Tax earmarking and grass-roots accountability
Dhillon, Amrita and Perroni, Carlo (2001) Tax earmarking and grass-roots accountability. Economics Letters, Vol.72 (No.1). pp. 99-106. ISSN 0165-1765
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Official URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V84...
We ask whether tax earmarking can foster accountability in public provision of goods and services when consumers can privately monitor provision. We show that earmarking can raise the stakes that consumers have in monitoring public provision independently of how taxes are earmarked, because it introduces a more direct linkage between monitoring and taxes paid.
|Item Type:||Journal Item|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions|
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics|
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||Taxation, Accountability|
|Journal or Publication Title:||Economics Letters|
|Page Range:||pp. 99-106|
|Access rights to Published version:||Open Access|
|References:||Buchanan, J.M. (1963). The Economics of earmarked taxation. Journal of Political Economy, 71, pp.457-469. Davis, M.L., and Hayes, K. (1993). The Demand for good government. Review of Economics and Statistics, 75, pp.148-152. Laffont, J.J., and Tirole, J. (1994). A Theory of incentives in procurement and regulation. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.|
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