The Library
Political competition, tax salience and accountability : theory and evidence from Italy
Tools
Tools
Tools
Bracco, Emanuele, Porcelli, Francesco and Redoano, Michela (2019) Political competition, tax salience and accountability : theory and evidence from Italy. European Journal of Political Economy, 58 . pp. 138-163. doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2018.11.001
![[img]](http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/style/images/fileicons/application_pdf.png) |
PDF
WRAP-political-competition-tax-salience-accountability-theory-evidence-Italy-Redoano-2018.pdf - Accepted Version Embargoed item. Restricted access to Repository staff only until 19 November 2020. Contact author directly, specifying your specific needs. - Requires a PDF viewer. Download (1470Kb) |
Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2018.11.001
Abstract
This paper argues that electoral competition may hinder rather than foster political accountability, especially when elected officers can choose among a number of tax instruments. We develop a political agency model showing that politicians in more competitive jurisdictions use less salient tax instruments more intensely. Defining salience as visibility or, analogously, as voters' awareness of the costs associated with specific government revenue sources, we argue that voters are less likely to hold politicians to account for the associated tax burden of a less salient instrument. This in turn implies that strategic politicians will more heavily rely on less salient revenue sources when electoral competition is stronger. Using data on Italian municipal elections and taxes over a 10-year period, we determine the degree of salience of various tax instruments, including property taxes (high salience) and government fees for official documents (low salience). We then show that mayors facing stronger competition for re-election use less salient tax instruments more intensely.
| Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Subjects: | J Political Science > JN Political institutions (Europe) | ||||||||
| Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics | ||||||||
| Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): | Elections -- Economic aspects -- Mathematical models -- Italy, Politicians -- Economic aspects -- Mathematical models -- Italy | ||||||||
| Journal or Publication Title: | European Journal of Political Economy | ||||||||
| Publisher: | Elsevier BV | ||||||||
| ISSN: | 0176-2680 | ||||||||
| Official Date: | June 2019 | ||||||||
| Dates: |
|
||||||||
| Date of first compliant deposit: | 20 November 2018 | ||||||||
| Volume: | 58 | ||||||||
| Page Range: | pp. 138-163 | ||||||||
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2018.11.001 | ||||||||
| Status: | Peer Reviewed | ||||||||
| Publication Status: | Published | ||||||||
| Access rights to Published version: | Restricted or Subscription Access | ||||||||
| RIOXX Funder/Project Grant: |
|
Request changes or add full text files to a record
Repository staff actions (login required)
 |
View Item |
