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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF IMAGINATION
FROM PLATO AND ARISTOTLE TO ITS INTRODUCTION INTO
ENGLISH ART EDUCATIONAL THEORY

by


A thesis submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
to the University of Warwick
Department of Education
January 1977
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Acknowledgments.

I would like to thank Professor L.R. Perry for his help during the course of my research for this thesis, and for his valuable comments and advice. My thanks also to the University of Warwick for the use of study facilities.

I would also like to express my appreciation of the efficiency of the Inter-Library Loans section of Warwick University library, my thanks to Mrs. P.A. Cooper for typing the thesis, and my gratitude to my wife for her patience and forebearance.

Finally I wish to thank the Social Science Research Council for the grant which supported me during the three years of full-time study which made possible the writing of this thesis.
This thesis is an attempt to discover and to give an account of the origins of the (Romantic) idea of imagination which dominates English art educational theory. Though I have written what is essentially the history of an idea, I have endeavoured throughout to relate the different aspects of "imagination" to concurrent philosophical, psychological, and aesthetic theories. My method has been to read in the original (i.e. translated) sources everything I could find on "imagination" and closely associated concepts and, with the occasional support of expert commentaries and commentators, to establish the relationships and differences between these findings. No work of this type or scope has hitherto been undertaken though, inevitably, work has already been done on a few aspects of the subject, (notably by M.W. Bundy and M. Warnock), so that though I cannot claim that all this thesis is entirely original, all of its seven parts contain much original work, and Parts 3, 4, and 5 are largely original.

I have sought to demonstrate that "imagination" is an ancient and very broadly used concept which enjoys a prominent place in often-contradictory theoretical systems and that its contradictions, stemming largely from Platonic metaphysics, Aristotelian philosophy of mind, and even elemental cosmology, compounded and unresolved throughout subsequent history, have entered English art educational theory. The separate parts of this thesis are chronologically based, this being to my mind the simplest and most direct way of dealing with the subject matter. Thus the study starts with Plato, including reference to pre-Socratic myths, and Aristotle, traces the developing theory of imagination through Antiquity and the Middle Ages, with particular reference to Christian theology; moves to an examination of "imagination" in Renaissance magic, comparing and relating this
to the theory of art from Alberti onwards; considers the philosophers of the 17th century with specific concentration on place of "imagination" in their theories, and examines the Romantic and pre-Romantic, philosophical, psychological, and aesthetic theories of imagination. Finally there is an account of some of the subsequent 19th century developments in Existentialism and Phenomenology. My conclusion is that because of the great breadth of interpretation that "imagination" bears, its undefined use at the heart of art educational theory can only perpetuate the obfuscation that exists there.
PART 1:

PLATO & ARISTOTLE.
Chapter 1 : PLATO

Introduction.
A.N. Whitehead remarked that the history of western philosophy consists of footnotes to Plato. With respect to the theory of imagination this is very largely true, for though there is no word in his Dialogues which corresponds to our broad modern concept of imagination, there are central themes in his works which have come to be regarded as aspects of this concept. These themes are threefold, and to varying degrees they dominate subsequent theories of imagination: so we have Plato's idea of "madness", a mystic or visionary state which is very like the later notion of divine revelation; a psychology of cognition developing from the material of sense to the formal ideas of reason; and an epistemology whose apogee are the Forms, ideals which are close relatives of Kant's Ideas of reason. The second of these themes is more fully worked out by Aristotle and his De Anima, with its theory of imagination as intermediary (and to some extent interregnum) between sense and understanding, has heavily influenced subsequent psychology. Mediaeval Christian theology came to regard the imagination as a sine qua non of divine vision, following the Platonic (1) and Neoplatonic models, and in Kant's Critique of Judgment imagination is seen to be a cognitive faculty which presents aesthetical ideas. To my knowledge, there is no theory of imagination before Plato (2) but, as I have attempted to show, Plato took much from his forebears, especially Pythagoreanism and mythology, a fact which is very important in the light of the survival of his Timaeus during the Middle Ages - probably the only one of his works which was known in its entirety during that period. How far

(1) See G.F. Havel, "The History of Philosophy", vol. 2, p. 92 : "... Plato and his philosophy had the greatest share in obtaining for Christianity its rational organisation, and in bringing it into the kingdom of the supernatural, for it was Plato who made the first advance in this direction."
(2) See J.J. Cavan, "Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition From Alcmeon to Aristotle", p. 251 : "Before Plato ... we find no record of any serious treatment of memory or imagination."
Plato's theories as such were influential during the centuries between the closing of the Athenian and the opening of the Florentine Academies is unknown (1), but the Pythagorean Timaeus was an authoritative text for alchemists and pre-Newtonian natural philosophers, who had their own ideas about the magical powers of imagination. (2)

The following chapter on Plato is divided into two sections which are both concerned with what I have called, following P. Friedlaender, the Platonic eidos* of "highest state", and the two ways of achieving it. These are the manic and the dialectic routes. The former pertains to the "madness" which I have already mentioned, the latter to the cognitive psychology upon which Aristotle founded much of his De Anima.

In the first section I deal with this manic route to the eidos, relating it to some ancient beliefs which Plato adopted and concentrating specifically on the mythology of the Phaedrus, which yields a paradigm of the idea of inspiration and which, in the Renaissance, was of particular interest to Marsilio Ficino and Giordano Bruno. In the second section I deal with the dialectic route to the eidos concentrating here on Plato's concept of eikasia and its function in cognition. Finally I suggest that there may be grounds for interrelating these two "routes".

(1) The extent of Plato's influence is probably greater than has hitherto been suspected; see e.g. R. Klibansky, "The Continuity of The Platonic Tradition", p. 35: "...the prevailing theory of a definite break between Mediaeval and Renaissance Platonism which has dominated the history of philosophy cannot be maintained on closer inspection of the facts."

(2) See Klibansky, op. cit., p.23: The Timaeus with its attempted synthesis of the religious teleological justification of the world and the rational exposition of creation was, throughout the earlier Middle Ages, the starting point and guide for the first groping efforts towards a scientific cosmology." See also G.H.G. Mure, "Aristotle", p.241.

* I have rendered all Greek words into their English equivalents throughout in order to avoid complications with typing.
CHAPTER 1. PLATO

SECTION I.

The man Timaeus was a Pythagorean philosopher, (1) and the Timaeus, as Guthrie says, is the "most Pythagorean" (2) of Plato's dialogues. Indeed, Pythagoreanism was a "major formative influence" on Plato, (op. cit., p.147) although the full extent of that influence is inestimable since the precise nature of Pythagorean belief is unknown. We do know, however, that Plato's most fundamental beliefs are, in all likelihood, Pythagorean in origin. It is Aristotle, the source of much that is known of the pre-Socratic philosophers, who first ascribes to Pythagoras the doctrine that "the principles of numbers are the principles of all things." (3), and Pythagoras is also credited with the discovery of the dependency of musical intervals upon mathematical ratios. Pythagoras and his followers receive little mention in the Dialogues, but Socrates agrees with them that harmonics (4) and astronomy are "sister sciences" (5), and stresses the value of astronomy as preparation for a study of the laws and principles of mathematics. The importance of mathematics for Plato is well-known, and any schoolboy will associate Pythagoras with maths., more fundamental, is the doctrine of metempsychosis which Plato took from Pythagoreanism, and whose inception is wrongly credited to Pythagoras himself. (6)

(1) See Klibansky, op. cit., p.27.
(2) W.K.C. Guthrie, "A History of Greek Philosophy", Vol.1., p.282. C.f. also Guthrie, op. cit., p.211. "A.K. Taylor held that throughout this dialogue Plato was doing no more than reproduce a fifth-century Pythagorean account of the world. Few would go all the way with him in this, but we have seen enough to give assent..." (..to the great influence of Pythagoras on Plato.)
(3) Republic, 520d. By 'harmonics' we would nowadays mean "tuning, or acoustic theory". (New Oxford Dictionary of Music).
(4) Metaphysics, 985b 27. See also Guthrie, op. cit., p.168.
(5) Republic, 520d. In Republic 600b occurs the sole mention of Pythagoras in the dialogues, he is favourably compared with Homer and other "postical individuals" who are "only imitators", and incapable of knowledge. (600c-e). Guthrie comments, (op. cit., p.160), "this single reference is of great importance".
(6) See Encyclopaedia Britannica, "Metempsychosis". This doctrine is ancient and universal, and is found in Buddhism; Pythagoras probably found it in Egypt, where he is said to have travelled, See also Guthrie, op. cit., p.165.
A belief in metempsychosis and in the kinship of all nature is shared by Empedocles, (see Appendix A), Heraclitus, and the ancient Greek mystery religions including Orphism and Dionysianism, though the individuating aspects of each of these philosophies are difficult to pinpoint. Friedlaender’s assessment of Pythagoras as an "intellectual force effective through the ages" (1) is absolutely correct, and is a view shared by Hegel(2); similarly Bertrand Russell’s description of him as 'half Einstein half Mary Baker Eddy' is indicative of the wide sweep of Pythagoreanism. The influence of Pythagoras on Plato is manifest in the cosmology of Timaeus and in the visionary, ecstatic content of some of the Socratic dialogues, but it also has a significant effect on the mainstream of European philosophical belief through the Neoplatonism which Plotinus founded in the 3rd century A.D. Many of Plotinus’ followers wrote biographies of Pythagoras, and the widespread belief in the 'principle of plenitude' or 'chain of being' which was held by artists, scientists and philosophers during the 17th and 18th centuries, is in large part a development of Pythagorean doctrines of universal harmony. And whilst Neoplatonism contributed enormously to Catholic theology, Pythagorean number theory had a great practical influence on Italian Renaissance painting(3). Neoplatonism also did much to shape early Romantic theory through Novalis (who probably coined the term "Romantiker") at the end of the 18th century and who was a passionate admirer of Plotinus. The vision of a universal harmony

(2) Hegel (op. cit., p.194-5) is less than approbatory on the breadth and influence of Pythagoreanism : "All the ideas of magic, that medley of unnatural and natural, the mysteries which pervade a clouded miserable imagination, and the wild ideas of distorted brains, have attached themselves to him. However corrupt the history of his life, his philosophy is as much so. Everything engendered by Christian melancholy and love of allegory has been identified with it."
(3) See Wittkower, "Architectural Principles in the Age of Humanism", p.33, where he quotes from P. Wittkower’s "Architectural Principles in the Age of Humanism". Wittkower has exhaustively shown how 'Renaissance artists firmly adhered to the Pythagorean conception 'All is Number' and, guided by Plato and the Neo-Platonists and supported by a long chain of theologians from Augustine onwards, they were convinced of the mathematical and harmonic structure of the universe and all creation!'
is what links these developments, a vision which is sometimes seen as the reward of protracted effort and devotion and sometimes of immediate intuition, and in both cases what we now call "imagination" has a crucial and indispensable part to play. As we shall see, this "vision" occurs in several guises throughout the history of human thought, it is, as I hope to demonstrate, a permanent and precious quality of the human mind and generally associated with imagination.

Following Friedlaender, I have called this "vision" the eidos in relation to Plato, identifying the dialectic and the manic routes to the eidos—the former being the reward of effort, the latter of something like intuition. One or other of these routes is the theme of most of the Dialogues, but in this section we are concerned with the manic route, particularly as it is formulated in Phaedrus; as Jowett says in the introduction to his translation of this work: "...he appears to intimate here, as in the Ion, Apology, Meno, and elsewhere, that there is a faculty in man, whether to be termed in modern language genius, or inspiration, or imagination, or idealism, or communion with God, which cannot be reduced to rule or measure."(1)

Attitudes to the ancient myths were changing during Plato’s time (2) but it is evident from the opening remarks in Phaedrus that Socrates has a good knowledge of them and, as becomes forcibly demonstrated in this work, a great respect for the truths which they embody. Plato’s own views of the old myths is ambiguous(3) as the themes of the different dialogues show, but it is not unreasonable to assume that he may have shared Socrates’ obvious respect for them. They certainly inform Plato’s own mythology in their common quest for an anthropomorphic framework for the ineffable mystery of the “vision”(4) of which we have spoken, a quest which appears

(1) The necessary connection between soul and eidos “is the focal point in Plato’s philosophy” as it is in the myths; see Friedlaender, op. cit., p.193.
(2) See Friedlaender, op. cit., p.172.
(3) See s.s. Phaedrus 239c and Laws 903b.
to be common to all myths and which also characterises the late Romantic aesthetic of myth and symbol as means of intimating 'Ideas' in the sense of Kant (and Schopenhauer) and 'spirit' in the Hegelian (and Berkeleyan) sense. Whereas for the Romantics imagination is seen as both the maker and interpreter of myth and symbol, for Plato these functions are aspects of "divine madness". The Platonic myth is something more than an attempt to familiarise the unknown through allegory, (1) for it has an eschatological significance which transcends interpretation, and contains an injunction to strive towards the very highest state, the eidos, as exemplified by philosophy. Several of the Dialogues illustrate this point, but none more so than the Phaedrus, but it is possible that the full import of Plato's myths may escape those who are in the habit of making a rigid distinction between the intellect and the emotions, as Jowett warns:

"No one can duly appreciate the dialogues of Plato, especially the Phaedrus, Symposium, and parts of the Republic, who has not a sympathy with mysticism."

And he adds:

"By mysticism we mean, not the extravagance of an erring fancy, but the concentration of reason in feeling, the enthusiastic love of the good, the true, the one, the sense of the infinity of knowledge and the marvel of the human faculties." (2) (See Appendix B).

Phaedrus is unique in Plato for its idyllic pastoral setting, in "a spot sacred to Achelous and the Nymphs." (3). Its theme is madness; not the "human infirmity" (Phaedrus 265a) which we normally understand by that word, but "divine madness" which is "a divine release of the soul from the yoke and custom of convention." (op. cit., p. 244-5)

(1) Plato was adverse to allegorical interpretation of the myths, see Republic 378d., & Phaedrus 239b-c. N.B. also J.C. Stewart, "The Myths of Plato," p. 155: "Eschatological Myths demand genuine belief."
(2) Quoted from Jowett's introduction to his translation to Phaedrus. The sentiments expressed here are not dissimilar from the Empedoclean views of B. Russell (see appendix A), and despite the cautionary word "mysticism", I can only reiterate their importance in educational theory.
(3) Phaedrus 270b. For a discussion of the importance of the setting of this dialogue, see Friedlander, op. cit., p. 172.
Socrates lists four types of this madness: "prophetic, initiatory, poetic, erotic,"(1) each of which is identified with a god: "the first was the inspiration of Apollo, the second that of Dionysus, the third that of the Muses, the fourth that of Aphrodite and Eros." (Phaedrus 265b). The old myths were undoubtedly the religion of Plato's day, and their influence on him is strikingly apparent from these passages, but an examination of the individual importance of these gods and their attributes shows how the beliefs which they carry still survive to this day, retaining much of their original force. Apollo is the most important of these gods for Plato, as he is in Greek mythology, and is second only to Zeus; (2) he is the sun-god, and the sun is elsewhere a symbol for knowledge. (3) He is Socrates' patron god, and both Pythagoras(4) and Plato(5) were said after their deaths to be sons of Apollo. According to Otto,

"Apollo is the most Greek of all gods .... Although Dionysiac enthusiasm was once an important force there can nevertheless be no doubt that the Greek temper was inclined to subdue this and all other forms of intemperance, and that its great representatives unhesitatingly embraced the Apollonian spirit and nature. Dionysiac nature desiderates intoxication, and hence proximity; Apollonian desiderates clarity and form, and hence distance. The first impression this word gives is of something negative, but implied in it is the most positive thing of all - the attitude of cognition." (6)

(1) Hackforth's translation has "mystic" for "initiatory".
(3) See Republic 7, 514ff., the simile of the cave.
(5) Zeller, p.118.
(6) Otto, op. cit., p.98.
This rather austere, distant quality of Apollo accords well with the contemplative temper of his philosopher followers, and is characteristic of the Apollonian tendency in art, which Nietzsche and Burckhardt(1) contrasted with the Dionysian.(2)

The poetic madness associated with the Muses is more familiar, being a part of the artistic myth which has retained its original form, and it hardly needs amplification here, as with the other myths of human creativeness, it largely owes its perpetuity to the authority of Plato. The divine inspiration of "poets, prophets and soothsayers" is dependent upon their lacking "every particle of reason and understanding”; (loc.cit.) The sense of awe communicated by these words seems at odds with Plato's condemnation of poets and artists in the Republic, and a similar inconsistency is the assertion, both in Phaedrus (267b) and Symposium that erotic madness is superior to the others. Socrates is undoubtedly the prototype for Diotima's Eros, (Symposium 201 ff) the spirit (daimon) who is the guide to philosophy (Phaedrus 257a) and who, "like all spirits", mediates between the mortal and immortal. As Friedlaender says, Plato was deeply attached to the demonic world(4) to which Socrates is guide, giving, as it does, "protection against philistinism" and "the impetus for an ascent to the World of Forms"(5)

In Platonic terms the daimon's remarkable powers are only explicable by the transmigration of the soul, and its innate (Empedoclean) tendency towards that to which it truly belongs; but that the route is difficult and even painful is illustrated by the efforts of the neophyte to depart from the cave, and, in Phaedrus, the soul's pain in growing its wings and the

(1) See appendix C.
(2) Guthrie, op. cit., p.330-1., suggests that the prophetic mania which Socrates associates with Apollo may have been borrowed from worshippers of Dionysus.
(3) "Like Bacchic maidens ... when they are under the influence of Dionysus.” (Ion.774).
(4) N.B. also Guthrie, "A History of Greek Philosophy", Vol.1, p.231: "Pythagoras himself quickly achieved the status of a daimon intermediate between man and god, or even an incarnation of the Hyperborean Apollo."
charioteer's struggle with his steeds(1). In the mythical and emotive realm of poetic madness, it is Dionysus who is the archetypal daimon.

As the "Dacchae" of Euripides shows, the arrival of the cult of Dionysus into Greece was a remarkable historical event,(2) and the drunkenness, revelling, and lasciviousness which are associated with his name and that of Bacchus are a mould from which the mythical notion of the dissolute artists has been cast. The almost total identification of Dionysus with Bacchus, illustrated in the paintings of Rubens and Titian, is erroneous, but is understandable in terms of the superficial antics of their followers; excess and intoxicant may substitute for inspiration, and may even protect against philistinism, but they are also the elements of artistic charlatanism.(4)

Drunkenness was a prominent feature of Dionysian orgies(3), but the original orgia were not the simple physical events implied by the English word; and were acts of religious devotion.: "...and .. Bacchanein is not simply to 'revel' but to have a particular kind of religious experience the communion

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(1) The growth of the wing of the soul is an important occurrence, since it pertains to the soul's awareness of its immortal destiny. In Greek art, wings indicate self-motion, the essential quality an immortal being; hence both Eros and Hermes are represented as winged. (See also Phaedrus 245a, & Friedlaender, pp.197,ff.) The charioteer simile is extraordinary; in its complexities can be found the embryonic, tripartite division of psychology and psychoanalysis, but it also has a remarkable parallel in the Katha Upanishad. As Friedlaender notes, this curious similarity is first referred to in "The Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and Upanishads" (A.B.Keith, in Harvard Oriental Series XXXIII, Cambridge Mass., 1925) Friedlaender, op.cit., p.371, note 20, says Keith (pp.603 & 613) is of the opinion that the two similes are independent of each other as "the details are perfectly distinct", but Friedlaender asks (p.193) : "Could this figure have found its way out of the Far East to Plato?"
(2) See H.P.Nilsson, "Cults, Myths, Oracles, and Politics in Ancient Greece", pp.26-7, : "The advent of this god to Athens was momentous, for in his cult tragedy arose, the theatre is built in his precinct, and his priest presided at the Great Dionysia."
(3) See Cratylus 406b, where the etymology of "Dionysus" is said to refer to wine as making those who have no mind think they have. See also Laws 677b, a ref. to drunkenness at Dionysiac festivals; and Laws 673b, where it is said that according to tradition, Dionysus was driven mad by his stepmother Hera, and in order to revenge himself he inspired mankind with Bacchic madness.
(4) i.e. since such excesses are popularly regarded as peculiar to the 'artistic temperament'.
with God which transformed a human being into a Bacchos or a Bacchae ...(1).
The imbibing of wine was a means of becoming enthous, or "full of the god"(2),
in a state of complete self-abnegation - a state of being, literally,
possessed. In this condition the enthusiast or Bacchante is inspired, the
god is in him and acting through him, whilst he, the individual is ekstaticos,
'outside himself'.(3) The Dionysian cult is credited with introducing tragedy
and drama (4) into Greece, and drama was initially a religious ritual(5),
and the function of the actors was rather different from that of our
contemporaries. As Guthrie points out: "Mimesis meant acting as much as
imitation, mimete was often, and mimos always an actor. The relation
between an actor and his part is not exactly imitation. He gets inside it,
or rather, in the Greek view, it gets inside him, and shows forth through
his words and gestures. There is more to it than that. Drama began, as
it remained, as religious ritual, and we cannot hope to understand Pythagorean
thought if we allow ourselves to forget that it, too, was primarily religious.
In the earliest and simplest dramatic representations men impersonated gods
and spirits for religious ends, and what they supposed to be happening can
be best illustrated by contemporary worship like that of Dionysus." (Guthrie,
op. cit., pp.230-1).

So the actor does not simply play a part, or portray a character, but
it comes to life through him, just as the god is revived through the thiasos,
or follower. Similarly, no man can be a poet, visionary, lover, or philosopher
unless the god speaks through him, and he is in a state of madness.(6).

(1)See E.L.Dodds, Introduction to his edition of "The Bacchae" of Euripides.n.X.
(2) Liddell & Scott.
(3) Guthrie, op.cit., p.231 : "Pythagoras and his school ... were in the full
stream of these religious ideas."
(4) See Encyc.Brit., "Drama", & "Dionysus". Aristotle makes no such ascription
in the "Poetics", but Plato, Symposium 1775, speaks of "Aristophanes, whose sole
concern is with Dionysus and Aphrodite".
(6) See Symposium, 209a: "creative souls...conceive that which is proper for the
soul to conceive or retain. And what are these conceptions? - wisdom and virtue in
general. And such creators are poets and other artists who may be said to have
invention," etc. c.f. I. 21a: poets are "...in a manner the fathers and authors of
wisdom," & Laws 682a: "...for poets are a divine race, and often in their
strains, by the aid of the Muses and the Graces, they attain truth. The ambivalent
attitude Plato has towards artists is shown by the above in comparison with his
notorious views in Republic, and, e.g. in Anology: "...not by wisdom do poets
write poetry..." etc. (Apol. 32).
The historical origin of these beliefs would be impossible to identify exactly, just as the ancient and universal belief in metempsychosis cannot be said to have a beginning in any particular time or place. Plato's sources are, as we have seen, recognisable from the allusions made in his writings; given the stamp of his authority, they have been enormously influential. The notion of the artist as a bystander in the creation of 'his' works, as the possessed or inspired whom the gods - The Muses, Dionysus, or Apollo have chosen, is equally old even though its formulations vary. The distinctness of the soul from the body is an inseparable part of this notion, and for Plato the soul must reject and ascend from the body and its preoccupations in order to achieve the eidos. This ascension has two means in the dialogues, the manic and the dialectic; and Plato is inconsistent in his attitude to the former, and whereas his attitude to the latter is steadfast its root is the same, and when it is uppermost in the mind of Plato the rational, political philosopher he is led to advocate the banishment of artists from his ideal state. If in the first place we regard mimesis as imitation, which is its only meaning in modern English(1), then within the logic of his rational philosophy we must grant Plato the virtue of consistency in his attitude to the copiers of the unworthy physical world; others with a rational approach to education are less consistent. But, in the second place if we see the Platonic myth of inspired madness as a statement about human passions and emotions, and about an enduring psychological need satisfied by art, then mimesis is something more than simple imitation, and our interpretation of Plato's philosophical position is somewhat different, and the moral grounds for abolishing artists lose their former security. And the myth of the daemonic artist persists, as innumerable artists and divines have sought to forge a link between the individual and the eidos, the finite and the infinite, endeavouring to step from the limitations of the one to the boundlessness of the other, and in the majority of such cases the connecting step has been "imagination".

(1) Oxford English Dictionary, 1933 edn.
In concluding this first section it can be said that whilst the full implications of Plato's mystical and mythical views are by no means clear, his general position is deducible and the deduction already contains a blueprint for some later and very important aesthetic theory. Even the form of the four kinds of "madness" is reproduced during the Renaissance in Giordano Bruno's *eroici furori*, in poems which he dedicated to Sir Philip Sydney. Of more direct relevance to the theory of imagination is the similarity which exists between Plato and Kant. The impulse to clarity, form and cognition which characterises the 'Appollonine' (and thus the Platonic) inspiration presages the analysis of cognition in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, though this is rather more fully worked out in the dialectic route to the *eidos* as we shall see in the next section. This kind of inspiration seems also to be related to that sense of awe or wonder which Aristotle saw as the origin of man's philosophic impulse and which Kant also regarded as important to all philosophy, but the prophetic aspect of this inspiration also invites comparison with the productive kind of imagination of Kant's first *Critique*. It is with greater confidence that we can suggest a link between Plato's "poetic madness" and the aesthetic imagination of the *Critique of Judgment*: for Kant the aesthetic imagination is a property of artistic genius and yields the sublime which, unlike mere beauty (the Appollonine?), is not simply pleasurable (eudaemonic) but awesome. Plato's "poetic madness" is a property of the daemon (or spirit) who mediates between the mortal and the immortal as the imagination of Kant's genius furnishes Ideas of reason out of the intuitions of sense.

But Plato is wary of poetic madness as he is of the Dionysian and its mimetic licence where *acting usurps being* as the god usurps the self or soul; thus the soul at best is reduced to the role of spectator rather than participator in the quest for the *eidos*, a situation which does not obtain in the dialectic route to the *eidos* but which sets the seal on centuries of distrust of that part of man that dreams and which diverts him from the paths of righteousness and reason.
SECTION II.

Although translations from Greek use the word "imagination", there is no word in Greek which corresponds to its broad modern English usage. It certainly has no direct counterpart in the Dialogues of Plato, even though they are a major source of many of the inflexions which nowadays are to be found in "imagination". The emotive account of mania as the sine qua non of artistic creation, now absorbed into contemporary mythology, looks at first to be quite divorced from Plato's epistemology, but he did not make the rigid categorical distinctions to which we are accustomed.

Just as for Plato, the soul, as the most divine part of the individual(1) is imprisoned in the body, so are his ideas inescapably a part of their means of expression; it cannot be assumed that the myths and similes are merely illustration, for they are the embodiment of those ideas, vulnerable to interpretation but only fully meaningful in their totality. We can either say that these embodiments are the inevitable product of pre-scientific ignorance, the devices employed by a superior intellect attempting to overcome this ignorance, or that, in toto, they are an attempt to communicate an awareness of something which is at once so refined and so diffuse that it is not verbalisable. In short, we either believe that we know more, or that we perhaps know only as much as what Plato knew of the great eschatological mysteries. If we equate Plato's 'poetic madness' with "imagination", as succeeding writers have, then imagination may be explained in terms of inspiration as in Plato; otherwise, if we 'interpret' Plato, we must explain it in terms of personality as in much modern psychology; the first reading is prima facie exclusive and elitist - an aberration for which Plato has lately been brought to task, - the second is procedurally exclusive, for, to borrow Vygotsky's analogy, we could not hope to discover the fire-fighting property of water by analysing oxygen and hydrogen. We should be mindful of these deficiencies when considering the 'rational' psychology of imagination such as is found in Aristotle's De Anima, but which has its first serious(2) treatment in Plato's Dialogues.

(1) See Phaedrus 246c.
(2) See J.I. Beare, op.cit., p.251, sec.1.
The soul's progression from blank ignorance to the realm of the Forms is given a diagrammatic framework in the Divided Line simile. \(\text{(Republic 509e)}\)

The lower subsection of the line corresponds to eikasia, e.g. "images", "shadows", and "reflections in water and in solid, smooth and polished bodies and the like"; \(\text{(op. cit., 510a)}\) these "images", as appearances or phenomena\(^{(1)}\) are "the first ingenious and intuitive vision of the real" \(\text{(Paton p.76)}\). "Eikasia" has no English equivalent,\(^{(2)}\) but as Paton says, "we may call it imagination or the cognition of images, or again Intuition or the mere looking at objects," \(\text{(loc.cit)}\) and it is essentially a confused state wherein images and solid objects are intermingled.\(^{(3)}\) Mure describes it thus: "... in eikasia we shall find a stage of consciousness prior to proper, in which distinction of subject and object, and of fancy form fact are only beginning to emerge."\(^{(4)}\)

Plato's choice of a line as a simile supports a developmental interpretation of the soul's progress,\(^{(5)}\) an interpretation which is supported in parts of Theaetetus, Sophist, and Philebus, and the elementary cognitive role of eikasia, illustrated in the Divided Line simile, has its moral and emotive equivalents in the charioteer and cave similes of Phaedrus and Republic, where its analogues are the unruly black steed and the prisoners who sit gazing at shadows.

\(^{(1)}\) See H.J. Paton, "Plato's Theory of Eikasia", p.76.

\(^{(2)}\) Liddell & Scott give: "likeness, image, representation", and "conjecture, guessing." There are reservations against "representation."


\(^{(4)}\) Mure, op. cit., p.47. Mure adds in a footnote, p.47: "Or we might include in Eikasia all individual dogmatic judgments of value, and regard them as shadows of comparatively real originals in the sphere of pistis of the best public opinion as embodied, e.g. in the established legal system. We might, again, even relate Eikasia to Plato's theory of art, and discover in it the germ of Croce's view of the nature of aesthetic experience."

\(^{(5)}\) See D.Ross: "There is justification for the view that Plato thought of the four states of mind as forming a series, gaining in clarity as it proceeds? But noesis is Plato's main concern, and "we are not bound to hold that Plato thought of eikasia as an important phase in our apprehension of the world. The looking at shadows and reflections is only a rather occasional attitude in the life of the ordinary man, whose habitual state is that of pistis ...."
According to the Eleatic Stranger of the Sophist, there are distinctions to be made between divine creation, of the natural objects constituting pistis, (1) (which is the second subdivision of the divided line) and divine imitation, which is (referring to the objects of pistis): "images of them which are not them, but which correspond to them," (Sophist 266b) i.e., which is eikasia. These latter, the objects of eikasia, he calls:

"The appearances which spring up of themselves in sleep or by day, such as shadow when darkness arises in a fire, or the reflection which is produced when the light is bright and smooth objects meet on their surface with an external light, and creates a perception the opposite of our ordinary sight." (op. cit., 266b-c)

Human creation, we are told, may be either of manufactured articels, for example a house (Sophist 266c), or it may be imitation or likeness-making (op. cit., 235d) i.e., "which is a sort of dream created by man for those who are awake" (op. cit., 266c). This imitation may either be "a copy which is created according to the proportions of the original," (op. cit., 235d) or, "phantastic or the art of making appearances", (op. cit., 236c), which "give up the truth in their images and make only the proportions which appear to be beautiful, disregarding the real ones. (op. cit., 236a). This phantastic imitation is effected by means of an instrument (op. cit., 267a), (probably in reference to the plastic arts), or by the individual himself who is the instrument (loc. cit.), which is "the art of mimicry," that is, acting and poetry, (see pp.10-11 on mimesis). Painters (2) are without doubt the archetypal phantastic imitators (Sophist, 234b), who, by making their imitations seem real, "can deceive the less intelligent sort of children," (loc. cit.). In the way that sophistry can deceive by making fiction seem like fact (op. cit., 234c). The illusion is which the human mind is prone, (Republic 602a) particularly in the

(1) Paton, op. cit., p.85, says of pistis: "It includes all empirical science and all history as well as the ordinary judgments of the ordinary man..." (c.f. Ross, previous footnote.)
(2) And, therefore, poets; see Republic 600d-e.
"Heraclitan flux" (Paton, op. cit., p. 81) of eikasia where "doubt about the reality of sense is easily raised, since there may even be a doubt whether we are awake or in a dream,"(1) is a weakness which is exploited by the eikones(2) of the painter, and it is because of such exploitation that the painter and poet must be excluded from the ideal state. This banishment is a logical extension of Plato's fundamental tenet that the soul must be allowed to pursue its goal, the eidos, and it must do so unimpeded: not even Homer is exempted from the ban.

It is Plato's intention that eikasia be seen as the lowest of four stages of intellectual development which correspond to the four divisions of the Divided Line, but both Patón and Beare are of the opinion that he understates its importance.(3) Patón allies himself with those sceptical philosophers, "agnostics of all ages from Protagoras to Hume", for whom eikasia is "the only way of knowing" and whose objects "have been identified with the whole of reality" (op. cit., p. 82). On this view, "Memory, sense, imagination, and all that we call Thinking or knowledge are on one dead level which is described by Plato under the heading of eikasia" (op. cit., p. 82-3). In consequence, Patón finds in eikasia the source of all art: "The artist has all the marks of the stage of eikasia."(p. 93). For, "Imagination qua imagination takes no account of the difference between the apparent and the actual and is therefore properly included in eikasia.

If we admit this in regard to imagination, we have admitted it already in regard to the artistic activity as a whole. For the function of the artist is nothing more and nothing less than imagination, i.e. the making images clear and express to himself."(op. cit., p. 92).

(1) Theaetetus 158d; see also Appendix D.
(2) See Mure, op. cit., p. 39, footnote: "Plato plays deliberately on the connection of eikasia with eikon, 'image'."
(3) Although it was relatively unimportant for Plato.
The "first, broad, general, cognitive experience" (Paton p. 82) called eikasia is identified in Theaetetus with "the first ingenuous and intuitive vision of the soul whether in sense, memory, or imagination," (loc. cit.), which is aesthesis. (Paton p. 76) and aesthesis is also identified with phantasia. (1) In the fundamental Socratic belief in knowledge as recollection (2) this "first general experience" has a definite function in the cognitive development of the soul, and is not entirely discarded. No rules are given for choosing between the valuable and valueless, and these are only identifiable retrospectively, although Plato believes in the innate Empedoclean disposition (3) of the soul, an impulse to the higher realm which is its proper home. The existence or otherwise of this impulse, or of a means of recognising the actual and illusory in eikasia, is crucially important, but it is not established; some sensations are "preserved" to form memory (Philebus. 79a), for recollection is the "recovery" of "some sensation or knowledge" (op. cit., 79b). Not only are former sensations stored in this way, for there is also a "scribe", who seems "almost to write

(1) Paton, op. cit., p. 82 - a reference to Theaetetus 152c. C.f. Beare, op. cit., p. 263, sect. 11: "phantasia and aesthesis are of essentially the same nature." Beare adds, loc. cit., sect. 11: "Here phantasia is clearly a different thing from the faculty of reproductive imagination as defined by Aristotle..." (i.e. in De Anima. 429a 1.) Beare is also referring to Theaetetus 152b-c.
(2) See, e.g., Meno 81c., Phaedo 73., 75., & 79., Philebus 79a, & Laws 723.
(3) For the apparent difficulty of realising this disposition, see also Appendix A. The empirical rather than dispositional account of education is foremost in Theaetetus. (e.g., 186b-c: "The simple sensations which reach the soul through the body are given at birth to men and animals by nature, but their reflection on the being and use of them are slowly and hardly gained, if they are ever gained, by education and long experience." C.f. Laws 667b-c: "Learning has a certain accompanying charm which is the pleasure..." etc). N.B. also Aristotle, De Anima 406b 11-19: On the soul: "Thus Empedocles declared that it is formed out of his elements each of them also being soul; his words are:

"For 'tis by Earth we see Earth, by Water Water,
By Ether Ether divine, by Fire destructive fire,
By Love Love, and Hate by cruel Hate."

In the same way Plato in the Timaeus fashions the soul out of his elements; for like, he adds, is known by like, and things are formed out of the principles of elements, so that soul must be so too." On this passage, Beare, op. cit., p. 47 sect. 27, comments: "Plato's 'elements', however, were not material, and were far other than those of Empedocles." This may be so, but as will be seen, generations of alchemists believed in the actuality of the Platonic elements, and one is still left with the problem of moving from the actual to the formal.
down words in the soul" when "memory and perception meet", (op. cit., 39a) as well as "another artist", who is "the painter, who, after the scribe has done his work, draws images in the soul of the things he has described" (op. cit., 39b). Thus it is that we acquire the verbal memory and the "images" which together make our conceptual knowledge. The influential wax-tablet simile of the Theaetetus (191e-d), together with the similes of the scribe and painter, Trojan horse, (184d) and aviary, (197d-e), indicate how much Aristotle learned from Plato, and are strongly reminiscent of Locke's 'empty chamber'. When we are children, the mind is empty (197e) like the unoccupied aviary; the doves in the aviary represent "kinds of knowledge" (loc. cit.) in the mind, "one kind is prior to possession and for the sake of possession, and the other for the sake of taking and holding in the hands that which is possessed already. And then, when a man has learned and known something long ago, he may resume and get hold of the knowledge which he has long possessed, but not at hand in the mind." (198d) A man might possibly give a wrong opinion, for, "...wishing to capture a certain sort of knowledge out of the general store, he may take the wrong one by mistake. Thus it is that he may think eleven to be twelve, getting hold, as it were, of the ring-dove which he had in his mind, when he wanted the pigeon." (199a) The possibility of such an error is inconsistent with the Empedoclean formula for the soul's impulse to the eidos, just as is the irrational function of memory as admitted in Phaedo: "recollection may be derived from things either like or unlike? (74a) for "what is this feeling of lovers when they recognise a lyre, or a garment, or anything else which the beloved has been in the habit of using? Do not they, from knowing the lyre, form in the mind's eye an image of the youth to whom the lyre belongs? And this is recollection....such recollection can be effected by all manner of things." (73e) Soon in this light, the palingenetic account of the education of the soul (1) looks less credible,

(1) e.g. Meno, 81c.: "all enquiry and learning is but recollection..."
and Socrates' demonstration of it with Meno's slave boy (Meno 82ff) even more spurious, just as Leibniz's admiration of it(1) seems more a product of Christian dogma than of a close reading of the Dialogues.

In concluding and summarising these two sections of my first chapter I would like to indicate as clearly as possible those elements of Plato's philosophy which shape and anticipate subsequent contributions to the theory of imagination. Firstly, as I have already commented, our modern word "imagination" is far too broad in its connotations to be used accurately as a translation of anything in Plato, though there are those who have committed this inaccuracy. With the wisdom (or the prejudice) of hindsight it is possible to separate out of Plato formulations or intimations of most aspects of that wide range of notions which is commonly subsumed under our modern concept of "imagination". The eidos has been identified, following Friedlaender, with that exalted state in Plato which in subsequent notions may be identified with e.g., the Neoplatonic and mystic bliss of the vision of the "One" or God and, less restrainedly, the Ideas of reason found in Kant. In the first section I dealt with the "manic" route to the Platonic eidos and its four parts: the prophetic, the mystic, the poetic and the erotic; all of these, I believe, have a necessary connection with Plato's eikasia. It is important to note what these four kinds of "madness" or inspiration have in common, which is an intense emotive value whose content, as e.g. the poem, the beloved, or the god, has no priority. So it may be that the inspiration finds its content rather than vice versa, though Plato clearly indicates that this content must fall within four areas which, on his model, we may now call knowledge, religion, art, and love. Turning to eikasia, discussed in the second section, this notion is strikingly similar to what later philosophers, e.g. Descartes and Kant, call "intuition" - that which is immediate to sense - and what Brentano was to call "presentation". Plato's account of eikasia in the divided line simile of the Republic

(1) New Essays, I.2.1. Ch.1. sec.5.
undoubtedly favours the Apollonine route to *eidos* which therefore has both inspirational and dialectic elements and may be regarded as an enthusiasm for knowledge, which was shared by Pythagoras, Socrates, and Plato, whose patron god was Apollo and who were all, literally, philosophers. Thus for Plato the importance of *eikasia* is essentially in its precognitive rather than its ontological function, just as with the Kantian "intuition" in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. But the priority of *eikasia* to the higher cognitive functions of judgment and understanding gives to *eikasia* what Sartre calls the "naive ontology" of images, for there can be little doubt of a connection between *eikasia* and *eikones* (images). This connection and this naive ontology inform Plato’s account of memory in *Theaetetus*, *Philebus*, and *Phaedo*, which are akin to the empiricism of Locke and Hume and the Kantian "reproductive imagination"; the dependency of *eikasia* on *pistis* also anticipates other distinctions between ‘image’ and ‘object’ such as are found e.g. in the Cartesian (and Spinozan) "figure" as distinct from "image" and Kant’s "thing-in-itself". This problem of distinguishing between image and object, between imagination and reality, persists throughout the entire history of philosophy and, following the Platonic preference for objective knowledge, the distinction generally hinges on a description of the content of the presentation or intuition, and charting the progress of this distinction is one of the themes of this present thesis. Although the theoretical basis of Sartre’s rejection of the "naive ontology" of the image has its immediate foundation in the phenomenology of Husserl and Brentano, and in the latter’s detailed study of Aristotle, already in Plato the beginnings of this theoretical basis can be found. The suggestion of an actual connection between *eikasia*, *aesthesis*, and *phantasia* implicitly challenges the suggestion of an ontology of images in the way that Brentano asserted that all consciousness is consciousness of something — as will be seen in the chapter on phenomenology. Finally, a comment on Plato’s theory of art. In the body of Plato’s works is a dichotomy between the objective (knowledge) and the subjective (meaning), a dichotomy which I have characterised
as the dialectic and the manic routes to the eidos. Overall, it is the former which has held sway over Western European civilisation. In the Republic Plato dismisses art as copy of copy, i.e. pistis is a copy of an ideal and eikasia (and so eikones) a copy of pistis: Eikones, (as the writings of the Philostrati show), can be paintings. Thus, to put it broadly, art may have great meaning and emotional significance but has negligible cognitive value and so must be censored or banned from Plato's ideal state.
APPENDIX A.

According to Aristotle, Empedocles held that "knowledge is of the like by the like" (Metaphysics, B 1000b 5). As Guthrie says, (op.cit., p.211),
this view was shared by Pythagoras, Socrates, and Plato, and, (op.cit., p.208) :-

"The idea of the kinship of all nature has been sufficiently shown to be Pythagorean and to underlie the doctrine of transmigration and the prohibition of animal flesh. It recurs in these connections in Empedocles".

He also adds that "the religious ideas of Empedocles are demonstrably almost identical with those of Pythagoras." (op.cit., p.203, footnote 2). The notion that the soul grows like what it contemplates, (see A.E.Taylor, "Plato, The Man and His Work", p.147), so that e.g. "The philosopher who contemplates the kosmos becomes the kosmos in his own soul", (Guthrie, op.cit., p.211), is of profound and lasting educational importance, and one which is shared by one of the "progressive" educators of our own times, Bertrand Russell :-

"Thus, to sum up our discussion of the value of philosophy: Philosophy is to be studied, not for the sake of any definite answers to its questions, since no definite answers can, as a rule, be known to be true, but rather for the sake of the questions themselves; because enlarge our conception of what is possible, enrich our intellectual imagination and diminish the dogmatic assurance which closes the mind against speculation; but above all because, through the greatness of the universe philosophy contemplates, the mind is rendered great, and becomes capable of that union with the universe which constitutes its highest good." ("The Problems of Philosophy" pp.249-250).

See also Friedlander, op.cit., vol.1, p.196; for Socrates, "...true love is love that educates. The connection between love and education, however, can only be fully grasped from the point of view of the beyond. Education means shaping the beloved after the image of the god, whose followers had been both lover and beloved; hence, this orientation also imposes upon the educator the obligation to look up to the god and to resemble the latter more and more." See also Republic 500d. "And the philosopher, holding converse with the divine order, becomes orderly and divine as far as the nature of men allows;".
APPENDIX B.

There is a variety of attitudes to myths in general, and to Plato’s myths. Hegel regards myths as property belonging to a time when civilisation was in an immature state:

"The myth is always a mode of representation which, as belonging to an earlier stage, introduces sensuous images, which are directed to imagination, not to thought; in this, however, the activity of thought is suspended, it cannot yet establish itself by its own power, and so is not yet free. The myth belongs to, the pedagogic stage of the human race, since it entices and allures men to occupy themselves with the content; but as it takes away from the purity of thought through sensuous forms, it cannot express the meaning of Thought. When the Notion attains its full development, it has no more need of myth." ("Lectures on The History of Philosophy," Vol. 2, pp. 19-20).

From a certain philosophical standpoint, the need for myth may indeed be considered to have been outgrown when the capacity for abstract thought is realised. Guthrie is less dogmatic, and he wisely perceives that myth, wherever we may say it is directed, exerts a continuous influence on our beliefs, albeit less obviously than in the distant past:

"Its stories and images may be, at an early stage of civilisation, the only available means (and an effective one) of expressing profound and universal truths. Later, a mature religious thinker like Plato may choose it deliberately, and as the culmination of reasoned argument, to communicate experiences and beliefs, the reality and cogency of which is a matter of conviction outrunning logical proof. This is genuine myth, and its validity and importance are undoubted. The danger begins when men believe they have left all that behind and are relying on a scientific method based solely on a combination of observation and logical inference. The unconscious retention of inherited and irrational modes of thought, cloaked in the vocabulary of reason, then becomes an obstacle rather than an aid to the pursuit of truth." ("A History of Greek Philosophy," Vol. 1, p. 2.

APPENDIX B.
Guthrie is surely wrong to suggest that Plato deliberately chose myth as a vehicle, at least not as a culmination of reasoned argument; generally speaking reason and myth as we understand them are kept apart in the Dialogues, they hardly belong together. It is perhaps more accurate to say that myth was 'chosen' for him by the accident of the time and place of his birth. J.A. Stewart is for once near to the point here: "...Myth distinguished once for all by weight and ring from Allegory is an essential element of Plato's philosophical style; and his philosophy cannot be understood apart from it." (The Myths of Plato, p. 1.)

This is certainly a sounder assessment of the place of myth in Plato than that of E. Wallace, who considers that the mystical and mythical elements detract from the value of Plato's philosophy, (see his Introduction to Aristotle's "Psychology", p.XV.). Like Hegel, Wallace judges the myths from a prejudicial viewpoint; if logical thought is one's ideal, myth can at best be regarded as allegory, and at worst as manifest ignorance. This, as will be seen later, echoes the ascribed role of imagination in rational psychology.

APPENDIX C.
The influence of Pythagoreanism, and of the mysteries it embraced, on Plato, and thereby on the whole of Western philosophy, is one of the points to have been established throughout this chapter. The influence of Dionysianism and the Greek mystery religions which it typifies, is important in relation to the development of the beliefs which have nourished western art, particularly from the end of the 18th century.

Unlike Pythagoras, Dionysus was not a man who actually lived among men; nor was he, like Apollo, a god, for he has no Olympian ancestry. He was possibly Phrygian, but probably Thracian in origin, (see Encyclopaedia Britannica), and was a fertility god whose followers were mostly women. Graves, (The Greek Myths), says his mother was Semele, the moon-goddess, (p.27b), whereas Encyc. Brit. says she was Zemelo, a Phrygian earth-goddess; Petranck, (See Graves, op.cit., p.27b) says his mother was Lethe('forgetfulness').
a probable reference to Dionysus' association with wine. Dionysus' identification with Bacchus, a feature of his absorption into Greek mythology, becomes complete in Roman times. His cult superficially thrived on drunkenness, sexuality, and ecstasism, but inspired a profound mysticism which has influenced Christian theology. (See e.g. Russell's "History of Western Philosophy", pp. 345.)

Nietzsche calls himself "the last disciple of the philosopher Dionysus", (Things I Owe to The Ancients, sec. 5), he even signed some of his letters "Dionysus". He also calls Goethe a Dionysian, for this is "the highest of all faiths" (Twilight of the Idols, sec. 49), a faith which he praises above all for its 'Yea-saying', and for its sexuality. "The Birth of Tragedy" is a study of the Apollonian and the Dionysian aspects of art, and its tenor may be illustrated by the following quotation from "Twilight of the Idols", sec. 67:

"What is the meaning of the antithetical concepts Apollonian and Dionysian which I have introduced into the vocabulary of Aesthetic, as representing the distinct modes of ecstasy? — Apollonian ecstasy acts above all as a force stimulating the eye, so that it acquires the power of vision. The painter, the sculptor, the epic poet are essentially visionaries. In the Dionysian state, on the other hand, the whole system of passions is stimulated and intensified, so that it discharges itself by all the means of expression at once, and vests all its power of representation, of imitation, of transfiguration, of transformation, together with every kind of mimicry and histrionic display at the same time. The essential feature remains the facility in transforming the inability to refrain from reaction (— a similar state to that of certain hysterical patients, who at the slightest hint assume any role). It is impossible for the Dionysian artist not to understand any suggestion; no outward sign of emotion escapes him, he possesses the instinct of comprehension and of divination in the highest degree, just as he is capable of the most perfect art of communication. He enters into every skin, into every passion; he is continually changing himself.

Music as we understand it today is likewise a general excitation
and discharge of the emotions; but, notwithstanding this, it is only
the remnant of a much richer world of emotional expression, a mere
residuum of Dionysian histrionicism. For music to be made possible as
a special art, quite a number of senses, and particularly the muscular
sense, had to be paralysed (at least relatively): for all rhythm still
appeals to our muscles to a certain extent): and thus man no longer
imitates and represents physically everything he feels, as soon as he
feels it. Nevertheless that is the normal Dionysian state, and in any
case its primitive state. Music is the slowly attained specialisation
of the state at the cost of kindred capacities." M.Praz, "The Romantic
Agony," p.8, quotes Alfred Bauraler, who has called Dionysianism of the
6th. century B.C. the "Romanticism of antiquity".

APPENDIX D.

Plato never gives any guidance on how to recognise true perceptions as
against false ones, he only indicates how painful the process is of
renouncing the false. The near impossibility of distinguishing dream
from actuality is also noted in Timaeus:

"Of these and of other things of the same kind, relating to the
true and waking reality of nature, we have only this dreamlike sense, and
we are unable to cast off sleep and determine the truth about them. For
an image, since the reality after which it is modelled does not belong to
it (or, 'since its very intention is not self-existent') and it exists ever
as the fleeting shadow of some other, must be inferred to be in another
(that is in space), grasping existence in some way or other, or it could
not be at all. But true and exact reason, vindicating the nature of true
being, maintains that while two things (that is, the image and space) are
different they cannot exist one of them in the other and so be one and also
two at the same time." (52b, the brackets are Jowett's).
Chapter 2: ARISTOTLE

Introduction.
I shall discuss Aristotle at some length, but with good reason. For although the visionary aspects of Plato's philosophy are virtually absent from Aristotle's theories, the cognitive psychology which Aristotle inherited from his great forerunner and which he expanded and reformulated has been written into much subsequent theory - either wholesale or partially. I include in this Stoicism, Neoplatonism, Empiricism, Kantianism and Phenomenology. That the psychological elements of these philosophical traditions are not the same serves to underline the fact that, except for a few obvious examples such as the mediaeval Arab "faculty" psychologists, St. Thomas Aquinas, and Franz Brentano, Aristotle's De Anima seems not to have been read in the original (or in translation). Above all it is the Platonic element of Aristotle's psychology which has dominated what followed: what is essentially a dynamic theory in the De Anima becomes a theory of cognitive development - from the materials of sense, through imagination to understanding and reason - which is seen as a series of ontological moments or "faculties". This, caricatured, is Kant's account in the second edition of his Critique of Pure Reason. This pseudo-Aristotelian, or Platonic-Aristotelian psychology embraces what J-P. Sartre calls the "naive ontology" of images, the belief that mental images are copies of things existing as things, which modern thinkers have so consistently attacked from the position of neo-Aristotelian phenomenology.

The following chapter is divided into five sections. The first is introductory and deals in a general way with the differences between Aristotle and Plato, with emphasis on the fundamental doctrine of motion which underpins the De Anima. The second section is on Aristotle's conception of the soul, its differences from Plato's, and the motive form-matter, potential-actual framework on which it rests. In section three I outline and discuss the account of sense and of what in Latin is called the sensus communis, a function of cognition which is not unlike perception and which in some respects resembles Kant's synthetic faculty of imagination, but which is
different from Plato's "synthetic faculty". In a long fourth section I deal with Aristotle's theory of imagination, attempting to separate the various, sometimes confused, strands. Thus we learn that imagination (phantasia) derives from sense, explained as in Plato by a wax-seal, impression analogy; it is a form of movement (rather than static), and usually false (according to the extent to which it is autonomous, presumably); it is different from opinion, this latter demanding commitment to action; it is the basis of memory wherein the image is seen as related or mnemonic (to and of its object). Imagination is also regarded as a form of thinking as there is no thought without imagination, though conceptual thought is more universal than, being abstracted from, images. Aristotle also asserts that imagination is inseparable from appetite which he regards as the basis of motion; this assertion, together with the view that appetites need the moral restraint of reason, is the coping-stone of Stoic, Neoplatonic, and Christian psychology. In terminating this section I note some anomalies of Aristotle's theory of imagination, and consider his account of dreaming, in which he attacks the alleged prophetic and revelatory powers which later came to be an integral part of mediaeval theology. In the fifth and final section I briefly consider Aristotle's aesthetic theory, and the possible links between his phantasia and mimesis.
SECTION I

Since Plato and Aristotle were for 20 years contemporaries at the Academy, it would be surprising to find no problems common to their work, though their methods are quite different: "To leave Plato's dialogues for the treatises of Aristotle is to exchange a gallery of bright landscape paintings for a map, and a map that Aristotle sometimes seems to be constructing with special intent to convict his master of errors in perspective. But it is still Plato's country that he charts." (Hure, op.cit., p.67). Aristotle rarely cites the dialogues as an authority for Plato's ideas, but it is clear that the speculative psychology found in Theaetetus, Sophist, and Philebus, is at least a stimulus for Aristotle's own speculations. Aristotle's psychology of imagination, an amplification and re-development of Plato's, forms the basis of mediaeval theory:

"Plato, applying the standards of metaphysical idealism, seemed, on the whole, to deprecate these powers*, especially as they were for him connected with the doctrine of imitation. He did, however, lay the basis for a theory of phantasy in psychology and ethics, and he made a most significant contribution to enunciating the concept of the dream-phantasy. Aristotle, on the other hand, broke the connection between phantasy and imitation, ridiculed the Platonic notion of divinely implanted phantasies, and assuming the reality of sensible experience, laid the basis for the subsequent description of the phantasy in psychology. We have, then, from the very beginning what may be called an idealistic and mystical tradition founded by Plato, and an equally well defined empirical tradition deriving from Aristotle. To the concepts of phantasy and imagination in these two systems all subsequent views in classical and mediaeval thought may ultimately be traced; and, seen in one light, this history is the record of a conflict, lasting for many centuries, between

* i.e. phantasy and imagination.
theories emanating from these two great thinkers."(1)

The range of Bundy's studies does not extend much beyond the late mediaevalism of Dante, but despite the post-Newtonian demise of Aristotelian science Aristotle's psychological and aesthetic theories far outlived the influence of his ideas on physical science.(2) Bundy is quite correct to point out that Aristotle is antipathetic to the obscure Platonic notions of daemonism, metempsychosis, and knowledge as reminiscence. And whereas for Aristotle sense does not have quite the omnipotence which Locke was to give it, he certainly recognises its great importance in cognition. Plato based his theory of knowledge on what he considered to be worth knowing; Aristotle based his on what he saw as generally knowable, a radical shift from the old Socratic model: ".....when Socrates isolated himself from every external relationship by making an appeal to his daemon, and assumed, as I suppose, that everyone must do the same, such a view of life is essentially a secret, or constitutes an essential secret, because it cannot be communicated directly. The most that Socrates could do was to help another negatively, by a maieutic artistry, to achieve the same view. Everything subjective, which through its dialectical inwardness eludes a direct form of expression, is an essential secret."(3)

(1) M.W.Bundy, "The Theory of Imagination in Classical and Mediaeval Thought," pp.259-260. Although Bundy's book has been useful to my own analysis of the theory of imagination, his treatment of the relationship between imitation (mimesis) and imagination is inadequate and, I believe, inaccurate; cf. my remarks infra) on Aristotle's theory of art.
(2) A.W.Levy, "The Two Imagination", in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. XXV, pp.188-200), is quite certain of this influence: "The whole of the Western tradition lies under the spell of the De Anima; of a knowledge process dominated by the epistemological triad perception, imagination, thought, where the hierarchy of epistemic moments is dominated by the act of abstraction, and where sensation is but a reaping of the flowers of experience, synthesised and fixed in the vat of imagination and ultimately processed into those essences or concepts which are but the elements of judgment". (pp. 188-9). On imagination, Levy adds: "Kant's account in the Critique of Pure Reason still lies under the unacknowledged spell of the De Anima," (p.199).
(3) S.Kierkegaard, "Concluding Unscientific Postscript", (Ch.II,Sec.I.)
Finally, in contrasting the outlook and approach of these two philosophers, who both, in different ways, set the pattern for most subsequent speculation (including the theory of imagination), a quotation from the respected scholar Eduard Zeller:

"...the Athenian a born poet and an imaginative and speculative mind, with a tendency to mysticism enforced by the influence of Pythagoreanism; the Stagirite a man of sober disposition relying on the facts of experience and a powerful scientific organiser." And: "Plato would allow the world of sensual perception no real being. For Aristotle, however, this is the subject of investigation." ("Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy", p.167)

Fundamental to Aristotle's philosophy is his belief in the permanence of motion, upon which are founded his distinctions between actuality and potentiality, and between form and matter. As he asserts in the *Physica*:

".....there never was a time when there was not motion, and never will be a time when there will not be motion."(1) Within this conviction of the perpetuity of motion or change, as exercised in *De Anima*, he makes many distinctions of a conceptual nature; but it is motion which is of primary importance. E. Wallace finds a similar conviction in Hegel's attitude to psychology:

"Aristotle would seem then to take the same view of the study of the mind as Hegel has done in a passage of the *Encyclopaedia*. 'If we propose to think the mind,' we may suppose Aristotle to be saying with the latter, 'we must not be quite so shy of its special phenomena. Mind is essentially active. But if the mind is active, it must, as it were, utter itself. It is wrong therefore to take the mind for a processless ens as did the old metaphysic which divided the processless inward life of the mind from its outward life. No good will be done unless the mind be viewed in its concreta"

(1) *Physica*, 252b 5 ff; this statement is, however, tautologous, since Aristotle also asserts that time is "...itself a kind of motion," (on *cit.* 251b 12). On the eternal nature of motion, see also *Physica* 250b 1 ff-252b 6 inc.
reality, in its action: and in such a way that its manifestations are seen to be determined by its inward force."(1)

The Aristotelian soul is not a separate entity like the Platonic, but an immanent, active force which manifests itself in many different ways and which is united to the body in the way that all matter has form. Thus, for him, that which is subject to change or motion, the developing thing, (i.e. the individual person in De Anima), is what G.E.G. Mure refers to as a 'concrete' of matter (hylē), and form (eidos); matter and form, though conceptually distinguishable, were actually inseparable.(2) Development (energeia) is expressed in terms of matter becoming form, of that which is potential becoming actualised: "...the actuality of whatever is potential is identical with its formulable essence," Aristotle tells us; (De An.417b 12.) or as St. Thomas Aquinas puts it in his commentary on De Anima: "...the actuality of anything is the immanent idea and form of the thing as in potency."(3) This motion or change, understood as development, or as becoming, is known as entelechy, so that matter completely actualised is entelechy and in the successive stages of the process from potentiality to actuality, each higher stage is energesia compared to the lower, and dunamis compared to those above it.(4) Unformed matter is impossible, though it is described as stereis.(5) "...a cause of both being and not being." (De Caelo 287b 5) So form is to be understood as the beginning.

(2) "If we now....analyse the developing thing statically in terms of its composition, we shall find that it is a concrete....of matter(hylē) and form (eidos). Matter and form are in fact the respective equivalents of potentiality and actuality. They are consequently like the latter, a pair of terms purely relative to one another." (G.E.G. Mure, op.cit., p.10. Matter, Mure explains, is not 'stuff', but the materials of which a thing is composed; form is structure or structural principle. It is important to bear in mind, as J.I. Bares remarks, (op.cit., p.219 sec.14), the difference between an object and its shape (schema or morphe) and an object and its form.
(4) See J.I. Bares, op.cit., p.270 sec.16., whom I have closely followed here.
(5) G.E.G. Mure, op.cit., p.12, defines stereis as: "the absence of character for an subject which is by nature such as to possess it"
and the end of all motion, so far as the development of any individual thing or person is concerned, though Aristotle gives no priority to either form or motion. A grasp of the characteristic formulation of Aristotle's philosophical beliefs is crucial to a proper understanding of their application in the psychological theory of De Anima, and G.R.G. Mure also affirms that this teleological formula "dominates the whole course of Aristotle's speculation", adding:

"Follow him as he applies it in every sphere which he investigates; watch it grow from this initial abstract formula into a concrete universe of thought; and you may hope to grasp the essential meaning of his philosophy." (Op. cit., p.7).

Mure, (pp. 13-15), gives what he calls a "fourfold causal analysis of Aristotle's aitia(1), describing it as "...the permanent centre of his philosophy and the crucial test to which he brings the metaphysics of his predecessors." (Op. cit., p.16). But Aristotle does owe much to his predecessors. The problems to which he addresses himself come to him from Plato and his belief in the primacy of motion is perhaps Heraclitan, and his psychology is one of action, committed to the idea of soul, thought and imagination as kinds of movement. The influence of this teleological formula is far-reaching and profound(2) and may be seen to

(1) This aitia is inadequately rendered as "cause", a word whose modern empirical associations make it too specific to convey the broader Aristotelian accretions. Mure (op. cit., p.16), also introduces an appropriately organic element to his explanation of Aristotelian motion, describing this latter as "anabolic" and "catabolic".

(2) See E. Zeller, op. cit., p.176 : "It is...a merit of Aristotle's interpretation of the world that through the distinction between potential and actual being, one of which is converted into the other by motion, and especially through the important concept of entelechy ... the ground was cleared for the idea of evolution and the mathematical type of ontology and concept which Plato represents was replaced by a biological type." See also Wallace, op. cit., p.11. The notion of a transcendent reality has considerably less importance for Aristotle than have the "Forms" for Plato. In so far as there is a transcendent reality in Aristotle, this is best understood as a property of the fully-developed mind, which achieves a measure of autonomy. "...in the history of the individual, knowledge comes before its employment or exercise." (De Anima, Alq. 16). On this question of immanence and transcendence in Aristotle's philosophy, see "Aristotle" by H.D. Pocock, p.15ff. ("A representation of God in the De Anima as immanent in the individual would not necessarily be inconsistent with the representation of Him in the Metaphysics as transcendent." etc.).
shape the Neoplatonic principle of plenitude, the Leibnizian monad and, as the language of hyle and ideas partly indicates, the phenomenology of Brentano - who was an Aristotelian scholar - and Husserl. As both this present chapter and this present work conclude with a consideration of Sartre, whose studies of imagination are based on Husserlian principles, the psychology and aesthetic of imagination is given a certain symmetry which testifies to the lasting power of Aristotle's theories.
SECTION II

Part 'A'

The De Anima is, as Aristotle tells us, a 'history of the soul'. But Aristotle's conception of the soul is quite different from that of Plato; as already suggested, Aristotle is highly critical of the doctrine of metempsychosis which is fundamental to the Pythagorean and Empedoclean bases of Plato's theory. The epistemological beliefs underlying the psychology of De Anima are inevitably quite different from the idealism, and the belief in knowledge as reminiscence, which are dominant in Plato's works. Owing to the influence of Neo-Platonism and Christianity, the word "soul" fits more happily into discussion of Plato than of Aristotle; modern English has no word as E. Wallace says, which "can fully represent what Aristotle meant by psyche."

"And when we ask what English term would best translate the word used by Aristotle it is difficult to arrive at any precise decision. 'Mind' might well be said to occupy the same place in the psychology of our day* which psyche did in Aristotle's times: it might be plausibly regarded as the true equivalent of Aristotle's word. But on the other hand it is to be remembered that the 'mind' means less than Aristotle's expression meant in Greece." (Wallace, op.cit., p.XLVII).

Hume's empirical notion of the self is inadequate as it gives no credit to the mind as a possible formative power in its own right, and the "spirit" of both Berkeley and Hegel is in each case too autonomous and transcendental a conception accurately to convey the immanent and teleological qualities of the Aristotelian psyche, which probably has its closest relative in Brentano's idea of "consciousness" and the assertion that all consciousness has an active content, i.e., can only be spoken of as "consciousness of". For Brentano as for Aristotle there is no thought without a "presentation".

Based on the developmental formula which is contained in his distinctions of form and matter, and of actuality and potentiality, Aristotle gives an account of the individual's dynamic progression from the near-materiality of perception to the near-formal state which is the quality of mental autonomy. He speaks of the animate body as ousia (essence or being) * Written in 1882.
of which the *soma*, the body *per se*, is the *hyle*; the *psyche* *per se* is *eidos*. For the *soma* to have life is to have realised in it certain antecedent potentialities which belonged to the *hyle* from which the living body has sprung; *psyche* is the realisation of such potentialities. The Aristotelian soul is as inseparable from body as form is from matter, but this soul is not materially explicable: it has no material body. Body itself is always of the nature of a *subiectum*, but is the subject of no attributes or predicates, nor is itself an attribute or predicate. (1) Even to speak in terms of a "unity" of soul and body would be misleading since it implies the possibility of disunity, of Platonic dualism, which Aristotle is intent on refuting:

"...we can wholly dismiss as unnecessary the question whether the soul and body are one: it is as meaningless as to ask whether the wax and the shape given to it by the stamp are one, or generally the matter of a thing and that of which it is the matter." (De An. 412b 6ff)

This 'soul' "...is precisely the actuality whereby the body has life," (2) and, given what Mure calls the 'fourfold causal analysis' of Aristotle's philosophical beliefs (op. cit., pp.15-17), "It is (a) the source of origin of movement, it is (b) the end, it is (c) the essence of the whole living body." (De An. 415b 8ff). The impossibility of any non-conceptual separation

(1) This paragraph closely follows J.I. Beare's exegesis (op. cit., pp.220-1, sec.17.
(2) St. Thomas Aquinas, op. cit., p.169, sec.222. It must be observed at this point that though he gives much valuable elucidation of Aristotle's often difficult ideas, St. Thomas sees Aristotle through the eyes of his Neo-Platonic, Hebrew god; and the bulk of what subsequently passed for, and was reviled as, the work of "The Philosopher" was the emasculated version which St. Thomas made acceptable to the church. Hence for example when Aristotle says the soul "...is a substance in the sense which corresponds to the definitive formula of a thing's essence. That means that it is 'the essential whatness' of a body of the character just assigned..." (viz. organised, possessed of potentiality of life), (De Anima, 412b 10ff), St. Thomas comments: "In artificial things, made by human skill, the forms imposed on the material are accidental forms: and since these are easier for us to perceive than is substantial form, as being more accessible to the sense, it is obviously reasonable to approach the soul, which is a substantial form (my underlinings), through a comparison with accidental forms." (op. cit., p.175, sec.235).
of body from soul, and of the dualism implicit in Platonic metempsychosis, is interdependent on the actual singularity of the body-soul:

"It is not with every causal body that a given form of soul will unite itself. To suppose otherwise is as erroneous as to suppose that a carpenter could do his work with a flute as well as with a hammer and saw." (Beare, op. cit., p. 270, sec. 16).

The Empedoclean notion of knowledge as being of like by like, a concomitant of Plato's belief in the transmigration of souls, is also attacked by Aristotle, for on his account there can be no innate knowledge in a soul which is coeval with its body; the individual, before knowing, is in a state of 'unlike' in relation to that which he does not yet know.(1) But, as has already been emphasised, although the roots of empiricism are perhaps to be found in Aristotelianism, Aristotle is himself far from being an empiricist. Empirical man is a part of nature; in Aristotle's conception man is, by his actual intellect, superior to nature.(2) Not superior in the moral sense which is for Plato synonymous with knowledge, but in the sense that man is able to subject nature to the synoptic power of his ability to abstract. It is in this belief of the importance of that ability, which Socrates valued so highly, to 'see the one in the many', that Aristotle resembles Plato; but this is one of the very few points at which their philosophies seem to touch.

(1) So, of the potentiality-actuality change, in relation to the individual's development, Aristotle says: "...prior to and during the change the two factors are unlike, after it like." (De An. 417a 20).

"At first, and while the transforming process is going on, there is dissimilarity; but at the end, when the thing is transformed and changed, there is similarity. And so it is between the sense-faculty and its object. And the early philosophers were wrong because they missed this distinction." (Aquinas, op. cit., p. 237, sec. 157).

(2) i.e., Aristotle does not emphasise the receptive function of our experience at the expense of the mind's active, organisational response to the natural world. It is this response which raises man above the natural and animal world.
Part 'B'

No account of Aristotle's conception of the soul and its attributes would be complete without some reference to his conjectures about physical science. The actual inseparability of soul and body demands such a reference, as does the far-reaching influence of Aristotelian science, though it is biological science which is of particular interest at present. The basic biological inactions of the living person, i.e., which are commensurate with the body being insouled, so to speak, are breathing, heartbeat, and nutrition. Aristotle considers the possibility that soul resides in the air we breathe (De Spiritu, 433a, 30ff.), and concludes that:

"...if the soul resides in this air, the air is at any rate a neutral substance. Surely, if it becomes animate or becomes soul, it suffers some change or alteration, and so naturally moves towards what is akin to it, and like grows by the addition of like. Or is it otherwise? for it may be contended that the air is not like the whole of soul but is something which contributes to this potentiality or in this sense makes it, and that which has made it is its principle and foundation." (Loc.cit).

Although he dismisses pre-Socratic and Platonic psychology and epistemology, the influence of the old elemental science still persists, and the apparently close relationship between soul and respiration is maintained. (1) But respiration is elsewhere described as "the means of affecting refrigeration" (De Respiratione, 478a 30), as a necessary function in holding a life-preserving balance between the excesses of hot and cold, the heart being the source of heat (On.cit., 478a, 25).

The heart is also considered to be the organ of digestion, whereby the raw material of food is changed into a form useful to the individual:

"...life and the presence of soul involve a certain heat. Not even the digesting process to which is due the nutrition of animals occurs apart from soul and warmth, for it is to fire that in all cases elaboration is due. It is for this reason, precisely, that the primary nutritive soul

(1) Cf. Leibniz, who calls psychology "pneumatology".
must also be located in that part of the body and in that division of this region which is the immediate vehicle of this principle. The region in question is immediate between that where food enters and that where excrement is discharged. In bloodless animals it has no name, but in the sanguineous class this organ is called the heart."


To modern anatomical science, which regards it as a pumping muscle, Aristotle's notions about the heart would be laughable; but these notions have not been restricted to anatomy. The heart has its chemical and its psychological correlates: "Now the other psychical faculties cannot exist apart from the power of nutrition and this depends on the natural fire, by the union with which Nature has set it aglow." (De Respiratione. 474b. 10ff). It is this cardiac fire which transforms the nutriment and makes it available to the blood for distribution to the muscles: "There is a similarity between this phenomenon and that of boiling; for boiling is due to the volatilization of fluid by heat and the expansion consequent on increase of bulk."


The old elemental science maintains its grip on Aristotle as it did on Plato and, owing to the survival and prestige of Timaeus, became the basis for mediaeval and Renaissance alchemy and magic. Air and fire are used to explain the continuation of life in the individual and the elements as a whole are the foundation of Aristotle's cosmology. (1)

The implications for the theory of imagination are perhaps not immediately apparent. But the ancient and traditional account of the function of the synthesising and transforming "faculty" which passes from Plato and Aristotle and eventually to Kant gives to this "faculty" a crucial

(1) See De Mundo, 227a 14ff. : "...the five elements, situated in spheres in five regions, the less being in each case surrounded by the greater - namely, earth surrounded by water, water by air, air by fire, and fire by aether - make up the whole Universe. All the upper portion represents the dwelling of the gods, the lower abode of mental creatures." On a biological plane, the exhalative, upwardly-reaching fires are cooled by the refrigerative qualities of respiration: the passionate heart needs the restraint of more mundane considerations.
place which is midway between the materials of sense and the forms of reason. The biological analogy tells of the heat which, by a process like boiling, refines nutriment into a vaporous state which is amenable to the blood and which, later understood as "spirits", were believed to ascend to the head. Food is made spiritous, as water is made vaporous, when exposed to fire. The intoxication caused by wine was believed to have operated in the same way; and so, in a mythology which even today has a tenuous existence, the heart is regarded as the biological counterpart and actual home of imagination.

The elemental and cosmological foundations of a theory which is able to embrace philosophies of biology, psychology, and chemistry, engender links which to modern ways of thinking are trans-categorical and therefore erroneous. But centuries of natural philosophy were based upon such links. In this way, the heart, the body's combustion chamber, is an elemental substrate of fire, and fire becomes associated with imagination. Fire is the essential transforming agent of the alchemist, the chemist, and the magician, playing a major part in transforming dross (the physical or material) into a pure form (rational or spiritual), as for example in changing base metal into gold. The theory and practice of physical science before Newton's time (he too was an alchemist) owed much to pre-Socratic philosophy, and it was not until the 18th century that the belief in a fire-principle, phlogiston, was finally dispelled by Lavoisier and Priestley. Even today imagination is seriously given fundamental connections with the four elements in the works of Gaston Bachelard who himself was a professor of physics, and long-standing myths about imagination and creative ability grew from this ancient cosmology: air the tempering agent associated with respiration and inspiration; (1) the heart as biological furnace producing

(1) See G.R.G.Hyrc. op.cit., p.99: "In all organisms there must, it seems, be a matter more divine than the four elements, in which the soul is primarily embodied, and vital heat is occasionally promoted by Aristotle to the dignity of being an analogue of the aether, and termed spiritus (resuma)." See Dr Gen.Animalium 736b 29
vapours and spirits, with its associations with the emotions\(^1\); and fire, catalyst and maker of fusions, associated with passion and fervour.\(^2\)

Through the magic and alchemy of Giordano Bruno and Paracelsus and the latter's great influence on the mystical writings of Jacob Boehme, these ancient notions also filter into modern philosophy and psychology of imagination.

\(^{1}\) See De Anima, 403a 29ff : "...a physicist would define an affection of soul differently from a dialectical; the latter would define e.g. anger as the appetite for returning pain for pain, or something like that, while the former would define it as a boiling of the blood or warm substance surrounding the heart".

\(^{2}\) De Anima, 406a 28ff : "...if the natural movement of the soul be upward, the soul must be fire; if downward, it must be earth."
SECTION III.

Aristotle's fundamental motive formula of form-matter and actuality-potentiality is applied microcosmically and macrocosmically, and is brought to bear on his analysis of the soul as a whole, and on the qualities which are the soul's components. The soul is to the body what sight is to the eye:

"Suppose the eye were an animal—sight would have been its soul, for sight is the substance or essence of the eye which corresponds to the formula, the eye being merely the matter of seeing; when seeing is removed the eye is no longer an eye, except in name— it is no more a real eye than the eye of a statue or of a painted figure." (De An. 412b 19ff)

Sense is related to its organ as soul is related to the body, the one is the sine qua non of the other; sense is related to its objects in precisely the same way:

"By a 'sense' is meant what has the power of receiving into itself the sensible forms of things without the matter. This must be conceived of as taking place in the way in which a piece of wax takes on the impress of a signet-ring without the iron or gold." (1)

Borrowing Plato's popular metaphor, Aristotle endeavours to convey the utter reliance of sense on its objects, whilst retaining a degree of autonomy for those objects; but as far as the actual organs are concerned, seeing and sight are the same thing, or we fall into an infinite regress: otherwise we must "...assume a sense which is aware of itself." (De An. 425b 16)

And as Aristotle observes:

"This presents a difficulty: if to perceive by sight is just to see, and what is seen is colour (or the coloured), then if we are to see that which sees, that which sees originally must be coloured. It is clear therefore that 'to perceive by sight' has more than one meaning; for even when we are...

(1) Op. cit., 424a 17ff. Or, as J. J. Barnes describes it: "The sensory faculty is nothing but a faculty until confronted by its subject. The perceiver undergoes a change when confronted with the object; the object is capable of independent existence; the object has its own actual qualities—its form, which sense finds in it at the moment of perception. Thus, for Aristotle, the object is what Kant would call a Ding an sich."
not seeing, it is by sight that we discriminate darkness from light, though not in the same way as we distinguish one colour from another. Further, in a sense even that which sees is coloured; for in each case the sense-organ is capable of receiving the sensible object without its matter. That is why even when the sensible object are gone the sensings and imaginings continue to exist in the sense-organs.

The activity of the sensible object and that of the percipient sense is one and the same activity, and yet the distinction between their being remains."(1)

Here then are the beginnings of the theory of imagination, for when the object of sense has departed its dematerialised impression(2) remains; the identification of this residual impression with the object maintained at this pre-perceptual level of sensation, for Aristotle insists that sensations are always true.(3) But sensations vary, so that in a perception of snow, sensations answering to 'cold' and 'white' are involved; to account for the synthesis of perception Aristotle describes what he calls the koine aisthesis, and which is rendered in Latin as the sensus communis. This sensus communis is both discriminative and autonomous, for as Aristotle argues: "...discrimination between white and sweet cannot be effected by two agencies which remain separate; both the qualities discriminated must

(1) Op. cit., 425b 18ff. Or, as he says earlier, (424a 25) : "The sense and its organ are the same in fact, but their essence is not the same." — i.e. "Sensation is thus usually described by Aristotle as a process in which we are 'moved' or 'affected' (literally, 'suffer') by an external object. It involves therefore immediately an 'alteration' or a qualitative transformation: the affection, which is the vehicle of alteration, produces a change in the nature or quality of the organ which perceives."(E.Wallace, op. cit., p.LVII).

(2) The deliberate use herein of terms associated with British empirical philosophy both anticipates a later chapter and implies the unacknowledged debt which empiricism owes to Aristotle; (although, of course, there is nothing mechanical about Aristotle's account).

(3) Sensus communis is the Mediaeval Latin translation of Aristotle's phrase: G.R.G.J. Theodore calls it the 'synthetic function', J.L.Dearie the 'synthetic function of sense', E.Wallace the 'central sense', and E. Taylor the 'common sensory'. The inadequacy of these substitutes reflects the problems of rendering Aristotle into English.
be present to something that is one and single." (De An. 426b 17ff) And this discriminative act is unbroken: "...the discriminating power and the time of its exercise must be one and undivided." (op. cit., 426b 29ff) He attempts to dispel the apparent paradox with an illustrative metaphor (427a 10ff), which is again reminiscent of Plato. He likens the sensus communis to a point on a line, which may be regarded as self-sufficient, or as a junction between the two sections on each side of the point; he thus endeavours to answer Platonic dualism by identifying an epistemological postulate with its psychological role. Sense, in E. Wallace's phrase, is already a "going beyond the immediate fact", so that:

"the object which it apprehends is perceived not in its individual character but in relation to its general idea. And thus the object of sense-perception as perceived is implicitly an universal: it is, to use Aristotle's example, not Callias, but Callias the man that we perceive." (1)

Bearing in mind the fundamental formula which guides Aristotle's psychology, and anticipating the direction in which his account of cognition is moving, his statement that "Actual sense corresponds to the stage of the exercise of knowledge" (De An. 417a 19), asserts the equal certainty with which we regard the sensed and the known. The object of sense is external and individual whereas knowledge apprehends universals, and it is an essential function of the sensus communis and of phantasia to mediate between sense and the understanding. The "synthetic faculty" of Plato's Theaetetus.

(1) E. Wallace, op. cit., p.LXII. The reference is to the Posterior Analytics 100a 16.
is very similar to Aristotle's sensus communis(1), and both conceptions bear a marked resemblance to Kant's synthetic power of imagination; but there are difficulties. Plato's conception, which is a function of the mind, is very like the transcendental schemata of the second edition of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason; Aristotle's sensus communis, with its degree of autonomy, is more a function of sense and is closer to Kant's productive imagination of the first edition of the Critique. As we shall see in the discussion of Aristotle's theory of imagination he is as reluctant as Kant to allow imagination any significant autonomy, and there is in both philosophers an ongoing unresolved dichotomy between a conceptual or analytic and a psychological autonomy. In maintaining what looks like an ontological distinction between object and impression which is not unlike the Kantian think-in-itself doctrine. But in maintaining that 'that which sees must be coloured' and that it is not Callias but 'Callias the man' that we (actively) perceive, Aristotle is also in anticipation of the phenomenological idea of intentionality.

His fundamental emphasis on action and motion informs his aesthetic theory, but the 'empirical' and 'rational' imaginations, so important for more recent theories of art, give him little cause for concern.

(1) See J.I. Beare, (op.cit., p.276 sec.21) who considers that Plato "...lays what may have been the foundation of Aristotle's theory of it as the faculty which distinguishes and composes the data of sense, and of the theory of imagination, memory, and reminiscence. Indeed, the terms in which he expressed himself respecting these, and the similes he employed for elucidating them, have remained part of, and have deeply influenced the language of, psychology, to the present day. In fulness of detail on such points Aristotle surpasses him; but all the main or cardinal psychological ideas respecting the functions of synthesis are already, at least in outline, to be found in Plato. The difference between him and Aristotle on this point was mainly a difference of method. He chose to classify all functions of synthesis as parts of the activity of the understanding. This, indeed, as an epistemologist or metaphysician, he was wise in doing; but for the purpose of empirical psychology, Aristotle's contribution of synthesis to the faculty of sense is unquestionablysound." G.R. G. Mure's views are similar; he finds the roots of Aristotle's sensus communis in Theaetetus, "though Plato ascribes the synthetic function to thought and not to sense." (Op.cit., p.109, footnote).

* i.e. the 'synthetic faculty'
Part 'A'.

Directly and indirectly, Aristotle's *De Anima* is a major source of all philosophy of mind up to — and in some cases beyond — the end of the 19th century. This includes Stoicism, Neoplatonism, Kant, Phenomenology, and even Associationism. Most of what Aristotle has to say about "imagination" (phantasia) occurs in the third book of *De Anima*, where he tries to say first what phantasia is not, and then what it is. As we shall see, there are difficulties in his account which are caused by his fundamental distinction between activity and passivity as well as anomalies between his account of phantasia and that of memory, and it is owing to these difficulties and anomalies that subsequent theories of imagination are incompatible with each other and yet have a common ancestry in Aristotelian psychology. He begins book three with a brief description of the soul:

"There are two distinctive peculiarities by reference to which we characterise the soul — 1. local movement and 2. thinking, discriminating and perceiving. Thinking both speculative and practical is regarded as akin to a form of perceiving; for in the one as well as in the other discriminates and is cognizant of something which is." (*De An.* 427a 15ff)

(He later describes phantasia as a form of movement and also says there is no thinking without "an image" (*De An.* 431a 14ff). He reproves Empedocles and other "ancients" who identified thinking with perceiving and who "all look upon thinking as a bodily process like perceiving, and hold that like is known as well as perceived by like", (427a 26), saying that they cannot avoid the dilemma that "whatever seems is true" and that "error is contact with unlike; for that is the opposite of the knowing of the like by like." (427b 4). In broad terms Aristotle is saying that it is very important in cognition to distinguish between the real and the apparent; for "imagination" can deceive; he is also saying that perceiving is bodily, with the implication that thinking is not and that there is something like an inner/outer distinction between them. Distinguishing between thinking and perceiving he says:

SECTION IV.
"...imagination is different from either perceiving or discursive thinking, though it is not found without sensation, or judgment without it. That this activity is not the same kind of thinking as judgment is obvious. For imagining lies within our own power whenever we wish (e.g. we can call up a picture, as in the practice of mnemonics* by the use of mental images), but in forming opinions we are not free: we cannot escape the alternative of falsehood or truth. Further, when we think something to be fearful or threatening, emotion is immediately produced, and so too with what is encouraging; but when we merely imagine we remain as unaffected as persons who are looking at a painting of some dreadful or encouraging scene." (On cit., 427b 16ff).

As he has already (427b 6ff) made a distinction between practical and discursive thinking, we can now say that "imagination" depends on sensation, that judgment depends on "imagination", and that to imagine, or to see a real or a mental image, does not affect us. He adds a little later that thinking "is held to be in part imagination, in part judgment" (427b 29), and goes on to describe "imagination" as "that in virtue of which an image arises for us..." (428a 1), asking whether it may be a "single faculty or disposition relative to images, in virtue of which we discriminate and are in error or not" (428 a 2). These 'discriminative faculties' he says are sense, opinion, science, and intelligence, and he proceeds to show that imagination is not the same as sense or opinion; practical thinking however, as we have seen, is in part "imagination". Thus he describes "imagination" as "for the most part false" (428a 11); it takes place in the absence of sense as for example in the case of dreaming (428a 8). He maintains that sense and knowledge are "never in error" (428a 17) so that imagination, which can be false, is neither of these. Aristotle is evidently making a distinction here between the appearance of images and the appearance of objects to sense and between imaging, as dreaming, and thinking; given his act-potentiality formula and his insistence on the soul's motive quality it is dangerous to

* This is almost certainly a reference to the ancient 'art of memory' of which F.A.Vates has so illuminatingly written.
interpret Aristotle as having a "naive ontology" of images or as having a continuity view of imagining, but this ambiguity exists in his account of "imagination". In speaking of "when we merely imagine" and making this act analogous with "looking at a painting" Aristotle seems at once to be admitting the "naive ontology" of the mental image and also to be denying it any potency in relation to the (motive) soul. Bearing in mind his idea of the soul and its difference from Plato's idea, we might construe Aristotle's remarks to be an attempt to restrict or deny that the image, mental or pictorial, has any autonomous meaning for the self or consciousness; his remarks may equally well be seen as an attack on the "menic" power of Plato's eikasia and, by inference, the eikon.

In saying what "imagination" is not, Aristotle makes distinctions between it and "opinion", and it is clear that he has in mind certain passages of Plato where sense, imagination and opinion are confused, i.e. in Timaeus (52a), Sophist (264a-b), and Philebus (39b). He agrees that like imagination opinion may be false but adds that "opinion involves belief" and "every opinion is accompanied by belief, belief by conviction, and conviction by discourse of reason" (De An.428a 17). Although "opinion" may be interpreted as e.g. "supposition" or "judgment" with the former lacking the strength of the latter, we must pay heed to Aristotle's motive or immanent conception of the soul and realise that for him there is a necessary connection between sense, belief, conviction, reason, and commitment to action. The point being made here, and it is one which is later to be resurrected by Leibniz, is that the individual lives, acts according to, what appears to him as sense and which he therein believes, etc., but that in relation to what we have called "imagination" he suspends belief, action, etc. So in broad terms distinctions between the "real" and the "imaginary" function in terms of action, and disposition rather than content.
Passing on to Aristotle's comments on what imagination is, we find:

"... imagination is held to be a movement and to be impossible without sensation, i.e. to occur in things that are percipient and to have for its content what can be perceived, and since movement may be produced by actual sensation and that movement is necessarily similar in character to the sensation itself, this movement must be 1. necessarily (a) capable of existing apart from sensation, (b) incapable of existing except when we perceive, 2. such that in virtue of its possession that in which it is found may be present various phenomena both active and passive, and 3. such that it may be either true or false." (De An. 425b 11ff).

Beginning with the last of his three points, he explains that though sense is always right with respect to its proper objects, the combination of the objects in perceptions may be wrong; so for example, "...while the perception that there is white before us cannot be false, the perception that what is white is this or that may be false." (428b 21ff). The cognitive process from sense to practical thinking allows the possibility of error to increase, and in what appears to be a moment of doubt he even admits the possibility of error in the perception of the special objects of sense, though at this initial level there is "the least possible amount of falsehood." (428b 18) But "the greatest amount of sense-illusion" comes in "the perception of the universal attributes which accompany the concomitant objects to which the special sensibles attach (I mean e.g. of movement and magnitude);" (428b 22) These three 'modes'- sense, and the two aspects or perception - are phases in that motion which "is due to the activity of sense", and the nearer its source that this motion is arrested, as presumably in both epistemological and psychological analysis (though Aristotle does not himself say so) the lesser the likelihood that error could occur. It is this motion which is imagination:

"If then imagination presents no other features than those enumerated
and is what we have described, then imagination must be a movement resulting from an actual exercise of a power of sense." (428b 30)

But he insists that this motion which is imagination is different from the activity of sense, (De An. 428b 26) which is consistent with what we have already found, but here we are concerned with imagination as the residuum of sense, rather like Plato's "wax-seal" and Locke's "tabula rasa" formulations, which becomes the content of thought.

The more complex (in Locke's sense) this content becomes, that is, the more 'universal' (conceptual) the more liable to error: this tendency is also stated by Spinoza, as we shall see, and the dangers of abstraction are more forcibly argued by Berkeley and Hume. For Aristotle as for Plato and for countless philosophers who followed, imagination is what remains to the mind as a result of the body's contact with the objects of sense: "...imagination remain in the organs of sense and resemble sensations..." and so, "...animals in their actions are largely guided by them, some (i.e. the brutes) because of the non-existence in them of mind, others (i.e. men) because of the temporary eclipse in them of mind by feeling or disease or sleep."(1)

In referring here to the possible "eclipse" of the mind by"imagination" he makes no distinction between possible autonomous images and active imaginings, though to be consistent with what he has formerly said we should interpret him as intending the latter in relation to dreaming, the illusions of illness - presumably feverishness but perhaps those of mental illness - and feelings. According to what we have already found this means behaving towards the imaginary as one would towards the real, but whereas hitherto the belief and conviction which beget action, and thus the action itself, were seen as the distinguishing features of the

(1) De Anima, 429a 4ff. Both J. L. Beare and E. Wallace comment on the close resemblances between the accounts of Aristotle and Hobbes. Wallace, for example, says: "Hobbes indeed was little else than translating Aristotle when he wrote: 'All fancies are motions within us, relics of those made in the sense.' The pictures of imagination in fact are simply a result of the general law of nature that the movement of one substance prolongs itself and gets communicated to another. And hence it is that in the Rhetoric, Imagination is described as weak sensation or, in the language of Hobbes, 'decaying sense'."

(An. cit. p. LXXXVII)
"real", the need for further, objective distinctions becomes apparent if pure thought is not to be regarded as a species of imagination. It is surprising that he should include feeling amongst his mind-eclipsing states without further clarification and in contradiction of his affirmation of the inability of imagination to affect us; both of these aspects of Aristotle's theory of imagination have implications for theories of art which are based on imagination - if Aristotle is right, that is. But his failure to make explicit any relation between imagination and art in the De Anima or between art and imagination in the Poetica seems a clear enough indication that he saw no such relation.

Although he barely ventures into the artistic uses of imagination he does refer to imagination in his work on memory, and as we have already seen he makes reference to the use of "images" in "the practice of Memonics". He says memory is "...neither Perception nor Conception but a state or affection of one of these, conditioned by lapse of time" (De Memoria et Reminiscencia, 450a 24). His account of memory and of the difficulties experienced sometimes in trying to remember, a task which involves "searching for an image in a corporeal substrate" (op. cit., 455a 15), looks like an unequivocal statement of the epistemological use of autonomous images, but we find Beare translating Phantasma as "presentation", a word which precludes a phenomenal distinction between "real" and "imaginary":

(1) J.I. Beare says in a footnote to 450a 25 of his translation of De Memoria et Reminiscencia: "The definition of memory implies that in its genesis an aisthesis (or upolepsia) has undergone something (pathos) owing to lapse of time since the eneivesis. The residue of the aisthesis (or upolepsia) so affected has become a phantasma (or set of kinesis capable of yielding a phantasma) related to the original aisthesis as its eikon." Beare's rendering of phantasma as "presentation" serves to remind us of the heavily Aristotelian nature of Brentano's "Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint", a source book for modern Phenomenology, which also regards the "presentation" as the basic essential for consciousness.
"Without a presentation intellectual activity is impossible. For there
is in such activity an incidental affection identical with one also
incidental in geometrical demonstrations. For in the latter case,
though we do not for the purpose of the proof make any use of the fact
that the quantity of the triangle is determinate, we nevertheless draw
it determinate in quantity. So likewise when one exerts the intellect ...
... although the object may not be quantitative, one envisages it has
quantitative, though he thinks it in abstraction from quantity; while,
on the other hand, if the object of the intellect is essentially of the
class of things that are quantitative, but indeterminative, one envisages
it as if it had determinate quantity, though subsequently, in thinking it,
he abstracts from its determinateness." (De Mem. 449b 30ff).

Although he says that there is no intellectual activity without a present-
ation, the rest of the foregoing quotation clearly indicates that the
presentation is a condition of the intellect, rather than vice-versa, in
this special case of a geometrical demonstration. We should not deduce
that this is always the case. Intellect and sense are interdependent;
intellect looks to sense (or its residua) for its content and sense is
informed by intellect: the presentation (phantasma) has a two-way cognitive
function as well as the mind-eclipsing ability already mentioned. So
within his form-matter, potential—actual formula Aristotle is now able to
provide an account of mind as dependent on sense and imagination for that
which is present to it as content but which the mind at once shapes or
conceptualises as it abstracts from imagination. He thus postulates an
actual intellect (Aquinas calls it intellectus agens), and a potential
intellect (intellectus possibilis): the former 'universalises' the
individuals given in imagination, transforming them into the formal
content of the latter which is then able to employ them in its speculative
autonomy. Seen from an empirical standpoint, the process is one of
formal refinement from the materiality of sense to the immateriality of
mind; from an idealistic standpoint, the process may with equal validity
be turned on its head; but in the life of the individual this process is
above all a continuous interaction, more or less randomly interspersed
with sojourns, of unpredictable duration, in the realms of intellec-
tion or of imagination.

The interchangeability of material and mental is facilitated by
what Aquinas calls Aristotle's "deliberative" imagination and its close
relationship with the actual intellect. So, keeping the vestiges of
the origin in sense of imagination, we are told: "...there will always
be in the mind of a man who remembers or expects something an image or
picture of what he remembers or expects." (De Rhetorica 1370a 23ff) For,
"To the thinking soul images serve as if they were contents of perception......
That is why the soul never thinks without an image." (De An 431a 14ff)
and imagination is regarded as a "kind of thinking". (433a 10) Mind is
related to what is thinkable as sense is to what is sensible, so that
"...phantasms are to the intellectual part of the soul as sense-objects
to the senses; as these last are affected by their objects, so is the
intellect by phantasms." (1), and "Pure sensuous apprehension and
discernment resemble intellectual understanding and discernment." (p.446,
sec.767). Hence, "...if intellect is related to phantasms as the senses
to their object, then just as the senses cannot sense without an object,
so the soul cannot understand without phantasms." (p.448, sec.772). But
he has already called imagination movement, and though he has had occasion
to borrow Plato's "impression" metaphor for explaining retention of images,
the emphasis is on qualitative change, "a kind of moving image" as Mure
describes it: "This is a vital part of Aristotle's doctrine. We
cannot too often remind ourselves that he regards the sense-content
(perceived, imagined, or remembered) always as dynamic, never as static -
not as a cross-section of the psychical stream, but as that which persists
through in all change." (Mure, p.116.footnote).

(1) Aquinas, op. cit., p.447, sec.770. Aquinas' "phantasms" correspond
to "images" here; "presentations" is probably too broad to cover both
these words and would in any case mask what is confused in Aristotle.
Imagination also responds to the "fourfold causal analysis," as Mure has described the structural basis of Aristotle's philosophy of mind, and two of the moments of this analysis are of particular importance to intellection, as "... all imagination is either 1. calculative or 2. sensitive." (De An. 433b 29). Animals and men both possess imagination, but:

"Sensitive imagination...is found in all the animals*, deliberative imagination only in those that are calculative: for whether this or that shall be enacted is already a task requiring calculation; and there must be a single standard to measure by, for that is pursued which is greater. It follows that what acts in this way must be able to make a unity out of several images." (De An. 434a 5ff). This ability to make a unity out of several images, surely identical with the ability to see the one in the many, which Socrates valued so highly, poses "the difficulty about interaction involving a common element" (429b 30) which Aristotle thinks he has solved in describing the mind as "in a sense potentially whatever is thinkable." (429b 31). But again he offers a static explanation, and resorts to a Platonic simile:

"What it thinks must be in it just as characters may be said to be on a writing-tablet on which as yet nothing actually stands written: this is exactly what happens with mind." (1)

Developmentally and conceptually, the common ground wherein the interchangeability of the bodily and the mental orders becomes effective, is equally well described as calculative or deliberative imagination, or as actual intellect (intellectus agens). Only in more general terms may a distinction be allowed between this imagination in its material origin, and this intellect in its mental origin; but here, as in other areas of transcription between the accepted substantives of mental philosophy, the

(1) De Anima, 430a 1ff.; this passage is surely the source of Locke's celebrated "tabula rasa", a metaphor (which only appears in the first edition of the Essay).

* Including man
intervening area synthesises features from both sides and achieves an identity, much as an individual manifests qualities of each of its parents. A similar interaction must occur in the mind too, since it has its practical (actual) and speculative (potential) moments:

"And in fact mind .... is what is by way of becoming all things, while there is another which is what is by virtue of making all things: this is a sort of positive state like light; for in a sense light makes potential colours into actual colours.

Mind in this sense of it is separable, impassible, unmixed, since it is in its essential nature activity (for always the active is superior to the passive factor, the originating force to the matter which it forms)."

(De An. 430a 14ff) The influence of Plato is again apparent in this passage; the actual intellect is the mind as "becoming all things", but mind as "making all things", the potential intellect, likened to light, immediately brings to mind Plato's likening of knowledge to the sun. The probability of this influence in emphasised by the ascription to this function of mind of metaphysical qualities: "separable, impassible, unmixed."

This platonic overtone is carried into the ensuing paragraph:

"Actual knowledge is identical with its object: in the individual, potential knowledge is in time prior to actual knowledge, but in the universe as a whole it is not prior even in time. Mind is at one time knowing and at another not. When mind is set free from its present conditions it appears as just what it is and nothing more: this alone is immortal and eternal (we do not, however, remember its former activity because, whole mind in this sense is impassible, mind as passive is destructible), and without it nothing thinks."(1)

Aristotle prevents the conclusion that he is arguing for knowledge as reminiscence, and potential intellect becomes, like soul, innate property

(1) De Anima, 431a 1ff.; see also op.cit., 434a 15: "The faculty of knowing is never moved but remains at rest."
of the living person; its immortality is a concomitant of the inevitable truth (for Aristotle) of the principles with which it structures experience. Mathematics are a product of this aspect of mind, for:

"...the mind when it is thinking the objects of Mathematics thinks as separate elements which do not exist separately. In every case the mind which is actively thinking is the objects which it thinks." (De An. 451b.15ff).

The potential intellect is thus "the form of forms" just as sense is "the form of sensible things", (432a,) for, as Aquinas observes, "objects only become actually intelligible when abstracted from phantasms" (p.429 Sec.739)

The mind thinks as abstract that which is not separate in the physical world, "for mind as speculative never thinks what is practicable," (De An. 452b.27)

and is only intelligible "through a concept": "Therefore the concept of the actually understood thing is also a concept of the understanding, through which the latter can understand itself." (Aquinas, p.423 sec.724). Concepts necessarily involve images, but are different from them by their universality, "they are abstracted from individuating conditions, whereas phantasms are always of particulars. Phantasms in fact are not actually, but only potentially, indivisible."

(1)

The progressive distillation of the materials of sense into the concepts of the mind does not follow the direct, undeviating course described above. As we have already seen the mind may be eclipsed by imagination, under certain conditions, and the dictates of reason have only a limited control over the actions of men, especially when action is influenced by the 'appetites'. It is "appetite and practical thought" which are the two "sources of movement". (De An. 433a.17) We have already observed the close link between imagination and practical thought, but imagination is also inseparable from appetite, and "when imagination originates movement, it necessarily involves appetite." (433a.21) As Aristotle clearly states, it is appetite alone which is able to impel movement; only appetite can rouse man or animal into

(1) Op. cit., p.457, sec.794; see also p.250, secs.77/8 : ..individuals are known by the senses, and universals (which are of the sciences) by the intellect." etc.
action: "That which moves... is a single faculty and the faculty of appetite;" (433a 22) and the object of the appetite, the initiator of the action towards or from which the movement occurs, may have its origin in thought or in imagination. (437b 12) As he has told us much earlier, "...appetite is the genus of which desire, passion, and wish are the species;" (414b 2) and the object of appetite, we now learn, "may be either the real or the apparent good." (433a 27) As "mind is always right, but appetite and imagination may be either right or wrong"(433a 26) morally good actions are the result of the influence of reason on the appetites; as Aquinas comments:

"All intellect", he says, 'is right', by which he means that we never err about the first principles of action, about such truths as 'it is wrong to do harm to anyone', or 'injustice is never right', and so on. Those principles correspond to the equally infallible first principles of the speculative reason." (Op.cit. p.477 sec.826).

But Aristotle does not proceed to draw the Socratic conclusion which Aquinas appends, that "if we act amiss it is, in the last analysis, because we fall short of what we intellectually know;"(1) though this is clearly implied. Since their objects may originate in imagination or reason, the appetites are frequently at odds with each other, though it is only in man that this struggle takes place, that is, "only in beings with a sense of time". (De An.437b 6) It is time, too, which conditions the images of memory; so man, with his actually related abilities of reason, calculative imagination, and memory, is able to reflect and predict (De An.437b 6ff) and thus to choose to act rationally. Ultimately, however, it is imagination that the objects, which provide the appetite with its stimulus to action, make their appearance: from intellect they appear in the calculative imagination, and from passion, desire, illusion, and dreams, they appear to the sensitive imagination. The crucial guide to morally good, rational behaviour, i.e. to behaviour governed by the

(1) Aquinas, loc.cit., this short statement, a remarkable combination of Socratic ethic and Aristotelian psychology, neatly encapsulates a major tenet of Stoicism which, absorbed into Plotinus' Neoplatonism, became central to Christianity and contributed greatly to the distrust of imagination only begun to be dispelled by Addison's Spectator essays from 1711.
"infallible first principles of the speculative reason", rests on being able to distinguish between these two kinds of imagination.

The ambivalence of the "mnemonic impression" is briefly discussed in the De Memoria (450b 12ff), where the problem of the possible autonomy of the memory-image is raised:

"Granted that there is in us something like an impression or picture, why should the perception of the mere impression be memory of something else, instead of being related to this impression alone? For when one actually remembers, this impression is what he contemplates, and this is what he perceives. How then does he remember what is not present? One might as well suppose it possible also to see or hear that which is not present. In reply, we suggest that this very thing is quite conceivable, nay, actually occurs in experience. A picture painted on a panel is at once a picture and a likeness: that is, while one and the same, it is both of these, although the 'being' of both is not the same, and one may contemplate it either as a picture or as a likeness." (Op.cit., 450b 16ff)

Like the picture, he goes on to say, the "mnemonic presentation" may be regarded as autonomous or as "relative to something else"; it is the soul which sees it "qua related", he tells us, but quite how the distinction is made is not explained. But he is not unaware of the importance of this distinction, for he speaks of the "mental derangement" of those who "do not recognize their phantasms as mnemonic" : "for they were accustomed to speak of their mere phantasms as facts of their past experience, and as if remembering them. This takes place whenever one contemplates what is not a likeness as if it were a likeness," (op.cit., 451a 16ff)

Aristotle's use of a painting as an analogy for the mental image once again serves to reiterate his recognition of the image as an ontological entity, but he unequivocally states that if either image or picture is not seen as related - the former to the original object of sense the latter to the portrayed - then their author is mentally sick. This, with his earlier analyses of "calculative" or "deliberative" imagination and their close association with intellectus agens, very closely parallels Kant's account
of imagination in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, where imagination as residual sense impression in Aristotle becomes "reproductive imagination", calculative or deliberative imagination becomes "productive" imagination; significantly Aristotle has no *aesthetic* imagination which corresponds to Kant's of the *Critique of Judgment*, this latter owing much to Plato's four kinds of "madness" or inspiration in *Phaedrus*. Although proof is unobtainable, it is highly likely that Aristotle, in referring (above) to the deranged, is attacking the Platonic notion of madness/inspiration; on this point I agree with M.W. Bundy's view that these "ecstatics"..."take their phantasms, *i.e.*, their imagined beliefs, *such as that of having seen certain supernatural beings, as actual happenings, true objects of the memory*, adding that "this view precludes any doctrine of inspiration in terms of phantasy." (Bundy, *op.cit.*, p.75). This denial of the Platonic inspiration, and Aristotle's mention of the painting, can be considered in relation to the artist as maker, the object as product (the painting) and the spectator, and in all three cases Aristotle's acid test is art as *mnemonic* : as imitation or representation in the way that an icon may be *e.g.*, a representation of the Virgin Mary. There is no hint in Plato or in Aristotle of the painted image as being an imitation of an ideal, *such as was developed during the Renaissance.*

For Aristotle, as for Plato in certain of his dialogues, the "imagination" functions as memory in synthesising sense and concept, but this *synthetic* function of imagination in cognition, which Kant attempts to explain fully, is allowed no autonomy by Aristotle except as dreaming or the illusion of a sick mind. But dreams, as Aristotle knew, have always been given mystical and prophetic value.

**Part B.**

Gaston Bachelard calls dreaming the "oneiric imagination", and he gives it considerable importance in his numerous writings on imagination; Baudelaire, who wrote a panegyric on imagination, asserted that to dream well is a gift granted to few men. The church fathers, following Synesius and finding many examples in the Bible of divine revelation in dreams, accorded great religious
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significance to dreaming. But Aristotle in his essay on dreams will have none of this. As we have already seen this "oneiric" imagination takes place in the absence of sense, but it is "not an affection of the faculty of perception in the simple sense" (De Somnis, 459a 10) and "since presentation is the movement set up by a sensory faculty when actually discharging its function, while a dream appears to be a presentation" he concludes that "it manifestly follows that dreaming is an activity of the faculty of sense-perception, but belongs to this faculty qua representative." (Op.cit., 459a 22) This activity, elsewhere called an 'impression', is the residual movement in the organ of sense left "when the external object of perception has departed", (460b 1) and he likens this movement to that of a projectile which continues its motion after having lost contact with whatever set it in motion. (459a 28ff) Enlarging on what he has already said in De Anima about the mind eclipsing abilities of imagination in states of passion, sickness, and dreams, he tells us in the De Somnis that "we are easily deceived respecting the operations of sense-perception when we are excited by emotions", so it is with: "...the coward when excited by fear, the amorous person by amorous desire; so that, with but little resemblance to go upon, the former thinks he sees his foes approaching, the latter that he sees the object of his desire; and the more deeply one is under the influence of the emotion, the less similarity is required to give rise to these illusory impressions. Thus too, both in fits of anger, and also in all states of appetite, all men become easily deceived, and more so the more their emotions are excited. This is the reason too why persons in the delirium of fever sometimes think they see animals on their chamber walls, an illusion arising from the faint resemblance to animals of the markings thereon when put together in patterns; and this sometimes corresponds with the emotional states of the sufferers, in such a way that, if the latter be not very ill, they know
well enough that it is an illusion; but if the illness is more severe they actually move according to the appearances."(1)

It is only when the links which imagination normally forges between perception and conception are broken, as in the sorts of cases he has given, that the oneiric imagination operates:

"For by day, while the senses and the intellect are working together, they (i.e. such movements) are extruded from consciousness or obscured, just as a smaller is beside a larger fire, or as small beside great pains or pleasures, though, as soon as the latter have ceased, even those which are trifling emerge into notice." (Op.cit., 460b 31ff) There are times when these 'trifling movements' produce "sights" which are "confused and weird", "...and the dreams (which then appear) are unhealthy, like those of persons who are atrabilious, or feverish, or intoxicated with wine. For all such affections, being spiritous, cause much emotion and disturbance." (Op.cit., 461a 20ff)

Aristotle is aware, as he says in a remark which reminds us of Hume, that it is only "...by the effect of custom the mnemonic movements tend to succeed one another in a certain order" (De Mem.et Rem. 451b 29), though he also insists upon the ability of intellect to "make a unity out of several images" (De An. 434a 5); in relation to dreaming, however, as G.R.G. Mure comments, "...imagination is illustrated only in its negative function..." (Mure, op.cit., p.117). So far as the alleged prophetic function of dreams is concerned, he is sceptical, saying that dreams "...must be regarded either as causes, or as tokens, of the events, or else as coincidences" (De Divinatione Per Somnum, 462b 26). Following a physiological account of dreams (op.cit., 461b 11ff), he concludes that "Most (so-called prophetic) dreams are ... to be classed as mere coincidences." (De Div.Per Som.436b 1). And so: "Oh the while, forasmuch as certain of the lower animals also dream, it may be

concluded that dreams are not sent by God, nor are they designed for this purpose (to reveal the future). They have a divine aspect, however, for Nature (their cause) is divinely planned, though not itself divine. A special proof (of their not being sent by God) is this: the power of foreseeing the future and of having vivid dreams is found in persons of inferior type, which implies that God does not send their dreams; but merely that all those whose physical temperament is, as it were, garrulous and excitable, see sights of all descriptions; for, inasmuch as they experience movements of every kind, they just chance to have visions resembling objective facts, their luck in these matters being merely like that of persons who play at even and odd. For the principle which is expressed in the gambler's maxim: 'If you make many throws your luck must change', holds good in their case also." (De Div. Per Som. 463b 10ff)

Finally, Aristotle tells us that vivid dreamers are "commonplace persons and not the most intelligent" for "the mind of such persons is not given to thinking, but, as it were, derelict, or totally vacant, and, when once set moving, is borne passively on in the direction taken by that which moves it." (De Div. Per Som., 464a 22). The oniric imagination, so highly prized by others, is for him on a par with the unrelated, autonomous images to which the deranged succumb, and so is a poor trivial thing somewhat similar to what we would call "day-dreaming" or "phantasizing"; certainly he allows it no place in Aesthetic theory as the following discussion of Poetica shows.
SECTION V.

In considering Aristotle’s theory of imagination I have already deduced, very briefly, a theory of art as imitation which is consistent with his view of the image as mnemonic. It is well known that his Poetica, a work which enormously influenced 17th and 18th century neoclassicism in Europe, is largely about art as mimesis which we usually render as “imitation”; but Aristotle is not entirely consistent in this doctrine and the Poetica does contain a single, noteworthy reference to something like the Platonic inspiration:

“...poetry demands a man with a special gift for it, or else one with a touch of madness in him; the former can easily assume the required mood, and the latter may actually be beside himself with emotion.” (1455a 30).

Despite what we have found elsewhere, this touch of madness, like its manic, Platonic forerunner, he will allow a creative function, but this single mention is not of the greatest consequence in Aristotle’s theory of art. Similarly, a brief comment in the Metaphysica reveals a view of art as a kind of conceptual activity which up to a point presages the idealising form of imitation which is an important aspect of Renaissance art theory: "Art comes into being when many observations of experience give rise to a single universal conviction about a class of similar cases.” (1). This view of art, which is even today enjoying something of a revival, also has echoes in the Poetica, as will soon be shown; it is also applicable to the visual arts, which are not mentioned in the Poetica.

Describing the (non-visual) arts, Aristotle says: "Epic poetry and Tragedy, as also Comedy, Dithyrambic poetry, and most flute-playing and lyre-playing, are all, viewed as a whole, modes of imitation.” (2). The idea of art as mimesis is also found in Plato (Republic, Bk.3), and this Greek idea is rather more complex than our English “imitation” would suggest, and Aristotle’s psychology of imagination can help to shed light on our interpretation of mimesis. As we have found, the mental image has negligible value as an autonomous entity and is spoken of metaphorically.

(1) Metaphysica 981a, quoted in H.W. Bundy, op.cit., p.61.
(2) De Poetica, 1447a 14; this is taken from Bywater’s translation. T.S. Dorsch has ".. forms of imitation or representation" for this last phrase.
as when he likens the mnemonic impression to a painted panel; this static image as painting or as (metaphorically) the content of imagination, has no power to affect us except in extreme cases such as the delusions of the feverish. Autonomous and "oneiric" imagination are a product of such states as passion, illness, inebriation and Platonic inspiration, they rupture the sense-thought link, whereas art should reinforce this link. This is the importance of the pleasure principle for Aristotle, for the most accurate representations, even of unpleasant things such as corpses, delight us in our recognition of their likeness (Poetica Ch.4) so we see the art work as related, as we do the imagings of memory. This is why the poet must "simplify and reduce to a universal form" (op.cit., 1455a 35) his story and why poetry is superior to history, for "poetry is something more philosophic and of graver import than history, since its statements are of the nature rather of universals, whereas those of history are of singulars."(Op.cit., 1471b 1ff).

This idealising tendency of art was, as I have observed, central to the aesthetic of the Renaissance and ironically the subsequent 'academic' tradition in European art, for, as Bundy points out: "It is the thought of Aristotle, rather, which results in the perpetuation of that interesting commonplace of aesthetic that Phidias to create an Aphrodite had in mind a form of perfect beauty, the result of many particular observations. The theory of imagination which coincides with such a view grows out of Aristotelian psychology rather than the Dialogues."(1)

There are etymological grounds for making an association between

(1) M.W.Bundy, op.cit., pp.62-3. A well known example of this theory is Raphael's letter to Castiglione, where he refers to the idealised origin of his conception in "una certa idea" of the nymph Galatea. To modern eyes Raphael's nymph clearly shows how ideals in material form quickly become the victims of fashion.
"imitation" and "giving an image of" (1), which do not obtain in the Greek mimesis where the emphasis is an accurate representation and universalisation, which indicates that Aristotle, given his theory of imagination, came very near to Kant's "productive imagination" with its rationality and its function in the creation and appreciation of the objects of taste and beauty. The counterpart of Plato's divine madness (inspiration) and Kant's sublime aesthetic imagination is absent from serious consideration by Aristotle. But he has said that the soul is characterised by motion and that imagination is a form of thinking and is also "a movement resulting from an actual exercise of a power of sense" (De An., 409a 1). He also says that "A picture painted on a panel is at once a picture and a likeness" (De Mem. et Rem., 450b 21). In The Psychology of Imagination, Sartre argues that in looking at a portrait of someone we posit the portrayed person as absent (or perhaps as non-existent) and the image is seen as the person portrayed, i.e., the picture is seen as a likeness; the person is only reachable through the image but such is the power of imagination that we are affected as though the person were present. Sartre calls this, - "the relationship that consciousness posits in the imaginative attitude between the portrait and its original" - "nothing short of magical" (op. cit., p.15). It seems to me that Aristotle is saying something very similar to Sartre, except that he (Aristotle) resists magical, irrational, and (to some extent) symbolical explanations and makes no direct ascription of this power to imagination. Both Aristotle and Sartre denigrate what the latter calls the "naive ontology" of images so that the synthetic or

(1) Skeat's "Concise Etymological Dictionary of The English Language" shows that our word Image, (a likeness, statue) comes from the French image, out of the Latin imaginex, accusative of image, a likeness, which is formed, with the suffix -ago, from the base im-in im-itari, to imitate. Lewis & Short's "Latin Dictionary" suggests a relationship of imago ("imitation, copy, representation, likeness," etc.) with imitor, which they give as: I, "To represent, to express, copy, portray", or, II. "To imitate, to act like, copy after, seek to resemble, counterfeit something." (For mimex, Liddell and Scott have 1. "imitation", and 2. "representation by means of human art", citing Plato (Sophist, 265a, Republic 394b) and Aristotle's Poetics; giving names, "an imitator, copyist", or an "Actor or Poet" as in the Poetics. Skeat's "mimic" originates from the Greek mimex, "imitator, actor, mimic." However, the Oxford English Dictionary says the Latin imago only apparently is "containing the same root as im-itari, to imITATE." The O.E.D.'s 3rd definition of imitate, "To be, become, or make oneself like..." is best.
The transformative power of imagination is an actual power and consequently the "image" is seen as "related to...", and consciousness as "consciousness of...". In considering drama Aristotle says that tragedy is not a mimesis of men, "...but of action and life, of happiness and unhappiness — and happiness and unhappiness are bound up with action. The purpose of living is an end which is a kind of activity, not a quality; it is their characters, indeed, that make men what they are, but it is by reason of their actions that they are happy or the reverse." (De Poetica, 1450a 15ff). The fundamental Heraclitan emphasis on motion informs the theory of art. Art is not, so to speak, a piece of life; but out of the tension, between art as autonomous and as likeness, imagination is given space to move and life is epitomised or exemplified, and in seeing the relation (or likeness) we are able to experience the pleasure of relief of tension which is the Aristotelian catharsis. Similarly we should say that the actor does not portray a character but rather that the character comes to life through him as the person in the portrait comes to life through the "image" in a "magical" transformation effected in imagination. In this way too, albeit more frenziedly, the Dionysian enthusiast is possessed by the god: he acts as though he were the god, believing that he is.

In concluding this second chapter and this first part on Plato and Aristotle I would like to make a few general points in relation to the differences between these two philosophers, and also with respect to later theories. Plato's interest in "madness" and the daemonic, and his use of myth as a vehicle for the ineffable, come to play an important part in Romantic notions of the nature of genius and the creative artist, and in the symbiotic function of art, when imagination is regarded as the essential creative 'faculty' of the artist. In Aristotle daemonia is underemphasised almost to the point of exclusion — but not quite, as I have hoped to indicate. Plato's wish to censor the mimetic nature of art and to give it a didactic function is largely granted in post-Renaissance neo-classicism,
and is not so very far removed from the cathartic function which Aristotle
ascribes to mimesis. Here, the absent is offered as present, so that we
react to the art object - the drama or poem for Aristotle - as though it
were real; this demands a suppositional ability, a willing suspension of
disbelief, which later thinkers, e.g. Sartre, have identified with
imagination.

In his descriptive psychology - "psychognosy" as Brentano called his
own, similar approach - Aristotle to some extent follows Plato in seeing
imagination as a derivative of sense and as having a cognitive function
qua mnemonic, i.e., as related to its object as the impression in wax is
related to the seal which made it; this is what Brentano calls the reference
by the image to something as object. These mnemonic images are the content
to which abstract thought refers when necessary. But Aristotle has emphasised
the essentially motive quality of imagination, thinking, and the soul, and
has asserted a necessary link between imagination and appetite:
"He said clearly, both in his treatise On the Soul and in his Metaphysics
that thought and desire have the same object. It is first present in the
faculty of thought and there the desire stirs." (F.Brentano. "Psychology
Brentano's book is heavily influenced by Aristotle as his great emphasis
on action shows, though he later came to reject this "necessary" link
between the "presentation", as he calls it, and desire. Whereas Brentano
was to offer a triadic division of mental phenomena which was based on
his study of Aristotle, the established tradition had followed a Platonic
triad, amplified by Aristotle and culminating in Kant's three critiques, of
the true (cognition), the good (appetition) and the beautiful (feeling);
the recognition and pursuit of this triad is fully advocated in the
Neoplatonism of Plotinus. From this latter source it is taken over by
Christian theology and later by Shaftesbury and Leibniz, among others,
and, truly a mainstay of the philosophia perennis, it also comes to
inform the aesthetics of Romanticism partly from Kant and also from
the first Romantiker. Generally speaking the theory of imagination up
to and including Kant is an uneasy alliance of Platonic metaphysics and Aristotelian psychology, accepting the necessary cognitive function of imagination but strongly distrusting its connection with the needs and pleasures of the flesh. As a consequence of this alliance philosophers have been obliged to address themselves to the problem of how to distinguish between the 'higher' cognitive and the 'lower' appetitive imaginations, usually with a conspicuous lack of success even when, with Locke, Platonic metaphysics begins to suffer its demise.
PART 2:

ANTIQUITY AND THE MIDDLE AGES.
Introduction:

In the chapters which constitute this second part I shall attempt to indicate and examine the significant contributions to the theory of imagination which is written into Dante's *Divine Comedy*, and which is very similar to the later Romantic theory which draws on the same Neoplatonic, Platonic and Aristotelian sources. I begin with some general background notes on the forces which shaped mediaeval theory of imagination, followed by some remarks on the theory of imagination in Stoicism and in the authors Plutarch, Quintilian and Philostratus, for although I accept P.O. Kristeller's view that "a single mediaeval tradition does not exist, rather, there are many different mediaeval traditions, some of them quite opposed to others" ("Renaissance Philosophy and the Mediaeval Tradition", p.7), the Middle Ages, as Kristeller later says, "were built upon a Roman and Latin and not directly upon a Greek foundation". (Op.cit., p.17). But just as it would be hard to overestimate the influence of Rome on the civilisation of Europe, it is easy to underestimate the legacy of North Africa, and so I have also considered Plotinus' *Enneads*, St. Augustine's theory of imagination and (in Part 3) the *Corpus Hermeticum*.

Except for the Aristotelian "faculty" psychology of the mediaeval Arabs, philosophical and theological speculation during the Middle Ages is basically a synthesis of Platonic and Aristotelian elements. This is also true of the psychology of Stoicism which is Platonic in form but Aristotelian in content, without the latter's emphasis on action. The association of sense and imagination with the appetites, to which Aristotle had drawn attention, is the basis of the lasting Stoic, Neoplatonic and Christian injunctions against the moral evils of these lower reaches of the cognitive process - 'lower' in the Platonic sense of the divided line simile. The Stoic distrust of the fickle imagination comes to be very widely held and is ultimately the view against which the praise of this "faculty", by post-Renaissance magicians, Addison's "Spectator" essays, and many Romantic writers, must be measured. But the Stoic view is true only to the Platonic aspects of Aristotle's psychology, as M.W. Bundy also asserts:
"The Academy, the Peripatetic school, and the Epicureans seem to have
done little to develop the Platonic and Aristotelian theories of phantasia.
It is to Stoicism that one turns for a theory which takes advantage of the
rich heritage of the thought of the two great thinkers. It is, in
consequence, the view which, next to these, is the most important influence
upon subsequent conceptions in classical and mediaeval thought. Although
this Stoic view has Aristotelian psychology as its basis, and is, on the
whole, constructive, its influence was detrimental to a full recognition of

Greek learning was generally held in high regard in Rome, but with the fall
of the Empire knowledge of Greek seems virtually to disappear from Europe,
and first-hand acquaintance was not renewed until the 12th and 13th centuries
in the case of Aristotle, and the 15th century in the case of Plato (1). With
the (probably sole) exception of Timaeus, translations of Plato into Latin
did not exist prior to the 15th century when Marsilio Ficino translated the
Dialogues for Cosimo de' Medici. (2). Apart from the Pythagorean Timaeus,
the preservation of Platonic thought, interlarded with Gnostic mysticism,
is largely owed to Neoplatonism. Aristotle's works seem to have fared
slightly better, owing in part to translations made by Boethius. (3).

(1) See Kristeller, op.cit., p.22: "The knowledge of Greek was not completely
absent from the Middle Ages, as recent studies have convincingly shown, but it
was never as common or extensive as it was in Roman antiquity or during the
Renaissance."

(2) See J.T. Muckle, "Greek Works Translated Directly into Latin Before 1350",
in Mediaeval Studies, Vols 4 & 5, (1942 and 1943): Both Cicero and Chalcidius
translated part of Timaeus; Cicero translated Protagors also. Amelius translated
Phaedo and Republic, but the availability of these is guesswork.

(3) See J.T. Muckle, op.cit., p.34. As Kristeller emphasises, during the Middle
Ages, "...the influence of Aristotle was not a unified phenomenon..."; certainly
it seems apparent that the De Anima was not known before its translation "a
little after 1150" (Muckle). And, as Kristeller adds: "It is interesting
to point out that Aristotle's Poetics and Rhetoric, the former practically
unknown during the Middle Ages, the latter largely treated as a work on moral
philosophy, became prominent as textbooks of literary theory only during the
Poetics was made in 1248.
Except for the obvious Platonic and Aristotelian elements, the nature and extent of the various doctrines which filtered into European philosophy from Alexandria and the near East are hard to specify. Worthy of mention here, in view of the magical practices of the Renaissance, are Gnosticism (1), the works of Philo of Alexandria (2), and number symbolism. This latter in part serves to underline the continuing influence of Pythagoreanism, but it also shows the influx of eastern astrology into Europe (3); an understanding of mediaeval number symbolism - mathesis as it is sometimes called - is essential to a proper interpretation of Dante's theory of imagination and is indeed a key to the structure of the Divine Comedy. In this great work Renaissance Humanism was to find a forerunner of its aesthetic beliefs. The final chapter of this second part of the thesis will consist of an analysis of Dante's theory of imagination.

I have already mentioned Epicureanism in passing, and refer to it briefly here to indicate that so far as we are able to judge from the De Rerum Natura of Lucretius its philosophical leanings are closer to Aristotle than Plato. Lucretius attacks metempsychosis and also asserts that "subtle images are emitted from the surfaces of things" (Bk. 4, 11, 115ff.), apparently suggesting an order of entities midway between objects and the contents of mind - ghostly things which anticipate some aspects of post-Renaissance folklore. Official theory looks more favourably on the virtues of restraint than the dubious pleasures of

(1) See R.T. Wallis, "Gnosticism", pp. 12ff. In a wide sense the term "Gnosticism" means "School of Alexandria". Wallis also warns against making too much of the "Orientalism" of Neoplatonism.
(2) See V.F. Hopper, "Mediaeval Number Symbolism" p. 60: "The Jewish acceptance of Gnosticism, prefigures in Philo and the apocalypses, resulted in the speculations of the Cabala." An interest in the Cabala is a prominent feature of Renaissance magic.
(3) See V.F. Hopper, op. cit., p. ix: according to Hopper, Babylonian astrology is the most prolific source of number symbolism: "The Middle Ages inherited this theory by virtue of the stubborn vitality of astrology itself, but the sanctity and incorruptibility of the astrological numbers was made by their presence in page after page of the Holy Writ, there to be pondered over and expounded by generations of Churchmen."
the flesh, and it is perhaps for this reason that Stoicism has been more resilient than Epicureanism. The simple moral programme of the Stoics, which dominates the Middle Ages, is to control passion and imagination, giving reason supremacy. Stoicism is rather less impressive and credible out of the mouth of an aristocrat and emperor like Marcus Aurelius than from a poor slave like Epictetus (as Kierkegaard somewhere remarks) but even so, in the former's "Meditations", arguably the last purely Stoic work, the message remains clear: "Erase fancy; curb impulse; quench desire; let sovereign reason have mastery." (Bk. 9, 7.). In this way may contemplation of the eternal be achieved:

"Many of the anxieties that harass you are superfluous: being but creatures of your own fancy, you can rid yourself of them and expand into an ampler region, letting your thought sweep over the entire universe, contemplating the illimitable tracts of eternity, marking the swiftness of change in each created thing, and contrasting the brief span between birth and dissolution with the endless aeons that precede the one and the infinity that follows the other." (Bk. 9, 32.). The rewards of the Stoic life look very like those of the dialectic route to the eidos in Plato, a fact which looks forward in time to some mediaeval Christian ideas about the need to curb imagination in order to reach a state of grace. The persistent note of censure against the amoral imagination is maintained by all Stoics including the Chrysippus of Plutarch's essay "Against the Stoics", for whom:

"The imaginable is the efficient cause of imagination; as any thing that is white, or any thing that is cold, or every thing that may make an impression on the imagination. Fancy is a vain impulse upon the mind of man, proceeding from nothing which is really imaginable; this is experienced in those that whirl about their idle hands and fight with shadows; for the imagination there is always some real imaginable thing presented, which is the efficient cause of it; but to the fancy nothing. A phantom is that to which we are led by such a fanciful and vain attraction; this is to be seen
This "fancy" is very like Aristotle's autonomous imagination which he dismisses as a delusion of the sick, rather in the way of Chrysippus. Plutarch himself prefers to accentuate the more constructive side of what we have found in Aristotle, stating that "..conception is a certain imagination, and imagination an impression on the soul" ("Against the Stoics" Sec.47). The Stoics take a rather negative view of imagination, on the whole, though M.W.Bundy points to the "substantial contribution" to the theory of imagination made by the Stoics in defining the Greek terms as e.g. in their

"..definition of phantasia kataluptike, 'a criterion of facts produced by a real object and conformable to that object.' The 'acataleptic' phantasy was called a phantasm, and upon this opposition of phantasia and phantasma was built a tetralogy of terms, including phantaston to denote the source of the real image, the phantasy, and phantastikon to correspond to the phantasm. These four terms had an interesting history in medieval thought.

Upon this distinction between the genuine and the illusory phantasy the Stoics erected their theory of conduct; for them the great ethical problem was 'the right use of phantasies". (Op. cit., p.260).

Whether, as a learned Greek and a literary man, Plutarch concurred with the mimetic theory of Plato or Aristotle, is not clear; but he offers no aesthetic function to any aspect of imagination. His Roman contemporary Quintilian is heir to a different tradition and his theory of imagination is even further removed from Stoicism than that of Plutarch. In Quintilian we find the first real link between art, emotion, and imagination; for him the vividness of images is an everyday reality rather than a delusion of the sick.

(1) Plutarch. "Morals" Vol.III, Hs.IV, Ch.XII. A short glossary is helpful here: imagination =phantasia; imaginable =phantaston; fancy =phantastikon; and phantom =phantasma.
"There are certain experiences which the Greeks call phantasii, and the Romans visions, whereby things absent are presented to the imagination with such extreme vividness that they seem actually to be before our very eyes. It is the man who is really sensitive to such impressions who will have the greatest power over the emotions." ("The Institutio Oratoria", Hr. VI. 50.)

For the rhetorician and orator, this power of imagination is a useful quality which can be manipulated to sway the emotions of an audience; Quintilian argues that anyone can acquire this power and thus influence people. He is quite favourably disposed towards the daydreaming aspect of imagination, the "fancy" of Plutarch, which seems to afford pleasures like those which Addison was to reassert at the beginning of the 18th century:

"When the mind is unoccupied or is absorbed by fantastic hopes of daydreams, we are haunted by these visions of which I am speaking to such an extent that we imagine that we are travelling abroad, crossing the sea, fighting, addressing the people, or enjoying the use of wealth that we do not actually possess, and seem to ourselves not to be daydreaming but acting." (Op.cit., Hr. VI., 30).

Most significant of all, however, is that this visionary ability, which he later calls "phantasia. or imagination, which assists us to form mental pictures of things", (Op.cit., Hr.VIII, III. 88), is the ability which Virgil employed when describing some of the scenes - of which Quintilian gives examples - in the "Aeneid". (Op.cit., Hr.VI., 75). Despite the subsequent dominance of Stoicism, the possible creative function of imagination, as such, was recognised by the Romans; nor was Quintilian alone in this recognition.

Philostratus' biographical work "In Honour of Apollonius of Tyana" expresses the Platonic view of visual art as imitation. On painting, Apollonius says "...surely those appearances are produced at random without
any divine significance", and Damis, with whom he is conversing, says painting is make-believe as "exact likeness" and "failing that function, it becomes an absurdity - mere silly daubing." (See Bk. II, Ch. 22 & Bk. VI, Ch. 19). But in a later passage of Bk. VI Ch. 19 this rather dismissive opinion on art is exchanged for something more substantial, when Apollonius is defending Greek art against a rather sarcastic Egyptian called Thespesian, who wants to know how it is the Greeks are able to make images of the gods; Apollonius replies: "With such craftsmanship as ideal beauty and devotion prescribe for divine effigies." Thespesian asks whether Phidias and Praxiteles went up to heaven and represented the gods from the life, "or had they something else to guide their plastic skill?". Apollonius: "Something else, and something full of ingenuity." Asks Thespesian: "What can that have been? You will not find any other principle besides mimicry." And Apollonius gives the memorable reply:

"Imagination produced these effects, and imagination is a more cunning craftsman than mimicry. Imitation can portray in art what it has seen, imagination, even what it has not seen, for it will suppose the unseen to be an analogy of the real. Mimicry is often disconcerted by wonder and awe, but nothing disconcerts imagination, which moves with imperturbable advance towards its ideal goal. The man who meditates a design for Zeus must see him with heavens and seasons and stars, as Pheidias did in that eager sally of ambition;".

This seems to be the first occasion in the literature of Western Europe that imagination replaces imitation as the idealising function of art, and as such alone it is worthy of note. The dialogue form is Socratic, and the "eager sally of ambition" looks like a milder form of Platonic madness or inspiration, but nothing can belittle the impact of the contrast between "mimicry" and "imagination". Bosanquet, in his "History of Aesthetic", is cautious about this passage, saying that "Inward or mental imitation does not for Philostratus amount to imagination." But for us, "in view of his instances, it is not easy to distinguish them." (p.110).
There can be no doubt that Neoplatonism is by far the most influential body of belief to come to us from Antiquity. Its doctrines are clearly evident in Christian theology and in the aesthetic theory of the Renaissance and Romanticism, having been absorbed by saints Augustine and Thomas Aquinas and reasserted through the Latin translation of Plotinus' "Enneads" by Ficino. (1) The association of certain mental states with intimations of deity largely becomes acceptable through the Plotinian notion of "emanations" whereby the "One" is a potency, to varying degrees, in all things. So, in a conception which Plotinus probably found in Aristotle's "Metaphysics", the universe is regarded as a chain of being (2) which both emanates from the "One" and proceeds back to Him, who is thus the beginning and end of all things and relations. The paradox of a deity that is both above and a part of nature reflects the Stoic ethic, written into Neoplatonism, which was a synthesis of Platonic metaphysics and Aristotelian psychology, incorporates an ambivalent theory of imagination:

(1) Huckle, op. cit., p. 41, knows of no translation of Plotinus' work before 1350, into Latin. An incomplete translation of the "Enneads" was done by Thomas Taylor, into English, at the beginning of the 19th century.
(2) Porphyry, a pupil of Plotinus, particularly mentions the influence of the Metaphysica on Plotinus. See also A.O. Lovejoy, "The Great Chain of Being", p. 52: "This vague notion of an ontological scale was to be combined with the more intelligible conception of zoological psychological hierarchies which Aristotle had suggested...

The result was the conception of the plan and structure of the world, through the Middle Ages and down to the late eighteenth century, many philosophers, most men of science, and, indeed, most educated men, were to accept without question - the conception of the universe as a 'Great Chain of Being', composed of an immense, or - by the strict but seldom rigorously applied logic of the principle of continuity - of an infinite number of links ranging in hierarchical order from the meagrest kind of existents, which barely escape non-existence, through 'every possible' grade up to the ens perfectissimum - or, in a somewhat more orthodox version, to the highest possible kind of creature, between which and the Absolute Being the disparity was assumed to be infinite - every one of them differing from that immediately above and that immediately below it by the least possible degree of difference."
This paradoxical nature of Neoplatonic thought concerning phantasia and related powers can hardly be overemphasised: its idealism taught it to despise phantasies, its dualism found a place for them, its psychology, largely Aristotelian, taught it to study them, and its passion for the Timaeus led it to recognise them as God-given." (M.W. Bundy, op. cit., p. 146).

In referring to the Timaeus Bundy reminds us also of the immense significance of Pythagoreanism for the Neoplatonists. The idea of a chain of being in which everything exists both for and in God denotes a fundamental unity of all things, a universal harmony such as Pythagoras believed was based on numerical relations. This aspect of Neoplatonism partly explains the subsequent belief in number symbolism and the growing importance of mathematics, and the idea of universal harmony later came to be affirmed by the rise of Biology and microscopy in the 17th century, as I shall again have cause to note.
Neoplatonism is virtually synonymous with the name of Plotinus, who saw himself as an interpreter of Plato. His "Enneads" is an eclectic mixture of Platonic and Aristotelian elements, as well as Stoicism and probably other occidental beliefs: "The cradle of Neoplatonism was not Athens but Alexandria, the meeting place of East and West, hospitable to all ideas." (W.R. Inge, "The Philosophy of Plotinus", Vol. 1. p.xii).

Neoplatonism is a rather mystical, synthetic philosophy which, as Inge also remarks, "sums up the results of 700 years of untrammelled thinking." (Op. cit., p.ix), and which has become a vital part of Christian theology. Although Plotinus has been called "the last great philosopher of antiquity"(1) with whom "the creative impulse of Hellenic philosophy ended" (B. Bosanquet, op. cit., p.118), he must be thought of as a great initiator rather than as the final resting place of a great tradition. For as well as forming the mainstay of Christian theology, Neoplatonism has had an influence on mediaeval, Renaissance, and modern thought such as "can hardly be exaggerated"(2) Bosanquet's assertion that Neoplatonism foreshadows Romanticism is not hard to substantiate, and the "beloved Plotinus" of Novalis, one of the founder Romantiker, is extremely close in spirit to both the "manic" Plato and the visionary Romantics. The Neoplatonic "principle of plenitude", the

(2) K.Gilbert & H. Ruhn, "A History of Esthetics", p.117. See also Henry, op.cit., pp.xxx-v-xxxvi: "Ten centuries of the Middle Ages, though knowing nothing of the Enneads of Plotinus, remained paradoxically enough, if only through the mediation of St. Augustine and the pseudo-Dionysius, closely dependent upon his thought. Of St. Thomas Aquinas, Dean Inge could write, not without exaggeration but with some plausibility, that he was nearer to Plotinus than to the real Aristotle. The Renaissance, in the person of Marsilio Ficino, rediscovered his works and was enthralled by his teaching. Later, such religious thinkers as the Cambridge Platonists, such philosophers as Berkeley and Hegel, such poets as Novalis and Goethe interested themselves in him and contributed by this interest towards an atmosphere in which his works, having been edited, translated, and explained, are no more obscure than those of the many-sided Aristotle or their common master, the 'divine' Plato".
belief that all things form a chain of being stretching from and back to the "One" (later "God"), became a commonplace of early biology and 17th and early 18th century aesthetic belief, and this and other aspects of Neoplatonism are a significant part of the doctrines of several philosophers who contributed to pre-Romantic theory of art, either directly or indirectly, including Leibniz, Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. Plotinus' view of art is closest to that of Apollonius amongst his forerunners, and he attacks the Platonic notion of imitation, stating that art improves upon nature. But before saying more about the theory of art in the "Enneads", I will give an outline of Neoplatonic beliefs.

Briefly, Plotinus believes that all being is an emanation from the One, the Primal Fountain of all Being, the Perfectly Good; this emanation descends by degrees to individuality and to the inert, formless, resistant matter which is non-Being. Within this emanation, Plotinus has two triads: that of the Divine Principles into the Absolute, Spirit, and Soul; and that of man into Spirit, Soul, and Body:

"In their objective aspects, Body, Soul, and Spirit are respectively the world as perceived by senses; the world as interpreted by the mind as a spiritual and temporal order; and the spiritual world. The last alone is fully real. Reality is constituted by the unity in duality of the spiritual faculty and the spiritual world which it contemplates in exercising its self-consciousness. The reality of Soul and its world is derivative and dependent; the phenomenal world does not possess reality." *(Inge, op. cit., p.xii)*

The human individual is separated from the One, to which he truly belongs, and is debased by his contact with alien, physical elements; thus the Soul longs restlessly to return home, retracing his steps in what Gilbert and Kuhn call a "metaphysical pilgrim's progress." *(op. cit., p.liii)*. So, "when we long for beauty we also long for home - for goodness, for God, and for truth." *(Loc.cit.)* Within this scheme, the human Soul belongs partly to the physical world and partly to the spiritual - "It stands midway between
the phenomenal world, of which it is the principle, and the world of
the Spirit, which is its principle. But the Soul is not only an
intermediary between appearance and reality. It is the point where
all converging lines meet; 'it binds extremes together', and it is the
vital correspondence with every region to which these lines lead.'
(Inge, op. cit., pp. 202-3).

The Soul then has two orders, and as a consequence, two orders of
imagination and of memory, (though Plotinus attempts to overcome the
dualism of his position). To the lower order belong sensation and
perception. Against the psychology of both Plato and Aristotle,
Plotinus emphatically rejects the 'impression' or 'imprint' account of
perception. "Perceptions are no imprints", he says, and they "are not
to be thought of as seal-impressions on soul or mind." (Enneads IV.6.1)
With the rejection of this theory must also go the notion of memory as
"lingering impressions", i.e. that "the sensible object striking upon
soul or mind makes a mark upon it, and that the retention of this mark
is memory." (Loc. cit) Plotinus, in some respects similarly to Aristotle,
is attacking the belief that the mind (or soul) is passive, though unlike
Aristotle, he also rejects the wax-seal metaphor of Plato. In any visual
perception, Plotinus says,
"...the object is grasped there where it lies in the direct line of vision;
it is there that we attack it; there, then, the perception is formed: the
mind looks outward; this is ample proof that it has taken and takes no
inner imprint, and does not see in virtue of some mark made upon it like
that of the ring on the wax; it need not look outward at all if, even as
it looked, it already held the image of the object, seeing by virtue of
an impression made upon itself." (Enneads IV.6.1).
If the perception were an imprint, he asks, how could we perceive great
magnitudes?
"And, most convincing of all, if to see is to accept imprints of the
objects of our vision, we can never see these objects themselves; we
see only vestiges they leave within us, shadows: the things themselves
would be very different from our vision of them." (Op. cit., IV. 6. 1.).
The mind, then, is an outgoing, affirmative power: "there must be no
impressions, nothing to which the mind is passive; there can only be
acts of that in which the objects become known." (IV. 6. 2.). In this
act of perception, this actual bridging of the gap between itself and
objects, the soul acts as "the Reason-Principle of the entire realm of
sense":

"Thus it has dealings with both orders - benefitted and quickened
by the one, but by the other beguiled, falling before resemblances, and
so led downwards as under spell. Poised midway, it is aware of both
spheres." (IV. 6. 3.)

This Aristotelian emphasis on mind as an active principle with its
specific denial of images as impressions, or as in any way passive, implies
that imagination is an act of the mind in which it comes to know itself.
Images as impressions also prevent our knowing things or objects themselves.
Plotinus' clearly accepting that things or objects exist and images do not.

This apparent rejection of the intermediary image leads him to propose
a dualistic account of memory and imagination which again brings to mind
Aristotle and the latter's "sensitive" and "calculative" imagination.
So for Plotinus there is what Inge calls the "sensible imagination" (Op. cit.,
p. 231) which is ". . . the stroke of something unreasonable outside the Soul;" (1).
At this level the imagination is the seat of memory, which "deals with
images" ("Enneads" IV. 3. 29.) but which "implies at once an object to
which it corresponds, and it is attended by a consciousness of some time
past at which the remembered event actually happened." (Inge, p. 226). This
is like the account of memory as "related" images which Aristotle gave;

(1) See also "Enneads", IV. 8. 3: "Taking it that the presentation of
fancy is not a matter of our will and choice, how can we think of those
acting at its dictation to be free agents? Fancy strictly, in our use,
takes its rise from conditions in the body; lack of food and drink sets
up presentations and so does the meeting of these needs . . . ."
for Plotinus: "...where there is to be memory of a sense-perception, this perception becomes a mere presentment, and that to this image-grasping power, a distinct thing, belongs the memory, the retention of the object: for in this imaging faculty the perception culminates; the impression passes away but the vision remains present to the imagination." ("Enneads", IV. 3. 29).

The present object as perceived becomes the "presentment" as present to the imagination, and the impression becomes the vision. Plotinus is uneasy about the discrepancies between the memory—image as related and also as an individuated, autonomous, and therefore unrelated "presentment," and he suggests that:

"Perhaps memory would be the reception, into the image-making faculty, of the verbal formula which accompanies the mental conception: this mental conception—a invisible thing, and one that never rises to the exterior of the consciousness—lies unknown below; the verbal formula—the revealer, the bridge between the concept and the image-taking faculty—exhibits the concept as in a mirror; the apprehension by the image-taking faculty would thus constitute the enduring presence of the concept, would be our memory of it. " ("Enneads" IV. 3. 30).

So imagination, the 'image-making faculty' and 'image-taking faculty', also receives, in the guise of memory, the verbal form which mirrors the invisible concept; in imagination the image is conceptualised as the concept is made concrete. As "the recipient in us" imagination thus "receives from both sides, absorbing not merely intellections but also sense-perceptions." (Loc. cit.) It is by this shaping, creative action of intellect, acting through imagination, that Nature is revealed and seen in its reality, yielding that Wisdom, ultimately pertaining to the All-Soul, of which it is a faint reflection:

"This Wisdom is a first (within the All-Soul) while Nature is a last: for Nature is an image of that Wisdom, and, as a last in the Soul, possesses only the last reflection of the Reason-Principle: we may imagine a thick waxen seal, in which the imprint has penetrated to the very uttermost
film so as to show on both sides, sharp-cut on the upper surface, faint on the under. Nature, thus, does not know it merely produces; what it holds it passes, automatically to its next; and this transmission to the corporeal and material constitutes its making power: it acts as a thing warmed communicating to what lies in next contact to it the principle of which it is the vehicle so as to make that also warm in some less degree.

Nature, being thus a mere communicator, does not possess even the imaging act. There is (within the Soul) intellection, superior to imagination; and there is imagination standing midway between that intellection and the impression of which Nature alone is capable. For Nature has no perception or consciousness of anything; imagination (the imaging faculty) has consciousness of the external, for it enables that which entertains the image to have knowledge of the experience encountered, while intellection also engenders—of itself and by an act derived from its own active principle." (Op.cit., IV. 4. 13). Imagination, like the soul, occupies a midpoint between two separate orders: the imagination between impression and intellect, the soul appearance and reality. The problem for imagination (as for the soul) is to which of these orders it can be said to belong, and whatever the answer, how does it effect its links with the other order? Plotinus implies that imagination is autonomous in saying that it stands midway between impression and intellect and that it is also a part of the soul. His concept of the soul suggests at once an immanent and a transcendental entity: a mixed Aristotelian and Platonic conception, which also anticipates some aspects of Kant's theory of imagination. In view of his emphasis on the shaping power of the soul and his attack on the empirical notion of impressions, imagination seems more of an image-making than an image-taking "faculty" and more in obedience to the self (initially) and the "All-Soul" or "The One" finally. These two aspects of imagination are seen as two aspects of the soul, so to the problem of their relationship Plotinus says: "The answer is that, when the two souls chime with each other, the two imaging
faculties no longer stand apart; the union is dominated by the imaging faculty of the higher soul..." ("Enneas" IV. 3. 31.) The (Platonic) impulse behind this union, as behind all the soul's activity, is the desire to return to the One, the All-Soul; and so, paradoxically, the aim of the related image (memory) is "forgetfulness", "a happy forgetfulness of all that has reached it through the lower", the realm of objects. And, "the more urgent the intention towards the Supreme, the more extensive will be the Soul's forgetfulness", for "the good Soul is the forgetful." (IV. 3. 32). The image-taking faculty (memory) surrenders its physical vestiges to the image-making, intimating that for Plotinus (as for the Kantian schemata) imagination is more of an intellectual "faculty" than a physical or empirical one. In existential terms this means the world is more a product of the mind than a shaper of the mind. The process of "forgetfulness" suggests a kind of abstraction or Socratic reminiscence such as the boy Meno was believed, like all mortals, to possess; as Inge says, we "do not remember noeta because we contemplate them as permanent activities of the higher self." (Op.cit.,p.227).

This is much as Plotinus has to say about memory and imagination, but in relation to what has gone before, especially in Plato and Aristotle, a significant synthesis is effected in Plotinus between the cognitive impulse of the "higher soul" and ethical and aesthetic impulses, and these impulses share a quality of joy. Like the soul and imagination, beauty also functions in the gap between the material and the spiritual orders, so that material objects may be beautiful through contact with a higher quality, (and some 'things' such as virtue are inherently beautiful -("Enneas", I. 6. 2). The material object "becomes beautiful by communicating with the Reason-Principle that flows from the Divine", for: "Our interpretation is that the Soul - by the very truth of its nature, by its affiliation to the noblest Existents in the hierarchy of Being - when it sees anything of that kin, any trace of that kinship, thrills with an immediate delight, takes its own to itself, and thus stirs anew to the sense of its nature and of all
its affinity." (Op.cit., I. 6. 2.). He continues: "all the loveliness of this world comes by communion in Ideal-Form." Whereas we see in his account of the two aspects of imagination a parallel with the Aristotelian amplification of the "dialectic" route to the eidos in Plato, the visual thrill of the beautiful, with its immediate delight in communion with "Ideal-Form", now recalls the "manic" route. Most significant of all, Plotinus states that the Soul "includes a faculty peculiarly addressed to beauty" (I. 6. 3.), though he does not give this "faculty" a name; none the less the soul acts to bring about a unity of Idea and matter such as imagination also effects, and for all its splendours this fusion of Idea and matter is the lowest kind of beauty whose finest function is to lead to "earlier and loftier beauties", which "in the sense-bound life we are no longer granted to know . . . but the Soul, taking no help from the organs, sees and proclaims them. To the vision of these we must mount, leaving sense to lie in its own place." (I. 6. 4.). And in a following passage he eulogises the second type of beauty which is bereft, like the forgetfulness to which memory strives, of physical attributes:

"Such vision is for those only who see with the Soul's sight - and at the vision, they will rejoice, and awe will fall upon them and a trouble deeper than all the rest could ever stir, for now they are moving in the realm of Truth." (1).

This vision is a "Dionysiac exultation" (I. 6. 4.) which leads the soul still further towards "the God" (I. 6. 7.) and of which he says "Anyone who has seen This, knows what I intend when I say it is beautiful" adding

(1) "Enneads", I. 6. 4.; the vision is truth rather than being of truth. The identity recurs in Keats' "Ode On A Grecian Urn": "Beauty is truth, truth beauty . . ." etc.; from the same poem the lines "heard melodies are sweet, but those unheard / Are sweeter . . ." are very like Plotinus' "And harmonies unheard in sound create the harmonies we hear and wake the Soul to the consciousness of beauty." ("Enneads", I. 6. 3.). The line "Beauty is truth . . ." etc., also is to be found in Shaftesbury.
that the path to this mystic vision must follow a rejection of the lower earthly beauty as Odysseus resists Circe and Calypso in order to "...flee to the beloved Fatherland", for "the Fatherland is There whence we have come, and There is the Father." (I. 6. 8.). It is no coincidence that to the modern ear the "Fatherland" means the German idea of Germany, for Romanticism is both German and Neoplatonic in its physical and spiritual origins, and militant nationalism is a product of Romanticism. The notion of the individual's spiritual journey, 'always home, to my father's house', was revived by Novalis - whom I have already mentioned as one of the first Romantiker - probably from this passage in Plotinus. Other Neoplatonic origins of Romanticism are to be found in the reiteration of this mystic kinship of the Good and the Beautiful which occurs in the Cambridge Platonists generally and in Shaftesbury's "Characteristics" particularly - a work that was more respected in Germany than in England. It is not difficult, recalling the Platonic daemon, to find in this "vision" and its being reserved for those who "see with the Soul's sight", a blueprint for the Romantic idea of genius, except that for Plotinus the vision is "the birthright of all, which few turn to use" and once attained it immediately bestows perfection and inner unity upon him who is now "the authentic man". ("Aeneads" I. 6. 9.) The precise function of imagination here is not stated by Plotinus, but being, like the soul itself, intermediary between the material and the spiritual, and being primarily visual, the imagination might easily be considered to have an important visionary function. This function is written into Dante's "Divine Comedy", as I shall show later in this second part of my thesis. Plotinus tells the "Authentic man": "you are now become very vision; now call up your confidence, strike forward yet a step - you need a guide no longer - strain and see." (I. 6. 9.). So Dante, (Purgatorio. XXX. 49ff.) reaches a point in his ascendent journey when he no longer needs his guide (Virgil), who personifies reason, and is reunited with Beatrice, who is love.
The daemon, the authentic man, the Romantic genius: these all seem to me to be configurations of the same type, of which there are few as Plotinus says, and only those who have known this "vision" can understand what he means in speaking of its beauty. The idea that the artist might be a guide to this vision is not articulated by Plotinus, though Dante seems later to have seen his great poem as fulfilling such a task. Certainly, unlike Plato, Plotinus recognises that art can have considerable importance in man's spiritual life, for "the arts are not to be slighted on the ground that they create by imitation of natural objects", the arts do not give "a bare reproduction of the thing seen but go back to the Reason-Principle from which Nature itself derives", they are "holders of beauty" and "add where nature is lacking" ("Enneads" V. 8. 1.). What nature lacks, according to what we have already found in Plotinus, is imagination, and though the beauty they have may not be of the very highest it is a necessary intermediary, a link between the material and the ideal, a unity of form and matter. So the beauty of a piece of sculpture does not consist in its beauty as stone "but in virtue of the Form or Idea introduced by the art", which Form is:

"...in the designer before ever it enters the stone; and the artificer holds it not by his equipment of eyes and hands but by his participation in his art. The beauty, therefore, exists in a far higher state in the art; for it does not come over integrally into the work; that original beauty is not transferred; what comes over is a derivative and a minor; and even that shows itself upon the statue not integrally and with entire realisation of intention but only in so far as it has subdued the resistance of the material." (Inge, op. cit., p. 232).

Beauty in an art work consists in the communication of the Idea through the material form; the artist has needed to struggle with the material in order to actively make it beautiful through "the creating principle", so the success or failure of his struggle is measured by the degree to which his work partakes of the ideal form of beauty. As Inge puts it:
"The true artist fixes his eyes on the archetypal Logoi, and tries to draw inspiration from the spiritual power which created the forms of bodily beauty. Art, therefore, is a mode of contemplation, which creates because it must. This is a real advance upon Plato and Aristotle." (Op. cit., p. 215). This "advance", if it is useful to talk of art in such terms, is a synthesis. The thrill of the Neoplatonic "vision" clearly has its antecedents in Plato, as does the idea that such delight accompany the attainment of the heights of morality, truth, and cognition, as well as love and beauty. It is important, I think, to underline the Neoplatonic view that there is a "faculty" in man to which beauty is specifically addressed and that beauty must be primarily, if not solely, visual. What could this "faculty" of the soul be, which is visual and yet not material? What else, we may deduce, but imagination. But this must, if imagination, be the higher, image-making part which belongs, like Kant's schemata, to reason; it is not free but restrained, or if unrestrained, inferior. Plotinus does not himself make such a deduction however, and though his opinion of art is as high as Philostratus' he does not give so high an aesthetic function to imagination; such a function we will find in Dante, though even there the imagination does not have quite the same symbolic power as Kant's "aesthetic imagination". As forerunners of the Renaissance in Italy both Plotinus and Dante (1) influenced the aesthetic notion of imitation as idealisation (2), but the imagination remained "dialectic"

(1) On Plotinus in this context see e.g., P. Henry, Op. cit., pp. xxxv-xxxvi: "The Renaissance, in the person of Marsilio Ficino, rediscovered his works and was enthralled by his teaching. Later, such religious thinkers as the Cambridge Platonists, such philosophers as Berkeley and Hegel, such poets as Goethe and Novalis interested themselves in him..." On Dante, see N.A. Hobbs, "Neoplatonism of The Italian Renaissance" p. 177: "Florentine humanism, generally speaking, held Dante in honour as one of its greatest forerunners..."

(2) On this notion see E. Panofsky, "Idea"; (e.g., p. 49) "the Renaissance, at first seeing no contradiction therein, demanded of its works of art truth to nature and beauty at the same time, just as antiquity had done (the idea of imitation is, after all, just as much an inheritance from antiquity as is the idea of electio)."
and Aristotelian as Pico della Mirandola's work on the subject clearly demonstrates, though beauty was a major aesthetic goal:

"The Renaissance was destined to drive the artist mad and make him the most miserable of men - at the very moment when the world was to become less habitable for him - by revealing to him his own grandeur and letting loose on him the wild beast Beauty which Faith had led after it obedient, with a gossamer thread for leash." (J. Maritain, "Art and Scholasticism", p.22). This "dialectic", Aristotelian notion of imagination has an implicit association with beauty in Plotinus, an association which in the 18th century was to become explicit and even commonplace, tied as it then became to the doctrine of taste.

The possible links between imagination and the "manic" route to eidos, or the Neoplatonic 'visionary thrill', are less evident in, and after, Plotinus. To accredit the image-taking faculty with transcendental or symbolic potency would perhaps have been too much against the Stoic ethic and psychology to have had any credence for the Neoplatonics, but the suggestion of such a potency does occur among the "lesser" and "less original" Neoplatonists, as Bundy calls them, who followed Plotinus (1). Neoplatonism was developed in more than one direction by its adherents such as Proclus, Porphyry and Iamblichus, and I would like now to consider briefly the more mystical work "On the Mysteries" of Iamblichus, which suggests that imagination has this "manic" potency to which I have referred. There is in Plotinus the clear indication that the soul should strive to unite with the One but also that this unity is a return, a kind of homecoming, to where the soul truly belongs. For Iamblichus the Plotinian "Father", the Divinity, is somewhat more paternalistic, and it is only by courtesy of His beneficence that we receive intimations of a higher reality; so this Divinity:

(1) See Bundy, op. cit., Ch.VII for a fuller discussion of these "Lesser Neoplatonists".
"...reveals through things which are deprived of knowledge, conceptions which precede all knowledge ....Through them also he inserts in us wisdom, and through everything which is in the world excites our intellect to the truth of real beings, of things which are in generation, and of future events."

("On The Mysteries", Sec. II, Ch. XVII.). The imagination seems to be the recipient of these insertions of wisdom and truth:

"For we do not see that any one of the things which are sewn through generation possess anything more than what is imparted to it by its first generating cause. But, in the present instance, the imagination will receive a certain more excellent addition from that which has no existence." (Op. cit., Ch.XXII.).

He also says that it is possible to invoke the "Gods" by operations which seem to effect likenesses, repeating an Empedoclean and Pythagorean notion, for "...it is not possible to speak rightly about the Gods without the Gods" (Op. cit., Ch. XVIII), as when "...invocation, and the things performed by a scientific operation, accede and are conjoined to more excellent natures through similitude and alliance."(1) For Plotinus, as we have found, similar conjunctions are made in the imagination, and perhaps Iamblichus had a similar idea in mind, for his "operations" certainly anticipate the magical operators of the Renaissance, such as Giordano Bruno, for whom imagination was a very real and necessary instrument.

It is clear that for Iamblichus the "imaginations procured by enchantments" are a rather inferior kind for, in common with Plotinus he speaks of two kinds of imagination but, unlike his great predecessor, he also makes a clear association between imagination (in his two senses) and "ecstasy". He says there are two kinds of ecstasy, one of which is (like the Plutarchan "fancy") disorderly, confused, material, and "fills us with stupidity and folly," it is incapable of knowledge and "wanders from wisdom".

(1) "On The Mysteries", Ch.XVIII: in a footnote (p.168) to his translation of this passage I tavlor says that according to Iamblichus we may approach divinity "through sacred operations" but divinity does not approach us. The nature of these operations is not clear, they may be magical, alchemical, or ritualistic in a religious way, perhaps all of these at once, but certainly not "scientific" in any modern sense.
The other kind "imparts goods which are more honourable than human temperance", it "gives itself to the cause which rules over the orderly distribution of things in the world", and "conjoins with natures that transcend all our wisdom." Making the distinctions between these two kinds of ecstasy, he is also characterising two kinds of imagination:

"The one, likewise, is unstable, but the other is above nature. The one draws down the soul, the other elevates it. And the one entirely separates us from a divine allotment, but the other connects us with it". Again, the one is "depraved enthusiasm", which is "similar to melancholy, or intoxication, or any other delirium exerted by the body", whilst the other is "the enthusiasm more excellent through a plenitude of power". So, in identifying these two, we must ".. by no means compare the diseases of the body, such as suffusions, and the imaginations excited by diseases, with divine imaginations", and ..

"..neither must you compare the most manifest surveys of the Gods with the imaginations artificially procured by enchantment. For the latter have neither the energy, nor the essence, nor the truth of the things that are seen, but extend mere phantasms, as far as to appearances only."(1)

(1) This, and the foregoing quotations, are all from Iamblichus, op.cit.. Ch.XXV. Tertullian associates ecstasy with sleep, as sleep renders the body inactive: "This power we call ecstasy, in which the sensuous soul stands out of itself, in a way which even resembles madness. Thus in the very beginning sleep was inaugurated by ecstasy: 'And God sent an ecstasy to Adam, and he slept.' So sleep is "ordinarily .. combined with ecstasy" and memory is "..an especial gift of the ecstatic condition..." (from De anima, in The Writings, Vol II). Tertullian considers that bad dreams "are inflicted on us mainly by demons", whereas good dreams come from God. (Op.cit., Ch.XLVII. see also Ch. XLIX for a similar view). I have already cited Keats' restatement of Neoplatonic ideas, and he again comes to mind in relation to the foregoing remarks from Tertullian. In a letter (22 Nov 1817) to Benjamin Bailey, Keats says "what the imagination seizes as Beauty must be truth..." and : "The Imagination may be compared to Adam's dream - he awoke and found it truth..." With respect to Tertullian's comments on sleep, dreams and ecstasy, these associations are seen as divine qualities of the imagination by Synesius of Cyræne in his De Insomniis - e.g., 

".. we have in the promise of our dreams a pledge from the divinity."
It is important to emphasise that both kinds of imagination are here connected with extremes of pleasure — ecstasy or enthusiasm — and that these two kinds of imagination are easily confused, or Iamblichus would not have to warn against confusing them. Despite the clear and undefended bifurcation of imagination, he is so strongly in the grip of Platonic metaphysics that he will not entertain the possibility of one imagination, having perhaps several aspects, whose test for authenticity might be in action or existence, as Aristotle had said. So, like Plato, Iamblichus is dismissive of "human art". He considers that "image-makers" are artificial, without divine elements, for "Nothing ... which is fashioned by human art is genuine and pure. He equates art with the lower imagination which deals in phantasms and appearances: "This delusive formation .. of phantasms, will be conversant with shadows, which are very remote from the truth." (Op.cit., Chs. XXVII-XXX). This really is a reiteration of the Platonic view as contained in Bk.10 of the Republic, it is the view against which Leonardo was to fight in his attempt to raise the status of art, a fight in which he was successful partly because the visual arts had come to have a religious function; also, though this may not be a direct reason for the elevation of the visual arts to "liberal" status, imagination as dreaming came to be recognised by the church fathers as the main means of divine revelation.
As I have already said, Christian theology took an enormous amount from Neoplatonism. In this chapter I shall consider the theories of imagination of St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas and also of the mystic, Richard of St. Victor, whom Dante regards highly and in whose writings the function of imagination in meditation and contemplation is outlined. I also mention in passing the theories of other writers who helped to consolidate the synthesis of Platonic, Aristotelian and Biblical thought into orthodoxy. The incongruities of this synthesis, or attempted synthesis, produce a dualistic theory of imagination as the amoral power which distracts men's minds from higher things and imagination qua dreaming as an instrument of divine revelation. Both these views are sanctioned by Augustine and Aquinas, who are by far the most important of the early theologians. H.H. Bundy asserts that Augustine says nothing new about imagination (1), but nonetheless it must be said that Augustine's theory of imagination was destined to become the "official" view, and that his theory is further to be valued for its clarity and for his unambivalent assertion that "aerial and ethereal essences" influence us and can "bear thoughts and dreams into our minds."

It is in his letters to Nebridius that we find Augustine's (essentially Neoplatonic) views on imagination; Nebridius has written to him that ".there can be no exercise of memory without images, or the apprehension of some objects presented by the imagination." (2). Augustine disagrees, taking a more Socratic than Aristotelian line: ".the things which we remember are not always things which are passing away, but are for the most part things which are permanent." (Letters" VII, Ch. II, 3.). He believes that to fix

(1) For a discussion of the theory of imagination in Augustine, also Syme and Boethius, see H.H. Bundy, op.cit., Ch. VIII; see also J. Morgan, "The Psychological Teaching of St. Augustine", esp. p. 212 ff.
(2) "Letters to St. Augustine", Vol. 1, Letter VII, Ch. I, 1. Augustine is clearly uneasy about rendering the Greek phantasias into Latin, and refers to "...the apprehension of some objects presented by the imagination, which you have been pleased to call 'phantasias'."
our thoughts on eternity does not require the presence of an image in imagination, for "as no man can doubt, the mind received more reliable and correct impressions before it was involved in the illusions which the senses produce." (Loc. cit.). Eternity "does not require any image fashioned by the imagination as the vehicle by which it may be introduced into the mind;" ("Letters", VII. Ch. I. 2.), for it is only by this Socratic reminiscence to which Augustine seems to refer "that, in regard to some things at least, there can be no exercise of memory without any image of the thing remembered being presented to the imagination." (Loc. cit.) It looks as though Augustine is favouring the "image-making" aspect of the Plotinian imagination over the "image-taking" one which is offered by Nebridius and at the same time denying imagination a symbolic function such as later theorists have given to the image as aesthetic object.

Augustine divides "images", which Nebridius "as well as many others" calls "phantasias"(1) into three, now familiar, types, "according as they originate with the senses, or the imagination, or the faculty of reason." (Op. cit., Ch. II. 4.). The first are the images of objects or persons we have once seen, like the "impressions" of Locke and Hume; the second are suppositions, "... when, for the sake of discourse, we ourselves suppose things..."(Loc. cit.), and the third are "chiefly .. numbers and measure." (Loc. cit.). Of these, the second seems to me to be by the fur most immediately important since here, pace Dandy, Augustine not only recognises the autonomy of imagination but also gives it what we today would regard as a very important function. This sense of "supposition", we may surmise, like J. Dewey's later "rehearsal" sense of "imagination", suggests that activities like theorising, hypothesis, planning ahead, are all done in imagination. But he minimises its value :

"Who can doubt that those images are much more unreal than those with which the senses acquaint us? For the things which we suppose, or believe, or picture to ourselves, are in every point wholly unreal; and the things which we

(1) Again Augustine here shows his reluctance to call "images" by the Greek "phantasias", seeming to want to retain this term for the higher sense of "image" and the Latin "imaginatio" for Nebridius' (lower) sense.
perceive by sight and the other senses, are, as you see, far more near to
the truth than these products of imagination." (Op. cit., Ch. II, 5.) Nor
does he think his third sense very important, for though it may appear that
thought produces an image, Augustine considers that intellect is hampered
by images, a view which reminds us of Plotinus' "forgetfulness". The
problem of how we are able to imagine things which we have never actually
seen is solved by "a certain faculty of diminution and addition which is
innate" and which enables the mind to recombine and alter the images which
are of his first "impression" type. But he makes little of these embryonic,
pre-Kantian "reproductive" and "productive" kinds of imagination and con­
ccludes his analysis of imagination with the Stoic assertion that it is "our
most sacred duty" to practice "resistance to the sway of bodily senses.."
and tells Nebridius "I would warn you never to link yourself in friendship
with those shadows of the realm of darkness." (Ch. III, 7).

As we have already seen, Bundy is not totally justified in saying there
is nothing new in Augustine's theory of imagination and a little later,
thanks to Nebridius' doggedness and Augustine's saintly patience, the latter
is obliged to explain the means whereby the heavenly powers (daemons)
communicate with us mortals. Augustine is "not a little stunned" by this
query from Nebridius, which he calls "a great one" ("Letters", IX, 2.) and
it is evident that he does not question the possibility of such communication
and his reply, taken in conjunction with Aquinas' views on the subject of
divine messengers - angels and demons - implicitly condoned many aspects
of magic, witchcraft and demonology which thrived during the Middle Ages
and the Renaissance. Imagination, as we shall see in Part 3, has a central
role in these occult practices which seemed to be sanctioned by the church
fathers. Augustine states emphatically that "...every movement of the mind
affects in some degree the body":

"Whence we may conjecture that, in like manner, when thought is busy,
although no bodily effect of the mental act is discernible by us, there
may be some such effect discernible by beings of aerial or ethereal essence whose perceptive faculty is in the highest degree acute, - so much so, that, in comparison with it, our faculties are scarcely worthy to be called perceptive. Therefore these footprints of its motion, so to speak, which the mind impresses on the body, may perchance not only remain, but remain as it were with the force of habit; and it may be that, when these are secretly stirred and played upon, they bear thoughts and dreams into our minds, according to the pleasure of the person moving or touching them: and this is done with marvelous facility. For if, as is manifest, the attainments of our earth-born and sluggish bodies in the department of exercise, e.g. in the playing of musical instruments, dancing on the tight-rope, etc., are almost incredible, it is by no means unreasonable to suppose that beings which act with the powers of an aerial or ethereal body upon our bodies, and are by the constitution of their natures able to pass unhindered through these bodies, should be capable of much greater quickness in moving whatever they wish, while we, though not perceiving what they do, are nevertheless affected by the results of their activity. We have a somewhat parallel instance in the fact that we do not perceive how it is that superfluity of bile impels us to more frequent outbursts of passionate feeling; and yet it does produce this effect, while this superfluity of bile is itself an effect of our yielding to such passionate feelings." ("Letters", IX, 3).

These 'aerial or ethereal essences', whose influence on our bodies Augustine likens to that of bile, immediately relate to contemporary beliefs of physical science, which was basically Pythagorean, and which rested largely on the authority of Plato's Timaeus. (See Appendix A). As we have already seen, not even Aristotle could resist the force of doctrine of the four elements, and this basic tenet, expounded by the Pythagorean philosopher Timaeus -- to whom even Socrates listens attentively -- is the key to understanding most of the scientific, cosmological, and magical beliefs of the Middle Ages and of the Renaissance. According to Timaeus, the cosmos is constructed out of the four elements: earth, water, air, and fire, (in
ascending order). The human body is made of the four elements which become progressively more refined from earth, the most base, to fire; so fire is the element in the body which is most akin to the soul, for the "divine form" to which the soul belongs is "made mostly of fire so that it should be as bright and beautiful to look at as possible." (1) The gods, then are associated with fire, just the birds inhabit the air, and other animals the water and the earth. Fire is also responsible for dreams, mirror reflections, and for vision; since sight, the gift of the gods, is the greatest of man's gifts: we owe to vision our finest achievements such as philosophy and mathematics.

Though they are in equal proportions, the four elements are interchangeable, undergoing a constant cyclical transformation here in the physical world, so that "anything in process of change" should be spoken of not "as being a thing but as having a quality". (Timaeus, Sec.49) The four elements belong in the three distinct realities which existed before the world came into existence: these are being, space, and becoming. The nurse of becoming was characterised by the qualities of water and fire, of earth and air." (2) So the elements are in a state of disequilibrium, of eternal motion, of becoming, which apprehended by "opinion with the aid of sensation", the phrase used in this instance to describe phantasia, and attacked by Aristotle. (3) The lowest reality, space, "eternal and indestructible", is "apprehended without the senses by a sort of spurious reasoning and so is hard to believe in - we look at it indeed in a sort of dream..."; (Timaeus Sec. 52) this "dreamstate" clearly corresponds to the lowest division of the divided line in Republic, Book VI. When the elements of the human body are in proportion and at rest the body is in a state of health; imbalance of the bodily elements causes disease, such as

(1) See Timaeus, secs. 40 & 42-43: sensation, for example, is explained as irregular motion caused by welding together the soul and the elements of the body.
(2) Op. cit., sec. 52. See also sec. 20: "...being has to becoming the same relation as truth to belief," etc.
(3) See De Anima 428a 24 ff., also Part I, Ch. II, p. (supra).
when there is bile in the blood. (Op. cit., Secs. 46-7). Augustine's likening, of the effects of aerial and ethereal essences on our bodies, to the effects of bile, is now seen to be most appropriate, since both show an imbalance of elements; the one is not a mere metaphor for the other, but they are both interdependent parts of the same cosmology. So we arrive at an appreciation of the extent to which the ancient elemental science found acceptance in the work of one of the two most important of Christian theologians during the Middle Ages. For Timaeus, the aether - the natural element of the "beings of aerial and ethereal essence" of which Augustine writes to Nebridius - is the "brightest variety" of air, that is, that part of this element which is most refined and closest to the divine element of fire. As "fire has achieved the maximum interpenetration of the rest; air the second..." (1) there is a rationale for the influence of beings or daemons on our bodies, and Biblical and Pythagorean beliefs find support in each other and fuse a body of dogma against which the early empirical scientists would come to struggle. (2)

(1) Op. cit., sec. 58. Compare Aristotle, De Mundo 395a lff., where aether is said to be superior to fire. Aristotle regards aether to be more divine than any of the four elements, and the body's vital heat (spiritus or pneuma) is an analogue of the aether in which the soul is primarily embodied. (2) The Stoic side of Augustine's theory of imagination is also shared by Boethius, "the last of the Romans and the first of the Scholastics", whose "Consolation of Philosophy" was for the Middle Ages a compendium of classical thought. Boethius introduced Aristotle to the West and preserved many of the works of antiquity, and his "Consolation" was indeed a consolation to Dante on the death of Beatrice and the form of his work is imitated in the alternating prose and verse style of Dante's "Vita Nuova". Both works are accounts of psychological recovery. On imagination Boethius says (e.g.): "...sence and imagination cannot aspire to the knowledge of the universal, since their cognition cannot go beyond worldly images...". Boethius is rewarded in the "Divine Comedy" by being placed in heaven in the circle of twelve lights, also containing Albertus Magnus, Aquinas, Dionysius the Areopagite and Richard of St. Victor, which surrounds Dante and Beatrice; ("Paradise", Canto X, Lines 124 ff.).
SECTION II

In this short section I shall expound the theory of imagination of Richard of St. Victor. There are other important early Christian mystics, such as Diorysius the Areopagite(1) and Richard's fellow monk Hugo of St. Victor, the "Alter Augustinus" as he was known, but in Richard we find a reasonably complete and accessible statement on imagination. For Richard, as for the Stoics, imagination is generally to be regarded as the servant of reason but as having its drawbacks in distracting the mind from prayer by its "clamouring" after physical desires. For Richard, as for the Stoics, imagination is generally to be regarded as the servant of reason but as having its drawbacks in distracting the mind from prayer by its "clamouring" after physical desires. (2)

But with all its evils, imagination can help the novice in his early meditation. His analysis of imagination follows Augustine and Plotinus in its subdivision into the "earthly" imagination which "...occurs when without deliberation, our mind runs vaguely this way and that on anything which we have seen, heard or done" ("Benjamin Minor", Ch. XVI) and the "reasonable kind" - "...when we create some imaginary thing from what we have known through the bodily senses. For example, we see gold and we see a horse, but we have never seen a golden horse. Now this cannot be done by an animal but is only possible by a rational creature." (Loc. cit.).

He further divides this "reasonable" imagination - which is clearly a descendent of Aristotle's "deliberative" imagination - "...according to whether it is set forth by the reason, or combined with intelligence". The first takes place when the mind uses some known form of visible things to produce some other visible thing in the mind yet without relating it to anything unseen. The second occurs when through the image of visible things we try to rise to the knowledge of unseen things. In the first we have the imagination combined with the reason, in the latter the intelligence combined.

(1) See Dionysius The Areopagite, "The Mystical Theology", Ch. II pp.195-6: "...many attain unto vision through the loss of sight and knowledge, and that in ceasing thus to see or to know we may learn to know that which is beyond all perception and understanding ... like as men who, carving a statue out of marble, remove all the impediments that hinder the clear perception of the latent image end by this mere removal display the hidden statue itself in its hidden beauty".

(2) Richard of St. Victor, "Selected Writings on Contemplation", Benjamin Minor, Bk. I, Chs. V & VI. Speaking of imagination in the service of reason, Richard cites Romans I. 20: (i.e. : "For the invisible of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made..."etc).
with the imagination." (Op.cit., Ch. XVIII). This second kind of rational imagination, attempting to rise to knowledge of the unseen, is given a degree of respectability in its being recognised as a mode of contemplation (though a relatively inferior one); but in Richard's mystical theology it remains, a counterpart of Platonic and Neoplatonic configurations, a dualist's means of circumventing a logically insoluble problem. Richard tries to fit imagination into an ascending scale of contemplation, but he ultimately is obliged to admit the inadequacy of imagination once the "visible things" have been left behind on the mystical ascent, (just as Dante was to do in the "Divine Comedy") :

"Thinking roams about, meditation investigates, contemplation wonders. Thinking arises from imagination, meditation from the reason, contemplation from the intelligence. Intelligence takes the highest place, imagination the lowest, reason lies between them. Everything which comes under the view of the lower sense, comes necessarily under the view of the higher sense. Hence it follows that everything which is grasped by the imagination, is also, together with much that is above it, grasped by the reason. So also, all that the imagination and reason include, together with those things which they cannot include, fall under the view of intelligence." ("Benjamin Major", BK. I. Ch. III.). This double triad of imagination/thinking, reason/meditation, and intelligence/contemplation, is described later as six moments of an ontological scale :

"The first lies in the imagination and is according to the imagination only. The second is in the imagination but according to reason. The third is in the reason according to the imagination. The fourth is in the reason and according to the reason. The fifth is above the reason and not contrary to it. So two are concerned with the imagination, two with the reason, two with intelligence." (Op.cit., BK. I. Ch. VI.). Inevitably it is the mid-point on the scale, between the third and fourth moments, which is crucial, for it is here that the "image" relinquishes the last traces of its physical origins and becomes a rational entity.
In the third moment "we are lifted up by the likeness of visible things to the consideration of invisible things", reaching the fourth moment where "...phantasy is wont to cloud rather than to help": "Let the imagination therefore give way for a time, give way and almost vanish: there is nothing in it which is able to help this work. What can the imagination do if reason fails? What place has the imagination where there is 'no variableness nor shadow of turning'...?" (bk. 4, Ch. 14).

Richard is simply repeating the well established Neoplatonic formula derived from both Plato and Aristotle in which the ascent of the soul to a state of grace is homologous with the mind's pursuit of knowledge. His scale of six moments looks clear enough but as we see from the quotations imagination is first said to have a direct link with intelligence/contemplation and then is said to sever these links at the middle of the double triad mentioned above. Imagination, in the case of the golden horse seemed also to have been credited with a productive or creative ability, suggesting a positive autonomous power in conjunction with reason, but this is not pursued - no doubt in deference to the mystic state with which he is more concerned. The link between imagination and the heights of contemplation are reasserted when Richard writes about dreams, where the Augustinian rather than the Aristotelian view predominates, paving the way - as Lundy remarks, (op. cit., p. 266) - for Dante's understanding of the powers of dream and imagination:

"To see a dream is to pass over by the mind into the secret place of divine contemplation. He who ascends by ecstasy into contemplation of sublime things asleep and sees a dream," ("Benjamin Major", "Of Dreams"). This mystical, visionary power of (imagination qua) dreams is repeated a little later:

"What is the seeing of dreams and the foretelling of things to come and the foreseeing of the mysteries of hidden things but to receive the grace of contemplation from heaven and by ecstasy to perceive knowledge of hidden judgments by a divine shewing?" (Op. cit., "Of Dream and Prophecy")
He seems to be unaware of the anomalies of an imagination which in waking is powerless without reason but in sleep attains the mystery and the ecstasy of contemplating heaven, but nevertheless this latter power of imagination, also unequivocally affirmed in the "De Insomniis" of Synecius, was taken for granted by Dante in both the "Vita Nuova" and the "Divine Comedy". The precedents for an exalted, but creative, function of imagination are thus to be found where, ultimately, the Romantics found them — in Plato, Aristotle, Neoplatonism, and in Christian mysticism — and they seem to be no less valid and true for Dante than for the poets of the 19th century.
SECTION III

Having considered the theory of imagination of Augustine and Richard of St. Victor I will terminate this chapter with a brief examination of St. Thomas Aquinas' views on imagination. He is the most important of these three figures as he became the foremost authority for the theology of the (Catholic) church, and also for his efforts in assimilating the philosophy of Aristotle into that theology. Much of the credit, or responsibility, for this latter task must be given to the patron saint of natural science, Aquinas' sometime teacher, Albertus Magnus. It was Albertus who almost single-handedly revived esteem for Aristotle and whose stated intention of "adapting Aristotle to the use of the Latin races" was fulfilled despite of an intense suspicion of "the Philosopher" evidenced by the repeated condemnation of his works of natural science and metaphysics in Paris in the years 1210, 1215, 1221, and 1231. Aquinas too, as we have already seen, was an avid student of Aristotle, and in his "Summa Theologica" he endeavoured to put down the sum of all known learning, and in this encyclopaedia of mediæval knowledge and belief gives an account of imagination and dreams which is in keeping with his forerunners but which was to sanction occult and magical practices which were far removed from Christian devotion.

Like Augustine and Richard, he believes that divine agencies influence men through dreams (and imagination) and as a consequence the official theological line established imagination as the recipient of God's message.

(1) In 1897 Pope Leo XIII directed that the works of St. Thomas be the basis of theology.

(2) See C.G. Hopkins, "The Share of Thomas Aquinas in The Growth of The Witchcraft Delusion", Intro., p.1. Hopkins holds Aquinas at least partly responsible for numerous superstitions and horrors, including devil worship, lycanthropy, belief in incubi and succubi, and all the turgescences of demonology and witchcraft, as well as sanctioning the establishment of the Inquisition. As Hopkins says: "It is clear that Thomas, directly or indirectly, afforded both explanation and support for the witchcraft delusion in most of its important features, and that his theories were extended to give credence to others." (Op. cit., p.172). And: "Generally speaking, thirteenth century scholasticism helped preserve the authoritative standing of ancient demonology and weave it into the orderly system of mediæval philosophy." (Op. cit., p.183) The pursuit of magic and alchemy continued well into the 16th century and beyond, to an extent which modern scholarship has only recently begun to realize; Renaissance magicians often cite Aquinas as the authority for the validity of their practices.
According to Aquinas, God communicates with man through angels and it is an angel that "enlightens the human intellect by means of phantasms" ("Summa Theologica", I. 0. CIII, Art. I.), and "the imagination which serves the intellect can be changed by an angel" (loc. cit.). He finds examples in the Bible of the use of imagination in dreams as a medium between divinity and humanity:

"Those things which are seen in dreams are seen by imaginative vision. But the angels reveal things in dreams, as appears from Matthew i 20; ii 13, 19 in regard to the angel who appeared to Joseph in dreams. Therefore an angel can move the imagination." (1) He realises that the angel may be good or bad (I. 0. CIII, Art. III) and also that "imaginative apparitions are sometimes caused in us by the local movement of animal spirits and humours" (loc. cit.), but he neither attempts to explain the physiology of this affection nor does he explain how the individual is to discriminate between the visions caused by good angels, bad angels, or good or bad digestion. He is aware that the recognition of imaginations as good or bad can pose awkward problems, and that the symbolic mystery of some images requires explanation:

"An angel causing an imaginative vision, sometimes enlightens the intellect at the same time, so that it knows what these images signify; and then there is no deception. But sometimes by the angelic operation the similitudes of things only appear in the imagination; but neither then is deception caused by the angel, but by the defect in the intellect of him to whom such things appear. Thus neither was Christ a cause of deception when He spoke many things to the people in parables, which He did not explain them." (loc. cit.) Failure adequately to explain images or imaginative vision is caused not by their having any inherent malevolence but by defects in the recipient of

(1) Aquinas, loc. cit., I. 0. CIII Art. III. He also says, citing Augustine and Aristotle, that through imagination a knowledge of the future may be revealed: "...the influence of the heavenly bodies causes the imagination to be affected, and so, as the heavenly bodies cause many future events, the imagination receives certain images of some such events. These images are perceived more at night and while we sleep than in the daytime and while we are awake." (loc. cit., I. 0. LXVI, Art 4)
the images; the fault is presumably in interpretation or actual response, for in the absence of intellectual enlightenment the imaginative vision may be taken as angelic or devilish:

"...the operation of the devil seems to be confined to the imagination and sensitive appetite, by moving either of which he can induce man to sin. For his operation may result in presenting certain forms to the imagination..." (Op. cit., II. 0. LXXX, II). He also adds that imagination may be swayed by passion (II. 0. LXXVII, 2), and may also adversely influence the judgment of a man who is out of the habit of using his intellect, (II. 0. LIII, 5).

Although he has obviously learned from his reading of Aristotle, (1) Aquinas reiterates the now orthodox Christian view, found in Augustine and Richard, that the "imaginative vision" is not simply a relatively low-level cognitive event but may also be spiritual in its import; I regard this as a variation on the Platonic (dialectic and manic) routes to the eidos, but this eidos has become something divine in the Christian sense. There can be no doubt that for Aquinas the cognitive function of imagination is the central one (2) - imagination for him, as for the Stoics, must be subservient to reason - but its possible spiritual function, as in parables, also suggests for us a potential aesthetic use of imagination.

(1) See op. cit., 2ae 2ac. 180. 5: "In the present life human contemplation is impossible without phantasms, because it is connatural to man to see the intelligible species in phantasms, as Aristotle says. However intellectual knowledge does not stop at the phantasms themselves, but in them it contemplates the purity of intelligible truth, and this holds not only for natural knowledge but also for the truths known through revelation."

(2) See Dundy, op. cit., p.225; also "Summa Theologica", I. q. 37, a. 4: "What is present in our understanding is more like an angel than are the images in our imagination; the former being actually understood, while the latter are only so potentially. But an angel can know what is in one's imagination in so far as he can know bodies, since imagination is a bodily faculty."
Chapter 3 : THE ARAB PSYCHOLOGISTS

Although Aristotle's *De Anima* was not amongst the works which Boethius translated, the Aristotelian tradition of psychological theory passes from Neoplatonism into Christian theology but in a somewhat distorted, Stoic form. As I have already noted in mentioning Aquinas' commentary on the *De Anima* (Part I, Ch. 2), his interpretations of Aristotle's philosophy of mind are coloured by his acceptance of Christianity and his wish to accommodate Aristotle to that faith. The third and the most faithful source of Aristotelianism, known also to Albertus and Aquinas, was the Arab "faculty psychologists" and in this chapter I shall give a descriptive analysis of the theories of Avicenna and Averroes' interpretation of Al-Ghazālī. What we are concerned with here is a synthesis of Aristotle's descriptive psychology and Galen's theories of the brain, yielding a psychological theory which allotted mental abilities to specific locations or chambers in the brain. To have chosen the brain is itself something of an advance, for in the case of imagination, for example, various bodily locations had been suggested, including the heart, and in *Timaeus* (sec. 71) both imagination and the capacity for inspired prophecy had been placed in the liver. (1).

The tradition of describing "all mental functions under the assumptions of the reality of matter" is considered by Bandy to be at the forefront of popular belief in the Middle Ages:

"This tradition, which for want of better term, we may call empirical, is interested in the orderly process of knowledge from percept to concept, and it is also interested in the psychological conditions underlying thought. It is this view, rather than that of the mystics, which was to become the popular medieval tradition, presumably because of its appeal to the love of system, of careful analysis, of subtle distinctions, and precise subordination. Its persistence is another indication of the popular preference of Aristotle to Plato, with the resulting failure to appreciate the subtle Platonic theory of imagination." (H.W. Bandy, *op. cit.*, p. 176).

(1) I have already observed a mythical connection between the element of fire and imagination; there is a further connection here with the myth of Prometheus, who stole fire from the gods and whose reward of eternal torment was to have his ever-regenerative liver torn out.
The influence of Aristotle’s De Anima on Avicenna is almost total, though, as Bundy seems not to have seen, Avicenna’s psychology takes almost no account of the attempt of Aristotle to give an existential description of mental life. Avicenna identified five main mental abilities which he located in three ventricles of the brain: the front, the middle, and the rear; these five abilities are the internal faculties, whilst the senses are the five external faculties. He calls the first of the internal faculties the sensus communis, the “faculty of phantasy”, which is “located in the forepart of the front ventricle of the brain. It receives all the forms which are imprinted on the five senses.” (Avicenna, “Psychology”, Ch.III, p.31). The second faculty, “representation”, is in the rear of the front ventricle, and as the sensus communis, like the image-taking faculty of Plotinus, simply receives, so the representative faculty retains, i.e. “preserves what the sensus communis has received from the individual five senses even in the absence of the sensed objects.” (Loc.cit.). In the middle ventricle of the brain Avicenna places imagination, which “in relation to the animal soul” is called “rational imagination”. (Loc.cit.). These correspond to Aristotle’s “sensitive” and “deliberative” imagination. For Avicenna the function of this faculty is to “combine certain things with others in the faculty of representation, and to separate some things from others.” (Loc.cit). So for him imagination both synthesizes and discriminates, though the latter ability is generally regarded as a function of judgment; but Avicenna’s “estimative faculty” is located at the far end of this middle ventricle and “perceives the non-sensible intentions that exist in the individual sensible objects, like the faculty which judges that the wolf is to be avoided and the child is to be loved.” (Loc.cit.). Before saying something about this idea of “non-sensible intentions” we should make quite clear what Avicenna is saying about the various aspects of imagination. The account looks to be both developmental and ontological, so the first internal faculty, image-taking, where (we might say) ‘impressions’ are registered, is the lowest stage; this is phantasy and sensus communis. The contents of phantasy are
retained in the faculty of "representation" to be used by imagination for combining or distinguishing, there being little doubt that this latter activity is cognitively superior to the former: the animal/sensitive imagination invokes an instinctive intention, the human/rational imagination an intention which is reflective and may be learned. The intention is defined by Avicenna as:

"...a thing which the soul perceives from the sensed object without its previously having been perceived by its external sense; but the external sense perceives it first and then transmits it to the soul, as, for example, when the sheep perceives the form of the wolf, i.e. its shape, form, and colour." (Op. cit., Ch. III, p. 30).

So, as our translator, F. Rahman, says:

"...an image qua image is neither painful nor pleasant and therefore the discernment of pleasure, or pain, or harm, etc., on which pursuit or avoidance of the object depends, is an operation distinct from the perception of the image itself.

Where this sense of pleasure or pain, of good or evil with reference to an image depends on previous experience, it involves memory and association. But where there is no past experience, as in the case of the sheep which, for the first time, encounters a wolf and perceiving danger in it flees away, the discernment of danger on the part of the sheep is explained by Avicenna as an instinctive interpretation of the image by the soul, although in this case also the presence of the image is necessary. For Aristotle such an explanation was not necessary, since according to him the perception of the image and that of harm and good is one and the same operation, but it is necessary for Avicenna since he distinguishes between the two operations." (Avicenna's "Psychology", pp. 82-3). The intention seems to be that part of the object which is able to become thought and therefore that, which is common to both image and concept. Brentano was to call intentionality "reference to something as object", emphasising what he called the mental "inexistence" of the object; whereas he makes an epistemological point about the unity of
mental and physical phenomena, Avicenna seems more concerned with conduct but not entirely so: "Now what is first perceived by the sense and then by the internal faculties is the form, while what only the internal faculties perceive without the sense is the intention." (On. cit., Ch. III, p. 50). Avicenna's "intentions" also form the basis of memory, "the retentive or recollective faculty" which thus stores what in Aristotle we called "related images"; so in Avicenna's example, also used by Leibniz in "Monadology", the dog will always associate being beaten with the stick with which it is beaten. Whether the intentions be conceptual, moral, or emotive, Aristotle, Avicenna and Brentano are all agreed that the mind is dependent upon the derivatives of sense for its content.

The authority of Avicenna's Aristotelian psychology was strong and persistent in the Arab world, and is clearly seen in the writings of Al-Ghazālī, to judge from Averroes' lengthy comments and quotations. Al-Ghazālī, describes three internal faculties which he locates in the three ventricles of the brain. In the foremost part of the brain he has the "common sense" which retains the images of things seen and combines them to form perceptions, and in the posterior ventricle he puts the estimative faculty which is "that which apprehends the intentions" and which differs from the common sense, the "representative faculty", which "apprehends the forms":

"..and the meaning of 'forms' is 'that which cannot be without matter, i.e. body', whereas the meaning of 'intentions' is 'that which does not require a body for its existence, although it can happen that it occurs in a body' — like eternity and concord." (Averroes, op. cit., Vol. I, sec. 54k).

(2) Of "estimative faculty", Van Der Bergh says (Averroes, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 188), "..the term is one of the different translations of the term phantasia, but has acquired a special sense — in the Latin translations it is called via conscientia."
(5) Op. cit., sec. 54f. Van Der Bergh, (Vol.II, p.188) says of the Arabic: "..instead of 'intentions' I might have translated it 'meanings' or 'significations'." The Latin is intentionem — "..an intention is what subsists in conformity with rational presentation."
In the middle ventricle Al-Ghazālī sites the two imaginations of Aristotle and Avicenna, the animal (sensitive) and the human (deliberative), calling this latter the "cognitive faculty". It is the function of this faculty to "combine the sensible forms and to compose the intentions with the forms", and as it is between the other two ventricles or faculties man "can imagine a horse that flies and a being with a head of a man and the body of a horse, and other combinations, although he has never seen such things." (Loc.cit.).

So these acts of combining and composing, performed by a creative imagination, are ingeniously explained by Al-Ghazālī as abilities of a faculty which receives both form and intention of an object. Receiving the form or image of all objects, and their intentions or meanings, it is able to separate these and to reallocate them, giving new meanings to the forms (or images) of objects. To complete his internal faculties, and to bring their total up to the give of Avicenna, Al-Ghazālī adds two kinds of retention; one is "of forms of sensible things" which occurs "as wax retains impressions", and this belongs to the representative faculty. The other, based on a similar model to the first, is of intentions which "are impressed" on the estimative faculty and retained in the memorative faculty. (Op.cit., sec.54).

In all of the foregoing account, Al-Ghazālī's views are very closely modelled on those found in the Psychology of Avicenna. Augustine's belief in the effects on our bodies of spirits, which he likens to the effects of bile, is also expressed by Al-Ghazālī. When the soul imagines something, he says, "the limbs and the potencies in these limbs" move according to these images:

"so that when a man imagines something sweet of taste the corners of his mouth begin to water, and the potency which brings forth the saliva from the places where it is springs into action, and when coitus is imagined the copulative potency springs into action, and the penis extends; indeed, when a man walks on a plank between two walls over an empty space, his imagination is stirred by the possibility of falling and his body is impressed by this imagination and in fact he falls, but when this plank
is on the earth, he walks over it without falling. This happens because
the body and the bodily faculties are created to be subservient and sub-
ordinate to the soul, and there is a difference here according to the
purity and the power of the souls."(1).
If the soul can move the body in this way, says Al-Ghazali, then : "...it is
not impossible that other things outside his body should obey him and
that his soul should control the blasts of the wind or the downpour of
rain, or the striking of a thunderbolt or the trembling of the earth,
which causes a land to be swallowed up by its inhabitants..." etc., (Loc.cit.).
These examples are cited and justified by Al-Ghazali in order to show how
miracles and other acts by prophets are possible, but we do not have to
look too deeply to see how this, and Augustine's similar beliefs, could
lend considerable support to magical and alchemical practices which sought
to influence things and events with spells and experiments whose rationale
was based on the old elemental science: if like knows like, then the
production of aerial or ethereal essences alchemically is the logical way
of influencing like essences which theological authority says exists unseen
about us. And if it is imagination by which the soul moves the body, then
experiments aimed at affecting the imagination will give the experimenter
a deal of influence over the imaginations, as well as himself receiving
the credit of having a powerful imagination. In this way does imagination
acquire its associations with magic, alchemy, and medieval medical science.
And although these occult practices have to a large extent been disabused,
by modern empirical science, of any working credibility, 'imagination' has
not yet relinquished its association with them.

(1) Averroes, op.cit., Sixteenth Discussion, secs.52-4. It would be an inter-
esting and informative exercise for someone to write a natural history of
similes and metaphors in philosophy and psychology; Al-Ghazali's 'plonk' example
is a case in point, since it gives a lively indication of what other men read,
and what of their reading they found particularly interesting. This example is
borrowed from the 'Theorems and Notices' and the 'Recovery' of Avicenna. It is
also used by Pascal when discussing imagination ('Pensees' 14); he found it in
Montaigne ("Essais", 11, 12). It is also to be found in Burton's 'Anatomy of
Melancholy' (part I, sect.2, subh.3, subh.2.) who describes it to 'Peter Pyrmus'.
As Van Der Berrh comments, (Averroes, op.cit., Vol II, p.172): "He means
evidently Petrus Berus (Pietro Boiro) a famous Genoese physician and an older
contemporary of Montaigne, who in his book De Prestidigitation (chapte de cilbo et
palm) had a long quotation from Avicenna's Psychology without example. Doubtless
Montaigne with his great interest for medicine found it there."
It is not difficult to see the parallel between the attempt at a scientific classification of mental powers and their location in the brain described by the Arabs, and the mystical ascent, in both its dialectal and manic phases, described by Richard of St. Victor. This ascent or spiritual journey is embarked upon by Dante in the "Divine Comedy" where, consistently with the mainstream of mediaeval belief, reason (Virgil) is the guide. According to Avicenna, there is always a part of the sensible, physical experience which is retained by the mind; we should note here the distinction between the image and the intention and their place on what is an ontological scale of mental abilities. Whereas the image is always physical in its origins and associations, the intention is always that part of the physical and imaged which is inherently rational (and, possibly, ethical). The intention is always present; at the animal level it is only instinctively responded to but at the human level there is scope for reflection before action. The image is the form of the object and for Avicenna as for Aristotle and the later Brentano it has no necessary pain/pleasure connections, but the intention does seem to have these and rational connections, entailing a paradox between this connection and the (reflective) separability. Fundamentally then the image remains physical (outer) and the intention mental (inner).
Chapter 4 : DANTE

Dante is a significant and appropriate culmination for the theory of imagination we have so far encountered; significant because in his works, above all the "Divine Comedy", are to be found all the major components of the theory of imagination, and appropriate because of his stature as a creative artist. The "Divine Comedy" is, as I have already said, a record of a spiritual ascent to heaven and as such it owes much to preceding accounts of such an ascent, Platonic, Neoplatonic, Aristotelian, mystical and theological, including within its terms of reference the whole of mediaeval learning, mythology, and elemental science. Although, as we have found, imagination has its associations with the element of fire and with the manic, mystic vision, this Empyrean imagination does not yet, even in Dante, have quite the exalted power of reason. As with the Stoics, imagination must remain subservient, the handmaiden to reason, and not before the sovereignty of reason is questioned can imagination become the "queen of the faculties" as Baudelaire called it. But imagination is still accorded this visionary power in dreams by writers such as Augustine, Synesius, Richard of St. Victor and Aquinas, and this power of imagination has a prominent place in Dante's works. In particular I refer to the "Vita Nuova" and the three great dreams which Dante has during the three nights spent in purgatory – even the number three is significant, as are the numbers of the cantos in which they occur. (See appendix B). The content of these dreams is designed to meet the requirements of the progressive ascendance of the soul, and their imagery is both symbolic and didactic, so that though the narrative is maintained the dreams need interpretation, their content indicates their spiritual quality.

This notion of spiritual progression is almost absent from the "Vita Nuova", for after the initial vision is provoked by his first meeting with Beatrice there is little qualitative change in the content of the ensuing visions. As a treatise on poetry, the "Vita Nuova" unquestioningly assumes that imaginative vision, especially in dreams, is the means of artistic
inspiration; Dante has dreams whose content and import become the matter for his poetical works, and though he has minimal contact with Beatrice herself, she is in effect his Muse, reformulating a myth which was to persist for centuries. After his first sight of Beatrice, Dante says that "Love ruled over my soul..." and that "he began to acquire such assurance and mastery over me, owing to the power which my imagination gave him, that I was obliged to fulfill all his wishes perfectly." ("Vita Nuova", II, 57ff). Henceforth, says Dante, Beatrice's "image" is "always present to my mind". (Op.cit., II, 28). On seeing her a second time, he retires to his room:

"As I thought of her I fell asleep and a marvellous vision appeared to me. In my room I seemed to see a cloud the colour of fire, and in the cloud a lordly figure, frightening to behold, yet in himself, it seemed to me, he was filled with a marvellous joy. He said many things, of which I understood only a few; among them were the words: Ego dominus tuis. In his arms I seem to see a naked figure, sleeping, wrapped lightly in a crimson cloth. Gazing intently I saw it was she who had bestowed her greeting on me earlier that day. In one hand the standing figure held a fiery object, and he seemed to say, Vide cor tuum..." (III, 16ff). He tells us that this "lordly figure" appears "in my imagination" (IX, 12), whilst he is on a journey away from his native city and later, during a bout of illness, he has vivid dreams in which the death of Beatrice is foretold. Aristotle's sceptical remarks against the alleged prophetic power of dreams are ignored, forgotten, or unknown, and the fiery, erotic vision, bearing the heart of the poet, appears in his imagination and is described out of it. It is imagination also which gives to love, represented by the lordly figure, this mystery over Dante which was to inspire the quest which furnishes the narrative of the "Divine Comedy", and so it is to imagination that the incidence of this work of art is owed.
The three dreams of Cantos IX, XIX, and XXVII of the "Purgatorio" have several features in common as well as significant differences. All are hypnotogogic, heralding a new dawn, and they all allow of a strictly psychological interpretation as well as having great symbolic, rather than merely decorative, importance. So, as he says in Canto IX, these dreams occur "at the hour near morning ... when our mind ... is in its visions almost prophetic". Here, as in "Vita Nuova", Dante constantly speaks of what "seems" and "appears", but the significance of these appearances is very great; as he remarks in the "Convito", "...we have a continual experience of our immortality in the divinations of dreams; which could not be, if in us there were no immortal part...". In the first dream, an eagle(1) "with feathers of gold" and "terrible as lightning" catches him up like the mythical Ganymede, "as far as the fire", i.e. to the sphere of flame which the Pythagoreans believed surrounded the world: "... there it seemed that it and I burned together, and the imagined fire so scorched that perchance my sleep was broken." (Canto IX. II. 51ff). When he wakes, Virgil tells him that he was visited by St. Lucy who came to help him on his heavenward journey, adding "... and I in her steps" - when faith leads, reason must follow. So the events of the dream are given an 'actual' explanation as well as having in themselves the symbols of Dante's progress; the eagle may be mythically interpreted as the messenger from Zeus or Jove who, infatuated by the beauty of the youth Ganymede, bears him off to Olympus. The visionary imagery of fire and love is like that of the "Vita Nuova".

It is Easter Sunday morning, and Dante has reached the gate of purgatory.

(1) P.L. Savona. ("The Divine Comedy", Vol 2), sees the eagle as a symbol also of the true empire. "The Home where Christ Himsely is a Roman" ("Paradiso", XXXII. 102). She adds (p.178): "To this true Empire ... the souls of men are brought by the purgatorial path, which is the fulfilling of Justice."
In his second dream Dante sees a deformed, ugly old woman who, on a
closer and longer inspection, comes to appear attractive - beautiful even -
of face and voice. She says she is Siren who had turned Ulysses from his
way, but Virgil, reason, breaks her fascination and reveals to Dante her
ture ugliness again; it must be noted, however, that Virgil's attention
to what is happening is only awakened by a mysterious 'lady' - reason
sometimes has need of the prompting of intuition. (1) D.L. Sayers
identifies the old woman with Lilith (2), though her calling herself
'Siren' invites another interpretation of this dream, for the Sirens were
the daughters of Earth, (3) and imagination is itself terrestrial in origin
according both to tradition and to Catholic belief. On the one hand
the dream is saying that the earthly is foul, and when indulged this
foulsness may come to appear delightful; but these delights are products
of Dante's own self-delusion: he wishes them upon the foul old crone and
so succumbs to the pleasures of his own imagination, loving it for its
own sake rather than as a portent of divinity. This fault of self-
indulgence, of over-elaboration, Dante presumably finds in the first
dream, for between the first and second dreams he has learned that
imagination may be servant or master:

(1) As D.L. Sayers says, this lady cannot be identified with e.g.
Beatrice or St. Lucy: "She symbolises something immediate, instinctive,
and almost automatic: one might call her an intuition, or perhaps the
reflex action of a virtuous habit, whose instant warning puts the soul
on the alert and prompts it to think rationally about what it is doing."
(On. cit., p. 221)
(2) Lilith was the "fabled first wife of Adam", not a real woman but
"a fantasy of Adam's desires"; (see D.L. Sayers, op. cit., p. 220). She is
also identifiable with Hecate, mythological queen of witches, and moon-
goddess, (see H. Graves, The Greek Myths, 71, 38, 7, 75, 1, & 89, 2).
(3) See Graves, op. cit., 170, 1, 174, 3, & 170, 7). The Sirens promised
Ulysses "foreknowledge of all future happenings on earth", and are
sometimes seen as personifications of fever. Even in this image, of
imagination as Siren/Lilith/Hecate, the mythological and psychological
attributes of imagination are resurgent.
"Imagination which so steals us at times from outward things that we pay no heed though a thousand trumpets sound about us, who moves thee if the senses offer nothing? A light moves thee which takes form in the heavens, either of itself or by a will which directs it downwards."


From the mythical format of the first dream, through the second dream which is a product of a more autonomous imagination, we move to the more obviously religious content of the third dream. In the first dream the images are both opulent and ambivalent needing actual and psychological interpretation in terms of St. Lucy's help in Dante's ascension. In this second dream the subtler imagery needs no textual explanation, for faith has awakened reason to recognise and to overcome imagination's ambivalence. Thus the imagery of the third dream is purely biblical, and an assertion of true faith. Dante dreams of the two wives of Jacob, Leah and Rachel, who in the writings of Richard of St. Victor represent the two aspects, the active and the contemplative, of the Christian life. Dante realises immediately after his second dream that the "Spirit" is his and man's only way to God (Canto XIX. 11. 1 & 92), and after the third dream Virgil, whose part in the dreams progressively diminishes, finally departs: faith has supplanted reason. The power of vision implicitly surpasses that of reason, and only in the final Canto, when confronted by God does his imagination fail and do words become inadequate to describe the vision:

(1) See E.G. Gardner, "Dante And the Mystics", esp. Ch. V, "Dante and the Victorinos", on Dante's knowledge of Richard's works. There is no doubt that Dante knew the "Benjamin Minor", e.g. Ch.XV, where "In his mystical interpretation of the Thirtyeth chapter of Genesis, Rachel signifies Reason, and Bilhah, her handmaid, Imagination." (Gardner, p.40). Gardner also quotes Ch. XV of the "Benjamin Minor": "Leah is affection inflamed by divine revelation; Rachel is reason illumined by divine revelation; Leah, affection conforming itself to the mark of justice; Rachel, reason exciting itself to the contemplation of heavenly wisdom." (Op.cit., p.270).
"Here power failed the high fantasy; but now my desire and will, like a
wheel that spins with even motion, were revolved by the love that moves
the sun and the other stars." ("Paradise", Canto XXXIII, 11. 142-5). (1)
It is the "high fantasy" which alone gets so far, in contrast with the
low (earthly) or intermediate fantasy, which, though Dante does not so
name them, we may associate with the first and second dreams and perhaps
with the classifications of the "faculty" psychology of the neo-Aristotelian
Arabs.

In these great dreams of the "Purgatorio" is found a creative synthesis
of more than a thousand years of theory of imagination. The Stoic directives
of Marcus Aurelius to 'erase fancy' and to 'let sovereign reason have the
mastery' so that 'the illimitable tracts of eternity' may be contemplated,
together with the enormously influential triadic divisions of Plotinian
mysticism and the Catholic theology which it shaped, are written into the
"Divine Comedy" and interlarded with the neo-Aristotelian psychology of
the Arabs and Aquinas, and the profuse and labyrinthine imagery of ancient
myths, Pythagoreanism, and number symbolism. In this monumental work,
created ostensibly to the glory of God but essentially to its own glory,
imagination stepped out of itself and made from itself something greater
than the sum of its parts. Dante understood, as Plato and Plotinus had
before him, though perhaps even more clearly than they, that success or
failure in art, philosophy, and theology are a measure of the degree to
which one intimates the uncommunicable. But with all its vast store
of natural imagery and esoteric learning, the "Divine Comedy" is fundamentally
intended to be a Christian allegory, and despite Dante's own love of honour
and esteem, a devotional work. Even during his own lifetime he was regarded
as a theologian and philosopher as much as a poet, though it must be said
that in elevating faith above reason and making imagination the human
vehicle for both, he is intimating to believer and unbeliever that imagination
(1) J.B.Sinclair, in a note to this passage ("Divine Comedy" Vol. II, p.486,
note 74) says : "Fantasia is defined in the Convito as 'the power by which
the intellect represents what it sees."
transcends rational thought to avail itself of a purer plane of mental life. Whether this plane is a psychic gift granted to the faithful, or an innate psychical or mental quality of a small number of individuals, or a mythological nonentity, comes to be a problem of some moment.

Anticipating the demise of metaphysics and religious belief, an empirically based epistemology must contend with, or ignore, this problem, aware that in the works of Plato, Plotinus, and Dante, is to be found the most eloquent testimony to the existence of this 'higher plane'; in the daemon of Socrates, the mystic vision of Dante, and the 'forgetfulness' of Plotinus, we have found striking similarities which become identified with the burgeoning concept of imagination. But under the restrictive authority of a monotheistic religion this imagination, now vaunted, now damned, certain of identity if not of allegiance, was devoured and disciplined by a voracious god; only with the brief tolerance of a leaky theology, in magic, witchcraft, and pagan mythology, did imagination purport to serve other masters.

With Dante, as M.W.Bundy says, "we complete a full circle of thought", (op. cit., p.269), and may now conclude this second part with a short summary of what we have so far found, always keeping in mind the fundamental contributions of Plato and Aristotle, on whom the theory of imagination, up to and including Dante, is based. From the synthesis of Platonic metaphysics, with the contrasting "dialectic" and "manic" routes to the eidos, and the philosophy of mind of Aristotle's De Anima, we have pursued a multi-faceted theory of imagination which, taken in its entirety, is not a coherent whole. There is an immediate conflict between the image viewed as an epistemological necessity but also as an ethical inferior, a conflict which is manifest in the "dialectical" Plato and in Stoicism. The ethical inferiority of the image also conflicts with the manic notion, largely ignored by Aristotle, which was reformulated by the early Christian mystics owing partly to traditional beliefs in the prophetic powers of dreams but mainly to
biblical references to divine revelation in dreams. The association of imagination with medieval and Pythagorean science and cosmology, linked with the spiritual and demonic powers of this oneiric imagination, became the basis of alchemical and magical notions of a ubiquitous imagination whose nature was thought to resemble elemental fire and aether. But somewhat in opposition to these occult ideas the Arab psychologists, working from Aristotelian texts and a primitive knowledge of the brain, constructed a "faculty psychology" in which imagination is related to sense, given an autonomous function, and related to reason. That rational part which persists in the world of sense and imagination is the intentio, a conception which Brentano was later to revive.

Finally, in Dante, we have found what may guardedly be seen as a forerunner to the imagination, empyrean in tendency, of the Romantics; but this "high fantasy", with its implicit aesthetic power in the creation of works of art, was to remain unsung for more than four centuries owing to the dominance of God and reason.
APPENDIX A.

On "Timaeus", see Klibansky, op. cit., pp. 28-9: "This dialogue, or rather its first part, was studied and quoted throughout the Middle Ages, and there was hardly a mediaeval library of any standing which had not a copy of Chalcidius' version and sometimes also a copy of the fragment translated by Cicero. Although these facts are well known, their significance for the history of ideas has perhaps not been sufficiently grasped by historians. The "Timaeus" with its attempted synthesis of the religious teleological justification of the world and the rational exposition of creation was, throughout the earlier Middle Ages, the starting point and guide for the first groping efforts towards a scientific cosmology."

"But apart from their value for the development of science, the Timaeus and the literature to which it gave rise preserved, through the centuries in which an attitude of contempt towards the visible world was prevalent in the accepted Church doctrine, the memory of the Hellenic appreciation of the rational beauty of the universe. It was precisely this fusion of the rational-mathematical, the aesthetic and the religious elements in the contemplation of the universe, this glorification of the cosmos, that appealed to the philosophers of the Renaissance and deeply influenced their cosmological outlook." See also "Timaeus", secs. 40 & 42-43.

(Sensation, for example, is explained as irregular motion caused by welding together the soul and the elements of the body). Klibansky has already mentioned the influence of "Timeaus" on Renaissance thought.

In this context, it is worthwhile mentioning the association of each of the four elements with the regular solids. (The fact that there are five regular solids was to cause some difficulty to the practitioners of number symbolism.). The solids, all based on the isosceles or scalene triangle, correspond to the elements: the cube - earth, the octahedron - air, the icosahedron - water, the pyramid - fire, and the dodecahedron - the cosmos.

The fifth construction is mentioned almost as an afterthought by Timaeus (Sec. 55).
but as the fifth essence (quinta essentia) it is the very highest, the quintessence, though its elemental nature is inevitably unknowable. The geometric structure of these solids forms the basis for the plane geometry upon which many great paintings of the quattrocento are realised, though the circle is also very important in this respect, for the sphere is associated with the soul (Tim. sec. 48) and so the soul is sited in the head, most nearly spherical of the parts of the body.

The linking of fire with vision has enormous mystical importance; there is a further link, however, of equally great importance for the present work, between these and imagination. So far, this mystical triad has been found to be implicit in Aristotle's elemental science and partly in Plotinus, but only through an understanding of the Biblical, Pythagorean, and mystical ingredients which combine and complement each other in this triad can the concept of imagination, even in its modern usage, be fully elucidated. As already intimated in the manic route to the Platonic eidos, and in passages of the "Enneads" of Plotinus, the ecstasy of the mystic vision comes, as we shall see, to be the apogee of imagination; but, inoffable and inarticulable, the vision's aptest metaphor is light. Thus, from Book VI of "Republic" where the sun symbolises the Good, through the entire history of mysticism, the brightest things have been used to symbolise the vision, and hence the importance of the sun, moon, and fire for the mystic and the shaman. Perhaps the most moving is Pascal's account of his vision: "From about half past ten in the evening until half past midnight. Fire 'God of Abraham, God of Isaac, God of Jacob,' not of philosophers and scholars. Certainty, certainty, heartfelt, joy, peace..." etc. The Christians of the Middle Ages would not have failed to see the significance of (e.g.) God's appearing to Moses as fire, and of the paralete's coming, at Pentecost, as tongues of fire.

Thus fire, the finest of the Pythagorean elements and the vehicle of divinity in both the old and new testaments, becomes an obvious symbol for Pascal's vision. But the modern notion of the symbol hardly does justice
to the unity of identification which the four elements indicate, for as knowledge is of like by like, so fire (for Moses as for Pascal), the sun, the One (for Plotinus and for numerologists), are not simply "seen as" God, but are God, in a unity of states of being.

APPENDIX B.

Numbers have a great symbolic significance for Dante, as for many of his contemporaries, and so any numbers occurring in his works, as well as the very numbering of Cantos etc., have a wealth of importance which his contemporary readers would have understood but which is lost to the modern reader. V.F. Hopper's "Medieval Number Symbolism" is an absorbing account of this lost language of number, and he tells of the "striking unanimity of all ages and climates in regard to the meanings of a certain few number symbols." And, "An examination of these earliest number symbols indicates that numbers originally carried concrete associations, as a result of man's early inability to comprehend abstraction." (op.cit., p.3) In pp.4-8 of this work Hopper recounts the significance of the number 3 and its multiples, which are particularly relevant to our present study of Dante's conception of imagination. So: "The idea of 3 as implying the superlative, or the all, was never lost. It appears in such common phrases as terfelix and trimmegistus, in the use of the trident and triple thunderbolt as symbols of greatness and power, in the Egyptian hieroglyphs where a single bar marking the picture of an object indicates but 1, a double bar 2, but 3 lines indicate 3 or an indefinite number of objects. As Aristotle put it, 'Of two things, or men, we say 'both' but not 'all'. Three is the first number to which the term 'all' has been appropriated'." (op.cit., pp.4-5; the Aristotle quotation is from De Caelo, I.1.) In this way, "... the all-embracing 3 became the most universal number of deity." (op.cit., p.5) The occurrence of groupings of 3 is common in folklore, as Hopper says, where one finds, e.g., 3 wishes, 3 applies, 3 suitors; 'everything happens in threes' as is sometimes said. Dante's passing of 3 days and nights in
Purgatorio is therefore not to be taken literally: it means he spent a very long time. That he has 3 dreams means they are divinely significant, a fact which is underlined by the numbers of the Cantos of "Purgatorio", wherein the dreams occur. As thrice three, nine is also a most important number, and in part XXIX of the "Vita Nuova" Dante explains its meaning: "...thinking more deeply and guided by infallible truth, I say that she herself was this number nine; I mean this as an analogy, as I will explain. The number three is the root of nine, because, independent of any other number, multiplied by itself alone, it makes nine... therefore if three is the sole factor of nine, and the sole factor of miracles is three, that is, Father, Son and Holy Ghost, who are three and once, then this lady was accompanied by the number nine, that is, a miracle, of which the root, that is, of the miracle, is nothing other than the miraculous Trinity itself." Thus, as Hopper says: "With the adoption of 10 as a complete cycle, the number 9 comes into prominence as 'almost complete'. Troy was besieged for 9 years and fell on the tenth. Odysseus wandered 9 years and arrived home on the tenth. The 9-10 relationship is very common in the "Iliad" and the "Odyssey", which both indicate a much earlier stage of number symbolism than the most ancient of Babylonian tablets." (op. cit., p.10).
PART 3: RENAISSANCE MAGIC.
Introduction.

In this third part I shall consider the theory of imagination of magical and alchemical practitioners during the Renaissance and post-Renaissance period. Particular reference will be made to the Hermetic texts, Marsilio Ficino, Giordano Bruno, Paracelsus, and Jakob Boehme, finding in the latter’s obscure mystical writings a culmination, in largely alchemical language, of the magical and quasi-scientific beliefs of his forerunners brought to the service a visionary mysticism which is reminiscent of Richard of St. Victor. Before Pletho brought the ancient Greek, Neoplatonic, and Gnostic texts to Italy, magic was frowned upon by the establishment though not actually banned, but the Renaissance saw an upsurge of interest in occult practices; as P.A. Yates says of the magician: “Respectable people might sometimes employ him surreptitiously and he was much feared. But he was certainly not publicly admired as a religious philosopher. Renaissance magic, which was a reformed and learned magic, and always disclaimed any connection with the old ignorant, and evil, or black magic, was after an adjunct of an esteemed Renaissance philosopher. This new status of magic was undoubtedly mainly due to that great flood of literature which came in from Byzantium, so much of which dated from those early centuries after Christ in which the reigning philosophies were tinged with occultism. The learned and assiduous reader of such authors as Iamblichus, Porphyry, or even of Plotinus, could no longer regard magic as the trade of ignorant and inferior persons.” ("Giordano Bruno and The Hermetic Tradition", pp. 17-18).

Prominent and very influential in the rise of Renaissance magic were a group of Gnostic texts, translated into Latin by Marsilio Ficino, known as the "Corpus Hermeticum". The authorship of these works was (wrongly) attributed to Hermes Trismegistus, an alleged contemporary of Moses, who was identified with the Egyptian priest Thoth; Hermes Trismegistus, as Yates points out, was probably the most important single figure in the Renaissance revival of magic (op.cit., p.18).
In common with the Greeks, the Renaissance Humanists believed in the value of things ancient: the older a piece of work, the greater the likelihood of its authenticity, since it was nearer the origin of all things and therefore nearer the 'Maker'. It was believed on very good authority, (that of Augustine and Lactantius, see Yates, op. cit., pp. 6 & 67), that the works of Hermes Trismegistus were older than the Bible, and that Egypt, the land of their origin, was the source of many of the beliefs of Pythagoras and Plato; it is salutary to note that the Medici ordered Ficino to translate the "Hermética" before the works of Plato (1). But within a hundred years of Ficino's translation doubts were raised about their antiquity, and their final dating of the 3rd century A.D. or thereabouts, by Casaubon in 1614, was, as Yates very persuasively argues, an event of immense importance in the history of Western European civilisation(2). By then the Hermética had spread their considerable influence, reinforcing the Pythagorean and Neoplatonic idea of the cosmos as a living thing (see Yates, op.cit., p.380), helping to make magic respectable — Pope Alexander VI dabbled — but, most significantly of all, gave to men the impetus to study the natural world. The magician was an "operator" as was the alchemist, astronomer, and early scientist, but the impulse to operate, to become occupied in base manual or mechanical tasks, was hitherto considered unworthy and unsuitable compared with occupations such as rational, philosophical or theological speculation. Although the operational methods of magic and other occult practices now seem

(1) This was in 1471, As G.R.S. Mead says, ("Thrice Greatest Hermes", Vol. I, p.2). Ficino's translation of the "Hermética" was enormously popular and ran to 22 editions during the period 1471-1611, being printed in Venice, Paris, Basle, Lyons and, in 1611, in London. See Appendix A. (infra) on the "Hermética" (2) The Platonic revival enjoyed continued support in England by the Cambridge Platonists, and Cudworth even attempted to refute Casaubon's dating of the "Hermética" (see "The True Intellectual System of The Universe", Vol.2, p.127). The extent of Ficino's influence on English literature has never been fully researched, as S.R.Jayne points out in his Introduction to the translation of "Marsilio Ficino's Commentary on Plato's Symposium". For short accounts of this influence see P.O.Kristeller, "Renaissance Philosophy and the Mediaeval Tradition", and Jayne, op. cit., pp.77.
wayward and misguided, what is important is the shift to attitude which
gave respectability to operations and which ultimately fostered modern
empirical science. Whereas this shift was not solely effected by the
"Hermetica" and magic, these Gnostic texts played a great part in shaping
man's emerging notion of himself as the potential and actual maker of his
own destiny.

To explain the impact of the "Hermetica" on the Renaissance it is
necessary to compare the Hermetic notion of man with the Mosaic. Both are
created in the image of God, but Adam has no divinity and no creative power,
and his desire for knowledge brings his downfall. Hermetic man, wanting
to imitate his maker by himself being creative, is allowed to do so; he has
the gift of creative ability, resembling and ultimately rivalling his maker:
"The Fathers of the Church had placed man in a dignified position, as the
highest of the terrestrial beings, as spectator of the universe, as the
microcosm containing within himself the reflection of the macrocosm. All
these orthodox notions are in the oration on the Dignity of Man, but the
Dignity of Man as Magus, as spectator, and the magical power of marrying
earth to heaven rests on the gnostic heresy that man was once, and can
become again, through his intellect, the reflection of the divine mens,
a divine being. The final revaluation of the magician in the Renaissance
is that he becomes a divine man. Once again one is reminded of a parallel
with the creative artists for this was the epithet which their contemporaries
awarded to the great, of whom they often speak as the divine Raphael, or the
divine Leonardo, or the divine Michelangelo."

This idea of man as creating in his sphere of operations as God does in
His is clearly important in art as it is in science, and I shall say more
of it later; and whereas the optimistic, teleological gnosis of man as
divine does much to shape this idea, the more Platonic, pessimistic and
dualistic notion of man as having an allotted and inescapable place in the
scheme of things is also influential. (1) There are two aspects to Renaissance magic, the demonic and the spiritual, (2) and the status of Magus such as was sought by Giordano Bruno is an unresolved combination of Socratic daemon and pantheistic magician. The optimistic, spiritual magician purports to affect and influence objects, events, and people by manipulating the basic elements of the cosmos, in an undertaking which is largely based on the belief, Pythagorean, Empedoclean and Hermes in origin, that like is known by like. This is supported by a belief in 'God' as the primum materia of the cosmos, from which come Intellectus, Spiritus and Materia. The spiritual magician seeks to introduce spiritus into materia, and imagination, closely related to "spirit" (3), is the indispensable medium for this operation - "the basis of most theories of natural magic is the power of imagination." (Walker, op. cit., p.149). Broadly speaking, spiritual or natural magic seems to have been more outward looking than its demonic counterpart, and as practiced by Paracelsus it was put to curative or medical use; he believed, as I shall presently show, that it was through imagination that people become sick or well. (4) Demonic magic, although having the same impulse towards universal knowledge as spiritual magic, and recognising the mystical importance of imagination in achieving this common aim, is essentially autodidactic and is addressed to the salvation of the individual practitioner.

(1) On the 'optimism' and 'pessimism' of magic see Yates, op. cit., pp. 44-5. Briefly, the optimistic magician aims to draw down high powers, the pessimistic to rid himself of the evil taint of the earthly.
(2) For a good account of Renaissance magic see D.P. Walker, "Spiritual and Demonic Magic from Ficino to Campanella."
(3) See Walker, op. cit., p.78 : "...the planets and the operator are not supposed to act directly on anything higher than the spirit which is the vehicle of the imagination." On spirit, see also Yates, op. cit., p.68.
(4) See Walker, op. cit., p. 158-9 : "Paracelsus is taken as the culmination of a magical tradition which includes the most diverse members : Avicenna, Alkindi, Ficino, Pomponazzi, who have however the common characteristic of having their magic on the powers of imagination and planetary influence .... Paracelsus is said to differ from the others in that he believes, not only that the heavens influence our imagination, but that the power of our imagination can alter, infect the stars and compel them to produce effects."
What links these four figures whom I shall consider in the next two chapters is an interest in imagination. It is not difficult to understand how imagination, with its long-established place between the objects of sense and the ideas of reason and its associations with elemental science and other occult beliefs, should come to be regarded as having a substantial existence. Whosoever could tap, influence, or control this imagination would have enormous power over the physical and the spiritual worlds and could aspire even to divine status.
In this section I am particularly concerned with Marsilio Ficino. In many ways he epitomises the 'universal man' of the Renaissance, and his range of interests and accomplishments is great; he believed it was possible to unite all areas of enquiry into one, and that there flowed through man and the universe a cosmic spirit, a "first instrument" which linked soul with body and physical with ethereal. The *spiritus* of Ficino is likened by D.P. Walker to the Cartesian "esprit", centred in the brain and flowing through the nervous system, but Ficino's conception has a wider application:

"There appear to be really three things in us: soul, spirit, and body. Soul and body, naturally very different from each other, are joined by the median, spirit, which is a certain very thin and clear vapour, created from the heat of the heart from the purest part of the blood; and thence diffused through all the parts. This spirit receives the powers of the soul and transfers them into the body. On the other hand, the spirit receives through the instruments of the senses the images of external bodies; these images cannot be communicated directly to the soul, because incorporeal substance, which is more excellent than bodies, cannot be given form by them through the reception of images. But at least, the soul, being present to the spirit in every part, easily sees the image of bodies shining in it as though in a mirror, and through them it judges bodies, and this cognition is called by the Platonists sense perception. While it sees the images, it conceives in itself by its own strength images like them, but much purer. Conception of this kind we call imagination and fancy; the images conceived here are kept in the memory. Through these, the eyes of the soul are wakened to behold the Universal Ideas of things, which the soul holds within itself. Therefore it sees a certain man by sense and conceives him in imagination, and in common with its own innate Idea of humanity, by the intellect it contemplates the
principle and definition common to all men, and it preserves what has been contemplated." (S.R. Jayne, op.cit., p.189 Speech 6, Ch. VI.).

This 'spirit' is the 'cosmic spirit' of alchemy, resembling the quinta essentia or aether of Timaeus; this cosmic spirit was thought to flow through the entire universe, providing a channel of communication between the terrestrial and the heavenly. Since according to the "Hermetica", Plato (Timaeus IIIc-IIIa), and Plotinus (En. IV iv 32), the world is one animal, "...its soul, like ours, must have a 'first instrument' which transmits its powers to its body." (Walker op.cit., 12), we can nourish and purify our own spirit by attracting and absorbing it. The ways of attracting cosmic spirit are numerous, it can be done by consuming things which contain an abundance of it, such as wine, white sugar, gold, or the scent of cinnamon or roses, or by plants or animals acquainted with a particular planet, or by Talismans and by Music; in these last two Ficino has much interest, and the latter he recommends most strongly. The belief that music is a particularly effective means of affecting celestial spirit is based on the Pythagorean (and Timaean) theory that man and the universe are constructed on the same harmonic proportions; thus there is a music of the spheres (musica mundana), a music of man's body, spirit and soul (musica humana), and a music of voices and instruments (musica instrumenta). Ficino, who was a priest and a practising physician, believed firmly in the therapeutic powers of music, and wrote:

"Nor is this surprising; for, since song and sound arise from the cogitation of the mind, the impetus of the fantasy* and the feeling of the heart, and, together with the air they have broken up and tempered, strike the aerial spirit of the hearer, which is the junction of the soul and body, they

* On Ficino's use of this term see P.O. Kristeller, "The Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino", esp. p. 235, 239ff; when distinguished from imagination, it is a higher faculty, which forms 'intentions'. Also p.10 fnote 1: "'Intentiones' probably in the scholastic sense of the first stage of universalization from sense-impressions,..." etc. The point about the intention, as we have already seen, is that it is seen as an innate idealising function; in the Phenomenology of Husserl, itself an idealistic philosophy despite its author's protestations to the contrary, the idea of 'intentionality' has exactly this function.
easily move the fantasy, affect the heart and penetrate into the deep recesses of the mind." (1). Music was a balm to the Saturnine melancholy to which Ficino was so susceptible, having 'charms to soothe a savage beast' as Congreve later wrote, but Ficino also used incantations - greatly influenced by the Orphic Hymns - to accompany his magical operations. But though we think of music in terms of melodies and (appropriately) "airs", it is important to note that for Ficino, as for Renaissance music generally, the words had pre-eminence over the instrumentation. Lest the point be obscured, it should be emphasised that Ficino's psycho-physiological notion of spirit, although to be found in a similar guise in Descartes, is a concept which owes its meaning to elemental science; it is a technical term, however vague, which has long been supplanted by the physiology of the nervous and endocrine systems.

By whatever means, images are mirrored into the soul, according to Ficino, and fantasy moves; this much, in so many words, we have long ago found in Aristotle. What we do not find in Aristotle is anything with the symbolic power of Ficino's talismans. These also affect the spirit, but talismans are visual, 'images of the world' to use Yates' pregnant phrase, and vision has a Dantean and Socratic importance in Ficino's philosophy of love. (2) The ability to infuse a visual image with the cosmic spirit was considered a divine attribute and, as we have already had occasion to note, the best of the Renaissance artists were called 'divine':

"And perhaps it is also chiefly in the imaginative and artistic sense that we should understand the influence of the Renaissance magic of the type inaugurated by Ficino and Pic. The operative Magi of the Renaissance were artists, and it was a Donatello or a Michelangelo who knew

(1) M.Ficino, Operaomnia p.651: (quoted by Walker, op.cit., p.6 ftnote 3). (2) The erudite Ficino gives a moving Epicurean account of the function of vision in love, (of how love is a commingling of bloods effected through vision,) which is too long to be quoted here; see Jevne, op.cit. p.297ff.
how to infuse the divine life into statues in their art." for, as she has previously (slightly over-) stated, Ficino's magic "....worked through the imagination, by conditioning the imagination through various ways of life and rituals towards receiving inwardly the divine forms of the natural gods. It was the magic of a highly artistic nature, heightening the artistic perceptions with magical procedures." (Yates, op.cit., pp.105-6). Dr. Yates calls Botticelli's "Primavera" a "figure of the universe", as Ficino understood the talisman, an image of the world designed to attract favourable planetary influence and to avoid Saturn, channelling the spiritus mundana rather than the spiritus mundi into the baffled gaze of the modern art historian. Imagination features largely in Renaissance magic, and clearly, though by strong implication, has a somewhat obscure part to play in Renaissance aesthetic. Disregarding 'spirit', the ontological image and the psychologically motive fantasy, owing much to Aristotelian and to Platonic and pseudo-Platonic epistemology, begin to play an increasingly important part in descriptions and explanations of human activity. Nowhere is this more pronounced than in magic. The Renaissance is ever regarded as a watershed in the history of Western European civilisation, but in weighing the importance of the art-work as talismanic image having a symbolic, divinely orientated power, whose effects are dependent upon the imagination of both maker and beholder. Particularly worthy of reiteration is the role of the Hermetic texts in chrystallizing the creative and operative impulse of Renaissance man; this is of crucial importance in the rise of modern science and in the literature of man's explanation of himself. In both cases 'imagination' plays a leading role. In the interim period when magic and alchemy began to succumb to the achievements of empirical science, imagination, over the go-between, has great prominence as both elemental entity and psychological faculty, particularly in medical practice. But slowly, as we shall see, imagination begins to exchange some of its ubiquity for a certain exclusiveness in a modern trend which begins by regarding 'genius' as a function of imagination.
SECTION II

The importance of Picino, in the development of our civilisation, has paled in relation to other, more rational, thinkers. But his belief in the integrity and operational necessity of imagination, although subservient to his idea of 'spirit', represents a step outside the traditional and well established Stoic view of imagination as an evil detractor from the higher ideals of life. The place of imagination in magical operations is more emphatic in Bruno than in Picino. In his express intention to make himself a Magus or a Messiah (1) Bruno believed imagination to be his means of success - "He who in himself sees all things, is all things", he wrote, ("De imaginum compositione", in Yates, op. cit., p.37), - citing Aristotle and Synesius, amongst others, as his authorities. As Dr. Yates informs us, Bruno's unique interpretation and employment of an ancient mnemotechnic skill, handed from the ancient Greeks, demanded a comprehensive imagination such as would give the operator the key to omniscience. (2) Plato's "Phaedrus" is a work which sheds some light on the attempt to understand what imagination meant to Bruno, for he published a set of love poems, "De gli eroici furori", in England in 1585, dedicating them to Sir Philip Sidney. These poems are based on the four types of "madness" which we found in "Phaedrus", and it is clear that for Bruno the universal doctrine of love and inspiration which connects these "furori" depends on imagination. (See Yates, op. cit., pp. 261-2). It is in the "Phaedrus" too that Socrates tells the prophetic tale of how the ancient Egyptian god Theuth invented writing and the reaction of king Thamus, who saw in the invention the death of memory and the degeneration into superficial rather than real wisdom. Apart from illustrating the Platonic doctrine of knowledge as reminiscence, this little fable neatly and aptly indicates what imagination and memory were for Bruno and, up to a point, what they were for any scholar prior to the invention of the printing press. All the knowledge that books could contain Bruno

(1) The messianic illusion was common in the Renaissance, as Yates (op.cit., p. 370) tells us; it was, of course, equally common during Christ's time.
(2) For a full and stimulating account of this skill see F.A.Yates: "The Art of Memory".
sought to hold in his head.

The art of memory required that its practitioner memorise all the details of, e.g., a building - a church was ideal - so that when a large quantity of information needed to be learned the practitioner simply overlaid (or 'attached') images of (or corresponding to) the information on to the already memorised, ordered details of the 'building':

"This classical art, usually regarded as purely mnemonic, had a long history in the Middle Ages and was recommended by Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas. In the Renaissance, it became fashionable among Neoplatonists and Hermetists. It was now understood as a method of printing basic or archetypal images on the memory, with the cosmic order itself as the 'place' system, a kind of inner way of knowing the universe. The Hermetic experience of reflecting the universe in the mind is, I believe, at the root of the Renaissance magic memory, in which classical mnemonic with places and images is now understood, or applied, as a method of achieving this experience by imprinting archetypal, or magically activated, images on the memory. By using magical or talismanic images as memory-images, the Magus hoped to acquire universal knowledge, and also powers, obtaining through the magical organisation of the imagination a magically powerful personality, tuned in, as it were, to the powers of the cosmos.

This amazing transformation, or adaptation, of the classical art of memory in the Renaissance has a history before Bruno, but in Bruno it reached a culmination." (Yates, op. cit., pp. 191-192).

For the non-magical practitioner, the recall of information simply required the mental equivalent of a stroll around the architectural mnemonic; the 'stroll' could start or finish at any point, or even be taken in reverse. Although the mnemonic structure was usually architectural, the zodiac or disposition of the stars could be used, and in this way the memory art was to become, for Bruno, a way of "reflecting the universe in the mind", and imagination the essential faculty in the acquisition of universal knowledge.
"Bruno's magic memory system thus represents the memory of a Magus, one who both knows the reality beyond multiplicity of experiences through having conformed his imagination to the archetypal images, and also has powers through insight. It is the direct descendent of Ficino's Neoplatonic interpretation of the celestial images, but carried to a much more daring extreme." (Yates, op. cit., p.198).

The possibility of 'universal knowledge', or omniscience, thus lies in the use of imagination as a storehouse organised as images in a manner based on the ancient art of memory, and though it can be said that for Bruno the image reflected the object and at the same time stood for a class of objects, as a single object answers to a concept, he certainly regarded the image as more powerful and evocative than the word. He conceives the cosmos as a magical scale, moving from the individuals of sense to the wholeness of the universe, each compounded part of the scale being attached to the next by means of "links", or "ladders of occult sympathies" which resemble Plotinian "emanations" - Bruno's "links" serving the Dionysian function of drawing down the daemon. The links were of three kinds; Incantation (i.e. songs and music); Talismans (i.e. images, seals etc.); and Imagination. This latter was Bruno's chief daemonic device:

"In De Magia, Bruno relates his magical psychology of the imagination to the terminology of normal faculty psychology, which, however, he transforms by making the imagination, and more particularly the magically animated or excited imagination, when joined to the cognitive power, the source of psychic energy. This magically animated imagination is the sole gate to all internal affections and the 'link of links'. Bruno's language is excited and obscure as he expounds this, to him, central mystery, the conditioning of imagination in such a way as to draw into the personality spiritual and demonic forces which will unlock his inner powers. This is what he was always trying to do with his magic memory systems, and the object was, as is quite clear from the closing pages of De Magia, to achieve the personality and powers of a great Magus or religious leader." (Yates, op. cit., p. 266).
We have found references to the synthetic power of imagination and its ability to produce chimaeras, unicorns, golden horses and the like, combining disassociated ideas into new wholes. The grand synthesis attempted by Bruno was not simply of disparate images but was an effort to reconcile the irreconcilable; on the one hand stood Christian theism with an omniscient, transcendent deity, and on the other hand stood Gnostic monism whose deity was omnipresent and immanent. And though the teleological tenor of Bruno's beliefs were strongly to influence Leibniz, the latter prudently omitted to make public the theological consequences of monism and the magical, Pythagorean and Neoplatonic notion of the cosmos as a single organism whose quick is spiritus, mediator of the vis imaginativa, was largely supplanted by a mechanistic philosophy in which men were comprised of "strings and pulleys". This transition was a slow one whose agents were men in whom magical and scientific practices were of a piece, and in an age of transition one expects to find imagination, which is consistently seen as the agent of change, at the centre of interest. With respect to art, this is not the case, except in the talismanic sense of Ficino and Bruno and in the conceptual sense of neo-Aristotelian psychology where art is the "idea" made manifest. The visual and literary arts degenerated into Horatian neo-classicism and philosophy into Cartesian rationalism; only in the theory and practice which bore modern science out of alchemy and magic does "imagination" remain an important concept, and it is not until the end of the 18th century, in the pantheism of Wordsworth, that this magical aspect of imagination was to re-emerge at the forefront of human consciousness.
Chapter 2: PARACELSUS AND DOCTRE.

SECTION I

During the period of transition from alchemy and magic to empirical science the major figures frequently combine interests in the old and the new practices. So we find that Copernicus' diagram of the solar system in his "De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium" of 1543 quotes Trismegistus as the authority of heliocentrism, and though for us the quality of his proofs depends on his mathematics, the sun clearly has great religious and mystical significance for him. Newton was an alchemist, as was Aureolus Philippus Theophrastus Bombast of Hohenheim - otherwise known as Paracelsus, - but Paracelsus was a successful practising surgeon and admired as such by Erasmus. The idea of imagination as an actual and substantial essence is more prominent in Paracelsus than in Bruno, and Paracelsus believed that owing to its power and ubiquity the imagination possessed real medical efficacy. On this power and ubiquity he says: "No place is too far from the imagination to go, and the imagination of one man can impress that of another, wherever it reaches."

("Philosophia Sagax", quoted in F. Hartman, "The Life of Paracelsus", p. 140). He considers too that imagination has a psycho-sexual power, and perhaps developing an idea of Aristotle's that the soul is transmitted into the foetus by the male seed, he asserts that by the influence of God the imagination of man creates semen. Thus the semen has two parts, one coming from the imagination the other from what he calls the Mysterium Magnum or "spiritual monad" - the "universal matrix" as Hartman describes it - and out of this male seed, containing potentially all the bodily organs and the spiritual part of man, the woman makes the child:

"It may therefore be said that the imagination of the father sets into activity the creative power necessary to generate a human being, and the imagination of the mother furnishes the material for its formation and development; but neither the father nor the mother is the parent of the essential spiritual man, but the germ of the latter comes from Mysterium Magnum, and the God its father." (Paracelsus, "Gebraerung des Menschen", 1543).
It was thought that even the gender of the child could be controlled by imagination and commonly believed during the 16th and 17th centuries that the physical appearance of the unborn child could be greatly influenced by the mother through the power of her imagination. (1)

This influence was owed to the foetus' being part of the mother, sharing her blood and imaginative spirits:

"If, for instance, a woman in her imagination strongly conceives of a snail, and then puts her hand upon her knee then will the image of the snail appear on the knee of the child. Her will (although unconsciously) acts in this way like a master, bidding a painter to paint him a snail. Wherever the touch of the hand goes, there will be the image." (Paracelsus, "De Virtute Imaginativa" in Hartman, p. 139.)

If a man commit the "unnatural sin of Onan" the "sperma", says Paracelsus, is taken away by spirits and witches to make Incubi and Succubi and other monsters, and it is no doubt for holding such views that he is called by Thorndike a "pretentious fakir", but the existence of such entities in imagination was really, rather than merely metaphorically, believed by Paracelsus. Occupying a realm between the physically real and the purely spiritual the imagination could affect both of these — "a Ressolute Imagination can accomplish all things", he says, bringing to mind Montaigne's "a strong imagination can bring on the event" — intimating that, as with the imagination's creative power in respect of the life-giving sperm, the effects are not simply to change the given but to bring something into being ex nihilo.

The idea that man in his sphere of activity acts as God in His, creating out of nothing as God did the world, even perhaps rivalling God

in his creative power, had been disseminated by the Hermetic texts. It is an idea which is to be found in England in the Cambridge Platonists; according to Paracelsus this creative power belongs to imagination. As Hartman says:

"Imagination is the formative power of man; it often acts instinctively and without any conscious effort of the will. 'Man has a visible and an invisible workshop. The visible one is his body, the invisible one his imagination (mind). The sun gives light and this light is not tangible, but its heat may be felt, and if the rays are concentrated it may set a house on fire. The imagination in a man in the soul of man, acting in its own sphere as the sun of the earth acts in that of the earth.\textsuperscript{(*)}\) The imagination of man creates in its way as does the imagination of God:

"The great world is only a product of the imagination of the universal mind, and man is a little world of its own that imagines and creates by the power of imagination. If man's imagination is strong enough to penetrate into every corner of his interior world, it will be able to create things in those corners, and whatever man thinks will take form in his soul. But the imagination of Nature is like a monkey aping the actions of man, that which man does is imitated by the monkey, and the pictures formed in the imagination of man create corresponding images in the mirror of Nature.\textsuperscript{(*)}\) (Paracelsus, op. cit., in Hartman pp. 137-8). It is particularly apt that at a time when speculative science was beginning to yield its authority to demonstrable, empirical science, imagination, with its established position between the physical and the mental, should be regarded as the most important of "faculties". The magical and alchemical impulse to be an "operator" probably generated the scientific need for universal method, but prior to the establishment of method the apparent universality of imagination was emphasised and employed. Operating out imagination into reality Paracelsus was no doubt a sometime charlatan,
but his medical and surgical practices were famous and notorious throughout Europe and his far-sighted, plausible accounts of silicosis and syphilis anticipated later developments in pharmaceutic chemistry and homoeopathy. (1)

But with Paracelsus and, perhaps, Jakob Boehme, the natural and alchemical history of imagination begins to draw to a close. Though they were to retain a metaphorical use, the associations of imagination with the blood and the heart were relinquished with the demise of the old elemental biology. In 1628 Harvey discovered blood circulation and in 1637 Sennert attacked the idea of a mother's being able to affect her unborn child by imagination: "The phantasies formed in the brain of the mother cannot be carried to the foetus, for they cannot mingle with the blood." (See Thorndike, op. cit., Vol. VII, Ch. VII, p. 214). The biochemistry of fire, spiritus, and quinta essentia had to wait until the end of the 18th century to suffer its final demise, along with the phlogiston theory, at the hands of Priestley and Lavoisier. Similarly, the astrological kingdom of heaven, supported by the authority of Aristotle and Ptolemy, had been shaken by Copernicus and was further weakened by the astronomical discoveries of Harvey's contemporaries Kepler and Galileo. Thus it was that the trans-substantial medium 'spirit', the ubiquitous, synoptic, consubstantial imagination, and the coalescent doctrine of transcendent divinity and love, all came to be regarded with suspicion and disbelief. Salvation was increasingly shown to reside in reason, method and demonstrability, and in the epistemology of Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz, imagination was given little more status than the eikasia of Plato. In art least of all, during the 17th century, was imagination accorded any creative power such as the Hermetic texts had suggested and Paracelsus averred.

(1) See J.C.Hargrave's article on Paracelsus in "Encyclopaedia Britannica."
SECTION II

The decline of belief in the objective operational powers of imagination is accompanied by a Stoic reassertion of the need always to subject imagination to the dictates of reason. Thus the spiritual and mystical functions of imagination fall into disfavour, though the seeds of Piccione's and Bruno's Hermetic and magical Neoplatonism fell on relatively fertile ground in England, blossoming into Cambridge Platonism and the Quakerism of George Fox and William Law. (1) This hardy perennial English mysticism of great importance for the concept of imagination developed in Romantic aesthetics, for the Neoplatonic tradition enters German consciousness through the writings of Hutcheson and Shaftesbury as well as of Leibniz and the Gnostic mysticism of Boehme. The influence of the latter's work is very hard to state precisely and would of itself merit a study of some length; in range it is great, in depth perhaps less so. (2) William Law was undoubtedly his greatest disciple, but in Germany he has been regarded as the father of that country's philosophical tradition and Hegel, who devoted a lecture to him, considers that through Boehme "Philosophy first appeared in Germany with a character peculiar to itself", adding that "Leibniz thought very highly of him". ("History of Philosophy", Vol. III, p. 188 ff.). R.H. Drinton, author of the best book in English on Boehme says:

(1) F.J. Powicke, "The Cambridge Platonists", in discussing Peter Sterry states: "In Sterry's frequent insistence on the emanative principle is traceable his indebtedness to Platonism or rather Neo-Platonism. Another very marked influence is that of Boehme (1575-1621), whose name indeed he does not seem to mention, but with whom much of his thought and phraseology present a very close affinity. Boehme attracted considerable attention in England...." (p.185, fn. note 1.)

(2) On Boehme's influence see e.g. C.F.E. Spurgeon, "Mysticism in English Literature", p. 27: "The influence of Boehme in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is very far-reaching. In addition to completely subjugating the strong intellect of Law, he profoundly influenced Hume. He also affected Thomas Erakine of Linlathen, and through him Carlyle, J.H. Mill, and others. Hegel, Schelling, and Schlegel are alike indebted to him, and through them, through his French disciple St. Martin, and through Coleridge - who was much attracted to him - some of his root ideas returned again to England in the nineteenth century...." Also Brinton, op.cit., p. 197: "It was, Havel, the two Schlegels and Schleiermacher, all of whom were born about 1770, looked on Boehme as their spiritual ancestor." On Boehme's influence on Newton and Milton see Spurgeon p. 82 and Brinton pp. 72-73. See also A.D. Snyder's "Coleridge on Boehme"; for Coleridge's comments on "Johnson" as he would call him, see "Biographia Literaria", Ch. IX.
"Jacob Boehme has been appropriately styled the 'father of German philosophy*. The ancestry of his thought is no less significant than its posterity, for in him culminated the little known, and less understood tradition which struggled for more than a millennium to demonstrate experimentally a Platonic conception of nature. This so-called 'Hermetic philosophy*, or 'philosophy of the alchemists', is inextricably embedded in gross superstition and imposture. It contained, however, a valuable kernel, which was the sincere attempt to erect a natural science on a Neo-platonic basis. In this effort it failed, but later, married to opposing Lutherism, it gave birth to Boehme's speculations and through them passed into the romantic idealism which characterised the full flower of German philosophy from Fichte to Schopenhauer. Through Boehme the alchemist tradition also passed into English romanticism and into many other protests against shallow rationalism or materialistic science." ("The Mystic Will", p.6). (1)

Boehme was very much a mystical writer who wrote out of his own personal experiences but in a Christian context, using the alchemical language of Paracelsus. His closest spiritual ancestor, in my estimation, is Richard of St. Victor, and like him Boehme attacks what Brinton calls "the oldest of all great problems" - the reconciliation of the subjective, spiritual self with the objective, rational world. There is a close parallel between the manic and dialectic routes to ethos of Plato, the intelligent and rational imaginations of Richard, and Boehme's concepts of the two wills, as he calls them, Vernunft and Verstand:

"As Vernunft is the external human point of view, Verstand is the internal...

(1) Brinton also quotes p.47 of E. Ederheimer's "Jacob Boehme und die Romantiker" : "The philosophy of that time is spoken of as poetic Spinozism. Its chief representatives were Schelling and Goethe. As a result of Boehme's influence the rigid unity of Spinoza's teaching was poetized to a unity of the universal life."

* In E. Pontcroux, "Le philosophe allemand, J. Boehme", (1882).
Divine point of view. What is opaque and meaningless and full of contradictions to Vernunft is transparent to Verstand because Vernunft attempts to go through the external to the internal while Verstand works through the inner unity outward. Vernunft struggles in vain from multiplicity to unity, Verstand beginning at unity sees reality as a whole filled with interrelated forms. Thus Vernunft is conceptual thought and Verstand is mystical experience. Verstand internalises the external. It sinks into the lowest depths of the dark abyss within the soul, and rises up with God's life to a deeper understanding of the same objects dealt with by Vernunft. It can see the meaning of things because it has come out of the source of all meanings. The transition from the partial point of view to God's point of view is the crossing of the deepest abyss in nature, where Vernunft is crucified and all particularity renounced that Verstand may rise to a profounder understanding." (Brinton, op.cit., p.103)

Boehme, a humble Silesian shoemaker, himself had mystical experiences but he understood that although such experience claimed to be beyond the reach of reason, it had to be communicable. He is consistent with himself in seeing that the particularity of his experience, however meaningful to him, could only be fully meaningful if universalised. It was a kind of pre-Romantic irony of Dante's "Divine Comedy" that the more effective the poet's means of describing experiences of an intensely personal kind, the more the means become themselves the focus of attention; in the tension between the nature of the experience and the quality of the poetry the reader may himself have an "aesthetic experience". It is in this gap between the public and the private, the Verstand and the Vernunft, that imagination abides. Boehme was not a poet and the function of his work seems to be more descriptive than reconstitutive: "His object is not to abolish reason but to make it the outward expression of a deeper truth than it can find within itself. Symbol and reality are both necessary but the latter must be the controlling factor." (Brinton op.cit., p.104.)
The dynamic impulse of Boehme's doctrines centres on his concept of the will, a concept which anticipates Schopenhauer, whom Brinton regards as Boehme's main heir, and some aspects of Sartre's existentialism:

"As life is Boehme's organising concept so will is his ultimate. All things are either wills or the objectification of wills. Matter is will contracted on itself. Imagination is will going forth to create. Life is the higher unity arising out of the opposition of will itself." (Brinton loc. cit.) (1)

In this function, imagination is the first reality of the cosmic will, and the existential nature of this will is evidenced by Boehme's deliberate identification of will with activity through the similarity of the German wollen (to will) and wollen (to move about, agitate). The 'abysmal will', as God or the vital spirit, is "the ultimate inner nature of being."

(Brinton, p.106) This abysmal will is as a nothingness, and the process by which this 'nothing' becomes a 'something' is called "imagination" by Boehme. Out of the imagination of God was created the world. Since anything must have material qualities then logically, as Boehme recognised, the materially unknowable God could only be described negatively, as a "no-thing". Through imagination the divine, and therefore the human will, 'creates'; it makes 'something' out of 'nothing', but this creation is really a destruction; it is an 'objectification of the will' (as Schopenhauer called it); a reduction of the more real to the less real, an insubstantiation of the divine. Imagination is indeterminate will becoming determinate; the process is reminiscent of Aristotle's potency-act formula, and a reversal of Plotinus' "forgetfulness"; but Boehme clearly states the need for "substance":

"Where no substance is there is no creating, for a creating spirit is no conceivable substance, but it must draw substance into itself through its imagination else it would not subsist" ("Incarcement", I, v.50)

(1) Brinton adds here: "This voluntarism made strong appeal to the Romanticists. If the classic spirit is the influence of thought on will, the romantic is the influence of will on thought."
All of this shaping, creative volition is a manifestation of the Verstand. This is positive, outgoing, active will which determines the structure of whatever it encounters; it does not simply encounter the physical world sensually, but penetrates the sensual to a 'mirror world of imagination' where it finds itself reflected and thus acquires a deeper knowledge of itself. This reflection is indistinguishable from Plotinus' "forgetfulness". In divine terms, the beginning of all being is in the imagination of the Ungrund, as it observes itself in the world (Grund). The cosmos is the imagination of God, and man stands at the intersection between the Ungrund and the Grund, between the Verstand and Vernunft. This latter 'will' describes a negative, passive acceptance of the external world, it relates to objectivity, and through its imagination by a kind of 'effort of attention' takes the form of that upon which it is centred.

In his "Aurora", Boehme speaks of seven "Qualleister", or forces (qualities) of nature. The first three, or lower ternary, seem to correspond to Vernunft; then there is a mid-point; and then the higher ternary corresponding to Verstand. The mid-point, or "Durchgangspunkt" is the transition stage from the lower, dark ternary to the higher light ternary, and Boehme sometimes calls it "the Cross", at this fourth stage "Nature must be crucified that it may be reborn". (Brinton p.144). This fourth stage Boehme also calls "fire":

"For the origin of imagination is the first form of nature ...... whence it goes through all forms and is carried as far as fire. There is the dividing bound or mark of spirit, where it is born. It is now free. It may be back again by its imagination into its mother the dark world, or going forward, sink down through the anguish of fire into death and bud forth in the light." (Boehme, "The Six Points", 713., in Brinton p.147).

This fourth stage he also calls, most evocatively, the "Feuerschreck". This "Feuerschreck" is the meeting point of God, man and nature; it also suggests the emotive force of Boehme's own mystical experiences. It may perhaps be interpreted as a kind of pre-Freudian birth trauma, or the
point of death where the soul quits the body; or imagination's instantaneous option for Verstand. In more existential terms, actions may be materialistic, idealistic, or indecisive; but hopes, expectations and doubts rest, in imagination, on a mass of habits, principles or ignorance. For the active will function determines structure, for the passive will structure determines function, and for the indeterminate will imagination may respond according to the dominance of habitual action or passion, or it may experience the "Feuerschrack" of the mystic. Brinton, (op.cit., p.126) finds a resemblance between the Verstand and Vernunft and Plato's light and dark steeds described in "Phaedrus"; we can find an analogy between the "Feuerschrack" and the daemonic vision of Socrates pertaining to the four kinds of "madness" and, again, to Bruno's eroici furori. The significance of these resemblances lies in the developing concept of imagination which, though having no direct counterpart in Plato, becomes with increasing certainty through Ficino, Bruno, Paracelsus and Boehme, the common identity for all of these mystical prodigies.

Boehme had understood that in the cosmos whose secrets and knowledge are greater in depth and magnitude than the human mind could hope to embrace, any interpretation a conception of the cosmos is necessarily a condition of the mind. Mind may limit itself, or it may recognise that its conceptions are less than itself and are products of will shaped in imagination. The imagination is thus an indispensable, working configuration of the known as it is known, but must also be a projection of the honourable. Boehme's concept of knowledge is almost Socratic, though a product of monotheism rather than polytheism, in that knowledge is absolute, identified with a form of omniscience, and existentially viable rather than - if this is possible - ontologically. For Boehme, who had experienced the 'terrifying flash' of mystical revelation, the rational and empirical epistemologies were implicitly a reduction and a limitation of man's potential divinity; they offer kinds of knowledge consistent with their modes of enquiry, (despite claims of exclusivity), but not knowledge itself conceived as gnostic, unified whole.
Imagination, in this ethos, is regarded as the universal agent and medium of this synthesis, and here we recognise a quality of 'Romantic' imagination. Through Paracelsus the trivial, undistracted oniric imagination is explicitly unified with elemental and alchemical science, to become an ubiquitous 'spirit' having a substantive - though unquantifiable - reality, able to go anywhere and to be, or become, anything. Fire and the quintessential ether are very closely associated with this conception of imagination, an association which modern metaphorical speech still maintains. The important question, made pressing by the refutation of elemental science and the phlogiston theory, and by an increasingly vigorous epistemology and psychology, is whether "imagination" can maintain its pretensions to the immanent, the transcendent, and the universal, and still remain a serviceable concept. This question may be unanswerable, depending on the mode of enquiry, since in this broad conception "imagination" is inclusive rather than exclusive of (e.g.) rational and empirical modes. Here we see the power of metaphor, since reason and experience may be regarded as metaphorical excursions into ignorance, in the way that drama is a metaphor for life. The danger, often overlooked by rationalists and scientists, is that limitations become obscured by achievements, and what starts as a mode of enquiry becomes enquiry itself. In this context we see something of the wisdom, and the optimism, of Boehme's determinitive imagination. And in discussing Boehme we discuss a precursor of existentialism and Romanticism, and in his idea of imagination and its implications - symbolic and sensual - we have an intimation of the aesthetic theory which sees art as man's greatest glory, and imagination as the psychological origin of art. Art becomes the statement of man's highest aspirations, and the work of art the focal point of the individual's-infinitising motions, culminating in "inspiration" or aesthetic experience. As Paracelsus had said:

"Intellectual reasoning may arrive at the door of the spiritual temple, but man cannot enter without perceiving that the temple exists or that he has the power to enter." (In Hartman, op.cit., p.271).
As D.P. Walker's book shows, there were several prominent men who, like Ficino, Bruno, and Paracelsus, attempted to create a science out of Neoplatonic, Pythagorean, and other occult beliefs such as Hermeticism. What these alchemists and magicians achieved was a measure of respectability for operations whose nature was hitherto regarded as inferior but whose importance grew with the authority of texts such as the "Hermetica". As well as initiating the rise of empirical science, these operators also developed a concept of imagination whose power was seen as (pseudo--) scientific rather than aesthetic. The attempt by Ficino and Pico della Mirandola to unify all knowledge seems to have demanded an instrument of unity such as Spiritus, which, like imagination, operated between intellect and matter. For Ficino it was music which was the primary medium of Spiritus, a view which has less originality when we remember that Renaissance music stressed words rather than music and that Plotinus had suggested the importance of language in linking the higher reaches of imagination with the mind. The visual and tactile equivalents of the Ficinian incantations were Talismans, amongst which we may count, as Dr. Yates says, a number of Renaissance paintings.

With his ability to concentrate and synthesise many visual images into one the artist thus achieves the status of Magus such as was sought by Giordano Bruno. Bruno's assertion that he who in himself sees all things is all things, put into practice through the ancient art of memory, gives to the imagination as associative a talismanic function and to the owner of such an imagination a messianic status such as was held by Socrates, Christ, and Hermes Trismegistus. Imagination is seen to have a symbolic and empyrean power but this power is a magical one, tied to magical beliefs and practices. Whereas Bruno's quest was largely autonomous, the medical activities of Paracelsus were more social although they were partly alchemical and magical and partly "medical" in a more modern sense. And though the substantial and ubiquitous power which Paracelsus credited to imagination was greatly over-stated we should not be too dismissive, as perhaps modern practitioners are, of psychosomatics. But the demise of elemental science brought the
demise of this potent concept of a magical imagination, though some of the old doctrines, interlarded with neo-Victorian mysticism, were passed on by Boehme, who was an admirer of Paracelsus. Boehme is a link between the old magical and Gnostic doctrines and the mystical aspects of Romanticism. The aesthetic which gave to art a kind of religious function and to imagination a mystical one has its precursor in the mystical writings of Boehme, who thus anticipates Blake and Wordsworth as well as having a profound influence on the Theosophy movement of Mme. Blavatskya, of whom Yeats and Joyce were devotees. The empyrean imagination of magic and mysticism moves, in the space of some 150 years or more, from science to art.
APPENDIX A.

There are two translations of "Hermetica" available, G.R.S. Mead's "Thrice Greatest Hermes" and W. Scott's "Hermetica", of which Scott's is easily the best. He dates the "Hermetica" at about A.D. 207-310, (p.8), and considers that they "probably represent the teachings of a man such as Ammonius Saccas (of about A.D. 243) who was the teacher of Plotinus, as Porphyry tells us." (p.2). Plato is the greatest influence on the Hermetic texts, especially Timaeus, and Scott finds no trace of Christianity - which he thinks the Hermetists considered to be beneath contempt - and little evidence of Egyptian beliefs, though the authors were probably Egyptians with a Greek education (as was Plotinus).

There is a notable absence of theurgy in the "Hermetica", whose message is one of self-reliance and steadfastness: "Think things out for yourself and you will not go astray." ("Hermetica" XI, ii). The following quotations will give a clear indication of the significant beliefs expressed in the "Hermetica":

"......all things that come into being come out of things that are, not out of things that are not." ("A Discourse of Hermes Trismegistus to Asclepius" Lib. II Sec. 13).

The philosophy of the "Hermetica" is teleological:

"......the Kosmos ......has been made by God. The Kosmos is ever-living; for it is made immortal by the Father, who is eternal. The Father has not been made by another; if he has been made at all he has been made by himself; but it ought rather to be said that he has never been made, but ever is. But the Kosmos is ever being made." ("A Discourse of Hermes Trismegistus" Lib. VIII Sec.2).

"......man......has been made in the image of the Kosmos. Man differs from all other living creatures upon the earth, in that he possesses mind, for do the Father has willed; and not only does man find himself to be in union with the second God, but he also apprehends by thought the first God. He perceives the second God as body; he apprehends the first God as bodiless." (op.cit., Sec.5)
"Men think there is a difference between sense and thought, in that sense
is connected with matter, and thought with incorporeal and eternal substance.
But I hold that sense and thought are united, and cannot be separated....."
(Op.cit., Lib. IX Sec.1.b.)

"And there will never come a time when anything that exists will cease
to be; for God contains all things, and there is nothing which is not in
God, and nothing which God is not. Nay, I would rather say, not that God
contains all things, but that, to speak the full truth, God is all things."
(Op.cit., Sec. 9.)

"And the vice of the soul is lack of knowledge" (Op.cit. Lib. X Sec.8.b.)
(This is in direct opposition to original sin, and the fall of Adam owing
to his desire for knowledge).

"For men is a being of divine nature; he is comparable, not to other living
creatures upon earth, but to the gods in heaven. Nay, if we are to speak
the truth without fear, he who is indeed a man is even above the gods of
heaven, or at any rate he equals them in power. None of the gods of heaven
will ever quit heaven, and pass its boundary, and come down to earth;
but man ascends even to heaven, and measures it; and what is more than all
beside, he mounts to heaven without quitting the earth; to so vast a
distance can he put forth his power. We must not shrink from saying that
a man in earth is a mortal god, and that god in heaven is an immortal
man." (Loc. cit., Sec. 24b)

"Bid your soul travel to any land you choose, and sooner than you can
bid it go, it will be there. Bid it pass on from land to ocean, and it
will be there no less quickly; .......Bid it fly up to heaven, and it will
have no need of wings; nothing can bar its way ......And should you wish
to break forth from the universe itself, and gaze on the things outside
the Kosmos (if indeed there is anything outside the Kosmos), even that
is permitted to you. See what power, what quickness is yours." ("A
Discourse of Mind to Hermes" Lib. XI Sec. 19).
"If then you do not make yourself equal to God, you cannot apprehend God; for like is known by like." — "Think that for you nothing is impossible; deem that you too are immortal, and that you are able to group all things in your thought, to know every craft and every science; find your home in the haunts of every living creature; make yourself higher than all heights, and lower than all depths; bring together in yourself all opposites of quality, heat and cold, dryness and fluidity; think that you are not yet begotten, that you are in the womb, that you are young, that you are, that you have died, that you are in the world beyond the grave; grasp in your thought all this at once, all times and places, all substances and qualities and magnitudes together; then you can apprehend God." (op.cit., Sec 20.b)

It is not difficult to imagine the amazement and excitement with which Renaissance men read these passages. The Biblical message of sin, guilt, repentence, piety and damnation, can hardly compete with the fierce optimism of the "Hermetica"; when one considers how wisely read the texts must have been, to judge by the number of editions to which they ran, Dr. Yates’ estimation of their part in the Renaissance looks decidedly tentative. A Ficino or a Bruno, reading this revolutionary message, must have asked "How?" — "How can I achieve this godlike omniscience, this 'grasp of all things in thought'?" The answer, quite naturally must have been "in and through imagination"; for the ubiquitous, oneiric powers of imagination had long been recognised. We are also told in the "Hermetica" of the artistic, image-making powers of man:

"......even as God is the maker of the gods of heaven, so man is the fashioner of the gods who dwell in temples and are content to have man for their neighbours. Thus man not only receives the light of divine life, but gives it also; he not only makes his way upward to God but he even fashions gods." Adding "I mean statues, but statues living and conscious, filled
with the breath of life, and doing many mighty works; statues which have foreknowledge, and predict future events by the drawing of lots and by prophetic inspiration, and by dreams, and in many other ways; statues which inflict diseases and heal them, dispensing sorrow and joy according to men's deserts." ("Asclepius" 23.b - 24.e.)
PART A:

THE PHILOSOPHERS OF THE 17TH CENTURY
Introduction

In this fourth part I am concerned with two things; firstly, to explain and analyse the philosophy of imagination of what are generally considered to be the most important philosophers of the 17th century, and secondly to indicate which aspects of their philosophical tenets influenced subsequent developments in the theory of imagination. Of the five chapters which comprise this part of the thesis the first is on Bacon and Hobbes, the second on Descartes, the third Spinoza, the fourth Locke and the fifth Leibniz. This is a period which saw the demise of the old alchemical and magical practices and the rise of modern empirical science, and philosophical interest begins to centre on the nature and limits of human knowledge and on the establishment of universally acceptable methods of acquiring knowledge. As respect and demand for demonstrable evidence increase so suspicious of the alleged magical, occult powers of an unquantifiable imagination also grow, and this change of attitude is clearly apparent in the works of Francis Bacon. The concept of imagination suffers comparative neglect at the hands of Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz, though the Neoplatonic tradition which so influenced Bacon's near contemporaries Bruno and Boehme strongly informs the reactions of Spinoza and Leibniz to the Cartesian ontology. From the old cognitive triad of sense-imagination/memory-mind philosophers in the Cartesian tradition tend to emphasise mind and its organisational powers at the expense of the other two, in agreement with the Stoic viewpoint; the largely English empirical tradition tends to emphasise the importance of first-hand experience at the expense of imagination and mind. Imagination, with its associations with discredited operations and practices and its long-established amorality, was of minimal importance, and it was not to rise to prominence before the loss of faith in the infallibility of reason and the demise of metaphysics. In this context - the beginnings of the Romantic theory of imagination - we are looking ahead to the publication of Addison's essays "On the Pleasures of Imagination" which owed an enormous amount to the publication of Locke's
"Essay" and which in their turn greatly influenced German aesthetic theory of the (Swiss) writers Bodmer and Breitinger. I have already said much about the mystical tradition passed on by Boehme; this tradition is very important in relation to the "spiritual" aspects of the rising (and established) German nationalism with its strong vein of pietism, and the re-emergence of the notion of a mystical, aesthetic imagination. In the aesthetics of Romanticism the lines of enquiry, which we have been (and are) following, converge. Thus the Cartesian aspects of Leibniz's philosophy are passed on to Kant via Wolff and Baumgarten, and the Pantheism, so regarded, of Spinoza is revived by Herder and Schelling - the latter also wrote a book on Bruno - and Boehme's mysticism greatly influences Hamann. Not even the experts seem to have extricated the exact nature and extent of this dynasty of ideas, but the important point is that the Romantic notion of imagination which currently inhabits art educational theory is founded no less on mystical and magical bases than on philosophical and psychological ones, and that these bases are very closely interrelated. Having considered the mystical and magical, I now turn to the philosophical ancestors of the Romantic imagination.
Chapter 1: BACON AND HOBSES.

SECTION I

The ubiquity and omnipotence of the magical imagination such as we found in Paracelsus and Bruno, and which was consistent with the pantheistic cosmology of Neoplatonic and Hermetic beliefs, comes under rigorous scrutiny in English empirical philosophy. Against the exaggerated claims made for imagination Francis Bacon adopts what can best be described as a scientific attitude; such claims, he says, need to be tested and he will not dismiss them until they have been proved wrong. It is clear from his works that Bacon knew something of Paracelsus, but he is sceptical of the operational or scientific use of imagination as Paracelsus understood it and says that it is poetry which is the product of imagination, and later ascribes the origin of poetry to "wit". This latter view is also held by Hobbes who, stating the origin of fancy in experience, identifies "natural good wit" with "fancy" (imagination). Both Bacon and Hobbes are suspicious of the easy products of inspiration and revelation, favouring the laborious accumulation of knowledge by experience and method.

It is a small irony that Locke should be so critical of the 'schools' since what is loosely called the 'empiricism' is to a large extent Aristotelian in outlook. If Francis Bacon is the father of British empiricism, Aristotle is its godfather, even though, Russell observed, with an uncharacteristic disregard for the truth, that Bacon "was virulently hostile to Aristotle". ("Hist. of W. Phil." p. 523). Bacon quotes Aristotle with approval, and must have understood, as Leibniz certainly did (1) that the 'Aristotelianism' of the Schoolmen was quite different from the true Aristotle. The celebrated and over-emphasised tabula rasa, to which Locke refers in the first edition of his Essay, he got from Descartes, but it originates from the De Animae of Aristotle. For Locke, there is nothing in the mind which did not first appear to the senses, and consequently imagination, in its familiar intermediary role, becomes an adjunct of sense but acts in the opposite

(1) See his Appendix in "New Essays" pp. 675-686, in praise of Aristotle.
direction from the rationalist account. In this way, imagination does not organise according to the dictate of reason, but simply reflects what sense presents to it. Imagination seems here to be denied a creative capacity, but Berkeley's questioning of the principle of natural unity, together with Hume's attack on causality, inevitably effect the elevation of imagination to some importance in philosophy and psychology. These changing fortunes of imagination are reflected, as we shall see, in Addison's "Spectator" essays and in Gerard's "Essay on Genius".

English philosophy the immediate origin of this state of affairs is found in Bacon's Novum Organon, which advocates inductive methods of enquiry into nature. With Bacon the tradition of English critical philosophy begins, and what one encounters in his writings is not a polemic against Catholic phantasising, but on the whole a fine show of plain good sense. His occasional references to Paracelsus and to magical practice generally express reservation rather than ridicule, a good understanding of human gullibility, and an ominously puritanical frame of mind - "The wisest, brightest, meanest of mankind" (1) - "Fascination is the power and act of imagination intensive upon the body of another..... wherein the school of Paracelsus and the disciples of pretended natural magic have been so intemperate, that they have exalted the power and apprehension of the imagination to be much one with the power of miracle - working faith. Others, that draw nearer to probability, looking with a clearer eye at the secret workings and impressions of things, the irradiations of the senses, to passage of contagion from body to body, the conveyance of magnetic virtues, have concluded that it is much more probable that there should be impressions, conveyances and communications from spirit to spirit (seeing that the spirit is above all things both strenuous to set and soft and tender to be acted on; whence have arisen those conceits (now become as it were popular) of the mastering spirit, of men unlucky and ill-omened, of the glances of love, envy, and the like. With this is joined the enquiry how to raise and fortify the imagination; for if the imagination fortified have so much power, it is worth while to know how to fortify and

exalt it. And here comes in crookedly and dangerously a palliation and
defence of a great part of ceremonial magic. For it may be speciously
pretended that ceremonies, characters, charms, gesticulations, amulets,
and the like, do not derive their power from any tacit or secret
contract with evil spirits, but serve only to strengthen and exalt the
imagination of him who uses them. As likewise in religion the use of
images to fix the cogitations and raise the devotions of those who pray
before them has grown common. My own judgement however is this: though
it be admitted, that imagination has power, and further that ceremonies
fortify and strengthen that power; and that they be used sincerely and
intentionally for that purpose, and as a physical remedy, without any the
least thought of inviting thereby the aid of spirits; they are nevertheless
to be held unlawful, as opposing and disputing that divine sentence passed
upon man for sin, 'In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread.' * For
magic of this kind proposes to attain those noble fruits which God ordained
to be bought at the price of labour by a few easy and slothful observances".
("Of The Dignity and Advancement of Learning" Ep. 4. Ch.III pp. 400-401).

Bacon had what we might call a slightly sceptical, enquiring mind, and
when he does describe the alleged powers of magic and imagination in the
use of what he calls "imaginations" - something like Bruno's talismans - he
reserves judgement. He is careful not to condemn such beliefs out of
suspecting hand, perhaps that a strong imagination can 'bring on the event', but it
is evident that what he really requires is some information on how and why
such things seem to work:

"The relations touching the force of imagination and the secret instincts
of nature, are so uncertain, as they require a great deal of examination
ere we conclude upon them." (op.cit.; Sec 985, p.665).

His reservations against magic and the power of imagination are
puritanical in that they rest on the preconception that advantages are

* Genesis iii, 19.
won only by labour; but this is tempered by his realisation that the facts will only be determined by lengthy examination. Presumably such an examination would demand demonstrable, causal evidence of the effectiveness of 'imaginants', for Bacon is something of a materialist who accepts the faculty psychologists' ascription to the ventricles of the brain, of the three 'faculties' of reason, imagination, and sense. (1) Basically his view of imagination is Aristotelian, calling it "an agent, or messenger or proctor in both provinces, both the judicial and ministerial,"(2) in the former capacity it acts according to sense, and in the latter according to reason. But this is not its sole function, for imagination has its own freedom for which Bacon quotes a happy metaphor:

"For it was well said by Aristotle, 'That the mind has over the body that commandment which the lord has over the bondman; but that reason has over the imagination that commandment which a magistrate has over a free citizen." For we see that in matters of faith and religion our imagination raises itself above our reason; not that divine illumination resides in the imagination; its seat being rather in the very citadel of the mind and understanding; but that the divine grace uses the motions of the imagination as an instrument of illumination, just as it uses the motions of the will as an instrument of virtue; which is the reason why religion over sought access to the mind by similarities, types, parables visions, dreams." (loc. cit.) The above passage follows Bacon's division of human learning into three areas - history, poesy, and philosophy - which correspond to the three faculties of the human mind, memory, imagination, and reason. Given a relationship between 'poesy' and imagination, and between 'divine illumination' and imagination, the making of a link between all three - poesy, imagination and illumination - seems to be a logical step to take. Bacon, for whatever reasons, is curiously loath to take this step. deliberately

(1) See "Of the Advancement of Learning" Bk.IV, Ch I, p.278. For a discussion of Bacon's theory of imagination, see H.R.Wallace, "Francis Bacon on the Nature of Man" p.67ff.
(2) "Of the Dignity and Advancement of Learning", Bk.V, Ch I, pp.405-406.

* Aristotle, "Politics", 1.2.
avoiding to ascribe any divine function of any consequence to imagination, and late:; lest the point be missed, he contradicts himself in what appears to be an attempt to deprive poetry and imagination of any divinity:

".... I see no cause to alter the former division; for imagination hardly produces sciences; poesy (which in the beginning was referred to imagination) being to be accounted rather as a pleasure or play of wit than a science"

(loc.cit). Having previously said that 'poesy' and painting are "the work of Imagination", poetry he quickly decides is a kind of intellectual amusement, and so misses an opportunity to offer an aesthetic theory which would have been some 200 years ahead of its time. There seems little doubt that Bacon suspected to where his ideas were leading, since his distinction between imagination and its motions is not consistent with Aristotle's account, which describes imagination as 'a kind of motion'. Perhaps Bacon was suspicious of the esoteric notions which were crossing the Channel, and sceptical of anything not hard-won; but even so, the claims and practices of magic and imagination are at the forefront of his attention.
SECTION II

If Bacon's tone is of polite scepticism, Hobbes' is of bluff common sense. After the prodigies of magic and gnosticism, Hobbes brings us down to earth: phlegmatic, persuasive, but quite misleading. Like the 'science' he so much admires, Hobbes promises and achieves much, but at a price; in his case, as with much empirical and positivistic philosophy, the price of reduction and simplification is distortion. An admirer of Galileo, Hobbes had a healthy respect for the possibilities of mathematics and mechanics, and a belief in the efficacy of method. He is a nominalist, rigidly maintaining the autonomy of material objects and arguing that notions of substantiality, and the concepts by which we identify them, are fictions of the mind. Narrowly avoiding the 'impression' theory of perception, he argues that sense is caused by an "external body, or object, which passeth the organ proper to each sense." ("Leviathan" Pt.I, Ch.1.) This 'pressure' of the 'motions of matter' is transmitted to heart and brain "by mediation of the nerves, and other strings and membranes of the body," (loc.cit.), causing a resistance in brain and heart, a counter-motion and pressure..." which endeavour, because outward, seemeth to be some matter without. And this seeming, or fancy, is that which men call sense." (loc.cit.). Bearing in mind Prof. Peters' injunction not to criticise Hobbes for not having read Freud, (in "Hobbes", p.113), we should not be too critical of his mechanistic models, but Peters is inaccurate in saying that Hobbes ".... simply developed a causal theory of sensation and saw no need for a theory of representation." (Op.cit., p.109). Hobbes' pseudo-causal account half impels him towards a representation theory of sense and imagination, then he quite explicitly distinguishes between the object as it is and the prejudice which may be effected by our perception of it:

"....though at some certain distance, the real and very object seem invested with the fancy it begets in us; yet still the object is one thing, the image or fancy is another. So that sense, in all cases, is nothing else but original fancy..." ("Leviathan", Pt.I, Ch.1). His use of the terms "fancy" and "imagination", in keeping with the habit of his time, is
synonymous, though he knows the Latin, visual origin of the latter and the Greek, "appearance" sense of the former; (see "Leviathan", Pt. I, Ch. II.)

His disputation against the 'Aristotelian' account of the "philosophy schools" is something of a red herring — unless the Schoolmen confused Aristotle with Democritus or Lucretius — for Hobbes' theory of imagination shows evidence of his knowledge of "the philosopher". His celebrated description of imagination as "decaying sense", (op. cit., Pt. I, Ch. II), with its organic rather than mechanical tenor, seems to refer to the motion of the 'appearance' which grows ever weaker with the passage of time and against the continuous demands of ongoing sense although, (pace Peters) the implied uniformity of decay is unacceptable to post-Freudian psychology.

Hobbes might have suspected weaknesses in his theory of imagination from his two divisions of imagination and from his observations on dreaming. Resembling Aristotle, and in anticipation of Locke, he has "simple" imagination which faithfully, and preperceptually, repeats the sensed object, and "compounded" imagination which he calls "fictions of the mind", and of which an example is a centaur as a compound of man and horse. The possibility of making any other than a logical distinction between these two sorts of imagination seems to elude Hobbes, who sees that dreams, active in the absence of the clamour of sense, seem clearer than sense itself, making it "a hard matter, and by many thought impossible" to distinguish between dreaming and sensing. His failure to recognise or explore the epistemological implications of distinguishing between dream and reality, or the cognitive implications of separating dreaming from perceiving, leads him on to very insecure ground. Firstly, out of his confusion he airs an acceptable (to his contemporaries) prejudice:

"From this ignorance of how, to distinguish dreams, and other strong fancies, from vision and sense, did arise the greater part of the religion of the Gentiles in time past, that worshipped satyrs, fauns, nymphs, and the like; and now-a-days the opinion that rude people have of fairies, ghosts and goblins, and of the power of witches." (op. cit., Pt. I, Ch. II.) The inconsistency and illogicality are compounded by his half-hearted
mollification of the established church: "Nevertheless, there is no
doubt but God can make unnatural apparitions...." (loc.cit.) but his
recognition of the power of superstition failed to deflect the charges
of atheism to which he became subject. On top this edifice of confusion,
Hobbes places, secondly, a rather weightier block than it could reasonably
support: "If this superstitious fear of spirits were taken away, and
with it, prognostics from dreams, false prophecies, and many other things
depending thereon, by which crafty ambitious persons abuse simple people,
men would be much more fitted for civil obedience." (loc.cit.). Although
his polemic against dreamers and prophets is vigorous and entertaining,
and very probably a timely and deserved disclaimer, it is based on
assumptions for which Hobbes has established no grounds. The suppression
of imagination in this context is seen as politically expedient, which in
his day could only mean imprisonment and persecution of practitioners of
magic and the like. What is attractive to Hobbes is an infringement of human
freedom, which may or may not be desirable; based, as we see, on prejudice,
it is hardly worthy of consideration. What he does appear to recognise
is that a problem exists about the degree of individual freedom which may
be allowed consistently with 'civil obedience', and that a theory of
imagination has a political significance. The mainstream of European
philosophy has been concerned, one way or another, with the relationship
between individuals (especially of sense) and universals (especially of
reason); this concern may be expressed in terms of a man and an ideal
(e.g. 'God', love,) or an object and a concept. The Platonic and Stoic
expressions of the need to suppress 'imagination' in all but its agreed
and necessary function as intermediary between the sensible and the
rational/divine, and vice versa, clearly have moral and political under-
tones; seeing 'the one in the many' may not be just conceptual or theo-
logical but may also refer to the individual person in relation to the
state. What has been established is that from the time of Plato, Hobbes'
great forerunner in seeing the political threat of an unrestrained
imagination, the relationship between the individual and the whole has always been seen to be occasioned, to varying degrees, by 'imagination'. Only in mystical, magical and aesthetic terms has imagination seemed to yield something more than the immediately-present in sense and reason; and in an increasingly pragmatic world, of which Hobbes was a harbinger and supporter, the mystical (qua 'enthusiasm') becomes increasingly peripheral, the magical irrelevant, but the aesthetic, after the rigours of Horatian neo-classicism, grows in importance.

Whatever the weakness of Hobbes' psychology, it manifests, in common with some of the superstitions he attacks, the implication that imagination is at the centre of human consciousness. He describes understanding as "The imagination that is raised in man, or any other creature imbued with the faculty of imagining, by words, or any other voluntary signs...." (op. cit., Pt.I, Ch.II.), and the primacy of motion, a central consideration in the new scientific age, and which informs his theory of imagination, leads him to describe thinking - "mental discourse" - as a "train", a succession of imaginations. (see op.cit. Pt.I,Ch.III). These may be "unguided", a "wild ranging of the mind", (loc.cit.) or regulated "by some desire, and design": the former (presumably) referring to waking or sleeping dreams, the latter he ascribes to the seeking and prediction of causes and effects: "In sum, the discourse of the mind, when it is governed by design, is nothing but seeking, or the faculty of invention...." Foresight, he implies, belongs to God, but the best prophet is the best guesser, and he the best "who hath most aims to guess by." (op.cit. Pt.I, Ch.III.)

All we imagine, he says, is finite, and when we say a thing is infinite we are confessing our ignorance, for as he has unequivocally stated, ".... a man can have no thought, representing anything, not subject to sense" - only names can be universal. (op.cit. Pt.I., Ch. IV.). Thus reasoning is simply an addition or subtraction of parts, and the giving of "bodies to accidents; or of accidents to bodies", and the giving statements about the infusion or inspiration of faith are regarded as absurd by Hobbes. Reason, he says, in
not gained by experience alone, nor born with us as are sense and memory, "but attained by industry", (op.cit. Pt. I. Ch. V.) When he divides "good wit", as he calls the intellectual 'virtues', into "natural" and "acquired", the latter is reason, "acquired by method and instruction... grounded in the right use of speech, and produces the sciences." (op.cit., Pt.I. Ch. VIII) The former is "good fancy", which is "...gotten by use only, and experience, without method, culture, or instruction" it consists of "celerity of imagination, that is, swift succession of one thought to another; and steady direction to some approved end" (loc.cit.). This swiftness of succession"...is caused by the difference of men's passions" and "...to have stronger and more vehement passions for anything, than is ordinarily seen in others, is that which men call MADNESS." (loc.cit.) Madness, he says, is caused by excessive passion and by "possession by spirits or demons", though the latter is clearly absurd - on his own argument. In his emphasis on the sense as the origin of thought, (given a degree of indubitability), Hobbes is in anticipation of Locke, and the 'natural celerity' of the imagination is intended to be understood as inborn in the way that good physical coordination is 'given', rather than innate capacities of the mind (e.g. Plato's reminiscence) but he is also taking a stand for the new science of mechanics against the old elemental science and replacing invisible powers and substances - amongst which we must by inference include the Paracelsan and magical 'imagination' - with visible, actual, material bodies. In all this there is also an aesthetic theory which is quite different from that of Dante or Bruno.

Discussing the "succession of men's thought", Hobbes offers a guide to distinguishing between imagination and judgement which is both original and instructive, and forms the basis of an aesthetic theory(1); this distinction is remarkable for its brevity, good sense and lack of adherents.(2) On the subject of thoughts he says:

(2) Though a similar view runs through Pope's "Essay on Criticism"
"...there is nothing to observe in the things they think on, but either in what they be like one another, or in what they be unlike, or what they serve for, or how they serve such a purpose; those that observe their similarities, in case they be such as are rarely observed in others, are said to have a good wit; by which, in this occasion, is meant a good fancy. But they that observe their differences, and dissimilarities; which is called distinguishing, and discerning, and judging, between thing and thing, in case, such discerning be not easy, are said to have a good judgment.... The former, that is fancy, without help of judgment, is not commended as a virtue; but the latter which is judgment, and discretion, is commended for itself, without the help of fancy." (loc.cit.) This distinction between the synthesising imagination and the analysing judgment is the basis for this theory of human activities which, he says, depend variously on the interaction of these two qualities, so that in poetry, fancy is eminent, in history, judgment: "In a good poem, whether it be epic or dramatic; as also in Sonnets, epigrams, and other pieces, both judgment and fancy are required; but the fancy must be made more eminent; because they please for the extravagancy; but ought not displease by indiscretion.

In a good history, the judgment must be eminent....Fancy has no place, but only in adorning the style." (loc.cit) (1)

It is significant that Hobbes' materialistic dismissal of superstitious fancies, and his selection of 'classic' poetic forms as examples, should be consistent with the aesthetic spirit of his age, when wit and invention were the poet's special talents, and imitation the aim of art. But imitation, in relation to Hobbes' views on the origins of thought, has a predominantly empirical sense, and he castigates the "inspiration" view of art with forceful eloquence:

"...Why a Christian should think it an ornament to his poem, either to profane the true God, or invoke a false one, I can imagine no cause, but a

(1) Thorpe, op.cit. pp.109-110 writes: "To Hobbes son of genius, whether astronomers, architects, or inventors, discoverers or geographers, mathematicians or statesmen, are to be accounted for by the fortunate union of a quick fancy and philosophic judgment. No one, except the Hobbes-inspired Charleton,....was to say anything like this again for a full hundred years, when Gerard wrote his book on genius."
reasonless imitation of custom; of a foolish custom, by which a man enabled
to speak wisely from the principles of nature, and his own mediation, loves
rather to be thought to speak by inspiration, like a bagpipe.*

Time and education beget experience; experience begets memory; memory
begets judgment and fancy; judgment begets the strength and the structure
and fancy begets the ornaments of a poem. The ancients therefore fabled
not absurdly in making Memory the mother of the Muses. For memory is the
world, though not really, yet so as in a looking-glass, in which the
judgment, the severer sister, busieth herself in a grave and rigid examin-
ation of all the parts of nature, and in registering by letters their order,
causes, uses, differences, and resemblances; whereby the fancy, when any
work of art is performed, finds her materials at hand and prepared for
use, and needs no more than a swift motion over them, that what she wants,
and is there to be had, may not lie too long unspied, so that when she
seemeth to fly from one Indies to the other, and from heaven to earth and
to penetrate into the hardest matter and obscurest places, into the future,
and into herself, and all this in a point of time, the voyage is not very
great, herself being all she seeks. And her wonderful celerity, consisteth,
not so much in motion, as in copious imagery discreetly ordered, and perfectly
registered in the memory; which most men under the name of philosophy have a
glimpse of, and is pretended to by many, that grossly mistaking her, embrace
contention in her place. But so far forth as the fancy of man has traced
the ways of true philosophy, so far it hath produced very marvellous effects
to the benefit of mankind. All that is beautiful or defensible in building;
or marvellous in engines and instruments of motion; whatsoever commodity
men receive from the observations of the heavens, from the description
of the earth, from the account of time, from walking on the sea; and
whateversever distinguisheth the civility of Europe, from the barbarity of
the American savages; in the workmanship of fancy, but guided by the
precepts of the true philosophy. But where these precepts fail, as they

* Hobbes is not consistent in this view. See e.g. "Human Nature", Ch.XI.
(In "Works", Vol._XIII).
have hitherto failed in the decline of moral virtue, there the architect
Fancy must take the philosopher's part upon herself." (1)

His account of thinking and of the part imagination plays is informed
by a particular notion of how the world works, a notion which is not
dissimilar from that of his contemporary Descartes. A nominalist and a
materialist, Hobbes believes that all objects are separate and relate to
each other as parts of a machine; hence his emphasis on the discretionary
nature of judgment. He believes also that imagination should serve
"philosophy", that is, physical science. C.D. Thorpe's enthusiasm for Hobbes'
apparent 'justification of the constructive imagination' is misplaced, since
the "fancy", as is clear from the early passages of "Leviathan", is based
on sense which mirrors a physical world constructed on mechanical and mathe­
matical principles. The construct is already in the world, perhaps not
yet explained by science, but mirrored by imagination; only when it 'traces
the ways of philosophy' does "fancy" benefit mankind. As an admirer of Galileo,
Hobbes would have been interested in the physics of motion and matter which
after his death was to become the basis of modern physics in Newton's three
laws of motion; he would also no doubt be aware of Aristotle's description
of fantasia as 'a kind of motion'. But the prevailing model of the cosmos
in Hobbes' day was a mechanical rather than a dynamic one, and for Hobbes
the "wonderful celerity" of imagination "consisteth not so much in motion,
as in copious imagery discreetly ordered", as though imagination were like
a well-ordered mental library, whose order corresponds to that of the cosmic
machine. His succinct and valuable rule of thumb distinction between
imagination as seeing similitudes, and judgment as seeing dissimilitudes,
demands a causal interpretation: judgment isolates the units of cause and
effect, imagination grasps the whole event. Motion has no substantive
existence: objects move when they collide, the movement being their changing

Thorpe, (op.cit., n.164) comments: "Hobbes has presented in this page one of
the finest justifications of the constructive imagination to be found in
literature."
position rather than some essence which temporarily occupies them. Only in so far as objects can be shown actually and analytically to interrelate can there be said to be imagination.

This emphasis on the discrete materiality of objects is a radical shift from the Platonic and Neoplatonic views, since it seems to deprive mind and the individual of all autonomy save natural wit and madness. What is missing is the scope for interpretation, for a subjective meaningfulness which is significantly and valuably different from the objective. There is no possibility of a creative imagination in Hobbes' account, it can only reproduce or rearrange; wit, invention and discovery are 'fancy's' best occupations, shared by "philosophers", (architects, astronomers, and so on). Imagination is becoming democratised. But the brain-mind correspondence which is implied in Hobbes' psychology has an inadequate model in the machine, be it as complex as a computer; and even Newton's physical laws offered a temporary alternative which was to be replaced by an organic model in philosophical psychology, and by Einstein's recognition of the interchangeability of energy and matter. Hobbes' view of the mind is too simple in its belief that a whole is the sum of its parts and that all the parts are quantifiable, and too naive in its assumption that quantity and quality are proportionate to each other. What is also glaringly absent from his account is any consideration of the mind as having innate dispositions, predilections, or structural principles; he does not even see fit to challenge this possibility.
Chapter 2: DESCARTES.

As I have already remarked, Hobbes and Descartes were contemporaries. Whatever the general differences in their philosophical positions they both regard imagination as an important form of thought. For Descartes all the forms of thought which are "images of things" are ideas - a view which Hume later held - and it is upon the connections of these ideas that our knowledge of the external world and other minds depends. For Descartes however the most certain of knowledge is that which the mind has of itself, by intuition or deduction, and though he is very much aware of the need to distinguish clearly between the objectively real and the imaginary, close examination of his works reveals (as with Spinoza) his confusion of "figure" with "image". As he regarded imagination as a form of thought and therefore as a form of existence, this distinction and confusion are important, but this importance is relatively small in the overall context of Descartes' great emphasis on the mind's essential subjectivity.

Epistemologically and theologically Descartes is an ontologist, a fact which has its repercussions in the representational theory of imagination and perception to be found in Locke, who, besides getting his 'relish for philosophy' from Descartes, quite possibly borrowed his "tabula rasa" from the same source. Descartes in his turn admits a debt to Aristotle, and like Leibniz admonishes the 'schools' for distorting 'the philosopher' beyond recognition. The cogito erro sum ("Discourse on Method", IV p.101) is more than a deduction of being from thought, and may also be understood as an identification of being with thought, with no suggestion - such as may be found in Plato - of an identification of becoming with thinking. The deduction or identity in the being-thought equation is for Descartes a matter of intuition, which he distinguishes from deduction by the latter's involving "a certain movement or succession". He is careful to say what he means by "intuition":

"By intuition I understand, not the fluctuating testimony of the senses, nor the misleading judgment that proceeds from the blundering
constructions of imagination, but the conception which an unclouded and attentive mind gives us so readily and distinctly that we are wholly forced from doubt about that which we understand. Or, what comes to the same thing, intuition is the unclouded conception of an unclouded and attentive mind, and springs from the light of reason alone; it is more certain than deduction itself, in that it is simpler, though deduction, ... ...cannot by us be erroneously conducted. Thus each individual can mentally have intuition of the fact that he exists, and that he thinks; that the triangle is bounded by three lines only, the sphere by a single superficies, and so on ...." ("Rules for The Direction of The Mind" III pp. 7-8).

Knowledge, of thought, subjective existence, and first principles is all intuited; intuition "springs from the light of reason" (loc.cit.). These two methods, deduction and intuition, "are the most certain routes to knowledge, and the mind should admit no others." (loc.cit.) Descartes' idea of intuition has rather a mystical pedigree which relates his epistemology to Plato's, for he believes in the immortality of the soul(1); whereas the body is a perishable machine, the soul, created by God, "... ...has in it something that we may call divine, wherein are scattered the first germs of useful modes of thought." ("Rules..." IV, p. 10). To this divinity of the soul, often referred to by Descartes, and placed in us (he says) by God — of whom this same divinity gives us an idea — (2) his 'intuition' must be ascribed. What looks here like little more than a subjective criterion for certainty becomes, in more mundane, objective terms, a criterion for knowledge when he speaks of a piece of wax as an example of intuited understanding.(3). The wax, deprived of its sensible qualities, he still perceives as "simple flexible and moveable" but as such meaningless to imagination, which cannot admit of the infinitude of changes of which the wax is capable: into a square, sphere, etc.,

(2) See "Principles of Philosophy" IX p. 82, X p. 97, and "Meditations" III.
(3) See "Meditations" II pp. 154-5.
ad infinitum. Without its "external forms" the wax is perceptible only to the mind, he says, and "it is now manifest to me that even bodies are not properly speaking known by the senses or by the faculty of imagination, but by the understanding only, and since they are not known from the fact that they are seen or touched, but only because they are understood, I see clearly that there is nothing which is easier for me to know than my mind." ("Meditations" II p. 157). There is an embryonic Berkeleyan idealism in this position, for Descartes is saying that all he can know in this context is his mind. The positivistic, empirical answer is simple: that the wax has sensible, objective qualities even though we may not be able to find words for them; and if we do not sense (see, touch, smell,...) the wax then we do not know that it exists. In this latter view understanding - the mind's self-knowledge - is a product, rather than the producer, of sense perception. Demonstrability is not considered important, is not even considered, against the intuited certainty of self-evidence; this fact of the Cartesian position is a significant omission in the face of post-Lockean empiricism.

Descartes' "intuition" and "internal light" are subjective, psychological qualities, but his "deduction" is a method and a criterion of knowledge. He distinguishes deduction from intuition, and says that formal ideas such as "duration" and "number" are acquired and, unlike the idea of God, seem to proceed from himself (1). Earlier ("Medita." I p. 157), he had referred to "sciences" such as Arithmetic and Geometry, which "only treat of things that are very simple and very general" and which "contain some measure of certainty" so that "even though I slept the case would be the same for all that is clearly present to my mind is absolutely true". ("Medita." I p. 159). Clarity is, as the cogito implied, the most reliable guide to truth, and "clear" is elsewhere defined as "present and apparent to an attentive mind";

(1) Descartes sometimes says soul and mind are identical, e.g. "Medita." I p. 141., but in "Pensions of The Mind" he attributes mind to brain and the soul is, he says, suffused throughout the body.
("Prince. of Phil". XLV p.37); so, "intuition" and 'clarity' are virtually synonymous and Descartes, confounding his epistemology with his theology, is caught in a circle. Up to a point he can break the circle by demonstrating the truth of his deductions, and in so doing offer a paradigm for knowledge; but a further complication of the 'intuition' theory is the problem of determining the existence of other minds. So within the terms of his subjective-objective, dualistic position, Descartes poses an epistemological problem concerning, in simple terms, the status of 'composite' sciences (e.g. physics, astronomy, medicine) and 'general' sciences (e.g. arithmetic, geometry); and a psychological problem concerning identity and its relation to the alleged identity of other persons and things. In both these problems, some consideration must inevitably be given to the possibility of distinguishing between the objectively real and the possible misapprehensions of imagination, a distinction which is rather more important in philosophies which argue the priority of sense. And in a rather more sceptical climate of opinion than Descartes placed himself, distinguishing between intuitions and images also poses a problem.

Descartes regards imagining as a mode of thought, but can conceive himself apart from imagination and feeling as they are "faculties employing modes of thinking". There are difficulties here involving the ontological nature of his position; Descartes cannot speak of himself as pure being because he is not God, (and also because 'being', as Kant showed, is the copula of a proposition). 'Existence' is not a predicate, and since Descartes identifies being with thinking, this too must also be predicated. The thought must itself occupy time, if there is a relationship between thought and thinking, as well as have some sort of content: thought and 'thinking of' are the same; on Descartes own argument of the identity of thought and being any cessation of thought must entail the termination of existence. It follows that modes of thinking are also modes of existence, (i.e. imagination, feeling and willing, as much as more abstract modes).

Ultimately all thinking is predicated sensibly, though the pattern or structure may be a function of the thinking mind itself rather than any
objective, 'imaged' reality. In the traditional, Aristotelian way
Descartes says that imagination is corporeal in its concerns (1) whereas
intellect "turns on itself" ("Meds." VI p.186.), it is further distinguished
from intellect by its need for effort. Bacon and Hobbes were probably
more correct in saying that thinking demands more effort than imagination,
especially if this latter includes day-dreaming; perhaps Descartes has the
'motion' sense of imagination in mind here. Or, what he might mean is that
since intuitions are given, the ensuing deductions are effortless, whereas
the collision of mind with corporeal images, and the subsequent attempts
to organise them, are a difficult task.

In making a fairly strict, but by no means absolute (2) distinction
between mind and body, Descartes carries his analysis into the qualitative
modes of the body. The mind is thought and the body may be a dream, so
he is faced with the problem of distinguishing dreams from sense, a problem
inherited by succeeding empirical philosophers. This distinction is
important for dualism, though secondary in importance to the rational
operations of the mind; for empiricists it is crucial since the physical is
held by them to be the origin of all knowledge, yet we find no arguments
in Locke or Hume (nor in Berkeley) which improve on Descartes. Only in
Leibniz and to a lesser extent in Spinoza is a useful contribution made
although with the doctrine of substance and the 'coherence' theory of
truth the problem would appear to be less pressing than in the 'correspondence'
and representationalism of Locke. Even the claim of greater liveliness of
the objects or impressions of sense, looking as it does to be very like the
'clarity' of Descartes, is open to dispute. For Descartes, as we have seen,
imagination is a "mode of thought"; it has its basis in "more simple and more

(1) See "Meditations" II p.152, where he says "to imagine is nothing else than
to contemplate the figure or image of a corporeal thing."
(2) He is not entirely consistent in this division. In "Passions of The Soul"
Art. XXX. p.747 he says "the soul is united to all portions of the body con­
jointly." And in "Meditations" III p.102 he speaks of the "intermingling of
mind and body", whereas earlier ("Meds" III p.100), he has said of his soul
that it is "entirely and absolutely distinct from my body."
universal" qualities, originating objectively (physically) or subjectively (mentally) -

"...although these general things, to wit, (a body), eyes, a head, hands, and such like, may be imaginary, we are bound at the same time to confess that there are at least some other objects yet more simple and more universal, which are real and true; and of these just in the same way as with certain real colours, all these images of things which dwell in our thoughts, whether true and real or false and fantastic, are formed.

To such a class of things pertains corporeal nature in general, and its extension, the figure of extended things, their quantity or magnitude and number, as also the place in which they are, the time which measures their duration, and so on." ("Meds" I p.146).

He defines thought as "all that of which we are conscious as operating in us. And that is why not alone understanding, willing, imagining, but also feeling, are here the same thing as thought." ("Princs. of Phil". Prt. I, Princ. IX. p.222). The will is subjective, a property of the action of the mind (see "Meds". III p.136), having desiring, affirming, etc., as its modes; and the understanding is objective, its modes being sense, imagination, conceiving the intelligible, etc.:

"Of my thoughts, some are, so to speak, images of the things, and to these alone is the title 'idea' properly applied; examples are my thought of a man or of a chimera, of heaven, of an angel, or (even) of God. But other thoughts possess other forms as well. For example in willing, fearing, approving, denying, although I always perceive something as the subject of the action of my mind, yet by this action I always add something else to the idea which I have of that thing; and of the thoughts of this kind some are called volitions or affections, and others judgments.

Now as to what concerns ideas, if we consider them only in themselves and do not relate them to anything beyond themselves, they cannot properly speaking be false; for whether I imagine a goat or a chimera,
it is no less true that I imagine the one than the other." (1) But
the need to distinguish between objects and imagination is important
in Descartes' ontological metaphysics as a means of establishing a
link between body and mind, and also as an epistemological require­
ment since for "sciences studying composite things", such as physics,
astronomy, and medicine, ("Meds" II p.147), the distinction is funda­
mental. Furthermore, the possibility of the existence of other
minds depends upon the objective reality of ideas ....

"If the objective reality of any one of my ideas is of such a nature
as clearly to make me recognise that it is not in me either formally
or eminently, and that consequently I cannot myself be the cause of
it, it follows of necessity that I am not alone in the world, but that

(1) "Meditations" III p.159. Spinoza has a similar idea; considered
ontologically, ideas all have equal veracity. We may venture the
opinion that Descartes has in mind here a causal notion of 'images',
raising an issue which is relevant to the study of Aesthetics as a
philosophical discipline, though neither Descartes, Spinoza, nor
Leibniz pursues the problem. Strictly speaking the ontological image
is not a 'passion' (as Spinoza calls it) or affection, and is "of something
real and true". So Descartes says: "For, as a matter of fact, painters,
even when they study with the greatest skill to represent sinews and
satyrs by forms the most strange and extraordinary, cannot give them
natures which are entirely new, but merely make a certain medley of
the members of different animals; or if their imagination is extravagant
enough to invent something so novel that nothing similar has ever been
seen, and that then their work represents a thing purely fictitious
and absolutely false, it is certain all the same that the colours of
which this is composed are necessarily real." ("Meditations" I p.146).
This passage exhibits some of the inconsistency of Descartes' philosophy,
for whereas his dualism and ontology are consistent with the notion of
the artist ('imaginer') as an originator of pure fictions, the idea of
art or "general things" as a medley or rearrangement of true (i.e.
irreducible) 'images' in a passive or kaleidoscopic way obviates the
role of reason in "corporeal nature in general, and its extension" —
in what we should call natural science. The overall tenor of Descartes'
philosophy would demand the former, 'ontological' interpretation, though
here he is arguing for the latter interpretation. By implication,
aesthetics becomes a strictly rational study, and this is how Humearten,
who gave this area of enquiry its name, conceived of 'aesthetics'.
Spinoza, as we shall see, identified images with passions, with the
implication — unintentional though it was for him — that Aesthetics
should be a psychological study.

In addition to the foregoing comments on the above quotation, we
should note the great similarity between Descartes' 'ideas' qua 'images
of things' and Hume's "impressions" as ideas.
there 's another being which exists, or which is the cause of this idea." ("Meditations" III p.163).

Thoughts originated subjectively are subjectively indistinguishable, (1) having no objective referents by which to distinguish them; they have no proximate cause and are related to the soul as if in it. (See "Passions of The Soul", Art. XXV, p.342). So although we might have recourse to imagination to visualise a triangle (2), the original notion is conceptual. In this way formal thoughts are directed towards the imagination where they find ideas, perceptions, or memories which conform to them (3); so that this 'Janus' imagination, as Bacon called it, looks both to mind and to body and functions in accordance with each in a kind of dualistic limbo between two states of being. Bearing in mind the doubts against divine revelation and intuition, the maintenance of ontological status for dreams, imagination and reality, and between the subjective and objective modes of thought, assumes the importance of a coping-stone in Descartes' philosophy.

He realises that he cannot expect the same demonstrative certainty with respect to physical phenomena as obtain in the deductions of logic, ("Meds." VI p.187) and even considers that his judgments might be misled by an "evil genius". But since he is persuaded that for the subjective-objective, or mind-body, duality he "can discover no other convenient mode of explanation", the postulation of such an evil genius

(1) See "Meds." III p.164; & III p.165, where he says no idea contains more than can be found in its cause, though "the reality that I consider in these ideas is only objective, it is not necessary that this should be formally .... "etc.
(2) See "Meds." VI p.185: "when I imagine a triangle, I do not conceive it only as a figure comprehended by three lines but I also apprehend* these three lines as present by the power and inward vision of my mind,** and this is what I call imagining".
* intenor; ** acie mentis.
(3) So he can, e.g., imagine a pentagon but not a chiliagon (See "Meds" VI p.186).
seems idle, and he dismisses it as irrelevant. The problem of separately identifying imaginations and realities still remains. He argues that objects are independent of him since he cannot perceive them at will, and they present themselves without his consent; ("Meds." VI p.188) but this is evidently circular since the value of "uninvited" and "willed" is conditional upon the duality which he is seeking to sustain. He also employs the familiar argument that objective ideas are more lively, clear, and in their way more distinct than the subjective ones (1). But Descartes' conceptual distinction, such as it is, has little psychological validity, especially in the light of modern (e.g. Freudian) discoveries; imaginations and perceptions may be equally lively, as he himself acknowledges when it suits his purposes (see "Meds." I 59), and, as he also says, there is "an infinitude" of cases where 'objects' are indistinguishable from 'imaginations'. ("Meds." VI p.189). Again with apparent circularity Descartes pleads that "we must allow that corporeal things exist" ("Meds." VI p.191) as God is no deceiver, but that we ourselves are fallible(2); the circularity may only be apparent since he intuits on one occasion that God is one with 'substance', with 'nature, or 'the order of things' (3) so that the problem of imagination and reality becomes one of coherence (rather than one of correspondence), as with Spinoza.

(1) See "Meds" VI p.188. Also "Passions of The Soul" Art.XXVI p.345. (2) Compare Leibniz, "On the Method of Distinguishing Real from Imaginary Phenomena", p.719, where he says that the argument that God is a deceiver carries no weight, "...for we are deceived by our own judgment, not by God, when we assert anything without accurate proof." (3) "Meditations" VI p.192: see also "Principles of Philosophy" I, p.239: "By substance, we can understand nothing else than a thing which so exists that it needs no other thing in order to exist. And in fact only one single substance can be understood which clearly needs nothing else, namely, God."
and Leibniz; and whereas this view is indicative of Descartes' influence on Spinoza, refutation is hampered by its inconsistency with his own general dualism. If we accept the new position that God is all, then imagination and reality have equal validity and the possibility of divine revelation is removed; distinguishing between imagination and reality is either a question of logical coherence or, (which may be the same), of convenience for the judging agent; else it has little philosophical importance and becomes a psychological question of pragmatic or existential phenomena. Briefly, in so far as he argues an immanent or pantheistic deity, Descartes is biting the hand that feeds his main philosophical tenet, and implicitly renouncing his own dualism. Returning to his own ontological argument for the existence of God, he argues that only by a "natural light" ("Meds." III p.160) do we distinguish between objects and images, but the argument stands or falls with his ontology.(1)

(1) See Leibniz, "Principles of Nature and Grace, Founded on Reason" Sec. 4, p.27: he says that the Cartesians are wrong in failing to realise the distinction between perception - "the inner state of the monad representing external things" - and apprehension - "which is consciousness of the reflective knowledge of this inner state and which is not given to all souls, nor at all times to the same soul...." And : "It is this also which made these same Cartesians believe that minds alone are souls, and that there are no souls in animals, and still less other principles of life."
Spinoza has been alternately defiled and eulogised as a rigidly
eclidesian rationalist and a God-intoxicated pantheist, and it should
perhaps be seen as a compliment to his works, rather than the product
of the bias or ignorance of his commentators, that they should be held
capable of such diverse interpretations. (1) To be now denounced and
ignored, now lauded and misunderstood, seems to be the fate of his
philosophy, and it is only in the last century or so that the balance
has been struck. His influence, or at least the influence of his reputa-
tion, is most marked in Leibniz and in several of the German romantic
ideologists whose ideas have so much shaped or modern aesthetic and cultural
mores: men such as Lessing, Goethe, Novalis, Fichte, and Schelling. (2)
The basis of Spinoza's attempted reconciliation of Cartesian dualism with
its implicit theology—a dichotomy which only he and Leibniz seem to have
seen—is probably to be found in the Aristotelian works of Scholastic,
Hebrew, and Arab writers and commentators of the later Middle Ages, and
some of the most noteworthy and scholarly of his exponents have found a
key to their understanding in these writers (3). Certainly Spinoza's
'system' is an attempt at an integrated, holistic unity which, despite
its mathematical procedure, answers more readily to description in

(1) L. Roth, "Spinoza" p. 144, calls Spinoza's thought "a fusion of religion
and science." S. Hampshire, in his "Spinoza" pp. 27-8, refers to the various
interpretations of Spinoza and the "genuine double aspect" of his philosophy:
"for some he has appeared primarily as a man obsessed with God, a pantheist
who interprets every natural phenomenon as a revelation of an impersonal but
impersonal God; to others he has appeared as a harsh materialist and deter-
minist who denies all significance to morality and religion." And: "...to
Coleridge and Shelley he communicated an almost mystical sense of the ideal
unity of Nature. But throughout the nineteenth century he appeared as the
philosopher who had exalted and displayed the powers of objective and
dispasionate reason beyond all other philosophers, and for this reason was
admired by such men as Renan, Flaubert, Matthew Arnold, and Anatole France."

(2) On Spinoza's influence on Hegel, Bradley, and Bosanquet, see L. Roth's
"Spinoza in Recent English Thought", in Mind XXXVI No. 142, April 1887.
(3) See especially H.A. Wolfson, "The Philosophy of Spinoza". Also Roth's
"Spinoza" p. 295, pp. 225-7, where he mentions the influence of Hobbes and
Enron on Spinoza. D. Kidner, "The Psychology and Ethics of Spinoza", P. 278,
finds a conflict in Spinoza between Aristotelian-Scholastic and Stoic-
Cartesian principles.
organic rather than geometric metaphors; and in spite of its 'rationalism,' his philosophy is closer in spirit to that of Locke than of Descartes: there are even grounds for calling him an 'empiricist.' (1). However, his understanding seeks to be all-embracing and self-consistent, and he dismisses "the Cartesian principles of natural things" as "useless, not to say absurd," (Letter LXX. to Tschirnhausen), though we should not allow his considerable debt to Descartes to pass unremarked. (2).

Like Descartes, Spinoza accepts the traditional tripartite division of cognition (3), but at the lowest level he rejects the Representationalist view and considers imagination, sense, opinion and perception together, obviating the actual separation which seems to be entailed in the conceptual distinctions made by other philosophers. (4). Like Berkeley, Spinoza will not speak of an image or other psychic event whose truth or epistemological status is a function of its correspondence with a separate, "external" object. The erroneousness or correctness of practical knowledge is dependent upon its coherence with our understanding and at this level the value and effectiveness of this knowledge are subject to pragmatic criteria; this view is also held by Leibniz. Imagination is defined as "... the modifications of the human body of which the ideas represent external bodies as present to us ... when the mind regards images

(1) Wolfson, op.cit., p.74 : "He was, many views to the contrary notwithstanding, a hard-headed, clear-minded empiricist, like most of the mediaevals and like Aristotle."
(2) This is particularly apparent in "De Intellectus Emendatione." But, given his place in a chain of influences, "...most of the issues of modern psychology and value theory are essentially those which Spinoza faced and to which he gave classic expression." (Diacony, op.cit., p.25).
(3) This division is fourfold in the "De Intellectus Emendatione," but the first and second sections are basically the same: all references in this work herein are to Elscwey edition unless otherwise stated.
(4) Hampshire, op.cit., p.69 says that Spinoza's "imagination...corresponds roughly to knowledge derived from sense-perception." For a general discussion of Spinoza's "imagination" see C.L. Perkinson, "Spinoza's Theory of Knowledge" Ch. VII.
in this fashion we say that it imagines." ("Ethics" II. XVIII. Note.).

Imaginations are passions, i.e. the mind is passive towards their
initial (and sometimes subsequent) affection, since they are not yet
translated by the understanding into our conceptual scheme, and because
the origins of the interactions of the body with other things are
as yet unknown. Such non-conceptualised 'ideas' Spinoza calls
"inadequate" or confused. Thus for him the contingencies described
by 'sense', 'imagination', 'perception', 'opinion', and 'commonsense'
have their conceptual value in coherence and their actual worth in
pragmatics. (1). The criterion of vividness for distinguishing between
perceptions and imaginations is taken by Spinoza to be proportionate
to the coherence of the phenomenon (perception or imagination) with
other phenomena: "A mental image is more vivid, in proportion as
it is associated with a greater number of other images" ("Ethics"
V XIII.). And, as he says in the "De Intellec '#tus Illuminatione"
(p. 34), the great clarity of imagination can often lead us to
mistake it for understanding, implying a Socratic view of morality,
that error is prorvation of knowledge, so that no man knowingly
does wrongly. But every inadequate 'idea' has its idea since
in its initial guise, the attribute of extension, it has exact reciprocation
under the attribute of thought, though this reciprocation might not always
be clearly seen. (2). Spinoza uses three names for the totality of all things:

(1) See Letter LXIV to Tschirnhausen: "Between a true and an adequate
idea, I recognise no difference, except that the epithet true has regard
to the agreement between the idea and its object, whereas the epithet
adequate has regard to the nature of the idea itself, so that in reality
there is no difference between a true and an adequate idea beyond this
extrinsic relation." See also "Ethics" I. 73. Schol.: "Nothing is
called contingent except in respect of a defect in our knowledge.
(2) See "Ethics" II. VII. Note: "...whether we conceive nature under
the attribute of extension, or under any other attribute, we shall
find the same order, or one and the same chain of causes - that is,
the same things following in either case."
"God", "substance", and "Nature"; these are essentially the same but may be considered under different attributes. So, for instance, we may speak of nature, in bodily terms, and of its contingencies which pertain to imagination or opinion; God is called "the cause irrationale" and "all things are in God and move in God" (Letter XXI to Oldenburg), so that it is logically impossible to separate God from his creation. Hence we arrive at Spinoza's celebrated - or notorious - equation, Deus sive Natura, (1) The mind's inadequate ideas may be a reflection of our failure to be or to comprehend God, but as God is to Nature, so is mind to body, for "... mind and body are one and the same thing..." (2). In Aristotelian terms, the mind/soul is the form of the living body.

Because of this perfect duplication of what are elsewhere called the 'physical' and the 'mental', the random, individuated passions of the imagination can never be said to be wrong (3) - another echo of Aristotle - since God and Nature perfectly cohere, and 'physical' and 'mental' are both attributes of substance, considered respectively under the guise of extension and thought. Any apparent delusion with respect to imagination is therefore either a result of our inability to conceptualise the image/passion, or of our having compounded images into an incoherent whole; a winged horse or a talking tree are Spinoza's examples of such incoherent compounds, and obsession with a single thing would, he says, be a kind of madness. Just

(1) "It is on account of this phrase that Spinoza has been alternately abhorred and venerated as a pantheist, 'pantheism' meaning the identification of God with Nature. Pantheism is usually a doctrine associated with mystical intuitions or with a poetical and romantic feeling of the splendour and unity of Nature. But Spinoza's identification of God with Nature, however, indirectly inspiring it may later have been to the poets of the Romantic Movement, in intention at least owes nothing to poetical imagination; it is conceived to be the outcome of exact definition and rigorous logic." (Hutcheson, op. cit., pp. 39-40).

(2) "Ethics" III. IV. Note: the passage continues: "...conceived first under the attribute of thought, secondly, under the attribute of extension. Thus it follows that the order or concatenation of things is identical, whether nature be conceived under the one attribute or the other; consequently the order of states of activity or passivity in our body is simultaneous in nature with the order of states of activity and passivity in the mind." (3) In the "De Intelligentia Incognitae" he says that imagination can only be effected by particular physical objects, and that a true idea is simple or compounded of simples. (See pp. 21-2).
as images, as inadequate ideas, may be confused passions, the mind also has its confusions in the acceptance of "transcendental" ideas such as "being," "Thing," "Something," "Man," which, he says, "represent ideas in the highest degree confused" ("Ethics" II. XL. Note I. (1)).

When such concepts are used, the imagination is totally ineffective since small, individual differences, embraced by such universals, are negated. Such abstractions are, in Spinoza's sense, unnatural — since man is part of Nature — and ignore the great variety of individual passions and perceptions, differently formed in different men; as well as making (in advance of Berkeley and Wittgenstein) important points against the abuse of language, he seems also to be attacking the vagaries of medieval philosophy: "It is not to be wondered at, that among philosophers, who seek to explain things in nature merely by the images formed of them, so many controversies should have arisen." ("Ethics" II. XL. Note I.). But those confusions must be regarded as exceptions, and though imagination may, like abstractions, be confused, the aim is perfectly to cohere the 'natural' with the rational, to perceive things "under a certain form of eternity" (see quaedam aeternitatis specie: "Ethics" II. XLIV. Coroll. II).

Nevertheless, all objects agree in some measure with others, or they could have no adequate ideas in common ("Ethics" II. XXXVIII Coroll., and XXXIX). For ignorance divides, and ignorance is a result of the individuations of imagination.

The assimilation of the passive imagination into reason is a function of active mind as will or understanding — these being the same for

(1) See also "De Intellctus Fundamentis", p. 34: "...we may never, while we are concerned with enquiries into actual things, draw any conclusion from abstractions." He also says, (op. cit., pp. 59-60, Fisher-Harris ed.), that words are part of imagination, and may be the cause of great errors: "It is to be noted that they are formed according to the caprice and notions of the vulgar, so that they are nothing but signs of things as they exist in the imagination, and not as they exist in the intellect."
Spinoza - (1) and defines mind's power as active/passive by the amount of his knowledge i.e. by the relative predominance of reason or imagination. The active mind has largely adequate ideas, the passive mind inadequate ideas and passive states so that "... spiritual unhealthiness and misfortunes can generally be traced to excessive love for something which is subject to many variations, and which we can never become masters of" ("Ethics" Y, XX, Note V.) This view is a reiteration of De Intellectus Emendatione (pp. 21-2) where he says "... the less men know of nature the more easily they can coin fictitious ideas."(2) But in his Deus sive Natura equation it would be imprecise, even prejudicial, to describe this action, this becoming, to reason alone. We are passive to nature as mind is to imagination, because we are a part of nature and therefore a part of God. Spinoza's inadequate ideas call to mind Plato's elkhasia, but Spinoza rejects Platonic reminiscence and metempsychosis ("Ethics" Y, XXI, Proof, Note.), as he must in order to remain consistent with his own position - though he maintains that:

"... we feel and know that we are eternal. For the mind feels these things that it conceives by understanding, no less than those things that it remembers. For the eyes of the mind, whereby it sees and observes things, (1) See "Ethics" II, XXIX, Coroll., also II, Defs. III. where he speaks of this activity as "conception" rather than perception in order to emphasise the action and to avoid any implication of passivity. Bigney, (op.cit. p.75ff) sees this active/passive distinction as a "sharp dualism" in Spinoza and argues that imagination and perception are two sources of inadequate ideas. Elsewhere, referring to "Ethics" Y, X, he says: "Spinoza tries to overcome the difficulties arising from his bifurcation of the intellect and imagination by maintaining their essential cooperation and harmony. That is to say, contrary to his previous Platonic notion that the intellect functions independently of imagination, he asserts the Aristotelian theory that there may be images of things of which we also have adequate ideas."(Op.cit., p.272). (2) Spinoza places great ethical importance on his passive/active distinction, regarding the man who follows his passion as a slave, who follows his reason as free. He also says (loc.cit.) that we need not fear that we fancy, as long as the object is perceived clearly and distinctly (i.e. coherently); the mark of clarity and distinctness being simplicitas, i.e. irreducibility. In a complex or compounded idea, "Falsity consists solely in the affirmation concerning anything of something which is not contained in the concept we have formed of the thing." It is interesting to note, in passing, the similarity in terms in respect of ideas between Spinoza and Locke, who were exact contemporaries both born in 1642 - both tilling Cartesian soil (to borrow Locke's metaphor), but the former categorised a Rationalist, the latter an Empiricist.
are none other than proofs. Thus, although we do not remember that we existed before the body, yet we feel that our mind, in so far as it involves the essence of the body, under the form of eternity, is external, and that thus its existence cannot be defined in terms of time, or explained through duration." ("Ethics" V. XXIII, Note).

His reason for maintaining this apparent optimism, (or deterministic pessimism), is contained in his De intellige Natura, for as he says in a letter to Tschirnhausen (LXVI) the mind's power of understanding extends only to things, but, as he also says in another letter (XXVII to De Vries) the intellect is infinite though it belongs to nature as passive; or, "The mind apprehends itself better in proportion as it understands a greater number of natural objects." ("De Intellectus Emendatione", p. 14). It is arguable that this passivity of the mind to nature is a basic tenet of empiricism and sensationalism, but Spinoza was unconstrained by the current notion of the body as a machine, seeing, as Leibniz did after him, a limitlessness in men's possibilities. In a letter to Elyenburg (XXXIV) he expresses the view, (also held by Descartes), that the will is beyond the constraint of our limited understanding. In simple terms, we should regard our imagination as a measure of our ignorance, in so far as they are inadequate, rather than insignificant delusions. In a very real sense, therefore, Spinoza may be said to regard imagination as a means of apprehending God - though his definition of imagination does not support this interpretation - since passions and individuations are innumerable, and though confused and inadequate they remain valid in the system of De intellige Natura. As he says in "De Intellectus Emendatione" (pp. 20-1, Footnote), "... fancy never creates or furnishes the mind with anything new." But in reason we strive to resemble God in essence and to imitate 'Him' in 'His' action: the aim is omniscience, the reward perfection, and though the reward is unattainable, man is able to apprehend this perfection and so attempts to achieve it. Spinoza's position here is little different from that of Giordano Bruno, but the practical implications are different.
for Spinoza they were moral, for Bruno magical and alchemical. For Spinoza this perfection lies in "... the knowledge of the union existing between the mind and the whole of nature" (op. cit. p.6); by implication Cartesian dualism is a product of ignorance.

As we have already noted, one important feature of the Spinozan "imagination" is its equation with passion, a significant departure from the Cartesian view:

"For imagination is an idea, which indicates rather the present disposition of the human body than the nature of the external body; not indeed distinctly, but confusedly; whence it comes to pass, that the mind is said to err. For instance, when we look at the sun, we conceive that it is distant from us about two hundred feet ..." etc., (1)

There is a good deal of psychological truth in this formulation, which seems to owe something to Aristotle and the scholastic intentio, but Spinoza, pursuing the logic of his own commitment to Deus sive Natura, is less cognitive in his intimation of intentionality than his definition of imagination leads us to expect:

"... we must necessarily admit, that the decision of the mind, which is believed to be free, is not distinguishable from the imagination or memory, and is nothing more than the affirmation, which an idea, by virtue of being an idea, necessarily involves (II, XIX). Therefore these decisions of the mind arise in the mind by the same necessity, as the ideas of things actually existing. Therefore those who believe, that they speak or keep silence or act in any way from the free decision of the mind, do but dream with their eyes open." (2).

Not only does he realise and state the power of imagination, he also has the acuity to realise, uniquely among his contemporaries, that imagination

(1) "Ethics" IV. I, Note. The 'sun' example is borrowed from Aristotle's De Anima.
(2) Op. cit., III. II., Note. It is possible to find here ideas which show Spinoza's anticipation of Freud. Hampshire, (op. cit., p.141), finds similarities between Spinoza's animus and Freud's libido.
of past, present, and future events may affect us with equal strength
("Ethics" III. XVIII.); this realisation has implications for a possible
aesthetic, but these are not developed by Spinoza. As an inadequate or
individuated 'idea', be it compounded (as e.g. a winged horse) or other­
wise, the imagination is always at least credible since it cannot be
wrong. In cases of uncertainty we may suspend judgment, but the unrelated
'image' is never less than inadequate and always possible provided it does
not contravene a kind of pre-Leibnizian 'law of contradiction'. That
objects could be, and were, made specifically for a purpose which required
just such a deferral of judgment, with the inevitable 'confusion', was
not a notion entertained by Spinoza. Throughout his entire works and
letters he makes only one, passing reference to art, seeming to accept the
idealising function of imitation which Alberti had helped to make a
commonplace of Renaissance painting. Beauty, as Spinoza says in two of
his letters,(2) is in the eye of the beholder, and we deduce from this that
he would have regarded Aesthetics as a branch of psychology. In equating
the scope of the mind (thought) with that of the body (extension), he is
open to the objection that what might be considered man's highest achieve­
ments - e.g. art in all its manifestations, though he would no doubt dispute
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ments - e.g. art in all its manifestations, though he would no doubt dispute

(1) See "De Intellecustis Animadversiones" p.10 : "I call a thing impossible when
its non-existence would imply a contradiction; possible, when neither its
existence nor its non-existence imply a contradiction, but when the necessity
or impossibility of its nature depends on causes unknown to us, while we
seign that it exists." So, as he later adds, (op.cit. p.21), he could not,
knowing the nature of body, imagine an infinite fly; or of soul, imagine it
as square; but he can imagine the existence of anything of which no
impossibility of unneccessity is seen. But by the same token, the more
the mind understands the less able it is to imagine.
(2) To Oldenburg, Letter XV : "... I do not attribute to nature either
beauty or deformity, order or confusion. Only in relation to our imagination
can things be called beautiful or deformed, ordered or confused." This
unequivocal statement of the dependency of beauty upon imagination is clearly
in anticipation of (and well in advance of) the aesthetic of Romanticism;
as it comes from Spinoza's correspondence we should beware of making too
much of it, except to say that this view is, as we have learned, inherently
Neoplatonistic and implicit in his published philosophy. See also Letter LVIII
to Boxel : "Beauty, my dear Sir, is not so much a quality of the object
beheld, as an effect upon him who beholds it."
this — are potentially derivable from the laws of nature as extended substance. (1). But he is well aware of the paucity of the mechanistic model of man:

"... the objectors cannot fix the limits of the body's power, or say what can be concluded from a consideration of its sole nature, whereas they have experience of many things being accomplished solely by the laws of nature, which they would never have believed possible except under the direction of the mind ..." ("Ethics" III. II., Note).

He adds that "... from nature, under whatever attribute she be considered, infinite results follow." (loc. cit.). Sav's criticisms are surely circumvented here, for Spinoza is saying that all of nature is governed by laws but that these laws are not known; the real problem is the truth of Spinoza's assertion about natural laws, a 'truth' which must necessarily accompany omniscience and which cannot therefore be accessible to man.

In his support, the scientific procedure of theory — hypothesis — law seems to afford increasing knowledge, or at least technology, of nature, but within this process, even at the forefront of research, expectations can and do shape perceptions and results. But ever here Spinoza's foresight of the possible abuses of universal ideas and his refusal to denigrate "inadequate ideas" is a recognition that in or through this inadequacy we may find the more adequate laws of the future. As we might say, exceptions only prove the rules which can account for them.

Qualifying Wolfson, it could be said that Spinoza was a kind of 'empiricist' who co-extended the infinitesimal divisions of logic and maths to the parts of nature, offering thereby a rather more complex and exalted idea of man than that propounded by those — empiricists and others — who accepted a mechanical model. But like Aristotle in the wake of

(1) For a discussion of this point, see E.L. See, "The Vindication of Metaphysics", (e.g. p. 50: "It may be objected that Spinoza has the very practical aim of showing us how to increase our knowledge, and that he should not be criticised because he has at the same time not given an account of artistic creation. He has, however, not merely failed to give an account of such imaginative construction, but he has given such a description of the functioning of the intellect that it is impossible."
Platonic dualism, Spinoza in the wake of Cartesian dualism did not entirely rid his psychology of the inconsistencies produced by regarding philosophical concepts as psychological actualities. The suspicion of a representationalist theory of imagination enters Spinoza's account when he seeks to separate memory from imagination, a suspicion which is almost certainly - according to Wolfson's close analysis - a product of his acquaintance with Aristotelianism. As we have seen, Aristotle distinguishes between what we called "productive" and "reproductive" imagination, (1) the latter being a reative function bearing some resemblance to memory. In his definition of "imagination", occurring late in the "Ethics" (V. XXIV., Dom.), Spinoza calls it "an idea by which the mind contemplates any object as present", whereas earlier, in "De Intellectus Emendatione", a 'thing imagined' is "not as we picture it to be" (quoted in Wolfson, op.cit., p.85). From these two passages two functions of imagination obtain: one is productive, and pertains to the image as unrelated; this the latter passage. The distinction is maintained in a Note to his definition of imagination in "Ethics" II. XVII, where he speaks of "the images of things" (rerum imagines) which "do not recall (referent) the figures of things" (rerum figurae) - a distinction between 'images' and 'figures' which probably refers respectively to the distinction between productive and reproductive imagination. We should note that Descartes also confuses 'figure' and 'image' ("Mediations" II) in his definition of "imaginer" (Fr.) as "...nothing else than to contemplate the figure or image of a corporeal thing". Spinoza makes no clarification of the separation of 'figure' from 'image', though they are of considerable importance in his philosophy in seeming to demand a separation of "adequate" from "inadequate" imaginations, with criteria for making such a separation, such as is nowhere to be found (i) See Wolfson, op.cit., pp.84-5: "...from the various statements of Aristotle's discussion of imagination in medieval Arabic and Hebrew philosophical texts it appears that a distinction is to be drawn between the kinds of imagination which may be designated by the terms 'retentive imagination' and 'composite imagination' corresponding to what is called today reproductive and productive imagination". And: "Suggestions of this distinction...may be discovered in the various scattered passages which occur in the writings of Spinoza."
in the "Ethics". Normally we would identify this reproductive imagination with memory, where the 'object' is understood to be posited as absent, and Spinoza's definition of memory is extraordinarily close to Aristotle's. (1)

For Spinoza then, there is the 'image', which is a passion, ('suffered', in Aristotelian terms, by the body), which, whatever the degree of its 'inadequacy' seems to enjoy some sort of ontological status; there is also the 'figure', object of the image-passion, the recognition of whose objectivity is both a function of memory and (conceptually speaking) a stage in the becoming adequacy of the imagination. Memory is a stage in the conceptualisation of imagination. These weaknesses in Spinoza's 'system' are a result of his attempt to reconcile the stasis of philosophy and theology with entelecheia of psychology and morality, an attempt, in his own words, to realise man's highest aim, an understanding of the relationship between mind and nature (God); this remains what it has always been, a fundamental task of philosophy.

We have found similar tensions and inconsistencies in the philosophical-psychology of Aristotle, where Wolfson finds the origin of Spinoza's implicit distinction between imagination and memory, as for Aristotle the memory-image is both the affection and that from which the affection is derived:

"In so far as it is regarded in itself, it is only an object of contemplation (theorema, speculumamentum) or a phantasm (phantasma...); but when considered as relative to something else, it is, as it were, a likeness (eikon, image) and a mnemonic token (memnonema, memoriale)." (2)

Memory is defined by Aristotle as ".. the state of a phantasm (phantasma, Gr. & Latin)". (3) So memory is not a mere phantasm (phantasma) or affection (pathos) but is the likeness (eikon) of a thing - though Aristotle had earlier called memory ".. an impression (typos) or picture (pravito) within us." (4) It seems very likely that Spinoza derived his

(1) See "De Intellelloka Emendatione" p 47., where memory is called ".. the sensation of impressions on the brain accompanied with the definite duration of the sensation." Aristotle, De Memoria et Reminiscentia, 440b, 10-22, 22-23.
(2) From Aristotle's De Memoria et Reminiscentia, 440b, 12-27, quoted in Wolfson, op. cit., p.86.
(3) loc. cit., p.86.
(4) loc. cit.
memory-imagination distinction from these passages, and Wolfson offers interesting circumstantial evidence to support this hypothesis. (1)

Having unearthed the inconsistencies in Spinoza's thought, caused by a conflict of philosophical and psychological enquiries, we must reiterate that the overriding impulse and concern of his work is essentially 'holistic', and that conceptual niceties are a product, and not a necessary precondition, of experience. The apparent correspondence of the memory 'image' to an object, so expressed, is better understood in Spinozan terms as the recognised coherence of that image with other 'images' in a way which is both pragmatically (or functionally) effective and conceptually adequate - these being actually coincidental. Spinoza recognises no priority in the relationship between what other philosophers bifurcate as the physical and the mental, and in this as in the quality of his intellect, his closest philosophical ancestor is Aristotle, and his heir Leibniz. An important epistemological question for Cartesian dualism, as has been shown, is the distinction between imagination and reality. Spinoza, who like Locke owed much to Descartes, endeavoured to forestall the problem by denying the duality and calling all things "God or Nature". It is not difficult to find in this phrase, and in many of the passages of the "Enneads" of Plotinus, a kind of pre-Romantic Wordsworthian pantheism. But in Spinoza (as, usually, in Wordsworth) there is none of that vacuous absence of discernment in which so many quasi-mystical and pantheistic minds seem to flounder; his is a mind whose satisfaction is in the recurrent recognition of harmony, order and coherence. In a way, imagination in its oneiric sense as the producer of unicorns, hippogriffs and the like, is a foil to the adequacy of coherence, but as long as such imaginings remain logically possible they continually test the alert mind by inviting it to comprehend them. This gadfly function of imagination

(1) See Wolfson, op. cit., pp. 86-7: "Now, in an old Latin translation of Aristotle, which was accessible to Spinoza and is translated by figura," etc. See also op. cit., p. 86, footnote 7: the passage referred to is De Memoria et Reminiscencia, 350 b. 16, from Aristotelis Opera Omnia, teat Extent Opera of 1572.
is already of considerable importance for the age (or the man) for which (or whom) there is the belief that much is to be learned, and unless this function atrophy any new idea has the potential to enlarge the understanding. Indeed Spinoza urged upon his reader the importance and value of versatility and new experiences, bringing to mind Bruno's messianic quest for omniscience and Humbold's injunction not to fear exposure to uncertainty. The existential importance of imagination is clear, but its aesthetic implications contain a small irony for the Spinozan 'system'. For if the art-work is an imitation, not only can it not present a perfect form of ideal (since we cannot know such an ideal if we are not 'God'), but in order to be a 'perfect' imitation it must therefore be in some way imperfect or "inadequate". The best would be the most perfectly imperfect. But it is not only in art but in all spheres of life that the imagination has this important function of at once giving the mind an exclusive confidence in itself by which it designates some phenomena 'real' and others 'imaginary'; an indication of its own inadequacy in failing to account for the 'imaginary', and the challenge of the possible-in-the-imaginary wherein the mind apprehends (also) the possibility of its own perfection. Within the Spinozan teleology such a state is logically impossible, so that the mind cannot hope to attain its own goal, and we must conclude that it is the attempt which is all-important, a conclusion at which any teleological system must arrive.
The influence of Galileo and Newton on the beliefs and practices of their contemporaries was immense, but for a more complete and satisfactory account of the impact and the import of Locke's "Essay" we must entertain other considerations. The absolute faith in the Bible and in the old testament as history which characterises the Reformation was called into question by an increasing number of discoveries. The biblically generated belief that the world was created in 4004 B.C. was undermined by the great age of Chinese civilisation, evidently predating the biblical creation, by the discovery of fossils, and by the discovery of other societies and ethnic groups, particularly in the Americas, which had independent moral codes, laws, and mythical beliefs. It is particularly within the context of these social discoveries that Locke's attack on the doctrine of 'innate ideas' should be seen, and this should not be forgotten in relation to his inheritance from Descartes or his debt to contemporary natural science. Locke's account of the mind is compositional, as to a certain extent is Descartes', but Locke is perplexing in his inconsistency and his insistence on an "active power" of sorts uncomfortably with his passive "tabula rasa" metaphor.(1) He is open to attack on all sides: as an empiricist/sensationalist he is repeatedly attacked by Leibniz for overlooking the innate capacities of the mind; when he speaks of "mental power" he sounds like a dualist; and in so far as he embraces these two views unreconciled, he is confused and inconsistent. On top of all this, Berkeley attacked him as a Representationalist. Nevertheless the "Essay" became the bible of an age and Locke's exhortation - "Reason must be your last judge and guide in everything" - an infallible rule.

Locke's doctrine of ideas is the basis of all he says about thought, knowledge, and language, and in this doctrine his fundamental ambiguities are deeply rooted. Of the half-dozen or so definitions of "idea" in the "Essay", the most familiar - ".. whatsoever is the object of the under-

(1) Only in the first edition of the "Essay", and nowhere else, does the use of the "tabula rasa" phrase occur in Locke, but it is constantly used in reference to him. "White paper" or "empty room" would be more accurate.
standing when a man thinks..." ("Essay" 1. 1. 2.) (1) — may be taken to refer to "object" as active aim or as passive presentment. In the former case it may be "whatsoever the mind perceives in itself" (op. cit., 2. 8. 8.), i.e. "nothing but bare appearances or perceptions in our minds" (op. cit., 2. 32. 1.) and "nothing but particulars" (op. cit., 4. 17. 8.); or, in the latter case, "actual perceptions of the mind" (2. 10. 2.); ("abstraction" is described as a process rather than an entity). (2).

These ideas have two sources only, sensation and reflection, (which owe something to Descartes' subjective-objective division). Understanding is passive in its reception of the "simple" ideas of sensation, which Locke says are produced by primary qualities extant in bodies (2. 8. 10.) (quite different from the irreducible intuitions of the Cartesian mind); these simple ideas are produced in us "as in a mirror" (2. 8. 16.) — very much a Platonic simile. They "imitate" real existences (3. 4. 2.) are thus impressions on the mind (3. 4. 11.) (Plato again), and are infallible (4. 1. 6.); they cannot be traced, invented, or destroyed, (2. 2. 2.) but simple ideas can be united "... to an almost infinite variety."

"These simple ideas, the materials of all our knowledge, are suggested and furnished to the mind only by those two ways above mentioned, viz. sensation and reflection. When the understanding is once stored with these simple ideas, it has the power to repeat, compare and unite them, even to an almost infinite variety, and so can make at pleasure new complex ideas. But it is not in the power of the most excelled wit, or enlarged understanding, by any quickness of variety of thought, to invent or frame one new simple idea in the mind, not taken in by the ways before mentioned: nor can any force of the understanding destroy those that are there. I would have anyone try to fancy any taste which had never affected his palate,

(1) Also, loc. cit.,: "...whatever is meant by phantasms, species, or whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking."

(2) See "Essay", 2. 2. 9. Both Locke and Leibniz use "reason" cognitively rather than in a "faculty" sense. See also Leibniz's "New Essays" p. 351 footnotr.
or frame the idea of a scent he had never smelt: and when he can do this, I will also conclude that a blind man hath ideas of colours* and a deaf man true distinct notions of sounds." (2. 2. 2.)

We have already traced a long established tradition which takes the mental power (or faculty) of repeating and uniting ideas - if not comparing them - to be imagination; Locke, perhaps vary of the more esoteric notions already adhering to this concept, ceits to give imagination the epistemological importance it seems here to be owed. He asserts that the conformity of simple ideas with the existence of things is sufficient for knowledge (4. 4. 4.), and he equates the "real essence" of simple ideas with their "nominal essence" (3. 3. 18). Ideas are "simple" because they are "uncompounded", i.e. irreducible, and they must all have come to us through one or other of our five senses (1); simple ideas are coeval with sensation. As well as simple, we also have complex ideas, which come from reflection and which are made by the active mind out of the simple ideas (2. 12. 1.). Whereas simple ideas are the necessary product of primary qualities, secondary qualities are produced "by the operation of insensible particles on our senses" (2. 8. 13.) that is, by some motion....of nerves or animal spirits ... to the brains or the seat of sensation, there to produce in our minds the particular ideas we have of them." (2. 8. 12).

Secondary qualities, e.g. figure, number, bulk, have no "resemblance" in bodies. Our complex ideas of substances are made up of ideas of the primary qualities of things, "which are discovered by our senses", and:

"Thirdly, the opines, we consider in any substance to give or receive such alterations of primary qualities, as that the substance so altered should produce in us different ideas from what it did before; these are called active and passive powers." (2. 23. 8.)

(1) This contention is the reason for Leibniz's calling Locke's empiricism "bestial". For further discussion see Leibniz, "New Essays" pp. 44-5 & 736; also "Monadology" sect. 26, 27, and "Principles of Nature and of Grace" 18.

Cf. also Descartes and Spinoza (spoga)

* In answer to Dr. Holyoake's problem, presumably.
A substance is defined according to its qualities by Locke, and is not a mysterious, unknown and unknowable "essence". Complex ideas are divided into ideas of "modes, which may be simple or mixed, Substances or Relations (2. 12. 3 ff.)

The great importance of Locke's "ideas", and their origin and nature, their division into simple and complex, is in their being the foundation of our reason and knowledge. Knowledge is a product of experience, of the observation of external, sensible objects, or of the operations of our minds within us. This simple-complex division is so important because the totality of human understanding is "to compound and divide the materials that are made to his hand" (2.2.2.) and knowledge depends on the agreement or disagreement of ideas. This agreement may be perceived immediately, or it may be demonstrable:

in the first instance the knowledge is called intuitive, "the clearest and the most certain that human frailty is capable of" (4. 2. 2. 4. 17. 2.) (1)

so that, for example, we see "as an eye doth light" that white is not black, nor a circle a triangle; we distinguish with intuitive certainty between simple ideas. In the second instance, demonstrative knowledge, reasoning is required to prove the agreement or disagreement of ideas, but the steps of reasoning depend upon an intuitive recognition of agreement/disagreement: mathematics are the epitome of reasoning.

(1) See also "Essay" 4. 9. 2. : "Experience teaches us that we have an intuitive knowledge of our own existence, and an internal infallible perception that we are." This is pure Descartes. Leibniz, "New Essays" p. 199, commenting on this section, says: "I am entirely agreed to all this. And I add that the immediate apperception of our existence and of our thoughts furnishes us the first truths a posteriori, or of fact. i.e. the first experiences, as the identical propositions furnish the first truths a priori or by reason, i.e. the first lights (les premiers lumieres). Both are capable of proof, and may be called immediate; the former because they are immediate between the understanding and its object; the latter because they are immediate between the subject and the predicate." Leibniz's additional remarks say something quite different from the "tabula rasa" empiricism of Locke, but the difference is one of emphasis, and as we see, it is not even consistently adhered to by Locke: for him the mind finds itself in the world, for Leibniz the mind finds the world in itself, and these "two" occurrences are simultaneous.
Locke has a third kind of knowledge, called "sensitive" (1) which is less certain than intuitive and demonstrative knowledge, depending as it does on "faith and opinion" and lacking the certainty of the other two kinds of knowledge. (2). Disregarding intuitive knowledge, Locke says it is by judgment that we accept agreement or disagreement or discern the truth or falsehood of propositions. Propositions may be of reason, pertaining to rational knowledge, or of fact, pertaining to knowledge of sense; (3) the greater part of our knowledge depends on rational deduction and on the intermediate ideas of sense ("Essays" p. 17, 2). Reason contains sagacity, by which it "finds out", and intuition, by which it sees connections by ordering intermediate ideas.

(1) There is a fourth kind, which Locke guardedly admits ("Essays" 4, Ch.13), which is "revelation", and which he says is less secure than knowledge from sense. He distinguishes between this and "enthusiasm" which he calls "the conceits of a warmed or overweening brain" (4, 19, 7.). Cf. Leibniz, op.cit., p. 512. : "Enthusiasm was at the beginning a good term. And as the sophism properly indicates an exercise of wisdom, enthusiasm signifies that there is divinity in us ... Socrates maintained that a god or daemon gave him internal warnings, so that enthusiasm could be divine instinct." See also p. 33 : "... Enthusiasm ... springs forth only from the imagination of a heated and conceited spirit", and again p. 54 : "We may yet call such a fancy sight or light, yet it is nothing more than belief and confidence."

(2) See "Essay" 4, 11, 8., where Locke implies that sensitive knowledge is the basis of science, as well as of everyday experience, but says 4, 11, 10.) : "So that, in the ordinary affairs of life, would admit of nothing but direct plain demonstration, would be sure of nothing in this life but of perishing quickly." Leibniz, (op.cit., pp.512-3) says : "... the truth of sensible things is justified by their connection, which depends upon the intellectual truths ground in reason and upon constant observations upon the sensible things themselves even when the reasons do not appear."

(3) This distinction between facts and reasons is Leibniz's ("New Essays" p. 14 and "Monadology" 23) but it is implicit in Locke.
Reducing Locke's philosophy to its barest bones, it is true to say that for him knowledge derives from simple ideas ("simple" is used similarly by Descartes and Spinoza). Whether he is correct in insisting on this priority is debatable, since the existence of such "ideas" as "white", "round", etc., other than as fictions or predicates, may be disputed. Locke assumes that they really exist in some objective sense, as had Descartes, but goes rather less deeply into the problem of demonstrating their existence than does his predecessor. His statement that it is idle to expect demonstration of the undemonstrable is circular, where there are no satisfactory grounds for distinguishing between them. It is surely the case that simple ideas are abstracted, having a conceptual identity rather than an intuited determination by the senses (this Berkeley also objects to), to be of use in complex ideas. As his definitions of "understanding" show, Locke is vulnerable to Berkeley's attack on his representationalism, and his statement that "... the ideas of primary qualities of bodies are resemblances of them" (2. 18. 15.), is met by Berkeley's contention that "an idea can be like nothing but another idea" ("Principles of Human Knowledge" 2), which Hume called "one of the greatest and most valuable discoveries that has been made of late years in the republic of letters." ("Treatise on Human Knowledge" Mk.I, Sec. VII). Locke's secondary qualities are an odd lot too, produced by "insensible particles" and "animal spirits", and may have been suggested to him by Epicureanism or contemporary microbiology. If all our ideas exist only in the mind, the problem of distinguishing between the "real and the 'imaginary' ones, a problem with which Locke is not
greatly concerned, is of some epistemological importance of a correspondence
is claimed between these ideas and an objective world or if it is main-
tained, as Locke maintains, "... that this conformity between our simple
ideas and the existence of things is sufficient for real knowledge."
("Essay" 4. 4. 1.). Leibniz, ("New Essays" p. 445) answers :

"... the ground of our certitude in regard to universal and external
truths is in the ideas themselves, independently of the senses, for
example, that of being, unity, identity, etc. But the ideas of sensible
qualities, as colour, savour, etc. (which in reality are only phantoms),
come to us from the senses, i.e. from our confused perceptions. And the
basis of the truth of contingent and singular things is in the succession
which causes these phenomena of the senses to be rightly united as the
intelligible truths demand."

The Cartesian duality of dream and reality is as acute in Locke as it
is in Descartes, and has a direct bearing on our claims to knowledge with
respect to the agreement or disagreement of ideas. Hobbes had said that
imagination unites, judgment discerns; for Spinoza, imagination - amongst
other functions - deals in particulars; Locke's "judgment" is that "whereby
the mind takes its ideas to agree or disagree" ("Essay" 4. 13. 3.). Bearing
in mind the nature of Berkeley's attack on Locke's representationalism, we
should say that either there is something in the nature of ideas (or the
mind originating them) which them agree; or that there is an objective,
natural world which interacts and interrelates and which we observe and
describe and, presumably, change by intervention. Between the two philo-
sophical poles of Cartesian dualism and Lockean empiricism, if we may
tolerate momentarily these over-simplified categories, there falls the
possibility of a third, broad position which attempts to operate within
the two conflicting and apparently irreconcilable poles. This attempt
has been undertaken in some measure by Aristotle and by Spinoza and Leibniz,
and with Descartes these philosophers offer, to varying degrees, theories
of imagination. Locke, for whom in his notion of complex ideas a uniting
and retaining principle seems crucial, hardly mentions imagination throughout the "Essay" and yet, by attacking innate ideas and implying the possibility of man’s self-dependency and salvation, in a manner somewhat different from that of the "Eremetica", be unquestionably precipitated the new prominence of imagination in Romantic aesthetics. Both Locke and Descartes state that 'ideas' and 'will' are greater in scope than present understanding, but as modern psychology has learned, man can condition both himself and his world according to his precepts, and the known can prefix the knowable despite a belief, as Locke holds, in the near-infinity of ideas. Even so, Leibniz admonishes Locke for having too limited a view of the knowable (1). The influence of Leibniz - the public, Cartesian Leibniz - on the philosophy of art was as great as Locke's, although he seems to have no opinions on the subject of art, just as Locke, on the occasion when he mentions the subject, is quite disparaging. Baumgarten, who gave "Aesthetics" a title and who first treated it as a philosophic discipline, based his theory on Wolff who was a disciple of Leibniz. The effects of Locke's "Essay" were to be rather more far-reaching and direct, socially, politically, and

(1) Locke, "Essay" A.3.22, says: "The causes of our ignorance, I suppose, will be found to be chiefly three:
First, Want of Ideas.
Secondly, Want of a discoverable connexion between the ideas we have.
Thirdly, Want of tracing and examining our ideas."
Leibniz, "New Essays" p.459, replies: "Above all we should be very wrong to complain of the defects of our knowledge, since we avail ourselves so little of that which charitable nature presents to us," Also, un.444-5: "Some one who has not understood the importance of having good ideas, and of understanding their agreement or disagreement, will think that in reasoning upon them so carefully we have been building castles in the air, and that there will be in our entire system only the ideal and the imaginary. An extravagant man whose imagination is heated, will have the advantage of possessing ideas more vivid and greater in number, thus he would also have more knowledge. There will be as much certitude in the visions of an enthusiast as in the reasonings of a sober man, provided this enthusiast speaks consistently, and it will be as true to say a harpy is not a centaur as to say a square is not a circle."
aesthetically, as much as philosophically. The aesthetic implications of Locke's empiricism first become manifest in Addison's "Spectator" articles, where the essays on the "Pleasures of Imagination" began to appear. The magazine, extremely popular in its time had its imitators in Europe as did Addison's praise of the imagination and its pleasures, and foremost amongst the imitators were Bodmer and Brielinger, through whose agency "imagination" becomes the central concept in the artistic theory of German, then English, Romanticism.
Although he says he is more impressed by Plato, the influence of Aristotle on Leibniz is very strong and particularly noticeable in the "Monadology"; elsewhere this influence is hard to extricate from Leibniz's unacknowledged debt to Spinoza, as for instance in the former's attempts to distinguish between real and imaginary 'phenomena' (1). But whereas Descartes emphasises mind at the expense of sense, and Locke sense at the expense of mind, we find in Spinoza and Leibniz some positive attempt to overcome dualism. For Leibniz, adopting the Cartesian criterion of distinctness - hitherto applied only to conceptions - "Being is explained by a distinct concept .... Existence by a distinct perception." He accepts with Descartes that, whatever he thinks it is still he who is thinking, and so, using the unprejudicial term 'phenomena' he asserts that the reality of phenomenon is determined by the phenomenon itself and by the antecedent and consequent phenomena, with the three criteria of vividness, multiplexity, and contiguity:

"It will be vivid, if the qualities, as light, colour, heat, appear sufficiently intense; it will be multiplex if they are varied, and adapted to many tests and to the institution of new observations; for example if we experience in the phenomenon not only colours but also sounds, odours, flavours, tactile qualities, and those things both in the whole and in its various parts which again we can discuss in various relations (varias causis tractare). Which things, indeed, a long series of observations, instituted especially with design and with choice, is wont to meet neither in dreams nor in those images which the memory or the phantasy presents, in which the image is very often weak and also disappears (disperat) in the course of the discussion. The phenomenon will be congruous when it consists of many phenomena, the reason of which can be given from themselves in turn, or from some common hypothesis.

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sufficiently simple; then it will be congruous if it preserves the usage of other phenomena which have frequently presented themselves to us so that the parts of the phenomenon have that position, order, result, which similar phenomena have had. Otherwise they will be suspected; for if we should see men moved in the air, sitting upon the hippogriffs of Ariosto, we should doubt, I think, whether we were dreaming or awake. But this proof can be referred to another head of considerations assumed from the preceeding phenomena. With which phenomena the present phenomenon must be congruous if, namely, they preserve the same usage, that is, if the reason of this can be given from the preceding, or all agree with the same hypothesis as a common reason. But, undoubtedly the strongest proof is the agreement with the whole course of life, especially if very many others affirm that the same agrees with their own phenomena also; for, that other substances similar to us exist, is not only possible, but indeed certain, as I shall soon say. But the most powerful proof of the reality of phenomena, which, indeed, alone suffices, is the success in predicting future phenomena from the past and present, whether that prediction is founded on reason, or in the hypothesis thus far succeeding, or in the usage thus far observed. Nay, though this entire life were said to be nothing but a dream, and the visible world nothing but a phantasm, I would call this dream or phantasm real enough, if, using reason well, we were never deceived by it; but just as we know from these what phenomena must be regarded as real, so, on the other hand, whatever phenomena conflict with those which we judge real, also those whose fallacy we can explain from their own causes, these only we think apparent.

But it must be confessed that the proofs of real phenomena, which have been thus far brought forward, however united, are not demonstrative; for, although they have the greatest probability, or, as is commonly said, produce a moral certainty, they, nevertheless, do not
create a metaphysical certainty, so that the assertion of the contrary implies a contradiction. And thus, by no argument can it be absolutely demonstrated that there are bodies, nor anything keep certain well-ordered dreams from being objects to our mind, which are considered by us as true, and on account of the agreement among themselves with respect to use are equivalent to truths." (Op. cit., pp. 718–9). Having offered rather more convincing arguments than Descartes' Leibniz concludes in similar fashion to his that, in respect of 'phenomena' (Leibniz's term) he will neither admit rashly nor doubt universally, and conjecture with probability that body exists (see "Meditations" III). Leibniz's arguments are not dissimilar from Hume's, as we shall see, and they are characterised by an evident belief in a certain uniformity, as is clear from the 'congruity' and the 'agreement with the course of life' arguments. There is some uncertainty as to whether he is offering some kind of procedural guide for, e.g. empirical science, or an existential guide for everyday use; in the former case, his last argument — "which ... alone suffices" — of predictive accuracy is undeniably strong, but it could be disastrous in the latter case, where it would not be difficult to think of cases in which experience would be too dearly bought to be of any future use. The argument from vividness, so important to Hume, Leibniz himself calls into question, giving it rather less weight than Hume was to do, and the argument based on coherence with the whole of one's life seems to advocate

(1) He earlier had qualified his reliance on vividness, but not on "connection of the phenomena" : "...although feelings are wont to be more vivid than imaginations, it is nevertheless a fact that there are cases when imaginative persons are impressed as much or perhaps more by their imaginations than another is by the truth of things; so that I think the true criterion concerning the objects of the sense in the connection of the phenomena, i.e. the connection of that which takes place in different places and times, and in the experience of different men who are themselves, each to the others, very important phenomena in this respect. And the connection of the phenomena which guarantees the truths of fact in respect to sensible things outside of us, is verified by the truths of reason; as the phenomena of optics are explained by geometry." ("New Essays" p. 422).
inflexibility as much as to assume uniformity, which may be adequate where circumstances are foreseeable but insufficient for anyone involved in scientific research or confronted with unique or unusual phenomena. Adopting for a moment an argument of Hobbes, we might well maintain that the ability to distinguish among phenomena be a function of judgment, the ability to see similarities - uniformity, coherence, congruity, - a function of imagination, so that the problem of separating 'real' from 'imaginary' phenomena is further complicated by the degree of reality or imagination exhibited by some phenomena. But Leibniz's views stand comparison with any to be found in philosophy on these points, and his 'course of life' point has, at the very least, the unusual philosophical merit of originality. The problem of discerning between imagination and reality was not one which caused him any lasting concern, and he is not unduly disturbed by the possibility that our life might be "a continuous and everlasting dream", although this is highly unlikely, and "...provided the phenomena are connected, it does not matter whether they are called dreams or not, since experience shows that we are not deceived in the measures we take concerning phenomena when they are understood according to the truths of reason." ("New Essays" p. 422).

Whereas for Leibniz the argument from contiguity is logical with pragmatic consequences, for Locke, as an empiricist, the congruity pertains to the causal interaction of objects presented (or represented) to us. "Knowledge..." he states, "...seems to me to be nothing but the perception of the connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy, of any of our ideas." He continues: "Where this perception is, there is knowledge, and where it is not, there we may fancy, guess or believe; yet we always come short of knowledge." ("Essay" vol. IV, Ch. I. Sec. 2). And, as he had previously said: "The mind, in making its complex ideas of substances, puts none together, which are not
supposed to have an union with nature," (Op.cit., Bk. I, Ch. 6, Sec. 2).
(1) Locke lists four kinds of agreement/disagreement, the very foundations, for him, of human knowledge: 1. Identity or diversity; 2. Relation; 3. Coexistence or necessary connexion; 4. Real existence. (Op.cit., Bk. IV, Ch. 1, Sec. 3). Leibniz reduces these to "comparison or concurrence" ("New Essays" pp. 400-1).

The most immediate problem seems to be Locke's "real existence" which is a relic of Descartes' ontology - 'God' being an example of 'real existence' - and which he might more happily have termed "verifiable existence", and which for Leibniz would be a question of coherence with other phenomena. Locke's Cartesian reliquary continues to display itself when he says that "intuition and demonstration are the degrees of our knowledge" (op.cit., Bk. IV, Ch. 2, Sec. 1.), — adding later, "sensitive" knowledge — and that intuitive knowledge, then "the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of the ideas immediately by themselves, without the intervention of any other .... as the eye doth light" is "the most certain the human frailty is capable of."
The 'knowledge' to which Locke here refers looks very like that which Socrates sought in Meno, but the presence of such knowledge hardly accords with a "blank tablet" or "empty chamber" theory of the mind. Similarly, Locke's division of knowledge into intuitive, demonstrative and sensitive demands a mind that is active and, so to speak, outgoing, and against which this 'empty' or 'blank' description militates.

The popular Leibnizian philosophy which percolated via Wolff to Baumgarten, becoming the coping stone of the new study called "Aesthetics", (1) Leibniz, it should be noted, argues that the agreement or disagreement of our ideas is a ground for truth, but not, he says, for knowledge of truth: "For we know truth only empirically, from having experienced it, without having the connexion of things and the reason there is in what we have experienced, we have no perception of this agreement or disagreement, unless we mean that we feel it in a confused way without being conscious of it." ("New Essays" p. 400).
is Cartesian in origin. Kant belongs historically as well as philosophically in this line of 'rationalist' thinkers, having based many of his lectures on the "Metaphysics" of Baumgarten. It is safe, if not entirely true, to say that if Locke may broadly speaking be called an 'empiricist', emphasising the origin of all knowledge in experience, Leibniz is a 'rationalist' emphasising the mind's innate disposition to structure experience according to logical criteria. But just as Locke is not entirely consistent in his empiricism - believing in intuition and mental 'power', and suggesting a quasi-dispositional account of memory, will and understanding - so Leibniz recognises the enormous importance of sense-experience, but rigidly maintaining the innate organisational capacity of the mind and arguing that insofar as we are only empirical we are no different from beasts; it is reason alone which elevates us. The Aristotelian tenor of this belief is appropriate for, although Leibniz is critical of the Aristotelian/Cartesian tabula rasa of Locke's "Essay", finding, as he says, more value in Plato's "reminiscence" (1), there can be no doubt of his great debt to Aristotle, a debt which he clearly indicates in the Appendix to his critique of Locke's "Essay". The "Monadology", as I have said, is fundamentally Aristotelian, as well as owing something to the Spinozian doctrine of substance. It is interesting to reflect that Leibniz, whose indirect influence on the course of aesthetics was considerable, was a man of extraordinary interests and accomplishments whose intellectual acumen, like Spinoza's, led him far in advance of the beliefs of his day but whose love of good opinion kept him from publicising many of his findings and from openly pursuing his notions to their (unacceptable) conclusions. His psychology and epistemology are a combination of an unswerving faith in the principles

(1) See "New Essays" p.14 ff. (c.s. "...I think ... I can say that our ideas even those of sensible things, come from within our soul." ("de nostre propre fonds").
of logic and a close knowledge of the emerging sciences of his time, especially biology and palaeontology; we may surmise that he would have found confirmation of the axiom that a conclusion can contain nothing not contained in its premise in the new microscopic discoveries of Leeuwenhoek (1), who indicated that living organs are compounds of smaller organisms. That the possible is potentially in the existent, and the given contains the possible as well as the realised, are fundamental beliefs of Leibniz.

Not unlike Aristotle, though with the benefit of scientific discoveries and consequently greater clarity, Leibniz anticipates Darwin in his belief in the interconnectedness of species (2), though the idea of a 'chain of being' was common in the seventeenth century. His 'law of continuity', holding that nature makes no leaps, at once has biological implications as well as offering an alternative to Cartesian mind/body duality; as a concomitant to this 'law' Leibniz adopts the Spinozist "substance" and offers his own, but not completely original, theory of the "monad" (3). In proposing the monads as simple substances, indivisible, without shape, parts or extension, Leibniz is faced with the problem of accounting for their origin, a problem which remains insoluble today with respect to the modern physical equivalents of monads. Leibniz says they can only begin and end at once.

(1) Leeuwenhoek's discoveries were well and widely known in his day. From about 1674 he had observed bacteria and protozoa in rainwater, pond and well water, and in the human mouth and intestines; these organisms he called "very little animalcules". In 1683 he published the first drawings of bacteria in the "Philosophical Transactions" of the Royal Society. With respect to Leibniz's "law of continuity", Leeuwenhoek also disproved the notion of spontaneous generation by showing that ants, weevils, etc., come out of eggs and not spontaneously out of sand, wheat, or whatever. In 1702 he wrote: "In all falling rain, carried from gutters into water-buts, animalcules are to be found; and... in all kinds of water, standing in the open air, animalcules can turn up. For these animalcules can be carried over by the wind, along with bits of dust floating in the air."
(2) See "Monadology" (2); also "Fragment of a Letter to An Unknown Person" of Oct 16th 1707. See also Locke, "Essay" 3. 6. 12.
(3) A similar inconsistency occurs in "New Essays" p. 52: "...that matter can think is a miracle of God."
and are therefore created by God ("Monadology" 5), an exception then
to his own law of continuity. (1). He calls his monads by the
Aristotelian term entelechies (op.cit., 18), this proposing a
dynamism for his irreducible substances which, being created by God,
are in a condition of becoming according to logical principles,
embracing the laws of contradiction and of sufficient reason (op.cit.,
31 & 32). Since all organisms are reducible to common substances and
have common principles, they are indefinitely intercommunicable:

"For as the whole is a plenum, which means that the whole of matter
is connected, and as in a plenum every movement has some effect on
distant bodies according to their distance, so that each body not only
is affected by those which touch it, and is in some way sensitive to
whatever happens to them, but also by means of them is sensitive to
those which touch the first bodies by which it is itself directly touched;
it follows that the communication stretches out indefinitely. Con­
sequently every body is sensitive to everything which is happening in
the universe, so much so that one who saw everything could read in each
body what is happening everywhere, and even what has happened and what
will happen, by observing in the present the things that are distant in
time as well as in space; .... But a soul can only read in itself what
is distinctly represented there; it is unable to develop all at once
the things that are folded within it, for they stretch to infinity."
("Monadology" 61).

(1) C.f. Berkeley, "Principles of Human Knowledge" Sec.127 : ";. no infinite
extension contains innumerable parts, or is infinitely divisible." Modern
science appears to support Leibniz. See also Leibniz's "Principles of Nature
and Grace, Founded on Reason" 15 : "The beauty of the universe could be
learnt in each soul, could one unravel all its folds which develop percep­
tibly only in time. But as each distinct perception of the soul includes
an infinite number of confused perceptions which embrace all the universe,
the soul itself does not know the things which it perceives, except in so
far as it has perceptions of them which are distinct and heightened : and
it has perfection in proportion to its distinct perceptions. Each soul knows
the infinite, knows everything, but confusedly." There is something of
Spinoza in this, but again the closeness of Bruno is remarkable — only the
emphasis on "imagination" is missing.
The similarity of the beliefs expressed here with those already found in Giordano Bruno are most striking; but Leibniz, cautiously omitting to land the imagination, prudently adds the caveat that the soul's representations must be distinct in order to portend the infinite. Nevertheless he clearly affirms that all souls contain potentially, if largely confusedly, (with monads and "plena") expressions of the whole universe; but these cannot be the property of contingent things; "... bodies and their representations in souls..."—but must come from God. (1) A living thing is a unity of body and monad, in a manner not unlike Aristotle's unity of body and soul, and is a "mirror of the universe" ("Monadology" 63) whereas the soul, which Leibniz calls the "mirror of the indestructible universe", is "... itself indestructible, but also is the animal itself, although its machine may often perish in part, and cast off or put on particular organic integuments." ("Monadology" 77). The indestructible soul is an aggregatum of monads, and because monads are entelechies and infinite in number, their combinations also are infinite according only to the law of contradiction, and all bodies are "in a state of perpetual flux like rivers, and parts are passing in and out of them continually." Leibniz also invented a mathematic, calculus, to describe this dynamic which Newton—who invented calculus at about the same time—called "fluxions". Although Leibniz uses the "machine" metaphor which was common in his time, this "body-machine" is unlike man-made mechanical objects:

"... every organic body of a living thing is a kind of divine machine, a natural automaton, which infinitely surpasses all artificial automata. Because a machine, which is made by the art of man, is not a machine in each of its parts, ... but the machines of nature, that is to say living bodies, are still machines in the least of their parts ad infinitum.

(1) See "Monadology" Secs. 8 & 9.
This it is which makes the difference between nature and art, that
is to say between Divine art and ours." ("Monadology" §4).

The idea of the monad, together with an organic view of man and
time offer Leibniz a means of overcoming Cartesian dualism:

"These principles provide me with a way of explaining naturally
the union, or rather the conformity, of the soul and the organic body.
The soul follows its own laws, and the body its own likewise, and they
accord by virtue of the harmony pre-established among all substances,
since they are all representations of one and the same universe."
("Monadology" 7e). He prudently avoids the complete identification
of the Spinozian Deus sive Natura, though he is patently on the brink of
such a step, preferring to speak of "conformity" and "harmony" - "the
two kingdoms, of efficient and final causes, are in harmony with one
another" - as nature makes no leaps. (1) The monad, as we have already
noted, pertains to God; this is the aspect of its final cause; its
efficient cause relates to the "universe of created things": "souls in
general", he says,

"...are the living mirrors or images of the universe of created
things, whereas minds are also the images of the Divinity Himself, or
the Author of nature, capable of knowing the system of the universe, and
of imitating something of it by architectonic patterns, each mind being,
as it were a little divinity in its own department." (2)

(1) C.f. Berkeley: "It may indeed on some occasions be necessary that the
Author of nature display His overruling power in the producing appearances out
of the ordinary series of things. Such exceptions from the general rule of
nature are proper to surprise and awe men into the acknowledgement of the Divine
Being; but then they are to be used seldom, otherwise there is a plain reason
why they fail of that object." ("Principles" Sec. 63). Berkeley, like Leibniz,
is prepared to allow the almighty occasionally to break the rules of logic;
the possibility of a miracle, or of a visionary imagination, is not totally
precluded.
(2) "Monadology" 83. See also "Principles" 14: "As regards the rational soul
or mind, there is in it something more than in monads, or even in simple souls.
It is not only a mirror of the universe of created things, but also an image
of the Deity. The mind not only has a perception of the works of God, but is
even capable of producing something like them, though on a small scale. For,
not to mention the wonders of dreams, in which we invent without effort (but
also without will) things which we could only discover after much thinking when
awake, our soul is architectonic in its voluntary activities also, and, dis­
covering sciences in accordance with which God had regulated things (mensura,
mensura, mensura, mensuro, etc.), it initiates in its own sphere, and in the little
world which it is allowed to act, what God performs in the great world."
In both his "Monadology" and "Principles of Nature and Grace" Leibniz reveals a great debt to his Neoplatonic forerunners, and clearly adhered to the "chain of being" account of a universe created by an immanent God and overseen by that same, now transcendent God; the logical impossibility of such a conception of God was no more lost on Leibniz than on Spinoza, but Leibniz wanted to have his metaphysical cake and eat it - the redundancy of the "God" concept was a possibility too dangerous to suggest, if not to contemplate - and he seems to have devised the monad as a stop-gap.

There are similar inconsistencies in his philosophy of mind. As we have seen, he has some sympathy for the Platonic notion of cognition as 'reminiscence' as against the empirical view of Locke, and he attacks the "blank tablet" account of mind (2). He also denies that knowledge is innate if understood as the actual 'consideration' (envisionment) of ideas and truths. Ideas are innate as "inclinations, dispositions, habits, or natural potentialities, and not as actions," ("New Essays" p.46) and as "the immediate internal object of a notion, or of what the logicians call an incomplex term" (Op.cit., p.21). He adds:

"...it suffices at the last to recognize that there is an internal light born with us, which comprises all the intelligible ideas and all the necessary truths which are only a result of these ideas and need not experience in order to be proved." (Op.cit., p.22).

(1) For a discussion of this and other influences on Leibniz, e.g., Cabalism, Plotinus, Pythagoreanism, Bruno, etc., see J.Politella "Platonism, Aristotelianism, and Cabalism in the Philosophy of Leibniz" Politella, (p.8), writes: "...that he was influenced by and drew extensively from, the Pythagoreans, Plato, Aristotle, and Neo-Platonists, the Cabalists, and other eclectic scholars of his own day, is not difficult to demonstrate." Also, p.54, Politella quotes a letter of Leibniz: "'All the order of natural beings must necessarily form one chain in which the different classes, like so many links, are so closely connected with one another that it is impossible for sense or imagination to determine exactly the point where one of them begins or ends...'."

(2) See "New Essays" pp.46-7: "Is our soul then by itself such a blank that besides the images borrowed from without it is nothing? This is not an opinion, (I am sure) that our judicious author could approve. And where do we find tablets that have no variety in themselves?"
From this "internal light" and not from sense-experience come the "primitive truths" such as the principle of contradiction (and identity), but for Leibniz, as for Locke, 'innate ideas' are in no way to be considered as foreknowledge as might be construed from the Platonic metempsychosis. But this 'internal light' looks rather more substantive than 'inclinations, dispositions' etc., and further confounds the epistemological with the psychological in reflection of the inconsistencies in his metaphysics. One is reminded of the problems Aristotle inherited from Plato, and indeed there is much that is Aristotelian in both the monadology and the 'dispositional' account of ideas as many of his terms and references show (1). Both Aristotle and Leibniz give prominence to the concept of "motion":

"...motion is not given in bodies as a real entity in them, but I have demonstrated that whatever moves is continually created, that bodies in any instant of assignable motion are something, at any intervening time between instants are nothing." ("New Essays" p.68).

But Leibniz gives no intimation of a psychology of imagination - which, we remember, Aristotle called 'a kind of motion' - just as he resists any mention of a concept of 'imagination' in the context of his view of the mind as a mirror of the universe and an image of the Deity; this cannot be oversight for though he may not have read Aristotle in the original he certainly knew of Bruno, and 'imagination', although an occult concept, was much discussed in the seventeenth century. The omission must in part be ascribed to what D.F.Bond calls a "distrust" of imagination, and to Leibniz's political discretion; the connection of imagination with creation had to wait for about a hundred years before acquiring respectability. The Aristotelian potential-actual

(1) Russell, in his book on the philosophy of Leibniz, (p.6, fn1.), agrees in ascribing much of it Aristotelian influence, but says that there is no evidence to show that Leibniz ever actually studied Aristotle.
formula is much in evidence in Leibniz's psychological speculations; he speaks of a passive "power" in matter and mass, whereby a body resists penetration and also motion (Kepler's "natural inertia of bodies"), calling this power Antitypia. This antitype is rather subtler than the time-honoured "imprint" or "impression" similes for sense-experience (and imagination), being less static and rather more repercussive or reverberative in its implications and offering a useful corroborative to his 'course of life' guide for distinguishing the 'real' from the 'imagined', (2):

"Whatever men continually think extension is (although in truth is always is body and has antitypia, although insensible to us, yet perceptible by the intellect) they do not at once call that body; for sometimes they think that it is a mere appearance and phantasmata. But whatever they not only see but also touch, that is, in which they find antitypia, that they call body; but whatever lacks antitypia, that they deny to be body. In the two, therefore, men both educated and uneducated place the nature of body, in extension and antitypia taken together; they take that from sight, this from touch; whence also from the union of both senses we are wont to be certified concerning things which are not phantasmata." ("New Essays" p.647).

So the antitypia is a quality which distinguishes things from phantases by resistance and impenetrability, a notion which is akin to Aristotle's

(1) The "Concise Oxford Dictionary" gives "that which a type or symbol represents" for "antitype", from the Greek antitypos: "reponding as an impression to the die", derived from "anti-" (opposite, against, in exchange, instead, rivalling) and "tupos" (a blow). Liddell and Scott have: "the impress of a seal, the stamp of a coin, a print, mark of any kind...figures or impressions wrought in metal or stone: a figure, image, statue of a man... an outline, sketch, draught... effect produces on the ear by a Blow, as the heat of horse's foot." Although not very far removed from the old, Platonic 'impression' (or the newer, Nameau one), Leibniz's concept of antitypia is an attempt to perform for psychology what the monad did for metaphysics.
statement that bodies 'suffer' the physical actuality of other bodies. The 'sense-experience', which is the 'antitype', has a means of corroboration to separate it from the delusions of imagination (which must be of the mind's making), and an implication of a kind of Hobbesian decay which is missing from the wax-seal account. But this implied, antitypical 'resonance' is qualitative as well as temporal, so that the proximities and the peripheral associations, which the antitype must have, help to identify it as 'real' i.e., as congruous with the course of one's life and resistant to the 'motions' of imagination. There is, or so one assumes, something like a causal explanation for this series of antitypical relations, whereas imagination, if it is for Leibniz what it is for Aristotle - a kind of motion - , must ever be created; this suggests a link between the immanent and the transcendental, forged in imagination. But this is speculation.

The second of Leibniz's bodily 'powers' is entelecheia, "too little understood by the schools; for such a power involves act (actus) ..." ("New Essays" p. 701); this 'power has also been closely identified with the monad. "Entelechy" is twofold, and may be primitive (substantial) or derivative (accidental); the primitive active force, called forma substantiae, is united with the material or passive power to form an unum per se. 'Derivative force' is a mode of the primitive, and approximates to the will (1); it acts according to the dictates of the mind upon contingencies, in accordance with the harmony of the kingdom of final causes. Though the idea is "something which is in the mind" (op. cit., p. 716), this inherence is dispositional and "consists not in a certain act of thought but in a power (facultas), and we say we have an idea of a thing, although we do not think of it, provided

(1) "New Essays" p. 703, where the will is described as: "...that which some call impetus, a constant evidently, or tendency so to speak, to a certain determinate motion..."
we can on a given occasion think of it." (Loc.cit.) The idea has a conceptual, abstract moment and a concrete, antitypical moment: "There must necessarily, therefore, be something in me, which not only leads to the thing but also expresses it.

This is said to express anything in which are contained conditions corresponding to the conditions of the thing expressed." (Loc.cit.).

In emphasising the actual unity of concept and antitype Leibniz is offering an Aristotelian alternative to the Cartesian account of the mind, but like Aristotle he is careful not to overlook the conceptual differences between the idea and its expression (antitype). (See "New Essays" p.716). So a given triangle exemplifies the idea of triangularity but does not exclusively embody it; or a given cause and its observed effect demonstrates, but does not exclusively contain, the notion of causality. On the one hand there are expressions of will, and on the other hand expressions of nature, and "... the deeds of each one represent his mind, and the world itself in a measure represents God." ("New Essays" p.716) (1). By inference, my actions are analogues of my self, and the descriptions of my actions provide the concepts by which I predicate myself (or others predicate me) as an individual. Similarly, the world is a representation, expression, or analogy of God. Leibniz is at issue with Locke on the problem of the origin of ideas such as "triangularity", "self", and "causality", and whereas Locke would say that the mind infers these abstractions from constant observation of nature, Leibniz relates them more closely to a Platonic view of ideas (2), though it would be wrong to make too much of this resemblance. But like Plato, he is faced with the difficulty of giving an intelligible account of the origin of abstract ideas, if they are not a product of the senses. That the mind is an

(2) See Politelle, op.cit., p.62, on the closeness of Leibniz's "monad" to Plato's Idea.
active principle is not in contention, the problem is how, or whether, we can know that the structures and codes by which we live and experience are, or are not, inherent in the mind, rather than acquired. As Spinoza clearly realised, there are fictions of the mind, such as Cartesian dualism, as well as illusions of the senses, to be discriminated from the 'real', and Leibniz, owing an unacknowledged debt to Spinoza's metaphysics, offers acceptable, practical advice. The problem of identity is approached differently by Hume(1), who has much in common with Locke, and who denies the possibility of an ontological, isolated 'self', apart from perceptions and predicates, equating psychology with philosophy, knower with known, indicating in his way the anomalies of Cartesian mind/body duality. There are affinities between Hume and Leibniz in their observation of the unity of self and other, a unity which is a source of optimism for Leibniz, of pessimism for Hume; but Leibniz has learned from Descartes that the self is a centre of consciousness but that, against both Hume and Descartes, it both perceives and apperceives:

"In a word, the insensible perceptions are as eminently useful in pneumatology as are the insensible corpuscles in physics, and it is equally unreasonable to reject the one or the other under the pretext that they are out of the reach of the senses." ("New Essays" p.50).

Because the monad is irreducible and ubiquitous, and because the "rational soul or mind" has in it more than is in monads, the mind, as we have learned, "... is not only a mirror of the universe of created things, but also an image of God". "Each soul", Leibniz affirms "knows the infinite, knows everything; but confusedly." Man imitates God, according to the innate, organisational capacity of reason, acting on an infinity of perceptions; this imitation is what he calls a pleasure of the mind, but it is not the only such pleasure:

(1) See Hume's "Treatise", II, Pt.IV, Sec.VI. : "... when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular impression or other..." etc.
"Martyrs and fanatics (although the affection of the latter is ill-regulated) show of what the pleasure of the mind is capable: and what is more even the pleasures of the senses are in the last resort intellectual pleasures, confusedly known. Music charms us although its beauty only consists in the harmony of numbers, and in the account which we do not notice, and which the soul none the less takes, of the beating or vibration of sounding bodies, which meet one another at certain intervals. The pleasures which the eye finds in proportions are of the same kind, and those caused by the other senses amount to much the same thing, although we may not be able to explain them distinctly". ("Principles" Sec.27).

Leibniz's belief in the beauty of harmony and proportion was an aesthetic commonplace, and what many artists and composers practiced was clearly in line with 'rational' philosophy. More mysterious are the vibrations "which we do not notice" and which perhaps have some relation to the "antitypes", and which presumably effect confused (or inadequate) resonances, struck pre-conceptually within us. Perhaps these are also similar to the 'ill-regulated affections of fanatics', pleasurable because, within the teleological unity of the universe, they intimate a harmony which is as yet not understood. This again is not too far removed from the Ficignon incantations and the Bruno talismans -- the potential for omnipotence is certainly similar, given method and the desire to experience all -- and Leibniz may himself have realised that the potential for omnipotence was unfulfillable but that to recognise its possibility is an almost mystical 'pleasure of the mind', as his own "Philosophical Dream" (1), Socratic in its visionary quality, indicates. There is also something Pythagorean in his avowal of the pleasure of harmony and proportion, and his lack

(1) See "Philosophical Writings" pp. 254-257.
of confirmation of art is a notable break from the Stoic tradition.

But he is not always so tolerant in his remarks about such prodigies as 'fanatics' and enthusiasts:

"Some idiots with a restless imagination form conceptions which they had not before; they are in a condition fine or at least very animated things in their opinion; they admire themselves and make others admire this fertility which passes for inspiration. This advantage comes to them largely from a vivid imagination which passion rouses and from an excellent memory which has well retained the methods of speech of the prophetic books which the reading or discourse of others had rendered familiar to them" ("New Essays" p.599)(1)

The function of imagination in this context reminds us that Leibniz conspicuously avoids imputing to it any of the powers which were claimed by Paracelsus, Bruno, or Boehme, even though he is unquestionably within the ancient tradition which argued a 'unitarian' cosmology rather than a dualistic one - to use Walter Pagel's term. Pagel places Leibniz within the "kabbalistic" tradition with Lull...Picus, Bouchin, Agrippa of Nettesheim, Bruno, Alstedius..." and Paracelsus; Politella shares this opinion. Magic, acting through forces which are linked sympathetically, is founded on the harmony of the universe as a "single living creature" (Timaeus 30b); the idea of such a harmony underlies a powerful and persistent philosophical tradition apparent in Stoicism, Plotinus, Cudworth, and Leibniz.(2) Like Spinoza, Leibniz believed in the unity of ideas with nature and in the pre-established harmony of all things, a belief also shared by Picino

(1) He goes on to speak of (p.60) a 'Silesian man', "...a man of knowledge and judgment, but who had since indulged in two kinds of visions: equally dangerous, the one of enthusiasts, the other of the alchemists..." Leibniz is quite possibly referring to Boehme here. He adds that if such "inspirations" really enlightened us, or gave knowledge, or if their professors had made gold, we should have grounds to give them credence. Even Locke had attempted to make gold.

(2) See A. Fitzgerald's comments on Synesius' De Insomniis (p.139), from where the quotation from Timaeus is taken.
and Bruno; Leibniz strongly attests to the pleasure afforded to
the mind by the beauty of proportion and harmony as did Picino
before him, and as Picino sees talismuns as "images of the world"
as Leibniz sees the soul as the mirror or image of all created things
and of the deity. In the unity of mind and nature Spinoza sees
perfection. Even Hobbes says "memory is the world". From the
magical and alchemical beliefs we have encountered, imagination is
regarded as the crucial agent of this unity of all things and the
key to both omniscience and power, as such it is the counterpart
of the philosophers' substance and an essential component of the
technology of a pre-scientific age. Even if this idea of imagination
cannot be maintained the psychological value of its function of
seeing similitudes (Hobbes) must be of great importance in our
experience of universal harmony. But this function has another
aspect, for the seeing of similarities is essential to recognition
and familiarity, the existential acts by which we make sense of
the world, and therefore to our psychological well-being. As
Descartes implied, imagination as a mode of thought is also a mode
of being, and so the 'imaginative life' is something rather more,
and rather more important, than phantasmagoria or a concourse of
chimaerons and hippogriffs. These too have an epistemological status
and a 'gadfly' function despite their imprecation of 'civil disobedience'
and 'inadequate ideas', for in their less outlandish manifestations they remind us, according to their inexplicability and originality, of the limits of our knowledge.
PART 5:

IMAGINATION AND ART: ALBERTI TO ADDISON
Introduction.

This part of the thesis is concerned with Renaissance and post-Renaissance theories of art, specifically of Alberti, Leonardo, Horace and Boileau. Little credit is given by any of these writers to imagination as an important power in the making or appreciation of art; this fact is noteworthy in relation to the subsequent emphasis during the 18th century, on the role of imagination in genius and taste, it is also a useful foil against which to consider this great rise in the importance of imagination in the context a rather different climate of opinion. Despite, and perhaps because of, the high regard in which imagination was held by alchemists, magicians and mystics, the Stoic view and distrust of imagination held sway over the minds of most thinking men at least up to the beginning of the 18th century; we have found evidence for this in the works of philosophers, and in Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola's heavily Aristotelian account of imagination we find an earlier confirmation of this view. In Section II of the following chapter I have commented on Pico's analysis of imagination with the intention of indicating why the arts, in a period of their ascendancy, should have no association with this low-status concept.

Broadly speaking, post-Renaissance beliefs are dominated by the authority of the Bible and the classics (1), Horace's Ars Poetica being by far the most important single work on aesthetics. Locke's "Essay", with its attack on "innate ideas", broke the grip of those authorities and undermined the dominance of rules over all areas of human activity, and Addison's articles on "The Pleasures of Imagination" - strongly influenced by Locke's "empiricism", - did much to elevate imagination to a central position in the aesthetic and philosophic theory of the 18th and 19th centuries. During the period of about 300 years prior to

(1) See N. Hampson, "The Enlightenment", p.16
1800 we see a radical volte-face in western European man's idea of himself: a move from the acceptance of the universe as an ordered mechanism, operating on mathematical principles, engineered and serviced by God, to a belief in anthropocentrism and the infallibility of reason, and finally to absolute, unprincipled subjectivism. The notion of an ordered, harmonious cosmos, operated according to rational principles discoverable by man, was eroded by events, beliefs, and a swelling tide of opinion, which argued an irregular structure governed by chance, irrational forces. Experts have pinpointed several events which effected this change—e.g., the Lisbon earthquake of 1755, the French Revolution, Hume's attack on causality—and certainly the demise of reason and its consequent replacement by what was seen as the arch faculty of concupiscence and individuality, imagination, was informed and presaged by such events.

The deposition of rule and reason, and the presumption of imagination, are the theme of this fourth part. The first chapter deals, in three sections, with Alberti and Leonardo, Pico, and Horace and Boileau. In the second chapter I consider the rise and persistence of Platonism in England, indicating its importance in relation to English and German Romanticism. Chapter three is one of the most important in this entire work, dealing as it does with Addison's resurrection and reinstatement of imagination as a central aesthetic concept; the extent of Addison's achievement has not been fully realised hitherto, nor has his enormous reliance on Longinus and Locke. The fourth and final chapter of this part deals with the epistemological, psychological and aesthetic developments of the concept of imagination following Locke and Addison, with sections on Berkeley, Hume and Gerard.
Chapter 1:

RENAISSANCE AND POST-RENAISSANCE AESTHETIC.

SECTION I

Alberti's treatise "On Painting" is a significant document in the aesthetics of visual art during and after the Renaissance. It was the chief source of 15th century theories of painting and the basis for the Academies of France (from 1651) and England where it ran to four editions during the years 1726 - 1755, greatly influencing Hogarth and Reynolds. Based on the works and methods of artists like Brunelleschi, Donatello and Masaccio, the treatise foreshadowed the art of Renaissance Florence but, (though he quotes Hermes Trismegistes), Alberti does not emphasise the imagination, strongly advocating the virtues of clear-living and hard work. Like Leonardo, Alberti - who calls painting "the master art" - was concerned to emphasise it as "most worthy of liberal minds", though the battle to raise its status, hard-won by Leonardo, was to have a deadening effect owing to the later conservatism of the Academies:

"Academic painters from the late sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries were searching for a rational art which allowed no place for fantasy. In such an art the solid virtues of diligence and application advocated by Alberti take on greater importance than the bravura of genius. The academies saw in Della Pittura the means to fill their needs." (J.R. Spencer. Intro. to "On Painting", p.12).

Alberti most certainly does emphasise the values of diligence in favour of what he calls "intellectual ardour", stressing too the importance of observing and drawing from nature (1). In his section in "Istorio" (p.90) he also emphasises "invention" - attributed some 250 years later (1) As he says, p.91: "Never doubt that the head and principle of this art, and thus every one of its degrees in becoming a master, ought to be taken from nature. Perfection in the art will be found with diligence, application and study."
to imagination - but disapproves of anything which is related to imagination; on the portrayal of vigorous movement in figures he says this is: "...not only without grace and sweetness but moreover they show the too fiery and turbulent imagination of the artist." (p.30). (1). And though he advocates the selection of the best parts from nature, (somewhat as Aristotle had intimated in his "conceptual" approach), as also Raphael was to do, Alberti also strongly advises the constitution of a carefully worked-out plan before starting drawing or painting. Nothing, it seems, was to be left to chance or to imagination, and perhaps Alberti was prudent in this, since imagination, as the Stoic tradition had long established, was an inferior faculty. But imagination, like painting, was still primarily visual, as opponents of the *ut pictura poesis* theory were quick to point out.

(1)"The notion of decorum is nearly as dominant in the second book of Alberti's *Della pittura* as in Horace's *Ars poetica*" (E.H.E.s., "Ut Pictura Poesis", p. 229, Fint. 146).
The artist's need for imagination, understood as the ability to put together new combinations, is recognised by Leonardo, but he regards this as the "weakest side of painting". ("Paragone", 22). In his concern to elevate painting to the level of the seven liberal arts (1) he compares it favourably with poetry, seeing this latter as a plagiaristic art which relies on imagination to collect and join together things "stolen from the other sciences." (2). In its reliance on imagination in this sense, poetry comes off badly in comparison with painting which, argues Leonardo - perhaps with Plato's famous denunciation in mind - depends upon true perception:

"The imagination cannot visualise such beauty as is seen by the eye, because the eye receives the actual semblances or images of objects and transmits them through the sense again to the understanding where they are judged. But the imagination never gets outside the understanding (sensus communis); it reaches the memory and stops and dies there if the imagined object is not of great beauty; thus poetry is born in the mind or rather in the imagination of the poet who, because he describes the same things as the painter, claims to be the painter's equal! But in truth he is far removed, as has been shown above. Therefore in regard to imitation, it is true to say that the science of painting stands to poetry in the same relation as a body to its cast shadow; but the difference is even greater; because a shadow penetrates through the eye to the understanding.

(1) The "Artes Liberales", Grammar, Dialectic, Rhetoric, and Arithmetic, Geometry, Astronomy, and Music, were considered to be fit occupations for free-born citizens; not so the mechanical arts, such as Painting and Sculpture, which required manual labour. The Liberal Arts were looked upon as disciplines through which man could conquer the ignorance resulting from the Fall, and enable the guilty soul to return to wisdom. (See Plutarch, "The Seven Liberal Arts".)

(2) Leonardo may have Horace's phrase ut pictura poesis (also attributed to Hesiod and Simonides) in mind; he was probably the first to explore the relationship between these sister arts, as poetry and painting were called, and treatises on art and literature from the mid 16th to the 18th century nearly always remark on this relationship.
while the object of the imagination does not come from without but is
born in the darkness of the mind’s eye. What a difference between
forming a mental image of such light in the darkness of the mind’s
eye and actually perceiving it outside the darkness.” ("Paragone", 18). (1)
He agrees that both arts imitate, but argues that painting serves the
superior sense – the eye is "the window of the soul" (op.cit., 23) –
and that the image of God or of man is much more godlike or manlike
than the word. Painting, he says, is "... the grandchild of nature and
related to God", (op.cit., 2), a significant change in status for
Plato’s ‘copies of copies’.

Leonardo is not always disparaging of imagination, and it is clear
that he regards a talent for painting as a gift (2), and not something
that can be learned or simply acquired through diligence, as Alberti
seems to intimate; but, like Alberti, he does underline the great
importance of drawing from nature: "... you should apply yourself
first of all to drawing, in order to present to the eye in visible form

(1) Hostility towards creative literature and the freedom of imagination was
also voiced by Savonarola; (see J.E. Shirlaw’s "A History of Literary
Criticism in the Renaissance", p. 14 ff). It is interesting to compare
Leonardo’s views with A. Alison’s: "The Painter addresses himself to the
eye. The Poet speaks to the Imagination" ("Essays on The Nature and
Principles of Taste", p. 9). Written some 30 years after Addison’s
popularisation of imagination, Alison’s views are rather more favourable
towards poetry, a fact which reflects the change in fortune of "imagination".
(2) It is interesting and informative to compare the views of Alberti and
Leonardo with those expressed by Dryden some 200 years later in his
"Parallel Between Poetry and Painting". Dryden says that the painter and
sculptor try to imitate God, and try to improve on nature (p. 132). He
says: "... a learned painter should form to himself an idea of perfect
Nature...", citing Raphael’s famous letter to Castiglione as well as
Alberti, Leonardo, Horace, Aristotle, Philostratus, and various French
and Italian critics. Dryden stresses that the aim of painting is to
please by imitating "the best of nature" (pp. 150-5). With Leonardo, and
against Alberti’s "diligence", he regards the ability to paint or poetise
as a gift: "Invention is the first part, and absolutely necessary to them
both; yet no rule ever was or can be given to compass it. A happy genius
is a gift of Nature: it depends on the influence of the stars, on the
atmosphere of the body, on the influence of the mind; it is the
particular gift of heaven; see the divines, both Christians and heathens.
How to improve it, many books can tell us; how to obtain it, none; that
nothing can be done without it, all agree." (pp. 153-5) See also W.G.
the purpose and invention created originally in your imagination....."
It would be wrong to make too much of this passage, but it does suggest
a function of imagination unknown to Alberti, a function which is
also absent from Michelangelo's theory of art where the concepts
"intelletto" and "concetto" are regarded as the basis and goal of
artistic endeavour. (1) And though Michelangelo's use of these concepts
betrays his sympathy with the more mystical aspects of Platonism, his
"imagination" is a traditional and conservative notion, as it seems
to have been for most of his contemporaries.

(1) See R.J. Clements, "Michelangelo's Theory of Art", p. 17 ff., and
p. 73 ff.
SECTION III

That Renaissance psychological theory was Stoic and Aristotelian is clearly indicated by Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola's treatise of 1500, "On The Imagination". His account is based squarely on the "De Anima", to which book he directs the reader for a knowledge of imagination (Ch. VI), and though Pico's treatise shows his knowledge of Plato, Aquinas, Augustine, Averroes, Avicenna and Synesius, there is no sign in it of the tendency to mysticism to which his famous uncle (Giovanni) was prone. Gianfrancesco is a great admirer of Zeno and Epictetus, citing them as exemplars (Ch. XII, p. 95), and considering the high esteem in which so many of the ancient writers were held during the Renaissance it is not very surprising to find no original views in his treatise, though this is a significant fact in the light of the claims made for imagination by the magicians and their followers. Like so many writers (e.g. Hobbes) Pico uses the terms "phantasy" and "imagination" synonymously: "Now this power of the mind, which the Greeks term fantasia, in Latin is called imaginatio. And this name it receives from its function; from the images, that is, which it conceives and forms in itself." (Ch. I, p. 25). The function of this "power of the mind" accords with the accepted tradition: "... for imagination is placed on the border between intellect and sense, and holds the intermediate ground." (Ch. III, p. 71). But, with Aristotle, he regards imagination as an indispensable part of cognition, thought, and action: "... we must admit that our actions for the most part depend upon the nature of this power; for under 'imagination' I at present comprehend the whole inner force of the sensitive soul, by whatever names it might be known to others," (Ch. V, p. 41). And: "What communication would the rational part have with the irrational, if there were not fantasy intermediate, somehow to prepare for reason the inferior nature, and set up this nature to be cognized?" (Ch. VI, p. 41).
The "inner force" of imagination, and the whole moral and existential importance which Pico realises it has, are not expanded or explored by him; he was either being prudent or he did not realise the implications for a non-magical theory of imagination beyond that which "conceives and fashions likenesses of things." (Ch. IV, p. 57). And though he later indicates an awareness of the great importance of sense experience in the formation of knowledge (as does Leonardo), he again disappoints by not elaborating on his observations, though we are reminded of the Aristotelian origin of some of Locke's views:

"When the rational soul is infused into the body, it is like a clean surface on which nothing has been painted, nothing delineated. It follows, therefore, that it cognizes nothing out of itself, but acquires all its knowledge and science from the senses through the medium of phantasy." (Ch. VI, pp. 42-3). The remaining chapters of the treatise are a predictably Stoic attack on imagination and its responsibility for disputation, sins, maladies, and brutish degeneracy; reason, man's most Godlike faculty must govern and dominate imagination:

"Nor is it hard to prove that universal errors which occur as much in civil life as in the philosophic and Christian life, take their beginnings from the defect of the imagination. The peace of the state is disturbed by ambition, cruelty, wrath, avarice, and lust. But then the depraved imagination is the mother and nurse of ambition, and thinks it a fine thing to outstrip all others, albeit without regard for the virtue or nobility whereby those may shine whom the man fired by ruinous ambition busies himself to surpass in honours. Cruelty, wrath and passion are born from and nourished by the imagination of an ostensible but deceptive good, which one who is carried away by per fervid sense and rash imagination to insults, wounds, and murders, thinks inherent in retaliation. What else kindles the ardour of lust?"
And what else, if not the deceitful imagination, brings to the fore the other vices which for want of time I omit to mention? Neglecting reason, she gives preference to injustice rather than to justice, to lust rather than to continence, to savagery rather than to clemency, to avarice rather than to generosity, to discord rather than to peace."

(Ch. VII. p. 45).

With regard to these remarks, and with respect to earlier ones where the value of imagination is recognised, it is not difficult to relate Pico's views to the exaggerated claims of magicians and to be insistent that it is a defect of imagination, not imagination itself, which he is attacking. Nevertheless, this weakness of imagination was, it seems, (despite what we have found in Dante) sufficient to debar it from being given a position and function of any value in aesthetic theory. Only the inferior arts, or that which is inferior in art, depends upon imagination, as Leonardo said; it is the rather complex concept of "imitation" which dominates Renaissance and subsequent aesthetic theory.
Prior to the beginning of the 18th century, humanistic aesthetic theory is predominantly Roman, being based on the "Ars Poetica" of Horace and, to a smaller extent, the "Poetica" of Aristotle. Whereas the early Greek poets such as Hesiod and Homer had, like Plato, regarded their art as a product of divine inspiration, the Horatian theorists stressed the virtues of good sense, reason and taste, and the practice of imitation, didacticism, and decorum. These poets and theorists, among them the Augustans in England, saw Virgil as their exemplar — he had been a friend of Horace — and as late as 1743 Akenside, writing his lengthy poem "On The Pleasures of Imagination" under the aegis of Addison's "Spectator" essays, says he took Virgil (and Dante) as his model. Indeed, as A.S. Cook tells us ("The Art of Poetry", p. 256), Virgil's works ran to 20 editions before 1500. Vida's "Art of Poetry", published in 1527, recommends using Virgil as a model and underlines the importance of clarity, coherence and the avoidance of obscurity; no place for imagination here. Although he calls inspiration "the sacred flame", Vida is very much a man of his time in asserting that "to copy nature is the task of art." (Op. cit., 1.395).

"Imitation", a central concept in humanistic theories of art, is not easy to pin down. Horace advocated the imitation of the great artists of the past and was obeyed, Alberti advocated the imitation of nature, and "imitation" also came to refer to an ideal as for instance in the "corta idea" of Raphael; and though this concept remains in many respects what R.M. Lee called "decorum"; a "pseudo Aristotelian" concept; it never corresponds to the Aristotelian mimesis. But the development from the notion of copying to that of idealising is significant:

(1) C.S. Kierkegaard's remark, some 250 years later: "It is one thing to make an idea clear, and another to make it affecting to the imagination." (Cited in H. Netter, "A History of Modern Criticism", Vol. II, p. 27).
(2) G. Howard, (Op. cit., p. 75), remarks on the similarities between Vida and da Frenenay's "De arte graphic" of 1568. (da Frenenay was also greatly influenced by Michelangelo whose "Dialogo della Pittura" of 1567, "one of the most important books on painting" (Howard, p. 50), states that painting is "nothing but imitation of nature."
"In the sixteenth century the doctrine of ideal imitation had not yet entirely supplanted the older and scarcely compatible notion that art is an exact imitation of nature, and it is not unusual, at least until past the middle of the century, to find them disconcertingly side by side — a fact which, the reader will agree, does not argue for the philosophical capacities of these writers." (H.H.Lee, op.cit., p.253).

The high ideals which artists sought to imitate were inevitably regarded as the product of reason, though the notion that the best artists are born and not made is also closely related to this attitude. In Boileau's enormously influential "Art Poétique", published much later (in 1674) these two aspects of this attitude recur. In this later work, the need for organic unity in the arts, as stated by Aristotle, Horace and Longinus, is transformed into the prescriptive device of the famous three unities of time, place and space, which came to dominate French classical drama. (1) Such is "the spirit of Descartes transferred to poetry". (2) This rigid, rule-based approach to art, together with the Stoic-Horatian dictum that art should instruct as well as delight, (and a corresponding emphasis on "decorum"), inevitably led to the adoption of formalised means of representing emotion and human behaviour, effectively forestalling any pretensions an artist might have had to originality. But the rational traditionalism of this "academic"

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(1) See Boileau, op.cit., Canto III, ll. 70 if.; I am specifically referring here to Racine and Corneille. It is in drama perhaps above all the arts that one sees the contrast between the so-called "classic" and "romantic" approaches; the early Romantics, especially the Schlegels, held Shakespeare in the greatest esteem, and here one sees the contrast between the drama of conflicting duties (classic) and that of conflicting values (romantic).

(2) This quotation is from Descartes, in A.S.Cook, op.cit., p. 314. See also H. Cassirer, "The Philosophy of the Enlightenment" pp. 269-70: "Boileau in his Poétique but attempts to arrive at a general theory of the genres of poetry, just as the geometer attempts to arrive at a general theory of curves. In the wealth of actually given forms he seeks to discover the 'possible' form, just as the mathematician wants to know the circle, the ellipse, the parabola, in their 'possibility', that is, in the constructive law from which they can be derived." On the influence of Descartes on the course of 17th and 18th century aesthetics see ch. VII of Cassirer's book; see also H.H.Lee, op.cit., p.221 ff.
attitude, "founded on the ideal antique and sustained by a set of thoroughly formalistic concepts" (Lee, p.261), and the cosmology of which it was symptomatic, came into question in the face of the all too obviously unmethodical, living world of nature, whose apparently infinite manifestations were becoming apparent to the new science of biology. I have already referred to these developments in the chapter on Leibniz. In aesthetic theory Boileau, besides popularizing the formalism of the classical approach to literature, also helped effect its supercession by translating, in 1674, Longinus' "On The Sublime", thrusting into prominence the long-recognised, undervalued, idea of "original genius". Notions such as "genius" and "the sublime" are at the very centre of attention in pre-Romantic and Romantic aesthetic theory, and are intimately connected with the theory of imagination; Longinus' work, with Locke's "Essay", is one of the twin foundations of Addison's essays "On The Pleasures of Imagination". But the Romantic exaltation of imagination, which Addison did so much to inaugurate, was not an autonomous reaction to classical formalism; it was greatly informed, as I have been at pains to maintain, by the continuing and resilient Neoplatonic tradition which, retaining its magical and mystical aspects in Bruno and Boehme and its philosophical aspects in Leibniz, was also firmly rooted in England as I shall show in the next chapter.
Introduction.

In considering the enormous impact of empiricism, wrought by Bacon, Hobbes and Locke, on the intellectual climate of Britain, we should not underestimate the importance of Cambridge Platonism and its origins in the Florentine Renaissance. The distrust of imagination, inherited largely from Stoicism, which runs through the predominant English intellectual mainstream of Puritanism and empiricism, reflects a concern for clarity and method in natural and discursive philosophy rather than an attack on the arts (1). The Cambridge Platonists were very much at odds with this mainstream, however, preferring to stress the virtues of meditation, contemplation, and learned research, and the fundamental antithesis between these two schools of thought is evidenced by the polemic against Hobbes which underlies all of Cudworth’s works; Locke’s attack on “innate ideas” has also been seen as directed against Cudworth. (2) Ernst Cassirer considers, erroneously in my opinion, that the empirical tradition made no noteworthy contribution to aesthetic theory, an area of enquiry in which he considers the first major contribution to have been made by Anthony Ashley, 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury, the “beloved Plato of Europe” as Herder called him. Though not easy to categorise, Shaftesbury belongs to the tradition of Cambridge Platonism, which “...preserved a nucleus of genuine ancient philosophic tradition, and passed it on uncontaminated to the centuries to come.” (E. Cassirer, “The Platonic Renaissance in England”, p. 202). We should note again, with Cassirer, “the agreement in basic principles between Leibniz and the Cambridge men.” (Op. cit., p. 59).

(1) See D.F. Friend’s “Distrust of Imagination in English Neo-Classicism”, p. 55: “...neo-classical ‘distrust’ of imagination is in large part concerned not with criticism of imaginative literature (tragedy, epic, lyric poetry, etc.) at all, but with criticism of intellectual literature (eloquence, philosophy, science, etc.).”

(2) In Cassirer, op. cit., p. 4: “The fundamental tendency of Locke’s attack on ‘innate principles’ seems quite clear only in relation to the doctrine of the a priori developed in Cudworth’s Intellectual System.”
The similarities between Leibniz and the Cambridge Platonists serve to confirm, should it be necessary, that we are here dealing with a powerful and permanent tradition which stretches back at least as far as Plato and of which the Cambridge school is but one manifestation. This tradition maintained the cosmology of the "Great Chain of Being", analysed in A.O. Lovejoy's book of that title, which saw all things in an ontological scale which stretched from the merest entity to the one perfectissimum. This cosmology is Neoplatonic, founded on the Plotinian "principle of plenitude" in which can be found the origin of Leibniz's "Law of continuity": "Among the great philosophic systems of the seventeenth century it is in that of Leibniz that the Chain of Being is most conspicuous, most determinative, and most pervasive." (1) The concomitants of this cosmology seem to have favoured the development of ethics and aesthetics as much as natural science, for the notion of a "Chain of Being" seemed to support the findings of biology, and Leibniz was not alone in seeing this notion confirmed by Leeuwenhoek's discoveries. But the great Chain came to be seen also as a programme of nature rather than an inventory, and the artist's function was increasingly seen as an imitation of the deity as mind or "nature", as method and product, God being manifest in change and becoming and thereby as insatiably creative. (2)

(1) A.O. Lovejoy, op.cit., p.144; see also p.171 where he says that the principle of plenitude is "inherent in the very substance" of Spinoza's doctrine, though "in its static form". See also S.Joulin & J.Goodfield, "The Discovery of Time" on the "Great Chain": "This conception dominated eighteenth century thought to an extent which it is hard to appreciate today. From Leibniz and Locke, through Addison, Bolingbrooke and Pope, Buffon and Diderot, to Kant, Herder and Schiller; one after another, one finds the most influential eighteenth century authors accepting this notion unquestioningly. In an unlikely alliance, Voltaire and Samuel Johnson were the only sceptics." (p.117-8). In the Lisbon earthquake of 1755, which occasioned a quarrel between himself and Rousseau, Voltaire found confirmation of his disbelief in divine order and plenitude.

(2) See Lovejoy, op.cit., p.206: "Since the strain in Western thought matured up in the doctrine of the Chain of Being thus consisted in an increasing emphasis upon the conception of God as insatiably creative, it followed that the man who, as moral agent or as artist, would imitate God, must be so by being himself 'creative'. The word, which through much repetition has in our own day become a sort of tiresome cant, could still in the late eighteenth century express a very exciting, and for the arts a very stimulating idea. Man's high calling was to add something of his own to the creation, to enrich the sum of things, and thus in his finite fashion, conscientiously to collaborate in the fulfilment of the Universal Design."
The idea of the artist as creative acquires something like common currency during the Romantic era, but it was an idea which grew out of Neoplatonism: "It is to be remembered, also, that a revival of the direct influence of Neoplatonism was one of the conspicuous phenomena in German thought in the nineties. A special student of this period has gone so far as to declare that 'if we are to speak of a key to early Romanticism, it is to be found in one of the thinkers of antiquity, Plotinus. For this Neoplatonic philosopher not only inspired the active system of Novalis, scattered through innumerable fragments, and many of the ideas of Schelling in his middle period; his arm reached further: through Novalis and Schelling he exercised an influence, though an indirect one, on both the Schlegels, and without a knowledge of this fact many a passage in the 'Dialogue concerning Poetry' and in the Berlin lectures remains an enigma." (Lovejoy, op.cit., pp.297-8).

The Platonic and Neoplatonic themes contribute greatly to the Romantic and pre-Romantic theory of imagination, and in this way enter the mainstream of art educational theory in England; this short chapter deals with the introduction of Platonism into England during the Renaissance and moves to a consideration of Cudworth and Shaftesbury, for there is also a continuous line of influence which links these two thinkers with Kant and Coleridge.

* L. Reilly, "Suphorion", (1912), p.591; no English translation of this work is available.
SECTION I

It was John Colet who introduced the Florentine Neoplatonism of Ficino into England in 1496, giving great impetus to the mystic theme which is so strong in English poetry and which immediately becomes evident in Spenser and Sidney. (1) Ficino's commentary on Plato's "Symposium", as Cassirer says, "...was a source book of English poetics throughout the whole of the sixteenth century. English literature found here the real philosophical justification of poetry, the intellectual foundation and legitimation of poetic genius and enthusiasm." ("The Platonic Renaissance in England", p.111). It is more the spirit than the letter of Neoplatonism that one finds in Sidney's "Apology", a work which still contains references to Aristotle, Horace, and the notion of imitation: "Poesy ... is an art of imitation, for so Aristotle teacheth in his word mimesis, that is to say, a representing, counterfeiting, or figuring forth: so to speak metaphorically, a speaking picture: with this end, to teach and delight;" (p.227). The synthesising function of imagination, which had become a commonplace of post-Aristotelian psychology and epistemology, is also implicit in Sidney's views when he speaks, in the familiar Renaissance way, of "idea or fore-conceit of the work" and of how the poet: "coulleth the general notion with the particular example. A perfect picture I say, for he yieldeth to the powers of the mind, an image of that whereof the philosopher bestoweth but a wordish description...."

Spenser was in "close familiarity" with Sidney and in 1579 dedicated his "Shepherd's Calendar" to him. In the Argument to the Second

(1) See E.M. Blakeney, "Mysticism in English Literature", Spengler deals at length with the sources of European mysticism in Plato and Plotinus, e.g., the "Hymns" of Spenser he says are "saturated with the spirit of Plato, and they express in musical form the lofty ideas of the Symposium and the Phaedrus...." (op.cit., p.24).
Eclogue (October) of this work we find something of an amplification of Sidney's "old proverb", orator fit, poeta nascitur when Spenser speaks of poetry as a "divine gift and heavenly instinct", not got, as Alberti implies of painting, by labour and learning. Says Spenser, poetry is "poured into the witte by a certain enthusiasm and celestial inspiration." A similar view is to be found in Sidney's "Apology":

"Neither let it be deemed too saucy a comparison to balance the highest point of man's wit with the efficacy of Nature: but rather give right honour to the heavenly Maker of that Maker; who having made man to his own likeness, set him beyond and over all the works of that second nature, which in nothing he showeth so much as in poetry: when with the force of a divine breath, he bringeth things forth for surpassing her doings, with no small argument to the incredulous of that first accursed fall of Adam: with our erect and bred wit, makest us know what perfection is, and yet our infected will, keepeth us from reaching unto it." (p. 222).

Before considering the Cambridge Platonists I would like to draw attention to the concept of "wit" as it occurs in Spenser and Sidney. We have already seen Hobbes' identification of "good wit" with "good fancy", and though I shall have a little more to say on the subject in the chapter on Addison, the point should be made that this "wit", which may be taken as that part of fancy which most closely relates to reason, is that which for Sidney gives us a knowledge of perfection. Remembering Hobbes' "promiscuous" use of "fancy" and "imagination", we can trace the clear implication that it is the intellectual part of imagination which is able to tend towards the mystical heights.
The idea of the poet as an inspired being, breathing the breath of God, was quite common in England during the 16th and 17th centuries. Gradually, from the Renaissance to the beginning of the 19th century, there is a revolution in the idea of the function of the artist: from imitator of nature to imitator of God (by His inspiration), to rival of God and creator in his own right and realm. And though the idea of inspiration is ancient, that of imagination as its medium is not widely accepted before the 18th century; to some extent this "revolution" is implicit in the writings of the Cambridge Platonists, for whom:

"The Dialogues of Plato and the Enneads of Plotinus have gained an almost canonical validity; they are placed on a par with the books of the Bible and treated with equal veneration as sources of religious knowledge." (E. Cassirer, "The Platonic Renaissance in England", p. 29).

Strong elements of mysticism and even the influence of the Cabbala are to be found in Henry More's works, and in Peter Sterry the parallel between God's creation and artistic creation is unequivocally drawn - this is the case for musicians and painters:

".. in one indivisible Act, or Idea of beauty, in the Spirit of the Painter, lie together all the differing lines, lights, shades, and colours, by which that Idea reflecteth itself in Picture upon the eyes and spirits of the Beholders. In like manner, the far greater perfection, the Will of God, being a simple Act of Goodness, supremely invisible and eternal, containeth originally, eminently within it self complacency and aversion, love and hatred, with their several objects, in their several forms and degrees, in their several risings and fellings, most properly and harmoniously suited to each other." ("A Discourse of the Freedom of the Will", pp. 22-3). (1).

(1) On Sterry in this context see P. J. Lewicke, "The Cambridge Platonists", Ch. VII. Lewicke writes of ".. these Divine Spirits (as they are esteemed and styled) Homer, Virgil, Tasso, our English Spenser" of whom he says "The works of these persons are called Poems. So is the Work of God in Creation and in its contrivance from the beginning to the end named poiesis .." etc. (Lewicke, p. 18-9)
Sterry also states the potency of the "image", an assertion which is perhaps based on Christ's being the image of God: "Our thoughts are living images in various postures and motions. They are in a manner the Creation, the Creatures of our Soul. They live, move and have their being in our souls" (Op. cit., p.41). That images are "creations of our soul" is clearly contrary to Locke's somewhat ambivalent attack on "innate ideas", and idea of mind's "proleptical" function (as Cudworth called it), together with the notion of the a priori (1), are an important aspect of the epistemology and psychology of the Cambridge philosophers; as Cassirer says:

"The mere impression affecting the soul can never sufficiently account for our consciousness of this impression. The act of consciousness requires rather an original spontaneity from which it alone can arise. The flux of sense-impressions must be referred to and measured by fixed and enduring thought patterns. It is only because we can think such unified existences, that we are able as it were to bring to a standstill the abundance of individual images in the mind, and relate them to, and compare them with one another." (Op. cit., p.77).

In Cudworth's concept of the "proleptical" there is some similarity with the scholastic "intention", and we shall find a similar notion in Hutcheson's "Enquiry", a work which was heavily influenced by Shaftesbury. Like, Aristotle, whose work he knew and quoted, Cudworth maintains what he calls "the Vital Sympathy betwixt the Soul and Body", but the emphasis is very much on the mind though the soul/mind distinction is unclear. He says that the soul has ".. an Inmate Cognoscitive Power Universally .." and so "a Potential Omniformity", agreeing with Aristotle "That the Soul is in a manner All Things".

(1) See E. Cassirer, op. cit., p.50 fn. 1: "In their defence of the a priori, most of the thinkers of the Cambridge School do not distinguish between the 'logical' and the 'temporal' sense of the a priori concept. Hence they argue not only for the a priori validity of theoretical and ethical principles, but also for the 'innateness' of these principles. In this respect they advocate essentially the position which Locke assails in the first book of his Essay."
This innate "cognoscitive power" of the soul is the mind: "For to know or understand a thing, is nothing else but by some inward anticipation of the mind, that is Nature and Domestick, and so familiar to it, to take Aquaintance with it..." (Up.cit., Eκ. III, Ch. III, Sec. 1). Bodies are perceived by "Understanding alone" and not by sense or imagination: "The Sensible Ideas of things are but Unbratile and Euenid Images of the sensible things, like Shadows projected from them; but Knowledge is a Comprehension of a thing Proleptically, as it were a priori." (Eκ. III, Ch. III, Sec. 2). He makes no distinction between sense and image such as was so important to Leibniz: "Phantasms and Sensible Ideas are really or Materially the same thing, which Aristotle intimates... for both Phantasms and Sensation are Passions or Sufferings in the Soul from the Body." (Eκ. III, Ch. IV, Sec. 5). Implicit here is a familiar Platonic and Stoic judgment on the relative unimportance of the sensible, which is no more than the phantastic, and of the superiority and the autonomy of the rational and intellectual:

"...we can have no certainty by sense alone either concerning the Absolute Natures of Individual Corporeal things without us, nor indeed of their existence; but all the Assurance that we have thereof arises from Reason and Intellect judging of the Phantasms or Appearances of Sense, and determining in which of them there is Absolute Reality, and which of them are but meerly Relative or Phantastical." (Op.cit., Eκ. IV, Ch. I, Sec. 5). (1)

(1) See E. Cassirer, "The Platonic Renaissance in England", p. 79: "The image or 'phantasm' is meaningless without the idea or 'schema' by which it is determined or given significance." And: "Genuine knowledge does not proceed by imitation, but by anticipation; it is not a copy of the given, but 'prolepticall'."
Many of the beliefs of the Cambridge Platonists are similar to others we have found in the Renaissance. Sterry's likening of the creative acts of musicians and painters to that of God is almost identical with the Hermetic idea of man's creating as God does (see p.127 supra), and Cudworth's comments on perception are very like those of Ficino. For Paracelsus, and particularly for Boehme, the world was made 'out of the imagination of God' — it is the divine and the human imagination which creates not reason or intellect. Cudworth's Platonic metaphysic largely explains his disdain for sense and imagination, and the operational function of imagination would hardly have endeared itself to his scholarly, contemplative nature. As I have shown, the magical and alchemical operators set great store by imagination; the development of controlled empirical science, despite relinquishing the substantive imagination for method, brought a central aesthetic and epistemological role for imagination in the works of Addison and Hume. Nevertheless, despite its omission from the works of the Cambridge philosophers, the later (Kantian) relationship between imagination and what Cudworth calls "Absolute Reality" — which is like Kant's "Ideas of Reason" and Plato's eidos — owes something to this Platonic revival.
Cudworth's views have their moral and aesthetic counterparts in Shaftesbury, who forms a significant link in the line which leads from Cambridge Platonism to Kant. It is significant that Addison's "Spectator" essays of 1711 were on the pleasures of imagination, and their praise and description of the physical nature of this pleasure is as antipathetic to the Cambridge men as one would expect from someone so heavily imbued with the spirit of Locke. But Shaftesbury, whose principal hate noire was Hobbes and who had been tutored as a boy by Locke, will only countenance intellectual pleasure, attacking the transient nature of the physical:

"Can there be strength of mind, can there be command of oneself, if the ideas of pleasure, the suggestions of fancy, and the strong pleadings of appetite and desire are not often withstood, and the imaginations soundly reprimanded and brought under subjection?" ("The Moralists", Vol. I, Treatise III, Pt. III, Sec. II, p. 203) (2).

Shaftesbury considers, as does his admirer Leibniz, that lasting pleasure comes from the beautiful and the well-proportioned, and from principles such as are afforded by mathematics, (see loc. cit., p. 297); such pleasures are purely intellectual and in many respects anticipate Kant's "Analytic of The Sublime". Cassirer considers that Shaftesbury virtually founded aesthetics: "It is almost universally assumed that the intensification of the aesthetic interest in the

(1) See Cassirer's "The Platonic Renaissance in England", p. 188.
(2) As a young man Shaftesbury made a study of the works of Whichcote, whose views on imagination are similar: "...By Mind, and Understanding, and Will, he (man) hath intercourse with God, and things invisible; and by these he is fitted to the improving all the lower Objects to Heavenly Ends and Purposes. But then, by Sense, Imagination and Bruteish Affection, we can only maintain Acquaintance with this outward and lower World." (from "The Work or Reason" or 1650, quoted in D.H. Long, "The Neo-Classical Psychology of Imagination", p. 272). See also C.P. Thorne, "Addison and Hutcheson On Imagination", p. 222 ff.; (e.g.: "...Shaftesbury finds himself unable to conceive of admiration of physical beauty in person, without reference to beauty of mind." And: "...Shaftesbury's theory of imaginative pleasure ... rests upon the assumption of a preconceived idea of absolute beauty, by which the relative beauty of external objects is measured.")
eighteenth century is explicable in terms of the extension and refinement of psychological enquiry; and that the aesthetic problem is simply a further development and natural outcome of basic psychological tendencies. But contrary to this supposition is the fact that precisely the great systems of English psychology contributed practically nothing towards the real foundation of aesthetics. There were of course investigations of the origin and structure and feeling which first marked out the paths along which aesthetics was to develop. But all of these investigations — as we have them in Hutcheson and Lord Kames, in Burke and Ferguson — go back to the pupils and disciples of Shaftesbury, not those of Locke, Berkeley and Hume. (Op. cit., p.196). (1).

The experts are divided on the question of the origin of aesthetics as an autonomous area of enquiry, and in opposition to Cassirer's view, notwithstanding Shaftesbury's influence and importance, both E.L. Tuveson and C.D. Thorpe make much of the English empirical influence stemming from Locke. Hutcheson, for example, who is an ardent admirer and promoter of Shaftesbury, nevertheless owes more in his aesthetic theory to Locke; this is also Thorpe's view. For Tuveson, commenting on Addison (who was a disciple of Locke): "... 'The Measures of Imagination' is the first work ever written on aesthetics as a wholly autonomous subject." (The Imagination as a Means of Grace", p.92).

It is perhaps of no more than historical interest to decide who or what started the study of aesthetics, but more valuable, I think, to ascertain the nature of this study according to beliefs of those who initiated it. The Romantic notion of imagination is a combination of Platonic metaphysics and empirical and speculative psychology.

(1) See Cassirer's "The Philosophy of the Enlightenment", p.312 for a similar view.
and it is this notion which is written into modern art educational theory. Aesthetic theory and the theory of imagination are very closely intertwined, and it seems clear to me that the responsibility for stimulating an interest in both is largely Addison's.
Chapter 3: ADDISON

Introduction.

Our contemporary ideas on imagination, and the lip-service paid to its importance in numerous areas of human life - including education - had their resurgence in the 18th century. The origins of these ideas I have endeavoured to trace in Greek myth and the philosophy and psychology of Plato and Aristotle, and though there is a new emphasis on the mythopoeia of symbolism and ambiguity in the later 19th century, this resurgence, and the focussing on interest on imagination, cannot be solely explained by events and beliefs dating back some 2000 years. The Renaissance had brought a new, Hermatically inspired anthropocentrism, as (Giovanni) Pico della Mirandola proclaimed (amongst others): "Thou, constrained by no limits ... shall ordain for thyself the limits of thy nature. We have set thee at the world's centre... thou mayest fashion thyself in whatever shape thou shalt prefer." ("Oration on The Dignity of Man", in Cassirer, "The Renaissance Philosophy of Man").

We have seen something of the exotic hybrid, product of magic, alchemy and mysticism, which was the post-Hermatic "imagination" of Boehme's forerunners; this empyrean, infinitising imagination persists and can be seen in aesthetic as well as theological theory, passing from Boehme through Hume and German Romanticism to Kierkegaard and from Blake and Wordsworth to Yeats. Generally speaking, certainly prior to about 1800, this metaphysical aspect of imagination maintains a greater prominence on the continent than in Britain where the philosophy of mind is dominated by Locke's attack on "innate ideas". (1). Locke's "Essay" is a crucial work

(1) See D.E.Pond, "The Neo-Classical Psychology of The Imagination": "English neo-classicism was formed in a time of conflict between the basic points of view. The supremacy of Platonic idealism or of Cartesian rationalism would have meant a continuance in England of a dualistic psychology in which imagination would occupy an inferior discredited position. It was owing to the rise of the empiricist psychology that the prestige of the imagination was enhanced and that a more intensive, and unbiased, study was made of its operations. Phantasms were no longer evaluated by an ideal truth, but by the truth of falsehood of the sensations which brought them into existence. To the creative writer imagination meant not only the reproducing of images, but the making of comparisons and the combining of materials into new and hitherto undreamed of situations and characters. Thanks to Hobbes and his followers, the imagination was no longer to be associated merely with error or passion, thanks to both Hobbes and Locke its associative powers were to be studied more intently and more sympathetically." (p.266).
in the development of the concept of imagination, inaugurating or symptomising (depending on one's view of history) a revolution in consciousness by irrevocably altering man's view of himself, voicing in its way the realisation that man's power to shape himself was his alone and not by the grace of God - as Pico believed. If God died at the end of the 19th century He was certainly unwell at the end of the 17th.

The attack on innate ideas was not a sudden, naive denial of all inborn potentiality but was part of the erosion of acquiescence to the unquestioned authority of principles, ideals, and deity. The centre of man's consciousness shifted to what had hitherto been considered to be the lower faculties such as sense and imagination, and away from the higher, nearer-to-God ratiocinative faculties. This anthropo-psychic revolution, if I may be allowed so to call it, is still ongoing today; what it brought about at the beginning of the 18th century was what was to become an 'operational' involvement with human psychology rather than a restrictedly metaphysical or speculative one. The specifically human powers become particularly interesting, and moral approbation no longer automatically attaches itself to purely human pleasures; imagination is to be enjoyed for its own sake. This enjoyment is the theme of Addison's essays on imagination, which are largely Lockian in language and conception but which are also greatly influenced by Longinus and, to a lesser extent, by Malebranche.

I have called this chapter "Addison" because it deals with the content of, influences on, and effects of, his essays "On The Pleasures of Imagination." In the following sections I will consider, respectively, Longinus' "On The Sublime"; Addison, the concept of "taste"; and the theories, of Hutcheson, Malebranche, Addison, and Shaftesbury, where these are concerned with imagination. In my estimation Addison is
the single person who has done most, during the 18th century, to bring imagination to the forefront of attention in aesthetic theory; so far as I am aware this view is not held by other students of this period.
SECTION I.

Longinus' "On the Sublime" is a work which, through Addison's agency, contributed enormously to the elevation of the concept of imagination to the forefront of Western European aesthetic theory. (1) The notion of the sublime is one which came to occupy the attention of several important aesthetic theorists up to and including Kant, but my immediate concern is more with the concepts of taste and genius, relating respectively to the appreciation of making of art, both of which are seen to depend upon the imagination. Somewhat in opposition to Locke's attack on "innate ideas" the idea of an 'original genius' as an idealising, innate power comes to Addison from Longinus: "...by some innate power the true sublime uplifts our souls; we are filled with a proud exaltation and a sense of vaunting joy, just as though we had ourselves produced what we had heard." ("On the Sublime", ch.7). Since Leonardo it is in connection with the literary arts that imagination has most prominently figured, though in this context the word "imagery" is most suitable, since what are referred to are the images which poets, for example, describe and evoke. Longinus also speaks frequently of feelings and emotions, in a way which runs counter to the neo-classical advocacy of restraint and decorum, and without condemnation of their close links with "images":

"...dignity, grandeur, and the power of persuasion are to a very large degree derived from images — for that is what people call the representation of mental pictures. In a general way the term 'image' is used of any mental conception, from whatever source it presents itself, which gives rise to speech; but in current usage the word is applied to passages in which, carried away by your feelings, you imagine you

(1) Addison had visited Boileau on his travels in Europe when a young man. He also quotes Boileau and Bouhours with evident approval (Spectator, 62).
are actually seeing the subject of your description, and enable your audience as well to see it." ("On The Sublime", Ch.1).

Bold imagery, says Longinus, is indispensable to the "onward rush of passion" which sweeps all before it (ch.32) and the ability to achieve such effects is a "mighty heaven-sent gift" of great genius (ch.34); as Gerard's "Essay on Genius" (1774) shows, the acceptance of imagination as the sine qua non of genius came to be a commonplace of pre-Romantic (and Romantic) aesthetics.

The most direct and obvious of Addison's borrowings from Longinus are the categories of "uncommonness", "greatness" and "beauty" which Addison says bring pleasure to what he calls the "primary imagination". These categories are almost identical to those of Longinus:

"...our ideas often go beyond the boundaries by which we are circumscribed, and if we look at life from all sides, observing how in everything that concerns us the extraordinary, the great and the beautiful play the leading part, we shall soon realise the purpose of our creation." (Op.cit., ch.35).

Addison's "primary imagination" is clearly based on Locke's "primary qualities" which "produce simple ideas in us" and perhaps it was no great feat for Addison to produce a popular synthesis of this conception of Locke's with Longinus three categories; the synthesis required imagination in more senses than one. But I shall discuss Addison in the next section. As to Longinus, it would be of some interest to be able accurately to date his work - at least in respect to the history of aesthetics and of the concept of imagination - but this date is unknown though it may be the 1st century A.D. It certainly had a great effect on 18th century theories and at a time when the rational, academic tradition was waning and fashionable talk
was of the conflict between the "heart" and the "mind" (1) and it was becoming clear that the heart had its reasons of which the mind had no knowledge. (2).

(1) I have already investigated the ancient notions about the heart in the chapter on Aristotle. In the 17th and 18th centuries the heart was regarded as the seat of the passions, the mind of reason. See Bouhours' "Art of Criticism" for an illustration of this conflict. (e.g. p.45: "It must be confessed ... that the Heart and the Mind are very fashionable things: There is scarce anything else talk'd of in fine Company." This heart (passion)/mind (reason) duality is Cartesian.

(2) For Pascal's views on Imagination see his "Pensees", 63. ("Imagination decides everything: it creates beauty, justice and happiness, which is the world's supreme good." etc.).
SECTION IX.

During the first half of the 18th century three of the main concerns of aesthetic theory were established, each in its way based on long-held convictions. Whereas Addison's views are a fairly direct outcome of Locke's empiricism, it is from a mixture of Neoplatonic, Stoic, and pseudo-Aristotelian psychology that Shaftesbury derived his beliefs and it is he who, with Addison, shapes the aesthetic of Hutcheson and — to a great extent — of Wordsworth and Keats. Baumgarten's "Aesthetica" is strongly influenced by the Cartesian elements in Leibniz and Wolff. These three major creeds: empiricism, Neoplatonism, and Cartesianism, thus spawn our modern theories of art albeit interlarded with other influences.

From Addison there emerges, clearly and unequivocally, the view that art, in the making and appreciating, depends on imagination but that imagination, ironically and in defiance of the popular Lockian position (if not the true one), is innate. In the creating of works of art imagination came to be the first requirement of genius, and in the appreciating, of taste. Only to the few were genius and taste attributed. That imagination might also function somehow between the two, and that these might even be closely related activities, was not immediately considered; nor was it said that this elite imagination (which the Aristotelian tradition had said even animals might possess) might be the birthright of all and not just the select. For Addison the imagination is autonomous, pleasure giving, related to feeling not thought, and is in no way the "handmaiden" of reason:

"Nowhere do we find the traditional and hitherto inescapable warning that imagination must remain the faithful servant of reason. Nowhere does Addison assert that the pleasure obtained from the imagination must

(1) Nevertheless, the "Spectator" was an extremely popular publication which purported to publish the speculations of the "Spectator Club", a group of gentlemen from middle class professions who endeavoured to bring learning out of libraries and colleges to the tea-table, the club, and the coffee house.
be used in the service of truth. Nowhere does he make the compromise that, although poetry exists primarily for the purpose of giving pleasure, the pleasure must disguise a rationally justifiable purpose.

On the contrary. The very absence of rational activity becomes a virtue of imagination." (E.L. Tavoseon, op.cit., p.94, on Spectator 411). Addison's autonomy of the imagination depends heavily on Locke's representationalism, especially with regard to the pleasures afforded by imagination through art: the "secondary imagination" as Addison calls it. (1) Tuveson considers that for Addison the imagination is a means of reconciling man to a cosmos become alien, impersonal, and menacing, and this certainly holds true for the "primary imagination". From his very first essay on the subject, Addison emphasises that he is concerned with a visual faculty: "... by the pleasures of imagination I mean only such pleasures as arise originally from sight." (Spectator, 411). He states that the "images" derived from sight can be retained, altered, or compounded by us, and can be recalled as though in a kind of private picture-show: "... by this faculty a man in a dungeon is capable of entertaining himself with scenes and landscapes more beautiful than any that can be found in the whole compass of nature." (loc.cit.).

(1) Addison never actually says what imagination is, and certainly no explanation can be found in Locke, who merely mentions it; how Addison came to use the term can only be explained by reference to Longinus and possibly Malebranche. His "secondary imagination" is very much a representational, visual faculty, whereas the "primary imagination" is very like perception: what they have in common is the visual referent, the object ("figure" in Cartesian and Spinozian terminology) and the image presented in the object's absence with the associated feeling of pleasure. Locke's passage on Association of Ideas ("Essay" bk. 2, ch. 2) was not added until the 4th edition of 1706, and he says nothing directly and exclusively about "imagination". He does say that ideas are associated haphazardly, "wholly owing to chance and custom", but without investigating the creative possibilities of such associations.
Comparison of this passage with the description of the prisoners in Plato's cave gives an indication of how far the imagination has advanced in prestige. The pleasures of the "primary imagination" come from the immediate experience of sense, when the object is actually in front of our eyes, such pleasures coming mostly from nature.(1) "Secondary imagination" is of objects...

"...not actually before the eyes, but are called up into our memories, or formed into agreeable visions of things that are either absent or fictitious." (loc.cit.).

There is a degree of passiveness in his "primary imagination" and of creativeness in the "secondary imagination", and the former seems to be more related to appreciation (taste), the latter to creation (genius) though he does not effect these relations. His pleasures of the "primary imagination" do not obtain with respect to art, except for architecture.

Although in his introductory essay and elsewhere he does dwell on the autonomous pleasure afforded by imagination, avoiding conditioning these by reason, he does feel obliged to make a brief comparison with the pleasures of understanding, regarding the latter as more refined and preferable but no more intense than those of imagination - "a description of Homer has charmed more readers than a chapter in Aristotle" he remarks.(2). So far as imagination is concerned, Addison

(1) A.O.Lovejoy finds more then 18 meanings of "nature". See 'Nature As Aesthetic Form'.
(2) See also Spectator 426: "The understanding, indeed opens an infinite space on every side of us, but the imagination, after a few faint efforts, is immediately at a stand, and finds herself swallowed up in the immensity of the void that surrounds it: our reason can pursue a particle of matter through an infinite variety of divisions, but the fancy soon loses sight of it, and feels itself a kind of chaos that wants to be filled with matter of a more sensible bulk. We can neither widen nor contract our capacity to the dimensions of either extreme: the object is too big for our capacity when we would comprehend the circumference of the world, and dwindles into nothing when we endeavour after the idea of an atom." Addison gives a distinction here which Kant also states in his "Analytic of The Sublime". He uses the words "fancy" and "imagination" promiscuously as he says, (Spectator 411).
is referring to a perceptual and representational component which is pleasurable and which we might call the aesthetic:

"The colours paint themselves on the fancy, with very little attention of thought or application of mind in the beholder. We are struck, we know not how, with the symmetry of anything we see, and immediately assent to the beauty of an object, without enquiring into the particular causes and occasions of it." (loc.cit.). Later explanations of this "immediate assent" sometimes talk in terms of associations or images, but Addison's description is reminiscent of Descartes' intuitions also recognised by Locke - but the suggestion of an innate response, to symmetry for example, is not acceptable to him, as his analysis of "primary imagination" shows. This kind of imagination, he says, arises from "... the actual view and survey of outward objects; and these I think, all proceed from what is great, uncommon, or beautiful." (On.cit., 412). These "sights" are, as I have already remarked, borrowed from Longinus; but there is a significant difference, for whereas the Greek says it is "nature" that has "implanted in our souls an unconquerable passion for all that is great and for all that is more divine than ourselves" ("On The Sublime", Ch.35), Addison, following Locke, offers what seems to be an empirical account of how we experience these "sights" and their pleasures: the great in nature calls out the great already in men for Longinus, for Addison the great produces greatness in men. But in his explanation of the effects of greatness Addison says that because God is great, contemplation of Him or His works inspires our astonishment and devotion:

(1) See E.L. Tylorson, op.cit., p.104: "Ultimately, this is why physical size, quantity, and so on are of first importance in Addison's papers, as they never are in Longinus." Although this "greatness" is quantitative it still seems to evoke a corresponding, qualitative response when the imagination is filled with the sights of the "stupendous works of nature": "We are flung into a pleasing astonishment at such unbounded views, and feel a delightful stillness and amazement in the soul at the apprehension of them." (Spectator, 412).
"He has given almost everything about us the power of raising an agreeable idea in the imagination." (Op.cit., 415). Not only do we find here a suggestion of the innate, but also an intimation of imagination's tendency towards "understanding" and its love to "grasp at anything that is too big for its capacity." His account of the pleasures of imagination contains many such ambiguities, and not surprisingly considering his attempted synthesis of Longinus and Locke and the many ambiguities in the latter's "Essay". What is important about Addison is his popularisation of imagination and its association with the pleasures of nature and art. His praise of "uncommonness" is the very antithesis of harmony and proportion, as in its inclusion of "monsters" and "imperfections", and as such serves to emphasise the degree of Addison's shift from the aesthetic norms of his contemporaries. His inclusion of "beauty" as the third of his sources of pleasure is something of a gloss on greatness and uncommonness as it was losing some of its former importance as an aesthetic concept, as Tuveson comments: "Beauty as a value in art shows a marked decline in importance as the great emerges to occupy its own place in aesthetics."

Turning now to his "secondary imagination" and its pleasures we find that these, like the "primary imagination" are finally dependent on the three categories got from Longinus, on Locke's associationism, and I suspect, on the old doctrine of ideal imitation. Ultimately however it is impossible for him to say why this "operation of the mind" gives so much pleasure: "the secondary pleasure of the imagination proceeds from that action of the mind, which compares the ideas arising from the original objects, with the ideas we receive from the statue, picture, description, or sound that represents them." (Op.cit., 416).
"Wit", (an important concept in the 17th and 18th centuries) is dependent upon the affinity of ideas which is the basis of the "secondary imagination". But this affinity is by no means random or haphazard, and there is the intimation of a principle such as 'taste' in Addison's (neo-Hobbesian) distinction between "wit" and "false wit", the latter being "... the affinity of letters, as in anagram, acrostic; or of syllables, as in doggerel rhymes, echoes; or of words, as in puns, quibbles; or of a whole sentence of prose, to wings and alters." Of wit itself, he continues: "The final cause, probably, of annexing pleasure to this operation of the mind, was to quicken and encourage us in our searches after truth*, since to distinguish one thing from another, and the right discerning betwixt our ideas, depends wholly on our comparing 'em together and observing the congruity or disagreement that appears among the several works of nature." (Op. cit. p. 16). Wit perhaps deserves a thesis to itself; it is clear from Addison and others (1) that it is closely allied

(1) I have already quoted Sidney and Hobbes on "wit"; Dryden thought that: "Great wits are sure to madness near allied, And their partitions do their bounds divide." Dryden's view is rather Platonic, as is Sidney's association of wit with perfection. Locke's definition of wit is like Hobbes' "false wit", and quite clearly separates wit from judgment: "For wit lying most in the assemblage of ideas, and putting those together with quickness and variety, wherein can be found any resemblance or congruity, thereby to make up pleasant pictures and agreeable visions in the fancy; judgment, on the contrary, lies quite on the other side, in separating carefully, one from another, ideas wherein can be found the least difference, thereby to avoid being misled by similitude, and by affinity to take one thing for another" ("Essay", 2. XI. 2). Locke's distinction here is very like Hobbes' between judgment and fancy, implying a resemblance between wit and fancy. But Addison seems to be closer to Malebranche as both the words and the sense of his remarks on wit indicate, for Malebranche relates wit to 'our rational parts', imagination to the irrational malevolent parts, stating that a strong imagination goes with a "want of wit"; (see "Search After Truth", Vol. 1, Pt. 3, Pt. III : "Of the Contagious Communication of Strong Imaginations." (1697).

* The use of this phrase, be it deliberate or accidental, further suggests the influence of Malebranche on Addison's thinking.
to creativeness, particularly in literature. The relationship between wit and imagination is strained by a conflict of two philosophies, for whereas illogicality becomes imagination, wit seems to belong with the ambivalencies and equivocations of 'right judgement'. Addison's "wit" is close to his "understanding" suggesting, despite his Lockian vocabulary and ideas, the priority of reason and the continued reliance on 'innate' abilities to guide discernment and taste:

"This different taste must proceed, either from the perfection of imagination in one more than another, or from the different ideas that several readers affix to the same word. For to have a true relish and form a right judgment of a description, a man should be born with a good imagination, and must have well weighed the force and energy that lies in the several words of a language, so as to be able to distinguish which are most significant and expressive of their proper ideas, and what additional strength and beauty they are capable of receiving from conjunction with others. The fancy must be warm, to retain the print of those images it hath received from outward objects; and the judgment discerning, to know what expressions are most proper to clothe and adorn them to best advantage. A man who is deficient in either of those respects, though he may receive the general notion of a description, he can never see distinctly all its particular beauties as a person with a weak sight, may have the confused prospect of a place that lies before him, without entering into its several parts, or discerning the variety of its colours in their full glory and perfection." (loc.cit).

This quotation brings to mind Longinus' definition of the image as "any mental conception, from whatever source it presents itself, which gives rise to speech", but this speech, like poetry and literature, needs the discernment of judgment for Addison, as too for Pope:
"True wit is nature to advantage dressed,
What oft we thought but ne'er so well expressed."

From the various opinions canvassed, it would seem that the creative artist needs that marriage of a warm fancy and good judgment which is wit, that nature and art afford primary and secondary pleasures respectively, and these pleasures depend on imagination but are more refined by discernment such as is possessed by the man of taste. The pleasures of imagination which Addison calls "secondary" arise from the comparison of our ideas with representations of art, therefore demanding judgment and taste. Although natural sights, especially of that which is great or uncommon, provide immediate, "primary" pleasure to the imagination, it is the imprinted images which are more beautiful for Addison, as in his example of the man in the dungeon. But "good imagination" and "right judgment" belong together, indicating that for Addison the imagination is best which is closer to what Malebranche calls "our rational parts", and that he still cannot avoid the shadow of Stoicism.
SECTION III.

The view that "good imagination" or "taste" are only given at birth to the few, and that these few are of noble or gentle birth, is implied by Addison but clearly stated by Malebranche. For Addison discernment and taste are innate, for Malebranche: "...I would have it presupposed that Princes excell in Strength and Vigour of Imagination..." (Op. cit., Vol. I. Pt. 2. Pt. III. Ch. II). Attempts to establish a standard of taste during the 17th and 18th centuries have a moral as well as an aesthetic intent, for if judgments of art, nature, and human actions were as subjective as a free imagination, general notions of good and bad, or of "right" (Addison) and "regularity" (Alison) would be unsupportable except on grounds of consensus. In the "Critique of Judgment" Kant sought to establish the notion of taste as a common ground extant in all human nature, with beauty as its expression. (1) Within the Cambridge Platonic tradition Hutcheson avoids the problem of establishing such a common standard by emphasizing the morally uplifting effects of the morally good in art: "...when we form the idea of a morally good action, or we see it represented in the drama, or read it in epic or romance, we feel a desire arising of doing the like." ("Essay on the Nature and Conduct of Passions and Affections", p. 69, in P. Kivy, "Francis Hutcheson...", p. 10, fint. 21). Alison's notion of "regularity" in relation to taste and imagination is almost a synonym for preceding notions of discernment and judgment, maintaining the belief that imagination needs the brake of reason: "...I should wish to appropriate the term Delight, to signify the peculiar pleasure which attends the Emotions of TASTE, or which is felt, WHEN THE IMAGINATION IS EMPLOYED IN THE PROSECUTION OF A REGULAR TRAIN OF IDEAS OR EMOTION." (Essays on The Nature and Principles of Taste", p. 12).

(1) See E. Cassirer, "The Philosophy of The Enlightenment", p. 298: "This approach considers taste as a sort of 'sense' shared by all, and it begins its formulation of the problem with the question of the nature and possibility of such a 'common sense' (sentias communis)." See also p. 322 on Shaftesbury's notion of the beautiful as "an original function of the spirit."
There is no question that Alison's book owes much to Addison's essays, his delights of taste being much the same as Addison's pleasures of imagination, and even in 1740 centuries of Stoic reserve ensured that imagination, however wonderful, free, or delightful, still needed the restraints of discernment, rectitude and regularity which, under the new empiricism, were believed and hoped to reside in human nature. (1)

Even Hume was an old-fashioned moralist when dealing with the problems of art and imagination:

"To check the sallies of the imagination, and reduce every expression to geometrical truth and exactness, would be the most contrary to the laws of criticism; because it would produce a work, which, by universal experience, has been the most insipid and disagreeable. But though poetry can never submit to exact truth, it must be confined by rules of art, discovered to the author either by genius or observation." ("On The Standard of Taste", p.7.)

He does seem to be saying that imagination is necessary and needs some freedom, but when all is said and done, rules are needed; deviation from rules and principles must have "just reason" for Hume:

"The general principles of taste are uniform in human nature: where men vary in their judgments, some defect or perversion in the faculties may commonly be remarked, proceeding either from prejudice, from want of practice, or want of delicacy: there is just reason for approving one taste, and condemning another. But where there is such a diversity in the internal frame or external situation as is entirely blameless..."

(1) *The Works of David Hume, vol. 1, p. 12. *"Philosophy", ch. VII: "If all men spoke the same language, we should always be inclined to believe that there is a necessary connection between words and ideas, but all men speak the same language with respect to the imagination. Nature says to all: when you have seen all colours for a certain length of time, your imagination will represent to you in the same manner the bodies to which those colours seem to belong."
on both sides, and leaves no room to give one the preference above
the other; in that case a certain degree of diversity in judgment
is unavoidable, and we seek in vain for a standard, by which we can
Out of this tension between the freedom of the imagination and a
tenacious adherence to the quest for rules and principles (natural
rather than logical) was born empirical psychology, with its attempt
to find uniformities in human nature. Increasingly, with the rise
of Romanticism, it is the diversities rather than the common elements
of aesthetic judgments which interest creative artists, a trend which
is already signalled by Addison, who includes the strange and the
disagreeable as pleasurable to his "secondary imagination" when "in
apt description" (Spectator 418). Even a dunghill, suitably expressed,
pleases the imagination. Here he has a nose for disunity if not for
anticipation, suggesting that perhaps the aptness of the description
"may be more properly called the pleasure of the understanding than
the fancy." (loc.cit.). He suggests that the pleasure we do get
from disagreeable things - "torments, wounds, deaths" - comes from
secretly comparing ourselves with what is described and consequently
rejoicing in our comparative safety and good fortune: pleasures which
do not obtain when such things really happen, assuming (as Addison
unquestioningly does) a clear distinction between "secondary imagination",
"primary imagination", and perception. But if he is right about this
comforting effect of imagination what he is praising is, in Platonic
terms, an indictment; he is also assuming an autonomy for art, based
on imagination as representational.
I have already made brief mention of two of Addison's aesthetic heirs, Hutcheson and Alison. Though not a great or original theorist, Hutcheson was an influential one, and both Hume and Kant acknowledged his value, though what one finds in his "Inquiry" is basically a reiteration of Addison's Lockean empiricism and its anomalies, compounded with Shaftesbury's Neoplatonism. Hutcheson's "Inquiry" is essentially a theory of beauty, but he uses the concept so loosely that it may on his account be attached to almost anything, as well as having a moral dimension. As Kivy comments: "... we have difficulty in discovering whether he meant by the idea of beauty a pleasure or a secondary quality because he saw no real distinction between them; both had the same perpetual unity." (Op.cit., p.19).

Hutcheson was a defender and a supporter of Shaftesbury and though his aesthetics are based more on Lockian principles, and the "Inquiry" was published 14 years after Addison's essays on imagination, these essays seem not to have influenced him. It was not until 1728 that Hutcheson, in his "Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections", wrote of the similarity of his ideas to those of Addison: "I have examined Addison's papers on the Imagination carefully and compared his ideas with my own on my essay on Beauty; I find that we are talking about the same thing: his Pleasures of the Imagination are equivalent to my pleasures perceived by the 'Internal Senses'." (Quoted in C.D.Thorpe, op.cit., p.237).

Hutcheson's use of the phrase "Internal Senses" is striking and intriguing, and may perhaps be equated with Addison's "secondary

(1) See C.D.Thorpe, op.cit., pp. 215-6. However, as Thorpe says, "... it was Hutcheson, aided by his friend and colleague J. Arnauld, rather than Aisophil, among prominent eighteenth-century writers, who first gave currency to Addison's phrase "Pleasures of the Imagination" as properly descriptive of aesthetic response, and read into it a meaning which was compatible with Addison's own."
imagination", and in his "Essay" Hutcheson writes of "The Pleasures of the Imagination, or of the Internal Sense of Beauty, and Harmony." C.D. Thorpe says that Hutcheson got his notion of "internal sense" from Descartes, and that Shaftesbury, Hobbes, and Locke had all "noted the existence of an 'internal sense'. For my part, the idea of "internal sense" immediately recalls the Arab psychologists Avicenna and Averroes, whose concept of intcntio, with its distinction between the formal and the physical aspects of the image, the intcntio being what Avicenna calls "a thing which the soul perceives from the sensed object without its previously having been perceived by its external sense". Certainly Hutcheson's notion refers to the formative powers of the mind, and it is quite possible that he was influenced by a distinction of Malebranche's, (whom he quotes and of whom he was an admirer), between the active and passive parts of imagination - a distinction which is strongly Aristotelian:

"...the faculty of Imagining, or the Imagination, consists only in the power that the Soul has of forming to its self Images of objects, in producing a change in the Fibres of this part of the Brain, which may be called the principal part, since it answers to all the parts of our bodies, and in the place where our Soul immediately resides, if we may be permitted to say so.

That shows us evidently, that this power which the Soul hath of forming Images includes two things, the one depending upon the Soul it self, and the other upon the Body. The first is Action, and the Command of the Will. The second is the Obedience that is given to it by the Animal Spirits, which trace these Images, and the Fibres of the Brain, upon which they must be imprinted. In this discourse the name of Imagination is indifferently given to either of these two things, nor are they distinguished by the words Active and Passive which might be given to them; because, by the sense of what we shall speak,
may easily be understood which of the two we mean, whether it be the 
active Imagination or the Soul, or the passive Imagination of the Body."

Early in Section II of this chapter I mentioned the essentially passive 
nature of Addison's 'primary imagination' and the active nature of his 
'secondary imagination'. Although the evidence is rather circumstantial 
it seems highly likely that Addison borrowed this part of his distinction 
from Malebranche (as might Hutcheson his "internal senses" though not 
from this precise location). I have also referred to the Hermetic and 
Platonic idea of man as creating in his sphere as an imitator, and 
finally as a rival, of God in His; in respect to these ideas of human 
creativity and the 18th century concept of genius, this active, 
secondary imagination is of vital importance.

But with Hutcheson and Addison the centre of interest is very much 
the pleasure of appreciation and the quality of what came to be called 
"taste", and in the function of imagination in this pleasure. In 
Alison's "Essays on The Nature and Principles of Taste" (1740) one 
finds something of a compendium of contemporary opinion - largely 
based on Addison - on taste, its relation to good breeding, and the 
dependency of the feeling of the sublime on imagination. He defines 
taste as "... that Faculty of the human Mind, by which we perceive and 
enjoy whatever is BEAUTIFUL or SUPRIMA in the works of Nature or Art."
upon imagination:

"The emotions of sublimity and beauty are uniformly ascribed, both in 
popular and in philosophical language, to the imagination. The fine 
arts are considered as the arts which are addressed to the imagination, 
and the pleasures they afford, are described, by way of distinction, as 
the Pleasures of Imagination. The nature of any person's taste, is, 
in common life, generally determined from the nature or character of
his imagination, and the expression of any deficiency in this power of mind, is considered as synonymous with the expression of a similar deficiency in point of taste." (Op.cit., Essay I, sec. I).

Repenting the prejudice of his time he goes on to say that "It is only in the higher stations ... or in the liberal professions of life, that we expect to find men either of a delicate or comprehensive taste" (ch.II, p.62) having previously remarked, with unconscious irony, that "It is upon the vacant and unemployed ... that the objects of taste make the strongest impression." (Essay I, sec. II). We must note in passing the status of the "fine arts", which includes painting (Alison cites Lorrain as well as Handel and Milton) as a liberal profession, but now, despite Leonardo's early distinctions, they are addressed to the imagination.(1) But inevitably, with Alison as with his forerunners, the imagination is not free but is constrained though Alison's reins of 'regularity' and "consistency" are perhaps a little less tight than others': "...whenever the Emotions of Beauty or Sublimity are felt, that exercise of Imagination is produced which consists in the prosecution of a train of thought." (Ch.II, p.112).

And: "... the distinction between such trains, and our ordinary trains of thought ... consists, 1st, In the ideas which compose them being in all cases Ideas of Emotion; and, 2ndly, In their possessing an uniform principle of connection through the whole of the train. The effect, therefore, which is produced upon the mind, by objects of Taste, may be considered as consisting in the production of a regular or consistent train of Ideas or Emotion." (Loc.cit.). Alison's Hobbesian "trains of thought" are neither uncontrolled flights of fancy nor logical progressions and are linked with emotions, like

(1) See also Reynolds' "Discourses on Art", esp. Discourse Thirteen, where the 'modern' notion of imagination, its superiority to imitation, has replaced Leonardo's in the official academic thinking.
Addison's pleasures of imagination; but there is some lack of clarity as to whether the emotions produce the train of ideas or occur concurrently with them. At all events, it is clearly established that the perception and enjoyment of the beautiful and the sublime in nature and art depend on imagination.

In Akenside's enormous poem on "The Pleasures of Imagination", completed in 1743, there is some attention paid to the function of imagination in the creation of art as opposed to the appreciation. The poem is rather bombastic and self-consciously erudite, and Akenside quotes (in his notes to the work) Shaftesbury, Longinus, Leibniz, Huyghens and Hutcheson; except for a greater than usual attention to the Stoic warnings against the effects of imagination on our daily lives, it is more or less a repetition of Addison. But about 30 years after the publication Akenside wrote a new General Argument to his revised poem, relinquishing his Stoic warnings, following Addison even more closely, and according with the views of Gerard's "Essay on Genius" which was published in the same year (1774):

"Hitherto the pleasures of the imagination belong to the human species in general. But there are certain particular men whose imagination is endowed with powers, and susceptible of pleasures, which the generality of mankind never participate. These are the men of genius, destined by nature to excel in one or other of the arts." ("Poetical Works", p. 77). Old Akenside no doubt included himself in the small but illustrious company here described, but posterity would probably judge his poem less indulgently than he did, (though it was a highly influential work in its time); but that is a matter of taste.

The effects of Addison's essays on the pleasures of imagination were felt strongly in Germany as well as in England, as I shall indicate in Part 6. Although I have dealt so far with the place of imagination in the concept of taste, the more active, creative function of imagination in the concept of genius is also being developed as Akenside's remarks...
show. Nowhere is this function of imagination more fully discussed
than in Gerard's essay on genius, a work which owes much to its author's
personal knowledge of Hume and his ideas. Despite the increasing
importance of imagination in aesthetics and in the theory of mind
the old Stoic doctrine of restraint and discernment retains its hold
on the freedom of imagination which, though no longer the handmaiden
of reason still remains a junior partner. This state of affairs
persists despite the epistemological and psychological importance of
imagination in Hume's "Treatise", and the duality of 'active' and
'passive' (Malebranche) corresponding to Addison's 'secondary' and
'primary' imagination recurs in Kant's 'productive' and 'reproductive'
imagination where, despite some discontinuities in the argument,
imagination remains subject to understanding and reason.
PART 6:

HUME, KANT, AND COLERIDGE.
Introduction.

With the examination of the beliefs about imagination of Addison and his followers we are moving towards the central tenets of Romanticism as found in Kant and transferred by Coleridge and Wordsworth into the mainstream of English aesthetic theory. Both Hume and Kant continued the traditions which their philosophical forerunners bequeathed to them, in the case of Hume it was Locke and Berkeley, and for Kant it was Hume but mainly the rational tradition of Leibniz. In both cases imagination has a central position in epistemology and psychology and in Kant in aesthetics too. With Herder, Kant is probably one of the two most important figures in early Romanticism, which is certainly a German manifestation imported into England by Coleridge. It is arguable that Romanticism constitutes a permanent human attitude, but historically it owes its rise to the peculiar situation in Germany during the 18th century, which country was a collection of states without such cultural and social homogeneity as existed, for example, in France. Germany was dominated by religion and the Bible, contemptuous of learning, and given to introspection, Pietism and ritual; although religious belief was to be eroded by scientific discovery the habits of mysticism and occultism retained their grip and became a permanent feature of Romanticism. Whereas in Britain there was an implicit belief in the psychological foundations of human knowledge, the growth of German philosophic literature is largely guided by Leibniz (1) and though associationism was not significantly challenged before Kant’s "Critique of Pure Reason" a reaction against it had set in following the publication of Leibniz’s "New Essays" in 1765. As Cassirer says, "...the doctrines of Locke and Berkeley, of Hume and Condillac, never gained unchallenged recognition in Germany." ("Philosophy of the Enlightenment", p. 120);

(1) See Cassirer’s "Philosophy of the Enlightenment", p. 80.
but Hume it was who awoke Kant from his philosophic slumbers. Both Leibniz and Kant shared an admiration for Shaftesbury, whose "Characteristics", available in parts in German from 1730, was fully translated during the years 1776-1779. (1) Before the rise of Romanticism aesthetic theory in Germany had what Cassirer calls an "intimate dalliance" with logic, and certainly Baumgarten (though not very influential) based his theories on Wolffian rationalism. This tradition is still clearly evident in Kant, but his "Critique of Judgment" betrays a debt to Neoplatonism.

In the first chapter I shall deal largely with Hume's theory of imagination, with some opening remarks on Berkeley and a final section on Gerard's "Essay on Genius". The imagination occupies a central position in Hume's "Treatise" and consequently in Gerard's concept of genius, and it is somewhat in response to the former that Kant's first critique was written, and I shall be considering Kant's theory of imagination in Chapter 2. In the third and final chapter I will discuss the theory of imagination in Coleridge and Wordsworth.

Chapter I - BERKELEY, HUME AND GERARD.

SECTION I.

This casual description of Locke, Berkeley and Hume as empiricists, which is sometimes made, stands up poorly to scrutiny. Berkeley's views may indeed be, as G. Warnock says, "parasitic on the doctrine of Locke", but his influence on Hume, except for the attack on abstract ideas, seems minimal. Indeed Berkeley's influence on Kant, despite the latter's protestations, is far greater, and though Berkeley says little about imagination and less about aesthetics his "peculiar union of Platonism and sensationalism" (I. Berlin, "The Age of Enlightenment", p.22) affects Hume and Kant respectively. His "Principles of Human Knowledge" was published shortly before Addison's essays on imagination, and given that Berkeley returned from Ireland in 1713, entering the literary circle of which Addison was part, it is interesting to speculate how far his attack on the Lockian dualism of "primary" and "secondary" qualities might have affected Addison's view of imagination. (1) Berkeley was strongly antipathetic to what he calls "the whole corpuscular philosophy" which informed Locke's theory of perception, arguing that, in Berlin's words, "..if we do not allow ourselves to be befuddled by scientific terminology which suggests the existence of imperceptible matter, while at the same time basing all our knowledge on the evidence of what can be perceived and it alone, we shall arrive at an orthodox Christian position that the universe is spiritual in character." (Op. cit., p.22).

His attack on Locke's notion of abstract ideas is sharp: "Whether others have this wonderful faculty of abstracting ideas, they best can

(1) For studies on Berkeley's theory of imagination see K. Woodhouse, "Berkeley, The Sun that I see by Day, and that which I imagine by Night", and R. Attfield's reply, "Berkeley and Imagination." See also R. Williams' "Imagination and The Self."
tell. For myself, I find indeed I have a faculty of imagining, or of representing to myself, the idea of those particular things I have perceived, and variously of compounding and dividing them." ("Principles", Sec.10, p.49).

The ocapogoat Schoolmen are blamed for the "false principle" of "abstraction", and the tendency to abstract is owed to language (secs.11 & 18), there being for Berkeley only three sources of ideas:

"It is evident to anyone who takes a survey of the objects of human knowledge, that they are either ideas actually imprinted on the senses; or else such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind; or lastly, ideas formed by help of memory and imagination — either compounding, dividing, or barely representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways." (Op.cit., Pt. I Sec.1).

In his later "Three Dialogues between Helias and Philonous" asserts that he does not mean "imprinting" in the "gross literal sense" of the seal impression on wax: "My meaning is only that the mind comprehends or perceives them; and that it is affected from without, or by some being distinct from itself." (p.247). The objects of sense are, he says, unknowable; (and sensation cannot exist without a perceiving mind): "their esse is percipi" as he says in a famous phrase, and ideas — "immediate objects of the understanding" — are passive and inert: "A little attention will discover to us that the very being of an idea implies passiveness and inertness in it, that it is impossible for an idea to do anything, or, strictly speaking, to be the cause of any thing."("Principles", sec.27, p.77).

He asserts that there is no action distinct from volition and that an active being is a spirit; ("Dialogues", p.271); we can have no idea of an abstraction such as unit, any unifying of ideas must be done by the percipient — an observation which Hume regarded highly. These passive and active functions were regarded by Malebranche as aspects of the passive and
active imagination, for Berkeley the evident connection of our ideas of sense testifies to the wisdom and abundance of God in whose mind the 'world of objects' (so to speak) has its existence; but we can have no knowledge of God nor of these objects which are like the Kantian thing-in-itself. Berkeley thus acknowledges "a twofold state of things", calling these the "ectypal" and the "archetypal", the former "created in time" and the latter "existed from everlasting in the mind of God." ("Dialogues", p.240). This distinction is very Platonic with its unknowable archetypes which are like the Forms (and also resemble Kant's "Ideas of Reason"), the ectypal, natural world and, presumably, our images of the ectypes — the 'copies of copies'. But Berkeley clearly asserts that our ideas whether we describe them as 'of objects' or 'images' all exist in the percipient; his ectypes do not admit of such a distinction as I have presumed.

Berkeley's conception of the self is something of an abstraction, and is much more like Kant's "transcendental unity of apperception" than Hume's conception; he asserts that there is a "... perceiving, active being (which) is what I call MIND, SPIRIT, SOUL, or MYSELF." ("Principles", sec 2, p.65). and later he adds : "A spirit is one simple, undivided, active being — as it perceives ideas it is called the Understanding, and as it produces or otherwise operates about them it is called the Will." There is then that which perceives, the self or spirit, in which perception it is presumably passive; this self or spirit also produces, which must then refer to the ideas "formed by help of memory and imagination" which he has said are compounded and divided. Both understanding and will seem to depend respectively on the imprints of the (passive) imagination and the compounds of (active) imagination; division, elsewhere called discernment, being perhaps a function of judgment. If we omit the (apparently redundant) abstractions such as "God" and the "self", the dependancy of human ideas and therefore knowledge on imagination in its two function is
almost complete, and this is virtually Hume's position in the "Treatise". Berkeley himself asserts that he has a "notion" of spirit but "not, strictly speaking, an idea of it." ("Dialogues", p.225). This distinction is between knowing what the word means and how to use it, and having a substantive idea of spirit; we can only know other spirits (mind) by analogy with our own (see "Principles", sec. 140, p.136), which opinion was also Kant's. Berkeley adopts a similar view with respect to the concept "man", saying that when we 'see' a man we perceive only "certain sensations or ideas excited in our own minds" so that "... it is plain we do not see a man — if by a man is meant that which lives, moves perceives and thinks as we do — but only such a certain collection of ideas as directs us to think there is a distinct principle of thought and motion, like to ourselves, accompanying and represented by it. And after the same manner we see God ..." (Op. cit., sec. 140, p.140).

I think that there can be little doubt of the influence of Berkeley's theological beliefs upon his philosophical speculations, for without them he might very well have stated as much as Hume was to do. The empirical view, commonly imputed to Locke, of perception and knowledge as the product of objects' impressing or imprinting the senses, depended on an objective world thus available to the senses. The basic counters of human knowledge are impressions of sense, images of an assumed objective world which was only assumed (as Berkeley realised) seeing that all we could really experience were those impressions or 'images'. And since these exist in our minds then any connection between them must also be a product of mind. This is, simply put, the basis of Hume's epistemological scepticism, which Kant essayed to answer in traditional terms, making assumptions about the unknowable much as Berkeley had.
SECTION II.

Although quite different in philosophical stance and style, Hume and Kant in some respects share similar views. Both agree, for example, that the imagination plays a crucial role in perception; and though their explanations of why imagination so acts are quite different, they also agree that how imagination performs this role is a great mystery. On the whole — and it is impossible to be more precise — Hume’s claims for the function of imagination in art, especially in genius, are less exaggerated than Kant’s, the latter having a fundamental belief in “Ideas”, the content of pure reason which are like the Platonic eidos, and whose existence the aesthetic imagination is able to intimate directly.

Hume’s philosophical beliefs have been much expanded and analyzed, including his theory of imagination and its function in perception and cognition (1), and his “imagist” notion that “… our ideas are images of our impressions, so we can form secondary ideas which are images of the primary” (“Treatise”, Bk.I, Sec.I.) has been most notably mauled by Ryle. (2). “Imagination” is a central concept in Hume’s “Treatise”; D.H. Price says it is “the keyword of Hume’s whole theory of knowledge” (“Hume’s Theory of The External World”, pp.15-16), though it has markedly less prominence in the later “Enquiry”; this may well be for “reasons of economy” as Furlong suggests (3) but I am more of the opinion that this change reflects Hume’s unease at the acknowledged mysteries of imagination: this “magical faculty” as he calls it, which

(1) See especially J.Wilbanks’ “Hume’s Theory of Imagination”; Wilbanks gives critical comment on the main Hume scholars, including E.J.Purlock, N.K.Smith and P.F.Strawson. See also H.Wamock’s “Imagination” esp. Pts. I & II.
(2) See his “Concept of Mind”, Ch.8, also S.Hampshire’s review of this work.
(3) In his article “Imagination in Hume’s Treatise and Enquiry Concerning The Human Understanding.”
is "always most perfect in the great geniuses" ("Treaties, Br.I, Sec.VI.").

This imagination, with its "unlimited powers" of forming relations and dividing ideas of vision or fiction, has now come to full prominence epistemologically as it would aesthetically:

"Reason not only loses its position of dominance; even in its own field, in the domain of knowledge, it has to surrender its leadership to the imagination. Thus reason and the imagination have now changed sides in the controversy surrounding the foundation of aesthetics. Whereas formerly imagination had to fight for recognition and equal rights, it is now treated as the fundamental power of the soul, as the leader and ruler to whom all the other faculties must submit."


This universal uneasiness about imagination also affected Kant, I believe, provoking the significant changes which he made in the Transcendental Deductions of the first and second editions of his "Critique of Pure Reason". It is important to note also that this "reason" which imagination usurps is by no means a consistent concept, and that the metaphysical tradition which Kant belongs to has a rather more idealistic concept of reason than the more empirical tradition to which Hume belongs; much more could be said about this distinction, but it is important with respect to Cassirer's observations to understand that Hume undermines both these concepts.

According to Hume, ideas are associated in imagination on three general principles, which are "resemblance, contiguity, and causation", ("Treatise, Br. I, Sec.II"); these are the basis for belief:

"Reason can never satisfy us that the existence of one object does imply that of another; so that when we pass from the impression of one to the idea or belief of another, we are not determined by reason, but by custom or a principle of association." (Op.cit., Br.I, Sec.VII.).

Our fictions and beliefs differ only in the manner of their conception,
that is, "An idea assented to feels different from a fictitious idea, that the fancy alone presents to us." (Loc. cit.). This rather vague but extremely important 'feeling' he calls "superior force, or vivacity, or solidity, or firmness, or steadfastness," and it distinguishes ideas of judgment (understanding) from the fictions of imagination — though it can happen that "in a few instances" impressions (feelings) and ideas (thoughts) have a resemblance. (See Hk.I. Sec.1). This liveliness and strength of beliefs is contrasted with the faintness and languour of the "perfect ideas" of imagination — perhaps because these are un-associated. But imagination has, as Hume admits, a facility for connecting and separating ideas as it pleases, though the "associating quality" is "a gentle force which commonly prevails" and the simple ideas (of sensation) "fall regularly into complex ones". This very shaky foundation for human belief is further weakened by Hume's later affirmation of the "close union" of "imagination and affections" (op. cit., Hk.II. Pt.III. Sec. VI.) so that "lively passions commonly attend a lively imagination", and his adding, in the same breath as it were, that "a mere fiction of the imagination" has little influence on our passions.

Wilbanks, in his study of Hume's theory of imagination, says that Hume had "a general conception of imagination" (p.3) saying that in Hume's view imagination "is the faculty of forming, uniting and separating ideas" (p.72); these two brief quotes say as much as Wilbanks' entire book. In fact Hume's theory of imagination is vague and self-contradictory and the epistemological tasks wished by him upon imagination are very much a part of an associationist psychology which is based upon the paradigm of mechanical physics and the old sense/imagination/understanding triad of faculty psychology. The prominence of imagination in understanding in the "Treatise" has a degree of shock value since
imagination seems to have supplanted "reason", but as the "Enquiry" reveals, Hume was certainly not an out-and-out empiricist and sceptic. In this later work he constantly reiterates the dependency of knowledge on "custom", but there is also an intimation of the Berkeleyan "God" or the Kantian "Ideas of Reason" in his definition of "custom" as "... a kind of pre-established harmony between the course of nature and the succession of our ideas" (Sec.V, pt.II), and also in his assertion that "by a natural instinct or prepossession" we are led to "repose faith in ... senses" and always to suppose without reason "an external universe" (sec.XII, pt.II). Because of this rather metaphysical facility, the like of which he has been at pains to disprove, Hume is able to make a contrast between "correct judgment", confining itself to "common life, and to such objects as fall under daily practice and experience", and the "imagination of man" which is "sublime" and delights in things remote or extraordinary such as are the truck of "poets, orators, priests and politicians." (Sec.XII, pt.III).

The implicit division in the "Enquiry" between a 'schematic' and an 'aesthetic' imagination, to use Kantian terms, does in fact anticipate Kant to some extent but it also has its repercussions on Gerard's theory of genius, so much admired by Kant. But an important aesthetic function for imagination was already well established whereas the epistemological function, hitherto obscured or minimised, was never so boldly affirmed as in Hume's "Treatise". In a footnote to his "Critique of Pure Reason" (A 120) Kant remarks that "Psychologists have hitherto failed to realise that imagination is a necessary ingredient of perception itself", but this is no more true of Hume than of Aristotle. In Hume the "continu'd and distinct existence of body" ("Treatise", Sec.I, Pt.IV, Sec.II) — what modern psychologists
call the 'constancy of perception' - is entirely dependent on imagination. In Strawson's phrase, our past perceptions are alive in the present ones, whereas for Kant it is the concept which is alive in the present perception: "This is what is now expressed in speaking of the intentionalitv of perception, as of imaging.", as Strawson describes it.\(^{(1)}\) From their different viewpoints both Hume and Kant regard the imagination as the "chief agent" (Strawson) of applying concepts to cases; for him this relation or application is habitual or customary, for Kant it is transcendental. But, as I remarked at the beginning of this section, there are similarities between the theories of Kant and Hume in respect to the imagination. Despite his sceptical position in the "Treatise" on the organisational powers of reason Hume retracted, by omission, the epistemological importance of imagination, as the later "Enquiry" shows. The lack of what Leibniz called a 'metaphysical certainty', for distinguishing between ideas and fictions, seems to have disturbed him almost as it did Kant, and we see him falling back on the old (Neoplatonic) principle of pre-established harmony, a principle which is also implicit in Kant's (Platonic) Ideas of Reason.

\(^{(1)}\) Op.cit., p.52. See also pp.49ff. for Strawson's discussion of Wittgenstein's treatment of this view of "imagination".
Before moving to a consideration of Kant's epistemological and aesthetic imagination I would like briefly to mention some of the aesthetic notions which were entertained in the years between the publication of Hume's "Enquiry" and Kant's first Critique, particularly of Gerard. We might describe Gerard as a wavering Humean associationist, but as we have seen there was also in England a strong Neoplatonic tradition. In the 1750's Edward Young had spoken of genius as "God within", as partaking of "something divine" - just as William Blake was later to speak on imagination as "Divine Vision", and even sober psychologists realised that the mechanics of associationism were perhaps not adequate to the task of explaining creative abilities: "The association of ideas can never account for the origin of a new notion" as Dugald Stewart wrote in his "Elements..." (Ch.VII, p.196); and though he published this work in 1792 - two years after Kant's "Critique of Judgment" - Stewart's belief in the imagination as a modifying and combining power with the ability to form new wholes (op.cit., p.72) indicates that the "transcendentalism" popularised by Coleridge was not a novelty in substance if it was in name.

Hume's influence on Gerard is clearly apparent, but the latter's theory of imagination is not entirely associationist. Gerard's "Essay" was published in Germany in 1776 and was well-received, and Kant was among the admirers of this work, which B. Fabian calls "... the best considered and most carefully wrought contribution to the literature on a subject which engaged the attention of practically the whole period from 1750-1800." (Introduction to Gerard's "Essay", p.XI.) (1) Fabian adds:

"Gerard was, as Kant immediately recognised, among the first late

(1) Fabian refers to Kant's "Menschenkunde oder philosophische Anthropologie" for remarks by Kant on Gerard, (see Fubian's Intro., p.XXVIII); but I have been unable to lay my hands on this book."
eighteenth-century proponents of the new concept of the imagination as 'productive' *Einhildungskraft.' But Gerard is by no means as brash as Blake in his description of imagination, speaking of imagination as genius in its associating power ("Essay", pt.I, Sec. III, p.44), and "... the force of imagination, or the vigour of the associating principles, produces genius." (p.60). The "simple principles of association" are, says Gerard, "resemblance, contrariety, and vivacity", (pt.II, Sec.I, p.109), and though he will allow that a high degree of genius must be accompanied by enthusiasm (p.66) - and, like Young, uses an organic (vegetable!) analogy for genius (1) - he asserts that imagination cannot be unbridled and must be subject to the laws of understanding. He says that "Even the brightest imagination can suggest no idea which is not originally derived from sense and memory" (pt.I, Sec.V, p.98), an assertion which Hume would not agree with; but Gerard does emphasize invention rather than originality as the main part of genius. This emphasis concurs with his distinction between two kinds of genius, a distinction which anticipates Kant in some respects; Gerard says there is scientific genius, requiring what he calls "penetrative" imagination, and which seeks information and understanding; there is also the artistic genius, dependent upon a "bright" imagination, which seeks taste and pleasure, (See pt.III, Sec.III, p.324-5). The traditional bifurcation of imagination into a higher and a lower part is now brought to inform the concept of genius, making the higher the scientific and the lower the artistic, a distinction and an embryonic formulation which is also recognizable in Kant's 'schematic' and 'aesthetic' imaginations.

(1) It is possible that Gerard was influenced by Linnaeus. (See Fabian, p.XXVI).
Kant's theory of imagination has had a direct influence on English aesthetic theory, on aesthetic education, and on art educational theory. Herbert Read's theory of imagination he got from Coleridge and Wordsworth and they in their turn — especially Coleridge — are largely Kantians. But this influence is by no means clear and uncomplication: Coleridge borrowed much from Schelling, whose intellectual attachments were no more stable than his own, and Kant's theory of imagination in the "Critique of Pure Reason" and the "Critique of Judgment" owes much to his philosophical ancestors as far back as Plato and Aristotle. (1) Kant sees imagination as a vital part of perception and cognition, operating as a bridge or synthesis between sense and understanding, (much in the Aristotelian mould) as well as an occasional direct link to the Ideas of Reason, as he calls them, these latter being deliberately Platonic in conception. Broadly speaking the Kantian imagination functions in what, in the discussion of Plato, I have called the dialectic and manic routes to the eidos: in the first and second editions of the "Critique of Pure Reason" it is the former 'route' which is expounded, in the "Critique of Judgment" the latter, albeit couched in Kant's characteristic philosophical language which, whatever its peculiarities, does not veil the truth of H.H. Price's remark that for Kant, no less than for Dume, the imagination is a very mysterious faculty.

(1) I have already quoted A.W. Levi on Kant's "unacknowledged debt" to Aristotle; see also "Literature, Philosophy, and The Imagination", p.18: 'Kant's account of the process of acquiring knowledge in the Critique of Pure Reason (wherein he exhibits the advance of knowledge from particular perceptions to universal concepts) lies under the tacit influence of Aristotle's De Anima." See also Brentano's "Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint", pp. 181 ff.
As N.K. Smith's commentary on the "Critique of Pure Reason" clearly shows, these 'mysteries' lure Kant into serious discontinuities, and have also, I should add, migrated into the heart - perhaps I ought to say the dead centre - of art educational theory in England, through the mediation of Coleridge and Bead.

The 'dialectic' of Kant's Antinomies of Pure Reason, influential in its turn on Hegel, derives from the respective philosophical traditions, represented by Leibniz and Hume, which Kant sought to reconcile in what he saw as the primary problem for metaphysics - "How are synthetic judgments a priori possible?" ("Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics...", Sec.5, p.73). In the solution to this problem imagination plays an important part, being "a faculty of a priori synthesis." It is indeed arguable that imagination is the faculty of a priori synthesis, but in his theory of imagination Kant is not always in agreement with himself. But he is undoubtedly in disagreement with Hume's theory of causality and the latter's "hasty and incorrect" views on reason:

"... he inferred that Reason completely deceived herself with this concept*, in falsely taking it for her own child, whereas it is nothing but a bastard of the imagination fathered by experience. The imagination, having by experience brought certain representations under the law of association, passes off a subjective necessity arising out of this, namely custom, for an objective necessity from insight. From this he inferred : reason has no power to think such connections, not even only to think them universally, because its concepts would then be mere fictions, and all its ostensible a priori knowledge is nothing but falsely stamped ordinary experiences; which is as much as to say there is no metaphysics at all, and cannot be any." ("Prolegomena...", Preface, II, p.6).

* i.e. "causality".
Kant endeavored in the "Critique of Pure Reason" to establish the functions of understanding and reason in human knowledge: "All our knowledge starts with the senses, proceeds from there to understanding, and ends with reason." ("Critique of Pure Reason", A 298, B 355, p.311) but this formulation is not adequately reconciled with the notion of reason as a set of innate principles governing the mind's conceptions.

The different Transcendental Deductions which Kant wrote for the two editions of his first critique contain different theories of imagination, and though the changes are superficially small their implications are great. What he calls "productive imagination" in the first edition—a conception which was so important for Coleridge—is omitted from the second where imagination is virtually a coextension of understanding, a handmaiden to the Categories; this is in diametric opposition to Humean empiricism. In the first edition the "productive imagination" is "the ground of the possibility of all knowledge" (A 118, p.149); that is, as opposed to the subjectivism of the second edition, the imagination seems (in my view) to be the pivotal point at which the Kantian things-in-themselves, unknown and unknowable, coalesce, as it were, with the Ideas of Pure Reason (also unknowable). Effectively this 'point' is an actual recognition in imagination of the rational in the empirical: the true a priori synthesis. But if "productive imagination" is simply the spontaneous action of understanding on the sensibility (B 152) then, on Kant's own terms, there would be no need for a philosophy of imagination: the synthesis of imagination is merely reproductive and subject to the empirical laws of associationist psychology. This, on Coleridge's somewhat arbitrary distinction, would reduce all "imagination" to "fancy", negating the transcendental function of imagination as Coleridge understood it.

The very first sentence of Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" affirms his belief that all knowledge comes from experience, and that "In the order of time... we have no knowledge antecedent to experience."
The objects of sense are represented in intuition, and this is the empirical ground of knowledge; we cannot know the (assumed) originals of what appear in sense, the things-in-themselves, and if we could there would be no a priori since all knowledge would depend solely on the things-in-themselves. Since we only have in intuition what Kant calls the "manifold" of appearances, these appearances ultimately depend on the organisational powers of the understanding, the categories, which are the pure concepts of understanding and are immanent in experience; these in their turn rely on the pure concepts of Reason, the Ideas, which Kant says are transcendent. Understanding is that S. Korner calls "the faculty of cognition through concepts which refer to sense-given particulars" ("Kant", p.30) and in applying a priori concepts to intuition Kant compares himself to Copernicus, who made the stars stationary and the spectator mobile. Sense provides the matter of appearances, understanding the form, and these are synthesised in imagination and in this (representative or reproductive) imagination is a 'necessary ingredient of perception'. This synthesis is both threefold and spontaneous, so:

".. knowledge is (essentially) a whole in which representations stand compared and connected" and "receptivity can make knowledge possible only when combined with spontaneity. Now this spontaneity is the ground of a threefold synthesis which must necessarily be found in all knowledge; namely, the apprehension of representations as modifications of the mind in intuition, their reproduction in imagination, and their recognition as a concept. These point to three subjective sources of knowledge which make possible the understanding itself - and consequently all experience as its empirical product." (A 101, pp.130-1).

(1) Nor would there be any need for philosophy; see "Critique of Judgment", Intro., Sec.II, p.10: "So far as our concepts have a priori application, so far extends the use of our cognitive faculty according to principles, and with it philosophy."
So, as he says a little later:

"There are three subjective sources of knowledge upon which rests the possibility of experience in general and of knowledge of its objects — sense, imagination, and apperception. Each of these can be viewed as empirical, namely, in its application to given appearances. But all of them are likewise a priori elements or foundations, which make the empirical employment itself possible. Sense represents appearances empirically in perception, imagination in association (and reproduction), apperception in the empirical consciousness of the identity of the reproduced representations with the appearances whereby they are given, that is, in recognition."

We should note that for Kant there is already an assumed duality between the unknowable thing-in-itself and the appearance to sense, whereas a plainer (Kantian) view would be that what appears and what is said to originate it are to all intents and purposes the same thing. Kant also asserts that outer sense is conditioned by the pure a priori intuition of space and inner sense by the pure a priori intuition of time (1), both of which forms of intuition have their appropriate functions in the aesthetic theory of imagination in the "Critique of Judgment". Time also plays a crucial role in his concept of apperception, but before considering this and the related concepts of consciousness and meaning it is important to make clear exactly what Kant does say about imagination.

Kant calls imagination ".. an active faculty for the synthesis of (the) manifold", dividing its functions into two types, the reproductive (empirical) and the productive (transcendental):

(1) Cf. Lessing's "Laocoon" : "...the boundless field of our imagination, the spirituality of its images, which can be ranged beside each other in the highest profuseness and variety, without covering or marring one another, as might be the case with things themselves, or their natural symbols, within the natural limits of space and time." (Ch.XV, p.40). See also Ch.XV, p.30, where he says that poetry articulates sounds in time and painting colours in space.
"The transcendental unity of apperception .... relates to the
synthesis of imagination, as an a priori condition of the possibility
of all combination of the manifold in one knowledge. But only the
productive synthesis of the imagination can take place a priori;
the reproductive rests on empirical conditions. Thus the principle
of the necessary unity of pure (productive) synthesis of imagination,
prior to apperception, is the ground of the possibility of all knowledge,
especially experience." (A118)
The empirical, reproductive function of imagination is responsible
for, in Strawson's words, bringing past perceptions alive in the
present, and this action is for Kant purely subjective. Judgments
of perception, as he says in the "Prolegomena", have only subjective
validity, pertaining to a single consciousness. Judgments of
experience have objective (necessary, universal) validity and
relate to consciousness in general; the a priori principles of possible
experience are the universal laws of nature, and the transcendental
imagination relates to these:
"The objective unity of all empirical consciousness in one conscious­
ness, that of original perception, is thus the necessary condition of
all possible perception; and (this being recognised we can prove
that) the affinity of all appearances, near or remote, is a necessary
consequence of a synthesis in imagination which is grounded a priori
on rules.
Since imagination is a faculty of a priori synthesis, we assign
to it the title of productive imagination." (A121). It is the
necessary unity of the manifold for which productive imagination is
responsible, and this unity is objective. (1) As he says in the

(1) In the second edition of the "Critique of Pure Reason" this unity,
of the sensible and rational, is achieved by the schemata, which are
"sensuous correlates of the pure categories .... produced by the
imagination." See also H.W.Cassirer's "A Commentary on Kant's Critique
of Judgment", p.29.
"Prolegomena", appearances not related under a priori principles are dynamic, and those appearances must belong to the reproductive imagination "which has only subjective validity" (B 141). We are now on to Kant's later formulations of his theory of imagination which have a bearing on his aesthetic theory, especially this dynamic, subjective aspect which, as shall be shown, has similarities to the function of imagination in relation to the sublime in the "Critique of Judgment".

In the second edition of the first critique Kant refers to "the understanding, under the title of transcendental synthesis of imagination" (B 153), and in a footnote to B 162 understanding and imagination are again identified with each other. Imagination here is clearly deprived of any measure of autonomy such as may be deduced from the first edition, Kant perhaps being mindful of the traditional unreliability of imagination, its mystery and subversiveness, and yet reluctantly obliged to recognise its function in perception and cognition:

"Synthesis in general ... is the mere result of the power of imagination, a blind but indispensable function of the soul, without which we should have no knowledge whatsoever, but of which we are scarcely ever conscious." (A 78, B 107). So it is that the imagination is free only to obey the laws of understanding in this second edition of the "Critique of Pure Reason", and its hidden, blind functions must be constrained within all possible limits:

"In so far as imagination is spontaneity, I sometimes also entitle it the productive imagination to distinguish it from the reproductive imagination, whose synthesis is entirely subject to empirical laws, the laws, namely, of association, and which therefore contribute nothing to the explanation of the possibility of a priori knowledge. The reproductive synthesis falls within the domain, not of transcendental philosophy, but of psychology." (B 152).
Returning to Kant's notion of apperception, it is this which must be added to imagination to make the latter's function intellectual, for apperception makes consciousness of representations possible. It is here, I think, that Kant's opposition to Hume has one of its soundest and most valuable formulations, for whereas the other two aspects of subjective synthesis are empirically acceptable their apriority is more an act of faith than a provable or demonstrable fact. The unity of apperception, which N.K. Smith believes makes Hume's associationism untenable, is not empirically accessible. It is simply a consciousness of duration (time) which retains its identity throughout the succession of experiences but which is not itself discoverable to or by experience; for Kant consciousness involves self-consciousness, a mere form whose contents are not the self but are for the self, so that self-consciousness is only possible as consciousness of the not-self.1 This, I think, bears a significant similarity to Berkeley's notion of "spirit"; Kant speaks of this "I", "ego", "thinking self" or "soul" as neither a subject nor a concept but:

"... only a designation of the object of inner sense in so far as we know it through no further predication; and though it cannot itself be the predicate of another thing, it cannot also be a determinate concept of an absolute subject, but only, as in all other cases, the reference of inner experiences to the unknown subject of them". ("Prolegomena", Sec. 46, p. 98).

And though he adds in a footnote that "it is nothing more than feeling of an existence without the slightest concept, and only representation of that to which all thinking stands in relation", this "I"... as a regulative principle, serves very well wholly to destroy all materialistic explanations of the inner appearances of our soul..." (loc. cit). The importance of this concept of consciousness is in its

1 See also my remarks on Kierkegaard, p. 314 ff., infra.
transcendental function as for Kant, as N.K. Smith says, "consciousness is in all cases awareness of meaning" ("A Commentary on Kant’s 'Critique of Pure Reason'", p.XL.), and because of this, "human experience becomes intelligible as a purposive activity that directs itself according to Ideal standards" (N.K. Smith, op. cit., p. Xiii). This purposiveness, which 'belongs to the natural human tendency for teleology', is a notion of central importance in the "Critique of Judgment".

To the productive and reproductive imagination of the "Critique of Pure Reason" Kant adds the aesthetic imagination of the "Critique of Judgment," and the elevated function of this latter aspect of imagination is to present us with sublime objects which are linked with the Ideas of Reason. The "Critique of Judgment" also gives us Kant's closely related theories of taste, beauty, and genius, pertinent to the making and the judging of art, and as an essential component of his theories he introduces the concept of "purposiveness": "... the concept of an object, so far as it contains the ground of the actuality of this object, is the purpose; and the agreement of a thing with that constitution of things which is only possible according to purpose is called the purposiveness of its form. Thus the principle of judgment, in respect of the form of things of nature under empirical laws generally, is the purposiveness of nature in its variety. That is, nature is represented by means of this concept as if an understanding contained the ground of the unity of the variety of its empirical laws.

The purposiveness of nature is therefore a particular concept, a priori, which has its origin solely in reflective judgment." ("Critique of Judgment", Intro. VI, p.17).
Purposiveness is a teleological concept, the fundamental principle of judgment, (1) and it pertains to the formal as opposed to the material aspect of objects. Where such judgments give pleasure the object in question is called beautiful, Kant says (op. cit., Intro., VII, p.27), and the judgment of beauty is a function of taste; (2) where they concern the formal purposiveness of objects such judgments Kant considers are "valid for all men" as with all empirical judgments. (3)

But aesthetic judgments reveal a subjective purposiveness in relation to the form of the objects, springing from "a spiritual feeling related to the sublime":

"Susceptibility to pleasure from reflection upon the forms of things (of nature as well as of art) indicates not only a purposiveness of the objects in relation to the reflective judgment, conformably to the concept of nature in the subject, but also conversely a purposiveness of the subject in respect of the objects, according to their form or even their formlessness, in virtue of the concept of freedom. Hence the aesthetic judgment is not only related as a judgment of taste to the beautiful, but is also as springing from a spiritual feeling related to the sublime." (Op. cit., Intro., VII, p.29).

(1) See Kant's Introduction, Sec.IV, p.15, where he says that judgment is either determinant or reflective, the former being regulated a priori but the principle of the latter can only be based on our considering empirical laws as being "... in accordance with such a unity as they would have if an understanding (although not our understanding) had furnished them to our cognitive faculties, so as to make possible a system of experience according to particular laws of nature." On reflective judgment see also H.V. Cassirer, op. cit., pp. 219 ff.

(2) See also Intro., sec.VII, p.26: "... the object is only called purposive when its representation is immediately combined with the feeling of pleasure, and this very representation is an aesthetical representation of purposiveness." Cf. Lessing, op. cit., p.15: "The aim of art ... is pleasure, and pleasure is not indisposable. It may therefore firstly be left to the lawgiver to decide what kind of pleasure, and what degree of each kind he will allow.

The plastic arts especially, in addition to their infallible influence on the national character, are capable of producing an effect which requires the closest attention of the law." Kant's lawgiver seems to be Reason through the categories of understanding.

(3) See also Intro., VII, p.28. Bernard (translator's Introduction p.XV) says that this agreement among men on the appreciation of beauty is a sensus communis.
Basically for Kant the beautiful is that which is purposive in relation to our faculty of judgment, and judgments of taste depend on the harmony which exists between understanding and imagination - this latter being, as the second edition of the "Critique of Pure Reason" argued, in conformity with understanding. It is not alone able to furnish an idea of beauty. Thus the beautiful is relatively limited, needs 'external' grounds, and affords an idea of an indeterminate relation between imagination and understanding; whereas the sublime is a property of the mind, is more subjective than the beautiful, and is based on an "indeterminate and indeterminable" relation of imagination and Reason; as J.H. Bernard says in his introduction to his translation to the "Critique of Judgment": "... in aesthetical judgments about the beautiful the mind is in restful contemplation, but in the case of the sublime a mental movement is excited ..." (p.26). The sublime is that which is absolutely great and so pertains to the Ideas of Reason only, and the feeling of the sublime is achieved by imagination's striving for infinite progress, in which it overreaches itself, attains a kind of absolute measure, and the sublime is felt. Whereas the beautiful is associated with pleasure the sublime is associated with pleasure and/or pain yielding, as it sometimes does, the discontinuity between imagination's estimation of magnitude and reason's, (pain), and giving pleasure because for Kant our striving for the Ideas is a kind of law, imposed by reason. (1)

It may be surmised that, in respect of Kant's comments on appearances and reproductive imagination in both the "Prolegomena" and the "Critique of Pure Reason" (n.161) the appearances not related to a priori principles are dynamic, therefore do not belong to the

(1) Kant's ideas on beauty and the sublime bear superficial resemblances to Burke's; see J.T. Boulton's Introduction to Burke's "Enquiry..." for a short discussion of this resemblance. (n.225).
schemata, are subjective, and are what Kant calls "images": "This schematism of our understanding, in its application to appearances and their mere form, is an art* concealed in the depths of the human soul, whose real modes of activity, nature is hardly likely ever to allow us to discover, and to have open to our gaze. This much only we can assert: the image is a product of the empirical faculty of reproductive imagination, the schema of sensible concepts, such as of figures in space, is a product and, as it were a monogram, of pure a priori imagination, through which, and in accordance with which, images themselves first become possible." ("Critique of Pure Reason", A 141-2, B 180-1). (1) The success or failure of Kant's defence of metaphysics seems to hinge to a great extent on his concept of imagination, which is not completely resolved either as purely a priori and schematic or as reproductive and dynamic, making possible respectively the beautiful and the sublime. Kant's epistemology, aesthetic theory, and his psychology, are all closely interrelated; the threefold synthesis of imagination, the very basis of all knowledge, depends entirely on a blind and perhaps (depending on how one interprets Kant) indeterminate function of the soul which is imagination's task. Kant remarks that illusion lies in taking the subject for the objective, yet the crucial epistemological issue at stake here is one of recognising which is which, for apriority, the entire structure of transcendentalism, is finally an act of faith, as Kant himself states. The distinction between the schematic and the aesthetic imagination is essentially that between the dialectic and the manic routes to the eludes of Plato. There seems to me to be a generic

(1) If we find an association or link between reproductive imagination and the sublime, this would indicate an ultimately psychological interpretation of sublimity. H.W. Cassirer, *op. cit.*, p.217, says of aesthetic imagination: "It is both productive, not merely reproductive, and free, for it is independent of any determinative laws of the understandings." It is *experience* says Cassirer which is the product of the productive imagination.

* "Kunst"
relation between the soul - Platonic and Aristotelian - and Kant's
apperception and his concept of Geist in the "Critique of Judgment".

A.V. Levi considers that the duality of Kant's distinction between
the 'scientific' and the 'humanistic' understanding of the two
critiques we have been discussing to be a "schism of the mind" inherent
to humanity.(1) As with Coleridge, Levi seems to regard Kant's
"productive imagination" as the creative faculty of the human mind,
but this essentially schematic, a priori faculty, must ultimately
serve the categories, but may also function in the judgments of
taste and the beautiful. What Coleridge overlooks, as Levi aptly
reminds, is the contribution imagination makes to human values: the
needs it may answer, which Kant attempts to answer in his doctrine
of purposiveness. For, as he says in the "Critique of Judgment"
(sec. 69) beautiful objects may lack "the animating principle of the
mind", "the indefinite harmony of the mental powers, their subjectively
purposive relation"; that is, they may be ohne Geist. Only an art work
(for example) which has this Geist (or "spirit" - cf Berkeley) can
make us feel the harmony of the mental powers, and this Geist, "the
faculty of exhibiting aesthetic Ideas" is a quality of genius.(2)

(1) See "Literature, Philosophy and the Imagination" pp.2 ff and 5. Cf.
H. J. de Vriesnauw, "The Development of Kantian Thought", Ch. II, Sec. 4,
p.84: "Because of its confused nature the function delegated to it is
not everywhere the same and Kant is forced to mark the differentiation
between the functions by designating them by corresponding names: it is
in this way that the theory of imagination is singularly complicated by
the distinction between empirical and transcendental imagination, between
reproductive and productive imagination. The same confusion is to be
traced in the result to which these functions give rise: At one time
they produce either the analytic of the synthetic unit; at another time
it is the Gestalt which are produced to which Kant expressly denies
the character of unity."

(2) See H. Bloeker, "Kant's Theory of The Relation of Imagination and Under-
standing in Aesthetic Judgments of Taste", p. 44: "Genius is what furnishes
the spirit which animates works of art; but for Kant spirit and taste are
opposed in certain respects. Genius is the spontaneous, free, sensuous,
uninhibited pole of aesthetic production; taste the pole of limitation,
discipline, control."
This harmony is clearly superior to that evidenced by the beautiful (between imagination and understanding) and has its Neoplatonic counterparts. Kant emphasises the spontaneity of the unity of apperception, reproduction and recognition, and this spontaneity is important for the aesthetic imagination and for distinguishing it from the apprehension of the mathematically sublime which is numerical and progressive in its magnitude, and the aesthetically sublime which is visual (i.e., intuition by the "measurement of the eye", sec. 26) and which belong to imagination. It is imagination which attempts to grasp magnitude in one intuition and in reaching an absolute limit in this attempt, experiences the sublime; only aesthetic imagination can arrive at an idea of the absolutely great, of the infinite, since the mathematically sublime is merely progressive. Imagination rediscovers the function which Dante gave it in the "Purgatorio", the attainment of the beautific vision, the inexpressible:

"... by an aesthetic idea I understand that representation of the imagination which occasions much thought, without any definite thought, i.e., any concept, being capable of being adequate to it, it consequently cannot be completely compassed and made intelligible by language. We easily see that it is the counterpart (pendant) of a rational idea, which conversely is a concept to which no intuition (or representation of the imagination) can be adequate.

The imagination (as a productive faculty of cognition) is very powerful in creating another nature, as it were, out of the material that actual nature gives it. We entertain ourselves with it when experience becomes too commonplace, and by it we remould experience, always indeed in accordance with analogical laws, but yet also in accordance with principles which occupy a higher place in reason (laws, too, which are just as natural to us as those by which understanding
comprehends empirical nature). Thus we feel our freedom from the law of association (which attaches to the empirical employment of imagination), so that the material supplied to us by nature in accordance with this law can be worked up into something different which surpasses nature." (1) Kant's assertion that aesthetic imagination is free and that aesthetic ideas can never be fully expressed or be made linguistically intelligible, no definite thought or concept being adequate to it, prompts H.W. Cassirer to call the work of art an "indeterminate concept" (op.cit., p.230). Certainly Kant is propounding a symbolic function for art, attainable only by genius and applicable just to art and not to science. (2) With respect to the special quality of genius and the rarity of the feeling of the sublime I understand from Kant that these belong to the non-schematic imagination, i.e., to those few uncategorical intuitions which, because of the assumed affinity of all appearances, immediately equate with the Ideas of Reason. They are "free" from the regular constraints of understanding and reason and from the other organizational forms of the rational mind, such as language.

All of this, as indeed the entirety of Kant's epistemology and aesthetic, is based on a faith in the fundamental affinity of the a priori and the empirical, of the objective and the subjective; a very close parallel to Spinoza's (Neoplatonic) conception Deus sive natura, and his unity of mind and nature. The similarities between

(2) Although Gerhard, as we have seen, did not make such a distinction. See also Abrams, op.cit., p.308 : "Almost all the romantic theorists commented on the disparity between imaginative and scientific perception, and deplored the disproportionate development of the latter in recent times. It is important to recognize, however, that by far the greater number refused to admit that there is any inherent or inescapable conflict between science and poetry, or that scientific progress necessarily entails poetic decline."
Kant and Spinoza also are evident in the latter's identical treatment of sense, perception, imagination and opinion, and Kant's emphasis on the spontaneous unity in experience of appearance, imagination and apperception; (we should also note the closeness here of Spinoza's 'opinion' and Kant's 'apperception'). Much hangs here on experience wherein for Kant the productive synthesis of imagination takes place, and on Kant's assertion that all knowledge too is grounded on the productive synthesis of imagination; as Spinoza said, the truth of an idea depends on its agreement with the object. The fundamental (existential) element is appearance which, despite Kant's insistence of the spontaneity of the threefold synthesis of imagination, is prior to its apperception; that is, things appear and then become meaningful and intelligible. This synthesis is governed by the mind through the categories of understanding, according to Kant, and is thus neither an appearance to mind alone, as we might construe from Descartes, nor to sense alone, as we might similarly construe from Locke or Hume.
SECTION II.

The inconsistencies of Kant's theories of imagination largely stem from his attempt to provide a logic of this concept, very much in the metaphysical tradition of Baumgarten and Wolff, as well as trying to account for the freedom of a creative imagination. Levi considers that these two endeavours lead Kant to "the curious extremity of giving to creativity a purely logical status" ("The Two Imaginations", p.191); Levi also considers that what he calls the "phenomenological-existential exegesis" has not improved on Kant's theory of imagination, (1) I have intimated that Kant's theory is fundamentally an attempt to reconcile the recurrent assertions of Aristotelian and associationist psychology and Platonic metaphysics, and that the prominence of the concept of imagination stems from its inevitable progression to the centre of enlightened aesthetic and philosophical/psychological interest, largely instigated by Addison and Hume. German romantic theory after Kant, to which Coleridge was heir, plagiarist and interlocutor in England, can be seen as an attempt to effect a unity of imagination and reason, the subjective and the universal, characteristic of die Romantiker— a term used first by Novalis or F. Schlegel.

For Kant the imagination finds harmony with understanding in the beautiful and with reason in the sublime, the former constituting the judgments of taste and the latter the manifestations of genius. As with Burke, Kant considers taste to be a property of all men, making beauty a unifying quality having for Burke a social function; the sublime is a rarer quality, given to few men, and therefore

(1) See also p.189 of "The Two Imaginations" : "...the classical tradition trichotomises 'Being' according to the objective correlates of the epistemic series. Thus sensation yields existential, conceptualisation yields essential and fantasy yields imaginary being. The schema is neat, but it conceals a fatal ambiguity— one from which the consequences are realised in the continuing perplexities about the ontological status of the realm of the imaginary."
effectively divisive. The Kantian imagination may be seen as an agent both of unity and division, a paradox owing to the discontinuities of his theory, and considering his influence on subsequent theory of imagination in England it would be of value to know which of these functions Coleridge favoured. It seems likely however that even he didn't know. The idea of the sublime effectively originates with Longinus but in the shorter term Kant evidently found much to interest him in Burke's "Enquiry" and in Burke's forerunner John Baillie's "Essay on the Sublime" of 1747. (1) Like Burke, Kant speaks in terms of magnitude in relation to the sublime, giving the concept a quantitative rather than a qualitative aspect which had its tangible and visible effects in the large canvases of artists like John Martin and James Ward. Burke's notion of the sublime also influenced Wordsworth, especially the latter's "Guide To The Lakes" and Book I of "The Prelude". Like Kant's, Burke's "sublime" is notable for not being simply pleasurable but may also be mixed with astonishment or even terror, a significant development, as E. Cassirer comments : "The significance of the doctrine of the sublime consists in the fact that from the dimension of art it indicates the limitations of eudaemonism and overcomes its narrowness." ("The Age of the Enlighten­ment", p.329).

The rather scant regard which Burke was given by Coleridge, Blake, and most other artists of the Romantic age, is possibly owed to his rather limited, Lockian view of imagination which he regards as "incapable of producing anything absolutely new; it can only vary the disposition of those ideas which it has received from the senses." ("Enquiry", Introduction on Taste, p.17). But the importance of the imagination for Kant cannot be regarded as simply an inheritance from Hume, for the concept was very much as the forefront of German aesthetic

(1) See J.T. Boulton's Introduction to Burke's "Enquiry", p.liii.
speculation in the middle of the 18th century following the publication of "Die Diskurse der Mahler"—modelled on Addison's "Spectator"—by J.J. Bodmer and J.J. Breitinger.(1) Both these writers on aesthetics emphasises what they called Dichtkraft, which L. Welch transcribes into English as the power of productive imagination" ("Imagination and Human Nature", pp. 68-9), and which was based on Addison's ideas on imagination. This concept of Dichtkraft was subsequently studied at some length by the little-known psychological theorist J.K. Tetens, whose "Philosophische Versuche" significantly influenced Kant: "There can hardly be any doubt that Kant borrowed from him the factor of imagination. It is divided in Tetens as in Kant, into a reproductive and productive function which he calls Dichtkraft." (H.J. de Vleeschauwer, op.cit., p. 85).(2) Whereas with some reason loses its dominance to imagination, in Germany the early Romantics followed Kant (especially F. Schlegel) in the endeavour to unify imagination and reason in the pursuit of the highest qualities of art; this unity clearly reflects Kant's theories on the sublime in relation to aesthetic imagination and the Ideas of Reason. It is also at the root of "the most fundamental theory of romanticism", romantic irony; (See A.E. Abrams, "Tieck's Romantic Irony", p.5).

The immediate heirs to Kant's "Critique of Judgment" were Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, and it was from Fichte that F. Schlegel took the beginnings of his theory of romantic irony. (See Abrams, op.cit., p.276).

(1) Both these writers were influential educators in Switzerland; Pestalozzi was a pupil of Breitinger. For a discussion of the influence of Addison on them, see M.H. Abrams, "The Mirror and The Lamp", pp.276ff; also R. Wellek, op.cit., Vol I, who says of Bodmer: "...he adopted the expanded Addison's concept of the pleasures of imagination..." (p.147). Abrams, (op.cit., p.245) says that Bodmer and Breitinger influenced Coleridge's notion of "esemplastic" imagination.

(2) See also L. Welch, op.cit., pp.37-2; and Wellek, Vol.II, p.164: "In Tetens' Philosophische Versuche über die menschliche Natur (1777), a book known to Kant and Coleridge, a distinction is drawn between 'bildende Dichtkraft', which is artistic, and Phantasie...etc."
In this context we should also mention Lessing, underlining the importance of the drama for the early romantic theorists. With Voltaire, Lessing was among the first to admire Shakespeare and to contrast him sharply with the Stoic attitudes informing the French classical drama of Corneille and Racine. "All Stoicism is undramatic" comments Lessing ("Laocoon", p.12), and in his "Hamburg Dramaturgy" he says that the "impressions produced by French Tragedy are absolutely cold and feeble" (pp.224-5), adding how unfavourably French drama compares with the Greek. He castigates Corneille for his malevolent misinterpretation of Aristotle's "Poetics" which, "followed by all subsequent poets, have failed to produce anything but the most shallow, vapid, and untragical stuff." ("Hamburg Dramaturgy", p.251). A reverence for Shakespeare, coupled with what Lusaky calls "Grecomania", were consuming passions of the early romantics, and this great admiration for the Greeks informs F. Schlegel's theory of romantic irony, which the latter regarded as a unity of objectivity (the Greek) and interessante (the modern), and which Hegel was to call "the acme of moral evil". Briefly, the objective refers to the attitude the artist should have in relation to his work, the interessante to his individuality and contemporaneity which the work must inevitably manifest: "... romantic irony was for Friedrich Schlegel that objectivity in a romantic work of literary art which nevertheless shows forth plainly the literary creator in all his artistic power, glory, wisdom, and love toward his creation."(Lusaky, op.cit., p.81).

This polarity between the objective and the interessante was coalesced into a like polarity of the transcendence and immanence of God in the world, echoed by the artist in his work, which was an article of Lutheran orthodoxy into which the Schlegels, like Kant, had been born. This, apparently incompatible, polarity bears a marked similarity to the notion of the "reconciliation of opposites"
which Coleridge got from Schelling, and which he thought was the
function of imagination. (1) As A.D. Snyder says of Coleridge
"... hence the definition of art as the union of reason and
imagination, as the reconciliation of opposites.

Without a doubt Coleridge had a near interest in bringing
to an end, or what seemed to him an end, the conflict between
the reason and the imagination." (2).

(1) I have already found precedents for this Promethean notion in
Cambridge Platonism, but see also E. Cassirer, "The Philosophy of the
Enlightenment" p.316 ff. Abrams, op.cit., p.272, comments on the great
impact of this near-blasphemous parallel of God and man in the 18th
century; see also pp.273-4 of this work: "...in ecclesiastical Latin,
creare was the common word to connote the orthodox concept that God made
the world 'out of nothing'."

(2) See "The Critical Principle of the Reconciliation of Opposites as
Employed by Coleridge", p.19; also on Coleridge and Schelling see
M. Warnock, "Imagination" pp.92 ff. See also Abrams on Schelling's
thinks Coleridge regarded his "esemplastic" as a translation of
"Eindildungskraft" - but would he have translated a noun by an adjective?
Chapter 3: COLERIDGE AND WORDSMITH

SECTION I

Posterity has generally been unkind to Coleridge the critic and aesthetic theorist, and not without reason. His numerous borrowings, from his German contemporaries (1), often unacknowledged, he seems to have admired as much for the sound as for the sense, and his contemporary reputation for erudition and profundity was quickly replaced by one for obscurantism and plagiarism (2). But the clearest authors are not often the most influential as they leave so little for their apologists and detractors to expound; disputations on the number of angels able to occupy a pinhead find a modern counterpart in the number of commentators a few sporadic remarks can engender, and Coleridge's comments on imagination are few, cryptic, and therefore fertile. They have, for all their inconsistency, exercised a powerful influence on English critical and aesthetic theory, (3) and, pertinent to the present study, on art educational theory. His influence on Herbert Read, doyen of art education in England, is openly acknowledged in "Education Through Art" — a work which has had a formative influence on the most recent government pamphlet on art education, "Art in Schools" (1971), wherein art education is primarily seen as "fostering the growth of imagination" (p.93). (4) Warnock's assertion that the "line" from Kant to Coleridge is "relatively straight" (op.cit., p.72), is an oversimplification, I believe, which ignores the effects of Schlegel's notion of romantic irony and Schelling's of the reconciliation of opposing forces (5), which latter Read much approved of.

(1) Coleridge visited Germany for nine months during the period Sept.1798—July 1799.
(2) For a contemporary, rather debunking view, see Hazlitt's essay "Mr. Coleridge"; Coleridge was also a favourite target of T.L. Fagge, appearing as Mr. Fagge in "Headlong Hall", Mr. Fosky ("a lover of shadows") in "Nightmare Abbey", and as Mr. Skonar, ("the dream of a shadow"), the "transcendental poet" of "Urontet Castle."
(4) On "Imagination and Education" see H. Warnock, "Imagination", Part V.
(5) See Ch.IX of Coleridge's "Biographia Literaria" for comments on his intellectual association with Kant, Schelling, Fichte and 'Behmen". 
and of which Coleridge wrote:

"My own conclusions on the nature of poetry, in the strictest use of
the word, have been in part anticipated in the ... disquisition on the
fancy and imagination. What is poetry? is so nearly the same question
with, what is a poet? that the answer for the one is involved in the
solution of the other. For it is a distinction resulting from the
poetic genius itself, which sustains and modifies the images, thoughts
and emotions of the poet's own mind. The poet, described in ideal
perfection, brings the whole soul of man into activity, with the sub-
ordination of its faculties to each other, according to their relative
worth and dignity. He diffuses a tone and spirit of unity that blends
and (as it were) fuses, each into each, by that synthetic and magical
power to which we have exclusively appointed the name of imagination.
This power, first put into action by the will and understanding and
retained under their irremissive, though gentle and unnoticed controul
(laxis effertur habenis) reveals itself in the balance of reconciliation
of opposite or discordant qualities: of sameness, with difference; of
the general, with the concrete; the idea, with the image, the individual
with the representative; the sense of novelty and freshness, with old and
familiar objects; a more than usual state of emotion, with more than
usual order; judgment ever awake and steady self-possession, with
enthusiasm and feeling profound and vehement; ..." ("Biographia Literaria",
Ch.XIV, pp.175—3M l)

Though Coleridge is here talking of poetic genius what he is essentially
dealing with is very close to Kant's "productive imagination", with

(1) For further comment on this passage in relation to English criticism up
to the present day, see Abrams, op.cit., pp.118 ff. See also R. Wellek,
quote the key passage in Coleridge's Biographia Literaria describing
imagination as the balance or reconciliation of opposite or discordant
qualities." Most commentators seem not to be aware of Coleridge's debt
to Schlegel here. For a further discussion of Schlegel's romantic irony
evidence of the influence of other early German romantics, particularly Schlegel and Schelling; this fusing and mediating function of imagination is also very similar to Schiller's "Spieltrieb" (1). He is saying that imagination is the sovereign power whose 'gentle and unnoticed' control is effectively like Hume's 'gentle force that commonly prevails' but which is activated by will and understanding in unifying all the faculties.

The 'reconciliation of opposites' is akin to the Socratic ideal of seeing the many in the one, as indeed Coleridge's "esemplastic" power of imagination means, he tells us, "shaping into one" (see op.cit., Ch.X, p.91). He invented the term "esemplastic" in order to designate a power of imagination and to "prevent its being confounded with usual import of the word imagination", and this term, which I believe owes something to Cambridge Platonism, looks like an attempt to describe the blending, fusing and unifying activity described in the above quotation. There is a confusion, deliberate or otherwise, between the idea of a unity of the self (i.e. the "faculties") and the unity of a poetic (or visual?) work of art, and though Coleridge makes no overt reference to Kant's unity of apperception this is a necessary component of the synthesis of the productive imagination, and of that imagination to which Coleridge is here addressing himself. The confusion may be deliberate in its implication that the work of art in its unity at once epitomises and evokes the exaltation of a sense of unity in whoever experiences that work. In the "usual import" of the word "imagination" Coleridge could well have in mind the tradition of Addison and its patently Lockian origins; more likely still, he means the Humean and Hartleyan associationist view, Kant's "reproductive imagination", which Wordsworth valued rather more highly than Coleridge, the latter regarding it as mechanical and calling it "fancy". Some eleven years after writing

(1) See Letter 14 of his "Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man."
the "Biographia Literaria" Coleridge wrote in a letter to Richard Sharp: "Imagination, or the modifying power in the highest sense of the word, in which I have ventured to oppose to Fancy, or the aggregating power." (15th Jan., 1804; see Intro. to "Biographia Literaria", p.xii, fnt.). Although the two functions are not mutually exclusive the earlier 'shaping into one' is rather more thorough in its implications than 'modifying', and it is quite likely that Coleridge had felt the restraint of Wordsworth in making this change.

There is a further complication to his theory of imagination in the "Biographia Literaria" where he superficially adopts a division of imagination first made nearly 100 years previously:

"The imagination then I consider as primary, or secondary. The primary imagination I held to be the living power and prime agent of all human perception, and as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM. The secondary I consider as an echo of the former, co-existing with the conscious will, yet still, as identical with the primary in the kind of its agency, and differing only in degree, and in the mode of its operation. It dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to recreate; or where this process is rendered impossible, yet still at all events, it struggles to idealise and to unify. It is essentially vital, even as all objects (as objects) are essentially fixed and dead.

Fancy, on the contrary, has no other counters to play but fixities and definites. The fancy is indeed no other than a mode of memory emancipated from the order of time and space; and blended with, and modified by that empirical phenomenon of the will which we express by the word of choice. But equally with the ordinary memory it must receive all its materials ready made from the law of association." (Op.cit., Ch.XIII, p.167).

Although these two kinds of imagination have the same titles as
Addison's it is clear that they are quite different; Addison's primary imagination essentially refers to that which is immediate to sense, and is passive. His secondary imagination may be an echo of his primary in so far as this "echo" resembles an impression or imprint, but it is really a hybrid of memory and day-dreaming which bears a closer resemblance to Coleridge's "fancy". For a fuller consideration of the implications for critical, aesthetic, and art educational theory and practice it is essential to look back to the theories of Kant as well as to those of Wordsworth, and to find in each and all a continuation of the anomalies which have passed into our own times.

There are those who think that Coleridge's theories of imagination owe their inception very largely to Wordsworth, but inspection reveals a common ancestry in Kant; in the case of Wordsworth this is no more evident than in Book XLV of "The Prelude":

"....Imagination, which, in truth,
Is but another name for absolute power
And clearest insight, amplitude of mind,
And Reason in her most exalted mood." (ll. 139ff.) (1)

There is also a Neoplatonic flavour to Wordsworth's statements about imagination:

"Imagination having been our theme,
So also hath that intellectual Love
For they are each in each, and
cannot stand Dividually." (Loc.cit., ll. 206-9). (2)

Wordsworth's emphasis on the moral and didactic functions of the

(1) See also the Preface to the poems of 1815: "Fancy is given to quicken and beguile the temporal part of our nature. Imagination to incite and support the eternal." (p. 755)
(2) This 'Neoplatonic flavour' is also evident in his ode "Intimations of Immortality", especially stanza V; it is interesting to compare this work with Coleridge's ode "Dejection" as they both mourn the apparent loss of imaginative inspiration.
sublime is close in spirit to Shaftesbury (1); as W. Strong says:

"It is imagination which enables Wordsworth to feel a presence

that disturbs him

'with a joy

Of elevated thoughts; a sense sublime ...' " etc. ("Imagination

and Fancy", p.7). This imagination, Strong opines, "is the creative

force of all great poetry, the seeing of the universal in the particular."

(loc.cit.). Wordsworth's close relation of reason, intellect and

imagination again indicates similarities with the productive imagina-

tion of Kant (rather than, e.g., the aesthetic imagination of the

"Critique of Judgment") and Wordsworth was certainly not the kind of

person to enthuse over the purely subjective and emotive aspects of

imagination, as subsequent writers were wont to do. There is an

element of detachment, matter-of-factness even, in the poetry of

Wordsworth which, though lapsing into bathos in the lesser works,

informs the quality of his best poems.

This "creative force" of Strong's is the 'power', traditionally

and persistently attributed to, or called, "imagination"; this

tradition, as we see, is maintained by Coleridge. It passes from him

via Read into English art educational theory. For Read the imagination

is very much a subjective power just as in Coleridge it is essentially

and literally a selfish power which modifies and reshapes 'for me'

what was originally and potentially a unity 'for all'. Thus mysterious,

magical, and invisible mental power is said to be responsible for acts

(1) See also N.Warnock, op.cit., p.120 on Wordsworth's knowledge of Hume;

she believes that Wordsworth placed Hume's connection of ideas and feelings

"at the heart of the mysterious active power of the imagination". See

also Abrams, op.cit., p.14: Wordsworth "...was ... an honest heir to

the centuries old tradition of empiricism. In his explicit prose comments,

he says that 'imagination is a subjective term: it deals with objects not

as they are, but as they appear to the mind of the poet', and his extended

analysis of the poetic imagination, in the preface of 1815, is in a thorough

accord with English psychology."
of creation, of self-assertion, which are, it should be stressed, acts which are described as creative by their location and their product; action and modification are synonymous. There is a real sense both for Hume and Kant in which to use imagination, to be imaginative, is to be active, i.e. to be alive, for imagination is the essential perceptual synthesis of the manifold of sense and the categories of understanding; in the Christian existentialism of Kierkegaard the 'infinitising' and perceptual functions of imagination together constitute a moral imperative. This latter development is already implicit in some of Wordsworth's poetry, and in Coleridge the purely aesthetic imagination is prominent but not alone; but this aspect of imagination has been promoted in its autonomy by subsequent writers as though it were only active in the realm of art making and appreciating. To have an aesthetic imagination is to act in a certain sphere which we designate 'artistic', and we should be no more surprised and delighted with exceptions in this sphere than any other; nor should it mystify us that the human mind or imagination should be capable of such great prodigies as art manifests seeing that, as Leibniz remarks, the body is able to perform so many astonishing feats – accepting for the moment the metaphorical senses of "mind" and "body". Some men have strong arms and some, so to speak, strong imaginations; that the latter are more mysterious does not necessarily make them more meaningful. Imagination may well be regarded, and perfected, in its autonomy, aesthetically; what is more important is its relation – established by Kant (and reiterated by Sartre) – with the concept of freedom. It is to this aspect of imagination that educationists in general should, I believe, address themselves: it is too important to be left to artists alone.
PART 7:

EXISTENTIALISM, PHENOMENOLOGY, AND CONCLUDING REMARKS.
Although I have fulfilled the intentions with which I set out at the beginning of this thesis it would be wrong to ignore entirely some of the developments in the theory of imagination, and particularly those which seem to have passed unnoticed by art educators, following the romantic era. But it would also be wrong, I believe, to make an easy equation of 'development' with 'progress' for it could well be argued that just as Aristotle wrestled with the problems of "imagination" bequeathed to him by Plato so posterity has wrestled with their joint bequest. As I began with Plato and Aristotle, so in a sense (and appropriately) I end: for the Phenomenology of Husserl, borrowed and extended by Sartre, is founded on a metaphysic which is ultimately Platonic, and, so far as the theory of "imagination" is concerned, both of these philosophers consistently argue against the Aristotelianism and empiricism of Brentano. In Phenomenology the term "imagination" almost becomes redundant, being variously replaced by "phenomenon", "appearance" or "presentation" with a distinction made between the act and the content of consciousness such as was denied by Brentano (though he later changed his mind). But before considering the phenomenological "imagination" I wish to say something about the existential theory of imagination in Kierkegaard and, firstly, about Hegel.

In the third volume of his "Encyclopedia", the "Philosophy of Mind", we find Hegel adopting the familiar tripartite division of human consciousness, calling the components intuition, representation, and thought. (Sec. 47 seq.). To the second of these belongs imagination, itself subdivided into: Recollection, which is the 'inwardisation' of the intuition as meaningful, i.e. as posited as mine; Representation, having subjective and objective elements, which
creates 'general representations', i.e., ideas; and Memory, whereby
the 'content' of intuition is made a sign, i.e. it is objectified,
externalized, "imaged", as for instance in language. (1) He says
that the general ideas encompass those images which belong to us
formally, leaving "an infinite host of images of the past" (Zusatz
to Sec. 455) 'slumbering' within us, any one of which may come to
life — to borrow Strawson's phrase — as when, for instance, we
recognize a face in a crowd. This formal aspect of imagination
belongs to Hegel's "reproductive imagination" ('Einbildungskraft')
wherein images are connected and thus raised to general ideas; Hegel
is careful to emphasise that this elevation and association of images
is effected by active mind and is not simply a number of similar
images coming into contact with each other. He also describes what
he calls Phantastie: "...in which intelligence posits its general
ideas or representations as identical with the particular aspect
of the image and so gives the former a pictorial existence. This
sensuous existence has the double form of a symbol and a sign, so
that this third stage comprises creative imagination (Phantastie),
which produces symbols and signs, the latter forming the transition
to memory." (Op.cit., Zusatz to Sec. 455). In the next section Hegel
adds: "Such is the creative imagination — symbolic, allegoric, or
poetical imagination — where the intelligence gets a definite
embodiment in this store of ideas and informs them with its general
tone." Not surprisingly, given this intellectual view of creative
imagination, Hegel's highest form of art is the 'classic' — "the art
(1) This sign/general idea connection is arbitrary, says Hegel, and
must be learned. In the sign, "The intelligence...gives proof of wider
choice and simpler authority in the use of intuitions when it treats them
as designatory (significative) rather than symbolical." Here also
intelligence "...gives its own original ideas of definite existence
of sublimity — *symbolic art*" as he calls it (Sec.561). Hegel's notion of creative imagination — and there are grounds for inferring a similar one from Coleridge — is very similar to the ideal imitation suggested in Aristotle's "Poetics" and developed and adopted during the Renaissance; this similarity is reinforced in Hegel's "Aesthetics":

"... this productive activity of imagination whereby the artist takes what is absolutely rational in itself and makes it art, as his very own creation, by giving it external form, is what is called genius, talent, etc." ("The Idea of Aesthetic Beauty", p.285). The transcendental, idealising imagination common to Kant, Coleridge, and Hegel seems often to induce an art which is rather dry, formal and neo-classic, raising spectres of arid academicism such as haunt the artistic establishment of Western Europe.

But this somewhat selective reading of Hegel's theory of creative imagination is balanced by reference to his notion of imagination as functioning in a kind of 'reconciliation of opposites' way in existence and perception: "Productive imagination is the centre in which the universal and being, one's own and what is picked up, internal and external, are completely welded into one. The preceding 'synthesis' of intuition, recollection, etc., are unifications of the same factors, but they are 'syntheses', it is not until creative imagination that intelligence ceases to be the vague mine and the universal, and becomes an individuality, a concrete subjectivity, in which the self-reference is defined both to being and universality." ("Philosophy of Mind", Sec.457). This sense of imagination as a continuous synthetic activity is tantamount to asserting that we live in imagination, albeit an imagination guided by intelligent principles. A similar synthesis of the finite (external) and infinite (universal) places imagination on a moral plane as a medium of what Kierkegaard calls, in his "Sickness Unto Death", 'infinitising'. The power of self-reference and self-reflection make this existential synthesis a moral task, but a task
which is never completed.

To "venture wholly to be oneself" (op.cit., p.142) is for Kierkegaard the true Christian heroism; the self (or 'spirit') does not actually exist but is a process of becoming, of "infinitising" as he calls it. Infinity can only be gained through despair which, says Kierkegaard, "is related to the eternal in man" (op.cit., p.150) and to the striving for infinitude; he calls this despair "an anxious dread of an unknown something" (p.154) and amongst its forms are determinism and dialectic. There is, we may note, a kind of dialectic of the finite and infinite which is the existential and the creative imagination, but Kierkegaard states that synthesis is a relation of two factors (in this case) and so is not a self: "The self is a relation which relates itself to its own self", and in the disrelation which may here occur he again says is a form of despair. Again, in anticipating the charge (perhaps) of infinite regression, he says that this too is despair: "...the self is a synthesis of which the finite is a limiting factor, and the infinite is the expanding factor. Infinitude's despair is therefore the fantastical, the limitless." (p.161). So, outside the Christian life, as Kierkegaard understands it, the dissociation of despair may pertain to the unlimited, the fantastical; or to the material, the limited and finite: when feeling, knowledge, or will become fantastic, he says, the self is volitized and a man is carried away from himself; when a man lacks infinitude he is mean-spirited, narrow-minded, and spiritually emasculated, he is a cipher, a philistine, for he has no imagination. It is imagination which is the medium for morally good (Christian), existential infinitising, for possibility is the only antidote to despair:

"The fantastical is doubtless most closely related to fantasy, imagination, but imagination in turn is related to feeling, knowledge,
and will, so that a person may have a fantastic feeling, or knowledge, or will. Generally speaking imagination is the medium in the process of infinitising; it is not one faculty on a par with others, but if one would so speak, it is the faculty \textit{instar omnium} (for all faculties). What feeling, knowledge, or will a man has, depends in the last resort upon what imagination he has; that is to say, upon how these things are reflected, i.e. it depends upon imagination. Imagination is the reflection of the process of infinitising, and hence the elder Fichte quite rightly assumed, even in relation to knowledge, that imagination is the origin of the categories. The self is reflection, and imagination is reflection, it is the counterfeit presentment of the self, which is the possibility of the self. Imagination is the possibility of all reflection, and the intensity of this medium is the possibility of the intensity of the self.\textsuperscript{165} (Op.cit., pp.167-4).

The notion of imagination as the faculty \textit{instar omnium} on which are dependent knowledge, feeling and will, is already present in Kant and Hegel, but it is still a faculty which acts according to understanding or intelligence; this latter constitutes a volatilization of the self for Kierkegaard, whose "imagination" anticipates Brentano's "presenting" but this latter is without the former's Christian and moral teleology. Nor is it surprising that in this near identification of self, imagination, and reflection, there is the blueprint for Sartre's notion of negation as an essential function of imagination, though Kierkegaard would have regarded Sartre's conception as a "volatilization", and his existential teleology is quite different from Sartre's phenomenology of imagination. There is a very real sense for Kierkegaard, far more than for Hegel or Kant, that we are imagination, living (if we are morally good) in a continuous possibility of infinity which for him is the Christian life. The potential for such an existential
imagination exists in his philosophical forerunners, and divested of its rational guides - themselves a product of a kind of faith - it is here given an actual location and a moral function. This function, a manifestation of despair, is reiterated by Schopenhauer in his assertion that it is only such depressed mental states that we are really alive; for it is only then that the possibility of improvement activates the individual, a possibility which imagination offers in its mediation to the infinite, in its "infinitising".
SECTION II

Kierkegaard's "infinitising" does have its counterpart in Brentano's conception of the perfectibility of mental phenomena, though Husserl attacked his "psychologism" (basically a denial of the ideal) — on good grounds, but, as I believe, erroneously. Brentano was certainly critical of any return to Platonic principles such as he found in Meinong's "Gegenstandstheorie" and Husserl's "Phenomenology", himself favouring a return to true Aristotelianism. There can be no doubt that his "Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint" owes much to the "De Anima" and, to a lesser extent, Leibniz's philosophy of mind. Brentano's "psychognosy", as he called his theory, constitutes a significant and powerful attack on the mysterious and metaphysical faculties of mind such as the creative and synthetic imagination.

Despite the valuable attention he gave to the problem of distinguishing between images and objects, Leibniz considered that even if all of life were a dream this would be of little consequence, and called all 'intuitions' "phenomena"; Brentano's term is "presentations" but he asserts that only mental phenomena possess real and intentional existence. Perception, he says, is inner perception to inner consciousness, it is true and we recognise it immediately as such; these inner perceptions, in (e.g.) linguistic form, are the basis of objective knowledge: "...Kant simply defined the contrast between intuition and concept in such a way that the latter is universal and the former individual. But just the opposite is the case. Inner perception never reveals to us anything which another person could not find exactly the same in himself." (Ibid., "Additional Essays", p.362). For Brentano the presentation is the sine qua non of all mental acts, which are characterised by reference to something as "object"; this reference he calls intentionality: "Every mental
phenomenon is characterised by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward an object (which is not to be understood as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity." ("Psychology...", p.88). Given this generic title "presentation", Brentano says that in many cases that which is actual may be non-existent (see "Supplementary Remarks", pp. 291 ff). Fantasy images differ only in origin and not in content from sensation — which Sartre was to reiterate and which led to Husserl's great emphasis on the phenomenological value of "fancy".(1)

As well as presentation, all mental acts have, according to Brentano, both judgment and feeling; the unity of mental phenomena depends on their being perceived together, (as opposed to Locke's "simple ideas"); they are fused in the "object" as he calls it and not in the act. All perceptions are judgments for Brentano, and judgments are simple affirmation or denial; consciousness is not "an absolute simple reality" ("Psychology...", p.165) but has distinct parts which are organically related like the parts of a coral reef, a conception which appears to owe something to the monadology of Leibniz. Brentano later revised his views in the unity of (inner) perception and judgment, and came to believe in the ability to "unite objects", (2) but in his "Psychology..." the belief in the identity of judgment and perception inevitably leads him to assert that all categorical judgment propositions

(1) Husserl comments on the five or six-fold ambiguity of "presentation", and gives a list of twelve different meanings; see his "Logical Investigations", Ch.VI, Investigation V, Sec.44, pp.652 ff.
(2) See his "Supplementary Remarks", op.cit., pp.276 ff., where he abandons the belief that presentations have a "feeling tone" and a judgment; all presentations have a temporal mode, he later adds, and comes to recognise our ability to unite objects, giving an "integral object" as he calls it (p.231).
are reducible to existential propositions (op.cit., p.218) and that
the compounding of elements is "merely a linguistic expression" (p.220) -
the chief aim of language being the communication of judgments. (1) It
hardly needs to be emphasised that Brentano's views here constitute a
radical attack on the old doctrine of a metaphysical, synthetic imagi-
ation, imposing the categories of understanding and reason on percep-
tion, but there is no basis in his account for explaining the more
extreme and individualised products and examples of humanity - the
works and men of genius, for example.

He does give a few remarks which are suggestive of an aesthetic
theory however. (2) The old metaphysical triad of the True, the Good,
and the Beautiful belong to the different but co-ordinating sides of
our mental life - Cognition, Appetite, and Feeling - which relate to
Brentano’s three categories of mental phenomena : Presentation, Judgment,
and Emotion (love/hate). Each class of mental phenomena has its own
perfection, he says, which for presentation if the beautiful : "This
perfection makes itself known in the inner feeling, which, as we saw,
accompanies every act. Inherent in the most perfect acts in each
fundamental class there is, so to speak a noble pleasure. The highest
perfection of the activity of presentation lies in the contemplation of
the beautiful, whether this is reinforced by the influence of the object,
or independent of such influence." (Op.cit., p.261) (3) Given the
earlier priority of presentation in mental life, there is a clear

(1) In his "Supplementary Remarks" Brentano says he is strongly against
"psychologism", the view that knowledge is not generally valid : "... it
would have to be paradoxical, even absurd, to me, if someone denied
that knowledge is judgment and that judgment belongs to the domain of
psychology." He asserts that anyone sharing our knowledge must share
what falls within the domain of human psychology and only in this domain
is it accessible to scientific enquiry.
(2) Unfortunately there is no English translation of Brentano's work on
aesthetics available.
(3) C.f. Sartre's view that the real is never beautiful, only the
imaginary, in his "Psychology of Imagination" p.225.
implication here that beauty (or the beautiful) is the highest achievement and perfection available to man, but Brentano also describes what he calls the "Ideals of Ideals", which is a unity of his three classes of mental life, corresponding to Christian blessedness and the Socratic and Platonic vision of the eidos (as I have earlier called it). It is here that the anomalies of a Platonic metaphysic and an Aristotelian "psychognosy" become manifest, but these anomalies are owed to some extent in Brentano to his later change of opinion against some of the views expressed in his "Psychology..."; this is particularly so in relation to the unity, of mental acts, which he originally regarded as a necessity. And given his early bifurcation of "outer" and "inner" perception it is surprising that he never considered the possibility of a neutral, unitary function out of which such a bifurcation could be advanced. But despite Husserl's objections to Brentano's views there is no doubt of the latter's awareness of the greater quality or meaningfulness of some forms of what he called "inner consciousness", but that his "psychognosy" is ultimately existential, without Kierkegaard's Christian morality, and not essential (or "eidetic") as is the phenomenology of Husserl and Sartre.

This 'eidetic' or essential impetus of the 'intention' is consistently maintained by both Husserl and Sartre; as the former says:

"To present something to oneself means .... to achieve a corresponding intuition of what one merely thought of or what one meant but only at best very inadequately indeed." ("Logical Investigations", Ch.VI, Inv.V, Sec.44, p.657). The need to maintain a clear distinction between sense and imagination was also felt by the later Brentano, who saw as he said no justification for making analogies between "objects" and the contents of consciousness, content having no being: "only that which falls under the concept of a thing (Reales) can provide an object for mental reference" ("On Genuine and Pictitious Objects", op.cit., p.291) he says, adding that
"Leibniz knew this"—perhaps having in mind Leibniz's statement that being is experienced by a distinct concept, existence by a distinct perception. Husserl, no doubt mindful of Brentano's position in the "Psychology...", maintains a positive distinction between the presentation and the presented (1); for him the mere "having of a content" is not an intentional experience nor an "introspective percept". On the rejection of this distinction Husserl remarks: "However the action of presentation is defined, it is universally seen as a pivotal concept, not only for psychology, but also for epistemology and logic, and particularly for pure logic. A man who admits this and yet bases himself on the above rejection, has eo ipso involved himself in confusion. For this concept has no part to play in epistemology and pure logic." (Op. cit., p. 658). For like Kant's defending philosophy in the face of Hume's notion of causality, Husserl is very concerned to defend a metaphysical concept of intention.

With Brentano on the one hand and Husserl and Sartre on the other, we complete a kind of circle, given the respective Aristotelian and Platonic allegiances their theories display; even Husserl's philosophical language is Platonic in flavour: "The Eidos, the pure essence, can be exemplified intuitively in the data of experience, data of perception, memory, and so forth, but just as readily also in the mere data of fancy (Phantasie)." ("Ideas", Sec.I, Ch.1, p.77). In attempting to grasp this essence in its "primordial" form, Husserl says that we can start from intuitions which are empirical or non-empirical, viz., "of a merely imaginative order" (loc.cit.). In adhering to the ontological essence (eidos) he is relinquishing Brentano's view of consciousness in the "Psychology..." (2) but he also puts great importance on the phenomenological

(1) See "Ideas", Sec.II, Ch.2, Sec.43, p.135: "It is a fundamental error to suppose that perception ... fails to come into contact with the thing itself." Also p.137: perception "presents and apprehends a self in its bodily preserve ... it does this in accordance with the apprehended object's own meaning, and to suppose that it acts otherwise is just to run counter to its own sense."
(2) On the relationships between the theories of Husserl and Brentano, particularly on intentionality see M. Saraiva, "L'Imagination Selon Husserl", op. pp.27ff., 20, 38, etc.
function of the autonomous "fancy" (Phantasie), stating that the phenomenologist needs its help in his "research in the region of essence" (Op. cit., Sec. 3, Ch. IV, III, p. 309). So works of art, the "fruits of imagination" excel our own fancy in their clarity, abundance, and originality, and are therefore of great assistance to the phenomenologist in his 'research'. Exactly how Phantasie may so assist is not completely clear, but much depends on what Husserl calls "neutrality-modification" - "the process of fancy in general is the neutrality-modification of the 'positing' act of presentation." (Loc. cit.) This "neutrality-modification" closely resembles Coleridge's notion "suspension of disbelief" (1) as a mental act, and is much like the phenomenological epoche, or "bracketing" of the world; as Husserl says - presumably against Brentano - "in no respect does the mental consciousness play towards that of which it is aware the part of a 'belief'." (2). This neutrality-modification is also an antecedent of Sartre's concept of "nothingness" in the "Psychology of Imagination", and has a similar aesthetic function; Husserl regards aesthetic observations as the neutrality-modification of perception; in looking at a picture, he says, "we do not impart to it".

Sartre's theory of imagination is based on Husserl's phenomenology. He accepts what he calls Husserl's "radical distinction" between consciousness and that of which we are conscious, regarding the object of consciousness as transcendent (rather than "objectively immem" as Brentano maintained); for Sartre: "an image is a certain type of

(1) See "Biographia Literaria", Ch. XIII: "That willing suspension of disbelief for the moment, which constitutes poetic faith."
(2) See Sartre's "Imagination, A Psychological Critique", Ch. IX, p. 128 on epoche; also: "Phenomenology is a description of the structure of transcendent consciousness based on intuition of the essences of those structures." He asserts that phenomenology draws its knowledge of eternal truths from fiction.
consciousness. An image is an act, not some thing: An image is a consciousness of some thing.” ("Imagination, A Psychological Critique", p.146). But this form of consciousness is sui generis, forming no part of a larger consciousness as Brentano held, and has a negative manifestation which is somewhat reminiscent of Kant's apperception, of Berkeley's "spirit", of Kierkegaard's "self": "The characteristic of the intentional object of the imaginative consciousness is that the object is not present and is posited as such, or that it does not exist and is posited as not existing, or that it is not posited at all." ("Psychology of Imagination", p.13). The image, as Sartre says, "involves a certain nothingness", i.e., a positing of the world as "nothingness" in relation to images - as against the "psychological determinism of (e.g.) Hume - "From this it follows clearly that all creation of the imaginary would be completely impossible to a consciousness whose nature was precisely to be 'in-the-midst-of-the-world'." (Op.cit., Ch.V, p.213). We must be able to escape from the world says Sartre or we could not produce the real. He does not examine the moral implications of the imaginary in his two works on imagination; he regards the aesthetic as quite separate from the moral and his concern is with the former. So, in looking at a painted portrait, he says we posit the person portrayed as not-present but we feel towards the portrait just as we would towards the person, in an aesthetic act which, for Sartre, is magical: "...the relationship that consciousness posits in the imaginative attitude between the portrait and its original is nothing short of magical." (Op.cit., p.21). This mode of thought, he says, still persists among certain primitive tribes, in black magic, etc. This magical act, this incantation as he elsewhere calls it (p.141), produces the object in thought with a view to taking possession of it: just as the actor, playing a role, is 'possessed' by the character he plays; this is close to the true Aristotelian mimesis and, we may recall, to the Dionysian enthusiast, the Bacchante,
'filled with the god'.

But for Sartre this is not simply an emotive loss of self but is an act of negation; the art-work is an unreality, and external analogue of the image effected by a negation of the world. We posit the world as a "synthetic totality", we "take perspective", an act which demands a freedom, to 'go beyond', of which being in the world is a necessary condition. In imagination, as Sartre says, "the whole of consciousness realises its freedom." (p.216). This negation, like the "forgetfulness" of Plotinus, is a rejection of and an escape from the world into a freedom which in its ideal nature relinquishes moral and all other responsibilities and attachments - like the man in the dungeon of Addison's example. It is difficult to interpret this negation as anything other than a self-indulgent relaxation, an abandonment, mere phantasising, though such a judgment can only be made on the contents of thought which, unless externalised, are private. Being "in-the-midst-of-the-world" is a condition of the body and in positing the world as a nothingness the mind is emphatically dividing itself off from the body, acting autonomously, and very probably performing a function which is essential to the equilibrium of the individual. But, like Husserl, Sartre seems to be more concerned with the metaphysical aspect of the image, its essential or eidetic nature which, it seems to me, remains an unrealisable possibility (like the concept of freedom) which we may or may not regard as an existential target. In this sense the imagination relates to the ideal, which we may regard as just one of its functions - though perhaps its most perfect - and may, as Kierkegaard showed, be a guide to the morally good life; but for Sartre this relation to the ideal is autonomous (though not 'naively ontological' in an empirical, 'impression' sense of images) and amoral, and belongs to the aesthetic.
"Art education has been regarded as particularly concerned with fostering the growth of the imagination. In art the use of the imagination extends to acts of revealing or discovering what was already there, but not noticed; also of clarifying relationships between what had previously seemed disparate phenomena or materials."


Art education in England is quite rigidly divided into three quite separate parts, primary, secondary, and tertiary, the latter being largely vocational (as in teacher training and Colleges of Art). The activities subsumed under these three divisions are enormously varied, many defying description — as "art" or anything else — but however great this variety, these activities are frequently ascribed to "imagination"; this fact may be owed to the great breadth of this concept, to the universal approval with which it is received, and often to the useful obfuscation which it engenders. This latter is particularly evident in tertiary education where, in the 'Fine Arts' at least, the notion of genius reigns supreme. This notion, which as I have shown originates in the Platonic daemon, recurs in various forms throughout the history of our civilisation: in Christian mysticism, the authentic man of Plotinus, the magus and messiah of Renaissance magic, and finally the Romantic genius. What links these conceptions is a belief in a transcendent realm, the Platonic and Phenomenological eidos, the Neoplatonic One, the Christian heaven, the Kantian Ideas of Reason, to which a few special individuals have access by dint of inspiration or revelation. Because of the haphazard, unpredictable nature of this quality of genius it is frequently felt that art cannot be taught and consequently there is a conspicuous neglect of technical proficiency at this level of art education. In many cases this attitude also exists in secondary
education owing to the large number of art teachers who have been through the non-vocational art colleges and, perhaps owing to poor professional training, have not had cause to reflect on the appropriateness or otherwise of this attitude for the secondary school child. This 'art cannot be taught' idea is deeply ingrained in the thinking of many educators generally and is reflected in the status, capitation allowance, and general strength of art departments in comparison with others within the secondary school. There is no question that in examination orientated schools - Grammar schools for example - art is the least of subjects on the curriculum and the art teacher is obliged to accept those pupils who are judged unable to deal with the more 'academic' subjects. It is part of the logic of this syndrome that art is also regarded as a therapeutical subject which is of use to academic pupils as a kind of relaxation from more demanding tasks in school. This state of affairs is undoubtedly changing with advent of comprehensive schools, some with departments or faculties of design, or of creative or expressive arts, often very well-equipped and frequently with an art trained person at the hand. But such establishments are not many in number. Even so, their existence is testimony to a striking change in attitudes to art education in the secondary school, the part of art education which is said to be particularly concerned with fostering the growth of the imagination. But it seems to me that there is a conflict between revealing and discovering what is already "there" and "clarifying relationships between .... disparate phenomena".

The quotation at the head of the foregoing paragraph symptomises the change of direction in art education, a change which is no better; nor perhaps any worse, than the old genius-expression-therapy syndrome it replaces and which itself might equally well be said to be centrally concerned with imagination. The subjective view of imagination is giving way to the empirical view. The problem remains whether the
empirical view meets requirements of an educational kind more satisfactorily than did the old view, for it is certain that this latter was and is concerned with the child as artist rather than as educand, with products rather than with the process of education in art; such a concern may well suffice in tertiary education, but it is inadequate for secondary.

Turning to the second great tradition of the theory of imagination, (that which starts, and to some extent finishes, with Aristotle), we find that the Platonic notion of metempsychosis and of daemonic inspiration is made redundant by the view that the soul has no extraneous 'true' home to which to return since its home is the body. It is pointless, as Aristotle says, to speak of soul and body as separate. The difference between the Platonic and Aristotelian traditions is epitomised in the attitudes to dreaming which in the Middle Ages came to be regarded as a medium of divine revelation as we see in Dante, and the 'divine imagination' as Iamblichus called it; Aristotle regards the dream as an autonomous, mind-eclipsing thing: a negative function as M.G.H. Mure describes it - interestingly enough in view of Sartre's later theory of imagination. For Aristotle imagination is a kind of movement; and as Leibniz said, that which moves is continually created. As Brentano later repeated, there is for Aristotle no mental activity without a presentation (phantasma) and actual knowledge is identical with its object: the mind does come to understand itself through its own concepts, but these it finds (as itself) in the world and not in any 'eidetic' world renunciation. Aristotle's theory of the soul is vividly repeated in Spinoza's assertion that the mind and the body are one but may be considered under different attributes - of thought and extension respectively; this unity is expressed macrocosmically in the formula Deus sive Natura. It is on the unity and identity of ideas (in the broadest sense) that truth depends,
asserts Leibniz, and the best tests for the truth of 'phenomena' are agreement with the course of one's life and their predictive accuracy; because of this unity 'fancy', as Spinoza says, can create nothing and can tell us nothing for it is indistinguishable from the mind's decision. The actual identity of presentation, judgment, and affection which Brentano maintained in his "Psychology ..." - though he later changed his mind - is based on Aristotelian and Leibnizian philosophy of mind - is a rather more accurate account of human perception than Hobbes' or Locke's (on which Addison's theory of imagination was based). The "naive ontology" of images, as Sartre calls it, which is the basis of the empirical and associationist accounts of perception and cognition, of Kant's "reproductive imagination", and of Coleridge's "fancy", the 'aggregating power', is the fruit of an alliance of Platonic metaphysics and Aristotelian philosophy of mind. On this account the imagination is said to synthesise, in a creative act, the separate 'impressions' which it receives from sense, according to the mind's structural principles (Kant); or this synthesis is a rather passive reception of what customarily impresses itself on the senses (Hume). Either the mind tends to shape the world, or the world tends to shape the mind.

The idea of using the imagination to reveal or discover what is "already there" immediately prompts the question: where? And though the answer might be "in the world", "in the mind", or "in phenomena", the activities of discovery and clarifying relationships between disparate phenomena or materials do appear to correspond to the first of these answers. This invites an empirical notion of imagination and, as the D.E.S. quotation indicates, a pseudo-scientific, investigatory approach to art education with the emphasis on observation and recording; thus mind is shaped by the world. This objective interpretation does overlook the statement that imagination grows, but there seems to be a contradiction between the aggregational
mention of discovery and the biological one of growth. Many
good art departments in secondary schools unwittingly follow the
precepts of Alberti and Leonardo in basing their syllabuses on
observation of the natural world, teaching skills and techniques
better to facilitate the recording and observation of the visual
environment. This procedure is no less justifiable as use of
imagination than the notion of genius, though it is no doubt a
more acceptable secondary school activity.

Imagination also belongs to a tradition which sees its function
as affecting syntheses between what Kant calls the manifold of
sense and the categories of understanding, in the building and
employment of concepts. But it was perhaps inevitable that this
synthesis be regarded not as a hidden and mysterious mental process
but as an activity realised in experience. The idea that perception
is the actual locus of imagination, indeed that we live in imagination,
is already implicit in Aristotle, Spinoza, and Leibniz, and is
clearly stated by Kierkegaard. Even in Coleridge imagination is
recognised as having this existential function, but despite the
importance of Coleridge as a forerunner of art educational and
aesthetic theory this function of imagination has not been investigated
in these areas. Art is too often apart from life, but education can
never afford to be; these facts are often overlooked by the unre-
flecting art educator who is, unfortunately, in a majority. The
alleged superiority of art over life, its adherence to ideals, is
(again) no more defensible in terms of imagination than are the more
or less mundane tasks of daily life.

The point of these remarks, and much of the point of this
thesis, is that "imagination" is a vast and ancient concept which
has a place, or at least a counterpart, in the often conflicting
philosophies of mind and art which have been expressed in Western
Europe since the time of Plato. It is essential that any theory
which purports to be acted upon, and which turns on, the concept of imagination, clearly state which theory of imagination is intended. Unpredicated or unexplained, "imagination", used as it often is as a pivotal concept in art educational theory, can tell us nothing of the user's intentions except perhaps that they are based on a blind enthusiasm for art education. Lack of clarity about the aims and intentions of art in the secondary school has bedevilled art education for too long — the art department which produces a syllabus is a great rarity — consideration is not even given to the problem of the appropriateness of aims and intentions for art education.

What I have tried to offer in this thesis are the materials for the achievement of greater clarity in art educational theory wherever the concept of imagination is involved; or, at least, grounds for dispensing with the unexamined use of this concept.
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