Wells, Katy (2016) The right to personal property. Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 15 (4). pp. 358-378. doi:10.1177/1470594X16653859 ISSN 1470-594X.

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Abstract

The subject of this article is the Rawlsian right to personal property. Adequate discussion of this right has long been absent from the literature, and the recent rise in interest in other areas of Rawlsian thought on property makes the issue particularly pertinent. The right to personal property as proposed by orthodox Rawlsians – in this article, the position is represented by Rawls himself – is best understood, I claim, either as a right to be able to privately own housing and personal items or as a right to actually own these things. I argue, however, that the resources of a Rawlsian theory cannot justify a basic right to property which is as extensive as this. Instead, what can be justified is a more limited set of rights, comparable with the rights we have over objects that we rent. Rawlsian justice, then, has a more radical implications in terms of basic property rights than has previously been thought.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Politics and International Studies
Journal or Publication Title:	Politics, Philosophy & Economics
ISSN:	1470-594X
Official Date:	1 November 2016
Dates:	Date Event 1 November 2016 Published 21 June 2016 Available
Volume:	15
Number:	4
Page Range:	pp. 358-378
DOI:	10.1177/1470594X16653859
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access

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