Madness and the Regulation of the Self in Bourbon Mexico

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# Contents

**Acknowledgements** .................................................................................................................................................. iii

**Abbreviations** .......................................................................................................................................................... v

**Images** ................................................................................................................................................................. vi

**Abstract** ............................................................................................................................................................... vii

**Introduction** .......................................................................................................................................................... 1

  Chapter Overview .................................................................................................................................................. 18

**Chapter One: Towards a New Historiography of Madness** .................................................................................. 25

  Section One: Parallel Historiographies of Madness ............................................................................................. 25

  Section Two: Mapping Out New Questions and Answers ................................................................................... 38

  Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................................... 57

**Chapter Two: Sin, Reason, and Selfhood** ............................................................................................................. 60

  Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................ 60

  Section One: The Relationship Between Sin and Madness ................................................................................ 62

  Section Two: Madness as a Justification for Regulating the Self ....................................................................... 72

  Section Three: Madness, Self-Regulation, and Wider Bourbon Governance ..................................................... 78

  Section Four: Individual Capacity for Reason ..................................................................................................... 85

  Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................................... 90

**Chapter Three: Madness and Medical Regulation of the Self** .......................................................................... 93

  Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................ 93

  Section One: Regulating the Humors and the Soul ............................................................................................ 95

  Section Two: The Expansion of Medical Regulatory Frameworks ................................................................ 102

  Section Three: Hysteria as a New Category for Regulating Against Sin and Madness .................................... 109

  Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................................... 118

**Chapter Four: Sensory Experience and Embodying Madness** ........................................................................... 122

  Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................ 122
Section One: Religious Ideals and Realities ................................................................. 125
Section Two: Speech, Sound, and Noise ......................................................................... 128
Section Three: Excessive Weeping, Gesture, and Touch .................................................. 136
Section Four: Sexuality and the Body ............................................................................... 145
Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 151

Chapter Five: Gender, Caste, Madness, and Selfhood ....................................................... 154
Introduction .................................................................................................................. 154
Section One: Antonio de la Cruz Chabindeño ................................................................. 157
Section Two: Mauricia Josefa de Apelo .......................................................................... 167
Section Three: Felipe Zarate .......................................................................................... 182
Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 193

Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 196
Theme One: The Relationship Between Sin and Madness .............................................. 197
Theme Two: The Role of Sin in Medical Understandings of Madness ............................ 198
Theme Three: Self-regulation and the Body .................................................................... 199
Theme Four: Intersections of Madness, Sin, Calidad, and Gender ................................. 201

Appendix ....................................................................................................................... 203
Section One: The Workings of the Inquisition ............................................................... 203
Section Two: Inquisition Case Proceedings .................................................................. 206

Bibliography .................................................................................................................. 208
Manuscript sources ........................................................................................................ 208
Newspapers and Periodicals ......................................................................................... 210
Contemporary Books, Sermons, and Plays .................................................................. 210
Published Secondary Sources ......................................................................................... 212
Online Sources ............................................................................................................... 230
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Declaration
This thesis is my own work and has not been submitted for a degree at another university.
Abbreviations

AGN  Archivo General de la Nación, Mexico City.
Images

Chapter Two

Image 1: One of Sevane’s letters.

AGN, Instituciones Coloniales, Clero Regular y Secular, Vol. 139, Expediente 20, f.111.
Abstract

‘They say very clearly that I am mad, but they are the ones that do mad things’.¹

So wrote Franciscan Friar Manuel Sevane in 1796, in one of many letters to the Viceroy of New Spain. Sevane’s letters catalogue his protest against the treatment he received at the hands of his fellow friars at the Apostolic College of Pachuca in New Spain and contest their plans to return him to Spain. Sevane’s case is an example of the rich archival material that demonstrates how the term madness was used in Bourbon Mexico (1713-1808). His words exemplify how people used madness to mark out individuals, behaviours, and ideas they thought immoral. For the friars living with Sevane, his violence, peculiar noises, and disrespect for religious practices were evidence of his madness. Sevane himself used the same rhetoric to criticise the friars for shunning him, writing reports on him, and ultimately trying to remove him from their community. Historians have yet to fully examine the complex cultural significance of the term and its role in daily life in Bourbon Mexico.

This thesis provides a new interpretation of madness. It takes as its starting point Michel Foucault’s concept of ‘technologies of the self’ in order to build upon the growing history of selfhood in Mexico. By exploring the role of madness in constructing selfhood, I explain how elites used the term’s interconnections with sin to delineate the boundaries between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour. The first chapter maps out an innovative historiographical framework for examining madness, introducing a range of categories of historical analysis that have not yet been used in this context. Chapter Two foregrounds a major claim of the thesis, that elite thinkers considered human sin to put all individuals at risk of falling into madness. It explores the relationship between the concepts of sin and madness that underpinned elite uses of madness as a rhetorical tool in a selection of sermons, political tracts, philosophical texts, and poems. Chapter Three analyses underexplored medical texts and shows that madness was understood to be humoral throughout the period. It also argues that madness did not become a secular concept in the eighteenth century; rather, medical texts conceived of madness as a tool for moral regulation. The fourth chapter examines the ways people used their bodies and how others used their sensory perceptions to label individuals as mad. Drawing on histories of the senses and emotions, the chapter analyses exceptionally detailed cases of clerical madness from missionary and Inquisition records. Chapter Five examines how the categories of gender and calidad, a socio-racial term denoting quality or status, interacted with the concept of

¹ AGN, Instituciones Coloniales, Clero Regular y Secular, Vol. 139, Expediente 20, f.142, ‘Dicen que estoy loco dicen muy bien, pero las locuras las hacen ellos’.
madness in Inquisition cases. I conclude that an analysis of madness enables us to deepen our understanding of what it was to be human in Bourbon Mexico.
Introduction

In 1787 Guardian José de Castro, of the apostolic college of Pachuca, wrote a letter to the viceroy of New Spain requesting that Friar Manuel Sevane be sent back to Spain because he suffered ‘all the signs of true dementia or madness’. Such interventions were occasionally taken when members of a monastic community believed a friar from Spain had gone mad on missionary work. Sevane’s case was unusual because the letter from the guardian initiated a ten-year period of correspondence regarding Sevane’s behaviour, mental faculties, loss of reason, and moral character. Over this decade Castro and others described how Sevane failed to attend mass and confession, refused to undertake work in the community, broke the monastery’s imposed nighttime silence by singing and playing an instrument, and physically attacked the other friars. Sevane’s failure to meet the expectations of his community regarding his thoughts, feelings, gestures, and noises constituted a breakdown in the self-regulation required of a sane and moral Spanish missionary. Failure to self-manage could be understood in a number of ways, but madness was central to Castro’s argument that Sevane had to be returned to Spain. In Sevane’s case, as in the other records analysed in this thesis, madness was a crucial term for referencing a failure to regulate the self.

This thesis studies the meaning of madness in Bourbon Mexico (1713-1808), using archival materials drawn primarily from Inquisition cases and missionary records, together with medical, theological, and other printed sources. It shows how the concept of madness was used to sanction behaviour in concrete, everyday life scenarios, with a focus on predominantly elite subjects. The approach taken allows for an exploration of myriad aspects of self-management in Bourbon Mexico. Overall, the thesis demonstrates that there was a great emphasis on regulating oneself as a virtuous, moderate, and productive individual. The concept of madness played a central role in the internalisation of these values.

The remainder of this introduction provides a framework for understanding the thesis as a whole. It outlines central aspects of the historiography of Bourbon Mexico and briefly discusses the historiography of selfhood and madness respectively. It also explains the theoretical underpinnings of the thesis and how my research builds on the existing literature. The body of sources and my methodological approach is discussed. The chapter concludes by providing an outline of the thesis.

1 AGN, Instituciones Coloniales, Clero Regular y Secular, Colegios, Caja 6166, Expediente 50, f.2 ‘todas las señales de verdadera demencia, o Locura’.
The established history of the Bourbon reforms forms a basis for the thesis. In Bourbon Mexico, but most comprehensively during the Caroline period (1759-1808), the Spanish state enacted wide-ranging legislation designed to rationalise control over production, trade, and taxation, and to better exploit the colonies for profit to fund military operations. The Caroline period refers to the latter part of the Bourbon rule under the reigns of Charles III and IV. Reforms had been fragmentary under the previous rulers Philip V and Ferdinand VI; under Charles III and IV a comprehensive vision was developed and instigated throughout the Spanish Empire. A major economic hallmark of the reforms was the introduction of free trade in 1789. The reforms were not all directly economic, although they aimed to make the colonies more economically efficient by shaping the behaviour of their subjects. Enlightenment ideas were a major influence on the Bourbon reforms. The Enlightenment was characterised by a pursuit for knowledge of human nature, observable truth, and a desire to regulate public and private life to create useful subjects based on ideals of rationality and efficiency. Historian José Enrique Covarrubias provides evidence that in this environment people were categorised based on their utility. The perceived disorder, superstition, vice, and dirtiness of the lower classes was the antithesis of enlightened ideals and thus required regulation. The ‘enlightened’ elite developed an ideal of a contained, self-managed individual who made productive contributions to colonial society. A desire for observation, categorisation, and order led to the rich documentation of life in Bourbon Mexico, especially during the latter half of the eighteenth century. Historians have established that these Enlightenment ideals of shaping healthy, productive, and compliant subjects were integral to Bourbon reform projects.

Legislation was wide ranging, from establishing formal police forces, to setting up institutions to order the lives of the poor, such as the poor house and state factory, to

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4 There is scholarly consensus that Bourbon Mexico participated in a global Enlightenment in the eighteenth century. For discussions of Spain and her colonies’ place in the Enlightenment, see: Juan Pedro Viqueira Albán, Propriety and Permissiveness in Bourbon Mexico (Wilmington, 1999); Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra, How to Write the History of the New World: Histories, Epistemologies, and Identities in the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic World (Stanford, 2008); Londa L. Schiebinger and Claudia Swan (eds), Colonial Botany: Science, Commerce, and Politics in the Early Modern World (Bristol, 2007).
5 José Enrique Covarrubias, En Busca del Hombre Útil: un Estudio Comparativo del Utilitarismo Neomercantilista en México y Europa, 1748-1833 (Mexico, 2005).
7 Silvia Marina Arrom, Containing the Poor: The Mexico City Poor House, 1774-1871 (Durham, 2000); Viqueira Albán, Propriety and Permissiveness in Bourbon Mexico; Gabriel Paquette, Enlightenment, Governance and Reform in Spain and its Empire 1759-1808 (New York, 2008); Glasco, Constructing Mexico City.
developing water systems and street lighting. State authorities reformed and expanded the police force in 1782, alongside instituting changes to the structure of criminal courts. In 1790, the police force expanded again with orders to arrest criminals, round up beggars, and monitor the habits of the populace. The state had passed legislation that made begging a criminal offence for the first time in 1774, and subsequent measures to confine beggars and vagrants were taken throughout the 1780s and 1790s. Authorities worked to control the consumption of *pulque*, an indigenous alcoholic drink from central Mexico made from the fermented sap of agave plants, which was associated with unruliness among the lower orders. The government increased taxation of *pulque* and introduced direct state control of *pulque* taxation as part of its broader package of reforms. These measures were part of a wholesale attempt by the authorities to take control of public space. Punitive measures were combined with new forms of support for the poor. A new foundling hospital was established in 1767, and a new Poor House in 1774. The Royal Cigar Factory was founded in Mexico City in 1769, which created work for thousands of poor men and women and was intended to replace traditional charitable giving. These developments demonstrated Bourbon interest in shaping an efficient workforce rather than distributing alms. All of these measures were part of the project to increase state revenue, augment regal authority at the expense of the church, and shape the expanding population into useful subjects in the interest of the crown’s finances and foreign policy. These manifold reforms constituted the practical stages of a vision to regulate the populace for the greater good of the state within a Christian framework that emphasised internalised religiosity.

Within the Hispanic world, Enlightenment principles were developed and adapted to both align with existing Catholic doctrine and also to reform Catholic piety. Early modern Catholicism adhered to a fundamentally pessimistic view of human nature based on St Augustine’s idea that man was a guilty sinner. Augustine based his philosophy on the premise that people are sinful by nature. He wrote in the *Confessions* that humanity ‘bears everywhere the evidence of its own sin’ and considered that humans neglected their moral

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8 Arrom, *Containing the Poor*, p.15; Teresa Lozano Armendares, *La Criminalidad en la Ciudad de Mexico, 1800-21* (Mexico, 2010), p.20.
9 Arrom, *Containing the Poor*, p.19.
selves in favour of earthly things. Given this state of sin, Augustine believed that grace was fundamental to human salvation: humans could not be saved without love of God, which came from their God-given inner light. Mexican enlightened Catholics, through the religious movement historians now label reform piety, accepted this fundamentally pessimistic view of human nature as inherently sinful. The central principle of reform piety was to emphasise St Augustine’s insistence on the necessity of grace for salvation. If God illuminated people from within, any external show of religiosity was superfluous and even superstitious and irreligious. Discussion of the constructions of human nature and selfhood in Bourbon Mexico, including considering madness as a technology of the self, must be understood within this framework of Catholic sin.

Reform piety originated in the 1760s. The upper clergy and learned lay figures who initially promoted reform piety championed an ascetic, individualistic religiosity that emphasised the importance of a personal internalised relationship with God over worshiping material things and places, such as relics and holy sites. Mexican reform piety was part of a broader process of religious reform in the Catholic world at this time. It was premised upon the belief that the Council of Trent (1545-63) had not done enough to reform Catholicism throughout the Catholic world. Its proponents sought to cultivate a stricter form of self-discipline based on God’s presence in the heart of every individual. The reformers emphasised the importance of the internal regulation of one’s thoughts and feelings and the cultivation of a personal relationship with God. Reform piety was a reaction against baroque Catholicism in which extravagant, externalised displays of religiosity were emphasised through both communal forms of worship and the use of elaborate artistic and sacred objects. Eighteenth-century reformers viewed these displays as irreligious and superstitious practices that detracted from true religious sentiment. Enlightened Catholics debated issues similar to those of the Protestant reformation; they expressed concern with what human nature was and how to achieve salvation. Historians such as Pamela Voekel show that

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15 Voekel, Alone Before God, pp.4-15.
reform piety constituted a rethinking of Catholic religiosity in eighteenth-century Mexico, but not a secularisation. 17

Voekel’s Alone Before God is the first book-length study of the self in Bourbon and Independence-era Mexico, and in the Spanish Americas more widely. She argues that clerical emphasis on austere, individual piety in the 1760s combined with bureaucratic attempts to modernise, such as attacking monopolies with free trade agreements and encroaching on church authority, led to the interiorisation of ideas of the self. 18 Her concept of interiorisation refers to interaction between an individual, others they have contact with, and their society’s expectations, whereby the individual internalised the values of their society thus producing the self. Voekel charts the rise of a pious and religiously informed self among elite society in Mexico City and the important port city of Veracruz. As Voekel acknowledges, these two cities were unusual in New Spain. Half of the population of Mexico City, the largest city in the Spanish empire, was Hispanic and many people were of mixed Hispanic and indigenous descent, whereas the colony as a whole was predominantly rural and indigenous. Mexico City boasted a university, an academy of arts, a botanical garden, a cathedral, and a royal palace, as well as twelve hospitals, and numerous convents and monasteries. As a port city, Veracruz housed many people from outside the city and the Hispanic population was usually from Spain, rather than Mexico. Notably, Veracruz had a large black population native to the area. 19 Voekel examines selfhood in these two cities with an awareness that ideas about individual piety were unlikely to have developed along a similar trajectory elsewhere. Voekel’s focus is elite Spaniards, and their thinking may not have influenced the indigenous population at all. 20 In Voekel’s words, these enlightened Mexicans, ‘advocated an individual spirituality, which helped to splinter the society of orders and estates into one of individuals’. 21 This attack on communal religiosity affected corporate privileges because each person’s relationship to the crown had been mediated through corporate groups such as confraternities. Changes to communal religiosity affected daily lives and working patterns as well as spirituality. During this same period, Bourbon bureaucrats had been extending the

17 Voekel, Alone Before God, p.9.
18 Ibid., pp.3-12. There is a fuller discussion of the historiography of selfhood in Mexico in chapter 1.
19 Ibid., p.12. More information on the ethnic breakdown of the population of New Spain, and its significance, is given in Chapter One.
20 Ibid., p.13. Voekel acknowledges that there is no evidence that reform piety only appealed in Mexico City and Veracruz. Rural areas did, however, reject new burial practices. See William Taylor’s work on rural Guadalajara and Mexico City. Taylor uncovered an Indian population with no signs of this individual faith in their religious practice: William B. Taylor, Magistrates of the Sacred: Priests and Parishioners in Eighteenth-Century Mexico (Stanford, 1996), pp.48-51.
state’s jurisdiction at the expense of the church, dismantling the corporate hierarchical society ruled by a divine monarch. These processes enabled the crown to enforce more direct regulation over the individual. Moreover, economic growth and Enlightenment thinking in the late eighteenth century fostered a belief that economic concerns were a legitimate human interest. Religiosity did not disappear but was refashioned to aid the development of the economically useful subject.

Voekel studies these themes through analysis of documentation reforming funeral and burial practices, and the debates regarding these reforms in Mexico City and Veracruz. She conducts statistical analysis of 2,100 wills and supplements this with analysis of sermons, tracts, official government correspondence, petitions from the laity to religious and secular authorities, parish burial records, newspapers, legal codes, confraternity records, and evidence from medical institutions. The elite men who wrote about burial reform called themselves the sensatos or ‘enlightened ones’ because they engaged with intellectual debates circulating in the Americas and Europe concerned with economic and scientific progress. They were bureaucrats, lawyers, doctors, and merchants. These men rejected communal and corporate displays of piety associated with Baroque Catholic superstition. Instead they favoured an internalised piousness that centred on self-discipline, moderation, and a personal relationship with God that did not require mediation through confessors or saints. They branded Baroque piety, which had been central to the justification of Hispanic social hierarchy, as morally bankrupt.

The process of interiorisation of the self, as shown by Voekel to underline these religious, political, and economic changes, underpins the arguments of this thesis. As the first study of the eighteenth and nineteenth century Catholic Reformation in Latin America, Voekel’s work is particularly useful because she describes how changing attitudes towards piety affected the understanding of selfhood among Mexican elites. She connects this new conception of piety and the self to new justifications and techniques of rule that were not based on Old Regime social hierarchies. These new techniques were based on observing and coercing the population rather than on overtly displaying power. I build on Voekel’s work by using madness as a window into the interiorisation of the elite self.

In this thesis, I reinterpret madness in Bourbon Mexico as a tool for managing and shaping the self based on elite perceptions of madness and techniques of self-management. The thesis explores who elite subjects considered to be mad, in what circumstances they

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22 Ibid., pp.4-5.
23 Ibid., p.11.
labelled individuals as mad, and how predominantly elite historical actors were supposed to regulate themselves against madness. A mad person was ‘One who has lost their reason’ and madness was similarly understood as the ‘alienation of reason’. Mad was an imprecise term, described in opposition to the equally diffuse concept of reason. Reason was a capacity to distinguish between right and wrong, to possess good sense. Behaviour that did not appear to be rational and moral could be labelled as mad because rationality and virtue were related to each other in the soul and juxtaposed against the concepts of unreason, madness, and sin. In theoretical texts and in lived experience madness largely functioned as a way of demarcating which thoughts, feelings, and behaviours were acceptable. Priests, doctors, lawyers, and judges in civil, judicial, and clerical contexts thus used the term to shape the useful, ordered, and obedient subjects they wanted to work for the state, church, and private enterprise.

The thesis builds on previous accounts of madness in Mexico and elsewhere. In response to Michel Foucault’s *Madness and Civilization*, historians have examined the institutional and social histories of madness by analysing the records of asylums, other institutions, and personal documents. Foucault argued that from the mid-seventeenth century to the end of the eighteenth century there was a ‘great confinement’ of the mad, in which those believed to be mad were locked away and silenced in punitive institutions. Those who were incarcerated were those who did not conform to Enlightenment ideals of rationality. Studies of madness describe the experiences of people labelled as mad and explain the political, social, and cultural contexts that produced different theories of madness. In doing so, historians have shown that understanding lay attitudes towards madness provides a lens for exploring the mental landscape of ordinary people.

The literature on New Spain, and the colonial Hispanic world generally, has analysed bureaucratic records, predominantly from the Inquisition, to demonstrate that people interpreted behaviour that threatened community harmony, and especially that which

25 Diccionario de Autoridades (O-R) (Madrid, 1737), p.329, 2, ‘Potencia o facilidad intellectual, que le sirve al hombre para distinguir el bien del mal, y lo verdado de lo falso’; Esteban de Terreros y Pando, Diccionario Castellano con las voces de ciencias y artes y sus correspondientes de las tres lenguas francesa, latina, é italiana (P-Z) (Madrid, 1787), p.399.
questioned Catholicism, as mad. The formative work in this vein is María Cristina Sacristán’s *Locura e Inquisición en Nueva España, 1571-1760*, which examines the period from 1571 to 1760. Her main thesis is that madness was seen as a religious and a medical disorder in colonial Mexico. She describes the different perspectives on madness provided by the Inquisition and related authorities, by families and neighbours of the ‘mad’, and to an extent by the supposedly mad themselves. Sacristán points out that Inquisition authorities used technical language to describe madness, but that they incorporated lay terminology into their assessments of the purportedly mad. From 1571 to 1760 most people who were thought to be mad in colonial Mexico were supported within their communities and, in contrast to Foucault’s theory, were not institutionalised.28 Thus, for a discussion of non-elite views of madness in colonial Mexico, *Locura e Inquisición* is to be recommended.

In her subsequent book, *Locura y Disidencia en el México Ilustrado, 1760-1810*, Sacristán again tests the idea of a ‘great confinement’ regarding the end of the colonial period. She argues that the rise in references to madness in judicial cases and hospital records from around 1760 is evidence of the greater confinement of the mad in this period. The first hospital for the mad in the Americas, the Hospital of Saint Hipólito in Mexico City, was established in 1567 for mad men; the Hospital of the Divine Saviour in Mexico City, the first for mad women, was established in 1687. More people were sent to these hospitals for madness in the eighteenth centuries than in earlier periods. Sacristán argues from the eighteenth century onwards these hospitals took a more secular approach to treatment.29 In particular hospitals became less focussed on charity and more on curing madness.30

This thesis agrees that the late-eighteenth century witnessed an increase in cases where people were described as mad and confined in prisons and hospitals as part of the bureaucratisation of the Bourbon reforms. Moreover, medical approaches to madness did change. However, these trends do not provide evidence of a secularisation of the concept of madness. Instead, this thesis shows that a religious concern with madness was internalised rather than secularised among elite historical actors. Madness was an important term for

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28 Sacristán, *Locura e Inquisición*, pp.119, 134. Sacristán’s work is discussed in greater detail in Chapter One.
surveillance and self-management. It was part of the process of moral self-regulation already analysed by Voekel regarding the Bourbon Mexican elite. This thesis explores how a vocabulary of madness shaped the experience of selfhood in a range of contexts in Bourbon Mexico, considering the views and experiences of predominantly elite men. Ultimately, it argues that to be human in Bourbon Mexico was to be at risk of becoming mad.

This thesis builds on these histories of madness and selfhood by applying an aspect of Michel Foucault’s concept of a ‘technology of the self’ to the study of elite perceptions of madness in Bourbon Mexico. I consider how the concept of madness functioned as a ‘technology of the self’ for the elite to regulate themselves to offer a new interpretation of the processes surrounding madness. My focus is on personal regulation, that is, the disciplining of individual bodies and minds. This was the most productive part of the theory for an exploration of sources that provides rich detail regarding individuals and their lives, and the theoretical ideals by which elites were supposed to live. Foucault described the personal aspect of ‘technologies of the self’ as ‘the procedures, which have doubtless existed in all civilizations, that are proposed or prescribed to individuals in order to fix, maintain, or transform their identities with particular ends in view’ and that operate through ‘a mastery of the self by the self or a knowledge of the self by the self’. 31 He stated that social control was developed through the interiorisation of values, rather than through physical coercion.

Foucault’s theory of technologies of the self are also more widely applicable to understanding madness in Bourbon Mexico. Other aspects of this theory could be used to expand research on the regulation of the whole population in Bourbon Mexico. Crucially, Foucault’s theory of ‘technologies of the self’ considers both the disciplining of individual bodies and the regulation of populations as a whole. He used the term biopower to refer to ‘an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugations of bodies and the control of populations’. 32 This latter aspect of ‘technologies of the self’ could be applied in future to understanding madness in Bourbon Mexico to extend understandings of governance during the Bourbon period, but is not applied in this thesis. The remainder of this discussion of Foucault’s theory of technologies of the self focuses exclusively on the aspect of the theory regarding personal discipline, rather than the regulation of populations.

32 Michel Foucault, Robert Hurley (tr.), The History of Sexuality (3 vols, Harmondsworth, 1990), I, p.140.
Foucault articulated the idea of technologies of the self in *Discipline and Punish* and the first two volumes of *The History of Sexuality*. As Jan Goldstein has pointed out, both *Discipline and Punish* and the *History of Sexuality* theorise that individuals are created by enforcing power relations on subjected bodies, thus considering the personal aspect of technologies of the self.\(^{33}\) Foucault specifically frames these questions of selfhood as, ‘How has the subject been established at different moments and in different institutional contexts as an object of knowledge that is possible, desirable, or even indispensable?’\(^{34}\) Moreover, in the *History of Sexuality* this enquiry led Foucault to consider the kinds of discourses that developed around sexuality in order to shape individuals.\(^{35}\) He developed the idea of interiorisation of the self by exploring the role of a confessor in creating a subject that internalises the values of their society and thus polices themselves. He describes this role with regard to the framing of sexuality as a sin in *The History of Sexuality*, writing that ‘thoughts, desires, voluptuous imaginings, delectations, combined movements of the body and the soul; henceforth all this had to enter, in detail, into the process of confession and guidance.’\(^{36}\) Foucault considered confession as a process of regulation.

In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault conceived of penal systems in an Inquisitorial fashion, arguing that ‘the penal investigation was a machine that might produce the truth’.\(^{37}\) Within this model, bureaucratic mechanisms such as penal systems, the confessional, educational institutions, and hospitals create contexts in which detailed pictures of individual subjects can be developed and their internal thoughts and motivations can be corrected.\(^{38}\) Foucault used Jeremy Bentham’s concept of the panopticon to illustrate this theory of punitive surveillance creating docile bodies. The individuals incarcerated in the panopticon may be observed at any time, but they do not know whether they are being watched because they cannot see the observer. This theory proposed that the incarcerated individuals would act as if they were under surveillance in all circumstances. Foucault suggested that given the potential to be observed, disciplined people always act as if under surveillance. Thus, they internalise the values of their society and regulate their thoughts and actions with no need for actual external enforcement.

This thesis examines whether Foucault’s theory of the disciplining of individual bodies and minds as an aspect of technologies of the self applies to madness in Bourbon

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Mexico. It considers the values to which historical actors were expected to adhere, the extent to which individuals were expected to internalise the values of their society, how they were expected to regulate their own behaviour, and what judgements authorities made of individuals who failed to meet their expectations. Interactions between elite bureaucrats, clergy, physicians, and the individuals they examined lie at the heart of this thesis. The thesis asks whether a lack of self-regulation was understood in terms of madness.

Jan Goldstein’s work *The Post-Revolutionary Self* provides a platform for theorising madness as a ‘technology of the self’ to discipline individual bodies. Her work extends Foucault’s concept of ‘technologies of the self’ to analyse what she terms psychological discourses of selfhood: theories of what it is to be human that draw on categories of mental faculties and deficiencies. Examples include imagination, reason, memory, and madness. Goldstein addresses Foucault’s lack of engagement with mentalities or ‘philosophies of mind’. Her work shows that analysing psychological language enables an exploration of self-regulation in a given society. Goldstein surveys the connections between psychological discourses and the social and political preoccupations of a state to uncover how individuals were expected to manage their internal and external behaviour as members of their society. In her words, ‘cultures reveal a lot about themselves by the kind of psychological discourses they adopt and, in particular, by whether or not those discourses generate self-talk’.39 She shows there was a new focus on the formation of the self in the period preceding and following the French Revolution. Her work explains how new social and political conditions led to the development of new understandings of the self which in turn influenced culture, society, and politics.40 Goldstein focuses on the psychological discourse of the self, as developed by philosopher Victor Cousin (1792-1867), and the extent to which Cousinian philosophy was used in the French education system, by examining educational institutions and pedagogical texts. In particular, Goldstein provides insights into the way the concept of ‘imagination’ served as a technology of the self in this context. Using a Foucauldian model, Goldstein describes a transformation of the attention given to, and the formulation of, the self from the eighteenth century to the nineteenth century. In doing so, she places conceptions of the self in social, political, and economic context. Goldstein’s work provides a method for applying the concept of ‘technologies of the self’ to psychological discourses of the self, which I draw on to consider how madness shaped individual selfhood.

40 Ibid, pp.1-5.
I thus consider the function of madness as part of entwined medical and religious discourses. Analysing the category of ‘madness’ can help one understand selfhood because madness was utilised to frame the parameters of a rational, moral subject’s behaviour and the internalisation of Bourbon Mexico’s enlightened values. I adapt Goldstein’s theorising on the importance of psychological discourses to ‘technologies of the self’ by situating my study in the deeply religious context of Bourbon Mexico. Discourses on psychology and selfhood in Mexico developed out of a religious worldview that considered sin to be a defining characteristic of human nature. Historians such as Covarrubias and Voekel show that human defects were emphasised in Mexican Catholicism on the basis that God was thought to have limited the human capacity for knowledge. God alone was thought to be omnipotent and omnibenevolent. Lacking knowledge of God’s divine plan, humanity was only able to discern the world through the senses.41

This thesis argues that madness functioned as a technology of the self for disciplining individuals in Bourbon Mexico. Historical actors self-regulated against madness by guarding themselves against sinful behaviour. Constantly striving against sin was necessary because human beings were thought to be at risk from falling into madness through sin. The intimate relationship between sin and madness is explained in Chapter Two of this thesis. Foucault theorised that religious authorities, such as confessors and inquisitors, enforced regulation on the self. His theory did not extend to the role of concepts such as madness. In fact, he explicitly excluded concepts relating to mentality and psychology, which he called ‘philosophies of the mind’, from his theory of technologies of the self.42 There is no obvious rationale for excluding psychological categories such as madness from analysis. Indeed, examining a society’s mental categories, theories, and processes is central to understanding what the self, or individual, was thought to be and how it could be shaped. I argue that madness as a category of analysis allows an exploration of the specific ways the self was shaped in Bourbon Mexico. Utilising madness as a concept by which individuals, especially elites, were expected to discipline themselves was part of the exercise of power by elites over the population of New Spain.

Furthermore, madness is an important term for demonstrating that medical regulation remained rooted in religious management in the late-eighteenth century. Self-regulation did not become secular in theoretical texts discussing how one ought to self-regulate, or in daily practice. This argument builds on the work of Voekel and Goldstein. Both

41 Covarrubias, En Busca del Hombre Útil, p.394.
42 Goldstein, ‘Foucault and the Post-Revolutionary Self’, p.111.
authors advocate a Foucauldian approach to historicising the self, which is based on institutional mechanisms advocating values that were then internalised by the population. For Voekel, the impetus in Mexico was religious; for Goldstein in France the rationale was psychological and philosophical. Both methods of analysis fundamentally bring questions of human nature to the fore. By bringing these two approaches together, the religious self and the psychological self, I develop both the historiography of the medical self and the religious self and argue that selfhood in this period must be approached without a separation of medical and religious discourses. This perspective builds on Voekel’s view that, ‘Through its reformation of the individual, enlightened Catholicism fertilized the cultural soil for the growth of medical observation as a technique of rule’.43 That is, religion was the driving force behind Mexican epistemology, and scientific thinking developed within a religious framework. In this thesis, I show how religious ideas shaped selfhood in theory and practice by establishing a link between the concepts of madness and sin in elite Catholic discourse and in everyday understanding.

As colonial elites made efforts to regulate all aspects of life in Bourbon Mexico, this thesis is able to theorise the ways in which a vocabulary of madness shaped elite perceptions of selfhood in a range of contexts. Mexico provides an opportunity to consider the importance of Enlightenment thinking on theories about madness, drawing on scientific journals established during the eighteenth century, texts printed in Mexico, and the circulation of journals and books from Mexico and elsewhere in the Atlantic. Interest in the pursuit of reason fuelled a blossoming literature that outlined how individuals and society were to be ordered. Its authors employed the concept of madness as part of their vocabulary. The colonial archive, I suggest, provides an opportunity to explore how the theoretical role of madness as a tool for regulation and self-regulation was applied in practice to the behaviour of the potentially immoral, irrational populace in contexts such as Inquisition trials and missionary life. I draw on detailed archival material about life in Bourbon Mexico to provide evidence of the importance of madness as a tool of self-management for elites. I argue that madness, as part of a vocabulary for describing human behaviour and thinking about the individual, was central to shaping enlightened Catholic selves in Bourbon Mexico.

To provide as full a picture as possible of how madness functioned to allow elite individuals to effect operations on their own bodies, minds, souls, and lifestyle, so as to transform themselves, a variety of printed and manuscript sources have been analysed to develop an understanding of the theoretical and practical applications of madness. Printed

43 Ibid., pp.15-16.
sources include religious, political, literary, and medical texts, which all provide evidence of madness’ regulatory function. Inevitably, these printed texts tell us about madness from the perspective of an educated elite group. These texts are all in Spanish, though some are translations from other languages. I have focused on texts that were written in, printed in, or known to have been sent to Mexico during the eighteenth century, as well as those known to have existed in libraries or personal collections. I have studied relevant translations and reprinted texts from earlier periods that were read during the eighteenth century. It is important to note that the canon of Enlightenment thought in Mexico is different from other parts of the world. For example, many Mexican writers read the works of Hermann Boerhaave and Ludovico Antonio Muratori but engaged with René Descartes and John Locke only indirectly. The thesis draws on a variety of texts from Mexico, other parts of the Spanish Empire, and the wider world that were part of enlightened Mexican intellectual discourse and that reflect the interests of an educated Mexican readership.

There is a rich archival heritage pertaining to colonial Mexico, and to the eighteenth century especially. This detailed and plentiful material makes Bourbon Mexico a fruitful area for research on how people were expected to regulate themselves. That said, it is important to note the widely acknowledged limitations of the archival material available to scholars of Bourbon Mexico. The archival material is almost entirely written by elite Spanish men, which makes it challenging to illicit the views of less elite historical actors. Sources such as monastic records present exclusively elite views, and while criminal and Inquisition records provide testimony from non-elite individuals, this is heavily constrained by the bureaucratic process and the purpose of the testimony. The richest body of archival material on madness is Inquisition records. As Sacristán rightly outlines, there are two main limitations of working with Inquisition material. First, it creates the impression that madness is based always on religious misdemeanour. Second, there is little information on the indigenous majority of the population because the Inquisition did not have jurisdiction to preside over their behaviour.

Therefore, one must be aware of the limitations of this archival material: it provides most

44 Cristina Gómez Alvarez, Navegar con Libros: el Comercio de Libros entre España y Nueva España: una Visión Cultural de la Independencia (1750-1820) (Madrid, 2011); Cristina Gómez Alvarez, Un Hombre de Estado y sus Libros: el Obispo Campillo, 1740-1813 (Puebla, 1997).

45 Enlightened Mexican authors were particularly interested in Boerhaave’s empirical methodology. They adapted Boerhaave’s emphasis on the importance of observation and classification to challenge established scientific and medical concepts in common use in the Americas and Europe. For more information on the literary canon in Enlightenment Mexico, see: Mauricio Sánchez Menchero and Rosa Angélica Morales Sarabia, El Corazón de los Libros: Alzate y Bartolache: Lectores y Escritores Novohispanos (s. XVIII) (Mexico, 2012).

46 Sacristán, Locura e Inquisición, p.24.
insight into the views of elite subjects, both bureaucrats and those with whom they interacted, and so an examination of elite views of and experiences of madness forms the main component of this thesis.

When I began this thesis, I hoped to put the voices of the mad at the forefront of the research findings. I planned to examine whether ‘mad’ people were given a voice in colonial records and how they understood themselves. Inspired by Roy Porter’s work on letting the purportedly mad ‘speak’ in Madmen: A Social History of Madhouses, Mad-Doctors and Lunatics, I attempted to bring together letters written by ‘mad’ Mexicans and fragments of testimony from such individuals. Here I met a further limitation of the source material as the archives for Bourbon Mexico do not have the wealth of personal writings contained in British archives. Where possible, I have considered the voices of the mad; for example, the prolific Friar Sevane’s writings are discussed as are quotes from individuals on trial with the Inquisition. However, the thesis focuses much more heavily on the writings of elite men setting out the standards by which subjects (especially other elites) ought to conduct themselves. The end result is a different kind of exploration focused on elite views and self-regulation.

The bureaucratic records analysed in this thesis all come from the colonial section of the Archivo General de la Nación, Mexico’s national archive, in Mexico City. The colonial documents were first collated in 1790 as an archival collection called the General Archive of New Spain, the Archivo General de la Nueva España, by Juan Vicente Güemes Pacheco y Padilla, the second count Revillagigedo and viceroy of New Spain from 1789-94. The collection was later amalgamated into the AGN. Online and PDF catalogues exist for the collection. The catalogues include summaries of the records based on the eighteenth-century case descriptions, which can be searched using a word search that lists all catalogue references to a chosen term.

This thesis examines documents where the eighteenth-century archival catalogue and printed sources referred to madness and related terms. Existing scholarship of madness identifies a constellation of terms that were related to madness, or denoted specific kinds of madness. Sacristán catalogues symptoms associated with five conditions linked to madness.

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(melancholy, frenzy, epilepsy, mania, and dementia), based on Inquisition records from 1571 to 1760. In doing so, she finds that specific terms were associated with particular behaviours. For example, she finds that hunger was associated with demencia, dementia or madness, lack of appetite was associated with melancholy, and inability to sleep was associated with both dementia and melancholy.\textsuperscript{49} Many people in a wide range of contexts used the term locura, madness. Judicial authorities, clerics, doctors, and other elites used a number of specific, related terms to describe the way in which someone was mad. In order to capture a broad understanding of madness, I searched for the following terms in the AGN catalogue and elsewhere for printed sources: locura, loco/a, demente, demencia, melancólico/a, histérico/a, mania, frenesi, fatuo/a. The terminology I draw upon differs slightly from that used by Sacristán because, in the period I study (1713-1808), I found these terms to be the most prevalent and most closely linked to ‘madness’.

Locura itself was defined as ‘dementia, alienation of reason’.\textsuperscript{50} Indeed, loco, madman, and demente, a demented person, were both also defined by their lack of reason.\textsuperscript{51} These terms occur frequently in the AGN catalogue and formed the basis of the catalogue search I conducted. Locura was defined in opposition to the nebulous concept of reason, which will be discussed in detail in Chapter Two. Locura was an umbrella term for a range of more specific conditions, which were all in some sense ‘irrational’. Some of these categories were defined explicitly in relation to madness. For example, frenzy signified a type of madness or delirium.\textsuperscript{52} The term mania defined an illness that affected one’s mental faculty of fantasy and was irrational.\textsuperscript{53}

Other terms I have included did not refer to madness or lack of reason in their definitions but were used in practice alongside madness to create a more specific diagnosis. Examples include the terms hysteria, melancholy, and fatuousness. Most simply, hysteria was a medical term for an illness that predominantly affected women.\textsuperscript{54} The term was often ill-defined, including long lists of wide-ranging symptoms. It was used by professionally-qualified doctors to define women who were thought to be mad. Melancholy referred to

\textsuperscript{49} Sacristán, Locura e Inquisición, p.88.
\textsuperscript{50} Esteban de Terreros y Pando, Diccionario Castellano con las Voces de Ciencias y Artes y sus Correspondientes de las Tres Lenguas Francesa, Latina, é Italiana (G-O) (Madrid, 1787), p.472, 1, ‘dementia, enajenamiento de la razon’.
\textsuperscript{51} Diccionario de Autoridades (D-F) (Madrid, 1732), p.66, 2; Diccionario de Autoridades (G-M), p.428, 2.
\textsuperscript{52} Diccionario de Autoridades (D-F), p.794, 2.
\textsuperscript{53} Diccionario de Autoridades (G-M) (Madrid, 1734), p.478, 2.
\textsuperscript{54} Terreros y Pando, Diccionario Castellano (G-O), p.297, 1.
'great and permanent sadness', which was primarily a religious affliction.\textsuperscript{55} It was a state of being that bordered on madness, and could become madness. Similarly, the term fatuous, which labelled someone who was simple or did not understand things, bordered on madness.\textsuperscript{56} Terms such as melancholic and fatuous described a range of behaviours that were hard to define as fully rational or wholly mad. Elite observers of the potentially mad were concerned about individual capacity to reason, understand, imagine, and remember.\textsuperscript{57} The terms included in the catalogue search and analysis of printed texts denoted a range of kinds of madness. They represented both differences in categories of madness and in its severity. In practice, these categories could be further qualified using phrases such as ‘half-mad’ and ‘semi-fatuous’.

The archivists who catalogued the cases in the late eighteenth century wrote brief descriptions of cases based on their contents and subsequent archivists have continued to use these terms to describe the individuals discussed. Searching for references to madness based on these classifications creates a diverse set of cases to explore. The body of cases is limited by whether or not the archivist working with this collection in the 1790s recorded that a file contained references to madness or not; it is highly likely that many more references to madness exist in the colonial record. The sample created with this word search does, however, allow a detailed discussion of the way terms related to madness were used in bureaucratic records and how bureaucrats applied them to men and women of varied caste and social position. The source material is detailed enough to allow the analysis to contextualise madness and draw out nuances in the treatment of men and women, Spanish, black, and mixed race historical actors.\textsuperscript{58} Historians have not yet used this material to consider the ways ‘madness’ functioned to shape different kinds of selfhood.

The following chapters explore how elites expected subjects to regulate themselves within a context where understandings of human nature assumed that most people were not capable of sustaining moral, rational behaviour. This thesis in short creates a new interpretation of madness in Bourbon Mexico by using madness as a category of historical analysis for exploring selfhood, human nature, the emotions, race, and gender.

\textsuperscript{55} Diccionario de autoridades (G-M), p.532, 2, ‘tristeza grande y permanente’.
\textsuperscript{56} Diccionario de Autoridades (D-F), p.726, 2.
\textsuperscript{57} Sacristán, \textit{Locura e Inquisición}, p.87.
\textsuperscript{58} Michael MacDonald’s work on madness in seventeenth-century England shows that the physician Richard Napier ascribed labels associated with madness to his patients based on socio-economic class. He interpreted similar behaviours differently based on the patient’s background and other characteristics. See: MacDonald, \textit{Mystical Bedlam}, pp.160-4.
Chapter Overview

The chapters draw on different sources to explore how madness shaped the theory and practice of self-regulation. Throughout the chapters, a range of sources are analysed to establish how elites applied madness to all people, and in what ways individuals were considered to be at different risks of falling into madness. Printed texts provide evidence of the exhortation to regulate the self on religious grounds, in line with Enlightenment values of order, utility, and moderation. Analysis of medical texts shows that moral aspects of madness were subject to regulation by doctors, who drew on religious understandings of madness and sin in their medical theories. Sources from the Inquisition, missions, and other contexts, such as the army and criminal justice system, illuminate the kinds of failures of self-regulation that resulted in someone being labelled as mad. The thesis explores how using one’s reason constituted a form of self-regulation, and how people used their bodies to perform rationality or give away madness. The final chapter addresses how gender and caste affected whether elites considered someone to be mad and, if they did, how the individual was regulated.

Chapter One: Towards a New Historiography of Madness

Chapter One reviews the historiographical literature on madness as well as providing additional contextual details about the history of Bourbon Mexico for the chapters to follow. The review outlines important developments in the historiography of madness in Hispanic and Anglophone contexts, the former providing relevant contextual detail for this thesis and the latter being important for the development of the history of madness as a whole. I show that these two scholarly trends have common roots in critiquing Foucault’s idea of ‘the great confinement’, but that there has been little interaction between the two literatures. In considering how historians have analysed institutional and social aspects of madness, this chapter draws out common approaches and findings in the works of historians such as Sacristán and Roy Porter. It also shows that the Hispanic literature on madness observes a link between those thought to be mad and religious misdemeanour. The link between sin and madness has yet to be explored fully. By considering the assumptions and theories that lay behind the ordinary usage and application of madness as a label, this thesis demonstrates that sin and madness were intimately linked.

The literature review draws on histories that have not yet been incorporated into the historiography of madness, namely, scholarship on selfhood, race, gender, class, and the emotions. I focus on scholarship on the self in Mexico in this review to complement discussion in this introduction on how the idea of ‘technologies of the self’ has been adapted
to a Mexican context. Historians of Mexico have established that the ways in which the self was regulated changed in the eighteenth century. This thesis nuances theories of selfhood and personal identity to show how the individual mind/body was a site for strict regulation. The review outlines the well-developed history of race, gender, and class in colonial Mexico and argues that this must be incorporated into a history of madness, which, surprisingly, has not been done previously.

Finally, the review explores the burgeoning field of the history of emotions. It examines how theories such as William Reddy’s ‘emotional regimes’ and Barbara Rosenwein’s ‘emotional communities’ allow historians to analyse identity through studying the emotions. Nicole Eustace’s work is also particularly helpful because it connects emotional behaviours to political discourse and shows how this relationship is affected by the intersections of gender and race. Work on emotions in colonial Mexico provides invaluable context regarding the kinds of expression and feeling allowed in that particular society, by whom, and in what circumstances. Much debate around whether or not someone was mad drew on observations of how an individual expressed their emotions. Exploring emotional discourses allows us to analyse madness as embodied and co-created, without reiterating historical actors’ debates about whether an individual was ‘truly’ mad or sane.

The chapter in sum explains how this thesis draws upon these historical fields to push the historiography of madness in new directions. Madness is considered as a category of analysis for understanding selfhood. The relationship between sin and madness in shaping the self is explored by analysing the emotional content of records pertaining to madness. The role of race, gender, and class in shaping madness and thus regulating the self is also explored. These avenues of enquiry allow a discussion of how different kinds of people were expected to regulate themselves against madness and ultimately this presents a new interpretation of what it was to be human in Bourbon Mexico.

**Chapter Two: Sin, Reason, and Selfhood**

This chapter explores the link between madness and sin in Bourbon Mexico and the importance of this relationship in justifying the regulation of individuals’ thoughts, feelings, and behaviour. Madness is shown to be part of a vocabulary for regulating the desired Catholic self, which was linked to philosophical developments and Bourbon state aspirations. Catholic ideas of human sinfulness are used as a starting point because, as the chapter argues, human sin was thought to put all individuals at risk of falling into madness. The chapter examines how madness was presented in theoretical texts to shape a discourse of the rational and virtuous self in comparison to the mad and sinful self. Like Gabriel Paquette’s
Enlightenment, Governance, and Reform in Spain and its Empire, 1759-1808, this chapter focuses on the vocabulary, beliefs, and theories employed during the Bourbon reforms. The chapter also considers how human behaviour was supposed to be regulated, thus building on the historiography of selfhood in Bourbon Mexico exemplified by Voekel’s Alone Before God. The process of reasoning is a strong focus of the chapter. As such, the chapter extends theoretical discussions of reason by considering how Spanish authorities enquired into the reasoning capacity of individuals who were suspected of being mad.

A body of printed texts from the period, some translations and new editions of earlier works, and a small number of manuscript sources, are discussed to establish the intellectual case for regulating the self against madness. The chapter draws on earlier religious texts that remained influential in the eighteenth century. It also analyses eighteenth-century literature and politico-moral tracts that made significant use of the concept of madness to dictate how individuals ought to regulate themselves to be sane and virtuous. Examples include eighteenth-century translations from Latin of Thomas Kempis’s The Imitation of Christ (c.1418-27); Juan Benito Díaz de Gamarra y Dávalos’s Treatise on the errors of human understanding (1781) and contemporary poetry published in newspapers and dictionaries. These texts show that discourses on madness presented unorthodox thoughts, expressions of political discontent, and even wearing flamboyant clothing and certain postures as sinful and consequently mad. These texts illustrate the moral landscape of Bourbon Mexico and the expectations of the elite regarding internal belief and external behaviour. Madness was a ubiquitous term in late-eighteenth-century Mexico, which shaped the moral self because it had such a broad applicability in political and theological discourse as well as daily life.

Chapter Three: Madness and Medical Regulation of the Self

Historians have not yet analysed how medical theories about madness were used to shape discourses on the self in Bourbon Mexico. This chapter addresses how madness was utilised in the medical regulation of the self in Bourbon Mexico. It argues that humoral medical theories remained important throughout the Bourbon period, and that regulation against madness involved moral management of the self. Ideas of human sinfulness underpinned thinking on madness in medical texts, just as in the literary, political, and religious sources discussed in Chapter Two. Medical discourses on madness emphasised both the importance of humoral balance to health, and, based on the non-naturals, the individual’s responsibility for preventing madness through managing their diet, sleeping patterns, location, exercise,

59 Paquette, Enlightenment, Governance and Reform in Spain and its Empire, p.22.
and feelings. The chapter intersects with a range of historiographies. Namely, it engages with scholarship that considers the secularisation of madness in the eighteenth century and the replacement of humoralism with new medical theories. It provides a different interpretation to much of the existing historiography. Regarding the historiography of madness in colonial Mexico, the chapter offers new nuances to Sacristán’s findings. The chapter also builds on the history of hysteria to consider how gender affected discourses on regulating madness.

Medical texts are analysed in this chapter to explore how medical authors advocated moral self-regulation. The chapter first examines Juan de Esteyneffer’s *Anthology of all illnesses* (1713), a major medical text printed in Bourbon Mexico that was re-published five times between 1713 and 1887.60 This text serves as an example of the humoral regulation that characterises the start of this period. It also considers André Piquer y Arrufat’s *Modern logic* as an example of how intertwined religious and medical concepts of madness were. The chapter then turns to later medical texts, such as a well-known article on hysteria in José Ignacio Bartolache y Díaz Posada’s medical journal the *Mercurio Volante*.61 I analyse the medical regulation of the passions and soul described in Juan Manuel Venegas’ medical text, the *Compendium of medicine* (1788). This analysis shows how medical authors made moral concepts easier to empirically observe, rather than secularising them. These texts show that medical authors overlapped and integrated new and old scientific theories in Bourbon Mexico. They allow us to consider what medical worldviews shaped beliefs about madness, how new understandings of the body, mind, and soul altered how madness was understood and treated, and what eighteenth-century understandings of madness tell us about the construction of the self in Bourbon Mexico.

**Chapter Four: Sensory Experience and Embodying Madness**

This chapter considers how madness and self-regulation were embodied. It builds on the established social history of madness by examining the emotional and sensory aspects of cases of supposed madness. This approach brings a new theoretical framework to understanding madness. The chapter tests Peter Bailey’s theory, adapted from Mary Douglas’ idea of dirt as matter out of place, that noise is sound out of place. It analyses how speech, gestures, the manipulation of objects, and the perception of sound and touch could

be associated with madness. Following Douglas and Bailey’s work, and drawing on Barbara Rosenwein’s theory that bodily gestures and sounds are ‘symptoms’ of emotions, the chapter analyses cases of individuals throwing things, shouting, and biting people. Sonya Lipsett-Rivera’s work on daily life provides a platform for comparing these ‘mad’ instances to the broader context of these actions. Comparing and contextualising the ways people manipulated their bodies uncovers why these individuals were thought mad when others were not. These comparisons show that historical actors could demonstrate a range of positive and negative feelings, but cultural codes regarding what one could do in specific situations was strict; appropriate behaviour was narrowly defined in Bourbon Mexico.

The chapter focuses on cases appearing in missionary records and Inquisition records where clerics were thought to be mad. The abundant material on parish priests and missionaries enables a detailed discussion of their reasoning and bodily comportment. The chapter describes what moral and sane behaviour looked like for these men; it observes an emphasis on doing one’s religious duty by caring for parishioners and taking part in monastic life. It outlines some common misdemeanours committed by ‘mad’ clergymen, such as refusing the sacraments. Many actions described by commentators as mad were failures of religious practice and were considered sinful.

The chapter explores why in these cases behaviour thought to be sinful was attributed to madness. The underlying assumption in these cases was that it was never rational to be sinful; on that basis these clerics had to be mad. The chapter shows that observers interpreted whether or not an individual was mad based on how people used their bodies. Failure to regulate one’s movements, speech, and gestures led to others labelling an individual as mad. Notably, while reasoning well was an internal process, demonstrating one could use reason (and thus self-regulate) was articulated through how one expressed oneself with bodily actions. The chapter considers deviant uses of sound, silence, outbursts of violence, nudity, and excessive weeping. Where possible, I draw on criminal records, army records, and other Inquisition records to provide evidence that disturbed sleeping patterns, outbursts of violence, and an inability to maintain work and domestic obligations, were used by elites as evidence of madness among the wider population.

Chapter Five: Gender, Caste, Madness, and Selfhood

64 Sonya Lipsett-Rivera, Gender and the Negotiation of Daily Life in Mexico, 1750-1856 (Lincoln, 2012).
Madness functioned to regulate the behaviour of many kinds of people in Bourbon Mexican society. This chapter considers how gender and race affected the ways in which madness was used to regulate the self. It provides a test for the findings of Chapter Four regarding the behaviours that led people to label an individual as mad. Did the standards of rationality applied to elite Spanish clerical men apply to other people? The chapter explores whether bureaucrats applied the label ‘mad’ to different kinds of people based on the same principles: were men and women thought to be mad for the same reasons? Were bureaucrats quicker to label mestizos as mad than Spaniards? Did the caste and gender of an individual affect whether people thought their behaviour was evidence of madness? It considers how elites expected different categories of people to regulate themselves. It also explores how elite individuals applied the term ‘madness’ to people they considered unable to be fully rational in the first place. This demonstrates how using madness as a category of historical analysis can uncover tensions between overlapping theories of rationality in operation in Bourbon Mexico. Elite authorities did not think that the capacity for self-regulation was the same in all groups. The chapter concludes that a person’s gender, caste and age affected whether they were thought to be mad and how they were expected to regulate themselves.

This chapter analyses Inquisition cases because the material on madness is abundant. For readers unfamiliar with the Inquisition and its history, the appendix offers a discussion of the workings of the Inquisition and its case proceedings. Inquisition records have been used by historians to explore gender, caste, and madness separately; however, there are no studies of the relationship between madness and caste in this context. Three case studies provide detailed evidence of the trials, as well as the expectations, internal worlds, and actions of the defendants. These cases involved two men and one woman, all of different non-Spanish castes. Therefore, they provide a point of comparison for the discussion of clerical madness. The Inquisition cases are particularly rich sources for discussing gender and caste as women and people of contested caste are present in the records. The only cases of ‘mad’ women found using the AGN’s catalogue were located in Inquisition records.

The chapter builds upon the work of María Elena Martínez and Laura Lewis on negotiating and performing caste to explore how assumptions of caste and gender shaped the Inquisition’s understanding of individuals.65 This chapter shows that many kinds of

65 Lipsett-Rivera, Gender and the Negotiation of Daily Life; María Elena Martínez, Genealogical Fictions: Limpieza de Sangre, Religion, and Gender in Colonial Mexico (Stanford, 2008); Laura Lewis, Hall of Mirrors: Power, Witchcraft, and Caste in Colonial Mexico (Durham, 2003).
selfhood were formed in this period drawing on common Catholic concepts, as Matthew O’Hara’s work on identity formation in late-colonial and early-independence Mexico suggests. In particular, the chapter shows how a concern for reason, passions, and sin can be observed in all of these cases of madness, but have different implications based on the gender and caste of the individual on trial.

Conclusions

Madness functioned as a technology of the self in Bourbon Mexico. Elites used the concept to regulate, and to justify regulating, individuals in eighteenth-century New Spain. The regulatory function of madness can be seen in elite discourses and in practical rulings regarding people’s behaviour. What made an individual mad differed based on the kind of person they were; women and non-Spanish men were not thought capable of being fully rational. Overall something or someone was mad if they acted against the established hierarchy and did not meet expectations, be they religious, political, medical or social. Revolution was mad just as singing during the night in a monastery was mad. Madness was anything the elite thought would hinder the management of pious, useful, and docile vassals for the enlightened reforms of their times. The following chapters explore these ideas.

Chapter One: Towards a New Historiography of Madness

This chapter describes and assesses the varied scholarship that informs the thesis. In some instances, it challenges existing scholarship. The chapter as a whole suggests new approaches to the history of madness in Bourbon Mexico. The first section of the chapter reviews the state of the field of the history of madness. It describes parallels between the Hispanic and Anglophone historiographies, and points to areas of research that have been overlooked with regard to the early modern Spanish world. The second section proceeds to set out an alternative literature for studying madness in Bourbon Mexico. The review draws on histories of selfhood, race, gender, and class, and the emotions to connect accounts of individual experience and agency to processes of bureaucracy, medicalisation, and power. I engage with these literatures to argue that diffuse bodies of material can reveal the role of madness in shaping the self and show how both were socially constructed.

Section One: Parallel Historiographies of Madness

Parallel histories of madness have developed in Hispanic and Anglophone scholarship. There have been few points of contact between these literatures, though they have a common root in the work of Michel Foucault. Foucault’s *Madness and Civilization* reinterpreted madness as a social and cultural construction tied to structures of power. It provided historians with a framework for thinking about the socially constructed elements of madness. For example, it theorised that the idea that madness was a disease was an invention and that there was a ‘great confinement’ of the mad in the eighteenth century. Foucault theorised that individuals who were ‘idle’ became associated with ‘unreason’ in the eighteenth century. These individuals, including the ‘mad’, poor, and vagrant, were removed from society en masse in a ‘great confinement’. In response to *Madness and Civilization*, historians have undertaken close analysis of archival material to examine whether Foucault’s theory fits the empirical evidence. Studies that shape the field do not focus on one geographical area, and thus this review discusses studies of madness in England, the USA, and the British Empire, as well as in Mexico and Spain. There is no published history of the asylums in New Spain, largely because the records of these institutions, in particular hospitals for the mad, are sparse.

1 Foucault, *Madness and Civilization*.
2 There are a variety of studies of hospital care for the mad in different parts of Spain up to 1700: Carmen López Alonso, *Locura y Sociedad en Sevilla: Historia del Hospital de los Inocentes (1436–1840)* (Seville, 1988); Hélène Tropé, *Locura y Sociedad en la Valencia de los Siglos XV al XVII* (Valencia, 1994); Jon Arrizabalaga, ‘Locura y Asistencia Hospitalaria en los Reinos Hispánicos (1400–1700)’, in Filiberto Fuentenebro, Rafael Huertas and Carmen Valiente (eds), *Historia de la Psiquiatría en Europa* (Madrid, 2003), pp.583-606; Teresa Huguet-Termes and Jon Arrizabalaga, ‘Hospital Care for the Insane in Barcelona, 1400-1700’, *Bulletin of Spanish Studies*, 87, 8 (2010), pp.81-104. The following works
Instead, Inquisition records form the backbone of studies of madness in both Spain and New Spain. Based partly on the greater availability of relevant institutional records, there are a number of useful histories of single institutions in Britain; well-known examples include studies of Bethlem Hospital and the York Retreat. As Andrew Scull has observed, this was a very popular approach to writing the history of madness in Britain in the 1980s. The historiographies of madness in both Britain and the Hispanic world have taken inspiration from Foucault’s work and suggest that confinement was part of the approach to the mad in this period, but they also challenge many aspects of his thesis. Rather than confirming Foucault’s theory, historiographies of madness have used it as a productive question for understanding madness in a number of contexts. Careful research into institutions, such as asylums and the Inquisition, allow historians to study the experiences of supposedly mad people and to place ‘mad’ historical actors in the political, social and cultural contexts that constructed the parameters of their madness.

María Cristina Sacristán’s seminal work on madness in New Spain, *Locura e Inquisición en Nueva España*, 1571-1760, critiques Michel Foucault’s idea of a ‘great confinement’ of the mad. Sacristán examines all of the Inquisition records catalogued with references to *locura*, madness, from 1571-1760. She analysed the social attitudes of families and neighbours towards people they labelled as mad and how they conceived of madness. *Locura e Inquisición* considers attitudes to ‘mad’ people; the institutional responses; the types of care; and the extent to which they were marginalised. She shows that madness was a mutable concept defined within communities based on their religious attitudes and social lives. That which threatened the harmony of communities could be interpreted as mad; behaviour which questioned Christian principles and church authority was particularly suspect. Colonial bureaucrats had a worldview that regarded madness as a religious, supernatural and medical disorder. Sacristán’s main conclusion in *Locura e Inquisición* is that, in contrast to Foucault’s concept of a ‘great confinement’, there was no mass institutionalisation of people who were thought to be mad before 1760. In New Spain, the ‘mad’ were cared for by their families and communities.

provide useful discussions of hospital care in the Spanish colonies: Muriel, *Hospitales de la Nueva España;* Guerra, *El Hospital en Hispanoamérica y Filipinas.*


5 Sacristán, *Locura e Inquisición*, p.129.
Sacristán’s work developed out of two historiographical traditions: one stemming from Foucault’s theory that madness is a social construct and the other working with Inquisition records to understand mentalities and daily life in colonial Mexican society. Inquisition records have been central to constructing social histories of New Spain. Sacristán’s view that studying madness provides a framework for understanding the whole society echoes the Inquisition studies approach that treats the records of the Holy Office as a window onto New Spanish society. She shows, for example, that religious orthodoxy, supernatural belief, and humoral medicine were formative aspects of New Spanish mentalities. Madness was an important concept in this worldview. Sacristán implicitly reaffirms the utility of Inquisition records for writing social histories of New Spain; however, she argued that the religious nature of the Inquisition sources hinder analysis of madness’ meaning in colonial Mexico. Sacristán correctly states that indigenous views of madness are hard to elucidate using Inquisition records because the Inquisition’s jurisdiction did not include Amerindians. She also argues that the religious purpose of the Inquisition presents a skewed interpretation of madness as a religious problem. Sacristán’s insights into how the term madness was understood and applied in New Spain form a useful platform for further study. This thesis disagrees with Sacristán’s view that the religiosity of Inquisition sources limits their utility. Hispanic society was profoundly religious and Catholic values permeated all spheres of life. This thesis explores how religion shaped understandings of madness. Concern about sin guided social expectations and regulation in the context of the Inquisition and elsewhere. Madness was intimately linked to sin and this connection affected all theorisation and application of the term.

Sacristán returned to Foucault’s idea of the ‘great confinement’ to analyse madness in the late-colonial period. In Locura y Disidencia en el México Ilustrado, 1760-1810 she examines Inquisition, criminal, and hospital records to show that state reforms led to a medicalisation of the concept of madness, which was accompanied by placing more people  

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7 The workings of the Inquisition and the historiography of the Inquisition are addressed in the appendix.
8 Sacristán, Locura e Inquisición, p.9. For a brief discussion of the historiography of the Inquisition, see footnote 1 in the appendix.
9 Sacristán, Locura e Inquisición, p.24.
11 Sacristán, Locura e Inquisición, p.24.
in institutions for the ‘mad’. When searching for madness in the colonial archive, year on year there are significantly more catalogue references to madness in the period after 1760. Increased reference to madness in bureaucratic records correlates with changes such as state and church reform and reform piety. Sacristán’s chronology paralleled that provided by Voekel for the development of the pious self in Bourbon Mexico. This thesis explores how the development of concepts of religious and medical regulation made madness a useful concept for managing the population of New Spain. Instead of a secularisation of the causes of madness, the analysis shows that, throughout the period, sin was thought to put people at risk of falling into madness. Doctors also saw madness as being about sin alongside other thinkers and authorities. It was the internalisation of a particularly Hispanic concern for the relationship between madness and sin, not secularisation, that led to more people being labelled as mad in the latter half of the eighteenth century.

Sacristán’s work on madness in New Spain has defined the field; she inspired a range of microhistories that use Inquisition records, particularly blasphemy trials, to explore the importance of madness in early modern Spain. Due to the nature of the source material, scholarship on the Hispanic world focuses particularly on the intersection of madness and religious misdemeanours. The most in-depth example of a microhistory based on Inquisition sources is Sara Tilghman Nalle’s book Mad for God: Bartolomé Sánchez, the Secret Messiah of Cardenete. The book describes the life of one sixteenth-century Spanish farmer based on the Inquisition records of his blasphemy trial. Nalle considers the role of unorthodox beliefs and how they framed ideas of madness in sixteenth-century Spain. She observes that madness was most often discussed in an individual’s Inquisition trial when they made blasphemous statements. Inquisitors and the friends, families, and acquaintances of individuals on trial interpreted blasphemy as a symptom of madness. Teresa Ordorika Sacristán’s study of Inquisition cases in seventeenth-century Spain also shows that a variety of commentators, from doctors, lawyers, and priests to family members, were most likely to label someone as mad when they engaged in blasphemy, shouting, inappropriate speech and behaviour, and violence. She observes key behaviours that are analysed in this thesis in the New Spanish context, arguing that the main concern in the Spanish trials was to work out if madness was genuine or feigned. Indeed, many Inquisition cases where madness was

12 Sacristán, Locura y Disidencia (Mexico, 1994).
13 Voekel, Alone Before God.
15 Teresa Ordorika Sacristán, ‘¿Herejes o Locos?’, Cuicuilco: Revista de la Escuela Nacional de Antropología e Historia, 45 (2009), pp.159-60.
discussed demonstrate inquisitorial preoccupation with whether or not a defendant was mad, simply sinful, or ignorant of correct doctrine. By reproducing their concerns, however, Ordorika Sacristán misses an opportunity to engage with why certain behaviours were associated with madness: what deeper purpose did the category serve?

Overall, scholarship on madness in Spanish Inquisition contexts does not analyse how madness was constructed. In particular, it fails to explore the intellectual assumptions involved in labelling behaviour or people as mad. That is, historians of madness and the Inquisition observe a link between cases of unorthodox religiosity and supposed madness, but they do not explore how the church operated as an important arbiter of what madness was. This thesis uses evidence that heterodox beliefs and self-expression were associated with madness to explore the connections between sin and madness. Catholicism, I argue, had a significant role in defining piety and sanity and sin and madness throughout New Spanish culture. The religious conception of the mad as sinful permeated all aspects of intellectual theories and practical experience. This thesis interrogates how the moral weight of the label of madness shaped how people regulated their bodies and behaviour.

Critiques of Foucault’s *Madness and Civilization* help to explain why historians of madness in Mexico and Spain may have underestimated the link between sin and madness. Erik Midelfort’s essay ‘Madness and Civilization in Early Modern Europe: A Reappraisal of Michel Foucault’ showed that Foucault himself had underestimated the role of religion in early modern madness. Engaging with Foucault’s emphasis on confinement in secular institutions may have, to an extent, distracted historians from other aspects of treatment for the mad. Similarly, Foucault’s equation of idleness with unreason masks other underlying assumptions that existed about unreason. Midelfort shows that in France and Germany not all mad people were sent to general hospitals as Foucault claimed, and if there was a large-scale confinement of ‘mad’ people it took place in the nineteenth century. Crucially, Midelfort examines what ‘madness’ meant in the early modern period and suggests that Foucault did not explore its multiple conceptions, for example as a stimulus for spiritual growth. Midelfort’s observation that Foucault underestimated the role of sin in madness is a useful premise for this research. This thesis builds on histories of the Catholic self to show that the connection between unorthodox religiosity and madness, as noted by scholars of

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17 Ibid., p.257.
18 Ibid., p.255.
madness in the Hispanic world, is more than a reflection of the kinds of sources available: it is a function of the religious values underpinning every aspect of life in Bourbon Mexico. This thesis adopts a new historiographical framework for studying madness to examine how religious values worked to construct madness as a consequence of human sin.

In the 1980s and 1990s historians of madness in England explored the social patterns of mental disorder. Michael MacDonald’s work takes madness to be both medical and religious in origin. His book *Mystical Bedlam* examines the views of over 2000 historical actors who suffered with supposed mental disorders in seventeenth-century England and were treated by Richard Napier, an English clergyman, physician, and astrologist. MacDonald’s intention is to discover ‘how popular beliefs about insanity and healing illuminate the mental world of ordinary people’. MacDonald analyses Napier’s notes alongside contemporary diaries and legal, medical, autobiographical, scientific, and religious writing. He finds that commonly-held understandings of mental disorder in seventeenth-century England had an intricate and well-developed vocabulary, but one that was imprecise. MacDonald showed that mental disorders were thought to have many natural and supernatural causes, a finding that is now well established in the historiography. He also observed that people were given different labels relating to madness based on social status. For example, ‘melancholy’ described upper-class sufferers whereas ‘mopish’ denoted someone poor and unintelligent. MacDonald’s work suggests there was a complicated web of causes, symptoms, and terminology that varied depending on the kind of person in question. The range of sources MacDonald examined to build this picture is a strength of his research. This thesis thus explores myriad causes and symptoms of madness and focuses particularly on how madness was differentiated by social status, which in Mexico was heavily based on racial classifications. It also develops a different line of enquiry regarding religious conceptions of madness. I argue that there was a peculiarly Hispanic, even Mexican, preoccupation with the role of sin in human nature and its propensity to lead people to madness. Thus insights into the social patterns of madness in England provide questions about what madness was caused by and to whom the term applied, but the social and religious context was distinct from that of Bourbon Mexico.

In ‘Foucault’s Great Confinement’, Roy Porter also showed that Foucault’s theories in *Madness and Civilization* did not apply equally to different domains in the eighteenth century. Porter explained Foucault’s argument that the ‘great confinement’ applied to those

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19 MacDonald, *Mystical Bedlam*, p.xii.
who embodied the concept of ‘unreason’, which referred to people who were idle. In Foucault’s view, the mad were not distinct from other kinds of idle people and all were confined.\textsuperscript{21} Porter observes that, in England, idleness was not equated to madness and work was not attributed to sanity. Unreason and madness in England could refer to an individual supposedly reasoning incorrectly. In early modern England, the ‘mad’ were sent to asylums for correction and were not readily accepted in workhouses.\textsuperscript{22}

To fully understand the significance of madness, Porter instead turned to the experiences of the supposedly mad themselves in his work \textit{A Social History of Madness: Stories of the Insane}.\textsuperscript{23} He placed ‘mad’ historical actors at the centre of his study and asked what it was like to be mad in the past. By analysing autobiographical material as well as institutional documents, Porter traced the encounters and interactions of the purportedly mad with physicians and others.\textsuperscript{24} Crucially, Porter showed that madness, like psychiatry, had a history that was accessible to historians. For Porter, studying madness revealed alternative stories from the asylum and challenged the idea of confining and silencing the ‘mad’. He, like Sacristán, thought that madness served to uncover the values and practices of the ‘sane’ society itself.\textsuperscript{25}

In early modern England, religious language shaped self-expression. For example, mental distress could be understood as holy, a form of religious suffering, or a response to temptation or possession.\textsuperscript{26} Sacristán also shows how ordinary people defined madness based on their religious and social lives.\textsuperscript{27} This thesis provides evidence that, in Mexico, madness referred to both idleness, as Foucault suggested, and reasoning incorrectly, as Porter argued. It builds on Porter and Sacristán’s insight, that religion formed the basis of early modern understandings of madness, to examine how a Catholic concept of human propensity to sin informed concepts of madness for supposed sufferers and those who judged and labelled them. Thus it also engages with Midelfort’s call to consider the role of sin in madness. Throughout the eighteenth century, Catholicism provided a common framework for the regulation of oneself and others. Therefore, exploring how ‘madness’

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., p.49. In Mexico the mad were not explicitly put to work in the eighteenth century, but conceptually madness and idleness were coupled, though in different ways for men and women. This link will be discussed particularly in Chapters Two and Four.
\textsuperscript{23} Porter, \textit{A Social History of Madness}.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., p.231.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., p.3.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., pp.350, 360.
\textsuperscript{27} Sacristán, \textit{Locura e Inquisición}, p.129.
functioned in Mexico must be grounded in a thorough understanding of the religious, political and social context.

Contextualising madness requires analysis of its connections to gender, race, and class. The history of madness in New Spain emerged from the history of the Inquisition, where there has been a keen focus on gender, race, and social hierarchy. However, scholars have not yet considered in depth the importance of these categories for perceptions and treatment of madness. Research on gender and race in the Spanish Americas is discussed below as both enable analysis of what madness was thought to be and to whom it applied in Bourbon Mexico. Such considerations also develop a greater awareness of elite thinking on human nature: who could be expected to behave rationally? Were those who could not be expected to be rational mad as a result? What theories of human nature were implicit in the ways bureaucratic authorities judged people, and were the theories and their judgements contradictory? Examining the interactions between social status and madness uncovers implicit theories of human nature at work and the realities of negotiating elite expectations to regulate oneself against madness. This thesis draws together the literatures on gender, race, and madness to examine how they interacted.

Research on madness in British contexts has shown that the term ‘madness’ had a gendered function. Much of this literature is written in response to Elaine Showalter’s provocative work, *The Female Malady*. Showalter’s thesis was both a feminist history of psychiatry and a cultural history of madness, drawing on medical and literary texts as well as paintings and photographs. The book’s thesis was that madness was constructed as a female malady in the nineteenth century: confinement and treatment was largely directed at women and the archetypical mad person was female. Many of Showalter’s empirical findings have since been challenged. For example, Joan Busfield examined statistical data on psychiatric treatment and the cultural dimensions of mental disorder to explain the relationship between gender and mental disorder. Her research showed that Showalter’s argument that women were overwhelmingly labelled as suffering from mental disorder was not supported by evidence from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Moreover, Showalter did not acknowledge many other cultural tropes about the mad outside of the link she perceived between madness and femininity. She did, however, put forward a bold thesis that provoked research into how gender shaped the concept of madness.

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The collected volume *Sex and Seclusion, Class and Custody*, edited by Jonathan Andrews and Anne Digby, also challenged Showalter’s findings and her emphasis on women.\(^{30}\) Robert Houston’s chapter in Andrews and Digby’s volume, shows, for example, that single men were over-represented in the asylum population in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Britain.\(^{31}\) Work in the collection goes further than dispelling myths about women and madness to consider the relationship between class, gender, and mental disorder. The literature on gender and mental disorder employs both quantitative methods to address questions such as who was confined, for how long, and what treatments were used, and qualitative approaches that examine subjective aspects of perceptions about the ‘mad’ and experiences of ‘mad’ people.\(^{32}\) Similar research is needed into the interactions of gender and madness in Mexico. This thesis observes that well-educated, Spanish men were overrepresented in cases of madness in colonial Mexico. The gendered construction and application of the term madness in colonial Mexico is discussed throughout the thesis.

The intersections of madness and race in the colonial Americas have been similarly overlooked. As with gender, this is curious because of the strong links between the historiography of race and the Inquisition, and studies of madness and the Inquisition. A useful starting point for theorising the relationship between categories of race and madness is the literature on mental disorder in colonial Anglophone contexts. The majority of the work in this field has focussed on the conditions of confinement of those considered mad in different British colonial contexts in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.\(^{33}\) Additionally, a few scholars have explored how categories of race and madness are co-constructed. Sander Gilman’s chapter ‘On the Nexus of Blackness and Madness’ attempted to expose links between race, gender, sexuality, and madness.\(^{34}\) Gilman’s findings are not convincing

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\(^{30}\) Jonathan Andrews and Anne Digby (eds), *Sex and Seclusion, Class and Custody: Perspectives on Gender and Class in the History of British and Irish Psychiatry* (Amsterdam and New York, 2004).


\(^{34}\) Sander Gilman, ‘On the Nexus of Blackness and Madness’ in Sander Gilman (ed.), *Difference and Pathology: Stereotypes of Sexuality, Race, and Madness* (Ithaca, 1985), pp.131-49. Regarding New Spain, Laura Lewis shows that gender and race were deployed as dynamic idioms that both precluded
because he dismisses empirical evidence that does not confirm his theories, instead drawing on a psychoanalytic framework to analyse the connections between categories such as ‘black’ and ‘mad’. With this theorising, Gilman asserts that the blackness of melancholy became associated with black bodies in the realm of ‘myth’. Thus aspects of Gilman’s article create tenuous links for which he cannot provide evidence. The value of this work lies with Gilman’s awareness of the importance of examining the categories used to label people. He shows that historians must examine the cultural construction of those categories in addition to analysing the structures, treatments, and patient profiles of colonial asylums.

More recently, Martin Summers has begun to trace how colonial racial theory and rhetoric shaped the treatment of black people in African colonial contexts and post-emancipation USA. His article “‘Suitable Care of the African When Afflicted with Insanity’: Race, Madness, and Social Order in Comparative Perspective’ examines racial theory and practice in mental institutions in the USA and colonial sub-Saharan Africa. It shows that historians must understand the history of colonial psychology and its racial theories to understand the role of race in the asylums of the USA. The intersection of race and madness in the New Spain must similarly be explored. Exposing the relationship between colonial racial ideologies and madness could have implications for understanding later approaches to mental disorders in post-Independence Mexico.

The intellectual history of madness and its related terminology has also enhanced this picture of how madness was understood and treated. A number of studies focus on the use of specific vocabulary connected to madness in order to trace intellectual shifts. One example is John Wright’s article ‘Hysteria and Mechanical Man’. Wright assesses the changing significance of the word hysteria based on the development of new medical epistemologies. He charts hysteria from the Hippocratic idea of the wandering womb to the seventeenth-century idea of a nervous disorder affecting the brain. Wright uses medical texts from different parts of Europe to provide evidence of a change in understanding of the causes of hysteria and its nature: hysteria became associated with nervous sensitivity rather than frustrated sexual appetite. Studies such as Wright’s discuss the relationship between

and promoted certain kinds of power in a number of different social domains and, ultimately, for all colonial subjects. See her article: Laura Lewis ‘The ‘Weakness’ of Women and the Feminization of the Indian in Colonial Mexico’, Colonial Latin American Review, 5 (1996), pp.87-8.


mind, soul, and body and help to build a history of madness that reflects madness as an umbrella term for interlinked mental disorders rather than one disorder or state.

Recent scholarship in intellectual history has focused particularly on the depiction and experience of melancholy. Contributors to Allan Ingram’s edited volume *Melancholy Experience in Literature of the Long Eighteenth Century* ask what ‘depression’ was like prior to the emergence of the medical classification. The volume focuses on the common phenomena of melancholy, spleen, and hypochondria in order to explore their presentation in European literature. Authors such as Daniel Defoe, John Bunyan, Pierre François Tissot, and Laurence Sterne are discussed alongside the autobiographical writings of lesser-known historical actors. The authors focus on melancholy to explain shifting conceptions of mental disorder and selfhood. For example, in ‘Melancholy, Medicine, Mad Moon and Marriage: Autobiographical Expressions of Depression’ Leigh Wetherall-Dickson observes that over time the answers to questions such as ‘who am I?’ and ‘what is wrong with me?’ are not constant, though the questions continue to be asked. His article explores these developments as fundamental issues of identity and human nature, which are socially and culturally constructed. The answers in any time and place arise from specific epistemological assumptions that can and do change. Therefore, research into the language and intellectual trends that frame mental disorders enables historians to contextualise the history of madness within wider intellectual currents and to uncover deeper attitudes towards personhood. I build on this historiography of intellectual and linguistic change by examining how in Bourbon Mexico the history of madness; theories of mind, body, and soul; and the formation of the self may differ from that of Britain and Europe.

Research into psychiatric terminology reveals how the concept of madness became associated with new medical ideas. Akihito Suzuki’s article ‘Dualism and the Transformation

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39 Ingram, Allan, and Sim, Stuart, ‘Introduction: Depression Before Depression’ in Allan Ingram (ed.), *Melancholy Experience in Literature of the Long Eighteenth Century: Before Depression, 1660-1800* (Basingstoke, 2011), p.2. See also: Elena Carrera, ‘Madness and Melancholy in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth Century Spain: New Evidence, New Approaches’, *Bulletin of Spanish Studies*, Vol. 87, No.8 (2010), pp.1-15. This special issue of the *Bulletin of Spanish Studies* examines what it meant to be mad and melancholic in early-modern Spain. It draws on work from Spain, France and the UK in the fields of history, history of medicine and literature studies to explain the interrelatedness of madness and melancholy and both the positive and negative associations with these concepts. The articles in the special issue use hospital records, Inquisition records, medical texts and literary works on madness to explore the wider meanings of the idea. This journal issue is most useful for contextualising cultural ideas of melancholy and madness in Spain before the eighteenth century.


41 Erik Midelfort outlines how a history of madness must consider specific geographical contexts within early modern Europe: Midelfort, ‘Madness and Civilization in Early Modern Europe’, pp.247-65.
of Psychiatric Language in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries’ re-evaluates how medico-philosophical understandings of mental disorder developed. His main argument is that a new language of mental disease was created in the eighteenth century as the diseased mind became central to medical language from around 1760. Prior to this, the language for making the treatment of madness a science did not exist. The language that emerged was based on understanding sensation and perception as distinct, which had first been suggested by Locke. Suzuki shows that the distinction helped to form a new model of madness in the late eighteenth century. Suzuki illuminates a variety of eighteenth-century intellectual trends that, through the development of a new language, shaped madness as a focus of scientific observation. Suzuki’s perspective is important for this thesis because his argument parallels the periodisation suggested by María Cristina Sacristán who suggests that understandings of madness in Mexico changed radically after 1760. This thesis engages with the idea that views of madness changed in the mid-eighteenth century to ask if there is a link between an increased concern regarding madness, and developing ideas of the self. It builds on the observation that shifts in the medico-philosophical concepts related to the mind converged with increasing references to madness in bureaucratic contexts around 1760. In examining how medical concepts of madness developed in Bourbon Mexico, the thesis acknowledges that new medical ideas developed regarding madness. It also challenges the idea that there was a decisive break with older religio-medical models of madness in Mexico from the 1760s onwards. In doing so, it provides a comparison with Suzuki’s findings on Britain.

A study of madness in Bourbon Mexico must consider intellectual shifts in the contemporary Hispanic world. In Locura e Inquisición, Sacristán describes the humoral worldview that underpinned medical understandings of madness in colonial Mexico; however, her two books on madness do not provide detailed analysis of medical or literary texts that discussed madness. Theories of madness in the Hispanic world have been analysed in articles such as Beatriz Quintanilla-Madero’s article ‘An Enlightened Perspective on Hysteria’ that examines an eighteenth-century journal article on hysteria, which I critique in Chapter Three. Drawing on an analysis of a wide range of eighteenth-century Mexican

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43 Ibid., p.426.
44 Sacristán, Locura e Inquisición.
46 Beatriz Quintanilla-Madero, ‘An Enlightened Perspective on Hysteria’ in Catherine Marie Jaffe and Elizabeth Franklin Lewis (eds), Eve’s Enlightenment: Women’s Experience in Spain and Spanish America, 1726-1839 (Baton Rouge, 2009), pp.143-158. See also the special journal edition discussed
medical texts, this thesis builds on and provides nuance to the picture of humoral medicine drawn by Sacristán. I also explore literary and philosophical tracts to uncover the broader cultural significance of the term madness. Moreover, Sacristán’s book *Locura y Disidencia* argues that during the Bourbon reforms the elite increasingly understood madness as a secular medical problem. Throughout this thesis, analysis of religious and medical texts, as well as court records, provides evidence that elite thinkers continued to understand madness as a religious problem, while religious understandings of madness underpinned changing medical theories in Bourbon Mexico.

Historians of Mexico have traced a different philosophical and scientific canon in New Spain to that read in contexts such as England. Histories of philosophy and science in New Spain do not directly address madness, but must be reviewed here because they form the basis for understanding theories of the mind and madness in Mexico on its own terms. The work of historian José Enrique Covarrubias on the idea of the ‘useful man’ in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries compares intellectual trends in France, Britain, Italy, Germany, and Spain to Mexico before examining how these theories shaped practical ventures by the state and private individuals in Mexico. In *En Busca del Hombre Útil*, Covarrubias shows that political and moral thinking in the second half of the eighteenth century was guided by the principle of utility.\(^{47}\) Crucially, Covarrubias observes traits that were peculiarly Mexican, developed by creole thinkers, as well as discussing which European ideas were influential.\(^{48}\) Of particular note is his analysis of major strands of Catholic Enlightenment thinking in Mexico, Spain, and Italy that reflect on the human condition. Historians of Mexico Mauricio Sánchez Menchero and Rosa Angélica Morales Sarabia provide a similarly useful study of Mexican Enlightenment intellectuals in their book *El Corazón de los Libros*.\(^{49}\) They analyse scientific journals and newspapers from the mid-eighteenth to the early nineteenth century to explore the various scientific standpoints taken in Enlightenment Mexico in their local context. Much of the book is devoted to examining the writings of two widely read Mexican Enlightenment authors, José Antonio Alzate y Ramírez, an ecclesiastical bureaucrat interested in science, and José Ignacio Bartolache y Díaz Posada, a medical doctor. Bartolache’s writing in his medical journal, the *Mercurio Volante*, is analysed in this thesis. Sánchez and Morales show that these thinkers drew heavily on the theories of Dutch

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\(^{47}\) Covarrubias, *En Busca del Hombre Útil*.

\(^{48}\) The term *creole* referred to people born in the Americas who were of exclusively Spanish descent.

\(^{49}\) Sánchez Menchero and Morales Sarabia, *El Corazón de los Libros*. 

botanist and physician Herman Boerhaave. Authors whose works were ubiquitous in northern European thinking were absent from the libraries of New Spain: Descartes was not read in the Americas, nor was Locke read by many intellectuals. Thus Sánchez and Morales helpfully outline Mexico’s distinct intellectual trajectory. This thesis draws on Sánchez and Morales’s findings to examine how madness was theorised by Enlightenment intellectuals. Madness is considered from a religious and politico-moral perspective and as a concept that became a source of increasing medical interest.

The historiography reviewed in this section shows that while there is a wealth of research on the history of madness, there are many avenues yet to explore. The literature on the Hispanic world observes a link between violations of the religious values of Mexican society and instances of supposed madness, but why this was the case must be explored. This thesis examines the link between sin and madness primarily by working with the concept of selfhood. In doing so, it draws on the history of the self in Mexico to rethink the view that understandings of madness became more secular in the eighteenth century. Instead it argues that 1760 was a turning point for the greater interiorisation of Catholic values. Regulating oneself against madness was part of this internalisation.

The role of indicators of social status such as race and gender in the conceptualisation and function of madness are considered to extend understandings of madness and how it functioned as a technology of the self. The historiography of madness, gender, race, and class in Anglophone contexts suggests ways of working with these categories in Bourbon Mexico. Section Two of this chapter examines the historiography of these categories in New Spain to analyse their relationship to madness. I also consider aspects of the intellectual history of New Spain because of its relevance to understanding the broader worldview within which discussions of ‘madness’ appeared. These bodies of work make possible further investigation of madness in Bourbon Mexico. This thesis takes them as a starting point to move beyond questions such as ‘was a historical actor mad?’ and ‘when were individuals thought to be mad?’ to explain how madness was socially and culturally constructed in this context. I build on this body of work by asking about the epistemologies that shaped beliefs about madness and by using madness as a way to explore how selfhood was constructed in Bourbon Mexico. The following sections review literature that shapes this thesis from the histories of selfhood, gender and race, and the emotions.

Section Two: Mapping Out New Questions and Answers
Selfhood

50 Ibid., pp.58, 73-4.
The introduction to this thesis describes Foucault, Goldstein, and Voekel’s theories of selfhood, which I adapt to consider madness as a ‘technology of the self’. They explore processes of examining and punishing or educating individuals so that they internalise values and manage themselves, removing the need for external surveillance while the threat of reprisal exists. As discussed in the introduction, the theory of ‘technologies of the self’ has not been applied to the concept of madness. I develop this theory in a new direction and build on other histories of the self discussed here, which provide useful context for the study.

Links between conceptualisations of the self and understandings of madness were noted at an early stage in studies of madness, though they have not been fully explored. In 1963 George Rosen wrote in ‘Social Attitudes to Irrationality and Madness’ that ‘Today, the idea of a personal self appears as an indispensable assumption of existence. Actually, like other views of human nature, it is in large measure a cultural idea, a fact within history, the product of a given era.’ Rosen’s article addressed European social changes that affected attitudes towards mental disorders and ideas of what mental disorders were in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. He uncovered some of the complex social dimensions of mental illness and provided explanations for changing attitudes based on social, economic, philosophical, and moral components. Rosen’s comment is a reminder that ideas such as the self and human nature are not fixed throughout time and space and therefore that the pursuit of understanding the history of the self can contribute significantly to understanding a society and its epistemology.

Existing historical studies of the self in Mexico are based on research of the Bourbon reforms and Mexican Independence (c.1750-1850) and focus closely on the importance of church and state reforms. This chronology allows historians to consider the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century as a period in its own right and to look for common ground and continuity between them. Historians use this framework to avoid making the end of colonial rule an artificial divide because many aspects of intellectual thought, political change, and daily life were shaped by the late colonial period. A key text on the changing intellectual context of the Enlightenment in Mexico is Juan Pedro Viqueira Albán’s *Propriety and Permissiveness in Bourbon Mexico*. Viqueira Albán challenged the idea that Spain and its colonies were unsophisticated backwaters, untouched by the Enlightenment. He provided evidence that the Enlightenment did indeed influence the Bourbon reforms, leading to

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52 Ibid., p.227.
greater regulation of education, public space, and public spectacles. Viqueira Albán showed that the reforms created a state that intervened more, not least in the daily lives of the poor, for example by establishing a poor house in 1774, as discussed in the thesis Introduction.\textsuperscript{54} Moreover, in Bourbon Mexico health was understood to be social and moral as well as physical: Viqueira Albán analyses state policies that blamed bull fighting for social depravity, advocated the use of the theatre as a moral corrective for the masses, attempted to control the behaviour of common people in the street through the regulation of alcohol sale and consumption, and advanced the ball game \textit{pelota} as the pinnacle of enlightened moderation and health.\textsuperscript{55} Thus, for the Bourbon state good governance involved gaining control over the bodies of colonial subjects through measures that can broadly be understood as promoting public health. These measures addressed morality as well as sanitary conditions. Viqueira Albán’s work offered a way of thinking about governance in New Spain that informs more recent studies. It creates an opportunity to consider how tightening bureaucratic control had implications for elite understandings of selfhood and therefore for their treatment of the people they ruled.

Patricia Seed’s study of changing marriage practices, contemporaneous with Viqueira Albán’s work, argued that the eighteenth century saw the emergence of the idea of the secular, rational, self-interested individual in daily life in Mexico. Seed used church records of prenuptial disputes, petitions to the \textit{Audiencia} of Mexico, which was the highest secular tribunal in the colony, ecclesiastical decrees, papal bulls, confessional manuals, and popular religious literature to analyse shifts in the meaning of words such as ‘love’, ‘will’, and ‘honour’ and the role of parents and children in marriage choices.\textsuperscript{56} She traced a change in praxis of marriage promises across the eighteenth century, from verbal contracts based on love and honour to written contracts aimed at securing the economic interests of the parties involved. The mediation of marriage disputes passed from the hands of the church to the hands of the state over this period too. Seed argued that support for individual choice in marriage declined because of a change in cultural values that prized status and economic success.\textsuperscript{57} Such changes provided evidence of the rise of the secular, economically motivated, self-interested individual.

\textsuperscript{55} Viqueira Albán, \textit{Propriety and Permissiveness}, pp.19, 35, 107, 186.
\textsuperscript{57} \textit{Ibid.}, p.11.
These studies have established important aspects of how self-regulation changed and became stricter in the eighteenth century by considering state governance practices and dimensions of individual choices. Furthering this work requires detailed exploration of the religious underpinnings of self-regulation. Pamela Voekel observes that Seed explored ideas of the self in this period but did not consider how religious values affected the economically self-motivated rational being she describes.\(^{58}\) Voekel claims that Seed missed an important aspect of the development of the self in Mexico: that church reformers promoted spiritual methods of achieving an economically productive society, such as employing self-discipline based on God’s grace in order to train the passions.\(^{59}\) Nonetheless, Seed’s work helps to situate studies of the self within the changing social milieu of Bourbon Mexico.\(^{60}\) Pamela Voekel’s work, discussed in detail in the introduction, shows through her examination of wills and burial practices that scientific perspectives were religiously informed.\(^{61}\) This thesis builds on her observations to examine regulation of the living mind and body. It considers self-regulation through discourses about appropriate and inappropriate behaviour and bureaucratic processes disciplining failures to self-manage. Religious values underpin every aspect of that regulation, in secular literature and criminal court cases as well as in Catholic texts and Inquisition proceedings.

Madness also forms a focal point because there are many references to it in the diverse records pertaining to Bourbon Mexico. This thesis argues that the term ‘madness’ was ubiquitous and readily employed to warn against disobeying the colonial order because it was implicitly linked to the idea of sin. Madness was a shorthand for immorality across a range of contexts and so to avoid being mad meant to avoid being bad by the strict standards of acceptable behaviour in Bourbon Mexico. I argue that examining madness is crucial to understanding how the self was shaped because of the connection I trace between sin and madness. Examining the religious roots of regulation against madness provides an understudied perspective on how society was governed in Bourbon Mexico that emphasises the persistent importance of Catholic conceptions of the world.

\(^{59}\) Ibid., pp.2-3.
\(^{60}\) Covarrubias’ work on utilitarianism and mercantilism, discussed above, helps to trace some of the links between economic ideas and philosophical discussions on human nature in the late-colonial and early independence era. In particular, see chapter five of his book: Covarrubias, *En Busca del Hombre Útil*, pp.231-267.
Gender and Race in the Colonial Americas

Bourbon Mexico was a patriarchal society ordered around the Hispanic concept of *limpieza de sangre*, which pre-dated the conquest of the Americas. *Limpieza de sangre* denoted the purity of Spanish, Old Christian blood, free from the ‘tainted’ blood of heretics or converts to Christianity from Judaism and Islam. It was the linchpin of Spanish concepts of honour and social hierarchy. Spanish men who met the criterion of *limpieza* through their family lines dominated high state and church offices and public life in Spain and the colonies to the exclusion of all other groups. In New Spain, the colony was run on behalf of the King by a viceroy, who was almost always a *peninsular*, an individual of Spanish descent born in Spain itself. *Peninsular* was a socio-racial category, rather than just a national category. The viceroy oversaw laws, public services, and the criminal and civil justice systems. The church and Inquisition also regulated society in New Spain and were led by *peninsulares*. One’s socio-racial position determined all aspects of life in New Spain and was an important aspect of Hispanic honour. Bourbon Mexico, like the rest of the Spanish Empire, had an honour based culture where one’s reputation was paramount in both individual success and family standing in the community.62 The Spanish conception of honour encompassed the whole colonial population; however, not all kinds of honour were accessible to all people. There was a distinction between *honor*, honour-status based on Spanish lineage, and *honra*, honour-virtue, based on conduct.63 *Honor* was only accessible to Spanish people, though anyone could achieve *honra* by behaving in accordance with the positive expectations of their gender and *calidad*, a term signifying quality or status that was used to conceptualise socio-racial differences.

From the mid-eighteenth century, encompassing the period from which most of the material for this thesis dates, five main categories of *calidad* were in use: Spaniard, which included *peninsulares* born in Spain and creoles born in the Americas, *indio* (Indian), *negro* (black), *mulato* for someone of mixed Spanish and African descent, and *mestizo* for someone of mixed Spanish and Indian descent.64 There were other terms, which described the mix of descent and in theory quantified how Spanish or Indian someone was. These labels held different associations. Labelling someone as *indio* was a way of marking them out as

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ignorant, superstitious, emotionally unstable, and involved in witchcraft; these attributes were also thought to be feminine. Black people were thought to be lying and licentious. Black men and mulatos in particular were seen as likely to be aggressive and sexually threatening. Mestizos were thought by the elite to be inclined towards evil. Race-based stereotypes were closely tied to perceptions of poor and impoverished people, whom the elite considered to be ignorant liars.

Labels of calidad ostensibly denoted genealogy, though they were really used to convey information on an individual’s behaviour and their reputation. Specific aspects of comportment, appearance, and kinship ties had racial attributes and were closely tied to understandings of class through calidad. Therefore, terms such as castizo, a less common term that in principle referred to someone with three Spanish grandparents and one indigenous grandparent, had a social significance far beyond the genealogical definition. As being Spanish conveyed the highest social status, to be castizo signified someone who was almost Spanish; something about the individual excluded them from Spanish status. Categories of calidad were relational and reputational, constructed based on performing one’s calidad in reference to social expectations. Negative attributes were associated with people of lower status and positive attributes were attributed to Spaniards, who were of higher status. Thus, while calidad was rooted in ideas of blood purity and contamination, it was an unstable category. A specific individual’s calidad was socially constructed from their reputation in their community.

Laura Lewis’ work, such as Hall of Mirrors, provides a framework for considering the ways in which reputation and cultural assumptions shaped the racial categories applied to historical actors. Lewis uses seventeenth-century Inquisition records to explain the workings of inter-racial social networks in colonial Mexico. She addresses the coexistence of different epistemologies within the colonial system, and the points of contact, co-optation, cooperation, and resistance between these views and different historical actors. Lewis asks how legitimate and illegitimate power was constructed and who utilised these differing forms of sanctioned and unsanctioned influence. She explores the ways historical actors negotiated their circumstances, drawing on cultural expectations of Spanish-ness, Indian-ness and blackness to demonstrate their legitimacy or the illegitimacy of others.

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66 Laura Lewis, Hall of Mirrors: Power, Witchcraft, and Caste in Colonial Mexico (Durham, 2003), pp.73, 98.
67 Arrom, Containing the Poor, p.82.
68 Lewis, Hall of Mirrors.
69 Ibid.,
Understandings of *calidad* intersected significantly with perceptions of gender. For Lewis, ‘gender’ and ‘race’ were ‘deployed in... colonial discourses as dynamic idioms that both precluded and promoted certain kinds of power in a number of different social domains and, ultimately, for all colonial subjects.’

Race was not inherent but a constructed category formed through complex interactions involving social and cultural expectations, lineage, kinship ties, and the appearance and comportment of individuals. Lewis’ work on race in colonial Mexico shows that *calidad* was constructed based on an individual’s reputational qualities. Thus, it was possible to gain legitimacy through proximity to Spanish networks and regular, respectable work. Lewis’ work on black women in colonial Mexico provides examples of this. She outlines the Inquisition case of a woman described as black who was imbued with ‘Spanish’ virtues through the ‘civilizing’ influence of an upbringing in a Spanish household and her good conduct, in contrast to another woman who was known as a black runaway slave.

In the Spanish Empire, men were considered to be ‘in everything more perfect than women’. There were, however, significant differences between how a Spanish man and a *mestizo* man were viewed. Similarly, a Spanish woman and a black woman would have very different lived experiences. Male honour depended on providing for one’s dependants, but appropriate employment depended on one’s *calidad*. For men of lower status, honour was attainable through hard work and a good reputation. They could, for example, work as a craftsman or a soldier. A man of any *calidad* and station in life could aspire to the Spanish

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70 Lewis, ‘The ‘Weakness’ of Women’.
71 The work of Rachel O’Toole on the construction of race in colonial Peru also provides examples of this process. O’Toole shows how negative qualities such as ignorance were equated with Indian-ness. In her chapter ‘The Most Resplendent Flower of the Indies’, O’Toole describes the Inquisition case of a nun in seventeenth-century Peru who claimed to have mystical powers. She and her confessor tried to present her to the Inquisition as a saint. The inquisitors thought the nun was lying in her trial and she was condemned as vain and ignorant. A crucial element of the case was the discovery that she had lied about her illegitimate birth in order to enter the convent. Her reputation was destroyed. Building on the revelation that the nun was not a legitimate Spanish woman, the inquisitors framed her as culturally Indian because she failed to answer questions adequately under oath. Ignorance reinforced the nun’s identity as illegitimate and closer to Indians because supposedly a legitimate Spanish nun would have been able to satisfy the inquisitors’ questions. See: Rachel O’Toole, ‘‘The Most Resplendent Flower of the Indies’: Making Saints and Constructing Whiteness in Colonial Peru’ in Daniella Kostroun and Lisa Vollendorf (eds), *Women, Religion, & the Atlantic World, 1600-1800* (Toronto, 2017), pp.136-155.
ideal of *honra*, honour-virtue, through discipline and correct application.\textsuperscript{75} Women were thought to be physically, mentally, and morally weaker than men. They were excluded from public office regardless of *calidad*, though appropriate behaviour and ways of achieving good reputations differed for women of different *calidades*. For Spanish women *honra* involved being *recogida*, secluded, from the world either in a convent or their home.\textsuperscript{76} These expectations could not usually be met by women of other *calidades*, most of whom would have had to work for their living. Thus for a black woman to be gainfully employed with a ‘master to serve’ was the best state from the perspective of the honour system.\textsuperscript{77} Spanish women were thought to be more moral, through being *recogida*, than non-Spanish women, but the comparable status of Spanish women and non-Spanish men was somewhat ambiguous. Regardless, people who were not Spanish men were considered to be deficient in a variety of ways.

In this thesis, I draw upon the established history of *calidad* and gender to explore the currently unstudied interaction between these categories and madness, and the social expectations placed on different kinds of people. Studies of *calidad* and gender enable new questions to be asked, such as whether some groups were more likely to be thought mad than others and whether all people were capable of rational behaviour. If some people were not capable of being rational, was their irrationality labelled as madness? These questions about how madness intersects with race and gender expose tensions in contemporaneous theories of universal human nature and hierarchies of race and gender. Examining how these discourses affected the application of the label ‘madness’ helps to develop an understanding of the ideologies that shaped self-management.

Scholarship regarding the social history of colonial Mexico takes as a point of departure the fundamental role played by *calidad* or race in structuring colonial society. This work began with quantitative studies from the mid-twentieth century that used census data to establish the classificatory systems used in colonial Mexico to demarcate race.\textsuperscript{78} Patricia Seed then built on this understanding to examine how race was socially constructed. In her article ‘Social Dimensions of Race: Mexico City, 1753’, Seed added substantially to understandings of the meaning and function of colonial racial terminology. She conducted a comparison of the racial categories used in census data and parish marriage records in

\textsuperscript{75} Cameron Bristol, ‘Patriarchs, Petitions, and Prayers’, p.183.

\textsuperscript{76} Elisa Sampson Vera Tuleda, Colonial Angels: Narratives of Gender and Spirituality in Mexico, 1580-1750 (Austin, 2000), p.3.

\textsuperscript{77} Lewis “‘Blackness,’” “Femaleness” and Self-Representation’, p.84.

\textsuperscript{78} Classic works are: Gonzalo Aguirre Beltrán, La Población Negra de México, 1519-1810; Estudio Etno-Histórico (Mexico, 1946); Magnus Mörner, Race Mixture in the History of Latin America (Boston, 1967).
eighteenth-century Mexico City. She considered the importance of occupation, reputation, language, and dress to colonial categorisation. Seed showed how racial categories were applied to individuals based on their economic roles and social position.79 This literature made it possible to explore how race was socially constructed in colonial Mexico and how other factors interacted with race to shape identity.

In the 1990s, debates about the social dimensions of racial categories were overtaken by analyses of colonial racial ideologies.80 Of particular note is the work of Douglas Cope, The Limits of Racial Domination: Plebeian Society in Colonial Mexico City. Rather than following elite categorisations and explanations, Cope studied the process of constructing social and cultural reality, and the ways ordinary people shaped their identities and understood their own behaviour.81 His work was framed around understanding the lives of the urban poor, including the material constraints of their lives, and the role race played in their interactions. He made comparisons between popular views and elite views, and examined the relationships between elite and popular groups.82 Cope analysed Inquisition and criminal records, notarial records, civil and ecclesiastical documents, and parish registers. In The Limits of Racial Domination, he traced the development of a racially diverse society and then argued that there was a distinct plebeian culture within that society. He further analysed plebeian values and resistance to elite racial ideology, asking what the significance of ethnicity was to the urban poor. Cope stated that control of labour was the prime method of social domination in colonial Mexico City. He explored channels of patronage and social mobility as well as ruptures to this system through riots and political action. His central finding was that ‘race is a mutable social identity that is reinforced and altered in many contexts’.83 Elite racial ideology influenced the lives of the poor through face-to-face interactions and the practical effects of patronage.84 Cope’s work theorised that differences between people in colonial Mexico were socially constructed based on an ideology of racial hierarchy. It enabled further discussion of how historical actors constructed and contested their identities in colonial Mexico.

The turn towards reading race and class as social constructions has led historians to think more broadly about identity as socially constructed. As Andrew B. Fisher and Matthew

80 See Patricia Seed’s summary of the class/caste debate and why historians need not be drawn into it: Ibid., pp.602-4.
82 Ibid., p.7.
83 Ibid., p.5.
84 Ibid., p.163.
D. O’Hara have stated, ‘Recent historical scholarship has underlined the degree to which imperial subjects played a hand in shaping the meaning of colonial racial discourse.’ Historians now do not focus solely on elite constructions of race and plebeian contestation of racial classifications. They instead analyse the ways race and other dimensions of difference were constructed by many different historical actors in their day-to-day interactions. The edited volume Imperial Subjects: Race and Identity in Colonial Latin America is an excellent example of this newer work on identity. Imperial Subjects collates studies from many colonial Latin American contexts to explain the interactions between elite colonial ideology and historical actors. It shows how those interactions formed their identities as individuals, community members, and subjects. The authors consider ‘how structures of colonial rule were transformed into venues of lived experience, and subsequently were transformed into identities.’ How did historical actors understand difference? Did historical actors understand difference in a way similar to current understandings of race? The authors use cases from contexts such as the Mexican Inquisition, to the gracias al sacar, or requests for legitimacy in the Viceroyalty of New Granada, in order to explore these questions.

Ann Twinam’s chapter ‘Purchasing Whiteness’ for instance builds on the research in her book Public Lives, Private Secrets. In the earlier work, Twinam explained how the colonial elite in New Granada created barriers to social mobility through barring illegitimate people from advancement, and how this illegitimacy could be officially altered with gracias al sacar requests. In ‘Purchasing Whiteness’ Twinam uses those gracias al sacar petitions from 1760-1808 in New Granada in which historical actors requested their status to be officially recognised as Spanish; typically gracias al sacar requests were from historical actors wanting to be recognised as legitimate children, thus removing the stain of having been born out of wedlock. These cases provide evidence that one’s socio-racial category could be changed, and not merely in the sense of racial ‘passing’ but by becoming something different. Such studies emphasising the fluidity with which status could be defined highlight the need for research into the specificity of individual and group identities, a theme that has been noted

86 Ibid., p.2.
by other historians of colonial Latin America. The fluidity of socio-racial status in the colonial Americas has implications for studying madness as an aspect of identity. Historical actors constructed not only their socio-racial status but also their sanity or madness in many daily interactions. Analysis of madness in this thesis considers where labels of madness intersect with those of socio-racial status. The thesis suggests that labels of madness or sanity were applied differently based on other aspects of identity such as gender and calidad.

Recent literature on race in the colonial Americas is explicitly intersectional. The apparent interactions between categories such as gender, race, class and, I argue, madness suggest it is important to consider the intersections of these categories in co-constructing madness and thus their combined role in self-management. Historians explore identity with an awareness that social categories such as gender and calidad did not exist independently of each other but interacted. The complexities of these categories and their interaction have been theorised by some scholars through intersectionality. Intersectionality refers to the study of dimensions of inequality, usually gender, race, and class; it assumes that these different dimensions do not exist separate from or parallel to each other. Rather dimensions of inequality interact and co-construct each other. On this basis, constructions of race, gender, and class are understood to interact in meaningful ways. Historians utilising intersectionality argue, for example, that to be a white woman in the colonial Americas was wholly different to being a black or an indigenous woman. Joan Cameron Bristol’s chapter ‘Patriarchs, Petitions, and Prayers’ analyses an Inquisition case of an afro-Mexican woman on trial for blasphemy and another blasphemy case of a non-Spanish, European man to explore how honour was shaped by gender and race. She shows that Christian ideas of morality were integral to gendered difference and that elite expectations of historical actors varied depending on their gender, race, and class identity.

María Elena Martínez’s research into the theoretical origins of socio-racial constructions has allowed historians to render visible the moral framework upon which racial differentiation was based in colonial Mexico. Her book Genealogical Fictions examines how race was understood through the concept of limpieza de sangre. She charts the use of limpieza de sangre in fifteenth-century Spain and its adaptation in the New World, where she specifically focuses on seventeenth-century applications of blood purity. Using bureaucratic records from the Inquisition, church, and state, including probanzas de

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92 Martínez, Genealogical Fictions.
limpieza, or legal proofs of blood purity, Martínez shows that the religious significance of blood purity declined and it became increasingly attached to discussions of the body and skin colour. Limpieza de sangre was an unstable category based on outward appearance, lineage, behaviour, and community reputation. It retained moral force even though the importance of Christian origins waned as the central focus of concern. Blood determined both outward characteristics and internal moral traits and by the end of the eighteenth century purity of blood was associated with rational people (gente de razón), signifying elite groups. Thus, Martínez provides evidence that the traits connected to blood purity were increasingly linked to class in the eighteenth century. Although the explicitly religious meaning of blood purity declined, Martínez’s study shows that a moral view of the world, informed by Hispanic Christian concerns about belief and lineage, underpinned how people were treated in colonial Mexico. Her research provides an important platform for a study of the intersections between race and madness because the theories underlying both were based on the same moral framework of Hispanic Christianity. Martinez shows that purity or cleanliness was attributed to the elite, supposedly virtuous and rational Spanish, juxtaposed against the purportedly immoral, irrational lower classes of mixed descent.

This thesis explores how that discourse interacted with the idea that to be sinful was to be mad. I examine how the belief that people of black, indigenous, or mixed-race descent and women were less moral and rational than Spanish men interacted with the conceptual link between morality and sanity. Martínez’s work uncovers how race was linked to morality through Christian Spanish conceptions of blood purity (cleanliness) as virtuous and a lack thereof as sinful. This thesis shows how madness, non-Hispanic racial categories, and female identity converged at a point where they were all understood to be sinful. Examining the relationship between labels that denoted ‘sin’ deepens understanding of how human nature was constructed, and how people were expected to regulate their behaviour.

The role of racial ideology in shaping selfhood across the mid-eighteenth to mid-nineteenth centuries in Mexico has been examined by historian Matthew O’Hara in A Flock Divided: Race, Religion, and Politics in Mexico, 1749-1857. His central argument is that reforms and disputes around religious practice across the late-colonial and early-independence period functioned to form social identities and communities through a bipartite process of internal self-reflection and external labelling. O’Hara’s work complicates the historical narrative about reform piety in Bourbon Mexico. Reform piety is

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93 Ibid., p.248.
94 Martínez, Genealogical Fictions, pp.226-231.
95 O’Hara, A Flock Divided, pp.3-7.
discussed in the thesis Introduction. O’Hara’s work shows that religious self-regulation did not affect all groups in the same way. He analyses church records to explore the role of the category of ‘Indian’ in Mexican religious, legal, and socio-political thinking because this lens uncovers how colonial practices moulded the politics of the Independence.  

A Flock Divided has three parts addressing: colonial conceptions of Indian difference and their relation to religious practice in the colony; reform efforts targeted at indigenous practices and their often unsuccessful effects; and the role of religion in shaping Mexican politics post-Independence. O’Hara’s work describes a series of interactions where marginal groups contested elite governance strategies. He addresses the contradiction between the Spanish idea of an Empire united by Christianity and the reality of one divided into many smaller parishes based on race.

O’Hara shows that religious disputes based on the practices of these social groups played a part in the construction of Indian-ness. As O’Hara analyses elite-popular interactions in urban and rural contexts, his work provides a way of understanding concepts of selfhood and identity formation in Mexico beyond the elite. O’Hara’s findings are compatible with Pamela Voekel’s research on elite theories and practices of selfhood, which she acknowledges does not necessarily apply to those outside privileged circles in Mexico City and Vera Cruz. Indeed, O’Hara builds on Voekel’s theory that religious reform turned Mexican culture from a corporate society to a society of individuals. While institutional religious reform attacked popular piety and the established social order, O’Hara holds that ‘from colony to republic, Mexican religion often retained strong corporate foundations rooted in colonial social categories’. There were many aspects of religiosity that developed in the later colonial period that had both corporate and individualistic strands. Catholicism provided common experiences and conceptual frameworks accessible to people across racial and class lines. O’Hara concludes that throughout New Spain people thought and believed in Catholic ways, even when they held unorthodox beliefs. Thus O’Hara’s work shows that self-regulation differed between social groups in Mexico but was always informed by fundamental Catholic precepts.

Concepts of self-regulation and reform piety developed within existing frameworks of corporate piety, rather than acting to dismantle corporate piety. In ‘The Supple Whip’, O’Hara explores practices of religious brotherhoods called the Santas Escuelas de Cristo, the

96 Ibid., p.10.
97 Ibid., p.221.
98 Ibid., p.223.
99 Ibid., p.229.
Holy Schools of Christ, in the late-eighteenth century, to exemplify the development of reform piety within corporate Catholic institutions. The brotherhoods were groups of predominantly elite Spanish men who practised collective self-mortification, and whose perceptions of identity and selfhood were thus not likely to reflect those of the majority of the population. O’Hara asks why the holy schools appealed at a time of increased elite focus on internal piety and why, considering their unreformed practices, they received official support. He argues that their success came from their cultivation of individual relationships with God through mental prayer and an emphasis on self-reflection and examining one’s own conscience. Corporate religiosity did not disappear; however, at all levels of society identity formation underwent significant changes.

Considering O’Hara’s work alongside that of Voekel provides a platform for considering the multiplicity of ways whereby the self was shaped in Bourbon Mexico. This thesis focuses largely on elite discourses of selfhood. In the practice of governing the populace, bureaucrats in the Inquisition and criminal cases assimilated the impressions of lower-caste observers as they sought to interpret, categorise, and manage defendants. Madness as a category of analysis for understanding selfhood complicates existing histories of the self because the term was employed by so many historical actors in such a wide range of contexts. Thus, this thesis considers both how elite thinkers thought madness ought to be regulated in religious, political, literary, and medical spheres, and the ways many kinds of people were regulated in practice, through Inquisition, missionary, army, and criminal records. At times, different and conflicting ideas about self-management emerge between theorists, bureaucrats, and ordinary people, but all were based on Catholic ideas of sin. Across the social spectrum, madness was understood to be connected to sin. Language related to sin was a primary mode of expression for discussing madness. Selfhood was shaped by this concern for avoiding sin, and thus madness, combined.

New work on identity reincorporates the physical body into the history of gender and race in examining how power relations worked in practice. Sonya Lipsett-Rivera’s book *Gender and the Negotiation of Daily Life in Mexico, 1750-1856* explores cultural aspects of human interactions with others and the environment, drawing on sources such as behavioural manuals and court records. In particular, she focuses on the value systems, notably regarding honour, that shaped ordinary experiences and embodied praxis such as how to stand, talk, walk, and gaze. Lipsett-Rivera explains how the body was a metaphor for

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101 Lipsett-Rivera, *Gender and the Negotiation of Daily Life*. 
the order of society, encompassing the body politic and gendered familial roles. She shows that control of one’s physical body underpinned all expectations of correct behaviour. The appearance of the body helped to shape understandings of ethnic difference; for example, beards were understood as a symbol of Spanish masculinity. Lipsett-Rivera’s work facilitates analysis of the embodied practices of the allegedly mad. Analysing records relating to supposedly mad people uncovers instances of speaking, shouting, singing, gesturing, and touching that were used as evidence of madness. These acts must be contextualised: not all instances of shouting, for example, were thought to be mad. What made the way these people used their bodies mad in the eyes of their observers? This thesis compares cases where people were thought to be mad with expected patterns of behaviour and other kinds of infractions. It argues that embodied practices transmitted knowledge of madness. Examining bodily practices that were thought to be mad shows that historians can explore selfhood at the level of continuous self-regulation of individual bodies by examining failures of self-management.

History of emotions
The history of the emotions also suggests useful insights for examining selfhood and the regulation of bodies. The bodily practices analysed in works like Lipsett-Rivera’s *Gender and the Negotiation of Daily Life* can also be conceived of as the symptoms of interior states. In this vein, there is an on-going ‘emotional turn’ in history and related disciplines. This research is premised upon the assumption that the emotions are socially and culturally constructed, as are other aspects of our experience such as gender, race, class, and madness. Historians have developed frameworks to show how this is the case; most influential are those of William Reddy and Barbara Rosenwein. In *The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions*, Reddy outlines a theory that the emotions are mostly, but not exclusively, learned. He works with research on cognition in psychology, the cultural dimensions of emotions in ethnography, and the observation of historians and literary critics that emotions have a kind of history, to suggest a theory based on ‘emotives’ and ‘emotional regimes’. For Reddy, ‘emotives’ are speech acts that describe and construct the world and change the individual who performs them. The idea underpins that of ‘emotional regimes’, which are the normative emotions and officially sanctioned practices that express those emotions and that underpin stable political regimes.102

Reddy uses Revolutionary France as a testing ground for his theory, drawing on historical material such as novels, plays, moral philosophy, letters, and court documents.\(^\text{103}\) From these sources, Reddy argues that the passions were understood to be negative phenomena prior to the French Revolution. According to Reddy, the Revolution opened up a new kind of emotional liberty through sentimentalism in philosophy and literature.\(^\text{104}\) Crucially, Reddy considers how emotions change over time and thus how they shape and are shaped by events. He makes explicit a link between emotional management and political control. This theory of emotional management provides the historian with a framework for relating ordinary expressions and feelings to power relations. The concept of ‘emotional regimes’ acknowledges that emotional behaviours are enforced and that a lack of conformity incurs penalties. Thus Reddy’s work suggests that analysing the emotions is an important aspect of theorising how the individual is shaped.\(^\text{105}\)

Reddy’s theories have, however, been rightly criticised by other historians. He claims too much authority for his theory of ‘emotives’ by arguing that exploring emotional suffering allows historians to dismiss categories of analysis such as power, race, class, gender, and ethnicity.\(^\text{106}\) I argue that theories of the emotions are most useful as analytical tools when used intersectionally with categories of analysis such as race, gender, and class. Considering these categories of analysis alongside the idea of ‘emotional regimes’ can expose how emotional regimes affected different kinds of people and, consequently, how emotional self-management differed between subjects.

Barbara Rosenwein provides useful criticism of Reddy’s work. She shows that Reddy’s analysis is shaped by his political agenda of ‘emotional liberation’. For example, Reddy argues that the French Revolution allowed the emotions more freedom of expression and this has continued, for the better, up to the present.\(^\text{107}\) As part of this agenda, Reddy implicitly judges some emotions as better than others. Rosenwein critiques this hierarchy by correctly pointing out that suffering has often held positive associations with honour; for example, it was the key way to imitate the life of Christ in the medieval period, and this continued in the early modern period.\(^\text{108}\) Thomas Dixon’s work on how the concept of the passions developed into the emotions in the eighteenth century also challenges Reddy’s

\(^{103}\) Ibid., p.155.
\(^{104}\) Ibid., p.147.
\(^{107}\) Rosenwein, Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages, pp.17-20.
\(^{108}\) Ibid., p.22.
findings. Dixon explains how the passions were thought to function and to show that the passions were never understood to be wholly negative.\textsuperscript{109} These criticisms all unveil errors in Reddy’s findings; however, I think Reddy’s use of his own theoretical framework is at fault, rather than the framework itself.

Barbara Rosenwein, in \textit{Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages}, takes her critique of Reddy’s theory further and argues compellingly that there were multiple ‘emotional communities’ in the Middle Ages, rather than two oppositional communities where one is dominant and hewn into structures of power and the other is oppositional. Rosenwein points out that the term ‘emotional regimes’ overlooks the variety and multiplicity of emotional groups. Instead, she theorises that the concept of ‘emotional communities’ better reflects manifold social groups and the ways individuals sit within multiple groups. For Rosenwein, ‘An emotional community is a group in which people have a common stake, interests, values, and goals. Thus it is often a social community.’\textsuperscript{110} The concept of ‘emotional communities’ is designed to acknowledge multiple groups and kinds of self-expression. Rosenwein provides historians with a new way of approaching social groups. She explores systems of feelings considering what was valuable or harmful, how others’ emotions were interpreted, and reviewing what kinds of emotional expression were encouraged, permitted, or criticised.\textsuperscript{111} As she points out, her theory has a similar function to Foucault’s concept of ‘discourse’, where language works to control individuals, and Bourdieu’s theory of ‘habitus’, where interactions are determined by culturally dependent standards that are internalised.\textsuperscript{112} Indeed, the research on selfhood and identity discussed above parallels Rosenwein’s concern with the management of individuals.

Rosenwein’s focus on how emotional groups co-exist and overlap differs from Reddy’s hierarchical model; however, it fulfils a similar function and shows sensitivity to the role of race, gender, and class in determining emotional regulation. I draw on these theories of emotional management to consider how the self was shaped through emotional categories. This thesis examines ways in which historical actors were expected to regulate themselves based on the values of a patriarchal, caste-based society. It also works to

\textsuperscript{109} Thomas Dixon, \textit{From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological Category} (Cambridge, 2003). Dixon’s thesis refers to English language usage of the terms passions and emotions. It is a useful reference point; however, the trajectory of the passions and emotions was different in colonial Mexico. This thesis shows that the passions were viewed much more negatively in colonial Mexico and were closely connected to sin and madness.

\textsuperscript{110} Rosenwein, \textit{Emotional Communities}, pp.24-5.


\textsuperscript{112} Rosenwein, \textit{Emotional Communities}, p.25.
establish common principles of self-regulation and emotional management. Both Rosenwein and Reddy’s theories help to shape this analysis of the emotional self in Bourbon Mexico.

Nicole Eustace’s research on the political role of the passions in revolutionary America exemplifies how the history of the emotions can expose the discursive regulation of the self within a political framework.\textsuperscript{113} She draws on both Reddy and Rosenwein’s work and crucially, in understanding emotional language as key to social interactions, she connects political discourses and emotional ones. Eustace shows that power dynamics were both expressed and shaped by the rules of who was allowed to express specific emotions, when, how, and to whom. Eustace examines the emotions historical actors ‘ought’ to have displayed and the realities of emotional interactions. She examines how historical actors discussed their own and others’ emotions based on the social ranks and relations of those involved. She also shows how elite groups thought the passions affected people differently according to gender, race, and class. Social status was maintained through the strict regulation of one’s emotions. Eustace convincingly shows that studying emotional expression is a way of investigating power relations because emotional control is a site where power is exercised over the individual. Such theories from the history of emotions have yet to be applied to studies of madness. This thesis adapts insights from research into emotional language to show how individuals had to self-regulate their emotional expressions to protect themselves from labels of madness. In Bourbon Mexico, the Catholic Church was a key arbiter of emotional expression.

Recent research into the history of emotions in Mexico draws on the same theoretical underpinnings as the literature on Europe and the USA. In particular, historians have adapted Rosenwein’s concept of ‘emotional communities’ to colonial Mexico. The seminal work on emotions in colonial Mexico is Sonya Lipsett-Rivera and Javier Villa-Flores’s edited volume \textit{Emotions and Daily Life in Colonial Mexico}, which provides evidence that the kind of emotional community one was part of shaped how emotions were experienced and displayed. The various chapters ask questions such as how were ideas of emotions transmitted? How were emotions managed and regulated under colonialism? How did sentimental vocabulary, expressive behaviours, and shared meanings of emotions change in New Spain over time?\textsuperscript{114} The chapter ‘Of Sadness and Joy in Colonial Mexico’ by Jacqueline Holler discusses happiness and sadness as religious states of being, such as love of God and

\textsuperscript{113} Nicole Eustace, \textit{Passion is the Gale: Emotion, Power, and the Coming of the American Revolution} (Chapel Hill, 2008).

the despair of fallen mankind. Of particular note for work on madness, Holler discusses understandings of melancholy as profound sadness. Holler argues that ‘emotion was powerfully channelled through the discourse and meanings of Catholicism’.\(^{115}\) Thus the mental state of an individual was not the prime concern of society; rather the correct religious expression of emotion was of the utmost importance. Holler also charts changes to the meaning of emotional vocabulary across the colonial period. For example, although joy or happiness were linked to fleeting momentary pleasures, in the later period a concept of wellbeing, or the good life, started to develop.\(^ {116}\)

The volume as a whole allows me to address the religious and emotional anguish that appears to be the primary expression of madness in Bourbon Mexico. Crucially, this research enables contextualisation of the accounts by and reports on the supposed mad. What kinds of feelings and expressions of feeling were accepted in a given situation? Why was a certain emotional response taken as evidence of madness in one individual or context if not in others? The evidence used by observers to discern madness in an individual was often emotional in content, and indeed medical and literary texts also cited certain kinds of or amounts of emotions as symptoms of madness. In this context, right feeling and expression was overwhelmingly informed by Catholic precepts. Thus, judgements about wrong feeling and wrong expression held moral weight: whether or not one was a good Christian was intimately intertwined with the ability to express oneself correctly and even feel appropriately. Such a role for the emotions made them key to determining what was deemed mad because having extreme feelings, or feeling too much could be sinful and put the individual at risk of madness. The overlapping terminology of the passions and conditions associated with madness form part of the exploration of how certain emotional states could be thought to be pathological, for example melancholy and fury.\(^ {117}\) This thesis considers how failures to regulate one’s emotions were theorised as mad: to manage oneself against madness therefore involved strict emotional regulation. In doing so, the thesis also firmly situates emotional discourses in the religious framework of the time, addressing Rosenwein’s concern that historians of the eighteenth century have framed emotions as a secular aspect of people’s lives.

\(^{116}\) Ibid., p.37.
\(^{117}\) See Jacqueline Holler’s article on sadness and melancholy for a discussion of the difference between the appropriate sorrowful state of humanity and pathological states of sorrow such as melancholy: Holler, ‘Of Sadness and Joy in Colonial Mexico’, pp.17-40.
History of the emotions intersects with other historiographies charted in this chapter, particularly work on identity. Historians have begun to map out how different groups and individuals were expected to feel and express their emotions by working with Rosenwein’s idea of emotional communities. Reddy’s concept of emotional regimes has been adapted to show how emotions adhered to power structures. Eustace’s work, *Passion is the Gale*, most explicitly links emotions to political discourses and self-management. The edited volume by Lipsett-Rivera and Villa Flores is particularly useful in its exploration of the intersections of gender, race and emotions. Although this work does not explicitly explore concepts of selfhood, it is a key platform for considering the kinds of self that were cultivated in Bourbon Mexico. Considerations of selfhood must examine both theoretical discussions of self-management, and the regulation of the populace in practice. In examining the idea of madness in this thesis I draw together studies on the emotions and selfhood because madness denoted a failure to regulate one’s emotions. A particular focus is the strong link between the concept of the passions, and madness through sin: how were the passions understood and in what ways did the sinful passions lead to madness? The passions are a key aspect of the link between sin and madness, which I argue is fundamental to understanding human nature in Bourbon Mexico. Therefore, a study of how madness functioned as a technology of the self must consider the religious and emotional dimensions of the concept.

**Conclusion**

A historiography for framing a study of madness in Bourbon Mexico must be based on many literatures outside of histories of medicine and mental disorder. This chapter has reviewed developments in the history of madness that followed interest in the voices and experiences of sufferers and the difficulties historians have had with bringing new methodologies to their focus on patients. The historiography of madness is taken here as a platform for writing the history of the self and thus is connected to a range of other historiographies that enable analysis of madness as a technology of the self. These include scholarship on selfhood, race, gender, and class, and emotions, which I argue are fundamental to furthering understandings of madness and regulation in the past.

Reviewing the existing literature on madness shows that parallel historiographies of madness have developed in Hispanic and Anglophone scholarship. These historiographies have a common root in testing and refining Foucault’s theory of the ‘great confinement’. For this thesis, the most crucial work on madness is that of María Cristina Sacristán because she

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118 Eustace, *Passion is the Gale*. 

considers madness in the context of colonial Mexico. She observes that madness held religious and medical connotations.

Studies of madness in Mexico and Spain observe a link between religious misdemeanour and supposed madness. Exploring the conceptual relationship between madness and sin is central to this thesis. Midelfort’s observation that Foucault’s work underestimated the importance of sin in understanding madness is important here. The literatures on Mexico and England both claim that around 1760 was an important turning point in the way madness was conceptualised and terms related to it. Sacristán shows that references to madness are much more common after 1760 than before in colonial bureaucratic documents. Regarding England, Suzuki refers to a linguistic shift that tied madness to the diseased mind from the 1760s onwards. This thesis examines how concerns about madness were internalised around this time. Histories of the Anglophone world provide useful examples of how historians of madness can analyse the ways in which gender and racial inequalities affected how terms for mental disorders were applied and understood. This thesis ties together these starting points on madness through an extended exploration of the relationship between sin and madness. This discussion incorporates the role of gender and race into explanations of how the category of madness was understood and applied to manage individuals and to prompt self-regulation.

Methodological innovation in the history of madness requires incorporating theories and concerns from other literatures. The thesis introduction and this chapter have reviewed relevant scholarship from the history of selfhood, which frame the discussions of empirical material in the chapters to come. The theory that Bourbon Mexico saw a rise of a ‘rational’, economically motivated self prompted studies that considered the religious dimensions of the self and the importance of race in uncovering diverging kinds of selfhood in late colonial and early Independence Mexico. As yet, there are no studies of madness as a category for self-regulation. By examining madness in this conceptual framework, this thesis builds on the history of selfhood in Mexico and suggests a new direction for studies of madness. In particular, this research explores how religious values shaped the construction of madness.

The thesis draws substantially on the historiography of calidad and gender in the Americas to consider how these categories shaped madness and thus selfhood. Like madness, calidad and gender have been theorised as social constructs by historians. Research into calidad and gender examines the colonial ideologies that shaped lived experience. Historians have established that calidad and gender must be understood as intersections: they affect each other and cannot be analysed as distinct categories. This
thesis examines how people of different gender and calidad were expected to regulate themselves and what kinds of behaviour were deemed unacceptable and consequently mad for different individuals. This discussion of differently regulated selves relates to the role of sin in Bourbon Mexico. Hierarchical ideologies associated women and people who were not of exclusively Spanish descent with sinful and irrational behaviours. This discourse had implications for the universal applicability of theories of human nature. Were all ‘kinds’ of people capable of being virtuous and rational and if not, what did madness look like as a result? This thesis draws together the histories of race, gender, and madness and relates all three discourses to concerns about sin. It shows that while distinct kinds of people were expected to regulate themselves based on different premises and to varied ends, self-regulation in Bourbon Mexico involved the idea that all humans were at risk of falling into sin and consequently madness.

The historiographies of race and gender, and of the emotions, help us understand the role of quotidian practices in regulating the self. Work on gender, calidad, and the emotions in daily life in colonial Mexico provides a platform for considering how people regulated and failed to regulate their bodies against madness. Research on gender, calidad, and emotion allow historians to ask what was considered to be a failure to self-regulate and which failures were labelled as mad by contextualising the ways people manipulated their bodies. They also help to attach a discussion of madness’ significance to power relations.

The main expression of madness was emotional and spiritual distress. Understanding madness therefore requires an awareness of the emotional behaviours that were permissible for different groups. What emotions were allowed and by whom? What failures of emotional control were deemed mad? What intellectual frameworks explained emotional rules? Discussion of appropriate emotional regulation threads through this thesis with regard to many kinds of self-management. The following chapters consider religious and politico-moral discussions related to regulation of the self, medical theories of self-regulation, and many practical instances of failed bodily and spiritual regulation all involving emotional expression. Examining emotional components of supposed madness enables a consideration of the interior worlds of historical actors, as I explore how individuals were supposed to regulate their thoughts and feelings as well as their outward behaviour.
Chapter Two: Sin, Reason, and Selfhood

Introduction

This chapter considers madness as part of a vocabulary for regulating the desired pious Catholic individual, the moderate and rational being, and the obedient and useful vassal of the state. Madness was an important concept in Bourbon Mexico because it linked together processes of philosophical and medical change, Bourbon state expansion, and enlightened Catholicism in a terminology of selfhood and governance. Following the work of María Cristina Sacristán, historians of madness in the Hispanic world have observed that in the early modern period madness was a religious concept. However, they have not explained how or why it was a religious concept, beyond stating that it was regulated in part through the Inquisition.¹ This chapter addresses the connections between religion and madness. I argue here that elite thinkers considered human sin to put all individuals at risk of falling into madness. In the Caroline period the risk of madness became pivotal in the regulation of individuals and society. Like Gabriel Paquette’s Enlightenment, Governance, and Reform in Spain and its Empire, 1759-1808, this chapter focuses on the vocabulary, beliefs, and theories employed during the Bourbon reforms rather than the effects of the policies that were actually implemented.² I argue that the emphasis on regulating against madness in many aspects of life shows that madness was an important concept regarding selfhood.

The chapter explores the relationship between madness, reason, sin, and regulation in a variety of texts because the Bourbon reforms, particularly those designed between 1759 and 1808, aimed to regulate all aspects of life and public discourse. It focuses on religious, political, and literary references to madness and then discusses a selection of manuscript case records. Section One surveys texts including the Treatise on the Errors of Human Understanding (1781) by the Mexican Enlightenment author Juan Benito Díaz de Gamarra y Dávalos, Archbishop Juan de Palafox y Mendoza’s Works (1762), and the play ‘Apostolate in the Indies and the Martyrdom of a Cacique’ (1731), written by Eusebio Vela, a Spanish peninsular playwright who resided in Mexico. Analysis of these texts establishes that authors

² Paquette, Enlightenment, Governance and Reform in Spain and its Empire, p.22.
perceived a connection between sin and madness, the two being linked through theories of reason and virtue, sin and the passions.

Section Two tests Pamela Voekel and Matthew O’Hara’s findings on the importance of internalised piety in the late colonial period. It considers how ‘madness’ featured in eighteenth-century rhetoric that promoted internalised piety based on an examination of one’s own conscience. The section considers an eighteenth-century translation of Thomas Kempis’ *The Imitation of Christ* (c.1418-27) and Pedro de Ribadeneyra’s *Flos Sanctorum*, originally published in 1599 and republished throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It also surveys the sermons and pastoral letters of Archbishop Alonso Núñez de Haro y Peralta (1729-1800). These documents were printed in various editions in Mexico during his life and in full in Spain in 1806. Section Two assesses how this personal, internal piety was developed by enlightened Mexican thinkers. These sources suggest that religious authors did not think it possible to regulate fully against sin and madness.

Section Three considers how discourses on the regulation of madness were part of Bourbon attempts to govern the populace. It reviews the politico-moral tract *The Obedience and Loyalty Owed to the Sovereign, and to his Magistrates*, written by Santiago Josef López Ruiz in Lima and published in Lima in 1785 and Spain in 1793, a Mexican poem from the newspaper the *Diario de México*, and Hipólito Bernardo Ruiz Villarroel’s *Political Illnesses that the Capital of New Spain Suffers* (1785-7). These texts allow a discussion of the ways a label of madness was used to justify the regulation of the political behaviour and daily lives of Mexican subjects.

The final part of the chapter, Section Four, examines whether historical actors considered reason to be in opposition to madness when they judged the supposedly mad. It explores the extent to which the ability to reason related to good self-regulation. Archival material from monastic and Inquisition records is discussed here to provide examples of the importance of reasoning. The section places assessments of reasoning in the context of the existing historiography of madness and Inquisition cases.

The chapter as a whole investigates a range of contexts where a vocabulary of madness, reason, and related phenomena was employed. From this analysis it appears that ‘madness’ did not describe a fixed reality. Rather it was a discursive tool used to justify regulation of all aspects of life including religious movements and political decisions as well as individual bodies and behaviour.
Section One: The Relationship Between Sin and Madness

Roman Catholic ideas of sinfulness permeated Mexican society in the eighteenth century, as discussed in the thesis introduction. The *Diccionario de Autoridades* (1726-39), the first dictionary of the *Real Academia Española* (the official body that oversees the Spanish language), defined sin as a ‘Deed, saying or desire against the Law of God and his precepts’. It was also ‘anything that departs from that which is honest and just, or that lacks that which is right’. Sin was associated with the Devil because the Devil was ‘he who instigates or incites one to commit [sin]’. The dictionary gave additional definitions of various categories of sin. These categories were: original sin, pertaining to the Fall of humankind; actual sin, which was of one’s own volition in thought, word or deed; habitual sin, which was any sin regularly practised; venial sin, which referred to a lesser, pardonable sin that did not separate an individual from God; and mortal sin, which had the potential to cause eternal damnation if the perpetrator was not absolved of the sin before death. Sin was thus an elaborate and inclusive concept and humankind was inherently sinful because of the Fall.

Key Mexican Enlightenment thinkers, such as Dr Alonso Núñez de Haro y Peralta (1729-1800), Archbishop of Mexico (1772-1800), considered sin to be central to the human condition. Haro y Peralta portrayed human nature as sinful and irrational in contrast to the state of humankind prior to the Fall. Writing about the state of humanity he argued, ‘Over is the short, happy time, in which peace reigned with innocence, in which the passions, subject to reason, followed [reason] without ever impeding it, in which the soul ruled with sweetness, and the flesh submitted with pleasure. The disorder of sin disturbed this beautiful order of grace’. For Haro y Peralta, the ideal state of human nature had been one where reason commanded the individual. On this basis, reason directed the passions and body, the irrational and sensory aspects of the individual, towards a life of virtue. Human sin destroyed this balance.

3 For a longer history of sin in the Catholic world, see Jean Delumeau, Eric Nicholson (tr.), *Sin and Fear: The Emergence of a Western Guilt Culture, 13th-18th centuries* (New York, 1990). Also, for discussions of variation within attitudes to sin in the eighteenth-century Catholic world, see: Covarrubias, *En Busca del Hombre Útil*, p.394.

4 *Diccionario de Autoridades* (O-R), pp.174, 2, ‘Hecho, dicho u deseo contra la Ley de Dios y sus preceptos’; ‘cualquier cosa que se aparta de lo recto y justo, o le falta lo que es debido’; ‘el que instiga o incita a cometerle’.

5 Alonso Nuñez Haro y Peralta, *Sermones Escogidos, Pláticas Espirituales Privadas, y dos Pastorales, anteriormente impresas en México* (3 vols, Madrid, 1806), I, p.73, ‘Se acabó, y duro muy poco el feliz tiempo, en que la paz reyaba con la inocencia; en que las pasiones, sujetas á la razón, la seguían, sin prevenirla jamás; en que el alma mandaba con dulzura, y la carne se sometía con placer. El desorden del pecado turbó este bello orden de la gracia’.
The centrality of human sin was also apparent in the writing of the philosopher and priest Juan Benito Díaz de Gamarra y Dávalos (1745-83). Díaz de Gamarra was born in Michoacán, educated in Mexico and Italy, and became the rector of the San Francisco de Sales College in San Miguel el Grande. He emphasised the defects of the human passions and the need to continually recognise divine will to counter those defects. For example, in the Treatise on the Errors of Human Understanding (1781) he wrote that ‘The passions make men take measures that are very strange and harmful to themselves and others. He who is impassioned never looks for what is right, but what is useful or delectable relative to the object of his passions.’ Thus the passions were dangerous because they favoured sinful things and created temptations to deviate from that which was right. The basic definition of sin, as anything that departs from that which is right or just, was thus embedded in Díaz de Gamarra’s view of the passions.

The passions are part of a constellation of terms including sin, spirit, will, and appetites that were used to describe feelings or emotions. Historians of the Hispanic and Anglophone worlds describe how by the eighteenth century the passions had long been discussed both as negative and immoral, and as positive paths to God. One eighteenth-century Spanish definition of the passions described them as ‘the movements, and diverse stirrings of the soul, according to the diversity of objects that present themselves to the senses’. Based on their location in the soul, the passions were inherently moral, as Díaz de Gamarra’s discussion also suggested. In the eighteenth century, enlightened authors emphasised the negative and sinful aspects of the passions. Haro y Peralta’s writing elaborated on a clear conception of rationality and morality as opposed to the passions and lower faculties (such as the imagination). Elite thinkers considered the faculties to be ‘parts’ of the soul based on an Aristotelian framework whereby the soul’s ‘parts’ were arranged in a hierarchy. Haro y Peralta described this dichotomy between reason and other aspects of

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6 Juan Benito Díaz de Gamarra y Dávalos, José Gaos (ed.), Tratados Errores del Entendimiento Humano, Memorial Ajustado, Elementos de Filosofía Moderna (Mexico, 1947), p.62, ‘Las propias pasiones hacen a los hombres tomar medidas muy extrañas y dañosas a sí mismos y a los demás hombres. El que esta apasionado, nunca busca lo que es justo, sino lo que es útil o deleitable relativamente a los objetos de su pasión.’
7 Dixon, From Passions to Emotions, p.5.
8 Holler, ‘Of Sadness and Joy in Colonial Mexico’, p.22; Eustace, Passion is the Gale, pp.4-5.
9 Terreros y Pando, Diccionario Castellano (P-Z), p.57, 1, ‘los movimientos, y diversas ajitaciones del alma, según la diversidad de objetos que se presentan á los sentidos’.
10 Voekel, Alone Before God, pp.3, 47-9; Covarrubias, En Busca del Hombre Útil, p.391-3.
11 Dominik Perler, ‘Introduction: Faculties and Their Explanatory Function’ in Dominik Perler, The Faculties: A History (Oxford, 2015), p.4. In the early modern period, many thinkers wrote critically about Aristotle’s ideas, but continued to use a vocabulary relating to the faculties to discuss the
the person in a pastoral letter that addressed his views on sinful, mutable human nature. The letter considered how humanity must guard ‘against the suggestions of spiritual powers that stir up the passions [by] proposing evil things to our imagination and encourage monstrous vices, which men fall into’. Thus, he considered the individual’s soul to be at risk from spiritual threats. Alongside the passions, the imagination was juxtaposed against reason and was a potential site for irrationality. Through the irrationality of the imagination, other lower faculties, and the passions, humanity was thought to be at risk of falling into sin.

Just as the passions were bound up with sin, reason was associated with virtue. Following one’s reason led to true beliefs and virtuous behaviour. A faithful Christian fixed one’s sights on union with God after death. The *Diccionario de Autoridades* defined reason (*juicio*) as an ‘Intellectual capacity or faculty, which enables men to distinguish the good from the bad, and the true from the false’. In this definition, that which was good was also true and rationally deducible. Therefore, what was immoral was also false and incorrect. To behave immorally was to act irrationally through sinfully indulging the passions rather than following reason. The *Diccionario de Autoridades*’s definition of reason thus mirrors its definition of sin as quoted above. The moral ability to distinguish between right and wrong required the ability to undertake sane and rational actions.

Learned authors considered reason to be God-given. They linked the concept both to God’s judgement and to ‘good sense’. This link is apparent in the term *juicio*, which means judgement or reason. One dictionary entry on *juicio* described it as ‘buen sentido’, ‘good sense’. *Juicio* was also a religious concept that referred to the Last Judgement. The dictionary definition elaborated on the religious significance of *juicio* stating that: ‘God’s judgements are final. Individual judgement is that which God gives to each one at the end of their life; and universal judgement is that which he will give at the end of the centuries, giving to all the reward, or punishment, according to their works.’ The poem explained how God would serve moral judgement to every individual and to humanity as a whole. Making a judgement was an inherently moral process and reason was necessary to make judgements.
God’s reason and judgement were the highest forms of these attributes and as part of his creation humanity was subjected to that judgement. Humans were also made in God’s image and so imbued with rational capacities. The more rational one was, the more one acted in accordance with God’s will, and the closer to God one was through one’s deeds.

Religious texts explicitly twinned irrationality and sin by likening heresy to madness. Indeed, heresy was madness. The *Diccionario Castellano* described idolatry as ‘worship, and adoration of false gods...’ and continued that ‘idolatry reached such madness, that crocodiles were worshiped, cats, stones, garlic, etc. from whence came just satire’. Such thinking created a strong discourse that justified denouncing heresy and idolatry as irrational as well as sinful. The link between madness and sin was even stronger in religious texts such as the Spanish language re-publication of Thomas Kempis’ *The Imitation of Christ*, translated by Joseph de Camino, a Spanish priest (Madrid, 1776). *The Imitation of Christ* is a fifteenth-century Latin devotional text that advocated cultivating one’s relationship with God through internalised spiritual practice and turning away from worldly desires. It was widely printed and reprinted in numerous languages throughout the early modern period. Joseph de Camino’s translation of *The Imitation of Christ* drew a very clear line from immoral thoughts to madness. Camino wrote that ‘It is madness to want a longer life, and not to care that it is a good life.’ Thus, one did not have to commit heresy to be mad. Merely turning one’s gaze away from immaterial, heavenly ends down towards material, earthly ones made a person mad. Therefore, the cultivation of a moral, Christian life that focussed on union with God after earthly death was the only good, and thus sane, way to live.

The rationality of conforming to Christianity and the madness of straying from that religious path was an idea highly developed in the *Flos Sanctorum*, a religious text popular throughout the eighteenth century in the Christian world. The *Flos Sanctorum* catalogues the lives of saints. It was written by Jesuit Pedro de Ribadeneyra (1526-1611) and published in 1599. Between 1599 and 1761, eighteen editions were published; the later editions were edited and expanded successively by other Jesuits. Various editions of the *Flos Sanctorum*...

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16 Terreros y Pando, *Diccionario Castellano* (G-O), p.321, ‘Idolatria, culto, y adoracion de Dioses falsos... La idolatria llegó á tanta locura, que se adoraron cocodrilos, gatos, piedras, ajos, &c. de donde vino la satira justa.’
were available in Mexico during the eighteenth century.\textsuperscript{20} The text exemplifies an eighteenth-century engagement with longstanding Catholic values and hagiography. The repeated adaptations and re-publication of the \textit{Flos Sanctorum} suggests it is an important text for examining religious discourse in the Bourbon period. The authors of the \textit{Flos Sanctorum} laced the text with references to madness as they outlined their views on Christian standards and provided exemplary tales through the saints’ lives. They described the madness and vanity of worldly, material interests in hagiographies such as that of the Blessed Peter González, a thirteenth-century Castilian Dominican friar. Prior to devoting his life to the Dominican order, Peter was described as ‘very given to finery, to amusements, to vanity, and madness’.\textsuperscript{21} The account juxtaposed the madness of Peter’s worldly interests in his youth to his later pious rationality. Madness and vanity were further linked in the \textit{Flos Sanctorum} with statements deriding the ‘vain judgements of the mad world’.\textsuperscript{22} As in \textit{The Imitation of Christ}, there was an interplay between vanity and madness. Authors often used vanity as an example of the madness of immorality, a sin to which people were very susceptible, which is discussed in more detail below.\textsuperscript{23}

Concern regarding reason and sin permeated Hispanic publications to demarcate behaviours with which the author disagreed. For instance, the association between sin and rationality was an ever-present theme in the politico-moral tract \textit{The Obedience and Loyalty Owed to the Sovereign, and to his Magistrates} written by Santiago Josef López Ruíz, a priest in the archbishopric of Lima. The work was first published in Lima in 1785 and then republished in Spain in 1793. López Ruíz wrote that:

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Seduced by the Devil, with vain curiosity, the man professes to know all things, as God knows them, and therefore, in searching for happiness, he finds his ruin and disgrace; because God punishes the sinner with his same sin, [God] knows to make the object of [the man’s] passions the source of his suffering. Lost in a blundering presumption, his so-called science leaves him more ignorant than a child deprived of
\end{flushleft}


\textsuperscript{21} Pedro de Ribadeneyra, \textit{Flos Sanctorum de las Vidas de los Santos} (Madrid, 1761), p.563, ‘Era muy dado a galas, a pasatiempos, a vanidad, y locura’.

\textsuperscript{22} Ribadeneyra, \textit{Flos Sanctorum}, p.19, ‘Los vanos juicios del mundo loco’.

\textsuperscript{23} These authors drew on Ecclesiastes in their discussion of vanity. For numerous references to vanity, see: Ecclesiastes, 1.1 – 12.14, The Bible, King James Version.
reason and bearings; his understanding eclipsed, he loses both knowledge and innocence. López Ruiz considered that claiming to be omniscient like God was a form of false reasoning. As such, it was an irrational and sinful thing to believe of oneself. He particularly took issue with contemporary confidence in scientific practices and discovery. For López Ruiz, to claim to be able to make sense of the world through scientific pursuits was to turn away from God, valuing one’s own capabilities above God-given reason. He considered turning away from God and towards science to amount to following one’s passions. This, as the quote shows, left the man without reason and innocence. López Ruiz argued that in such circumstances man would be irrational and sinful because reason stemmed from God, not scientific pursuit. Although he wrote during a period of scientific Enlightenment, López Ruiz considered contemporary science to undermine the righteous established power of the church. In the Bourbon period, elite authors employed a long-established vocabulary regarding sin, rationality, and passions to ostracise views that did not conform with their own, regardless of their perspective on Enlightenment ideas.

Elite thinkers considered human reason to be fragile and at risk of being overwhelmed by madness through following one’s desires and false ideas. López Ruiz’s work shows how rationality was considered fragile:

In general, ignorance and desire have been the inexhaustible fount of man’s mistakes, which always lead to error. Those dense fogs, eclipsing the lights of reason, blind the spirit and preoccupy it with erroneous judgements, and through false principles and ideas seduce man to favour his own passions, dressed up in the name of liberty. As a result, there is not an unjust action which man does not commit, there is no law that he has not violated, nor excess to which he does not blindly abandon himself.

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24 Santiago Josef López Ruiz, *La Obedencia y Lealtad Debida al Soberano, y a sus Magistrados* (Madrid, 1793), pp.23-5, ‘Seducido por el demonio pretende el hombre con vana curiosidad conocer todas las cosas, como Dios las conoce, y en aquello mismo, en que busca su felicidad, encuentra su ruina y su desgracia; por que Dios que castiga al pecador en su mismo pecado, sabe hacer del asunto de sus pasiones la materia de sus suplicios. Entregado á los extravíos de una torpe presunción, viene á quedar por su pretendida ciencia mas ignorante que un niño desproveído de razón y de conducta; y eclipsadas sus primeras luces, pierde á un mismo tiempo la sabiduría y la inocencia.’

25 López Ruiz, *La Obedencia y Lealtad Debida al Soberano* pp.19-20, ‘La ignorancia y concupiscencia han sido de ordinario el manantial inexhauto de los desaciertos del hombre y las que lo conducen siempre al error. Esas densas tinieblas, que eclipsando las luces de la razón, ciegan el espíritu, y lo preocupan de los juicios erróneos, son las que lo seducen por los principios de unas falsas ideas, que favorecen sus pasiones, disfrazadas con el nombre de libertad. Desde entonces no hay acción injusta, que el hombre no cometa, no hay ley que no atropelle, ni exceso á que ciegamente no se abandone.’
López Ruíz’s work was written to criticise the French Revolution and promoted obedience to the crown and church. It was written in Lima not long after the Tupac Amaru rebellion of 1780-1, a major insurrection that threatened Spain’s control over the Viceroyalty of Peru. Both the Tupac Amaru rebellion and the French Revolution provoked fear across Spanish America, including New Spain. López Ruíz’s text frames the fear of rebellion and need for good order using metaphors of light and darkness, and sensory processes. Reason was represented as a clear light guiding pure thinking and actions. The sensory metaphor of clear sight described the workings of the mind and clarity of thought. Just as the dark obscured sight, so ignorance and desire obfuscated reason. Irrationality thus was the result of emotion or passion impeding rationality.

This analogy, conflating the spirit’s ability to reason with sight drew on long established ideas of how the human mind/body functioned for rhetorical effect. For example, Thomas Aquinas, paraphrasing Aristotle, described thought as the process whereby the soul interpreted sensory information supplied by the body. Aquinas said that ‘The soul never thinks without a phantasm’. The ‘phantasm’, or mental image, was created by the body’s senses and that image was conveyed to the higher faculty of reason by the lower faculties of imagination, fantasy, and memory. This process had two distinct parts based on sensory perception and the intellectual faculties. The two aspects of the process mirrored each other in the creation of the internal image and its subsequent transmission. López Ruíz’s metaphor of the sins of ignorance and desire as darkness obscuring reason and blinding the spirit drew on such ideas. López Ruíz presented humankind as inherently susceptible to errors of thought and action, which made mankind less moral and rational. He did so by using evocative sensory language that represented reason as moral and clear-sighted and distorted reason as blinded by ignorance and sin.

Sensory analogies describing reason and madness, such as that provided by López Ruíz, developed the idea that everyone was susceptible to wrong-thinking and madness because all humans navigated their lives using their senses. Díaz de Gamarra believed that the senses enabled rational engagement with the world and understanding of it. He argued that the senses facilitated understanding of the world as it objectively was. However, the senses also made one susceptible to error as God had put a limit on human capacities. Díaz de Gamarra wrote, ‘Open your eyes, let yourself be persuaded by reason, hear the voice of

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nature and not those of flatterers and the ignorant." Like López Ruiz, he linked seeing, hearing, and reasoning. To see and hear clearly, and to choose to listen to the 'correct' things, was to be rational. Inability or failure to make such choices was to take irrational, and so sinful, decisions.

Other texts created even more explicit sensory analogies between reason, truth, clear sight, and good hearing. Archbishop Haro y Peralta conflated deafness and blindness with madness in his writings. His sermons condemned 'vengeful people, blind men and madmen!' as one and the same. He associated incorrect choices or doctrinal interpretation as a failure to perceive and reason correctly. In a sense, he suggested that immoral behaviour resulted when an individual was unable to perceive correctly. Haro y Peralta also described humankind as 'blind in their judgements or reasoning' regarding their understanding of the world, thus continuing the metaphor. He conflated inability to see with an inability to reason and implicitly associated correct sensory perception with correct thinking. Thus sensory analogies created a powerful rhetoric that by turning towards God one could perceive true and virtuous paths more clearly.

Discussions of reason and madness emphasised the idea that all humans were at risk of madness. For example, Diego de Torres Villarroel (1693-1770), who wrote under the pseudonym, 'the great predictor of Salamanca' wrote on this theme. Villarroel was a medically-trained writer and poet and held the seat of Mathematics at the University of Salamanca. He wrote political commentary, essays, poetry, scientific books, and an autobiography. His writing was widely read in Spain and copies were available in Mexico. His publication *Extracts from the Forecasts of the Great Predictor of Salamanca* stated that 'the world is one huge madhouse, and he who does not believe this, is one and a half times mad. Reason is a clock with many pieces, and some men are missing many pieces, others fewer, but it is certain that everyone is missing some'. In Villarroel's thinking madness was pervasive. What differed between individuals was not whether or not one was mad, but to

27 Gamarra y Dávalos, *Tratados Errores del Entendimiento Humano*, p.28, ‘Abrir los ojos, dejarse persuadir de la razón, oír la voz de la naturaleza y no la de los aduladores e ignorantes.’
28 Haro y Peralta, *Sermones Escogidos*, I, p.46, ‘¡Vengativos, ciegos y locos! ¡Vosotros que pensáis amais á los enemigos, solo con no perseguirlos!’
31 Diego de Torres Villarroel, *Extracto de los Pronósticos del Gran Piscador de Salamanca, Desde el Año de 1725 hasta el de 1753: Compone Este Libro Todas las Dedicatorias, Prólogos, Invenciones en Verso, y Prosa de Dichos Pronósticos* (Madrid, 1795), p.83, ‘Todo el mundo es casa de locos, y quien no lo cree, es loco y medio. El juicio es un relox de muchas piezas, y de estas á unos hombres les faltan mas, y á otros ménos; pero á todos es cierto que les falta alguna’
what extent one was mad. No human was fully rational and all had the potential to fall into madness.

Such views were not expressed solely in learned works. The risk of falling into madness and the difficulty of guarding against it permeated popular literature and refrains. Proverbs referenced the idea that all people had to guard against madness. For example, both John Stevens’ *A New Dictionary, Spanish and English, English and Spanish* (1706) and Esteban de Terreros y Pando’s *Diccionario Castellano* (1787) recorded the saying, ‘If Madness were pain, it would cry out in every house.’ This proverb conveyed the turbulent emotional experiences that were associated with the idea of madness. It facilitated an image of madness’ ubiquity by using a sensory metaphor that related madness to a sound of distress. In these texts, reason was denoted by clarity, light, and intelligible sounds, in contrast to the darkness, deafness, noise, and pain of madness. Other refrains such as ‘one or other of us, we are all mad’ provide further example of humanity’s potential for madness. This phrase articulated the idea that everyone had the potential to become mad by being human.

In Bourbon Mexico, the theatre was a tool for the moral education and reform of ordinary people. As Juan Pedro Viqueira Albán has asserted, intellectuals and bureaucrats advocated using the theatre as a moral corrective for the people as part of the extensive reform programme enacted in New Spain. Albán shows that the theatre was considered a space for modelling good behaviour. As one contemporary wrote, a good play ought ‘to correct the vices of men, those in which the recognized rule of morality are demonstrated, those in which the morality corresponds to a Christian people is respected.’ The theatre was used to convey the values of enlightened thinkers and Bourbon bureaucrats to the rest of the population.

Theatrical works alluded to the madness of sin, showing that the relationship between reason and virtue and madness and sin was part of public discourse. The play *Apostolado en las Indias y el Martirio de un Cacique* or ‘Apostolate in the Indies and the Martyrdom of a Cacique’ (1731) by Eusebio Vela (1688-1737), a playwright, director and

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34 Viqueira Albán, *Propriety and Permissiveness in Bourbon Mexico*, pp.27, 35.
35 José Antonio de Alzate y Ramírez (1737-1799) quoted in Viqueira Albán, *Propriety and Permissiveness in Bourbon Mexico*, p.35.
actor in Mexico City, provides examples of this. In the play, an indigenous lord named Axotencatl feigns Christian belief while practising his indigenous faith. Axotencatl’s son Cristóbal, a pious Christian convert and the play’s central character, tries to convert his father, which ultimately prompts Cristóbal’s martyrdom. Cristóbal converses at length with a Franciscan missionary named Friar Martín. During their discussion of theology, Friar Martín tells Cristóbal, ‘May God make you a saint, Cristóbal.’ Martin goes on to state that, he who is not a saint is mad knowing of the faith and of the favours, that we owe to Jesus, meek lamb, since, to save us he surrendered himself to death.

Vela used Friar Martín’s speech to explore the implications of Christian faith. For the character of Friar Martín, if one were aware of Jesus’ sacrifice for humankind, there was no other rational and moral choice than to behave virtuously. One had to be sufficiently educated in Christianity to be expected to dedicate oneself to Jesus.

Vela’s explanation of the religious conception of sinful behaviour as mad shows how a discourse of self-regulation against madness was spread through literature and performance. Vela’s elaboration of the relationship between sin and madness also suggests a tension in the expectation that people should regulate themselves against madness through avoiding sin. Martin’s statement prompts the question, was it possible for humanity, inclined as it was to sin ever since the Fall, to avoid sin and so avoid madness? Believing that ‘he who is not a saint is mad’ implied that all humankind was at risk of madness because ever since the Fall humanity had not been holy.

37 Vela was born in Spain but spent most of his adult working life in Mexico. He was an important figure in Mexican theatre and his works provided a critique of the Spanish conquest and evangelisation of the Americas, written from a position of empathy with the work of individual Franciscan missionaries. Apostolate in the Indies was a play about the first Franciscan missionaries to arrive in Mexico and their mixed success in converting indigenous people. It disputed the myth of a peaceful conquest of the Americas, though sympathised with the Franciscan mission. For a discussion of Vela and his work, see: Ben Post, ‘Eusebio Vela’s Mexican Hagiographies: Self-Fashioning in Eighteenth-Century Theater’, Hispania, 99, 4 (2016), pp.589-599; Patricia A. Ybarra, Performing Conquest: Five Centuries of Theater, History, and Identity in Tlaxcala, Mexico (Ann Arbor, 2009), pp.59-61; José Juan Arrom, Historia del Teatro Hispanoamericano (Época Colonial) (Mexico, 1967, 2nd edition), pp.99-101.

38 Germán Viveros (ed.), Eusebio Vela, Comedia Nueva del Apostolado en las Indias y Martirio de un Cacique / Eusebio Vela; Estudio Introductorio y Notas Germán Viveros Maldonado (Alicante, 1999), Act 2, Line 345, ‘Dios te haga santo, Cristóbal.’

39 Ibid., Act 2, Lines 351-9, ‘Es loco aquel que no es santo | teniendo el conocimiento | de la fe y de los favores | que a Jesús, manso cordero, | debemos, pues por salvarnos | se entregó a la muerte él mismo.’
Vela’s narrative focus on the character of the martyred cacique, the Christ-like Cristóbal, suggests that in his view all kinds of people had the potential for rationality and virtue and therefore also for irrationality and sinfulness. Vela considered Cristóbal’s religiosity within a linguistic framework drawing on ideas of rationality and madness, thus suggesting that an indigenous figure could be virtuous and rational. Cristóbal’s name itself references Cristo, or Christ. The linguist Ben Post shows that Vela had a positive view of indigenous religious and intellectual aptitude because the play’s martyr was Indian. Indigenous people were able to be moral and rational, just as the play’s Hispanic characters, including the Franciscans, could be sinful. All people were equally capable of madness.

Section Two: Madness as a Justification for Regulating the Self

Madness, because of its moral implications, was well placed in Bourbon society as a guide to behaviour that historical actors could be expected to draw upon to regulate themselves. Historians Pamela Voekel and Matthew O’Hara have researched concepts of selfhood in Mexico pre- and post-Independence. They argue that in this period self-reflection and a personal relationship with God were necessary for shaping the pious self and were fundamental aspects of the Catholic Enlightenment, as discussed in the thesis Introduction and Chapter One. Religious practice was to be based on spiritual self-discipline attained by God’s grace rather than an externalised, corporate, collective religiosity. Instead of using priests and the saints (and their relics) as mediators between the community and God, enlightened Catholics advocated that ‘the good Christian will consult his conscience in order to live in accordance with divine precepts and the morals advocated by Jesus Christ. This divine law is so perfect, that it not only moderates the unruly passions... but also dictates true charity towards one’s fellow man.’ Thus, in Bourbon Mexico, elite thinkers advocated processes of regulating oneself to be a pious, moderate individual. Through an analysis of madness’ function in religious texts, I argue that madness, as part of a vocabulary for

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40 Cacique denotes an indigenous, and often hereditary, chieftain.
41 See Ben Post’s explanation of the parallels between Cristóbal and Christ’s lives: Post, ‘Eusebio Vela’s Mexican Hagiographies’, pp.592-3.
42 Ibid., p.591.
43 For further discussion of Vela’s views of indigenous people, see Ben Post’s discussion of the Apostolado. He shows that Vela had a more positive view of indigenous people than other scholars have argued. For example, he criticises Victor Grovas’ argument that Vela portrayed indigenous people as instruments of the Devil. See: Post, ‘Eusebio Vela’s Mexican Hagiographies’, pp.592-6; Victor Grovas, ‘Eusebio Vela y Teatro del Siglo XVIII en México: La Visión del Indígena como Otro.’ Ángulo 114 (2008), pp.6-13.
44 Pedro Rodríguez de Campomanes, Discurso Sobre la Educacion Popular de los Artesanos y su Formento (Madrid, 1775), quoted in Voekel, Alone Before God, p.47.
describing human behaviour and thinking about the spiritual individual, was central to the
development of the pious self that Voekel and O’Hara have described in their work.

This view of madness emphasised individual responsibility. It placed an obligation on
individuals to be obedient, moderate, and rational. Ideas of self-denial, turning towards God,
and developing a direct relationship with God were used to reinforce and reformulate ideas
of individual piety in enlightened Catholicism. In his translation of The Imitation of Christ,
introduced above, Joseph de Camino wrote that,

'It is madness to go in search of perishable goods, and to put trust in them.
It is madness to desire honours, and to elevate oneself to distinguished offices.
It is madness to give in to pleasures to the flesh, and to crave that which will
subsequently bring frightful torments.
It is madness to want a longer life, and not to make sure that it is a good life.
It is madness to yearn for the present, and not to attend to what is to come.
It is madness to love that which does not last, and not to search assiduously for
eternal happiness.'

There is a strong theme of self-denial in this extract: the pious individual focussed their
efforts on their spiritual life, seeking to strengthen their relationship with God and to secure
their eternal salvation, rather than seeking worldly pleasures and glory. The internal dialogue
with God required exploring one’s own conscience and rooting out ‘mad’ or unorthodox
thoughts.

The concept of madness as a way of regulating behaviour may have been particularly
important in the Spanish context. The use of ‘madness’ in this passage from The Imitation of
Christ sets the Spanish language translation of the text apart from the original text and other
translations, as earlier Latin versions and contemporaneous English versions use the word
‘vanity’ instead of ‘madness’. The replacement of vanity with madness suggests a shift in
emphasis. Elsewhere in Joseph de Camino’s version, The Imitation of Christ discussed

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45 Camino, El Kempis, o la Imitacion de Jesu Christo p.3, ‘Locura es andar en busca de bienes
perecederos, y poner en ellos la confianza. | Locura es pretender honores, y elevarse a puestos
distinguidos. | Locura es dar gusto a la carne, y apetecer lo que trahe después tormentos espantosos.
| Locura es quere larga vida, y no cuidar que la vida sea buena. | Locura es ansiar por lo presente, y
no atender á lo venidero. | Locura es amar lo que dura tan poco, y no buscar con todo esfuerzo la
felicidad eterna.’

46 Thomas A. Kempis, De Imitatione Christi Libri Quatuor (Venice, Apud Pezzana, 1735, 2nd edition),
p.21; John Payne, Kempis, Of the Imitation of Christ; In Three Books; with the Book of the Sacrament
(London, 1785), pp.2-3. Multiple editions of Kempis’ work were available in Mexico in Spanish and
madness and vanity together as fundamental aspects of being human.\footnote{All of human glory, all temporal honours, and all the interests of the world are vanity and madness, in comparison to your eternal glory.' Camino, *El Kempis, o la Imitacion de Jesu Christo* p.220, 'Toda la gloria humana, todos los honores temporales, y todos los intereses del mundo son vanidad y locura, en comparacion de vuestra gloria eterna.'} However, madness was an all-encompassing feature; while vanity was described as madness, madness was not necessarily vanity. The Spanish use of madness instead of vanity in this translation was characteristic of the Hispanic preoccupation with the implications of sin for rational human action. For Spanish writers, vanity was one form of sin, but it was not as all-encompassing as the idea of sin itself. Nor did the term vanity convey what was at stake when one sinned. When people sinned they risked their sanity as well as their morality.

A powerful dichotomy between reason (or judgement) and madness was made explicit in Archbishop Juan de Palafox y Mendoza’s catechism ‘On Judgement’, printed in 1762.\footnote{Juan de Palafox y Mendoza, *Obras del Ilustrissimo, Excelentissimo, y Venerable Siervo de Dios Don Juan de Palafox y Mendoza, de los Supremos Consejos de Indias, y Aragón, Obispo de la Puebla de los Angeles, y de Osma, Arzobispo electo de Megico, Virrey, y Capitan General de Nueva-Espana, &c.: Tomo III, Parte II: Prosiguen las Cartas Pastorales, con los Tratados: Suspiros de un Pastor, Translaciones de Obispos, Memorial por la Inmunidad Eclesiastica, Castas à Personas Particulares (3 vols, Madrid, 1762), III, p.376.} Palafox (1600-1659) was a highly influential Bishop of Puebla (1640-1655), interim Archbishop of Mexico (1640-1642), and Viceroy of Mexico (1642). Many of his works were printed throughout the eighteenth century and fourteen different titles of Palafox’s writings, including his collected *Works*, were published in Spain and shipped to Mexico between 1750 and 1820.\footnote{Alvarez, ‘Catálogo de Libros España - Nueva España (1750-1820)’, pp.225-6.} The catechism ‘On Judgement’ linked immorality to irrationality and reason to judgement. Palafox wrote,

> Mad is he who does not abandon vice,  
> When he walks to judgement.  
> He who does not do penance,  
> Walks towards [a] horrendous sentence.  
> Do you want a pious sentence?  
> Make sure you do penance.\footnote{Palafox y Mendoza, *Obras*, III, p.376, ‘Loco es quien no deja el vicio, | Quando camina al juicio. | El que no hace penitencia, | Camina á horrenda sentencia. | Quieres piadosa sentencia? | Procura hacer penitencia.’}

In this text, madness and sin were related to each other because by maintaining a sinful life one committed oneself to damnation. Palafox described choosing eternal punishment as madness. The relationship between madness and sin here was literal rather than metaphorical; vice explicitly caused the loss of reason. The poem commanded constant
chastisement of one’s own thoughts and actions to correct the madness of sin, thus associating atoning for one’s sins with rationality. This theme of constant self-reflection was present elsewhere in Palafox’s catechisms. A catechism on the divine commandments stated that:

Of all [the sciences,] the utmost science, is to take care of one’s conscience.\(^{51}\)

Palafox’s catechisms emphasised the need to think constantly of one’s potential salvation or damnation and to establish a continuous internal dialogue that guarded against sin and thus against madness. Palafox designed his catechism around lines of circa ten syllables in rhyming couplets. The rhythm and rhyme of the lines would have made them easy to understand and memorise on hearing.

These catechisms clearly set out the religious requirement to regulate one’s own behaviour. Although Palafox wrote the catechisms in the seventeenth century, the multi-volume edition of his works was published in 1762, during the period of reform piety in Mexico. The publication of these works in the 1760s emphasised the importance of individual conscience and reflecting on one’s sin, and the on-going concern with self-regulation in the Caroline period. Religious reformers in the late-eighteenth century utilised earlier texts that advocated the development of individual relationships with God, and self-improvement. Individual moralisers used the idea that everyone was at risk of becoming mad to advocate self-censorship or management because, if all of human kind could be mad, everyone had an obligation to guard against madness by being alert to its presence in their own mind and conscience. Christian conceptions of madness and reason were harnessed to shape the thoughts of Bourbon subjects as they constructed their good, rational selves through reflection and internal communication with God. The priest López Ruiz wrote in his doctrinal discourse, The Obedience and Loyalty owed to the Sovereign, and to his Magistrates, that ‘The sacrifice of faith is very agreeable to God, because the faithful man captivates the weak lights of his understanding and reason: through obedience man sacrifices the most free of all his powers, which is his free will, and exercises the best of all his virtues, which is charity.’\(^{52}\)

In order to act with reason, López Ruiz urged mankind to give up free will and offer oneself faithfully and obediently to God. God’s grace was the only route to salvation and acting in

\(^{51}\) Ibid., p.351, ‘De todas la mayor ciencia, es cuidar de la conciencia.’

\(^{52}\) López Ruiz, La Obedencia y Lealtad Debida al Soberano, p.121, ‘Si es tan agradable á Dios el sacrificio de la fé, porque el hombre fiel cautiva las débiles luces de su entendimiento y su razon: por la obediencia sacrifica el hombre la mas libre de todas las potencias, que es su propia voluntad, y ejercita la mayor de todas las virtudes, que es la caridad.’
accordance with God’s will was necessary to open oneself to His grace. When one strayed from the path of reason, one erred morally. Reason and unreason were made central to the construction of moral expectations in this text.

In Haro y Peralta’s writing, the contradiction between humanity’s purportedly sinful, irrational nature and the need to guard against sin and madness led to a continuous internal struggle. He considered that human nature as flesh and spirit ‘obliges us to ceaselessly fight against ourselves’. There is, he stated ‘a perpetual combat, which makes life bitter, and puts salvation at risk’. Haro y Peralta’s concern about the sinfulness of humanity, which he linked to irrationality, was part of a longstanding Christian discourse regarding the need to constantly fight against human sin. Earlier church reformers had similarly emphasised the need for God’s grace to achieve salvation.

Haro y Peralta’s sermons were written in a similar vein to those of Palafox. Both clerics used vocabulary relating to the self to emphasise the need to reflect on one’s interior; the struggle against ‘oneself’ was particularly important to enlightened elites. Haro y Peralta, like Palafox before him, created a discourse that endorsed strict, constant self-regulation against any kind of sin. As he said, ‘In other wars[,] the enemy one fights against is external.’ Thus the central idea in his work was that all Christians must constantly fight against sin in themselves; in doing so, they would follow reason rather than the irrational passions. Such a task was considered extremely difficult, required constant vigilance, and as it took place within individual hearts the process was not easily discerned by others, including priests.

Haro y Peralta considered that Christians must fight sin. Throughout his writings, he emphasised they ought to do so through denying their own desires and managing their interior worlds. In doing so he wrote in the same vein as earlier authors such as Palafox and reflected the important contemporary idea of the enlightened, pious Spanish subject persistently fighting sin and madness in their soul.

Haro y Peralta’s writings dwelt on human struggles with self-regulation and the impediments to it. In his ‘Sermon on the Senses’, he explicitly described the imagination as mad in a discussion on the role of pride in human nature. He wrote that:

53 Haro y Peralta, Sermones Escogidos, I, p.73, ‘nos obligan á combatirnos, sin cesar, á nosotros mismos’.
54 Ibid., ‘un combate perpetuo, que hace amarga la vida, y pone en riesgo la salvación’.
56 Haro y Peralta, Sermones Escogidos, I, p.74, ‘En otras guerras el enemigo se combate, esta por de fuera.’
57 See Jean Delumeau’s work on sin for a concerted discussion on sin in early modern Western society. Delumeau, Sin and Fear.
Pride dominates the heart, obfuscates understanding; and makes us lose sight of God and ourselves. It drowns our feelings of fear, respect and religion; and inspires in us audacity, profligacy, and impiety. It imposes the qualities that appear in our mad imagination, and it robs us of the qualities that we have received from God.\(^{58}\)

The imagination was considered to be irrational because of its proximity to the corrupted, material body. Through the imagination, pride harmed the individual’s capacity to understand (a God-given quality) and so to self-regulate through using intellectual faculties. Haro y Peralta based his description of pride on an assumption that the concepts ‘understanding’ and ‘God’ were in opposition to ‘sin’, ‘madness’, and ‘profanity’. Capacity for moral, rational thought and deed was believed to be God-given, whereas sin and madness were a privation of God-given virtuosity. Haro y Peralta described these aspects of a person as fundamental to Fallen human nature; pride was the first emotion supposedly felt by Adam and Eve after eating the apple in the garden of Eden, and Haro y Peralta considered it to be the root of mad, sinful desires.\(^{59}\) His discussion of pride alluded to the fundamental tension between supposed human nature and Christian aims, that is, whether the sinful individual was capable of self-regulation.

Haro y Peralta’s pastoral letters in particular suggest that he did not think individuals were capable of regulating themselves without support. His writings continually state the view that humanity’s capacity to think and reason was varied. Haro y Peralta established the idea of changeable nature requiring regulation at all times to achieve salvation. He wrote considering:

- the variety of men’s characters; their fickleness; the diversity and multitude of their thoughts, judgements, inclinations and humours; spiritual guidance which tries to direct souls to eternal life is not only called the art of arts, but also the science of sciences. In truth, during this mortal life a continual flux and reflux of thoughts and movements reigns in man.\(^{60}\)

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\(^{58}\) Haro y Peralta, *Sermones Escogidos*, I, pp.117-8, ‘El orgullo domina el corazón; ofusca el entendimiento; y nos hace perder de vista á Dios y á nosotros mismos. Ahoga los sentimientos de temor, respeto y religión; y nos inspira audacia, libertinaje, é impiedad. Nos pone las cualidades, que nos figura en nuestra loca imaginacion; antes nos despoja de las que habíamos recibido de Dios.’

\(^{59}\) Genesis, 3.6-8, The Bible, King James Version.

\(^{60}\) Haro y Peralta, *Sermones Escogidos*, III, p.25, ‘[Considerando] la variedad del carácter de los hombres; su inconstancia; la diversidad y multitud de sus pensamientos, de sus juicios, de sus inclinaciones y sus humores; no solo llama arte de las artes, sino también ciencia de las ciencias al gobierno espiritual, que trata de dirigir las Almas á la vida eterna. A la verdad, en los hombres reyna, durante esta vida mortal, un continuo fluxo y refluxo de pensamientos y movimientos.’
The extract underlines the challenge posed to pastoral management by man’s essentially changeable nature. Regardless of what he termed, ‘the difficulties which occur in the direction or regime of souls’, Haro y Peralta believed it necessary that priests should attempt to govern their parishioners, just as parishioners should fight against sin in themselves.61 Discussions of humanity’s imagination, irrationality, and changeable passions provided a linguistic framework for justifying the constant regulation of the self against indomitable sin.

Haro y Peralta’s writing shows that for Bourbon Mexican authors, external behaviours were not sufficient evidence of proper regulation. The rational Christian regulated their interior world to allow grace to enter in. Only the interior state constituted a true measure of one’s piety. Self-regulation and self-knowledge were required but were not in themselves sufficient because only God’s grace enabled fallen humanity to unite with Him.62 For religious reformers, humanity was locked in an internal war with sin. An individual must persist in self-reflection to avoid falling into vice and madness, and to make union with God possible.

Section Three: Madness, Self-Regulation, and Wider Bourbon Governance

This picture of the self-regulation of the pious individual as a defence against falling into madness fits into a broader history of pervasive Bourbon governance. Regulation of all kinds was paramount in Caroline reform processes. The historian José Enrique Covarrubias has argued that political and moral thinking in the second half of the eighteenth century was guided by the principle of utility. Reason, utility, and justice were interwoven in discourses on the comportment of the individual as the Spanish state strove to shape useful individuals in order to further the ends of the state and by extension the collective good.63 Gabriel Paquette’s Enlightenment, Governance, and Reform in Spain and its Empire, 1759-1808 also shows that the intellectual foundations of administrative, fiscal, and commercial control were restructured to justify and enable stricter governance of the population.64 Like Covarrubias, Paquette analyses the language and theories employed by historical actors to develop and validate management of the populace in New Spain. Exploring the intellectual context in which the Bourbon reforms took place helps to elucidate the worldviews of the learned thinkers of the time, including the role they gave to concepts of madness and selfhood. This section draws on Paquette and Covarrubias’ approaches to explore the

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61 Haro y Peralta, Sermones Escogidos, III, p.25, ‘las dificultades que ocurren en la direccion ó régimen de las Almas’.
62 See Pamela Voekel, Alone Before God, pp.46-7 for more discussion of grace and self-reflection.
63 Covarrubias, En busca del Hombre Útil, pp.230-2.
64 Paquette, Enlightenment, Governance and Reform in Spain and its Empire, p.22.
vocabulary of madness. It considers how ‘madness’ was employed to justify Bourbon governance and the regulation of individual thoughts, choices, bodies and selves.

What was considered to be mad differed depending on context. In political writing, learned authors used the threat of madness to govern the individual and as a metaphor for governing the body politic.65 For example, López Ruíz tied together religious and political obedience. He stated that, ‘You know that God has declared himself perpetual protector of the authority of the kings, and an unrelenting avenger of attacks committed against the security of their thrones.’66 Religious and secular hierarchies worked towards similar ends in governance. The treatise, as the author’s brother wrote in a prologue, was written to educate the population with regard to the Christian faith while bearing in mind the importance of political matters. ‘It [incites] adults and the heads of families to industry and work in order to banish idleness, vices, and forestall indigence: it forms docile and submissive vassals, and it repairs the ruins of their church, and adorns it with decency.’67 The theme of obedience dominates the text as López Ruíz set out his views on the appropriate social hierarchy and its maintenance. The reference to docile vassals is particularly striking, bringing to mind Foucault’s concept of docile bodies. It implied the possibility of moulding the thoughts and behaviours of the populace to be compliant with the views of the authorities, and that individuals should monitor themselves to this end. Industrious behaviour contributed to the state’s ends of creating more efficient subjects for the benefit of the Crown. López Ruíz wrote that in the reign of light, that is, of reason, ‘The servant ought to obey his master, the son his father, the wife her husband, and the vassal his King’ and that ‘this law of submission, which conforms well to nature and reason, has at its terminus God, the author and legislator of the universe.’ 68 Thus according to López Ruíz, every individual had their appropriate place in the world and this was based on principles of God-given reason. The disintegration of this hierarchy would be contrary to God and to reason.

65 Mariselle Meléndez takes a similar approach regarding the body in: Mariselle Meléndez, Deviant and Useful Citizens: The Cultural Production of the Female Body in Eighteenth-Century Peru (Nashville, 2011).
66 López Ruíz, La Obedencia y Lealtad Debida al Soberano, p.140, ‘Sabe pues, que Dios se ha declarado protector perpetuo de la autoridad de los Reyes, y un vengador implacable de los atentados cometidos contra la seguridad de sus tronos.’
67 Ibid., pp.16-17, ‘Excita á los adultos, y padres de familia á la industria y trabajo para desterrar el ocio, los vicios, y precaverles de la indigencia: los forma vassallos dóciles, y sumisos, repara las ruinas de su Iglesia, y la adorna con decencia.’
68 Ibid., pp.4-5, ‘El siervo debe obedecer á su señor, el hijo á su padre, la mujer á su esposo, y el vassallo á su Rey... y esta ley de sumisión tan conforme á la naturaleza y la razon tiene por término á Dios, autor y legislador soberano del universo.’
López Ruiz’s ideas addressed the behaviour of individual subjects but in doing so had broader political significance. Madness was a key concept for understanding non-compliance as it was used as a political metaphor in order to shape social values. López Ruiz wrote as the voice of God to those who entertained the ‘mad fantasy’ of overthrowing divinely appointed monarchs, addressing prospective revolutionaries thus:

You wanted to sustain the mad and ambitious Project of ascending the throne… You will briefly occupy a shadow of the office, to which you madly aspire, in order that your fall will be noisier, because having obtained it without my approval, I will violently divest you of it.69

Thus, López Ruiz framed political upheaval and revolution as mad, as well as using madness to describe an individual who engaged in such acts. Madness was something to monitor and regulate in order to shape the ‘docile vassals’ that López Ruiz wanted to comply with the regulations of state and church. He described people and behaviours that did not conform to religious and political dogmas as mad, as well as larger scale phenomena that disturbed the established order. He thus employed ‘madness’ as a powerful concept to argue against disobedience.

Haro y Peralta employed the same vocabulary when he criticised those desiring to enrich themselves in a sermon entitled ‘On Temptations’. He condemned all who did not strive to self-regulate through religious principles, claiming that the Devil tempted people with the idea that it was acceptable to enrich themselves and dedicate themselves to earthly interests. He wrote that the Devil tells people, ‘You will not abandon yourself to a mad ambition; you will not elevate yourself above your state, but you will maintain your rights, and moderate your pretensions.’70 In this statement, Haro y Peralta wrote as if the Devil were adopting the new language of political right and moderation. Just as López Ruiz’s ‘God’ voice decried the madness of overthrowing royal rule, Haro y Peralta’s ‘Devil’ voice argued that looking after one’s own interests was moderate and reasonable. With this idea, Haro y Peralta criticised people for justifying a small amount of sin through the language of moderation; this amounted to being tricked by the Devil’s temptations dressed up in Enlightenment rhetoric. For the Archbishop, sin crept into the individual’s heart through small thoughts and choices. He believed that accepting ‘moderate’ sin allowed the Devil into

69 *Ibid.*, pp.160-2, ‘Quisiste sostener el proyecto loco y ambicioso de subir al trono… Ocuparás por breves días una sombra del puesto, á que locamente aspirabas, para que sea mas ruidosa tu caída, porque habiéndolo obtenido sin mi aprobación, te despojaré violentamente de él.’

70 Haro y Peralta, *Sermones Escogidos*, III, p.61, ‘Vosotros no os dexaréis llevar de una ambicion loca; no os elevaréis sobre vuestro estado, sino que sostendréis vuestros derechos, y moderaréis vuestras pretensions.’
the individual’s heart, led to moral decline, and caused madness. Haro y Peralta, a proponent of enlightened Catholicism, critiqued aspects of the Enlightenment’s values, as did López Ruiz with regard to scientific pursuits, which is discussed in Section Two above. Haro y Peralta used common concepts, such as madness and moderation, to argue that no sin in oneself could be tolerated. For Haro y Peralta, the only way to prevent oneself from falling into madness was to prevent sin from taking root at all.

A vocabulary pertaining to madness and rationality was part of a larger metaphor of medical health and illness that bureaucrats used to describe Mexico. A political tract entitled *Political Illnesses that the Capital of New Spain Suffers* explicitly considered Mexico City’s problems as an illness, employing the common metaphor likening the body politic to the physical body.71 The manuscript text was written between 1785-7 by Hipólito Bernardo Ruiz Villarroel, a lawyer from Spain who held a range of bureaucratic roles in New Spain.72 Villarroel critiqued the problems that he thought besieged Mexico City and set out a vision for improvement. In his damning assessment he noted, ‘This is the state of Mexico’s capital, the emporium of riches, the envy of foreigners, the ambition of the Spaniards, and the general sewer of the universe.’73 Mexico City was well-known among Europeans who travelled to New Spain, such as Prussian explorer Alexander von Humboldt (1769-1859), as a place of extreme contradictions and inequality.74

Villarroel thought the capital was wasteful and unproductive, and decried especially the immoral character of the people of Mexico City. He was particularly vicious in his criticism

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71 Miguel Angel Porrua (ed.), Hipólito Bernardo Ruiz Villarroel, *Enfermedades Políticas que Padece la Capital de esta Nueva España: en Casi Todos los Cuerpos de que se Compone y Remedios que se le Deben Aplicar para su Curación si se Requiere que sea Útil al Rey y al Público* (Mexico, 1979), p.31, ‘Siendo notorio que tengan los cuerpos políticos una cierta analogía con el cuerpo humano.’ The same idea was expressed by Francisco Carrasco, senior fiscal (attorney) of the Real Hacienda in the early 1760s. He thought that happiness was about abundance and feared disequilibrium from disproportionate growth of different social sectors. He stated that, ‘Health [sanidad] is nothing but the internal economy of [the body’s] organs, humours, and parts in a true equilibrium... in the same way, a state is healthy when its humours and parts are in equilibrium... legislation is required to ensure that no single part grows disproportionately so that it becomes detrimental to the whole.’ Carrasco quoted in Paquette, *Enlightenment, Governance and Reform*, p.58.

72 Woodrow Borah, ‘Alguna Luz sobre el Autor de las Enfermedades Políticas’, *Estudios de Historia Novohispana*, 8 (1985), pp.51-79; Genero Estrada, ‘Introducción’ in Villarroel, *Enfermedades Políticas*, pp.viii-xiii. There are three existing copies of the *Enfermedades Políticas* manuscript in Mexico City, California, and Madrid. As the text was circulated, rather than kept private, it is surveyed here alongside contemporary printed texts.

73 Villarroel, *Enfermedades Políticas*, p.173, ‘Este es el estado que tiene la capital de México, el emporio de la riqueza, la envidia de los extranjeros, la ambición de los españoles y la cloaca general del universo.’

of the supposed morality of the indigenous population. He claimed that ‘The character of the Indian is precisely that of being the mortal enemy of all other castes; he is shiftless and does nothing of his own will without being forced, he is extremely malicious, [an] enemy of the truth, distrustful, friend of novelties, disturbances and commotions’. Thus, in Villarroel’s opinion, indigenous people perfectly embodied sin. He framed the supposed vice and disorder of the masses as irrational, stating that Mexico City was:

uninhabitable to cultured people; [it is] full of hideouts and holes, where crude people house themselves, which one ought more appropriately to call pigsties than the houses of rational beings, for each one contains a swarm of dirty and revolting men and women, who are an abomination to others because of their depraved lives and customs.

To Villarroel the masses were wholly different in their nature from the ‘cultured’ and ‘rational’ elites. People who lived in impoverished conditions were not merely poor, uncultured, or even sinful, as indeed he believed them. In addition, they were fundamentally not ‘rational beings’, a vital aspect of contemporary theories of human nature. Villarroel, like the other authors discussed, juxtaposed purportedly rational and irrational behaviour in order to convey disdain towards behaviour that did not meet elite expectations. He dehumanised non-Spaniards as animalistic and irrational. This interpretation of ordinary people, and especially indigenous peoples, as less rational than the elites differed substantially from Eusebio Vela’s creation of the saintly and rational indigenous character, Cristóbal. Comparing the two authors’ representations of the rational capacities of indigenous people provides evidence that there were conflicting ideas of who could self-regulate along rational, Christian lines. Namely, did all people have the capacity to self-regulate to be rational and moral? Or, were only some kinds of people able to do so? The entire thrust of Political Illnesses was to establish the need to regulate the structures and

75 Borah considers this malice against indigenous groups to have developed during the time he spent as a mayor managing local disputes. Borah, ‘Alguna Luz’, pp.63-6.

76 Villarroel, Enfermedades Políticas, p.89, ‘El carácter del indio es precisamente el de ser enemigo mortal de las demás castas; es desidioso y nada hace de su propia voluntad, a no ser a fuerza de rigor; es extremadamente malicioso, enemigo de la verdad, desconfiado, amigo de novedades, disturbios y alborotos’.

77 Ibid., pp.245-6, ‘Inhabitable a la gente culta; lleno todo de escondites y de agujeros, donde se alberga la gente soez, a los que con más propiedad se les debe dar el nombre de zahúrdas que de casas de habitación de racionales, por contener cada una un enjambre de hombres y de mujeres sucios y asquerosos que son la abominación de los demás por sus estragadas vidas y costumbres, perfectos lupanares de infamia y abrigo mal permitido de cuantas castas de vicios son imaginables; lunar feo y asqueroso de toda buena cultura y, finalmente, deposito de un vulgo indómito, atrevido, insolente, desvergonzado y vago, que llena de horror al resto de los habitantes.’
people of Mexico City and to set out a plan for achieving its reform along enlightened principles. However, Villarroel did not consider all people to be able to govern themselves.

Ideas of obedience and conformity, framed around the ‘madness’ of stepping out of line or standing out, were widely disseminated to a literate audience through a variety of publications. These ranged from conduct books to poetry aimed at shaping correct behaviour. At the turn of the nineteenth century, references to locura appeared in newspapers such as the Gaceta de Mexico and the Diario de Mexico. The edition of the Diario de Mexico for 29 January 1806 opened with a poem entitled, ‘To the Affected Ones’, which described the madness of the vain excesses of the ‘fop’ who was preoccupied with fashion and appearances and who wished to be extraordinary. The poet criticised the fop for ‘raging to make himself distinguished’.\(^7\) Rage or madness, rabia, was thus related to excessive behaviours.\(^7\) The poem’s author considered that the mad desire to be eminent or outstanding had to be moderated in all aspects of life to achieve rational and moral behaviour. In contrast to Juan de Camino’s translation of the Imitation of Christ, where ‘vanity’ was replaced with ‘madness’, this poem linked vanity to madness: the specific sin of vanity was madness. The poem pointed to various aspects of life that had to be regulated in order to achieve moderation and sanity, though it did so implicitly by describing the areas in which the fop was excessive:

- His madness does not stop at finery:
- He makes a study of gestures, and of actions
- At the cost of violent contortions...
- He looks, moves, or speaks,
- In everything he wants to be remarkable.
- And what does this achieve? [The fate of] every fool:
  - In being more distinguished, one is more despised.\(^8\)

Madness was an effective technology of the self in this poem because it inferred that all aspects of verbal and non-verbal communication had to be monitored carefully by an individual to avoid being portrayed as mad. Displays of wealth and adorning oneself were not acceptable, just as in the Flos Sanctorum, discussed in Section One, the blessed Peter González’s interest in finery was described as mad. More insidiously, the poem’s audience

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78 Diario de Mexico, 29 January 1806, Numero 121, Tomo 2, p.113, ‘Que rabia por hacerse distinguido’.
79 Diccionario de Autoridades (O-R), p.478, 1.
80 Diario de México, 29 January 1806, Numero 121, Tomo 2, p.113, ‘No para en los adornos su locura: | Hace estudio de gestos, y de acciones | A costa de violentas contorsiones... | En todo quiere hacerse remarcable. | ¿Y que consigue? lo que todo necio: | Quanto mas se distingue, mas desprecio.’
was reminded of the need to look, walk, speak, and even smell a certain way. It continued, ‘He is always equipped with perfumes: He wishes to smell neither like a man nor of neglect’.\textsuperscript{81} In the poem, every human sense was used to detect and describe difference. Such references may have influenced the value judgements of the collected readership. Texts presenting madness in this way prescribed fixed rules of conduct that, while not always being legally or religiously enforced, strongly motivated people to regulate their own behaviour. These values were to be internalised by the audience; however, the process could not be wholly internal as sanity had to be demonstrated through outward behaviours. Historical actors had to dress in accordance with their station, hold themselves in a dignified but modest posture, and speak in turn. Through referring to the madness of the fop and his desire to be remarkable, the poet implied that moderate behaviour was what was acceptable and by association rational.

Authors of all the texts discussed, including the author of ‘To the Affected Ones’, employed terms related to irrationality to convey moral disapproval of the behaviours of others. The word locura, madness, functioned in this rhetorical way, as has been discussed, and the words rabia, anger, and necio, fool or nitwit, had similar functions.\textsuperscript{82} The Diccionario de Autoridades said that a necio was ‘ignorant, and that they do not know what they could and ought to know’ and they were ‘imprudent or lack of reason, stubborn... in what they do or say’.\textsuperscript{83} The dictionary provides evidence that the words for mad and foolish had similar meanings as both were the opposite of reason. As discussed earlier, reason was also a nebulous term, referring to the capacity to distinguish between truth and falsity and to make moral judgements. It included a concept of ‘good sense’ and referred also to God’s judgement of mankind. The significance of these mutable, ill-defined, and often interchangeable concepts was that authors employed them to influence the intended audience to manage their own behaviour. In the context of the poem, the readership ought not to dress flamboyantly nor draw too much attention to themselves through their manner of speech or body language. Thus the poem advocated that individuals modelled their behaviour on what the author considered to be moderate, reasonable conduct. Failure to manage one’s appearance and social graces was mad.

\textsuperscript{81} Ibid., ‘De perfumes vá siempre prevenido: Ni quiere oler á hombre ni en descuido’.
\textsuperscript{82} See the Introduction for a discussion of common terms related to irrationality and madness addressed in this thesis.
\textsuperscript{83} Diccionario de Autoridades (G-N) (Madrid, 1734), p.657, 2, ‘Ignorante, y que no sabe lo que podia y debia saber...’; Ibid., p.658, 1, ‘Vale tambièn imprudente o falto de razón, terco... en lo que hace u dice’.
Section Four: Individual Capacity for Reason

The process of reasoning was important to historical actors when investigating a potentially mad individual. Historians María Cristina Sacristán and Teresa Ordorica Sacristán have observed this in Inquisition cases from Spain and New Spain in the early modern period.84 This section discusses the ways authorities examined the rational capabilities of those they suspected of madness and compares this process to the theoretical importance of reason discussed above. It analyses three cases of clerics who were believed to be mad in missionary records and Inquisition records because they all contain rich discussion of these men’s ability to use reason.85 These cases show that a demonstrable capacity to reason was important in presenting the appearance of sanity. However, whether an individual could reason well or not was often ambiguous and so examining reason alone was not enough to determine madness or sanity.

Officials attempted to discern madness by assessing an individual’s ability to reason, taking this as reflective of their ability to self-regulate.86 In this way, an assessment of madness involved examining the person’s body and mind. The priest, doctor, and professor José Ignacio Brizuela, who held a chair of Medicine at Guadalajara University, accused a number of his students of heresy in 1798. He claimed their medical theses argued for materialism and atheism; for example, he said that Don José María Vasquez Borrego ‘denied the spirituality of the soul’.87 The Inquisition investigated his claims; following up such denunciations was believed ‘necessary to uproot the weeds that the enemies of the faith and the state sow’.88 The imagery used implied that the ideas spread by heretics and traitors once disseminated were hard to remove. Political and religious threats were taken seriously and, until proven otherwise, Brizuela’s accusations of heresy were taken seriously because of his status. Two of the Inquisition’s doctors, Dr José Francisco Rada and Licenciado Mariano Aznarez, were consulted about the contents of the disputed theses. Along with the commissioner, a local agent for the Inquisition and the ecclesiastical judge in his area, and the priests involved in the case, they decided that the theses were not heretical. They firmly

84 Sacristán, Locura e Inquisición, pp.82-4; Teresa Ordorica Sacristán, ‘¿Herejes o Locos?’, p.141.
85 For more detailed discussion of missionary and Inquisition records, see Chapters Four and Five, and the appendix on the Inquisition’s workings.
86 This process took place in criminal cases as well as Inquisition trials and monastic records. For example, see the discussion of the defendant’s ‘modes of thinking’ in AGN, Instituciones Coloniales, Indiferente Virreinal, Criminal, Caja 5602, Expediente 63.
87 Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 1387, Expediente 3, f.165, ‘nego la espiritualidad de el alma’.
88 Ibid., f.170, ‘necesario para arrancar de raiz la cizaña q.e siembran los enemigos de la religion, y del Estado’.
stated that the phrases Brizuela referred to were not remotely materialistic and that his mistakes showed him to have a very weak brain.\textsuperscript{89} Indeed, the Inquisition’s staff suspected that he was mad.

Brizuela’s poor understanding of contemporary science and medicine provided evidence that it was he, rather than his students, who did not have rational capabilities, the ability to regulate his thoughts, and so he was accused of making a false accusation because he was mad.\textsuperscript{90} The Inquisition’s emphasis on the importance of understanding contemporary science in assessing Dr Brizuela contrasts with López Ruiz’s criticism of scientific endeavour, which he portrayed as a rejection of God and God-given reason. The verdict implied that a rational person of his training would not make such an error and false claim. The case against the students did not progress for some time, but nine years later, the commissioner in Guadalajara, deemed ‘this insubstantial and improbable denunciation appears most likely to be the product of ignorance, or lack of reason, on the part of the said Dr Brizuela’.\textsuperscript{91} His inability to construct a logical, well ordered account of his claims and his poor grasp of learned ideas led the Inquisition to judge that he was ignorant or mad. As the religious, political, and literary references to madness showed, the Inquisition considered reason to be clearly in opposition to madness.

Often, an individual’s ability to reason was difficult to determine in practice. Francisco Javier Lazcano, a \textit{padre calificador} (a qualifier, who assessed the Inquisition’s initial denunciations and investigations), evaluated Deacon José Illaregui’s ability to reason in his assessment of the Deacon’s sanity. The Inquisition tried Illaregui in Mexico City in 1753 for heresy and suspected him of having ‘a temptation to Judaism’.\textsuperscript{92} Lazcano wrote that ‘the tenor of his conversation, and answers to diverse questions’ were consistent with ‘reason and the faculties’ and he considered Illaregui to have ‘perfect sanity’.\textsuperscript{93} Lazcano was interested in Illaregui’s logical thought process and his ability to converse and to listen, understand, and respond to questioning in a calm, attentive, and articulate manner. These capacities reflected good self-regulation and so sanity. His assessment was, however, contradictory. Lazcano continued, stating that ‘he appears to have been always a man of limited understanding, little insight, no capacity to judge correctly and with skill, with almost

\textsuperscript{89} Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 1387, Expediente 3, f.185.
\textsuperscript{90} Ibid., f.186.
\textsuperscript{91} Ibid., f.198, ‘Esta denuncia insustancial e improbable, parece q.e es mas bien producida por la ignorancia, o falta de juicio de dicho Dr. Brizuela’.
\textsuperscript{92} Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 943, Expediente 5, f.178, ‘una tentacion de Judaismo’.
\textsuperscript{93} Ibid., f.309, f.315, ‘el thenor de su conversacion, y respuestas a diversas preguntas’, ‘Juicio, y potencias’, ‘perfecta sanidad’.
no scientific training, and especially short of reflection, and therefore his answers are
impetuous and violent, made with deranged haste. Discerning whether or not an
individual’s thought processes revealed good self-regulation was a complicated business.
Lazcano considered Illaregui’s level of education as part of his assessment of Illaregui’s
judgement and reflection. ‘Correct’ reasoning required more than ‘understanding’ a concept;
it necessitated understanding, judgement, and reflection, none of which Illaregui had
displayed consistently. For Lazcano, Illaregui’s lack of ‘scientific cultivation’ was a stain on his
character and compounded the assessment that he was not able to reason and reflect well.
In lacking capacity to judge and reflect, Illaregui appeared to Lazcano to be deranged.
Lazcano’s assessment of Illaregui’s reasoning was contradictory, but shows that authorities
examined individuals in attempts to discern their capacity to reason, to reflect, to understand
and to be knowledgeable, which in turn reflected their ability to self-regulate.

Ability to reason did not reflect one’s ability to self-regulate as clearly as controlling
one’s gestures, expressions, and speech. While the authors discussed in Section Two valued
regulating one’s interior above all else, in practice it was hard to assess whether someone
was sane and moral based solely on examining their ability to reason. Assessments of Friar
Sevane, who was described in the Introduction, were contradictory, as were the discussions
of Illaregui. Friar Eufrasio Sanchez, the guardian at the college in San Diego where Sevane
was sent in 1796, described in a letter to the Viceroy how ‘the aforementioned Father Sevane
lives in this convent with notorious tranquility: but this doesn’t result in a solid mode of
thinking, as we desire, which would make him able to undertake the offices that
respond to a monk.’ While Sevane’s behaviour appeared to have improved on entering the convent
at San Diego, his intellectual capacities were still in doubt. The Guardian’s view demonstrates
that to fulfil his role, Sevane needed to be able to think clearly and reason well. The capacity
to reason was an important facet of being deemed sane rather than mad. In some ways,
Sevane’s thinking reflected an unregulated interior and so showed that he was mad.
However, this was to be contested.

In circumstances where a purportedly mad cleric expressed themselves logically and
coherently, their ability to reason complicated attempts to label them as mad. In practice,
external behaviour was often the most reliable guide for discerning madness, rather than an

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94 Ibid., f.315, ‘muestra haver sido siempre hombre de entendimiento aturdido, de ruda penetracion,
de nada juiciosa synderesis, casi, con ningun cultivo de Sciencia, y especialmente de cortissima
reflexion, y por eso impetusas, y violentas sus respuestas, con trastornada precipitacion.’
95 Instituciones Coloniales, Clero Regular y Secular, Vol. 139, Expediente 20, f.119, ‘el referido P.
Sebane vive en este Convento con notoria tranquilidad: pero no se traduce en el, como deseamos, un
solido modo de pensar, que lo acredite util a los oficios, que corresponden aun Relig.o.’
ability to think coherently. The observations of witnesses differed from religious writers’ views that one had to look beyond the individual’s behaviour to examine their interior world, as discussed above. In this regard, Friar Manuel Sevane’s letters provide a point of comparison to the correspondence of Brizuela. While Brizuela’s letter denouncing the theses was thought to be nonsensical and hard to grasp (only a second-hand copy of the original exists in the records), Sevane wrote a series of well-penned criticisms of the Guardian and his fellows at the college of Pachuca with neat, legible handwriting, and coherent sentences that met contemporary epistolary expectations of form and content. He complained in writing to the Viceroy on a number of occasions, stating for instance in 1796 that:

Some men without experience, science, prudence, or conscience say very clearly that I am mad, but they are the ones who do mad things... they write reports about me full of slander, and of things I did not do, nor have thought of doing, showing hatred and rancour to all the Real Audencia, the Royal Tribunal, of Mexico saying that if I return to the college and enter through one door the whole community will leave through the other.96

See Image 1 on page 113 as an example of Sevane’s writing. Sevane clearly demonstrated his understanding of his situation: he was aware of what could happen to him, and that the friars at Pachuca thought he was mad. His clarity of thought and direct criticism of the actions of others made it hard to dismiss Sevane’s perspective, unlike Brizuela’s. His sustained, well-written correspondence are an example of the college’s difficulties in assessing his sanity based on rational capabilities, which provoked substantial debate around his status as a ‘madman’ or a ‘delinquent’.97 What was uncontested, and formed a stronger case for determining madness, was Sevane’s sensory assault on his fellow friars. Whereas discussions of his thoughts and feelings could be ascribed a range of labels, including madness and delinquency, the sounds, expressions, and violent motions Sevane made assured others of his madness.

96 Instituciones Coloniales, Clero Regular y Secular, Vol. 139, Expediente 20, f.142, ‘unos hombres sin experiencia, ciencia, prudencia, ni conciencia, Dicen que estoy loco dicen muy bien, pero las locuras las hacen ellos... me hacen unos Autos llenos de calumnias, y de cosas que no hice, ni he pensado hacer, y de firmas falsas, manifestando a toda una Rl. Aud. De Mexico, el odio, el rencor, diciendo si buelve al colegio y entra por una puerta toda la Comunidad se sale por la otra’.
97 Ibid., ff.31, 36, 40.
Image 1: One of Sevane’s letters, AGN, Instituciones Coloniales, Clero Regular y Secular, Vol. 139, Expediente 20, f.111.
Conclusion

Madness shaped the governance of historical actors in Caroline Mexico. Drawing on the work of Voekel, O’Hara, and Paquette, I argue that madness functioned as part of a vocabulary to justify regulating the self. Its use moulded social expectations and formed a rhetoric of sanity and piety juxtaposed against madness and sin. Authors used this rhetoric to decry political processes with which they disagreed as well as to ostracise individual behaviours they considered to be immoral. The idea of madness and its use in Bourbon Mexico has been explored using a range of texts, including politico-moral tracts, religious sermons and catechisms, hagiography, poetry, plays and dictionaries. These texts all provide evidence of the regulatory function of madness.

In Caroline Mexico, madness was a fluid term used to denote anything that went against the views of those in power. Who had authority varied based on the context of the text or situation, from religious leaders to bureaucrats and playwrights, though the premise on which madness was understood remained the same. Madness functioned as a regulatory principle, shaping moderate, obedient subjects, across all of the contexts discussed. The risk of madness required self-regulation in order to be both a pious Catholic with a personal relationship with God and a useful, productive vassal of the state.

The religious texts discussed show that sin was an important Catholic concept, central to understandings of human nature. Following this line, to be sinful put one at risk of becoming mad through indulging one’s passions rather than following the moral course charted by God-given reason. López Ruiz associated the passions with following false, immoral ideas and he, as well as Díaz de Gamarra, used sensory analogies to elucidate ideas of sin obscuring reason in the descent into madness. Re-publications of The Imitation of Christ and the Flos Sanctorum emphasised failing to follow the correct moral path as mad. In the Bourbon period, the heretical individual was the mad individual.

Religious works that were written or selected for reprinting in the Bourbon period stressed the need to regulate one’s interior to facilitate divine grace in the soul. Such justifications of self-regulation counselled that preparing the soul for God’s grace was a perpetual battle against sin and madness in every human heart. Palafox’s catechisms cautioned that failing to repent of one’s sins was madness and emphasised penance and following one’s conscience as the route to salvation. Haro y Peralta’s sermons and letters showed that sinful humanity could only unite with God through God’s grace. Alone, he claimed, humankind could not fully attain reason, which was the light that led souls to God.
In these texts, virtue was synonymous with reason just as sin was with madness. Haro y Peralta demanded an intense, searching, perpetual self-reflection that abjured the senses, passions, and imagination. According to such religious reformers one should undertake a ceaseless battle against sin in oneself; knowing God began with knowing oneself. There was thus a strong moral impetus to regulate against madness and sin. However, for these authors, being rational and virtuous could never be fully realised.

In diverse contexts, secular authors reflected the shared impetus to guard against madness as an impossible but necessary task. Vela’s play *Apostolate in the Indies* suggested that the only way to be entirely rational was to be a saint; taken to this logical conclusion the standard was all but unattainable. Yet, for Vela, to the extent that anyone could be rational and moral, indigenous people were just as able to manage themselves as good, rational Christians as other people. This was exemplified in Vela’s work by the character of Cristóbal. Equally indigenous people were just as fallible and at risk of falling into madness as others, which was characterised by Axotencatl. Not all elite authors held the same views of human nature. The vitriolic writing of Hipólito Villarroel on the customs and habits of the Mexican populace exposed an underlying assumption that different standards of rationality applied to individuals of different castes. Villarroel dehumanised non-Spaniards, in particular indigenous groups, with a rhetoric of irrationality, animalism, and vice. Spanish understandings of indigenous people are the subject of further examination in Chapter Five.

In theory, all people were at risk of madness through sin; however, for some elite thinkers, specific individuals were less able to be rational than others in the first place. Religious understandings of human nature, specifically reason and virtue, and madness and sin, acted as a framework for justifying a range of ideas about self-regulation. Elites in various contexts employed madness as a regulatory term. Poetry provides an insight into social expectations from dress to gestures, marking out ‘unacceptable’ choices as mad. The language used in ‘To the Affected Ones’ functioned similarly to that of the other publications discussed. It was comparable, for example, to the interweaving of madness and vanity in *The Imitation of Christ*. Here too, the imprecise term ‘madness’ was employed to criticise different kinds of sinful behaviour.

The regulatory vocabulary of reason and madness was also applied to political contexts to denote approval or criticism of rule and disorder. Upheaval, disorder, and revolution was branded as madness, which provided moral weight to the idea of established monarchical order and empire. Authors describing the madness of disorder wrote with reference to the anxieties of the Spanish empire, including population expansion,
miscegenation, and high levels of migration, poverty, and rebellions. Notable events outside of New Spain included the Tupac Amaru rebellion and the French Revolution. The different contexts in which authors advocated for regulation against madness were all grounded in the same moral vision of shaping the rational, obedient, useful Christian subject.

Discerning whether an individual could reason well was part of a process of establishing whether they were sane; reasoned thinking was necessary for good self-regulation. The final section of this chapter shows that the juxtaposition of reason and madness was important in assessing individuals as well as in discussing madness in theory. A cleric who could reason well, who could form coherent and logical arguments, grasp theoretical concepts, and reflect about himself, was not mad regardless of what he thought. An inability to clearly articulate one’s perspective, in contrast, was a key element in being labelled mad. In practice, authorities such as clerics found it hard to precisely confirm whether or not a potential madman was able to think well. They considered logical thought processes, knowledge of scientific concepts, and self-reflection in reaching an assessment. Often these assessments led to contradictory views of the individual’s reasoning, which was harder to discern in practice than to outline in theory.

This chapter has shown that the risk of madness was inherent to the human condition and that elites expected individuals to regulate themselves in order to remain sane and moral. Regulation was a fundamental concern in the Bourbon period as the crown worked to consolidate and extend its control over all aspects of colonial life. Simultaneously, the church sought to shape its flock into self-reflecting individuals who managed their behaviour to avoid and repent of their sin. The use of madness as a regulatory tool in the Caroline period is part of the broader picture of Bourbon reform. The next chapter shows that the same principles animated the understanding and deployment of concepts related to madness in medical texts.
Chapter Three: Madness and Medical Regulation of the Self

Introduction

The idea that one could fall into madness through sin animated medical discussions of madness throughout the eighteenth century. Historians have observed that madness had a religious component in the early modern period. However, they have neglected to consider how those religious underpinnings affected the way in which medical authors viewed the process of regulating madness in the early modern Hispanic world. Moreover, the established historiography of madness in Mexico regards the eighteenth century as a time of secularisation, when madness came to be understood largely in non-religious terms.

The key work on madness in Caroline Mexico, María Cristina Sacristán’s *Locura y Disidencia en el México Ilustrado, 1760-1810* draws on Inquisition, criminal, and hospital records to argue that from 1760 reforms of the state and church led to a more secular, medicalised understanding of madness. Sacristán suggests that these reforms resulted in an increased tendency to incarcerate people who were thought to be mad. Certainly there was greater incarceration of the supposedly mad in the Caroline period than in the earlier colonial period, but this trend does not provide evidence that the concept of madness had become more secular. This chapter shows that even in medical texts, whose enlightened authors elucidated new theories of how the mind and body worked, the underlying assumptions about madness continued to be religious. The world view of such medical writers was shaped by the need to guard against sin. This religious imperative shaped their understanding of how people ought to regulate their internal and external lives, and influenced how they judged and managed others.

Like other elites, medical authors were interested in and motivated by concern for order, balance, moderation, and piety. Medical authors drew on a range of theories to develop the medical management of madness. This chapter situates the discussion of madness and sin within the context of contemporary medical theories. The scholarship on madness has not examined eighteenth-century Mexican medical texts to consider how theories of madness evolved there. This chapter provides evidence that medical texts across the whole of the eighteenth century in Mexico based their understanding of madness on humoral principles. While new medical ideas were developed and adopted as part of elite

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2 Sacristán, *Locura y Disidencia*. 
scientific theorising, these new models were in many ways incorporated into the existing structure of humoral theory.

Historians such as Roy Porter and Akihito Suzuki find that that, in seventeenth and eighteenth-century England, humoralism was replaced by theories of nerves, fibres, and proto-psychology. In exploring the medical theories of Bourbon Mexico, this chapter shows that this change did not take place in Mexico. Rather, the chapter agrees with Angus Gowland’s findings on early modern melancholy that new medical ideas were subsumed into a humoral framework. It was within this framework that medical authors articulated their regimens for avoiding sin and madness. Even when the language medical authors used was strictly secular, the assumptions underpinning their writing were moralising ideas regarding humanity’s sinful state and the need to cultivate a moderate, pious self.

This chapter surveys eighteenth-century medical texts that discussed madness and related terms. All of these texts have been analysed previously by other scholars; however, they have not focussed on madness nor have they interrogated the assumptions underpinning these medical discourses. Considering medical texts in this light enables a reappraisal of how medical thinkers used madness to justify shaping Spanish subjects in New Spain. The medical texts are predominantly Mexican in origin. They are Juan de Esteyneffer’s *Anthology of All Illnesses* (1712), a medical guide for the non-expert; an article on hysteria in José Ignacio Bartolache y Díaz Posada’s medical journal the *Mercurio Volante* (1772); and Juan Manuel Venegas’s *Compendium of Medicine or Medical Practice* (1788). The widely circulated Spanish text *Modern Logic or the Art of Discovering the Truth and Perfecting Reason* (1747), written by Andrés Piquer y Arrufat, is also analysed. I selected these texts from catalogue searches at the library of the Palacio de la Escuela de Medicina in Mexico City and online searches. They were all chosen because they refer to terms related to madness, and were written and published in Mexico, except for Piquer’s work which was shipped to Mexico and widely circulated there.

The chapter is divided into three sections. The first provides an overview of humoral medicine, which was the dominant medical theory at the start of the Bourbon period. It then examines Esteyneffer and Piquer’s works to consider how medical authors theorised

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4 For details on the availability of Piquer’s work in Mexico, see the catalogue of books sent to Mexico provided with Gómez Álvarez, *Navegar con Libros*, p.239.
madness early in the Bourbon period. In doing so, this section explains the established medical theories regarding madness before 1760. This date is significant because Sacristán claims the meanings of madness secularised from 1760 onwards in Mexico. Similarly in England Suzuki argues that a new language of philosophy of the mind emerged around 1760 that amounted to a paradigm shift in understandings of madness.\(^5\) The section establishes the interconnected humoral and religious roots of madness in Bourbon Mexico and shows how a common linguistic framework underpinned thinking on madness in all manner of texts, including medical ones. Subsequent sections test whether later medical authors wrote about madness by drawing on secularised theories without reliance on the humors.

The second section explores how the same underlying humoral ideas and religio-moral conception of sin animated Venegas’ medical discourse on madness printed in 1788. It shows how his theories were underpinned by a humoral framework, but that he developed an anatomical language for discussing the soul and passions that made these intangible concepts empirically observable. This section intersects with two main historiographies of madness in New Spain and early modern Britain. It provides nuance to the existing historiography of madness in New Spain and disputes the idea that madness secularised in this period. It also presents a contrast to the findings for eighteenth-century Britain, which predominantly finds that during this time medical authors stopped using Hippocratic-Galenic principles to understand madness.

Section Three considers how religious values shaped discourses surrounding the ostensibly secular medical term ‘hysteria’. It disagrees with the scholarship on hysteria that argues that hysteria was a secular category in Bourbon Mexico. The authors discussed in Sections Two and Three, Bartolache and Venegas, forged new paths in Mexican medical writing, using medical terms and theories that their predecessors had not employed; hysteria provides an excellent example of this. Yet their regulatory frameworks were based on the same moral underpinnings as earlier medical authors and contemporary religious, political, and literary writers. Medical theories of how the self ought to be regulated were part of a wider discourse on self-management that focussed on the interior as a site for developing pious, rational, moderate, and useful enlightened subjects (as explored in Chapter Two).

**Section One: Regulating the Humors and the Soul**

Ideas of the relatedness of madness and sin were bound up with contemporary medical theories in Bourbon Mexico. At the start of the period, elite medical theorists predominantly

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expounded a Hippocratic-Galenic humoral medical worldview. Humoralism was a holistic theory whereby health constituted a balance or equilibrium between the four humors, which differed between individuals and made up their complexion. The humors were bodily fluids that were divided into categories having different qualities and effects within the body. The four humors were black bile, yellow bile, blood, and phlegm. The balance of humors, and as such health, was affected by disease. The causes of disease, known as the contra-naturals, could be spiritual as well as material. The non-naturals, which comprised air, food and drink, sleep and wakefulness, exercise, evacuations and repletion, and the passions of the soul, also affected humoral balance. In humoral theory, people could influence their health by altering the non-naturals. Regimes for affecting the humoral balance through the non-naturals included purging, bleeding, sweating, vomiting, and spiritual regulation. A long tradition of physicians trained in the Hippocratic-Galenic tradition perceived humoral imbalance in the body as the cause of madness. A predominance of black bile in the body was associated with a melancholic temperament and the prevalence of yellow bile was associated with choleric tendencies. Humoral imbalance caused damage to organs, especially the brain, spleen, and liver. Humoralism emphasised the interconnectedness of mind and body. It advocated balancing the humors through regimes managing both mind and body. These views were widely held throughout the early modern world, including in Mexico.

Sacristán observes that humoralism was important to medical assessments of madness in colonial Mexico. She provides some analysis on the use of bleeding and purging to rebalance the humors, drawing on the Short Treatise on Medicine (1592) written by Augustín Farfán (1532-1604), a Spanish court doctor and priest who moved to Mexico. As Sacristán’s work does not analyse medical texts from the eighteenth century, this section considers how physical and spiritual regulation stemmed from a humoral framework in that period.

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6 Fields, Pestilence and Headcolds, pp.113-15.
7 Nancy G. Siraisi, Medieval and Early Renaissance Medicine: An Introduction to Knowledge and Practice (Chicago, 1990), pp.104-5.
10 Sacristán, Locura e Inquisición, pp.84-5.
13 Sacristán, Locura e Inquisición, pp.124-5. See also: Agustín Farfán, Tractado Breve de Medicina, y de Todas las Enfermedades, Hecho por el Padre Fray... (Madrid, 1944).
Juan de Esteyneffer explained conditions related to madness based on humoral medical models in his work *Anthology of All Illnesses*, first published in Mexico in 1712. Esteyneffer was a Moravian Jesuit and pharmacist who arrived in Mexico in 1697. He wrote the *Anthology* to support the Jesuits’ missionary work in Mexico and it was one of the most popular medical guides for lay people well beyond the eighteenth century: five editions were published between 1712 and 1887. The book was arranged into chapters according to ailments, starting from the head down to the feet. The remedies offered often had only one ingredient and used native ingredients where they were available.

Historians Luz Maria Hernández-Sáens and Sherry Fields have observed that Esteyneffer’s approach to illness was quintessentially humoral. Esteyneffer distinguished between the causes and symptoms of pain and then separated the causes into extrinsic and intrinsic causes. Extrinsic causes were the six humoral non-naturals, outlined above. The intrinsic cause of the illnesses Esteyneffer described was a disequilibrium of the individual’s internal humoral complexion. He applied humoral principles to the regulation of conditions with mental and emotional components, such as frenzy, delirium, illness of the heart, epilepsy, melancholy, and hypochondria, though he did not explicitly discuss ‘madness’ as such. For example, Esteyneffer described frenzy as an inflammation of the brain that took two different forms with varied causes. ‘Simple’ frenzy ‘occurs when the brain is heated in order to heat the blood in the veins of the brain’ whereas ‘[true frenzy] originates from the bilious blood forcing out, or diffusing itself by way of erysipela, through the parts of the brain’. By defining these two kinds of frenzy, Esteyneffer implied that the former could be treated by cooling the blood and therefore the brain, while the latter was harder to regulate.

Medical authors such as Esteyneffer associated blood and heat with fiery, enraged behaviour. Thus, he advocated that simple frenzy could be modified by adjusting the humoral balance with purges, bleedings, and herbal remedies. Esteyneffer wrote that one ought:

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14 Fields, *Pestilence and Head Colds*, p.xvi.
16 Juan de Esteyneffer, ‘Algunas Advertencias al Lector Benevolo’, in Juan de Esteyneffer, *Florilegio Medicinal de Todas las Enfermedades* (Mexico, 1713), [no page number].
to bleed the patient from the basilica vein, or the cephalic vein, as appears best, and
[do] this several times, on several days, but always in small quantities; and be advised
that the opening or slit in the vein has to be very thin; firstly, because this allows the
hottest, thinnest blood to leave; secondly, because the wound lasts for a shorter
period...  

The process of finding a narrow vein from which to extract the hottest and thinnest blood
was a mechanical solution to humoral imbalance. Esteyneffer advocated small, frequent
adjustments to this balance by bleeding the patient often but only taking small quantities of
blood. If no other method for bleeding were available, Esteyneffer suggested applying
leeches to the body.  

Esteyneffer’s writing provides evidence that, in the eighteenth
century, medical authors considered madness to be a condition managed by regulating the
humors. This accords with Sacristán’s analysis of previous medical works, such as Farfán’s
writings mentioned above. Preventing and curing mental disorders required careful
regulation of an individual’s humoral balance.  

Esteyneffer’s descriptions of conditions such as frenzy had implications for individual
behaviour. For example, a symptom of delirium was to be unusually quiet. Esteyneffer
described how sufferers, ‘do not talk, and they are still, as if they were asleep, but so they
continue without interruption’. Sensory symptoms of delirium could be a lack of
engagement with one’s surroundings and unresponsiveness. How one used one’s voice and
body were read as signs of the individual’s interior state. Delirium was thought to be a
precursor for frenetic behaviour. Esteyneffer wrote that ‘The signs of advanced frenzy are:
when the delirium continues, with heat in the head and sleeplessness; with it [frenzy] [one]
talks a lot: some of happy things, and others of anger.’ Heat was associated with choleric
temperaments and behaviours. Thus, overheating was associated with an excess of feelings.
Whether happy or angry, the frenetic individual spoke more than was expected, and slept
less. Esteyneffer’s descriptions of symptoms show an underlying assumption that
moderation both signified and created balance. Such descriptions contained implicit

19 Esteyneffer, *Florilegio*, p.12 ‘sangrarlo de la vena del Arca, o la vena de todo el Cuerpo, la que mejor
paraciere, y esto varias vezes, en varios dias, pero siempre en poca cantidad; Y se advierte, que ha
de ser la abertura, o Scissura de la vena, bien delgada; lo primero, porq salga la sangre mas caliente,
y delgada; lo segundo para que se tie ne mas brevemente la herida’.  
22 Esteyneffer, *Florilegio*, p.11, ‘Desvario suave’; ‘no hablan, y están quietos, como si dormieran, pero
assi continuan sin interrupción’.  
Cabeça, y desvelo; en el mucho hablar: unos de cosas alegres, y otros de furiosas.’
judgements that a sane, healthy, and well-ordered person would speak, move and sleep in moderation because their humors were in balance. The excessive speech and feeling of the supposedly frenetic individual, and the listlessness of the purportedly delirious, made them mad to their contemporaries.

Esteyneffer’s approach to regulating madness built upon a core belief in the need for spiritual regulation. Esteyneffer’s introduction emphasised the importance of appealing to God’s mercy through prayer when seeking medical cures. He wrote, ‘Here it seemed to me [to be] of much utility to add some dogmas, or general doctrines, that are usually observed in cures, such as the following. The first and the main one is the invocation of the clemency of Our Father, and the intercession of the saints.’ Regardless of the therapies or medicines Esteyneffer recommended, the first and foremost principle for regulating the health of one’s body was thus to manage one’s spiritual health. As historians such as Hernández-Sáens have observed, Esteyneffer combined religious principles, knowledge of indigenous herbs, and humoral theories in his medical guide. He drew on his training as both a Jesuit missionary and a pharmacist in compiling his advice. As a priest, Esteyneffer considered prayer to be a therapeutic practice; therefore, he placed spiritual regulation at the heart of maintaining health in all its senses.

The links between spiritual management and the regulation of madness were more explicit in the work of Andrés Piquer y Arrufat (1711-1772). Piquer trained as a physician and a philosopher at the University of Valencia where he held a chair as a professor of Anatomy (1742-1751) before becoming a court physician in Madrid (1751-1772). The corpus of Piquer’s works contains a heterogeneous mix of Hippocratic theories, experimental science, hydraulic understandings of the body, and philosophical tracts. Although he proclaimed that his ideas described the body as mechanistic, the content was often consistent with humoral medicine. His book *Modern Logic or the Art of Discovering the Truth and Perfecting Reason* (first published in 1747) was categorised in the third edition (1781) as a philosophical text.

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24 Esteyneffer, ‘Algunas Advertencias al Lector Benevolo’, [no page number], ‘Pareciome añadir aquí de mucha utilidad algunos dogmas, o doctrinas generales, que generalmente se observan en las curas, como son los siguientes. Lo primero, y lo principal es la invocación de la clemencia de Nuestro Señor, y la intersección de los Santos.’


28 Andrés Piquer y Arrufat, *Logica Moderna, o, Arte de Hallar la Verdad, y Perfeccionar la Razón* (3rd edition, Madrid, 1781), [no page number].
*Modern Logic* is included in this chapter on medical ideas because it constituted a methodology for approaching medicine and logic. There were no firm boundaries between medical theorising and philosophical inquiry during this period. In *Modern Logic*, Piquer insisted that academically-trained doctors must be instructed in logic and critical thinking. Furthermore, analysing Piquer’s works exposes commonalities with the authors discussed in Chapter Two. In *Modern Logic*, Piquer explained that sometimes reason was able to correct harm done to the imagination, but that this was not always the case. He wrote that ‘sometimes the illness that harms the imagination leaves the reason healthy and this corrects the errors and disorders of the imagination’. Piquer considered a strong faculty of reason to be capable of overcoming the mistakes of the imagination. He elaborated on this idea, stating that madness developed when the injured imagination affected reason’s capacity to suppress fantasies. In his words, ‘Here it must be noted that sometimes the strength of fantasy is so powerful that however hard reason tries to resist, it cannot succeed. This occurs when the part of the brain where imagination resides has been damaged through illness.’ This explanation of irrationality and disordered thinking was premised upon an understanding of fantasy as a capacity of the rational soul. The *Diccionario de Autoridades* described how fantasy, ‘forms images of things’ that were transmitted to reason by the imagination. Fantasy under the control of strong reason served a useful function but, when unregulated, it caused fictitious and potentially sinful ideas to overwhelm the individual.

Reason, fantasy, and the imagination were part of a Hippocratic-Galenic model of the human faculties that eighteenth-century medical and religious authors drew upon. According to Hippocratic-Galenic medicine, specific faculties were attributed to certain parts of the body. Crucially, university-educated physicians considered cognitive abilities to be associated with the soul and localised in the brain and nervous system. This common vocabulary for understanding human faculties and anatomy was shared by Piquer and Haro y Peralta. As discussed in Chapter Two, Haro y Peralta’s sermons on topics such as the senses and temptations described both fantasy and imagination as mad. He used a terminology of

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31 Piquer y Arrufat, *Logica Moderna*, p.159, ‘algunas veces la enfermedad que daña la imaginación, deixa al juicio sano, y este corrige los errores y desordenes de aquella’.
32 Piquer, *Logica Moderna*, p.159, ‘Se ha de notar, que a veces es tan poderosa la fuerza de la fantasía, que el juicio por mas que quiera apartar de ella algunos objetos, no puede conseguirlo, y esto sucede en aquellos que por enfermedad tienen viciada la parte del celebro donde reside la imaginación.’
33 *Diccionario de Autoridades* (O-R), p.248, 2, ‘Que forma las imagenes de las cosas.
35 See Chapter Two on Haro y Peralta.
reason, fantasy, imagination, and madness to describe and denounce human sin. Piquer shared this linguistic framework. As in Haro y Peralta’s sermons, Piquer’s analysis described how reason could in principle regulate fantasy, and so also regulate sin, but might not be strong enough to do so. The same underlying religio-medical terminology shaped how a range of elite writers, including trained physicians, conceptualised human capacity.

Consistent with humoral medical theories, Piquer considered that madness took hold of individuals through the brain, but thought that the principal way to protect oneself from it was through internalised mental regulation. He wrote that, ‘When the illness of the brain impairs the imagination in such a way that it imparts the damage to reason, madness, melancholy, or mania follow.’ Historian Marcelo Frías Núñez also finds that Piquer assumed many Hippocratic-Galenic ideas although his attitude towards these theories was ambivalent. While threats to an individual’s faculties may have been physically located in the brain, they were best treated through mental exercises and self-monitoring. Piquer suggested that the best remedy to cure damaged reason was ‘to despise the representations of fantasy, and to strengthen judgment so that it dominates and I know that by making good use of reason, and habituating oneself to overcoming and moderating the force of the imagination, one attains relief’. Piquer thought that recovering from madness and other similar ailments required an internal battle with oneself and the impressions that came from fantasy. Notably, he emphasised that applying reason was most effective when one undertook to use it as a regular practice or habit. Morality and sanity were to be maintained through persistent self-regulation, using the reason to moderate the impressions created and transmitted by fantasy and the imagination respectively.

The idea of individuals falling into madness through sin, common in religious, literary, and politico-moral texts alike, clearly informed Piquer’s view of illness. He argued that preventing and curing madness required the religious regulation of the soul. The individual had to guard constantly against sin to protect their soul, and reason which resided in the soul, from corrupting influences. Piquer thought those who were especially virtuous required particularly careful regulation. He stated that it was necessary for priests to monitor parishioners for signs of madness: ‘Spiritual directors should take particular notice of this

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36 Piquer, Logica Moderna, p. 159, ‘Quando la enfermedad del celebro de tal suerte vicia la imaginación que comunique el daño al juicio, se sigue la locura, ó bien melancólica, ó maniática.’
37 Frías Núñez, ‘El Discurso Médico a Propósito de las Fiebres y de la Quina’, p.222.
38 Ibid., ‘despreciar las representaciones de la fantasía, y fortalecer el juicio para que la domine: y sé yo que haciendo buen uso de la razón, y acostumbrándose á vencer y moderar la fuerza de la imaginativa, se consigue el alivio’.
39 See Chapter Two on religious, literary, and politico-moral texts.
illness of the imagination, since it usually arises in people with scrupulous consciences, in whom the imagination slowly erodes good judgement.\textsuperscript{40} Regarding the madness of the imagination, the individual required the support, and even the management, of priests to direct this process of guarding against sin. This need extended to all Christians, regardless of how pious they were, as Piquer considered ‘scrupulous consciences’ to be at particular risk.

Like Haro y Peralta’s concern that through temptation sin could gradually creep into an individual’s heart, Piquer’s statement suggests that he thought that all people, even the most virtuous, were at risk of falling into sin and madness. Although he was not trained as a priest, Piquer’s medical regulation of madness was animated by religious concerns. It placed the expertise of the clergy in such matters above his own by maintaining that madness of the imagination had to be governed by a priest. In this too Piquer and Haro y Peralta’s writings are remarkably similar. Piquer thought individuals could not govern their own imagination and fantasy. Haro y Peralta, in turn, wrote that humanity was capricious and prone to temptation and so required difficult spiritual direction, the ‘science of science’ as he characterised it.\textsuperscript{41} In accordance with the claims of the ecclesiastical hierarchy that priests ought to regulate sinful people, Piquer argued that illnesses that affected the immaterial realm required spiritual aid and thus doctors could not claim exclusive authority to manage these ills.

Esteyneffer and Piquer’s works show that in the first part of the Bourbon period medical ideas pertaining to madness were premised upon humoral principles, which required self-regulation in order to be a pious individual. In Hippocratic-Galenic thinking madness was caused and cured through the imbalance and rebalancing respectively of the humors. The linguistic framework used to discuss reason and madness was common to religious thinkers as well as medical practitioners and elite figures generally. Piquer, like the authors discussed in Chapter Two, employed this vocabulary to justify self-management and governance to maintain rational, virtuous behaviour, based on the same underlying principles.

Section Two: The Expansion of Medical Regulatory Frameworks

In 1788 the first Mexican medical text with a dedicated entry on madness was published. The Compendium of Medicine or Medical Practice was written by Juan Manuel Venegas, a creole medical doctor, and published in Mexico City. Venegas criticised the ideas of earlier authors,

\textsuperscript{40} Piquer, Logica Moderna, p.159 ‘De esta enfermedad de la imaginación deben tener noticia y procurar conocerla los directores espirituales de las almas, porque de ella nacen casi siempre las conciencias escrupulosas, corrompiendo poco á poco en ellas la imaginación al juicio.’

\textsuperscript{41} Haro y Peralta, Sermones Escogidos, III, p.25.
including Esteyneffer, which he described as, ‘extremely lacking in the most basic medical principles’. The *Compendium* was set out in alphabetical order by the ailment’s Latin name, followed by the vernacular Spanish. It contained entries on topics such as drunkenness, epilepsy, hysteria, passions of the soul, melancholy, and also madness. In Venegas’ eyes the *Compendium* offered a new and thorough appraisal of the many diseases afflicting the varied terrain of New Spain. That said, just like Esteyneffer, Venegas grounded his writing on madness and related illnesses in language used by religious authors. He talked about the soul, the passions, and God in descriptions of mental disorder and therapeutics. Venegas distanced his work from that of earlier authors, criticising their lack of relevant training, but drew on many of the same principles to form his medical theories. This section shows that in the late-eighteenth century humoral theory remained important in medical authors’ approaches to treating madness. Rather than replacing humoralism, new concepts were incorporated into longstanding theories of madness. Moreover, this section considers the religious underpinnings of discussions of reason, the passions, and madness in Venegas’ work.

Venegas described the humoral causes of madness. He considered madness to be an illness of ‘the hot humors’ and thus a symptom of an imbalance in the body. He also related madness to other conditions, such as hypochondria, defined as an affect or passion, and epilepsy, a sudden loss of movement or senses accompanied by convulsions. He wrote that, ‘If the origin of this ill [madness] were hypochondria, it is characterised with the name of melancholy. Its origins are hypochondriac, hot, or raw materials, that pass from the liver to the blood, and the intestines’. Venegas’ discussion of madness is similar to Esteyneffer’s discussion of frenzy; both authors understood the conditions within a humoral medical model and thought these conditions came from the blood overheating.

Much of Venegas’ advice on treating madness and related conditions involved humoral regulation, just as Esteyneffer’s approach had 76 years earlier. Venegas listed

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42 Juan Manuel Venegas, *Compendio de la Medicina: o Medicina Practica* (Mexico, 1788), [no page number], ‘Extremamente destituidos de aquellos principios menos inciertos de esta Facultad’.


44 *Diccionario Academia Usual*, p.529, 1, ‘Hipocondría, afecction, o passion que se padece, procedida de los hipocondrios; la qual causa una melancholia suma, y otros efectos que atormentan al sugeto; como son dolor de estómago, flatos frecuentes, vomitos, oppression del pecho, dificultad en respirar, falta de sueño y otros que refieren los médicos.’; Venegas, *Compendio*, p.112, ‘La Epilepsia, Gota coral, o Mal de corazon es una repentina y accesional privacion de movimientos y sentidos, acomañada de convulsiones, o movimientos convulsivos.’

45 Venegas, *Compendio*, pp.211-2, ‘Si el origen de este mal fuere hipocondria, se caracteriza con el nombre de Melancolia. Sus principios son materiales hipocondriacos, calientes, o crudos, que del higado pasan a la sangre, y a los intestinos’.
treatments for madness, including ‘provoking vomiting, [and using] gentle enemas, [and] repeated laxatives’, which Sacristán finds had been important remedies in sixteenth-century medical texts.\textsuperscript{46} These therapies were all supposed to restore the humoral balance and were part of a traditional selection of techniques for purging the body.\textsuperscript{47} Elsewhere in the text, Venegas gave a recipe for a ‘distilled wine to purge mad men’ which contained ingredients such as black hellebore, long thought to regulate the humors. Consistent with the ‘hot’ causes of madness, Venegas recommended directly cooling the body if the purges did not work. He described how if insanity persisted, one ought to cool the sufferer with ‘baths of cold water’.\textsuperscript{48} He advocated efforts to directly counter the hot humors and regimes to manage the humors of the sufferer as well as the need for the repeated use of such techniques.

Like earlier medical authors, Venegas recommended that physicians adopt the long-established practice of bloodletting. He recommended a range of ways of letting blood for different types of person and madness, though he did not elaborate on what the different kinds of madness were. For the second stage of madness, Venegas described how ‘the ankles, or arms, will be bled as often as necessary’.\textsuperscript{49} Regular bleeding was a routine part of the process of monitoring and suppressing the body. Moreover, Venegas stated that madness was an illnesses of the hot humors and therefore ‘leeches will be applied to the anus; or if the sufferer were young, sanguine, and robust, a bleeding will be done to him’.\textsuperscript{50} Bloodletting was thought to have a cooling effect on the blood and the body, thus addressing the purported role of the ‘hot humors’ in making people mad. It could also be observed to have a sedating or calming effect on individuals who were essentially weakened by the blood loss.

Regardless of Venegas’ claim to replace old medical models with new ones, analysis of his theory of madness confirms Sacristán’s claim that medical ideas about madness were humoral throughout the colonial period.\textsuperscript{51} This contrasts with claims of historians such as Roy Porter and Akihito Sukuki regarding Britain at the same time. Porter and Suzuki both find that in the eighteenth century humoral ideas regarding madness were replaced with new

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p.211, ‘los vomitorios, lavativas suaves, laxantes repetidos.’ Sacristán, \textit{Locura e Inquisición}, p.125.}
\footnote{Nutton, ‘Humoralism’, p.286.}
\footnote{Venegas, \textit{Compendio}, p.214, ‘los baños de agua fria’.}
\footnote{Venegas, \textit{Compendio}, p.211, ‘se sangrarán los tobillos, o brazos, las veces que fuere menester’.}
\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p.212, ‘se aplicarán sanguisuelas al ano; o si el enfermo fuere mozo, sanguineo, y robusto, se le hará una sangría’.}
\footnote{Sacristán, \textit{Locura e Inquisición}, pp.85, 124-5.}
\end{footnotes}
psychological theories of madness that emphasised the role of the nervous system. Venegas’ description of madness’ pathology provides evidence that in Caroline Mexico madness continued to be understood based on a humoral medical framework.

Venegas theorised the greater incorporation of religious terminology relating to immaterial aspects of personhood into an empirical model for monitoring the individual. He argued that doctors could examine the soul’s movements, writing that, ‘The effects of the soul sometimes are denoted by the pulse, according to the impression that they cause in the nerves’. Thus, Venegas claimed that the effects of the soul were physically observable, and so could be subject to medical regulation. Venegas began to incorporate the soul into an anatomical model of illness where one had to be trained to observe the body, for example the rhythm and strength of the pulse, to diagnose the problem and prescribe the cure. The nerves were a technical, anatomical term, described in contemporary dictionaries as, ‘The organic part of the animal, composed of white, strong, fibres, and so attached, that they appear to be only one [thread]. Its shape is round and long like a rope. They [the nerves] serve to bind and attach the other parts of the body, and for the natural or voluntary movements of them [the parts of the body].’ Therefore, the nerves were thought to be responsible for the body’s movements or gestures. Religious texts referred little to the nerves; however, they did have moral connotations. The Diccionario de Autoridades stated that, ‘In the moral sense, [nerve] is taken for the efficacy or vigour of reason.’ The term ‘nerve’ was related to the strength of one’s reason to carry out that which was morally good. The nerves were interlinked with the process of reason directing the moral actions of the individual. Venegas conflated the link between the anatomical function of the nerves and the moral sense of the nerves as part of the workings of the soul. By theorising the relationship between the soul and the nerves, Venegas subsumed the workings of the soul under a banner of nervous disorders. As Gowland observes regarding melancholy in early modern Europe, medical authors grafted newer theories onto existing ideas of the soul, passions, and humors. By developing this conception of the soul’s relationship with the

53 Venegas, Compendio, pp.291-2, ‘Los afectos de la alma algunas veces se denotan por el pulso, según la impresion que hacen en los nervios’.
54 Diccionario de Autoridades (G-M), p.663, 2, ‘Parte orgánica del cuerpo del animal, compuesta de fibras blancas, fuertes, y tan unidas, que parecen una sola. Su figura es redonda y larga como una cuerda. Sirven para atar y unir las otras partes del cuerpo, y para los movimientos de ellas naturales ó voluntarios.’
55 Ibid., p.663, 2, ‘En el sentido moral, se toma por la eficacia ó vigor de la razón.’
nerves, Venegas crafted a discourse that confirmed the role of moral regulation of the self in medical approaches to madness. Therefore, Venegas brought the soul and its workings into the realm of medical observation and regulation, rather than secularising his approach to madness as Sacristán claims took place more generally in the Caroline period.\(^{57}\)

Venegas created a particular anatomical taxonomy to describe the workings of the passions of the soul, extending direct medical regulation to a range of passions he believed to affect reason. Myriad thinkers had long since understood such passions as anger, love, and sadness to be dangerous and thus legitimate fields of medical observation and management.\(^{58}\) Authors such as Esteyniffer and Piquer cited the passions of the soul as causes of illness. Venegas also considered that ‘When illnesses resist the appropriate remedies, in unusual ways, one has to think that some passion has overtaken the patient.’\(^{59}\) Venegas gave the passions their own entry in his book. He defined the medical properties of individual passions and described their observable effects on the body. He deemed that ‘love causes a swelling movement in the solids and fluids: fear [causes] a compressive movement: anger a constricted movement; hatred [an] impulsive [movement]: and jealousy [a] swirling [one]. The passions that can be controlled with the assistance of medicine are venereal love, fear, anger, and sadness.’\(^{60}\) With these observations, Venegas participated in an ongoing discourse on the negative effects of the passions on the individual. Venegas’ taxonomy was directly adapted from a non-medical text to bring the passions into a medically-observable framework. In the *Teatro Crítico y Universal*, Benito Jerónimo Feijóo y Montenegro (1676-1764), a Spanish friar and Enlightenment thinker, wrote that ‘Love in the heart surges; that which causes fear is compressive; that which causes anger, tremulous: in this way one can discover the productive movements of other passions.’\(^{61}\) Venegas recycled Feijóo’s list and expanded it, without crediting him. Feijóo described how the passions affected the

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\(^{57}\) Sacristán, *Locura y Disidencia*, p.243. Sacristán claims that elites continued to understand madness based on humoral medicine, but that through a process of secularisation the term was ‘liberated’ from a discourse of salvation. As discussed at various points in the thesis, I agree that humanism remained important for understanding madness, but in contrast to Sacristán, I argue that it did not become a secular concept in this period.

\(^{58}\) Holler, ‘Of Sadness and Joy’, p.22.

\(^{59}\) Venegas, *Compendio*, pp.291-2, ‘Quando las enfermedades se resisten a los debidos remedios, con modos desacostumbrados, se ha de pensar que alguna pasion ocupa el enfermo.’

\(^{60}\) *Ibid.*, pp.291-2, ‘el amor causa en los solidos, y fluidos un movimiento undulatorio: el miedo, compresivo: la ira, crispatorio; el odio, impulso: y los zelos, vorticoso. Las pasiones que se sujetan al auxilio de la Medicina son el amor venereo, el miedo, la ira, y la tristeza.’

\(^{61}\) Benito Geronimo Feijóo, *Theatro Critico Universal, ó Discursos Varios en Todo Genero de Materias, para Desengaño de Errores Comunes* (9 vols, Madrid, 1761, 4th edition), VII, p.373, ‘Amor en el corazon, es undulatorio; el que causa la de miedo, compressivo; el que causa la de ira, crispatorio: y a este modo se puede discurrir de los movimientos productivos de otras pasiones.’
sensations in the heart, which Venegas replaced with ‘the solids, and fluids’. In doing so, Venegas employed a new anatomical language to expand medical observation of the passions. He shifted the emphasis of the passage from the heart and its passions to the observable mechanistic body. By doing so in a medical text, he brought the ‘passions of the soul’ firmly into a newer explanatory model of the body’s anatomical functioning. Venegas’ reinterpretation of the passions updated existing understandings of the effects of the passions on the body and made them medically observable. His adaptation of a text written by a friar provides clear evidence for the continuity of religiously-informed medical ideas in the late-eighteenth century. Moreover, it is consistent with Voekel’s claim that medical observation was particularly important in this period. Venegas’ theorisation of the passions contributed to regulation of the self by making the passions empirically observable to the physician.

Venegas’ ideas about how one ought to regulate oneself provide evidence that he wanted to shape the discourse on the moral individual based on the interiorisation of their relationship with God. He referred directly to God to describe how to manage so-called venereal love, defined as the ‘desire to unite with the thing one loves’. Venegas explained how, ‘one will think of God’s constant presence in the crime, and in his inevitable punishment’ to cure oneself of venereal love. Preparing oneself for God’s judgement by doing penance for one’s sins could cure illnesses of the passions. Thus regulating the passions remained deeply connected to Catholic morality in Venegas’ work. This discourse provides evidence that academically-trained doctors justified self-regulation based on internalised religiosity across the eighteenth century. In highlighting God’s ‘constant presence’ when individuals sinned, Venegas developed reformed Catholic ideas that one must constantly strive to be virtuous and promptly do penance for one’s sins. Therefore, Venegas justified strict self-regulation based on the need to internally battle sin in the same way as contemporary religious authors such as Haro y Peralta. Venegas justified the regulation of one’s thoughts, feelings, and interior as a protection against succumbing to the passions and falling into sin and thus madness. For late-eighteenth century medical authors such as Venegas, a concern for self-management was articulated through a rhetoric of persistently and internally doing penance for one’s sins.

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62 Voekel, Alone Before God, p.171.
63 Venegas, Compendio, p.291, ‘deseo de unirse con la cosa amada’.
64 Ibid., p.293, ‘se pensará en la constante presencia de Dios al delito, y en su inevitable castigo’.
Venegas’s recommendation to self-regulate was based on a desire to shape pious, useful vassals for the church and crown. His argument was premised upon the authority of doctors to dictate correct lifestyle choices and emotional displays, which he justified with scientific thinking on the mechanistic and nervous body. Crucially, this enabled learned medical authorities to promote their social and cultural values to a wider reading audience and to inculcate such values as the basis of good health. In this manner, Venegas claimed that so called ‘venereal love’ was an effect of luxury, inaction, and hot drinks and food. He stated that, ‘to cure this passion, one will occupy the mind with arduous things: the body will be lowered with sobriety, and work’. Venegas developed a rhetoric where individuals were obliged to regulate their passions, and so preserve their reason and morality, through hard work and self-denial, refusing to indulge in sloth and other sins. Venegas grounded his arguments for medical regulation in the Enlightenment values that motivated many elite bureaucrats and clergy: those of self-control, moderation, order, obedience, and utility. Venegas utilised his medical text to champion the values of elite, enlightened Mexican society. He tapped into fears of excess by blaming luxury for illness and advocating work as a cure for the passions. Through promoting desired behaviours as part of a model for health, Venegas’ work contributed to shaping a concept of the moderate, ordered, and socially useful individual.

Through the cultivation of medical categories and their associated symptoms as part of new explanatory systems of illness, authors such as Venegas emphasised ideas of the healthy and moral self. Historian Sharon Bailey Glasco’s *Constructing Mexico City: Colonial Conflicts over Culture, Space, and Authority* shows that the preventative measures suggested by Venegas drew on a vision of the role of the individual in society: the useful subject who was hard-working, resigned to their obligations, and moderate in the emotions they felt and expressed. Glasco argues that Venegas’ *Compendium* made individuals responsible for their own health through advocating a range of methods of self-care, including taking care over diet, having enough rest, and behaving moderately in one’s pursuits. The individual and not their circumstances was to blame for illness.

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65 Regarding other authors with these aims, see: Covarrubias, En Busca del Hobre Útil, pp.12-13, 23-4, 30.
66 Venegas, *Compendio*, p.293, ‘Para curar esta pasión, se ocupará la mente en cosas arduas: el cuerpo se deprimirá con la sobriedad, y el trabajo’.
67 Glasco also finds such preventative measures in the *Gaceta de México*, the only daily newspaper in Mexico City at the end of the eighteenth century. See: Bailey Glasco, *Constructing Mexico City*, pp.69-72. Regarding the medical content of the *Gaceta de México*, see also: Virginia Guedea, *Las Gacetas de México y la Medicina: Un Índice* (Mexico City, 1991), pp.5-12.
As part of his enlightened project, Venegas used ideas of madness and the passions to justify shaping the behavioural and emotional regimes of individuals. The *Compendium* collected together a range of reference points for measuring madness, all based on observation and experimentation. Venegas built substantially on existing humoral theories in his writing. Significantly, he applied a new anatomical vocabulary to discussing long-established ways of regulating the self based on the soul and the passions. This new vocabulary provided a method for shaping individuals by encouraging them to internalise the values of enlightened Bourbon society. The medical discourse of the late-eighteenth century was intimately bound up with Enlightenment social expectations.

**Section Three: Hysteria as a New Category for Regulating Against Sin and Madness**

Although hysteria was not part of a religious vocabulary centred on sin, in Caroline Mexico its usage was underpinned by the same moral considerations that shaped discourse on madness, the soul, and the passions. Thus hysteria, which was considered a form of madness, is useful for understanding the medical regulation of the self because it shows how religious ideas permeated even ostensibly secular medical theories. In the Caroline period, Hispanic medical authors referred particularly to hysteria to justify the role that doctors played in governing the behaviour of women. Hysteria had longstanding associations with ancient Greek ideas that the womb could wander around a woman’s body, particularly if she were sexually unsatisfied. Such ideas significantly shaped understandings of hysteria even when the medical models underpinning the concept changed. As historians such as Mark Micale and John Wright have shown, from the late seventeenth century new explanatory systems associated hysteria with the head and nervous disorders. These theories were reinforced by autopsies that provided evidence that the idea of the wandering womb could not explain hysteria. Despite changing theories regarding the causes of hysteria, it remained predominantly associated with women, and emphasised female physical and moral weakness. Most of the texts discussed in this chapter and Chapter Two consider humanity as a whole, but the language used in the non-medical texts tended to imply reference to elite, Spanish men unless otherwise stated. As hysteria was primarily associated with women, texts discussing hysteria provide an opportunity to consider some of the ways authors sought to justify regulating women in particular.

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71 As such, hysteria has been described by historian Elaine Showalter as ‘the quintessential female malady’. Showalter, *The Female Malady*. 
There is an extensive literature on hysteria in Europe and North America. This vast field includes work from a range of disciplines including history, literary criticism, and feminist theory. Scholars draw on a wide range of sources. For example, Laurinda Dixon analyses early modern depictions of women in art, Guenter Risse examines eighteenth-century lecture notes and patient case histories, Jeffrey Boss and Wright consider medical publications on hysteria, and Micale combines analysis of literary and medical references to hysteria. Micale and the authors of the edited volume *Hysteria Beyond Freud* pay close attention to the language used in their sources and the way hysteria functioned as a metaphor, drawing on Susan Sontag’s idea of illness as a metaphor.

There is scholarly consensus that in the early modern period, the womb’s causal role in creating hysteria was diminished in favour of theories related to the nerves. Some medical authors and practitioners combined their theories of hysteria as a nervous disorder with ideas of humors and vapours, but in other cases disputed the relevance of the humors, favouring a nervous pathology instead. Historians also confirm that hysteria continued to be understood as a predominantly female condition based on greater female sensitivity and susceptibility to illness, though there are studies of male hysteria by authors such as Micale and George Rousseau. Micale observes that work on hysteria began to analyse the role of class in hysteria diagnosis from the 1990s. He and other scholars provide evidence that in the eighteenth century hysteria was predominantly associated with upper-class women, just as other nervous disorders were ascribed to the upper classes. Other studies suggest that in the nineteenth century physicians also diagnosed the symptoms of people of middle- and lower-class origins as hysteria. Hysteria was associated with women described as maidens, spinsters, and widows, even though hysteria’s pathology was less closely linked to the womb.

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womb. Regarding New Spain, Beatriz Quintanilla-Madero finds that medical authors considered hysteria to be a nervous disorder in the brain by the end of the eighteenth century. Similarly, doctors considered women, especially upper- and middle-class women, to be susceptible because of inherent weakness and behavioural factors such as gluttony and lack of exercise. This historiographical context frames the discussion of hysteria in Bourbon Mexico.

Medical authors did not refer to categories used by clerical authors such as the soul and the passions to define hysteria. The earliest published New Spanish discussion of hysteria is a journal article entitled, ‘News of the Hysterical Illness Called “Palpitation”’. The article was written and published in 1772 by José Ignacio Bartolache y Díaz (1739-1790), a Mexican intellectual and practising doctor, in his medical journal entitled the *Mercurio Volante*. Subsequently, other authors such as Venegas discussed hysteria. Bartolache, like most of his medical colleagues in Europe, considered hysteria to be a female condition involving symptoms of sensory disorder, respiratory problems, and emotional distress, all of which could be observed, classified, and regulated. Bartolache asserted that hysteria was caused by an ‘irritation of the womb, [which] infests the brain and nerves, and also the muscles, primarily those that serve the vital movements, and then in its progress those that serve the voluntary movements’. Thus, his explanation of hysteria was based partly on concepts of a mechanical body in which the role of nerves and fibres were foregrounded. He also linked hysteria to the womb, emphasising the idea that women were more susceptible to this illness than men. He called upon doctors to make special efforts to manage hysteria, stating that, ‘it ought to be considered worthy of special attention on the part of doctors’.

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81 The *Mercurio Volante* is credited as the first medical periodical published in the new world. See: Quintanilla-Madero, ‘An Enlightened Perspective on Hysteria’, p.143.
82 Micale, *Approaching Hysteria*, p.19. Esteban de Terreros y Pando’s *Diccionario Castellano* (1787) similarly described the symptoms of hysteria. He wrote that, ‘one of the first problems is difficulty breathing: some women imagine that they have a cord around their neck: others, that they have a mouthful in their throat and they cannot swallow it: others feel like they are suffocating: also it brings with it deliria, nausea, convulsions, pain, vomiting, restlessness’. Terreros y Pando, *Diccionario Castellano* (G-O), p.297, 1, ‘Termino de Medicina, que se dice de una enfermedad, a que las mujeres están mui expuestas; tambien se llama pasión histérica, y mal de madre… uno de sus principales accidentes es la dificultad de respirar: unas mujeres imajinan, que tienen un cordel al cuello: otras, que un bocado en la garganta, y que no le pueden tragar: otras se quedan como sufocadas: asimismo trae consigo delirios, nauseas, convulsiones, dolores, vomitos, inquietudes’.
83 Bartolache, *Mercurio Volante*, p.43, ‘Irritacion de la matriz, infesta el celebro i nervios, i tambien los músculos, primeramente aquellos que sirven a los movimientos vitales, i luego en su progreso los que sirven a los movimientos voluntarios’.

111
required management, but for Bartolache neither women, nor priests, were best placed to direct that process. In Bartolache’s account, hysteria retained a significantly gendered component rooted in his views on the workings of the female body, while incorporating ideas that the brain and the rest of the nervous system were a site of illness. Much of the discussion of causes and symptoms was framed in secular, anatomical terms to emphasise the role of medical knowledge in diagnosing and regulating hysteria. In this regard, hysteria differed from other forms of madness.

Authors such as Bartolache and Venegas advocated labelling women who supposedly failed to regulate their thoughts, feelings, and gestures as hysterical. Drawing on his work with ‘ill hysterics’, Bartolache argued that observations of an individual patient’s gender, age, profession, lifestyle, previous conditions, and behaviour were required to identify and regulate hysteria. Bartolache described how hysteria manifested itself:

The woman feels in her stomach a very unpleasant weakness, or a feeling of hunger and fainting, which cannot be overcome with bland foods; but it is helped by bitter foods and those that exude spirits: [she feels] coldness in the extremities of her body, buzzing in the ears, [and has] a dazed mind, a knotted throat, no vigour or aptitude for activity, a propensity to sleep, perturbed ideas, fear of incurable illness (having heard so many experiences of others) and of death; finally, [she suffers] other manias which have been worsening every day for the duration of the illness. Over the progression and worsening of the hysteria[,] convulsive tremors are observed, difficulty breathing, longing, sighs, tears, severe headaches called spikes, fainting, contortion of limbs, jumps, [and] gestures, which seem to be the work of enchantment.

These symptoms of dizziness, altered sensation, respiratory problems, and excessive emotional display are very similar to those Micale finds to be typical in Europe and the USA.

With this broad description of symptoms, Bartolache pathologised the expression of morbid concerns, lethargic behaviour and sleeping for long periods, and exaggerated expressions

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85 Ibid., p.45; Sánchez Menchero and Morales Sarabia, El Corazón de los Libros, p.120.
86 Bartolache, Mercurio Volante, pp.42-3, ‘Siente la muger en su estómago una molestísima debilidad, o sensacion de hambre i desfallecimiento, in superable por medio de alimentos blandos líquidos; pero si por otros acres i espirituosos: frio en las extremidades del cuerpo, zumbido de oidos, aturdiu la cabeza, anudada la garganta, ningun vigor ni aptitud para las acciones, propension el sueño, perturbacion de ideas, aprehensiones de gravísimas enfermedades, (quantas se oyen contar de otros) i de muerte: en fin otras manias, que segun la duracion del mal se van cada dia empeorando. En el progreso i gravedad del hysterismo se observan tremores convulsivos, dificultad de respirar, ansias, suspiros, lloros, dolor de cabeza agudo, que llaman clavo, delíquios de animo, contorsiones de miembros, saltos, gestos, que parecen obra de encantamiento.’
87 Micale, Approaching Hysteria, p.19.
and movements. The description of weeping, sighing, and unusual gestures suggests that Bartolache thought behaviour that was outside of gender and class expectations was a medical problem. Such behaviour signifying extreme sadness may have been associated with immorality because persistent, extreme sadness was associated with the Devil and sin throughout the colonial period. 

By defining hysteria based on how an individual used their body and interacted with others, Bartolache used hysteria to justify the restriction of behaviour that exceeded expected moral and social boundaries. For Bartolache, the hysterical woman was one who had failed to moderate herself to be quiet, calm, obedient, and pious.

The same concern for regulating women’s emotions and their verbal and bodily expression was present in Venegas’ discussion of hysteria. He wrote that hysteria could be diagnosed by an individual’s ‘sad ideas, alienation, insolences, [and] contraction of limbs’. Negative feelings, internal torment, and poor physical control of one’s body were symptomatic of hysteria. The *Diccionario Castellano* also foregrounded emotional components of hysteria, but associated the term with heightened feeling generally, rather than exclusively with sadness. It suggested hysteria was ‘excited with the violent passions of anger, love, sadness, [and] bad news’. Across a range of texts, hysteria accrued associations with strong emotions, especially sadness, and a disposition to becoming distressed. Sanity and morality were persistently associated with moderation in feeling and behaviour. Regarding women, medical authors cited a failure to regulate oneself as hysteria, which justified therapeutic intervention in women’s daily lives.

Medical authors stated that women were more susceptible to hysteria than men and related this to women’s innate sinfulness. Bartolache made this link explicit by describing women as ‘A weak sex because of their own constitution, sickly and very much exposed to threats because of the destiny that Providence has given to them, [they are] penalised with just punishment for their wilful neglect of duty.’ Therefore, in Bartolache’s view, woman’s sinful nature led her to fall into the madness of hysteria. Quintanilla-Madero, a psychiatrist and academic, also surveys Bartolache’s writing on hysteria. She writes that Bartolache, ‘expresses his concern for women and their problems and speculates rationally on the

90 Terreros y Pando, *Diccionario Castellano* (G-O), p.297, 1, ‘Se excita con las pasiones violentas de la ira, amor, tristeza, malas nuevas, y buenos olores; y los malos olores’.
91 Bartolache, *Mercurio Volante*, p.41, ‘Sexo debil por su misma constitucion, achacoso i mui expuesto a contingencias por el destino que la Providencia le dio, multitado con la merecida pena de su prevaricación.’

113
possible origins and treatment of the disease, which he ascribes only to natural, not moral, causes'. I find the opposite: Bartolache’s discussion of the causes and symptoms of hysteria was grounded in a Christian conception of morality that assumed female sinfulness as a cause of illness. In Bartolache’s view, suffering from hysteria, while related to the nervous system, was fundamentally a religious punishment. It was induced by the generalised sin of women as descendants of Eve and the particular sin of the individual woman. Moreover, God wished their punishment upon them for their sins as He shaped their fate. The idea of hysteria was bound up in a framework of Christian assumptions because it was perceived as a penance for immorality.

The same assumption of female sinfulness underpinned other authors’ views of women as weak and susceptible to hysteria. Venegas wrote of hysteria that ‘The underlying causes are weaknesses, or fragility of the complexions.’ As scholars such as Risse and Dixon find in writings from northern Europe, Venegas considered women to be weaker than men by nature. Common assumptions regarding women’s physical and moral weakness shaped Venegas’ discussion. Similarly, in the *Diccionario Castellano* (also discussed in Chapter Two), Esteban de Terreros y Pando (1707-1782) a Spanish, Jesuit lexicographer observed that:

> It has been said that the cause [of this illness] is malignant vapours which arise from the womb; but the most skilled of the Moderns assure us that the womb has no influence in this at all and attribute the entire cause to hypochondria: according to the same Moderns this is why these maladies are so unrelenting and strong in women, and so rare or absent, with the same symptoms in men, as there is nothing particular [anatomically] to women that there is not to men, aside perhaps from their greater delicacy and susceptibility to impressions.

Here too, an implicit belief in moral weakness shaped the rationale for understanding hysteria as a women’s problem. The imagination was susceptible to ‘impressions’ or false ideas which could corrupt the individual. A susceptibility to impressions equated to a weakness to temptation. Women’s susceptibility to hysteria stemmed directly from their

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93 Venegas, *Compendio*, p.187, ‘Las causas antecedentes son debilidades, o delicadezas de las complexiones.’
95 Terreros y Pando, *Diccionario Castellano* (G-O), p.297, 1, ‘La causa próxima se ha juzgado ser los vapores malignos, que se levantan de la matriz; pero los mas hábiles Modernos aseguran, que la matriz en nada interviene para esto, y que son los hipocondrios toda la causa: A cuenta de estos mismos Modernos esta decir por qué son tan continuos, y tan fuertes estos males en las mujeres, y tan raros, ó ningunos con los mismos síntomas en los hombres, si nada hai particular en las mujeres que no haya en los hombres, si acaso no es su mayor delicadeza, y facilidad á las impresiones.’
greater propensity for sin. Ideas of physiological susceptibility were considered alongside the
more powerful rhetoric of moral culpability at the heart of medical conceptions of hysteria. These views paved the way for justifying medical regulation of emotional regimens and provided a justification for male medical control over women’s minds and bodies. Terreros y Pando and Venegas assumed female sin to be important in causing hysteria. Bartolache’s discussion of female immorality and lack of self-regulation made that assumption explicit.

Bartolache made women responsible for their hysteria by blaming their sinful lack of self-regulation for their illness. Bartolache considered the principal cause of hysteria in Mexico to be ‘the abuse of sweets and chocolate’. This belief reflected Bartolache’s observation that hysteria was endemic among privileged women, as he wrote, ‘Without exaggeration... of ten secular women four, and of as many other nuns scarcely two are found free of hysteria’. Bartolache’s supposition of hysteria’s prevalence among nuns aligned with contemporary concerns over the lax morals and excessive behaviours of criolla nuns, born in the colonies of Spanish descent. Concern about women’s consumption of chocolate was widespread. Nuns were criticised for their consumption of chocolate, which was also conspicuous among wealthy secular women who consumed chocolate drinks during mass. Such self-indulgence was already understood to be gluttonous, and thus sinful. Bartolache extended the harm caused by excessive consumption of sweet food and chocolate from a sin that harmed one’s soul to one that harmed reason. Gluttony led to hysteria in addition to moral decline. Accordingly, Bartolache instructed women to regulate their consumption of sweets. He recommended ‘using chocolate with great moderation, and even more with sweets’. He prescribed accepted ways of behaving based on their supposed health benefits, but in doing so reinforced religious ideas that one had to guard against sinful

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96 Bartolache, Mercurio Volante, p.45, ‘el abuso del dulce i chocolate’.
97 Ibid., pp.43-4, ‘Sin exageracion... of diez Personas seglares las quatro, i de otras tantas Religiosas a penas dos se hallaran libres de mal hysterico’. Bartolache’s views were similar to his contemporaries elsewhere in the Americas and Europe. Since the 1990s, historians have established that eighteenth-century thinkers associated hysteria and nervous disorders generally with the upper classes. For a discussion of hysteria and class, see: Micale, Approaching Hysteria, p.154.
98 Vera Tuleda, Colonial Angels, p.32. In order to be a nun in Spanish America one had to be of legitimate birth and almost always of Spanish descent and with a sufficient dowry to enter into a convent. Nuns were supposed to be the ‘Brides of Christ’ and their enclosed lives in the convent were to revolve around the hierarchy of the religious community and the importance of obedience. Nuns’ lives were highly regulated and the behavioural standards expected of nuns were higher than those of lay women from similar backgrounds, most obviously regarding enclosure and virginity. See: Asunción Lavrin, Brides of Christ: Conventual Life in Colonial Mexico (Stanford, 2008), pp.9, 19-25; Asunción Lavrin, ‘Masculine and Feminine: The Construction of Gender Roles in the Regular Orders in Early Modern Mexico’, Explorations in Renaissance Culture, 34, 1 (2008), pp.3-26.
99 Vera Tuleda, Colonial Angels, p.32.
100 Bartolache, Mercurio Volante, p.45, ‘Usese con gran moderacion de el chocolate, i con mucha mas de el dulce.’
behaviour, such as gluttony, from which madness could ensue. Although not discussing chocolate, Risse finds that doctors associated over-consumption with hysteria in late eighteenth-century Edinburgh. He cites excessive drinking of tea and coffee and eating too much meat and gravy as supposed causes of hysteria.\textsuperscript{101} Similarly, Venegas deemed that ‘sobriety and regulation of meals’ cured hysteria. Proper restraint regarding what, how much, and when one ate shaped the virtuous, rational self.

The endemic nature of hysteria was an issue of poorly regulated female lifestyles. Bartolache also criticised behaviour related to the sin of sloth. He claimed that ‘the tight-fitting dress, because it supposes inaction or lack of exercise’, and the ‘perverse custom’ of going to bed and rising late were causes of hysteria.\textsuperscript{102} Both of these purported causes were likely features of the lives of cloistered nuns and elite lay women. For Bartolache, like his contemporaries in Europe, being sedentary and unproductive led to moral corruption and so put a woman at risk of being hysterical.\textsuperscript{103} Similarly, Venegas claimed that an ‘idle, delightful, and sedentary life’ led to hysteria.\textsuperscript{104} This statement reflects the Enlightenment values of work, productiveness, and moderation, as well as a pious belief in self-denial and eschewing worldly pleasure.

Bartolache and Venegas advocated regular exercise for women to keep them occupied in tasks that were not harmful to their moral health, nor to others. Bartolache recommended that nuns took exercise in the morning before they ate by shaking their whole bodies to agitate their lungs and muscles. He thought this not necessary for ordinary women because they could leave their houses to take their exercise.\textsuperscript{105} Bartolache thought living in enclosed convents made nuns more susceptible to hysteria than lay women and so tailored his advice to them. Venegas, in contrast, gave advice on exercise for elite lay women. He advised that they ought ‘to take lots of exercise, mainly on horses, and in the countryside, to institute an industrious life’.\textsuperscript{106} The threat of hysteria justified doctors’ claims that women’s daily routines had to be regulated. For enlightened medical authors, hysteria developed from a lack of self-management. Thus ‘ill hysterics’ were morally culpable for their condition and

\textsuperscript{101} Risse, ‘Hysteria at the Edinburgh Infirmary’, p.2.
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid., p.45, ‘el vestido ajustado, supuesta la inaccion o falta de ejercicio’; ‘la perversa costumbre de recogerse a dormir i levantarse tarde’.
\textsuperscript{103} Risse, ‘Hysteria at the Edinburgh Infirmary’, p.2.
\textsuperscript{104} Venegas, \textit{Compendio}, pp.187-8, ‘vida ociosa, deliciosa, y sedentaria’.
\textsuperscript{105} Bartolache, \textit{Mercurio Volante}, pp.46-7. The \textit{Compendio} also contained an entry on hysteria and advocated dietary regulation and exercise, in particular advocating horse riding in the morning in the fresh air see Venegas, \textit{Compendio}, p.187.
\textsuperscript{106} Venegas, \textit{Compendio}, p.188, ‘La sobriedad y el arreglo en las comidas’; ‘hacer mucho ejercicio, principalmente a caballo, y en el campo, instituir una vida laboriosa’.
Idleness was a major factor in becoming hysterical. Discourses on hysteria provide evidence of how medical texts could be used to shape the concept of the ideal individual. A supposedly sinful lifestyle was thought to cause madness and made the individual woman responsible for her own sanity.  

Medical authors constructed the category of hysteria to justify their regulation of ‘moderate’, pious, and well-ordered female selves. While hysteria could, in principle, affect men as well as women, the dictates on self-regulation were supposed to shape female behaviour, thoughts, and feelings. Venegas’ advice on regulating women against hysteria focussed on lay women as he considered the best therapies to prevent and cure hysteria to be ‘marriage, moderate happiness, and work’. Women of all ages had to be properly occupied according to their station in order to lead virtuous, useful, and rational lives. As Dixon finds in seventeenth-century Dutch visual sources, medical authorities and other elites expected women to aid their health with marriage and motherhood. Similarly, Boss observes that regardless of the connections between hysteria and the womb, seventeenth-century medical writers in Britain thought hysteria could best be treated through marriage. Venegas’ emphasis on the importance of matrimony for preventing madness in women provides evidence that women were not thought able to regulate themselves. Indeed, they were susceptible to hysteria without male management and motherhood to occupy them. Applying oneself to appropriate roles and tasks was deemed both morally necessary and required for good health, thus working in the home under the guidance of a father or husband could help women to be virtuous and rational. Being happy (in a moderate way) in one’s occupation as a wife was deemed important because prolonged sadness was thought to be pathological. Similarly, extremes of feeling had the potential to harm one’s use of reason. Whether of joy or sorrow, the passions could overwhelm reason, as religious and philosophical authors described. Bartolache and Venegas’ discourses on hysteria were part of a broader trend of using concepts that related to madness to regulate the self.

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107 While most discussion of hysteria addressed elite women, in some Inquisition cases, authorities diagnosed women as hysterical. An example is the case of Mauricia Josefa de Apelo, who is discussed in detail in Chapter Five. Also see her case records: AGN, Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 1009, Expediente 15, ff.309-353.

108 Venegas, Compendio, p.188, ‘las nupcias, la alegria moderada, y el trabajo’.

109 Dixon, Perilous Chastity, p.38.


111 Dixon, Perilous Chastity, pp.17, 38.

Emphasis on moderate outward behaviour was informed by enlightened elite concerns with developing rational, pious, and hard-working subjects for the crown and church. Bartolache himself explicitly referred to the direction of the sciences towards the crown’s ends. He wrote in the introduction to the *Mercurio Volante* that, ‘We know that our court has begun to set an example... by reforming [medical] studies according to contemporary ideas of utility and the good of the state.’ Bartolache described a contemporary trend in political theory and practice to value the public good, which led to the development of places of work, provision of medical care, and an emphasis on safe, clean streets as part of a project to create useful subjects. Bartolache situated his work within this tradition and claimed that the role of the *Mercurio Volante* was to, ‘communicate to the public in our ordinary Spanish intriguing and important information, which is about various matters of physics and medicine, two sciences, of whose utility no one ever doubted’. He was committed to the principles of ‘utility and public good’, just as the Bourbon administration was. Bartolache and Venegas’ discussions of hysteria provide evidence that medical authorities incorporated individual behaviour into models of self-regulation towards the wider social goal of creating useful, moderate subjects. Bartolache thought that hysteria was caused by a lack of female regulation, specifically a lack of obedience and deference to their fathers, husbands, superiors in the convent, and spiritual directors. The explicit link between female sinfulness and hysteria justified elite Spanish doctors’ authority to dictate how women ought to manage themselves or be managed. That self-management, although often framed in a secular, medical vocabulary without reference to the soul or the passions, was based on the same concern with falling into sin and madness that animated contemporary literary texts and earlier medical theories. Reform piety, not secularisation, shaped the self in eighteenth-century medical theory.

**Conclusion**

The concept of madness shaped discussions about the governance of historical actors in Caroline Mexico. I have argued that madness functioned as a technology of the self. Medical authors moulded social expectations by forming a rhetoric of sanity, health, and morality juxtaposed against madness, illness, and immorality. Their ideas were part of a broader trend where religious figures and other commentators drew on conceptions of sin and madness to

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113 Bartolache, *Mercurio Volante*, p.5, ‘Sabemos que nuestra Corte ha comenzado á dar un exemplo… reformando los Estudios, segun las ideas que hoi se tienen para la maior utilidad I bien del Estado.’

114 Bartolache, *Mercurio Volante*, p.5, ‘comunicar al Publico en nuestro Español vulgar algunas noticias curiosas é importantes, i sean sobre varios asuntos de Fisica i Medicina, dos ciencias, de cuia utilidad nadie dudo jamás’. 
justify their prescriptions of how individuals ought to regulate themselves. Medical authors, just like their contemporaries, aimed to justify the development of pious, moderate, and useful vassals.

Humoral principles shaped much of the discourse on madness and medical authors turned them towards developing the ‘moderate’ individual. Throughout the Bourbon period, medical thinkers described madness as an effect of the ‘hot humors’ and prescribed cooling techniques such as cold baths, purges, and bleeding to counter its effects. This finding confirms Sacristán’s view that historical actors understood madness as humoral across the colonial period, in contrast to findings elsewhere in the early modern world. The discussions of humoral causes and cures also exposed the underlying moral expectations of good Spanish subjects in Venegas’ writing. He discussed aspects of women’s lives such as female occupation and dietary consumption within a humoral framework. The underlying principle behind advocating restraint in one’s diet and other behaviours was to cultivate moderation. The idea of the moderate self and a pious and useful individual adapted humoral concern for balance towards a political and religious end.

Religious values shaped the medical discourse on madness throughout the eighteenth century. For the authors of medical texts, the belief that sin caused madness underpinned all theories of how to guard oneself against becoming mad and how to manage the supposedly mad. Madness’ conceptual roots in sin made it impossible to ever fully eliminate madness. These authors described therapies for guarding against madness and managing it that required regular practice and use, for example Piquer’s recommendations to develop a habit of using one’s reason. The writing analysed from the first part of the Bourbon period shared much of the language of religious authors, who discussed madness as part of discourses on the passions, the soul, the imagination, fantasy, and the temptations. A common framework underpinned elite thinking on madness. There was little distinction between the regulatory principles advocated by Piquer and Esteyneffer and the priests discussed in Chapter Two.

Throughout the Bourbon period, doctors continued to base their rhetoric of protecting oneself from madness on principles of piety. Medical understandings of madness did not secularise in this context as various historians of eighteenth-century medicine claim. Venegas explicitly advocated meditating on one’s sins, doing penance for them, and thinking of God. He presented such interiorisation as a necessary part of regulating the passions and so maintaining one’s sanity. He did not, however, encourage turning to the clergy to support this form of self-regulation. Instead, madness and the passions were incorporated into
medical theories of the mind. Defining and describing conditions that had previously been seen as issues for the clergy allowed physicians to prescribe how to eat, sleep, exercise, work and dress, as both Bartolache and Venegas did. Medical theories of regulation of the self against madness, like political, literary, and religious discussions of madness, were grounded in the Catholic idea that sin caused madness. The sinful individual had to be tempered to shape the rational, obedient, and useful Bourbon subject.

Developments in scientific thinking emphasised the way in which observation of the natural world had the potential to enable knowledge of God’s creation, including humanity. Madness and immaterial, spiritual concepts such as the soul and the passions were reframed as observable, measurable, and amenable to doctors’ regulation. Venegas in particular created an anatomical approach to categorising and defining the passions and advocated methods to regulate each one to avoid spiritual illness. He also wrote about the relationship between the soul and the nerves, which grounded moral principles in a secular anatomical framework and made it possible to argue that the soul’s movements could be interpreted by doctors. Madness continued to be a moral category, but was increasingly scientifically comprehensible.

The new secularised category of hysteria played a similar role in expanding the medical regulation of the self. As the historiography of hysteria in other contexts suggests, medical authors associated hysteria with upper-class women, over-indulgence, and a lack of exercise. It was believed to be a nervous condition, but was not entirely detached from uterine pathology. Marriage, obedience, and a moderate lifestyle were supposedly the cornerstones of effective management. Bartolache and the other authors who referred to hysteria considered sin to be the most important cause. Through his construction of hysteria as an illness of well-to-do women caused by lax, sinful behaviour, and by gluttony and sloth especially, Bartolache justified pressuring women to conform to behaviour desired by elite Spanish men. His discussion of the causes of and therapies for madness were not only concerned with the generalised sin of humanity, or women, but with specific sins he thought Mexican women were prone to. Even with regard to a new medical category, regulation of the self was premised upon internalising Catholic values.

In Caroline Mexico, to be human was to be at risk of falling into madness. Madness was a fluid term used to denote anything that went against the views of those in power. Who had authority varied based on the context, from religious leaders to physicians. Authority figures utilised madness as a regulatory principle for shaping moderate, obedient subjects, across all of the texts discussed in Chapters Two and Three. The risk of madness required
self-regulation in order to be both a pious Catholic with a personal relationship with God and to be a useful, productive vassal of the state. Evidence of the regulation of daily life can be found in the records of colonial bureaucracies, such as the Inquisition, missions, the criminal courts, and the army. The following chapters assess the ways in which this idea of madness as a technology of the self played out in the bureaucratic regulation of individuals in Bourbon Mexico.
Chapter Four: Sensory Experience and Embodying Madness

‘You will recognise madness by singing, and playing, and horsing around’.¹

Introduction

In this chapter I consider how authorities and witnesses described their sensory observations of supposedly mad people, and their descriptions of how ‘mad’ people used their bodies. Historical actors labelled others as mad based not only on what they did, but also on how and when they did it. In principle, the opposite of madness was to use one’s reason. However, discerning rational capacity was difficult as I have shown in Chapter Two. One approach was to judge whether others regulated their behaviour appropriately – and so could reason – by interpreting their bodily movements. The sounds, gestures, expressions, and touch of an individual, and the ways others perceived these, were at the heart of self-regulation and thus shaped verdicts of madness.

Chapter Two of this thesis took the findings of other historians that madness was a religious concept and examined how, in theory, human sin put individuals at risk of madness and how strict self-regulation was necessary in order to be moral and sane. This chapter considers the embodied aspects of self-regulation: what did self-regulation involve in practice, and how did failure to self-regulate manifest itself? It builds in particular on María Cristina Sacristán’s examination of how madness was socially constructed in New Spain by considering the emotional aspects of madness and the ways people use their bodies to express themselves. I draw on Barbara Rosenwein’s insights into interpreting bodily expressions of emotion to the topic of madness.² Similarly, the chapter adapts insights from Jacqueline Holler’s article on the construction of melancholy in colonial Mexico.³

The chapter also draws on the historiography of the senses. Historians of madness in both the Anglophone and Hispanic historiographies have yet to take this approach. Historians and anthropologists have established that sensory perception is culturally determined; it is the result of place and time and must be historicised.⁴ Historian Peter Bailey

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² Rosenwein, Emotional Communities, pp.27, 191-203.
describes noise as ‘sound out of place’, drawing on Mary Douglas’ work on dirt as ‘matter out of place’. I extend this concept to examine instances when noise as sound out of place was attributed to madness. I also consider where weeping, violence, gesticulations, and nudity were deemed mad as actions ‘out of place’. The chapter incorporates recent work into ordinary life in colonial Mexico to show how people were supposed to regulate themselves. The chapter particularly builds on the work of Sonya Lipsett-Rivera’s *Gender and the Negotiation of Daily Life* to contextualise the ways people used their bodies and were perceived by others, and William Taylor’s *Magistrates of the Sacred*, to provide context regarding the work of the clergy and their relationships with parishioners.

The chapter uses this material to contextualise specific religious aspects of cases of madness. It shows that while people who were believed to be mad often appear in the historical record because of a religious misdemeanour, their religious infraction was not a rationale for labelling them as mad. Instead, the diagnosis of madness was based on their behaviour. By contextualising transgressions such as blasphemy, heresy, extra-marital sex, and solicitation, this chapter provides a deeper understanding of the role of religion in madness and what kinds of self-regulation were necessary in practice to appear sane.

The chapter is based on analysis of the cases of twenty-three clerics. The records are found in Inquisition records, missionary documents, and official correspondence in the ‘Vice regal Government’ section of the AGN in Mexico City. Some cases are very brief, consisting of two or three folios; others are hundreds of pages long, spanning decades of correspondence and trial records. These cases are taken from many areas held under the New Spanish jurisdiction, from Oaxaca in the south to Durango in the north. There is some clustering in central Mexico, with five cases based in the archdiocese of Mexico and three in Puebla. Three cases were located in the northern frontier missions. Some individuals appear in the records in brief reports discussing arrangements for their care, the management of their possessions, or their removal from office and provision for replacing them. Other, longer cases appear in Inquisition trials and other disputes involving alleged misconduct.

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7 As discussed in Chapter Two, Sacristán observes that the documents available were religious in origin and this affects the impression they create of madness, but does not interrogate the relationship between the two. See Sacristán, *Locura e Inquisición*, p.24.
8 See the appendix for information on the workings of the Inquisition.
Fourteen are Inquisition cases involving some combination of blasphemy, heresy, and the solicitation of women. The longest, most detailed cases record disputes concerning the state of mind of a defendant or when their misconduct was deemed particularly severe. Examples of madness from other Inquisition, criminal, and army records are also drawn upon to demonstrate the wider relevance of these findings.

The clergy form the bulk of the cases discussed because this body of material provides particularly rich detail about the actions and sensory perceptions of ‘mad’ individuals, which is not consistently available in other records. The clergy were overrepresented in Inquisition cases of madness in comparison to the general population. Based on figures from 1810, there were 6827 diocesan and regular priests in New Spain out of a total estimated population of 6,122,354, of which, 3,676,281 were indigenous and so not subject to the Inquisition. The total estimated population the Inquisition regulated was therefore 2,446,073. Hence, the priesthood made up an estimated 0.3 per cent of the population under the Inquisition’s jurisdiction, whereas they accounted for 24.6 per cent (fourteen of fifty-seven) of the Inquisition cases where a defendant was described as mad. The clergy were a fairly homogenous group in New Spanish society, as they were all educated men of Spanish descent, offering a comparable group of cases across which to examine the ways a lack of self-regulation was attributed to madness. The work of William Taylor on parish priests is particularly useful for contextualising the behaviours of the clergy in eighteenth-century New Spain because it provides detailed discussions of the lifecycle of priests.

The chapter is divided into four sections. Section One characterises the clergy in New Spain. It provides an overview of their lives, education, and common types of clerical misconduct. Section Two addresses the speech, sound, and noises of the supposedly mad. It provides evidence that inappropriate sounds and silence were more important in labelling someone as mad than the specific words, even heresies, an individual uttered. Section Three considers gestures, touch, expressions, and tears, all of which functioned as symptoms of madness. These bodily signs held different meanings for different kinds of people, in different contexts, and could be ambiguous, especially tears. Section Four provides nuance to Sacristán’s observation that sexuality was a facet of madness. The history of sexuality in colonial Mexico provides important context for understanding these aspects of cases

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9 Dale Shuger makes a similar observation that in early modern Spain the proportion of clerics who were considered mad in Inquisition cases was much larger than in other social groups. See: Dale Shuger, ‘Madness on Trial’, Journal of Spanish Cultural Studies, 10, 3 (2009), p.290.
10 Taylor, Magistrates of the Sacred, p.78; Aguirre Beltrán, La Población Negra de México, p.232-4.
involve madness. This section considers how regulation of the body’s appearance and
avoiding public displays of sexuality was important to appearing sane. As a whole, the
chapter considers how bodily actions and emotions out of place were important in
determining whether someone was mad.

This chapter argues that a fear of being considered mad served to regulate external
behaviour because to speak, gesture, and use objects inappropriately was to risk being
perceived as mad. In all of the cases where an individual was labelled as mad, their
misconduct, whether sexual, heretical, or related to the neglect of duties, was accompanied
by embodied behaviours that put them outside the boundaries of ordinary, accepted
conduct. ‘Mad’ uses of the body can be categorised as sounds, silence, nudity, expressions,
tears, violence, and self-violence out of place.

Section One: Religious Ideals and Realities
The ideal cleric regulated his thoughts and behaviour to internalise and express his rationality
and morality. Historians Taylor and Asunción Lavrin have described the standards set in
colonial Mexico for the secular clergy, who were parish priests and deacons who were not
members of a religious institute, and the regular clergy, monastics who were members of a
religious institute. In principle, to be ordained an individual had to be of legitimate birth
and from an Old Christian family.¹¹ Most parish priests in late colonial Mexico were described as
creole, though many missionaries travelled to Mexico from Spain.¹² Texts chronicling the
lives and achievements of clerics emphasised that such men, especially the regular orders,
required bravery and strength of character to carry out their duties.¹³ The clergy were to
demonstrate these qualities in parishes and missions through their activities in the
community as shepherds to their flocks. The ideal cleric was an educated man who behaved
virtuously, cultivating in himself charity, obedience, humility, tolerance, and celibacy.¹⁴ The
minimum standard of education was to be literate, have some awareness of Latin, and to
have passed exams in moral theology. To obtain a benefice, a stipendiary ecclesiastical office
with duties towards a specific parish, a candidate almost always required a bachelor’s
degree, which comprised grammar, rhetoric, and philosophy. While studying for a bachelor’s
degree, candidates had to practice monthly confession, attending mass daily, praying twice

¹¹ The term Old Christian related to the term limpieza de sangre, which is defined in Chapter One. It
referred to families with supposedly exclusive Christian heritage, with no genealogical ties to heretics
or converts from other faiths.
¹² Taylor, Magistrates of the Sacred, p.87: Michael McCloskey, Missionary College of Santa Cruz of
¹³ Lavrin, ‘Masculine and Feminine’, pp.7-8.
¹⁴ Taylor, Magistrates of the Sacred, p.86.
a day, attending the cathedral on feast days, and performing spiritual exercises during Lent. To be ordained necessitated studying theology, and some students pursued further studies to gain licentiates and doctorates. In the eighteenth century, seminaries continued to teach ‘interior mortification’, as they had since the sixteenth century in New Spain, through enforced silence and introspection to harness the passions. Following this training, the priests moved into parish service. Priests were not automatically allocated a parish benefice; most were assistants to beneficed priests, and only about a third were beneficed. A priest held a benefice for life or until he gained a better position, either in a more sought-after parish or at a higher level. The priest for a parish was entitled to an income, labour, and supplies from his parishioners and he usually acted as the commissioner, a local agent for the Inquisition and the ecclesiastical judge in his area.

Conditions of education and work could be challenging, especially for the regular orders. Missionaries in New Spain had strict training in apostolic colleges and often worked in more onerous conditions than their secular counterparts. Most of the missionaries discussed in this chapter were part of the Franciscan order. They took over Jesuit missions after the latter’s expulsion from the Spanish Empire in 1767 and there are far fewer catalogued references to madness preceding this date. The Franciscans based their work on the principles of poverty, obedience, and chastity. Missionary training took place in the apostolic colleges, which had a strict daily routine that emphasised preparation for mission work. This routine involved maintaining saintly silence; it was prohibited to talk in the dormitories and friars undertook two hours of individual, silent prayer per day. There was daily instruction on missionary work, languages, and theology. Moreover, the movements of the friars were restricted to certain areas of the college at specific times of day. Thus the college had a strict set of behavioural codes for friars. In the spirit of obedience, if sent to a mission they did not wish to attend, they were to defer to their superiors and carry out their duties ‘without dispute, controversy, complaint, nor feeling’. They committed to ten years

15 Ibid., p.88-90.
16 Ibid., pp.79-80.
17 In the second half of the eighteenth-century, friars established missions in the areas of Coahuila, Nuevo León, Tamaulipas, Nuevo Santander, and Baja and Alta California. See: Alvaro Ávila Cruz, Los Frailes Descalzos de Pachuca: Su Convento y Colegio (Pachuca, 2009), p.87; Steven Hackel, Children of Coyote, Missionaries of Saint Francis: Indian-Spanish Relations in Colonial California, 1769-1850 (Chapel Hill, 2012), p.53.
18 Ávila Cruz, Los Frailes Descalzos de Pachuca, p.27.
19 Apostolic colleges were founded in New Spain in Querétaro (established 1683), Guatemala (1700), Zacatecas (1707), Pachuca (1732), Mexico City (1736), and Orizaba 1798. See Ávila Cruz, Los Frailes Descalzos de Pachuca, p.42.
20 Ibid., p.61.
21 Ibid., p.57.
of work in the missions and sixty per cent of Franciscan missionaries achieved this. The average length of service was sixteen years.\textsuperscript{22}

The responsibilities of the regular and secular clergy towards their flocks were similar. One major difference was that parish priests often worked in the parish of their birth.\textsuperscript{23} Although reports of hard work and loneliness were prevalent in both missions and parishes, work in the missions was particularly onerous as missionaries were at greater risk of violence than parish priests, even in rural areas.\textsuperscript{24} Many missionaries considered themselves to be unable to fulfil their obligations and wished to return from missions, or even not to be sent in the first place for fear of ill health and death.\textsuperscript{25} Clerical work involved dedicating oneself to prayer, a simple lifestyle, work in the community, and study as ongoing practices. To be a priest or missionary in New Spain required strict standards of behaviour and self-regulation.

Taylor’s work on parish priests in the Archdiocese of Mexico and the Diocese of Guadalajara in the eighteenth century explains how parish life was organised, the experiences of parish priests, and the effects of the Bourbon reforms on local religious practices and life.\textsuperscript{26} Taylor shows that the existing documentation on the clergy does not fairly represent the activities of the majority of clerics because it disproportionately discusses the extremes of both virtuous and scandalous behaviour.\textsuperscript{27} Rather, he explains how most clerics, whether part of the regular or secular orders, met the minimum requirements asked of them by maintaining their sacramental duties. Even those whose personal conduct was inadequate usually diligently observed their sacramental duties and often also worked charitably towards the material needs of their parishioners.\textsuperscript{28}

Nonetheless, Taylor shows, as other scholarship has done, that the clergy appear in records for committing a range of misdemeanours.\textsuperscript{29} There were many ways in which members of the clergy did not successfully regulate their behaviour. Drunkenness, absenteeism, violating vows of chastity, soliciting women, and greed were commonly

\textsuperscript{22} Hackel, \textit{Children of Coyote, Missionaries of Saint Francis}, p.53.
\textsuperscript{23} Taylor, \textit{Magistrates of the Sacred}, p.87.
\textsuperscript{24} For examples of indigenous groups executing Franciscan friars in Texas and in Alta California in the late eighteenth century, see: Lavrin, ‘Masculine and Feminine’, p.8; Hackel, \textit{Children of Coyote}, p.53.
\textsuperscript{26} Taylor, \textit{Magistrates of the Sacred}, pp.3-7.
\textsuperscript{27} \textit{Ibid.}, p.205.
\textsuperscript{28} \textit{Ibid.}, p.181.
\textsuperscript{29} \textit{Ibid.}, pp.180-5. For brief references to priests who were described as mad and intellectually deficient see p.616. Regarding clerical misdemeanour, see also: Shuger, ‘Madness on Trial’, p.290; Allyson Poska, \textit{Regulating the People: The Catholic Reformation in Seventeenth-Century Spain} (Leiden, 1998), p.51.
recorded; small doctrinal errors were often overlooked or pardoned. Many clerics did not maintain standards of dress, with unclean and tattered robes an oft cited issue. Those who dressed most scandalously, for example being seen in public out of uniform, were also the most likely to engage in extreme forms of misconduct. These infringements were committed by the regular orders as well as the secular priests, though eighteenth-century observers considered the former to be more virtuous.

Section Two: Speech, Sound, and Noise

The Inquisition processed many cases of blasphemy and heresy that were not linked to madness. Indeed, blasphemy was one of the most common crimes in colonial Mexico. Blasphemous or heretical statements prompted suspicion of madness and formed part of the evidence that an individual could not control their own behaviour, leading to the label of madness. Blasphemy and heresy trials account for six of the sixteen Inquisition cases where priests were deemed mad.

In committing heresy, a cleric demonstrated a serious moral failure. The Franciscan friar Felipe Antonio Alvarez was tried for heresy by the Inquisition from 1758-1771 after having been imprisoned in a monastic prison in Querétaro from as early as 1744. A number of witnesses from the monastic community testified against Alvarez, though their identities were kept anonymous in the records. In the prison one witness overheard Alvarez disputing the authority and morality of church hierarchy. Among other things, he claimed that Alvarez said that ‘the Pope and all the other sacred ministers usurped authority they did not nor could not have’. Moreover, he allegedly claimed ‘that none of those who are called priests, bishops or Popes have the capacity to administer the true sacraments’ and made the surprising statement ‘that original sin was not committed by any man and Indian in particular but by the community of priests’. More specifically, he presented the Catholic Church as unable to provide the most important aspect of its position and duties. He purportedly

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31 Ibid., p.206.
33 Teresa Ordorika Sacristán similarly observes that people’s words were an important factor in labelling them as mad in early modern Spain, See: Ordorika Sacristán, ‘¿Herejes o Locos?’, pp.159-60.
34 AGN, Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 1117, Expediente 4, f.4.
35 Ibid., f.2, ‘el Romano Pontifice como todos los demás sagrados Ministros se usurpaban la autoridad que no tenían ni pueden tener’.
36 Ibid., f.2, ‘Que ninguno de los que se llaman sacerdotes, obispos, o Papas tiene facultad de administrar verdaderos sacramentos, que justifique las almas p.a no ser mas que unas ridículas ceremonias las q.e con nombre de sacramentos usa la Romana ig.a’ and ‘que el pecado original no havia sido cometido p.r algún Hombre particular, e Indio sino p.r la comunidad de los sacerdotes’.

128
denied its capacity to mediate between individuals and God, thus radically undermining the
basis of clerical authority. Alvarez supposedly also claimed that clerics were not just fallen as
humans, but that they were more sinful than other people, as he linked original sin to the
clergy, rather than humankind or, indeed Eve and womankind. His peers denounced him to
the Inquisition because his thoughts and speech were perceived as sinful, and because he
attacked the established hierarchy by blaming the clergy for sin. Alvarez’s inability or refusal
to regulate his speech led to his imprisonment.

Heretical statements could prompt inquiries into whether or not an individual was
mad. Ignacio Zubia, a parish priest from Spain who resided in the Archdiocese of Mexico, was
tried by the Inquisition from 1770-4. He was accused of making false accusations against the
church and monarchy. The Inquisition accused Zubia of offensive statements against Juan de
Palafox y Mendoza (whose work is discussed in Chapter Two), the King, and the Pope, all of
which was deemed to constitute heresy.37 His statements against the Pope were especially
cconcerning because of their timing in 1770, not long after the appointment of a new pope.
Following the Jesuits’ expulsion from the Hispanic world in 1767 and the death of the Jesuit
Pope Clement XIII in 1769, a new Franciscan pope, Clement XIV, had been appointed. A
Bourbon plan to suppress the Jesuits partly prompted his appointment.38 The adviser
Amestoy made a lengthy formal accusation against Zubia, which catalogued a number of
claims regarding Zubia’s view of the Pope and the process by which he was appointed.
According to Amestoy, Zubia claimed that ‘the present Pope is not the true Pope, but an anti-
Pope’.39 The term ‘anti-pope’ was defined in Spanish dictionaries as ‘He who is concurrent
with the Pope, head of the faction that causes a schism in the Catholic Church in order to
depose the legitimate Pope from his seat and usurp his [the Pope’s] dignity, maintaining that
his election is legitimate’.40 Such a denunciation of the Pope as illegitimate from a member
of the clergy was heretical and deeply concerning to the Inquisition. Zubia explained his belief
that Clement XIV was an Antipope by saying that the election had been based on the wishes
of the Bourbon Crown and as such was void.41 Thus Zubia attacked both the church and the

38 Jonathan Wright, ‘The Suppression and Restoration of the Jesuits’ in Thomas Worcester (ed.), The
verdadero Papa, sino Antipapa’.
40 Diccionario de Autoridades (A) (Madrid, 1726), p.310, 1, ‘El concurrente con el Papa, cabeza de
partido, que mueve cisma en la Iglesia Cathólica, para deponer y echar de la Silla al Papa legítimo, y
usurparle la Dignidad, manteniendo que su elección es la legítima’.
41 Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 1024, Expediente 13, f.286, ‘Que se havia hecho la elección
por contemplación de los reyes y que havia sido nulla’.
crown, voicing opinions that were not acceptable from anyone in the Spanish Empire, least of all a cleric.

As established in Chapter Two, political and religious obedience was associated with rationality; to claim the Pope was an Antipope and that the Bourbon monarchy had exerted their will in the election was not a ‘rational’ position to take. Furthermore, the inquisitors, the Inquisition’s ecclesiastical judges, described Zubia as having a ‘blind passion... for the Jesuits’. This language is very similar to that of the author Santiago Josef López Ruíz, discussed in Chapter Two. López Ruíz described challenging the political order as mad, using a sensory analogy of the passions blinding reason. Moreover, as also discussed in Chapter Two, the passions were associated with sinful desires. Therefore, the Inquisition’s concern for order, hierarchy, and loyalty to the church and crown was expressed using language that implied that to act otherwise was to be blinded by passion, to be sinful and irrational. Potentially heretical behaviour created a reason for the Inquisition, peers, and doctors to explore Zubia’s and Alvarez’s states of mind, their use of reason, their intellectual capacities and their sanity. In itself, a moral failing was not evidence of madness, but it demonstrated a lack of proper self-regulation that initiated inquiries into madness.

In practice, historical actors labelled others as mad based how they spoke as much as the words they used. Drawing on anthropologist Mary Douglas’ work on dirt as ‘matter out of place’, historian Peter Bailey describes noise as ‘sound out of place’. Bailey theorises noise as a selection of sounds that are perceived as disproportionate, illogical, disordered, and incomprehensible. Such noise may also be distinct from other kinds of sounds by being toneless. As sensory experience is ascribed social significance, sounds necessarily can have moral connotations. Historical actors used madness as a label for some behaviours they sensed and interpreted as out of place, disproportionate, and disordered. Making certain sounds, or noise, could be interpreted as mad behaviour. Just as Bailey shows that noise demarcates sound as immoral, noise can characterise sound as mad.

Making inappropriate sounds was regularly cited in these cases as evidence that an individual was disruptive. For example, Friar Mariano de la Santisima Trinidad wrote to the Inquisition in 1771 that Zubia, who had been sent to the College of San Joachin, ‘is very annoying to the community whom he disturbs with his continuous sighs and laments, which

42 Ibid., f.286, ‘ciega passion... para con los Padres de la Compañia de Jesus’.
most of the college hears’. Here, Friar Mariano de la Santisima Trinidad described the quality of sound that Zubia made rather than recounting the specific words he spoke. In doing so, he conveyed how the college community could not look after or tolerate Zubia’s presence. Zubia’s sighs, his wordless noises, constituted inappropriate expressions of feeling. As it was reported that the sounds he made were heard throughout the college, it would appear that they were also disproportionately loud for the quiet, residential context. Inquisition officials agreed with the friar that these disruptive, unpleasant noises were evidence that Zubia had a spiritual illness.

Regulating oneself to behave rationally required making sounds only at appropriate times and in a manner and at a volume that was expected. Sighs, screams, wailing, banging, and making music all featured in the descriptions of the behaviour of the clerics thought to be mad. One example is the case of Friar Manuel Sevane, who we met in the Introduction and in Chapter Two. Sevane was from the province of San José in Spain and resided at the Franciscan apostolic college at Pachuca, in the Hidalgo area to the North West of Mexico City. The missionaries who lived with him at the college unanimously described a man of inflexible nature, who did not go to mass, nor confession, and had not taken up his duties within the community. In his day-to-day behaviour Sevane insulted and threatened the guardian and other friars and refused to take part in the college’s life and work. In 1787 the guardian at the college began a process attempting to forcibly return Sevane to Spain on grounds of madness.

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44 Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 1024, Expediente 13, f.330, ‘es, ser mui molesto a la comunidad a quien perturba con los continuos suspiros, y lamentos, que por la mayor parte de este colegio se perciven’.
45 For discussions of emotions in colonial Mexico, see Villa-Flores and Lipsett-Rivera (eds), Emotions and Daily Life in Colonial Mexico.
47 The Franciscans operated the majority of missions in northern Mexico in the second half of the eighteenth century. Their work covered a broad geographical area and had contact with many different indigenous groups and languages from California in the North West to Texas in the North East. Missionaries were trained in apostolic colleges in Querétaro, Guatemala, Zacatecas, Pachuca, and Mexico City. For more information on the Franciscan college in Pachuca, see: Alvaro Ávila Cruz, Los Frailes Descalzos de Pachuca: Su Convento y Colegio (Pachuca, 2009); José Vergara Vergara, Convento y Colegio de San Francisco de Pachuca (Pachuca, 1995). The following works give an overview of the missions on New Spain’s northern frontier: Erick Langer and Robert H. Jackson (eds), The New Latin American Mission History (London, 1995); Hackel, Children of Coyote; McCloskey, Missionary College of Santa Cruz of Querétaro; Cynthia Radding, Wandering Peoples: Colonialism, Ethnic Spaces, and Ecological Frontiers in Northwestern Mexico, 1700-1850 (London, 1997); Maria de Fátima Wade, Missions, Missionaries, and Native Americans: Long-Term Processes and Daily Practices (Gainesville, 2011).
Sound out of place features repeatedly in accounts of Sevane’s behaviour in the college at Pachuca, and must be understood based on what sound was expected in the monastery. The location, timing, and volume of Sevane’s speech was an important emotional practice that was understood by others in relation to their social and cultural expectations. Accounts of Sevane’s speech provide evidence that he did not regulate his voice to acceptable places, times, and volumes. When speaking, the friars were taught to use few words, to be serious not jocular, to avoid discussing business matters, and to speak with measured voices. The manner in which Sevane spoke was as important as the words he used in making him seem mad. The Master of Novices at Pachuca, Friar Julian Bonhome, said that Sevane had publically shown disrespect for the guardian and that he insulted him ‘with shouts and impertinent words’. Bonhome recounted how Sevane delivered his insults, rather than repeating the words he used. What mattered was not what Sevane said, but that he yelled these insults in front of the guardian and others, publically displaying his lack of respect. The same words whispered to a companion or uttered in private, though not respectful, might not have constituted the same failure to regulate one’s emotional practices that led others to consider Sevane mad. Bonhome also highlighted that ‘on some nights the aforementioned Sevane stood at the window to insult the Reverend Father Commissioner Visitor with dreadful words’. In this example too, the content of the insults was not given as evidence of madness, but the inappropriateness of sound to the context was. Sevane was calling out of the window, presumably at a loud volume so his words carried to the visitor, and again showing disrespect to a senior individual. An apparent inability to regulate the sounds he made for the situation was compelling evidence of madness.

Inappropriate use of music and song was also cited in Sevane’s case. Friar Bonhome claimed that Sevane regularly played a guitar and sang between the hours of 8pm and

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49 Ávila Cruz, Los Frailes Descalzos de Pachuca, p.69.
50 Instituciones Coloniales, Clero Regular y Secular, Vol. 139, Expediente 20, f.54 ‘con gritos, y palabras desvergonzadas’.
51 Similarly, in the case of Nicolas Lara, a priest denounced for blasphemy, witnesses described the way he expressed himself as well as the things he had said that constituted blasphemy. For example, one witness claimed that ‘Father Lara viewed others with repugnance, running at the women who entered the church and threatening them’. AGN, Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 1436, Expediente 4, f.29, ‘se manifestó el Padre Lara repugnante a ellos, corriendo a las Mugeres que dentran al Templo, y amenazándolas’.
52 Shouting was also an important aspect of the criminal case of Tabaco el Loco, discussed below. Multiple testifiers recounts his ‘terrible shouts’. AGN, Instituciones Coloniales, Real Audiencia, Criminal Contenedor 290, Vol. 644, Expediente 2, ff.117-9, ‘gritos terribles’. For a further example of cries and shouts as evidence of madness, see: AGN, Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 865, Expediente 1.
53 Instituciones Coloniales, Clero Regular y Secular, Vol. 139, Expediente 20, f.54, ‘algunas noches que dho Sevane se ponía a la ventana a insultar con palabras atraves al Rmo P.e Com.o Visitor’. 

132
midnight, when the other friars had retired to their dormitories to pray and sleep.\(^{54}\) Singing and playing musical instruments was part of daily life in religious and secular settings, but was not acceptable in all contexts. Music had a role in liturgical settings: at the college in Pachuca, mass was sung on Sundays and other Holy days, and on Saturday afternoons the whole community sang litanies.\(^{55}\) Although silence predominated in the college, making music in the form of chanting in religious services was a part of monastic daily life. Sevane’s music making did not take place within these contexts. His supposed inability to regulate his behavior to make sounds in appropriate ways and contexts was attributed to madness.

The monastic community perceived Sevane’s sounds as noise, which marked them out as mad. Many members of the community complained that Sevane disturbed their sleep. For example, Friar Juan Monteagudo reported that ‘he has heard it said, that because of the extreme noise that Friar Manuel Sevane made at inconvenient times of night, some of the friars have had to move elsewhere because Sevane prevented them from sleeping’.\(^{56}\) Friar Bonhome, who had known Sevane for eleven years and lived next door to him, provided more detail on Sevane’s noises. His testimony stated that ‘for seven years he had observed the community very mortified by the nocturnal follies [locuras] of Sevane, singing, and playing some instrument, giving a cacophony of sound, thus he declared he [had] needed to leave the cell adjoining Sevane’.\(^{57}\) Bonhome highlighted how loud Sevane was and explicitly stated that he considered singing and making noise with an instrument in the night to be mad behaviour. Such behaviour constituted follies or madness. His description also suggests the quality of the sound was incoherent and disorderly; Sevane did not play a melody or a tune. Moreover, the guardian described his singing as ‘tuneless vocals’.\(^{58}\) The tuneless nature of a sound gave it the quality of noise and, in this case, told the listener something about the person making it.

Indeed, in her article, ‘The Power of Laughter’, Sonya Lipsett-Rivera discusses the importance of tone of voice in any interaction in colonial Mexico. She describes situations

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\(^{54}\) Instituciones Coloniales, Clero Regular y Secular, Vol. 139, Expediente 20, f.54 ‘Que en el mismo dho tiempo ha tenido en continua turbacion a la Comun.\(\circ\) con sus manias, y voces, que regulam.te eran de las ocho, hasta la media noche, poco mas, o menos, tocando una guitarrilla, y cantando lo que queria’.

\(^{55}\) Ávila Cruz, Los Frailes Descalzos de Pachuca, p.61.

\(^{56}\) Instituciones Coloniales, Clero Regular y Secular, Vol. 139, Expediente 20, f.56, ‘Que ha oido decir, que por el ruido extremoso, que Fr. Man.l Sevane hacia a deshoras de la noche, tubieron algunos Relig.\(\circ\) q.e mudarse lejos, porque les impedía el descanso’.

\(^{57}\) Ibid., f.55 ‘por los siete años ha observado mui mortificada la comunidad por las locuras nocturnas de dho Sebane, ya cantando, y tocando algun instrum.to, ya dando voces descomparadas, motivo por que el que declara se usó en necesidad de dejar la celda que tenia contigua a Sevane’.

\(^{58}\) Instituciones Coloniales, Clero Regular y Secular, Vol. 139, Expediente 20, f.52 ‘desentonadas voces’.
where humour went sour, and shows through numerous examples that while the words used
did not cause offence, an ill-judged tone of voice could turn humour to insults and cause
fights.\textsuperscript{59} In Sevane’s case a lack of tunefulness conveyed a lack of rational, ordered behaviour
to the guardian. Sevane’s sounds in the night were neither melodious nor timely; the noise
he made flouted expectations that friars would uphold quiet times and sing in structured,
religious ceremonies, and revealed a lack of self-regulation.

Knowing when not to speak or make noises is a fundamental aspect of behaving in a
culturally acceptable manner.\textsuperscript{60} Historian Peter Burke describes the importance of silence to
communication. Silence often has connotations of respect and deference to authority. Burke
explains how in Christianity religious silence combines a sense of respect for God with an
understanding that spiritual realities cannot be described in words; hence turning inward to
the spiritual is necessary.\textsuperscript{61} Silence was the sound of Christian authority and the pious
observance of religious regulations. Monastic communities regulated sound particularly
strictly. Silence demarcated respect and obedience to God and to the religious hierarchy
within monastic communities.\textsuperscript{62} In the college at Pachuca, friars spent most of their time in
silence. The day began at 4.30am and ended at 8pm, when the friars retired to their
dormitories for silent individual prayer and rest. Talking was proscribed in the dormitories,
cloisters, refectory, and offices; during the day there were very few moments for
conversation.\textsuperscript{63} The college prescribed two hours of mental prayer per day for all friars,
unless practising with the choir.\textsuperscript{64} Silence was saintly in the college and marked obedience to
authority within the monastic community.

Witnesses described an individual interrupting prescribed silence as evidence of
their madness. The sounds Sevane made were distinctly out of place for his religious context.
The references to Sevane’s songs, playing, and ‘loud voices’ specifically stated that he
interrupted the ‘hours of silence’ and the ‘hours of utmost silence’.\textsuperscript{65} Sevane’s sound was not
only out of place because he played at night time when others were sleeping, but because
this time was prescribed as saintly. Silence was necessary to cultivate a relationship with
God. In his testimony, the friar and head nurse at the college, Miguel Martínez, claimed that
Sevane’s noise interfered with specific religious practices. Martínez was quoted saying:

\begin{itemize}
\item[60] Peter Burke, \textit{The Art of Conversation} (New York, 1993) p.123.
\item[61] \textit{Ibid.}, p.127.
\item[63] Ávila Cruz, \textit{Los Frailes Descalzos de Pachuca}, p.69.
\item[64] \textit{Ibid.}, p.60.
\item[65] Instituciones Coloniales, Clero Regular y Secular, Vol. 139, Expediente 20, f.52, ‘las horas de mayor
silencio’; f.57, ‘en las horas de silencio’ and f.58 ‘las horas de mayor silencio’.
\end{itemize}
The noise he made was at inconvenient times of night, and that he fought alone, or
sang, or played, and with this he mortified the community, who wanted... to go to
the matins, and therefore some moved far from Sevane: and that based on his
eighteen years of experience as a nurse, and the care he has given to Sevane’s
madnesses, he has recognised that [Sevane] is truly mad.66
Sevane’s inability to maintain silence and his interference with prayer times in the college
led others to believe he was mad. Such a religious infringement involved Sevane
manipulating his body inapropriately and, for his fellow friars, these extreme examples of
sound out of place could not be explained within ordinary and accepted behaviours. Actions
that affected the community’s ability to observe their religious practices demonstrated
Sevane’s severe inability to regulate his emotional practices and were best explained as
madness.

The case of José de Illaregui provides another example of an association between
inappropriate sound and madness. Don Pedro Pablo de Ybarra, the notary in the case, stated
that ‘in this tribunal the culprit broke out in laughter’ and had to be reprimanded.67 Ybarra
continued, saying ‘that he seems to have been completely distracted’.68 Clearly an individual
subjected to an Inquisition trial was expected to behave seriously, attentively, and to make
the appropriate sounds when responding to questions. When and where laughter was
appropriate must be understood based on the colonial context. In her article discussed
above, Lipsett-Rivera also considers laughter as a category of analysis for understanding
masculine cultures in seventeenth and eighteenth-century Mexico. Laughter had the
potential to forge bonds, but could also create divisions and tensions between people;
moreover, elites disapproved of some qualities and manners of laughing.69 Ecclesiastical
regulation existed to control behaviours that prompted laughter, including talking, teasing,
note-passing, and humorous gesticulation.70 Just as the church and monasteries required
saintly silence, the imposition of silence in the Inquisition court symbolised the maintenance

66 Instituciones Coloniales, Clero Regular y Secular, Vol. 139, Expediente 20, f.59, ‘el ruido q.e metia
era a deshora[s] de la noche, y que se peleaba el solo, o cantaba, o tocaba, y con esto mortificaba a la
comunidad, q.e queria... ir a los maytines, y q.e por eso se mudaron algunos lexos de Sevane: y que
por la experiencia q.e tiene de 18 años de enfermero, y el cuidado q.e ha puesto en las locuras de
Sevane, ha conocido q.e está verdaderam.te loco’.
67 AGN, Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 943, Expediente 5, f.247, ‘Que en esta Aud.a
prorrumpio en Risa de reo’.
68 Ibid., f.247, ‘pareze a estado en el todo distraido’.
70 Ibid., p.245.
of authority. Illaregui’s laughter constituted a sound out of place, inappropriate to the context, coming from an unregulated individual, which marked him out as mad.

Silence as well as sound was a form of communication that witnesses could interpret as mad.71 In Esteyneffer’s Anthology of All Illness, discussed in Chapter Two, the author describes being very talkative as a sign of frenzy and reticence to speak as a sign of delirium.72 Similar ideas appear to have shaped assessments of defendants. Inquisitor Don Pedro Pablo de Ybarra asked the prison directors to provide a summary of their observations of Illaregui, ‘especially with regard to extremes of joy or sadness, or of talking a lot or little’.73 His request provides evidence that extremes of emotion and expression were worthy of investigation and could suggest that someone was mad. Implicit in this phrasing is the idea that moderation of feeling and of external expression made someone an ordered, rational individual. The prison directors responded that Illaregui was not talking at all and that they considered him to be melancholic.74 On a previous occasion they had also stated that ‘Prisoner number 21 [Illaregui] was not speaking’.75 Thus Illaregui’s refusal to engage with others in a timely and calm manner reinforced ideas that he was melancholic or mad. Similarly, a notary described José Ignacio Brizuela, a priest, doctor, and professor who held a chair of Medicine at Guadalajara University, as ‘apoplectic and insulted and as a result, frenetic and demented, incapable of responding’.76 Here too, an inability to communicate provided evidence of madness.77 The notary thought Brizuela could not speak because he was mad with rage. To be sane involved meeting expectations of speech and silence that were strictly regulated, especially in contexts such as an Inquisition trial and within unequal relationships between gaoler and prisoner.

Section Three: Excessive Weeping, Gesture, and Touch

Barbara Rosenwein’s work on Emotional Communities shows that awareness of the emotional states of others stems from their ‘symptoms’, or outward expressions, that is, the

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71 On the uses of silence as a form of communication, see: Peter Burke, The Art of Conversation, pp.123-5.
72 Esteyneffer, Florilegio Medicinal de Todas las Enfermedades, p.11.
73 Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 943, Expediente 5, f.309, ‘con espezialidad, azerca de estremo de alegua o de tristeza, o de mucho o poco hablar’.
74 Ibid., f.310.
75 Ibid., f.183, ‘el reo num.o 21 no ablava’.
76 AGN, Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 1387, Expediente 3, f.198, ‘apopletico e insultado y de resultas, frenetico y demente, incapaz de contestacion’.
77 A further example of silence conveying madness is from the case of Tabaco el Loco, who spent almost a year in ‘deep and continuous silence’. Instituciones Coloniales, Real Audiencia, Criminal Contenedor 290, Vol. 644, Expediente 2, f.119, ‘profundo, y continuo silencio’.
gestures, exclamations, and other outward signs that can be perceived. This approach to the emotions is closely related to work on the senses. Studies of the Catholic world shows that the senses had a moral dynamic, which made them a tool for understanding and discussing the self. In this way, modes of expression such as weeping could demonstrate to their audience that an individual was mad. Gary Ebersole’s work on weeping shows that tears form part of the moral values of a society and have to be regulated to maintain accepted standards of expression. Historians Jacqueline Holler and Bernard Capp have found that in early modern Mexico and England respectively, tears held a religious significance and could be an entirely appropriate form of self-expression. Moreover scholars of early modern Spain observe that confession was to be accompanied by ‘tears of contrition’.

Tears were often understood as a true expression of an individual’s internal state, though their meaning was also ambiguous in some contexts. Just as tears have been found to be appropriate to certain contexts, they were also deemed more appropriate to some kinds of people than others. Over a long time period, weeping has been identified as a female emotional practice in many societies and humoral theory identified women as more humid than men and more prone to weeping than men. In colonial Mexico, tears were often associated with women and Indios, or indigenous groups. Notably, composure in pressured

78 Rosenwein, Emotional Communities, pp.27.
79 Wiets de Boer, ‘The Counter-Reformation of the Senses’ in Bamji et al. (eds), The Ashgate Research Companion to the Counter-Reformation, pp.245-6.
80 For additional discussions of the historical roles of the emotions and how individuals have to regulate their emotions based on the expectations of their social group, see: Reddy, The Navigation of Feeling, pp.118-22; Rosenwein, Emotional Communities, pp.24-7; Eustace, Passion is the Gale, pp.6-11.
Gary Ebersole and Andrea Noble both stress the importance of contextualising tears regarding social hierarchy, class, gender, race, and regional background, to analyse their significance. See: Gary Ebersole, ‘The Function of Ritual Weeping Revisited’, p.212; Andrea Noble, ‘The Politics of Emotion in
situations was an important mark of social status and masculinity. Public weeping was less acceptable for Spanish men, especially those holding important offices, and was most associated with women. Depending on the social context, tears, like sound, could be out of place or entirely appropriate.

Dr Vicente Ignacio de la Peña Brizuela, who provided a lengthy commentary on Friar Felipe Antonio Alvarez, a heretical monk discussed earlier in this chapter, paid close attention to the accused’s tears. Brizuela described how Alvarez spoke through his tears and repeatedly cried with humility. For Brizuela, crying when discussing one’s religious errors signified misery and repentance. Mexican Inquisition cases reported tears in confession; for example, in 1794 Juan Manuel de Rosas, a Spanish farmworker from near Pachuca, confessed to the Inquisition with tears in his eyes that he had made a pact with the Devil. As the historiography on tears finds, tears could serve as proof of humility, grief, and repentance.

In the Inquisition case of María Francisca Ortiz Mendivil, a Spanish woman who denounced herself to the Inquisition in Mexico City for making a pact with the Devil in 1719, tears were understood to be a sign of her repentance; religious authorities accepted and even expected it. Tears may have been acceptable in more contexts for a woman like Mendivil than for a male defendant as they were associated more with women than men. However, cases such as Rosas’ trial show that religious authorities also interpreted men’s tears as signs of genuine feeling, in this instance misery and repentance. Regulating one’s emotional display to appear repentant could involve weeping regardless of gender.

The quantity of tears an individual produced could be associated with moderation, and therefore with sanity or madness. For example, Brizuela described Alvarez as ‘bathed in tears’. He also reported that Alvarez had described himself as nothing more than ‘a miserable worm’. To witnesses, Alvarez’s weeping was possibly a sign of irrationality. Tears may have displayed grief, shame and repentance, but grief and its physical manifestations could be excessive and result from madness. Brizuela explicitly referred to Alvarez’s

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90 AGN, Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Caja 1593, Expediente 17, f.8.
92 Ibid., f.179, ‘un miserable Gusano’.
93 Regarding excessive sorrow as melancholy, see: Holler, ‘Of Sadness and Joy in Colonial Mexico’, p.34.
copious tears.\(^\text{94}\) He wept so much he was ‘bathed’ in tears, in comparison to Rosas who had tears in his eyes and was not described as mad. The quantity of tears an individual produced affected whether their weeping constituted ordinary expression of humility and remorse or excessive emotionality ascribed to madness. Alvarez’s inability to regulate his emotional display implied that he might be mad.

As tears were often understood to provide a true reflection of an individual’s internal state, they could denote madness. In the bigamy trial of an ex-slave called Antonio de la Cruz Chabindeño in 1738, the Inquisition’s doctors noted that ‘we always find him with profound melancholy, and often in tears, some of those times, [in] a sort of fury, which although it passed, gave signs of the beginnings of a mania’.\(^\text{95}\) Cruz’s tears were understood as a physical symptom of his melancholic tendencies. As Dr Juan Joseph de Zúñiga y Mendoza wrote, ‘everyone knows that crying is a sign of fear, of a well-known sadness’ or melancholy, which was a form of madness, as discussed in the thesis introduction.\(^\text{96}\) Cruz’s defence lawyer, Licenciado Joseph Mendez, thought Cruz’s tears provided concrete evidence of his madness because, ‘these sudden tears as he experiences at each step are but born of interior afflictions that cannot be feigned, and therefore sometimes this kind of insanity is ascribed to the humors’.\(^\text{97}\) Cruz’s interior state, which was apparent through his tears, was evidence of humoral madness, not his ‘crime’. The eyes were commonly thought to be windows onto the soul, providing a glimpse of the true feelings and intents of the person.\(^\text{98}\) Mendez clearly interpreted Cruz’s tears as showing others something of the nature of the individual’s soul. He framed Cruz’s external display of feeling as uncontroversial evidence of Cruz’s internal, spiritual suffering and insanity. Mendez argued that Cruz’s tears were evidence of ‘real’ feeling; they could not be feigned. Moreover, expressing internal pain through tears involved displaying his fear, a loss of self-control for a man placed on trial by his social betters in the Inquisition. A lack of self-regulation, of internally containing one’s passions in order to present a controlled and moderate exterior, showed that Cruz had lost his reason to sinful,

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\(^\text{94}\) For a further example of the Inquisition considering a man’s abundant tears to be a sign of madness, see the case of Don Manuel Pereda. A friar wrote to the Inquisition describing how he wept like a child. AGN, Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 1468, Expediente 6, f.94.

\(^\text{95}\) Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 865, Expediente 1, f.538 ‘siempre le hallamos; con profunda melancholia, muchas veces llanto, algunas, una especie de furor, q aunq pacado, dava indicios de una iniciada mania’.

\(^\text{96}\) Ibid., f.527, ‘saben todos q el llanto es un signo de temor, u de una conozida tristeza’.

\(^\text{97}\) Ibid., f.522, ‘estas repentina lagrimas como a cada paso se experimenta sino nazen de Ynterior afflictions Ynfinxible, y por eso alguna vez esta Ynsania se Ymputa a los Umores’.

melancholic passion and was mad. Regulating one’s emotional display was crucial to appearing to have successfully regulated oneself against madness.

Tears were not always accepted as a genuine externalisation of an internal feeling. In Alvarez’s case, Brizuela stated that Alvarez, ‘his arms crossed with the greatest humility[,] started to weep: and in this way, I stood up, saying to him that those tears were faked’. Brizuela differentiated between what tears were supposed to show, and how much they could be trusted. While weeping could show sorrow, grief, fear and repentance, and while Brizuela viewed extreme emotional upset as a sign of madness, a lack of control over one’s passions, he did not think Alvarez’s emotional display was genuine. Brizuela explicitly stated that he thought Alvarez was sane. In Brizuela’s view, an emotional display such as tears could show someone was mad, but faked tears were a sign of an individual manipulating their emotional display. Someone in control of their passions, and who manipulated their emotional display to present as grief-stricken and repentant, was not mad.

Appropriate bodily regulation included moderating one’s facial expressions and gestures as these were imbued with cultural significance. In performing his emotions by manipulating his face and body in unusual ways, Friar Sevane opened himself up to discussions about why he expressed his emotions using these particular practices. One author considered the ways Sevane used his facial expressions and moved his body to be evidence of a problem with his mental faculties. The author stated:

I noticed certain movements, which suggested [a] lesion of the faculty of fantasy, or some passion of mind, which compelled him to produce expressions that neither fit with a man who is in his right mind, nor can they be classified as dementia. And when he wrote the response (which he did in my presence) he raised his eyes with a furious gesture many times...

The commentator gave a somewhat contrary assessment of Sevane’s mental state. He did not consider that the expressions were a sign of madness; however, he stated that a person who was sane would be able to maintain control of their expressions. Sevane’s expressions denoted a lack of control over his passions and faculties, necessary for rationality. Bodily

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99 Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 1117, Expediente 4, f.179, ‘cruzados los brazos con la mayor humildad comenzó a llorar: y estando de esta manera; me puse en pie, diciéndole, que aquellas lagrimas eran fingidas’.
100 Ibid., f.179.
101 Instituciones Coloniales, Clero Regular y Secular, Colegios, Caja 6166, Expediente 50, f.6 ‘advertí ciertos movimientos, q.e indicaban [un] lesion de la fantasía, o alguna passion de animo, q.e le obligo a producer expresiones q.e ni caben en hombre q.e esta en sus cabales, ni se pueden calificar de demencia. Y quando escribió la respuesta (q.e lo hizo a presencia mia) elevo muchas veces los ojos congest furioso’.
expressions, such as the eye gestures and strange expressions, constituted emotional practices that were read as a lack of regulation of feelings, thoughts, and external reactions. Sevane’s inner mental and emotional state was interpreted by others through the way he used his body.

Behaving violently was a sign of loss of rational control. Deranged clerics and other individuals were described committing unexpected, threatening, and harmful acts in missionary, Inquisition, and criminal records. Sevane bit the hand of Sebastian Garrido, another friar, and drew blood.\textsuperscript{102} Research on honour and aggression in colonial Spanish America shows that biting usually occurred as an incidental part of a defence against a raised hand, or else multiple bites occurred during a prolonged attack, often between couples or to shame someone during an altercation.\textsuperscript{103} Sevane’s behaviour does not fit either pattern, as it seems unlikely Garrido was fighting with him, nor was Sevane mounting a sustained attack on the other priest.\textsuperscript{104} The unpredictable and extreme nature of Sevane’s seemingly random attack threatened the bodies of others and had implications for the social order of his monastic community. Sevane was dangerous to live with. His disorderly attack barred some commentators from considering him to be sane as he thus proved himself to be unable to regulate his emotions and bodily practices.

A number of cases describe individuals throwing things and judge this behaviour to be excessive and a sign of madness. Both Alvarez, the heretical monk imprisoned in Queretaro, and Brother Ignacio Cabrera, a Franciscan confessor who was denounced in Guanajuato in 1735 by another priest for soliciting women, threw things at other people.\textsuperscript{105} Alvarez threw things at a calificador, a qualifier, whom he wished to leave his cell. Cabrera threw stones at a woman in church from the pulpit and was accordingly described as ‘demented according to his displays’.\textsuperscript{106} These actions were threatening and caused embarrassment for the community because they showed that an individual either could not or would not uphold standards of respectful behaviour. Such behaviour was explicitly linked to madness. For example, Feliz Albanado y Xiron, a commissioner for the Inquisition said of

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[102]{Instituciones Coloniales, Clero Regular y Secular, Vol. 139, Expediente 20, f.54, ‘le mordio una mano, haciendole sangre’.


\footnotetext[104]{Other clerics who were thought to be mad also engaged in supposedly unprovoked attacks. As examples, see: Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 1117, Expediente 4, f.7; AGN, Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 1175, Expediente 32, f.361.

\footnotetext[105]{Teresa Ordorika Sacristán finds a similar instance of a supposedly mad individual throwing stones in a church. See: Ordorika Sacristán, ‘¿Herejes o Locos?’, p.145.


141}
Nicolas Lara, a parish priest in Alajuela (now in Costa Rica), that ‘the violence of his nature... persuaded me he could have a touch of madness’. 107 While there were many situations in which people were violent, a tendency towards violence, or committing violence out of place, was taken as evidence of being unable to control oneself and being mad.

Madness and violence were also linked in criminal and military records. In Antequera, Oaxaca in 1771 Bartolome de Leon, known also as Tabaco el Loco [Crazy Tobacco], was imprisoned for killing a seven-year-old boy with a stone. 108 El Loco, the madman, had a reputation for ‘excessive’ behaviour, including throwing stones, injuring people, and dirtying people’s washing. His violent behaviour was explicitly linked to madness. The surgeon in the trial wrote that ‘with impulses of dementia, from which he suffers, he threw a stone hard at the said boy’. 109 Violence that was removed from any situation that witnesses and judges considered explicable, and that was extreme in force or given the context, could be explicitly understood as resulting from madness. Similarly, soldiers were removed from their duties and sent to hospital for acts of unacceptable violence. One soldier was believed to be mad because he hit another in the head with the butt of a rifle. 110 Another ‘committed the grave crime of slapping Don Juan Bautista Drigget, a Sargent in the same corps, during an inspection...’. 111 The notary observed that those involved suspected ‘that his crime had been caused by an attack of madness’. 112 The soldier lashed out at a superior in a formal, ritualised context. The significance of such an act, violating the ritual and hierarchical codes, was very different to use of violence in a professional, military capacity, or as part of male sociability. 113 As with sound and tears, violence did not necessarily denote madness, but could do when it was out of place.

Violence had particularly sinful connotations when it turned inwards and led to suicides and attempted suicides. Suicide was considered to be a violation of natural law. It was closely linked to the Devil, and led an individual to be eternally damned. 114 Historians of

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107 Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 1436, Expediente 4, f.18, ‘la violencia de su genio... me persuado puede tener ramo de locura’.
109 Ibid., f.114, ‘con implusos de la demencia que padece descargo fuertemente una piedra en el dho muchacho’.
110 AGN, Instituciones Coloniales, Gobierno Virreinal, Indiferente de Guerra Caja 1976, Expediente 1, f.3.
111 Ibid., f.4, ‘cometio el grave delito de dar un bofeton en el acto de inspeccionas... D. Juan Bautista Drigget, Sarg.to del mismo Cuerpo’.
112 Ibid., ‘su crimen habia demandado de un rapto de locura’.
suicide disagree over whether cultural understandings of suicide changed between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries.\textsuperscript{115} Michael MacDonald, Terence Murphy, and Jeffrey Watt argue that suicide became secularised in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. They observe that illness, insanity, poverty, despair, honour, and matters of conscience were important factors in suicides and attempted suicides.\textsuperscript{116} I endorse the more nuanced analysis of authors such as Susan Morrissey, working on Russia, and Zeb Tortorici, writing on New Spain. They provide evidence that the religious significance of suicide became combined with other interpretations of why people committed suicide, such as those outlined. They show that after 1700 Christians still widely believed suicide to be a sin.\textsuperscript{117} Evidence for this view includes that in New Spain, most individuals who committed suicide were buried in unconsecrated ground.\textsuperscript{118} Moreover, authorities under-recorded suicide, especially among the clergy, to avoid scandal. If a priest’s body displayed signs of a change of heart and an attempt to survive, authorities would not record their death as a suicide. As a result, priests who committed suicide were often buried within the church boundaries.\textsuperscript{119} In the eighteenth century, people ascribed many meanings to suicide including sin.

The Inquisition case of Friar Alvarez shows that clerics and doctors understood attempted suicide as evidence of sin and madness, which were closely intertwined in these cases.\textsuperscript{120} Accounts of his attempted suicide describe his fear of damnation, despair, and


\textsuperscript{116} MacDonald and Murphy, \textit{Sleepless Souls}; Watt, \textit{From Sin to Insanity}.


\textsuperscript{118} Tortorici, ‘Reading the (Dead) Body in Colonial New Spain’, p.53. For examples of exceptions see the notes in the article on p.218. Burial practices regarding people who committed suicide may also have changed from 1787 when Charles III ordered construction of suburban cemeteries. See Tortorici, ‘Reading the (Dead) Body in Colonial New Spain’, p.64.

\textsuperscript{119} Tortorici, ‘Reading the (Dead) Body in Colonial New Spain’, p.54. Under-reporting and recording on suicides may have been a more widespread practice as Sharon Strocchia finds that there was under-reporting of nuns committing suicide in convents in Italy in the same period. See: Sharon T. Strocchia, ‘Women on the Edge: Madness, Possession and Suicide in Early Modern Convents’, \textit{Journal of Medieval Studies}, 45, 1 (2015), p.57.

\textsuperscript{120} In military records regarding the attempted suicide in 1817 of Antonio Castañeda, an army grenadier, military officials thought his actions were caused by madness. An official called Roque Pérez
mental disorder. Friars Felix de Castro, Francisco Garcia Figuerra, Pablo Perez, and Dr de Rocha, reported Alvarez as trying to kill himself in the convent prison in Querétaro. Their letter to the Inquisition stated that Alvarez:

fell into a profound disturbance or melancholy; that he suffered a serious perturbation of his faculties, continuously fighting with many doubts that offered themselves to him against our Holy Faith; that desirous of freeing himself from these [doubts] he frequently resorted to the Holy Sacrament of penitence; that he reached such a high point of fatigue, grief, anguish or torment which these doubts caused, along with other baleful thoughts of his bad life, that considering himself damned, he came to contemplate and even to decide to cut his throat one night.121

The letter made a clear link between melancholy and perturbed faculties and the impetus to commit suicide. This provides evidence in support of Tortorici’s argument that in New Spain understandings of suicide formed a ‘hybrid’ involving mental disorder, emotional despair, and sin. Cutting his throat was a bodily display of Alvarez’s disordered interior, and his extreme feelings and his passions, which he was unable to control. His behaviour was understood with regard to spiritual issues. He had sought relief from his torment and in failing to find it turned his despair inward. For the friars, Alvarez’s actions were framed in part around his belief in his own damnation.122 Attacking himself constituted an inability to regulate his emotions, and a failure of self-management through extreme religious despair and failed penitence. As Jacqueline Holler notes in her article on melancholy, despair and illness were experienced through the lens of Catholicism.123 Many motivations could be read

Gómez wrote to Viceroy Don Juan Ruiz de Apodaca reporting that Castañeda ‘is seriously ill, and according to the excesses that he does he shows [his] madness, and [the madness] exposed [him] to take his life with a blow, because of his fury’. The brief letter regarding Castañeda states that his illness and fury led him to try to take his life. AGN, Instituciones Coloniales, Gobierno Virreinal, Operaciones de Guerra Vol. 686, Expediente 23, f.90, ‘esta gravamente enfermo, y segun los excesos que hace da muestra de locura, y expuesto a quitarse la vida de un golpe, respecto a su furiosidad’.

Underneath the letter, a series of notes qualified the views of friars and doctors who were involved in Alvarez’s case. One wrote that Alvarez did not have a ‘partial dementia on points of religion’. Dr Nicolas de Torres, explicitly disagreed with the discussion regarding partial dementia and stated that Alvarez’s attempted suicide was the result of ‘true dementia’. Many views coalesced to produce an understanding of what led Alvarez to attempt suicide; however, debates around madness and quite ‘how’ mad formed the basis of discussions. See Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 1117, Expediente 4, f.35, ‘demencia parcial en puntos de Religion’; ‘demencia parcial’; ‘verdadera demencia’.

into actions of self-violence: such behaviour constituted an inability to control one’s thoughts and feelings in a rational and moral manner, which made it likely that the individual was mad as well as sinful.

**Section Four: Sexuality and the Body**

Historians have observed an apparent relationship between madness and sexual misconduct. In *Locura y Disidencia*, María Cristina Sacristán described sexual misconduct as a facet of madness in Bourbon Mexican records, but not a separate category in itself. Sacristán correctly observes that cases of madness often involved sexual misdemeanour; however, the relationship between the two must be contextualised. Sexual misconduct was not in itself thought to be mad. Outside of studies of madness, historians have examined discourses concerning supposedly poor sexual conduct. Linda Curcio-Nagy shows how individuals drew upon ideas of powerful lust, weak flesh, and yielding to passions, in order to mitigate blame for their own and others’ weakness of will. Giving into one’s sexual passions has to be understood as part of a wider set of behaviours that was not necessarily deemed mad, even when caused by overwhelming passion. Sexual behaviour was part of a range of bodily displays, such as eating, sleeping, weeping, and inflicting violence that could be related to madness. As illicit sexual behaviour was part of quotidian life in Bourbon Mexico, there had to be something unusual about an individual’s sexual behaviour for it to be evidence of madness rather than an ordinary moral failing.

How people moved their bodies was highly regulated in daily life. In *Gender and the Negotiation of Daily Life in Mexico, 1750-1856*, Lipsett-Rivera describes the strict bodily regulation that was outlined in behavioural manuals for elite groups. They prescribed correct ways to walk, inhibiting movement generally, and rules regarding eye contact. These external behaviours were thought to tell the world about the condition of the individual’s soul. For priests, making eye contact with a female penitent in the confessional was prohibited as the gaze was sexualised. Manuals stated that women should keep their eyes lowered; men should not stare at women; and in conversation the gaze should not be fixed on the face. Don Juan de Escoiquiz Morata (1762-1820), a Spanish clergyman, wrote that young men ‘when walking should not jump or run, should go at a moderate pace without lifting the feet

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too high, nor stomping, nor dragging the feet on the ground.’

Manuel Díez de Bonilla considered different walking paces to reflect an individual’s station and character: a slow pace denoted slothfulness, and a fast walk was appropriate for servants. Contained movement was strongly associated with virtuosity in contrast with vigorous movement, which could be perceived as sexual. The manner in which people went about their business was significant, regardless of the morality of their actions.

Extramarital relationships were common among the population as a whole and for priests as well. Aside from bigamy, these relationships were largely tolerated. Taylor’s work on priests in the Archdiocese of Mexico and the diocese of Guadalajara in the eighteenth century provides substantial evidence that heterosexual and often long-term monogamous relationships were fairly common, especially in remote rural areas, and were not very scandalous to parishioners or the ecclesiastical courts. Violating celibacy only caused a scandal if it was particularly indiscreet, repeated and promiscuous, aggressive, or involved virgins or married women. Ecclesiastical suits brought against priests tended to involve multiple offences over many years, which became difficult to ignore. Additionally, ecclesiastical authorities prosecuted priests guilty of solicitation, which was a serious problem in eighteenth-century New Spain. Solicitation was defined as inviting sexual contact while confessing the individual after the sign of the cross had been made, though regarding nuns it applied at all times. Solicitation violated the sacrament of confession and thus was much more serious than a cleric otherwise breaking his vow of celibacy.

As Lavrin has observed, the clergy’s role as spiritual leaders and confessors gave them privileged access to and great responsibility towards women. Priests who cohabited often admitted their relationships quite freely but vehemently denied that they had solicited women. Solicitation constituted a serious moral failure to regulate one’s internal desires

127 Juan de Escoiquiz Morata, Tratado de las Obligaciones del Hombre (Madrid, 1803), pp.112-4. Quoted from Lipsett-Rivera, Gender and the Negotiation of Daily Life, p.160.
131 Taylor, Magistrates of the Sacred, pp.185-6.
132 Ibid., p.186.
134 Lavrin, Brides of Christ, p.216.
135 Taylor, Magistrates of the Sacred, pp.185-7.
and external behaviour. In spite of this, the ecclesiastical courts were prone to protecting their own and tried to avoid scandals. Unless there was good evidence of such a breach of position it was unusual to prosecute a priest for a first or second offence. After multiple individuals had denounced a priest, a formal complaint from a priest was often necessary to force the ecclesiastical authorities to hold perpetrators to account. Sexual misconduct was an ordinary part of life in Bourbon Mexico.

Attempts to cover up and ignore priests’ sexual misconduct took place in cases where priests were ultimately labelled as mad. Seven of the sixteen Inquisition cases where clerics were labelled as mad involved solicitation. In the case of Cabrera, discussed above, the Inquisition collected information on his transgressions for over a decade. They tried to present aspects of the case as not involving formal solicitation. They argued this on the grounds that Cabrera had told the woman to leave the confessional before having sex with him, and also because one of the women was alleged to be attracted to the priest prior to his approaching her. Here the Inquisition operated, as in the many cases described by Taylor, to protect the public reputation of the clergy and avoid a local scandal. The evidence against Cabrera, however, was too strong for these attempts to acquit him to be viable. For example, Doña María Martínez de Alarcón described confessing to Cabrera, saying that ‘after he confessed me, without getting up from the place [the confessional], he grasped my hands and made me sit down, he started to embrace and to threaten me [so] that I embraced him, and he made me kiss his neck, I did it out of fear because I knew of his violence’. Such evidence was corroborated by other testimonies; for example, Brother Antonio Torres described how Cabrera had solicited a married woman called María Petra Picharda in the confessional. Torres had told Picharda she should denounce Cabrera to the Inquisition. The Inquisition were not able to ignore multiple accusations of solicitation and repeated, unwanted amorous advances, and no one else could be blamed for Cabrera’s behaviour.

While historians have associated sexual behaviour with madness, Cabrera’s sexual behaviour was cited as a reason for seeing him as mad by only one individual. Alarcón said of Cabrera’s solicitation ‘that no person of reason would do those things’. In her view, such sinful behaviour was not rational. She used madness to explain behaviour that was otherwise potentially inexplicable. No other victims, witnesses, or inquisitors described Cabrera as mad.

136 Taylor, Magistrates of the Sacred, p.188.
137 Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 1175, Expediente 32, f.344, ‘después que me confeso sin levantarse del Lugar me cojio de las manos y me hizo sentar me empezo abrazar y amenzarme que lo abrazara, y me hizo que lo besara el pesquezo, lo hizo de miedo, porque conozi su Violencia’.
138 Ibid., f.346.
139 Ibid., f.344, ‘que ninguna persona de Juizio las hiziera’.

147
because of the solicitation. In contrast, other aspects of how he behaved, such as, throwing stones in church, were associated with madness. When this sexual behaviour is properly contextualised, it becomes apparent that sexual misconduct was sinful and prompted inquiries into an individual’s state of mind, but failures to regulate how one spoke, gestured, or touched, were more important as indicators of madness than sexual deviance alone.

The solicitation case of Ignacio Zubia was treated more seriously than Cabrera’s because he solicited a novice in a convent, but again it was not seen as evidence of madness. Zubia was accused of having a ‘depraved friendship’ with a young maiden for five months, during which time she became a novice, despite which his advances continued. Licenciado Don Julian de Amestoy, an inquisitor fiscal, adviser to the Inquisition, wrote that ‘this culprit started to use amorous words with her such as, my soul, my life, all my love, all my consolation, I [am] all yours, and you [are] all mine, your life is mine, and mine is yours, embracing her, and giving her kisses’ as well as whipping her. Zubia was accused of using the confessional as a cover for his relationship with the novice, preventing her from attending to her duties so he could spend more time with her and refusing to let her see another confessor, which nuns were entitled to do. Moreover, he was said to have told the woman that such behaviour was not sinful. Amestoy stated that Zubia might have solicited many other women because of additional evidence from a married woman whom he pinched under her clothes. He described Zubia’s solicitation of women as an enormous perversity. He wrote that Zubia had offended God, broken his saintly laws, ‘and caused scandal and spiritual ruin in souls’. Indeed, the Inquisition considered excommunicating Zubia, though they did not describe his solicitation as evidence of madness.

Where sex was associated with madness, there had to be something out of the ordinary about it to demarcate it as madness. Exposing the body, especially in a sexual

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142 Ibid., f.282, ‘comenzaba este dho reo a tratarla con palabras amatorias de, mi Alma, mi vida todo mi querer, todo mi consuelo, Yo todo tuio, y tu toda mia, tu vida es la mia, y la mia es tuia, abrazándola, y dándola osculos’ and ‘darla unos azotes en sus mismas carnes’. For a discussion of an eighteenth-century priest soliciting (and whipping) a novice, see Robert Darnton, The Forbidden Best-Sellers of Pre-Revolutionary France (London, 1996), pp.91-5.
143 Lavrin, Brides of Christ, p.221.
145 Ibid., f.282, ‘y causar escandalo, y ruina spiritual en las Almas’.
146 Ibid., f.282.
fashion, could provide evidence of madness. The presentation of one’s body represented, although imperfectly, the person’s interior; a clean, covered, well-dressed body created an impression of morality and respectability. Priests were to dress in long black robes to demonstrate continuous mourning, a clerical collar, dull-coloured stockings, their shoes had to be sandals, and their hair kept short. For mass they also had to wear a surplice and cap. As Taylor discusses, priests were occasionally reported for dirty clothes and being seen in public without their habit. For all individuals, clothes also acted, in part, to prevent the sexualising of the body. Having one’s ‘hidden’ or ‘dishonest parts’ exposed was a source of humiliation and people uncovered and attacked genitals to shame and punish others.

Controlling one’s body was key to proper conduct because the body was a metaphor for social order; it told others about one’s self and one’s place in the world. Individuals made moral judgements about each other based on appearance. Lipsett-Rivera explains how connections between presentation and morality were often implicit in the judgements people made about each other. Male clothing was less strictly regulated than female apparel, but being clean and tidy was still important for appearing moral and sane. In the criminal case of Tabaco el Loco, discussed above, the defendant was described as ‘wet and dirty with mud’. His apparent inability to control his appearance was an important facet in the commonly-held view that he was mad. Clothes held significant moral and symbolic value. To be inappropriately dressed, or to undress publically, had repercussions for how individuals were judged.

Indecent exposure featured in the case of Friar Vicente Alcayde, who claimed that his behaviour was the result of witchcraft. In 1787 Friar Vicente Alcayde, a Spanish missionary in Queretaro, accused a widow called María Velasco of bewitching him. The

149 Ibid., p.183.
151 Ibid., pp.164, 206.
152 Ibid., p.138.
153 Lipsett-Rivera shows that on occasion, clothes were explicitly linked to morality for men as well as women. For an example of explicit links between clothes and male morality, see: Ibid., p.168.
154 Ibid., p.163. For another example of the importance of cleanliness to sanity, see the Inquisition case of Don Francisco Pimental. In the case, a slave called Gabriel caught the caged ‘madman’ Pimental blaspheming in 1712. Gabriel described Pimental as eating cleanly like a sane man. For more details, see: AGN, Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 748, Expediente 12, ff.543-553.
155 Instituciones Coloniales, Real Audiencia, Criminal Contenedor 290, Vol. 644, Expediente 2, f.119, ‘moxado, y sucio del lodo’.
156 Historians have established that there were Inquisition cases of witchcraft and pacts with the Devil throughout the eighteenth century. Ruth Behar demonstrates that there were 224 female witchcraft cases in the eighteenth century in comparison with 79 male cases. These cases were increasingly not taken very seriously by the Inquisition. Behar, ‘Sex and Sin, Witchcraft and the Devil in Late-Colonial
pair had cohabited for around a decade. At the time of Alcayde’s denunciation he had been a priest for over thirty years and had lived in New Spain since 1770. He accused María Velasco of jealousy of his relationship with another woman, a married Spaniard called María Gertrudis Romero. He claimed that María Velasco had used witchcraft against him. In particular, he accused her of ‘tying’ him, a practice of binding a person to one’s will, usually a romantic partner, by making them physically incapable of having sexual relations with others. The notary recording Alcayde’s account wrote that ‘she has maddened the declarant, obliging him to blaspheme heretically against God, denying his name, and his righteousness, and asking her for a relic with an image of St Veronica, to shit in, and similar excesses’. The account continued stating that during ‘all of this [he was] not himself and was overwhelmed by some diabolic impulse, because he has always been, is, and declares [he] will die a Catholic’. The Inquisition did not take his claim seriously, and instead considered him to lead a sinful life. In a letter discussing Alcayde, the lawyer Maestro Juan Antonio Bruno wrote that ‘no doctor has certified that the ills suffered by Father Alcayde were the effect of witchcraft; nor has one noticed any evidence of witchcraft or evildoing on the denounced María Velasco’s person or in her house’. Bruno then turned to what he perceived to be more probable and less supernatural causes for Alcayde’s ills. ‘Father Alcayde’, he wrote, ‘has spent many years submerged in drunkenness, and the base vice of lustful living, with various women’. Not only did the inquisitors dismiss Alcayde’s claim of bewitchment, they considered him to be a sinful and unruly man and began proceedings against him instead.

The inquisitors and witnesses were particularly concerned with how Alcayde exposed his body to others. María de Jesus Romero, one of Alcayde’s mistresses, described

Mexico’, p.52. Female cases were less common and less likely to be pursued by the Inquisition. Solange Alberro finds that denunciations of women to the Inquisition made up between 20 and 30 per cent of denunciations in this period. However, women accounted for only 16 per cent of cases that were taken to an official conclusion. See: Solange Alberro, ‘Herejes, Brujas y Beatas’, p.88. For further discussion of witchcraft and gender, see: Noemi Quezada, ‘Cosmovisión, Sexualidad e Inquisición’ in Noemi Quezada (ed.), Inquisición Novohispana (2 vols, Mexico, 2000), II, pp.82-3.  

158 Ibid., f.104.  
159 Ibid., f.92, ‘ha dementado al declarante, obligándolo a blasfemar hereticalmente de Dios, renegar de su nombre, y de su Justicia, teniendo a su magestad, por iniquo, y pidiendo a la mujer un relicario, en que tiene la imagen de la verónica, para cagarse, en ese con otros excesos semejantes’.  
160 Ibid., f.92, ‘todo esto enajenado, y arrebatado de algún impulso diabólico, porque siempre ha sido, este y protesta morir, como católico’.  
161 Ibid., f.143, ‘no se ha certificado por Medico alguno, que los males padecidos por el P.e Alcaide fuesen efecto de maleficio; ni en la Persona, y casa de Maria Belasco la Denunciada, ha notado, ni observado alguno de los Yndicios de Bruja o maléfica’.  
162 Ibid., f. 143, ‘Padre Alcaide, hace muchos años que ha vivido sumergido en la mayor embriaguez, y vicio torpísimo de la Luxuria, con varias Mugeres’.
how he entered the room barelegged where guests were present, with his ‘shirt raised, his dishonest parts bare, illuminating them, and showing them with the light, which he carried in his hand’.\textsuperscript{163} Such sexual behaviour, displaying ‘his parts’ or genitals, was scandalous and sinful.\textsuperscript{164} Publically removing clothes or showing one’s genitals was a display of the body out of place and thus constituted a loss of self-control.\textsuperscript{165} It had a far more striking effect on inquisitors’ perceptions of a priest’s sanity than breaking vows of celibacy or soliciting women. The Inquisition decided that Alcayde was mad because he publically displayed his sexuality in inappropriate ways, not because he had sexual relations. The body’s presentation and symbolic de-sexualisation conveyed sanity to others and failure to regulate appearance could be given as evidence of madness.

Conclusion

Constructions of madness in eighteenth-century Mexico drew heavily on sensory experience. The main finding of this chapter is that uses of the body that were ‘out of place’ in some way could be understood as evidence of madness. A well-regulated, sane interior manifested through a controlled, contained exterior that produced orderly sounds, gestures, movements, and touch. To be perceived as sane, one’s exterior and conduct had to express a rational and virtuous internal state.

The main line of inquiry into whether an individual was mad was to examine the way they used their body. The way a cleric expressed himself could make him seem either sane or mad to contemporaries. Deviant uses of sound, silence, movement, facial expressions, outbursts of violence, nudity, and excessive weeping all built up impressions of men who were unable to control their passions and posed a threat to their communities and to moderate, ordered society. These factors were more important than whether a cleric had broken a specific social code or even a sacrament. Blasphemy, heresy, violating celibacy, and solicitation all featured in the cases discussed. They were part of ordinary life and priestly misconduct more generally: most priests who did these things were not considered mad. Therefore, other aspects of a priest’s behaviour, namely the ways they did these things, were what made them mad.

Sound out of place formed an important sensory aspect of madness. This chapter has drawn upon Bailey’s concept of noise as sound out of place to explain how an

\textsuperscript{163} Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 1238, Expediente 3, ff.92-3, ‘la camisa levantada, las partes deshonestas descubiertas, alumbrándolas, y mostrándolas con la luz, q.e traía, en la mano’.

\textsuperscript{164} Lipsett-Rivera, \textit{Gender and the Negotiation of Daily Life}, p.163.

\textsuperscript{165} Father Lara also undressed from his sacerdotal robes in public. See: Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 1436, Expediente 4, ff.29-30, 37.
unregulated, and mad, interior was expressed through supposedly inappropriate sounds. Blasphemy and heresy led to Inquisition cases, but were not evidence of madness. A sane individual, who managed themselves according to the expectations of their surroundings was one who chose to speak, sing, laugh, and shout in culturally appropriate situations. Monasteries, churches, and courts provide examples of strictly-regulated spaces where people had to show respect through maintaining silence. An inability or refusal to contain oneself, for example, by disrupting the silence of sleep and monastic rituals, was cited as evidence of madness in a number of cases. The quality of a sound could have connotations of madness as well as immorality. Examples include tuneless sounds and disproportionately loud sounds. An individual’s silence could convey madness if they failed to conform to expectations that they should express themselves. The mad connotations of silence, sound, and noise were important for distinguishing between a madman and a sane person. Inappropriate use of sound constituted a failure to regulate one’s behaviour and was evidence of madness.

Regulating one’s emotions was an important aspect of presenting oneself as sane. Expressions of feeling such as weeping, facial contortions, and violent acts such as biting, throwing, and hitting, as well as self-violence revealed something of a person’s interior state. They could all be evidence of a lack of self-control or regulation and so of madness. Bodily movement and expression has also to be contextualised: the chapter has demonstrated that these things could be perfectly acceptable depending on the time and place. Tears had a range of potential meanings, including grief and repentance. Too many tears, and uncontrollable tears in comparison with restrained tears, could denote an excessive display of emotions and thus madness. The boundaries between acceptable and unacceptable expression varied between people, who all required different kinds of self-regulation. Similarly, unusual expressions and gestures denoted a lack of emotional and bodily control and revealed madness.

Violence was part of everyday life in public and private. However, outside of ordinary contexts, such as fights, it showed that an individual was unable to control themselves and so was mad. The most extreme form of violence, which reveals the relationship between sin and madness, was suicide. In this period suicide was understood as multi-causal and was not ‘secularised’ as some historians have argued. Suicide was believed to be a response to poverty, abuse, and religious despair, among other explanations. It was an extreme emotional response not compatible with good self-management. Controlling one’s emotional state and its physical manifestations was a prerequisite of ‘sane’ behaviour.
Historians of madness in the Hispanic world have observed that madness was related to sexual behaviour in the eighteenth century. Contextualising the sexual aspects of cases of madness shows that sexual deviancy often brought individuals to the attention of the Inquisition, but was not necessarily what was deemed ‘mad’ about their behaviour. Cases of breaking celibacy and solicitation, prevalent among the clerical community in general, were not regarded as madness. Sexuality was related to madness when an individual displayed explicit sexuality in a public way, such as Alcayde’s nudity. Sexual misconduct in private was not given as evidence of madness in these cases.

Previous chapters have shown that madness was conceptualised in opposition to reason. Chapter Two in particular explained how madness and sin were theoretically related. This link is apparent in the kinds of behaviours that were described as mad. In practice, appearing sane and moral required carefully managing how one used one’s body. Just as the character of the ‘fop’ in the poem *To the Affected Ones*, discussed in Chapter Two, wished to be ‘remarkable’ and was thought to be mad because of the ways he spoke and gestured, the speech, sounds, and bodily gestures of the clerics discussed in this chapter made them mad to their contemporaries. Moreover, in Chapter Two I argue that, while elites considered reason to be important evidence of sanity, it could be difficult in practice to discern whether an individual could reason well. In the case of Sevane, observers relied on evidence of how he used his body because he appeared able to think coherently and yet this did not appear to prevent him being thought mad or not. Those judging madness looked to the bodily manifestations or sensory aspects of accounts to decide whether an individual was mad. What was important was how the accused communicated. To be mad was to be out of control, unbalanced, and to lack the composure expected of one’s status. The mind and body required strict regulation to avoid madness. Sensory aspects of an interaction provided evidence of whether or not an individual was mad.
Chapter Five: Gender, Caste, Madness, and Selfhood

Introduction
Themes of sin, the passions, and reason thread through cases of the supposedly mad. This chapter considers a series of Inquisition case studies of individuals described as mad at various points in their trials. It shows how the ideas discussed in the earlier chapters manifested in Inquisition cases. The history of madness in New Spain has relied heavily on analysis of Inquisition cases, such as those described in this chapter. In particular, María Cristina Sacristán’s Locura e Inquisición uses Inquisition records to write a social history of madness, incorporating the perspectives of the inquisitors and the friends and family of the supposedly mad into her narrative. This chapter builds on Sacristán’s findings by exploring how a concern for sin motivated discussions of madness in Inquisition cases. Instead of considering the religious nature of the Inquisition sources to be a limitation, as Sacristán does, I consider them to be a further site for exploring what madness meant in Bourbon Mexico and how it was used by elites to understand ordinary people of a range of calidades.

The historiography of madness in colonial Mexico has not yet explored the relationships between gender, calidad, and madness beyond some brief comments by Sacristán. Chapter One outlines the ways in which scholarship relating to the Anglophone world has begun to develop understandings of the relationships between gender, class, race, and madness.¹ This chapter provides evidence of similar interconnections in Bourbon Mexico. It incorporates analytical concepts such as gender and calidad and considers how they interacted with labelling an individual as mad. It asks whether or not inquisitors expected all individuals to conduct themselves rationally, and what explanations for ‘irrational’ behaviour they found compelling. This chapter draws on the extensive literature on gender and calidad in colonial Mexico, as discussed in detail in Chapter One. It shows that, as María Elena Martínez suggested, race in the eighteenth century held a moral force, such that non-Spanish individuals were assumed to be sinful.² This chapter explores how calidad, gender, and madness were all related to sin, and how these discourses on sinful humanity interacted. Analysing the interplay between madness, calidad, and gender enables greater

² Martínez, Genealogical fictions, pp.226-231.
understanding of how madness as a ‘technology of the self’ shaped different kinds of Catholic subjects in Bourbon Mexico.

While instances of mad clergymen in Inquisition cases have been explored in Chapter Four, this chapter turns to lay cases. It primarily analyses three cases chosen from the forty-three Inquisition cases consulted for the years 1712 to 1808 that contain references to mad, lay individuals in the AGN’s catalogue. All of those cases were consulted in writing this chapter. See the appendix for a discussion of the Inquisition’s processes and the makeup and recording of cases. The case documents pertaining to each trial range in length from two folios to around 200 folios. These cases, relating to thirty-three men and eleven women, were catalogued using the words loco/a (madman or madwoman), and demente (demented person). Doña, a mark of high status for Spanish women based on their lineage, respectability, and the social standing of their husband, was used to describe only two of the women. There is a greater prevalence of markers of social standing among the men. Although eighteen have no prefix to their names, the other fifteen were described as Don, a term used for a Spanish man of high status within the community based on lineage, wealth, and reputation. These men included three doctors, two bachilleres, and one licenciado.3 The defendants were predominantly accused of blasphemy or making heretical propositions. A minority were accused of taking communion twice or more in one day, which was not in compliance with Catholic doctrine; communion was expected at least once per year after confession, but at most once per day.4 Devil pacts featured heavily in female cases, although not everyone who blasphemed or made a pact was thought to be mad.5 Rather than being sentenced, individuals who were considered mad were often sent to hospitals for the mad or were cared for in other charitable institutions, usually in conjunction with interludes convalescing with family. A few individuals were cared for solely by relatives and a small number were confined in prisons. The sources provide rich details of the lives of defendants, although those details are recorded by elite men working within the Inquisition and are

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3 A bachiller was an individual with a bachelor’s degree and a licenciado was an individual with a more advanced degree.
4 Alexandra Bamji, ‘The Catholic Life Cycle’, p.193; Poska, Regulating the People, p.9. For examples of cases where individuals were considered mad because they took communion multiple times in a day, see: a case in 1720 against Teresa Narvaez for taking communion at different times every day, even after breakfast. She seemed mad and so was taken to the hospital for mad women; Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisicióin, Vol. 781, Expediente 28, ff.274-276. Also, in 1744 Francisco Xavier from San Antonio in Puebla de los Angeles took communion several times in a day. He had a reputation for being half-mad or simple (asimplado); AGN, Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 901, Expediente 14, ff. 267-272.
5 A pact with the Devil involved a written, verbal, or internal agreement which was either temporary and contractual, or eternal. Blasphemy was a common crime in Colonial Mexico, see: Villa-Flores, Dangerous Speech, p.6.
therefore be shaped by their worldview. Discussions about the individual’s life were drawn predominantly from confessors and the family and neighbours of the accused, rather than from the individual themselves.

The chapter sections are structured around three case studies. The cases were chosen because they offer particularly rich examples of the themes found in the body of sources as a whole. They are not ‘typical’ cases, because the most common case involved a Spanish man and was very short. The trial would be abandoned quickly on the basis of the defendant’s madness. Instead, the cases chosen reflect the themes of sin, the passions, and reason, which appear in many other cases. Where other cases provide similar findings, or a case study depicts a broader trend, I have indicated this in the text. One female case and two male cases were chosen; none of these defendants were Spanish. These cases enable a discussion of how the term madness was applied to people who were not Spanish and not male. I contextualise these cases with references to the rest of the sample of Inquisition cases, and the cases of the ‘mad’ clerics, discussed in Chapter Four. Through these case studies, the chapter addresses how the relationship between sin and madness, as explored in previous chapters, affected the regulation of individuals tried by the Inquisition. Madness, non-Hispanic socio-racial categories, and female identity, were all associated with sin. The chapter shows that to understand the ways in which the Inquisition policed the boundaries of rationality and morality, one must understand how these categories were related to theories of calidad and gender and produced different kinds of Catholic selves.

The case studies are considered in chronological order, beginning with the case of Antonio de la Cruz Chabindeño, an ex-slave, who was arrested by civil authorities in Taxco in 1737. Cruz was accused of bigamy and transferred to the custody of the Inquisition in whose prisons he was said to have gone mad. Cruz’s case allows us to consider the importance of elite assumptions based on calidad, the rational capacities of non-Spaniards, and the role of the passions in a case of ‘madness’. The next case is of Mauricia Josefa de Apelo, a servant in a convent in Mexico City. On a number of occasions beginning in 1769, Apelo denounced herself to the Inquisition for making a pact with the Devil. Apelo’s case enables a discussion of women’s ideas of their own sinfulness, the close relationship between calidad and morality, the role of sexual desire in female cases, and the importance of spiritual regulation. Finally, the chapter considers the case of Felipe Zarate, who was denounced to the Inquisition for blasphemy in Texcoco in 1789, but who remained free as the inquisitors could not decide on the reasons for his behaviour. Zarate’s case provides a further opportunity to consider how a potentially mad individual conceptualised their own behaviour, how ideas
regarding masculinity and the humoral body could shape cases, and the importance of one’s reputation to verdicts of madness.

Section One: Antonio de la Cruz Chabindeño

The case of Antonio de la Cruz Chabindeño provides an opportunity to explore the role of \textit{calidad} in explaining how the Inquisition understood madness. During the trial, the inquisitors discussed the role of reason and the passions. Many of their concerns were similar to those discussed in Chapter Four: Could the defendant reason? Were they overcome by passion? How else could their behaviour be explained? Were they indeed mad? As Sacristán observes, Cruz’s case offers an opportunity to consider how the authorities discerned madness without reference to the opinions of family and acquaintances because Cruz was believed to have gone mad in prison.\(^6\) The case is atypical because of its length and detail, and because it offers an exclusively elite view of Cruz’s madness, which was not shaped by, or in reference to, external views. This case study builds on Sacristán’s discussion of Cruz’s case by contextualising it with regard to the history of \textit{calidad} and emotions.

In 1737 Cruz was arrested by the Mayor of Taxco for the mistreatment of his second wife, a former widow Apolonia Rosales Rivera, whom he married in 1735 in Pueblo de Mazatepec.\(^7\) He was a free mulatto who had previously been a slave and had worked as a cowherd.\(^8\) He and his mother had been slaves on the Chavinda ranch in the Zamora area. The initial arrest and imprisonment in Taxco led to the discovery that Cruz had committed bigamy, a religious crime. His first wife, María de Mendoz, was still alive and living in the Valle de Peribán with their four children.\(^9\) Cruz claimed that Mendoz had died while he was working away for six years. The two places where Cruz married were over 350 kilometres apart so it is plausible that he did not expect to be discovered. His crime was not unusual in eighteenth-century Mexico; there were 554 recorded bigamy cases, of which 468 defendants were men.\(^10\) In February 1738, Cruz was sent to the Inquisition’s secret prisons where he was thought to have gone mad. However, the Inquisition staff involved in Cruz’s case never completely agreed over his state of mind. In January 1739 Brother Juan de la Vega heard Cruz’s confession and subsequently wrote that he was ‘of sound mind’ but that he suffered from demons, was terrified of going to hell, and thought his soul was damned.\(^11\) The priest acknowledged Cruz’s extreme spiritual anxiety but did not see it as an impediment to his

\(^6\) For Sacristán’s discussion of Cruz’s case, see: Sacristán, \textit{Locura e Inquisición}, pp.92-7.
\(^7\) AGN, Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 865, Expediente 1, ff.471, 481.
\(^8\) Ibid., f.467.
\(^9\) Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 865, Expediente 1, f.471.
capacity to reason. For other Inquisition staff, however, Cruz’s expression of inner turmoil provided compelling evidence that he must be mad.

Throughout the trial the inquisitors judged Cruz’s behaviour and state of mind based on concepts of *calidad*, which shaped their expectations. Historians of New Spain, notably María Elena Martinez, show that the body and skin colour were important markers of an individual’s supposed morality, stemming from ideas of *limpieza de sangre*.¹² Joan Cameron Bristol’s socio-cultural history of power relations in New Spain and their effect on the lives and practices of Afro-Mexicans provides evidence that Spanish elites considered people of African descent to be intrinsically immoral or amoral.¹³ Cruz’s case constitutes a further example of how *calidad* shaped the assumptions of inquisitors when judging an individual. Cruz told lies during his Inquisition trial and these lies were interpreted according to expectations about his *calidad* and his associated lack of self-regulation. Don Pedro Navarro de Isla, the inquisitor, questioned Cruz about his baptism and knowledge of Christian doctrine, and then the death of his first wife.¹⁴ The inquisitor accused him of lying about her death, claiming that ‘this mulato lied, because he is (as they say) a slave’.¹⁵ Cruz’s behaviour was understood on the basis of expectations of a mulatto slave or ex-slave. His *calidad* was understood as an indicator of his internal moral character, blackness was associated with impurity, which his supposed lies confirmed.¹⁶ Many defendants lied, or were believed to have lied, in Inquisition trials and interpretations of these ‘lies’ differed according to assumptions regarding their gender, *calidad*, and reputation. The Inquisition used such evidence to shape their view of the nature of the person they were trying. In Cruz’s case, the authorities thought lying was only to be expected from a *mulato* slave.

Cruz’s status as a mulatto who used to be a slave affected their understanding of his behaviours and capabilities. Cruz was a ‘free mulatto’ at the time of his trial, ‘having earlier been a slave of Don Domingo de Revollar’.¹⁷ Cruz’s lack of master may also have affected the authorities’ understandings of his behaviour. For example, the Inquisition described the ‘multiplicity of women’ with whom Cruz had relationships.¹⁸ Extra-marital relationships were not uncommon, however Cruz was understood to be an uncontrolled mulatto man who did not regulate himself or his passions. Cruz met elite expectations of the hyper-sexualised

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¹³ Bristol, *Christians, Blasphemers, and Witches*, p.49.
¹⁴ Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 865, Expediente 1, ff.477, 481.
¹⁶ Martínez, *Genealogical Fictions*, p.201.
black or mulatto man, the ‘sexual vagabond’, who was a threat to white Spanish lineage and by extension the social order.\textsuperscript{19} As Cruz was transported from prison in Taxco to the Inquisition in Mexico City, the inquisitors did not have reputational information from Cruz’s acquaintances on which to base their views of his behaviour. Their assessments came from their own interpretation of his behaviour and their assumptions about people like Cruz: mulattos and slaves. The commentators on Cruz, who were exclusively Inquisition employees, were concerned with his nature throughout the trial. In 1739 Dr Zúñiga and the surgeon Francisco Dorantes referred to Cruz’s ‘natural and unnatural actions’ in their assessment and Zúñiga remarked upon ‘the natural audacity of this culprit’.\textsuperscript{20} The Inquisition referred to Cruz on multiple occasions as a slave, regardless of his free status, implying that the word slave signified Cruz’s social standing. In the Hispanic legal framework, slaves, alongside children, the mad, the ill, and criminals were thought to be inherently deficient; therefore their legal status was restricted.\textsuperscript{21} The Inquisition’s use of ‘slave’ to describe Cruz had substantial implications for their understanding of his status. This status may also have conveyed the view that a man like Cruz ‘needed’ to be enslaved in order to be civilised. Laura Lewis’ work on the construction of race in colonial Mexico exemplifies the ways in which black people could gain legitimacy through proximity to Spanish networks and regular, respectable work. She provides examples of a woman described as black by the Inquisition who was supposedly imbued with ‘Spanish virtues’ through living in a Spanish household, in contrast to another woman who was known to be a black runaway slave. The supposed best state for a black person was to be gainfully employed with a ‘master to serve’.\textsuperscript{22}

Cruz’s \textit{calidad} as a mulatto defined the parameters of the Inquisition’s regulation of his behaviour and created tensions in what could be expected of him. His defence lawyer Licenciado Joseph Mendez argued that:

\begin{quote}
The nature of the same culprit [Cruz] explains his coarseness; and although for the crime of polygamy [coarseness] is not usually [an] effective excuse with respect to the laws of nature from which not [even] the common people are excused; there is no doubt in this case that he married twice, but [what is in doubt is] the spirit [of this], and his belief in the death of his first wife with more or less moral certainty which is based on sound discretion and perfect reason, one can accept a lack of
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{20} Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 865, Expediente 1, f.530, ‘las naturales, y no naturales acciones’ and f. 526 ‘La natural audacia de este Reo’.
\textsuperscript{22} Lewis, “‘Blackness”, “Femaleness” and Self-Representation’, pp.81-5.
reliability with which human discretion weighs the judgements, which cannot be one for [both] the common people and the elite class, and with this he is also excused, not from all [his crimes] but from knowledge of canon law which determines the kind of test [regarding] his belief in the death of his first wife.  

Mendez asserted that Cruz’s calidad explained his rusticity and immoral choices. While bigamy was not acceptable for the ‘common people’, he argued that Cruz could not be held to the same standards as someone of elite, Spanish descent. He stated that Cruz was not able to make correct judgements about his wife’s death and the appropriateness of marrying again because as a common person, a mulatto, he was not able to reason well. Such discussions did not take place in the cases of the ‘mad’ Spanish dons found in the sample. In Mendez’s view, Cruz’s calidad and lack of education limited both his capacity for right thinking and virtuous action, and his knowledge of Catholic doctrine.

Cruz’s case provides a rare example of colonial records documenting a process of an individual supposedly going mad. His case provides an example of elite judgements that did not draw upon the perspectives of family and acquaintances to establish information about the individual’s character and capacities. In this respect, the case differs from the majority of sample cases. When the inquisitors, lawyers, and doctors involved in the case turned to debating Cruz’s madness, they examined Cruz to assess his capacity for reason and other intellectual faculties. Early in the Inquisition trial, Dr Zúñiga suggested that Cruz’s faculties were intact. Zúñiga wrote that he had conducted a ‘rigorous examination; which lasted an hour and a half, with respect to the mind, or reason; we find him agreeable, and he appears to be healthy, with his mind intact, and he reflects remembrance, of everything that has passed, and [the] present’. As Cruz was able to converse well and discuss his situation and life, Zúñiga considered him to have the capacity for reflexive thought and so to be sane. He argued that Cruz had substantially greater capabilities than Mendez and Dorantes credited him with.

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23 Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 865, Expediente 1, ff.519-20, ‘Porque la naturaleza del mismo Reo explica su rusticidad; Y aunq para el delicto de la poligamia no suele ser eficaz escusar con respecto de versar sobre leyes de la naturaleza en que ni los rusticos se escusan; pero quando no es la dificultad o duda zerca de lo principal q esta Duplicidad del Matrimonio, sino del Animo, y creencia del fallezim.to de la d.a mujer con mas o menos certidumbre moral q pende de una sana discrez.on y juicio perfecto puede ser bastante excepcion la falta de aquella formalidad con q la discrezion Umana pesa los dictamenes, q no puede ser una en los rusticos, y en los Politicos; y con esto se escusa también, no en el todo sino en el conozim.to de las dezisiones canonicas q determinan los expezie de Prueba... para creer y persuadirse a la muerte de la primera mujer’.

24 Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 865, Expediente 1, f.499, ‘rigoroso exsamen; por espassó de hora y media, por lo que toca a la mente, o juicio; le hallamos acorde, y a el pareser sano, con integra notisia, y reflexa recordasion, de todo lo pasado, y presente’.
The positions of the lawyers and doctors in Cruz’s case were built on assessments of Cruz’s capacity for understanding, which was a typical concern in the sample of cases of ‘madness’. Dorantes, the Inquisition’s surgeon, wanted ‘to be able to make a judgement [regarding] if there is any kind of fatuousness’. In addressing Cruz’s capacity, Dorantes focussed on understanding rather than reason: fatuousness was defined as ‘simplicity and lack of understanding to distinguish things’, or ‘simple, silly, foolish, that does not discern or distinguish’. Mendez, the defence lawyer, also framed his concerns with regard to understanding as he described Cruz as ‘empty of understanding’; he ‘lacks knowledge and capacity to understand’. Early modern thinkers considered understanding to be a lower faculty. As discussed in Chapter Two, the higher and lower faculties were ‘parts’ of the soul stemming from Aristotelian principles whereby the soul was composed of a hierarchy of faculties. The distinct, higher faculty of reason relied on understanding to distinguish between true, moral choices and false, immoral ones. Establishing what intellectual capabilities Cruz had was necessary for judging him as mad or sane. Regardless of calidria, the inquisitors asked what ‘reason and capacity’ the defendant had, just as in the cases discussed in Chapters Two and Four and in many of the forty-three Inquisition cases analysed for this chapter. Establishing intellectual capacities was a prerequisite for judging behaviour, but these capacities were difficult to discern conclusively.

Discussions of reason were commonly interlinked with considerations of an individual’s passions. As discussed in Chapter Two, the passions were often regarded as fickle and inherently irrational, with the potential to overwhelm individuals. Ordinary passions had to be separated out from authentic madness when assessing an individual. In

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25 Ibid., f.505, ‘que nos sirva esto de prueban para poder hacer juicio de si hay alguna especie de fatuidad’.
26 Diccionario de Autoridades (D-F) (Madrid, 1732), p.726, 1, ‘Simpleza y falta de entendimiento para distinguir las cosas’; Diccionario de Autoridades (D-F), p.726, 2 and Diccionario Academia Usual, p.466, 1, ‘Simple, tonto, insensato, que no discierne ni distingue’.
27 Ibid., f.521, ‘Leso y bazio de entendim.to’ and ‘falta el conocim.to e Yntelliccion en las potenzias ynterrnas’. See Diccionario de Autoridades (G-M), p.288, 1, ‘Inteleccion... La acción, por la qual el entendimiento comprehende o concibe una cosa’. ‘The action whereby the understanding comprehends or conceives something’.
29 Diccionario de Autoridades (D-F), p.501, 1, ‘Entendimiento... Una de las tres potencias del alma... Es una potencia espiritual y cognoscitiva del alma racional, con la qual se entienden y conocen los objetos, assi sensibles como no sensibles, y que están fuera de la espera de los sentidos’.
Cruz’s case, his jealousy over his second wife’s apparent pregnancy with another man had to be distinguished from madness. In November 1738, Zúñiga wrote that Cruz suffered from:

- a melancholic delirium, and serious passion of the spirit, sometimes caused by love,
- a cause that should not be underestimated, and which indeed is integral to madness...
- sometimes caused by extreme jealousy (zelotipia), a greater, and stronger passion, from which this prisoner has suffered a great deal.\[32\]

Zúñiga explained that extreme passions were related to, or essential aspects of, madness. He described Cruz as suffering from the effects of love and the passion of jealousy, which was described as a condition in itself.\[33\] Love had many connotations and was a crucial part of the relationship between God and mankind.\[34\] The *Diccionario de Autoridades* described love as a ‘sentiment of the rational soul, by which one seeks with desire the true good, or it is apprehended, and craves enjoying oneself’.\[35\] The definition suggested that love involved the potential for closeness to God to be corrupted into base, self-serving desire, which overwhelmed reason. Wariness of the instability and irrationality of love was apparent in contemporary discussions, as demonstrated in Patricia Seed’s analysis of the significance of love in eighteenth-century marriage. She cites a civil law case of a father who wished to prevent his daughter from marrying and described her intention as ‘a passion that was not influenced by the rational liberty of human understanding’.\[36\] Thus passions generally, and specifically those such as love, were integral to the human condition and made it possible for an individual to become mad if those passions were not properly regulated and directed towards religiously-sanctioned ends.

Passions such as love could also lead to jealousy, which was founded in loss or fear of losing a loved one. In 1738 Dr Zúñiga discussed Cruz’s supposed jealousy writing that, ‘he [Cruz] recounted it [his case], albeit in his brusque style, in a way that was consistent with being in possession of a sound judgement, since even though he was jealous of the pregnancy of the second woman... he wanted revenge which is more consistent with having

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32 Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 865, Expediente 1, f.526, ‘un delirio melancolico, y graves passion de animo, ya de amor causa q no se desprecia, antes si es esencial a la demencia... ya de Zelotipia, mayor, y mas fuerte passion, de la q mucho a padezido dho reo’.

33 For definitions of zelotipia/celotipia, see: *Diccionario Academia Usual*, p.950, 3; Esteban de Terreros y Pando, *Diccionario Castellano con las Voces de Ciencias y Artes y sus Correspondientes de las Tres Lenguas Francesa, Latina, é Italiana* (A-F) (Madrid, 1786), p.394, 2.


35 *Diccionario de Autoridades* (A-B), p.272, 2, ‘Amor... Afecto del alma racional, por el qual busca con deseo el bien verdadero, a apprehendido, y apetece gozarle’.

sound judgement’. Zúñiga considered Cruz to be suffering from extreme jealousy, which he deemed a negative emotion though one that was logical given the circumstances. Definitions of jealousy linked it to love and the passions, describing it as ‘the suspicion, uneasiness, and mistrust, that the loved person has moved, or moves their affection, or fondness, giving it to another’ and as a ‘passion of the soul, caused by envy, and desire for a good one has, or one thinks that another possesses’. Cruz’s separation from his wife while in prison and the evidence that she had developed another relationship was consistent with this definition.

Sonya Lipsett-Rivera’s work on jealousy shows that men and women were equally likely to experience and express jealousy in late-colonial Mexico based on the threat of losing a partner. Laws and honour codes prescribed scenarios in which people might feel jealous and sanctioned ways of acting on that jealousy. For example, men were entitled to lash out at unfaithful wives and the men with whom they had relations. This provides helpful context for understanding Zúñiga’s view of Cruz’s apparent jealousy. In this instance, jealousy did not denote an impassioned loss of reason, but was a legitimate emotional response to a situation that attacked Cruz’s status and endangered his relationship with his second wife. His purported desire to take revenge was considered understandable and rational based on the moral codes of the context.

Observers repeatedly described Cruz as melancholic, but the relationship between melancholy and madness in his case was ambiguous. Inquisitors, priests, and doctors cited melancholy in a number of cases of male ‘madness’. Jacqueline Holler’s work on melancholy in New Spain shows how in the colonial period emotions such as sadness were religious states and sorrow was seen as natural for fallen mankind. Melancholy was a passion, or emotion, of ‘great and permanent sadness’, which was primarily a religious affliction. Extreme sorrow was unacceptable because it called into question God’s

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37 Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 865, Expediente 1, f.526, ‘la contó, en aquel su estilo aunq bronco, acorder con todas las circunstancias de no faltar a las Reglas de un sano juicio; pues aunq llegando a [ser] zelos de la utero gerencia en la segunda... quiere vengarze, esto mas afianza estar los sensorios y partes pertenecientes al juicio mas libres’.
38 Diccionario de Autoridades (S-Z) (Madrid, 1739), p.566, 2, ‘la sospecha, inquietud, y rezelo, de que la persona amada haya mudado, o mude su cariño, o afición, poniéndola en otra’. Terreros y Pando, Diccionario Castellano (A-F), p.394, 1, ‘pasion del alma, causada de la envidia, y deseo del bien que posee, o se piensa que posee otro’.
39 Sonya Lipsett-Rivera, “‘If I Can’t Have Her, No One Else Can”: Jealousy and Violence in Mexico’ in Villa-Flores and Lipsett-Rivera, Emotions and Daily Life in Colonial Mexico, pp.70, 75.
42 Diccionario de Autoridades (G-M), p.532, 532, ‘tristeza grande y permanente’.
providence and so was pathologised as melancholy.\textsuperscript{43} Thus Cruz’s supposed melancholy was an example of inappropriate or excessive feeling, but did not necessarily amount to madness. In later records from 1739, Dr Zúñiga considered Cruz to be affected by ‘a passion of spirit or a melancholic feeling that hurts his heart (as perceived from his complaint), leaving his reason unaffected.’\textsuperscript{44} Zúñiga did not consider at this point that Cruz’s melancholy affected his sanity. In this instance, Zúñiga’s link between the effects of the passions and the heart was reminiscent of Feijóo’s description of the effects of the passions, love, and anger on the heart, as discussed in Chapter Three.\textsuperscript{45} Emotional states, as well as innate rational potential, were key to whether one was sane or mad both in literary texts and in assessing the behaviour of real people.

Melancholy’s meaning in relation to reason and madness could be ambiguous. On another occasion, Zúñiga and Dorantes (the surgeon) judged that ‘although his reasoning is often coherent, [which is] evidence of an undamaged ability to reason, it [his reasoning] changes easily, in many scattered propositions, which is evidence of his deep melancholic passion, as we have declared.’\textsuperscript{46} Here the doctor and surgeon presented Cruz’s capacity for reasoning as more complicated. The doctor and surgeon observed that Cruz expressed logical ideas but he changed his mind frequently and his intentions were not always well thought-out. Later in the case they wrote that Cruz’s melancholic passions ‘degenerate into manias’, which suggested that melancholy was on a spectrum moving towards madness.\textsuperscript{47} Indeed, the Inquisition’s authorities also debated whether or not there was truth in the idea that ‘there is a danger in melancholics of becoming mad people.’\textsuperscript{48} Don Diego Mangado y Clavyo, the Inquisition’s fiscal, or prosecutor, in the case considered this to be an unhelpful idea and one not based on the evidence of the case itself. Assessing Cruz’s state of mind was a complex process that drew on a varied terminology related to madness that was applied imprecisely. While the doctor, surgeon, and lawyer quoted all described Cruz as melancholic, the significance of melancholy was not always clear to them.

\textsuperscript{43} Holler, ‘Of Sadness and Joy in Colonial Mexico’, p.27.
\textsuperscript{44} Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 865, Expediente 1, f.499, ‘una pasion de animo o afecto melancolico q lastima (segun se percibe de su queja) el corazon; dejando libre la razon’.
\textsuperscript{45} Feijóo, \textit{Theatro Critico Universal}, p.373.
\textsuperscript{46} Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 865, Expediente 1, f.538, ‘y aunq lo q lo raciocina sea muchas vezes conforme, y seguido; prueba de una razón sin daño, muda fácilmente, en varias proposiciones disparadas, q arguyen su profunda passion melancolica: como tenemos declarado’.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., f.500, ‘degeneran en manias’.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., f.534, ‘en los melancolicos ai peligro de passar a dementes’.
As with the clerics discussed in Chapter Four, Cruz was ultimately labelled as mad because of the unusual ways he used his body and the cyclical nature of his symptoms. Zúñiga and Dorantes described how Cruz spoke lucidly at times, but at others he wept, shouted, and refused food periodically, which constituted evidence of madness.\(^{49}\) Towards the end of the trial, Dr Zúñiga wrote that he had been able ‘to correlate the known passion of the spirit of this culprit with the movements of the moon’.\(^{50}\) Definitions of melancholy explicitly linked it to the phases of the moon: melancholy was ‘one of the four qualities that the astrologers give to the third quarter of the celestial cycle’.\(^{51}\) Moreover, the moon was cited as a cause of madness in other Inquisition cases and in the missionary records pertaining to Friar Sevane, as discussed in previous chapters.\(^{52}\) The *Diccionario de Autoridades* defined a lunatic as ‘a madman, whose madness is not continuous, but by intervals that are produced from the state in which the moon is found: when it grows they become furious and distempered, and when [it] wanes [they become] peaceful and reasonable.’\(^{53}\) The dictionary definition describes symptoms similar to those reported by Cruz’s doctors. The doctors considered experience of strong passions such as melancholy to be capable of tipping people into illness. For example, Cruz’s doctors wrote that, ‘we always find him with profound melancholy, and often tears, some[times], a sort of fury, which although it passed, gave signs of the beginnings of a mania’.\(^{54}\) Thus, they deemed melancholy to be related to mania. The definition of mania was an ‘Illness of fantasy that disturbs and disorders it, establishing it as a category without reason’.\(^{55}\) Thus melancholy could cause an individual to lose their reason if not managed appropriately. Factors beyond the control of the individual or the doctors

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\(^{49}\) Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 865, Expediente 1, ff.499, 530, 538. For a fuller description of Cruz’s tears, see Chapter Four.

\(^{50}\) *Ibid.*, f.527, ‘observar mas con las mutaciones de Luna la conocida passion de animo de este Reo’.

\(^{51}\) *Diccionario Academia Usual*, p.253, 1, ‘melancólico... Uno de los varios epitetos que los astrólogos dan al tercer quadrante del tema celeste’.

\(^{52}\) Inquisitors, doctors, priests, and a slave woman considered the phases of the moon to cause madness in the case of María de Guadalupe: AGN, Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 1104, Expediente 5, ff.130-2; and friars at the apostolic college in Pachuca thought Sevane’s madness was related to the moon. For example, Friar Miguel Sosa y Armas ‘observed that [Sevane] was worse based on the phases of the moon’. Instituciones Coloniales, Clero Regular y Secular, Vol. 139, Expediente 20, f.55, ‘observó que en las mutaciones de la luna estaba peor’. See also: Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 1086, Expediente 1, ff.86-102.

\(^{53}\) *Diccionario de Autoridades* (G-M), pp.439, 2-440, 1, ‘Lunático... El loco, cuya demencia no es continua, sino por intervalos que producen del estado en que se halla la Luna: Cuando esta creciente se ponen furiosos y destemplados, y quando menguante pacíficos y razonables.’

\(^{54}\) Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 865, Expediente 1, f.538, ‘siempre le hallamos; con profunda melancholia, muchas veces llanto, algunas, una especie de furor, q aunq pacado, dava indicios de una iniciada mania’.

\(^{55}\) *Diccionario de Autoridades* (G-M), p.478, 2, ‘Enfermedad de la phantasía que la altéra y desordena, fijandola en una especie, sin razón’.
and inquisitors made people vulnerable to melancholy, which was understood in this context as a passion or state of being that might lead to mania and madness.

The inquisitors concluded Cruz’s case in 1739 by sending him to the hospital for madmen on the basis that he was ‘perfectamente demente’. He died there later that year of causes that were not stated. A number of cases ended with the Inquisition sending defendants to the hospital for madmen, though by no means the majority. These cases differ from the instances of ‘mad’ clerics who were often sent to convents and apostolic colleges to recover. Cruz’s case offers an unusual opportunity to consider how the authorities judged an individual whom they believed was going mad.

As with all interactions in Bourbon Mexico, calidad was fundamental to the assumptions the Inquisition’s authorities made of Cruz. They considered him, as a mulatto freed from slavery, to be immoral and wayward. As he was believed to have gone mad within the Inquisition’s prison, the records enable an examination of the Inquisition’s inquiry into madness with no incorporation of the views of those who knew Cruz personally. Cruz’s case provides evidence that, regardless of calidad, the Inquisition’s staff were concerned to establish whether or not an individual was able to comprehend and to reason. They thought Cruz was immoral, but still potentially capable of some level of rationality. The extent to which he was able to be rational and could be held to the same standards as a Spanish defendant was debated. In this respect, Cruz’s case differs from the many cases of supposedly mad Spanish men found in the Inquisition records, where the defendants’ calidad was not considered a hindrance to rationality. The Inquisition’s staff also discussed Cruz’s passions extensively. They aimed to establish whether or not passions such as love and melancholy constituted madness and clearly marked out some emotions, such as jealousy, to be rational under certain circumstances. Although aspects of Cruz’s lack of self-regulation were described as compatible with reasoning, the authorities ultimately decided that he was mad because of his displays of fury and mania, which coincided with the lunar calendar.

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56 Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 865, Expediente 1, ff.538-9 ‘perfectamente demente’. The first hospital for mad men established in the Spanish colonies was set up in 1567 in Mexico City. See: Sacristán, Locura y disidencia, p.12.
Section Two: Mauricia Josefa de Apelo

Mauricia Josefa de Apelo’s case, and the case that follows of Felipe Zarate, took place in the latter half of the eighteenth century during a period of ecclesiastical and state reform. Apelo’s case provides evidence of how gender and calidad were the basis for understanding an individual’s behaviour and how these categories interacted with assessments of morality and rationality. It also provides an example of female patterns of religious engagement and madness in this period.

The case began with Apelo’s self-denunciation for a Devil pact. She denounced herself on five separate occasions between 1769 and 1785. In 1768 Apelo was a servant at the Convent of Santo Domingo in Mexico City (on the same plaza as the Inquisitorial Palace). The Inquisition described her in 1769 as a doncella, a maiden, and at different points she was described as castiza, mestiza, and india. Commentators struggled to agree on the causes of Apelo’s behaviour. Some thought she was mad, others described her as very sane and very Christian, and many considered her condition to be changeable, and possibly caused by physical illness. Doctors thought Apelo’s illness could be best treated by spiritual means. The varied assessments of Apelo’s behaviour led to uncertainty among the Inquisition’s staff, which is apparent in their discussion of the case. Multiple times the inquisitors absolved Apelo ad cautelam (under warning) in acknowledgement of the disagreement of officials in the trial. She was sent to the Hospital of the Divine Saviour for a three-month period in 1770 and was later moved to the Real Hospicio de Pobres, Mexico City’s poor house. Her trial ended with absolution for her sins in February 1785 and a statement written on her behalf in March 1785.

The psychiatrist Ernestina Jiménez Olivares discusses Apelo’s case in Psiquiatría e Inquisición: Procesos a Enfermos Mentales. Although the book is framed in terms of injustices committed against the mentally ill, Olivares provides a useful description of Apelo’s case. My discussion provides analysis based on the social and cultural context of the period. Apelo’s behaviour and the Inquisition’s response can be related to Bourbon Catholic ideas of self-regulation and contemporary understandings of madness, without recourse to present-day conceptions of good care for the mentally ill. Apelo’s self-denunciations were part of a

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60 These terms are all defined in Chapter One.
61 Ibid., ff.321, 323, 335.
62 Arrom, Containing the Poor, pp.1, 279.
process whereby she tried to regulate herself in order to behave as a good Catholic woman, and, on failing, handed herself over to her confessor and the inquisitors. Apelo’s Inquisition case is one of a trend of cases of self-denunciation by women in Bourbon Mexico.65 The sample used in this chapter contains a number of other examples of women who denounced themselves to the Inquisition and were found to be mad.66

Historians such as Ruth Behar, Serge Gruzinski, Matthew O’Hara, and Zeb Tortorici cite unorthodox beliefs and self-denunciation as evidence that defendants had internalised the values of the Catholic Church and Inquisition. Moreover, defendants expressed themselves using Catholic language and concepts.67 Indeed, in a number of cases where women denounced themselves to the Inquisition, they cited fear of hell and desire for absolution as reasons for their self-denunciation.68 Apelo framed her admissions to the inquisitors in terms of sin and repentance. She confessed that she had not believed in the articles of the faith since she was six or seven years old. She claimed she threw her rosary and scapular on the ground in order to invoke the Devil. He came to her in the shape of a man and they had a sexual relationship. As the records state, ‘she has had a friendship with the Devil, and she has seen him many times in the figure of a man, he has had carnal relations with her many times’.69 She also reported that she had not confessed her sins sooner for fear of reprisal from the Devil.70 Women were often accused of being seduced by the Devil, and

65 Behar, ‘Sex and Sin, Witchcraft and the Devil in Late-Colonial Mexico’, pp.36-8; Taylor, Magistrates of the Sacred, p.188.
69 Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 1009, Expediente 15, f.312, ‘ha tenido amistad con el Demonio, i lo ha bisto muchos beses en figura de hombre, ha tenido muchas beses comercio carnal con ella’.
70 Ibid., f.339.
making implicit pacts with him, because of their inherent weaknesses. This loss of self-control was attributed to sinfulness and irrationality.\(^7\)

A Spanish woman called María Francisca Mendivil, who the Inquisition suspected was mad, also denounced herself after confessing to a priest. The notary recorded that, ‘she was suspicious of being a heretic and an Apostate and other things of which she accused herself, but she confessed to have been a bad Christian’.\(^7\) Mendivil, like Apelo, had internalised Christian values of what thoughts and acts were acceptable and attempted to regulate her behaviour, or sought re-dress regarding her behaviour, based on accepted Catholic standards. Although there were cases of men self-denouncing, it was more common for women to do so.\(^7\) Apelo and Mendivil’s self-denunciations, among others, are evidence of practices of female self-regulation in Bourbon Mexico, where women shared intimate aspects of their interior worlds with their confessors, and told of their shame and fear for their souls.\(^7\) Confessors often doubted women’s abilities to manage their own thoughts and behaviour and viewed them as particularly at risk of falling into sin. Understanding cases such as Apelo’s, and the role of madness in inquisitorial judgements, must begin with how the authorities viewed women who self-denounced.\(^7\)

The Inquisition’s quest to understand what kind of person Apelo was began with their discussion of her *calidad*. Apelo’s parents were described as Spanish and *castiza* respectively. As discussed in Chapter One, *castizo* technically referred to someone of mixed Spanish and Indian lineage where three grandparents were Spanish. However, it signified far more than that definition. As Francisco Antonio Lorenzana, the Archbishop of Mexico (1766-72) wrote, ‘*castizos* are declared clean’. That is, for Lorenzana, an individual who was *castizo* was sufficiently Spanish, or sufficiently pure blooded, to command Spanish status, rather than a mixed socio-racial status. With parents who were Spanish and *castiza*, and based on the cultural connotations of being *castiza*, Apelo ought to have been able to claim Spanish status. Indeed, Apelo explicitly described herself as Spanish though no other commentators in the case did so. In Apelo’s case, to be *castiza* signified that she was almost Spanish, but

\(^7\) Lewis, *Hall of Mirrors*, p.114.

\(^7\) Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Caja 1593, Expediente 17, f.8 ‘era sospechosa de ser hereje y Apostata y lo Demas de q. se le acusaba, pero se confesaba haver sido mala cristiana’.

\(^7\) Behar, ‘Sex and Sin, Witchcraft and the Devil in Late-Colonial Mexico’, p.36; Alberro, *Inquisición y Sociedad en México*, p.290. For an example of a man writing to denounce himself to the Inquisition for making a pact with the Devil in 1799, see: Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 1394, Expediente 5, ff.21-64.

\(^7\) Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 1242, Expediente 6, f.27.

\(^7\) Sacristán also observes the strong religious dynamic of female Inquisition cases where the woman was supposedly mad. She characterises this as ‘popular madness’ in contrast to the ‘cultivated madness’ of elite men. See: Sacristán, *Locura y Disidencia*, pp.123-180.
something about her excluded her from that privileged status. Someone who was *castizo* had significant Hispanic characteristics, yet their behaviour, outward appearance, and perhaps social ties were not quite Spanish.

Apelo’s case provides further evidence for the established historical perspective that categories of *calidad* were relational and reputational, based on performing one’s *calidad* in reference to social expectations. As Joan Cameron Bristol has argued in ‘Patriarchs, Petitions, and Prayers’ individuals drew on ideas of honour associated with *calidad* to present their own behaviours as conforming to good Christian morality. They also used the rhetoric of honour to suggest that others were not behaving as they ought to, sometimes because of their *calidad*. Ambiguity concerning Apelo’s *calidad* shows that her perceived morality was intimately linked to socio-racial preconceptions. Indeed, in the case of María Efigenia de los Reyes, the trial was abruptly stopped when the Inquisition attributed Efigenia’s poor behaviour to her *calidad*: the Inquisition ruled that she must be *india* and they could not prosecute her. Inquisitorial discussions about the relationships between morality and *calidad* show that *calidad* was religious as well as genealogical. Witnesses and inquisitors described Apelo as *castiza, mestiza and india* on different occasions; the less virtuous a commentator thought her to be, the less Spanish they thought her to be.

*Calidad* was flexible and the circumstances of an individual’s life affected how they were perceived. Bachiller Don Jose Antonio Pietrando, a confessor at the poor house, wrote to the Inquisition to give testimony on Apelo. He described Apelo as, ‘of mestiza quality, a single woman of sixty or more years, [she is] totally ignorant of the art of writing and is prevented from presenting herself in person to the Inquisition because she is locked up in the poor house because of her poverty’. Pietrando’s assessment that Apelo was *mestiza* was based on his assumptions linking *calidad* to lack of education and poverty. Scholars of

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77 In the case of Nicolas Lara, a priest whose case was discussed in Chapter Four, the denouncer Don Sandoval described Lara as ‘of a white colour’, rather than as Spanish, as would be expected for a priest. Sandoval judged Lara based on an assumption that his *calidad* and morality were intertwined. Irreligious conduct was labelled un-Spanish. See: Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 1436, Expediente 4, ff.19-20, ‘de color blanco’. For a further discussion of ambiguous morality and socio-racial characteristics in a ‘madness’ case, see: Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 1119, Expediente 9, ff.173-211.
79 For an extended discussion of this relationship, see: Martínez, *Genealogical Fictions*, esp. p.220.
80 Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 1009, Expediente 15, f.337, ‘de calidad Mestiza, soleza, muger a lo q.e manifiesta de sesenta y tantos años de edad, totalmente ignorante al arte de escribir e impedida de presentarse ante V.S.I. en persona por estar encerrada a causa de su pobreza en el Real Hospicio de Pobres’.

170
race in the colonial Americas have shown that mestizos had an ambiguous status. Racial categories held different significance depending on the geographical context, circumstances of an interaction, and an individual’s stage in the life course.\textsuperscript{81} Joanne Rappaport’s book \textit{The Disappearing Mestizo} asks when and how someone was mestizo. It shows that in sixteenth and seventeenth century New Granada identifying people’s calidad was a fluid process based on language, status, and the place they lived. She focuses on the category of mestizos because they appeared and disappeared in colonial records based on their intermittent identification (by themselves and others) as Spanish or Indian instead of mestizo.\textsuperscript{82} Similarly, in Bourbon Mexico, an individual such as Apelo could slip in and out of the category of mestiza according to judgements of her capabilities and social position.

Pietrando’s perception of Apelo was shaped by his assumptions about people of her quality and status, which he shared with other elite Spanish men in positions of authority. In discussing Apelo’s habit of thinking out loud, Pietrando made reference to ‘the ignorant people’, ‘la gente ignorantante’. He wrote that ‘often the common people do not know how to distinguish well between speaking in a low voice and speaking mentally’.\textsuperscript{83} Pietrando’s generalisations about ignorant and rough people illustrate that he saw Apelo as a poor person of a lower caste. Pietrando described her failure to distinguish between thinking to herself and talking under her breath as expected behaviours of someone of a low status, of an ignorant and common person, who was not ‘Spanish’. Like others of his elite Spanish calidad and status, Pietrando did not have high expectations for the behaviour of someone of Apelo’s calidad. Her testimony was given little weight in the trial proceedings as a result. Therefore, thinking out loud and speaking at inappropriate points, such as when not addressed, shaped interpretations of social status and calidad.

Perceptions of gender and calidad influenced the authorities’ views of Apelo’s ability to reason and potential madness. Pietrando explained his relationship with Apelo and how he considered her to have poor intellectual capacities and to be a coarse, ignorant woman. He wrote that:

\begin{quote}
I don’t see dementia in her, nor any other illness with which to be able to attribute it. Neither have I had dealings with her outside of the confessionary, and thus I
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{82} Joanne Rappaport, \textit{The Disappearing Mestizo: Configuring Difference in the Colonial New Kingdom of Granada} (London, 2014), pp.4-11.

\textsuperscript{83} Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 1009, Expediente 15, ff.337-8, ‘Muchas veces la gente ruda no sabe distinguir bien entre el hablar en vos baja, y el hablar mentalmente’.
cannot make a judgement on her behalf. Rather, confessing her in her natural rudeness and inability to explain herself, I have noticed some basic understanding, and judgement to distinguish [between things].\textsuperscript{84}

In Pietrando’s view Apelo was poor, ignorant, and mestiza. He saw her capacity to discern and reason as limited because of her \textit{calidad}, rather than as a result of being mad. He explicitly stated that he did not consider her to have an illness that affected her capacity for reason. Instead, he summarised her intellectual capacities as limited comprehension and difficulties in expressing her own thoughts. He also cautioned that he had only conversed with Apelo when confessing her, and so his ability to assess her was limited.

The Inquisition also requested Brother Francisco Larria’s view of Apelo’s ‘reason and capacity’.\textsuperscript{85} Larria was a \textit{calificador} for the Inquisition; as such, his role involved determining whether defendants had committed acts against the faith. He commented on Apelo as well as other defendants who were considered to be mad.\textsuperscript{86} His response addressed Apelo’s ability to reason by considering her faculties and focusing on her understanding and will. He wrote that ‘she does not have perturbed faculties, and that she is in her right mind, although she lacks the best instruction, and her capacity is limited: nevertheless I am of the opinion that it is formal heresy, with grave relevance as regards understanding, and with obstinacy as regards the will’.\textsuperscript{87} Larria expressed a view that Apelo was not intellectually very able. He also emphasised her immorality and her obstinate will. Pietrando and Larria’s views were compatible with elite views that people of mixed descent and women were less rational than Spanish men.\textsuperscript{88}

Pietrando’s assessment considered Apelo to have ‘some background understanding, and judgement’.\textsuperscript{89} As \textit{juicio}, reason or judgement, signified a capacity to distinguish between good and bad, Pietrando’s assessment implicitly stated that Apelo ought to be able to make

\textsuperscript{84}Ibid., f.338, ‘no veo en ella demencia, ni alguna otra enfermedad a que poder atribuirlo. Tampoco la he tratado fuera del confesionario, y asi no puedo hacer juicio en su favour. Antes bien confesandola entre su rudesa natural, e inhabilidad de explicarse he advertido algun fondo de entendimiento, y juicio para dicernir’.

\textsuperscript{85} Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 1009, Expediente 15, f.322, ‘juicio y capacidad’.


\textsuperscript{87} Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 1009, Expediente 15, f.325, ‘no tiene perturbadas las potencias, y q.e si esta en su entero juicio, aunque carece de la mejor instrucion, y su capacidad es corta: sin embargo estoy en concepto de q.e es hereje formal, con grabe pertinacia de parte del entendimiento, y con obstinacion de parte de la voluntad’.


\textsuperscript{89} Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 1009, Expediente 15, ff.337-8, ‘algun fondo de entendimiento, y juicio’.
moral choices. Pietrando explicitly argued that Apelo was not mad but her memory was damaged. He reflected that ‘I must not persuade myself that Mauricia is demented, or simple, much less reflecting that she is... ill... exhausted... all of which made her lack her memory’.90 A problem affecting her memory held a different significance to lacking rational capabilities; it left intact the idea that Apelo was able to make moral choices. Apelo’s mutable and apparently improbable testimony was interpreted by others as madness. Dr Mier Bergosa y Prado remarked of her testimony that ‘the implausibility of the facts, their mass, age, variety and the contradictions that they contain, and bring about... hinder the ability to receive an exact, clear and individual statement... they have warned she has a kind of madness, mania, dementia or simplicity’.91 Thus, as with the other cases, the inquisitors wanted to establish Apelo’s capacity to make moral choices in order to establish if her transgressions were the result of volition and thus to manage her accordingly.92 In practice, policing reason, understanding, and will was fraught with differences in opinion, making regulating defendants difficult.

Assessments of Apelo’s madness could become confused by contradictory understandings of its relationship with calidad and poverty. Silvia Arrom’s study, *Containing the Poor*, explains how Mexico City’s elite formed a secularised approach to managing the poor, including the new poor house (1774), during the Bourbon Reforms.93 The poor were increasingly reviled as uncivilised, idle, lazy, and in moral decline. As discussed in the Introduction, begging was banned and beggars were seen as morally defective.94 These attitudes to the poor shaped officials’ views on Apelo during her stay there. Descriptions of Apelo confirm Arrom’s findings that the poor were vilified as immoral and ignorant, and build on these findings by considering how Apelo’s apparently impoverished state affected others’ discernment of her rationality or madness. Brother Francisco Garfias, a confessor at the poor house, described in November 1784 how Apelo changed her denunciations regularly,

90 *Ibid.*, f.346, ‘no me debo persuadir q Mauricia es demente, o simple, mucho menos reflexando q es... enferma... débil... todo lo qual fue le hacer q falte la memoria’.
91 *Ibid.*, f.340 ‘La inverosimilitud de los hechos su multitud, antiguedad, variedad, y contradicciones q contienen, y producen, dificultan... el poderle recibir una declaracion exacta, clara, é individual... le han advertido alguna especie de locura, mania, demencia, o simplicidad’.
92 On the same principle, the Inquisition emphasised that they did not intend to punish Alvarez, a ‘hysterical’ novice, because she was mad and not able to make moral choices. See: *Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición*, Vol. 1162, Expediente 34, f.387.
94 Arrom, *Containing the Poor*, pp.19-23.
expanding on previous testimonies and then denying them with tears. Garfias claimed that she often responded to questioning by repeating ‘I don’t remember’ and he could neither coax nor force other responses from her. Garfias wrote inconsistently that ‘she is not mad’ but is ‘very deceitful, very ignorant, and very full of brutal malice, accompanied to a large extent by madness’. The Spanish elite frequently wrote derisively about Mexico City’s poor, and associated immoral behaviours such as lying with poor, uneducated people.

Lying featured prominently in Inquisition testimonies as defendants confessed and retracted statements in their attempts to navigate their interrogations. It was often associated with immorality, particularly in the cases of people who were poorer and of lower caste. For example, Laura Lewis analyses the case of a woman described as black who was thought to lie because of her *calidad*. In a similar vein, Garfias attributed Apelo’s lies to her status as an ignorant ‘common’ *mestiza* woman. As discussed above, Cruz was also described as lying based on his *calidad*. Lying was explicitly linked by elites to people of low status. For example, when writing about how to manage the city’s poor, the first director of the poor house, Dr Don Andrés Ambrosio Llanos y Valdés (1774-91), described ‘the custom these people have of lying’. Therefore, those suspected of habitual lying, such as Apelo, were seen as vulgar, immoral, and uneducated, with unclear implications for whether they were thought mad or not.

An inability to maintain behaviours expected of Spanish people made individuals Indian in the eyes of the Inquisition. Historians of race in the Spanish Empire such as Rachel O’Toole have demonstrated this. O’Toole describes the Inquisition case of a nun in seventeenth-century Peru who claimed to have mystical powers. She and her confessor tried to present her to the Inquisition as a saint. The inquisitors thought the nun was lying during her trial and she was condemned as vain and ignorant. A crucial element of the case was the discovery that she had lied about her illegitimate birth in order to enter the convent. Her reputation, and so her *calidad*, was destroyed. Building on the revelation that the nun was not a legitimate Spanish woman, the inquisitors framed her as culturally Indian because she failed to answer questions adequately under oath. Ignorance was equated with Indian-ness as a legitimate Spanish nun would have been able to satisfy the inquisitors’ questions. Moreover, as Laura Lewis’ work on the construction of race in colonial Mexico argues, caste

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95 *Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 1009, Expediente 15, f.344 ‘no me acuerdo’.*
96 *Ibid.,* ff.344-5, ‘Ella no esta loca’, ‘she is not mad’; ‘muy mentirosa, muy ignorante, y muy llena de malicia brutal, acompañada de una gran parte de locura’.
97 Lewis “Blackness,” “Femaleness” and Self-Representation’, pp.81-5.
99 *Arron, Containing the Poor,* p.82.
was constructed through social networks and kinship. Indian identity, for example, was heavily tied to whom one knew and how one spent one’s time. O’Toole and Lewis provide evidence that proximity to those with Spanish status made an individual more Spanish and links to Indian-ness signified ignorance and immorality.

Building on O’Toole’s work, Apelo’s case provides an example of how an individual’s speech and actions interacted with elite cultural assumptions to produce a label of India. As in O’Toole’s case, reputation shaped the defendant’s calidad. In Apelo’s case, no revealed ‘fact’ was required to undermine Apelo’s ‘Spanish’ status, as the authorities judged her based on her actions. When authorities labelled Apelo as India they marked her out because she appeared to be ignorant and unable to maintain the behaviours and attributes expected of one of Spanish descent. They marked her out by describing her talking under her breath and lying. The nature of her self-denunciation also contributed to this impression, for a pact with the Devil was seen as superstitious, ignorant, and thus inherently Indian. She claimed to have engaged in a sexual relationship with the Devil whereby ‘she called to the Devil to satisfy her appetite; and in fact she managed to have the carnal act with him sometimes in the figure of a man, and sometimes as a dog’. Such a claim was both superstitious and disgraceful. Labelling Apelo India made her irrational and her lascivious behaviour was thus intelligible to the Inquisition. Apelo’s behaviours and networks made her culturally Indian, or created a barrier to her being considered Spanish. Her alleged poor conduct was described as the result of ignorance, madness, and not being Spanish. Inquisitor Don Pedro de Benega wrote that Apelo was of ‘Indian... quality’, though she ‘has expressed that she is Spanish’, and that she must be absolved. The inquisitors explicitly stated that Apelo’s Indian-ness, like Efigenia’s discussed above, was a reason for her absolution because Indians were not under the jurisdiction of the Inquisition. If Apelo were indigenous then her self-regulation, or lack thereof, would not have been a concern for the inquisitors.

As other commentators considered Apelo to be a pious and reasonable woman and did not describe her as Indian, the inquisitors found it difficult to understand Apelo’s behaviour. Self-regulation, if successful, made individuals moral and sane. For some commentators, Apelo’s outward behaviour met their expectations of a good, sane Christian woman. During her interrogations Apelo had the capacity to answer the inquisitors’

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100 Lewis, Hall of Mirrors, pp.7, 146.
101 Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 1009, Expediente 15, f.314, ‘llamó al demonio para lograr con el su apetito; y de hecho lo logró teniendo acto carnal con el unas veces en figura de hombre, y otras de perro’.
102 Ibid., f.323 ‘calidad ... India’ and ‘ha expresado que es Española’.
questions about Christian doctrine and it was noted that she went to mass and confession as appropriate. Her good Christian behaviour assured those who knew her well of her soundness of mind. A letter written by Brother Pietrando in November 1784 provides many accounts of Apelo’s behaviour from the nurses and female patients who cared for and lived with her in the poor house. Pietrando interviewed the women and included their testimonies in his analysis of Apelo because of their good reason and Christian conduct. These women without fail said that they had not noticed anything about Apelo that suggested she was demented. Doña Gillariana Castillejas, the senior nurse, had treated Apelo for two years. She explained that Apelo took part in all devotions and confessed every three days; she was ‘a very holy soul... very devoted, and very Christian’.103 One patient said she had not noticed anything suggesting madness, dementia, frenzy, or mania in her conversations with Apelo. Lastly, Brother Pietrando gave the opinion of Doña Josefa Vasquez, the superior at the poor house, who had noted Apelo’s obedience and considered that she was neither mad nor simple. Apelo prayed with her rosary, confesseed and received the sacraments. The women in the poor house claimed that she was a good, sane Christian. Christian faith was the standard against which to test Apelo’s sanity. The nurses and residents considered that a woman of such morals and faith could not be mad. Thus Apelo’s reputation as a sane woman was based to a large extent on her pious conduct.

The discussion of Apelo’s character provides clear evidence of the intertwined nature of morality and sanity in thinking about behaviour and regulation. In Locura y Disidencia, Sacristán argues that the ‘popular mad’ understood their predicament in terms of sin, but that elite views of madness became secularised during the Bourbon period.104 She argues that concerns about saving an individual’s soul from eternal damnation were replaced with socio-political understandings of madness.105 However, Apelo’s case provides evidence that the Inquisition and staff at the poor house continued to see madness and sin as interconnected. There were direct links among perceptions that Apelo was good, sane, able to use her intellect, and more Spanish. This contrasts with judgements that she was malicious, mad, lacking intellectual capacity, and less Spanish.

The views of the nurses and patients regarding Apelo’s goodness and sanity reflect the concepts described in Chapter Two where reason was seen as God-given and so moral comprehension was inherently rational. This view was reinforced by the idea of reason taking

103 Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 1009, Expediente 15, ff.346-7, ‘una alma muy santa... muy devota, y muí christiana’.
104 Sacristán, Locura y Disidencia, pp.121-3.
105 Ibid., p.243.
place in the soul so that failure to act rationally had moral implications. When the Inquisition’s doctor described Apelo as having a disturbed mind and lack of perfect reasoning, the implications of his pronouncement were both intellectual and moral. The capacity to think and to reason was tied up with understandings of intellect: the commissioner, Father Gregorio de Campos, commented in 1773 on Mauricia de Apelo’s ‘intellectual potential’. Regardless of how the commentators viewed Apelo, both sides of their discussion drew on the assumption that goodness and sanity were linked, and that therefore immorality could be caused by a lack of reason or madness.

Good outward conduct was not supposed to guarantee a moral and sane interior world, as shown by the analysis of Haro y Peralta’s writings in Chapter Two. When reporting the testimony of the women who described Apelo to the Inquisition as a good Christian, Brother Pietrando qualified that ‘she is of good conduct, at least outwardly’. Implicit in this statement is the importance of managing the self by regulating one’s inner world. Apelo’s case proved to be intractable because it made apparent the difficulties of knowing whether someone was moral and sane: reputation was important but not always sufficient to establish moral character in a case where public opinion did not fit the picture of the defendant’s confessions. Pietrando continued: ‘And in the interior? It is that which she confesses, with deep repentance, to have sinned. Therefore [she confesses] to more than that which has manifested, and she affirms again to have really committed [these sins] because of malice’. This statement shows that Pietrando considered it necessary to investigate Apelo’s thoughts and desires as well as her external behaviour. He stated that it was in her internal mental world that she had committed sins. Thus Apelo was more sinful than was immediately apparent or than could be revealed by observing her actions. Apelo’s internal moral failings were not necessarily outwardly apparent and needed to be managed by strict self-regulation and confession.

Pietrando related sin to the Devil in his discussion of Apelo’s morality. He claimed that the Devil had a strong influence in the poor house, saying ‘that the Devil has more power in the Hospice than God’ and that Apelo had succumbed to his temptations. There is substantial evidence from this period that church authorities placed less emphasis on the

108 Ibid., ‘Y en lo interior? Es lo q confiesa ella misma con harto arrepentim.to haverle faltado. Por tanto a mas de lo q tiene manifestado, y q de nuevo afirma haver cometido realm.te por malicia’.
109 Ibid., f.349 ‘q mas potestad tiene el demonio en el Hospicio, q. Dios’.
Devil as a cause for sinful behaviour. Nonetheless, some members of the clergy, such as Pietrando, continued to cite the Devil’s potential to affect individuals. Pietrando’s statement of the potency of the Devil in the hospice conformed to the view that women and non-Spanish people were more at risk from the Devil’s influence than Spanish men. Apelo’s pact with the Devil was a failure to spiritually self-regulate in order to resist the temptations of the Devil.

Women in ‘madness’ cases were perceived to be at risk of uncontrollable sexual desire based on assumptions that women were inherently sinful and susceptible to the Devil’s temptations. Larria, the *calificador*, considered that Apelo was lustful and this affected her capacity to comprehend and make good moral choices. He stated that, ‘in my opinion the root of everything, both her errors, and the other bad inclinations of will and understanding, is lust, which seems to predominate in her, and this monster rears its head in her declarations’. Lust was a complex and multifaceted sin that could be committed in thought as well as deed. A single woman like Apelo was expected to abstain from sexual behaviour and thoughts of any kind. The Inquisition’s staff claimed that Apelo’s lustfulness was so extreme as to be an illness. In 1773 Father Dr Juan Gregorio De Campos, a commissioner for the Inquisition, described Apelo as suffering from uterine fury. He wrote that ‘there is some basis to fear that in them [women,] she suffers that effect that they call uterine fury, and this induces some injury in the imagination’. Uterine fury first appeared in a Spanish dictionary in 1787 in the *Diccionario Castellano’s* definition of nymphomania. In 1788 it was included under the *Diccionario Castellano’s* definition for uterine, which reads, 

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113 Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 1009, Expediente 15, f.325, ‘siendo en mi consepto la raiz de todo, assi de sus herrores, como de las otras malas afecciones en voluntad, y entendimiento la lascivia, q.e parese predominar en ella, y saca la cabeza este monstro en sus declaraziones’.


115 Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 1009, Expediente 15, f.335 hay algun fundam.to p.a reselar q en ellas padesca aquel afecto q llaman furor uterino, y este induzga alguna lesion en la imaginac.n.

‘doctors call the furious and amorous passion of a woman uterine fury... some maidens have passed as possessed, the cause being only a uterine fury’. As this definition suggests, authorities believed that a lack of legitimate expression for sexual desire could make a woman, often single and older (like Apelo), ill. Laurinda Dixon’s work on hysteria, *Perilous Chastity*, observes that in pre-Enlightenment Christian thinking supernatural forces instigated uterine fury; the Bourbon Spanish definition emphasises that women suffering from uterine fury could be mistakenly believed to have suffered from demonic intervention. Campos’ use of uterine fury to describe Apelo’s behaviour placed it in a medical classificatory context separate from ideas of demonic possession. He was using new medical terms to describe her, suggesting that in his mind the most important way of understanding Apelo based on a disorder of her female body. Larria’s related observations about Apelo’s lust emphasised a sinful disposition as the basis of Apelo’s situation. The language they used differed, but both men explicitly linked Apelo’s desires and irrationality to her femininity and sexuality.

Campos’ view of Apelo suggests that the Inquisition’s doctors made links between the uterus, poor behaviour, and ill health in nuns and other single women. The Inquisition’s doctors also described *Doncella* Rafaela Ignacia Alvarez as hysterical based on the contents of her self-denunciation. The Inquisition labelled both Apelo and Alvarez as mad because of their uteri. Alvarez, who was also tried in 1773, wrote to the Inquisition denouncing her sins, including, in her words, ‘having put the saintly cross in the indecent place in my body on three occasions’. As with Apelo, Alvarez was concerned that she was unable to regulate her sinful behaviour. She understood her own situation based on the demands of being a good Catholic woman. The Inquisition paid less attention to the morality of Alvarez’ actions than those of Apelo because she was commonly thought to be mad. The Inquisition arranged that Alvarez be removed from the convent ‘with honour’, which emphasised that there was no shame implied in her discharge because she was ill. The records describe that Alvarez

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117 *Terreros y Pando, Diccionario Castellano* (P-Z), p.744, 2, ‘Los Médicos llaman furor uterino á la pasion furiosa y amorosa de una mujer... Algunas doncellas han pasado por poseidas, siendo solo la causa un furor uterino’.


119 In the case of María del Castillo, a married Spanish woman in her forties, hysteria was linked to the birth of her two children. Thus Castillo’s case differed from the others discussed because she was not an unmarried maiden; however, her ‘hysteria’ was still linked to her reproductive organs. See: *Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición*, Vol. 1242, Expediente 6, ff.27-37.

120 *Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición*, Vol. 1162, Expediente 34, f.385, ‘aber puesto la Sta Cruz en lugar yndesente de mi cuerpo por tres ocasiones’. Officially, masturbation was described as an exclusively male activity. See Lavrin, ‘Sexuality in Colonial Mexico’, p.51.

had a reputation as a ‘madwoman’, a *loca*, and that ‘her principal illness was hysterical’.\footnote{Ibid., f.387, ‘era su principal enfermedad el Histerico’.}

In Alvarez’s case, her behaviour could not be reconciled with that expected of a Spanish nun and so was cited as evidence of hysteria. Similarly, with Apelo, other aspects of her life, such as her *calidad* and ignorance, were not ultimately sufficient to explain her self-denunciation. Her behaviour and reported desires were more extreme than prosaic female weakness. The Inquisition’s interpretation of these women’s supposedly immoral and lascivious actions had similarities with Bartolache’s views of Mexican women as indulgent and lustful and prone to hysteria (discussed in Chapter Three). Labels of hysteria and uterine fury provided ways of understanding and regulating these women that acknowledged the susceptibilities of their weak bodies and minds. However, not all irrational and immoral thoughts and deeds could be explained away as mere feminine weakness: it was still possible to expect a level of moral and rational behaviour from women.

Campos prescribed confession as the best way to manage Apelo’s uterine fury.\footnote{In Alvarezc’s case, the convent focussed on medicating and containing her. Accounts noted that the nuns ‘were persuaded that she was mad’ and therefore ‘they did not reprehend nor punish her, and only on one occasion they locked her up in a room, and it was in order to give her an infinity of medicines’: Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 1162, Expediente 34, f.387, ‘estaban persuadidos a que estaba loca” “no la reprehendian ni castigaban, y solo en una ocasion la encerraron en un quarto, y fue para hazerla una infinidad de medicam.tos’. Madness was a mitigating factor regarding Alvarez’s moral culpability though it needed to be managed through restricting her movements and medicating her as happened in other cases, such as those of Mendivil and Cruz. In practice, treatment of individuals could be invasive.} This suggests that his use of medical categories relating to the uterus was still rooted in spiritual medical approaches, if not in a supernatural conception of the causes of illness. In other Christian contexts, prayer was also thought to be the best defence against uterine fury.\footnote{Dixon, *Perilous Chastity*, p.39.} The treatment of Apelo’s condition aimed at self-regulation to improve her spiritual health rather than using physical interventions. For example, in 1773 Inquisitor Don Miguel de Asorinlios asked for Campos’ advice on Apelo’s state ‘As [a] spiritual and bodily doctor’.\footnote{As an example, see: Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 1009, Expediente 15, f.335, ‘Como Medico espiritual y corporal’.}

In his reply, Campos thought Apelo’s uterine fury was best managed through spiritual means to achieve ‘the good of her soul and the quiet of her conscience’.\footnote{Ibid., f.335, ‘al bien de su alma y quietud de su conciencia’.} He recommended ‘imposing on her the medicinal penances that I will deem convenient, taking care of her spiritual direction in order that this proceeds with the success that one desires’.\footnote{Ibid., f.335, ‘imponiendola las penitencias medicinales que estimare por convenientes haziendo cargo de su dirección espiritual y para que en esta proceda con el acierto que se desea’.} The Inquisition consistently prescribed medicinal penance for the ‘mad’ women in the sample.
analysed. Bartolache, however, described moral regulation that did not draw on spiritual penance, advocating exercise, restriction of chocolate, looser clothing, and a sleep regime involving rising and going to sleep early. His focus was on moral regulation, but not spiritual or religious regulation.

Although doctors sometimes tried physical interventions, such as administering bleedings, and medicines described as ‘powders’ and ‘cordials’, a constant theme was the need for a spiritual director to manage women’s behaviour. Campos discussed Apelo’s uterine fury, but suggested that this was best managed through moral and spiritual means. His main concern was to protect Apelo’s soul and conscience from the pernicious effects of her female body. After the failure of Alvarez’s bleeding and medication, the Inquisition prescribed penance. Thus medical understandings of Apelo’s behaviour considered her to be more susceptible to losing her mind because of her female body; being female could make her more easily mad and required the management of a male confessor. Therefore, the practical approach to the regulation of Apelo was very similar to that of Mendivil. This approach differed markedly from that recommended in Bartolache’s contemporaneous publication on the moral regulation of hysteria, which he had placed firmly in a secular, medical framework.

Apelo’s trial, and its eventual conclusion in 1785, when Apelo was absolved for her sins, was marred with uncertainty. Her muddled testimony, the nature of her claims, her dubious calidad, and the inconsistency of her reputation among those who knew and assessed her made it impossible to ascertain with sufficient certainty the cause of Apelo’s behaviour and how to manage her. Thus she was absolved ‘ad cautelam’, under warning, more than once in acknowledgement of the disagreements in conclusively judging why she behaved as she did. In Apelo’s case, the Inquisition strove to understand to what extent she was responsible for her actions, based on the kind of person she was and her capacities, in order to find an appropriate way of shaping her as a good Catholic subject. Apelo’s calidad was much debated and explicitly associated with her morality: the more sinful an individual thought Apelo to be, the less Spanish she became in their eyes. Her case, and that of Alvarez, confirm Sacristán’s view that the way in which women who were thought to be mad appear to have understood themselves was profoundly religious. They had recourse to confessors

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131 Ibid., ff.321, 323, 335.
and the Inquisition as part of their efforts to regulate their own thoughts, feelings, and actions. The inquisitors, priests, and doctors who worked with these women emphasised the importance of spiritual guidance and regulation of their sin and ills. In this case, Apelo was cautiously freed with instructions to continue spiritual penance and confession. Among the multitude of ways of assessing Apelo, the state of her soul was ultimately the primary focus of attempts to reform her behaviour. The Inquisition judged women differently to men: lust and hysteria formed the basis of many assessments of female madness. The inquisitors had low expectations of women’s rational capabilities. They also understood women and men to be differently affected by conditions related to madness.

Section Three: Felipe Zarate

As with a number of cases discussed in Chapter Four, and in the Inquisition sample analysed for this chapter, Felipe Zarate’s Inquisition case began with an accusation of blasphemy. In 1789 three alguaciles, constables who oversaw the apprehension of criminals, arrested Zarate and put him in prison one night ‘because he was walking about disturbing the city’ while drunk. They reported to a priest in Tlaxcala that Zarate had blasphemed and the priest denounced Zarate. The defendant was married, a native of Tlaxcala irregularly employed as a weaver, and was described as a mozo, a young man, and a mestizo, a man of mixed Spanish and Indian descent. The commissioner presiding over the case, Dr Don Josef María Solano, described Zarate’s actions, stating that while it was not possible to ascertain what kind of reputation Zarate had, ‘that which is certain is that Felipe Zarate has left these inhabitants very scandalised, having expressed his horrendous curses publically in the streets’. The content of his blasphemies included sayings such as ‘I shit on God, and on Blessed Mary’, ‘God is a prick, and the Virgin, I don’t need them for anything’, and ‘damn him who raised me’. The Inquisition records state that Zarate had served prison sentences on two occasions and if he were mad, the next appropriate course of action would be to send him to the Saint Hipólito hospital. Ultimately, Zarate was neither imprisoned nor hospitalised. The Inquisition freed him with no repentance or penitence required.

Like other defendants, Zarate understood his own failure to regulate his behaviour within a Catholic framework of interior sin and self-reflection. Inquisitor Father Dr Bernardo

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133 Ibid., f.88, ‘Lo es cierto es que Felipe Zarate ha dejado mui escandalizados a estos habitantes, por haver vertido sus horrendas execraciones publicamente en las calles’.
134 Ibid., ff.76, 79, ‘me cago en Dios, y en Maria Sma’, ‘es un carajo Dios, y la Virgen, yo no los necesito para nada’ and ‘maldito sea el que me crió’.
135 Ibid., f.88.
de Prado said that Zarate argued that ‘he is not mad... although he acknowledges that he almost lost his reason with the death of his father’.136 Thus Zarate and the inquisitor had a common understanding of the terms reason and madness, but this was not the language Zarate considered relevant to his self-understanding. Indeed, based on the sample of cases examined for this chapter, the ‘mad’ defendants did not consider themselves to be mad, but they spoke of religious failings, suffering, and temptation.137 The night Zarate was taken into prison, the constables called for a priest because of the blasphemies Zarate was committing. They recounted that the priest asked Zarate, “why do you not call for St. Mary in order to not banish him [the Devil]” He [Zarate] responded: “Father, I say, ‘Hail Mary’, and the Devil responds to me: ‘Your stomach with mine’”.138 This cryptic phrase appears to have suggested that Zarate did not think God or the saints could help him: only the Devil responded to his calls. He understood himself as a Catholic subject with an acute sense of sin and claimed that in spite of these instances, ‘he was Christian’.139 For Zarate, his religious beliefs were the most significant aspects of his worldview for thinking about his own self and moral regulation.

Zarate most clearly articulated to the Inquisition aspects of his interior moral world and his self-regulation through discussing his conscience. In doing so he drew on a shared understanding of Catholic religiosity, expectations of examining one’s conscience, and that ignoring one’s conscience was sinful. In addition to his more straightforward blasphemies, the notary recorded that Zarate described being visited by ‘the voice that was the worm of conscience’.140 Zarate claimed he referred to it as the worm of conscience because it told him what he ‘ought’ to do. His phrasing evokes a moral perspective, a self-awareness that ate away at him. The Diccionario Academia Usual compiled by the Real Academia Española (the official body that oversees the Spanish language) described conscience as a ‘science, or internal knowledge of the good we should do, and the bad we should avoid, and safe rule in order to know the good, or the bad we have done.’141 This definition of conscience was very

136 Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 1206, Expediente 2, f.114 ‘no es loco... aunque se acuerda que casi perdió el juicio con la muerte de su Padre’.
137 The only exception to this that I have found is a case of a Spanish man who wrote to the Inquisition denouncing himself for a pact with the Devil and then retracted his denunciation claiming he thought he was mad. The Inquisition responded by letter telling him they believed he was ill and should stop writing to them. See: Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 1394, Expediente 5.
138 Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 1206, Expediente 2, f.68, ‘¿porque no llamas a Maria Sma pa no desterrarlo? el respondió: Padre, yo digo: Ave Maria, y me responde el Demonio: Tu barriga con la mia’.
139 Ibid., f.111, ‘si era Cristiano’.
140 Ibid., f.110 ‘la voz q.e era el gusano de la conciencia’.
141 Diccionario Academia Usual, p.253, 1, ‘Ciencia, ó conocimiento interior del bien que debemos hacer, y del mal que debemos evitar, y regla segura para conocer el bien, ó el mal que hemos hecho.’
similar to that of reason in the eighteenth century, and a counterpoint to definitions of sin.\footnote{As discussed in Chapter Two.} Zarate understood himself as a Catholic who had to manage his behaviour based on his internalised faith. His persistent referrals to his conscience indicated self-reflection and awareness of the moral implications of his behaviour. Moreover, his blasphemies and struggles with his conscience suggest that he viewed his behaviour as sinful. His self-understanding was permeated by ideas of sin that were central to Catholic perspectives on human nature at the time.\footnote{For further examples of ‘mad’ individuals who were concerned for the state of their soul, or instances of witnesses displaying concern for regarding the ‘sinfulness’ of a purportedly mad individual, see: AGN, Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 921 Expediente 1, ff.151, 169; Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 1055, Expediente 5, f.208; AGN, Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 748, Expediente 12, ff.544-8.}

As shown in Chapter Two, good Catholic behaviour in Bourbon Mexico involved regulating oneself in accordance with one’s conscience to avoid sin. In Zarate’s case, however, the inquisitors refused to engage with these elements of Zarate’s confessions and were dismissive of his spiritual plight. Instead they argued that his references to the ‘worm of conscience’ were evidence of ‘the spirit of falseness of this prisoner, the contempt for the law of God that he wants to take on a semblance of holiness among the corruption of his customs’.\footnote{Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 1206, Expediente 2, f.111, ‘el spiritu de falsedad de este Reo, el despricio de la Ley de Dios queriendo usurparse los visos de la Santidad en medio de la corrupcion de sus Costumbres’.} Thus Zarate was dismissed as an untrustworthy and immoral individual who did not act upon his conscience. They were concerned that Zarate was manipulating their shared understanding of how a good Catholic would behave to avoid punishment. Although the words Zarate used expressed Catholic sentiments of repentance, and his blasphemies themselves provided evidence that he knew enough Christian doctrine to explicitly challenge Catholic principles, Zarate’s behaviour and demeanour did not convince the Inquisition that he repented. Other aspects of his presentation made him, in the eyes of the Inquisition, a sinful figure. In this regard, Zarate’s case provides evidence that inquisitors were well aware that defendants did not always genuinely repent.

The Inquisition sought to examine Zarate’s reasoning and passions to explain his failure to act morally. As Chapter Two shows, inquisitors often began inquiries into sanity or madness by considering the rational capabilities of an individual. In Zarate’s case, the inquisitors discussed his capacity to reason and a range of potential hindrances to rational thought. Commissioner Dr Don Josef María Solano asked the priest Josef Manuel de Arpide, who denounced Zarate, if Zarate was ‘in his full and thorough reason, or if his senses were...
perturbed by alcohol, anger, or passion’. Commissioners regularly asked about these hindrances to reason with regards to men’s behaviour. The inquisitors considered Zarate’s reason to be at risk of being overwhelmed by the passions in the manner of theoretical discussions of reason and the passions in printed texts. The passions were ‘the movements of the soul, which incline us to love or loathe something intensely.’ This definition emphasised the strength of feeling that the passions could produce. In asking if Zarate had been moved by passions, including anger, Solano suggested that impassioned behaviour, and temporary loss of reason, could potentially have explained Zarate’s behaviour (and would have been a mitigating factor). The commissioner’s questions suggest that reason was understood to be fragile and could be altered or clouded by many stimuli and feelings.

Different kinds of irrationality were associated with different kinds of people. Gendered expectations shaped what kinds of irrationality were expected or even accepted of different individuals. Women were thought to be inherently less rational than men; nonetheless, there were specific kinds of impassioned, irrational behaviours that were strongly associated with men, and thought to be more acceptable for men. Solano’s question about Zarate being overwhelmed by cólera, violent anger or indignation, provides evidence that he approached Zarate’s behaviour with a set of defined behavioural expectations. Men sometimes described their own irreligious behaviour to be a result of anger. For example, a man called Don Bernardo Aleman Pérez Conde wrote to the Inquisition in 1760 denouncing himself for breaking a religious image while choleric. He described his misery and shame and that he had been moved to excess. The Inquisition records stated that Pérez Conde had gone mad. Thus, anger featured in a number of Inquisition cases regarding male madness.

Anger was generally associated more with male madness than female madness. The behavioural manual A Treaty of Obligations of Men identified anger as something young men felt often and had to learn to overcome. Furthermore, a man overcome by anger could be equated with a madman. Here, A Treaty of Obligations of Men said: ‘A man carried away [arrebatado] by anger is the same as a rabid madman who does not know what he is

145 Ibid., f.65, ‘en su entero, y cabal juicio, o perturbado de sentidos por bebida, colera, o pasion’.
146 Escoiquiz, Tratado, p.27, ‘Las pasiones son los movimientos del alma, que nos inclinan á amar ó á aborrecer con viveza alguna cosa’. In Chapter Two, a slightly different eighteenth-century definition of the passions is given. Here, I draw upon Escoiquiz’s description because it elaborates on the emotional effects of the passions on the person.
149 ‘Boys are very prone and exposed to anger’: Escoiquiz, Tratado p.45, ‘Los muchachos son muy propuensos y expuestos á la cólera’. 

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The strong passion of anger overwhelmed reason such that it made men mad. The idea of being carried away, or snatched, from the verb *arrebatar*, has strong connotations of a violent force acting on a passive individual: the man beset by anger was not his own master, not in control of his passions. The language used to describe emotional states also overlapped with that used to categorise madness, such that excesses of feeling made one mad. Such an interpretation of anger, as both masculine and mad, legitimated acting without reason in certain circumstances as it made allowances for men who lashed out, spoke harshly, or shouted at others in anger.

Such understandings of a male propensity for madness through anger were grounded in humoral theories of the body. The *Diccionario Academia Usual* described cólera as ‘one of the four humors of the human body: it is warm, dry and bitter. Bile... Ire, anger, indignation’. Thus, cólera, which referred to anger, was part of ordinary humoral complexions. An individual with a choleric humoral makeup was fiery and quick to anger. Men were commonly thought to be choleric: hot and dry; whereas women were phlegmatic, denoting coldness and moisture. Men were therefore thought to be more prone to anger, as anger (cólera) was an excess of masculinity. It signified an imbalance of the humors, but as men tended to be hot and dry, this was in keeping with their humoral complexions.

Humoral theories and treatments were applied in cases of madness throughout the Bourbon period. Doctors associated Antonio de la Cruz Chabindeño’s melancholy with his humors. Moreover, a doctor bled Alvarez, the novice discussed above, in an attempt to cure her hysteria, and purges were administered to cure madness in another case. Missionary records also provide evidence of humoral theories underlying approaches to madness. In 1786 a friar called Juan Castaño from San Miguel in Extremadura was returned to Spain by order of the King because he was found to be mad. The rationale for his return was that Castaño ‘could return to his reason only by returning to his native airs’. In 1802 Friar Augustin Merino from the province of Cantabria was removed from missionary work in Spain.

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150 Escoiquiz, *Tratado* p.45, ‘Un hombre arrebatado de cólera es lo mismo que un furioso que no sabe ya lo que se hace.’

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California and returned to Spain on the same grounds.\(^{156}\) The climate was an important factor in humoral theories of illness, indeed, the airs were one of the non-naturals.\(^{157}\) Just as Chapter Three shows that humoralism underpinned medical theorising of madness in Bourbon Mexico, these cases explain how elite bureaucrats associated madness with the humors in their assessments of ‘mad’ individuals and the therapies they employed.\(^{158}\)

The Inquisition’s search for an explanation for Zarate’s immoral and irrational behaviour also led them to consider whether he was inebriated, which was a common question in the male cases I have studied.\(^ {159}\) As noted previously, the commissioner asked if Zarate was ‘in his full and thorough reason, or if his senses were perturbed by alcohol, anger, or passion’.\(^ {160}\) Discussion of his consumption of alcohol proved to be an important theme of the trial and was directly linked to his blasphemies. Ramón Varela, an *alguaçile*, constable, attributed Zarate’s diminished capacities and consequent blasphemies to his drunkenness. He said, ‘he was taken to the prison, attributing these follies to the effects of inebriety’.\(^ {161}\) Some of Zarate’s co-workers also explicitly attributed his blasphemies to drinking alcohol. For example, Juan Ignacio Ariza, a Spanish blanket weaver, said Zarate ‘was half drunk on the night in question [of his arrest], but capable of recognising people’.\(^ {162}\) Ariza stated that he heard that Zarate would blaspheme when he had been drinking *pulque*.\(^ {163}\) His testimony elaborated that:


\(^{158}\) For further examples, see: Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 865, Expediente 1, f.522; AGN, Instituciones Coloniales, Clero Regular y Secular, Vol. 139, Expediente 20, f.1. For a discussion of the role of the climate in treating a case of hysteria in a Protomedicato case from 1810, see: AGN, Instituciones Coloniales, Protomedicato, Caja 5458, Expediente 15, ff.1-5.


\(^{160}\) Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 1206, Expediente 2, f.65, ‘en su entero, y cabal juicio, o perturbado de sentidos por bebida, colera, o pasión’.

\(^{161}\) *Ibid.*, f.72, ‘lo llevaron a la carcel, atribuyendo estos desatinos a efecto de embriaguez’.

\(^{162}\) *Ibid.*, f.76, ‘estaba dicha noche medio borracho, pero capaz de conocer a las gentes’.

\(^{163}\) *Pulque* is an alcoholic drink from the agave plant. It originates from central Mexico and predates the Spanish conquest. It was strongly associated with Indians in central Mexico, see: Joan Cameron Bristol, ‘You Are What You Drink? Tequila, Maguey, and Mexican Identity’, *Global Studies Review* (2011), 7, 1; Juan Pedro Viquiera Albán, Sonya Lipsett-Rivera and Sergio Rivera Ayala (trs), *Propriety and Permissiveness in Bourbon Mexico* (Wilmington, 1999), pp.130-144.
regularly on Sundays, which was when he [Zarate] drank, starting to drink, talking to himself, he [Ariza] noted that on eight occasions, he [Zarate] said, “What do you think Devil, that you have to seize me by that end? I will send you to hell”, and that continuing the drink he started to refer to the first blasphemy [again].

Thus, Ariza’s testimony provided evidence that Zarate habitually drank to excess and during these episodes he blasphemed. Zarate’s consumption of pulque and his drunkenness has to be understood in the context of colonial masculine behaviour and sociability. Drinking alcohol was a common part of masculine behaviour and pulque was associated with lower class and indigenous culture. Historians have shown that consuming pulque and drunkenness was an ordinary part of lower caste, masculine life in Bourbon Mexico. Moreover, authors such as Deborah Toner have shown that elite groups across the colonial and independence periods associated drunkenness with sinfulness, incivility, and lower caste behaviour. This association is borne out in discussions of Zarate’s behaviour and in several other cases discussed below. Moreover, consuming alcohol and blaspheming often went hand in hand.

Drinking to excess was linked to violence and crime and was seen as a mitigating factor in male transgressions. This relationship has been analysed predominantly in studies of male honour, and the escalation of situations where honour was verbally challenged leading to physical attacks. The cultural connotations of alcohol in Bourbon Mexico were crucial to Zarate’s case. Many men (and women of lower socio-economic groups) consumed alcohol and behaved in disorderly ways and this led the Inquisition to categorise Zarate as a disorderly, immoral individual.

Some commentators considered Zarate’s inebriation to have made him mad. In some cases, including Zarate’s, madness emerges as a temporary state that individuals pass through as a result of their consumption of alcohol.

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164 Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 1206, Expediente 2, f.76, ‘regularmente los días Domingos, que era quando bebia, al comenzar a beber, hablando solo, le noto como en ocho ocasiones, que decía: ¿Qué piensas Diablo, que me has de coger por ese lado? te despachare yo al infierno, y que continuando la bebida comenzaba a referir la primera blasfemia’.


167 Villa-Flores, Dangerous Speech, pp.10, 152.

168 Taylor, Drinking, p.45.

169 Taylor, Drinking, pp.45, 82; Lozano Armendares, La Criminalidad en la Ciudad de México, p.33.

170 Toner discusses drunkenness as a state of instability that affected boundaries between divine, human, and natural forces. See: Toner, Alcohol and Nationhood, p.xxv.
through. The Fiscal, prosecutor, Mier Bergosa y Prado, wrote that he had received a letter written to the inquisitors that described Zarate by saying:

this man is a heretical blasphemer, and is... very irreligious. But because the same witnesses assure that he is dominated by the vice of drunkenness, and that on the occasions in Texcoco when he was heard to blaspheme, he was troubled by drink, it does not appear that his sayings and productions have all the malice that at first sight they represent.

Thus, the effects of alcohol on Zarate’s mind mitigated the sinfulness of his actions. Moreover, the author continued, ‘he appeared stupid, of those who are such because of excessive drink, like many times[,] it has this sad effect, making [his] dementia permanent.’ Other cases of supposed male madness were also attributed to sustained and excessive alcohol consumption. Vicente Alcayde, a missionary in northern New Spain who was discussed in Chapter Four, was considered by the Inquisition to have a lustful and drunken lifestyle that drove him to idiocy; his madness made him unfit for missionary work in California. In the criminal case of a man called Joseph Mariano Peregrina, similarly, a witness described how the defendant ‘always has had the vice of drunkenness, the continuation of which has resulted in dementia’. Drinking alcohol to excess was thought to have made Zarate and these other men not only temporarily mad or stupid, but permanently demented. On this basis, the inquisitors could treat Zarate as a madman and regulate his behaviour accordingly.

The inquisitors’ inquiry considered the extent to which Zarate could be expected to act morally, which was based on his rational capabilities. For example, Don Mathias de Naxera’s letter to Dr José Francisco Rada asked for his opinion on Zarate’s ‘state of faculties’ and ‘his intelligence’. Naxera wrote a similar letter to the wardens of the secret prisons. Father Josef Manuel de Arpide, who denounced Zarate to the Inquisition, described Zarate

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171 For other examples of this phenomenon, see: Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 865, Expediente 1, f.527; Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Caja 1593, Expediente 17, f.1.
172 Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 1206, Expediente 2, f.103, ‘este hombre es un blasfemo heretical, y es... muy irreligioso. Mas porque los mismos testigos aseguran que es dominado de el vicio de la embriaguez, y que en las ocasiones que en Tescuco se le oyó blasfemar, estaba turbado con la bebida, no parece que tienen sus dichos, y producciones toda la malicia q a primera vista representan’.
173 Ibid., f.103 ‘le ha parecido un estupido, de aquellos que son tales por la excesiva bebida, como que muchísimas veces resulta de ella este triste efecto, haciéndose permanente la demencia’.
177 Ibid., f.105.
as 'not drunk, nor possessed by some kind of passion, but in his natural state'. In comparison to the prosecutor, the doctor and priest who denounced Zarate considered that his behaviours stemmed from an innate quality, rather than a passing influence such as alcohol or passions. In response to Naxera’s letter, Dr Rada said of Zarate, ‘I have not noticed any delirium, melancholy, fury, or mania; but a sort of fatuousness, which gives quite a good idea that his mind is not perfect’.\footnote{Ibid., f.104, ‘no he advertido Delio Melancólico, Furor, o Manía; pero sí un género de Fatuidad, q.e da bastante idea, de q.e su mente no esta perfecta’} As discussed regarding Cruz’s case, fatuousness denoted behaviour that was out of the ordinary: simple-minded rather than excessive or dangerous. The term was part of the constellation of terms used to discuss individuals whose capabilities were liminal, difficult to determine between reason and unreason. The sample of cases shows that both men and women were described as fatuous.\footnote{For examples, see: Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 1175, Expediente 32, ff.332-361; Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 748, Expediente 12, f.549; Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 1267, Expediente 14, ff.87-89; AGN, Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 1336, Expediente 6, f.67; Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 943, Expediente 5, ff.180-1; Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 1009, Expediente 15, f.349.} This terminology provided a linguistic framework that mapped onto a spectrum of severity. Fatuousness, the inability to distinguish between things, was associated with a lack of rational capability, hence the association with madness. It was a term to label symptoms that Dr Rada thought were not serious. The doctor and the wardens of the secret prisons described Zarate as ‘half mad, or fatuous’, to imply that they considered him to be stupid and inane rather than threatening.\footnote{Ibid., f.67, ‘no estaba Ebrio, ni poseido de alguna pasion, sino en su natural acuerdo’.} The inquisitors were concerned that Zarate was not capable of understanding how to behave well because he did not have strong powers of reasoning. As with Cruz and Apelo, this may have been bound up with ideas that someone of Zarate’s non-Spanish caste may inherently struggle to reason well.

The sample of Inquisition cases shows that considerations of an individual’s rational capacity affected the extent to which they were seen as morally culpable. The discussion of Apelo’s case above provided evidence that the Inquisition worked to establish whether or not an individual could be held morally responsible. In many other cases, the Inquisition chose not to punish religious misdemeanours because they believed that the offender was mad. Indeed, their most common response was to take no action.\footnote{In the Inquisition case of Miguel de Lovera, the Inquisition ruled that they would not punish him for his blasphemies on the basis that he showed signs of madness. See: Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 1175, Expediente 3, ff.11-19. A further example is the case of a Spanish man called Manuel Juan José who wrote to the Inquisition claiming he had made a pact with the Devil. The Inquisition responded to Juan José’s letters; they told him he had an illness and to stop writing to} Don Pereda, the
Secretary, expressed this idea in a letter from 1790, stating that ‘if Felipe [Zarate] is touched by madness, he cures himself, and if he is not, he [should] not make fun of us’ by pretending to be mad.\(^\text{183}\) In Pereda’s opinion, ‘he gives sufficient indications that he is more malicious than fatuous’.\(^\text{184}\) For Pereda, malicious intent was the root of Zarate’s behaviours but did not make Zarate mad. This contrasts with the idea conveyed in theoretical texts, discussed in Chapter Two, that sin caused madness. Madness or fatuousness may have been mitigating factors for sinful behaviour. If Zarate were fatuous, his behaviours may have been less punishable. Indeed, those who thought him fatuous or stupid considered his blasphemies to be less significant. For example, the author who considered him to be stupid with drink thought that ‘it does not appear that his sayings and productions have all the malice that at first sight they represent’.\(^\text{185}\) The language used to label Zarate’s behaviour, and to establish what kind of person he was and why he behaved irrationally and immorally, had significant implications for how the Inquisition treated him. Different labels could be attached to the same behaviours with vast differences in a defendant’s supposed culpability. Such rulings affected the outcomes of all trials of ‘mad’ individuals.

The Inquisition’s ability to interpret an individual’s behaviour was shaped, to a large extent, by reputation. Commissioner Solano wrote regarding the testimony of witnesses to Zarate’s blasphemies that ‘Felipe Zarate is too little known in this city of Texcoco, with the exception of one or other artisan of his role one does not find anyone who has dealings with him: and his treatise with those referred to has been without continuation, at different times’.\(^\text{186}\) Solano had plenty of evidence of Zarate’s misdemeanours but was unable to establish the context surrounding his blasphemies. The witnesses themselves were unsure of what caused Zarate’s behaviours. For example, the weaver, Joaquin Campos, recounted a conversation he had had with a fellow weaver Josef Henríquez where Campos said of Zarate’s behaviour ‘that maybe it was the effect of intoxication, or it was that [he is a] madman’.\(^\text{187}\)

In the cases of Cruz and Apelo, as well as Zarate, the inquisitors found it harder to judge the

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\(^{183}\) Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 1206, Expediente 2, f.109, ‘si Felipe esta tocado de locura, se cure, y si no lo esta, no se burle de nosotros’.

\(^{184}\) Ibid., f.109, ‘da indicios bastantes de que mas es malicioso q fatuo’.

\(^{185}\) Ibid., f.103.

\(^{186}\) Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 1206, Expediente 2, f.87, ‘Es tan poco conocido Felipe Zarate en esta ciudad de Texcoco, que a excepcion de uno, u otro artesano de su oficio no se encuentra quienes haya tratadole: y su tratado con los referidos ha sido sin continuación, en diferentes tiempos’.

\(^{187}\) Ibid., f.69, ‘que tal vez sera efecto de embriaguez, o sera ese hombre loco’.

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capacities of the individuals because they did not have longstanding reputations as mad people. Indeed, their ambiguous statuses made the cases more complex. These cases contrast with the many very short Inquisition cases, where an individual was dismissed because they were well-known as a mad person. When the context of a case was more ambiguous, many explanations were plausible for certain actions. How the Inquisition dealt with defendants was based largely on how others in the community saw them, as long as the witnesses themselves were reputable. Solano dismissed other potential witnesses as ‘Indians incapable of producing true testimony’. Thus, deciding how to understand, label and manage an individual was based on reliable testimony from reputable sources. Just like a defendant, a witness’ trustworthiness was premised largely on reputational qualities such as calidad, as Solano’s comment suggests. Elite men generally considered women to be less reliable than men and so women would have to have good reputations to be considered credible witnesses.

Sacristán observes the important role of witness perspectives in Locura e Inquisición. These case studies have built on her findings by contextualising the reputations of defendants and their potential for rationality or madness, taking into account the significance of gender, calidad, and the type of misdemeanour committed such as blasphemy, bigamy, and Devil pacts, alongside compounding factors such as emotional issues, and alcohol consumption. These aspects have not hitherto been considered with regards to madness in Bourbon Mexico. In Zarate’s case, the Inquisition decided that there was insufficient evidence of his character to try him for his crimes. They released him in June 1790. Therefore, the reputation of a defendant among a wider community was crucial to how the Inquisition interpreted and regulated their behaviour.

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190 For example, the nurses and patients in Apelo’s case: Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 1009, Expediente 15, ff.346-8. Also, see: Instituciones Coloniales, Inquisición, Vol. 1127, Expediente 7, ff.79-98. The women giving evidence against a priest in the latter case (purportedly a potential imposter and escaped madman) were described in terms of their good conduct. Their overall reputations were brought up many times by inquisitors and by the women’s male relatives. Onenotary from the Inquisition wrote brusquely about the women to the Inquisition in Mexico City saying that they were ignorant, they did not understand Catholic doctrine, they were all Indians, and he did not wish to bother the inquisitors in Mexico City with the details of their complaints.
192 Sacristán, Locura e Inquisición, pp.71-2.
Conclusion

Different kinds of Catholic selves were shaped through the interactions between ideas of \textit{calidad}, gender, reason, madness, and sin. The Inquisition cases discussed confirm the theories of historians such as Behar, Gruzinski, O’Hara, and Tortorici that Catholic vocabularies and the internalisation of Catholic values framed how individuals understood themselves and attempted to live their lives and regulate their own behaviour. The cases suggest that self-understanding and self-regulation differed by gender. Women self-denounced to the Inquisition in attempts to repent for their sins. Though self-denunciation was rare for men, fear of one’s own sin and a desire to repent also featured in male cases. The articulation of sin and self-reflection relied on a common Catholic linguistic and conceptual framework.

The Inquisition’s processes of evaluating the rationality and morality of the defendants had some features in common when considered across all the cases reviewed for this thesis. In all of these cases, the inquisitors made inquiries into the intellectual faculties of the individual in question: were they in possession of reason? Could they understand, discern between, and remember things? Did they have an illness of the imagination? The inquisitors, lawyers, confessors, and doctors involved in cases judged these capacities based on the conversations they had with defendants. They aimed to uncover information about the individual’s interior state. Though, as all of the cases show, what was said often did not provide sufficient evidence to label someone as mad. In Cruz’s case, how he used his body ultimately led to a label of madness, as was the case in the examples of supposed clerical madness in Chapter Four, and reflected on in literary texts in Chapter Two, such as the poem ‘To the Affected Ones’.

This chapter has shown that madness was part of a vocabulary of terms used to explore the morality and mental capacities of Inquisition defendants. The range of terms reflected different kinds of madness and denoted severity. For example, the term fatuous, used in both of the male cases discussed, expressed a sense of simplicity or lack of understanding; melancholy described a deep feeling of sadness. These terms occupied a space that bordered on madness and it could be difficult to distinguish between kinds of madness. They also affected understandings of moral culpability, which was inversely associated with rationality in some instances. The idea that Zarate was fatuous was linked to the idea that he was not malicious and did not need to be punished. Similarly, for Cruz, the idea that he may not have understood his actions made him potentially less responsible for his choice to marry a second time. Madness mitigated sin in these cases, rather than
stemming from it. Assessments of Apelo differed; her perceived lustfulness was evidence of both madness and a sinful nature.

The authorities consulted considered the passions to be a cause of defendants’ behaviour in the cases discussed. The passions affected all individuals; some kinds of passion affected men and women equally and could be understandable based on the context. For example, the inquisitors considered that Cruz’s jealousy and desire for revenge was compatible with rationality, based on the context of his second wife’s infidelity and pregnancy by another man. The ways passions related to madness differed by gender. Anger was humorously associated with men. It signified excess and linguistically overlapped with terms related to madness, such as anger and fury. The consideration that Zarate was mad because he was excessively angry conformed to the idea of the madman as a man carried away by anger. Similarly, the inquisitors observed in Zarate’s case, and others discussed, that alcohol could explain blasphemous statements and irreligious behaviour. Alcohol was thought to harm reason in the short term, producing temporary irrationality, or could make someone permanently mad through sustained use. The role of alcohol in a defendant’s behaviour was only discussed in the cases of potential male madness I have analysed.

Inquisitors portrayed Apelo’s lustfulness as a typically female form of madness. Women were ubiquitously believed to be morally feeble, at risk of the Devil’s influence, and physiologically weak. As a supposedly sinful woman who was not married, Apelo was described as overcome by a pathological lust. Apelo and Alvarez’s cases provide evidence that female madness was more intimately associated with the female form and their ‘dangerous’ sexuality. Doctors drew on theories of hysteria and uterine fury to frame their beliefs about women’s capacities and weaknesses. As discussed in Chapter Three, doctors and priests prescribed various kinds of moral and spiritual regulation to manage women’s sinful madness. Physiological aspects of madness were discussed in male cases, such as the role of the phases of the moon in Cruz’s purported madness. Indeed, theories of the humoral body were often important tools for understanding cases of suspected ‘madness’ in Inquisition trials.

These understandings of madness, morality, and gender were inextricable from assumptions of cualidad. Those who assessed Apelo thought she was either more or less Spanish, based on their assessment of her morality: the more virtuous they considered her to be, the more Spanish they perceived her cualidad. Morality and cualidad were intimately related to stigmatising assumptions made of the poor and uneducated. For example, inquisitors considered all three of the defendants discussed to have told lies, which was a
vice associated with the common people. Labels related to *calidad* were often ambiguous.

Apelo’s case is an excellent example of how negotiable and changeable an individual’s *calidad* could be. Elite views of those of low social status created a contradiction between two fundamental assumptions: that all of humanity had a capacity for God-given rationality, and that those who were not Spanish men were not fully capable of rational thought. The Inquisition inquired into all of these individuals’ capacity to reason. However, their views of non-Spanish *calidad* emphasised the assumption that mulattos and mestizos were less able to reason well than Spaniards. At some points in these trials, inability to reason well or to make moral judgements was therefore attributed to *calidad*. The idea that Cruz could not be held accountable for not knowing his wife was alive and thus choosing to remarry is a good example of this low expectation of the common people. At other points, inability to reason and unacceptable feeling and expression was evidence of madness. The matrix of assumptions regarding ordinary people’s morality, difficulties assessing their capacity for reason, and uncertainty of how rational one could expect a poor, uneducated lower-caste person to be, all caused ambiguity and contradiction in Inquisition verdicts on madness.

Many aspects of the relationship between madness and sin, the role of reason and the passions, and the need to examine bodies as well as minds to discern madness surface in these case studies. Moreover, the underlying role of religious, Catholic self-regulation was at the heart of how individuals and the Inquisition’s assessors viewed defendants’ misdemeanours. These cases also suggest that rather than relying on a prescribed formula for assessing morality and madness, the Inquisition judged and treated potentially mad defendants according to their existing public reputations. This led to ambiguity and lengthy trials when it was unclear what kind of reputation an individual had, a concern in all three cases discussed. It is well established that *calidad* was formed through an interplay of bodies, behaviours, and external perceptions, as were the related reputations of men and women as virtuous or sinful. An individual’s identity as a mad person was similarly negotiated in relation to gender and *calidad*. The concept of madness thus played an important role in the process of forming Catholic selves.
**Conclusion**

The concept of madness played a fundamental role in producing enlightened Catholic selves in Bourbon Mexico. In this thesis I have explored how, in many situations, elite thinkers and bureaucrats applied the label of ‘madness’ to ideas and behaviours of which they were critical, and thus justified regulating society along the lines of their preferred vision of the world. They utilised a terminology pertaining to madness to shape moderate, productive, and pious individuals for the Bourbon state. Thus, I suggest that the history of madness is a fruitful field for further developing understandings of selfhood. By framing madness in terms of selfhood, the thesis has tied the history of madness to wider processes in Bourbon Mexico. For example, it considers the role of madness in contemporary piety, political reform, medical development, social hierarchies, and daily life. Historians have not fully explored these aspects of madness. I incorporate these areas of analysis into understandings of madness as a concept against which people tried to define and manage themselves and each other. In doing so I contribute to the burgeoning history of selfhood in Bourbon Mexico building on Pamela Voekel’s work on the topic.

The thesis Introduction set out how Michel Foucault’s concept of ‘technologies of the self’ could be applied to the term madness. It considered how historians Voekel and Goldstein applied the term to trace histories of the religious self and the psychological self. Foucault theorised that scholars could examine personal identity as part of political processes. He argued that power relations and procedures of observation bring individuals into existence. In particular, ‘technologies of the self’ provides a framework for thinking about the relationship between the externalised perspective of an authority or expert, and the internalised, subjective individual that forms in response to external forces. I take as my starting point Foucault’s theory that the self is developed through processes that require individuals to internalise the values of their society, which produces and maintains specific identities. Such an approach has enabled a productive study of madness because it has facilitated an analysis of the theoretical meanings of madness as well as deliberations regarding purported instances of madness. It also reveals glimpses of supposedly mad individuals’ self-perceptions. The thesis incorporates these areas of research into a coherent whole focussed on how people were expected to regulate their bodies and minds. Considering madness as part of selfhood has enabled a discussion of theoretical justifications for managing the self, and the ways in which elites labelled people as mad in practice. In doing so, this thesis has incorporated understandings of madness into the history of selfhood and identity in Bourbon Mexico.
This Conclusion summarises four central arguments about how madness functions as a ‘technology of the self’ through its relationship with sin. The themes correspond roughly to the four research chapters of the thesis. They summarise key aspects of how madness was understood in Bourbon Mexico, all of which relate back to the core argument that concern over human sin motivated thinking on madness.

**Theme One: The Relationship Between Sin and Madness**

Catholicism provided an overarching context for all forms of regulation in Bourbon Mexico. This remained a deeply religious society where piety informed all aspects of life. Within the conceptual framework of Catholicism, sin was an all-encompassing idea. Historians including Ruth Behar, Serge Gruzinski, Matthew O'Hara, and Zeb Tortorici have all found that internalised Catholic values framed self-understanding in colonial Mexico. I have built on their findings to show that, more specifically, the concept of sin underpinned all aspects of self-regulation. The religious texts discussed in Chapter Two showed how sin was an important Catholic concept, central to understandings of human nature. Understanding madness in this context required the discussion of a pervasive Catholic vocabulary that underpinned and justified discourses on self-regulation. Moreover, later chapters have shown that throughout the Bourbon period sin was the main way for people to articulate their failure to meet the standards expected of them as good Catholics.

Madness was related to sin through the connected concepts of reason and the passions. Chapter One of this thesis explained how historians have observed that madness was linked to ideas of sin in the early modern period, but have not explored the relationship between the two in full. Discussions of religious and politico-moral tracts in Chapter Two showed that human nature was considered inherently sinful and irrational. Authors wrote that the passions, in opposition to reason, drew people to sinful things. Similarly, virtue was associated with God-given rationality. The chapter showed that a juxtaposition of reason and virtue against irrationality and sin was extended by many elite writers, who likened sin to madness through irrationality. A fundamental finding of the thesis is that elites utilised an existing constellation of terms including sin, rationality, and the passions to define their own views about how the world ought to be, while decrying as mad that which deviated from it. This finding disputes the historiography on madness in New Spain which has suggested that madness became a secular concept during the eighteenth century. The thesis consistently shows that madness retained religious significance across the period and interacted with the political, social, and cultural processes that defined the enlightened Mexican world.
Elite historical actors used madness as a rhetorical tool, based on its sinful connotations, to justify the persistent self-management of individuals. This process was part of the broader picture of managing all aspects of life under Bourbon rule. Different chapters have analysed printed texts and manuscript sources referencing madness to illustrate the breadth of contexts in which the term was employed. Examples include authors criticising political unrest by using madness as a metaphor, moralising sermons denouncing worldly pleasures as mad, doctors using terms related to madness to describe behaviours they considered to be immoral, and inquisitors describing individuals as mad based on transgressive behaviour. By examining how elites used the term madness to exclude that of which they disapproved, this thesis extends Voekel’s work on elite forms of piety and self-identity. In particular, this thesis considers how madness was part of regulating all kinds of people to develop an elite vision of society, and did not apply exclusively to elite self-management. By exploring the role that sin played in shaping a Catholic conception of madness, I have shown that a history of madness can inform an understanding of multiple aspects of selfhood in Bourbon Mexico.

Theme Two: The Role of Sin in Medical Understandings of Madness

The relationship between sin and madness traced in this thesis also formed the basis of medical conceptions of madness throughout the period. Medical authors, like their peers, were preoccupied with developing a pious and productive society. Their works conveyed a belief in the importance of spiritual regulation to fortify reason and avoid madness. The language medical authors employed mirrored that of religious and political texts, and was employed by elite witnesses to instances of purported madness. This vocabulary of reason, fantasy, imagination, and madness is suggestive of the common theoretical framework that underpinned approaches to madness and its regulation throughout the period. Medical texts also provide evidence that scientific developments continued to combine religious and anatomical ideas throughout the period. In instances where medical theories were not based upon a pre-existing terminology of madness and the faculties, such as in the case of hysteria, religious concepts continued to underwrite the author’s moralising. With regard to madness, analysis of medical texts has confirmed Voekel’s finding that Catholicism provided the motivation for developing scientific techniques in the Bourbon period. The enduring connection between sin and madness made understanding and managing madness inherently moral.

My findings challenge the claim that elite thinkers developed a more secular understanding of madness in the late eighteenth century. Madness, and attempts to manage
it, did not become more secular during this period. By considering the medical texts themselves, I have contested María Cristina Sacristán’s view that madness became a secular term in the latter part of the eighteenth century. While doctors used medical terminology to diagnose and treat supposedly mad individuals, their usage of those terms continued to be based upon a religious foundation. Internalised piety was in fact a starting point for regulating oneself to avoid madness, and important to recovering from madness.

Exploring the religious roots of theories of madness brings the role of humoral medicine to the fore. Whereas historians of madness in early modern Britain find that psychological theories replaced humoral conceptions of madness, in Mexico medical authors subsumed new ideas into a humoral framework. Humoralism fed into the relationship between madness and sin. Many terms relating to madness, such as reason, the passions, fantasy, and the imagination, were part of a Hippocratic-Galenic model. This terminology was shared by medical authors, clerics, and political writers. Indeed, often these thinkers were the same people. The continuity of these humoral medical ideas was one way in which madness functioned as a tool to regulate against sin. Considering hysteria as a term related to madness shows how the moral connotations of madness pervaded a newer secular vocabulary. When elite thinkers employed a more secular rhetoric, they continued to assume that madness and its variants were related to sin. Thus, the connections between madness and sin ran deep and affected areas of thinking that were no longer overtly religious.

Theme Three: Self-regulation and the Body

Understandings of the term madness tied it inextricably to the idea of being irrational, or unable to reason. Good self-regulation required the ability to reason well, which some authors considered to be a habit one had to cultivate. This thesis has found that an ability to reason was consistently cited as a requirement for sanity. Printed texts of all kinds repeatedly made the link between an ability to reason and sanity. In practice, however, historical actors found it difficult to discern whether an individual was able to reason well or not. In the cases of people who were thought mad, inquisitors and other authority figures asked whether the subject of a case possessed reason, and could remember and understand, or whether their faculties were perturbed. There was a complex interplay between the importance of regulating the interior to be moral and sane, and regulating the exterior through orderly and moderate outward conduct.

Chapter Four focussed on how observers attempted to assess the interior states of others by looking at the way they used their bodies. In some instances, authorities attempted to look beyond external conduct to discern the inner morality of the individual.
For example, the clerics who assessed Mauricia Josefa de Apelo described her immoral, lustful, and mad character regardless of her good external, observable conduct. In this vein, religious texts counselled that priests must examine their flock’s thoughts and desires and must not accept good outward behaviour on its own as proof of a virtuous interior. These perspectives were consistent with the many ways an individual could commit sin: namely, in thought, word, or deed. In contrast, other cases of supposed madness led to contradictory assessments of individuals where their external behaviour was deemed wholly inappropriate, but they nonetheless appeared capable of coherent thought. Manuel Sevane, the Franciscan friar whose case began this thesis, is a clear example of such cases. The interplay between interior and exterior was complex and judging an individual’s capacity to reason was fraught with ambiguity.

As discerning another’s ability to reason well was an imprecise and difficult process, people relied on how others used their bodies as a guide to their state of mind. Observing speech, sounds, gestures, expressions of feeling, weeping, violence, and sexual displays was fundamental to judging the rationality or madness of others. The thesis has drawn upon theories not previously used to explore how madness was understood in real-life scenarios and what a ‘mad’ lack of self-regulation looked like in practice. In Chapter Four, I adapted Peter Bailey’s idea of noise as ‘sound out of place’ to show how in situations where individuals were labelled as mad, they had used their bodies in ways that were ‘out of place’ or inappropriate to the context. In this way, examining how people used their bodies and expressed their emotions has shown that regulating oneself against madness in colonial Mexico involved strict management of one’s outward behaviour. Appropriate self-management differed between social groups, calidades, and genders, but was commonly centred on the body and its movements.

Chapter Four in particular has shown that how people used their bodies was the most important aspect of whether they were considered mad or not. It categorises those deviant bodily expressions that led historical actors to label others as mad. The categories outlined were sound, silence, movement, facial expressions, outbursts of violence, nudity, and excessive weeping. Examples included priests who shouted and sang in sacred spaces or at sacred times, clerics who behaved violently towards each other or their parishioners or exposed themselves sexually, men who wept excessively, and women who took part in illicit, sexualised practices that they recounted to confessors. Physical manifestations of madness, that is, bodily movements and sounds that were deemed excessive or inappropriate to the context, re-occur throughout the thesis. They suggest that how people used their bodies was
an integral aspect of maintaining a reputation for being sane and moral or mad and sinful. Strange gestures and speaking too much or little were described in Chapters Two and Three. Additionally, the subjects of the case studies in Chapter Five were described as speaking inappropriately, crying, and shouting. Regardless of the kind of person one was, to be labelled as mad was to be considered unable to regulate one’s body and so avoid sinful behaviours.

Theme Four: Intersections of Madness, Sin, Calidad, and Gender

Finally, the thesis has shown that an understanding of madness in Bourbon Mexico must consider how the concept interacted with categories of analysis such as gender and calidad. This link has not been explored previously. I found that madness, gender, and calidad were linked via foundational ideas about sin and irrationality. More specifically, these concepts interacted because madness, gender, and calidad were all related to sin and the passions. Gender and calidad were associated with madness because Bourbon society considered women and non-Spanish people to be inherently sinful, irrational, and prey to their passions. In many ways, those who were not Spanish men were not thought capable of being rational, as existing scholarship shows. In engaging with the scholarship on race, gender, and class, this thesis has provided further evidence that calidad was constructed through the interaction of individuals’ behaviour, reputation, lineage, and the cultural expectations of others. As Laura Lewis, María Elena Martínez, and Joan Cameron Bristol all show, calidad and gender had moral significance. This thesis has extended the connection between social hierarchy, sin, and irrationality to examine their links to madness. An identity as a mad person was always constructed as part of a process of shaping one’s calidad and gender.

The central themes of this thesis as a whole, such as the role of individual sin, capacity to reason, and the passions, all intertwined with the calidad and gender of defendants in the Inquisition trials in Chapter Five. This chapter found that individuals were considered less Spanish when they were perceived as less moral. Poor reasoning could be attributed to madness. However, it was also attributed to calidad and gender in instances where Inquisitors’ stigmatising views of people who were uneducated and had low social status won out in their assessments of defendants’ mental capacities. In the examples examined in Chapters Two, Four, and Five, verdicts on the sanity or madness of an individual were often abstruse or inconsistent. Similarly, the relationship between the passions and madness differed according to an individual’s gender. Anger was strongly associated with men, for example, and lust with women. Men’s madness was sometimes linked to behaviours such as consuming alcohol, whereas women’s madness was more likely to be
attributed to their supposedly excessive sexuality. The same assumptions about the sins of women and non-Spanish people framed theoretical discussions of madness and uses of the term madness in political and moral discussions, as discussed in Chapters Two and Three. Throughout the thesis, expectations regarding gender and calidad, and indeed people’s self-perceptions, were framed by a Catholic language of sin. This Catholic world view shaped the interactions between categories such as madness, gender, and calidad for the supposedly mad and those who labelled them.

The concept of madness was a technology of the self in Bourbon Mexico because its intimate connections to sin made it an ideal concept for describing and denouncing things of which the speaker disapproved. Elites shaped the conditions whereby all kinds of people had to regulate their behaviour to be moral and sane, rather than sinful and so mad. These expectations formed a powerful vision for Bourbon society that saw individual actions, political movements, and religious values as mad if they did not conform to an ‘enlightened’ view of the world. Such a terminology enabled elite thinkers and bureaucrats to justify and enforce their vision of making Mexicans pious, moderate, and productive vassals of the state. I have shown that the idea of madness played an important role in self-regulation in Bourbon Mexico. It was one of a number of concepts that were used by elites to define the well-managed, enlightened subject. The thesis is, therefore, part of an ongoing project to understand selfhood and self-regulation. Exploring the significance of the term madness enhances our awareness of what it meant to be human in Bourbon Mexico.
Appendix

Section One: The Workings of the Inquisition

There is a voluminous historiography of the Inquisition in the Hispanic world generally and New Spain specifically.1 The purpose of this appendix is not to relate that historiography, but

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1 For the interested reader, Richard Greenleaf and Henry Kamen’s works on the Inquisition in Mexico and Spain respectively are foundational texts of twentieth-century Inquisition history. Both historians advocated using the Inquisition’s documentation to write social histories of the contexts in which the Inquisition was situated. Indeed, they advocated reading the many records of the Inquisition trials in detail, which was a relatively novel practice at this point. Regarding their work, see: Henry Kamen, *Inquisition and Society in Spain in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (Bloomington, 1985); Henry Kamen, *The Spanish Inquisition: An Historical Revision* (London, 1997); Richard E. Greenleaf, *Inquisición y Sociedad en el México Colonial* (Madrid, 1985); Richard E. Greenleaf, *The Mexican Inquisition of the Sixteenth Century* (Albuquerque, 1969). A classic text regarding the intellectual history of the Inquisition in the eighteenth century is Monelisa Lina Perez-Marchand’s work on political ideology and the Inquisition. See: Monelisa Lina Pérez-Marchand, *Dos Etapas Ideológicas del Siglo XVIII en Mexico a Travé de los Papeles de la Inquisición* (Mexico, 1945). Excellent studies combining quantitative and qualitative research on Inquisition cases were undertaken in the 1980s. Regarding the Inquisition in Mexico, see: Solange Alberro, *La Actividad del Santo Oficio de la Inquisición en Nueva España, 1571-1700* (Mexico, 1981); Alberro, *Inquisición y Sociedad en México*. Alberro’s work is complemented by the contemporaneous doctoral study of María Asunción Herrera Sotillo, who used similar statistical tabulations and provided new information on the Inquisition’s bureaucracy and finance. See the published version: María Asunción Herrera Sotillo, *Ortodoxia y Control Social en México en el Siglo XVII: el Tribunal del Santo Oficio* (Madrid, 1982). For comparative quantitative work on Spain, see: Gustav Henningsen and Jaime Contreras, ‘Forty-Four Thousand Cases of the Spanish Inquisition (1540-1700): Analysis of a Historical Data Bank’ in Gustav Henningsen et al. (eds), *The Inquisition in Early Modern Europe: Studies on Sources and Methods* (DeKalb, 1986), pp.100-129. A precursor to these quantitative studies was the MA thesis of Mariel de Ibáñez entitled ‘El Tribunal de la Inquisición en México: siglo XVI’ (1945). She provided innovative statistical tabulations of Inquisition cases. Her thesis was later published, see: Mariel de Ibáñez and Jose Luis Soberanes y Fernández, *El Tribunal de la Inquisición en México: siglo XVI* (Mexico, 1984). To my knowledge, there is currently no such study of the Inquisition in eighteenth-century Mexico. Many historians of Spain and New Spain have written micro-histories using Inquisition records, following on from Carlo Ginzburg’s famous book on Menocchio. For examples of these works, see: Carlo Ginzburg, *The Cheese and the Worms: the Cosmos of a Sixteenth-Century Miller* (Baltimore, 1980); Nalle, *Mad for God*; Noemi Quezada, ‘El Umbral de la Locura: el Caso de Fray Agustín Claudio’, *Annales de Antropología* 23 (1986), pp.195-236; Stephanie Kirk, ‘Illicit Passions: “Mala Amistad” in the Eighteenth-Century Mexican Convent’, *Latin American Literary Review*, 33, 66 (2005), pp.5-30. There has also been a turn towards inter-disciplinary approaches to Inquisition studies, which provide a particular focus on colonial culture. An excellent example of this work is anthropologist Noemi Quezada’s two volume ethno-history of the Inquisition. See: Noemi Quezada (ed.), *Inquisición Novohispana* (Mexico City, 2000); Mary Perry and Ann Cruz (eds), *Cultural Encounters: The Impact of the Inquisition in Spain and the New World* (Berkeley, 1991). Currently, many historians draw on Inquisition records to write a range of histories that do not specifically focus on the Inquisition. Examples of this prevalent form of scholarship are detailed in Chapter One regarding gender, race, emotions, and selfhood in the colonial Americas. For an aid to the historiography of the Inquisition in Spain and Mexico respectively, see: Helen Rawlings, *The Spanish Inquisition* (Malden, 2006); Richard E. Greenleaf, ‘Historiography of the Mexican Inquisition: Evolution of Interpretations and Methodologies’ in Mary Perry and Ann Cruz (eds), *Cultural Encounters: The Impact of the Inquisition in Spain and the New World* (Berkeley, 1991), pp.248-276.
to provide a brief overview of the workings of the Inquisition for the non-specialist. A consideration of the Inquisition’s rationale and processes is of particular use in understanding the analysis provided in Chapter Five and, to a lesser extent, Chapters Two and Four.

The Spanish Inquisition was established in 1478 and from 1508 was directly controlled by the Spanish Crown rather than the papacy. In Mexico there were three phases of inquisitorial development: the monastic Inquisition (1522-62), the episcopal Inquisition (1536-69), and the Holy Office of the Inquisition (1571-1820). The Inquisition functioned along the same lines in Mexico as in Spain, although there were fewer staff to carry out the organisation’s work. Two or three Inquisitors, who judged cases, presided over the tribunal in Mexico City. They were aided by a fiscal, who prosecuted cases, and a secretary, who authorised documentation. There were a range of other salaried and unsalaried roles within the Inquisition such as notaries, who recorded the trial proceedings, and councillors, who gave the inquisitors legal advice. A condition of employment by the Inquisition was to be male, of Spanish lineage, descended from an old Christian family with no converts, heretics, Jews, or Muslims in their lineage. This group of officials included both *peninsulares*, from Spain, and *creoles*, from the Americas.

All Inquisition staff were university educated, often in Mexico City or Lima, and many Inquisitors were priests with legal and medical training who held the title of Doctor or *Licenciado*. The Inquisition’s doctors required a medical licence only available to those with a degree in medicine. Medical degrees were offered only at the *Real y Pontifica Universidad de Mexico* in Mexico City prior to 1790. The University’s constitutions outlined a medical curriculum that was based on the works of Hippocrates, Galen, and Avicenna. Professionally-qualified doctors were educated in much the same way as their non-physician peers, and many also had received a clerical education, which is described in Chapter Four. Some roles within the Inquisition were unsalaried and part time. However, the Inquisition

Finally, for a more detailed discussion of the Inquisition’s workings than I provide here, and for example Inquisition cases provided in English translation, I recommend John Chuchiak’s work, see: John F. Chuchiak IV, *The Inquisition in New Spain, 1536-1820: A Documentary History* (Baltimore, 2012).

4 *A Licenciado* was the title of someone with a master’s degree, often in law.
employed a full-time salaried doctor, surgeon, pharmacist, and barber. Salaried and unsalaried employment in the Inquisition conveyed prestige to the officeholder, and exempted them from religious and civil prosecution; only the Inquisition possessed the jurisdiction to try them and it would usually be lenient with its officeholders.

The Inquisition had authority over the Hispanic population but not the indigenous population. Amerindians were ruled under a separate jurisdiction based on the principle of the two republics: Spanish (incorporating all people who were not exclusively Amerindian) and Indian. In 1793 the estimated population of Mexico was 3,799,561, of which 2,319,741 (61 per cent) were thought to be indigenous. The Inquisition also nominally ruled over an area of over 3,000,000 square kilometres, from New Spain, to New Mexico, Nicaragua, and the Philippines. Scholars have estimated that ninety-five per cent of Mexico’s population did not have contact with the Inquisition because of the Inquisition’s vast dominion.

The purpose of the Inquisition was to expose and punish heresy with the aim of reforming the beliefs and behaviours of the population and preserving religious orthodoxy. The definition of heresy was broad and included apostasy, blasphemy, bigamy, superstitious activity, and witchcraft, and actions against the Inquisition itself. During the colonial period there were over 2,300 denunciations to the Inquisition in New Spain. Five-sixths of those denunciations did not culminate in a trial because there were insufficient witnesses to continue the proceedings. Many cases were also suspended after a trial had started. Of those that led to sentences, the most common outcomes were absolution - formal forgiveness, reconciliation – the confession of sins to be reunited with God, and penance – involving confession to a priest, voluntary devotions and absolution. The most common sentence for minor heresies such as blasphemy was an abjuration de levi, a renunciation of their actions under a slight suspicion of heresy. Across all kinds of trials, relaxation to the secular courts for the death penalty was very rare. The Inquisition executed far fewer people than was once thought. Its main concern was with moulding defendants to conform to the religious and social norms of the colony.

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8 Chuchiak, *The Inquisition in New Spain*.
10 Alberro, ‘Herejes, Brujas y Beatas’, p.87.
13 Alberro, *Inquisición y Sociedad en México*, p.208, *abjuration de levi* was the sentence given to 67.7 per cent of blasphemers.
Section Two: Inquisition Case Proceedings

The Inquisition brought people to trial by investigating accusations made by members of the community. Denunciations had to be made under oath in the presence of a notary and two others. To bring someone to trial, a case required three people willing to denounce the accused. For a person to be imprisoned and their goods confiscated (to pay for their maintenance in the secret prison), five denouncers were needed. A trial then had two stages: a preliminary investigation and a judicial proceeding. The Inquisition instigated a set of procedures for conducting trials in 1484 and this was used, with some alterations, throughout the institution’s existence. 14

When the Inquisitors decided to proceed with a case, the Inquisition’s prosecution gathered witness testimonies against the defendant. Inquisitors apprehended and interviewed the defendant only after witness testimonies had been collected. Hearings for defendants and witnesses started with the same formulaic questions. First the interviewee was asked for basic details about their lives including their full name, address, place of origin, age, calidad, marital status, and occupation. 15 The Inquisitor asked the interviewee what religious teaching they had received, and to recite four prayers at the start of the trial. The prosecutor asked the interviewee if they knew why they had been summoned. If they said no, they would be asked whether they knew of any actions that had been committed against the Catholic faith. Interrogations were based predominantly around open questions, which gave a defendant or witness an opportunity to elaborate their response and to explain fully what they had witnessed or done. Individuals gave their testimonies under oath, in secret, and then signed an account that was read back to them (if they could not sign their name, this was done on their behalf), to ensure a full and truthful account. Many testimonies were ratified, a process of formally approving the truth of the interviewee’s testimony, by reading the previously accepted testimony back to the witness at a later stage to check that they would re-affirm their testimony. The witness signed the subsequent document under oath to confirm they agreed with the original testimony.

Trials differed substantially in length and the numbers of witnesses called: some lasted just days and others involved protracted hearings over many years. Records show many cases stopped abruptly with no conclusion to the proceedings. When cases did reach an official conclusion the correct procedure was for the Inquisitor to read the sentence to the defendant who signed to acknowledge their understanding and acceptance.

14 Chuchiak, The Inquisition in New Spain, pp.32-3.
All of the Inquisition cases assessed in this thesis are held in the AGN’s Inquisition section, which is made up of volumes and boxes of trial proceedings. There is no internal structure to the volumes, and cases from one geographical area may be bundled alongside cases of different content and origin. A case file often holds correspondence between the Inquisition’s staff and other individuals outside the institution, and provides different perspectives and discussions of proceedings. During the trials, witness testimony was recorded word for word by notaries; the documentation sometimes includes sections of altered or crossed out testimony, or, occasionally, blank spaces that presumably indicate a disruption to the court proceedings. One set of trial records may contain sections written in various hands of differing legibility. Notaries copied all trial records and sent them to the Suprema, the supreme council of the Inquisition, in Madrid, which required documentation to be produced in duplicate or triplicate. Copies of trial information were also sent to other parts of Mexico, to priests and Inquisition staff operating outside Mexico City, with whom the Tribunal in Mexico City corresponded for advice.
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