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Adverse selection and moral hazard in joint-liability loan contracts : evidence from an artefactual field experiment

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Barboni, Giorgia, Cassar, Alessandra, Trejo, Arturo Rodriguez and Wydick, Bruce (2013) Adverse selection and moral hazard in joint-liability loan contracts : evidence from an artefactual field experiment. Journal of Economics and Management, 9 (2). pp. 153-184. ISSN 1819-0197.

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Official URL: http://www.jem.org.tw/

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Abstract

We design an artefactual field experiment to study the relationship between joint-liability lending and adverse selection, moral hazard and risk preferences. While theories concerning joint-liability lending have highlighted its ability to mitigate adverse selection in credit transactions, our experimental results indicate that joint-liability lending may actually induce problems of adverse selection. The results of our experiment, carried on in partnership with a Bolivian microlender, show that borrowers exogenously endowed with a risky project are disproportionately likely to choose jointly-liability contracts over individually-liable contracts. This behavior does not appear to be motivated by risk-diversification, but rather by free-riding, as these subjects disproportionally switch from safe to risky projects when exogenously given a joint-liability contract instead of an individual contract. Thus the results of our experiment offer a possible explanation why joint liability loans have diminished in popularity in recent years among both borrowers and microfinance lenders.

Item Type: Journal Article
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School > Finance Group
Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School
Journal or Publication Title: Journal of Economics and Management
ISSN: 1819-0197
Official Date: July 2013
Dates:
DateEvent
July 2013Published
Volume: 9
Number: 2
Page Range: pp. 153-184
Status: Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Published
Access rights to Published version: Open Access (Creative Commons)
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