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Political competition, tax salience and accountability : theory and evidence from Italy

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Bracco, Emanuele, Porcelli, Francesco and Redoano, Michela (2019) Political competition, tax salience and accountability : theory and evidence from Italy. European Journal of Political Economy, 58 . pp. 138-163. doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2018.11.001

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Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2018.11.001

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Abstract

This paper argues that electoral competition may hinder rather than foster political accountability, especially when elected officers can choose among a number of tax instruments. We develop a political agency model showing that politicians in more competitive jurisdictions use less salient tax instruments more intensely. Defining salience as visibility or, analogously, as voters' awareness of the costs associated with specific government revenue sources, we argue that voters are less likely to hold politicians to account for the associated tax burden of a less salient instrument. This in turn implies that strategic politicians will more heavily rely on less salient revenue sources when electoral competition is stronger. Using data on Italian municipal elections and taxes over a 10-year period, we determine the degree of salience of various tax instruments, including property taxes (high salience) and government fees for official documents (low salience). We then show that mayors facing stronger competition for re-election use less salient tax instruments more intensely.

Item Type: Journal Article
Subjects: J Political Science > JN Political institutions (Europe)
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Elections -- Economic aspects -- Mathematical models -- Italy, Politicians -- Economic aspects -- Mathematical models -- Italy
Journal or Publication Title: European Journal of Political Economy
Publisher: Elsevier BV
ISSN: 0176-2680
Official Date: June 2019
Dates:
DateEvent
June 2019Published
19 November 2018Available
12 November 2018Accepted
Volume: 58
Page Range: pp. 138-163
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2018.11.001
Status: Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Published
Access rights to Published version: Restricted or Subscription Access
RIOXX Funder/Project Grant:
Project/Grant IDRIOXX Funder NameFunder ID
UNSPECIFIEDUniversity of Warwickhttp://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100000741

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