Dhillon, Amrita and Perroni, Carlo (2001) Tax earmarking and grass-roots accountability. Economics Letters, Vol.72 (No.1). pp. 99-106. ISSN 0165-1765

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Abstract

We ask whether tax earmarking can foster accountability in public provision of goods and services when consumers can privately monitor provision. We show that earmarking
can raise the stakes that consumers have in monitoring public provision independently of how taxes are earmarked, because it introduces a more direct linkage between monitoring and taxes paid.

Item Type:	Journal Item
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Taxation, Accountability
Journal or Publication Title:	Economics Letters
Publisher:	Elsevier
ISSN:	0165-1765
Official Date:	July 2001
Volume:	Vol.72
Number:	No.1
Page Range:	pp. 99-106
Identification Number:	10.1016/S0165-1765(01)00412-8
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Access rights to Published version:	Open Access
Related URLs:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1765%280...
References:	Buchanan, J.M. (1963). The Economics of earmarked taxation. Journal of Political Economy, 71, pp.457-469. Davis, M.L., and Hayes, K. (1993). The Demand for good government. Review of Economics and Statistics, 75, pp.148-152. Laffont, J.J., and Tirole, J. (1994). A Theory of incentives in procurement and regulation. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/11

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