Latin America and the Liberal International Order: An Agenda for Research

Introduction

International Relations has been consumed by debates over the future of the ‘liberal international order’ (LIO). The LIO’s norms and institutions, associated with US leadership, appear to be threatened from without by the rise of authoritarian powers like China and corroded from within by the likes of US President Donald Trump and a rising tide of anti-European Union politicians and voters.¹ Concern about the current crisis has been complemented with greater attention to the order’s origins and evolution to unearth lessons about how LIO might be adapted to changing conditions.² More critically, scholars have uncovered how imperial practices and power disparities have been central to LIO.

Despite the LIO debate’s expansive parameters—historical and contemporary, supportive and critical—Latin America has been largely absent from the multitude of studies of LIO, also often called the American world order, global liberal order, or the US-led liberal world order. For example, a recent special issue of International Affairs on ‘Liberal Internationalism in Theory and Practice’, edited by G. John Ikenberry and representing a spectrum of perspectives on LIO, mentioned Latin America only twice, and quite offhandedly. This is not an aberration; the lack of attention pertains across the spectrum of Anglo-American IR scholarship that deals most centrally with the topic. This empirical gap also has consequences for our understanding of LIO. The absence of Latin America³ as an object of study in the LIO debate, and the minimal consideration of Latin American states as actors who have shaped international order, contributes to theoretical blind spots in both critical and supportive IR scholarship and public debate on LIO. For critics who have emphasized the imperialist and colonial roots of LIO,⁴ the experience of Latin American states over two centuries—-independent but often internationally unequal—offers a rich vein of experiences of partial inclusion or marginalization from LIO.⁵ For supporters who argue for reforming LIO to save

³ ‘Latin America’ is a necessary shorthand, though it obscures much diversity in how countries and subregions engaged with and were affected by international factors.
it, such as Ikenberry, Latin American experiences could elucidate core weaknesses exacerbated by the order’s global expansion.

LIO has shaped Latin America, and Latin America has shaped LIO—but not always in the ways supporters or critics might expect. At first blush, Latin America appears to be a poster child for the successes of LIO: the region has long (if distinct and uneven) liberal roots; it rapidly democratized at the end of the Cold War; and it includes many expansive free traders. The region’s diplomatic traditions prize international law, peaceful settlement of disputes, and international organization. Reaching back to the 1860s, Latin American jurists have made prominent contributions to international jurisprudence, the ‘mortar’ that binds international order. Its diplomats have played crucial roles in international organizations, as discussed below. However, in other ways, LIO historically has been, and remains, superficial in its reach in Latin America. The region has had only partial success in pursuing its goals through LIO. Domestically, liberal roots are balanced by authoritarianism; formal democracy is hobbled by poor governance; external openness is paired with monopolies and corruption; and regional international organizations have weak competences despite their proliferation. Even as Latin Americans often claimed a place in Western, liberal international society, leading powers relegated the region to a secondary status.

This article has two primary goals. The first is to show how Latin America largely has been overlooked in the primarily Anglo-American, International Relations debate on LIO. The second is to illustrate why this omission matters for our understanding of LIO’s evolution and effects. Latin America’s omission emerges from two features of the LIO debate. Supportive scholars have largely explored why great powers choose to build order and how that order shapes relations between these large states. In these accounts, Latin America is placed within the US sphere of influence and, therefore, is of little inherent interest. On the other hand,


critical accounts have focused on LIO’s historical links to colonialism. Non-great powers are foregrounded, but these are often colonies or decolonizing states. In short, Latin American experiences do not fit neatly into supportive or critical accounts. Placing Latin America at the heart of studies of LIO requires rethinking key aspects of the debate. Since much of the region gained independence in the 1820s, Latin American statehoods evolved in conjunction with LIO. Latin America’s international role needs to be connected to broader questions of ‘ownership’ of LIO beyond the United States and Britain.

In the following section, we assess the role of Latin America in the primarily Anglo-American literature on LIO. Finding that the region has been of marginal importance to that debate, we offer a macro-historical sketch of Latin America’s engagement in LIO’s formative ‘critical junctures’. Our goal is not to establish an overarching causal explanation of how Latin America shaped LIO or how LIO shaped Latin America—an enormous and probably impossible task. Instead, this brief history highlights spaces for empirical and theoretical contributions to the LIO debate about how the evolving international order interacted with regions at its margins. For IR theory on LIO, deeper study of Latin America’s experience should cast light on the ways in which non-great powers outside the order’s core shaped, and were shaped by, the elements of this order for more than a century.

Overlooked: Latin America in the LIO debate

Before assessing how LIO has variably included and excluded Latin America, we first survey how academic research on LIO, both supportive and critical, has treated the region. We have surveyed recent, prominent works of IR scholarship focused on liberal international order, liberal world order, US-led world order, American world order, or some variant, with an emphasis on the English-language literature where LIO has been a major concern.

This is not, of course, terra nullius. There is a great deal of relevant work regarding (and from) Latin America, but it mostly has been unexplored in IR’s core debates about LIO. Important studies discuss the Latin American role in international law and human rights norms, international political economy, and regional and international organizations. However, these studies, often in neighbouring disciplines to IR, have had little influence on the core IR narratives about LIO’s formation. Likewise, scholars in diverse fields have explored the effects of international financial institutions, globalization, and neoliberalism on

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Latin America, but this is rarely viewed in terms of LIO. Economic histories have examined how international markets shaped Latin American development, but the particular notion of LIO merits little discussion. Many international political aspects of Latin America’s relationship with LIO have been subsumed by studies of US-Latin American relations; however, these are not coterminous. Finally, given the emphasis here on the English-language debate, it is important to note that Latin American scholars have extensively debated (often in Spanish and Portuguese) relevant issues in somewhat different terms: US power in inter-American relations; the effects of neoliberalism and democracy promotion; and the region’s place in global political and economic structures. Especially in Brazil, Latin American IR scholars have sometimes tackled LIO directly, but this work has rarely informed the Anglo-American LIO debate.

The following review groups work on LIO into the broad camps of supporters, critics, and regionalists, with a focus on emblematic authors within each perspective. These groupings necessarily elide some of the nuance present in the work; even key supporters often advocate reforming LIO and related aspects of US foreign policy. However, the goal is less a comprehensive coverage of the LIO debate than a discussion of Latin America’s role in it. With few exceptions, such as the rise of Brazil from 2006-2012, Latin America is tangential.


For an important exception, Stuenkel and Taylor, eds., *Brazil on the Global Stage*.

Brazil is often grouped with other emerging powers. See Andrew Hurrell, ‘Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order: What Space for Would‐be Great Powers?’, *International Affairs* 82: 1, January 2006, pp. 1–19; Kristen
Latin America in the LIO canon

Latin America is conspicuous in its absence in the canonical works on LIO, which typically see the order as positive sum, if not universally benign. The term ‘liberal international order’ is perhaps most associated with Princeton Professor G. John Ikenberry. For Ikenberry, despite variations over time, the LIO can be understood as a relatively open and rules-based form of organizing international politics. In discussing LIO’s evolution, canonical works argue that today’s LIO was layered over previous international orders—the Westphalian system of sovereign states, British liberal internationalism, and Wilsonianism—and retains some of their characteristics. (Less acknowledged is that this order was also layered over early international law that emerged from the Iberian conquest of the Americas.) Intellectually, Ikenberry and his collaborators undertake another form of layering, adding liberal institutional and ideational content to adaptations of hegemonic stability theory that emphasize the centrality of a major power. Liberal authors, however, have seen international multilateral institutions as potentially self-sustaining, given the efficiencies and benefits they create, and the shared liberal democratic norms of core states.

Deudney and Ikenberry argue that the post-WWII, US-led variant of LIO is marked by five features: co-binding security institutions that limited US unilateral power, penetrated US hegemony that permitted consultation in US decisions, semi-sovereign great powers Germany and Japan that foreswore military might, economic openness through multilateral


16 Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan; G John Ikenberry, ‘The end of liberal international order?’, International Affairs 94: 1, January 2018, pp. 7–23.


trade institutions, and shared civic identities based in liberal democratic values. Though Ikenberry and his collaborators reach optimistic conclusions about LIO’s benefits for economic growth and international stability, they recognize that the order is inherently presaged on international inequalities that grant the United States a dominant role to maintain the system. Some of LIO’s hierarchical international relationships are largely negotiated; others resemble patron-client relationships or are coercive.

Many, and perhaps all, of the five characteristics that Deudney and Ikenberry ascribe to LIO could be relevant to Latin America’s engagement with the United States and wider world. However, the region is largely hidden in ‘the shadow that hegemonic nations cast’, to use the words of Ikenberry and Kupchan. Ikenberry spends significant time in Liberal Leviathan comparing multilateral US strategies in postwar Europe with bilateral approaches to East Asia. He mentions that US policies in Latin America were at times ‘crudely imperial’. Similar phrases recur in his work, which has not deeply explored Latin America’s role in LIO or LIO’s effects on Latin America. Again, this absence is not uncommon. For example, Sorensen’s book on the origins and crisis of LIO only mentions the region briefly, largely in terms of its democratization and uneven experiences with market transitions, but it is tangential to his account of LIO’s rise or of its more recent crises. The gap reflects relative inattention to non-great powers’ roles in shaping LIO. Latin America’s lack of great powers and the often-overstated presumption of US domination have led this scholarship to overlook the region’s contributions to and engagement with LIO.

As we suggest below, studying the Latin American experience challenges aspects of these accounts, while providing empirics to develop under theorized aspects of LIO. Most accounts of LIO leave the actual bargains between the United States and weaker states unexplored, variously suggesting mechanisms of socialization, use of market power, imposition, and payoffs. Most explicitly, Lake sees weaker states as ‘subordinates’ who support a relationship based in legitimate authority; subordinates’ support is in fact key to the maintenance of

Latin American acquiescence is often taken for granted. This contrasts with emerging historical scholarship on Latin American agency in inter-American relations. If these asymmetrical bargains are fundamental to the working of liberal hegemonic leadership, they should be explored in greater depth. The nature of these bargains raises questions about the benefits of LIO: do these relationships create widely shared gains or are they narrow pacts with elites, perhaps to the detriment of populations? While inequality has emerged, even among supporters, as a central challenge in the LIO’s core states, these issues have a longer and often troubling heritage in Latin America.

Latin America in critical accounts
In the eyes of its harshest critics, LIO is little more than a facade, and an intellectual justification, for Western and US dominance over the poor and weak. For these critics, often situated in post-colonial theory, imposition and coercion are more marked characteristics of LIO than negotiation and restraint. Parmar, Jahn and others argue that liberal internationalism, and much LIO scholarship, serves to legitimate and naturalize, not to explain, certain international policies. ‘The key point is that the LIO is a class-based, elitist hegemony—strongly imbued with explicit and implicit racial and colonial/imperial assumptions’. Critics see liberal politics as ineffective in developing country contexts, and often hypocritical. Jahn argues that ‘liberal foreign policies frequently failed to achieve their goals and that liberal actors often failed to act in accordance with liberal principles’. This vision of the world has ‘special rules’ for the West and ‘cuts off the rest of the world’. In describing LIO’s origins, critical accounts highlight colonialism’s role in the development of today’s international system. Jahn argues that ‘The establishment of liberalism thus required

policies of colonialism’. Recent leading critical histories of the League of Nations and the creation of the United Nations emphasize race and empire, but do not discuss the Latin American role, despite the region’s numerical weight both in Geneva and at the 1945 San Francisco conference. Critics argue that LIO is inextricably linked to hierarchies not just between states, as Ikenberry agrees, but of class, race, and empire. Parmar argues that ‘background ideas’ of race and empire underpinned foundational moments of liberal order and implicitly guide its institutions and policies today. This limits LIO’s ability to incorporate non-Western powers.

Given dominant critical currents in the scholarship on US foreign policy towards Latin America, which emphasize the role of economic interests and racial prejudice in shaping US policy, one might expect the region to be a central case for critical accounts of LIO. However, Latin America has not featured prominently. For example, the region is barely mentioned in Pankaj Mishra’s popular critiques of LIO (and when it is, in Age of Anger, it is always grouped with Africa and Asia). Latin America’s minimal role owes, perhaps, to the countries’ largely sovereign status throughout the development of LIO. Latin America’s international political status has long been ambiguous: ‘Indeed the region has often been seen as a kind of international middle class, occupying an intermediate position between First and Third Worlds’. Many critiques of LIO are focused on its philosophical bases, its ties with colonialism, the failures of its policy interventions, or its limited and elitist nature. Latin America may be less immediately relevant to formal colonialism, but it would seem to connect deeply with concerns about the role of elites—an area of emphasis for the region’s historically oriented dependency theorists. The lack of attention to Latin America in critiques of LIO mirrors the disconnect, noted by Kapoor, between Latin America’s tradition

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of economically oriented dependency theory and today’s more influential, cultural strands of post-colonial IR theory. However, because these bargains were struck with (or imposed on) the leaders of legally sovereign states, they may tell us more about the interaction of weak states with LIO today. These relationships are emphasized by the idea of ‘international insertion,’ common in Latin American IR but usually marginal in dominant, English-language debates on LIO.

LIO, Latin America, and regional orders

Of works that engage directly with LIO, Latin America has been most represented in those that emphasize the regionalization of international order. However, the relationship between regions and LIO is somewhat ambiguous. Proponents of liberal economic multilateralism tend to see regionalism as undermining global trade gains. From an IR perspective, these discussions focus on whether regions are likely to promote stability or act as competing blocs. For Katzenstein, regions are not especially autonomous from the broader, US-led global structures. Much of the regionalist literature has a contemporary bent. Acharya sees regionalism as a response to US relative decline. Drawing on examples of non-western contributions to the construction of international order, Acharya has argued that the US-led LIO is likely to contract, that it is being replaced by open and connected regional orders normatively shaped by local actors, and that these are generally positive developments.

Hurrell, emerging from a ‘society of states’ tradition, is skeptical of what he calls liberal solidarist international society. Latin Americans historically emphasized a ‘traditional pluralist conception’ of global order. This shifted during the 1990s, when, ‘Outside Europe, the Americas provide the clearest example of the move towards a regional liberal solidarism’. For a decade, Latin American states were active promoters of economic integration and democratic solidarity at the regional level. Issues once considered purely internal—regime type, human rights, organized crime—became the core of the inter-American agenda with the

40 See Tickner, ‘Hearing Latin America voices’.
support of most of the region’s leaders. A temporary reduction in the region’s left-right tensions seemed to produce a Latin American consensus for deeper integration with LIO.44

The ambiguity regarding the relationship between regional orders and global LIO increases in the case of Latin America. Acharya argues that regional orders will remain open and integrated under a looser global framework.45 During the early 2000s, South America upgraded regional organizations and sought to diminish US influence through closer ties with a rising China; at the same time, much of Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean became more deeply integrated with the United States through production chains and migration networks. Multifacted regionalism in Latin America has long co-existed with deep US engagement.46 But will a retrenching United States seek to reestablish a traditional sphere of influence over Latin America, or will Latin America press for regional autonomy? What do these countervailing trends mean for the sorts of bargains that Ikenberry describes between leading and secondary states? Through a critical lens, how does the region’s historical experience with US interventionism—in which regionalism was often used defensively but without deep commitments—mean for its future?

Latin America and LIO: A brief history
What can Latin America tell us about LIO, and what can LIO contribute to our understanding of Latin American countries’ international roles and domestic development? For authors generally supportive of LIO, the order’s failure to take deeper root in seemingly hospitable ground may offer puzzling cases or insights into how to integrate states beyond LIO’s North Atlantic core. For critics focused on the illiberalism of the liberal order, Latin America presents a different mix of exclusion and inclusion in aspects of international political and economic order from more recently postcolonial states. Latin American states and LIO evolved together in many respects. Historically, some Latin American elites strove to more fully join LIO’s society of states, structures of open trade, global institutions, democratic practice—though they were often counterbalanced by conservative or nationalist forces within their own societies. Even when Latin American liberals had the upper hand at home, they were not always welcomed into Eurocentric international society on equal terms.47

44 Hurrell, On global order, p. 255.
45 Acharya, The end of American world order, pp. 1–11.
Instead, Latin America often found itself on the margins of LIO—but not without some influence. It shaped expansive, if thin, regional international institutions during the early 20th century. The region developed important works on international law, though these were often defensive in content. The progress of democracy was uneven, and regional international economic insertion was characterized by great fluctuations in models and performance. While some authors interpret this as an absence of agency, one can instead treat Latin American agency as present but conditioned by domestic forces and international power asymmetry. Both critics and proponents of LIO agree that asymmetries are central to the system’s creation and operation. Latin America offers an important locale to more thoroughly examine peripheral states’ engagement with asymmetrical international orders—to the detriment of their societies, some might argue—and to grapple with international order’s effects on processes of state formation and economic development.

The following historical sketch outlines potential insights into LIO from Latin American experiences. This focuses on Latin America’s relation to LIO’s critical junctures and on how we might understand the region’s international position in this context. During two centuries of Latin American independence, leaders have adopted, adapted, rejected, and embraced aspects of liberal international ideas and practices on politics and economics, even as their countries were often left at the margins of the emerging, partly liberal, community of states.

**Independence and British LIO**

There has been little attention to the role of Latin America in emergence of the first variant of LIO: the British-led expansion of open trade, the gold standard, and freedom of the seas. Most states in Latin America achieved political independence by the mid-1820s and evolved alongside British-led order; imperial arrangements, liberalism, and other ideas shaped new and inchoate forms of sovereignty that emerged in the region. Latin American states were not, for the most part, colonized as part of the order’s extension. However, British investment

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49 Lorca, *International law in Latin America or Latin American international law*.

50 Thorp, *Progress, Poverty and Exclusion*.


52 Long, *Latin America Confronts the United States*.


and trade with Latin America was expansive during the period and affected elite and state formation. As the 20th century unfolded, the Western Hemisphere was the crucial site of commercial and strategic competition and accommodation between the US and Britain.\(^\text{55}\)

New Latin American states may not have been ‘rule makers’ in the British international order; however, an important segment of Latin American elites actively favored Britain as a bulwark against Spanish efforts at reconquest and because liberal ideas aligned with their republican views and opposition to trade restrictions.\(^\text{56}\) Liberal economic thought, including that of key British thinkers, was widely known and debated in the region throughout the 19th century.\(^\text{57}\) Liberal philosophy influenced a period of export-oriented commercial policy in Latin America, though liberals struggled to wean governments from reliance on tariff revenues and nationalist economic policies also had many adherents.

More generally, political liberalism was unevenly embraced both within Latin American societies and in the emerging liberal powers’ views of Latin Americans. Liberalism at home remained a contentious question throughout the period of British-led LIO, provoking conflict in many countries between liberals and conservatives, who favored rigid social hierarchies and a central role for the Catholic Church (in contrast to the Protestant Anglo-American powers).\(^\text{58}\) Grandin argues that Latin Americans developed distinct notions of the relationship between individual rights and sovereignty from the US and Britain.\(^\text{59}\) Even this distinct liberalism was far from universal. In Brazil, liberalism was juxtaposed first with monarchy and slaveholding and later with military authoritarianism and centralized developmentalism.\(^\text{60}\) Mexican liberal President Benito Juárez favored close ties with the United States in opposition to conservatives who sought to—and briefly did—re-establish European monarchy.\(^\text{61}\) The United States, of course, also experienced deep and deadly divisions on these issues but, after its own civil war, claimed a leading international role in a way that Latin American states could not. Even liberal Latin Americans were not accorded full


\(^\text{59}\) Grandin, ‘The Liberal Traditions in the Americas’.


participation in the European society of states. Latin American diplomats frequently argued for inclusion under the standard of civilization, which created an international legal hierarchy, rather than rejecting the standard’s legitimacy. Despite that, they often found themselves relegated to secondary or marginal positions, in inter-American relations, at the Hague in 1907, and then in the League of Nations.

During this period, Latin America seems to fall into the gap between attention to great power interactions (the US-British power transition) and those powers’ colonial and imperial practices. Latin American countries are either the battlefield, prize, or victim of frequent great power intervention, but rarely international actors in their own right. If we are to understand the effects of LIO on sovereign but relatively weak states—a central contemporary issue—this is a major oversight. How did these dynamics affect the early version of LIO? How did this early LIO affect Latin America’s development, including elite composition and definition of national interests? From the perspective of the LIO debate, or at least its major English-language currents, these questions remain largely unexplored.

US-led LIO’s founding moments
Most accounts of the origins of US-led LIO emphasize two key figures: Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Delano Roosevelt. These narratives, particularly those of more supportive scholars, tend to emphasize the policymakers’ interactions with Europe and, in the case of FDR, Asia. Critical accounts have focused on these figures’ continuation of imperial/colonial relationships and the race, class, and gender biases in founding moments. Latin America’s relative absence is a particular oversight because US-Latin American relations were fundamental to both presidents’ foreign policy evolutions and worldviews.

Wilson serves both as a pivotal historical figure and a liberal/colonial archetype. Best known for the Fourteen Points and his advocacy of international organization, critical accounts point out that Wilson’s record was notoriously retrograde on ‘the race question’, including keeping African American men out of Princeton and then pushing them to the corners of federal employment. Racial paternalism, both Wilson’s and that of his European counterparts, marked the post-WWI international system as well. This occurred most notably through the League of Nations Mandate System, which denied Africans, Asians, Arabs, and Pacific

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islanders the right to self-rule based on assumptions that they were incapable of governance without ‘civilized’ tutelage. Parmar argues that ‘Wilson’s conviction that US intervention in world affairs was essential’ to the early development of LIO after WWI. Ikenberry has recognized this point, agreeing that, ‘The liberal internationalism of the Woodrow Wilson era was built around civilizational, racial and cultural hierarchies. It was a creature of the western white man’s world’.

To what extent did this system also reflect Wilson’s earlier experiences of ‘teaching’ Latin Americans about good governance? One account of Wilson’s liberal internationalism notes that ‘the president began to develop the idea of collective security in the Western Hemisphere’ and saw postwar plans as ‘the extension of Wilson’s Latin American policy’. Wilson’s designs in both hemispheres were marked by crusading notions of paternalistic progressivism and ‘uplift’, with limitations on national self-determination and democratic governance. US policymakers’ racial contexts and prejudices also shaped policy toward Latin America in the decades before the Great War. Wilson himself ordered multiple military interventions in the region and infamously defended an intervention in Mexico with the goal of ‘teaching the South American republics to elect good men’. Wilson’s interventions were justified by democratic and progressive ideals, but were equally marked by racial paternalism, notably in the long, brutal occupation of Haiti. Latin Americans decried the contrast between Wilson’s rhetorical embrace of self-determination and US occupations that denied that right to Haitians and Dominicans; they would later attempt to use Wilson’s own League of Nations to limit US unilateralism.

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64 Pedersen, *The guardians*.  
However, the paternalistic progressivism of Wilson’s interventions in Latin America differed from the Mandate System in important ways: these occupations violated the nominal sovereignty of the intervened. Most Mandates had never been recognized as possessing juridical international sovereignty. Some US interventions eschewed this problem, with the Marines arriving at the invitation of an at-least-nominally governing party (as in the Nicaraguan intervention). This was certainly not the case in Mexico, where Wilson intervened militarily twice. The violation of sovereignty provided a rallying cry for many other Latin Americans who responded in part through international legal innovation.

US experience with international law and burgeoning, Pan American international organization informed its international projects. These practices, formed in the Americas—and not just by US fiat—clearly affected the Wilsonian international project of 1919. Grandin argues that ‘Based on principles of non-aggression, international arbitration, and economic justice, [Latin Americans] developed a sovereignty–social rights complex…that would revolutionize the interstate system’. Latin American legal practices of *uti possidetis* and Pan American conferences shaped US plans for the League, Grandin notes. More generally, Latin America shaped US international behaviours in the hemisphere and globally. The overlaps were often quite concrete, as in the case of the League covenant. Parmar notes the role of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in shaping Wilson’s international designs; the same organization supported the development of international law in the Americas. In many respects, the First World War brought Latin America more deeply into the ‘global’ than ever before. The US shirked the global postwar system its president had helped design, but Latin America largely embraced it. The League of Nations and new International Labour Organisation offered opportunities to bolster multilateralism and gain greater access to international society, while shaping developments in technical cooperation, labour rights, and arbitration. This was not an entirely smooth experience; Brazil quit the organization in disgust when defeated Germany was granted a permanent seat while its own aspirations were

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74 For an earlier period, see Brian Loveman, *No Higher Law: American Foreign Policy and the Western Hemisphere since 1776* (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2010).
75 Scarfi, *The Hidden History of International Law in the Americas*, pp. 31-34.
77 McPherson and Wehrli, eds., *Beyond geopolitics*.
Other Latin American states also had tense relations and at times shunned the League, but there were important successes, too. More attention to Latin America’s role in the interwar period would add nuance to a period often examined largely as the failure of LIO. For example, Helleiner has shown how ideas that shaped Bretton Woods emerged from inter-American policies during this time.

Moving forward, Latin American diplomats were significant actors in the creation of the post-WWII system, translating their numerical weight and diplomatic skill into influence, particularly in the preservation of regional systems and the creation of social, cultural, and economic components. Having been promised a rejuvenated, more multilateral inter-American system in the 1945 Chapultepec Conference, Latin Americans defended that goal at the United Nations conference at San Francisco. Their threat of a walkout led the great powers to shift positions and make space for regional systems under UN Charter Article 51. Latin Americans also shaped the development content of Bretton Woods institutions during this time. Concepts of human rights advanced by Latin American jurists, and previously developed in the Western Hemisphere, greatly influenced the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Latin American ideas of democracy promotion, including nonrecognition of coup governments, have roots dating at least to the 1907 Tovar Doctrine. They gained new life in the immediate post-WWII period, though the willingness to put pro-democracy norms into practice was often limited. Uruguay’s 1945-46 Larreta Doctrine on collective intervention in defense of democracy failed against Latin American opposition, as did the later Venezuelan Betancourt Doctrine. Military authoritarians and dubious democrats have shielded one another’s abuses behind the rhetoric of sovereignty and nonintervention. Even when the US pushed for democratization, intransigent dictators often resisted those pressures. Still, the flame of Latin American support for democratic governance and human

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79 McPherson and Wehrli, eds., Beyond geopolitics.
81 The creation of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America is a salient example. Hernán Santa Cruz, ‘La creación de las Naciones Unidas y de la CEPAL’, Revista de la CEPAL 57, 1995, pp. 17–32.
83 Helleiner, Forgotten foundations of Bretton Woods.
and social rights endured. Civil society and regional juridical practices against human rights abuses in the 1970s and 1980s reshaped global discourses and policies.\textsuperscript{87} These episodes support Acharya’s view that the LIO was not only made in the USA; Latin American and others’ contributions ‘helped to localize and strengthen’ international order.\textsuperscript{88} However, these contributions have rarely been examined in depth in the context of the LIO debate to gain a better understanding of that order. Instead, secondary powers and minor states are seen as accepting bargains for their benefits or suffering as victims, but rarely as shaping central aspects of LIO’s formation. In practice, liberals, radicals, and reactionaries in Latin America all jousted with Washington to shape the rules and their application.

Attention to the interwar period, and to the influence of the Good Neighbor Policy on evolving US and Latin American views of international order would not just uncover the ‘forgotten foundations’ of other US policies, it would help show how those have been shaped from the margins—sometimes through explicit attempts to constraint US unilateralism.\textsuperscript{89} These contributions merit inclusion; however, their relative absence reflects the ensuing marginalization of Latin America from the order that its diplomats supported and shaped in Bretton Woods and San Francisco.

Cold War
While Latin Americans shaped the institutions of the post-WWII order in their region and globally, the concrete benefits of LIO fell short of their expectations, particularly in terms of material support for economic development. Many Latin American liberals, whose influence had risen from 1944-47,\textsuperscript{90} were sidelined as anticommunism trumped democracy in US and LIO priorities.\textsuperscript{91} Though the origins of US-European and US-Asian postwar relations have received extensive attention, the reborn inter-American system plays little role in these IR debates.\textsuperscript{92}

\textsuperscript{88} Acharya, \textit{The end of American world order}, p. 43.
\textsuperscript{91} Many of these liberals, like Venezuela’s Rómulo Betancourt and Costa Rica’s José Figueres, were fervent anticommunists. Aaron Coy Moulton, ‘Building their own Cold War in their own backyard: the transnational, international conflicts in the greater Caribbean basin, 1944–1954’, \textit{Cold War History} 15: 2, 2015, pp. 135–54; Kyle Longley, \textit{The sparrow and the hawk: Costa Rica and the United States during the rise of José Figueres} (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1997).
During the Cold War, Latin America was part zone of contestation and part second-class member of what Ikenberry calls the Western order inside the world system. Initially, the United States counted on—and largely received—Latin American backing in international organizations, particularly in the UN General Assembly. This began to change as Latin American diplomats used the inter-American system to extract greater concessions in exchange for anticommunism. Of course, US-Latin American relationships were not always negotiated, and even then, not as equals. Examples of US coercion, often in the name of preserving liberal (anti-communist) international order are myriad: covert operations in Guatemala in 1954, Guyana in the early 1960s, in Cuba for decades, in Chile in the early 1970s, and in Central America during the 1980s. Invasions of the Dominican Republic in 1965 and Grenada in 1983 were only the most obvious instances in which the US presumed for itself an exception to LIO’s rules. In other cases, the United States tolerated or directly supported illiberal rulers who maintained stability and diplomatic support in Latin America and elsewhere. Latin America’s role in the Cold War has not been a major part of the discussion of LIO. For critics, US interventions in the region might be proof that imposition and violence are the core of LIO—Exhibit A of the imperial nature of US policy. Ikenberry, too, categorizes US relationships with Latin America as ‘crudely imperial’. However, recent historical scholarship has demonstrated the importance of Latin American agency during the Cold War; better understanding these complex relationships would add nuance to LIO’s accounts of the period. Mexico delicately managed relations with the United States and Fidel Castro’s Cuba to burnish its regime’s fading revolutionary credentials without jeopardizing economic growth. In their ‘quest for autonomy,’ Brazil’s generals maintained a certain distance from the US despite shared anti-communism. At times they were ahead of the United States in repressing the region’s left; at others, their developmentalist policies conflicted with


For recent histories of the US and Latin America during the Cold War, see Brands, Latin America’s Cold War; Stephen G. Rabe, The killing zone: the United States wages Cold War in Latin America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).


Renata Keller, Mexico’s Cold War: Cuba, the United States, and the legacy of the Mexican revolution (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
Washington’s goals. In a more positive light, even partial inclusion in the LIO facilitated the region’s emergence as a nuclear-weapons-free zone and contributed to the relative absence of Latin American interstate militarized conflicts since World War II, though internal conflicts and US interventions could be as destabilizing and devastating. In practice, Latin American support or contestation of US policies varied widely. Scholarship on Latin America’s Cold War emphasizes overlapping local, regional, and national dimensions of conflicts. However, the international dimension has largely been considered in terms of US-Soviet bipolarity. A more complete picture would consider how LIO shaped Latin American preferences and choices. Globally, the emergence of new states through decolonization provided diplomatic partners for Latin Americans to challenge the US. However, liberal internationalism remained influential in Latin America’s Cold War, with struggles for democracy and multilateralism at local, regional, and global levels. International institutions were sites not just of hegemonic coercion but of resistance and willing cooperation. This included US-backed regional IOs and subregional organizations that diluted or mediated US influence. A fuller picture of LIO during the Cold War requires a better understanding of how it operated in Latin America and how Latin American states engaged with, accepted, challenged, revised, or influenced LIO. This stretches from the founding moments, at which Latin Americans were not only present but active, through the middle of the Cold War when democracy barely survived in the region, to the resuscitation of liberal regional traditions during the 1980s amid repression and bloodletting.

Liberal at last?
When the liberal order expanded at the end of the Cold War, it seemed that Latin America’s full membership might be at hand. Starting in the mid-1980s, the region embraced LIO’s tenets as readily as anywhere in the world. Elections spread, while economic barriers fell. Regional commitments to democracy were made and strengthened. Ambitious plans for subregional and hemispheric trade were advanced, often with enthusiastic cooperation with the US. Many Latin American states expanded their involvement with UN peacekeeping, global environmental governance, and global trade regimes.

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However, this engagement often provoked greater disappointment. The order’s reach was broad, but not deep. De jure democracy was supported; in some cases, regional commitments helped turn back threats to democratic rule. However, regional democratic norms were applied unevenly and rarely against incumbents, sapping the instruments of legitimacy.\(^9^9\) In many more countries, weak state capacity undermined the gains from democratic governance. Liberalization, which had emerged largely in response to debt and economic crises, was broadly perceived as having exacerbated inequalities. Ikenberry argues that LIO’s crisis in core states results from the decline of ‘embedded liberalism’ and rise of neoliberalism, which reduced state capacities to cushion global economic fluctuations. This dynamic was more pernicious and came earlier in Latin America, long marked by high inequality and little elite propensity to support redistributive taxation.\(^10^0\) Privatization helped balance the budgets of heavily indebted governments but also limited their ability to respond to dislocation and discontent. International and constitutional commitments to social guarantees—Grandin’s ‘sovereignty-social rights complex’—often remained paper thin. Meanwhile, the explosion of global connections facilitated transnational corruption and illicit trade alongside legal exchanges. Burgeoning, illicit nonstate actors benefitted from the underbelly of LIO-inspired globalization, in which products and funds were easier to move than ever, but where the lack of a legal framework meant that markets were opaque and disputes were settled with violence. Not all these problems can or should be blamed on LIO, nor should they be disconnected from domestic causes. However, in many of these issues, international drivers are central. Post-Cold War democracy promotion, engagement with international financial institutions, and evolving patterns of trade are deeply connected, and profoundly rooted historically, in the region’s uneven engagement with LIO.

Discontent set the stage for two important shifts, both with ambiguous effects for Latin America’s engagement with LIO. The first was the emergence of the ‘new left’ or ‘pink tide’ in the region. There is nothing necessarily anti-LIO about a turn to the left—the post-WWII refoundation emerged in the context of the US New Deal and brief opening for the Latin American democratic left. However, many new left leaders rejected both US leadership and participation in LIO at a time when Washington itself was trampling international norms in


the name of the War of Terror. Liberal regional commitments on democracy, human rights, and trade waned, while enthusiasm grew for the creation of subregional orders with varying commitments to liberal norms.\textsuperscript{101} The second shift was the ‘rise of the rest’, namely China. Together, these trends opened space for greater Latin American participation in South-South diplomatic efforts, with Brazil often leading the way.\textsuperscript{102} To an extent, this brought Latin America (or at least Brazil) into the debate about whether rising powers will make the LIO less liberal and less orderly.\textsuperscript{103} With a hint of déjà vu, these discussions often emphasize US-Chinese competition and depict the region as a zone of great power rivalry. There is tremendous diversity in Latin American responses to this conjuncture, in which Latin American liberals must also grapple with the inconsistency of LIO’s central players.

Conclusions

Latin America has been marginal in the study of the origins and operations, causes and consequences, of liberal international order. There is much to learn from the region’s evolution alongside LIO, its longstanding contributions to the international law, norms, and institutions that form LIO’s core, and its experience of partial inclusion in an asymmetrical order. Studying Latin American engagement with LIO would provide a more robust understanding of the role of secondary powers and small states in the order’s creation and continuation. We have sketched these gaps above, but much work remains to be done.

As IR increasingly recognizes the need to incorporate non-US and non-European perspectives to become a truly global field,\textsuperscript{104} the literature on LIO would benefit from engagement with concepts and theories emerging from Latin American scholarship—only briefly signalled here. How do the negotiated bargains of hierarchy, as seen by scholars like Ikenberry and Lake, square with concepts like autonomy and international insertion more often emphasized by Latin American IR?\textsuperscript{105} The debate over whether to join hegemonic


\textsuperscript{102}Marco Antonio Vieira and Chris Alden, ‘India, Brazil, and South Africa (IBSA): South-South cooperation and the paradox of regional leadership’, \textit{Global Governance} 17: 4, October/December 2011, pp. 507-528.


\textsuperscript{105}Roberto Russell and Juan Gabriel Tokatlían, ‘From antagonistic autonomy to relational autonomy: a theoretical reflection from the Southern Cone’, \textit{Latin American Politics and Society} 45: 1, Spring 2003, pp. 1–24; Tulio Vigevani and Gabriel Cepaluni, \textit{A política externa brasileira: a busca da autonomia, de Sarney a
hierarchies or prioritize principles is surely relevant to understanding the choices of secondary states. Latin America has the longest sovereign history of facing this choice from the margins of international order, liberal or otherwise. These choices look very different depending on geostrategic and economic position, even within Latin America. The region’s diversity offers a wide variety of perspectives, contexts, and empirical variation. Including Latin America in the study of the LIO offers much more than a new set of cases; it should provoke a greater rethinking of the relationships at the core of that order, as well as the theory and concepts we use to explain them.