will to power was correspondingly both the producing "agent" and the "object" produced. With respect to the machinic linguistics of assemblages connoting exteriority (connections with the outside always already being made) to promote desire as a component in an assemblage, to refuse to reify/ personify desire at the subject pole, recognizes
that desire and the object desired arise simultaneously. Deleuze rejects the account of desire as lack which (Plato construed desire in terms of a void in a subject that is filled by the acquisition of an object, and most philosophers in the West, the notable exception is Spinoza who comments in "Ethics" that we do not endeavour, will seek after or desire because we judge a thing to be good, on the contrary, we judge a thing to be good because we endeavour, will, seek after and desire it" (trans Samuel Shirley, Indianapolis: Hackett (1982) Pt III Prop 9, Scholium), and all psychoanalysts have followed him in treating desire as lack. Plato argues in the "Symposium" that one who desires something is necessarily in want of that thing. (The Deleuzian critique of "desire as lack" is discussed in "Spinoza, Nietzsche, Deleuze. Another discourse of desire" Alan D Schrift in Hugh Silverman ed "Philosophy and the Discourse of Desire" New York: Routledge (1995)), and assumes that desire arises in response to the perceived lack of object desired or that desire is a state produced in the subject by the lack of the object. In Nietzschean terms, such a negative definition of desire is symptomatic of a reactive slave mentality. Deleuze and Guattari, reject this notion of desire as "an idealistic (dialectical nihilistic) conception" (Anti-Oedipe) and replace it with one in which desire is a primary force rather than a secondary function of preliminary requirements/aims.

20 Deleuze and Guattari are not constructing an analysis grounded within Derridean deconstruction, "schizoanalytic destruction" derives from the unconscious logic of non-unified connection and inclusive disjunction, as elaborated in "L'Anti-Oedipe". (For example compare Deleuze's "Différence et répétition" and "Logique du sens" with Derrida's early works "Speech and Phenomena", "Of Grammatology," and "Writing and Difference").
21 The problem in an oedipalizing world is to discover an exit-point, to discern what Deleuze and Guattari term "a line of flight". An over determined expression which, beside bearing the sense of "line of least resistance"/"point of leakage" and "diverging line", is a term for the real/imaginary lines which converge on the vanishing point in a perspective drawing.
22 In fact "L'Anti-Oedipe" constructs its own strategy to subvert the binary opposition "paranoia/"schizophrenia": it performs a mode of discourse that is simultaneously paranoid and schizophrenic. Fundamentally paranoia and schizophrenia are located at opposite ends of the social/individual spectrum in "L'Anti-Oedipe". Paranoia designates the despotic over-coding of power that imposes its absolute standard of value on individuals/social forms whereas schizophrenia designates the release of desire/social production from the confining limits of any code, and their release into the affirmative improvement of "permanent revolution". (In capitalism, the paranoid and schizophrenic poles of desire are revealed in their most extreme/transparent forms - the intensified despotism of capitalism represents the paranoid, tendency of desire to arrange entities in molar aggregates and to impose upon them a centralized, unified organization, whereas capitalism's accelerated deterritorialization of flows represents the schizophrenic or revolutionary tendency of desire to form molecular/non-systematic associations of heterogeneous elements). The "paranoid" tendencies of style in "L'Anti-Oedipe" linked Marx and Nietzsche with the data of astronomy and a critique of Freud and Lacan to produce a type of revolutionary, unified field theory of human science while correspondingly the "schizoid" tendencies of the text reduced such an apparently comprehensive theory to flights of sophisticated imagery and schizophrenic/paraphrenic word kaleidoscopes, which resist the confinement of any definitive conscious. (The role of style in "L'Anti-Oedipe" is discussed in Eugene W Holland "The Anti-Oedipus: Postmodernism in Theory, or the post-Lacanian historical contextualization of psychoanalysis" Boundary 2 14:1 (1988)).
23 The "Body Without Organs" in terms of "L'Anti-Oedipe" regarded as an entity produced by desiring-machines emerging in the second stage of desiring-production. (The three syntheses that Deleuze introduces in "Logique du sens" to illustrate the structure of ideas/problems are used in "L'Anti-Oedipe" to highlight the functioning of the elements of desiring-production: desiring-machines effecting connective syntheses, the body-without-organs disjunctive syntheses and the nomadic subject conjunctive syntheses.) Deleuze formulates the notion the "Body Without Organs" in "Logique du sens": identifying partial objects and the body-without-organs as two elements of the schizophrenic depths, a savage main in which one is constantly in danger...
of being subsumed within, but whose projection onto the metaphysical surface of thought can be contemplated in safety. In the Deleuzoguattarian scheme, the opposition surface/depth is negated together with the inherently dangerous characteristics of the body without organs, but the basic elements of a transcendental surface of idea/problems re-emerge as traits of the body without organs.


26 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari - op. cit. (1980).


28 During desiring-production a moment occurs when desiring-machines arrest motion and form "an enormous undifferentiated object. Everything stops dead for a moment, everything freezes in place" ("L'Anti-Oedipe"). That undifferentiated object is the Body Without Organs, the desiring-machines at zero degree of intensity, a moment of anti-production reversed into the process of production (hence desiring machines only function by breaking down.)

"The organs-partial objects (i.e. desiring-machines) and the body without organs are at bottom one and the same thing; one and the same multiplicity... Partial objects are the direct powers of the body without organs, and the body without organs, the raw material of the partial objects" ("L'Anti-Oedipe").

The "Body Without Organs" resembles Spinoza's immanent substance and desiring-machines are its ultimate attributes. The "Body Without Organs" is an extra component/element produced in conjunction with desiring-machines. The whole in totalized perspective is an organized system of production to which the "Body Without Organs" and the organs partial object in synchronization oppose. The whole exists at a molecular level of arrangement/organization in contrast to desiring-machines and the "Body Without Organs" which operate at a molecular level.

Desiring-machines and the "Body Without Organs" are essentially in continuity, two states of the same initial origin, an operative multiplicity in one mode and a pure/unextended zero-intensity substance in another, in a constant oscillation such that the two modes are still maintained as separate entities. (The quasi-causality of the "Body Without Organs" is best interpreted in relation to the wider context of a social body without organs, which in a reterritorialized form Deleuze and Guattari call the "socius"). Each society produces a "socius" - the natural/divine presupposition of production, the three types of "socius" include the body of the earth of primitive societies, the body of the despot of barbaric societies and the body of capital in capitalist societies. This "mystical" quasi-causality Deleuze and Guattari apply to all societies and attribute to the "miraculating" relationship existing between desiring-machines and the "Body Without Organs".

When desiring-machines are "miraculated" they enact an attachment to the "Body Without Organs" as numerous points of disjunction between which a complete elaborated network of new syntheses is now produced, demarcating the surface into co-ordinates like a grid. Each binary chain of dual desiring-machines is a line traversing the plane of the "Body Without Organs"; a multiplicity of such lines crossing and re-crossing that surface to constitute a grid, which inscribes/records the distribution of desiring-machines within a plane. (A desiring-machine can operate within a number of distinct binary chains but not in synchronization) A desiring-machine can be located at the intersection of various lines on the grid, functioning as a point of disjunction engaged with this, and now with that machine. The "Body Without Organs" in contrast enacts a disjunctive synthesis. What Deleuze and Guattain suggest is an affirmative/non-restrictive/inclusive form of disjunction, a "disjunction that remains disjunctive, and that still affirms the disjoined terms, that affirms them throughout their entire distance, without restricting one by the other or excluding the other from the one" ("L'Anti-Oedipe") - in effect difference that differentiates itself and affirms its difference.

In the Deleuzoguattarian scheme the three agencies of unconscious desiring-production are discernable as a giant egg covered with intersecting lines and a transient point crossing the various routes traced on the egg's surface. The "Body Without Organs" is the world-egg, a cosmic embryo whose zones/gradients/intensities and lines of potential disruption/dislocation are correspondent to the after-image the chains of desiring-machines inscribe on its surface. The lines represent the desiring-machines, and the transient point the nomadic subject. (It can be envisaged that this is a developed model of the plane of singularities of "Logique du sens".)

The "Body Without Organs" resists any equation with a notion of identity/possession. "The "Body Without Organs" is never yours or mine. It is always a body" (Mille Plateaux). The Deleuzoguattarian notion of the "Body Without Organs" constitutes a dual attempt both to de-
naturalize the human body and to situated it in direct relations with the flows/elements of other bodies/entities. In deriving initial inspiration from the Spinozist conception of the univocity of being - all things regardless of type have the same ontological status - the "Body Without Organs" designates an indistinguishability between human/animal/textual/social/physical bodies. As an alternative to psychoanalytic aggregate oedipalized organic unity Deleuze and Guattari invoke Antonin Artaud's conception of the "Body Without Organs", a body dis-invested of all fantasy/images/projections, a body without psychical interior/without internal cohesion or latent significance.

The "Body Without Organs" is a limit/tendency to which all bodies aspire. Deleuze and Guattari evoke the idea of an egg, a surface of intensities before stratification/organization/hierarchy. It is without depth/internal logical arrangement, and in contrast be conceived of as a flow/arresting a flow of intensities. The "Body Without Organs" opposes the structure/organization of the body as it is stratified/regulated/ordered and functional, in that it is subordinated to possession. It is a notion of the body before and in excess of the coalescence of its intensities and their future into meaningful/arranged/transcendent totalities which form the unification of the subject and of signification.


31 If social codes are scrambled/deterritorialized an inclusive investment of the "Body Without Organs" is possible - the nomadic subject, (the third component of desiring-production is produced) is manifested as a point of pure intensity travelling over the grid of the "Body Without Organs", a transitory locus of becoming/co-present/assembled identities migrating from one desiring-machine to another. The nomadic subject traces a process of becoming other, becoming plant/animal/mineral/woman - becoming "races, cultures and their gods" ([Anti-Oedipe) becoming all the names of history as it traverses the natural/social/historical "Body Without Organs" of the world.
NOT TO TOUCH THE EARTH (ELEPHANT STONE)

Perhaps the clearest characterization of Deleuze and Guattari's project comes from the introductory "plateau" of "Mille Plateaux" called "Rhizome". The rhizome is defined via the principles of connection, heterogeneity, non-signifying rupture, cartography and decalcomania. In "Rhizome: Introduction" (1), an introductory volume which would later reappear in "Mille Plateaux" as its opening chapter, Deleuze and Guattari produce an extensive elaboration of their conceptual scheme.

The rhizomic process is the production of the multiple, a production occurring "not by always adding a further dimension, but on the contrary, in the simplest way possible, by force of moderation, at the level of the dimensions at our disposal, always n minus one (it is only in this manner that the one forms part of the multiple, through being always subtracted)" (2).

The characteristic principles of a rhizome are developed at length and the authors then make reference to Gregory Bateson's "Steps to the Ecology of Mind" to introduce a key term: "A plateau is always in the middle, not beginning or end. A rhizome is made of plateaux. Gregory Bateson uses the word "plateau" to designate something very special: a continuous region of intensities, vibrating on itself, which is developed by avoiding any orientation on a culminating point or towards an exterior end" (Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari) (3).

Deleuze and Guattari define their use of "plateau" as "every multiplicity connectable with other by superficial underground stems, in such a way as to form and extend a rhizome" (4).

Since "the multiple demands a method which actually creates it", Deleuze and Guattari reject typographical/lexical/syntatic creations but use words "which, in their turn, function as a plateaux. RHIZOMATICS = SCHIZOANALYSIS = PRAGMATICS = MICRO-POLITICS. These words are concepts, but concepts are lines, that is to say number systems attached to a particular dimension of multiplicities" (5). This concentrated statement summarizes the strategic options which Deleuze and Guattari can access in the rhizomatic project: each of the terms serves as one of many modes of approach to produce assemblages.
In this section the point of departure of the operation is to initially enact a process/activate a line of flight casting contemporary painting as an exemplary mode to demonstrate systems of machinic functioning - how painting/the artwork operates in terms of such functioning - in terms following a trail suggested, leading from the "rhizomatic" analysis presented in "Mille Plateaux".

Deleuzo-guattarian philosophy criticizes the notions of contradiction and opposition of depth and organic unity within classical thought, in order to develop an open system based on multiplicity, simultaneity and surfaces. It is no longer appropriate to interpret what a text means but to ask what it does and how it connects with other things. Rhizomatics opposes itself to what Deleuze and Guattari call the tree image and the root image. In opposition to both these models of a text, Deleuze and Guattari adopt the metaphor of the rhizome, an underground - but perfectly manifest - network of multiple branching roots and shoots with no central axis, no unified point of origin, and no fixed direction of development - a proliferating/chaotic/diversified system of growths.

"The rhizome is reducible neither to the One nor the multiple... It is not a multiple derived from the One, or to which the One is added (n + 1). It is composed not of units but of dimensions, or rather directions in motion. It has neither beginning nor end, but always a middle... from which it grows and which it overspills. It constitutes linear multiplicities with n dimensions being neither subject nor object... and from which the One is always substrated (n - 1).... Unlike a structure, which is defined by a set of points and positions, with binary relations between points and biunivocal relationships between the positions, the rhizome is made only of lines of segmentarity and stratification as its dimensions. The rhizome operates by variation, expansion, conquest, capture, offshoots... The rhizome is acentered, non-hierarchical, non-signifying system."

(Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari) (6)

Each of the fifteen chapters of "Mille Plateaux" is a "plateau", "a plane of consistency" or "level of intensities" which traverse any number of traditional disciplines and levels of analysis. Each plateau has its own themes and concepts which are interrelated with those of other plateaux and which appear in other plateaux, but which ultimately are not reducible to
any abstract system or totalizing unified structure. In "Mille Plateaux" the various plateaux trace open trajectories rather than systematic boundaries, and the works multiple concepts, although rigorously delineated and closely aligned constitute loose resonating aggregates rather than finite structures, aggregates whose principle of formation is explicitly progressively supplementary and open-ended.

The aim of a plateau is not simply to multiply terminology, but to maintain a constant "destructuring/multiplying" of a given set of terms until a point is reached at which they intersect with terms coming from destructuring processes occurring on other plateaux, without ever collapsing into or becoming identical with them. Such intersections will form a rhizome, something that develops "au milieu": in the middle/in between. Conceptual argument is eschewed in favour of images/non-concepts that are strategically "under-determined" so that their understanding and extension to other domains requires the invention of new connections rather than the simple application of a pre-established rule. (In a perspective informed, like Jean-François Lyotard's, by a reading of Kant, Deleuze emphasizes the division/distribution between free aesthetic and rule-bound rational judgement) (7).

Equally striking is the conscious ainlinearity of the text - Deleuze and Guattari have suggested that their writing is founded within short term as opposed to long-term memory which may contribute to the non-linearity of "Mille Plateaux" - and here we may define a link between short-term memory and the discourse of postmodernity. This procedure is what patterns "Mille Plateaux".

From the rhizomatic perspective "Mille Plateaux" has neither subject nor object, constituted only by lines of articulation (segmentarity/strata/territorialities) in one respect and in another, by lines of flight (movements of deterritorialization and destratification). These lines and their measurable speeds, constitute a "machine assemblage", "orientated towards those strata which doubtless made it into a sort of organism, or else a signifying totality, or else a determination attributable to a subject; but it is orientated equally towards a "Body Without Organs", which endlessly breaks down the organism, frees and circulates.
asignifying particles, pure intensities, and creates subjects to whom it allows no more than a name, as the trace of an intensity" (Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari) (8).

“We shall never ask what a book, a signifier and signified means, we shall not look for anything to understand in a book; instead, we shall wonder with what it functions, in connection with what it transmits intensifies or doesn’t, into what multiplicities it introduces and metamorphoses its own, with what body without organs it makes its own converge. A book only exists by means of an outside, a beyond. Thus, a book being itself a little machine, what measurable relationship does this literary machine have in turn with a war machine, a love machine, a revolutionary machine etc.”

(Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari) (9).

Writing suggests Deleuze and Guattari, has “nothing to do with signifying. It has to do with surveying, mapping, even realms that are yet to come” (10). The necessity of map-making exists not only as an underlying principle of the rhizomatic system, it is presented explicitly as an essential element for understanding the role of writing, which “should be quantified”

In “Mille Plateaux”, the earlier schizo-analytic analysis in terms of types of desiring process is largely superseded by a cartographic analysis.

“The rhizome is altogether different, a “map and not a tracing”. The orchid does not reproduce the tracings of the wasp, it forms a map with the wasp, in a rhizome. What distinguishes the map from the tracing is that it is entirely oriented towards an experimentation in contact with the real. The map does not reproduce an unconscious closed in upon itself, it constructs the unconscious.... The map is open and connectable in all of its dimensions; it is detachable, reversible, susceptible to constant modification. It can be torn, reversed, adapted to any kind of mounting, reworked by an individual, group or social formation... A map has multiple entryways, as opposed to the tracing, which always comes back “to the same”. The map has to do with performance, whereas the tracing always involves an alleged “competence”... The tracing should always be put back on the map”

(Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari) (11)
The complete terminology introduced in the schizo-analytic project, "multiplicities, strata, and segmentarities, lines of flight and intensities, machine assemblages and their plane of consistence (are) units of measure in each case... (which not only form a quantification of writing, but define writing as always the measure of something else") (Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari) (12).

Rhizomatics is the term for a strategy and an objective: it constitutes a de-centered series of linkages between elements/relations/processes/intensities/speeds (velocities)/flows - proliferations of surface connections. Rhizomatics opposes hermeneutics/psychoanalysis/semiotics, it is a form of pragmatics focusing upon what can be achieved: methods by which texts/concepts/subjects can be made to work/produce/effect new linkages. The rhizome works effectively when applied to a variety of experimental fields - philosophy/art/science or even everyday life. It is inseparable from its numerous/possible but concrete applications, each of which will slightly modify its definition. As Deleuze describes in "La Pensée mise en plis", it is this space "in between" two specific definitions that the rhizome will in its turn "gain ground while varying, branching off, metamorphosing itself" (13).

Deleuze and Guattari denounce any universal semiotics which seeks to explain all of reality in terms of signs. In Plateau 3 "10,000 B.C. - The geology of morals (who does the earth think it is?)" they conduct an analysis of the physio-chemical, organic and anthromorphic "strata" of reality in terms of the linguistic categories of content and expression. These linguistic terms are drawn in an extremely broad fashion, ceasing to function linguistically and becoming physical concepts, categories for understanding the articulation/arrangement of matter. (in combination with the quasi-geological terminology - strata/epistrata/parastrata). The result is not on a one dimensional longitude to convert the world into signs, but to ultimately situate material signs within a plenum of matter.

In adopting the terms "content" and "expression" Deleuze and Guattari follow the model developed by the linguist Louis Hjelmslev (14). Hjelmslev's scheme subverts the
traditional opposition of form and content and renders arbitrary the designation of levels as either expression or content, and poists a material substrate which precedes the formation of the planes of expression and content. The substrate or Hjelmslevian “matter” Deleuze and Guattari identify as the plane of consistency or “the Body Without Organs”, that is the non-formed/non-organized/non-stratified or destratified body. The level of content and the level of expression are formed on this plane of consistency and, “between content and expression, there is no correspondence, no cause-effect relationship, no signified-signifier relationship: there is a real distinction, reciprocal presupposition, and only isomorphism” (Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari) (15).

Deleuze and Guattari propose three basic models of content/expression relationships which correspond to the physio-chemical/organic/anthropomorphic strata of reality (the great stratum or physio-chemical entities/the organic stratum/the anthropomorphic stratum). This model of analysis insists that by content one must not simply understand the hand and tools, but a social technological machine which pre-exists them, and constitutes states of force or formations of power (“puissance”). Similarly “by expression, one must not simply understand the face and language, or languages, but a collective semiotic machine which pre-exists them, and constitutes regimes of signs” (Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari) (16).

In the anthropomorphic stratum expression and content take on a new configuration:

* the form becomes “alloplastic”, and no longer “homoplastic” that it effects modifications in the external world. The form of expression becomes linguistic and no longer genetic, that is it operates, through symbols that are comprehensible, transmissible and modifiable from without.*

(Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari) (17)

A tool or invention alters in function and consequently in nature, when it transfers from one social milieu to another. The social machine as Deleuze says in “Dialogues” is “a collection of proximate elements (un ensemble de voisinage) man - tool - animal - thing”; that collection
In a similar way words alternate in function and meaning within the contexts of different social orders, according to the specific arrangements of inextricably inter-related practices and signs which form a regime of signs. In the anthropomorphic stratum content and expression correspond to two machines, a social/technological machine (technological "machinic arrangement") and a collective semiotic machine ("collective arrangement of enunciation"/"regime of signs"). Such machines penetrate all strata and organize humans/animals/organisms in heterogeneous functioning circuits that combine man/nature, organic/inorganic, mechanical/non-mechanical in one sphere of interaction. In this extended sphere of anthropomorphic stratum, a new form of life is evolved, a mechanic "phylum" of non-organic life whose realm is the "mechanosphere"/"rhizosphere". This "mechanosphere" incorporates not only the machinic arrangements of content/expression but also "abstract machines".

The concept of the "abstract machine" features significantly in "Mille Plateaux" as the necessary complement to the mechanic arrangements of content and expression. Hjelmslev made the distinction between unformed matter and the substances fashioned by the forms of expression and content. Deleuze and Guattari in a similar way develop an unformed plane of consistency "Body without Organs" from which expression and content are extracted each with its individual form and co-present substance. The plane of consistency is occupied/traced by the abstract machine the machinic arrangements, or "concrete machines" (in the anthropomorphic stratum, both the social technological machines of content and the regimes of signs of expression) "put into effect the abstract machine" (19).

The relationship between the plane of consistency and the stratum of content expression, between the abstract machine, which tracks the plane of consistency and the machinic
arrangements, which determine the abstract machine in a defined organizational framework of content/expression, may be perceived metaphorically in terms of a dual action of force - one moving from the abstract machine to the machinic arrangements and the other moving from the machinic arrangements to the abstract machine.

Deleuze and Guattari suggest that the abstract machine "operates via "matter" and not substance, via "function" and not form". (20). An abstract machine may be defined partly by its matter - the configuration of its plane of consistency. A plane of consistency is destratified/decoded/deterritorialized however it has its own internal organization whose principles Deleuze and Guattari derive from Spinoza. (21).

The Spinozist design of longitude and latitude, of differential speeds between non-formed elements and the intensive affects of anonymous forces is employed extensively throughout "Mille Plateaux" to define planes of consistency and their characteristic modes of individuation An abstract machine is characterized by its matter - its haecceities relations of speeds/affects (22) and also by its function. This function is neither semiotic nor physical, neither expression nor content, but an abstract function that informs both the expression-form and the content-form. In an abstract machine, content and expression yield to "a content-matter which presents only degrees of intensity, resistance, conductibility, heatability, stretchability, speed or slowness; an expression-function which presents only "tensors", as in a mathematical or musical notation" (23).

Language is a vital component in the construction of the anthropomorphic stratum, it is an integral element contained within a regime of signs ("régime de signes") (24). With the production of the concept of a regime of signs, Deleuze and Guattari are concerned to subordinate language to pragmatics.

The primary function of language, according to Deleuze and Guattari, is not to transmit information/enable communication but to issue "mots d'ordre" ("words of order"). Language categorises the world and in using a language one, to an extent, must accept the codes
inherent in that language. Deleuze and Guattari contend that the basic function of language, its essential condition, is to transmit the discourse of others and impose a collective order. "Mots d'ordre" are not associated with any single category of statements but alternatively all language acts are regarded as acts of power. Deleuze and Guattari define the function of "mots d'ordre" by relating them to the Stoic theory of incorporeals. Language can be perceived as a mechanism via which an incorporeal attribute is allied to a thing, as the catalyst of an incorporeal transformation. The operation of "mots d'ordre" and the basic function of language is therefore to produce such incorporeal transformation. Although individuals may articulate transformations, the transformations themselves, the "mots d'ordre" are social in origin. They form a constituent part of a collective organization of enunciation/"regime signs" which can be defined as "the set of incorporeal transformations which are in effect in a given society, and which are attributed to the bodies of that society" (25).

In "Mille Plateaux" - Plateau 5 "587 B.C. - 70 A.D. - On a Few Regimes of Signs" Deleuze and Guattari produces a concentrated classification of regimes of signs, identifying a "pre-signifying" regime indicative of primitive societies (firstly elaborated in "L'Anti-Oedipe") a "counter signifying regime" characteristic of nomadic warrior tribes (see Plateau 12), a "signifying regime" situated within despotic societies, and a "post-signifying" regime, elaborated via authoritarian "passionate" social formations. The notion of a regime of signs is most accurately defined in the context/terms of the signifying and post-signifying regimes of Plateau 5.

In "Mille Plateaux" the opposition between deterritorialization and reterritorialization no longer registers as the interaction of social forces as it did in "L'Anti-Oedipe". Instead, reterritorialization involves a "double-becoming", where one deterritorialized element serves as a new territory for another deterritorialized element (and the "least" deterritorialized element reterritorializes the "most" deterritorialized). De/re-territorialization is therefore regarded as immanent to the diverse semiotic processes themselves. The opposition between one-coding/paranoia and de-coding/schizophrenia are re-
configured in "Mille Plateaux" as the difference between two regimes of signs, the signifying and the post-signifying, and two regimes of "faciality" (two distinct white wall/black-hole systems) the full face and the averted face.

The signifying regime retains in many respects the order of despotic representation exemplified in "L-Anti-Oedipe". The over-coding/paranoia of despotism is now characterized as a regime of "full faciality", wherein the face of the despot over-codes the primitive body (26). The despot's body is above all a "face" "which is itself a complete body: it is like the body of the centre of signification, on which are attached all the deterritorialized signs, and it marks the limit of their deterritorialization" (27). The post-signifying regime, by contrast, is characterized not by de-coding and schizophrenia, but by "subjectification"/"subjection" and the "averted face". Whereas the transcendental signifier of the despot imposes stable meaning from the centre of a signifying regime, meaning in post-signifying regimes is instead constantly open to subjective interpretation - the centre no longer holds, no transcendental signifier reigns supreme. Without the existence of a completion point as an acentred fully-signifying regime, interpretation becomes pointless - but nevertheless it continues "ad infinitum" - post-signifying regimes, paraphrasing Deleuze and Guattari, promote endless "interpretosis" in a vacuum.

The despotic regime is depicted as a pattern generated by a relative deterritorialization of signs and a reterritorialization of signs within ever increasing/proliferating circles of signification/interpretation rationalized by a centralized/totalizing/transcendent power.

The post-signifying regime, in contrast, is initiated from a point of subjectivication which completely deterritorializes all signs, acting as a focal point for a passionate/delirious fixation, those signs, however, are reterritorialized through the immanent self-subjugation of the speaking subject to the subject of speech.

The post-signifying regime of subjectification still interacts within an after-image of the regime of significance in the illusion of some type of guarantee of stable meaning, its only
resource is the delusion of an individual subjectivity. Desire may be apprehended by meaninglessness deflected by the blank wall onto a desolate subject or fall into the black hole of subjectivity - or it can reject both extremes within this exclusive disjunctive that promotes them as the only alternatives and emerge from the black-hole of subjectivity to inscribe/split the blank wall of social existence, form a rhizome of collective enunciation, and traverse the deterritorialized plane in a constant process of exploration/discovery.

"Mille Plateaux" defines three degrees of deterritorialization in the context of regimes of signs/faciality: (1). Signifying regimes identified by a simple "relative" deterritorialization, for although discourse can be constantly produced, it can only derive meaning by the despot, affixed to the White Wall of the despots face. (2). Deterritorialization becomes absolute in post-signifying regimes - with an averted face. There is no common factor to compare/judge subjective interpretation - it therefore is rendered negative, interpretation leads to a "black hole"/subjective opinion (3). Deterritorialization becomes absolute and positive when the search for meaning is negated in favour of a process of experimentation and when such experiments intersect/connect with the experiments of others in a de-personalized collective form of enunciation.

In "Kafka": pour une littérature mineure" (28), Deleuze and Guattari locate within Kafka's writing an eminent formulation of the operation and inter-relation of two types of machinic systems - the expression-arrangements of regimes of signs and the content-arrangements of social technological machines. In the contingent of the Deleuzoguattarian analysis Kafka is regarded as a writer who experiments/creates with and through the "Real", without representing it. In order to interpret the process/possibility of such experimentation/creation within language, one must situate language not simply in the immanent pragmatics of regimes of signs but also in terms of the immanent yet virtual force of abstract machines.

Deleuze and Guattari propose that language should not be conceived in terms of constraints and homogeneity, but alternatively by a multiformity which can be represented as
immanent/continuous in a specified condition. It is the combination of the diverse "lines
of variation" constituting the composition of a word that form the "abstract machine" of a
language, and subsequently it is the assimilation of the "concrete machines" of a regime of
signs that will determine which variables will be maintained and which will not. To regard
a language as a single/totality entity is a mis-conception, for in effect every language is
constructed via a plurality of languages/a multiplicity of semantic worlds. Meaning is an
encounter between force fields. Specifically, it is the "essence" (diagram/abstract
machine) of that encounter. The abstract machine is itself in continual variation, changing
with each actualization.

The artist and writers that feature prominently within the Deleuzoguattarian design utilize
language atypically, not simply to deviate from the standard, but explicitly to engage the
virtual line of variation which is immanent within linguistic variables.

When an artist or writer invents he/she simultaneously experiments with something which is
already actual and additionally creates something new, for he/she invents at the level of the"
abstract machine", which is present but also must be constructed. "The lines of change or
creation" in language "are part of the abstract machine, fully and directly" (29) and in a
basic technique artists/writers simply experiment/extend the lines of variation existing
within collective assemblages of presentation/annunciation. The lines of variation are,
however, virtual and potential as opposed to actual - that is they do not direct one
determinate route/course of development, but a multiplicity of possible directions of
metamorphosis.

An abstract machine

"is not an infrastructure in the last instance, any more than it is a transcendent idea in a
supreme instance. Rather, it has a pilot role. An abstract or diagrammatic machine does not
function in order to represent something, even something real, but it constructs a real to come,
a new type of reality. It is this not outside history, but rather always "ahead" of history, at
each moment that it constitutes points of creation or potentiality"

(Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari) (30)
In a paradoxical mode artists/writers correspondingly, in synchronization proceed via the lines of variation of the abstract machine immanent within a continuous/assembled discourse and "create" the abstract machine, actualizing a definite line of flight, a single "real to come". However at the level of the abstract machine it is incorrect to simply propose an inventive/experimentative design, because the abstract machine is a compilation of the unformed matter and anonymous forces of a plane of consistency - there is no longer any specific distinction between content and expression. Deleuze and Guattari use the notion of the abstract machine to stand as the figure from which to derive the primary, transformative processes. The abstract machine can serve as a transcendent model against which other abstract assemblages may be judged. In general, an assemblage has greater affinity with an abstract machine the more it embodies lines without contours (abstract lines) which pass between things (lines of absolute deterritorialization), and the more it possesses a power of metamorphosis. The more an assemblage opens up and multiplies connections, the more it traces a plane of consistence with its quantifiers of intensity and consolidation, the closer it is to the abstract machine.

Essentially there is the ultimate phase of the plane of consistence, the plane of unformed matter/anonymous forces from which the various strata of content and expression are constituted. In the anthropomorphic stratum content and expression correspond to regimes of signs and social-technological machines and throughout the stratum one locates an immanent plane of consistence. The plane of consistence is a plane of absolute deterritorialization, the various strata defined by their degree of relative deterritorialization and reterritorialization. Immanent within every regime of signs/every language one locates lines of continuous variation from the abstract machine and the plane of consistence. It is on this plane that invention/experimentation/creation occurs. An artist uses images, a writer words, a philosopher concepts - all persue and produce the lines of variation of the plane of consistence. Contained in the anthropomorphic stratum, the plane of consistence appears as a mechanosphere/a compound or intermixture of physical/mental and natural/artificial. The unformed matter of this plane of consistence includes an eclectic variation of fluxes of words/images/ideas/dreams/animals/minerals/plants. On this plane
non-organic life develops, the life of the abstract/immanent/virtual lines of variation of experiment/creation/becoming.

In the terms of "Mille Plateaux" a line of flight, a line without segments/a collapse of all segmentality, is the line along which structures constituted in terms of the preceding lines (molar lines/molecular lines) break down and are transformed into something else - it is a line of absolute deterritorialization. In any assemblage, the lines of flight are primary, an assemblage is defined by its abstract line - assemblages do not have a causal infrastructure/sub-structure but an abstract line of specific/creative causality, a line of flight/deterritorialization which is effective in relation to other, general causalities, but which may not simply be explained in terms of these.

The line of flight is always privileged because "it is always on a line of flight that one creates" (Gilles Deleuze). (31) Throughout "Mille Plateaux" preference is accorded to those processes/modes of existence which display the maximum degree of creativity - absolute deterritorialization/continuous variation/becoming minor are some of these processes and rhizome/body without organs/plane of consistency/nomadism are some of the modes of existence exhibiting these creative processes.

The fundamentally affirmative character of the Deleuzian metaphysic is expressed in the coincidence of life and abstraction, and this is manifest in the line of flight:

"The notion of abstraction is very complicated: a line can represent nothing, be purely geometric, but still not be truly abstract so long as it traces a contour. The abstract line is the one which does not trace a contour, which passes "between" things, a mutant line... the abstract line is not geometric, it is the most living, the most creative line."

(Gilles Deleuze) (32).

At the level of lines of flight, the assemblage which outlines this process is of a "painting-machine type" The process refers back to this machine, whose objective function is the emission of quanta of deterritorialization, the passing of mutant flows - all creation in this sense passes through the painting machine.
Nothing in "Mille Plateaux" is unambiguously one thing or another; everything is both/and, and the line of flight is no exception. If it can be both the line of maximum creative potential and the line of greatest "danger". As well as being creative lines, lines of flight may possess a dimension of negative annihilation. From this two lines may be identified, lines of mutation and lines of abolition. The danger is that having broken away from the limits imposed by the molar forms of segmentarity/subjectivity, a line may fail to connect with the necessary conditions of creative development or be incapable of so connecting and turn instead into a line of destruction/abolition. Because one never knows in advance how a line will turn out, painting is therefore always an experimental activity.

Artists/Philosophers/critics who utilize Deleuzo-guattarian concepts must metamorphose the "tools" they borrow. The problem is not to vow allegiance to a given vocabulary but to connect oneself to a "thought" that "develops" through a virtually unending creation of concepts. As Deleuze explained in 1988: "To create concepts is to build a region of the plane( of immanence), to add a region to the previous ones, to explore a new region, to fill in the gap" (33)

The articulation of the Deleuzo-guattarian enterprise involves the "capture" of schizoanalytic concepts in different areas of knowledge - these concepts are therefore confronted and placed in relation to each other. Their original meanings are fractured, and redistributed on a transversal line of reasoning, creating a new background for thinking. Deleuze himself often insisted on the importance of heterogeneous classifications in his work, as in Borges’s or Foucault’s.

"Borges offered a Chinese classification on animals that Foucault enjoyed -- belonging to the Emperor, embalmed, tamed, piglets, mermaids, etc...... In a classification, the matter is always to bring closer things that are apparently very different, and to separate others that are very close. It is the formation of concepts" (Gilles Deleuze) (34)
The entire terminology introduced in the schizo-analytic project - multiplicities, strata and segmentarities, lines of flight and intensities, machine assemblages and their different types, bodies without organs and their construction, their selection, the plane of consistence - are units of measure in each case which not only form a quantification of art/the artwork, but define painting as always the measure of something else. Painting in this instance isn't to do with signifying, but with surveying, the cartography - even of worlds yet to come. This line of cartographic analysis, the relationship between the painting-machine and other specific machines, as well as the abstract machine, provides a particular angle from which one can approach and work through the enterprise of "Mille Plateaux" and the strategy of cartography itself, to examine the role of painting as the function of the Art Machine.

The analysis of painting in "Mille Plateaux" can be approached from two axes of map-reading/cartography.

"On a first, horizontal, axis, an assemblage comprises two segments, one of content, the other of expression. On the one hand it is a "machinic assemblage" of bodies, of actions and passions, an intermingling of bodies reacting to one another; on the other hand it is a "collective assemblage of enunciation" of acts and statements, of incorporeal transformations attributed to bodies. Then on a vertical axis, the assemblage has both "territorial sides", or reterritorialized sides, which stabilize it, and "cutting edges of deterritorialization", which carry it away."

(Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari) (35)

The primary function of the analysis of painting on the horizontal axis is "exemplary", it reveals more clearly the abstract concepts suggested by the rhizomatic system, while substantiating the avant-garde role of painting through its machine and collectively enunciated assemblages.

On the vertical axis of the Assemblage, from the territorial/reterritorialized side to points of deterritorialization, the function of an analysis of painting is "demonstrative" beyond
the exemplary function, certain types of painting/artworks can be chosen to demonstrate the operation of the rhizomatic oscillation between territoriality and deterritorialization.

Utilizing "captured" Deleuzoguattarian concepts it is possible to conduct an experimental process/operation upon the paintings of David Salle, to reveal the essential rhizomatic traits of the lines which trace the map of painting and beyond. The line of hard segmentarity/molar line, the line of supple segmentation/molecular line and the line of flight of deterritorialization or abstract line are not simply terms of art analysis, because for Deleuze and Guattari these lines conjugate with other lines, life lines, lines which bring about the variation of the line of painting itself, lines which are between the lines represented.

What is aimed at is here to demonstrate that the painting/artwork may be defined as a function of living lines, "lines of flesh". These are the lines which crisscross and traced upon the map, lines which the painting process may follow, lines of the hardest of which a signifier emerges and into the lowest of which the "subject" emerges, lines inscribed on a Body Without Organs, where everything is traced and flees, the abstract line itself, with neither imaginary figures nor symbolic functions - the "real" of the Body Without Organs. "This body is the only practical object of schizoanalysis......the lines it brings out could equally be the lines of a life, a work of literature or art, or a society, depending on which system of co-ordinates is chosen" (Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari) (36).

In Plateau 6: November 28 1947: How do you Make Yourself a Body Without Organs?: Deleuze and Guattari return to the "practice" of the Body Without Organs - "It is not at all a notion or a concept but a practice, a net of practices. You never reach the Body Without Organs, you can't reach it, you are forever attaining it, it is a limit, "on which" we sleep, live our waking lives, fight - fight and are fought - seek our place, experience untold happiness and fabulous defeats; on it we penetrate and are penetrated; on it we love" (Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari) (37).
Deleuze and Guattari make certain distinctions between types/genres/substantial attributes of the Body Without Organs (hypochondriac body, paranoid body, schizo body, drugged body, masochist body), between two phases of the Body Without Organs ("one phase is for the fabrication of the Body Without Organs, the other to make something circulate on it or pass across it") between an individual Body Without Organs and an eventual ensemble of Body Without Organs, its uninterrupted continuum, "the field of immanence of desire, the plane of consistency specific to desire with desire defined as a process of production without reference to any exterior agency, whether it be a lack that hollows it out or a pleasure that fills it" (Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari) (38).

To exemplify these aspects/types/phases of the Body Without Organs, Deleuze and Guattari utilize Artaud’s essay “To be done with the judgement of God” November 28 1947, and William Burroughs’s “Naked Lunch” and cite Spinoza’s “Ethics” as “the great book of the Body Without Organs” Also in Chinese Taoist treatises we can see the formation of circuits of intensities and multiplicities, “an intensive body without organs, Tao, a field of immanence in which desire lacks nothing and therefore cannot be linked to any external or transcendent criterion” (39). This region of continuous intensity or plateau, of which the Body Without Organs is made, occurs in Artaud’s “Heliogabale” and "Les Tarahumaras", which expresses:

"the multiplicity of fusion, fusionability as infinite zero, the plane of consistency. Matter where no gods go, principles as forces, essences, substances, elements, remissions, productions, manners of being or modalities as produced intensities, vibrations, breaths, Numbers"  
(Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari) (40)

These two works by Artaud also introduce another problem, "... the difficulty of reaching this world of crowned Anarchy if you go no farther than the organs... and if you stay locked into the organism, or into a stratum that blocks the flows and anchors us in this, our world." Deleuze and Guattan suggest that the Body Without Organs “is opposed not to the organs but to that organization of the organs called organism” which for Artaud was the system of God’s judgement, “precisely the operation of He who makes an organism”. They maintain that the
organism is but one of three great strata which bind us most directly, the others being
significance and subjectivation: "the surface of the organism, the angle of significance and
interpretation, and the point of subjectification or subjection". And to these strata the
Body Without Organs opposes "disarticulation (or n articulations) as the property of the
plane of consistency, experimentation as the operation on that plane (no signifier, never
interpret!), and nomadism as the movement" And it is in this situation that we observe the
tension and movement along the vertical axis between stratification (in organisms
"significance" and subjectivation) and destratification (by disarticulation,
experimentation, and nomadism). Additionally this process of disarticulation summarizes the
key methodology of the Deleuzoguattarian project:

"Lodge yourself on a stratum, experiment with the opportunities it offers, find an advantageous
place on it, find potential movements of deterritorialization, possible lines of flight,
experience them, produce flow conjunctions here and there, try out continuums of intensities
segment by segment, have a small plot of new land at all times. It is through a meticulous
relation with the strata that one succeeds in freeing lines of flight, causing conjugated flows
to pass and escape and bringing forth continuous intensities for a BWO( connect, conjugate,
continue: a whole "diagram", as opposed to still signifying and subjective programs. We are in
a social formation; first see how it is stratified for us and in us and at the place where we are,
then descend from the strata to the deeper assemblage within which we are held; gently tip the
assemblage, making it pass over to the side of the plane of consistency. It is only there that
the BWO reveals itself for what it is: connection of desires, conjunction of flows, continuum of
intensities. You have constructed your own little machine, ready when needed to be plugged into
other collective machines"
(Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari) (41)

For Deleuze and Guattari Castaneda describes a long process of experimentation. "Tales of
Power" seeks a "site" finding "allies" then progressively renouncing interpretation "to
construct flow by flow and segment by segment lines of experimentation, becoming-animal,
becoming-molecular, etc. For the BWO is all of that: necessarily a Place, necessarily a
Plane, necessarily a collectivity (assembling elements, things, plants, animals, tools,
people, powers, and fragments all of these; for it is not "my" body without organs, instead
the "me" (moi) is on it, or what remains of me, unalterable and changing in form, crossing
thresholds)"
(Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari) (42)
"Tales of Power" represents the example of the liberation of lines of flight, of flows and the unleashing of continuous intensities on the Body Without Organs, while distinguishing the "island" of the tonal (organism "significance", the subject, God, and his/her judgement, stratification) and the "nagual" (the freeing of flows of intensity on the Body Without Organs, of animal and molecular - becoming, destratification). Deleuze and Guattari concentrate upon this description of the levels of disarticulation/deterritorialization in order to counter the move towards the consequences of the restratification/reterritorialization of organisms, "significance", or subjects onto a "cancerous" Body Without Organs. The cartography of Deleuze and Guattari aims to delimit territories and then deterritorialize, to discern strata and then destratify, to define articulations and then disarticulate. Their use of art/literary elements is the crucial strategy of rhizomatics/cartography: to reveal the nature of the intensities traced on a plane of consistence, or the Body Without Organs defined diversely as "the egg. But the egg is not regressive; on the contrary, it is perfectly contemporary, you always carry it with you as your own milieu of experimentation, your associated milieu. The egg is the milieu of pure intensity, spatium not extension. Zero intensity as principle of production" (43) as one body "not at all a question of a fragmented splintered body of organs without the body (OWB). The BWO is exactly the opposite..... a distribution of intensive principles of organs, with their positive indefinite articles, within a collectivity or multiplicity, inside an assemblage, and according to machinic connections operating on a BWO is desire, it is that which one desires and by which one desires..... desiring one's own annihilation, or desiring the power to annihilate" (44). It is here we can identify the "parameters"/"dimensions" of cartography: "the identity of effects, the continuity of genera, the totality of all BWO's can be obtained on the plane of consistency only by means of an abstract machine capable of covering and even creating it, by assemblages capable of plugging into desires, of assuring their continuous connections and transversal tie-ins" (45), performed by the activity of the art/literary elements. As Deleuze and Guattari construct a rhizome from the fabric and conjunction "and... and... and..." in which there is enough force to disrupt the verb "to be" certain artworks/paintings/literary works serve to reveal this rhizomatic direction by moving between things, initiating a logic of AND,
reversing ontology displacing the foundation, cancelling end and beginning, providing the tools for map-making, developing a constant flow of intensities travelling between plateaux and the construction of the semiotic pragmatic constituting of an "architectural" strategy of rhizomatics.

In the terms of the Deleuzoguattarian programme applied to the analysis of this project the oeuvre/art production of the artist David Salle may be conceptualized in the first stages of the investigative framework as a rhizome - an uncentred and complex progression, a convoluted aleatory network of tracings. In the paintings one can map the disseminating rhizome of David Salles images and propose an interpretation/questioning not what the/that rhizome means or whether it is a great or unified art, but how it functions and where it goes. When examining Salle's oeuvre in terms of its active functioning one may treat it as an "image machine" (46) (a rhizomatic machine - a typically Deleuzoguattarian conjunction of the natural and artificial whose elements/components are derived in an equal and undifferentiated forms from art and life, and whose operation consists of a successive/repetitive construction of "machinic arrangements" "agencements machiniques", collections of heterogeneous elements that somehow function together) (47)

The Deleuzian strategy advocates a form of thought that is defined by its essential exteriority - its potential for multiple and polyvalent relations with an outside. This constitutes one of the most important characteristics of rhizomes: rhizomes being a certain type of assemblage/multiplicity and as such being defined by their outside "by the abstract line, the line of flight or deterritorialization according to which they change in nature and connect with the other multiplicities" (Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari). (48). Additionally rhizomatic thought implies a process which displays immediate connections with the outside. It can be suggested that David Salle's painting process will never be carried out enough in the name of an outside. The outside has no image/no meaning/no subjectivity - the painting assemblage with the outside, against the painting-image of the world, a painting-rhizome. Following this Deleuzian process paintings are "animated" by a movement
which comes from without, an external force/intensity such that something jumps from the painting, entering into contact with a pure outside.

At the level of a text, the effect of the dislocation between principle and example is to render explicit the character of the book as artifice/as an assemblage. David Salle (in a similar way to Jean-Luc Godard's films (see analysis in Section 7)), achieves a corresponding result in a relation to painting by means of a disjunctive assemblage of images. Such is the nature of a rhizome: an assemblage in constant connection with an outside, "une pensee du dehors".

Considered as a concept, the painting machine has no stable identity. It is more like a conceptual "haecceite" a certain configuration of qualities which seems to make certain distinctions/register certain oppositions, only to disperse upon closer examination into the multiple determinations of which it is constructed.

The characteristics of the painting-machine can correspond to the difference Deleuze and Guattari describe between state sciences which proceed via the search for invariants, and nomadic sciences, which typically discover a process of continuous variation. The concept of the "state-form", by virtue of the unity of composition of its object is an invariant, whereas the concept of the painting-machine is like a line of continuous conceptual variation, a path traced across several conceptual domains. There is no essential end to this procedure, no point at which the concept may be declared fully defined, without the need for further specification. Each particular specification is like an image in a film, dissolving into those which succeed it.

Adopting the Deleuzoguattarian concept in "une litterature mineure" (primarily exemplified in the work "Kafka pour une litterature mineure" (49) and transferring its referential direction into the image based design of art production one can proceed along an inventive/explorative course. A minor usage of language entails linguistic deterritorialization and the liberation of a-signifying sounds, but not a reduction of
language to a state of meaninglessness. Rather than negating the relationship between content and expression, a minor usage reverses the traditional relationship between dominant forms of content and dominated forms of expression. A minor literature employs deterritorialized sound to disrupt conventional content, and then re-assemble the elements of that content in new ways.

"... expression must shatter forms, mark new ruptures and functions. Once a form is shattered, the content, which will necessarily have broken with the order of things, must be reconstructed."

(Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari) (50).

In a corresponding contingent, within a painting the deterritorialized image/element disrupts a conventional totalic/unified mimetic interpretation. The "minor" writer/artist engages a "machine of expression" capable of disorganizing its own forms and of disorganizing the forms content, in order to liberate pure contents which mingle with expression in a single intense matter.

The details of how this radical process actually functions is not explicitly delineated in "Kafka", for Deleuze and Guattari provide no substantial analysis of the operative scheme in action. However some insight is afforded of the Deleuzoguattarian practice via a consideration of Deleuze's approach to Francis Bacon's painting in "Francis Bacon: Logique de la Sensation" (51). Deleuze suggest that for modern artists the blank canvas is not a "tabula rasa", but the space of unconscious visual pre-conceptions and received conventions of representation, which the artist brings to the painting and which he/she contests/attempt to oppose/subvert/expugnate/evade.

For Francis Bacon, the instance of the subversion occurs during the process of painting when the chance stroke of the brush introduces a small locus of chaos, a restricted/qualified catastrophe that Bacon terms "a diagram". "The diagram" says Deleuze "is indeed a chaos, a catastrophe, but also a seed of order or of rhythm" (52). Bacon traces the suggested form/colour/line of this diagram and employs it as a generative mechanism to
develop/construct an intensive set of relations within the painting itself, which in a parallel way transforms the image he started with and forms a new image/set of images derived from the initial image.

Deleuze contrasts Francis Bacon's method/technique to that of the Abstract Formalists (Mondrain/Kandinsky) and the Abstract Expressionists (Pollock). The problem/difficulty with Abstract Formalism is that the constraints of representation may simply be replaced with those of an abstract code, in which case the diagrammatic potentialities of chaos/chance are excluded from the canvas. The dilemma for Abstract Expressionism is that the diagram may cover the entire canvas and produce nothing but a undifferentiated complexity. Alternatively Bacon's strategy is to paint portraits and studies of human figures, therefore remaining to an extent within the parameters of representation, but to allow the diagram in each painting to deterritorialize the human subject, to induce/engender "a zone of Sahara into the head" (53).

It would seem that the functioning of deterritorialized images in a David Salle painting is to a degree analogous to that of "the diagram" in Bacon's. An a-signifying, disruptive image appears within the painting/is located in the painting, a localized catastrophe sets expression and content into a resonating dis-equilibrium. An intensive nexus of metamorphosis opens up, a process of becoming that operates as an active force of deformation and re-combination within the representations of content and the forms of expression. An intrinsic logic of relations of images and representations suggests itself, and the composition takes form as the implications of these relations are developed/enacted.

For example via a shaping of Deleuzo-guattarian concepts it becomes possible to conceive/perceive a painting-machine/image-machine, an example of the painting as an assemblage, as a connection with other assemblages, in relation to other "bodies without organs" existing only by virtue of what is outside and beyond it. The painting-machine concept exemplifies the conceptual strategy of Deleuzian thought outlined throughout this section. Its elaboration is the exercise in nomadic thought which only functions in
connection with an outside. The painting-machine is a concept in exteriority, it is the successive points along a conceptual trajectory giving the concept its suggestive power; it is a concept whose mode of definition functions in constant connection with domains beyond the limited parameters of the painting. In principle the painting-machine can be specified in quite abstract/theoretical terms.

Additionally through the construction of the painting as an "open ring" as "a broken chain of affects" with variable speeds, precipitations and transformations, always in relation to the exterior, David Salle's paintings are opposed to the Modernist model constituted by the interiory of a substance/subject. Furthermore against such a closed system, from Deleuze and Guattari, we may opt for "Nomadology".
NOT TO TOUCH THE EARTH

NOTES


The rhizome may be summarily described in the six following terms:

1 & 2 Principles of connection and heterogeneity - connections bringing together diverse fragments, not only different theories, but also theories with objects/practices. These multiple connections are not simply massified links, but also micro-linkages which compose diverse domains, levels, dimensions, functions, affects, aims, and objects.

"...a rhizome neither begins nor arrives, it is always in the middle, between things, inter-mezzo, but the expression "between things does not designate a localizable relation which goes from one thing to another and vice versa, but a perpendicular direction, a transversal movement which carries onward both one thing and the other" (Mille Plateaux)

3. The principle of multiplicity - opposed to any concept of a One as subject or object, a genuine proliferation of processes that are neither ones nor twos. The rhizome constitutes n-dimensional linear multiplicities without subject/object and which "are defined by their exterior, by the abstract line, the line of flight or deterritorialization along which they change their nature by connecting themselves with others" (Rhizome: Introduction).

4. The principle of ruptures/breaks and discontinuities - the rhizome is an acentered/non-hierarchieal/non-signifying design composed of lines of segmentarity or stratification (dimensions) of flight or deterritorialization "as the maximal dimension according to which, in following (this line of flight) the multiplicity changes its nature, metamorphoses" (Rhizome: Introduction). Any one of the rhizomes connections is capable of being severed/disconnected creating the possibility of other different connections.

5 & 6 Principles of cartography and tracing-manias - not a reproduction or tracing, model making or paradigm-construction, but map-making/expenementation. Since the lines of segmentarity and lines of flight are contrary to aborescent lines of the tree image, "the rhizome relates to a map which must be produced or constructed, and is always capable of being connected and disconnected, turned upside down, modified, as map with multiple entrances and exits, with its lines of flight" (Rhizome: Introduction).


In "Mille Plateaux" the BWO is developed along a transversal line on which it cannot be limited to simply one definition - it is not one or the other but both simultaneously in their heterogeneity.

"That is why we treat BWO as the full egg before the extension of the organism and the organization of the organs, before the formation of the strata; as the dense egg defined by axes and vectors, gradients and thresholds, by dynamic tendencies involving energy transformation and kinematic movements involving group displacement, by migrations; all independent of accessory forms because the organs appear and function here only as pure intensities" (Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari).

"Mille Plateaux" indicates a process wherein one may multiply various series of metamorphoses, construct for oneself a "Body Without Organs" and eluding the static representations and various lines of "death" that always threaten the advancement of experimentation.
Deleuze via Spinoza defines a body in two ways:

"On the one hand, a body, no matter how small, always consists of an infinite number of particles: a body, the individuality of a body, is defined by relations of rest and movement, of swiftness and slowness among particles. On the other hand, a body affects other bodies, or is affected by other bodies; it is this power of affecting and being affected which also defines a body in its individuality" (Gilles Deleuze - Spinoza: philosophie pratique (1981)).

A body is a complex relation between differential speeds, between a deceleration and an acceleration of particles - a relation that varies between bodies and within each body. Its affective power may be limited or extensive. Human affective powers are numerous, and it is only through an extended experimentation that one may comprehend the capabilities of the human body. A body and its milieu, the particles that affect it and those that it affects, are concomitant/interpenetrating and subsumable within larger complexes of particles, defined by different affects and relations of movement. Nature from a Spinozist perspective, is constituted from differential rhythms and affective intensities. The co-ordinates of a certain body are determined by what Deleuze terms the "longitude" of its relations of stasis and motion between "non-formal elements" and the latitude of the intensive states of an "anonymous force" (force of existence/power of being effected). The totality of longitudes and latitudes constitutes Nature of the plane of immanence/consistency, always variable/ceaseless modified/composed/recomposed by individuals and collectives.

What Deleuze and Guattari call "hecceities" is a term adopted from Duns Scotus, whose "haecceitas" may be translated as "thisness" (See: Duns Scotus "Philosophical Writings" - trans Allan Walter Nelson - New York (1962)).

"A season, a winter, a summer, an hour, a date a perfect individuality which lacks nothing, although it is not that of a thing or a subject. These are heccities, in the sense that each is only a relation of movement and rest between molecules or particles, a power of affecting and being effected" (Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari - "Mille Plateaux")

The time of "hecceities" is that of "Aion" which is the indefinite time of the event. Hecceities and the plane of consistency are in fact similar in many ways to the events and the metaphysical surface elaborated in "Logique du sens".

There is no direct equivalent English translation for "régime de signes". "Régime" in French can mean "political regime", "system of governing", modes of giving" /"organization": "administration" /"management" /"system of regulation" /"laws. Despite the inadequate quality of the phrase "régime de signes" has been adopted by most translators.
Image" deployed in the Deleuzian sense is used broadly, encompassing words/thought/perceptions in addition to visual "representations" expressed here. Deleuze suggests that an image can be defined as the translation of a dynamism from one level of reality to another different dimensionality. This involves a transposition from one space/substance-medium/field of operation - to another, (that transposition may be likened to the projection of a volume onto a surface). This definition of image as surface of contraction is derived from Bergson. According to Bergson the human body does not simply produce and consume images - the human body "is an image" - a perceptual mechanism of contraction.

"I see plainly how external images influence the image I call my body: they transmit movement to it. And I also see how this body influences external images: it gives back movement to them. My body is, then, in the aggregate of the material world, an image which acts like other images, receiving and giving back movement, with, perhaps, this difference only, that my body appears to choose, within certain limits, the manner in which it shall restore what it receives" (Henri Bergson "Matter and Memory" trans N M Paul and W S Palmer New York: Zone Books (1988); "Matière et mémoire" Paris: PUF (1939)).

The world is the sum total of images in reciprocal presupposition.

There is no situation where an image exists "in" a body/mind (minds like the bodies they are associated with, are themselves images.) An image is a centre of dynamic exchange whereby movement is contracted or redilated from one dimension of reality to another and is in
consequence always in the middle - a site of passage and exchange in a field of extensity/a milieu.

For Bergson and Deleuze/Guattari ideas and images belonging to a given body are essentially "impersonal" outside of any structure of extensity such as identity/personality - which alternatively derive from them, secondly as a regularization of ideas/images from the outside. "Images can never be anything but things" (Henri Bergson - ibid 1888/1939). Images "are not in the brain; it is the brain that is in them". This special image which persists in the midst of the others, and which I call my body, constitutes at every moment a transversal section of the universal becoming. It is then the place of passage of the movements received and thrown back, a hyphen, a connecting link between the things which act upon me and the things upon which I act - the seat, in a word, of the sensori-motor phenomena" (Henri Bergson - ibid 1888/1939).

"Agencement machinique" as with many Deleuze/Guattarian concepts/terms is difficult to translate accurately. For "agencement" the suggestions offered by translators include "assemblage"/"arrangement"/"organization" but no single definition is fully appropriate. "Agencement" denotes an arrangement resulting from a combination of elements, and may be assimilated to the notions of both "organization" and "organism". "Machinique" is a term which plays upon the words "machine" (machine) and "machin" (thing) suggesting both the functional and diverse character of arrangements. In Deleuze and Guattari's late works "machinic arrangements" tend to replace "desiring-machines".

With this work Deleuze and Guattari initiated a consummate new way of thinking and writing, and more importantly, it was this text that discovered a new theoretical "continent": that of "minor literature". Kafka, for Deleuze and Guattari, introduced a revolutionary approach to literature, not the development of any specific philosophical proposition nor the outcome of a traumatic invention or rhetorical "dispositio", but the enactment of new operational principles for literature - for Kafka literature becomes experimental in a very defined sense, it is the creation of a new programme of writing that enables the perception of what the writer currently apprehends as a situation of underdevelopment with which he/she experiments as if it were an extreme solitude/desert. The Kafka of Deleuze and Guattari is no longer depicted as a writer concerned with which type of language he should employ, but rather as a writer who for the first time radically opens-up the question of "literature" to the forces and the differences that run through it. With the concept of "minor literature" Deleuze and Guattari bought about not simply a basic reterritorializing re-evaluation of literature but a dramatic reconsideration of the complete structure of "literature" itself as a compendium of hierarchically organized literary genres or as a centre of subjection.

(For the use of "minor literature" in a variety of contexts. See Louis A Renza "A White Heron" and the Question of Minor Literature" (Madsion: University of Wisconsin Press (1984) in which one finds the following remarks. "For Deleuze and Guattari, their "minor literature" is "schizo" literature in its subatomic-like anti-oedipal and self-deconstructing release of literary "intensities". In effect Deleuze and Guattari aim to distance Kafka's work from the many attempts to reduce it to the literature of the major signifying regimes. Also see Rêda Bensmaïa "Traduire ou 'blanchir' la langue" "Amour Bilingue d'Abdelkebir Khatibi" Hors Cadre 3 (Spring 1985) and the special issue of Cultural Critique nos. 6 and 7 (1987) both on minor literature.)
Fundamental to Deleuze and Guattari's programme is a Nietzschean conception of the cosmos as the ceaseless becoming of a multiplicity of interconnected forces. This multiplicity admits no stable entities but only a "dynamic quanta" and therefore must be evaluated/interpreted in terms of difference rather than identity.

In Deleuze and Guattari's collaborative design the Nietzschean model of the cosmos remains but with the emphasis translated to forces. In "Mille Plateaux" Deleuze and Guattari identify the plane of consistency with the time of "aion," and an unextended intensive "spatium". The plane of consistency, they suggest, is criss-crossed by lines of continuous variation, which are similar in character to a series of singular points, abstract lines of virtual possibilities that are manifested in a variety of machinic arrangements. Each machinic amalgamation is "un ensemble de voisinage" an assemblage of heterogeneous terms composed in a topological relation of "proximity"/"vicinity", and it is the abstract line that traverses the terms and facilitates their interaction. This virtual, abstract line of continuous variation is effectively something like the will to power - a self delineating difference that creates relations of proximity/difference between terms. Additionally the plane of consistency as well as sharing many of the features of stoic incorporeals remains a plane of forces/bodies, each body characterized by the longitude of its relations of motion and velocity/slowness/latitude of the intensive affects of which it is capable, according to its internal power or degree of force. The longitude of relations of motion and rest involves non-formed elements and the latitude of affective powers involves the intensive states of an anonymous force. Therefore the plane of consistency is, in many respects, an articulation of a Nietzschean physics, which depicts the cosmos as the becoming of a multiplicity of forces, differentiated in terms of dynamic quanta as opposed to stable objects. Furthermore, the plane of consistency is the "virtual" dimension of difference and the will to power.
The Deleuzoguattarian scheme is essentially a juxtaposition of difference and unity - multiplicities/haecceities/disjunctions/irreducible - intersecting series are synchronous/co-present with a univocity/of being and a non-transcendent plane of immanence. Deleuze cannot coherently maintain the primacy of difference over unity without falling back on a form of transcendentalism that his entire philosophical system appears poised to denounce, reducing language to non-comprehension and allowing the surfaces upon which thought is supposed to occur to shatter into a collection of operating unrelated/individuated molecules. Therefore in order to be effective difference must be conceived as running in parallel to unity (1).

In order to harmonize this dichotomy it is necessary primarily to examine the role that Deleuze designates for philosophy - the creation of concepts - in order to subsequently decide how a typical Deleuzian philosophical proposition is constituted, given that the principle aim of philosophy is normative. Philosophy in this mode/design is a practice that can only be conceived upon the basis of the effects it initiates, and this conception can have no grounding in any transcendental position. From such a consideration about the nature of philosophy it can be concluded that the correct approach to the Deleuzian concept of difference is an analysis of how it functions, and not of how one might perceive its metaphysical priority. Difference intrinsically operates as a concept that resists transcendence - positive in maintaining the irreducibility and contingency of singularity, and disruptive in rejecting principles of unification. Deleuzian difference is not situated in opposition to unity, but simply against the transcendental principles of unification that exclude difference rendering it negative. For Deleuze Spinoza's expressionism is the model for the compatibility of difference and unity, provided that (as in Spinoza's work) expressionism is in accord with univocity. In the conception of the rhizome one can locate a univocity of being, the affirmation neither of difference nor unity, but the surface which is the fusion of the two.

The Deleuzian project of philosophy is one of creating/organizing/re-configuring perspectives - "the discipline that consists in creating concepts" (2). To engage in
philosophy is to develop a perspective, via concepts, within which or by means of which the world is revealed/emerges. In collaboration with Félix Guattari, Deleuze defines three central concordant traits that form concepts: (A) a concept is composed of intersections within other concepts both in its particular area of concern and in related surroundings/areas - Deleuze writes, "philosophical theory is itself a practice, as much as its objects...It is a practice of concepts, and it must be judged in the light of other practices with which it interfaces" (3). (B) a concept is defined by the unity it articulates among its constituent parts - the “consistence” of the concept (4), it occurs when heterogeneous elements accord as a whole that is at once unique and inseparable from those composing elements (C) a concept is “an intensive trait, an intensive arrangement which must be taken as neither general nor particular but as a pure and simple singularity” (5). A concept is a productive force that resonates across a conceptual field, creating effects as it traverses through and by the elements/concepts contained within that location. A concept is not a representation in the traditional sense, but a point in a field - on a "plane" - that is immanently logical/political/aesthetic. It is comprehended/valued not by the status of its truth/accuracy of its reference, but by the effects it produced within and outside of the plane on which it is situated. The concept, according to Deleuze and Guattari, “does not have reference: it is autoreferential, it poses itself and its object at the same time that it is created” (6).

Philosophy as the creation of concepts may be regarded not simply as an articulation/demonstration but more precisely as an operation. Philosophy combines/initiates new points into planes that it is concentrating upon, and within this process rearranges that plane - produces a new plane or effects the interaction of that plane with others. To understand philosophy then, is to evaluate its operation/understand the effects it introduces rather than merely assess its truth.

Another composite part of philosophy's operation is "Philosophical constructivism" - "Philosophy is a constructivism, and its constructivism, possess two complementary aspects which differ in nature: creating concepts and tracing a plane" (7). Deleuze and Guattari
elaborate that the plane traced by the concepts that produce it is not reducible to those concepts, but in contrast the concepts delineate a plane that is necessarily perceived as an open system - (a unity but not a totality) - a unity in the sense that there is a relation/context among the concepts located on/within it, open in the sense that the concepts do not exhaust the interpretative meaning of the plane but enable development/re-configuration. Deleuze terms the planes traced by philosophy "planes of immanence" indicating that there is no origin beyond the plane that may be regarded as a structuring principle. The Deleuzian scheme rejects all forms of the illusion of transcendence in describing how philosophy functions (8).

"We do not have the least reason to think that the modes of existence need transcendent values which would compare, select, and decide which among them is "better" than another. On the contrary, there are only immanent criteria, and one possibility of life is valued in itself by the movements it traces and the intensities it creates on the plane of immanence" (Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari) (9)

The Deleuzoguattarian philosophical project is a "practice", a practice whose operations are evaluated by the effects they initiate. Thus there is a place for "truth" in philosophy, but it is in a secondary/derivative capacity - the primary design of philosophy is orientated towards the normative. The place of "truth" within the context of this interpretation resides in the assessment of effects. Such a move privileges normative planes in relation to other planes by making them the axes around which evaluation revolves. This Deleuzian view of philosophy, perceives philosophy as a creation rather than a reflection, and theory as practice rather than basic speculation.

Philosophy is a project of creation, the generation/fabrication of concepts that define new perspectives. It is principally a normative procedure, a discipline whose effects should be judged normatively. It is within this context that we can now assess the Deleuzian concept of difference. Deleuze essentially privileges difference.
"... in the essence, difference is the object of affirmation, affirmation itself. In its essence, affirmation is itself difference."

(Gilles Deleuze) (10)

When Deleuze privileges difference, he engages in the practice he calls philosophy. He is creating a concept that will contribute to shape a perspective from which to view a situation within a new dimension. The function of the concept of difference is synchronically to subvert the unifying forces that structure philosophical discourse and to replace such forces with an alternative perspective via which one may continue to think philosophically. Deleuze states, "It is necessary that a system is constituted on the basis of two or three series, each series being identified by the differences between the terms which compose it" (11). Systems should not be regarded as unities but instead as compositions of series, each of which is itself defined on the basis of difference. The thought of such difference at the level of compositions of series Deleuze terms "singularities". Deleuze conceives difference as intrinsically constitutive and unity as the product of the play of difference.

The concept of difference is both positive and disruptive - positive in taking series (singularities/desire/active forces/rhizomatic configurations etc), as irreducible/contingent forces and disruptive in rejecting all narratives of these constituting forces that would place them under the governance of a unifying principle that would render them and/or the phenomena they constitute as mere derivations from/reflections of one true world/origin. These two characteristics converge to structure the basic impulse of the concept of difference - that is to resist transcendence. To acknowledge the Deleuzian form of difference is to reject the illusion of transcendence, and to conduct philosophical exercises from the surface. To think in terms of difference is to affirm surfaces, which occurs when one realizes that those surfaces are not derivative/secondary to an external component but constitutions of series that come to form them and, in some sense, define them. Philosophy is a practice of difference which is correspondingly an art of surfaces.
The Deleuzian concept of difference, however, requires the additional supplementation of the Spinozist notion of "univocity of being" in order for it to function effectively (12). Deleuze's notion of difference is essentially anti-transcendental, it preserves the integrity of surfaces of difference from any reductive unifying principle that exists outside planes of immanence. The attraction of Spinoza, for Deleuze, is that in his system there is no transcendental principle of explanation precisely because there is no transcendence. The philosophical question posed by Spinoza focuses upon developing a perspective within which an anti-transcendental position can be effectively established. For Deleuze the central concept is "expression". Expression is the relation among substance/essence/modes that allows each of these elements to be determined as distinct from and yet constituent of others. For Spinoza it is this concept that, by substituting itself for emanation and displaying all forms of dualism, introduces into philosophy the anti-transcendental notion of the univocality of being. Expression is thus a concept that removes the possibility of transcendence from the philosophical field. Throughout all its expressions, being remains univocal. It is however vital to recognise that being univocal is not contemporaneous with being identical:

"The significance of Spinozism seems to me this: it asserts immanence as a principle and frees expression from any subordination to emanative or exemplary causality. Expression itself no longer enamates, no longer resembles anything. And such a result can be obtained only within a perspective of univocity".

(Gilles Deleuze) (13).

The significance of univocity is not that everything is the same nor that there is a principle of the same that is a basis for everything, but alternatively that with univocity comes difference.

If there is nothing outside of the surface and all there is is surface, then what demarcates the surface is quintessential/inherent. There is no other realm which may be discovered/revealed to understand the world/worlds. This notion is concurrently Spinozist and Nietzschean returning us to the complexity and irreducibility that defines surfaces, but
with the affirmation that such complexity/irreducibility are exactly the characteristics of a surface. The crucial point is that Deleuzian difference can only function as such in relation to surfaces, which are non-transcendent, on the basis of an ontological univocity. In this respect difference can be at once promoted and affirmed. It is promoted as the result of a perspective - the creation of concepts - that negates transcendence and returns to surfaces and their differences. It is affirmed because those surfaces and differences are no longer conceived as being derivative from/parasitic upon a unifying transcendental origin/principle.

Within the Deleuzian view of the philosophical project a perspective is interpreted not as the product of difference but the product simultaneously of unity and difference. The dual necessity of unity and difference in the formation of any perspective is the circumstantial parameters within which the Deleuzoguattarian concept of the rhizome should be understood. The rhizome embodies neither pure unity nor pure difference, it is reducible neither to some central point that constitutes its origin of evolution/situation of development. The rhizome is the play of the unity of its complimentary parts and their contained difference, and it is only because of this play that it proposes a view of difference as a positive rather than a negative phenomena. The rhizome is principally the univocity of being, a univocity that, correctly manifested, is the affirmation neither of difference nor unity but of the surface that is the interface/interpolation of the two.

From this a number of conclusions can be drawn. Firstly while at a certain level of generality Deleuzian philosophy may be "philosophy in the traditional sense" (14) the kinds of concepts invented and their rhizomatic assemblage result in a far from traditional enterprise/process. Deleuze creates untimely concepts, calculated to produce critical effects on the established forms of understanding: "The philosopher creates concepts that are neither eternal nor historical but untimely and not present" (Gilles Deleuze) (15). Secondly, an understanding of the formation/composition of the book/text-rhizome has implications for how we should read/interpret it. "Mille Plateaux" cannot be read as a series of stages in an unfolding exposition/argument. Without any fixed/delineated territory, a
conceptual rhizome has no beginning and no end, it is entirely "middle", composed of plateaux which are themselves always in-between each plateau can be read in no matter what order, and related in any way to another corresponding plateaux. Different plateaux may overlap, sometimes deploying the same concepts, although not in the same manner, but they remain self-sufficient trajectories.

Despite the notable presence of a metaphysical tendency, (a system-constructing impulse evident in the proliferation of concepts/distinctions), it would be futile to attempt to reconstitute a system from Deleuzoguattarian philosophy or "Mille Plateaux". Such an architectonic analysis would suppose the existence of a stable conceptual interiority which their project or works do not posses. The appropriate way to proceed would appear to be to choose a particular conceptual line and track it: exegesis should follow a route/path, rather than reproduce a system.
ACROSS (OUT OF TIME)

NOTES

1. This is not the deny that there is a tendency in Deleuzian thought towards pure difference and its resounding affirmation but there is also the presence in it of an opposite tendency that makes Deleuze appeal constantly throughout his work to writers whose work is unitary/monistic such as Scotus/Spinoza/Bergson.


5. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari - ibid.


8. The illusion consists of the notion that there is some unifying principle/set of principles outside the planes on which discourse occurs that engenders an order and sense, and the major task of philosophy is to discover that principle/set of principles.


12. If difference is offered as the single directive concept then it is difficult to interpret how there could be planes or surfaces. What principle/What reason enables a collection of points to be regarded as a series, or several set of series, the articulation of a plane, if all there is is pure difference. Also how can surfaces be developed without their becoming a new principle of transcendence? Initially it would appear that any principle of unity that is promoted to explain surfaces must be transcendent, at least to the differences it balances. It is only with the addition of Spinoza's thought of the univocity of being that the above problems might be resolved. "The philosophy of immanence appears from all viewpoints as the theory of unitary Being, equal Being, common and univocal Being" (Gilles Deleuze "Spinoza et le problème de l'expression" Paris: Minuit (1968)). This claim is vital if one is to understand how a Deleuzian philosophy of surfaces and differences is to operate coherently. An argument with this structure is suggested and elaborated by Todd May (See "Difference and Unity in Gilles Deleuze" in Eds Constantin V Boundas and Dorothea Olkowski 'Gilles Deleuze and the Theatre of Philosophy'' London: Routledge (1994)).


BECOMING X (IMPACT)

Using Deleuzian concepts is not like interpreting a plan or utilizing a static definition in another field of thought. In order to employ Deleuzian concepts it is necessary to metamorphose the tools that are adopted. The premise suggested is not to embrace a given vocabulary but to connect with a thought that develops through a virtual unending creation of concepts. Consequently Deleuzoguattarian concepts are at once fascinating/provoking/transient, they ultimately resist any attempt at replication - Deleuze and Guattari’s thought constantly creates other rhizomes without establishing the concrete foundations for a systematic/static structure of thought.

The process of creation and transformation extends concept to the fringes of other areas of thought, to which they are then connected. As Deleuze explained: “To create concepts is to build a region of the plane (of immanence), to add a region to the previous ones, to explore a new region, to fill in the gap” (1).

Deleuzian philosophy concentrates on the quite specific activity of conceptual creation -to philosophize is to invent new concepts. These are described as “singularities”, elsewhere as lines or intensities, which react upon the flow of thought, forming relays between artistic, literary or other practices. Concepts function in assemblages with non-conceptual modes of thought, forming rhizomes. Informing this viewpoint is an ideal of conceptual thought and a corresponding choice: the Deleuzian view of concepts implies a commitment to a certain notion of conceptual form. It is a matter of different styles or modes of conceptual functioning. Specifically, the choice is between a mode of thought governed by figures of interiority and one whose essence is exteriority: “une pense dehors”.

The classical image of thought, as it is presented in the history of philosophy, is of conceptual systems whose relationship to the outside is always mediated by some form of interiority (consciousness/concepts). These are centered and hierarchial systems. Precisely the primary characteristic of arborescent thought is its organization around a principle of unity/interiority - this constitutes the underlying structure/axis in terms of which the
object in question (language/the unconscious) and its relation to other things must be understood.

In contrast to this image, Deleuze defends a form of thought defined by its essential exteriority. Its potential for multiple and polyvalent relations with an outside. This Deleuzian alternative is not simply a matter of another image of thought, an alternative model for the elaboration of concepts. For what would imply a constant form which could then be reproduced in different domains, whereas exterior thought is characterized primarily by its inconsistency/variability - interiorized thought/aborescent thought does provide a model, but there is a fundamental dis-symmetry between the opposing poles in this case - the former resides completely outside the domain of the reproducible of representation, belonging instead to the world of the simulacra, where repetition implies essential difference. “La pensee du dehors” is a matter of the force which destroys the image and its copies, the model and its reproductions, all possibilities of subordinating thought to a model of the True/the Fight/the Law (Cartesian truth/Kantian right/Hegelian law). What is recommended is not the repetition of some Other Form of conceptual assemblage, but a process - the operation of putting thought into an immediate relation with outside forces.

Thought is essentially nomadic, a thought which refuses any universal subject, attributing itself instead to a particular multiplicity which does not locate itself within some englobing totality, but is rather deployed in a milieu without horizon, occupying a smooth space.

In “Francis Bacon: Logique la de sensation” Deleuze regards Bacon as engaged in a process to make visible invisible forces, and in this he is addressing a problem common to all the arts, “il ne s’agit pas de reproduire au d’inventer des formes, main de capter des forces”. In the proceeding sections of this project a consideration of Deleuze’s views on painting/cinema/literature may suggest how Deleuze extends the problematics of force in relation to various modes of art production.
This "process" of force might in some sense be termed as experimental affective physics, the individual arts painting/cinema/literature, delineating broad areas of research into the nature and use of force.

In Francis Bacon's painting for example, forces of isolation/deformation/dissipation connect field and figure, force of coupling bring figures and objects together, and forces of separation convert triptychs into expanses of light infused with the rhythms of an ametrical time. Also in modern cinema the forces that structure the visible and the sayable are isolated and intensified, sound and image diverging into separate strats.

In the "critical postmodern" paintings of David Salle we observe a mode of operation that stresses the invention of new roles and new configurations/assmeblages of form for painting in a pictorial/artistic/philosophical game. It asks the question "What is painting?" in a direct/uncompromising manner. This mode of experimentation is one which no longer adheres to the classical aesthetic rules of beautiful/of form/of what pleases, but asks itself constantly through its practice and its relation to tradition, what the rules of art/painting are. Subsequently the very notion of the aesthetic and its object are placed in question by the postmodern avant garde art.

Each are mode experimentns with itself, testing its limits by making visible the invisible, audible the inaudible, sayable the unsayable. Each art experiments with forces, the various works of a given art as much inventing as discovering the forces they capture. Each art experiments with the body of sensation, which for Deleuze is the body without organs, the unorganzised body-world of non-formed-elements and anonymous affective forces.

At this point it would appear appropriate to introduce Deleuze's later work, without Felix Guattari, to consider how this "perpetuum mobile" (2) developed without a negative effect, in constant re-configuration/re-reference to the becomings/metamorphoses of the preceding books.
Firstly neither “Cinéma 1: l’Image-Movement” or “Cinéma 2: l’Image - Temps” (3) can be regarded as direct applications/illustrations of previous work. In these two books Deleuze does not use directly the concepts he produced with Guattari but creates many others. The works on cinema never constrain his previous work in a closed system, the two books open Deleuze’s former work onto new becomings.

“...pushed me towards cinema. For me, at that point, a time had come when my work was revolving around the problems of space and time, thanks to Bergson, and I told myself cinema people have already understood this in their own ways.”

(Gilles Deleuze) (4)

Accordingly, all of Deleuze’s works produced after “Mille Plateaux” can be interpreted as different unfoldings of some “becomings” of previous designs in the areas of painting/cinema/literature/philosophy. In spite of this variety of subject, Deleuze develops the fundamental lines of work characterized by his preceding programme. To summarize the point made previously concerning “Mille Plateaux” concepts are in constant metamporphosis.

“Concepts are not stagnant, one must perpetually modify them and the more one remodifies them the more they become coherent. One must invalidate the concepts, confirm them, refute them....”

(Gilles Deleuze) (5)

Both of the works on cinema illustrate Deleuze’s project for inventing classifications of images, signs and concepts.

“The question of signs always preoccupied me. I have always envisioned the problem of signs as being non-linguistic. For me signs have always been an indication that there is a discourse different from the “Logos” It’s my deep hatred for too rational a discourse. Signs exist and this is a mark of violence and of the involuntary. I believe that we only do things pushed by violence and involuntarily”

(Gilles Deleuze) (6)

All of Deleuze’s concepts in recent works elucidate or “unfold” signs. He demonstrates how
signs act, how they connect to each other - producing/cutting/capturing or circulating pre-individual flows. These flows (light/desire/un-formed matter) attract or repel each other inducing the power of what Deleuze terms a "Chaosmos" (7). From and through these various inter-relations of forces, configurations are introduced which structure/shape a fragile/temporary stable representation of reality - with its shaped matter and signifying forms - from which various interpretations can be constructed.

Deleuze utilizes the Bergsonian notion of "duration" to define the "time" in which desiring flows/"the pleat"/"images-time"/"images-movement"/"the figural" will evolve. Deleuzian thought develops with Bergsonian duration (internal succession without exteriority) as the background (8). The Deleuzian project can be conceived as Bergsonian in two fundamental ways: in his notion of time and movement, and his consistent linking of science and the necessity for a new representation of reality in its perpetual metamorphosis.

In consequence the most recent additions to the Deleuzian programme are not closed systems, like "Mille Plateaux" they offer multiple possibilities/contingencies.

Regarding the various interpretations of "Le Pli" ("the pleat") (9), there are at least four available readings: a book about the Leibnizian system/an analysis of the baroque/an explanation of the concept of "Le Pli" as integrated within Liebniz's work/an elaboration of a general theory of "Le Pli" (10). From "Mille Plateaux", through a reflection on time and cinema, Deleuze was led to an investigation of Foucault's work and to various systems of signs arranged within the three areas of knowledge/power/desire. (11). This process of analysis confronted Deleuze with a new conception of what Foucault and Blanchot considered as the thought of the "outside". In the final section of "Foucault" Deleuze exemplifies how the "line of the outside" folds itself, creating a "zone of subjectivation" which allows for what the poet Henri Michaux called "la vie dans les plis". In this way "Le Pli" is the first stage of a new thought process that examines/re-defines life/humanity/thought itself, based on a dynamic representation of reality progressively revealed by the totality of Deleuze's
programme. In a sense Deleuze wrote "Le Pli" within a Leibnizian framework in order to unfold into the infinite pleats of his own project.

The themes articulated by Deleuze in the late sections of his design highlights an encompassing technique that traces a continuation of lines of conception instigated by "Mille Plateaux". Deleuze's later work remains consistent with both a unique and multiple pretext. While "Mille Plateaux" centralized notions of space/time/the sign, "Logique de la sensation", "l'Image - Movement", "l'Image - Temps" analyse how painting and cinema enable us to re-think/re-concieve these notions by creating the concepts of "the figural" of "image-time" and "image-movement". Deleuze describes various systems of signs while keeping his work independent from linguistics/psychoanalysis.

With "Foucault", Deleuze develops his research about time and signs while characterizing various "régimes de visibilité" and "régimes d'énonciabilité", organized around three axes. This study brings him to the limits of the classical representation of reality, towards a "thought of the outside" and new modes of subjectivation in the pleats formed by the line of the "outside".

"Le Pli" affords the beginnings of a general conception of the pleat that requires a re-reading of "Mille Plateaux" in order to consider how it is possible to re-invent a "Life in pleats" through redefining the concepts of signs/space/time.
NOTES


A concept, for Deleuze, has three determinations: it is a fold on a plane of immanence; it is a multiplicity of elements; and it is embodied in a conceptual person/personae.

The concept “significant form” recurs frequently throughout the discussion of aesthetics - the task of philosophy in art is to create aesthetic concepts. The concept may be described as a specific fold on a plane of immanence, as an event on a horizon - (a particularly appropriate characterization for a concept based on the opposition between figure and background). The word “form” is the term for the plane of immanence, folded in various ways in the course of a venerable philosophical tradition. The word “significant” in the concept is the term for the multiplicity of elements that make it up and which may be summarized along three oppositions: emotional/expressive/intellect/expression/impression and form/representation. Significant form is emotional/expressive and non-representative. The concept, additionally, is embodied in the two conceptual personae of the artist whose emotions are translated into form, and the audience which re-creates the emotion out of the form - two personae engaged in what could be described as a pragmatic exchange. Thus reconfigured, the phrase “significant form” is a concept, reorganizing the plane of immanence producing effects of knowledge and truth. This illustrative model demonstrates that in a Deleuzo-guattarian scheme a concept is the pedagogy of territorialization: triangulating the field through a network of oppositions that will end in a correlation - Deleuze’s philosophical style is based on the exploitation of correlations, e.g. a series of parallel oppositions, both within philosophy and outside of it. Ultimately, however, one cannot triangulate Deleuze and Guattari’s enterprise - the text deterritorializes itself according to its own lines of flight. The other of the concept is called the “figure”, and with this another correlation is produced (figure/concept, transcendent/immanent, deterritorialization etc.)

2 On the concept of “perpetuum mobile” and its use by Deleuze see “Logique du sens” Paris Minuit (1969).


4 Gilles Deleuze - Interview in “Libération” 3 October (1983).

5 Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1983).


ANIMAL NITRATE (THE IMAGE OF CHANCE)

PART 1

Deleuze in "Francis Bacon: Logique de la sensation" (1981) reads Francis Bacon's painting technique as a "pedagogy of the image" conducted for the sake of a painterly practice that deforms the world in order to make it visible again. "How to make visible forces that are invisible?" is the question which Bacon confronts and on account of which Deleuze renders him the object of his analysis, in an attempt to construct a general logic of sensation.

In this section I wish to invoke certain parallel analogies and points of convergence between a Deleuzian conception/process of art articulated through the interpretation of the works of Francis Bacon and a more general investigative/innovative framework (which will integrate an extensive Deleuzian analysis) within which we might subsequently initiate an inquiry into the paintings of David Salle.

Deleuze exemplifies Bacon as a painter who de-figures representation in the search for a sensation that would give itself, in itself and for itself. This practice constitutes a major revision of the type of subjectivity that comprises the background of phenomenology. In Bacon's and Salle's work subjectivity is disintegrated, traversed by intensities and "hystereized". Deleuze views sensation as emerging from an interaction between a perceiving subject and a fractured/disintegrated figure in the painting. Deleuze envisages/describes a painterly technique/method that is correspondingly directed against the organic representation of classical art and against the kind of abstraction that moves towards geometric shapes/forms. Between these two positions, Deleuze highlights within Bacon's imagery, a modulation and gradation of signification, the measured distortion/obscuration/disjunction of the corporeal elements, as principle examples of a technique of modulation.

According to Deleuze, the elementary rhythms of a Bacon painting are those that pass between the uniform tones of the background field and the human figure surrounded by that field. A systolic force moves from the field to the figure, enclosing and constricting the figure, and
a diastolic force passes from the figure to the field as the body undergoes an intensive
deformation. The encircling force of the field isolates the figure, disconnects it from all
narrative and therein evacuates any figurative/representational content. The expanding
force that is emitted from the figure in turn induces a contorted athleticism in which the
body is seized by a convulsive action in order to escape itself. "Tout la serie des spasmes
chez Bacon est de ce type, amour, vomissement, excrement, toujours le corps qui tente de
s'eclipper par un de ses organes, pour rejoindre l'aplat, la structure materielle.....Et le
cri, le cri de Bacon, c'est l'operation par laquelle le corps tout entier s'eclippe par la
bouche" (Gilles Deleuze). (1)

The Body in a Bacon canvas is in the process of a becoming substantively plural - multiple
"bodies" - via an integrated technique of escape. The initial moment of this escape is a force
of dislocation. Bacon multiplies dislocations, never allowing a stable form to be reinvested
in the canvas/painting. This is achieved via continuous punctuations of
splitting/disruption. Bacon's framing/highlighting techniques consist of a paradoxical
character of displacement - containing a form only to consequently/ultimately void that space
into an exposure of its forces. Elements - circles/ellipses/syringes/circular
beds/tubes/basins/pipes/curved contours and cylinder forms of furniture, function as
figurative elements but also highlight the figural elaboration of the body which Deleuze
views as trapezes for acrobatics. Apart from the circular beds the elliptical contours do not
usually complete themselves in the frame, but create a horizontal movement in tension with
the downward movement - both carry on beyond the frame. Dislocation releases the forces and
spaces incarcerated. Deleuze articulates this strategy when he sees the depiction of the
mouth as acquiring a capability of illocalization, it is no longer a particular organ but an
aperture through which the entire body escapes, and via which the flesh descends.

The complexity of Bacon's pictorial space opens-out molar entities, particularly the planar
multiplication and material modulation of planes, creating zones of intensity which
disrupt/deform a traversing body. This space acquires an increased level of intensity as
Bacon's work develops towards the non-rational elements/marks and the tonal variation of the
flesh that Deleuze concentrates upon/engages in a process of mutation. The effect is not however limited to the body, the ground plane and arrow effects in certain late works indicate the extreme exacerbation of earlier techniques - the molecularisation of variation manifested in the dispersal of the brushstroke and the adaption of the aerosol - the paints fragmentation/it's nomadic distribution.

A Francis Bacon painting constitutes its own life, a new reality, replete with resonant energy. Instead of illustrating an image, an oblique allusion or an appropriately symmetrical pattern, the feature of a Bacon canvas which is immediately apprehended and asserts itself unequivocally and independently, whatever elements are brought into play, and even when the theme of the work puts it on a level with mythology, is a kind of "real presence" to which his figure/figures attain. Through these figures, the viewer with no preconceived ideas gains access to a flesh and blood reality.

"I want very much to do the thing that Valéry said - to give the sensation without the boredom of its conveyance. And the moment the story enters, the boredom comes upon you."

(Francis Bacon)

Bacon's work transcends superficial excitement and picturesque effect - it continues in a calculated way to provoke/disturb, charged with a searing impact. What Bacon aims at is not so much to produce a picture as to utilize the canvas to assert certain "realities", about perception/movement/paint. He wants the painting to operate primarily through sensation.

"(Art is) a method of opening up areas of feeling rather than merely an illustration of an object."

(Francis Bacon)

In this strategic/technically contrived modulation, Bacon uniquely concentrates, in certain works, on a destruction of the face and on a subsequent re-configuration/re-emergence of the head beneath the face. This would not be possible, if sensation was defined as a mere representation of the interaction of an eye and an object. However, sensation is a reaction
not to a form, but rather to a force and Bacon’s paintings attempt to encapsulate and illustrate that force. What Bacon searches for in his paintings is an essence/method of painting which would be as remarkable and personal to himself, as the thing painted. More precisely the paint should not lag behind the idea, nor was it to seem supplementary to it. The paint and the idea should be one, indissoluble and indistinguishable. It is crucial that force itself should exist on a body for there to be sensation. Force is the necessary condition of sensation provided that sensation is not demarcated as representating force. Deleuze terms the logic of sensation that he identifies in Bacon’s work “haptic” in order to emphasize its dualistic predominance over eye and hand in a singular logic of sensation (not sensations - sensations are contiguous and extensive as opposed to sensation which is intensive).

In a 1987 interview David Salle describes his painting as linking two traditions. “There has been painting for hundreds of years that wanted to see the interior or workings of human beings, in a physical sense, and there has been painting that wanted to examine the exterior mannerisms of human society. Both kinds of painting have existed side by side for hundreds of years and I think my paintings have something of both” (2). Thus in one respect the surface of the picture acts as the location for the images of society’s projected desires and the numerous resultant mannerisms. Salle’s unrelenting/uncompromising representations of the inane/banal/kitsch ephemera of modern culture belong in this category. He introduces them, exposes them, yet only to re-position and re-present them again by means of his particular composition. This disjunctive eclecticism has a magnetic effect of attraction and repulsion upon the viewer. Similarly Salle suggests superficial relationships between images, redolent with meaning, which he simultaneously exposes as negative/non-sustainable. In this charlatanic/dissonant exercise of meaning (lessness) he continuously produces and dismantles ambiguous undirected references - he plays upon the structures of signification and visually invalidates the pictorial fragments of our ersatz culture. In another respect there is a formalization of human traits, reflecting the periodic counterplay of humanity’s inward and outward nature. To this purpose Salle uses the (female) body as the centripetal correlation for an optical investigation of human nature.
"I think that there is an idea about the body being the location of human inquiry that one finds in my work, that makes it somehow resonant with much earlier kinds of painting.”
(David Salle) (3)

In choosing the body as the location of human inquiry, Salle concentrates upon surfaces and their composition, the emphatically visible. This utilization of the "pornographic-like" female nude-model is the most potent and intractable of Salle's strategic techniques. Salle deploys the nude, in a similar way to his employment of a large canvas, as a given inexhaustible site of interest, a proliferating intersection of connections. In addition to being grounded in contemporary culture the "pornographic-like" nude - the body as the focus of desire - presents Salle with a virtual aesthetic theory, a theory of painting as initself determinantly exciting/energizing/active - "a body" - a figure/entity that intensifies life. In the paint that constitutes the skin of the nude and literally the skin of the painting, Salle’s art delineates its crux. This essentially comprises an exemplary/rigorously developed proposition of the irreducibility of the essence of painting. To comprehend the mechanics of Salle’s painting it is crucial to advance the vicissitudes of the nude. Salle’s nudes although of a sexually provocative type are not arousing when encountered on the canvas (thus "pornographic-like" rather than "pornographic"). He uses the association of arousal but not the consequent response, which ultimately would shatter the unity of the painting - a unity he wants to question, to render paradoxical/ephemeral, to suspend/defer, but which must imperatively finally be affirmed. Salle’s distinctive innovation is a way of composing stimulating images: compositing intensities using formal devices to construct paintings that are visually disjunctive but, by that very means take on a poised coherence.

As can be seen in overview, most precisely in "Foucault" (4), Deleuze’s strategic interpretative mechanisms concern an active engagement with the theoretical question of what it means to describe in one medium the practices of another medium. Whilst maintaining the presupposition that all acts of translation are essentially a betrayal, Deleuze, expermentally traces those instances in which the verbal may invoke the visual. In Deleuze's
writing there is a constant reference to the establishment of "tableaus" - verbal exemplary illuminations of scenes that in their inherent stylistic quality and depth manifest the complete intensity of a visual presence. Additionally the language that Deleuze adopts/utilizes to elaborate the operations of force/intensity is a vivid and materialized one that renders even the most chimerical concepts substantively present. Although he describes the arts as primarily conceptual, Deleuze produces concepts that are quite physical in operation, as opposed to ideal abstractions. The Deleuzian philosophical narrative is one of mappings/cartographies/lines of flight/vanishing points/rhizomatic and crystalline networks.

As Deleuze indicates in "Dialogues" the arts in his view are by no means unreleated to one another: "So what is it then, to paint, to compose or to write? It's all a question of the line; there is no considerable difference between painting, music and writing. These activities are distinguished by their respective substances, codes and territorialities, but not by the abstract line they trace, which passes between them and carries them toward a common destiny" (Gilles Deleuze). (5).

And Deleuze observes in "Francis Bacon: logique de la sensation". "Car il y a une communaute des arts, un probleme common. En art, et en peinture commence en musique, il ne s'agit pas de reproduire ou d'inventer des formes, main de capter des forces" (Gilles Deleuze) (6)

The Deleuzian project is directed towards an experimental operation that goes beyond the surface fixities of an art medium to find the forces and energies, the fluxes and sensations that a specific socio-historical examination has missed.

Deleuze's volume "Francis Bacon: Logique de la sensation" can be viewed as articulating a Deleuzian conception/process for art. It is this concept of art that I wish to elaborate and investigate in the following section by tracing a line of trajectory, working through a selection of the components and stating/outlining the pattern of its hypothesis. In addition I will continue to highlight points of intersection with a reading of the practice of David
For Deleuze, as for many critics of twentieth-century art, Cézanne is one of the founding figures of modern painting. It is through Cézanne that Deleuze approaches Francis Bacon, and it is within a specific tradition of Cézanne criticism that Deleuze develops his analysis. In "Logique de la sensation" Deleuze cites two works that situate his argument within that tradition - Henri Maldiney's "Regard Parole Espace" (1973) (8) and Jean-François Lyotard's "Discours, Figure" (1971) (9).

Deleuze's strategy in "Logique de la sensation" is to combine the analysis of Maldiney and Lyotard, to inter-articulate the space of Lyotard's figure matrix (the space of the invisible, of the possible is an invented space traversed by unconscious forces that render visual what Lyotard terms the "figural" a domain of Dionysian anti-form that can play through the images of figurative and abstract). The ground of painting is a "figure-matrix" of fantasy, the scene of the invisible pulsations of the Id) but negating the Freudian apparatus that Lyotard adopts, and the Straussian space (10) of sensation within a single plane of consistency. Deleuze argues with Maldiney that Cézanne is a painter of sensation, and it is the Figure that "la forme sensible rapportée a la sensation". It is the fusional world-body of sensation that Cézanne paints, and it is by entering into the painting’s world-body that the viewer comes to experience the canvas as sensation. However, what Cézanne ultimately attempts to do, according to Deleuze, is to go beyond sensation and paint the invisible forces that are inculcated within it. Turn sensation back on itself, extend/contract it, to utilize that which sensation renders the forces that are not given, to make sensate the forces that are non-sensate. In Deleuze's view the quality of Cézanne is to "avoir subordonné tousles moyens de la peinture a cette tache: rendre visibles la force de plissement des montagnes, la force de germination de la pomme, la force thermique d'un paysage.....etc?" (Gilles Deleuze). (11).

"Logique de la sensation" has a structural arrangement founded upon a framework of rubrics, each dealing with an aspect of Francis Bacon's painting. When the rubrics are compiled and
viewed in total they are intended to construct a general "logic of sensation". Deleuze's
discussion begins fairly internally - analysing Bacon's specific painterly practices - then
moves from a formal analysis of the tableaux to the wider art-historical implications of
Bacon's method.

Rubic One "Le rond, La piste" describes the techniques that Bacon uses frequently to delimit
the central figure through the effect of encapsulating that figure within a type of oval
shape. However, in parallel, Deleuze structures the narrative such that the division formal
investigation/socio-historical inquiry is revealed to be no more than an expedient
heuristic. For example, the basic technique of delineation with an oval is re-conceived by Deleuze as only one component in a
higher logic or series of logics. In the first rubic Deleuze offers a number of instances of
this re-conception. Initially Deleuze states that the delimitation with the oval is itself
an open-ended systematic procedure of experimentation, it makes "sensible une sorte de
cheminement, d'exploration de la Figure dans le lieu, ou sur elle-même. C'est un champ
opératoire" (Gilles Deleuze) (12). Next, Deleuze says that the delimitation of the single
figures will have to be perceived in the context of the later more inclusive study of Bacon's
supplementary method of "linking" several figures in a triptych format. Thirdly the
isolation of the figure, resisting any definite narrative associations is not merely a
process of defiguration (although this does comprise a fundamental tenet of Bacon's scheme).
Deleuze argues, "Des lors elle a comme deux voies possibles pour échapper au figuratif: vers
la forme pure, par abstraction: ou bien vers le pur figurai, par extraction ou isolation".
(Gilles Deleuze) (13). If Bacon decides upon the second option, other practitioners have
opted for the former, and consequently much of "Logique de la sensation" contrasts the option
of abstraction with the technique of "de-narrativizing isolation". This attention to the
multiple possibilities of art history by Deleuze is another means by which the first rubic may
be situated within a higher logic. From the outset then it can be seen that Deleuze digresses
from a pure analysis of Bacon extending the parameters of the study to incorporate a more
comprehensive study of a whole area of art experimentation.
In his depiction/deployment of the female nude/sections of the female anatomy, David Salle constantly engages in a process of modifying their impact and re-focusing their charge. He uses a series of effects to achieve this end, from the subtle grisaille technique to the idiosyncratic arrangement of posture or from the refusal to reveal facial expressions to the frequent quotations from Art History via the components he appropriates. Salle has observed that, "eroticism is this generation's word for authenticity", and what fascinates him about this view of "authenticity" is the way it focuses upon something that becomes more extensively distorted the closer you get to it. This perverse exchange of identities between the authentic and the distorted image intrigues Salle and allows us to understand why he regards eroticism as "an integral part of understanding the aesthetic" (14). It is the impulse, a perceptual catalyst, "it is about how you know to single something out" (15).

Taking a more specific look at Salle’s models we might identify a number of different types presented - the catatonic or mute woman, the burlesque dancer, the wistful day dreamer, the melancholic waif, the self-possessed dancer and a variety of anatomical nudes in classical "studio poses". The most memorable however are the "pornographic-like" ones: women depicted in a range of vulnerable/compromised positions/in bizarre costuming/in characterisation. Usually viewed from behind or with clothes pulled up over the head, these women seem unaware/unconcerned with being looked at. Their faces and distinguishing features often obscured/undifferentiated/cropped out.

It is here that I wish to introduce the proposition that the way Salle uses inserts in his pictures ("Sextant in Dogtown" (1987) and "Marking Through Webern" (1987)) is similar in practice and implication, to Bacon’s employment of the oval. Salle uses the inserts in his pictures, in an erotic sense, as mirrors of the female body. They convey a series of metaphysical and metaphorical implications that complicate Salle’s field of references. The inserts can be seen as "windows" with faces peering out at us as we peer through them. The images/subjects of the inserts also tend to mirror the body’s configuration - (the ornaments and vases with their tapered lips, the wrinkled Giacometti-type heads) - they contribute to establish the evocation of atmosphere underlying the works, from the grinning mockery of the
face in "Marking through Webern" (1987) to the more theatrical impact of the images superimposed onto "Yellow Bread" (1987) / "Satori Three Inches Within Your Heart" (1988). Salle is then both representing the body through images and actualizing it through the collocation of the inserts. These works establish their own "reality" and never exist as simply descriptive. They are actual corporated bodies rather than works about bodies. It is here that we have the "real reality" of the painting, revealed appropriately enough through the skin of the paint that is the surface. The inserts serve to consequently energize/animate the work - they literally transform it. Salle has suggested that the motivation behind this strategy is "to get inside of things, inside the thing, and also to see from the outside, simultaneously, to be director and directed". (16).

"......there are things in my paintings and there are things in the world and the two things are not the same - even though one might look like the other. Nudes in paintings are not the same as nudes in the world. It is their relationship that is interesting."

(David Salle) (17)

In "Epaulettes for Walt Kuhn" (1987) the implication is obvious that any traditional erotic interpretation is repudiated by the placement of the image of the dead fish (a Flemish still life) stretching across the entire upper section of the picture. The small inserts of two Fifties style light-fittings and the mule (all common items from Salles visual vocabulary) activate the surface creating a three-dimensional effect, illuminating the ground and cancelling out relationships. The portion of dripping paint is a "quote"/a piece of calculated artifice that leads to the lower frieze where it finds an echo in the epaulettes of the female-figure's costume.

Salle's female nude-models are contemporary readings of the body, where the body itself, rather than simply provoking an imaginative reaction, is the scene of action and the vehicle for a more complex communication.

In a similar vein to the method whereby Bacon's oval is a generative factor that leads/connects to other Baconian methods, so too the first rubic of "Logique de la sensation"
contains the principle components for the complete Deleuzian scheme. In rubic 2 we can observe the experimental/discursive style of Deleuze’s design - he moves quickly beyond the concerns initially indicated (Bacon’s defigurative tactics) to general art historical concerns, but he proceeds to move in a way that allows/requires supplementary annotation in/via later rubics.

The main focus in rubic 2 “Note sur les rapports de la peinture ancienne avec la figuration” concentrates upon the impact of the photographic image. It is suggested that the photograph’s chemical reproduction of images gives it a realism that releases other art forms from the desire for realism. Deleuze admits that advances in photography have extensively re-directed the impulse of painting, there is a kind of anxiety of influence in which the painter begins his/her work with the sense that the work is being conducted in a world already of the photograph. " ... la peinture moderne est envahie, assiégée par les photos et les clichés qui s'installent déjà sur la toile avant même que le peintre ait commencé son travail. En effet, ce serait une erreur de croire que le peintre travaille sur une surface blanche et vierge. La surface est déjà tout entière investie virtuellement par toutes sortes de clichés avec lesquels il foudra rompre" (Gilles Deleuze) (18). However, whereas traditional interpretations have tended to regard the release of painting as a natural development wherein a non-visual art easily locates its correct direction, Deleuze states that this process has nothing natural/spontaneous/inevitable about it. The prevailing condition of the cliche is a threat/pressure to the artist, and only a concentrated strategy can enable painting to negate this cliche. (This notion of art as a practice of defined effort, Deleuze is keen to emphasize, is complementary to the method of the scientist/experimenter/engineer): " Ainsi, ayant renoncé au sentiment religieux, mais assiégé par la photo, la peinture moderne est dans une situation beaucoup plus difficile, quoi qu'on dise, pour rompre avec la figuration, qui semblerait son miserable domaine reserve. (Gilles Deleuze) (19). One form of painterly practice would be that of abstraction: "il a fallu l'extraordinaire travail de la peinture abstraite pour arracher l'art moderne à la figuration" (Gilles Deleuze) (20), however, the break with figuration can also be a direct confrontation with figuration - a working through it/a "defiguration". 
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The main focus in rubic 2 "Note sur les rapports de la peinture ancienne avec la figuration" concentrates upon the impact of the photographic image. It is suggested that the photograph's chemical reproduction of images gives it a realism that releases other art forms from the desire for realism. Deleuze admits that advances in photography have extensively redirected the impulse of painting, there is a kind of anxiety of influence in which the painter begins his/her work with the sense that the work is being conducted in a world already of the photograph. "... la peinture moderne est envahie, assiégée par les photos et les cliches qui s'installent déjà sur la toile avant même que le peintre ait commencé son travail. En effet, ce serait une erreur de croire que le peintre travaille sur une surface blanche et vierge. La surface est déjà tout entière investie virtuellement par toutes sortes de clichés avec lesquels il foudra rompre" (Gilles Deleuze) (18). However, whereas traditional interpretations have tended to regard the release of painting as a natural development wherein a non-visual art easily locates its correct direction, Deleuze states that this process has nothing natural/spontaneous/inevitable about it. The prevailing condition of the cliche is a threat/pressure to the artist, and only a concentrated strategy can enable painting to negate this cliche. (This notion of art as a practice of defined effort, Deleuze is keen to emphasize, is complementary to the method of the scientist/experimenter/engineer): "Ainsi, ayant renoncé au sentiment religieux, mais assiégée par la photo, la peinture moderne est dans une situation beaucoup plus difficile, quoi qu'on dise, pour rompre avec la figuration, qui semblerait son miserable domaine reserve. (Gilles Deleuze) (19). One form of painterly practice would be that of abstraction: "il a fallu l'extraordinaire travail de la peinture abstraite pour arracher l'art modern a la figuration" (Gilles Deleuze) (20). However, the break with figuration can also be a direct confrontation with figuration - a working through it/a "defiguration".
In rubic 3 "Athlétisme" Deleuze returns to a formal analysis, to an engagement with the internal dynamic scheme of Bacon's design. Indeed the first word of this rubic is "Revenons". More than this though we might note a process of Deleuzian rhizomatic functioning where one section of a formation connects with a multitude of others. Rubic 1 discussed the impact of the figure and its surrounding oval, rubic 3 extends the format and introduces a third element. "Revenons aux trois éléments picturaux de Bacon: les grands aplats comme structure matérielle spatialisante - la Figure, les Figures et leur fait - le lieu, c'est-à-dire le rond, la piste ou le contour, qui est la limite commence de la Figure et de l'aplat" (Gilles Deleuze) (21). Deleuze treats the three elements of the flat tableaux - space/figure/oval - as complementary mechanisms from which various painterly combinations can be derived.

There are two discernable strands of narrative discussion contained here. Firstly, a recapitulation of rubic 1 notes how the relation of oval to figure can construct the Bacon painting as an activity of "witnessing" in which the figure is delimited from an action by virtue of it's appearing to be "l'attente ou de l'effort" (22). In this context the figure is primarily a stable entity around which the open space of the tableau is engaged in a galvanized motion. "Dans beaucoup de tableaux, l'aplat est précisément pris dans un movement par lequel il forme un cylindre; il s'enroute autour du contour du lieu; et il emprisonne la Figure" (23). Secondly in many of Bacon's paintings it is the figure itself which is involved in energetic motion. (24). As Deleuze notes the Baconian figure is that of a body in the process of a vehement becoming. In this case the oval works not simply as a delimiting factor that directs the figure inwards towards itself so that it might complete a self-sufficient systemativity, but in direct contrast the oval becomes an aperture to a state of openness to which the figure positions itself, as if it had located a "point de fuite". Deleuze here is reading Bacon's technique as a process of infinite mutation/transformation. In Rubic 4 "Le corps, la viande et l'esprit, le devenir-animal" Deleuze extends the initial premise of his narrative. Where the figure was primarily regarded as a complete element able to inter-connect with larger processes, but not apparently divisible in itself, now in contrast the figure itself is in the process of a "becoming"/mutation in which it is not only the relation to the outside that is in
transformation but also the figure itself in its internal (dis)organization. The human figure is promoted as internally divided in two procreative ways. Firstly the human body is conditioned by a tension between “heads and faces”

“Porträtist, Bacon ist Maler von Köpfen und nicht von Gesichtern. Es gibt eine große Differenz zwischen den beiden. Denn das Gesicht ist eine räumlich strukturierte Organisation, die den Kopf bedeckt, während der Kopf eine Abhängigkeit des Körpers ist, obwohl er die Spitze der Tendenz ist. Es ist nicht dass sie fehlt, es ist ein Geist, der Körper, die körperliche Seele, ein tierischer Geist, es ist der tierische Geist des Mannes: ein Schweinesgeist, ein Böllersgeist, ein Hundegeist, ein Fledermausgeist...... C'est donc un projet très spécial que Bacon poursuit en tant que portraitiste: défaire le visage, retrouver ou faire surgir la tête sous le visage” (Gilles Deleuze) (25).

Spasmodic deformations are patent in Bacon's portraits - for the face is the most heavily coded zone of the body and hence the point at which the effects of diastolic forces are most pronounced. As a portraitist, Bacon's project is to paint the head beneath the face, the body of sensation as opposed to the figurative body of conventional representation. In many of Bacon's portraits animal traits seem to emerge from the human forms, and Deleuze regards these traits as a general "becoming animal" of the body. He is not saying there is a mimetic relationship between human and animal but that there is a "zone d'indiscernabilité, d'indécidabilité", between humanity and the animalistic. What is important about meat is that it "est la zone commune de l'homme et de la bête, leur zone d'indiscernabilité". Ultimately, the head and meat taking on incipient traits of the head, the head instantiating "la puissance illocalisée de la viande"

This connects to the secondary thread of Deleuze's narrative in this section - a tension between flesh ("chair") meat ("viande") and bone.

Deleuze's narrative is directed towards promoting Bacon as a painter who de-figures representation and divorces the figure from any kind of stable representation with the principle ambition of communicating sensation in and of itself. Rubic 6 "Peinture et
Sensation" is an explicit elaboration of this, however to reach this stage of development Deleuze announces that an additional phase of review should be undertaken, a "Note Recapitulative: Periodes et Aspects de Bacon" Rubric 5. The fifth rubric initiates a process of review and re-consideration of Bacon's techniques, borrowing extensively from and acknowledging the relevance of David Sylvester's analysis(26) while correspondingly questioning the assumed possibility of any totalizing summarization of the career.

Sylvester identifies three distinct periods in Bacon's career. Deleuze summarizes these as "la premiere qui confronte la Figure précise et l'aplat vif et dur; la seconde qui traite la forme "malerish" sur un fond tonal a rideaux: la troisième enfin qui réunit "les deux conventions opposées" et qui revient au fond vif a plat, tout en réinventant localement les effects de flou par rayage et brossage" (Gilles Deleuze) (27). Deleuze re-defines this chronology in two ways. Frist he suggests that the three practices are simultaneous and not successive, and secondly, any recapitulation is made redundant by the fact that Bacon's career is in effect open-ended and moving towards a more complex level in a fourth phase where a complete breakdown of representation might be attained. "la zone de brouillage ou de nettoyage, qui faisait surgir la Figure, va maintenant valoir pour elle-même, indépendamment de toute forme définie, apparâître comme pure Force sans objet, vague de tempête, jet d'eau ou de vapeur, oeil de cyclone.....La Figure s'est dissipée....."(Gilles Deleuze) (28)

In the sixth rubric "Peinture et Sensation" Deleuze suggests that it is the operation of defiguration to attain/to obtain pure force that essentially constitutes the logic of sensation. Recalling the notable phenomenological reading of Cézanne by Merleau-Ponty Deleuze perceives sensation as the result of an encounter of apprehending subject with the disintegration of the figure of the painting. " Ce qui est peint dans le tableau, c'est le corps, non pas en tant qu'il est represente comme object mais en tant qu'il est recu comme éprouvant telle sensation"(29). In accordance with Valéry, we may suggest that sensation is that which is transmitted directly avoiding the constraints of a defined narrative. "Historie" has a twin meaning - "story" and "history" and Deleuze highlights this ambiguity to argue that the sensation of Bacon's defiguration is also in addition a
concerted attempt to negate narrative and historical reference. Exceeding the parameters of figuration and representation, pure power "qui déborde tous le domaines et les traverse. Cette puissance, c'est le Rythme, plus profond que la vision, l'audition etc", "logique des sens" Cézanne said "non ratonnelle, non cérébrale" (30). "Logique de la sensation" may be regarded as contributing to a full-scale revision of phenomenology's emphasis on subjectivity, (a subjectivity conceived as that of a fully centered/fully composed/fully integrated being). Deleuze's scheme still maintains a type of "subjectivity" but it is now a subjectivity that is fragmented, traversed by intensities, suffused with energies - "hystericized"

Deleuze sees Francis Bacon as a successor to Cézanne as a painter of sensations and forces. However Bacon's canvases also highlight an experience of the body that is only latent in Cézanne, an experience that leads beyond the phenomenological "lived body" to a chaotic "body without organs". The body in Bacon's works is always in a process of becoming other - becoming animal/molecular/imperceptible - and the systolic and diastolic rhythms that play through the compositions are those of a "non-organic life", "une Puissance plus profande et presque invivable". (Gilles Deleuze) (31)

If Bacon is to be regarded as a painter of sensations, it is in the general sense of a painter of the incoherent/disorganized and non-organic sensations of the body without organs. The body without organs "s'oppose moins aux organes qu'a cette organisation des organes qu'on appelle organisme C'est un corps intense intensif. Il est parcouru d'une onde qui trace dans le corps des niveaux ou des seuils d'apres les variations de son amplitude" (Gilles Deleuze) (32)

The body without organs is the body of sensation, for sensation is "la recontre de l'onde avec des Force agissant sur le corps" (Gilles Deleuze) (33)

The body without organs does have "organs" in a certain sense, but only provisionally, they emerge and disappear or are unspecified with multiple/contradictory functions. The organs of sensation are more exactly the location where forces interconnect with the undulating body
without organs: "A la rencontre de l'onde a tel niveau et de forces exténeures, une sensation apparaît. Un organe sera donc détermine par cette rencontre, mais un organe provisoire, qui ne dure que ce que durent le passage de l'onde et l'action de la force, et qui se déplacera pour se poser ailleurs" (Gilles Deleuze). (34)

The various organs through which the body escapes are all such provisional organs, loci of sensations on the body without organs.

Ultimately, what the body without organs discloses is an affective dimension of becoming, one in which no entities as such can be discerned/specified, but only vectors of force/matter and currents of affects. If the body without organs is a body in any defined sense, it is as it appears and is developed in "Spinoza: Philosophie pratique" (35) where he characterizes the body as a particular configuration of relations of swiftness/slowness, of rest/motion between "non-formed" elements, and a specific level of affective intensity of an anonymous force. Deleuze in this situation approaches the body without organs through Bacons images of the human form, for the experience of the body without organs does have a corporeal dimension and Bacon does provide numerous "dramatic" visualizations of the body undergoing a process of becoming. However, the body without organs is primarily the body of sensation, and sensation occurs at a pre-subjective level in which body/world cannot be differentiated. The fundamental rhythms of a Bacon canvas, those of the systolic compression of the field and the diastolic deformation of the figure, bringing figure and field into a necessary relationship and promoting the formation of a common body without organs that includes both field and figure. In Bacon's art, the human form finally is not itself the body without organs, the canvas is.

"L'hystérie", rubic 7 situates Bacon's artistic practice in the context of the writings of Antonin Artaud, to illustrate the implications of a post-phenomenological operation of modern aesthetics upon subjectivity - not a subjectivity of the "organism" but of the "body without organs". The body escaping through one of its organs and the face becoming bestial/meat-like are two examples of a general process whereby the human form becomes a
The body without organs is the body of sensation, for sensation is "la rencontre de l'onde avec des Forces agissant sur le corps". (37)

In addition, Deleuze wishes to highlight/distinguish the unique direction of Bacon's scheme, the tradition from which it develops/ in which it can be located, together with the subsequent relations it engenders. Deleuze, adopting Worringer's interpretation of a specificity of the Gothic tradition of art, suggests that Bacon's practice is dualistically confrontational, directed equally against the "organic representation of classical art" and a process of abstraction that transforms representations into "geometric forms" (38). Bacon's Gothicism in contrast proposes "C'est un géométrie qui n'est plus au service de l'essentiel et de l'éternel, c'est une géométrie mise au service des "problèmes" ou des "accidents", ablation, adjonction, projection, intersection" (Gilles Deleuze) (39). And just as certain art-historians have advocated that there is a substantiated link between the Gothic tradition and the sense of an intensified religiosity (e.g. Erwin Panofsky) (40), Deleuze acknowledges a spiritual dimension to the search for intensity that is neither abstract nor representational. Bacon's geometry gives witness "d'une haute "spiritualité" puise c'est une volonté spirituelle qui la même hors de l'organique, a la recherche des forces elementaires" (41). Also contained in this rubric are the fragments/basis of a Deleuzian "art-process", that distinguishes the various aims of different aesthetic practices. Deleuze suggests that there is a distinctive force to painting, a special connection of painting to hysteria - a hysteria of the medium itself integrating the direct effect of lines/colours etc on the eye of the viewer. There is, as Deleuze continues, an optical specificity to painting that means regardless of the prevalent psychological condition of the painter, that psychological impulse is transferred/translated into a separate/different energy band when appearing through the painted image.
L'abjection devient splendeur, l'horreur de la vie devient très pure et très intense. C'est le pessimisme cérébral que la peinture transmue en optimisme nerveux. C'est la double définition de la peinture: subjectivement elle investit notre œil, qui cesse d'être organique pour devenir organe poivrant et transitoire, objectivement, elle dresse devant nous la réalité d'un corps, lignes et couleurs libérées de la représentation organique (Gilles Deleuze) (42).

The dialectical relationship of the visible to the invisible is the main contention in rubic eight, "Peindre les forces". Deleuze concentrates upon the specific inherent features of painting within a broader context of the project of modern/contemporary art practice, and more precisely on the contribution of Bacon's scheme to that enterprise. "Il semble que, dans l'histoire de la peinture, les Figures de Bacon soient une des réponses le plus merveilleuses à la question, comment rendre visibles des forces invisibles?" (43).

At this point it seems appropriate to introduce David Salle's highly individualistic treatment of similar "forces" that we have hitherto been surveying within the discourse on Francis Bacon's practice. Salle's images of the female body depict sensations in a condition similar to Bacon, however they now attain incarnation within a negative mode. The forces are still rendered immanently present although they lack a direct intensified resonance. Salle traces the disappearance of physical sensation/presence- ultimately nothing remains but an apprehensive/chimerical image, but equally this echoes a compelling violence in its depiction. The sense of animation may have faded but the impact is retained. The image in fact emphasizes a double shock, functioning on two levels, there is the primary fascination of the "pornographic-like" figure/figures and a secondary more mesmeric agitation derived from its debasement and then a gradual realization of its consequent petrified insubstantiality. The viewer experiences a controlled hysteria/muted sensuality, dark spectres materialize as elegant balletic/cinematographic postures of the female figure or sections of female anatomy. The emphasis is on subject matter/content not narrative, and a heightened awareness of a presence, difficult to identify. The work raises questions regarding our appreciation/comprehension of the presence and absence of others, it
highlights, as in Bacon, the isolation of the human condition and is a memorable addition to
the tradition of works of art that reflect upon the transience of existence/presence.

Salle's anomic rendering of the nude might indeed serve as a metaphor for the relentless
obliteration of the human subject. The chilling banality of pornography is preserved through
Salle's repertoire of gesture and pose. Salle's nude models are rendered in a manner of
generalized classical abstraction, ranging from a quick sketch/grisaille wash to the smooth
clean-contoured colossal figures recalling the supercool impersonal scale of billboard
advertising. Concurrently in Salle's paintings the face is often obscured, we are denied
access to the female's sensation/perception of her own nudity. Obscured by other elements,
overlayed with different images or floating vacantly on the surface, we are never entirely
allowed to enter the model's space. Through this representation the fragility of presence
is revealed. The end-game scenario is replayed to infinity with no beginning/end, no
past/future - only the perpetual continuum of the present. Salle's nudes are ubiquitous and
insinuate themselves into the paintings. They frequently appear as multiple within a single
work or occur as glimmering after-images, concealed by more prominent/substantially modeled
forms. By design - via distance and reiteration - they are invariably consigned to the realm
of the artificial, representations manipulated and controlled. There is little attempt to
simulate a naturalistic situation - the visible signs of production correspond in their own
mechanistic way to Salle's technique and engender concomitantly a psychic distancing of the
viewer from the object viewed.

Salle's paintings compose discarnate/inert sensation. This applies equally to his attitude
toward sexuality, and to his sense of the possibilities of contemporary painting. At one
level Salle addresses the fraying of psychic health, the shattering of sexuality into
simulation and one-dimensional spectacular imitated rituals. Yet more significantly the
paintings reveal a condition, that Salle has constructed within his work, of an emptiness at
the core of being.
Salle paints sensations that are evasive and that he intuitively recognizes as being carried in the diverse fragments that make up the work. The vision that underlies his work is the sense that life holds us but is unknowable. The fragments that structure the contemporary condition present an open field of narrative possibilities but refer finally only back to themselves. Salle moves in and out of sensations feeling/expressing them from different perspectives. The paintings "participate in meaninglessness" (44), however equally they are a testament to multiple possibilities and with the death of meaning we are left with the power and beauty of images as things-in-themselves. This is the liberating force in Salle's work: his paintings are energized even as they refer to a consequent recognition of loss. Thus the paintings are inevitable presences even as they expose us to the experience of absence. (45).

Persuing such a line of flight it is possible to read Bacon's painterly strategy as a reaction against forces of pessimistic representation. In contrast to initially adopting a state of painterly optimism, Bacon's superficial evocation of intimidating/violent subject-matter is the site of a prolonged struggle of such optimism against the pressures that would relegate it to a level of banality.

Having situated Bacon within a broader context of art history, Deleuze in rubric 9 and 10 now returns attention to the particularities of Baconian form, with the task of demonstrating that each strategy/technique is an option among a range of possible endeavours open to the artist. Deleuze began "Logique de la sensation" with a direct formal examination of the principle elements that comprise Bacon's practice, in the course of the investigation Deleuze subsequently diversifies/enriches the initial givens.

"Il appartient donc à la sensation de passer par différents niveaux, sous l'action de forces. Mais il arrive aussi que deux sensation se confrontent, chacune ayant un niveau ou une zone, et faisant communiquer leurs niveaux respectifs. Nous ne sommes plus dans le domaine de la simple vibration, mais dans celui de la résonance."

(Gilles Deleuze) (46).

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In rubric 9 "Couples et Triptyques" the discussion takes two themes. One suggests that the primary emphasis placed on the single figure may have to be supplemented, in that even the isolated figure engages in an interactive process with other figures with which it is in an integral and necessary resonance. The second strand of discourse aims to describe the function of the triptych in Bacon's oeuvre, which Deleuze translates as a type of dialectical overcoming of the vibratory impulse of the figure/coupled figures. Deleuze suggests that the logic of sensation of the figure has only a limited capacity in the fact that it can only attain a qualified level of defiguration: wherein the figure constitutes a given point by which permutations can be graded, there is always the possibility that representation may return and encompass the figure within the parameters of a closed static meaning.

In the triptych format, however, no single figure exists in isolation, no figure is regarded as having significant priority (not even the figure located in the central panel) the triptych organization of material could be seen as increasing the difficulty of the project towards defiguration - in that the introduction of more figures would presumably encourage a narrative connection to develop/be developed. - but in actuality the relations between elements appears to be enhanced more vibratory/more mobile. Three panels containing information leads to an increase in the potentialities/indeterminances/transmigrational resonances among the panels.

Deleuze acknowledges John Russell's summary of the multiple condition of the Bacon triptych (47) In the case of a number of figures being presented, various readings can be derived but there is never anything to ground/privilege any single interpretation over another. This strategy depends upon what may be termed "abortive mimesis". Possible narratives are projected at different and incompatible ontological levels, so that when an element appears within two possible/different narratives it is rendered "unreadable". Mimesis stops and starts and the viewer is forced/obliged to re-frame and may never achieve a coherent and stable solution. What remains is ultimately a sheer vibratory facticity, a quality of "thereness" or to adopt the term that Deleuze quotes from Bacon (in English) the "matter of
fact" nature of the painting wherein things are simply painted and no final meaning can be directly assigned to them. The interconnecting relations between the elements within the separate panels may simply be determined as active/passive witnessing, but even this rationalization is not to be regarded as having narrative significance, more directly it produces a combinatory force that gives the painting a rhythmic power.

"Peindre la sensation, qui est essentiellement rythme..... Mais dans la sensation simple, le rythme depend encore de la Figure, il se presente comme la vibration qui parcourt le corps sans organes, il est le vecteur de la sensation, ce qui la fait passer d'un niveau à un autre. Dans l'accouplement de sensation, le rythme se libere deja, parce qu'il confronte et reunit les niveaux divers de sensations differentes: il est maintenant resonance, mais il se confond encore avec les lignes melodiques, points et contrepoints. Avec le triptyque enfin, le rythme prend une amplitude extraordinaire, dans un mouvement force qui lui donne l'autonomie, et fait naître en nous l'impression de Temps: les limites de la sensation sont depassées, explosives dans toutes les directions."

(Gilles Deleuze) (48)

Rubric 10 "Note: Qu'est-ce qu'un triptyque?" extends and develops the Deleuzian analysis of the implication of Bacon's most prominent strategic device. Previously Deleuze had said that the rhythmic force of the triptych was the result of its presenting multiple elements that can reach an accord in unstable relationships. Deleuze now suggest that this process takes place at levels of increasing abstraction/defiguration in which the painterly specificity of the work is gradually diminished and a purer non-medium specific rhythm is issued. On a primary level the triptychs work figuratively via the interaction of a witnessing figure with an acting one. However and in direct contrast, upon an alternative level, the action of these figures can be re-worked/reversed in the situation where the dynamic is no longer in the representative mode of horizontal-vertical. Deleuze elaborating upon this new direction, argues that the existence of the figures contained in the triptychs are not dependent to any definite extent upon an identity based reading. To act and to witness might appear to be the characteristics of personifiable entities, but the connection of these two forces is only one dimension within a broader framework of possible interconnections that has little to do with characterization at all. Therefore, as rubric 10 exemplifies them we may locate in the
Deleuze continues with the premise that the transformations that the body endures throughout Bacon's work are more accurately interpreted as elements that facilitate variations within the painting with the ensuing consequence that the incarnate figure possesses a latent quality of perpetual transition even in its shape and revelation/materialization.

It is the triptych that Deleuze finds the most complete development of Bacon's "logic of sensation". The essence of sensation is rhythm, and the elementary rhythm of a Bacon painting is the systolic and diastolic vibration that passes between field and figure. Bacon paints configurations of bodies and objects complex relations, the multiple vibrations of the several forms interacting with one another and creating diverse patterns of resonance. In the triptychs the individual vibrations/patterns of resonance experience a compulsory movement that dis-engages rhythm from specific figures and gives it an autonomous form. Deleuze identifies in the triptychs three types of rhythm - active rhythms of diastolic movement, descent/augmentation; passive rhythms of systolic movement, assertion/diminution; "witness rhythms" of horizontal forms that act as constants against which active/passive rhythms can be measured. These rhythms are co-ordinated in a triptych painting via an "logique irrationnelle . . . Cette logique de la sensation qui constitue la peinture" (Gilles Deleuze) (49) with the result that "c'est le rythme lui-même qui devient sensation, c'est lui qui devient Figure, d'après ses propres directions séparées, l'actif, le passif et le témoin . . ." (Gilles Deleuze). (50)

The rhythms of primary sensation, the vibrations that pass between field and figure, develop "forces d'isolation, de déformation et de dissipation". The rhythms of resonant combinations of figures adopt "forces d'accouplement". But the rhythms of the triptych employ a new force "une force de séparation" which is distinct from the force of isolation.

In most of Bacon's triptych paintings each of the three canvases has a background field of bright/raw colour. In the individual canvas the tension between the systolic field and the
diastolic figure enacts the field and the figure into relation with one another, in the triptych the field of the three canvases forms a single luminous/chromatic element within which the figures are suspended like "des trapezistes qui n'ont plus pour milieu que la lumiere ou la couleur". The background fields of the three canvases interact with one another via the unifying force of light/colour which correspondingly imposes a rigid separation of the figures located in the individual canvases. From this separation of the figures, the rhythms of the triptych no longer determined by particular bodies themselves becomes figures, relational movements in a field of "l'universelle lumiere" and "l'universelle couleur", light and colour creating "un immense espace-temps qui reunit toutes choses, mais en introduisant entre elles les distances d'un sahara, les siecles d'un Aion". In the triptych arrangement, the unifying and separating forces of light and colour are identified as autonomous principles, and the disengaged rhythms generated by the various forms become figures of a floating, non-pulsed time of pure becoming, the time of the Stoic Aion.

The Deleuzian analysis of Bacon is framed in terms of sensation, systolic/disatolic movements, the force of colour/light and the rhythms of time. However, the sensation that Deleuze identifies in Bacon is not that of a "lived" body, but that of the body without organs and the forces of systole and diastole of colour and light and the process of transformation, are not simply the organic forces of the auto-genesis of forms, but also the mutating/deforming forces of a chaotic dimension of affective becoming. The invisible forces that Deleuze finds in Bacon are forces of disruption/transgression, affective forces immanent within the real, forces which in the triptychs are disclosed through the pure vectors of light and the rhythms of an ametrical time.
"There's no narrative. There really is none; there isn't one"
(David Salle) (51)

In the example of the organization/arrangement and effect/scope of the triptych format one may discuss significantly corresponding patterns of strategic technique in works of Bacon and Salle. The impulse of David Salle's work has come from an exploration of fragmentation as a means of concomitantly giving the image a renewed potency and yet synchronically rendering it inconsequential/distanced. Salle favours multiple canvasses, the diptych and also the triptych format with its echoes of the altarpeice or, in Twentieth century terms, the loaded menace of Francis Bacon or Max Beckmann. The medium becomes not only a means of communication but also a point of reference.

The diptych (two-panel composition) or triptych (three-panel composition) as distinct from the undivided canvas surface, allows Salle to re-inforce the theme of separateness and fragmentation that is central to his work. Both formats open the possibility of ambiguity, and yet also allow for not one but several "narrative" solutions. (In the classical Renaissance tradition the diptych/triptych organization depicted two or more episodes in a narrative shared with the audience. While in the majority of cases maintaining a consistent style, the painter depended upon myth/tradition to provide continuity for seemingly unrelated episodes, their contiguity, however, implied that they were contained in the same story/the same temporal art. In contemporary art, Jasper Johns provides, for example, contiguity implied both in similarity and difference. In such binary images, the banality of repetition is partially avoided and abruptly closed. At the other extreme, the conjunction of two/three dis-similar images, the broken language of dislocation, becomes a way of blocking false assumptions and preserving the capacity of disposable images.)

As an example we might look to David Salle’s "How to use Words as a Powerful Aphrodisiac"
(1982) this is an uneven triptych, the large central panel of which superimposes one of Picasso's Analytic Cubist heads of 1909 (52) over a vehemently illustrated painting of a Coney Island carnival by Reginald Marsh (53). The small, displaced panel on the right is composed of colourful/gestural marks, a homage to the gestural abstraction of the 1950's. The triptych is about the practice of making art, about coming to terms with the traditions of picture-making in the Twentieth century. The experimental/studio-study/cerebral analysis are maintained in an accord with the journalistic/urban/dynamic, while in addition abstract pattern-making is not discounted. The prominent red-tinted emblematic raised fist and forearm on the left is a reference to corporeal power/force. “Abandoned Shells” (1984) is based on a three-times repeated well-known still photograph of George Balanchine rehearsing a dancer, a distinctly ambiguous motif in itself,(54) for it corresponds less to the graceful rhythms of ballet than the erratic stagger of the walking wounded, it reads almost like a Descent from the Cross. Over this triptych are overlayed pasted “globules” of tacky check material and a daubed caricatural portrait of an army officer, an unidentifiable fruit and a Janus-like figure. Often Salle jarringly offsets his imagery of culture with incongruous motifs, with the imagery of consumer society - domestic utensils/food/sections of female anatomy, packaged as objects of desire. (55)

No homogeneous value system can be externally imposed to unify/totalize all the possibilities of vibration/rhythm/transformation inherent in the works of Salle and Bacon. The Deleuzian approach is not a form of Derridean deconstruction in which a hierarchy of terms would be disrupted by parodic inversion. It is not a question, for example, of demonstrating that the passive is in fact the active and vice-versa, more but precisely of illustrating that the essential description of either to these two options according to pre-emptory valuations is inaccurate. Although Deleuze must acknowledge the constraints of the parameters of language to define two poles of relation, he is principally concerned to emphasize that all such namings are in actuality arbitrarily impositions whose fictional quality must be continually stressed.

However, despite the high level of freedom that is indicated by this open/non-hierarchical
combination of elements within the space of the painting, the artist himself/herself is not able to approach the canvas in a mode of pure-spontaneous creative latitude/immunity. Rubric 11, "La Peinture avant de Peindre...", discusses how even the apparently vacant space of the untreated canvas is, to a certain extent already imagistically/compositionally predetermined before the artist sets to work. On a simplistic level, as elaborated in preceding rubrics, no artist is ever entirely detached from tradition/heritage/influence. On a more complex, and perhaps negative level, it is suggested that the painter/artist is working in a world that is information saturated/dominated by images/representations/figurations and therefore there can never be any means by which the artist can hope to address the work in the pure/innocent act of creation. At this point the Deleuzian analysis becomes orientated in a directly sociological form addressing the modern/post-modern contemporary condition of the dynamic proliferation of media communications - a society dominated by insecure signs and images sliding past one another, dissociated and de-contextualized, failing to link into any defined sequence.

"Nous sommes assiégés de photos qui sont des Illustrations, de journaux qui sont des narrations, d'image - cinéma, d'images - télé....Il y a là une expérience très importante pour le peintre: toute une catégorie de choses qu'on peut appeler "clichés" occupe dńà la toile, avant le commencement c'est dramatique"  
(Gilles Deleuze) (56)

Deleuze plays upon the double meaning of "cliché" which in French means both a kind of stereotypical thinking and a snapshot (the linking of the two is in the interpretation of both procedures as instant acts that require a minimum of effort and result in the depiction of reality as a static refined image). Deleuze, attending to the relationship between the photographic image and the painted image, views the photographic as a dangerous kind of "short-circuit thinking"/representation since its apparent realism creates a sense of authenticity/of innocent directness that maintains its stereo-typing.

Equally Bacon regards the photograph as both a problem and a challenge. Bacon's painting starts always, already with the realization that painting has to exist in a world pervaded by
photographic cliches. While Bacon's practice does not presume to offer a universal solution, his sense that the photograph's danger lies in a freezing of the image that occurs automatically, leads him to a distinctive painterly technique. (57). This strategy, notes Deleuze, is that of the introduction of "chance"("hazard") into the act of painting.

Salle's attitude towards objects/styles/media is highly sophisticated. We are able to discern a technique that takes nothing as a given - that with considered force renders any positive statement against an equal and opposing energy. The aims are high - a work of art is presented as a group of representations each separated and clarified and then brought together in such a way that makes content flicker on and off as perception generates friction among chains of association. Emotion is delivered, but it circulates through sets of images that exist in a refractive numinous index. Salle is concerned that, irrespective of the nature of the emotion, whatever the overtones of vulgarity/coldness/carnality that might be implicated via the fragmentary process, that the image should be elegantly stated and maintain the classical order of a highly-cultivated style. His paintings "manifest"/"narrate" themselves on many levels/strata. Salle acknowledges/accepts intuition/improvisation/risk, but submits them to an ultimate control. He demonstrates, that perhaps the "truth" of the human condition, or of a visual order lies in the itinerary of not being able to find it.

Rubric 12 "Le Diagramme": abstraction and action painting", aims to specify Bacon's tactics of defiguration by contrasting his practice with the processes of geometric abstraction - Mondrain/Kandinsky where the technique of painting is subordinated to a higher ulterior meaning. By utilizing the effects of various binary codes that dominate the painting (horizontal lines against vertical lines) the painting is regarded as a mechanism to promote a spiritual energy/force. The modulated exercise of painting is reinscribed in defined/rational terms (sharp lines/rectangles), "...les formes abstraites appartiennent à un nouvel espace purement optique qui n'a même plus à se subordonner des éléments manuels ou tactiles....la peinture abstraite élabore moins un diagramme qu'un code symbolique, suivant de grandes oppositions formelles" (58) - and abstract expressionism/action painting.
where, although the emphasis rests on the manual process of the artist at work on the surface of the canvas the rendering tactile of the painted plane is so total/extreme that paradoxically the optical sensation is diffused/lost.

Between these two options a third alternative may be identified, neither a rationalized coding nor a contourless discordance but a technique of deformation/transformation via zonalized operations.

Michel Leiris traces back to its origin in Baudelaire the notion of an ideal beauty that is quintessentially modern in that it refuses to fall back on "the emptiness of a beauty that is absolute and cannot be defined". That notion has integrated within it an element which is timeless/immutable, but also has an indispensable/circumstantial element that is in a continual state of transition. "For Baudelaire" wrote Leiris, "beauty cannot come into being without the intervention of something accidental (a misfortune, or the contingency of modernity) which drags the beautiful clear from its glacial stagnation; it is at the price of degradation that the mummified One turns into the living Many".

"The current idea of beauty as something that arises from a static mixture of opposites is, therefore, obsolete", Leins continued, "Beauty must have within it an element that plays the motor-role of the first sin. What constitutes beauty is not the confrontation of opposites but the mutual antagonism of those opposites, and the active and vigorous manner in which they invade one another and emerge from the conflict marked as if by a wound or a depredation", and "We can call "beautiful" only that which suggests the existence of an ideal order - supraterrestrial, harmonious and logical - and yet bears within itself, like the brand of an original sin, the drop of poison, the rogue element of incoherence, the grain of sand that will foul up the entire system".

Leins saw both stable and unstable forces essential to beauty. Ideally there should be a balance/perfect polarization between these two mutually indispensable elements of beauty. "On the right-hand side, a beauty that is immortal, sovereign, sculptural; facing it, the
element of the left, sinister in the strict sense, since the left stands for misfortune, and for accident, and for sin”. Beauty resulted not from the interaction/synergy of opposites, but from an equivocal struggle between them, an ambiguous accord or preferably a tangential coherence of the straight line and the curved line, a conjunction of the rule and its exception. “And yet”, as Leiris continued, “we shall see that even this image of tangential meeting is an ideal almost never attained. Our aesthetic emotion - or approximation to beauty depends in the last resort on that lacuna which represents the left handedness of beauty in its highest form: an obligatory incompleteness, an abyss that we can never traverse, a breach that opens on to our perdition”.

Bacon’s paintings are what Leiris calls “mythic translations of our inward structure which move us to the extent to which they throw light on ourselves while at the same time resolving our contradictions in a harmony not to be found elsewhere”. (59)

In the paintings of David Salle one can observe a full-scale vision of what a contemporary notion of “reality” might be about. Conjured up as if by free-association, a myriad of apparently disconnected fragments from art and life are maintained in an enigmatic/insubstantial/fragile accord that operates in a transient condition between tangible matter and filmic ethereal images, between the codified languages of abstraction and those of figurative art.

In the later rubrics of “Logique de la sensation” the Deleuzian process of art concepts is elevated to a more generalized level, offering new insights into the possibilities of art in the contemporary condition. Deleuze produces an outline of a taxonomy of languages, more precisely, of artistic languages. Rubric 13, “L’Analogue”, contains many of the central tenets of the Deleuzian “philosophy of art”. Deleuze intends this sections title to refer not to a specified type of correspondence theory of art but more accurately to the linguistic distinction of digital and analogical communication (60).
While not opting for a entire Structuralist framework of interpretation Deleuze nonetheless aims to produce a theory of communication that would acknowledge "gradations" of signification, but that would not restrict meaning to the defined limits of the oppositions of entirely differentiated elements of language. This method is elaborated comprehensively in the two works on cinema, where Deleuze replaces the dominant semiotics of film (a Metzian semiotic system - a structural semiotics that focuses upon broad and narrow unities of film) with a fluid semiotics that concentrates less upon distinctive isolated elements than upon signifying tonalities/graduations of shift. For example, according to a standard semiotic interpretation of film theory, there is, in film, a basic dilemma in the attempt to depict a quality of tense because an image is located in the present even if it is essentially designed to refer directly to the past, and can only achieve a representation of temporality with defined oppositions of image - the cut to a flashback that juxtaposes one image against another producing a binavism of past and present. Deleuze, in contrast, in "Cinema 2: L'image-temps" suggests that the image in itself can vibrate with layers of temporality, the image itself is not an isolated/singular element, but a graded richness, encompassing the modulations of past/present/future. "Modulation" is the central device that Deleuze employs to create a semiotic method based upon indiscrete variation/the tonal shift/the variable gradation. (A more extensive study of Deleuzian film theory is contained in the proceeding section).

David Salle's attraction to the images he uses lies in the fact that they work aesthetically and that he can literally make them alter their function by giving them a different weight/tone/context. Salle develops the ability to organize complex images and construct spontaneous variations which reflect the contours of a theme. Salle's images are concerned predominantly with the process of transformation and possibilities of continuous additional readings. Similarly Bacon's paintings, states Deleuze, in the tradition of Cézanne, are not encoders of reality - in the sense of a linguistic code as meticulous structuring - but modulations of it.
Rubric 15, "La traversée de Bacon", initially identifies Bacon as a qualified/modified inheritor of an Egyptian haptic aesthetic but continues primarily to examine specifically Bacon’s treatment of the traditions of colour from Van Gogh/Gauguin/Cezanne. This tradition locates its sensations in modulations of colour - colour not as a distinct opposition, but as a convoluted oscillation/graduation or analogical (as opposed to digital) variation. "C'est la couleur, ce sont les rapports de la couleur qui constituent un monde et un sens haptiques, en fonction du chaud et du froid, de l'expansion et de la contraction" (61). In the remaining segments of this rubric Deleuze produces a more comprehensive definition of the particular colourist strategy that Bacon develops. Firstly the colourist approach is distinguished from those in which the modulation of light is the dominant practice. "On appelle coloristes les peintres qui tendent à substituer aux rapports de valeur des rapports de tonalité, et a "rendre" non seulement la forme, mais l'ombre et la lumière, et le temps, par ces purs rapports de la couleur" (62).

Within colourism itself, however, there are several subdivisions that may be discerned. Firstly there is the Cézanne tradition: "La modulation par touches distinctes pures et suivant l'ordre au spectre, c'était l'invention proprement cezannienne pour atteindre au sens haptique de la couleur" (63). However, Deleuze extends this scheme defining another possible different colourist modulation that separates itself from the Cézanne option; in this case the division of flat background and foreground figure is contrasted in the respect by a vivid tone and saturation in the background that renders it not only a quality of "passage" from one colour to another, but a complete sense of movement/transformation/modulation and in a secondary capacity, broken tones for the foreground form which construct another type of "passage" in which the colour appears to be animated. It is this post-Cezanne mode that is attributable to Bacon’s practice.

Rubric 16 “Note sur la couleur” suggests that colour is the ultimate transformative force, the principle modulator in Bacon’s artistic design. In previous sections, Deleuze identified the motivating elements of Bacon’s strategic technique of permutation as structure/figure/contour. This analysis is now amended as Deleuze situates these elements
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influenced/administered by the vibratory power of colour: "tous les trois convergent vers
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Within the context of the history of painting, the female nude has featured as an object surveyed/displayed for the privileged male gaze of spectator/owner. (As a category of representation this category has emblazoned conventional projections of male desire.) Women are not presented as essentially themselves but rather as objectifications of a presumed male subjectivity. This objectification was primarily justified by the elevation of the nude to the "high-art" status of the classical academic tradition. Traditionally one of the exemplars of art, the nude was integrated into mythological/biblical/historical themes that generated diverse/dramatic effects. The genre functioned to reconcile the conflict between propriety and sexual pleasure. However, by the mid-nineteenth century the genre began to disintegrate. In terms of artistic convention, it was no longer incontrovertible that the presentation of the nude should appear within a thematic context. The resultant consequence was realized by the progressive development of the nude depicted prominently in unidealized modes of depiction. Given its principle status within the classical canon it was therefore inevitable that the nude would come to adopt a central role within the iconoclastic force of modernism - the nude that transgressed/inverted the erotic ideal. (e.g. Edouard Manet "Olympia" (1863)/Pablo Picasso "Daemoiselles d'Avignon" (1907)/Willem de Kooning "Women 1" (1950/52). Manet's "Olympia", frequently acknowledged as the first modern masterpiece is a radical departure from previous approaches to the nude, and at the time was highly controversial.

No longer a submissive and seductive ephemeral offering, "Olympia" is self-confident and confrontational - fixing her eyes on the viewer in a matter-of-fact defiant directness. She appears to know, as a prostitute, her position as a perfect/complete commodity. (See: Walter Benjamin "Paris: Capital of the Nineteenth Century Reflections", trans Edmund Jephcott, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich (1978)). "Olympia's" declaration of independence and self-awareness is a metaphorical correlative of modernism's formal position - its imperative tone and self-proclaimed autonomy. Modern painting asserted its autonomy/fits "objectness" by emphasizing the process of picture-making itself - its own internal "languages" of colour/line/shapes/surface. (This will be treated more extensively in proceeding sections). David Salle takes this modernist self-reflexivity a stage further. The process of representation is understood to include not only the disposition of lines/colours/shapes on a flat plane, but additionally the cultural/sociological forces that structure the interactions between the artist/the viewer/the work. In contrast to the declarative mode of the modernist painting - "Look at me! I am a real object" - Salle's address is interrogative - "Are you looking at me? Why? What am I?" The ubiquitous female nude model constitutes the principle articulating agent of Salle address.

Salle is not the only artist to bring into question the function of sexuality in contemporary art and culture. Kitaj/Dine/Rosenquist/Fischl/Clemente/Freud among others have also engaged with such issues, recognizing them as a motivating force in the re-assertion of "figurative painting". Using similar means, Rosenquist confronted analogous themes with "Playgirl" (1966), yet Salle goes beyond Rosenquist's unequivocal equation of the woman's body with consumer and disposable production, his cross-referencing of high-art and "pornography", the imagery of taste and desire, addresses more subtly the fabrication/reception of works of art. These pictures concern female sexuality as well as male. Salle's images do not share the explicit voyeurism of, for example, Francesco Clemente's "Four Winds" (1981). They often imply the complicity of the woman, for example "The School Room" (1985), has been linked to the confrontational/hard-edged female eroticism found in the works of Kathy Acker, with whom Salle has worked. (February 1984 - Salle designs sets for the Richard Forman directed/Kathy Acker written play "Birth of a Poet"). (In 1979 Salle read Juliet Mitchell's "The Sadian Woman", a feminist interpretation of de Sade. Subsequently he adapted phrases from this as titles for paintings, such as "Rob Him of Pleasure").

The force of Salle's nude-models does not lie in angst-ridden narratives neither is it generated principally by direct references to past art or to pornographic type material. His posed figures, tensed or twisted offering or constrained are derived from photographs staged by Salle himself, they may have a generic relationship to the historical nude or to the nude of the pornographic magazine but they are distanced/removed - yet not rendered entirely neutral - by mediated decisions/the evidence of artistic selection/arrangements.
7 In “Logique de la sensation” an art historical argument emerges, but here, in contrast to the works on cinema, the history never appears to be even partially totalized. It develops only in fragments and continues digressions that slowly reveals glimpses of a narrative that is never entirely completed/articulated.
9 Jean-François Lyotard “Discours Figure” Paris: Klincksieck (1971).
11 Gilles Deleuze - op.cit (1981)
16 David Salle - op.cit (1987)
20 Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1981)
24 Bacon’s practice concentrating upon the transformative and the transforming of shapes appears, at this point of contact, precisely correspondent to a generalized Deleuzian interpretative scheme
25 Gilles Deleuze - op.cit (1981)

“La viande est cet état du corps où la chair et les os se confrontent localement, au lieu de s'composer structuralement”

Deleuze euphonizes the important function in Bacon’s compositional strategy of the vertebral column. It is that it essentially provides the body with a solid/stable support structure but in contrast it operates virtually as a measure/marker against which the deviations of the flesh can be measured. Deleuze suggests that we may discern here some of the reasons for Bacon’s fascination with scenes of the crucifixion - the sublime religiosity of the crucifixion shows an attempt to counter the body upright towards the radiance of the heavens and alternatively all transcendental elevation is counteracted by the weight pulling the flesh downwards towards its own animalistic base condition. As Deleuze states “...la viande a une tête par laquelle elle fuit et descend de la croix”. Bacon uses the animal form in such a way that returns the observer to human form and renders therein a heightened understanding of it. "Three Studies for a Cruicifixion" (1962) "A Crucifixion" here and elsewhere in Bacon’s oeuvre is not a descriptive title and less a reference to an actual event. It is, rather, a generic term for an environment in which bodily abuse is dispensed to one or more persons and one or more other persons gather to bear witness. "It may be unsatisfactory" Bacon said to David Sylvester in 1963, "but I haven't found another subject so far that has been as satisfactory for covering certain areas of human feeling and behaviour". He also added on this occasion "One of the things about the crucifixion is the very fact that the central figure of Christ is raised into a very pronounced and isolated position, which gives it, from a formal point of view, greater possibilities from having all the different figures placed on the same level. The alteration of level is from my point of view very important"
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ANIMAL NITRATE (THE IMAGE OF CHANCE)

NOTES


Within the context of the history of painting, the female nude has featured as an object surveyed/displayed for the privileged male gaze of spectator/owner. (As a category of representation this category has emblazoned conventional projections of male desire). Women are not presented as essentially themselves but rather as objectifications of a presumed male subjectivity. This objectification was primarily justified by the elevation of the nude to the "high-art" status of the classical academic tradition. Traditionally one of the exemplary examples of artistic expression, the nude was integrated into mythological/biblical/historical themes that generated diverse/dramatic effects. The genre functioned to reconcile the conflict between propriety and sexual pleasure. However, by the mid-nineteenth century the genre began to disintegrate. In terms of artistic convention, it was no longer incontrovertible that the presentation of the nude should appear within a thematic context. The resultant consequence was realized by the progressive development of the nude depicted prominently in unidealized modes of depiction. Given its principle status within the classical canon it was therefore inevitable that the nude would come to adopt a central role within the iconoclastic force of modernism - the nude that transgressed/inverted the erotic ideal (e.g. Edouard Manet "Olympia" (1863)/Pablo Picasso "Daemoiselles d'Avignon" (1907)/Willem de Kooning "Women 1" (1950/52)). Manet's "Olympia", frequently acknowledged as the first modern masterpiece, is a radical departure from previous approaches to the nude, and at the time was highly controversial.

"Olympia"s declaration of independence and self-awareness is a metaphorical correlative of modernism's formal position - its imperative tone and self-proclaimed autonomy. Modern painting asserted its autonomy/its "objectness" by emphasizing the process of picture-making itself - its own internal "languages" of colour/line/shape/surface. (This will be treated more extensively in proceeding sections). David Salle takes this modernist self-reflexivity a stage further. The process of representation is understood to include not only the disposition of lines/colours/shapes on a flat plane, but additionally the cultural/sociological forces that structure the interactions between the artist/the viewer/the work. In contrast to the declarative mode of the modernist painting - "Look at me! I am a real object" - Salle's address is interrogative - "Are you looking at me? Why? What am I?" The ubiquitous female nude model constitutes the principle articulating agent of Salle address.

Salle is not the only artist to bring into question the function of sexuality in contemporary art and culture. Kitaj/Rosenquist/Fischl/Clemente/Freud among others have also engaged with such issues, as a motivating force in the re-assertion of "figurative painting". Using similar means, Rosenquist confronted analogous themes with "Playgirl" (1966), yet Salle goes beyond Rosenquist's unequivocal equation of the woman's body with consumer and disposable production. His cross-referencing of high-art and "pornography" the imagery of taste and desire, addresses more subtly the fabrication/reception of works of art. These pictures concern female sexuality as well as male. Salle's images do not share the explicit voyeurism of, for example, Francesco Clemente's "Four Winds" (1981). They often imply the complicity of the woman, for example "The School Room" (1985), has been linked to the confrontational/hard-edged female eroticism found in the works of Kathy Acker; with whom Salle has worked. (February 1984 - Salle designs sets for the Richard Forman directed/Kathy Acker written play "Birth of a Poet"). (In 1979 Salle read Juliet Mitchell's "The Sadian Woman", a feminist interpretation of de Sade. Subsequently he adapted phrases from this as titles for paintings, such as "Rob Him of Pleasure").

The force of Salle's nude-models does not lie in angst-ridden narratives neither is it generated principally by direct references to past art or to pornographic type material. His posed figures, tensed or twisted/offsetting or constrained are derived from photographs staged by Salle himself, they may have a generic relationship to the historical nude or to the nude of the pornographic magazine but they are distanced/removed - yet not rendered entirely neutral - by mediated decisions/the evidence of artistic selection/arrangements.
Deleuze euphonizes the important function in Bacon’s compositional strategy of the vertebral column - it is not that it essentially provides the body with a solid/stable support structure but in contrast it operates virtually as a measure/marker against which the deviations of the flesh can be measured. Deleuze suggests that we may discern here some of the reasons for Bacon’s fascination with scenes of the crucifixion - the sublime religiosity of the crucifixion shows an attempt to counter the body upright towards the radiance of the heavens and alternatively all transcendental elevation is counteracted by the weight pulling the flesh downwards towards its own animalistic base condition. As Deleuze states “...la viande a une tete par laquelle elle fut et descend de la croix”. Bacon uses the animal form in such a way that returns the observer to human form and renders therein a heightened understanding of it. “Three Studies for a Crucifixion” (1962) “A Crucifixion” here and elsewhere in Bacon’s oeuvre is not a descriptive title and less a reference to an actual event. It is, rather, a generic term for an environment in which bodily abuse is dispensed to one or more persons and one or more other persons gather to bear witness. “It may be unsatisfactory” Bacon said to David Sylvester in 1963, “but I haven’t found another subject so far that has been as satisfactory for covering certain areas of human feeling and behaviour”. He also added on this occasion “One of the things about the crucifixion is the very fact that the central figure of Christ is raised into a very pronounced and isolated position, which gives it, from a formal point of view, greater possibilities from having all the different figures placed on the same level. The alteration of level is from my point of view very important”.

In the interviews with David Sylvester, Bacon tends to frame his statements dialectically, opposing will and intuition, chance and judgement, the organic and artificial, indeed all of his strategies are enriched by a conscious play of psychological and philosophical metaphors addressing some of the most fertile paradoxes of modern thought. What seems essential is a friction between opposites, unless an issue has a fundamental contradictory basis then it has no vitality. What Bacon achieves through these unyielding contrasts is elliptical - His answer, perhaps the only answer - "nothing". "I'm just trying to make images as accurately off my nervous system as I can. I don't even know what half of them mean. I'm not saying anything. Whether one's saying anything for other people, I don't know" (Francis Bacon) See Dawn Ades "Francis Bacon" London. Thames and Hudson (1985) with essays from Andrew Forge and Andrew Duncan (published on the occasion of exh at The Tate Gallery 1985). also see Michel Leiris "Francis Bacon" London. Thames & Hudson (1988).


"The paintings have to be dead; that is, from life but not a part of it, in order to show how a painting can be said to have anything to do with life in the first place.


45 Thomas Lawson in his widely quoted "Last Exit Painting" (Artforum 20 No.2 Oct. 1981) acknowledges David Salle's elegance and high fashion, and the diptych format so characteristic of his early eighties paintings, and notes that "meaning is intimated but tantalizingly withheld". It disappears as you approach it. He continues to suggest that Salle "makes paintings that are dead, inert representations of the impossibility of passion in a culture that has institutionalized self-expression. They take the most compelling sign for personal authenticity that our culture can provide, and attempt to stop it, to reveal its falseness. The paintings look real; but they are fake. They operate by stealth, insinuating a crippling doubt into the faith that supports and binds our ideological institutions".
Rene Ricard also uses Salle's remark in "Cover" (May 1979) as a support for his argument that the paintings have to be "dead," that is, from life but not a part of it, in order to show how a painting can be said to have anything to do with life in the first place.


"As the decade went on, Bacon began to attach more and more importance to the idea of the triptych - partly, perhaps, because the gamble was on so much larger a scale, partly because it was possible in a triptych to give a compartmented view of life. Bacon lives his own life on many levels and takes care to keep them apart from one another, and in the triptychs. As in life, there are those who do (or are done to), there are those who look on, and there are those who pass by in the street below, or on the far side of the open window."


52. P. Picasso "Head of a Woman" (1909) Gouache New York, Acquavella Galeries.

53. R. Marsh "Chicken Ride" (1940). Watercolour, New York, Mrs. Reginald Marsh. Reginald Marsh's work appears as impulsive/agitatedly swirlingly baroque - in some ways "journalistic." Salle's attraction to Marsh concerns the visual control on the part of the artist in calling attention to how he felt about the subject matter without there being any apparent intrusion of interpretive morality into the context. There is a sense of life, vivacity and movement in Marsh's extrovert scenes of soldiers and sailors with their girls in train stations or on pier, or in the crowds jostling along the boardwalk at Coney Island in the heat of summer ("Coney Island" (1936)-"Picnic at the Beach" (1939)). Marsh a splendid draughtsman loved crowds the profusion and chaos of street life. In one sense both Marsh and Salle represent "American entertainment" at its best, their works have a scale/ambition/impetuous/rhythm yet at the same time include a lightness/elegance and will to structuring.

54. It is possible to acknowledge that there exists a correspondence/connection of influence in materials/thematics, Throughout David Salle's aesthetic, derived from E.J. Bellocq, the shadowy photographic chronicler of New Orleans at the turn of the century with his now faded but remarkable photographs of the nameless women of Storyville, the red-light district of the jazz age.

In 1970 a selection of ingeniously developed superb prints by photographer Lee Friedlander, recovered from original Bellocq glass negatives, was published by the Museum of Modern Art in New York - the subsequent book became, deservedly, an instant classic. So much about Bellocq's photographs affirms current taste: the low-life material; the near mythic provenance (Storyville); the informal, anti-art look, which accords with the virtual anonymity of the photographer and the real ananymity of his sitters.

Most of Bellocq's photographs are individual portraits. That is, there is a single subject per picture - he photographs his subjects in full figure, though sometimes a seated figure will be cut off at the knees. Central to the impression the pictures effect is that there are a large number of them with the same setting/cast in a variety of poses, from the most natural to the most self conscious/and degrees of dress/undress. That they are part of a series is what gives the photographs their integrity/depth/meaning. Each individual picture is informed by the meaning that attaches it to the whole group.

Notably, it could not be detected, from at least a third of his collection of pictures that the women are "inmates" of a brothel. Some are fully clothed, others are in their underwear: one poses in a chair, her hands clasped behind her head. Many are photographed naked - with an unpretentious candour about, mostly, unpretentious bodies. Some just stare there as if they were unsure how to act once they have removed their clothes for the camera, only a few offer a 'voluptuous' pose - liked the long-pressed adolescent odalisque on a wicker divan, probably Bellocq's best known picture. Two pictures show women wearing masks. In some pictures, in which the subjects adopt a genteely pensive look, the emotion is hard to read. But in others there is little doubt that posing is a game, and fun - a woman in a shawl and bed stripped stockings sits beside a bottle of "Raleigh Rye" appreciatively eyeing her raised glass. Clearly no one was being speed upon, everyone was a willing subject.
Here we might locate David Salle's singular link to a certain type of high-art "pornographic/erotic" prose ("the Story of "O"/Bataille's "Voyage of the Eye") in which scenes are repeatedly established and suspense is created primarily by means of heavily motivated/descriptive ornamentation. Salle's paintings seduce the viewer into a panoramic but amorphous realm of memories/subjectivity/projection/aesthetic déjà vu.


Discussing the use of photographs Bacon said: "I think of myself as a kind of pulverizing machine into which everything I look at and feel is fed. I believe that I am different from the mixed-media jackdaws who use photographs etc. more or less literally or cut them up and rearrange them. The literalness of photographs so used - even if they are only fragments - will prevent the emergence of real images, because the literalness of the appearance has not been sufficiently digested and transformed. In my case the photographs became a sort of compost out of which images emerge from time to time. Those images may be partly conditioned by the mood of the material which has gone into the pulveriser" (Francis Bacon - Quoted in "Francis Bacon" John Russell - London: Thames and Hudson).

In the first instance, Bacon does not so much use a photograph as attack it, questioning its status as a record of fact (Bacon was fascinated by colour photography, or more precisely, reproductions of colour-photography. Oscillating as he does in his paintings between calm neutral colour and dramatic/violent colour, he discovered in the heightened/falsified colour of photography a potent stimulus). The photograph, ready-made and not essentially subject to aesthetic convention, captures a moment in chance and accident. Bacon used both the restricted and the non-aesthetic fact of the photograph, and the "free-marks" he uses/makes by accident/chance are derived from this and establish a "graph" within the painting. Additionally the photograph occasionally records a curious disjunction from reality, and this has provided Bacon with a key to unlock further possibilities.


This is the case in Bateson, whose sense that certain forms of communication, for example, that of the schizophrenic, do not follow the precise digital distinctions of officialized languages.


Alois Riegl "Die Spatromische Kunstindustrie Vienna: Staatsdruckerie (1927)


See: Sandford Schwartz - "David Salle": The Art World: "The New Yorker" (April 30 1984) and "Polka's Dots" or "A Generation Comes into Focus" (1986)
In the conclusion to "Cinéma 2" Deleuze states: "A theory of the cinema is not "about" cinema, but about the concepts that cinema gives rise to and which are themselves related to other concepts corresponding to other practices, the practice of concepts in general having no privilege over others, any more than one object has over others" (1). Deleuzian "film-theory" is not an enclosed system but projects obliquely the concepts that cinema has contributed to establish. It is not a question of applying philosophical theory to cinema nor of producing another theory of the cinema but alternatively of thinking/working with this object, operating synchronically in and outside of this field. Deleuze's project is philosophically orientated. Philosophy itself is not a reflection on an autonomous object, but a practice of the creation of concepts, a constructive pragmatism. It is the primary basis of this section to present a summary account of Deleuze's work on film in order to subsequently, in proceeding sections, promote an analysis of its implications in relation to the art-practice of David Salle. Ultimately specifically via the incorporation/capture of Deleuzian operative mechanisms, focusing directly on the texts "Cinéma 2 L'image temps"/"Le Pli: Liebniz et le Baroque"/"Qu'est ce que la philosophie?", the fundamental intention is to ultimately produce an innovative account of David Salle's oeuvre.

For Deleuze, the philosopher works in conjunction with the cinema producing a classification of its images/signs but re-configurating them in order to employ them in new areas. What makes the cinema of special interest is that, as with painting, it generates new dimensions of conceptual construction. "Affect, percept and concept are three inseparable powers, going from art to philosophy and the reverse" (2). Cinema and philosophy converge in a continuous process of intercutting - philosophy as assemblage, a type of induced becoming of thinking.

Positioning himself between philosophy and cinema, Deleuze constructs two parameters for the filmic image - movement and time, or more exactly time through movement - but only in order to read them through Bergson, while simultaneously re-reading Bergson co-presently. Deleuze's reflection on cinema is an attempt to demonstrate that cinema corroborates
Bergson's pluralistic vision and that it facilitates the intuition of "duress" according to spatial and temporal flows that are no longer static surfaces/immobile points. Despite Bergson's scepticism, Deleuzian cinema allows the possibility of the ascent to the non-human/super-human moving image-duress. In a concomitant condition to that of the world, the cinema is Bergsonian because it reactivates the concept of duration, matter (image-moment) transforms into memory (image-time), and the present, never correspondent to itself, is twinned with the virtual image of the past it will become. The cinema is time, the image is simply a movement - image; the cinematic present essentially does not exist in itself. Deleuze articulates these basic formulations in the terms of a specifically philosophical design, he tracks the project beyond Bergson and purposefully in the direction of Nietzsche. Again, like the world, the cinema is Nietzschean because in both, the circular becoming of time precipitates - as it does in modern cinema - short-circuits/bifurcations/detours/irrational divisions where the notion of intensity is substituted for that of the truth.

The modern cinema re-configures the concepts of modern philosophy in a new scheme. Specifically, for example, the cinematic reversal of the subordination of time to movement recapitulates a philosophical move which transpired over the course of several centuries. Deleuze highlights a variety of conclusions, emanating from this cinematic reversal. The analysis is initiated with the surpassing of the classical notion of the image which was defined in relation to the external world and self-aware subject. In contrast the modern world and the modern image exist in a condition of "incommensurability". Modern films are no longer subordinate to the world or the subject. The modern image cannot be integrated into a totality, it is connected via "irrational cuts", between the non-aligned, a confrontation occurs between "outside" and inside". It is through this confrontational relation/interaction that thought is engendered. Deleuze conceives modern cinema as investigating a thought external to itself. It is "thought" which remains central to the programme throughout. The foundation/configuration of concepts is precipitated by an enigmatic "image of thought" which inspires its developments divergences and transformations, the necessity of perpetually creating new concepts, not as a process of external determinism, but as a process of a becoming which integrates and motivates the problems themselves. The production
of concepts in the cinema is determined by a forceful "image" of thought which is
intrinsically linked to our "present". Cinema does not operate only with connections by
rational cuts, but via re-connections on "irrational cuts", this is not the same image of
thought. This image of thought perceived via re-connection by "irrational cuts" inspires
Deleuze's constructive pluralism - the immanent creation and re-creation of a philosophy of
immanence, a constructive pragmatism.

Deleuzian "film-theory" utilizes the notion of an open totality, correspondingly transient
and un-defined, in which the temporality in which we are located presents itself in its
synchronistically contradictory condition - incessant flux and instantaneous disjunction.
By "cinematically" fusing Nietzsche with Bergson, Deleuze animates a new connection in his
own project. That paradoxical time which may be discerned in the cinema of "modernity" -
(incommensurable moments/undecidable memoirs/serialized instants/crystalline amnesia-)
returns to the "logique du sens", the logic of paradox. Sense corroborates/vindicates itself
only in the experience of nonsense, because it expresses itself only in a language that, while
operating, simultaneously attempts to recognise the sense of what it is characterizing.

Deleuze seems to apply this notion of the paradoxical constitution of sense in connection to
another mode of expression - the image replaces the sign, and time is serialized upon the
model of the "narrative" of the "White Knight" (3).

Deleuze's concentration upon time and his illustration of the multiple forms of
disassociation that time motivates projects a composite analysis, where the heterogeneity
of the cinema - the complexity of its signifying process produces a general theoretical
investigation. For Deleuze to operate with the cinematic means essentially a re-capitulation
of the pre-linguistic, the adoption of a material which carries, without expressing it, that
which a language has the ability to express ("sans l'énoncer l'énoncable d'une langue") prior
to all process of signification. Additionally, however, in deciding to counter the plenitude
of the image as signifying/asyntatic to every functioning of a signifying nature, Deleuze
traces-out a further option. Principally aesthetic the Deleuzian scheme may only become
analytic by relying on a semiotic model where all signs are formulated/conceptualized on the basis of the image in-itself. Deleuze employs a Peircean design as opposed to a Metzian one, and this makes concessions to the attraction of sight which dominates the emanation of filmic signals (4), however correspondingly he has recourse to affirm the exigencies of classification, where the aim is not to question the multiple connections of the linguistic and visual, but alternatively to assemble/categorize/totalize under the sign of the image, even if it is an ambiguous one, the assemblage of filmic figures by inscribing there the assemblage of films. The combination of the Peircean logic of extensive categorization and the Nietzschean logic of unlimited paradox is achieved only with difficulty. A double expedient - categorization and displacement, inscribes Deleuzian thought in a contradictory condition which is represented by the division of his film-theory into two volumes (5).

Deleuze identifies a situation of "catholicity" in cinema, a type of universality that accepts, arranges and reconciles everything inside an open-ended whole, the plane of consistency, therefore, which allows differences to resonate together without diminishing the defined nature of their boundaries, is being modelled in/on the cinema. In fact one may suggest that there is a conciliation, in cinema, that would enable a negotiated exchange between the image and the "real". Such a conciliation occurs in the realm of belief, rather than certainty, there is an adumbration of redemption where the wholeness ("le tout") of the aesthetic would respond to the nothingness of the ethical.

Deleuze's film-work and the method by which it is conceived and presented testifies to Deleuze's preoccupation to break with the empire of the sign and with the exact correspondence of signifier and signified. Much more than in previous works Deleuze consciously employs the complete systems of analysis from other researchers, and despite his unfailing recognition of his debts, to mix and inter-connect them until they become fully inscribed within his own design of thought, as if he aims this process of inscription to produce perspectives/theories/notions, to negate their initial sense/origin and to circulate rhizomatically. Manipulating fragments that already have an established meaning, Deleuze enacts the possibility to set them in motion, to make their meanings circulate, and ultimately to break
their initial meanings by inscribing them within his own thought system. The signifieds he utilizes transform into the signifiers of an other argument, which, without subverting the core of their basic composition, allocates them a new place/function because of the way he "opens up" cinema to philosophy.

In order to achieve a consolidation of his "film-theory" Deleuze locates his project in a "synthetic" image of cinema ("l'image d'un cinéma synthétiseur"). A veritable "spiritual automation", connecting man and machine, harmonizing contradictory impulses and materializing a fantasy world where disjunctions communicate and where fusion operates within a recognition of fracture. (At this point it is necessary to recall the conclusions in "Logique du sens"). Beyond paradox the univocity of sense instantly emerges from a poetry individuated from figures, maintaining the trace of the prime resonant sonorities, primary and parallel to language. This deliquescent occurrence, when sense and being attain a correlativity, is related to the cinema as an art of the figure, in that cinema re-animates the possibility of making this occurrence/instant exist in a co-present state with the awareness of paradox. Via the constructed impossible taxonomy of cinema; it is the integer ("intégrale") of these fragments that emerges - a synthesis of occurrences/instants transformed into essences.
TIME AND AGAIN (NEW DAMAGE)

NOTES

3. In "Logique du sens" (fifth series) in order to comment on the paradoxical nature of regression to infinity, Deleuze refers to a discourse enacted between Alice and a Knight about the name of a song in "Through the Looking Glass".
4. See "Cinéma 2, L'Image temps" - "Recapitulation of images and signs" - Deleuze explains his choice of 'Peirce's strength, when he invented semiotics, was to conceive of signs on the basis of images and their combinations, not as a function of determinants which were already linguistic' (Gilles Deleuze). Deleuze uses a collection of Peirce's writings presented by Gérard Deledalle "Charles S. Peirce, Écrits sur le signe" Paris: Seuil (1978).
5. A consequent divergence (both aesthetic and historic) in cinema is observed around 1950 into an "Organic cinema" (whose temporality remains dictated by the movement of actions and the linear development of narrative) and a "Crystalline cinema" (where time is open directly to thought in the form of multiplication and serialization) (See "Cinéma 2, L'Image Temps" Chapter 6 "The powers of the false" on the opposition of the two regimes). The first volume proceeds by means of categories leading to traditional divisions in the history of cinema, while the second proceeds by operations that negate the traditionally constructed-founded typologies. Deleuze relies predominantly on Peirce for his reading of classical cinema in "Cinéma 1" and then on Nietzsche for his discussions of modern cinema in "Cinéma 2". Deleuze allows/enables the two temporalities to co-exist, without accounting for the contradiction between them or coping with the aporias that the contradiction generates.
“New York was an inexhaustible space, a labyrinth of endless steps, and no matter how far he walked, no matter how well he came to know its neighbourhoods and streets, it always left him with the feeling of being lost. Lost, not only in the city, but within himself as well. Each time he took a walk, he felt as though he were leaving himself behind, and by giving himself up to the movement of the streets, by reducing himself to a seeing eye, he was able to escape the obligation to think, and this, more than anything else, brought him a measure of peace, a salutary emptiness within”

Paul Auster - The New York Trilogy
THE FOUNTAINHEAD (VISION MACHINES)

"My work is a confluence of fleeting things. It's about grasping a moment, a feeling, and making it manifest."
(David Salle)

The art of David Salle is one of eruptive forces, where disparity, dissonance and distance constitute significance. His deliberate/contrived fragmentation and individuation of forms concentrates upon what an image is, how it is constructed and how it functions - on the process of representation itself. In the paintings there is no fixed centre of meaning, only the discursive action of the painting.

Salle's use of the image is characteristic of the postmodern discourse, in that it reveals how versions of reality are formulated. He foregrounds both the constructions and their necessity, emphasising the contexts in which the images are produced and their inherent multiple possibilities of interpretation. He questions centralized/totalized/hierarchized closed systems. The predetermined heterogeneous discrepancies in Salle's work, the combination of utterly dis-similar stylistic elements, reveal an attitude of mistrust towards absolute truths. Salle's concern is always with transformation, additional readings, and never mere appropriation. The contemporary condition reflected in the paintings is a situation dependant on randomness/contingency and multiplicity. Through his work Salle constantly recognises discontinuity and difference.

The discourse forming the basis of Salle's work, the way he questions the world, his stance towards "reality", is never "either/or" but always "both/and". There is a consistant overlapping of philosophical/critical/pictorial narratives. What Salle so accutely questions are the assumptions of how meaning is produced and how it is put together.

Salle's paintings deliberately resist conventional readings, and any attempt to contrive a linear connection between the disparate elements inevitably proves impracticable. There is
an absence of a clear narrative or hierarchical arrangement. This lack of standards, of a unified theory of value, is Salle’s point of departure as he oscillates between value-laden and the valueless, between stylishness and stylelessness. Salle understands representation, its insufficient/unsatisfactory meaning and its current status as the locus of the “real”/“reality effect” - it is in this situation that he must work, fully cognizant of his complicity with the prevailing conditions of contemporary culture and the necessity/possibility of operating within it.

Salle acknowledges the promiscuity of images, utilizing many types of representation/sources/styles. Images are not an order of appearance, his paintings insist; they are their own reality. The heterogeneous array of images is rich and evocative, yet resolutely resistant to any satisfactory reconciliation. Replete with familiar and not-so-familiar images derived both from the everyday world and the world of art, the paintings seem to promise meaning, but as Salle asserts, no narrative or story-line is likely to be discovered. His work is about the traffic of imagery, about selection and making references. The constant assertion and denial of every kind of priority - the chimerically erotic verses the flatly decorative, the figurative and the abstract, the opaque and the transparent - resulting in an enigmatic conditionality that negates all hierarchies and leaves us in a state of suspension. The viewer’s eye fluctuates in a painting between would-be realism with exchangeable signs of reality and an attempted constellation of (un)real fragments of pictorial worlds.

"L'art n'est pas le chaos mais un composition du chaos qui donne la vision ou sensation, si bien qu'il constitue un chaosmos.... un chaos compose - non pas prevu ni preconu. L'art transforme la varabbilita chaotique en variete chaoide....."

(Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (1)

From the outset Salle does not attempt to blend the elements of the painting into a pseudo-unity but instead lines them up with all their disparity. The disparate elements come to form an “integrated unity” a concept of pictorial and compositional space with a history - the space of time. What empowers the postmodern work of art is a principalled oscillation between
presence and absence, between experience and its memory traces. Salle's phrasing of
experience and his pushing things towards a limit is a dazzling exhibition of calculated
tension and control - working in contradictory ways, but also with complete visual harmony.
What this aims at is to construct a broken entity, a unity of non-unifiable phenomena, by
means of a dramaturgy of fascinating paradoxes: he alternates between the representation of
forms of presence between valuable and worthless objects, between "pornography" and vision,
between absence and exaltation, between psychological desolation and mathematical poetry.
(The silences and pseudocontradictions, sudden vulgarities and high-art quotations in
Salle's work are related to the elisions and discontinuities of signification structures)

What we require to establish is the distinction between traditional ideas of representation,
which are dictated by the ideal of transparent meaning and the contemporary idea of original
representation, which denies all forms of transparency and asserts multiple meanings that
require a process of ongoing interpretation. It is necessary to examine the implications of
the move away from interpreting art works as originating from the individual subject to a
conception that regards them as appropriations of pre-existing texts/elements/materials.
Whereas Modernism conceives artists as expressing individual perspectives through their
work, postmodern thought views artists as aiming to achieve "personal identity" via the play
of textual interpretations.

Like Warhol and Rauschenberg, Salle in his paintings indicates his understanding of the role
of images and signs within experience (2). Salle renders explicit priority to signs and texts
making it clear that viewers must engage with the painting in a type of "cultural archaeology"
to create their own interpretation.

Fragmentation appears to be one of the most convincing representations of the way
contemporary consciousness accumulates and understands experience. Salle admits that a
willingness to live amidst uncertainty/diversity/incongruity are signs of his
individuality. He is interested neither in assimilation nor appropriation but the necessity
that derives from contingency - an art that insists on the significance of an integrated
continuous questioning. Salle does not negate nor confirm the duality but simply shows it for what it is, a paradox - in a presentation of extremes that intersect. Through his art he proposes a new syntax, that includes the circulation of losses, parataxis and the introduction of a new meaning across a discontinuous hiatus. There is no amalgamated harmonious accord and the opposites are not resolved, exclusive images confront each other, images interact via/ despite of their disparity. In its entirety a David Salle painting can be called a non-synthesis, the result is a logic of non-entity - it is the logic of disjunction.

It was from the German artist Sigmar Polke that Salle learnt the technique of transparent painting: the painter paints subjects from totally different origins, one on top of the other. These layers yield disjunctive spatial formations in which the subject of the painting itself clashes with the transparent surface, so that there is no unity whatsoever. Polke had adapted this technique from Francis Picabia’s work of the thirties, and Salle has obviously mastered it completely. Superimposed upon the human contours of his female nudes, often in provocative postures, Salle’s heterogeneous paintings are both in an abstract vein and include naturalistic photo-painting techniques, with the occasional hint of the social realism that prevailed during the American Depression. Salle’s representation of humanity is capricious/fleeting even destructive. Salle’s juxtaposed images insinuate a metaphorical interpretation, as does the frequent diptych format, but in the end the metaphors fail to cohere. Meaning appears on the surface, as soon as it is approached it vanishes, provoking the viewer into a more extensive realisation of the themes inculcated within the conventional representation that express them. The structure of these paintings are incoherent - a reflection of incoherent appearances in the contemporary world - ideas and mental images, once they have become visual, are considered to be just as "real” the phenomena which are physically tangible or can be experienced psychologically. (3)

Numerous devices have come to characterize Salle’s work, the eclectic mix of fact and illusion, of multiple visual languages, irrational shifts in scale, the deadpan collisions of artifice and nature, the “Popart-like” inclusion of the tacky, artificial world, the billboard scale, crass commercial facture, and cinematic split-screen constructions, veils
"Monday arrives on schedule. You sleep through the first ten hours. God only knows what happened to Sunday.

At the subway station you wait fifteen minutes on the platform for a train. Finally a local, enervated by graffiti shuffles into the station. You get a seat and hoist a copy of the New York Post. The Post is the most shameful of your several addictions. You hate to support this kind of trash with your thirty cents, but you are a secret fan of Killer Bees, Hero Cops, Sex Friends, Lottery Winners, Teenage Terrorists, Liz Taylor, Tough Tots, Sicko Creeps, Living Nightmares, Life on Other Planets, Spontaneous Human Combustion, Miracle Diets and Coma Babies. The Coma Baby is on page two: COMMA BABY SIS PLEADS: SAVE MY LITTLE BROTHER. There is a picture of a four-or-five year old girl with a dazed expression. She is the living daughter of a pregnant woman who, after an automobile accident has been lying in a coma for a week. The question that has confronted Post readers for days is whether or not the Coma Baby will ever see the light of the delivery room"

Jay McInerney - Bright Lights, Big City
and transparencies, the submission of space to a bombardment of images, the use of block
prints or silhouettes that serve as highlights of "narrative" or points of emotional
attention, the consistent attraction to images/textures/materials that seem removed by one
or two degrees from any absolute reality, all the fragments belong to a world of complete
artifice, of reproduction, of frozen and incomplete "narrative" sequences - they are all
consequences of a complex engagement with the nature of meaning and with the appropriateness
of submitting a visual culture to a charged visual questioning. (4) (5).

Each image within a painting engenders a series of associations with our visual perceptions
and its innate history. Dislocated from its principle context (the screen/the magazine/the
book/art history) an image is re-configured within a different context but one that still
preserves some aspects of its content. (6). Comment is rendered on that content via the mode
of depiction. It is characteristic of this process that the paintings combine numerous styles
and periods, eliminating time and style for the purpose of establishing new co-efficients of
association. The intermeshing of time and space, of different levels of "reality", of
imagination and actuality is a general pre-condition of Salle's pictorial method. Salle's
paintings acknowledge that the consequence of thought about signification, with its
rejection of primary origin and such founding principles of history and causuality and
sufficient reason, has been to evacuate history from discourse - and with this evacuation the
very idea of reference and representation has become been rendered problematic. This
recognition is apparent in Salle's use of images - which are not debased but are unanchored,
yet their presence, instead of being weakened through a separation from context, becomes
increasingly more assertive.

The fundamental question of modern painting becomes a matter of how to paint the affirmation
of the "other" or "the outside". Deleuze identifies an "abstraction" in
painting/writing/thought that is quite different from the self-purifying kind - that of
"abstract machines", that force art forms beyond and beside themselves, causing the basic
structures of their languages, as thought possessed with the force of external entities, to
start stuttering. (7). Deleuze connects this stuttering abstraction with an enigmatic an-
organic vitality able to perceive in inert/terminal moments other/new ways of continuing. Consequently Deleuze suggests that the canvas is never empty. For before the artist interacts with the canvas, there is the “avant-coup” of an extensive preparatory work which aims towards negating the ambient clichés - the canvas thus is approached as already a site of too many givens/too many possibilities from which the painter must extract a singular space that releases the chance of an “après-coup” of unusual new “virtualities” unpredictable and unforeseen. This is why Deleuze terms the act of painting “hysterical”. To paint one must perceive the surface not as an empty blank, but in contrast as “intense”, where “intensity” implies filled with the invisible virtuality of alternative possibilities - one must become sensitive to the surface as “mixed”/“assembled” in a particular transformable/indeterminable vein, as opposed to merely “flat”. One can then identify abstraction as an invention of other spaces with original clusters of mixtures/assemblages.

David Salle’s play with veils or transparencies serves him as a means of both affirming and denying the presence of other images, just as his skilful manipulations of changes of scale and pictorial language produce conceptual tensions/modifications in tone, passages of development, or sub-themes. The exploitation of these effects leads to a definition not so much of a specific “meaning” as a condition that is ambiguously and perversely alive. For Salle the surface is a place where disparity assembles.

Deleuzian philosophy is founded upon the conception of thought as experimentation. This practice does not take place “in” but is an experimentation “of” the transcendental field which is constitutive of all experience - in effect it composes this field. To experiment is to investigate/to question, and painting conceived as thought is directed not only to access the transcendental field, to render tangible the forces that comprise molar existence, it is also to experiment with it - that is correspondingly to generate new affects.

Deleuze articulates an analysis of art within the context of an explication of Francis Bacon’s painting and the production of a haptic space. As stated in the previous section, Bacon’s painting does not simply invert the figurative’s tactile-optical space into abstract
expressionism's non-figurative mantel space, neither does it subordinate the tactile-optical difference into the pure optical space of abstraction (where figuration is internalized) - it operates "figurally" within the figurative to produce a haptic space which is when, "sight itself discovers in itself a tactile function ("fonction de toucher") which is proper to it, and belongs only to it, distinct from its optical function" (Gilles Deleuze). (8)

In the concluding section of "Francis Bacon: Logique de la sensation" Deleuze states that the passage from the hand to haptic eye "is the great moment in the act of painting", since "it is there that painting discovers at its base and in its own way the problem of a pure logic: to pass from the possibility of fact to the fact". It is Bacon's painting which involves "the creation of original relations substituted for the form" - a site is produced for the inherent forces via the integration of disequilibrium in a deformation. This, however, is not a reintegration into a form but a new type of integrity - the rhythm of the Figure. The constitution of this new configuration of forces is determined by the contours different functions. This rhythm/tension of expansion/contraction functions across the contour which in this situation no longer delimits a form but becomes a per porous layer/intercurrent enabling a communication between what the colour models and the ground. Yet this different contour is itself an effect/function of the new constitutive operation of colour in modern painting. In the Deleuzian scheme colouism is essentially haptic - colour for Deleuze is intrinsically haptic, it is not abstracted to a code of primary colours and its power is not reduced by an external overcoding. What Deleuze's analysis elaborates is that the modulation of colour itself in Bacon's work produces a shallow depth or proximity between two planes, which is principally the displacement of a narrative function with the contour acting as the communicating factor between the two planes.

In "Mille Plateaux" Deleuze and Guattari formulate the structural mechanism that enables Deleuze to use the term "haptic" in "Logique de la sensation". This effectively involves the extraction of the term from its traditional usage in art history, where its properties were determined by the empirical study of a proposed original occurrence, so that it can be deployed trans-historically as an effect, a function of vision.
Deleuze proposes that there are different types of abstraction and different kinds of figurability in painting, and these differences are the constitutive elements of its "logic" (negating the plain opposition of abstract to representational). It is this "logic of sensation" in painting which Deleuze attempts to clarify.

Usually pictorial space has been regarded as constructed from distinct simple elements or else held together by expressive wholes, or by figure/ground "gestalten". Deleuze's logic however envisages another contingency prior to, or existing concurrently with these possibilities. Deleuze thinks pictorial space can become "ungrounded" (effondé) and disparated in its composition, a force of indistinctions/in-between spaces/"leakages" ("fuites"). In this case, pictorial space attains an uncentred and formless condition, it discovers the workings of non-probabilistic chance in its composition: and it departs from the predominance of purely "optical" frontal vision to discover more "haptic" types of spatialization, which have multiple entrances and exits rather than simply a single perspective (9). Painting experiences the collapse of visual co-ordinates, as a condition of materializing other singular visual sensations. Such is the state of sensibility that allows the painter to perceive and register the latent unseen. Deleuze terms painting inherently "hysteral" in his examination of Francis Bacon. A "catastrophe" is depicted in the working together of an assemblage of a-signifying elements which Bacon calls the "diagram".

In "Mille Plateaux" Deleuze and Guattari ask directly the question, "What should be termed abstract in modern art?" In composing an answer Deleuze and Guattari trace the emergence and development of the abstract line - "a line of variable direction, that describes no contour and delimits no form" (10). This formulation requires that which is termed abstract to be itself re-thought along several lines concomitantly, to sense the larger change in the conceptual terrain, to re-think abstraction in its logic. Firstly the simplistic oppositional model of figurative to abstract loses its centrality to be replaced by types of pictorial space and the kinds of figuration that this engenders. Images/figures are not generated from a vacuum to co-ordinate with external examples, but come into being, as it were.
from a compositional space that always diverges from visual points, producing new sensations. Abstraction, is therefore not defined as an evacuation of the illusionist space of figures and narratives, it is, in contrast, a form of sensation of an-other more extensive abstract space which exists before and ultimately exceeds them. Secondly this in turn necessitates a reconfiguration of the perceived orientation of abstraction. Thus the procedure is not to strip everything down in self-referential abnegation, but to track the sensations of elements that come from the experience of the collapse of the visual- the "blindness" of painting - what one paints is always invisible abstract forces. Thirdly the "space" of abstraction is not essentially geometric; "The abstract line cannot be defined as geometrical and rectilinear". (11). Geometric form is superseded in favour of more tactile/dispersed/de-centred/unlimited forms of space. Deleuze and Guattari propose that we recognise the classical Athenian preoccupation with geometric/rectilinear form as only one possible scheme preceded, according to Riegel (12) by an Egyptian one and followed accordingly to Worringer (13) by a Gothic one - one may then conceive the classical space of perspectival distance in terms of an optical/haptic distinction rather than in terms of form/content.

Additionally extending this analysis Deleuze and Guattari highlight an argument proposed by Leroi Gourham (14) that: "Primitive art begins with the abstract, and even the prefigurative........ Art is abstract from the outset, and at its origin could not have been otherwise" (15). In such a case Classical European illusionism is therefore only a later development in the abstract art continuum. Deleuze and Guattari thus suggest that far from being the result of a stripping down of illusionist space abstraction exists as something prior to it.

The haptic is required to locate its definition following a process of derivation from a pair, the smooth and the striated, whose essence is determined by the division between them being produced in accord with the mode of spatialization where the haptic and optic exist in relative combinations, the smooth and striated operate in theory as abstract poles. This distinction can be characterized as the opposition of composition/immanence to organization/transcendence.
Smooth space is defined in "Mille Plateaux" as "filled by events or necessities, far more than formed and perceived things. It is a space of affects, more than one of properties. It is haptic rather than optical perception" (16). "The haptic function and close vision presuppose the smooth, which has no background, plane or contour, but rather changes in direction and local linkages between parts" (17). Here Deleuze and Guattari reconcile the haptic with the abstract line, "The haptic-optical, near-distant distinction must be subordinated to the distinction between the abstract line and the organic line; they must find their principle in a general confrontation of spaces". (18). When Deleuze and Guattari draw upon Wilhelm Worringers notion of a "Kunstwollen" - (a will to art), as being a will to abstraction, they include the qualification that their "nomad art" extracts the non-organic/abstract line from Worringers geometric Egyptian based art. Therefore the immanent-affective abstract line is disassociated from the "transcendent - objective abstract/geometric line". Instead the originality of the Deleuzoguattarian aesthetic is located in the conception of life as non-organic force ("puissance") (19). This renders impracticable any reductive impulse of their aesthetic-theory to a "pure" modernism. (20).

A more incisive/specific definition of the haptic is produced by tracing the analysis through "Francis Bacon: Logique de la sensation" - the haptic emerges not as an exclusive property but a variable affect. The "great moment in the act of painting" says Deleuze (21), is precisely, not the passage to the haptic but the "action" of the passage itself to whatever affect the painting invents. It is the passage and the composition/formulated structure of the passage which provides the criteria in process - not the haptic but the control/demarcation of the diagram.

One of David Salle's quintessential strategies involves the posing of visual questions through the display of the emblematic origins of the images. The accumulated images thus call attention to the multiplicity of their various/eclectic sources as they are re-formulated/re-defined according to the relevant prevailing context - the question of postmodernism/the void/a breakdown. Salle's careful enunciation of myriadically derived imagery subverts initial/recognisable meaning, questioning recognition in the presence of
the virtual experience offered by the painting. A liberation of meaning is produced via the heterogeneous interaction of meaning against meaning.

A primary encounter with "meaning" occurs with the interaction between a text and a painting. In "Mille Plateaux" the Deleuzoguattarian conception of nomadic art, cited below, is analogous to and radiates throughout the principle techniques of Salle's image orientation.

"There exists a nomadic absolute, as a local integration moving from part to part and constituting smooth space in an infinite succession of linkages and changes in direction. It is an absolute that is one with becoming itself, with process. It is the absolute of passage, which in nomad art merges with its manifestation. Here the absolute is local, precisely because place is not delimited" (Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari) (22).

Such insight connects the relation of David Salle's paintings to the texts of Deleuze and Guattari.

"Nomad thought"/a nomadic conception of art is located within the edifice of an ordered interiority, it moves freely in an element of exteriority. It does not attain an identity, it is a process of difference. It does not recognise the artificial division between the three domains of representation, subject/concept/being; it replaces restrictive analogy with a conductivity that knows no bounds. The concepts created do not simply reflect the eternal form of a legislating subject, but are defined by a communicable force in relation to which their subject, to an extent that they can be said to have one, is only secondary. Rather than reflecting the world, they are immersed in a changing state of things. "What interests us are the circumstances" (Gilles Deleuze) (23) because the concept in its unrestrained usage is a set of circumstances at a volatile junction. It is a vector; the point of application of a force moving through a space at a given velocity in a given direction, the concept has no subject or object other than itself. It is an act. It synthesizes a multiplicity of elements without effacing their heterogeneity or hindering their potential for future re-arrangement. The modus operandi of the nomadic is affirmation, even when its apparent object is negative.
Nomad space is "smooth" or open-ended. It can rise up at any point and move to any other. Its mode of distribution is the "nomos" an arrangement in an open space. Both volumes of "Capitalisme et Schizophrenie" construct a smooth space of thought.

In relation to the nomadic connection to space, it is the journey that matters, points along the way being merely relay stations between successive stages. Nomadic life is essentially en route, distributing being across an open, indefinite space. Nomads are essentially deterritorialized - a special relationship to territory renders the nomad deterritorialized: it is a pure surface for mobile existence, without enclosures or fixed patterns of distribution. Movement across it is open-ended/fluid, comprising alternately motion and rest. This is the primary characteristic of the nomad, occupying and maintaining smooth space - it is under this aspect that one may determine the nomad.

In the final plateau of "Mille Plateaux" Deleuze and Guattari provide a detailed specification of the opposition between "smooth" and "striated" space via several examples. In relatively formal terms, the difference can be expressed in terms of an inversion in the relationship between points and lines. Striated space treats the line as something between two points, as in geometry. Smooth space in contrast, gives priority to the line, points being simply relays between successive lines. Additionally, the lines themselves are different in each case. They are locally directional with open intervals in the case of smooth space, whereas in striated space they are subordinate to a global dimensionality and have closed intervals. Striated space closes a surface, divides it into determinate intervals constructing breaks, whereas a smooth space involves distribution across a surface, by frequency or along paths.

However, it should not be perceived that the nomad is simply the product of such a space. The relationship between the two is active in both directions, a matter of assemblage, each working on the other. The nomad not only inhabits a smooth space, but develops and extends it: "The nomads inhabit these spaces, they remain in them, and they themselves make them
grow, for it has been established that the nomads make the desert no less than they are made by it. They are vectors of deterritorialization" (26).

The practical significance of the enterprise lies in the criteria it provides for the evaluation of the process/processes that constitute a project, specific in each case. It is a matter of assessing a given situation, the nature of a given process. Smooth spaces are important as are lines of flight because it is here that the transformation occurs/is displaced/reconstructed/confronts new obstacles/invents/modifies etc.

"...the cinema perhaps has the great advantage, just because it lacks a centre of anchorage and of horizon, the sections which it makes could not prevent it from going back up the path that natural perception comes down. Instead of going from theacentred state of things to centred perception, it could go back up towards the acentred state of things and get closer to it. Broadly speaking, this would be the opposite of what phenomenology put forward". (Gilles Deleuze) (27)

If we accept this Deleuzian proposition of the reversibility of the trajectory, this might initiate a move away from a reductive notion of abstraction in painting - hence a painting that is contingent and conditional. This type of painting does not regard itself as definitive, but proposes an inexact combination of event and structure, of change and the duration/execution and idea, consequently presenting a diagram of the possible. (28)

In contrast to the classical/orthodox notion of the abstract in the philosophical tradition Deleuze produces the notion of an abstract logical space anterior to the divisions up/down, high/low moments within the Platonic tree (29), a space that includes a force/potentially which constantly submits its branches to unpredictable and convulsive variations. Deleuze effectively reverses Platonism to see Forms/Conditions/Totalities as associated/connected to an unlimited abstract space which precedes and evades them (a space that exceeds the highest genera and has components that are smaller/more minimal than the lowest species - in the terms of Duns Scotus this would be the indifference of Being and the existence of "haecceities") (30).
In "Logique du sens" Deleuze characterizes variations as "series" composed of indistinct "singularities" a hybrid of impure mixtures that complicates and diverts from the pure lineages of a given. "Logique du sens" attempts to describe how the possibility of such deviations and variations/ramifications forms an ineliminable anonymous layer/surface of meaning, prior to sense/reference/articulation. In "Différence et Répétition" there is the attempt to define how when "difference" is removed from the position of making distinctions/opposition, within/among the rigid elements of the tree it emerges as a complex repetition, a complete and intricate scheme of time and movement that includes a non-probabilistic "nomadic" chance which no play of the categorical dice can ever negate.

One may identify two types of abstraction in the Deleuzian programme, two notions of what it is to abstract and to be abstract. Firstly there is the Platonic type of abstract Form. It is the object of the "critique of abstractions", which Deleuze formulates when he describes himself as an empiricist, saying: "the abstract does not explain, but must itself be explained" (31). To explain "by" abstraction involves taking abstract Forms and examining the means/conditions via which they appear in the world or are derived from it. However to interpret the abstractions themselves is to re-contextualize them in a larger/smaller "pluralistic" world which includes "multiplicities" that are inherent to Forms and produce variation within them, changing their connections - in this vein one demonstrates that they are abstract in the manner by which they do not have the capacity of intricacy/involvement/movement - such is the "critique". Therefore one achieves an intricated condition in things prior to Forms which "does not go from one point to another, but passes between the points, ceaselessly bifurcating and diverging" (32).

The Second type of Deleuzo-guattarian abstraction proposes another question: not the procedure via which Forms are derived/appear in things, but the circumstances under which something new/singular result from an external source. The "abstract
machine"knows nothing of forms and substances, this is what makes them abstract, and also defines the concept of the machine in the strict sense. They surpass any kind of mechanics. They are opposed to the abstract in the ordinary sense. Abstract machines consist of "unformed matters and nonformal functions". Every abstract machine is a consolidated aggregate of matter/ functions ("phylum" and "diagram") (33) the "And" which operates externally. To move from the first critical type of the abstract to this second "affirmative" kind is to alter the basic notion of the "abs-tractus" - the process of extrication/ moving away.

The primary conception is to regard the "abs-tratus" as Form derived from Matter, actualized in terms of "possibilities" and their "realisations" (the transcendental/dialectical conditions of possibilities). A straightforward notion views the world as logically congruent with possibilities rendered by abstractions, even if in fact all the possibilities are not substantiated/initiated, or all the categories under which they come are not fully understood/manifested. However, in the situation where the world is re-defined on the terms of dis-unification and incongruity, composed of multiple divergent opportunities/contingencies, one can conceptualize the abstract via "virtualities" which in contrast to abstract "possibilities" are real even if not "actualized". One can begin to perceive the force/potential of entities for which no synonymous abstract co-equivalent exists, since their "effectuation" would coincidentally diverge in too many directions/senses (34). In fact "effectivity" appears to be deployed as the single criterion in Deleuze's conscious requirement to locate a practice effectuating the diagram of the plane of immanence.

Deleuze terms such viabilities "virtual" in a manner that is in opposition with the "possible" offered by Bergson in his critique of abstraction (35). In this way the virtual can be said to be abstract in a different sense from the possible. Abstract machines are said to be "Abstract, singular, and creative, here and now, real yet nonconcrete, actual yet noneffectuated..." (36), comprising of a kind of "real virtuality" in things. They integrate an abstraction of immanent force rather than transcendental form - the abstract
"virtuality" latent in entities of alternative entities, of other accessible worlds within the present world, other histories within our history. They are "rhizomatic"/serial/differential/intricate as opposed to inclusive/simplifying/purifying, and elucidated by an abstract diagram not an abstract code.

From this analysis it is apparent that the two types of abstraction do not exist individuated/in isolation. They are in fact two concentric forces operating in a counteracting discord within any logical space. The reversal of Platonism is a contingent in which one is placed in priority, and in what therefore the implication of being prior to illustrates: (priority of immanent condition to that of transcendental form). The transmigration from one type of abstraction to the other centres upon a change in seeing, one must become attuned to the prior immanent condition that exemplifies multiple external directions/levels, continuously bifurcating and deviating.

It is the second type of Deleuzian abstraction that is appropriate, and which I should like to concentrate upon in this discussion of contemporary postmodern art. At this point the analogy with cinema appears to be appropriate. In the paintings of David Salle concepts proliferate in and through the work, singular elements from past and present are re-assembled/mixed-up in a form of non-narrative continuity - a sort of "abstract machine". This, in turn is entirely consistent within a Deleuzian analysis of cinema. (From this point of view a certain caution may be required in the construction of interdisciplinary analogies. It might be sufficient to state/recognise that the arguments of abstraction have been more extensively rehearsed in painting and that painting is a more comprehensively developed discursive practice, but a counterpoised reading may yet prove valuable.)

Deleuze states "the whole is outside and what counts is the "interstice" between images, between two images: a spacing which means that each image is plucked from the void and falls back into it"(37). Deleuze sees the films of Jean-Luc Godard as "abstract" not because they remove all "narrative" or "diegesis" and retreat to pure filmic self-reference, but because they take singular elements from all over, past and present, and re-
assemble them mixing them up in the strange non-narrative continuity of a type of "abstract machine". The motivation is not the removal/absence of narrative but an attempt to attain an "outside" of other heterogeneous connections via a free and abstract "And" (38) (39) "Godard's strength is not just in using this mode of construction in all his work.... but in making it a method which cinema must ponder at the same time as it used it" (40).

Film is not a "code" of which abstraction would be the self-reference; it is an "abstract machine" that has movement and time as specific abstract "virtualities" which are then in turn "effectuated" in particular conditions. "Narrative" comprises only one limited possibility. Therefore what Deieuze confers upon film is most specific to it - the forces of its time/movement/images which are reciprocal with achieving innovative connections with other mediums. (41).

"Film ceases to be 'images in a chain... an uninterrupted chain of images each one the slave of the next', and whose slave we are ("Ice et ailleurs"). It is the method of BETWEEN, "between two images", and which does away with all cinema of the One. It is the method of AND, "this and then that", which does away with all the cinema of Being-is" (Gilles Deleuze) (42).

As narrative in film depends on the abstract "virtualities" of movement and time, so figuration/image in painting may be said to depend on how pictorial space is held together and comes apart - on the way it achieves an "order out of chaos". There are thus different kinds of abstraction and different types of "figurability" in painting, and these differences are more important to its logic than the simple opposition between abstract and representational. It is the "logic of sensation" in painting that Deleuze attempts to articulate. (43).

The whole undergoes transition, because it ceases to be One-Being, in order to become the constitutive "and" of things, the constitutive "between-two" of images. The whole transmutes with the force of "dispersal of the outside" or "the vertigo of spacing" (44), that void is the questioning of the image, therefore "false continuity" takes on a new meaning.
And you may ask yourself
What is that beautiful house?
And you may ask yourself
Where does that highway lead to?
And you may ask yourself
Am I right, Am I wrong?
And you may say to yourself
My God what have I done!
Letting the days go by
Let the water hold me down
Letting the days go by
Water flowing underground
Into the blue again, after the money's gone
Once in a life time
Water flowing underground.....

Talking Heads - Once in a Lifetime.
at the same time as it becomes a law. This analysis is synonymous with the question of abstraction in painting. In this medium we also perceive an abstraction of the "And" rather than the is, of the "outside" rather than of the absence of figuration and narration; and here too the problem is to see such abstraction as primary/foremost.

Extending this model we could examine the topographical complex spaces of David Salle's paintings - spaces illustrated by promiscuous relations of transparency and opacity, which might function as examples to complicate/enrich the previously oppositional concepts of literal and phenomenal transparencies. Negating the either/or Modernist dogma, these paintings are capable of holding multiple concepts in uncanny suspension, implying both baroque theatricality and cinematic illusions. The space of Salle's painting is not simple/homogeneous, there are rifts and inexplicable transitions, abrupt appearances and disappearances.

One of Salle's common techniques is to produce a narrative block, making the composition go "blank" at the moment when conventional composition would dictate some kind of resolution. His successive re-elaborations, like stories within stories that never fully end or are resolved, are reminiscent of the compulsive/inexhaustible space/time ambiguities elaborated by writers such as Kafka or Lewis Carroll.

The appearances/disappearances in Salle's paintings could perhaps be more accurately described using the language of film. David Salle makes use of numerous cinematic devices - the zoom/panning/close-up/splicing/montage etc. Individual paintings may display several overlapped images, as though one were seeing one image through another. Such a technique suggests the range and ubiquity of images encountered in the contemporary condition. The sources of the subject-matter are familiar or obscure, as wide-ranging as the images themselves - cartoons/Old Master paintings/modern sculpture/pornography/geometric or biomorphic shapes - Salle combines these eclectic annexations in arrangements that are frequently startling and unsettling. The metaphor of the "screen" may be suggested as a powerfully evocative image with which
we may conceptualize David Salle’s paintings. It effectively defines the ground onto which Salle projects layers of images. It is not a mirror which would carry resonances of “narrative”/history, but literally a “screen” which registers deep-focus and new perspectival effects (45).

The painting “Rob Him of Pleasure” (1979) is an example of one of the first occasions where Salle uses images which are overlaid - an elemental strategy in virtually all of his subsequent paintings. Salle’s aesthetics of superimposition and transparency substantially extended the expressive range available to him. The picture plane, in this instance is re-enforced metaphorically in the manner of a sheet of glass, behind which deep space extends into abrupt/unexpected vistas. On this hypothetical glass layer, line drawings inscribe figures and incidents in another order of depiction. To lateral contingencies, often extended across a diptych/triptych format, this add another theme of discourse. These two co-ordinates, along the surface and internal from it, produce a space that requires an immensely sophisticated treatment. In addition this technique engenders the possibility of multiple readings - the images release narrative strands of period/style/source in a variety of sequences. Ultimately narrative is encouraged but forestalled, the possibility is indicated but not sustained. It is this double movement concurrently towards a resolution and then away from it that mobilizes the image into the kind of temporal zone more usually found in film.

Salle introduces doubt into the function of systems of everyday visual communication. There is no defined centre of meaning only the discursive action of the painting. Images collide and short-circuit in Salle’s work. The way things look in the world is dependent upon speed/position/memories and therefore maybe by constructing a scene from independent elements a more realistic/“intimate” state can be attained.

We observe multiple enigmatic pseudo-historical references all appearing in the present - Abraham Lincoln’s post-classical profile/primitive sculpture/Goya/Reginald Marsh/Giacometti/Seventeenth century landscapes/ Eighteenth century cartoons/Watteau
figures, 1950's style furniture. However Salle does not select images unconsciously or indiscriminately. He selects/re-combines and composes images methodically for presentation. There is a rigid intelligent structural framework, sophisticated and pre-ordained, constructed to support the images directing their intersections and increasing their penetration. Certain forms of imagery consistently appear - vernacular objects and generic images - (Eames chairs, targets, light bulbs, shoes, sentimental objects reminiscent of a self-conscious clichéd idea of history). Images/objects are included as perceptual triggers - musical instruments, table cutlery, socially marginal characters (clowns, jesters, fools) and of course there is the one category that recurs most prominently as a paradigm of representation, the ceaseless depiction of female models.

Salle's images frequently seem to be directed away from the viewer. For example the nude models often present their backs to the audience. The picture plane, to which Salle places an extraordinary formal and metaphorical valence, can facilitate a refraction of attention. This method may be termed "tangential/detached content", a content that might be "revealed" if the work were less sensitive to the contradictions inherent in painting and the world it so problematically represents. The emotional tone of the paintings range from intricate self-consciousness to lyrical vulnerability, from nervous cynicism to a swirling, permeating sense of loss. Regret, hope, pessimism indicate the possibility of experience rather than experience itself; the paintings aspire to a closure/completion but are unwilling to reconcile the necessary illusions for this to be achieved. In Salle's work one is consistently aware of his seeing through systems and conventions of expression.

In Salle's work distance is principally achieved by severing the image from its referent through such cinematic devices as the splice/jump-cuts/dissolve/zoom/split frame/soft focus. The diptych format predominates throughout the oeuvre, corresponding to the splice, dislocations in scale and subject to the jump-cut and lap dissolve, the multiple overlays and "expressionist" washes correspond to the montage technique. These techniques, for Salle, are mechanisms designed to rupture naturalism and separate
images from their referents. As Deleuze states in relation to Godard, "... the interaction of two images engenders or traces a frontier which belongs to neither one nor the other" (47). In Godard's films the montage adopts a new function, determining relations in the direct time-image, and reconciling the cut-up with the sequence shot.

"Unexpectedly I Missed Cousin Jasper" (1980) is one of the first diptychs to appear in Salle's work. In the centre a woman smoking a cigarette is outlined in red, her eyes meditatively unfocused, her face divided by the two sections of the diptych, (a woman smiling is a classic image of reflection - virtually a cultural icon). Smoke here is analogous with introspection/contemplation. In this case the smoke works to represent a group of other images which signifies a past more immediate to the image of the outlined woman than her present. The temporal subtleties of the work start to resonate. The diptych format is essential to the cut-up/jump cut "narrative", psychologically/temporally/formally. On the left panel two women rendered in blue - the same woman in different temporal zones and poses - listens to a telephone and reacts. The body language is astutely described and the drawing technique perfectly captures the implicit content. (48). On the right panel, the blue ground seems to indicate a later chronological moment in which the woman, probably the same one, plays a violin. Both action and reaction, described in blue, underline the present, with the face outlined in red - the temporal zones of memory and present co-relate. Other images subsequently divert our attention. The dogs, mute witnesses to the "drama" echo the double memory, alert on the left, patient on the right. The two grisaille women, running in deep space continue the discordant flow of "narratives". The woman on the left moves forward in a gesture of anticipation, the woman on the right seems to be directed away in an action of evasion. The poses, although similar, are taken at different angles, this re-enforces the division of the canvas emphasizing it within our attention. However, consistent to Salle's complete strategic programme the interpretative narrative breaks down. Although this painting is one of Salle's most accessible works, the "narrative" continues inviting assumptions that begin to negate the primary reading, obtruding on the first scenario on many ambiguous levels, spatially and temporally. Alternative scenarios emerge and thus the work reconditions
“In this area near 34th Street there were far too many people, shops filled with tawdry merchandise, hawkers of Ethiopian incense, illicit wrist-watches, and flimsy bangles of pressed gold tin. There were days when - perhaps due to the atmosphere, or lack of sunspots - traffic seemed to flow smoothly on the streets, people smiled and apologized, but today was not one of them. The bees were wingless, marched with heads drooping, elbows poised to jab. The workers here meted out an existence under fluorescent lights, long windowless hours, in rubber gloves and face masks behind whirring whippets of equipment, as dental hygienists and sewing-machine operators, and cashiers ringing up toilet paper and hair spray.”
Tama Janowitz - The Male Cross-Dresser Support Group
"In this area near 34th Street there were far too many people, shops filled with tawdry merchandise, hawkers of Ethiopian incense, illicit wrist-watches, and flimsy bangles of pressed gold tin. There were days when - perhaps due to the atmosphere, or lack of sunspots - traffic seemed to flow smoothly on the streets, people smiled and apologized, but today was not one of them. The bees were wingless, marched with heads drooping, elbows poised to jab. The workers here meted out an existence under flourescent lights, long windowless hours, in rubber gloves and face masks behind whirring whippets of equipment, as dental hygienists and sewing-machine operators, and cashiers ringing up toilet paper and hair spray."

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itself for numerous readings. We move from image to image across a real or implied space that is filled with "something" whether paint/fabric/canvas. Such spatial journeys are the medium of a "narrative" subtext, in which the temporal delays and spatial disjunctions are brought into the orbit of various meanings and semi-meanings. In Salle's paintings there is continually this pulsation of images that expand only to fall part.

Similarly "We'll Shake the Bag" (1980) is another diptych composition that involves a number of Salle's basic characteristic techniques. Though composed of two separate panels, it depicts one continuous scene of a couple lying awake in bed. Each smokes a cigarette, isolated/lost in his/her own thoughts. Superimposed on their figures is another scene (taken from an Olive Fife photograph - "Hallowe'en Contest") outlined in orange, of boys in Halloween masks biting at apples suspended from a string. This scene of childhood pleasure and its attendant nostalgia contrasts with the cool, detached expression of the couple. Their alienation from one another is heightened by the clashing blue and red hues of the two panels.

Salle's simple outline drawings or line sketches, which allow one figure to be seen underneath another, suggests not only the multiplicity of images but also the tentative and ephemeral nature of vision/perceptions of the world. Additionally the naturalistically/defined/modeled figures recede in space (as in traditional/illusionistic painting) and contrast formally with the images rendered in a flat, outlined drawing style.

One senses clearly that any given painting within Salle's work is conceptualized/plotted/assessed, as it progresses, and continually modified as it nears completion. His paintings are replete with images and devices that speak of disconnection. Salle's foremost signature device (after the nudes) is the layering and juxtaposition of images, employed in incompatible modes of representation. Salle overtly - and with a certain degree of sardonic humour - challenges the viewer to read the images represented as occupants of the same world. In the resulting clash, and our acceptance/non-acceptance of it lies his largest subject area.
In "Brother Animal" (1983) a diptych like "Unexpectedly I Missed Cousin Jasper", the imagery is again complex and dense. The left hand panel is dominated by a bifurcated organ, perhaps a heart or a fruit, may be a pomegranate. The bilateral symmetry of this shape is rhymed at the right by the rounded contours of a pair of legless Eames chairs attached to a deep blue panel on which a man seated on a bed and a standing woman, dressing or undressing, are shown in a hotel room. The exterior of the hotel appears at the right drawn in pink superimposed over the woman's figure. Another older couple are located within a white "triangular-like cone" shape towards the bottom left. Amputated chairs, a split organic substance, and a couple's personal drama suggest themselves as the active constructive elements of this work.

"B.A.M.F.V" (1983) has been described as "epically sardonic"; on the right below an impasted "punctuation" of paint, is a blue-toned off-white surface on which an ethereal figurative motif - the motions of a matador's exercises with his cape, based on a fabric/wallpaper series - has been sketchily rendered. The rhythm/continuity of this right panel is disrupted by a dark grisaille insert - the painting of a characteristically wistful but pensively contemplative nude. The left-panel consists of a broader/larger acrid field of a yellow/green satin colour, to which a combine element has been attached, (constructed of cement and chicken wire). Additionally there is a loose/sketchy layer of underdrawing, a widely-gauged motif of hastily executed partial nudes in acrobatic positions. Also in the upper left section, Salle positions a pink-and-white painting-within-a-painting of a toothbrush. However, it is the other more prominent figures that command attention. On a background gash of white paint, Salle depicts a pair of garishly costumed party-goers, and most notably located above this couple is the cartoon-image of a depraved-looking duck, painted as if in Technicolor - an absinthe drinker in the context of a Disney feature.

"King Kong" (1983) could be read as a concurring aesthetic experience and about the nature of aesthetic satisfaction. The letters of "King Kong" create a characteristic chiaroscuro effect, the blue figure establishes a shallow depth and an optical tension with the lettering. The addition of the light and the table is totally effective as it echoes and
concentrates the dominant colours, and in the boldly aggressive way it produces a friction in the relationship between the lettering and the naked light bulb. It can also be taken as an exaggerated bodily metaphor, a twisting away from any form of simple affirmation.

"Tennyson" (1983) is clearly related to the above painting. In this instance Salle’s "quoting system" refers to Jasper Johns - the title of one of his works, the heavy pigmented brush-strokes, and the wooden/plaster replica ear from one of his targets. A nude figure resides on a sandy beach with the name of the Victorian poet forcefully presented in a central position. It is once again a question of aesthetic balance, of elements locating their place, an echoing of tones, a locking in of horizontal and vertical readings, a slight but effective framing, and a play between surface and a plunging diagonal perspective. Salle always maintains a momentum balanced on the edge of transition.

David Salle’s work has consistently exhibited “postmodern” characteristics, for example, quotational practice. More precisely however, in relation to the above paintings one can discern the wish to develop/articulate the area between painting and sculpture, and yet these works still consequently maintain a defined relationship/a close affiliation to modernist aesthetics via a positive commitment to the heritage of Picasso and the American Abstract Expressionists.

The question that is positioned here in relation to the work both of David Salle and Jasper Johns, concerns the extent to which the canvases they present may be automatically identified as paintings or as sculptures.

"I’m interested in things which suggest things which are, rather than in judgements. The most conventional things, the most ordinary thing - it seems to me that those things can be dealt with without having to judge them, they seem to one to exist as clear facts, not involving aesthetic hierarchy" (Jasper Johns) (49)
"I think one works and makes what one makes and then one looks at it and sees what one sees. And I think that the picture isn't pre-formed - I think it is formed as it is made....." 

(Jasper Johns) (50)

In Johns’ work primarily the division painting/sculpture is addressed. Jasper Johns, “White Target” (1957) is a work to be looked at rather than into. Johns appears to take the background out of the painting and isolate the thing. Johns’ flag works (“Flag”) (1954-1955)) owe their quality as physical objects to three factors - the co-existence of the image with the field, the representation of a solid object and the physical presence of the paint crust that transforms the painting into a low relief. John’s radical discovery was that, presented in conjunction, these three aspects add up to a slab. (51). In a 1965 interview Johns said that what interested him was ”.....the particular object encountered at any moment.....the one object which is being examined is what is important”. (52).

This statement would seem to promote objectivity and the specific over the general, not objecthood, it refers to restraint/withdrawal/straightforward emotionality and to the use of the object as an image in art.

With the construction of works such as these, with Johns and Salle, there emerges an extension into space, a re-construction of the traditional picture space, that while it may be conceived in terms of the sculptural is not sculptural. That is they function within the defined parameters of sculpture while correspondingly maintaining a distance from it.

The space that their works investigate is not the internal representation of the painted space, but of space as an integral component of the paintings construction, and therefore of paintings relation to sculpture - an investigation that operates within the question of the eminence of painting as painting. In effect the implication is that the work operates/exists in a location at once between painting and sculpture, similarly reliant upon but never fully integrated within the conditions applicable to either. The work presents the superficial appearance of a painting but the development of space means that it remains somewhat distanced from that definition and consequently forms the possibility of a relation to sculpture.
Painting becomes the pre-condition for a questioning from within painting of painting, in opposition to Greenbergian Modernism and subsequently of the relation to the sculptural and with that to the external nature of space. Essentially what this duplicity indicates is the effective presence of an irreducible origin. (53).

The exploration of paintings relationship to sculpture promotes a questioning of the unity of the work. A consequent recognition of the impossibility of a founding purity. This derives from the internal function of the painting itself, and towards the crucial moment in the painting, in which the painting within its practice/activity, being a painting explores as an essential part of its construction its relation to sculpture.

The implications of this analysis serves to illuminate the internal fragility of the Modernist programme, causing Modernism to be re-worked/re-opened to other interpretative possibilities, that is another autonomy. What is apparent is the presentation of a painting that resists the limited determinations of autonomy and therefore of an initial purity.

The identification of the presence of a symmetry of unsolved elements in the paintings of David Salle, forces a constant questioning of painting from within, allowing for a space of interpretation/an affirmed irreducibility to be unfolded. (The painting is always incomplete, in the process of becoming "a painting"/"an art-work" - a transient ontology - facilitating the capacity for a contrived/continual re-interpretation and re-positioning of painting itself beyond the determinations of tradition).

Salle’s paintings send out conflicting signals, compounding the problem of reading them accurately. They register an ambivalence between accepting a belief and subsequently distancing oneself from it, between emotional attachment and emotional involvement, between wanting to break with a tradition and wanting to remain connected to it. Salle’s radically irreverent treatment of images, his sophisticated disruption of “narrative” is principally a method of emphasising painting as a “means towards” rather than an endpoint - the work becomes a situation replete with suggestive potentialities, rather than a
determined and final self-contained whole. His work registers the re-conceptualization of the paintings compositional space.

These practices, detailed above, negotiate some form of compromise with the implicit historical dilemma of what it means to work in the area of painting today, in the conditions "after Modernism". With the demise of the exclusivist Modernist criteria, which following Clement Greenberg, seemed to mandate an ever narrower field of investigation for the visual arts, the present is characterized by a formal diversity in art. The orderly divisions of the Modernist epoch have been replaced/supplanted by a fragmented and shifting way of ordering the world. The basic presuppositions/boundaries of the judgement of the aesthetic of Modernism have been rendered problematic to the extent that the enduring validity of this aesthetic as an historically specific manifestation of the aesthetic theory of Modernity, and moreover the essential notion of the idea "aesthetics" itself as an independent/autonomous sphere, appear inherently unstable. (54).

The contemporary postmodern situation projects a scenario that is structurally and prodigiously complex. The volume and vivid quality of information and data proliferates to such an extent that the existing/familiar categories/classifications of experience rapidly immaterialize into overlapping/shifting complexities. "Reality" potentially becomes "immaterialized" into labyrinthine systems of intensive complexity.

It is primarily in opposition to Clement Greenberg's conception of Modernism that the theories of the postmodern have originated/evolved within the visual arts. The basis of the issues in debate focus on Greenberg's insistence on the traditional specificity of the aesthetic object, his instruction to artist to develop a work from the immanent formal properties of the medium, and the subsequent self-enclosed/self-referential autonomous quality of the "high-Modernist" work itself.

A belief in the autonomy of the conditions of production of art has worked to establish a certain limit of inquiry within the modernist definition of art-historical theory. The concept
of autonomy vanously utilized in the Modernist tradition appears to operate as to produce consistent sets of hermeneutic circles: sets of reciprocal restrictions which effectively draw into a single scheme of thought/sensibility what should be accounted for/accredited and what is relevant in interpretation/explanation. (55). In Greenberg’s account the question of autonomy is essentially a question of the extent to which a work of art is “purified” of any degree of aesthetic content extraneous to the basic formal properties of its particular physical medium, (Greenberg conceives the autonomy of the art work solely at the level of its meaning). Greenberg’s conception of autonomy is concentrated around the notion of specifically/definite aesthetic “values” - a “pure” expression of the irreducible elements of experience via the reduction of the “meaning” of the work to the fundamental formal constituents of its physical medium. Autonomy becomes intricately linked, within Greenberg’s analysis, to that of self-referentiality - (For example: with the question of abstraction, Greenberg advocates that it is an essential formal component of autonomy, the mechanism via which the medium may be purified of any excess aesthetic content). Modernism defines/locates its interest within containable and in terms of, verifiable limited criteria.

In "Towards a Newer Laocoon" (1940) (56) Greenberg presents a defence of abstract punism/abstract/non-objective painting which rejects literature as a model for the plastic arts and therefore subsequently eschews overt subject matter. The basic premise was to simultaneously establish the quality of a certain abstract art and legitimate abstraction as the culmination of an inexorable historical linear progression

"Guiding themselves, whether consciously or unconsciously by a notion of purity derived from the example of music, the avant-garde arts have in the last fifty years achieved a purity and a radical delineation of their fields of activity for which there is no previous example in the history of culture.....Purity in art consists in the acceptance, willing acceptance of the limitations of the medium of the specific art."

".....the purely plastic or abstract qualities of the work of art are the only ones that count".

(Clement Greenberg) (1940) (57).
In “Modernist Painting (1961) (58) Greenberg states

“... each art would be rendered “pure”, and in its “purity” find the guarantee of its standards of quality as well as of its independence.”

What Greenberg is principally concerned to promote is an art that stands out from/against its general context of production, that is Greenberg's notion that kitsch is apparent/prevalent in contemporary society. For Greenberg the value of Modernist art is the “capacity”/”ambition” to remain “self-critical”. “Modernism” therefore is not only a practice/set of practices, but a principled/coherent enterprise or project of self-criticism - a self-criticism, Greenberg believes, operating in a variety of methods that are unique/irreducible (painting being the practice specific to Greenberg’s own concerns). Greenberg traces the evolution of this tendency in what he terms “Western Civilization” to Kant and the Enlightenment, proposing that the Kantian critique of logic - which attempts to establish the defined nature of limits/the extent of logical reasoning - is the model/framework of all authentic Modernist projects - to establish/maintain the intrinsic capacities/closure of particular practices (59).

Greenberg’s avowed Kantianism withstanding there would appear to also be a definite Hegelian dimension to his historiographic presuppositions. (60). He conceives of the complete history of Western Art from the Renaissance onwards in terms of a strictly defined formal evaluation/development.

“The path of which Cézanne said he was a primitive, and by which he hoped to rescue Western tradition's pledge to the three-dimensional. It led straight, within five or six years of his death, to a kind of painting as flat as any the West had seen since the Middle Ages. The Cubism of Picasso, Braque and Leger completed what Cézanne had begun”

(Clement Greenberg) (61).

This statement evidently constitutes the basis of Greenberg's claim that Modernism should be identified with the “self-critical tendency” initiated by Kant. It also suggests that
Greenberg constructs the framework of a highly generalized theory of linear artistic progression. Greenbergian Modernism is not only a definition of the development of a style of painting, but a proposition that a specified consciousness of art history dictates the form of the art of the contemporary.

The significance of artistic continuity constitutes the central component of Greenberg's 1955 essay "American Type Painting" (62.) It essentially argued that American post-war artists had absorbed and subsequently surpassed earlier European work. Read in conjunction the two essays "Modernist Painting" and "American Type Painting" can be viewed as a theoretical validation of more specific judgements regarding particular artists and their continuities with previous art/artists.

Greenberg's dictum in the later essay is that "visual art should confine itself exclusively to that which is given in visual experience and make no reference to anything given in other orders of experience". By "visual experience" Greenberg means "Modernist formal judgement". This specialization may be read as a reduction of both interests/values that Greenberg codifies in "Modernist Painting" as the self-critical process of Modernist painting-practice. It is a process that Greenberg argues is based on the cumulative "narrowing" or concentration of artists on the unique constituents of their chosen medium, which is, in painting, the two-dimensional surface and the space of the canvas together with its enclosing frame. This is what he means by the phrase "the ineluctable flatness of the support".

In contrast Deleuze by-passes conceptions of "aesthetic purity" and alternatively locates in the "folds" of Neo-Platonic "complicatio" the source of abstraction. Here Deleuze identifies something that cannot possibly conform to the purity of Forms and to the types of abstraction that pertain to them. Deleuze offers another "minor" tradition of abstract "complication" - in Prout's signs/Leibniz's "minimalist" monads/Spinoza's treatment of divine names where it is linked to "the problem of expression" - which informs his own view of abstraction. Deleuze's rendering of the "space" of abstraction is not based on the
absence of figure/image/narrative. Rather than absence and negation, abstraction is concerned with the affirmation of the "outside". Thus "Modernity" does not concentrate upon a simplistic purification of the means of representation, turning within to proclaim an enclosed autonomy, but by contrast, it is about untimely forces which prefigure other new "outside" possibilities, and so introduce a certain "heteronomy" in mediums. For Deleuze the basic question becomes how to think/paint/write such "other"/"outside" forces.

The question of abstraction in painting according to Deleuze, is an abstraction of the "AND" rather than of the "IS", of "the outside" rather than the deposition of figuration and narration, and of the problem to regard such abstraction as first. As with Metz in film-theory, the contrast is drawn against Clement Greenberg's attempt to see in abstraction an apotheosis of autonomy and "opticality".

Following Lessing's classical division of the arts Clement Greenberg argued, in effect, that abstraction in each artform, for which abstract painting takes the lead and indicates the way, would achieve an absolute separation where each would remain in place, and appeared principally to one sense organ. Painting would be freed from "theatricality" and concentrate on what was purely "optical". Greenberg's design attempts to combine all the arts and senses together in a totality. Essentially the problem with formalism revolves around the failure to distinguish between classical representation and figuration. Formalism deploys the term "optical" against the imaginary tactile markers of representative space whilst the Deleuzian term "manual" is deployed against both the pure optical space of abstraction and the relative subordination of hand to eye (tactile to optic) in classical representation. For if abstraction breaks with classical representation it remains figurative, "since its line still delimited a contour" (Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari) (63). Thus for Deleuze the violence of this new abstract art is primarily ocular, collapsing optical organization and debasing the optical horizon to a tactile ground. The new painting selects/abstracts from the constraints of painting and isolates the "abstract
line" in its operation, where its autonomy/non-subordination to form operates a "decomposition" of matter.

Deleuze is concerned to subvert this formalist project. In the Deleuzian programme the provision is articulated for things to be inseparably connected while remaining singular and non-totalized, and so remain undisturbed by paradoxical objects which fall in-between the supposed parameters of specific mediums, mixing them up in new configurations, thus sanctioning a more Nietzschean trajectory.

The impetus informing the Deleuzian view of abstraction becomes clear if we consider that the programme of his philosophy, one where aesthetics clearly cannot fill a derivative role, is Nietzsche's "reversal of Platonism", which he describes as follows:

"Give me a body then; that's the formula of the philosophical reversal. The body is no longer the obstacle which separates thought from itself, that which must overcome in order to think. On the contrary the body is that in which thought plunges or ought to plunge, in order to arrive at the unthought-like, that is ...... No longer will life be subpoenaed (faire comparaître) before the categories of thought - thought will be flung into the categories of life"

(Gilles Deleuze) (64)

Rather than setting out from abstract concepts to which the world must confirm thought must actively extract from the world. Such a procedure aims "to find the conditions under which something new is produced ("creativeness")" (Gilles Deleuze) (65). Both a philosophical approach which takes the world as the concretion of the abstract and an artistic practice which merely validates that claim by giving form to the abstract is an anathema to Deleuze - painting cannot have a merely epithetic existence. Thus just as he acknowledges Hegel's and Kant's reversals of Platonism but describes them only as "abstract" (Logique du sens), so he recognizes the radicality of the break with classical representation performed by pure abstraction, but seeks a painting that breaks with the figurative in a "more direct and sensuous (sensible) way" (66).
The concept of "abstract" which Deleuze brings to the discussion of Modern Art is developed along with Guattari, through the notion of "abstract machines". Is is the "And" which moves outside, which allows for a world that is disunified/incongruous/composed of multiple divergent paths, in which one can think in terms of abstract "virtualities" that are quite real even thought they may not be "actualized"." (67).

Deleuze finds an abstraction concerned with discovering/developing within things the fragile intricate "abstract" virtualities of other things inherent in materials, it supposes the subsistence of connections which exceed the messages of the medium, and ourselves as senders and receivers of them. Thus the "abstract" use of the medium is not when it itself becomes the message, but when it starts to stutter "and....and.....and" prior to message and transmission.

If the language system appears to be in perpetual disequilibrium. If the system bifurcates and involves terms each one of which traverses a zone of continuous variation, language itself will begin to vibrate and to stutter. Artists sensitive to this method, "invent a "minor use" for the major language within which they express themselves completely: they "minorize" language, as in music, where the minor mode refers to dynamic combinations in a state of perpetual disequilibrium. They are big by virtue of minorization; they cause language to flee, they make it run along a witch's course, they place it endlessly in a state of disequilibrium, they cause it to bifurcate and to vary in each one of its terms, according to a ceaseless modulation" (Gilles Deleuze) (68).

Each state of a variable is a position on a "crest line" which bifurcates and extends itself in other lines. It is a syntactic line, whereby syntax is constituted by means of curves/links/bends/deviations of this dynamic line as it passes by positions with a double perspective on disjunctions and on connections. It is no longer the formal or superficial syntax that presides over the equilibrium of language, but a syntax in the process of becoming, a veritable creation of a syntax that produces a "foreign language" within language and a grammar of disequilibrium. And, "just as the new language is not
external to the system, the asyntactic limit is not external to language either; it is “the outside” of language, not outside of it....to cause language to stutter, and at the same time bring language to its limit, to its outside” (Gilles Deleuze) (69).

In David Salle’s painting “His Brain” (1984) the diptych format is again utilized, although on this occasion it is an asymmetric one. The images on the larger right-hand panel are four layers deep. The basic image features the drawing of a naked woman who forces her behind towards the viewer. Superimposed upon her body are silhouette portraits of Abraham Lincoln and Monet’s studio boat, (from which he made many of his most famous Impressionist riverscapes during the 1870’s), like the model’s rear they also appear to be moving towards the spectator. The third layer is a sketch of a woman in a contemplative/reflective pose. The left narrow panel is covered with a garish pattern of vibrant biomorphic shapes partially interrupted by a long, black bar-like split.

The central idiomorphic essence of David Salle’s work manifests itself in the extreme diversities of adopted subjects/methods/techniques -“anti-composition”. The array of images/figures/objects within a Salle painting may be rendered in very different and contradictory styles. Paradoxically, it is this combination of divergent styles that makes a Salle painting distinctive and immediately recognizable. A single work may display a stylistic diversity ranging from commercial illustrations to Old Master paintings and exhibit both thick and thin, abstract and descriptive passage of paint.

Salle’s technique can be integrated within a Nietzschean scheme, whose critique of the assumptions of Modernity establishes the foundations for developments within postmodern thought. Nietzsche defined the essential transition that is integral to postmodern thought when he attacked the distinction that characterizes discussions of truth and reality - the distinction between appearance and reality. (Without this division, the notion of accurate/defined representational images would never have formed the basis of Classical-age thought). Classical-age thinkers attempted to validate representations directly by reconciling appearances against a prior/stable reality. In
Nietzsche views the artist's willingness to limit him/her-self to fragments of the real as a positive sign of engagement with life. Additionally, it reflects a genuinely historical point of view, since reality may only manifest itself via available perspectives/categories. Nietzsche also suggests that far from rendering the artists productions useless for interpreting reality, the concrete grounding of their work in appearances has the effect of presenting "reality once more". The temporal encounter with reality through art, although comprising no guarantee as to its representative character, nevertheless may provide appropriate perspectives that make it less likely that we will take some form of abstractive network as transparently real.

This issue is vital for understanding postmodern forms of representation, since they contrast with the rejection of representational practices exercised by modernists, who suggested the capacity of penetrating the veil between appearance and reality by turning inwards - however when we substitute the image of historical humanity for the reflection of nature by the rational mind such an inwardly directed move proves less than credible. Alternatively we should adopt existing images to formulate an interpretation. This implies that Nietzsche's elimination of the "appearance - reality" distinction might foreshadow our febrile creation of the postmodern condition, producing/reproducing things and formulating and reformulating images, without purpose/grounding beyond the productive activity itself.

Deleuze's analysis formulates this notion exactly. We have had to confront the loss of the
distinction between iconic copy and simulacrum. Therefore in recognising David Salle's resistance to the equivalency valuation that images receive, it is not in order to reject the simulacrum problem. In contrast Salle's attitude, expressed through his own simulation practices, is that we can call upon resources/material from any place/location, yet not randomly/indifferently - their original role may well have a part to play. This means that Salle can make use of a variety of attitudes/perspectives to confront the limitations of our own methods of thinking.

Salle's frequently bizarre conjunction of images, such as the positioning of the brashly painted Santa Claus over a sunbathing woman in "Wild Locusts Ride" (1985) excludes deep involvement in any single image. The vulgar and synthetic joviality of the Santa negates the relaxed summer drift of the figure resting in the sun. The dominating fact of the Santa appearing on the surface articulates, through the unlikely medium of kitsch vulgarity incarnate, that the picture plane is the paintings ultimate reality. Clashing violently against it we are cajoled into acknowledging the fictive nature of the woman on the porch. The dialectic between the painted and the replicated, between the grisaille and the colourful banality, between social privilege and cheap disposable image is all counterpoised by the panel on the right. On this section the clamour and rush of a political meeting are gridded in and out of a fabric that simultaneously conceals and adds to its impact.

Any degree of seductive impact registered in a Salle painting is ultimately rendered artificial - all seductiveness is fake, for Salle, a sign of unfulfilled promise (as the rope-skipping nudes reveal in "Muscular Paper" (1985)).

Object-relational interplay is problematized in Salle's work; it is the source of the inner discontinuity of his "narrative" line, which is composed of multiple divergences and is thus all the more engaging. There is an acerbic bitter quality about Salle's sensibility which gives his art an undeniable force.
Salle fabricates a system of references made of sex and design - a system that destroys itself only to be replaced immediately by another pictorial effect. It is indeed a central compositional strategy of David Salle's to interlock visual construction and destruction processes. An enchanting art of disenchantment.

"Fooling With Your Hair" (1985) has been described as "a kind of personal essay or manifesto, the artist's heart laid bare, that reads like a mathematical equation" (71). Many of the foremost aspects of Salle's aesthetic are contained in concentrated form in one work. On one hand we have the gaudy quality and design of the 1950's in the upper section of the painting and on the right Salle nonchalantly plays with quotations from the European tradition in the form of two Giacometti sculptures and on the left with the vague paraphrase of a Watteau drawing, ("The Shoeshine Boy"). In Watteau's original the boy is shown as an amiable, if evidently dim-witted urchin, adapted by Salle as an alter-ego, he is conferred with a sexual elegance, the haunted shrewdness of a young Pierrot. The character's abstruse quality is exemplified and revealed by two equated pairs of images - a pair of intensely biomorphic 50's - Italian style light fixtures and two Giacometti sculptures, the first a noble bust and the second a "tragic-faced", full-breasted nude. The co-presence of the hyper-artificial lamps with the Giacometti pieces engender a sententious atmosphere of subdued eroticism expressed through visual forms. The strikingly "pure" lurid colours of the upper panel contrast distinctively with the three sections forming the lower panel, in variously tinted shades of grisaille. Also in the lower section a Salle model described with "manneristic" artificiality exercises a sequence of three contorted poses.

Both sections of this painting present obfuscated simulated formulations, whether in the quotations of the upper part or the unnatural poses of the model in the lower part. Everything is phrased hollow and false, empty/vacant ciphers devoid of life - a derivative/imitative "reality" that has superseded "real" life. A muted sensuality, a delicately toned play of light moves horizontally across the whole surface of the painting. time is thus introduced as Salle paces the "reading" and directs attentions. We follow the
rhythms of the contorted grey/negative figure, engaged in "sub-sadomasochistic-like
games". We focus on the central metal chair that forces itself off of the surface. The
tonal values of the upper external panels direct us back down to the lower frieze, but the
rhythm is alternated with the first of the 50's style lamps providing the colour chord for the
series of separate panels that "flash" off from it in harsh/quick/angular idioms. It is the
rhythmical structure rather than the significance of the images that creates the overall
disposition. The chair is the central/crucial feature, the "focal point" from which the
organization of the pictures composition departs and is subsequently arranged, it
prohibits a reading that would seek to distinguish of the two sections as separate since
it seems as close to the surface of the work as the images on the top line.

"The School Room" (1985) serves as an exemplification of the main tenets current
throughout Salle's work. One of Valenciennes's sketches is re-worked into the
composition (72), its measured Neo-Classical spacing intact but its subtle greys and tans
cruely rendered in lurid yellows and oranges. The right-hand panel is devoted to a
"close-up shot" of a foot rammed between a female model's buttocks, as she lifts her
skirt to permit it. On the left panel the image of a prone nude in gauzy grisaille and
dream-like/surreal background colour, (echoing an earlier phase of Salle's work when
the nudes often seemed tinged with melancholy), is overlayed by the head of a negro(
derived from a Géricault portrait (73)) who looks dispassionately away. This is a
disturbing image. Salle, as usual, stops immediate reality short, so that it becomes
frustratingly remote. The close-up confrontation with the model's nude bottom painted
in grisaille, like Ingress's later variants upon his "Grande Odalisque" immediately cools
and desexes it somewhat, and this defusing continues via more elaborate devices.

"The point about the poses in my work is that they are the body in extremes - often seen
from strange points of view and spatial organization. It has more to do with the abstract
choreography and angles of vision than with pornographic narrative. They are not
voyeuristic in the sense that Eric (Fischl)’s depictions of intimate family scenes are
voyeuristic, because they’re not candid - i.e., they’re specifically posed in order to be seen
that way."
(David Salle) (74)
“Midnight. I’m sitting in a booth at Nell’s with Craig McDermott and Alex Taylor - who has just passed out - and three models from Elite: Libby, Daisy and Caron. It’s nearing Summer, mid-May, but the club is air-conditioned and cool, the music from the light jazz band drifts through the half-empty room, ceiling fans are whirring, a crowd twenty deep waits outside in the rain, a surging mass. Libby is blonde and wearing black grosgrain high-heel shoes with exaggeratedly pointed toes and red satin bows by Yves Saint Laurent. Daisy is blonder and wearing black satin tapered-toed pumps set off by splattered-silver sheer black stockings by Betsey Johnson. Caron is platinum blonde and wearing stack-heeled leather boots with a pointed patent-leather toe and wool tweed turned-over calf by Karl Lagerfeld for Chanel. All three of them have on skimpy black wool-knit dresses by Giorgio di Sant’Angelo.... Last night I had dreams that were lit like pornography and in them I fucked girls made of cardboard. The “Patty Winters Show” this morning was about Aerobic Exercise.

Bret Easton Ellis - American Psycho
Such a painting brings into play a manifold complex of associations. However, the atmosphere of erotic tension conjured up is reminiscent of one of Degas' rehearsal room interiors - erotic tension generated by distanced control. (Degas urbanity, detached mood of observation, close tonal values, incipient montage and troup f'oeil effects and decisively the chilly eroticism of his ballet themes suggest their likelihood as models for Salle). Salle's eroticism has more to do with work/design/effectiveness than with either pain or pleasure.

Salle's paintings can appear "brutal", violent and broken, more and more unreserved in their confrontations with the spectator. The images coalesce because they occur through some tangential need, (through a series of original- formal structural methods techniques/strategies. Salle creates a situation where images seem visually and emotionally to require each other) some rhymical instance that corresponds to the constantly qualified/qualifying currents that underlie the flows of emotion and atmosphere

Salle's nude female bodies are frequently blandly modelled monochrome images saturated with a translucent field of colour recalling the haunted quality of faded back-and-white photographs. In Salle's paintings the objects and images that frequently are most prominent are the "cultural icons" - the Santa head in "Wild Locusts Ride" (1985) or the mutant Donald Duck in "B.A.M.F.V." (1983) or inanimate objects whether painted, the numerous full-colour vases, or appended in actuality to the paintings surface, furniture in particular. The nude models in contrast, seem ultimately untouchable, their apparent availability contradicted - or at least given levels of complexity - by their visual remove.

Grounded in the tradition of the New York School, Salle insists upon the possibility or necessity of an "absolute specificity". He explicitly views his art as a further extension of, for example, Frank Stella's formalism, but using and adapted to contemporary conditions. Salle considers aspects of formalism in the interpretation of the significance of an art work not as a compendium of items rendering a meaning, but more precisely the
appreciation of the totality of the images within a complete painting for what they are. He has stepped "outside" Modernist aesthetics into a negation of it, and yet preserved something of its aesthetic values - stretching the limits of the aesthetic - this further critical dimension is not a nihilistic negation of Modernism, but rather a challenge to the legitimate discourse of high art and the previous borderlines established for painting. It does not matter what a particular painting stands for but what in fact it is. For Salle, formalism is the consequence of the inter-changeable nature of images that have lost their initial significance. It is an attempt to create forms that would deflect from the immanence of the prevailing technical pictorial environment - media/advertising - that dominates the contemporary experience.

Salle's chosen images - the girl with her legs spread apart, the Giacometti sculpture, the Negro portrait, the Picasso-type heads - are all applied in a highly calculated manner. The images function as remote/detached "factors". By reducing the aesthetic impact of single images and signs, he reworks the original images so that they become more or less "abstract" elements of pictorial material, which he then organizes/arranges in the complete picture. These devalued but simultaneously highly charged images serve as the constructive elements of a "new non-objective painting". Salle's scepticism towards established truths leads to a method of unmeditated artificiality. The only clear/defined thing about the paintings is the technical execution, the conceptual lucidity and the artistic gesture. The heterogeneous array of images is multiple and evocative yet intractably resistant to any satisfactory reconciliation.

"Coral Made" (1985) consists of two large sections, clearly divided in form as well as in content. The left panel painted in hues of green/grey/black, depicts a mysterious group of figures derived from a staged photograph by Renee Magritte. They stand in curious relationship to one another - the man on the left engaging in some form of disputation, the woman in the centre pointing at him accusingly, and the woman in the foreground turning away defensively and fearfully. In front of the group appears a target in the manner of Frank Stella. On the right panel an irregular, abstract stain/form overlays three
of the screen prints of photos of an elegant nude. Supplementing this section we see a sketch in a stylish spiky "expressionist" vein and a pasted on/inserted antique picture of a dog in the mode of Edwin Landseer. The interrelationship between the elements is barely discernable. Salle's sceptical attitude towards established truths leads to a method of unmeditated artificiality. The only clear/precise thing about these paintings is the technical execution, the conceptual lucidity and the artistic gesture. The heterogeneous array of images is rich and evocative, yet stubbornly resistant to any satisfactory reconciliation.

"The Cold Child" (For George Trow) (1985) includes a frontal view of a woman arching her back (inspired to some extent by a 1949 Picabia Acrobat), so that her open legs form an inviting entry-point. The figure is softly modeled as a three-dimensional form. Painted over the model in outline is a thin sketchy drawing of café diners, (a scene based on a photograph of Picasso and other artists hunched over drinks at a café table). Standing over the diners, a waiter holds aloft a tray of drinks arranged so that it directly collides/coincides with the model's vagina. (One interpretation of the image is clear - the woman is being served on a platter - but however at the same time the implied oral gratification, whatever its degree of mutuality, will never be achieved because the dual mise-en-scene allows only a coincidental, purely optical, intersection of worlds.)

On the left hand panel of the diptych is a greyish field of upholstery fabric with metallic glints. Against this tactile but disfigured field are numerous painted biomorphic shapes, either chalky/liverish/green in colour. From the centre of this dull ground an actual but legless fiberglass chair juts forward.

"Muscular Paper" (1985) is a majestic triptych. On the left is a Picasso sculpture of a woman (taken from a Brassaori photograph) which appears like a malformed bone, laid over this is a naked woman outlined in red. Eight blue pegs look into and out of this dark section. In the central panel two naked women skip on a rope, covering their behinds are two painted heads, blue/green heads of vulgar cheapness, taken from a reproduction of
a de Ribera painting (76). Between the women and the heads is a complex sketchy structure - a phallus/cervix/fountain - from which a head might or might not be emerging. The mood is of sombre imprisonment, which the initial sculpture's conventions have established, the huddled naked woman, in a posture of clinging despair and the brisk images of the twin runners to the right are concealed by the sardonic positioning of the two heads. Just as the images become unsettling, but decipherable in a strategy that Salle frequently adopts, any internal consistency is broken by the right-hand panel which illustrates a bridge - a Max Beckmann derived structure in what seems to be a central-European town, below are tug-boats and an odd structure that would appear to refer back to the quasi-fountain-like object between the two exercising women.

The dislocated quality of Salle's imagery is imbued with a style of the tragically vaudeville echoing in an atmosphere of dark humour/discomfiture/sense of the "Becklettian" absurd - his search for resonant incongruity.

Within the theatrical what would seem to be happening in Salle's painting is what Deleuze terms "a dislocation of the internal monologue" (77).

"...... the internal monologue gives way to sequences of images, each sequence being independent, and each image in the sequence standing for itself in relation to the preceding and following ones: a different descriptive material. There are no longer any perfect and "resolved" harmonies, but only dissonant tonings or irrational cuts, because there are no more harmonics of the image, but only "unlinked" tones forming the series". (Gilles Deleuze) (78).

Deleuze's description of Godard's film technique concentrates upon the use of the "unlinked" image. Deleuze confers upon Godard a recrudescence quality. In Godard's films the "unlinked" image becomes both serial and atonal. The question of the relation between images is no longer of knowing if it works/doesn't work "si çà va ou si çà va pas", according to the harmonics/the resolved tunings, but of knowing "How its going" ("Comment çà va"). "Like this or like that, how its going" ("comment çà va") is the
constitution of series of their irrational cuts, of their dissonant turnings, of their unlinked terms" (Gilles Deleuze)(79). In this situation each series refers to a way of seeing/speaking intrinsic to itself, a way which could be that of current opinion expressed through slogans, but also that of class/sort/typical character functioning through thesis/hypothesis/paradox/imagined acuteness/abrupt change of subject. Each series is the method an artist uses to articulate him/her self indirectly in a sequence of images attributable to another, or alternatively, the method by which something/someone articulates indirectly in the vision of the artist perceived as other. There is no longer the stability/unity of the artist/images/elements/world that was sanctioned by the internal monologue. “There is the formation of free indirect discourse” of a “free indirect vision which goes from one to the other” (80). The stability of the internal monologue is broken to be replaced by the diversity/deformity, the otherness of a free indirect discourse.

As Salle's oeuvre develops each painting becomes a more complex and finely tuned performance, this further underlines the centrality of film-technique and musical structure as analogous modes for discussing the way he constructs a work and the kinds of "meanings" it can communicate.

There are two works in the "Symphony Concertante" series. Additionally "Yellow Bread" (1987) and "Kelly Bag" (1987), also show obvious associations. "Symphony Concertante II" (1987) presents a military officer with a Victorian waxed moustache (another image derived from Magritte). He is flanked by two female "musicians", one nude the other clothed, both holding musical instruments behind their backs. The officer appears, isolated/insulated to be looking through the two figures, he seems caught/"freeze-framed" on a screen, almost as if the two females were watching a televisual image. Behind the officer, just to the right of his head is a Belocq-style photo-insert of a young girl. The officer seems trapped in the convolutions of a Borges-like enigma. Attention is equally focused on the secondary details of the composition. The musical instruments awkwardly positioned behind the girls backs, the colourfully strident futurist ceramic piece that deflects concentration from the central "characters" echoing yet reversing the colours.
of his uniform. The atmosphere is conjured up via the modulated rhythms and cinematic postures of the female figures that speak eloquently of fear/repulsion/rejection and secrecy. The dominant tone is one of an assured performance, of typical exhibitionism with an undercurrent of repressed lasciviousness, and of imperative needs expressed in restrained delicately controlled passages. There is a comprehensive subjugation of narrative in favour of elegant imagery.

"Marking through Webern" (1987) is clearly related to these works. On this occasion the lower panel depicts four stark, almost repetitive images of a partially clothed figure in a foreshortened plunging baroque posture. The second and third images of the series are connected by a small insert of a 1950's-style sketch. These divisions are echoed in the upper panel where the wooden board and the blue oval enact a similar bridging-effect between the first and second image and the third and fourth image respectively. (81) The materials and the surface of the painting are hyper-raw and kitschy, the imagery is equally provocative/minatory - inflated and hyper dramatic. Fragments of "histories" collide side by side, thematizing the reciprocity between visible and invisible, oscillating in a series of turbulent sequences. On the extreme right the two frieze panels are united by a sequence of direct/brutal devices that include a superimposed, crudely drawn and incomplete insert, some loose dripping, and an overwritten figure. This is an assertive almost aggressive work consolidated in the pierced chair that literally abuses the space and the chunky"crude" folk art ceramics. It is a condition of intensified presence and self awareness that Salle attempts to recount/convey in this work, an refined/aggravated vehemence articulated through the work. The totality of the painting disseminates an impression of artifice/seduction manipulation.

Throughout the process of painting Salle concentrates upon the focused selection and manipulation of imagery. A gramarye chimeric mood often co-exists with a hyper-hystencal cartoon-like awkwardness. Critical postmodern art emphasizes the reality of art as a form of production, impelled to attend to the contingencies of a life within history. The memory trace is ultimately what Salle's sources of imagery are reducible to, and at
a secondary remove, the derivation of sources becomes less consequential. What is at stake is how elements are deployed to make the paintings appear effective. (82). Salle seeks, through a plethora of information, which dominates the viewer to force a recognition. (If the "narrative/formal/expressive" properties of the work cohere in a strikingly original way, the work can present a mode of engagement with the visual world that engenders an emphatic relationship to it.)

In a similar fashion Godard in his films according to Deleuze's analysis utilizes every method of a free and indirect discourse. He does not merely confine himself to a process of adopting and renewing, but on the contrary he creates an original method which allows him to make a new synthesis. "Godard's films are syllogisms, which simultaneously integrate degrees of probability and paradoxes of logic" (83). Godard's method operates upon the constitution of series, each demarcated by a category - every sequence of images is a series, insofar as it is reflected in a genre. Therefore this reflective status of the genre implies that instead of a genre subsuming images which naturally belong to it, it constitutes the limit of images which do not belong to it but are reflected in it. Replacing its capacities for subsuming/constituting in favour of a free power of reflection, genre can be said to become purer for delineating the direction of pre-established/existing images, more than the character of the present images more than the challenge of the present images. Godard's reflexive genres are, in the Deleuzian sense, genuine categories through which the film passes. Throughout his films Godard is constantly creating categories, which are not definitely fixed but re-distributed/re-shaped/re-invented for each film.

"A montage of categories, which is new each time, corresponds to a cutting of categories. The categories must, each time, surprise us, and yet not be arbitrary, must be well founded, and must have strong, indirect relations between themselves: they must not be derived from each other, so that their relation is of the "And..." type, this "and" must achieve necessity" (84) (Gilles Deleuze)
Categories therefore are never complete answers but categories of problems which introduce reflection into the image itself, they are problematic/propositional functions. One of the most notable devices that Salle adopts from film-technique is the way he treats surface and the attention he gives to light and colour. Deleuze identifies in Godard a consistent method of supreme Colourism. He uses colours as significant/individuated genres in which the image is reflected. Colours in themselves can fulfil the function of categories, that is, not only do they affect objects/people/written words, but they form categories in themselves.

"The Wig Shop" (1987) is suffused with a melancholic recognition that something is being lost and that all we may hope for is to remember it, but subsequently then we realise that not even that will have any degree of certainty. There is a bitter sweet ironic tone prevalent in the atmosphere. What concerns Salle is the latent mood of something that having once been present is now irredeemably captivated in the desperate process of slippage/loss. The main female figure, upon which attention is first focuses, is surrounded by busts and models that appear sinisterly more like decapitated heads. This intuition is echoed in her gaunt, angular features and a gaze hypnotized in reverie. The insertion of the Giacometti bust seems both to reflect and mock her internal distorted projections. The right hand panel serves as a literal accompaniment, phrasing the same mood. The dominating, active female figure appears to be tuning a musical instrument apparently in search of the correct sound. Any excessive "narrative" dependency relating to the interaction of the two central female “character”s is fractured by the insertion of an incongruous element - a found still-life, directly/prominently incorporated into the composition. As a purely visual element, within Salle’s scheme it functions perfectly introducing both optically and psychologically a tension that energizes the design. A work by Salle invites/frustrates/instructs/shocks the inquiring consciousness, and yet continuously pronounces that it is in itself simply a work and “a fiction”. It offers a knowledge that is never complete. "The Wig Shop" highlights the development of Salle’s aesthetic.
The paintings of this period still include vintage Salle motifs - the sinister costumed dolls, the Giacometti heads, the vases and musical instruments but there is an increased emphasis of the isolation of the grisaille female figures, even as they become more prominent overall from the brightly painted dogs "Jar of Spirits" (1987), the still lifes, "Epaulettes for Walt Kuhn" (1987) and the figurines "Sextant in Dogtown" (1987). Though still deprived of colour, these female figures are painted in a more fully rounded manner and appear in each painting as the central article around which the other elements revolve. The female figures are now less overtly sexual and more completely fetishized.

Another main feature of this collection of works is that the layering technique now appears less prominent. Instead Salle disrupts the picture-plane primarily by juxtaposed and inserted images. Occupying gaudy grounds they are distinctly separated from each other, and the general composition, by clean-edged borders. The result is a more static surface that moves decisively in the direction of disengagement and paralysis but while still maintaining the vital components producing the tense equilibrium between orders of reality and degrees of tangibility.

"Pattern Cutter" (1989) is an evenly-divided vertical diptych, the left section comprises of the head of a charging boar set against a verdant fern-and leaf background, and the right section depicts a close-up of a woman holding a sheet of printed fabric, rendered in black-and-white monochrome with a highlighted tinge of pink. Two medium/large panels are inserted: a Negro lawn jockey in a red and white outfit transposed against a blue field of colour, and a Picasso-type clown head sculpture piece in bronze and orange. A prominent drip of white paint just above the boar's snout melts down into a brown patch below on which is scribbled a mirrored "Art Brut" type head. Along the middle horizontal, to the right of centre Salle placed a cartoon-sketch of a scowling woman in light-blue and a mannequin-like figure cut by a thin green vertical stripe.

Deleuze remarks: "Cinema ceased to be narrative, but it is with Godard that it becomes
the most “novelesque” (85). Godard gives the cinema the particular powers of the novel. He uses reflexive types as so many interceders through whom I is always another. It is the fractured line/zig-zag line, which combines the author, the characters and the world, and which interacts between them.

“Modern cinema develops new relations with thought from three points of view. The obliteration of a whole or of a totalization of images, in favour of an outside which is inserted between them; the erasure of the internal monologue as whole of the film, in favour of a free indirect discourse and vision; the erasure of the unity of man and the world, in favour of a break which now leaves us with only a belief in this world.”

(Gilles Deleuze) (86)
NOTES


2. Leo Steinberg has argued that an artist like Robert Rauschenberg, with whom Anselm Kiefer shares much in common, has moved away from giving privilege to the upright visual plane, turning instead to what Steinberg terms the "flatbed picture plane." Rauschenberg's complex overlapping images, many of which are reproduced from existing cultural images, create a sense of ambiguity for the viewer. In this respect they are similar to Salle's images. Steinberg continues:

   "Rauschenberg's picture plane had become a surface to which anything reachable - thinkable would adhere. It has to be whatever a billboard or dashboard is, and everything a projection screen is, with further affinities for anything that is flat and worked over - palimpsest, concealed plate, printer's proof, trial blank, chart, map aerial view. Any flat documentary surface that tabulates information is a relevant analogue for his picture plane - radically different from the transparent projection plane with its optical correspondence to man's visual field." (Leo Steinberg - "Other Criteria: Confrontations with Twentieth Century Art" (New York: Oxford University Press (1972)).

   The "flatbed" concerns the plane of action, rather than a purely visual plane, it is any kind of surface on which the artist "tabulates information" or produces transformations. Salle's overlapped/transposed images, in particular, seem to be such work surfaces. The subject supposedly located behind the Modernist picture surface is now transformed into an artist in the world, working/re-working surfaces to produce images whose significance is complex, as is a text. Steinberg's analysis converges with the ideas of Victor Burgin (See: "The End of Art Theory: Criticism and Postmodernity" London: MacMillan (1986)), when he writes

   "Rauschenberg's work surface stood for the mind itself - dump, reservoirs, switching center, abundant with concrete references freely associated as in an internal monologue - the outward symbol of the mind as a running transformer of the external world, constantly infesting incoming unprocessed data to be mapped in an overcharged field" (Leo Steinberg - ibid (1972)).

   Salle's work surface, similarly, seems to portray the mind of an artist as "abundant with concrete references" and as "a running transformer of the external world" rather than something confined to its own intentional space.

3. Salle adroitly manipulates the equivalence in principle of styles and themes, a mixture of sophistication, intelligence, naivety and wit, the lack of respect for the revered great cultural figures of history, the brazen treatment of sacrosanct myths and traditions, the proximity of calculation and perversion, along with a simultaneous melodramatic undertone.

   Salle's polarities have their formal origin in his foundation in the realm of conceptual colour-field painting associated with Richard Diebenkom. Additionally Salle's initial basics are comparable to the early work of Sigmar Polke with whom he is linked by an intellectual kinship to Dada and the surrealism of Francis Picabia. With Salle, what is surprising and new, as with Picabia, does not lie principally in the style, but in the substance and manner of the presentation.

   In the Postmodem condition reality has lost its uniform character and has disintegrated into numerous intricate sections which in turn, can be divided and duplicated. In these different realities the human subject is confronted with itself both as a stranger and as an alien. In the phase of profound extensive social/historical change art has ceased to pursue its utopian dream of any substantial human identity, the union of mind/body, the notion that
a relationship between humanity and the world could proceed harmoniously. This blatant absence of continuity in life comes to light particularly clearly in works of art.

Sigmar Polke's painted pictures/photographs/sculptures/spatial arrangements are a formal mixture of different visual worlds. It is an amalgamation of the artistic and the trivial, the manual and the industrially manufactured, Dada, Surrealism, curiosity and experiment.

Polke's definition of art, although thoroughly serious, contains a playful/risk associated perspective. Being ironical, Polke perceives the contemporary condition as unreal/grotesque/incongruous/deceptive/contradictory. With his ironical distance however, even Polke is inextricably involved in the world, with an odd kind of complicity. What makes his position so relevant is the fact that he is constantly attempting to come to terms with the postmodern condition, rather than denying it or seeking refuge in the soothing haven of a halcyon world.

Polke's art has been ascribed to numerous different movements. In his early paintings the world is reflected/projected in a confusing variety and on several levels/layers, so that the reality of the original pictures constitute a distorted image of empirical reality - confused/gnarled/inverted/tightly packed, as if everything were simultaneously on the point of collapse. Everyday experience is distorted beyond primary recognition, but in such a manner that we subsequently arrive at a more clearly comprehension. His paintings of the 80's confront the viewer with a "cosmos" of colours, indescent and dangerous (See: "The Computer Moves In (1983)/"Alice in Wonderland" (1987)). Under the influence of light and atmosphere they upon occasion transform entirely and even apparently disintegrate". The effect of his paintings is always compelling. It is an art of perpetual change. Nothing is fixed, everything is fluid and interlinked, with only very few fixed lines/contours that might lend support. One is engaged in a visual field with only a few familiar landmarks of reference. It is a version of reality that reveals itself via perceptions of seeing/feeling. It is ultimately intangible, though paradoxically constructed with conjuring tricks. It is a situation that negates the divide good/evil, beauty/horror. Polke is certainly prepared to take risks in order to realize his visions artistically and sensitize his addressee's warped powers of perception.

Polke adroitly manipulates all types of visual media. He is, it might be said, a visual "maniac". In fact there is not a visual medium which he has not addressed/incorporated and whose capacity to trigger off new experiences he has not explored. Polke is widely regarded as a key figure in contemporary art, his art and artistic stand-point have type-cast him into this role. The confident use of all the possibilities/opportunities afforded by the visual arts, both popular and serious/manual and technological, his extraordinary ability to combine these options, his profound inventiveness as well as the ironical distance he maintains, together with his undisguised subjectiveness - make Polke one of the foremost initiators of post-avant-garde art.

Polke's studio farm in Willich in the lower Rhine area has been described literally as a "laboratory" (Peter Schjedhhal) in which many of the elements were concocted which were to transform the artistic climate of the contemporary situation. Notably from time to time he has been joined by Achim Ducho, Walter Dahn, Julian Schnabel and David Salle, among others.

4 It is interesting that in his catalogue introduction to Jack Goldstein (New York: Hallwalls (1978)), Salle talks of "a clouded pool of personal symbols". Frequently when one artist writes about another he/she responds to qualities that are relevant to their own work. This sense of something being clouded over, either in terms of its original purpose or its immediate possibilities is highly appropriate to Salle. Meaning is something hazy but persistent. It can be abandoned momentarily but remains constant in some form.

5 "If world is in painting and you are imposing other worlds on top of world in painting, that is perhaps surrealism. But if there is literally no world in the painting, but there are just "worlds" and you are superimposing that in a way that becomes the painting, that's conceptually different. My work is about "no world" in painting" (David Salle). Quoted in Rosetta Brooks, "From the Night of Consumerism to the Dawn of Simulation" "Artforum" February 1985.

6 In 1984 Salle read George W.S. Trow's "Within the Context of No Context" (1981) and in 1985 he dedicated a painting to this author titled "The Cold Child" (for George Trow); after passages that appear under that heading in the writer's best known work. Lisa Liebmann describing Trow's book writes "Adrift in seas of psychosocial melancholia, "Within the Context of No Context" bohs along fitfully, in small blunts and large meditations, leaving a freighted trail of period lormotifs" (See: Lisa Liebmann "The Magic Lantern: lost visions of adulthood" in "David Salle" ed David Whitney Rizzoli: New York (1994).)


9. In “Francis Bacon: Logique de la sensation”, Deleuze analyses within Bacon’s paintings the production of a haptic space. Bacon’s painting does not simply invert the figurative’s tactile/optical space into abstract expressionism’s non-figurative manuall space, neither does it sublate the tactile/optical difference into the pure optical space of abstraction (where figuration is internalized) - it operates “figurally” within the figurative to produce a haptic space, which is when “sight itself discovers in itself a tactile function (“function de toucher”) which is proper to it, and belongs to it, distinct from its optical function. Deleuze declares unequivocally at the end of “Francis Bacon: Logique de la sensation” that the “passage” from hand to “haptic eye” “is the great moment in the act of painting”, since “it is there that the painting discovers at its base and in its own way the problem of a pure logic to pass from the possibility of fact to the fact.”


19. The haptic does not qualify a capability of sight, the sight attributed to a phenomenological body determined by an inherent/aient subjectivity, but delinates a sight/site where the subject is not constituted by either representation or phenomenological “sentir”. This “vue sans regard” defines the affectivity of the body not as an organism but as composition of power (“vue sans regard” is a phrase from Patrick Vauday: See “Ecrit à vue” - Deleuze -Bacon” in critique no 426 (1982) - the concise phrase, roughly “seeing without looking”, communicates the passivity/passion of a viewing/seeing experience which is non-constitutive, neither of what is seen nor of the seeing subject.


24. See “Le lisse et le stire” in Mille Plateaux p. 474. As a primary illustration for their discussion of this kind of spatiality, Deleuze and Guattari propose the quilt, traditional in American women’s art.

25. “The nomad distributes himself in a smooth space: he occupies, inhabits, holds that space; that is his territorial principle” (Gilles Deleuze and Guattari “Mille Plateaux” p 381).

This essential trait may be expressed either in terms of the nomad relation to the space inhabited or in terms of the space itself. Sedentary space is stratified, marked by enclosures and pathways between enclosures, nomadic space is smooth, broken only by temporary/switching traits. It is a fluid space, variable in its contours and lacking any totalizing dimension/directionality. It is characterized instead by its plurality of local directions. It is a rhizomatic space.


28. The term "conditional abstraction" is used by Kate Linker in "Individuals" catalogue published by the Los Angeles Museum of Contemporary Art (1991) identifying the "fading power of pure abstraction.

29. The typical model for the conception of the abstract within the philosophical tradition has been that of a taxonomic tree of distinct classes/types - One abstracts as one moves in an upward direction to higher levels of generality and one concretises/instantiates as one moves down towards particulars/specific instances of kinds. Therefore the dialectic that Plato confers upon Socrates centred upon the aim to discover the higher/more general Forms in the lower, more particular things which constituted them by confirming that the lineages are pure/unpolluted/unmixed, following the division of the tree, notions of both analogy/resemblance and force/potential ("dynamics") would be made to cohere to this "free-structured" model.

30. See: Duns Scotus "Philosophical Writings" trans. Allan Wotter - New York: Nelson (1962). One can speak of individuated entities within a plane of consistency, but they are not persons/subjects/things/substances, rather they are what Deleuze and Guattari call "hecceities" - a term borrowed from Duns Scotus, whose "haecceitas" may be translated as "thisness".

31. Gilles Deleuze - Preface to "Dialogues" with Claire Parnet - Paris: Flammarion (1977). The formula is adopted again in "Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?"


34. The introduction of effectivity as a criterion directly poses the question of the immanence/arbitrariness of the restricting instance. Effectivity in this context requires neither a transcendent instance nor is it dependent upon the arbitrariness of an extrinsic limitation. Recalling Plateau six - "November 28, 1947 How Do You Make Yourself a Body Without Organs?" of "Mille Plateaux", this would imply asserting that "effective" immanent restraint energises dissolution whilst transcendent limitation blocks/represses it and lack of restraint exhausts it. This affirmation however, seems to require a Spinozian perspective where effectivity and affect compose the body of sensation. The immanent synthesis of these two poles of sensation is what is exemplified in the final rubric of "Francis Bacon: Logique de la sensation", and perhaps the emphasis on the autonomy of the art work as monument-sensation in "Qu’est-ce-que la philosophie?" is in fact the expression of this immanence.

35. See: Gilles Deleuze "Le Bergsonisme" Paris: PUF (1968), and "Diffference et répétition" on the concept of the virtual. All problems communicate with one another and may be said to be explications of a single question. All ideas/problems, therefore, co-exist in a single virtual realm, an "informal" - pre-ceeding all specific form) groundless ("sans fond") unfounded (effondé) Chaos. The virtual is a chaos of chance which prevails upon us as an imperative (the violence of the idea as a provocations to thought) in the form of a question.


39. The introduction of affectivity as a criterion immediately poses the question of the immanence/arbitrariness of the restricted instance. Effectivity in this case neither requires a transcendent instance nor suffers from the arbitrariness of extrinsic limitations. In the light of Plateau six of "Mille Plateaux" this would mean asserting that "effective"/immanent restraint energises dissolution, whilst transcendent limitation blocks/represses it and lack of restraint exhausts it. This affirmation however would appear to require a Spinozian point of view where affectivity and affect compose the body of sensation. To reiterate the immanent relationship of these two kinds of sensation is what is produced in the final chapter of "Francis Bacon: Logique de la sensation", and perhaps the emphasis of the
autonomy of the art work as monument-sensation in "Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?" is none other than the expression of this immanence.

40 Gilles Deleuze - op. cit (1985)

41. This is one source of contention with the film semiology of Christian Metz. Deleuze suggests that one must position the second of his definitions of abstract in the prior position, see it as first as to regard narration as only "an indirect consequence that flows from movement and time rather than the other way around" (Gilles Deleuze - "Pourparlers").

42 Gilles Deleuze - op. cit (1985)

43. The genetic continuity between "Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?" and Deleuze's earlier work is obvious but may be succinctly summarized in respect to aesthetics by the following quotation: "The eternal object of painting: to paint forces". This statement re-asserts the claim Deleuze made regarding the painting of Francis Bacon - elaborating on Paul Klee's much repeated phrase, "not to render the visible, but to render visible" as signalling a "capture of forces" and resolutely not a reproduction of forms. (See: "Francis Bacon: Logique de la sensation")

44 See: Maurice Blanchot "L'entretien infini".

45. In 1995 David Salle directed a 90 mins. feature film "Search and Destroy", a dynamic and capricious narrative reminiscent superficially of John Landis "Into the Night/Martin Scorsese "After Hours"/Jonathan Demme "Something Wild" but suffused with sub-Godardian motifs. Including glorious character performances from Christopher Walken as a disturbed thrill addicted businessman (in an outlandish scene in which he sings and dances in a pop-art coloured restaurant we have a moment of supreme visual "decadence" that goes a long way towards redeeming the films many flaws) and John Turturro as Ron, the cast also included Rosanna Arquette and Ethan Hawke, with the films executive producer Martin Scorsese appearing in a cameo role.

Undaunted, the IRS threatening Martin Mirkheim (Griffin Donne) with bankruptcy by unpaid taxes, the ambitious but as yet unsuccessful business entrepreneur attempts to audaciously fulfill his dream of becoming a movie producer, turning Dr Luther Waxling's (television therapist) "Winner's philosophy" book into a film. The journey from Florida to LA "success" takes the underdog hero through a maze of enigmatic/bizarre/perverse experiences and strange characters, including principally the disturbed cable TV "self-help guru"/all American novelist Dr Luthar Waxing (Dennis Hopper)

Salle adopts a distinctive visual style using flat, brightly coloured, montage imagery shot by cinematographers Michael Spiller and Bobby Bukowski. It is the kind of film debut one would expect from a collagist painter with a "pervasive" and irreverent sensibility. A disjunctive fanatasia at the expense of the American myth of success. A haphazard/throwaway parody, the film is lacking in formal discipline and obviously under-rehearsed, but on occasion there is a scene/gesture that approaches a higher level of excellence.

46 Throughout Salle's emotional register one may discern a persistent theme that consistently evokes a sense of emptiness at the core of being. (See: Lisa Liebmann "Harlequinade for an Empty Room" On David Salle" Artoform Feb. (1987)). Salle undoubtedly has an acute sense of the threatening void, of the "Beckett-like" absurd human condition, and our vain attempt to impose order on the world. The dislocated quality of Beckett's stage images and his style of tragic vaudeville are resonant in Salle's dark humourdisengagement/sense of the absurd - his quest for panoramic incongruity.


48 See "David Salle, Works on Paper" (1974-1986) ed. Ernst A Busche, including extensive texts. Institute of Contemporary Art, Boston, December 9 1986.-February 8 1987. Drawing is indispensable to Salle's style. His painted line drawings have a kind of perverse wit - as if the drawings have drawn themselves, and he is being rather unkindly critical of the process. Salle's drawing refers to the standards or conventions of draftmanship in a way that is ironic and casual but very intense.

Jasper Johns came to the use of objects via Marcel Duchamp's Readymades. However, he went beyond Duchamp in that he highlighted the difference between sculpture and painting as it relates to the objects character. Through transferring the Duchampian impulse to another sphere of art practice, Johns established his own project in the exploration of the nature of the object. In addition he also demonstrated a different concept. He painted flags and targets (between 1955 and 1960/61) as a mechanism by which he could play upon the words "thing" and "picture", a variant on the more traditional dichotomy of "reality"/"illusion". By making the image either coincide with a real object or incorporate additional material - one flag or three flags, a target or a target plus other components - he suggested that the two words "thing" and "picture" cannot be separated in any meaningful way. In an interview in 1965 he said: "If the painting is an object then the object can be a painting" (W Hopps "Jasper Johns" Artforum ill No.6 March 1965). The question: is it art or an object? is rendered superfluous. In 1960 Johns illustrated the same point in sculpture, casting two Ballantine ale cans in bronze, one hollow, the other solid, he then overpainted the bronze to reproduce the cans illusionistically (see: M Kozloff "Jasper Johns" New York: Harry N Abrams (1969)).

In foregrounding the examination of paintings attempt to investigate, as painting, its internal dynamic relation to sculpture, as an essential constituent of the paintings fabrication, what is brought out is the primacy of meaning that may then be attributable to certain component details of the work integral to the construction of the work. The "complication" of the painted surface is not simply a self-reflexive concern with objectivity but a move towards a rigorous questioning of the fundamental basis of the activity of painting, that is altogether more forceful because it is a question initiated external to painting while at the same time being incorporated within the painting itself. Similarly this analysis extends to the relation of Johns to Salle in the introduction of material/fragments from the "outside" world onto/into their painted surfaces - the presence of elements that are both sculpture and painting becomes apparent, in a complex inter-relation within the painting.

In "Modernist Painting" (1961) Greenberg stated:

"It was the stressing however, of the ineluctable flatness of the support that remained most fundamental in the process by which pictorial art criticised and defined itself under Modernism. Flatness alone was unique and exclusive to that art....Flatness, two dimensionality, was the only condition painting shared with no other art, and so Modernist painting orientated itself to flatness as it did to nothing else"

What emerges in Johns and Salles work is a continual re-evaluation/re-assessment of the traditions of sculpture and painting that in turn initiates a questioning regarding reproduction and interpretation, undermining the basic assumptions of Modernist theory.

What Greenberg was advocating along the lines of a formal criticism was an analysis in which the principles of relevance were connected to an apparently coherent theory of development/progression in modern art, a theory according to which the internal motivation appropriate to each form of art resided in its tendency towards a self-definition and purity of means.

Greenberg identifies what painting shares with no other artform/medium - that is its quality/condition of flatness. The dynamic motivation of modernist painting is therefore explained as the intensification of the degree of flatness, a conceptual primacy that is centered on and orientated to the painting's external surface. This inevitably involves a negation of mimetic/descriptive/narrative content. In short this is essentially a rationale for limiting criticism/explanation to a concentration upon the formal/technical aspects as the elements/components of progression.

Traditionally the term "aesthetics" has been deployed in an "immaculate"/pure sense. This promotes the basic task of aesthetics as consisting dualistically in an operation to explicate a palpable absolute delineation of art and aesthetic experience and additionally the formulation of a definitive criteria of aesthetic excellence. This "immaculate" view is specifically linked to the rise of Modernism and the tendency to emphasise the prominence of formal values at the expense of overt narrative content, culminating ultimately in the emergence of non-objective art (Art reaches a stage of "autonomy", its production motivated and justified in purely artistic terms and it no longer depends upon external factors that have reference to social utility). It is within the conception of the idea of the purity of the medium, of a "specific art", that the traditionalist relies on Greenbergian aesthetics is located. From this basic point alone he derives his account of both the aesthetic meaning of modernist painting and its essential continuity with tradition.
It is in terms of a repudiation of Greenberg's work, and the type of art which it came to represent, that much of both the art and the art-theory produced since the mid-1960's has to be understood.


55. The question arises as to whether art should be concerned with/preserve its own specialized laws/issues/competencies and singularly be addressed to an elevated elite, actual or ideal - (the Modernist paradigm preserves a "utopian" vision of creative human expression untainted/unadulterated by either kitsch or political doctrine, it maintains an insulated, socially exclusive and gendered art together with an attendant discourse - or should alternatively art engage with the social/cultural world and express/foreground issues/controversies/interests that are negated or marginalized by dominant ideologies/narratives.


57. Clement Greenberg - ibid (1940)


59. Classically Kant has been closely allied to the project of Modernity - his project interpreted as basically Modernist in that it attempts to delineate finite lines of demarcation between philosophical knowledge/scientific method/aesthetic experience. However, while the introduction of such divisions are implicit within the Kantian programme, there exists a further dimension of complexity and comprehensiveness that can be applied and understood. The primary function of the "Critique of Judgement" is to demonstrate that in addition to existing as a distinct category of human experience, the aesthetic is also a united assemblage of various complex elements, whose appreciation is intricately linked, synchronically to theoretical reason and ethical freedom extending the dimensions of integrative comprehension.

60. In a manner similar to the way the reader receives the impression that modern painting stands as a logical link in the progress of painting, so also does Greenberg's criticism represent a logical/progressive link in the course of the history of criticism. While Greenberg claims Kant as his essential source, Nicolas Calas (See: N. Calas "The Enterprise of Criticism" in "Art in the Age of Risk" New York: E. P. Dutton and Co. (1968)) noted that his ideas owe more to Hegel in reality, even though his influence observes its own limitations.

The terms "interiority/exteriority/fixedness" within the interpretive - the contested field of interpretation. It is thus that their meanings are important because they are fluid. Even when apparently set/definite they remain open to negotiation. This is already present in the register of finitude - the work has the capacity to be re-released, the possibility of negotiation can never be entirely exhausted. At the primary level that endures is the presence of this possibility as an inherent and ineliminable potential.

The images of Géricault are often and obviously quoted by Salle. The famous painted studies of severed limbs and the equally notable turbaned Turkish head, appear in perhaps a dozen paintings or more. Géricault's presence in Salle's oeuvre dates back to 1985 "Géricault's Arm" in which a distinctively forceful depiction of a corpse-like limb emerges, violently and ominously, from the torso of a grey studio nude, in the place of her own arms and head. The painterly physicality and powerful emotional pitch recall both Géricault and perhaps Francis Bacon. (At first it would appear as if these examples represent the antithesis of a painter like Salle who prioritizes an intellectualized dry/distanced emotional frigidity, but Salle at his most ambitious attempts nothing less than History Painting, and therefore in the cause of such a progressive enterprise the foremost precedents are accessed).

In addition the visceral intensity of Géricault's concentration allied to the impassive rendering of disembodied bodily sections gives Salle's studies a perverse and paradoxical carnality. Their peculiar intensity emanates from an imaginative indication towards "Sadism". This is what probably appeals to the Sadean in Salle.

Longo and Salle may be said to have succeeded in re-introducing an attitude to the present art-scene which prevailed and was characteristic of the time of Baroque - they...
regard themselves as employing an entire range of artistic techniques/strategies to concentrate primarily on effects. It is also the medium of film which has inspired both practitioners, with its comprehensive apparatus for stimulating/evoking emotion and passion - additionally Longo emphasizes the staged/set-piece arrangement particularly/notably in the category of installations.

In observing the production of Salle and Longo's work one can perceive a distinctive emphasis on "special effects" which frequently attempt to overpower the stringent noise of the mass media with visual material that is especially inflammatory - like their contemporary Julian Schnabel, they endeavour to overwhelm the viewer/audience with a tremendous barrage of images/means of representation.

Salle's work from the period he was enrolled at the California Institute of the Arts, in Valencia, near Los Angeles (1970-75) shows evidence of much photographic based material. In a four-scene piece of four bathrobed women, "Untitled" (1973), each is photographed in a Kitchen situation, holding a cup of coffee and staring out of the window. A different coffee brand label is placed at the lower edge of each picture, an ironic comment on the way individuals become functions of commerce - consumed by what is consumed. (Kenneth Baker discussed this work when it was included in Salle's first show, organized by Paul McMahon for Projects Inc., Cambridge Massachusetts (1974) - see Baker, Kenneth "It's the Thought that counts" - The Boston Phoenix 24 September 1974, section 2 B9. Salle underlined the following sentence in the review. "What makes the piece successful as art is the way it connects our inquiry into its meaning with our incessant inquiry into what's going on with other people")

In "One Year at 55MPH" (1975) another early work, Salle wearing aviator sunglasses, sits in the driver's seat of a car, facing the passenger's seat (and the camera). The title is placed directly/prominently to the right. Numerous signatures surround the two sections of mounted information.

Salle engages with popular images/objects, he then shows the perversity of the society as a whole - its demoralizing of individuals by reducing them to an equation with images/objects which are in the end disappointingly vacuous. Salle's art is an aesthetic of discontent, disclosed via methods of contradiction that centre on the problematic of representation and object relations. Salle's concern appears to depart from an interest that illustrates the internal character of external objects, and the power of internal objects over the external world. He essentially constructs an equity of disillusioned longing between the internal and external worlds, a longing exacerbated/more intense because the objects he depicts have an eternally perverse/partial nature.

In 1975 David Salle re-located in New York and was employed by a magazine company. This experience fuelled his earlier fascination with photography, with the iconography of mass-circulation, especially the representation of women as metaphors of consumption.

In his early painting "Vivid Cuban Words" (1980) the lush poolside image is drained of colour, sapping its glossy life and rendering it grisaille, in the apparent neutrality of a black-and-white photograph. The figures make no contact - the two in the pool gaze at the woman on the left as we gaze at their luxurious environment, at the ostentatiously ersatz "naturality" of the shaped pool and potted vegetation. Glamour appears/existing only at a distance - via the photographic medium. The sixteen regular yellow dots on "Vivid Cuban Words" read like the serial on a negative, a distancing device that reminds us of the artifice of the infinite reproducibility, of the "reality" before us. Salle's painting has often pivoted on the re-cycling of motifs, disjointed and juxtaposed, by adding multiple layers of mystification and incongruity complemented frequently with jangling disparate titles.)

After Joseph de Ribera's "Clubfooted Boy" (1652)

75 Gilles Deleuze - op-cit (1985).
76 Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1985).
77 Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1985).
78 Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1985).
81 The painting "Marking through Webern" (1987) is a complex and finely tuned performance that underlies the centrality of music and dance as analogous modes for discussing the way Salle structures his work and the kinds of meanings it conveys. The works engender a condition where both choreographic and dance rhythm focus, moment by moment, on the concrete impetus of musical structures.

Salle twice deployed/exercised these elements directly in the mid-1980's in partnership with the dancer and choreographer Karole Armitage, whom he met in 1982 and who was
known for radically disjunctive/punk influenced ballets, such as "Drastic Classicism" and "Watteau Duets". In the Spring of 1986 an Armitage piece, with sets and costumes designed by Salle, was commissioned by Mikhail Baryshnikov for the American Ballet Theatre. Titled "The Mollino Room" after the modern Italian architect/designer Carlo Mollino, it opened at the Kennedy Center, Washington and later the Metropolitan Opera House, New York and was performed to a score consisting of two movements by Hindemith and a recording of a 1960's Mike Nichols and Elaine May routine called "My Son the Nurse".

(See "David Salle" by Peter Schjedahl, ArTrandom (1989) "Karole Armitage and David Salle. Three years of the ballet stage").

The fact that Salle should have chosen to collaborate directly with Karole Armitage, is no cause for surprise. Armitage builds her work in much the same way as Salle with a similar insistence on a mosaic scheme/technique of components/fragments, the same exploitation of dischord and the ambiguous, and even possibly the same understanding of the body as the location of human inquiry. "The Mollino Room" echoes Salle's willingness in his paintings to mix cartoon and quotations from Art History. The reference to Carlo Mollino is explanatory and appropriate - Mollino is a seminal figure in the evolution of European modern style and his work is based on the evocation and juxtaposition of different period styles. This is precisely the procedure/strategy of Salle and Armitage in their respective domains. "The European Phrasing of the Late Albert Ayler" (1987) for which Salle produced both the costumes and the decor is more ambitious. It is an eclectic fusion of music by Webern/Stravinsky/Ayler together with Lord Buckley and Yo-Yo Ma. It proved a dazzling production, "Ayler hits a plateau of harmonious erotic feeling, powerful and free... that I want to call courtly" (Peter Schjedahl - Review of Armitage/Salle collaboration "The Elizabethan Phrasing of Albert Ayler").

What is significant is the push towards a synthesis within the clear evidence of the interdependence of the sections/parts of construction. Salle and Armitage aim to "structure" improvisation. What they locate in Ayler is the power of convincing phrasing. What attracts Salle principally is Ayler's capacity to arrange complex statements and to construct spontaneous variations which reflect the contours of a theme. Ayler adopts the technique of extending a solo based on a simple theme because this allows him to create a series of sounds of extraordinary force and effectiveness, while at the same time maintaining the comprehensive architecture of the piece in a direct and communicable mode. Salle in much the same way utilizes a method that enables him to problematize this field of references without losing control - fusing easy familiarity with radical ambiguity, creating a tension at the interfaces of images wilfully denying the literal surface of meaning.

Salle's association with Armitage led him not only to work as a costume/set designer/collaborator for her productions but it also gave the movement of the figure more prominence in his pictures. In the left hand panel of "The Trucks bring Things" (1984) the contorted female nude, head cropped dramatically by the lower edge of the canvas, seems to tumble among the furniture pieces - the movement appears extravagant/inexplicable. Daubed over this image hovers the head and shoulders of a woman, disembodied, perhaps the absent head of the naked figure beneath. Both images seem "half-remembered/half-perceived". Salle contrasts this with a motif taken from a famous mid-century advertisement - a confident, bustling gent gestures to a barman to bring another drink to his table. This painting seems to concern the legibility of the body, indicating how the body's actions may be instinctive/particularized, ambiguous even incomprehensible.

The disparate elements come to form an "integrated unity" a concept of pictorial and compositional space with a history - the space of time. What enpowers the postmodern work of art is a principalled oscillation between presence and absence, between experience and its memory traces.

82. Gilles Deleuze - op. cit (1985)
83. Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1985)
84. Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1985)
85. Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1985)
86. Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1985)
THE MIRROR OF ENIGMAS (NUMBERS IN THE DARK)

There exist many analogies that may be discerned between the work of David Lynch and David Salle. Lynch's cinematic imagery appears redolent with possibilities that can as a mechanism operate as a metaphorical structure which, in the following section, firstly we can conduct an analysis of elements of David Salle's oeuvre, and secondly to progressively animate Gilles Deleuze's concentration, in his later work, on philosophy/cinema/art/literature. Ultimately the intention is to construct original linkages between these components - it is always a process of advancing Deleuzoguattarian terminology in other directions.

David Salle's paintings capture a glamorous/visually extravagant style and he finds a similar elaborately constructed visual world in the cinema. Lynch has himself acknowledged, and it is an affirmation that is confirmed by Salle, that he is involved with the "melos" of American melodrama, with the undercurrents/subtexts that flow under a story and allow one to express something beyond "narrative" possibilities. Both artists use violent but distanced/mediated images as a counterweight to surface superficiality/sugary excess. This distance is essentially apparent, and moreover it is a strategy that both artists use as a means of being present to the world, attentive and open. The "story" becomes, then, a pretext, a support on which to hang a fascination with human insincerity and an overwhelming sense of melancholic despair. Melodrama is a genre that is attractive explicitly because it is larger than life - an artifice to present the most dramatic incidents and emotions of life in one's own timescale and with one's own timing.

The scenery in Salle's paintings, as frigid as it is manneristic, has much to do with his fondness for the America of the 1950's/early 60's era, expressed not only in the design/furniture elements, but also often in garish/vibrant colour schemes. Beginning with the early "nouvelle vague" paintings and culminating with his rhetorically disparate recent works this formative era reverberates throughout Salle's oeuvre.
"........the photograph on the dashboard,
taken years ago,
turned around backwards so the windshield shows,
every streetlight reveals a picture in reverse,
still so much clearer....... 

REM
Nightswimming
Godard's compelling fusion of radical chic and television angst are inculcated in the atmosphere of Salle's first "New York paintings" and emanations from the "American Graffiti Dream" ("Life" for example magazine advertisements for alcohol cigarettes/sweets/household appliances/model's of domestication) - supply most of the ostensible content/material of the later "Early Product Paintings". American middle-class ideals, in the sleek form/the perfect surfaces of Salle's depictions, take on the quality of something positively monstrous and oppressive. There is an ironic recognition that "decent-type" people in their small towns with their "white-fenced" values are desperately holding onto all they have got. Salle knowingly acknowledges that American fables of redemption are now a mere nostalgic illusion. They offer no psychic renewal. The old theme of American individualism aspiring to move forward in time and space unencumbered by guilt or reflection in human limitations is certainly unavailable to the guilt-ridden psyche that defines the contemporary human condition. (1)

Salle has a real love for the popular myths of American culture and a genuine nostalgia for some lost age of innocence when life was simpler. He also knows however that this world may never have existed, that even at the time things were not the way the media represented them, and that our memory and imagination may well be based on untruths. Salle's work suggests that all America is a society of ghosts, and that contemporary American civilization in general has been seduced by the attributes of its own popular culture. It has become a country where nothing lasts, where people pursue visions that lead nowhere, and where all relationships are transitory. Not only has culture taken full possession of imagination/memory/identity, but the proliferation of images produced via interaction in time and space has led to a proliferation of the self, to a land of multiple schizophrenia.

In David Lynch's 1986 film "Blue Velvet" Lumberton is presented in imagery which unmistakably conjures up mythic small-town America, (familiar from Capra and Sturges), orderly and lawful on the surface yet disturbed and chaotic underneath (2). Lynch has described "Blue Velvet" as a "story of love and mystery. It is ostensibly about a guy who
lives in two worlds at the same time, one of which is pleasant and the other dark and terrifying” (3). Neither of these two worlds are entirely contemporaneous with ours. Lynch succeeds in mixing the atmosphere of the 1950's with that of today, so that we are no longer able to locate exactly where we are. (The 1950's are a rich source of inspiration for Lynch. “Blue Velvet” and “Twin Peaks” are both imbued with an idealized pastiche of a 50's “look” - clothes/cars/roadhouse diners/apron-dressed smiling women/high school parties/friendly local stores) For Lynch the main protagonist of “Blue Velvet”, Jeffrey Beaumont, also belongs to an earlier period: “The boy is an idealist. He behaves like young people in the 50's, and the little town where I filmed is a good reflection of the naive climate there was back then. The local people tended to think the way people did 30 years ago, their houses, cars and accents have remained the same” (4).

“Blue Velvet” as Lynch says is , "a film that deals with things that are hidden within a small town called Lumberton and things that are hidden within people” (5) “Blue Velvet" is informed by a complex world view, the central matrix is the locus for the generation of a series of possibilities between civilization/savagery, pure love/carnality, morality/immorality, town/wilderness, possibilities ingrained within mythic American fiction In a sense “Blue Velvet” regards/acknowledges the complexity of experience existing between good and evil. By extension the corollary of this is the conflicted/ambiguous philosophy of nature which we find in American culture (6).

Lumberton is a fantasy mirror, an idyllic American utopia. Beyond the city and the suburbs, where family/community/morality decay at an ever-increasing rate, there is the small town at the edge of nature. Beyond the corrupting influence of contemporary civilization, the world is beneficent and man is best capable of realizing his full potential as simple, decent and hard working. Lumberton is home - a metonymy for America - a typical American small town in the midst of a forest, combining all the resources of its organized comfort and sense of order to resist an infinitely mysterious environment. It is a town where one feels protected from emptiness and the forces of cosmic darkness,
by the little restaurant, the fireman who waves hello from his big red fire engine, the sheriff's department run by a kindly sheriff and the houses with neat gardens bordered by white fences under a perfect blue sky, and where everybody knows everybody.(7).

However, in the film world of David Lynch, order is unremittingly vulnerable - the forces of chaos lie just beneath the surface, ready to exploit any frailty. Beneath the well-tended suburban lawns ants and beetles tear each other apart with venomous intensity. (The insect incarnates the brutal/anonymous/swarming "animality" of the species, an "animalistic" horror at its most "alien"/incomprehensible, contradicting any existential notions of life. For insects "living" is reduced to mechanical reproduction and pullulation.) A gold-framed photograph of a high-school sophomore conceals a life of drug abuse/promiscuity/self-degradation Lynch penetrates the "civilized" surface of everyday life to discover strange undercurrents of perverse passion, probing beneath the layers to expose the dark/irrational motivations above which the mundane world is just a façade (8).

Arriving in Lumberton, Jeffrey Beaumont enters an unstable town in the process of revelation, a process that threatens to peel away the town's homespun/calm surface and leave nothing but an incarnate evil underneath. Once night falls and the shadows deepen, one can perceive the malevolent presence of evil. In the opening sequence of "Blue Velvet", the garishly red roses and yellow tulips contrasted against a perfect white picket fence and the vivid green of a freshly cut lawn, are a pastiche upon the stereotypical attributes of suburban happiness, the banal made strange with intent. Lynch's extreme imagery signifies a dissatisfaction with the cinema's constant recourse to clichéd images. When, in the same sequence, a fireman on a passing fire-engine looks directly into the camera, smiles and waves, the effect is comic, but are we supposed to laugh? Beneath this suburban idyll, the forces of chaos seem to lay in wait, ready to engulf/disintegrate stability. Is it that Lynch is laughing at himself, that he is mockingly lured into his own pastiched image of the suburban American dream? (9).
The billowing blue velvet curtain in "Blue Velvet's" opening credits creates a mood of intrigue/subterfuge. Curtains conceal, both for the viewer inside looking out, and the observer outside looking in. They represent a shifting surface behind which may be discovered a performance, as in the theatre, or a performer, as in a nightclub. Curtains cover windows/doors/spaces. The velvet curtain represents the seductive surface of artifice.

"I like the idea that everything has a surface which hides much more underneath" says Lynch. "Someone can look very well and have a whole bunch of diseases cooking; there are all sorts of dark twisted things lurking down there. I go down in that darkness and see what's there" (David Lynch) (10).

Lynch's preoccupation with surfaces implies a risk of dealing only with surfaces, specifically the superficial surface without depth. The television series "Twin Peaks" guides the viewer through a multi-layered text of surfaces, with isolated moments of clarity. By contrast the film version "Twin Peaks": Fire Walk with Me" emerges as a text of elaborate surfaces, with periodic revelations of what lies beyond the superficial.

The velvet curtain is David Lynch's metaphor for surface. We look behind the velvet curtain seeking meaning, but there is no guarantee we can locate it. What we discover ultimately takes us beneath our own "surfaces", in mind and flesh - especially flesh.

"I'm real keen on the Mid-West, downtown L.A., Egyptian hieroglyphics, black-and-white German expressionism and art-deco" (11)

To balance the choice of expressionism in this list one might add:

"I like diners. I don't like dark places. I like light places with Formica and metal and nice shiny silver -metal, mugs, glasses, a good Coca-Cola machine. So I'm looking for stories or a script in the 50's, you know, detectives and that kind of thing - diner stuff"
(David Lynch)(12)
The realization of this is "Blue Velvet", where 40's "noir" meets 50's diner culture meets a postmodern "bricolage".

David Salle clearly enjoys the crass over-simplifications, the uncomplicated vulgarity and the transparent falsity of 50's style. Salle similarly to Lynch makes us comply to the sliding surfaces that are alluring and seductive as long as you ask no questions, where the skilful use of simultaneity immediately complicates the image, and where as soon as we begin to unravel the distinct elements we become lost in a maze of questions and conflicting emotions. (13).

In certain of Salle’s paintings, we are witness to the most hidden desires, secret longings, sexual obsessions. Deprived of intimacy, they are dragged into the light and thereby enlarged onto an over dimensional format to such an extent that they are rendered objects of public display. For example the five-meter wide painting "The Tulip Mania of Holland" (1985) by its scale alone transfers the nocturnal world of the peepshow into a sphere of general availability. There is no seductiveness, there rarely is with Salle’s nudes, they lack pornography’s obligatory illusion of ecstasy - the models are engaged not in an act of sexual play but in the laborious process of poses that precisely by appearing forced/unnatural dramatize the "reality" not the fantasy of femaleness. The upper panel is constructed from an "atomic-age" garishly coloured synthetic fabric, making an eloquent use of the two-panel system - literally a realm unattainable, a firmament of dreams. Also included in this design scheme Salle integrates three images of African tribes-people in murky photographs, and four views of a hyper-kitsch 50’s Italian-style armchair. On the panel below along with the two nudes we have the sketch of a young man (from John Singer Sargent) and an insert painting of male genitals. The distorted perspectives, the placement of the nudes on examination table-tops generates distance anew, and an atmosphere of melancholic despair encircles the observer. The tension between above and below/far and near/then and now is a closed loop, endless and excruciating.
“Blue Velvet” like “Wild at Heart” (1990) and “Twin Peaks” (1989) offers a reckless/frenzied and often violent journey through peculiar and perverse worlds - the dark side of the human psyche - and as an audience we function as voyeurs into these worlds; intrigued and fascinated by what we see, yet always distanced from it. One of the dominant tones, that produces a degree of aesthetic consistency in Salle’s work is the undercurrent of erotic play that becomes a syntax for dealing with controlled violence. In both Salle and Lynch’s work there is an oscillation between the urge to repress knowledge into secrecy and the compulsion to reveal what is concealed. Salle’s paintings, as with Lynch’s later films are laced with figurations and gestures revealing a preoccupation with secret passages/narratives-mirrors/disguises/masks/eaves dropping secret relationships/individualism/the threat of sexual violence. Both artists achievement is to combine high dramatic/romantic pathos with postmodern pastiche. (14)

Lynch’s work suggests a formal organisation of material which achieves interest by using forms interrogatively rather than in a closed, autotelic style (like Salle the “narrative units” are not conventionally arranged to be interpreted, rather they seem to point to a process-image-ordering/ derivation of meaning and significance). The actual plot of "Blue Velvet" is not an end in itself - it always serves a meaning, for “narratives” are not related for their own sake but for the demonstration of something that extends beyond themselves - we can always figure out acts of reading that will offer a new and significant sense of an ending

In the project Deleuze does not try to abandon binarized thought, or to replace it with an alternative, rather binarized categories are played off against each other rendered molecular and analyzed in their molar particularities so that the possibilities of reconnections and realignments in different "systems" are established - (the outside/ exterior does not necessarily remain eternally counterpoised to an interiority that it contains) - the outside is the transmutability of the inside. It is for this reason that Deleuze advocates linking the outside not with the inside, but with the “real”. The outside is a “virtual” condition of the inside, as equally real (15), as time is the virtual of space.
The virtual is immanent in the real (Thought is the confrontation/encounter with an outside)

In the Deleuzian understanding of the time-image in cinema the outside is what displaces the inside what emerges is passed from without to effect an interiority, (the problem is posed to concepts, to thinking, from/as the outside that can only appear to thought as the thought, and to sight as the unseen). The outside insinuates itself into thought, drawing knowledge outside of itself/outside of what is expected, producing a space it can occupy - an outside within the inside. Significantly Deleuze claims that the outside must be thought itself. Thought is projected/captured/identified insofar as it is integrated into networks of knowledge/subjectification.(16) (17).

It is not in a convergence but in the process of disjunction that the outside is active in the production of an inside. This explains why, for Deleuze, the middle is always the privileged initiation point (thought is primarily operative "in between"). Thought begins in the middle/at the point of intersection of two series/events/processes that, however transitional, share a moment of convergence. Ultimately however, the interiority of this interaction is not the principle area of concern, alternatively the focus concentrates on the means of alignment/connection, creating a plane of co-existence facilitated by the operations of the outside. "Becoming" is the activity via which the two series transform - becoming is bodily thought, the ways thought/force/change come to invest/invent new series, metamorphosing new bodies from the old via an active engagement

"What counts is .......... the interstices between images (in cinema), between two images:

a spacing which means that each image is plucked from the void and falls back into it"

(Gilles Deleuze) (18)

Becoming is what facilitates the action of a trait/line/orientation/event to be disengaged from a system/series/object which consequently may effect a transformation of the whole, making it no longer function singularly - it is a process of the encounter that releases
something from each protagonistic element and in that process, makes "real" a virtuality, a series of enabling/transformative possibilities - both subject and object are transformed via the encounter. (19).

Thought exists between a cause and its habitual effect, between one being and another. It is an unhinging/a re-arrangement of order/organization not to replace but to re-order. Thought may not primarily produce a new entity but may intersect to cause a "stammer"/hesitation/pause - thought can actively function passively to interrupt habit/expectation by enabling something already in the series/subject/order to "become". Thought consists in extending the space/"zone of indeterminacy" between stimulus and response producing further potential responses to the extent that confronted with an individual stimulus a reaction cannot be predicted. Thought-in-becoming is less a novel action than a non-action of derangement of stimulus response circuits in order to create a space/zone where chance/change may intervene.

Lynch utilizes "narrative" units of a specific type; they are what he would term secrets/facets/atmospheres of a particular environment/world, like "found objects" within the milieux he creates on film. The "narratives" are the elements of information, or the style of the brushstrokes, that define these constructs. ("Twin Peaks" operates as a fascinating contradiction: its overall direction concentrates upon the hunt for a killer, but this is a device/excuse for visiting the place Twin Peaks; the stories of the people who live there are full of idiosyncrasy/mystery/menace but they have no essential "narrative" purpose, hence the extension of narrative themes/flows into paranoid circuits and complications.)

The European conception of the book ("the arborescent search and return to the old world") is opposed to the American conception: "...there is the rhizomatic West, with its Indians without ancestry, its ever-receding limit, its shifting and displaced frontiers. There is a whole American "map" in the West, where even the trees form rhizomes. America reversed the directions: it put its Orient in the West, as if it were precisely in America that
the earth came full circle; its West is the edge of the East" (Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari) (20). The authors refer to Leslie Fiedler's "The Return of the Vanishing America" (21) to illustrate the geographic element that functions in American literature. They suggest that the search for an American "code" intersects with other searches. Deleuze and Guattari conclude that an American writer/artist creates a cartography within his or her style. In contrast to the European model, each artist/writer constructs a map that is directly connected to the "real" social movements crossing America. Supplementing this geographic/cartographic construct Deleuze and Guattari add a rhizomatic dimension, therefore this movement within American literature/texts is not specifically a question of a particular place, nor of a given moment in history, even less a particular category of thought. It is a question of a model, which is constantly set-up and then dismantled, and of a process which is constantly prolonged, which continually breaks off and begins again.

"the world is changing, and we are changing within it. As soon as you think you've got something figured out, it's different. That's what I try to do. I don't try to do anything new, or weird or David Lynch".

(David Lynch) (22).

The aura of degeneration and evil that emanates from "Blue Velvet" is one whose terror achieves its fear and its thrill not through a palpable darkness, but through an impalpable uncertainty. As in many thrillers Jeffrey's motives become confused: "I don't know whether you're a detective or a pervert" Sandy says to him. Jeffrey uncovers a violent/transgressive side of his "wholesome" hometown but in doing so he also makes uncomfortable discoveries about himself.

"Blue Velvet" does not simply register some anterior evil lurking in the American landscape/psyche, but it constructs this evil (and its antithesis) through a fruitful imbalance of its formal operations. Far from simply fitting into pre-established traditions "Blue Velvet" challenges the basic assumption of traditions - that pessimism is somehow
more real/true than optimism. The film performs this challenge by making the evil
catalytic and manoeuvrable rather than dogmatic and manipulative.

For the majority of analysis Deleuzian film-theory is framed in a Bergsonian/Peircean
language of “images”/“signs”. If inventively/procreatively one connects the final chapter
of “Cinema 2” and the chapter on “le visible”/“l’enoncable” in “Foucault” one may perceive
that cinema, like painting, can be for Deleuze an art that integrates/centres forces.

In “Foucault” Deleuze identifies Foucault’s early “archaeologies of knowledge” as
organized around the opposition of “le visible” and “l’enoncable” - “that which can be
seen” and “that which can be stated”. What Foucault demonstrates is that knowledge
takes shape via relations of forces that make certain things visible/sayable and others
invisible/unsayable. In the historical formation of knowledge, configurations of forces
dictate the conditions of visibility/enunciability of all possible objects of knowledge, but the
forces of the visible and the forces of the sayable are not the same, nor do the visible and
the sayable directly relate to one another as referent to sign or signified to signifier. Each
has its separate history of formation and each its separate configuration of forces, even
though the two do impinge on and influence one another.

In his “archaeological studies” Foucault distinguishes the domains of the visible and the
sayable and brings into relief the forces that shape those domains. In this sense, his
work is consonant with the work of certain contemporary film-makers, who in terms of
Deleuzian film-theory take as their project the creation of a cinema that is explicitly audio-
visual, in which sounds and images are treated as separate components with
autonomous modes of organisation/articulation. Deleuze argues for example, in “Cinema
2” that the film-makers of the French New Wave disrupt the classic cinema’s traditional
co-ordination of sound and image and inaugurate an innovative practice in which sound
and image function as self-contained compositional elements. In modern cinema,
speech, instead of influencing organizing images, folds back on itself and becomes de-
naturalized. “...new types of speech-act and new structurations of space. An
"archaeological" conception almost in Michel Foucault's sense. It is a method that Godard was to inherit, and which he would make the basis of his own pedagogy" (Gilles Deleuze) (23). For example in the later films of David Lynch, the characters deliver lines of dialogue as if they were overhearing someone else speaking, their speech resonating less with their interlocutors' discourse than with itself. In addition visual images are no longer connected specifically to the rational co-ordinates of a narrative space/time, but are juxtaposed in non-rational sequences that function as direct images of time, while the visual space of the image becomes "archaeological, stratigraphic, tectonic" an anonymous/empty/disconnected space whose "pictorial or sculptural qualities depend on a geological, tectonic power as in Cézanne's Mountains" (Gilles Deleuze) (24)

“A whole pedagogy is required here, because we have to read the visual as well as hear the speech-act in a new way.... a "Godardian pedagogy" "(Gilles Deleuze) (25)

This new regime consists of images and sequences that are no longer linked by rational cuts, which end the first or begin the second, but are re-linked in conjunction with irrational cuts, which no longer belong to either of the two and are valid in themselves (interstices). Irrational cuts thus have a disjunctive value.

What Lynch makes visible and sayable in his films are invisible and unsayable forces, the same forces that structure the Foucaultian archives of "le visible" and "l'énonçable". Lynch engages the forces that structure the visible and the sayable and by defamiliarizing conventional images and sounds, creates sonic and optic assemblages that render audible and visible unheard and unseen forces.

In the same way David Salle effects discordant "visual music" in paintings like "Black Bra" (1983) with its cinematic close-up of eyes, its Cezanne-esque apples, and its brandished brassière. Indeed the painter's 1988 exhibition at the Mary Boone Gallery, which included such restlessly complex works as "The Wig Shop" (1987) "The Kelly Bag" (1987) and "Symphony Concertante 11" (1987), was remarkable for its compositional turbulence -
doubled imagery, multiple inserts and aspects, frantically agitating semi-nudes, intricate reprises and head-on collisions of imagistic motifs. These are some of the Salle's darkest but imagistically richest works.

In Deleuzian philosophy the emphasis on choice and an affirmation of alterity requires the creation of new concepts. In "Le pli: Leibniz et le baroque" (1988) (26), Deleuze constructs the notion of the fold as an anti-extensional concept of the multiple/an anti-dialectical concept of the event/ an anti-Cartesian concept of the subject (27). Deleuze's fold is a figure of the multiple located in an anti-set-theoretical ontology - Deleuze's multiple folds/unfolds appear in the manner of an organic process of expansion/contraction which is in direct contrast to the Cartesian concept of extension which is present and determined by shock(28).

Philosophy according to Deleuze, is not an inference, but rather a "narration". What he says about the Baroque can equally be applied to his own style of thought: "the description takes the place of the object, the concept becomes narrative, and the subject (becomes) point of view or subject of the enunciation" (29). Baroque forms exist with an extreme level of intensity that is intrinsic to them, they fragment even as they evolve/develop, they tend to occupy space in every direction, to punctuate it, to become contemporary with all its multiple possibilities. Deleuze identifies in Liebniz's thought the play of a dualistic movement between fixity and passage, the activity of a simultaneous mobility and closure of concepts. This confirms what Deleuze observes about the sufficiency of Liebnizian reason, an "extraordinary philosophical activity which consists in the creation of principles", where there are "two poles, are towards which all principles are folding themselves together, the other toward which they are all unfolding, in the opposite way". The double movement characterizes what Deleuze calls "the extreme taste for principles", far from favouring the division into compartmentalization that "presides over the passage of beings, of things, and of concepts under all kinds of mobile partitions" (30).
"Le Pli : Leibniz et le baroque" is not simply an explication of a history of philosophy/art. Deleuze suggests that it is a process wherein the Baroque is reconciled with the concept it is perceived to "lack". It may be said to be a stratum in the "geology" of the present (the continuity/discontinuity of the Leibniz series and its connections with various other series).

The most succinct formulation of the relations between the Baroque and the present would be that the Baroque "exists within our present condition." The Baroque in contemporary culture is not concerned with a nostalgia for the past but a possibility endemic to and perhaps unrealizable in the present. If the contemporary condition is Baroque it is because of the unrelenting and prevailing crisis of postmodern culture requiring faster and faster circulation, more and more artifice to realize value and secure subjects. If a Baroque thought process is integrated within our present condition by means of the simultaneous mechanisms of an enclosure and an opening onto a world, the same it may be said is applicable to Leibniz. If we proceed to trace and integrate Leibnizian notions about a compound substance being composed of a multiplicity of monadic substances, and being defined in terms of existence as a unity of movement and transition, then one could interpret the singular predicates which define this notion as relations to the world. For example, one would have a Leibniz constituted around a number of "pre-individual" singularities - a "transvaluation" of all values.

Deleuze argues that it is possible to discover the actuality of Leibniz across the range/spectrum of his work. For example, we might locate a key mechanism in Leibniz's mathematics - the process of extracting an irrational number. The number within comprises of a complete series of rational numbers, or as with existence/the sphere of contingent truths, the extraction of a differential relating incommensurable series and contained within "a certain potential".

The Deleuzian concept of the fold gives us a new Leibniz "incompossible" with the traditional Leibniz. Leibniz's theories about "incompossibility" may afford a way/method of thought regarding self-organizing systems. Reading Leibniz, Deleuze finds in his work
numerous examples of a root differential which brings together incommensurable series. Leibniz use of the Neo-Platonic triad of explication-implication-complication-already demonstrates the sharing of a common root, "le pli" - a substantive/verbal morphological form. Deleuze's reading of Leibniz replicates Leibnizian principles with the intention of extending his claims beyond the limits he had established for them himself. "Leibniz innovates when he invokes a profoundly original relation among all possible worlds. By stating that it is a great mystery buried in God's understanding, Leibniz gives the new relation the name of "incompossibility". We discover that we are in a dilemma of seeking the solution to a Leibnizian problem under the conditions that Leibniz has established. We cannot know what God's reasons are, nor how he applies them in each case, but we can demonstrate that he possesses some of them, and what their principle may be"

(Gilles Deleuze) (31).

The notion of "incompossibility" helps us explain Deleuze's proposition that Leibniz advocates God, but the contrary of this suggestion, Leibniz non-advocate, is not impossible/contradictory in itself. To explain how Leibniz the non-advocate is not contradictory in itself, another relation is needed, not between two differently conceived Leibnizes but rather between Leibniz the non-advocate and the world where Leibniz has advocated. The non-advocating Leibniz must be excluded from the world in which he has advocated and as a consequence the two worlds are in a relation of "incompossibility"(32) and world in which Leibniz does not advocate cannot pass into existence at the same time as the world of advocacy. Therefore one may suggest that a Leibniz that does not conform to established sentiments is perfectly possible and implies no contradiction but requires another world in which to be realized.

For Deleuze, Leibniz is the philosopher most closely identified with the Baroque. Leibniz is current in the ensemble of his research in his treatment of contradiction. He helps to explain/unfold what we know about the contemporary condition of the world. For the Baroque, a vital concern was centred around the new and a new ordering, as indeed it is, according to Deleuze, for Leibniz. The Leibniz series contains the Baroque event in
so far as it develops in formal continuity with the exterior. Leibniz thus produces what could be an "individuation" of things, derived from the analysis of the requisites of the notion of the fold. An infinite movement integrated within the subject either virtually or under a certain potential. The experience of the Baroque entails that of the fold. Leibniz is the premier philosopher of "le pli", of curves and twisting surfaces. He re-figures/re-defines the phenomenon of "point of view"/perspective - of "narratives" that invalidate "narratives" to develop the infinite possibilities of serial form. Leibniz is acknowledged for promoting the conception that all predicates are contained within the subject. A conception, that it has been claimed, prefigures the modern subject-predicate logic. Additionally it should be seen that the subject-predicate notion also operates on a metaphysical level, inculcated within the deterministic scheme that a monad unfolds only in the form of a complete individual notion. Deleuze adapts this scheme to annotate the conception that all analysis is infinite, and more precisely the analysis of existants in terms of the actually infinite.

The concept of the fold enables us to conceive of a Deleuzian-Leibniz "incompossible" with the traditional Leibniz. The fold besides being a theme of Baroque art can also be observed moving across the surface of the multiple subject matters of the Leibnizian oeuvre. "Incompossibility" occurs, in Deleuze's configuration, when "series" diverge in the vicinity of a singularity. That is when the predicates of a subject imply a contradiction, one finds oneself, insofar as that subject exists, in the presence of another world. The world in which Leibniz operates transvaluations and the world in which he advocates exist in a relation of incompossibility. A transvaluing Leibniz is therefore non-contradictory in that there would be two diverging Leibnizian series.

For Leibniz neither the self nor the world works schematically. Everywhere the subject flickers iridescently, adhering to the forces that exert stress and define the individual body, its elasticity, and in its contorted notions in volumes that produce movement in/of extension. The subject lives and re-enacts its own "genetic" development as a play of folds. With the fold a fluctuation/deviation from the norm replaces the permanence of a
law, when an object assumes its place in a continuum of variation. The object acquires a new status "a temporal modulation"/"a continuous variation of matter". The object is not divided from the template that formed it. A "continuous temporal molding" of serialized objects replaces a paradigm of spatiality by another, of temporal order. Deleuze notes that Leibniz's system of continuity and modulation transforms completely traditional notions about object and event, but simultaneously confirming to an order of preformation.

The fold is the principle of the Leibniz-Baroque series or more precisely its principle in relation to the contemporary world. Leibniz's work continues to be appropriately current because it contains within it, under a certain potential, an understanding of the incommensurable relation to existence, being for the world as the infinite movement of folding, as the perfect co-incidence of the forces of transcendence and immanence.

In the conclusion to "Le Pli: Leibniz et le Baroque", discussing painting, Deleuze suggests that paintings seem to exceed the parameters of their frame - the law of a perceptual series ("contained" within the space/time frame is a "subject") the world it comprises, cannot be held within, more exactly the representational content of the world. It is through the Baroque that the recognition emerges of the world being an hallucinatory presence/a fiction. Authentic being for the world requires a realisation of perception as precisely fictive.

"The Baroque is widely known to be typified by the "concetto" but only insofar as the Baroque "concetto" can be opposed to the classical concept." (Gilles Deleuze) (33). It is Leibniz that introduces a new conception to the concept which is in opposition to the classical conception of the concept in the way that Descartes had conceived it and therein transforms philosophy.

The Leibnizian concept, "is not a simple logical being, but a metaphysical being, it is not a generality or a universality, but an individual; it is not defined by an attribute, but by
predicates-as-events" (Gilles Deleuze) (34). Leibniz's myriad connections and series of concepts are not held in a prescribed order or unifying system. Multiplicity and a variety of inflections produce "events"/"vibrations" with an "infinity of harmonics or submultiples". The Baroque is defined by the fold that goes out to infinity. In Leibniz's world one encounters no difficulty in reconciling full continuity in extension with the most comprehensive and unified individuality. "...the essence of the Baroque entails neither falling into nor emerging from illusion but rather "realizing" something in illusion itself, or of tying it to a spiritual "presence" that endows its spaces and fragments with a collective unity" (Gilles Deleuze) (35). The Baroque introduces a new type of "story" in which description replaces the object, the concept becomes narrative and the subject becomes a point of view/subject of expression.

Both David Salle's imagery in his paintings and David Lynch's films "Blue Velvet"/"Twin Peaks"/"Wild at Heart" are conducive to being interpreted within a Deleuzian-Leibniz-Baroque framework. Deleuze's analysis has proven that many Twentieth century art-forms can attest to the continuing vitality of Baroque elements/schemes. A type of postmodern Baroque (a distinctly postmodern form- Baroque as process rather than product) (36) utilizes familiar Baroque themes and devices, but these elements experience a transformation once they are immersed in the currents of, for example, painting/film/literature - instead of being a mere repetition of formula alternatively this becomes a disruptive process of transgression and uncertainty.

A key aspect of the Baroque is its narrative ambiguity, "...stories enclosed one in the other, and the variation of the relation of narrator-and-narration" (Gilles Deleuze) (37) multiple story lines, fragments of interpolated narratives, puzzles within puzzles, frustrating the narrative flow by constantly fracturing, everywhere restructuring and undercutting meaning.

Salle and Lynch take our desire for meaning and aggravate it. Explanations are Baroque and overtly complicated. Like architecture - in place of highly detailed decoration (which
distracts and produces confusion) or elaborate stained glass (glass which is opaque rather than transparent), the postmodern Baroque renders an excess of "narrative" messages. The "narrative" line never settles into a familiar/constant linear structure for any significant length of time, it frustrates any attempt to pin-down any one particular "narrative" form. Logic and meaning are confounded, each semiotic element which ordinarily would narrow the range of "narrative" meaning combines with other elements to expand/complicate the possible meanings. (38)

With "Wild at Heart" (1990) and "Twin Peaks: Fire Walk with Me" (1992) Lynch returns to the Baroque style of his early works. In these two prodigious/agitated films Lynch extends his search for a non-psychological cinema which combines textures and themes, a cinema with a more extensive uncircumscribed/epic tone and free, unpredictable constructions. The genre he was aiming for can be termed "cine-symphony", characterized by traits such as the use of powerful contrasts, the revelation rather than the concealment of the use of discontinuity in the "architectural" structure, a broad application of Dolby sound exploiting its resources to obtain/contrast space/power in the sound, and a bolder mixture of tones and atmospheres. These components are still nevertheless to be integrated to form an expressive whole which is organized around elements displaying their disparateness. (39)

In "Wild at Heart" (1990) the film's visual and sound leitmotivs and its system of alternating plots delays the emergence of anything concrete to the extent that it never arrives. The subject of the film resides precisely in the chasm which is opened up by that very delaying mechanism. Additionally the film's violence leads nowhere. It neither procures a cathartic transcendence nor is it reinscribed to catalyze the action. Lynch introduces effects purely to shock and this specifically can be identified as the "meaning" of the film and the source of its special pathos. Its rhapsodic structure resembles that of "Twin Peaks: Fire Walk with Me" (1992) and involves a rectilinear trajectory, a forward flight which is intersected by encounters/episodes/visions that suddenly occur and then evanescently dematerialize.
Lynch uses isolated sequences and discontinuous continuity acts within the narrative which have no direct bearing on plot development, disrupting the syntactic flow with random inserts, but forming integrated narrative segments. The car accident scene in "Wild at Heart" disrupts Sailor's and Lula's, to date, uneventful journey, and operates as a premonition of the dark sequence of events to follow. In itself, the episode seems bizarre and out of context. A car wreck/severed bodies/and a young girl who dies of visually explicit head injuries, doesn't relate directly to Sailor and Lula's "story", but is suggestive of a mood/atmosphere. The film assumes a darker tone after the incident, and prepares us for a later negative lead. In the final sequence, when Lula arrives to meet Sailor, she encounters a similar meaningless and bloody road accident - like a harbinger of doom at their fateful meeting. The conspicuousness of these effects is blatant in producing a recurrent Lynchian technique - violating the decorous convention that continuity cuts should be seamless/unnoticeable. Lynch uses their visibility as a structural procedure, in which the continuity cut is distinct from the elements linked, re-enforcing the impression of a fragmented/non-totalized structure.

Deleuze suggests that the characteristics of a "new" cinema include: "the dispersive situation, the deliberately weak links, the voyage from, the consciousness of clichés, the condemnation of the plot. It is the crisis of both the action-image and the American Dream" (Gilles Deleuze) (40)

Lynch's cinema is at its most provocative/energized with the abstract sequences that supplement the narrative without relating directly to it. (The expressionistic shadowed face iming "In Dreams'/a severed ear in a field/warring ants beneath a newly trimmed suburban lawn, are a few examples of the visual idiosyncrasies that appear in "Blue Velvet")

In "Wild at Heart" the "video-clip style" relies on images that are highly conspicuous in themselves. There are distinct contrasts between one scene and the next, an emphatic/abrupt editing style and the periodic recurrence of short mental visions, or
rather sound-image blocks which disappear as quickly as they arise. Discontinuity and the resulting contrasts are present in Lynch's work from the start and they have repercussions at every level of his films formal structures as well as in their narrative arrangements.

Throughout "Wild at Heart" one may identify a recurrent theme concerning how two people, and by further extension, the world itself can hold together. This question is inscribed in the form of the film. Formally, the linkage of disparate and contrasting elements - grotesque/picturesque, sentimental/bloody, poetic/abrupt, gentle etc. which comprise the film makes "Wild at Heart" (1990) into a film of continuity cuts and hyphens. The primacy of the effects is blatant, thus producing one more effect, negating the traditional filmic convention that continuity cuts should be integrated/unnoticeable. With Lynch, their visibility becomes a structural procedure, in which the continuity cut is distinct from the elements thus linked, and therefore re-enforces the impression of a discontinuous/poetically unstable structure.

Lynch's addition of a happy ending, recalling the "Wizard of Oz" (1939) is deliberately unannounced so that it does not smooth over the variegated structure or provide a sense of calm at the conclusion to a narrative full of dramatic and violent incidents. Lynch's humour is a combination of cynicism and naivety - the happy endings of "Wild at Heart" and "Blue Velvet" are so overstated as to caricature the traditional happy ending - they are derisive appendages to mock narrative closure. The formal closure of "Blue Velvet" fulfils the promise of singing robins, but it is a fake robin; the formal closure of "Wild at Heart" re-unites Lula and Sailor, who finally gets to sing "Love Me Tender", but the implied ending leaves Lula's deranged mother still anxious to eliminate Sailor, and Santos with a still valid "hit" contract.

With "Blue Velvet" Lynch demonstrates the art of making "ordinary" daily-life strange. The smooth anonymous style of the shooting script injects an extensive measure of strangeness and terror into the simplest of images. Utilizing a distinctive/consciously
unusual editing style makes seemingly/original banal images into something terrifying. (For example, there is a disturbing sequence in which Jeffrey opens his bedroom door one evening and walks down the stairs towards the living room on his way for a walk - this typical style shot begins in total darkness before it is illuminated by the bedroom door opening, creating the impression of an opening onto another more convulsive/ectopic world).

For "Blue Velvet" Lynch adopts the screen format of Cinemascope. Many of "Blue Velvet's" shots use a telescopic, wide-angle curved lens. The wide-angle lens allows the screen to accommodate vast rooms, (similar to the extensive dimensions of Salle's canvases), such as the living-room in Dorothy's flat/the Williams family home Ben's place. The living space thus created, while virtually coinciding with the frame space, reinforces the feeling that the characters exist in settings which precede them.

Few contemporary painters have achieved Salle's vision of an ambitious and fluid balance of visual and literary constructs, his oeuvre is a complete and sustained "narrative" of rapidly accumulated visual and worldly experience/information. (41). Salle does not have an instantly recognisable/definable signature style and his work provides neither structural symmetry nor narrative logic. What we might discern is a contrived/inexorable emotional distance and a concentrated negation of self-absorbed gesture. (If there is, for example, an "expressionistic" passage in a Salle painting its appearance suggests that he is "doing that style" so to speak). If there is a profound quality to Salle's accumulations of imagery - the rich incident often in endlessly variable combinations/beautiful/ugly febrile/clever/thoughtful/chic - there seems also a hollow resonance, a melancholic quality, as he makes vacancy seem seductive.

Salle's paintings are strictly composed/highly organized but yet there is no established set pattern or dependable rhythm to the mechanism via which this dynamic operates. Pictorially childishly sketched areas with clashing colours appear next to technically adroit and masterfully executed line drawings, elegant pieces of fabric are covered with
"tasteless" consciously "untalented" figure-drawings, reminiscent of the 1950's advertising imagery, fragments of Nineteenth Century illustrations appear superimposed on monochrome photographic transparencies of the human anatomy/body, enlarged elegiac images appear next to sub-Disney cartoon characters, newspaper photos next to "Afro-cubist" motifs, Giacomettiesque figures alongside arrangements of 1950's furniture and design pieces. Signs/meaning/value only develop through opposition, through conceptual and material difference. Salle's paintings do not seek the referential meaning of the individual signs/images, but he works rather with the relative relationships among these signs/images. If Salle's oeuvre can be viewed from this standpoint we can suggest that the individual elements, scattered over the canvas, and superficially at least "arbitrarily" arranged, are analogous to an act of play that violates the conventions of language and rationality. What is aimed at here is not a classical totality of an associative plane of meaning but rather the play of signifiers which, at every moment in the process of creation, of the signifying act, both challenges and seeks to go beyond its own self-formulated boundaries. Using both figuration and "narrative" material Salle demonstrates that form can correspond to content in such a manner, so that at a particular moment language is at one with meaning, and the work emerges not as expression but as a creation.

David Lynch's script of "Blue Velvet" revolves around an extravagant logic, it is an eclectic fusion of sequences suffused with dream-like fantasy images of pictorial strangeness alternated with more impassive everyday scenes. For example, such moments when Sandy and Jeffrey talk together in the car/ the party scene/the town diner scene and so on - this ingrained banality is of course essential to the story - it can be contrasted with the high-mannered stylization of the scenes in Dorothy's apartment and the series of violent scenes involving Frank. It was "Twin Peaks" that later confirmed definitively how David Lynch was able to endow the common-place with an extra/extraordinary dimension. "Blue Velvet's" familiarity and intimacy serve to show just how strange Lynch's version of reality is. Normal life proceeds precariously while around is darkness and violence (42). Thus "Blue Velvet" acquires a more interesting and
beautiful atmosphere more entirely in tune with the disturbance it provokes in us. Lynch brings the horrid and the normal into a close juxtaposition until the viewer is unsure what it is that exactly constitutes normality. (43).

A key term when describing Salle and Lynch's work is "act of reading", both the paintings and the films allow the reader to travel through the "narrative" unfolding a multiplicity of interconnecting perspectives which are offset whenever there is an alternation from one to another. For example it is in "Blue Velvet's" potential for a constant substitution of identities (Sandy and Dorothy incarnate two sides of a female figure/Frank is both a murderer and a father/Dorothy is a mother and lover) that enables the viewer to create a network of connections that is not simply dependent upon the mechanical/passive linear process of isolated data accumulated from different perspectives. In other words, all the units that constitute the conditions of a "narrative" can be mixed and matched to multiply and create new points of departure/new "narrative" lines.

The Baroque is characterized by a polysemous fusion of "authentic" representations which consistently forces the viewer into an uneasy oscillation between ways of understanding. The plot of "Blue Velvet" does not operate according to any clear/rational principles. Frank has no essential motive for kidnapping Dorothy's husband and child, no more than Dorothy has for continually refusing to notify the police. The massacre at the end remains ambiguous. The mysteries which Detective Williams elaborates to Jeffrey do not lead to any form of revelation. Indeed the manner in which the detective is constantly depicted implies some hidden/alarming secret (incest with his daughter/an overarching conspiracy theory) but ultimately nothing conclusive transpires. Even the prominent motif of the severed ear obeys no comprehensible logic. In addition, lapses in the characters' behaviour add yet another controvertible layer of strangeness to the story. Dorothy is in a highly emotional state when she talks to her husband and child on the telephone, but subsequently she does not address this issue with Jeffrey, and in fact Jeffrey himself, inconsistent to his general motivation in the film, does not offer to help...
them at this stage, nor does he even enquire after them. There is a proliferation of perfidious details such as these.

An overwhelming complexity of narrative structure is integral to the Baroque. However, narrative is only a part of what occurs in works of this type. Lynch and Salle's rationale is based overwhelmingly upon knowledge: how we acquire it, how we construct narratives out of it, and how we use it. According to David Lynch, the central structure of "Blue Velvet" concerns the fact that Jeffrey discovers evil but this does not alter his life, and Lumberton will revert to its normal existence. "That is the subject of "Blue Velvet". You apprehend things, and when you try to see what it's all about, you have to live with it" (David Lynch) (44). The movement and meaning of "Blue Velvet" are metaphorically contained in its first sequence - Lumberton's sunny surface disrupted by a chance incident which leads inexorably to the penetration of what resides below.

Within this opening sequence is contained the first intimation of the theme of violence associated with the act of looking. Jeffrey's mother watches television, on which we see a shot of a gun. From then on, the film's tendency is to offer "tableau-like" scenes/displays - Dorothy's night-club performance/Dean Stockwell's mimed rendition of "In Dreams"/the grotesque arrangement of corpses which Jeffrey discovers in Dorothy's apartment - which are always matched by an emphasis on seeing. From Frank's interdiction to Dorothy ("Don't you fucking look at me"), through Jeffrey's pleas on being discovered in her closet ("I didn't mean to do anything except see you"), to his realisation that he is "seeing something that was always hidden", the questions of power/fear/knowledge which drive the film are always linked to the idea of looking and vision. The epitome of this is clearly the long, theatrical sequence in which Jeffrey spies on Frank's "abuse" of Dorothy. This becomes the film's "moral" vortex, as it mirrors Jeffrey and Frank, emphasising Jeffrey's need to confront what lies within himself.

In between two horrific visions and two frightening journeys into the night, the hero is able to return to the stability and the familiar environment of his home. One might
therefore regard Jeffrey's experience as vague and only reflecting a fairly limited encounter with evil - that is if we accept the conclusion, the banal notion that the world is "strange" and imperfect. However, although we might not ever learn anything definite in the complex takes upon character formation, the subtlety is located in the detours used to reach these conclusions. In this respect Lynch adopts a superficial literalness which on the symbolic level enables him to penetrate much further. There is a quality in the fascination generated by "Blue Velvet" which resists the usual psychological interpretations, or more precisely which utilizes them so easily so that they become disconcerting.

As with David Salle, Lynch effects a series impersonal techniques in order to distance the viewer from the primary force of the violence and emotion that he often depicts. Sex and violence in Lynch's films border on the obscene but they are not pornographic - the obscenity relates to the limits of degradation to which the human spirit can succumb/endure/experience. For the viewer, the question is not one concerning superficial provocation, but regards the means by which we may locate ourselves from/against the "depravity" of the scenes projected.

Consistent ambiguity and the "illogical logicality" of dream-structures are adopted frequently as major elements in "Blue Velvet". This is particularly relevant for the crucial scene where Frank and Dorothy "make love" while Jeffrey observes. What is unusual primarily about this scene is its theatricality. Frank demands of Dorothy, "Don't look at me" as he erupts with a torrent of obscenities. He inhales gas which stimulates him further, intensifying his ritualised abuse of Dorothy. He inhales gas which stimulates him further, intensifying his ritualised abuse of Dorothy. He clutches a blue velvet cord, a perverse mockery of an umbilical cord, as he sohs "Hello, baby. It's daddy" then inhales once more, whimpering, followed by further obscenities. "Don't look at me...." he shouts, from which we realise the source of Dorothy's "performance". Jeffrey peers through the wardrobe door observing the scene acted out before him. All he can do is watch and listen. (Throughout the film we never really discover who Dorothy is - we know her only through her performances - either on stage at the night club, or on various other "stages".
specifically in front of male audiences, all of which she provides with a different scenario. The victim to Frank, the dominus to Jeffrey, and later the self-ingratiating lover. To her son she performs as “mother” but this is at a secondary remove before Frank and Ben and the curious assembly at Ben’s place. The nearest Dorothy comes to a “natural” representation is the final sequence - the slow-motion image as she embraces her little boy -( and in this sequence the camera performs for her)

One has the sense that the characters enact a series of ritual movements and behave entirely to please the voyeur, knowingly giving a performance. Dorothy crawls about and appears to get up with seemingly no other reason than to be seen by Jeffrey and us. However, immediately afterwards Jeffrey himself is forced to exhibit himself, as if on stage. Therefore upon the next occasion when he has to hide because of Frank’s arrival, the situation can no longer be perceived in the same way. In addition the ensuing “fantasy” scene has an intrinsically disturbing quality which is not simply due to the explicit violence it contains, the scene’s unsettling emotional impact seems to arise from an archaic acoustic impression which endows it with a kind of troubling vagueness that can inspire bizarre feelings/interpretations/impressions. Moreover, the disjunctive structure is heightened/intensified by the sense of the scene occurring outside of time. The sentences which Frank re-iterates (“Don’t you fucking look at me”) reverberate as if in a memory. There is no distinction between the continuous scene in which Jeffrey is present and the sequences in which he recalls it. The scene is the very act of remembering, the unfolding of something which has already been inscribed. Finally the scene is de-sensitised because it comes to resemble a ritual enacted for someone else. We automatically assume it is directed for Jeffrey, but it could equally be for Dorothy herself

In “Blue Velvet” we can identify many existing worlds within the wider “narrative” framework. No single narrative entity is allowed to dictate meaning or significance (consistency is disrupted) thus opening the potential range and interaction of “gestalten”.
(There is neither extended unity nor fragmented totality but a constantly transient
displacing and evolving development from one condition to another) (46).

The film "Blue Velvet" can appear as a dream but a structured one. The Dorothy/Sandy
parallel encourages us to regard the two women as one. Early in the film, when Sandy
meets Jeffrey one night in a tranquil Lumberton avenue, she emerges from disquieting
shadows and is accompanied by a tremor of wind, the music at this point is also
peculiarly unsettling. Thus Sandy might apparently seem an ordinary high-school girl but,
as she will recognise a number of times, she is in fact the starting point/instigator of
Jeffrey's meeting with the other woman (Dorothy). Later, in the diner where the two
speak, as the adolescents they really are, Jeffrey relates to Sandy the specifics of the
horrid/fascinating details he has discovered when breaking into Dorothy's apartment.
Then, rather incongruously he tells her, (rather than Dorothy the character who most
identifies with this description) "You're a mystery" Sandy and Dorothy exist as two sides
of the same female figure. Their worlds are divided according to a traditional scheme -
the blonde associated with daylight and convention whereas the brunette belongs to
night/darkness and transgression. If, at the film's conclusion Jeffrey resides in Sandy's
dream (47), the sugary-sweet world/the idyllic 50's paradise that she describes to him,
one may think that he is here to stay. However the words from the song Frank plays for
Jeffrey still echo, recalled in a process of conscious association, "In dreams you are
mine," therefore Frank will always find a way of penetrating/subverting stability with chaos
and anxiety. Frank's final removal from the film leaves Jeffrey's world "healed", but with
its capacity for the bizarre still intact. The final image of an artificial robin with a bug in
its beak serves precisely to emphasize this: Sandy's dream of restored harmony is
fulfilled, but the quality of the image, its tone, signifies infinitely more than it symbolically
represents.

This sense of overloading pervades every aspect of "Blue Velvet". From the saturated
colours of the opening sequence ( its too red roses/too white fence/too blue sky) through
to the ritualized/regressive excess of Frank's sexual violence, to the beautifully forced
naïveté of most of the dialogue, Lynch resolutely refuses any naturalistic norm. The narrative worlds of “Blue Velvet” might superficially appear as fragmented and divergent but Lynch employs many structures/devices to enable the enaction of a process of creative communication.

Frank cuts off an ear (presumably from Dorothy’s husband) and Jeffrey discovers it - the ear is a message from one to the other. Another interaction between the two men revolves around “letters”. The sequence when Frank brutally attacks Jeffrey might at first seem grotesque and meaningless but underneath the surface of violence a more complex series of effectual narratives operate. As with Salle the initial violence of the images is mediated and dispersed/distanced by a constellation of generative/radical elements that facilitate multiple/further possibilities. Consequently when viewed through this framework the drama appears fundamentally different/ altered from the perception at the initial encounter

Lynch’s most explicit sequence of “psycho-drama” is the conflict between Jeffrey and Frank. Jeffrey has flashes seeing himself in the roaring bestial incarnation of Frank, as he hits Dorothy. Frank manifests himself via the fissures of Jeffrey’s conscious “normality” and becomes his dark self. As Jeffrey watches Dorothy perform at the Slow Club and watches Frank watching Dorothy, he is disturbed by the thought that the desire he experiences for the woman performing is not so far removed from Frank’s desire. “You’re like me” says Frank later to Jeffrey, as Jeffrey becomes attuned to his own physicality, both the pleasure and pain that may be derived. Jeffrey’s “joyride” with Frank and his gang is a journey into an unknown realm where he is fundamentally psychologically vulnerable. Jeffrey is disorientated - nothing seems real, not the location, not Ben/not Frank and his thugs/not even Dorothy. When the car stops Jeffrey is dragged out. Frank announces to Jeffrey that if he continues to intervene in his actions he will send him a “love letter”, a bullet in the head. (However, it is Frank who eventually receives the bullet from Jeffrey in Dorothy’s apartment, just after we hear the country and western song entitled “Love Letters”). Frank continues his declaration by repeating the
words of the song that has becomes his signature theme: "In dreams I walk with you/In
dreams I talk with you/In dreams you're mine". This can be read literally - I am the father
and will always be with you, speaking to you. It is equivalently terrifying; you belong to
me, you resemble me, we are alike, and paternal; whatever happens I will love you and
I will never leave you. As a girl dances on the bonnet of the car to the tune of Roy
Orbison's "In Dreams" Frank recites the lyrics, wipes Jeffrey's face with a torn piece of
blue velvet and instructs his thugs to hold Jeffrey down while he beats him savagely.
Jeffrey's degradation marks his initiation into a netherworld realm of the senses - if
Dorothy gave him pleasure (they have made love once) then Frank's "joyride", as Frank
promises, is a love letter that has "fucked him forever".

The ear symbol functions as a "gift" offered to Jeffrey by the "father" figure. The ear is
a "passage-way" a symbol of communication between worlds. The ear transmutes the
gift of passing through the surface, of travelling between worlds, then of "recovering" a
"normal" world - at the end of the film we exit through Jeffrey's ear. Frank has offered
Jeffrey a key to life and a gift of imaginative possibility.

Postmodernism's reaction against the psychological and mythical structures of
Modernism when transposed into the genre of detective fiction (in this instance "Twin
Peaks"/"Blue Velvet") enacts an appropriation/exploitation of the "detective narrative" as
a paradigmatic model in order to explain change and possibility. For example in Robbie-
Griillet's "Le Voyeur" the "detective novel" form foregrounds the absence of a conclusive
ending or linear technology and displays the calculated non-presence of plot and
describes its "story" as a "process", a circle which has no end, a kind of calisthenics of
perception. Like the work of Nabokov and Borges this is representative of "postmodern
detection", an operation which ultimately denies the ability of the human to solve
problems via "syllogistic order".

While a Borges text such as "The Garden of Forking Paths" ostensibly provides a form
of ending it also engenders a disturbing sense of unease/incompletion. "Twin Peaks"
basic narrative structure could be identified, in one sense, as a "pure analytic detective story", a fictional genre that lends itself to endless acts of re-readings. Narratives of this type, filmic/literary, place emphasis on the act of reading and its processes. The story that Agent Cooper is trying to relate eventually manifests itself as a search for the nature of the narrative driving force itself - it is not a matter of discovering/unveiling an ultimate interpretation of the "plot"/story line. In a similar fashion Borges is known for his resistance as being categorized as a systematic writer. "I reject all systematic thought because it always tends to deceive"(48). However, his texts do search for the "story" of their own unreadability and can be situated in a very systematic discourse in order to demonstrate various aporias of interpretation and expose the act of reading as resisting theoretical closures and rendered identification.

The traditional detective figure in literature may be viewed as the quintessential representative of Western, Post-Renaissance rational thinking, a character embodying an anthropomorphic/positivistic/teleological approach to reality. In pursuit of final rational causes and linear design the detective envisions a world as a defined/constructed cosmic drama, in which crimes are solved by inferring casual relationships and problems eliminated through inductive reasoning.

The first season of "Twin Peaks" conformed superficially to the basic principles of a detective novel. The narrative began with/at a dead body and then unfolded into a series of investigative responses to the murder of the young woman; the arrival of a "heroic" detective, the evaluation of physical/forensic evidence and the interrogation of suspects/witnesses. However, the series seemed, in the second season (if not earlier) to become something quite other than a televised detective novel. "Twin Peaks" compared itself with the literary detective novel in both its parody of the genre and its celebration of detective conventions, but, at the same time, the series subversively disassembled the narrative framework that structures detective fiction. This subversion is essentially what made "Twin Peaks" so simultaneously like and unlike a detective novel.
The narrative form of "Twin Peaks" can be interpreted within the parameters of a Deleuzian programme. The dramaturgy may be read as a mode of effectivity/action which scatters plot units/images into different linkages or new alignments without necessarily negating their essential materiality. Ideally what is produced are unexpected intensities/peculiar sites of indifference/new connections with other elements/objects. This generates affective/conceptual transformations that problematize/challenge/move beyond the primary intellectual/pragmatic frameworks. Instead of the "eternal" status of a defined, the narrative has short-term effects, though they may continue to be explored after repeated viewings/analysis. The narrative only remains effective/energized if it has effects/produces re-alignments/re-arrangements. In Deleuzian terms such a text should be described as fundamentally moving "nomadological/rhizomatic".

In counterpoising the Lynchian narrative with Deleuzian rhizomatics, the question becomes one of how the narrative operates "differently". In essence how to regard a narrative structure that is beyond complementarity/polarization, beyond subjectivity/signification. The enigmatic story-lines provide no easy solutions - plot details/trails proliferate: no concrete closure is afforded - ready-made answers become a blockage for thought, that cannot and should not be answered but need to be continually posed/rigorously raised in such a way as to directly resist answers.

Deleuze is a thinker of movement/difference, a cartographer of force rather than form and his aim is to produce a certain quality of disruption or "stuttering".

The second season of "Twin Peaks" offered a fundamental re-adjustment of the depiction of Cooper; the shift of focus from Laura Palmer to Dale Cooper himself signals a number of other changes in both the epistemological and the narrative structures. The shift is principally, at first, one of narrative structure, paradoxically the more we learn about Dale Cooper's past, the stronger the forward motivation of the series becomes. What has happened in re-starting "Twin Peaks" after the "solution" of Laura Palmer's murder, is a disruption of the paradigmatic narrative structure of the detective novel.
If one of the objects of investigation in the renovated/restarted narrative of the last nine episodes is Cooper himself, the other is Windom Earl. His arrival in "Twin Peaks" initiates a further disruption/dismantling of the detective-fiction narrative structure that was operative - if not predominant - in the first season. Windom Earle is so disruptive because he, even more than BOB, is a radically "serial" killer. His murders do not remain in a retrievable/recuperative past because they are only understandable as parts of a chain of events that stretch into the future as well as into the past. Earle's narrative is one that connects the past to the future by, for example, stabbing a drifter exactly the way that he stabbed Caroline (Cooper's ex-girlfriend) in ways that are "diseased" but not disorganized there is perhaps, too much unity/coherence to Earle's narrative - Cooper relinquishes his status as an "outsider" to the "criminal/revenge narrative" operating in "Twin Peaks" - beginning at/before the moment he becomes a sheriff's deputy instead of a Federal Agent, the emphasis/dynamism supporting the structural framework of the series comes to be dominated by the force of the "revenge plot" narrative of Windom Earle. This current pulls the events of the past through the vision of the present, transferring both past and present into the future. In this sequence of episodes of the series it is possible to view the past as locating itself in the present/future.

The ending of "Twin Peaks" is strictly antithetical to the plot structure of classic detective fiction. It is common place in a detective novel to begin with a sense of innocence violated by the discovery of a murder and then work to restore that innocence/ordering by identifying/negating the murder/murderer. "Twin Peaks", of course, begins with a sense of innocence violated, but ends with the complete destruction of the detective hero who was supposed to restore the stability of the social order. In detective fiction investigative procedure may temporarily worsen the situation, for example, as it puts pressure on a murderer who may kill again, however in "Twin Peaks" there is the indication that the detective can ultimately do more harm than good.

While "Twin Peaks" contains elements of detective fiction, it subverts the narrative structure and intentions of the genre. Like Roman Polanski's film "Chinatown" it leaves
us with the image of the detective defeated and vilified. The failure of the investigative plot to master the criminal plot or to recuperate the past transforms the parameters/dimensions of the detective-fiction based scenario into the structural arrangement of a multi/polyvalent postmodern narrative complex.

Developing from this many postmodern writers choose anti-detective fictional narrative structures in order to evoke the impulse to "detect", to violently frustrate it by refusing to solve the crime. This postmodern structure/arrangement violates Aristotelian expectations. Not only does it deny readers a conclusion, but also by refusing them the "pleasure" of catharsis produces pity/fear/dread. However, this quality of dread actually conveys the possibility of freedom and infinite possibility. The "dreadful uncertainty" created by many postmodernist narratives, particularly in the anti-detective form, can open up new realms of consciousness unhampered by the constraints of telos/positivism. In "Twin Peaks" it can be said that Special Agent Dale Cooper exemplifies a postmodernist detective.

"Twin Peaks" achieves one of the most endlessly deferred conclusions in television history, principally by having the last episode of series one create the complete/new narrative problem of Bob's invasion of Cooper as his next vehicle for violence and murder. Denying the specificity or containment of the "criminal narrative" by extending what is usually an individual/group human agent into the non-human, conceptual realm of "evil" itself, "Twin Peaks" transforms physical violence into a fluid/dynamic and a potentially ubiquitous entity that exists independently of human understanding/control. In addition "Twin Peaks" adulterated any linear narrative development; its "narrative" becomes increasingly episodic, incorporating ever proliferating subplots and gratuitous comic scenes.

The development of narrative in "Twin Peaks" is essentially dependent upon the elimination of boundaries - for the story (and series) to continue the horizons of the "crimes" has to expand outwards in order to prevent any real solution (49). The lines of
demarcation are both temporal and spatial involving a dissolution of the parameters
delineating past/present/future; between physical and psychic space; between individual
human beings; and between human and non-human. (The visions of several characters,
the revelations both of past and future events, the Black and White lodges, inhabit a non-
physical location that can be accessed only via a time/space warp. The traditional
barriers separating one consciousness from another frequently disappear - Cooper
dreams Laura Palmer's "red room dream"/Maddy Ferguson says she was so close to
her cousin she could "feel" her thoughts/non-human and non-physical entities invade
physical and human space in order to activate damage in the case of "Bob", or warn or
instruct as with Cooper's benevolent giant).

Events in "Twin Peaks" break the rules of conventional ratiocinative detective narrative,
just as Dale Cooper's crime-solving methods violate the tenets of scientific detection (50).
No solution/ending is expected or delivered, or if found will only lead to the discovery of
a wider/more elaborate crime/conspiracy that subsumes the earlier "solved" mystery.
The result is that we move through a world where empty signifiers randomly
appear/emerge amidst overtly determined ones, implying the necessity to
pause/question the nature of all significations, and where quickly shifting signifiers leave
a longing for meaning/a grasping at empty forms. "Twin Peaks" radically alters the grid
of meaning/predictability, undermining any sense of order and producing phantom-like
patterns. The ways we usually view/perceive the world seem anachronistic when
positioned against the chimerical shifts that counter meaningless or the potential of
meaning.

During the first of Agent Dale Cooper's prophetic dreams, Laura Palmer says to him "I
am full of secrets. Sometimes my arms bend back". The task of discovering who killed
Laura Palmer, and how her murder is related to another similar case in Montana, is
transformed through the process of investigation into the task of uncovering Laura's
secrets - which are the secrets of "Twin Peaks" - and attempting to coerce them towards
a coherent/related narrative. The more we know, however, the harder it becomes to
discern a clear pattern in the disturbing relations that are uncovered. Connections are multiplied until nobody seems unrelated to the murder. Lynch in order to prevent closure, presents such a proliferation of material that connections can never be ultimately completed to a point of finitude. (For example, after discovering that Leland Palmer murdered his daughter after years of sexual abuse, we remain unsure of how the "demonic" entity "Bob" (a parasitic supernatural being who inhabits Leland Palmer) fits into the picture and how its actions can be separated from Leland's or from those of his other future hosts). In addition we lack any coherent way to connect "Bob" with the other "criminal narratives" of "Twin Peaks". What "Twin Peaks" aims to present is a convoluted and complex web of secrets that integrally entangles its characters/inhabitants.

Laura's killer, although temporarily utilizing the form of Leland Palmer, has a separate identity, the psychotic entity "Bob". "Twin Peaks" transgress received narrative conventions by positioning the possibility of both a natural and supernatural "solution" to the principle plot-motivating dynamic. As Thomas Pynchon states at the conclusion of "The Crying of Lot 49", "Either you have stumbled indeed...onto a secret richness and density of dream...or you are hallucinating it". "Twin Peaks" explores the allure of the supernatural without completely privileging/mystifying it by concentrating on the indecisive quality of the "uncanny", rather than comprehensively engaging a totally occulted truth. "Twin Peaks" explores both levels without ever definitely adhering to either of them.

"Twin Peaks", like the "Traverspiel" of German tragic drama described by Walter Benjamin, is a spectacle of moving that does not offer its audience any satisfactory consolation in the face of irredeemable loss. (51). As the series progresses, the mystery becomes ever more complex, and no single solution is ever suggested and therefore the outlets for the audiences vicarious mourning are stifled, leading to an ever-increasing level of intensity.

This process is concurrent with the Deleuzian programme of evacuating the inside (of a subject/text/organism) forcing it to confront its outside. Evacuating/destabilizing any
systemacity/organization/or usual/habitual functioning allowing a section/part/feature to "spin off"/ mutate into a new organization/arrangement/system, to endlessly deflect/become/construct. The "narrative" of "Twin Peaks" entails the exploration of the possibilities of "becoming", the virtualities latent in the plot, the capacity of the plot to link with and make other possibilities deflect/transform while being re-organized in the process.

The shifting relations of meanings represents an "active" process. This process plays upon the parameters of possible perceptions. The perceptual process tends to focus upon the interaction of figure and ground, to raise the figure or bring it closer. The imaginary border between figure/ground not only isolates discrete/individual units but disengages them from the contextual/connecting surface - this dislocation/dissection seems central to the strategy of "Twin Peaks". It continually pulls events/images/language out of their normal context and forces a process of continuous re-appraisal, (perhaps as ground instead of figure). Language and signification seem to foreground the primacy of multiple possible meanings. (For example among the clues revealed at the site of Laura's murder is a "broken heart" pendant - the other half of which is tenderly held by her "boyfriend" James, literalizing his own broken heart).

When Windom Earle wants to taunt Cooper into a chess game he fashions a giant plaster pawn around a would-be victim. Rusty kills him and then sends the dead pawn-encased-in-a-pawn to Cooper. This kind of narrative punning, a playfulness with metaphors, making patterns transparent, displays an arbitrary nature that underpins the nature of linguistic relationships/significations. What "Twin Peaks" accomplishes is a bringing into focus of the primacy of artifice and illogic - the series illustrates how tentative patterns of meaning actually are.

By recognising the artifice of what we usually take for order or how various constructs impose order on the world, we might come to some better view/understanding of our own nature as the "subject and the object" of understanding. Viewed in this way the
alternating figure/ground relations of order/disorder emerge as complementary, even defining some dimensions of human nature. In one respect the series rendered transparent what we commonly and actually interpret as order, disturbingly revealing how arbitrary/elusive our linguistic codes really are. Yet in another respect it operated via sketching a deeper/more complex sense of "order", one of which we are ultimately a part.

Part of what characterizes the originality of approaches adopted by Lynch and Salle is the distance from humanism, a quality also found in the films of Peter Greenaway. This distance can be correctly identified as a certain type of artistic freedom. Lynch and Greenaway began their careers as painters who progressed through experimental filmmaking before they adopted more "mainstream" narrative tactics, and both could be described as formalists whose imaginative creativity prominently consists of their capacity to operate outside of the moral categories that restrict most forms of humanistic fiction. In other respects they are quite different - Lynch intuitive and poetic, while Greenaway intellectual and systematic - but the recent fascination of Lynch/Greenaway/Salle with violence/eroticism/cruelty unaccompanied by any capacity for empathy gives their latest works a cold "pornographic" lustre, refracting images that articulate the temper of the times.

The writer Jorge Luis Borges establishes with his work in prose that the acts of writing and reading can actively turn into circular ruins (52) - a never ending process that can confuse and exasperate a reader so that one cannot think beyond the literal. It is not merely as an artistic embellishment that the "labyrinth" forms a vital narrative axis in Borge's fiction, since it's very significance represents all reading processes. The worlds in Borge's fiction are not pristine landscapes, normal and realistic but a complex very literary texture, a universe of readings that always connect with previously inscribed data. The characters in certain of Borge's texts ("The Secret Miracle"/"Death and the Compass"/"The Circular Ruins"/"Borges and I") find themselves uncovering enigmatic sign codes, but the quest is never completed by the "author" figure. In other words the act of reading cannot simply be consummated inside the text, as a literal reading would
be, but also outside of it. Readers of the "narratives" of Borges/Lynch/Salle/Deleuze are
not principally consumers of texts but "characters" actively engaged in a search for
meaning and significance.

The text is not just an inert artifact, a static object to be approached by the reader. In
order to achieve a significant moment in communication the text must clearly be
perceived as an event, as something that is in the process of happening. Deleuze, via
Leibniz, Henri Michaux and Gaetau Clerambault identifies an event as a non-coincidence
between language and interpretation, the virtual sensation of a sematic moment of
totalization and dispersion. In a narrative it can be conceptualized as a seriality of the
revelation of experience/insight. The event is an immanent activity over a background
of totality, thinkable within the interiority of the continuous - "Un elan vital" a complex of
extensions/intensities/singularities which is both punctually reflected and accomplished
in a flux. Deleuze suggests an excess in the occurrence of the event distributed in the
inexhaustible fullness of the world.

"the world itself is an event and, as an incorporeal (= virtual) predicate, the world must be
included in every subject as a "basis" from which each one extracts the factors/manners
that correspond to its point of view (aspects). The world is predication itself, manners
being the particular predicates, and the subject, what goes from one predicate to another
as if from one aspect of the world to another" (Gilles Deleuze) (53).

Deleuze summaries the fundamental import of Leibnizian philosophy as operating
between two poles. "Everything is always the same thing, there is only one and the same
Basis, and: Everything is distinguished by degree, everything differs by manner...." (54).
Leibniz's philosophy pushes the limits of communication. The subject is enveloped in the
predicate reciprocally, both as the affirmation of a one and same world and of an infinite
difference/variety in this world.

David Salle's later paintings contrive to test the borders of purist taste. His works offer
assemblages of strange resemblances, disturbing and frivolous pictorial moments, 
系统性地解构的组合，突然的延迟，突然的出发，重新描绘 
the semiotic flow as a translinguistic, quasi-narrative textual "thingness" whose 
resonantly distinct materialism frames the image through a more distinct, legible and 
conscious space of correspondence with the viewer.

Engaging the viewer rather than creating a sublime transcendent realm becomes the 
essential generative motivation. Salle's work is both assimilative and disseminative, that 
it is informed by the twin impulses of undecidability and indeterminacy. The 
undecidability is a function of the viewer (55) - the myriad responses the viewer is 
capable of recognising as the potentialities of the work. The indeterminacy is a function 
of the work itself, its internal contradictions/ambiguities.
MIRROR OF ENIGMAS (NUMBERS IN THE DARK)

NOTES

1. It is curious to observe how attracted Salle feels towards the painters of the post Depression years - Kuhn/Soyer/Marsh/Hopper. What appeals to him about this evocative scene painting of American low-life/working people, of the bars/eateries/barber shops/clinamas/the vaudeville is that these artists present simply elements of an American-patchwork, an attempt to capture the particularity of that experience. This is certainly something that matters to Salle - to reveal the scene not through the meanings of the images but through the way they present themselves, to capture the relentlessness/inventiveness and capriciousness of the time.

There is sufficient reason to suggest that the analogy with Edward Hopper may be extended further. Hopper was a true innovator with a searching eye and an intensely personal imagination allied to an apparently unforced non-quantifiable style. In Hopper's paintings the style is in the image; style and image are indivisible. There is a similarity in both Salle and Hopper in the way they focus on solitude - even when more than one person is portrayed we approach something very near to alienation/desolation. Hopper painted scenes from 20th Urban American life, (masterfully considered/re-arranged/refined and finely composed), that no other artist considered as appropriate/useful subjects. He defined the particular mid-century malaise estrangement and alienation in urban angst. Hopper's repertoire consists most notably of the working ordinary men and women at work or in uneasy repose, in ordinary workplaces - the office, the motel room, the cafeteria, the suburban back porch.

Hopper tapped something disquieting and new in modern life that nobody else seemed willing to address, or else had rejected as an impossible task to resonant in visual terms. A sense of loneliness in the crowd of modern life, the feeling of estrangement in the new and harsher office/factory life, the isolation of suburbia, the condition inside us, something of what men and women began to experience by the early 30's, within the terms and physical conditions of modern/urban/capitalist life.

John Hawkes perceptively writes of Salle's exquisite discontent being apparent within a "landscape of indifferent hunters and vanished lovers" fully aware that "dead passion is the most satisfying" (See J. Hawkes "An Offering" to David Salle in the Catalogue published in conjunction with a 1985 show at the Mary Boone Gallery). Salle's paintings of this time are models of referential indusivity and inscrutability, rendered with an unremitting composure and dexterous stylishness. Salle affirms the prevalent uncertainty that pervades the present condition - surveying an emptiness without and an emptiness within. Salle actively initiates the creation of a new role/offers a new performance/conducts a renewed transference, amid the endless series.

2. The drama of "Blue Velvet" is enacted in the imaginary Pacific Northwestern town, Lumberton. The young protagonist, Jeffrey Beaumont, is a college student called back to his family home because his father has suffered a heart attack. Returning to his hometown Jeffrey takes to running his father's hardware shop. When out walking one day he discovers a human ear in the grass, covered with insects. He takes this finding to a local policeman, Detective Williams, who subsequently tells him not to mention the incident to anyone. Upon leaving the detective's office, Jeffrey is approached by the detective's daughter, a blonde called Sandy, who reveals she has overheard the preceding conversation from her room which happens to be situated directly above her father's office. Sandy directs Jeffrey to a mysterious dark-haired woman called Dorothy Vallens, who is apparently under police surveillance and is allegedly implicated in a murder. It transpires that the human ear may belong to the missing husband of Dorothy Vallens.

The action continues as one night, Jeffrey with Sandy's assistance (although initially she is reluctant to participate directly) breaks into Dorothy's apartment. When Dorothy, the cabaret singer at the Slow Club returns home earlier than expected, Jeffrey is forced to hide in a closet from which he first observes and then eventually takes part in a series of strange/violent/disturbing scenes. Dorothy first receives a phone call from her husband and small child who have been kidnapped by a criminal psychopath called Frank. She then discovers Jeffrey and with a kitchen knife, makes him exit the closet and get undressed. She begins to caress Jeffrey but is interrupted by a knock at the door. Jeffrey returns to his hiding place from which he witnesses Frank's violent behaviour. Frankterrorises Dorothy and forces her to engage in frenetic intercourse punctuated by insults and body blows, as he speaks successively in the voices of a baby and a father. This is intensified by unusual accessories such as an oxygen mask, from which Frank avidly inhales, and a strip of blue velvet. When Frank finally leaves, Dorothy brings Jeffrey out...
of the closet and tries to arouse him. She allows him to explore her body and then demands that he strike her. He refuses (later he will consent but with obvious distaste) and leaves, with Dorothy in a distressed state ("Help me!"). She asks him to say nothing to the police.

As the story develops Jeffrey is drawn into a degenerate and perverse world, mysteriously he becomes Dorothy's secret lover, even as he falls in love with Sandy. His relationship with Sandy, arising from their complicity in these enigmatic events, proves to be one of reciprocated love.

As his investigation continues Jeffrey uncovers a violent drug-ring involving Frank, a police-officer with a yellow suit and a third man who he identifies as "the well-dressed man". Jeffrey is discovered one night at Dorothy's apartment and coerced into accompanying Frank and his gang on a frenzied/destructive journey into the night, firstly to the house of an effeminate friend, Ben, an accomplice in their drug-trafficking conspiracy who is holding Dorothy's kidnapped husband and child, then in a speeding car Jeffrey is forced further witness Frank's psychotic rituals. On a stretch of desolate wasteland Jeffrey is severely alternately assaulted and kissed by Frank, threatened with death, treated to a declaration of love, and offered an invitation, by a now highly unbalanced Frank, "to dream together". He is then abandoned shockingly injured.

Although visibly and mentally disturbed by these events Jeffrey recovers quickly. He relates the information from his investigations to Detective Williams, but omits the role played by Sandy. The policeman rather strangely tells him he should await further questioning. The main events now occur during one evening. Jeffrey and Sandy go to a party together and declare their love for one another. On the way home they encounter Dorothy, appearing suddenly, presumably from Jeffrey's house. Naked and covered with marks of abuse, she clutches at Jeffrey as Sandy looks on shocked. Dorothy again pleads for help and the actions imply some mutual secret association. Sandy slaps Jeffrey and leaves (although she will quickly forgive him).

At Dorothy's apartment Jeffrey finds the sinister after effects of a massacre, the yellow-suit man dead covered with blood sways, but remains on his feet. The husband lies bound and dead. When Frank return to the apartment this time in the guise of the "well-dressed man" Jeffrey barely escapes with his life. Hiding once again in the closet he uses a trick to kill Frank with a bullet in the middle of the forehead.

We next see Jeffrey in an idealized/calm world. His father has recovered and Dorothy is re-united with her child. Sandy and Jeffrey are engaged in apparently mutual affection. In an enchanted hyper-idealized scene a robin appears in the garden, recalling the dream that Sandy related earlier to Jeffrey, an ecstatic vision of love/harmony - but the robin has an insect in it's beak. "It's a strange World" the couple conclude.

"Blue Velvet" is perhaps Lynch's most accomplished, tightly controlled yet intricate/uncontrolled work. The story is neither regular nor logical. The general shape is acutely bizarre, even more so in the details, the increasingly and seemingly inexhaustible sense of visual material/psychological weirdness accumulates in the links of the various "narrative" chains.

3 David Lynch - Interview in "L'Ecran fantastique No. 53 February 1985 - dossier about "Dune" including several interviews
4 David Lynch - in "L'Ecran fantastique No 76 Jan. 1987 - about "Blue Velvet"
6 On one hand there is the Puritan notion of the evil wilderness, exemplified by Hawthorne's "Young Goodman Brown", and on the other hand we have the optimism of Emerson, for whom nature was, always and ever, beautiful/good/sublime, a reflection of the countenance of God. These complex oppositions run throughout mythic American fiction e.g see: Fenimore Cooper "The Last of the Mohicans"/"The Pioneers" / "Wyatt Earp" (See Leslie Fiedler "Love and Death in the American Novel" - New York: Criterion (1960)).
7 Similarly with "Twin Peaks" Lynch presents a timeless town embracing the decades between 1950 and 1990. The forest is a symbolically complex signifier. The foundation of the "Twin Peaks" community, timber is the town's economic resource, however just as the series opens the sawmill is running at a loss and a scheme is in operation to hasten its bankruptcy in order to implement a project of re-development which would consequently entail the destruction of the forest/wilderness ("Ghostwood").

"Ghostwood" comes to represent the unknown/unknowable, a realm existing beyond the enclaves of civilization. "Ghostwood" is "nature" to Twin Peaks, "culture". Shots that link
"Blue Velvet" is among a number of films produced in the 1980's that delved beneath the surface of the American suburbs, uncovering disruptive elements/psychopaths/brutality/sickness - elements successfully hidden away underneath wholesome images supported by television situation comedy/melodramas/the Mickey Mouse club etc.

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The themes and elements of "Blue Velvet" have precursors in the expressionistic "noir"/"small-town" films of the 40's/50's - Lynch initiates a disquieting journey into "noir territory. Confirming the "noir" connection are glimpses in "Blue Velvet" of movies on TV - a hand advancing with a gun/feet climbing darkened stairs - that Jeffrey's mother and aunt are watching during his comings and goings in his "real" "noir" adventure. "Blue Velvet" successfully captures the mood of the small town "noir" films of the 1950's. (film "noir" of the 1940's specifically encapsulated the fears/anxieties of the metropolis - with the later 50's "noir" films, nowhere was safe - the psychopath could be next door; an encounter on a train "Strangers on a Train" (1951); the town Sheriff "Touch of Evil" (1958); a visiting preacher "The Night of the Hunter (1955); a half-forgotten character from the past "Cape Fear" (1962). The apprehensive dimension of the 1950's era is also represented in the increasingly popular science-fiction genre, expressing the fear of infiltration - Communism; "Pick up on South Street" (1953); Aliens; "Invasion of the Body Snatchers" (1956)/radioactive fall-out, "The Incredible Shrinking Man" (1957); the vindictive woman; "Born to be Bad" (1950); all which threatening the ideal of the nuclear family) and there is something of "Night of the Hunter" in "Blue Velvet"s open invocation of horror/beauty/strangeness within the archetypal American heartland, but in the latter these elements prove more elusive/difficult to specifically locate. "Blue Velvet" also plays off heavily on a collective memory of B-movie dialogue and situations - particularly the scenes between Jeffrey and Detective Williams - which it uses to preclude any
conventional identification between spectator and character. "All my movies", said Lynch, who claims to have started making films to enter into his paintings, "are about strange worlds that you can't go into unless you build them and film them. That's what's so important about film to me - I just like going into strange worlds."

(David Lynch) "Première" (USA) Vol 4 No 1 September 1990.

10 Quoted in Jane Root: "Everyone a Voyeur" Monthly Film Bulletin - (April 1987)


13. "Twin Peaks" brings directly into consideration (and in doing so problematizes the systems of narrative organization) the set of narrative practices associated with network TV. A cult work according to Umberto Eco must be susceptible to breaking/dislocation/unhinging, "so that one can remember only parts of it, irrespective of their original relationship with the whole." Successively, via cult-constructing images/details/dialogue fragments, "Twin Peaks" solicited an engagement with the hyper-banality of its textual architecture.

The innovative elements/sections in the "Twin Peaks" pilot episode, for example, have little to do with basic aspects of the characters/plot; alternatively, they are matters of mise en scene and certain areas of emphasis involving inconsistencies/dissyncrasies in the character and plot. In one scene, close to the beginning, following the credit sequence comprising tranquil views of the fictional North Western town of Twin Peaks, Peter Martell (Jack Nance) discovers the nude body of a tortured and murdered teenage girl named Laura Palmer wrapped in plastic beside a lake; he calls the sheriff's office in shock, and the sheriff's secretary Lucy (Kimmy Robertson) summons the sheriff (Michael Ontkean) - who happens to be named Harry S Truman - to the phone in an extremely convoluted manner. This totally inessential and absurd piece of confusion injected into a macabre/direful moment is an early signal that Lynch's auteurist intentions are principally to proceed neither with nor through the plot, but at oblique angles to it. This is ostensibly the pattern that Lynch traces throughout the pilot - constructing/inserting disjunctive segments in the "mechanical" surface/exterior plot and creating distinctive formalist designs inside them. "Twin Peaks" self-consciously plays, at a meta-narrative level, with our perceptions of narrative connection/relationship/meaning - exaggerations of both motivation and event are common-place, and together with repeated genre-splicing and constant shifts in pattern from murder mystery to soap opera to horror/tragic drama, fundamentally disengages our "normal" sense of narrative construction and ultimately make up the artificial order that drives such transparent narratives.

14. The films of David Lynch and the paintings of David Salle subvert and parody cliché. Both artists work can appear as games with clichés. Deluze identifies clichés as "floating and anonymous images which circulate in the external world, but also penetrate each person and constitute his internal world, so much so that each one of us possesses no more than the psychic clichés by means of which he thinks and feels, becoming himself a cliché amongst others in the world which surrounds him. Physical clichés of sight and sound and psychic clichés feed off each other. In order for people to survive such a world it is necessary that this miserable world has infiltrated into their innermost consciousness, so that inside is like the outside" (Gilles Deleuze - "Cinéma 1: L'image - movement" Paris: Minuit 1983).

For example in several exchanges in "Blue Velvet", Sandy and Jeffrey ("fresh-faced" suburban adolescents) deliver the line "life is strange". Uttered once such a line would constitute a line of clichéd dialogue - with each subsequent repetition the line becomes a parody. The question is are Sandy and Jeffrey really claiming that "life is strange" or indicating that their character outlines are stereotypes that observe action within the film and find it strange. As cliché becomes stereotype - the duplication of an original - it is also via implication, duplicates an "archetype" - Lynch's conscious manipulation of the cliché within the opposing elements of "Blue Velvet" elevates the banal to a mythological level. Additionally in the concluding scenes of "Blue Velvet", once "equilibrium" has been restored, a robin sings on the branch of a tree outside the immutable suburban home, in answer to Sandy's earlier wish/dream that everything will be restored to "normality", "When the robins come back". However it is revealed that the singing robin, is in reality a mechanical device, which the characters regard in wide-eyed delight, pretending that it is real. Is Lynch mocking the audience, the narrative conventions of a happy/closed ending, or is he simply layering another dimension upon a game of clichéd image-making?

15. The virtual is the "unsaid" of the statement/the unthought of thought. It is real and subsists in them, but has to be negated, at least momentarily, for a clear statement to be produced.
as ephemeral/superficial effect. It is the role of philosophy to explain that process of
negation/to re-condition statements in the context of their evolution.

16. Elsewhere in "Cinéma II" Deleuze equates the outside with force: "Forces always come
from the outside, from an outside that is farther away than any form of exteriorty. Such
an interpretation enables the Nietzschean distinction between forces of action and
reaction, as developed in "Nietzsche et al philosophie" to apply directly to thought itself.
Deleuze advocates an active thought, thinking that is productive/self-expanding.

17. In "Cinéma II" Deleuze posits the body as the catalyst/motivation of thought, its
source/inspiration.

"The body is no longer the obstacle that separates thought from itself,
that which it has to overcome to reach thinking. It is on the contrary
that which it plunges into or must plunge into, in order to reach the
unthought, that is life. Not that the body thinks, not, obliterate and
stubborn, it forces us to think, and forces us to think what is
concealed from thought, life. Life will no longer be made to appear
before the categories of thought, thought will be thrown into the
categories of life. The categories of life are precisely the attitudes of
the body, its postures. "We do not even know what a body can do"
in its sleep, in its drunkenness, in its efforts and resistances. To think
is to learn what a non-thinking body is capable of, its capacity, its
postures."
(Gilles Deleuze)


19. In his explication of the movements/speeds of becoming Deleuze continually emphasizes
the way becoming-other refuses imitation/analogy, refuses to represent itself as like
anything else - rather becoming is the activation/freeing of lines/forces/intensities from the
parameters/constraints of an identity/fixed purpose to the transformation/problematization
of identity.

20. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari "Mille Plateaux: Capitalisme et Schizophrenie 11" Les
Editions de Minuit Paris (1980).


27. See Alain Badiou "Gilles Deleuze, The Fold Leibniz and the Baroque" in Constantin V
Bourdas and Dorothea Olkowski (eds) "Gilles Deleuze and The Theatre of Philosophy"

28. It might be noted that Deleuze’s organicist vision of the multiple threatens the notion
of singularity, however it can be stated that for Deleuze singularities/events are not points of
fracture but alternatively what singularizes continuity in each one of its individual folds.
The event is an immanent active process, it is a creation that is conceivable only inside the
interiority of a continuum. It follows therefore that the multiple and the concept/the multiple
and the one, are not situated in opposition to each other because the multiple exists by the
concept and is necessary for the universal condition of continuity and co-relatively the
multiple is the original focus of the possibility of concepts - Deleuzian organicism does not
simply revolve around a Leibnizian model of possible/extra-possible worlds but
additionally/more exactly a Nietzschean scheme of diverging series.


30. Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1985)


32. "We have seen that the world was an infinity of converging series, capable of being
extended into each other, around unique points. Thus every individual, every individual
monad expresses the same world in its totality although it only clearly expresses a part of
this world, a series or even a finite sequence. The result is that another world appears
"when the obtained series diverge in the neighbourhood of singularities". Compossible can be called (1) the totality of converging and extensive series that constitute the world, (2) the totality of monads that convey the same world (Adam the sinner, Caesar the Emperor, Christ the saviour ...) Incompossibles can be called (1) the series that diverge, and that from then on can belong to two possible worlds, and (2) monads of which earth expresses a world different from the other (Caesar the Emperor, and Adam the non sinner). The eventual divergence of series is what allows for the definition of incompossibility or the relation of vice-diction" (Gilles Deleuze) - ibid (1988).

33 Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1988)
34 Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1988)
35 Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1988)
36. The postmodern Baroque represents a fusion/merging/interactively corresponding movement between the two distinct Baroque elements distinguished by Deleuze in "Le Pli: Leibniz et le Baroque". The Baroque is a state of transition. Classical reason has disintegrated under the force of divergences/incompossibilities/disorders/dissonances. The Baroque is the attempt to recognize reason by means of dividing divergences into multiple possible worlds, and by constructing from incompossibilities multiple possible border-lines between those worlds. Dissonance in the same world are resolved ultimately in accords because the only entirely irreducible dissonance exists between different worlds. In the Baroque the distinction between points of demarcation become less defined but what is lost in this process is regained in and through harmony "Confronted by the power of dissonance, it discovers a florescence of extraordinary accords......" (Gilles Deleuze - "Le pli: Leibniz et le Baroque"). However this re-figuration is only temporary, the neo-Baroque, with the unfurling of divergent series within the same world, disrupts the incompossibilities at the same level. "......harmony goes through a crisis that leads to a broadened chromatic scale, to an emancipation of dissonance or of unresolved accords, accords that are brought back to a tonality" (Gilles Deleuze - "Le pli: Leibniz et le Baroque"). This musical analogy is appropriate in that it illustrates the rise of harmony in the Baroque model and then the consequent dissipation of tonality in the neo-Baroque model - from a harmonic closure to an opening out onto a polytonality. The dual definitions constituting the postmodern Baroque exist as poles along a continuum-line between which meaning may be interpreted in a constant state of oscillation. The postmodern Baroque requires a condition of "capture" rather than one of absolute closure.

37 Gilles Deleuze - op. cit (1988)
38 In Lynch's concluding sequence, to "Wild at Heart" (1990) Glinda, the Good Witch from "The Wizard of Oz" appears "deus ex machina" to Sailor and says, "Don't turn away from love". Sailor returns to Lula and sings "Love me Tender", a token act of commitment for which he was "not ready" at the beginning of the film. Lynch's ending is a playful departure from road movie conventions. Traditionally the couple on the run, whether from the authorities or criminals, meet an ill-fated end. "You only Live Once" (Fritz Lang 1936)/"They Live By Night" (Nicholas Ray 1949)/"Gun Crazy" (Joseph Lewis 1949)/"Au Bout de Souffle" (Jean-Luc Godard 1959)/"Bonnie & Clyde" (Arthur Penn 1967)/"Pierrot le Fou" (Jean-Luc Godard 1965).

David Lynch describes Lula and Sailor as "struggling in darkness and confusion like everyone else... The idea that there's some room for love in a really cool world is really interesting to me" (David Lynch - Quoted in David Breskin "The Rolling Stone Interview with David Lynch" "Rolling Stone" 6 September 1990).

39 The one auditory effect which sums up the world of "Wild at Heart" is the amplified sound of a match being struck, accompanied by various images of conflagration - a burst of flame/a landscape of fire/a human torch crashing about in an interior space. It is a baleful/apocalyptic effect - the post-industrial age enacting a process of inexorable termination. However, this is not the central matrix of the film, but merely a significant plot detail. "Wild at Heart" is, in total, full of "significant plot details" - the film ultimately is much more elaborate than its source novel (see: Barry Gifford - "Wild at Heart" Paladin: London (1990)).

The relationship between a fragment from "Wild at Heart" and the film as a whole may be the same as between "Wild at Heart" and the totality of Lynch's films, assuming that a temporary form of totality can be objectified. The question of composition which enables
a part to exist in its opaque, enigmatic presence seems closely allied to a question of scale. In as much as Lynch's works display each thing as belonging within a larger ensemble of the next higher scale, and also of containing something smaller from the scale below. The part and the whole, the container and contained are incommensurable.

In the passage between the multiple levels/worlds that structure the architecture of Lynch's filmic constructs, one may discern changes of scale. Lynch shows that the universe may be unified, but at the same time the microcosmic elements do not exactly replace the macrocosm and vice-versa. In Lynch's way of depicting a scene there is frequently a dizziness in the extremes of scale between which we live. Hence his taste for contrasts, particularly defined in "Wild at Heart", between vast wide-angle shots and extreme, microscopic close-ups. In "Wild at Heart" we see both the cosmic stretch of the horizon with the last beams of the setting sun glowing at its edge and the microphotographs of match flames.

Lynch's affirmation of contrasts, in character/tone/scale/rythm/worlds/sizes, is his method of defining separate worlds. He introduces separations into the natural continuum, which is perceived symbolically as being undifferentiated because everything is a matter of intermediate stages, or, in the words of Leibniz, "natura non ficit saltus" His is the work of creation.

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In "Twin Peaks" the FBI/Sheriffs office hunt for a killer is a "plot" device to enable a wider investigation of small-town America with its idiosyncratic characters, and sub-surface perversities. The hyper-absurdity of specific narrative and character contrivances periodically reduces the validity of the "place" to parody/pastiche. Consequently, the series is imbued with the dynamic of the unexpected: it is television in which the viewer can be abruptly thrust into the unknown (e.g., the "dream" sequences and the "Lodge" sequences) while still remaining located within the parameters of the genre of television drama, and with enough of the appearance of "normality" to, at least superficially, seem familiar.

The polarization of opposites prevails throughout the series. The development of the central characters provides examples of Lynchian transformations/Deleuzian "becomings/process of metamorphosis". Almost thirty "plot-engaged" characters are presented throughout the first episode, most of whom subsequently undergo experience and development. These processes of metamorphosis provide sub-narratives which reflect the essence of the main narrative, and also echo a recurring theme in Lynch's work. As we go beneath the surface image - the pristine appearance of Laura Palmer for example - we discover something else; the "person" who is Laura Palmer's shadow - promiscuous/pedatory/drug-addicted/defiled.

With the work of David Salle and David Lynch, dichotomy pervades the human condition as much as surfaces and the order of things (In a David Salle painting the polarities of the pictorial/visual elements are engaged in a process of continuous interchangability. There is a conflict between "Self" and "shadow", opposites struggle for supremacy - decent becomes obscene, ugly becomes beautiful, wrong becomes right). The more extreme a position, the more easily it may be subject to transformation, a conversion/metamorphosis into its opposite. All dualities ultimately flow into one another, continually transgressing their own boundaries. (There is good in evil/evil in good).

Deleuze in "Cinéma 2. L'image-Temps" conducts a Nietzschean analysis of film-theory with the work of Orson Wells (Chapter 6 "The Powers of the False" Section 2). This scheme forms the central structure of the Deleuzian cinematic vision/project. This may be extended and developed in order to encompass an operative examination of the films of other directors:

"There is a Nietzscheanism in Welles, as if Welles were retracing the main points of Nietzsche's critique of truth: the "true world" does not exist, and, if it did, would be inaccessible, impossible to describe, and, if it could be described, would be useless, superfluous" (Gilles Deleuze - "Cinéma 2")

In this subsequent section it is proposed that the work of David Lynch can also be examined within the context of Deleuzian-Nietzschean filmic theory.

In a Nietzschean vein Lynch consistently differs a system of judgement. In Lynch's later films there is no value superior to life, life is not to be judged or justified, it is innocent, it has "the innocence of becoming", beyond good and evil. The critique of the notion of truth...
returns constantly to the impossibility of judging man and life. In the work of many film-makers the system of judgement experiences a crisis, however it is nonetheless retained and transformed. In Lynch the system of judgement becomes tangibly impossible. Lynch creates characters who ultimately resist possible definitive judgement. If the ideal of truth integrates, the relations of appearance are no longer sufficient to maintain the possibility of judgement. In Nietzsche's phrase "... with the real world we have also abolished the apparent world" (Friedrich Nietzsche - "Twilight of the Idols" trans. R.J. Hollingdale, Harmondsworth; Penguin (1982)). In the prevailing condition we experience bodies that are intrinsically forces. These forces however no longer relate to a centre, they only interact with other forces, refer to other forces, that they will affect or that will affect them. This power is continuously maintained and the relation is necessarily enacted, even if in a variable style determined by the forces which are involved.

Deleuze suggests that the "short, cut-up" and "piecemeal montage" and the "long sequence shot" serve a similar function - tracing Nietzsche's concepts but in a filmic language/technique. The short-montage shot shows bodies in a successive manner, each of which exercises its force/experiences that of another. The sequence-shot displays in a corresponding way a relation of forces in its variability/instability, its proliferation of centres and multiplication of vectors (the scene of brutal violence/highly dramatized love, as Jeffrey is intensively beaten in "Blue Velvet"). With both of these techniques, there is the disruptive effect of forces, in the image or of the images in their relations. On occasion a short-montage reproduces a sequence-shot, through cutting as in the hyper-violent psychotic sex scenes in "Blue Velvet" or a sequence-shot may produce a short montage, through constant reframing.

We might then infer that everything in life is a matter of forces, if it is understood that the relation of forces is not quantitative but necessarily implicates certain "qualities". There are forces which are only capable of reacting to others in a single uniform way. Frank in "Blue Velvet" is only characterized by violence, irrespective of the manner in which it is derived or in which direction it is motivated. This is a type of exhausted force, even as it remains quantitatively significant, can only ultimately destroy and kill, and perhaps terminate itself. It is here that it re-configurates a centre, but one which coincides with death. Regardless of its significance/power this force, is exhausted because it does not possess the ability to transform. It is therefore regressive/colllapses/degnerates - it represents a state of impotence, the point at which the 'will to power' is merely a will to dominate a being for death, which seeks its own annihilation so long as it can react through the action of others. Frank in "Blue Velvet" may be seen to represent impotence in the fullest sense of the delineation. He is a man of revenge not in the same manner, however, as the truthful man who claims to judge life - with the credentials of higher values. A "truthful man" seeks truth, but such a man has strange motives, as if in some way he were dualistic. Jeffrey in "Blue Velvet" would initially at least appear to epitomize the truthful man, for an extensive period of the film he seems largely indifferent to the fate of either Dorothy or Sandy, engrossed in the process of uncovering a delirious/secret/nighmare world. The truthful man ultimately desires nothing more than to be able to exercise judgement/superior values/good. The truthful man takes himself to be a higher man, the man of revenge in contrast is a higher man who can claim to judge life by his own standards/authority. However, in actuality this is the same motivation but simply in two forms. Jeffrey the truthful man invokes the law for judging but also has his double in Frank who takes revenge by nature and perversion. This is what Nietzsche termed stages of nihilism: the spirit of revenge manifested in various forms - behind the truthful man who judges life from the adopted position of an apparently higher value system there is his double the sick man.

"the man sick with himself", who judges life from the perspective of his sickness, his degeneration and his exhaustion...this is perhaps better than the truthful man, because a life of sickness is still life, it contrasts life with death, rather than contrasting it with "higher values"... Nietzsche said "behind the truthful man, who judges life, there is the sick man, sick with life itself... They are, however, complementary as two figures of nihilism, two figures of the will to power" (Gilles Deleuze - "Cinéma 2").

It might seem that this process appears to be restoring a version of a system of judgement. However, it is not a question of judging life by a higher authority which would be goodtrue, it is a matter, more accurately, of evaluating every human/action/passion/value in the context in relation to the life which they occupy. As Deleuze says, affect as immanent evaluation, replaces judgement as transcendent value. "I love or I hate" instead of "I judge". Nietzsche in his programme substitutes affect for judgement suggesting that beyond good and evil does not essentially imply beyond good and bad. The bad may be exhausted and deteriorating but in this state it will include all the more potential for multiplication. The good is energetic and in the ascendence with the capability of transforming/rejuvenating itself, to metamorphose itself in accordance with the nature of
the forces it encounters, and which will correspondingly form a greater force with them, always increasing the power to live, always receptive to new possibilities.

In reality the positions good and bad are only arbitrary - there is only becoming, and becoming is the power of the false life, the will to power. Deleuze returns to the basis of his analysis from "Nietzsche et la philosophie" (1962). Interpretation entails what Deleuze calls a "method of dramatization" in Nietzsche. The question Nietzsche asks is not "what does it mean?" but "who makes meaning?". "Good" and "bad" have no intrinsic meaning, but are symptoms of the way of life of the speaker: only by "dramatizing" the words, by putting them in the mouth of a "master" or "slave" one can determine their sense. Deleuze proposes to negate all "personalist" references in understanding Nietzsche's method of dramatization. When we ask "who makes this meaning?" the "who" does not refer to an individual as such to a person, but rather to an event, that is to the forces in their various relationships in a proposition or a phenomenon, and to the genetic relationship which determines these forces/powers.

Interpretation/evaluation are the basis of Nietzschean critical philosophy and that critique is itself in no way neutral/disinterested. Every evaluation expresses a mode of existence. When the good/noble" man evaluates he affirms his difference from the sick/base" man and joyfully destroys what is negative within himself.

Ultimately the will of the "good/noble" man to correct life is a "nihilistic" will, for the man of good wants life to become as reactive and vengeful as he is, to turn on itself and annihilate itself.

There is a will to power in both types but the sick is no more than a will to dominate in the exhaustion of becoming-life, while the true is artistic, the creation of new possibilities in the advancement of becoming. Nietzsche proposes to replace the will to truth with an affirmative will to falsehood; an artistic will that would turn a will to deception into a superior/creative will. If becoming is the power of the false, the "good/noble" man becomes the will to the nihility of the true to power to the level of artistic becoming. Jeffrey might at first seem a truth-seeking man, but as the narrative strands of "Blue Velvet" develop he becomes adept in metamorphoses, with the ability to exist in two contrasting worlds - in the nightmare realm of Frank's transgressive activities and in the hyper-idealized dream world symbolized by Sandy. Jeffrey's becoming maintains its innocence in spite of his ecstatic/horrific experiences throughout the film. At the conclusion he, as stated previously, remains principally unchanged. Jeffrey's good is subject to what is re-born from life, what metamorphoses and creates. Out of becoming it makes a protean being - as an alternative to a uniform/fixated being. What Lynch characterizes in Jeffrey Beaumont, is the "goodness" of life itself, a strange goodness which takes the living being to creation. It is in this sense that we may articulate an authentic/spontaneous Nietzscheanism in Lynch.

Nevertheless Deleuze says "in becoming", the earth has lost the centre, not only in itself, but in that it no longer has a centre around which to turn. Bodies no longer have centres except that of their death when they are exhausted and return to the earth to dissolve there. Force no longer has a centre precisely because it is inseparable from its relation to other forces. In terms of film-technique this is represented by short-shots which invariably diverge to the right and to the left, and sequence shots that similarly produce a mixture of vanishing centres. Forces lose the dynamic centres around which they arrange space - movements themselves lose the centres of revolution via which they develop. In this situation we observe a mutation which is simultaneously cinematic and metaphysical. What contrasts with the model of truth is not movement - movement remains consistent with the true while it highlights invariable/points of gravity and stability of the moving body - privileged points through which it passes/points of fixity in relation to which it moves. This is the case for the essence of the movement - image determined by the effect of truth which it invokes while the movement preserves its centres. This is what Deleuze has been suggesting throughout his filmic theory.

"... a cinematographic mutation occurs when aberrations of movement take on their independence, this is, when the moving bodies and movements lose their invariants. There then occurs a reversal where movement ceases to demand the true and where time ceases to be subordinate to movement: both at once. Movement which is fundamentally centered becomes false movement, and time which is fundamentally liberated becomes power of the false which is now brought into effect in false movement" (Gilles Deleuze - Cinema 2).
Deleuze suggests that it is Orson Welles who initiated this contingent. Welles in his conception of bodies/forces/movement "constructs a world which has lost the energy at the centre or "configuration" the earth" (Gilles Deleuze - Cinema 2). Welles like Lynch subjects the conception of a centre to a double transformative process establishing a "new" for/of cinema. The centre ceases to be a sensory-motor and becomes optical, determining a new regime of description and correspondingly it becomes "luminous" determining a new progression of "narration".


45. "It's a strange world" Jeffrey says to Sandy in "Blue Velvet". Why does he mention this world? Is there another? Actually, there are a number of worlds, and since we cannot maintain ourselves constantly in the same one, we have to accommodate this plurality.

In Lynch's films characters are positioned in the ambiguous condition of having to exist/traverse between different worlds. For Lynch the theatre is one of these worlds (for example the classic-style "Slow Club" where Dorothy Vallens sings before a large 30's microphone/the Roundhouse in "Twin Peaks" where Julee Cruise sings, (the classic Lynchian motif a stage on which a woman sings in a thin/ethereal/fragile voice). When Jeffrey enters Dorothy's apartment at night he has just walked onto a stage and is about to become an actor in a play. Her apartment is conceived as a stage set (filmed frontally). The only constant in Lynch's cinema is that more than one world exists. Lynch described "Blue Velvet" as a story "about a guy who lives in two worlds at the same time, one of which is pleasant and the other dark and terrifying". This is the same scheme as in "Twin Peaks"/ "Fire Walk with Me" - A film about one woman it is also a film in which different worlds are so closely presented/connected that they begin to appear as one, though unstable and flickering. The problem is that characters can never remain in just one world - they have to pass from one to the other, at their own risk.


47. Lynch makes this abundantly clear that this is still a dream via the explicit artificiality of the robin on the window-cill. (Sandy reveals the dream she had the night she met Jeffrey. "There is trouble till the robins come", she tells him. "The robins will bring love into the world....". For once Sandy is centre-stage, she acts rather than reads, is expressive rather than passive. Yet her eloquence here is embarrassing/hyper-comic/hyper-real in its naivety. Jeffrey at this stage remains uncommitted, neither convinced by, nor dismissive of, the suggestion that the evil will perish and the suburban American dream/ideal will be restored once "the robins come".


49. In many respects, Episode 9 of "Twin Peaks" was the pivotal/defining episode of the series. Within two hours, it transformed nearly every character/pilot/situation in the show so that they were re-directed to an ongoing narrative form. The concluding episode of the first series essentially erases/de-emphasizes most of the extant materials from the first season's plot developments any many of features/themes articulated by the first seasons central characters - (the first eight episodes superficially followed the structural form of an episodic serial, many of the central plot points principally seemed to head in a single direction with the implication that the narrative elements would tie up within the parameters familiar to the format of the T.V. series. However, the opening episode of the second series essentially re-wrote/erased many of the central plot strands from the first season) - even more remarkable episode 9 re-invented/re-cycled numerous plot lines. On most prime-time continuous serials, the "cliffhangers" are usually resolved fairly rapidly or continued on a different level. The notion that a plot strand can be "resolved" and simultaneously that its conclusion can them operate as the initiating factor to open another type of plot involving the same protagonists in a different situation without different antagonists, and under a completely different object is virtually unprecedented.

For example Episode 9 there is almost nothing remaining from the previous material concerning the Laura Palmer investigation plot line which acted as the central axis defining the narrative development of the first eight episodes. Consequently, the investigation into the murder of Laura Palmer is re-invented in Episode 9 and a new set of clues is laid out for the protagonists to follow. The first part of the scenario is concerned with tidying-up and redefining old plotlines, the second part involves establishing new lines of narrative development for the second season. The overall effect of the new plot lines is to take the
murder investigation out of terrestrial forensic territory in which it had been grounded during the first season and reorientate it towards the extraterrestrial dimension of the “Giant/BOB” dichotomy, re-directing attention to BOB and “his” human host (BOB figure who had not even been alluded to in the last three episodes of the first season suddenly re-emerges forcefully in the second section of Episode 9.) The murder of Laura Palmer is thus re-invented as a “Spiritual Crime” as well as a physical one, and the dramaturgy is established for the revelations of the Black Lodge as well as its denizen BOB as the origin-point of the previously peripheral mention of “an evil in these woods”. (This is probably the first time in the series that the motivational pretext for Laura’s murder is located away from Laura herself and her “wicked ways” and onto her actual killer - consequently it is necessary for the viewer to finally confront the brutality of Laura’s murder at the end of this episode)

Despite its superficial/calculated similarities to the previous eight episodes, Episode 9 additionally initiates a new hybrid narrative form for the second season, one that almost thoroughly replaces the episodic serial/continuous serial split from the first season. Instead of running the mini-series plot in the foreground and the soap-opera plots in the background the episodes are divided into five specific delineated smaller episodic serials, each of which sustains narrative unity on nearly all levels within the episodic serial but also is integrated into a wider, continuous narrative scenario that covers the complete 22 episode season.

The result of this new narrative structure highlights the dexterity with which individual plotlines are established, deferred and perhaps resumed. The idea of segregating the second-season’s plotlines into units was highly innovative but even more inventive was the origin point of these new plotlines. In both prime time and daytime continuous serials new plotpoints usually emerge from original characters introduced into the basic situation. The difference in plotting in “Twin Peaks” second-season was that its new characters and plotlines were utilized to fill in enigmas in previously established situations. The plots of the second season were moved forward by moving backwards, filling in more and more of the enigmatic “back-narrative” of the series in order to advance from the previously established narrative lines into fresh areas. This “backward, then forward” motion of plot is yet another inventive solution to the standard continuous serial problem of how to stimulate interest in the plotlines of future episodes in a way that is consistent with the raw material of previous ones. This method provides more “credible” new plot-threads than the “investigative-exposition” method of season one, since new plotlines are forced to emerge in a less arbitrary fashion. “Twin Peaks”, especially in the second season, was essentially designed as a specifically open-ended narrative intended to replicate itself endlessly if so required.

Dale Cooper’s detection methods result from the trust he places in the intuitive dimension of his unconscious - his use of intuition is what distinguishes him from more traditional versions of the detective. Cooper’s unorthodox crime-solving techniques include clairvoyance, premonitions, “shared” dreams, visions, and an obsession with Tibetan Buddhism - they not only violate classic rationalistic detection but also do not really provide any concrete “solutions” to the crimes manifested throughout the narrative - his revelations usually lead to a larger series of unanswerable questions.

The “plot” in “Twin Peaks” opened up at the end of the first season/beginning of the second season, to the presence of a supernatural entity whose unintelligible name “BOB” was crucial for the solution of the murder of three women. This entity, whose last name and essence remain unknown, was gradually unveiled by agent Cooper’s enigmatic, idiosyncratic attempts to decipher - via principles of Oriental philosophy and integrated elements of chance - a number of clues, the messages left by an unknown “writer” in a set of scattered letters, the design of a mysterious map that hosted extraterrestrial entities and the chess game on which the lives of different characters depended.

Well into the narrative game of “Twin Peaks” agent Dale Cooper pronounces “BOB’s” name, but this literal plot wears out temporarily when the entity, responding to the name flies out of the body of Leland Palmer (significantly Laura’s father). Similarly the characters in certain of Borges’s texts, “The Secret Miracle,” “Death and the Compass,” “The Circular Ruins,” “Borges and I” find themselves uncovering puzzling sign codes, but the quest is never completed by the author figure. In the “narrative worlds”, the act of reading cannot be consummated inside the text (as a literal reading would be), but also outside it.

50 Dale Cooper’s detection methods result from the trust he places in the intuitive dimension of his unconscious - his use of intuition is what distinguishes him from more traditional versions of the detective. Cooper’s unorthodox crime-solving techniques include clairvoyance, premonitions, “shared” dreams, visions, and an obsession with Tibetan Buddhism - they not only violate classic rationalistic detection but also do not really provide any concrete “solutions” to the crimes manifested throughout the narrative - his revelations usually lead to a larger series of unanswerable questions.


The "time" that Salle sets forth in his fractured "narratives" is "anytime", the "place" is not an established/tangible "place" - the "mystery of the spare locked room" is the subject of virtually all of his paintings. Time is repeatedly killed and scenes are set up by means of heavily motivated detailed descriptions of miscellaneous paraphernalia/clothing/furniture and overall decor. Salle's paintings seduce the viewer into a panoramic amorphous sea of memory/projection and aesthetic deja vu - an atmosphere of exquisite disconnection.
BREAKING INTO HEAVEN (ELEGIA)

From 1989 David Salle entered a prolific and divergent period of production. The first of the "Tapestry Paintings" indicated a transitional state of development as Salle evolved an increasingly elegant sophisticated and adroit aesthetic - ingeneously technical and strategically inventive (a splashy advancement of technical skill, surface complexity and formal ambition). Salle's technique of image derivation and its subsequent compositional implications (even though his "vocabulary" is polymorphous, his method is almost picaresque - traversing a particular cartographical path, evacuating linguistic/imagistic structures and reconditioning/recomposing them) forces the maximum optical pleasure from each painterly incident, lending his canvases an almost deliberate atmosphere of decadence.

From Cézanne to 60's Pop, the development of painting has always been engaged with artists for whom the problem of producing a "personal style" entailed testing the limits of painting to see if it was possible to push a stage or two further. Since the 60's however the problematics of style have come to depend increasingly on conditions of personal selection/co-option, and how each artist uses a range of available potential styles, creating an aesthetic from the plentitude of expedients. If each category of image and painterly technique could be presented as an artifact of its time/place, then a/the, mosaic/fragmented/disjunctive structure of the artwork as a layering of the artifacts can emerge.

In David Salle's "Tiny in the Air" (1989) the background is a genre gaming scene including nine figures around a table. Two medium-sized insert canvases, each depicting a nude model, manipulating an anatomy doll, in black-and-white, are located below the center-line and adjacent to the right edge. Two smaller inserts - a modern/primitive nude sculpture, Giacometti-like, in tan and yellow and an abstract torso, "Borges-like", in red on grey/orange - follow on the left edge. An open rectangle in blue inscribed over
the painting's left section separates a large grey/blue "distintegrating" rectangular "block" below, and a beige/light grey outline of a period face above. On the alternate side of the middle vertical floats an even more ethereal woman's face, painted with simple black lines.

With "Lampwick's Dilemma" (1989), perhaps Lampwick is the courtly-painted figure turned sideways with a walking-stick in his hand. Two vertically off-centre canvases are inserted into the painting's middle-ground - a green/black negative toned shot of a woman tennis player, and an orange/black negative toned female model exercising a contorted acrobatic-like pose with two child's decorated plastic balls, pushing her foot into the foreground. Several subsidiary images orbit the canvas perimeter - two small inserted canvases at the left end, one showing a Magrittean-pigeon with folded wings, the other a nude female torso, along the base are, from left to right, a blue outline of a "grotesque"/demonic mask, a light-blue abstract/moderne form, a dull green square with a pink-outlined ring: at the top left sits a substantial/prominent African sculpture in brown/peach. Light green and blue streaks meet at the upper left.

In the Spring of 1991 an exhibition of Salle's late "Tapestry of Paintings" opened at the Gagsonian Gallery, New York. This show initiated a period of new, cool maturity. Salle's palette now revolved around Greuze greiges, sickly high-mannerist yellows, and poignantly hollow slate blues. The background of each of these large paintings are lightly traced evocations of pastoral/festive Eighteenth-century scenes from traditional tapestry designs (for example, a treatment of ruins surrounding the Roman pyramid of Cestius dominates "Hamlet Mind" (1990-1991)). Against these backgrounds of pastiched old masters float typical Salle motifs, naked models/models dressed as harlequins/African tchatchkes/abstract smears of paint, additionally Salle introduces a few new elements such as cartoon bubbles that hover aimlessly in most of the paintings ("Mingus in Mexico" (1990), "E.A.J.A." (1990)) these bubbles, however, are empty - Salle has always trafficked in the inexpressible.
These paintings integrate a synoptic overload of hermetic visual texts and manufactured inchoate images, seemingly united only by Salle’s desire to combine them, correlating a multiplicity of divergent images and unnameable presences, the painting resists any attempt at decipherment. The archaeology of dislocated images - the material components of the picture - reveal configurations of order and disorder via interactive process. This animated strategy of affirmation and denial, the chaotic disjunctive narratives/texts creates a site that resists primary synthesis. This complex interaction articulates the resonant presence of difference within the picture frame that negates the possibility of a defined synthetic totality. However, since the work is finished in its incompleteness, “there must be a unity which is the unity of that multiple piece, of that multiplicity, as in all of those fragments” (Gilles Deleuze) (1).

Deleuze’s emphasis of the fractional/portional demonstrates how we might view within David Salle’s oeuvre a “communication that would not be posited as a principle, but would result from the play of (textual) machines and their detached pieces, of their unconnected parts” (2). It is ultimately Leibniz who inspires this vision in Deleuze, since Leibniz “first posed the problem of communication resulting from closed units or from what cannot be attached” (3). Via Leibniz’s innovation, which demarcates the extended borders of communication, the subject is enveloped in the predicate, as Salle’s intention is folded into its effect. Inclusion of the subject in the predicate implies that the world constitutes a chaotic comos/chaosmos. Through Leibniz’s system Deleuze conceives of art works that are composed of units that do not operate logically, that is, neither based upon pieces as a long unity or a fragmented totality, nor formed or prefigured by those units in the course of a logical development. The condition is one of perpetual movement, metamorphosing or emigrating from one to another (4). If we can concur with the Leibniz -Deleuze scheme, outlined above, it becomes easier for us to also accept certain of the presuppositions arising and, by way of analogy, apply them to our present discourse on the late paintings of David Salle.
In "Le pli: Leibniz et le Baroque" the Deleuzian fold can be allied to the concept of a subject that is neither Cartesian (reflection/cogito) nor Husserlian (focus/relation to/intentionality). The concept of the subject requires that the outside is conceived of as the exact inversion of the inside, the world as a texture of the intimate and the microscopic in torsional relation to the microscopic. With such a concept, the subject emerges as multiple in series, a legitimate unfolding of predicates - it is a point of view from which there is a truth/an objectless subject, since knowledge is released from all relations to object.

Deleuze draws from Leibniz a "new relation between the one and the multiple" (5) 
"...there must also be multiplicity of the one and the unity of the multiple" (6). In Leibniz's "extreme taste for principles", Deleuze suggests, that there is one pole towards which all principles are folding themselves together - Everything is one and the same - and another pole towards which all principles are unfolding and distinguishing themselves - Everything is distinguished by degree and different. He concludes that no philosophy has ever pushed to such an extreme the affirmation of a one and same world, and of an infinite difference/variety in this world. The relation one to multiple is assembled and dispersed to form the quasi-relations one to one/multiple to multiple. These quasi-relations are subsumed under the concept without concept, "the fold". The function of "the fold" is essentially to avoid distinction/opposition/a finalized binarity. In opposition to the Plato/Descartes conception of the multiple where the elements composing it are clear/distinct in their belonging, Leibniz-Deleuze offer the idea of the effect of nuance. Avoiding the definitive position that relates the predominance of the obscure Leibniz-Deleuze suggest that nuance can be adopted to dissolve latent oppositions - nuance is in this case the ultimate anti-dialectical concept. Continuity in this situation can be established specified/locally as an exchange of values at each point - the opposition clear/obscure is no longer separate or located in a hierarchical scheme.

The Leibniz-Deleuze concept of the multiple is designed to inseparate itself from all thoughts and to multiply within the multiple all possible thoughts of the multiple. ...the
really distinct is not necessarily either separated or separable’/ ".....nothing is separable or separated, but everything conspires" (7).

Deleuze-Leibniz shared relationship is founded upon a notion of the world as an intricate, folded and inseparable totality, such that any distinction is perceived as a matter of local operation, a conviction that the multiple cannot even be regarded as multiple, but only achieved as a fold. This is a culture of divergence (in the serial sense), which compossibilizes the most radical heterogeneties, this is fundamentally an opening without counterpart - "a world of captures rather than enclosures" (8). This state of Deleuzian philosophy is therefore the capture of a life that is synchronistically total and divergent - grounded in Leibniz's assertion of one single image and same world, and of the infinite difference and variety located in this world and mediated via the Baroque: a texturology which proposes a general organicism/presence of organisms everywhere. (9).

Deleuze-Leibniz consider the world as “as series of inflections or events: it is a pure transmission of singularities.” (10). The category of the event is central, because it supports/envelops/dynamizes the category of singularity. Therefore the question arises what is an event/the conditions of an event if everything is to be an event? (11). The Leibniz-Deleuze scheme integrates elements of Whitehead’s theories into the programme (12) understanding the event as what singularizes continuity in each of its local folds and correspondingly the designation of the origin, always singular/local, of a truth/concept or what Deleuze formulates as the “subordination of the true to the singular and the remarkable” (13). Therefore an event is both omnipresent/creative structural/extraordinary, and consequently the series of notions related to the event are continually disseminated and contracted into the same point. (14).

Tangibly, the event for Deleuze, means an immanent active process occurring over a background of a totality, an artificial construct admittedly, but discernable/thinkable within a continuum of inferiority - it is a complex of extensions/intensities/singularities which are contemporaneously punctually reflected/accomplished in a flux.
In line with Leibniz's programme Deleuze attempts to configure the monad as "absolute inferiority". Presenting the outside as the exact reverse/"membrane" of the inside, conceiving the world as a texture of the intimate, thinking the macroscopic/molar in torsional as relation to the microscopic/molecular - these operations constitute the essential meaning of the concept of the Fold. It is via the notion of the Fold that Deleuze attempts to define a figure for interiority/subject that is neither reflection/cogito, nor relation to the focus/intentionality/nor a pure empty point/eclipse but an absolute inferiority, reversed so that it negates the relation to the All. Leibniz terms this "relation", which folds the absolute inferiority, onto the total exterior the "vinculum", and this is what enables the monadic interior to subordinate/highlight the exterior monads without recourse to transfigure the limits of its inferiority. (15).

The conception of a subject as an inferiority whose exterior forms a "primitive" link to the infinite multiple/world includes three effects. Firstly it releases knowledge from any specific relation to an "object". Knowledge functions via recalling immanent perceptions, as an interior "membrane" mechanism, a subsumption/domination of multiplicities correlated in an assemblage. "I am forever unfolding between two folds, and if to perceive means to unfold, then I am forever perceiving within the folds. Every perception is hallucinatory because perception has no object" (Gilles Deleuze) (16). Secondly the Deleuze-Leibniz programme composes the subject as a series/an unfolding of predicates, the subject is directly multiple providing multiple supports for the relation of several serial limits. Thirdly the Deleuze-Leibniz programme renders the subject the point/point of view from which there is a truth/"function of truth" - the point of view from which truth is. Inferiority is essentially the embodiment of such a point of view. The vinculum is additionally the arrangement of the factors of truth.

Essentially truth is variation which implies directly that it is only the case for a point of view. This is not a variation of truth between each individual subject but a condition via which the truth of a variation appears to the subject. The conception of truth as varying/in process requires that it is in each case ordered/arranged at one point/from situation to
situation. The true is only manifest in the moment that accounts for the variation that it is. "...the point of view is the power to order cases in each domain of variation, a condition for the manifestation of the true". (Gilles Deleuze) (17).

In the later paintings of David Salle the concept of artifice features predominantly as the main compositional device, every episode/passage in Salle's work is positioned/layered with what appears to be highly conditioned predetermined arbitrariness. Stray images or their fragments systematically guide the eye through a network of references that seemingly, at least superficially, have little/nothing to do with one another. On one level Salle wants the question of the possible meaninglessness of his work to be a very real factor in the viewer's experience of each canvas. On a different level, however, Salle manipulates the viewers expectations in order to make some cogent points regarding the exchange value of aesthetic signs.

Concomitant with the "Tapestry Paintings" Salle was developing a number of other related pictorial themes that would eventually result in several divergent series of paintings - "The Black Glass"/"Torn Poster"/"Silkscreen"/"Ghost"/"Ballet" Paintings. Perhaps unsurprisingly, all the experimentation dating from this period seem to lead directly to the most recent pop-like distillations, "The Early Product Paintings". For example, "The Torn Poster" series (1991) inspired in part by 1950's "afficism" (Mimmo Rotello etc...) mark a return to post-war advertising imagery, together with a renewed fascination with the use of intersecting collage techniques and tromp l'oeil effects. Numerous "Early Product" leitmotifs, including a Margrittean pigeon (18) and a nautical life-saver are premièred in the "Torn Poster" series, indeed retrospectively the "Torn Poster" paintings are almost "studies" for the later works.

The "Early Product Paintings" are coolly classical, summary works - derived from Salle's college sketches. Their mood evokes an atmosphere that is distinctly elegiac. Almost
all Salle's main themes, from furniture design to sub-erotic/pornography are represented to some degree. By openly acknowledging his present sources in Magritte and the American trompe l'oeil painters Salle is declaring the "Early Product" works as History paintings to succeed the "classical" masterworks of pop.

The arranged structure of the images is intentionally confused/confusing. They ostensibly require that we recognise/identify each style, each method of representation, interpret its individual meanings, and subsequently "reconcile" the equity of meanings with a multiplicity of differences and, by extension come to terms with a cultural collapse as it is flattened out to a continuum, by the way we conceive/apprehend images in our transient experience. Postmodern painting is embedded in our "schizophrenic culture" which has developed in conjunction with/in response to, the continuous and relentless flow of visual/textual information that assails sense-perception. No principles of cohesion/synthesis/development seem easily discernable and no vision of a unified history/narrative possible.
BREAKING INTO HEAVEN (ELEGIA)

NOTES


2. Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1979)

3. Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1979)

4. In the final chapter of "Le pli: Leibniz et le Baroque" Deleuze connects Leibniz’s concept of "new harmony" to Baroque and contemporary music (See: Ronald Bogue "Rhomomusikology" - Substance 20:3 (1991)). By virtue of the radiation of musical waves that move in and about monads, the world is made up of "divergent series" and this resembles an infinity of pleats and creases of unified and dispersed matter. In "Qu’est-ce que la philosophie" Deleuze and Guattari suggest that deterritorialization, and its obverse reterritorialization, implicitly link "monadonomadic" thinking to the art of displacement transformation. Contemporary artists in the line of Leibniz transform "monadology" into "nomadology". They become emigrant thinkers who deterritorialize accepted notions of space. Forms, like modes of folding disappear. The strategy of "Le pli" continually bends problems back to Leibniz’s fascination with infinite and curvilinear forms. Deleuze appears to use Leibniz’s concept of harmonics to advocate the possibility of infinite thought within defined limits.


Deleuze appears to have re-conceived his understanding of the relationship between the monads and the world. The Baroque is identified, by Deleuze, not with an essence but with a function: "It does not invent things: there are all kinds of folds coming from the East, Greek, Roman, Romanesque, Gothic, Classical folds.... Yet the Baroque trait twists and turns its folds, pushing them to infinity, fold over fold, one upon the other". The Baroque folds. It folds at two levels - both lower and upper, both matter (or body or world) and mind (or soul or subject) both outside and inside, both low and high, both thin and deep. In this movement, a subject is the expression of the world because the world is what the subject expresses. This movement for Deleuze is specifically Baroque. The notion of "inter-expression" needs to be understood more precisely because there is a domain of "similitude" which forms the possibility of relations of whole and parts which precedes the domains of the monads of substances or possible existents.

Spinoza has been taken as the philosopher who succeeds in affirming difference as such in its immanence (See "Difference et repetition" (1968)). This affirmation is manifest in the notion of the "essence of mode" that is central to the Deleuzian interpretation exemplified in "Spinoza et la Probleme de l'Expression" (1968) that suggests that the essence of modes are intrinsic modes (intensive qualities that are singular and intself even if the corresponding mode does not exist. Which is to say, while existing modes are always modes of a given attribute of God, they are formally distinct from those attributes. There is something like an essence of mode/singular which is indeed already implied in the notion that there are different attributes of God, (e.g. thought/extension) which are nonetheless each infinite in their own right - or to adopt the phrase that Deleuze uses for Leibniz - formally diverse but ontologically one.

Deleuze and Guattari suggest that Perception and Thought have substance which enables them to maintain the proposition that thought/perception is always "real" and located "outside" even in fantasy - if fantasy has substance it is a body, and its apprehension by another thought/body is as real as the perception of an object, or body with extension (thought/perception have only "intension" or virtual reality/they are real but not objective). (See "Spinoza: Philosophie pratique" (1970/1981)). Effects (thoughts/perceptions) are things, in other words real beings with an essence/existence of their own


9. There are two systems/paradigms of the Multiple: the mathematical and the organicist, Plato/Aristotle. In opposing the fold to the set (Leibniz to Descartes) activates the organicist system. The Deleuze-Leibniz system must be distinguished from the mathematical model for in mathematics it is individuation which constitutes a specification,
and this is not the case with physical things/organic bodies. The distinction to be made is between the animal and the number. The Leibniz-Deleuze opt directly for the animal (essentially the Leibniz system is based in both animal psychology and animal monadology).

The principle that concerns Deleuze is "individuation" and it is in regard of his notion of the singular that Leibniz is employed. Additionally Leibniz represents an organicism scheme in opposition to a mathematical one, inasmuch as for Leibniz there is a distinction between the principle of individuation that governs in mathematics and that which governs bodies - the individuality of the body comes from elsewhere. Deleuze would appear generally to have more sympathy for a notion radical plurality of individual sorts or "amulacae" than for an abstracted "mathesis" that might be conceived as governing some inert matter as to which the specificity of the material would be secondary. Leibniz's notion of a universe constituted by an infinite number of animal souls (monads) which include (but do not contain - Deleuze via Leibniz distinguishes between a given monad's relationship to other monads, a relationship of pre-established harmony, and the fact that a given monad (or soul) "has" a body, or more precisely, a body (a "one") "appertains" to a monad (an "Each" or "Every"), infinite numbers of sub-souls in relation to the notion of "becoming animal" in "Mille Plateaux".

10 Gilles Deleuze - op.cit (1988).
11 See: Chapter 6 "What is an Event?" Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1988).
14 It is a combination of immanence and excessive infinity which enable us to comprehend an event. Thinking the event or making a concept of the singular, always as the conjunction of commitment and subtraction should exist co-presently, the world/situation/condition and the infinite. In Chapter 4 "Sufficient Reason" (Gilles Deleuze - ibid (1988)), Deleuze relates a version of the principle as "the identity of the event and the principle, which is more succinctly phrased when he states "Everything has a concept". Here once again, Deleuze's sensibility is manifest through turns of style assembled to negate an established dialectic through the play of nuances.

...for Leibniz, it is both true that the individual exists and that this is in virtue of the power of the concept; monad or mind. Thus this power of the concept (to become subject) does not consist in infinitely specifying a genre, but in condensing and prolonging singularities. These are not generalities, but events, drops of events.

(Gilles Deleuze)

Leibniz/Deleuze say that the multiple exists by concept or the multiple exists in the One. This is the function of the monad, to extract the one from within the multiple so that there may be a concept of this multiple. This enables a constructed equivalence to be discerned between "to be an element of/to belong to" ontological categories and to possess a property have a certain predicate", categories of knowledge. Deleuze expresses this: "Finally, a monad has as its property, not an abstract attribute, but other monads". Deleuze distinguishes between the operations of knowledge/encyclopedic concepts" and the operations of truth/concepts as events". It is within this distinction that Leibniz/Deleuze define two levels of thought of the world - the level of "actualization" (monads) and the level of "realization" (bodies). It might be suggested therefore that in infinity, the monadic dimension of a given thing proceeds with the verification -as truth of what its corporeal dimension is the expression of; or that the monad is an entity of truth, while bodies are encyclopedic assemblages. However, simultaneously Deleuze folds one onto the other "repairing" the apparent gap generated via the initial divergence of the distinction.

Within this scheme there would apparently seem a contradiction between the principle of sufficient reason and the principle of indiscernables. However, for Deleuze, the connection of reason and the interruption of indiscernables only facilitate at best flux - a hyper continuity. "The principle of indiscernables establishes cuts, but the cuts are not gaps or ruptures in the continuity. On the contrary, they redistribute continuity in such a way that there is no gap, that is the "best" way". Therefore within this scheme the universality of events is also the universality of continuities. For Leibniz/Deleuze "everything happens" implies that nothing is interrupted, and therefore everything has a concept, that of its inclusion in continuity as an infection of the fold.
Deleuze, in Chapter 5 - "Incompossibility, Individuality, Liberty" has recourse to apply discursive elements from both Nietzsche and Mallarmé to evoke a "revelation of Thought-world that throws dice" because "...from them the world lacks principle, has lost its principles. That is why the roll of the dice is the power of affirming chance, of thinking of chance in sum, which is above all not a principle but the absence of all principle. Thus Mallarmé gives to absence or nothingness what issues from chance, what claims to escape it all while limiting it by principle". Deleuze aims to demonstrate that beyond the Leibnizian baroque is our world where chance's gamble "makes incompossibles enter into the same world, shattered".

Within the context of the concept of the Fold Deleuze investigates the vital notion of vinculum - a subject directly articulating the classical closure of the reflexive subject but without reflexive clarity and the Baroque animalistic pacification of the empirist subject without the inevitable passivity. Deleuze identifies the requisites:

("1) each individual possess a body that cannot be separated from it; (2) each one possesses a body inseparable as it is the constant subject of the vinculum that is fixed to it (its vinculum; (3) for variables this vinculum has monads taken en masse; (4) these masses of monads are inseparable from infinities of material parts to which they belong; (5) these material parts make up the organic composition of a body, whose vinculum, envisioned in respect to the variables, assures its specific unity; (6) this body is one that belongs to the individual monad, it is its body to the extent that it already avails itself of an individual unity (thanks to the vinculum now envisioned in relation to the constant)"
(Gilles Deleuze)

18. Magritte's leitmotif of the pigeon ("The Murderous Sky" (1927)/"Clairvoyance" (1936)/"Deep Waters" (1941) - finds its refrain in Salle's "A Double Life" (1993), a painting from the Early Product series that features two such birds. So too Magritte's image of an ambiguously draped section of cloth ("The Village of the Mind" (1926)/"The Ordeal of Sleep" (1928/27)) - appears in Salle's recent work, in many forms of photographic and painterly performances. It assumes the enveloping form of a chador-like cloak in the photo-silkscreened insert of a neoclassical Tapestry Painting "Hamlet Mind" (1990/91) and is a concealing vestment in the "Ghost Painting" series (1991-92). Additionally it can be located in the Early Product Painting "Exit Weeping" (1993) where it takes the form of a man's "Mouchoir" compositionally floating yet pictorially located.

Magritte in fact provides Salle with far more than simply iconographic material. The effusive combination, in his work, of repressed emotion and chimeric eroticism is of particular relevance. In addition his deadpan surrealism/lyrically meaningful narratives/subversive strategies, together with his use of words in paintings appear equally poignant. Overall is the importance of Magritte's key position at the intersection of C19th/C20th Century European/ American still-life/trompe l'oeil traditions - the crossroads at which Salle, too, is presently located.
“He reads the story right through, every word of it from beginning to end. By the time he finishes, dawn has come, and the room has begun to brighten. He hears a bird sing, he hears footsteps going down the street, he hears a car driving across the Brooklyn Bridge. Black was right, he says to himself. I knew it all by heart.....For now is the moment that Blue stands up from his chair, puts on his hat and walks through the door. And from this moment on, we know nothing”

Paul Auster - The New York Trilogy
David Salle's paintings have a distinctive tone and style, an immediate impact and identity. As his work has developed - the quality of confrontation - which his paintings provoke has become simultaneously more direct and more complex. The purpose of this project is to suggest that Salle's methods and concerns remain constant. He is an artist who has brought to painting an informed knowledge of the issues regarding presentation/representation/performance, of the interaction between the work and the audience, and the complicity generated and correspondingly surpressed by the spectator.

Salle's paintings generally articulate a spectral disengagement, a disconnection presenting an aggregate of signs/symbols that come to represent lived experience, because ultimately we recognise that this aggregate is all there is. Acknowledging a world in which everything is a representation, but which is still constant, it is via a recognition of the limitation of painting in the face of the widespread technologies of reproduction/manipulation that Salle manoeuvres the medium of painting and "history"/"narrative" into oblique relationships - what sustains the project is the possibility that in the essential distance of painting from "history"/"narrative" one is able to confer some kind of redress to a society/social realm which is characterized by spectacle and "amnesia". The alienation effect that the paintings generate inculcates a filmic quality, something of that medium's ability, to recall emotion/sentiment at a distance, and films adroit willingness to confront heightened emotional themes in parallel to the tawdry and everyday.

"Mais le concept n'est pas donné, il est créé, il se pose lui-même en lui-même, auto position. Les deux s'impliquent, puisque ce qui est véritablement créé, du vivant de l'œuvre d'art, jouit par lui-même d'une auto-position de soi, ou d'un caractère autopoïétique, a quoi le reconnaître. D'autant plus le concept est créé, d'autant plus il se pose. Ce qui dépend d'une libre activité créatrice, c'est aussi ce qui se pose en soi-même, indépendamment et nécessairement: le plus subjectif sera le plus objectif.

(Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari) (1)
The question of philosophy is the singular point where concept and creation are related to each other.

In Deleuzian philosophy a concept is both absolute and relative, that is relative to its own components/to other concepts/to the plane on which it is defined/to the problems it is supposed to address, but it is absolute through the condensation it enacts/the site upon which it locates on the plane/the conditions it assigns to the problem. As a whole it is absolute, but inasmuch as it is fragmentary it is relative. "Il est infini par son survol ou sa vitesse, mais fini par son mouvement qui trace le contour des composantes". (Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari) (2). The concept is real without being actual, ideal without being abstract. The concept may be defined by its consistency it's "endo-consistance"/"exo-consistance", but also it has no reference, it is self-referential; that is it promotes itself and its object at the same time that it is created. Deleuze and Guattari suggest that it is "constructivisme" that unites the relative and the absolute.

"Le chaos chaotise, et défait dans l'infini toute consistance, sans perdre l'infini dans lequel la pensée, le problème de la philosophie est d'acquérir une consistance plonge..." (Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari) (3)

As Nietzsche came to understand, the situation of thought is essentially a creation.

Deleuze suggests that art struggles with chaos, it does so in order to bring forth a vision that illuminates for an instant - a sensation. Art situates elements of chaos in a frame in order to form a "composed chaos" that becomes necessary, or from which it extracts a chaoid sensation as variety. A concept is a chaoid state par excellence - it refers back to a chaos rendered consistent, become thought, a mental chaosmos. Chaos is constituted from three "Chaoids" art/philosophy/science - as forms of thought/creation. "Chaoids" are the "realities" produced on the planes that cut through his chaos in different ways.
The artist utilizes multiple chaotic varieties that no longer constitute a reproduction of the sensory in the organ but establish a being of the sensory, a being of sensation, on an anorganic plane of composition that is able to restore the infinite. The struggle with chaos in painting, is found in another way in philosophy, it is always a process of containing chaos by a secant plane that crosses it. Painters engage a catastrophe and leave a trace of this passage on the canvas, the transition from chaos to composition.

Artists work with sensations. By means of the material, the principle design of art is to extract the affect from affections as the transition from one state to another - to present a bloc of sensations, a pure being of sensations. Art, in relation to the precepts/visions represented - artists are presenters of affects, the inventors and creators of affects. Deleuze suggests that art opens-up the triple organization of perceptions/affections/opinions in order to substitute "a monument" composed of percepts/affects and blocs of sensation that come to replace language. "Le monument n'actualise pas l'événement virtuel, mais il l'incorpore ou l'incarne: il lui donne un corps, une vie, un univers" (Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari) (4).

Paintings are images which interpret the world, wherein we are predisposed to regard them as complexes of "narrative"/expressive/aesthetic significance which establish a particular way of viewing the world. Salle's paintings foreground a self-consciousness (conscious of its own meaning, a type of analytical approach to images that emphasize a display of control over the philosophical questions of picture-making, of material and materiality and the nature of the painting's effects). What this suggests is a questioning of painting, and within this the correlation of painting to image and representation - painting questioning the essence of its own possibility by contrasting/foregrounding the primacy of images and representation. The supposition of finitude and interpretation is transposed into a process whereby painting becomes the site of an active exposition. The painting maintains, central to its internal composition, the question of its own activity/presentation/interpretation, it therefore integrates as constant an affirmative irreducible quality - the essential means by which the painting exists/functions will always
be in the manner of a question. This "ever present" question is not merely a supplement to the artwork but a precise/intrinsic element that plays a determining role in the act of presentation.

Salle's conception of the artist represents a similar change of interpretation. Instead of regarding art as emanating from the creative subject, Salle appropriates narrative materials wherever he finds them, transforming/dislocating them from their original context/condition in order to pose questions/conflicts for our condition. Contrary to the ideology of the individual subject, Salle's works tap collective sources and are addressed to collective meanings. We have seen how he turns away from any linear notions of narrative progression towards an open relationship to a variety/multiple of sources/contexts/meanings - synthesizing conflicting interpretations within a single work.

For this reason, this is why, following a Deleuzoguattarian analysis, Salle's program is far more than an extension of a Modernist programme since he raises doubts about Modernist ideals and transposes over this in its place a more ambiguous veil in its place.

The analysis articulated within/throughout the project would appear to suggest the necessity for a re-assessment of the understanding of experience/thought/knowledge. Nietzsche's idea of experience as a field of fluctuating intensities points towards alternatives to the modern idea of the conscious/rational subject. In tracing out the implications of these notions it is appropriate to consider forms of thought in a new light. Through the "death of the subject" one can register the loss of the fundamentals of Modernity, of a rationally observed/rationally operating world. The circle that closed between the conscious subject and a rationally ordered world has been broken, and thinkers such as Nietzsche provide a basis for thought in the postmodern instant.

Nietzsche's conception of the Dionysian provides part of the basis for a re-conceptualization of ideas of legitimate action/knowledge. The standard ideas of action/knowledge are dependent upon maintaining a stable reference point for objects
and a stable identity for subjects. Nietzsche's concept of the Dionysian raises questions about notions of stability, especially if they are conceived in a static/unhistorical manner. His exposure of the genealogy of consciousness contributes particularly to historicizing concepts of consciousness/action. Similarly his genealogical analysis of value affects the modern idea of the individual and history/narrative.

"The individual, the "single man", as people and philosophers have hitherto understood him, is an error: he does not constitute a separate entity, an atom, a "link in the chain", something merely inherited from the past - he constitutes the entire single line "man" up to and including himself.

(Friedrich Nietzsche) (5)

What Nietzsche means is that human lineage is available to all, providing the materials from which one can appropriate elements in the formation of an identity. Although Nietzsche's point does not change the minimal notion of identity necessary for referential discourse, it does have the virtue of opening up questions of cultural formation/impact upon identity. We have observed such a process in the work of David Salle where the multiple variety of sources/narratives activated provide the substance for a continual reconsideration, he emphasizes the multiple narratives that enter into experience in the C20th condition. (Postmodern ideas about textuality necessarily indicate a different understanding of human action).

Nietzsche suggested doubts that reasoning cannot be divorced from passionate desires, indeed Nietzsche advocated that the philosopher's desire to comprehend reality as definitive given is an illusion, since nothing is in effect "real" except our collections of desires/passions, that we may function with no other "reality" other than the "reality" of our drives - for thinking is only the relationship of these desires and their interconnection.

(6) The most ambiguous dimension of the thinkers task is that reality is only accessible via our drives among which we may situate the drive for verbalization and the drive for visualization. Therefore a thinkers action towards an understanding cannot be completed because of the thinker's own embeddedness in the language/images creating more
instances of language/image. In a related manner, questions simply generate more questions.

"The thinker thus expresses the noble affinity of thought and life: life making thought active, thought making life affirmative. In Nietzsche this general affinity is not only the pure "Socratic secret "par excellence", but also the essence of art"

(Gilles Deleuze) (7)

This approach illustrates the implications of the Nietzschean program that poists the modern conception of the conscious subject as superficial. Nietzsche aims to subvert the sharp distinctions positioned between the affective and the rational/between thought and imagination. Nietzsche re-interprets the psyche as "a fluctuation of intensity" (8) presenting experience as a flow of pulsations moving in different directions and forming themselves into different patterns. Some of them double back upon themselves to form a reflective consciousness. Therefore, the rational may be regarded as a set of structures emerging from fluctuations of energy rather than as a separate power. This is why Nietzsche conceives of thinking as a relationship between drives and intensive moments. Rather than an aesthetics of reception, Nietzsche's works call for a performance hermeneutics, an incitement to action, to an action of transvaluing values.

Nietzsche's philosophical program articulated here is thus consistent with David Salle's notion of multiple layers of meaning. If the intensive moments of experience organize themselves into different levels/patterns, then the attainment of understanding is embedded within the "activity" of achieving ordered relationships from among these intensive moments. Pure chaotic thinking is unproductive because it merely creates a weak/confused response to the conditions under examination. Nietzsche views effective thinking as emerging from the sensual/linguistic materials that present themselves in fragmentary form within momentary experiences. However, these moments are never self-contained since they constitute the narrative/historical flow of a person's experience.
With David Salle the canvas becomes a site of irreducibility, resistant to simplicity. In accordance with postmodern theory we can suggest that Salle's work negates the idea of a depth of background that determines the value of signifiers. What this implies (in a loss of depth background) is the loss of the idea that the signified determines the signifier. If we accept a shift to the interplay between various kinds of signifiers, which seems to be what is at issue in Salle's imagery, we witness what replaces the depth model is for the most part a conception of practices/discourses/textual play. Thus depth is replaced by surface or by multiple surfaces.

The relationship of the concept of multiple surfaces to Nietzsche's ideas concerning the psyche as a field of fluctuating intensities that only gradually organize themselves into patterns of thought operate very closely together because of the fact that when we remove the idea of a pre-figured depth background what remains is the interaction of the intensities and forms of hierarchy themselves, often constructed into "meaningful" discourses and "texts". Meaning/interpretation falls within an intertextual field, and is already charged with a meaning that calls, like anything else, for a critical examination/re-examination. There seems to be little doubt that Salle wants us to see this point, as it is exemplified by his frequent use of image fragments/textual fragments and references within his visualizations. He understands the process of image-making as coincident with an ongoing effort to understand complex texts. Salle's paintings become sites for expressions/reflections, providing the emotional impetus for thought surrounding contentious areas. They leave us to resolve the conflicts they present in our own way, rather than pretending to possess solutions to the problems they depict.

The images/symbols/elements form a multiple co-relational correspondence to the painting, in the sense they are integral to the content, but in another they are parasitic upon/engaged within another external history/narrative/context. This reciprocal identity opens up the possibility of a presence that re-defines the homogeneity of mimesis and representation. The terms/contingency of representation becomes a site of equivocation/ambiguity that operates within the process of presentation. The painting
therefore maintains as constant the question of what a painting is, opening up the space of the question, and therefore ultimately resisting the possibility of an irrevocable/specific termination.

In a story by Jorge Luis Borges, the narrator discovers a crystal ripped "with all veins of light" where "all the places of the earth meet without mingling beheld, from every possible perspective simultaneously". Deleuzian philosophy shifts as we look at it. It twists and coils into unexpected shapes - suddenly, rapidly, continuously, like a snake between stones, and every perspective yields new perceptions.
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2. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, ibid (1991)


5. Fredrich Nietzsche, "Twilight of the Idols" trans R.J. Hollingdale

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