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Postsecularity in twenty questions: a case study in Buddhist teens

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Introduction

Postsecularism is a scholarly position that observes, that despite steady decline in religious ties in the postwar period, there has been a manifest resurgence in conspicuousness of religion and religion-related issues throughout the affluent societies of Europe, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Habermas (2006) reflected that with postsecularity, the nature of religious behaviour and convictions had not changed particularly, but awareness of it has.

To move beyond the usually limited potential of the postsecularism concept merely to evoke reaction, Moberg and Grunholm (2012) recommended that if research data could be gathered, it would help postsecularity gain greater analytical value—bringing theorists closer to the subjects, politics, and movements involved in the reconfiguring of the religious and the secular. For postsecularity to become the subject of empirical sociological research, it needs to be operationalized. If postsecularity were a unidimensional phenomenon, one might conceive a reliable scale that could measure the extent of postsecularity and perhaps correlate it with other social forces. From what sociologists have written, however, it would appear that postsecularity is multi-faceted rather than unidimensional, meaning the best starting point for its
operationalization would be to describe the cluster of different dimensions included within the concept. Dimensions one would expect to find in a multidimensional hermeneutic of postsecularity (and this forms my tentative definition of postsecularity) might include diminished secularity and modernity, increased visibility of religious practice in the public sphere, and an increase in what de Groot (2008) calls ‘liquid religion’. Postsecularism’s near-neighbours of projection, religious revivalism and resistance identity, might feature in postsecularity to an extent that remains to be seen. It is these dimensions that underpin the 20 questions used as the empirical basis for this chapter.  

To offer some background context to this study, it should be mentioned that Buddhism is a minority religion in Britain for which Thanissaro (2014a) has previously invoked postsecularity to explain growth when secularization or melting-pot theories would lead us to expect decline. Buddhists have some special features with regard to postsecularity which should be indicated at the outset. Firstly, not all practising Buddhism self-identify as ‘Buddhist’. Secondly, Buddhism is one of the few world religions where followers do not believe in some form of God. Thirdly, for Buddhism, as with many of the other Dharmic religions, there is difficulty generally in distinguishing between public and private expressions of religion. Finally, for Buddhism in the West, it is important to distinguish between the styles of religious practice found in heritage Buddhists (those who have ethnic roots in the countries of Asia) and convert Buddhists (those who have converted to Buddhism independent of their family’s influence)—a dichotomy that will help shed light on boundary marking’s impact on certain aspects of liquid religion. Thanissaro’s (2014a) preliminary foray into the postsecular nature of Buddhist faith in Britain was limited by the qualitative nature (focus groups) of the research. For that study it was not possible to tell whether Buddhist opinions expressed were statistically significant, and since
research was restricted to heritage Buddhists, conclusions about Buddhism could have been confounded with ‘Asianness’. This chapter aims to unpack the question of the sort of religiosity for which postsecularity reflects a resurgence—to answer the question of whether as well as being is a quality of an age or a culture, postsecularity is also a feature of the participant people—and to explore the relationship between boundary marking and postsecularism. Furthermore, I aim to apply quantitative analysis to postsecularism and to compile a set of questions identifying postsecular attitudes—looking specifically at: (1) facets of modernism and secularity, (2) public and private spheres of religion, (3) liquid religion, (4) projection, and (5) boundary marking in a case study of teen Buddhists in Britain.

**Modernism and secularity**

The first telltale sign of postsecularity should be erosion of the values of secularity and modernity. I have combined modernity and secularity under the same heading because Taylor (2007) observed both are closely related in the way they cast doubt on non-scientific aspects of religious belief. Secularity tends to show the characteristics of pluralization and relaxation of the sacred, a breakdown of boundaries between the sacred and the profane (Connolly 2005), being seen in both political and social spheres (Turner 2010), not being merely a net reduction in religious belief and practice but a change in the very conditions of belief (Warner et al. 2010). These elements, taken together, herald a redefinition of what is considered a ‘neutral’ perspective to reduce the influence of religion and to emphasize secular humanism as the common creed even in a diverse society. The presence of Buddhism in the West might be considered a symptom of secularism by mainstream Christians. Modernism anywhere in the world represents the institutional or ‘solid’ manifestations of religion. Buddhist modernism throughout the world shares the discourse of rational and scientific
Buddhism that downplays devotional acts, merit-making, miracles and pre-scientific cosmologies. In Asia, Buddhist modernism picks up additional meaning in terms of Buddhists essentializing their own identity and institutionalizing themselves around temple life and spiritual leaders (McMahan 2008) and possibly agitating for Buddhism as a state religion. In the West, however, Buddhist modernism has taken on a slightly different set of features from those seen in Asia; it tends to include the expectation of proof based on scriptural research or individual experience, a sense of universalism and downplay of moral injunctions (Baumann 2001; Braun 2015).

In England, cross-sectional surveys conducted since 1974 at four-yearly intervals have charted the decline in adolescent religion in terms of attitude towards the tenets of (Christian) faith and church attendance (Kay and Francis 1996) that are indicative of secularism and modernism. In terms of choice of indicative questions, one of the first facets of postsecularity would be a diminishing of modernity and secularism as reflected by increased belief in the value of religion relative to science, increased religious self-labelling, increased perception of the relevance of religious teachings, and value of religious clergy. In this study, Buddhists were found to be significantly less likely than religiously undifferentiated adolescents (hereafter RUA) to believe that religion had been replaced by science. Furthermore, they were significantly more likely to identify themselves as religious. Buddhists were more likely to think clergy did a good job, and less likely to think the religious teachings had lost their relevance to contemporary life.

**Public and private religion**

A second telltale sign of postsecularity derives from religion appearing more in the public sphere rather than being hidden away in the private sphere as per modern times (Casanova 1994), as the result of postsecularity (Utriainen et al. 2012). A previous small-scale study of heritage
Buddhists in Britain found temples were attended on a weekly or more occasional basis to present meals to the monastic community, for festivals in the Buddhist calendar, or for the anniversaries of the passing of relatives (Thanissaro 2011). Temple attendance in previous research was cited as one of the hallmarks of being a ‘proper Buddhist’ and considered advantageous because teens could meet experts face-to-face to receive instruction in Buddhism (Thanissaro 2014a) in a conducive peaceful setting (Thanissaro 2014b). While at the temple, teens were more focussed on learning the Buddhist message as illustrated by the words of Vari, a 20-year-old Thai Buddhist: ‘There is more motivation … if you come to the temple; you have to listen’ (Thanissaro 2014b: 320). It should be borne in mind that having a local temple to visit in the UK is a fairly recent phenomenon and has only featured in UK Buddhist life since the 1990s (Thanissaro 2013).

Empirical measures of public religion are assessed in terms of the frequency of attendance at a place of worship. The presence of postsecularism would lead us to expect increased frequency of public aspects of religious participation. Temple attendance was found to be the most typical religious involvement for Buddhist teens. Religious participation in the public sphere in our Buddhist case study is represented by frequency of attendance at a temple or meditation centre—82% of Buddhists attended at least on a weekly basis which is much more than the 5%–6% of the general population who attend a place of worship weekly for the same age-group (Brierley, 2006). Religion in the public sphere thus seems to remain at a high level for Buddhists.

**Liquid religion**

A third set of indicators relate to ‘liquid religion’ which serves to discern ways in which non-religious life has been resacralized, revitalized, and re-enchanted by religious values (Utriainen et al. 2012). When discussing the shift from modernity to ‘liquid modernity’, specifically in
reference to religion, Bauman’s (2001) expectation was that religion would disappear along with other ‘solid’ establishments. Ironically, Kees de Groot was able to apply Bauman’s (2000) concept of liquid modernity to religion, identifying three places where liquid religion could be observed, namely: (1) in the religious sphere, (2) at the boundaries between the religious and the secular spheres, and (3) outside the religious sphere (de Groot 2008). To these three I have added ‘lived religion’ and will examine all four in turn, allocating indicative questions.

Thanissaro (2013) saw the postsecular aspect of ‘liquid religion’ as accounting for the seemingly porous interface between Asian cultural identity and the Western cultural mainstream, a compromise between pleasing parents and the Buddhist community, fitting in enough with non-Buddhist peers to avoid being ostracized while succeeding in education. Using these four aspects of liquid religion, our understanding of the relationship between Buddhism and liquid religion becomes more nuanced.

**Liquid religion in a religious context**

Liquid religion in a religious context can mean both empowerment of the temple congregation and the deregulation of religious ideas and symbols, allowing them to circulate in society in ways increasingly beyond the control of religious institutions, empowering believers within their community to feel they could do more to solve the problems of the world. In previous research, being part of a Buddhist temple community was cited as giving a sense of belonging also conducive to learning. In the words of Maya, a 15-year-old Sri Lankan Buddhist, there:

> is a nice community that we have in the temple. It is like something we can always depend on. It’s by coming to the temple, like with any religious place, you do kind of become a part of the community and it is your second family. It is your ‘family away from home’.
Indicative questions pointing to increased liquid phenomena in the religious milieu include disagreement with the statements ‘there is nothing I can do to help solve the world’s problems’ and ‘the temple community seems irrelevant to life today’. The present study found Buddhists were significantly less likely to feel powerless in the face of the world’s problems and also less likely to think the religious community was irrelevant to contemporary life.

**Liquid religion on the secular borderline**

Liquid religion may be manifested by religious-type experiences being sought on the borderline with secular activities. Given that modern cosmopolitan culture would expect people to emphasize their individuality and independence, it would be deemed a particular sacrifice to go against this trend and express attitudes where they make long-term commitments to something larger than themselves, whether it be ideals or communities, secular or otherwise. With this aspect of liquid religion, religiosity becomes orientated away from traditionally ‘solid’ religious values such as security, conformity, and tradition, and towards self-expression and individuality (Lassander 2012). De Groot (2008) gives the example of those who take part in festivals where a religion organizes but does not dominate the event, and where celebrities may be deployed as its public face. Postsecular participants might simply want to feel part of something larger than themselves without pressure to make a long-term commitment to shared values—their connection more aesthetic. For such manifestations of ‘instant community’, any appearance of a mass movement is illusory, since like a ‘flash mob’ demonstration, any allegiances apparent during the event rapidly fade the moment it ends. To this category Wickström and Illman (2012) add the example of treating the environment as sacred. Indicative questions for liquid religion on
the secular borderline included: ‘I am a spiritual person’, ‘I am influenced by celebrities’, the filial piety question ‘we should keep our aging parents with us at home’ and the environmental question ‘I am concerned about the risk of pollution to the environment’.

This study showed that disconnection from religious roots was not found in the UK sample, since Buddhists were less likely to estimate that they were influenced by celebrities and more likely to believe they should care for parents in old age. Buddhists, however, were found to be more likely to identify as a spiritual person—but this observation should be put in context by comparison with Buddhist self-identification as ‘religious’, since converts were significantly more likely to say they were spiritual rather than religious, and for heritage Buddhists it was the other way around. There was no evidence to suggest environmental concern was linked with being a Buddhist in a way corresponding to liquid religion on the secular borderline. The statistics fail to reflect the ‘instant community’ phenomenon being present in Buddhists—especially heritage Buddhists—and therefore the aspect of liquid religion on the secular borderline would seem to break down, at least for Buddhist self-identifiers—although this will be discussed as interference by boundary marking.

**Liquid religion outside the religious sphere**

The third facet identified by de Groot is where liquid religion is found completely outside the religious sphere. It may manifest as religion being treated as a consumer commodity (Frisk and Nynä 2012) fuelling a ‘smorgasbord’ approach to spirituality following free market principles (Carrette and King 2012). Included in this aspect are tensions and contradictions on the part of subjects where identity boundaries have become porous. Individuals in Western society consider themselves often erroneously as either secular or religious—however, all combinations of believing in and belonging to religion have latterly been observed, including the permutations in
between (Beaumont 2010). Authority may be plural and increasingly complex (Utriainen et al. 2012). The sort of questions asked need to be those that represent values conflicting with those of the respondent’s own religion. Postsecularity would be demonstrated by the simultaneous presence of seemingly conflicting sources of authority. Although for other religions, suitably conflicting attitudes would need to be chosen accordingly, for Buddhists, making use of the assumption of atheism, the question asked concerns belief in God. The presence of postsecularism would predict evidence of competing sources of authority coexisting. Buddhist adolescents were found, nonetheless, to be significantly less likely to say they believed in God.

**Lived religion**

A possible fourth facet of liquid religion not specifically mentioned by de Groot but included as a postsecular religious phenomenon by authors such as Utriainen et al. (2012) is that of ‘lived religion’. Lived religion entails well-being practices such as yoga, charismatic healing, and angel therapy engaged in and made use of and by individuals in their everyday lives. The indicative question chosen for lived religion was agreement that life had a sense of purpose. The presence of postsecularism would predict the religious to have more of a sense of purpose in life. It was found that Buddhists were significantly more likely to have lived religion in that they were more likely to say that they felt their life had a sense of purpose.

**Projection**

Projections are a phenomenon described by Berger (1967) where ‘apparitions’ are perceived by those who have been raised in a certain religious culture to anticipate and have a vocabulary to deal with certain aspects of the supernatural. Experiences reported in social science that would seem to conform to this category include Bauman’s (1997) reference to Maslow peak
experiences and Abby Day’s (2013) description of normally unreligious young people having
supernatural encounters with apparitions of recently deceased relatives. For those assuming the
contemporary age to have normalized towards Dawkins-style hyper-rationalism, to see angels
might suggest a throw-back to the beliefs of preliterate cultures. Many would expect such beliefs
to have been displaced by modernity in the way Pirsig (1974) argued that ‘ghosts’ had been
banished by ‘rational belief” in his novel Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance. Indicative
questions pertaining to projection and which would indicate the presence of postsecularism relate
to belief in angels and life after death because they push back against values supposed to have
been displaced by modernity. Buddhists were found less likely to believe in angels but were
more likely to believe in life after death.

**Boundary marking**

Differences in boundary marking may relate to what people do with their religion. Where at first
sight ‘revivalism’ or ‘resistance identity’ might seem to indicate reversion to modern or
premodern identity, it may indicate postsecularism if it occurs as a defence against secularization
or the melting pot of an ‘other’ mainstream identity. For the purpose of interpreting the features
of postsecularity, in this section data concentrate on the differences of attitudes between heritage
and convert Buddhists.

**Religious revivalism**

Religious revivalism means entrenching of identity in defensive reaction to a perceived ‘other’
and might be perceived as a resolidifying of religion towards ‘modern’ forms. Although
Habermas (2006) referred specifically to fundamentalism, Bauman only alluded to religious
revivalism in the face of secularism as ‘ghettoization’ (Bauman 2001). Indicative questions for
religious revivalism include considering yourself to be a ‘proper’ example of your own religion, considering your religion to be the only true religion, and having a sense of national pride. Heritage Buddhists were found to be more likely than convert Buddhists to say that they had a strong sense of national pride, to consider themselves a proper Buddhist, and to think Buddhism to be the only true religion. Heritage Buddhists are therefore more likely to use religious identity to mark boundaries against ‘the other’ than converts by entrenching themselves in the attitudes of religious revivalism.

**Resistance identity**

Unlike revivalism which resists ‘the other’, resistance identity counters individualism by emphasizing aspects of religion that bind the community together as a collective. In the context of this discussion of postsecularity, resistance identity works against mainstream secular forces (for example, as we shall see later in the chapter, ‘the Establishment’ for convert Buddhist teens or dissolution of the ‘in-group’ for heritage Buddhist teens) that seek to undermine collective identity. Resistance identity was exemplified in Thanissaro’s (2014a) description of Buddhist teen reaction against stereotyping and special effort to ensure that funerary practices would not die with their parents. It would also include efforts to counter relativism concerning religious truth claims. Resistance identity is implicit to the extent the religion serves to bring people together in a Deleuzian (Deleuze1993) sense of religion serving merely as an arbitrary set of shared values that cement a group of people together—thus putting community before themselves in a way I would argue could be a form of resistance identity that indicates another aspect of postsecularity. Following Singelis et al. (1995) to ascertain the degree of collectivism within a hierarchy (vertical collectivism), the following question was chosen: ‘I would do what pleases my family even if I detest that activity’; and to determine the degree of collectivism on
the basis of equality (horizontal collectivism), the following question was selected: ‘the well-being of my fellow students or workers is important to me’. The presence of postsecularism would predict a resurgence of positive attitudes towards submission to community values at the expense of individualism—so as resistance identity postsecularism may manifest as community values subduing the modernist tendency to individualism. Collectivism was found to be stronger for heritage than convert Buddhists on both the horizontal and vertical dimensions. Heritage Buddhists were significantly more likely than convert Buddhists to agree that they would do what pleased their family even if they detested the activity and to agree that the well-being of their fellow students or workers was important to them.

**Conclusion**

It would appear that the quantitative approach to postsecularism employed in this chapter has succeeded in bringing research closer to the subjects, politics, and movements involved in the reconfiguring of the religious and secular. Although philosophical, theological, theoretical, or normative approaches have some analytic power in their description of postsecularity, the more empiricist epistemology of the approach in this chapter provides an innovative potential for predictive power. It has revealed the weakness of omitting to use self-identifiers, and it is emancipatory to the extent it has revealed the diversity within the Buddhist category.

Assuming that Buddhist teens in Britain are a valid testing ground for the theory of postsecularity and given that postsecularism seems to be reflected generally in the way Buddhists experience resurgence in their religion, to help assess whether we have captured all the relevant facets of postsecularism in our questions, we have to see whether postsecularity’s sub-components follow the same general trend. Despite the multifaceted characteristics of
postsecularism, data from this study of British Buddhists would indicate that diminished modernism and secularity correspond with postsecularism. Increase in public expression of religion also conforms to postsecularism, but it is pertinent to add that for Buddhists there is a high frequency of involvement with private expressions of religion (meditation, prayer, chanting, bowing to parents, and scripture reading) alongside public expressions of religion—so it cannot be said that public expressions have replaced private expressions. Increased prevalence of liquid religion in the religious context, lived religion, and some aspects of projection also bear witness to these aspects being part of the postsecular. Results were less clear, however, in the case of liquid religion on the secular borderline. Buddhists were more likely to say they were spiritual, but contrary to expectations, less likely to show signs of instant community. Buddhists were also less likely to show the expected signs of liquid religion outside the religious context where mixing and matching of conflicting authorities would have been required. This disparity, at least in the case of Buddhists, would seem to correspond with efforts to mark boundaries through resistance identity and religious revivalism for Buddhists where certain aspects of modern religion are clung to or reinstated—not in reaction to secularity, but in response to individualism or competing expressions of religious faith. There are many challenges to this exercise in finding empirical indicators for postsecularism. For example, it is a sort of tautology to assume the religious in a postsecular age will show more signs of postsecularism than the secular, and then use their individual differences as the definition for postsecularity. Furthermore, the questions chosen to operationalize postsecularism in this study may not have been ideal since use was made of questions on a survey designed for more general purposes. Nonetheless, there is huge potential for applying this methodology to map postsecularity in different sectors of society. As these 20 questions are worded neutrally and
show statistical significance for content validity matching postsecularity, they are commended for wider use in postsecular research in non-Buddhist religions.

There are several aspects of religiosity that are measurable (Francis 2009)—religious affiliation, religious participation, religious attitudes and beliefs—and many other aspects of religion which are not so easy to quantify, whether it be doctrine, mythology, ethics, ritual, experience, institution, or material (Smart 1992). It would appear that of all these aspects of religion, it is attitudes that best reflect the religious resurgence described by postsecularity. The findings of this study with Buddhists correspond with Habermas’ observation that awareness is the aspect of religion that has changed with postsecularity. This study adds weight to Habermas’ argument for postsecularity having transformed awareness of religion, by showing that postsecularism can be considered a quality of the people as well as being a feature of the age or the culture, because it is reflected and measurable in participants’ attitudes.

Although postsecularism appears useful as more than just a sociological concept—as shown by the wide range of essays in this book—it needs to be distinguished from border marking, otherwise the instant community aspect will be obscured. De Groot’s three aspects of liquid religion appear to be borne out by empirical data (within the boundary marking caveat) but could usefully be strengthened by explicit inclusion of the category of ‘lived religion’. Bauman’s general notion of secularization may require revision since there is not always a clear opposition between the ‘modern’ and the postsecular. It may be that in describing liquid modernity in relation to religion, Bauman has assumed that religion must be either solid or liquid—either with an objective fixed structure or a socially constructed one.

It seems likely that religion has always been of a more hybrid nature than academics have acknowledged—but with new paradigms of social research, the liquid aspects have become more
apparent. However recent religious hybridity might be, we are still left with the puzzle of whether revivalism is reversion to modernist religion or whether it has somehow become further transformed in a way that would constitute a new postsecular form caused by the process of liquefaction and recongelation. To extend Bauman’s metaphor, there are two scenarios for materials that melt and recongeal—some resolidify in mixed form (e.g., neapolitan ice cream which forms an interesting pattern of marbled variegations) forming solid forms in new combinations—possibly illustrated by the pan-Asianism phenomenon seen in the USA; whereas some resolidify by separating out more completely than previous to melting (e.g., butter). The case for Buddhists would seem to follow the butter metaphor—since as a result of the porous boundaries between Western and eastern cultures, Buddhists have artificially shored up their boundaries in a way more complete than is seen in more religiously homogenous cultures. This study reaffirms Thanissaro’s (2014a) findings with the heritage Buddhist community that postsecularism is displayed in the characteristics of religious resurgence for British Buddhists. This chapter has shown additionally that postsecularity can be observed in the convert Buddhist community. The Buddhist community seems to display nearly all the facets of postsecularity, whether it be rejection of modernism and secularity, liquid religion in the religious context, lived religion or projection. Aspects of liquid religion on the borderline of the secular or in non-religious contexts are interfered with by Buddhist boundary marking. Since the heritage and convert Buddhists are using religion to mark boundaries in different ways, the aspect particularly of ‘mixing and matching’ of religious authority and ‘instant community’ are obscured. Heritage Buddhists are aligning themselves relative to pressure to maintain and perpetuate the identity of their in-group. By contrast, convert Buddhists seem to be aligning themselves relative to
rejection of establishment values and social status while advocating alternative spirituality (Thanissaro 2016).

Convert Buddhists have thus demonstrated cultural agency by reinterpreting and mobilizing an array of resources in a way that would not have been possible in the modern era. These differences may be due to alternative ways of interpreting the term ‘modernity’ depending on the boundaries/identities being promoted or defended—which for Buddhists would differ in Asian and Western contexts (McMahan 2008) — although, it could be argued that self-identification as belonging to a religion is, in itself, a vestige of religious modernism.

Many of the characteristics of postsecularism are useful for explaining the tenacity with which Buddhist identity features, very different to the values of a mainstream culture, are being passed down to a second generation of young Buddhists. The melting pot theory of acculturation would predict this minority religion would gradually lose its identity to that of a majority secular mainstream. But this prediction fails to correspond with the observed reality of Buddhist teens living in Britain receiving nurture into their family’s tradition. Postsecularism allows for the way modern forms of religion may recombine with postsecular forms. Nonetheless, postsecularism-like examples of ‘Buddhist’ mixing and matching of spirituality such as the mindfulness movement or juxtaposition of mindfulness with contemporary art, literature, and Judaism (Mitchell and Quli 2015), are often applicable only to those who have an aesthetic interest in Buddhism rather than an affiliation to Buddhism. It should be pointed out that failure to define the level of self-identification with Buddhism in research participants weakens any conclusions to be drawn in research about postsecularity. I have dealt with postsecularity in Buddhist self-identifiers, but different conclusions might be reached if the same research questions had been fielded in the quasi-community of Buddhist sympathizers.
Notes

1 The author would like to thank Revd. Canon, Prof. Leslie J. Francis (University of Warwick), and Prof. Mandy Robbins (Glyndŵr University) for supervision of this research, and to St. Mary’s RE Centre for hosting the online version of the survey used in this study. Special tribute is also extended in the year of writing (2017) to three social commentators cited in this chapter—Zygmunt Bauman, Robert M. Pirsig, and Peter L. Berger—who passed away on 9 January, 24 April, and 27 June respectively.

2 But not the USA—with the possible exception of ‘white guilt’ which shows aspects of boundary marking (Steele 2006).

3 The case study on postsecularity described in this chapter is based on data derived from a quantitative survey including the 20 questions described and general demographic questions fielded in the period 2013–2014 as a paper and online survey to self-identifying Buddhists aged between 13 and 20 and resident in Britain, as part of a University of Warwick-funded doctoral research project. Where comparisons are made with non-Buddhists, Buddhist adolescent data case has been compared for significant differences against a dataset of answers to identical questions published by Francis (2001).

4 A summary of the 20 questions and the statistical analysis behind the conclusions can be found at doi: 10.13140/RG.2.2.11696.46085.

Further reading


Postsecularity has not caught up with Buddhism in the academic literature. Closest to the topic under examination has been limited discussion of Buddhism and postmodernity. Although running counter to Asian Buddhist views, this chapter argues that postmodernity and Buddhism (in the West) have much in common because of Buddhism’s inherent fluidity.


A recent example of mixing and matching of religion, sexuality, and other aspects of identity in young British convert Buddhists—which the authors specifically identify as lived religion.

The third section of this book approaches the argument that both Buddhism and postmodern philosophy are perceived to have a shared problem in ethics—the non-identity of identity, interconnectedness of opposites, and the lack of a transcendental foundation of an entity—comparing Nagarjuna amongst others with Kristeva, Lyotard, and Derrida.

**References**


