Issue linkage and issue tie-in in multilateral negotiations
UNSPECIFIED (2002) Issue linkage and issue tie-in in multilateral negotiations. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, 57 (2). pp. 423-447. ISSN 0022-1996Full text not available from this repository.
We describe a model of international, multidimensional policy coordination where countries can enter into selective and separate agreements with different partners along different policy dimensions. The model is used to examine the implications of negotiation tie-in - the requirement that agreements must span multiple dimensions of interaction for the viability of multilateral cooperation when countries are linked by international trade flows and transboundary pollution. We show that, while in some cases negotiation tie-in has either no effect or can make multilateral cooperation more viable, in others a formal tie-in constraint can make an otherwise viable joint multilateral agreement unstable. (C) 2002 Published by Elsevier Science B.V.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions|
|Journal or Publication Title:||JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS|
|Publisher:||ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV|
|Number of Pages:||25|
|Page Range:||pp. 423-447|
Actions (login required)