STRATEGIES FOR SURVIVAL

A STUDY OF THE POST - 1949

FOREIGN POLICY AND EXTERNAL RELATIONS

OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA

by

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Summary

Since 1949 China has been politically divided into two: the People's Republic (PRC) on the mainland, and the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan, the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu, and the Pescadores. Each regime claims to be the sole legitimate government of the whole of China, and this continuing struggle has posed for both of them serious problems of international recognition as well as of domestic political legitimacy.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the evolution of the foreign policy strategies of the ROC in coping with this national crisis. It is a historical account of the foreign policies and external relations of the ROC between 1949 and the end of 1979. Chapter One reviews the historical background to the division of China in 1949 and which led to the survival crisis of the ROC. Chapter Two describes the state ideology of the ROC and its place in the ROC's foreign policy formulation. Chapter Three, dealing with the strategy of military counterattack, dating from the end of 1949 until the end of 1958, describes the ROC's dependence upon the United States. Chapter Four, dealing with the strategy of political counterattack, dating from the end of 1958 until October 1971, discusses the ROC's other foreign policy options, such as the Russian option, and the ROC's efforts to achieve close relations with neighbouring countries. Chapter Five focuses on the ROC's agricultural assistance programme directed towards the newly independent countries in Africa, from 1960 to October 1971. Chapter Six analyzes the ROC's post-UN foreign policy strategy of economics- and trade-first diplomacy, from October 1971 until the end of 1979. Finally, a conclusion will be presented which summarizes the evolution of the ROC's post-1949 foreign policy strategies for the purpose of national survival. It also pays particular attention to some of the reasons for the limited success of these strategies.
Introduction

Since 1949, the foreign policy of the Republic of China (the ROC, also known as Nationalist China), has concentrated on attempts to prevent diplomatic rejection as a nation. The ROC's problem was caused primarily by the result of the civil war in which it was finally defeated by the Chinese Communists. The latter then established the People's Republic of China (the PRC) on 1st October 1949 on the mainland, following the ROC's retreat to Taiwan, an island about 90 to 120 miles off the south eastern coast of the Chinese mainland. Since then the ROC and the PRC have been engaged in a continuous struggle, across the Taiwan Straits, for the final control of China, including both the mainland, which has an area of 3,690,500 square miles, and Taiwan, which has an area of 14,000 square miles. In other words, despite the fact that it is no longer in control of the mainland after October 1949, the ROC continues to consider itself as the only legitimate ruler for all of China; whereas the PRC, or Communist China, claims legitimacy to rule Taiwan, which has never come into its possession. Had the ROC been defeated totally in the civil war, or had Taiwan not been historically a province of China, the current China problem, i.e. the problem of China's national reunification, would probably not exist. Nevertheless, with both the ROC and the PRC calling for "national reunification" and accepting there is but one China, which they each exclusively claim to represent, the world has been confronted with the dilemma as to which China is to be recognized.
The ROC, holding less than 0.38 percent of the whole Chinese territory and about 0.18 percentage of the Chinese population, plus the fact that it is a minority force in Taiwan in relation to the native Taiwanese, is clearly in a less advantageous position vis-a-vis its Communist rival. Thus, since 1949, the ROC has been engaged in a continuous struggle for survival. Internally, it encounters possible resistance from the Taiwanese islanders, and potential military threat from the mainland Communists. Externally, in addition to constant challenge by the PRC of its legitimacy, the ROC has faced a serious crisis of international de-recognition, particularly after October 1971, when the ROC was expelled from the United Nations of which it was an original member and replaced by the PRC. A crucial development was U.S. President Carter's announcement on 16th December 1978 that the U.S. would establish diplomatic relations with Peking, and de-recognize Taiwan.

The U.S. decision was essential to the ROC's status as a nation, not only because of the vigorous support and security protection the U.S. granted to the ROC but also because the U.S. was one of the superpowers and the only major western power which consistently supported the ROC's cause for almost three decades after 1949. It was under this prolonged period of U.S. assistance and protection that the ROC was able to construct and to consolidate its national and international development.
Consequently, when the ROC became increasingly isolated internationally and could no longer stem the tide of diplomatic de-recognition, commentators around the world predicted the imminent collapse of the ROC on Taiwan. Some expected a military expedition from, or eventually a political absorption by, the PRC. Some expected an internal collapse of law and order in Taiwan. And some predicted that after a period of isolation and frustration, the ROC would inevitably come to terms with the PRC. Nevertheless, in spite of the unfavourable development, the ROC showed no sign of abandoning its declared goal of national reunification, which was to be implemented through the programme of "mainland recovery". On the contrary, Chiang Ching-kuo, the current President of the ROC, made it quite clear that there would be no association whatever by his government with the Peking regime, whoever its spokesman might be. The fixed purpose of the ROC was to liberate the mainland from communism. There would be no compromise. And the ROC would continue its fight for national survival, whatever difficulties it might face.

The ROC's determination in carrying out its national programme, despite all the difficulties looming ahead, raises the question as to how it, as a small power in contrast to the vast mainland, managed to survive as a nation during the last three decades after 1949.

The purpose of this thesis is thus to analyze the different stages of foreign policy strategies that the ROC employed from October 1949 until the end of 1979 for the objective of
national survival. That is to say, it is to study the extent, if any, of flexibility and adaptability of the ROC's post-1949 foreign policy in coping with the problem of national survival and its effects upon its external relations.

The foreign policy strategies under consideration will be the strategy of "military counterattack" (1949-1958), the strategy of "political counterattack" (1958-1971), the strategy of "foreign aid" (1960-1971) and the strategy of "economics- and trade-first diplomacy" (1971-1979). Since the time-period covered is extensive, it is necessary to point out that, in order to limit the scope of this thesis to the main points under discussion and to restrict the text to a manageable length, the thesis will be confined only to those policies or issues which had the most direct relevance to our present inquiry. In other words, rather than present a comprehensive historical account of the ROC's post-1949 foreign policies and external relations, the thesis will concentrate on those subjects pertaining to the different stages of policy strategies essential for the political survival of the ROC.

The thesis will be divided into seven chapters. Chapters One and Two are introductory and will direct us towards the main body - Chapters Three to Six - of our discussion. The division of the time-period as shown above for each foreign policy strategy from Chapter Three to Chapter Six is to some extent artificial. This is because the transitions from one strategy to another were tightly connected and, as the study
will show, their operation in some periods over-lapped.

Chapter One deals with the background of the ROC's foreign policy formulation, their problems and causes. Why was (and is) the ROC's political survival at stake? Why was (is) the ROC confronted with the legitimacy crisis? Why, how and to what extent were (are) these two issues connected? In addition to tackling the above questions, attention will also be given to the situation in China before the 1911 Revolution, which gave birth to the ROC in 1912, and the traditional Chinese view of the world order, as these in some ways help to explain some aspects of the contemporary Chinese mentality and ways of dealing with foreign countries. Mention should also be made of the national capability of the ROC after 1949, and the issue of "legitimacy" as related to the ROC situation.

Chapter Two introduces the ROC's official ideology, *San Min Chu I*, and its significance in the formulation of the ROC's foreign policy. What is the *San Min Chu I* ideology? How and why was it formulated? To what extent was (and still is) the ideology related to the orientation of the ROC's foreign policy and external relations? And to what extent is it related to the ROC's current programme of "mainland recovery" and the policy of anti-communism? Here, a brief examination of the role and the political thoughts of Sun Yat-sen, who was the founding father of the ROC, also the creator of the *San Min Chu I* ideology, and his political successor, Chiang Kai-shek, will be given.
Chapter Three is about the strategy of "military counterattack" which, together with Chapter Four, dealing with the strategy of "political counterattack", give mainly an account of the ROC's foreign policies towards, and hence dependence upon, the U.S. Why did the U.S. support the ROC? How did the ROC perceive its role in the context of Cold War politics and make use of its alliance relationship with the U.S. for its foreign policy objectives? Why and how was the strategy of "military counterattack" formulated in the first place and later altered to emphasize "political counterattack"? In this transition, what aspects of policy were changed and what remained? Were the strategies effective in terms of policy objectives? Chapter Four will also include a brief description of some of the ROC's foreign policy options and its external relations with its neighbouring countries during the period concerned.

Chapter Five describes the strategy of "foreign aid", or the so-called "agricultural diplomacy". Our discussion concentrates on the ROC's agricultural assistance programme directed towards the newly independent countries in Africa with a view to winning their support over the issue of Chinese representation at the United Nations. Attention will be paid to the evolution of the representation issue at the U.N., its implications for the two Chinese governments in the context of their diplomatic rivalry, and the significance of the newly independent African countries for the representation issue. Attention will also be given to the aid given by the PRC to Africa as well as the African responses to the ROC
aid programme launched so as to assess the effectiveness of the ROC's aid strategy.

Chapter Six analyzes the ROC's post-UN foreign policy strategy of "economics- and trade-first diplomacy". Our emphasis will be on the formation of the strategy, its relevance to the ROC's concern of national survival and, most of all, the degree of flexibility and adaptability of the ROC's foreign policy in the operation of this strategy. A brief account of the ROC's economic performance on Taiwan will be provided so as to give a fuller picture of how this strategy has come into being. The notion of "intermediate technology" as the core of the strategy under discussion will also be introduced here.

Chapter Seven will present conclusions, paying particular attention to some of the reasons for the limited success of the ROC's foreign policy strategies.

Finally, mention should also be made regarding research methods and research material. The thesis is based on a historical approach, from sources available in Taiwan and England.

The former, mainly in Chinese, included several interviews with government officials of the ROC and/or people who have direct or indirect connection with, or were interested in, the subject. Most of the interviews took the form of informal conversations. It also included official publications from the government of the ROC; newspapers such as Jung-yang
jih pao (the Central Daily News), Lien-huo pao (the United Daily) and the China News were also consulted. The latter, mainly in English, were secondary sources in various libraries.

Other sources of data used included official publications of the United States government and the United Nations organization for general material on the ROC-U.S. relations and ROC-U.N. relations.
Chapter One
The Background and Main Directions
of the ROC's Foreign Policy

Since its arrival on Taiwan island in 1949, the government of the ROC (hereafter the Nationalist government) has faced a vital and permanent constraint in the formulation of its foreign policy, i.e. the concern for national survival which is inextricably intertwined with the issue of legitimacy. The legitimacy of the Nationalist government has been challenged from three sides: the native Taiwanese majority (internal), the Chinese Communist government on the mainland (internal and external) and the international community (external). This three-fold challenge constitutes a major threat to the continued existence, hence the survival, of the Nationalist government and the Kuomintang, (abbreviated the KMT). To cope with these threats, the Nationalist government has depended on the U.S. and its allies for support. Such external dependence, however, has its negative effects. The Nationalist government has to act quickly to cope with any possible modification of such support, particularly if it declines. It also has to take into account the possible risks of foreign intervention. Thus, the Nationalist government becomes vulnerable to external pressure. In this regard, accurate calculation of external support has also been an important issue of concern in the foreign policy formulation of the Nationalist government.

The main purpose of this chapter is to introduce and to analyze the above issues, i.e. the causes and problems of the foreign policy of the ROC since 1949. To do this, it is
necessary to outline the history of the power relations of the KMT-CCP, the two dominant political parties in China after 1911, during the period up to the end of the Chinese civil war in October 1949. It is also necessary to look at the social conditions and political circumstances that gave birth to the two parties concerned. Thus this Chapter has three parts. Part one deals with the situation of China before 1949, and it will be further divided into two sections for discussion: China under the old system, i.e. before the establishment of the republic in 1911, and during the republican period, from 1911 to 1949. Part two looks at the situation of China after 1949. Finally, part three deals with theoretical aspects of the issue of legitimacy, and its relation to the ROC's struggle for survival.

I. China before 1949

1. China before the establishment of the republic in 1911

This section will examine China's old practice of foreign relations, namely, China's traditional view of its place in the world, and its growing clashes with the West in the 19th century. This is not just because it outlines the antecedents of ROC foreign policy, but also some of the principles embodied in the ROC's own foreign policy at least up to 1949.

Under the old system, China governed its affairs according to the Confucian philosophy of "peaceful ordering". This philosophy emphasized the existence of a natural order between men and the universe which governed and regulated
their relationships.\(^1\) It was within this context of a natural order that the Chinese political system as well as the framework of its foreign relations was fixed.

On top of the system, there was the ruler, or the Emperor, who had absolute power and was regarded as the almighty "Son of Heaven" and "Ruler of the World". His main duties were to rule according to the Confucian philosophy which was fully expressed in the "Mandate of Heaven", for the benefit of the country and to bring about an orderly state of affairs. The main duty of his subjects was to help him to carry out his mandate. Between the ruler and the ruled, there was very little communication. Consequently, there existed a tremendous gap between the two classes with the ruler obviously placed high above the ruled.

This superior mentality of the Chinese Emperors also affected traditional Chinese attitudes towards foreigners, and it informed the pattern of their external relations. That is, as a consequence of this superior feeling, and as

1. The crucial principle of this philosophy is *jen*, or benevolence in English. Confucius defined a man of *jen* as one who is "courteous in his private life, deferential in public service, and faithful to other people". To put it more precisely, in Confucious' view, *jen* is the manifestation of what is genuine in human nature and doing of what is right and proper. It embraces all the moral qualities a man should exhibit in his relations with others, emphasizing sympathetic fellowship among men and unselfish assistance to others. See Chester C.Tan, *Chinese Political Thought in the Twentieth Century* (David and Charles, Newton Abbot, 1972). pp 1 - 2.
a result of China's early civilization, the Chinese Emperors and the Chinese people normally regarded Westerners either as "barbarians" or "foreign devils" and treated them accordingly. That is, they either tried to erect a "bamboo curtain" between themselves and Westerners, or, if contacts were inevitable, imposed stringent restriction on their activities in China. Those countries that wished to trade with China or to do missionary work there were permitted to do so only if they were willing to recognize the Chinese Emperor as "the Son of Heaven, ruler of the world", just as the Chinese themselves believed. As a matter of fact, possibly as a result of this unequal treatment, and possibly due to geographical distance, Westerners rarely came to China before the 19th century. Needless to say, such an unequal relationship was even more pronounced in ancient China's relations with its neighbouring "states" such as Korea, Nepal, Siam (now Thailand) and Burma. These "states" for centuries paid an annual tribute to the Chinese Emperor to recognize the latter's power.

It is largely true to say that, traditionally, China paid more attention to domestic affairs than to external affairs. It is also true to say that Chinese had the belief that as long as they could cope with domestic affairs, external matters would run their proper course. Thus, the Chinese Emperors were quite ignorant and unaware of developments outside the Chinese borders. China became very self-centred, isolated, and unconscious of the growth and progress made in the Western
world. This, the so-called "Sino-centricism"\textsuperscript{1}, was the traditional Chinese perception of the world order and of its role in this order.

As the dominant characteristic of ancient China's external relations, this mode of "Sino-centricism" went almost unchallenged until the middle of the 19th century when Westerners and their civilization began to penetrate into China. Particularly towards the end of the century when the Manchu dynasty was declining, China experienced unprecedented blows to its status.

The Manchu dynasty, which ruled China from 1664 to 1911, was the last dynasty in Chinese history. During its reign, the Manchus, like their predecessors, ruled China in accordance with Confucian philosophy. It was inevitable therefore that they were more concerned with domestic affairs and took little notice of the Industrial Revolution, which had significantly modernized the Western world, until it had a serious impact on China.

One of the consequences of the Industrial Revolution was that foreign countries became more interested in China as a potentially huge market for their goods. Confident in their new prosperity, naval and economic strength, they were no

longer content with the stringent trade restrictions imposed upon them by the imperial government or with the inferior treatment that they had received for centuries. They came to China in large numbers with the intention of improving their status and promoting their commercial interests there.

The foreign countries most active in China during the latter half of the 19th century were Great Britain, Russia, France, Germany, Japan and the United States. It was during this period that China was declining with the strength of the imperial government severely challenged at home and abroad. At home, the imperial government was confronted with large-scale uprisings and local unrest caused by a general mood of dissatisfaction of the people towards the government. The internal disorder severely crippled the capacity of the imperial government to cope with the growing strength of the foreign countries in China and their respective bids to increase their power and influence over China.

The turning point in Chinese history and China's external relations, from the self conviction of superiority to its humiliation, came when China lost the Opium War in 1842 which resulted in the signing of the Treaty of Nanking. The Treaty, in addition to the ceding of Hong Kong, compelled China to

1. The chaos was caused mainly by sudden rapid population growth during the 18th century and by the growing conflicts between bureaucrats and commoners. Although this disorder was not a new phenomenon in the late Manchu period as it had also haunted the previous dynasties, this time the confused situation was exacerbated by the military and commercial penetration of the West. For an account of China's situation during this period see Chiang Meng-ling, Hsi-ch'ao (Tides from the west) (Taipei: World Publishing Co., 1976), pp. 3-68.
open five ports to British trade, to establish official recognition and extend diplomatic relations on an equal basis, and to pay reparations, etc. The impact of the Treaty in terms of the subsequent national status of China was incalculable. It was the first of a whole series of "unequal treaties" imposed on China by Western countries. Other countries, i.e. France, Russia, Germany, Japan and the U.S., followed suit. China was thus forced to open itself up to the outside world and made a series of political, commercial and territorial concessions to foreign countries. After the granting of privileges to Britain in China, other foreign countries made similar demands on China. The imperial government, constrained by its internal weaknesses, always responded to these demands by signing treaties which provided foreign countries with leased territories, or extra-territoriality, or foreign control of custom tariffs, or the exercise of foreign authority over Chinese territories. These were the so-called "unequal treaties" which the Chinese subsequently fought to annul for about half a century. Gradually China's old system weakened and disintegrated. Not only was China's traditional feeling of superiority gradually undermined by the foreigners' privileges in China, but even the Chinese themselves questioned the strength of the old system in dealing with national affairs.

1. The five ports were Canton, Amoy, Foochow-fu, Ningpo and Shanghai, see Articles II, III, IV, V and VI of the Treaty.
Thus, at this time China faced the threat of partition by foreign countries on the one hand; on the other hand, its internal order continued to deteriorate, and calls for national reforms and regenerations were widespread. If the Confucian philosophy of "peaceful ordering" had provided old China with remarkable internal stability and national security enabling it to endure dynastic changes at home and to remain apart from, and superior to foreign countries, it also made the traditional Chinese governing system quite dogmatic, i.e. less responsive to sudden changes. Thus when foreign countries and Western civilization penetrated into China, Confucian philosophy became gradually less effective in coping with the impact of Western influence. As Chester C. Tan described:

"Rules of propriety may contribute to the moral order, but they are plainly inadequate to cope with the complexity of modern commercial and industrial relations. Moreover, the Confucian concept of grand unity, which viewed the Chinese Emperor as a cultural universe embracing all of humanity, is obviously unsuitable to the modern world of sovereign, independent states committed to power politics."

Thus, what was missing in the old system was the ability flexibly to handle conflict caused by power politics. It was natural therefore, when China was confronted with the new,

1. For instance, there were the T'ung-Chih Restoration and the Self-Strengthening Movement in 1862, and the Hundred Days of Reform in 1898. For more information on these reforms and their meaning and significance in China, see, for example, Franz Schurmann and Orville Schell, eds., Imperial China (London: Penguin Books, 1972), pp. 195-233; Dun J. Li, Modern China: From Mandarin to Commissar (New York: Charles Scribner and Sons, 1978), Chapter 4, "Partition of China", pp. 79-113; also Chester C. Tan, op. cit., Chapter 2, "Moral Conservatism and Liberal Democracy", pp. 23-45.

2. Chester C. Tan, ibid., p. 7.
modernized Western world which threatened the partition of China, that its old order should be attacked severely.

It was against this background that a large number of revolutionary forces were formed. However, instead of agreeing on a positive solution for the programme of national regeneration, they held conflicting viewpoints as to how the programme should proceed. These ranged from those advocating total reform, i.e. total westernization of the old system, to those proposing a return to the old system. As a result, China's situation became more critical. The interplay of internal disorder marked by widespread revolutions and external calamity marked by the threat of partition plunged China into a dark period of uncertainty. Needless to say, even the tribute system gradually collapsed, causing not only a great loss of the Emperor's virtue, but also an important loss of his annual revenue.

In 1899, the American Secretary of State John Hay issued the commercial "Open Door" policy, which called on the great powers to support the principle of equal trading opportunities in China. Hay also asked the powers to stop seeking special privileges at the expense of China and other nations.¹ In so doing, however, a significant consequence was that it helped China to preserve its territorial and administrative integrity.² Partition of China by foreign countries was


therefore avoided. Nevertheless, the policy could not help to restore the declining prestige of the Manchu government.

In October 1911, the Manchu dynasty was overthrown. In January the following year, the Republic of China was proclaimed, with the Kuomintang (the history of the KMT will be dealt with shortly) as the central force in the administration. Nevertheless, the republic existed only in name because, due to internal weakness and the emergence of warlords, it was unable to unify the entire country under a centralized political structure until 1928. During this period, a new revolution was staged, which saw the emergence of another political force, the Chinese Communist Party, the CCP, collaborating and competing with the Kuomintang for the final control of China.

1. After 1916 the new Republic was challenged by the emergence of about a dozen "military governors" for a period of 15 years. These military governors, also known as warlords, controlled vast areas of China, in particular in some northern provinces. In order to obtain more power, the warlords not only fought against each other but also challenged the KMT-established national government, whose power concentrated in the south. Consequently, China was divided into several power regions, each run by different military factions. As a result, a unified and centralized political authority could not be created in China until 1928 when the warlords were put down by the Northern Expedition (1926-8), under Chiang Kai-shek's leadership. For a more detailed study of the warlords' politics, see Ch'i Hsi-sheng, Warlord Politics in China, 1916-1928 (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1976); also his The Chinese Warlord System: 1916-28 (Originally issued by the Center for Research in Social Systems, the American University, Washington, 1962, reprinted by U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, 1971).
2. China during the republican period: 1911-1949

The evolution of the KMT-CCP relationship up to 1949 can be divided into four aspects for consideration: (1) the formation of the two parties respectively; (2) the KMT-CCP relationship from 1921-1945; (3) China's relations with Soviet Russia and the U.S. during this period and after World War II; and (4) the KMT-CCP relationship after the War, namely, the Chinese civil war from 1945 to 1949.

(1) The formation of the KMT and the CCP

(A) The formation of the KMT

In discussing this topic, two things deserve our special attention. That is the Communist influence in, and the internal split of, the KMT. The two issues, interrelated in some ways, will be dealt with only briefly here, a more detailed study will be given later.

The formation of the KMT into an effective party took several years. Its history began in Honolulu in 1894 when Sun Yat-sen organized Chinese emigrants in that year to form the Hsing Chung Hui (Society for the Regeneration of China). Its declared objective then was "to overthrow the Manchus, restore the Chinese nation, and establish a republic". Nevertheless, from then until 1919, this revolutionary

1. For the role of Sun Yat-sen, his political philosophy and his relations to the KMT, see Chapter Two.

organization had been renamed, reorganized and its objectives reformulated four times. They were the T‘ung Meng Hui (The Alliance) in 1905, the Kuomintang (the Nationalist Party) in 1912, the Chung Hua Ko Min Tang (the Chinese Revolutionary Party) in 1914, and Chung Kuo Kuomintang (The Nationalist Party of China, abbreviated to Kuomintang, or the KMT) in 1919. Apart from the Kuomintang and Chung Kuo Kuomintang which were set up on the Chinese soil, the rest were headquartered abroad. All of these organizations, aimed at the realization of Chinese national revolution, were to establish a republican form of government and to reconstruct China into a modern state.

According to Sun, the revolutionary programme of China's reconstruction should be divided into three stages for implementation: first, military administration; second, a one-party political tutelage; and, third, constitutional government. According to Sun, this three-stage transition to democracy was mainly due to the deeply-rooted monarchical tradition in Chinese society that made a quick transition impossible. Moreover, Sun maintained, the KMT should be

the dominant force to reach this constitutionalism.\(^1\)

(a) **The reorganization of the KMT in 1924**

In 1919, the KMT was still a loose organization, largely made up of intellectuals. Thus, in 1924 Sun proposed another reorganization of the KMT with the intention to strengthen it and to recruit new members from different classes. This decision marked a turning point in modern Chinese history, because it not only opened the way for the subsequent involvement of Soviet Russia in China's domestic affairs, but also, as a direct consequence of this, provided a solid foundation for the subsequent development of the CCP in opposition to the KMT. Thus, it was from this occasion that Communist influence began to be institutionalized in China.

The reorganization of the KMT was held in Canton during its first National Congress in January 1924. The significance of the occasion was marked by two momentous decisions adopted by the Congress: (i) cooperation with Soviet Russia and

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\(^1\) Sun first revealed his intention of following the Soviet example of one-party rule in a lecture in October 1923, see Sun Yat-sen, *Sun-wen Hsüeh-shuo* (The Theory of Sun Yat-sen), in *Tsung-il Ch'üan-shu* (Complete Work of the President) 12 Vols., (Taipei: The Central Committee of the KMT, 1956), Vol. II-B, p. 686. His position was further clarified in January 1924, when he proposed to place the Kuomintang above the state: "There is one thing more which we may talk as our model. Russia is governed entirely by one party, which wields greater power than parties in Great Britain, the United States and France... (The success of the Russian Revolution) was due to the fact that the party has been placed above the state." See Sun Yat-sen, *Fundamentals of National Reconstruction* (Taipei: China Cultural Service, 1953), p. 161. Thus to Sun, government by a single party was to form the basis of the Chinese state. "At present we have no state to govern, and we can only say that we should use the party to build a state." Sun, ibid.
(ii) admission of the Chinese Communists into the KMT.

(i) Cooperation with Soviet Russia

First of all, it needs to point out that the reorganization of the KMT was based on the model of Russian Communist Party. Sun was not a Communist sympathizer. Nevertheless, in order to win support for his revolution, and after failure to obtain support from other western countries, Sun turned his attention to Soviet Russia. In fact, Sun's decision to seek support from Soviet Russia was also caused by two other reasons. Sun was possibly impressed by the successful performance of the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, and by the announcement of Soviet Russia in 1918 of the intention to relinquish all rights and privileges acquired by Tsarist

1. Sun had asked for assistance from Great Britain, the U.S., France and other countries, but none of them, except for Russia, showed any sympathy. See Chong Key-ray, The Sources and Development of Sun Yat-sen's Nationalistic Ideology as Expressed in His "San Min Chu I". (Claremont Graduate School and University Centre, Ph.D. thesis, 1967), pp. 27-36.
Russia. The former led Sun to adopt the Russian method of revolutionary organization for a new KMT in 1924.2 And the latter attracted Sun as an expression of genuine friendship.

Similarly Soviet Russia had its reasons for supporting Sun's call for assistance. To put it very briefly, first of all, immediately after the 1917 Revolution, the new Russian government was desperately in need of international recognition and friendship. For this reason, a friendly China was important not only because Soviet Russia and China shared the longest border in the world (about 3,000 miles), but also because China, though beset by serious internal and external problems, then was still a big country. Secondly, precisely

1. The Russian intention was made known in July 1918. Speaking before the Fifth Congress of the Soviet, Chicherin, the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, outlined the content of Soviet Russia's foreign policy toward China as follows: "We renounce the conquests of the Tsarist government in Manchuria and we restore the sovereign rights of China in this territory...We recall from China all military consular guards..." For text, see Jane Degrass, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy (1917-1941), (London: Oxford University Press, 1951), Vol. I, pp. 158-161. A more dramatic gesture made by Moscow in regard to China was the famous Karakhan Manifesto of 25th July 1919, issued by the Council of the People's Commissars. In a blanket address "to the Chinese Nation and the Governments of Southern and Northern China", the Manifesto proclaimed that the Soviet government abrogated "all secret treaties made before the revolution with China..." returned "to the Chinese people without any kind of compensation the Chinese Eastern Railway, and all mining, gold and forestry concessions which were seized from them by the government of Tsars..." as well as renounced "all territory obtained through aggressive means by the former Russian imperial government in China, Manchuria, and elsewhere...and all special privileges formerly obtained by Russia in China..." See Keiji Furuya, Chiang Kai-shek: His Life and Times, abridged English edition by Chang Chun-ming (New York: St. John's University, 1981), pp. 123-4.

2. See footnote no. 1, page 21.
because of this geographical connection, for reasons of security, Soviet Russia wanted to incorporate part of China's territories, especially Manchuria, into its system. Manchuria—the Northeast Provinces of China—was a huge and rich area with profound economic and industrial potential and strategic importance. That is, in addition to its size, Manchuria had the greatest concentration of heavy industry and railways in China. It also had enormous reserves of coal, iron, and many other minerals. For these reasons, the region had been an issue of major conflict between Japan and Russia since the 19th century because both countries wanted to gain control of it, seeing it as a stepping stone for an invasion of China. China was inevitably involved because Manchuria was historically a part of it. After 1905 Russia had become more concerned about Manchuria, because, as a result of the 1904 Russo-Japanese war, Japan had gained control of Port Arthur and Dairen, a lease of the Liaotung Peninsula, and railway and mining-rights in southern Manchuria. Since then Japan had become a serious menace to China. Even the Russians felt threatened. Thus it was important for Russians to see a strong China opposing Japan. Thirdly, Soviet Russia wanted to spread Communist influence (i.e. ideology) into China. This Soviet effort was to bring China into the anti-imperialist camp of "world revolution". Consequently, Soviet Russia was willing to assist Sun's cause

1. This motivation to see a strong China however did not conflict with Russia's territorial ambition on China. For the Russians, the strategy to gain access to Manchuria and its neighbouring areas was to get the Japanese out of the region first.
and had actually worked to get involved in China's domestic affairs.

Nevertheless, although Sun sought collaboration with Soviet Russia, he was still sceptical about the real intentions of the Russians. Thus, in order to avoid the possibility of Communist influence spreading in China, Sun insisted on issuing a joint manifesto with Adolph A. Joffe, a Soviet adviser, before the reorganization of the KMT. The manifesto, issued on 26th January 1923, contained Sun's position that he had no intention whatsoever of instituting the Communist system in China on the one hand, and on the other hand, a Soviet pledge not to impose Communism on China:

"Dr. Sun Yat-sen holds that the Communist order or even the Soviet system cannot actually be introduced into China, because there do not exist here the conditions for the successful establishment of either communism or Sovietism. This view is entirely shared by Mr. Joffe, who is further of the opinion that China's paramount and most pressing problem is to achieve national unification and attain full national independence, and regarding this great task, he has assured Dr. Sun Yat-sen that China has the warmest sympathy of the Russian people and can count on the support of Russia." 1

To further reaffirm this position of "no Communism in China", Sun proposed that his San Min Chu, i.e. the Three Principles of the People—Nationalism, Democracy and People's Livelihood, be the cornerstone of the Chinese revolution.

The manifesto hence became the foundation of the subsequent cooperation between the KMT and Soviet Russia. The programme of cooperation was immediately implemented with exchanges of personnel between the two sides. In June 1923, Sun sent his military aid, Chiang Kai-shek, to Russia to study Soviet military and political conditions. In exchange, an old Bolshevik, Michael Borodin, together with some other Soviet advisers, arrived in China. Borodin's major tasks were to act as the principal political adviser to Sun and to assist him in carrying out the reorganization of the KMT. Meanwhile, under Russian coaching, the Whampoa Military Academy was founded in Canton, with Chiang Kai-shek as Commandant, to train national revolutionary forces. As a result, Soviet influence in China's national affairs grew steadily. Nevertheless, it did not take the KMT too long to realize that the real Soviet intention was not to help it in the Chinese revolution but to assist the CCP to build up its own strength and to split the KMT, already torn by serious internal clashes.

(ii) Admission of the Chinese Communists into the KMT

First of all, it needs to be mentioned that Communist influence in China began prior to the establishment of the CCP in 1921. It began since 1919. In that year, the International Communist Organization, the Comintern, was set up in Moscow. Its influence immediately reached in China when a Communist agent Grigory Voitinsky was sent to China to meet radical elements there and to help organize
The important leaders in charge of organizing various Communist groups at that time were Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Li Ta-chao and Mao Tse-tung. Abroad, in France, Chou En-lai and others carried out similar activities among the Chinese there with the purpose of propagating Communism. The arrival of the Russian Communist agents in China constituted an important factor in the subsequent birth of the CCP. The role of the CCP and its relations with the Russian Communist movement will be examined in more detail shortly.

In 1924, encouraged by Russian Communists and reassured by the Sun-Joffe manifesto, the reorganized KMT recruited several Chinese Communists as individual members. As a consequence, a number of important Communists were elected to the Central Committee of the KMT: for instance, Li Ta-chao, T'an Ping-shan and Yu Shu-teh as regular members; Mao Tse-tung, Chang Kuo-t'ao, Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, Lin Tsu-han, Han Lin-fu and Yü Fang-chou as alternate members. Also important in this recruitment was the appointment of Chou En-lai as head of the political department of the Whampoa Military Academy.

One needs to emphasize the point that, despite this decision, Sun never trusted the Chinese Communists wholeheartedly. On one occasion he was quoted as saying: "if the Communists betray the Kuomintang, I will be first to propose their

1. The society was headquartered in Shanghai with branches in Peking and in several other provinces: Hunan, Hupei, Chekiang, Anhwei, Shantung, and Kwangtung.

2. Ch'en Tu-hsiu was in charge of the group activities in Shanghai, Li Ta-chao in Peking, and Mao Tse-tung in Hunan.
expulsions."¹ As this study will show later, Sun's concern proved justified.

Other decisions adopted at this occasion concerned the organization of peasants and workers. Sun was fully aware of their living and working conditions and intended to improve them. As a consequence, the KMT set up a department in charge of labour and peasant movements, headed by Liao Chung-kai. In Sun's opinion, the task of the Chinese labour movement was not to attack the capitalists, but to support his San Min Chu I.² As to the peasant problem in China, Sun deemed that it could be solved through peaceful cooperation among the government, farmers, and land owners, rather than through conflict and destruction.³ Various mass organizations were also established at this time throughout the country by students, workers, peasants, and businessmen. Unfortunately, as will be shown later, the KMT were not able to mobilize their support. On the contrary, it was the CCP which played a leading role in all these activities.

(b) The goals of the KMT

Accompanying the reorganization of the KMT was the modification of the Party goals. These were made in


accordance with the prevailing conditions in China. The initial goals of the Party, as declared in the Hsing Chung Hui mentioned earlier, were "to overthrow the Manchus, restore the Chinese union, and establish a republic". In 1919, the Party was to advance the "consolidation of the Republic and implementation of the San Min Chu I". In the 1924 National Congress of the KMT, its goals were obviously broadened to include elements of social reform and a fundamental readjustment of China's international status. Its tone was nationalistic: it identified China's enemies as imperialism and militarism (i.e. warlordism). It singled out farmers and labourers as potential sources of support but also appealed to intellectuals, soldiers, young people and women. It condemned the position of landlords in relation to tenants and of employers in relation to labourers. Western privileges in China were condemned openly. Thus, the KMT adopted a more detailed programme for the implementation of San Min Chu I. It was to "abolish the unequal treaties and to restore China's international status" (Nationalism), to encourage "direct exercise of right by the people" (Democracy), and to promote "equalization of landownership" and "regularization of private capital" (People's Livelihood). These goals were subsequently reaffirmed several times. Realization of San Min Chu I therefore became the political platform of the KMT as well as the ideological framework of the ROC on which the task of national revolution and reconstruction was to be based. In 1947, it was officially incorporated by the national

government of the ROC in its Constitution as the state ideology.¹

(c) The KMT leadership

Sun died in 1925 with his goals of unifying and rebuilding China unfulfilled. At the time of his death, Sun was the supreme leader or Tsung-li (President) of the KMT. The leadership then passed to Chiang Kai-shek who was elected to the Presidency in 1928. Ten years later, Chiang became the Tsung-tsai (Director-General) of the Party. Here one needs to point out that during this ten years Chiang’s dominating influence in the KMT was exercised through his control of the Whampoa Military Academy. That is, Chiang was not actually in full control of the KMT party, due to inner Party divisions. The split was marked by the existence of different factions, notably the leftists (radicals) and the rightists (conservatives), in the Party, opposing each other.² The rightist faction, led by Hu Han-min, proposed to oppose imperialism and warlordism and believed in Sun’s San Min Chu I. The leftist faction, led by Wang Ching-wei, also proposed to oppose imperialism and warlordism, but was more in favour of Communist ideology. This faction later proved to have very


². For literature on the KMT’s internal split and the power struggle between Chiang Kai-shek, Hu Han-min and Wang Ching-wei, see Chester C. Tan, op.cit., Chapter VI, "The Kuomintang Leaders", pp. 162-223.
close relations with Communist movement, for instance, it cooperated with the Chinese Communists and hit hard at the rightist faction.\(^1\) As a matter of fact, some of the leftists were actually Communists. The split was severe after Sun's death with the emergence of three powerful figures: Chiang Kai-shek, Hu Han-min and Wang Ching-wei, competing for leadership in the Party. Chiang was in a more advantageous position in the struggle because he was then in command of the Party army. Hu died in 1936. Eight years later Wang died. The death of these rivals helped Chiang to consolidate his power base, which was luckily strengthened anyway during the period of Japanese invasion of Manchuria.\(^2\)

In 1948 Chiang was elected president of China by the National Assembly in accordance with the new Constitution. He was re-elected four more times after that—in 1954, 1960, 1966, and 1972. He was also commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

Despite the damage to his prestige suffered as a result of the loss of the mainland to the Communists, and despite Taiwanese dissatisfaction under the initial period of the KMT rule (1945-49; this will be dealt with later), when Chiang arrived in Taiwan in 1949 as head of the government, party, and army, no one was in a position to challenge his authority. In effect, as the national leader, Chiang was


2. In 1931 Japan invaded and then occupied Manchuria. This action aroused strong anti-Japanese feeling in China. Many anti-Japanese demonstrations were formed. Chiang prohibited demonstrations and concluded an armistice with Japan. It was during this period that Chiang's popularity grew steadily.
regarded as a stabilizing factor for the internal unity of his island nation. However, he died in 1975, having, like Sun, failed to achieve Chinese unification under KMT leadership.

The current leader of the KMT is Chiang Ching-kuo, Chiang Kai-shek's eldest son. He became the President of the ROC in 1978 and formally took over the chairmanship of the KMT after his father's death.¹

(B) The birth and formation of the CCP

In addition to the influence of the Comintern, the birth of the CCP also owed a very great deal to the May Fourth Movement in 1919, but it was not formally institutionalized until 1921.²

The May Fourth Movement was led by the patriotic and progressive students in Peking (renamed Peiping by the KMT in 1937) in protesting against unfair Japanese demands at the Versailles Peace Conference. The story of the Movement can be summarized as follows. A few months after World War I broke out, Japan presented China with the notorious

1. In accordance with the Constitution, the then Vice-President Yen Chia-kan succeeded Chiang Kai-shek. However Yen was never very powerful or influential in terms of policy formulation. This was mainly because Yen, during his presidential term (1975-8), acted practically under Chiang Ching-kuo's guidance and supervision. The latter formally took over Yen's position after the 1978 presidential election.

2. For the most comprehensive description of the movement, see Chow Tse-tsung, The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960). For the Communist evaluation of the movement, see Hu Chiao-mu, Thirty Years of the Communist Party of China (Peking, 1951), pp. 4-7.
Twenty-One-Demands (1915), the acceptance of which would make China a Japanese protectorate. During the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919 the victorious Allies, headed by Great Britain and France, acceded to the Japanese demand of transferring the former German possessions in Shantung to Japan. China, who fought on the side of the Allies, had hoped that Shantung, the home of Confucius, would be returned to China. When this was not done, the Chinese delegation walked out of the peace conference and refused to sign the Versailles Peace Treaty. When news arrived in China that the Chinese delegation had failed in its main mission, students in Peking staged a massive demonstration on May 4, 1919 that was followed by similar demonstrations across the country. Though begun as a patriotic reaction to the unfair treatment of China by the victorious Allies, the May Fourth Movement, named after the Peking demonstration, proved to be much wider in scope in terms of its impact. That is, the Movement not only brought the intellectuals into the streets, in popular demonstrations, but also brought them into even closer contact with the masses. Among these intellectuals, there were, for instance, Ch'en Tu-hsiu, a professor at Peking University, and his colleague, Li Ta-chao, later a co-founder of the CCP, and other prominent figures such as Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai.

After the May Fourth Movement it began to show that the KMT, while under the leadership of Sun having a large following, did not attract many intellectuals into its camp. Like Ch'en Tu-hsiu and Li Ta-chao, for example, they preferred a Communist solution for China. This can be seen from their
earlier action to set up Marxist study groups at Peking University in 1918 to popularize socialist doctrines and the ideas of Karl Marx. This effort, together with the May Fourth Movement, accelerated the spread of Communist revolutionary ideas rapidly in China. This intimate relationship between Russian Communist Party and the CCP was clearly pointed out by Chiang Kai-shek in his book *Soviet Russia In China*. He said:

"The Chinese Communist Party is not indigenous to China. It is an outgrowth of Soviet Russia. This offshoot of Soviet Communism had first to live as a parasite on the Kuomintang and then seek a chance to organize workers, farmers, and other masses in order to stir up class struggle in the name of the Kuomintang. Its aim was to set up, during China's fight for national unification and independence, Russia's very first satellite in Asia." 1

At its inception, the CCP had only a handful of members, mainly professors and students, 2 but its influence and prestige grew steadily. It even set up its own army, the Red Army, in 1927 opposing the KMT's armed forces. In some ways identical to the KMT's declared objectives, the CCP also stressed the importance of unifying China through the policies of anti-imperialism, anti-militarism, labour reforms,


2. The First Congress of the CCP was held in Shanghai on 1st July 1921. At that time, the total number of Communist members throughout the country was no more than sixty. The Congress was attended by 12 delegates including Mao Tse-tung, Chang Kuo-t'ao, etc. The Comintern was represented at the Congress by H. Maring. Ch'en Tu-hsiu was elected as first Secretary-General of the CCP. Later in October, Mao Tse-tung became the Secretary of its Hunan branch.
and "democratic revolution". It was very obvious that, the CCP's long term goal was not to set up Sun's San Min Chu I system but a Communist system in China. It was on this matter--i.e. ideology--that the KMT and the CCP found themselves in complete disaccord. Thus, although the KMT allowed the admission of the CCP members to its ranks and the two parties formally formed two United Fronts (1924-26 and 1937-38), conflict, distrust and incompatibility were really the main features of their relationship. These were also the crucial reasons for their final split after 1945.

In 1935, Mao Tse-tung emerged as the Party leader. In June 1945 he was formally confirmed as Chairman of the CCP and he held this post until his death in 1976.

1. At the Second Congress in 1922, the CCP declared its goals as follows: (1) Overthrow the feudal warlords and stop civil wars, so that internal peace can be established within China; (2) Free China from imperialist oppression, so as to bring about her true independence; (3) Unify China, including Monogolia, so that a truly democratic republic can be established; (4) Recognize the internal autonomy of Monogolia, Tibet, and Sinkiang; (5) Under the principle of federation, incorporate Monogolia, Tibet, and Sinkiang as part of the Republic of China; (6) Respect and protect all freedoms; and (7) Enact laws to protect workers, peasants, women, and children. The CCP's First Congress did not issue a declaration or pass a resolution. The Second Congress was much better prepared, because it not only passed a CCP organizational law but also issued a long declaration. See Wang Chien-min, Chung-kuo Kung-ch'an tang shih-kao (History of the Chinese Communist Party: A Rough Draft) (Taipei: Publisher and date of publication not indicated), Vol. I, pp. 58-9.

2. The CCP joined the Comintern in 1922, indicating its intention to institutionalize Communist ideology in China.
(2) **Collaboration and confrontation: the KMT-CCP relationship from 1921 to 1945**

The KMT and the CCP formed alliances on two occasions. The First United Front, from 1924 to 1926, was formed to stamp out the warlords, and the Second United Front, from 1937 to 1938, was to resist Japanese aggression against China. The former was known as the Northern Expedition campaign and the latter as the Resistance War against Japanese aggression.

Both coalitions were short-lived, because while the primary motivation of the CCP was to advance its own power base among the masses and in the armed forces at the expense of the declared objectives of the coalitions, the KMT, suspicious of the CCP's real intention, also wanted to promote its own interests, namely, to undermine the CCP's influence and to unify China under the San Min Chu I system. Thus, shortly after the completion of the Northern Expedition, Chiang Kai-shek started a series of "annihilation campaigns" against the Communists. This decision to curb Communist influence included the expulsion of several Russian officers whom Chiang believed were scheming with the leftist elements of the KMT against him. In this connection, a few words must be said to describe Russian penetration in the KMT's affairs.¹

Initially Chiang had continued Sun's policy of cooperation with Soviet Russia, and had also depended on Soviet agents for political advice. He had even sent his son, Ching-kuo, to

¹ For an account of Russian activities in China, see Chiang Kai-shek, *op. cit.*, pp. 30-36.
Russia for military training and political education. Nevertheless, Chiang soon discovered evidence of Russian Communist plans to use China's national revolution to stir up trouble in China and to alienate him from other factions of the KMT. In fact, although the Russians had responded to Sun's call for assistance, they were unwilling to see a coalition within the KMT as this might affect its plan to spread Communist ideology in China. Moreover, the Russians were of the view that a united KMT might again seek alliance with the imperialist powers. Thus, the Russians worked, through the radical elements of the KMT, first, to split the KMT, then, to drive out the conservative members, and finally turn it on to an even more radical course.

When Chiang realized Russians' real intention, he, in addition to the purge campaign to rid the KMT of Communists, ordered the immediate closure of all Russian diplomatic missions and commercial establishments in China. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were severed. Thus came to an end, at the close of 1927, the first period of China's ill-fated alignment with Soviet Russia. After that, there were another two periods of KMT cooperation with the Russians: from 1932 to 1945 and from 1945 to 1949. These will be dealt with later.

1. For information on Young Chiang's experience with Russian Communists, see, e.g. Tillman Durdin, "Chiang Ching-kuo's Taiwan", Pacific Community, VII (October 1975), pp. 92-227; also his "Chiang Ching-kuo and Taiwan: A Profile", Orbis, XVIII (Winter 1975), pp. 1023-1042. See also "Chiang Ching-kuo" in Howard L. Boorman, ed. Biographical Dictionary of Republican China Vol. I, pp. 306-312.
Chiang's extermination campaign did little to achieve its purposes. Instead, it reinforced ties between the two Communist parties. It also helped the CCP to win more sympathy and public support, and hence contributed to the consolidation of its strength.

In September 1931, the Japanese army launched a military invasion of Manchuria. This aggressive action gradually escalated into the Sino-Japanese War on 7th July 1937. Almost immediately, the Second United Front was established. In this connection, it is necessary to say a few words about Japanese interests in China.

The expansionists in Japan had long held the opinion that China's unity was Japan's disaster. In the mind of the Japanese militarists, a unified and strong China would block their aggressive design in Asia. It was therefore a great disappointment for them to see the achievement of the Nationalist unification of China in 1928. The fact that China was now united did bring prestige and quick international recognition to the KMT-dominated national government of the ROC. And during its first few years in power, the national government had proved its ability and intention to advance national conditions and had, to some extent, improved its political image at home and abroad. It also had some success in reasserting China's sovereignty. For instance, several concession areas were returned to Chinese control, and the foreign powers assented to China's resumption of tariff autonomy, which China had lost during the period of the unequal treaties. Yet these were merely token gains because the unequal treaties were scarcely breached. One instance was Japan's continued possession of its special
rights in Manchuria. Chiang wanted Japan to leave Manchuria but Japan wanted to stay. Relations between the two countries remained cold and strained. On top of this, Soviet Russia was waiting for a chance to get into Manchuria. Thus, in order to prevent China from further integration as well as from Soviet domination, Japan took preemptive strike in Manchuria in 1931.

China immediately appealed to the League of Nations to take action against the Japanese aggression. The League called upon Japan to refrain from aggravating the dispute, but it failed to impose sanctions on the aggressor. The Great Powers, though not solidly behind the League decisions, took little action to support China. After that until the War broke out in 1937, the Soviet Union was in fact China's major supporter. The Soviet support—came during the KMT-CCP Second United Front—was marked by the U.S.S.R.-ROC Non-aggression Pact, signed on 21st August 1937. Under the Pact, the Russians quickly sent ammunition, military advisers, and hundreds of aircraft with Soviet pilots to China. Later on the Soviet Union also extended credits for military aid to China for civilian purchases and currency stabilization.

Thus, during this period Russian influence in China had resumed and grown into its climax. It had effectively set up several Soviet regimes in China's important areas. For instance, during the period of 1930-34, there were six scattered areas under the control of the Chinese Soviet Republic. Among these, the "Central Soviet District" along the Kiangsi-Fukien border, was most important. With 17
hsien (counties) and 3 million of population under its control, it lasted for 4 years. The other Soviet districts were much smaller and less permanent. Even so, the establishment of Soviet regimes in China, though controlled by the Chinese Communists, seriously endangered Chinese sovereignty. It also undermined the prospects of China's national unification.

Here, it needs to be mentioned that during the Second United Front, the CCP, in order to show its sincerity in the collaboration, declared its intention of renouncing all Communist programmes, and of adhering to the San Min Chu I doctrine as advocated by Sun. The CCP also declared its intention of abolishing the Chinese Soviet Republic and the Red Army. Nevertheless, as the War dragged on, conflict between the two parties renewed. The major cause of the conflict was the old issue of power—dominance over the other. Thus, instead of concentrating the power of the coalition to resist the common enemies, both Chiang and Mao concentrated on consolidating their power in the areas which they respectively controlled. As soon as these power bases were strengthened, they turned to fight against each other. Consequently, the longer the War went on, the more chaos and confusion China's internal situation underwent.

On 8th December 1941, Japan attacked the U.S. at Pearl Harbour, starting the Pacific War. The War brought the U.S. into alliance with China, and Great Britain joined the Pacific War as its colonial possessions were attacked. This widening of the Sino-Japanese War had both positive and

negative effects on China. On the positive side, it lifted Chinese morale, consequently contributing to the winning of the long-standing War. As one of the War victors, China regained its lost territories, such as Manchuria, Taiwan, the Pescadores Islands, etc. and prestige. On the negative side, however, the return of these territories, noticeably Manchuria at this stage and Taiwan after 1949, created new problems for China. This was because both the KMT and the CCP were determined on a race to gain control of Manchuria, even at the cost of civil war. (The KMT-CCP confrontation over Taiwan will be dealt with later.) The situation became more complicated when the Soviet Union, in view of its strategic and economic significance, also joined into the race for Manchuria.

(3) China's relations with the U.S. and the Soviet Union during World War II

(A) Relations with the U.S.

Unlike Soviet Russia, the U.S. refrained from military assistance to the KMT government during its war with Japan. The U.S. decision was partly due to its national policy of non-involvement in China's internal affairs and partly due to the decisions reached at the League of Nations. However,

as an expression of sympathy and friendship, the U.S. had provided China with financial assistance by extending both loans and credits to China in addition to lend-lease assistance. The first U.S. military aid to China came on 17th April 1941 when President Roosevelt approved an amount of US $45,000,000 to Chiang.\(^1\) After that the U.S. assistance to China, hence its involvement in its national affairs, began to grow steadily.

First of all, after Pearl Harbour, the U.S. and Great Britain became fully-fledged allies of China, meaning a promise of not only collaboration with, but also financial and military support to, China. Secondly, as an expression of friendship to China, the U.S. and Great Britain, by their treaties with China dated 11th January 1943, abolished their extraterritorial jurisdiction in China. They also attempted to elevate China into a great power status after the War.\(^2\)

However, this international alliance was marked by deep conflict, which was caused mainly by the different priorities of interests of the partners involved. While Chiang's main concern was in China and in Asia, the other allies were more concerned with Europe. The existence of these divergent viewpoints led to many controversies that had powerful

\(^1\) The China Yearbook, 1980, p 397.

\(^2\) Actually British Prime Minister W. Churchill did not agree with this policy initiated by U.S. President F.D. Roosevelt. Churchill, while admired and liked the Chinese as a race and "pitied (them) for their endless misgovernment", however, "did not much like the idea of the Chinese running up and down the Pacific". For information on the U.S. policy of making China a great power and the different views of the major powers on this policy, see Tang Tsou, America's Failure in China, 1941-1950 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1963), pp. 33-87.
repercussions in China. One serious consequence was the decision of the Yalta Conference (February 1945) which was taken at the expense of China without its previous knowledge and consent.

(B) Relations with the Soviet Union and Yalta Conference

Prior to Pearl Harbour, Soviet Russia had been the major military and economic supporter of China. This support was clearly expressed in the 1937 U.S.S.R.-ROC Non-aggressive Pact. Nevertheless, Joseph Stalin's real intention to assist China was to keep China continuously fighting against Japan so as to reduce the chance of the latter's attack on Siberia. This motivation became more pronounced when Germany attacked Russia in June 1941 because Soviet Russia could not possibly fight against two formidable enemies in both East and West at the same time. Thus, during the War period, the relationship between the two countries was rather cordial, despite the fact that Chiang was deeply suspicious of Soviet encouragement for the Chinese Communists to fight against his government.

The turning point of the U.S.S.R.-China relationship was the Yalta Conference. At Yalta, Stalin exacted a very high price for Soviet entry into the Far Eastern War from U.S. President F.D. Roosevelt and the British Prime Minister W. Churchill. Stalin demanded the independence of Outer Mongolia, 1

1. The Soviet Union had provided China with its most substantial military aid, but when Germany attacked Russia in June 1941, this aid virtually ceased. By then, however, the U.S. had sold China 100 fighter planes--the beginning of an American effort to provide air protection.
full occupation of Port Arthur and partial occupation of
Darien (both ports are defence keys to Manchuria) and the
joint management of the Chinese Chungchun Railway. On the
basis of these decisions reached at Yalta, the territorial
integrity of China was again severely damaged. Chiang had
no alternative but to sign the Sino-Soviet Treaty of
Friendship and Alliance on 14th August, the same date of
Japan's surrender, confirming what had been secretly arranged
among the big powers at Yalta. In return, Soviet Russia
promised to support the Nationalist government as the central
government of China. This Treaty, officially terminated by
Chiang on 10th January 1953, marked the third and last
period of the KMT alliance with Russian Communists.

After the War the KMT-CCP alliance also came to an end.
Though Chiang's prestige stood high at that time and China
was now ranked as a great power,¹ these achievements helped
little to bring the country peace and unification. On the
contrary, post-War China was immediately split by a new
civil war which, fought between the KMT-led national
government and the CCP, finally led to the political division
of China in 1949. This division has lasted to the present
day.

¹. By now, all the "unequal treaties" formulated under the
Manchu government were abrogated. Thus China had
regained its national independence.
The factor that caused the outbreak of the civil war was the Manchuria crisis, in which both the national government and the CCP had raced against each other for the final control of Manchuria. The conflict was an extension of the long-standing power struggle between the two hostile parties. Each side distrusted the other, each sought to ensure its own survival. Even a coalition government, which was initially suggested at the Cairo Conference in 1943, was impossible because while the KMT intended to continue its political dominance, the CCP insisted upon the independence of its armies and regional governments under whatever coalition formula might be worked out.¹ Thus after the War, while trying to reach a peaceful settlement through negotiations between the two parties, they had located their military strengths respectively in different areas and tried to resist each other.

The process by which the post-War KMT-CCP conflict developed until October 1949 may be divided into three phases for discussion: (i) from August 1945 to the end of 1946, the KMT and the CCP raced to take over Manchuria, built up their

¹ The idea of a coalition government was suggested when China was still engaged in War and when peaceful negotiations between the two parties were carried on. The main issues in the negotiation were: the disposition, size, and command of the Communist armies; the relationship between Communist-organized regional governments and the national government; and problems of civil rights and legalization of the CCP and its activities in the Nationalist area. Hollington K. Tong, Chiang Kai-shek (Taipei: China Publishing Company, 1953), p. 309.
forces, and fought many limited wars while still conducting negotiations for a peaceful settlement; (ii) during 1947 and the first half of 1948, after initial success by the KMT, the strategic balance turned in favour of the Communists; and (iii) the Communist victory in the later part of 1948 and during 1949.

During the first phase, the roles of both the Soviet Union and the U.S. deserve our special attention.

A concomitant result of Russian entry into the Far Eastern War was its deliberate occupation of Manchuria. Thus, three days before the unconditional surrender of Japan, Soviet Russia declared war against Japan and its troops immediately moved into Manchuria. After the War, Russian troops continued to remain on Chinese soil. They took over military depots of Japanese equipment, weapons and ammunition or destroyed them. More than this, when they eventually evacuated Manchuria in 1947, they handed over some of the military depots that had been well-kept to the Chinese Communists. In this way, they strengthened the CCP considerably in the civil war against the Nationalists.

The U.S. had hoped that there would be a unified and prosperous China after the War so that it could play a positive political role in Asia, opposing Soviet expansionism and Japanese militarism, and maintaining peace in Asia.1 Thus the American government lost no time in mediating between the two parties, hoping to bring about a coalition government or a cessation of hostilities in China. The mediation efforts lasted from September 1944 until January 1947. During this period, the U.S. sent Ambassador Patrick Hurley and General

George C. Marshall to China, but both missions failed. All negotiations ended in March 1947.

The conflict became more severe when both parties took action to consolidate their individual positions. In November 1946, for instance, the national government convoked a National Assembly which, in the absence of the CCP and other minor political parties, decided on the adoption of the Constitution of the Republic of China. The Constitution, which was originally drafted in 1936,

1. In the early years of the Chinese Republic, there were a number of small parties and political groups. Chiefly because of their limited membership, loose organization, as well as lack of leadership and policies, most of them either vanished or were merged with others. The KMT alone weathered the political storms of the Republic and became the ruling party of China until the advent of Communist power on the mainland. When the KMT re united China through military force, the activities of other political parties were not allowed prior to the Sino-Japanese War. The CCP had to resort to arms in order to carry out its programmes. The Chinese Youth Party, founded in Paris in 1923, maintained its existence by seeking protection from local warlords, who were beyond the control of the Nationalist government. Under the circumstances of almost one-party dictatorship, there was little opportunity for people to organize political parties against the policies and programmes of the KMT. The other political parties were, for instance, the China Democratic Socialist Party (founded in 1931), the National Salvation Association of the Chinese People (organized in 1936), the Liberation Action Committee of the Chinese People (organized in 1927), the Chinese Rural Reconstruction Group (established in 1930), the Chinese Vocational Education Association (founded in 1917) and the Chinese Democratic League (organized in 1939). The Chinese Youth Party still functions in Taiwan. Another party in Taiwan is the China Democratic Socialist Party, established in Shanghai on 15th August 1946. See, e.g. The China Yearbook, 1974:118-131.

2. There was a draft constitution proclaimed by the national government of the ROC on 5th May 1936. A constitutional National Assembly was scheduled for 12th November of that year to write a finished constitution based on the draft. However, shortly afterwards, the Sino-Japanese War broke out. The ROC's efforts to introduce constitutional government were therefore delayed. The Constitution of the ROC of 1947 was based on the 1936 draft constitution with some revisions.
came into effect on 25th December the following year. It has been and still is the fundamental law of the ROC. It has also been regarded as the mandate on which the ROC's rule is based.

This Constitution reaffirmed Sun Yat-sen's San Min Chu I as the basic philosophy of the state. It called for a division of power between five government bodies of Yuan: the executive (the cabinet), and legislative (the law-enacting organ), the judicial (the agency to interpret the Constitution and serve as a court of last resort), the control (the agency exercising the power of administrative impeachment and of supervising officials), and the one responsible for the civil service examination; and it also enshrined the four people's rights of initiative, referendum, election and recall. More information concerning this division of powers will be given in Chapter Two. The fundamental national policies outlined in this Constitution include six sections: national defence, foreign affairs, national economy, social security, education and culture, and frontier regions.¹

The Constitution may be amended directly by the National Assembly (the agency responsible for amending the Constitution and for electing the President and Vice-President) or upon the proposal of the Legislative Yuan to the National Assembly.² In this respect, it seemed the way was prepared for election of both central and local officials, upon which KMT tutelage would end and democracy would begin.

Regardless of this development, in December the same year, the Communists launched a drastic land reform policy in their occupied areas by enforcing the "Regulations on Compulsory Purchase of Excess Land from the Landlords". By doing this, the CCP effectively weakened the KMT's position and strengthened its own popularity, among the rural classes.

During the second phase, the situation began to tilt in favour of the CCP. One of the reasons for the CCP's success was the result of the land revolution in rural China. Another reason was the poor performance of the national government in the management of national economy. The economic situation in China after the War progressively deteriorated because of the prolonged fighting. This was also the main cause of inflation and declining living standards. Moreover, much tax revenue failed to reach the treasury because of malpractices throughout the bureaucracy. There were also widespread criticisms of corruption and inefficiency in the government. But the turning point in the war came with the battles fought in Manchuria in late 1947, when the CCP forces crushed the government's best armies. After this the KMT-led national government experienced irreparable military and economic disasters, with one province after another being lost to the Communists.

1. For information on the national condition of China at that time, see Brian Crozier, The Man Who Lost China (London: Angus and Robertson, 1977), pp. 301-346.
Finally, the fate of China was gradually sealed after early January 1949 when the Communist victory became gradually a political reality on the mainland. During the first half of 1949, the national government lost control of more than half of China although it still had a large army. At this stage the U.S., clinging to its basic policy of non-involvement in China's civil war and internal political problems, continued to provide a moderate amount of aid to the national government. Nevertheless, this support did little to promote the KMT's military operations.

After the second half of 1949, the national government became helpless with its forces suffering one debacle after another, and with the government base moving from one place to another; it moved first from Nanking to Canton, then to Chungking, and finally, to Taipei. Then in August, the U.S. State Department issued a White Paper on Sino-American relations. This document released at that particular time—when the situation of the national government was undoubtedly hopeless—was really intended to absolve the

1. After the War, U.S. aid to China continued. For a detailed account of U.S. aid-to-China programme during this period, see D.C. Gupta, United States Attitude Towards China (Delhi: S.Chand & Co., 1969), pp. 191-231.

2. The White Paper was proposed by U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk and drafter by Philip C. Jessup. The choice of the publication date for the Paper was a heavy blow to the morale of the ROC. The fall of two provinces without a battle in southwestern China during the winter of 1949 was said to be related to the publication of the Paper. The full text of the Paper is included in United States Relations with China with Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949, Department of State Publication 3573, Far Eastern Series 30; the text of which has been translated and printed in Chinese by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ROC.
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American government of any responsibility for the imminent fall of China's mainland. Thus when Communist armies succeeded in taking the provinces of south and west China—almost the last footholds of the KMT forces on the mainland—the final fall of the national government and the collapse of the KMT forces on the Chinese mainland became inevitable.

In December 1949, the defeated national government re-established itself on Taiwan, to which Chiang Kai-shek had withdrawn early in the year, taking most of the government's gold reserves and the Nationalist air force and navy, and with him, about 1.5 million Chinese emigrants. Taipei, the largest city in Taiwan, was chosen as the provisional capital.

On 1st October the same year, with most of the mainland held by the CCP's forces, Mao Tse-tung proclaimed the establishment in Peking of the People's Republic of China (the PRC), with Peking as its capital. This, however, was not the end of the civil war, as both Chinese governments continued to think of themselves as participants in an unfinished struggle, with the main fronts now to be found along the Taiwan Straits, and with diplomatic confrontations all over the world.

It will be recalled that, on 2nd October, one day after its establishment, the Soviet Union extended recognition to the PRC. The Soviet action constituted a clear violation of the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance signed with the ROC in 1945. As a reply to the Soviet action, the U.S. State Department issued a statement two days later, reaffirming American recognition of the Nationalist government of China.
Thus the initial connection between the unfinished Chinese civil war and Soviet-American post-War rivalry was established. This caused the transformation of the China problem from an internal issue of ideological and political confrontation between two political parties into a Cold War issue, dependent on the development of international ideological and power relations.

II. China and Taiwan after 1949

1. Taiwan and its historical connection with mainland China

Taiwan—or Formosa in Portuguese—¹ is a tropical island lying about 90 to 120 miles off the south eastern coast of the Chinese mainland. It is about 85 miles across at its widest point and about 240 miles long. With an overall area of 14,000 square miles, Taiwan constitutes about 0.38% of the total Chinese territory. In fact, Taiwan is the smallest province and the only island province of China.

Despite this smallness in size, Taiwan, even in its early history, had strategic value. Both Japanese and Chinese

¹ Formosa is a word of Portuguese origin, meaning "the beautiful island". Westerners often use it to describe the island, although Taiwan, a word of unclear origin, is also popularly used. From time to time, attempts are made to attach political significance to one word or the other. For example, advocates of Taiwanese independence living in America usually used the term Formosa in an attempt to deny even a linguistic affiliation with China. Independence advocates who live in Japan, however, are obliged to use the word Taiwan if they wish to be understood. In this study, the island will be called Taiwan. No connection is intended.
pirates used the island as a base for raids on the sea lanes along the Chinese coast, and throughout the kingdoms of Southeast Asia. The 15th century brought the Europeans to Taiwan: first the Portuguese, then the Spanish and the Dutch. They were interested in establishing trading posts. In 1662, Koxinga, the son of a famous Ming pirate and a Japanese woman, expelled the Europeans and made the island his personal kingdom. Twenty years later, his grandson surrendered the kingdom to a Manchu emperor, who incorporated it into Fukien, the closest Chinese province on the mainland. Thus Taiwan was made a province of China.

The Manchu emperors ruled Taiwan from 1683 to 1895, though their administrators did not venture far from the island's garrison towns. In 1894, China and Japan went to war. The Japanese won. By the Treaty of Shimonoseki, the Chinese ceded to the Japanese Taiwan and the Pescadores, a group of islands lying off the west coast of Taiwan. The first decade of Japanese rule was spent in pacification, the next four decades in modernization. At the start of the Second World War, Taiwan was the oldest and wealthiest Japanese colony.

It was not until the Second World War that other nations rose to challenge the Treaty of Shimonoseki. In Cairo in 1943, the Allied powers, headed by Churchill and Roosevelt and Chiang Kai-shek, declared: "All territories that Japan

1. Article II, Treaty of Shimonoseki, signed on 17th April, 1895, see Hungdah Chiu, *op.cit.*, pp. 197-198.
has stolen from China, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and Pescadores, shall be restores to the Republic of China." 1 The Potsdam Declaration of 1945 reaffirmed this intent. 2 When the War ended, the Supreme Commander of the Allied powers gave the Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek authority to accept the Japanese surrender and administer the island. In the 1952 Peace Treaty between the ROC and Japan, the latter formally relinquished its claim to the island. 3

2. Taiwan under the KMT rule, the initial period: 1945-1949

It is said that the native Taiwanese population, about six millions, initially welcomed the arrival of the new Chinese government in 1945. Nevertheless, to their disappointment, for two years after its transfer from Japan to China, the national government, still dominated by the KMT, preoccupied with the civil war, paid relatively little attention to the development of the island. The first Governor-General, Chen Yi, was appointed by the national government from the mainland. His policy was to exclude the native islanders from the government, and meanwhile to exercise some sort of military control over them. Chen Yi's discriminatory policy not only antagonized the native population but also provoked tension between the latter and the 1.5 million mainlanders who came to the island after the Second World War. On 28th February 1947, conditions had become so bad that the local

1. Ibid., p. 207.
2. Ibid., pp. 208-209.
3. Ibid., pp. 245-247.
Taiwanese revolted, which led the national government to resort to force to restore order. The incident is known as the "February 28th Uprising". One serious consequence was that a few of the Taiwanese who had been active in the uprising escaped to Hong Kong, where they founded the Taiwan Independence Movement. The Movement advocated an independent state of Taiwan governed by Taiwanese only, and it appealed to the memory of the uprising to stimulate Taiwanese antipathy to KMT rule.¹ This Independence Movement has constituted another potential threat to the KMT's minority rule on the island.

In May, a new Chinese governor, Wei Tao-ming, was appointed. Wei was a civilian and his policy was to pacify local discontent by admitting large numbers of natives into his administration. Nevertheless, he was unable to repair the damage caused by the uprising. Nor could he win the confidence of the native Taiwanese immediately and whole-heartedly in KMT rule.

¹. The Taiwan Independence Movement is also active in the U.S., Japan and some European countries. For a full account of the movement, see George H. Kerr, Formosa Betrayed (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965). Kerr, who was American vice-consul in Taipei when the uprising and its supression occurred, was an eye-witness to some events and had first hand account of others. He had many friends among the Taiwanese, some of whom were killed, and his account is openly partisan. For another account sympathetic to the Taiwanese, see Douglas Mendel, The Politics of Formosan Nationalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970). Even detached observers such as General Albert Wedemeyer were strongly critical of the conduct of the Nationalist government during the uprising. See US Department of States, United States Relations with China (Washington, D.C. August 1949), p. 309. For an official Nationalist report, see The Truth about the February 28, 1947 Incident in Taiwan (Taiichung; Historical Research Commission of Taiwan Province, 1967).
In the meantime, the unsettling consequences of the civil war reached the island. As mentioned earlier after January 1949, Nationalist troops began to withdraw from the mainland. Accompanying them were a large number of the civilian mainlanders. Thus, by autumn that year, there were about 1.5 million Chinese mainlanders living among 6 million Taiwanese. General Chen Cheng (1898-1965) was appointed by Chiang Kai-shek as the new governor of Taiwan. It needs to be pointed out here that while the mainlanders began to emigrate to the island, some communist underground agents, capitalizing on local dissatisfaction with the Nationalist government, started a vigorous drive to infiltrate the island. Thus, in his short term as governor, Chen Cheng concentrated his efforts not only on stabilizing the island's political and economic conditions but also on suppressing communist activities.

For these reasons, "Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion" were adopted on 18th April 1948 by the National Assembly of the ROC on Taiwan. In accordance with the procedure prescribed in Paragraph 1 of Article 174 of the Constitution, the provisions empower the President:

"...during the Period of Communist Rebellion, by resolution of the Executive Yuan Council, to take emergency measures to avert an imminent danger to the security of the State or of the people, or to cope with any serious financial
or economic crisis, without being subject to the procedural restrictions prescribed in Article 39 or Article 43 of the Constitution."

In addition to these measures, Chen Cheng also reformed Taiwan's currency to ward off the impact of inflation on the island, and introduced the 37.5 per cent land rent reduction programme. This was the first phase of Taiwan's land reform.

In December that year, with the arrival of the national government and the national headquarters of the KMT, the relocation of the ROC on Taiwan seemed to have been completed. Chen Cheng became Premier the following year.

During the first years of Chinese rule on Taiwan, the KMT had little party activity locally. It set up a provincial committee but made no serious effort to recruit the indigenous elements. It was only after the arrival of the Party's national headquarters that the KMT began to develop its local strength and actively to seek natives as members.

The terms "Nationalist government" and "Communist government" will be used from now on to refer to the two Chinese governments.

1. The procedural restrictions prescribed in Art. 39—which allows the President to declare and to terminate martial law, and Art. 43—which authorizes the President to issue emergency orders, are that the President's decisions to carry out the above rights during state emergency depend on the confirmation of the Legislative Yuan. In case the Legislative Yuan withholds confirmation, the said orders shall forthwith cease to be valid. The China Yearbook, 1979, pp. 651-2.

2. Chen Cheng was elected as the Vice-President from 1954 until his death in 1965.
3. Taiwan under the Nationalist government: after 1949

Thus, in the whole course of history, Taiwan has been administered from the mainland of China for only two periods—from 1683 to 1895 and from 1945 to 1949. Since 1949, the island has been governed by the Nationalist government of the ROC directly. The island has never been under Communist rule.

As noted earlier, the cause of the dispute has been that both Chinese governments have claimed legitimacy over the island, in addition to the claim on the mainland.

Despite the outcome of the civil war, neither Chiang Kai-shek nor his followers regarded the 1949 retreat as permanent, but as merely tactical. They were determined to return to the mainland, to terminate Communist rule there and to re-unite the country under Nationalist leadership. Chiang's determination can be found in one of his numerous speeches:

"So long as there are still a few comrades who are willing to die with me for the cause (i.e. national reunification and reconstruction), I shall keep the White-Sun-Blue-Sky flag (the Nationalist flag) flying and fight on."

Taiwan was, and still is, therefore, regarded as a base for offensive operations:

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1. Extract from President Chiang's speech in the opening address to the Seventh National Congress of the KMT, held on 10th October 1952 at Taipei. See Chang Chi-yun, The Rebirth of the Kuomintang (The Seventy National Congress) translated into English by Nee Yuan-ching, revised and edited by Tsao Wen-yen, (Taipei: China Cultural Service, no date), p. 10.
"After making Taiwan secure, we (the Nationalists) can proceed to mobilize our resources to turn it into a model province based on the Three Principles of the People, and also a formidable stronghold for the recovery of the mainland."  

"Hsiao-mieh Kung-fei, Tai-hui Ta-lyu" ("Wipe Out the Red Bandits (i.e. Chinese Communists) and Recover the Mainland") thus becomes the national slogan of the Nationalists. In relation to this slogan, as Chapter Three will show, a programme of resisting Soviet Russia is adjoined. The slogan can therefore also be understood as "Fan-kung K'ang-eh", meaning "Opposing Chinese Communists and Resisting Soviet Russia".

However how did the Nationalist government, as a defeated force, secure Taiwan in the first place and then proceed to the programme of modernization there after the island had been badly damaged politically, economically, socially and psychologically by the Second World War?

Here it is necessary to say a few words about the capabilities of the Nationalist government after 1949.  

As mentioned earlier, since 1949, the area under the Nationalist government's effective control has been confined to an area of 0.38% of the whole Chinese territory, including Taiwan, the Pescadores, and the offshore island groups of Quemoy and Matsu. Thus in comparison to the Communist

1. Chang Chi-yun, ibid., p. 35.

2. "Capability" is only a relative term. This section provides only some very general background information about the ROC's national capability after 1949, but does not imply that the ROC's national capability is static.
government on the mainland, the Nationalist government on Taiwan is but a minor power. Nevertheless, as a minor power, the Nationalist government has had both advantages and disadvantages in terms of capability. The advantages were that it made the Nationalist government's modernization programme (i.e. transforming Taiwan into a model province based on the Three Principles) possible and manageable, which it had not been during the Nationalist rule on the mainland. The disadvantages were that it set a physical limit on the development and capability of the Nationalist government.

Taiwan has very few mineral resources. But it has a good record of agricultural development. Similar to other island nations, Taiwan has depended on foreign trade. Particularly during the early stage of economic development, it had to make use of agricultural exports to pay for foreign raw materials or capital intensive goods. (For more information on Taiwan's post-1949 economic development, see Chapter Six.) Such a dependence on import-export trade, though important for the economic viability and modernization of the island, could have had a negative effect on Taiwan, had there been any economic blockage from outside.

Significantly related to Taiwan's economic situation has been its military strength. The two issues are often discussed together because on the one hand, a country's military build-up is dependent upon its economy; on the other hand, a large military build-up could drain resources which might otherwise be available for national economic growth and development.
The Nationalist government has always been torn by the dilemma of whether it ought to maintain a large armed force of, reportedly, almost 600,000 (excluding the reserve) ready for combat operations, equipped with modern, sophisticated weapons at the expense of the island's economic development; or whether it ought to abandon the "mainland recovery" programme and concentrate its economic efforts on improving Taiwan's economic conditions and people's living standards.

The problems that have actually faced the Nationalist government in terms of military strength have concerned the maintenance of military supply lines from overseas, mainly from the U.S.; military modernization with the most up-to-date equipment; the ability and necessity of the Nationalist government on its own to maintain such a large armed forces; and internal and external support for its military programme of "recovering the mainland".

Since the 1950's the U.S. has been Taiwan's major arms supplier. Under the 1954 U.S.-ROC Mutual Defence Treaty (see Chapter Three), the U.S. was to assist the Nationalist government to modernize its weapons and equipment through either cooperative production or trade. The U.S. was also obliged to provide the Nationalist government with military advice. Nevertheless, important as it was (and still is) to Taiwan's national defence, this supply system has been interrupted several times since the early 1970s. The interruptions were caused by the changes in U.S. policies towards the two Chinese governments which were clearly marked in the 1969 Guam Doctrine, enunciated by the U.S.
President Richard Nixon. Consequently, the Nationalist government has had to look to other countries for sources of supply, including South Africa, Israel and Western Europe.\(^1\) Thus, despite the fact that the Nationalist army is numerically large compared to the island's relatively small size; and despite the fact that, it has been said, the Nationalist government is capable of manufacturing and repairing a limited amount of modern high performance weaponry, ammunition, electronic communications facilities and certain types of aircraft and vessels at home, and that it has the potential of producing nuclear weapons, the Nationalist government has suffered severely from an uncertain supply system, particularly during the 1970s. (This will be dealt with again in Chapter Six.)

Closely related to the military supply system has been the question of whether a large military build-up is indeed necessary; or if the Nationalist government is capable by itself of maintaining such a large armed force and if so for what. In this connection, mention should be made of the importance of the two offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu, to the national defence of Taiwan.

Judging from their location, there is no doubt that these two islands constitute the "front line" of the ROC's defence. This also partially explains the reasons why there

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1. There were scattered reports that the Nationalist government have arms deals with these countries, see for example, Fox Butterfield, "Secret Taiwan Deal for Israeli Missiles Reported", *International Herald Tribune* (7th April 1977), p. 5; Melinda Liu, "Israel fills Nationalists' Arms Gap", *Far Eastern Economic Review* (FEER) (29th April 1977), pp. 24-6.
were the two Quemoy crises. However, although for the purposes of Taiwan's defence, possession of these islands by the Nationalist government has advantages, it also has certain disadvantages for both governments in the civil war. For both rival governments, the islands constitute a link between Taiwan and the mainland, symbolizing the "one China" position maintained by them. For the Nationalist government, they also serve to bottle up the ports of Amoy and Foochou, preventing the Communist government from using them as assembly points for forces preparing to invade Taiwan. Nevertheless, for the Communist government, the islands offer a convenient place from which to exert controlled military pressure on the Nationalist government at an acceptable cost. They can be bombarded, or their re-supply can be interdicted (as happened during the second Quemoy crisis), without the awkward international repercussions that would result from blockading or attacking Taiwan.

Here the Nationalist government faces another dilemma: if it sets about strengthening the two principal islands' defence by deploying even more troops on the already over-armed islands (the Nationalist government reportedly stations nearly one-third of its troops, all crack units, on the two

1. Quemoy depends heavily on Taiwan for consumer goods, military resupplies and many other things. It is because nearly 53.55% of the land is hilly and only 36.36% is arable. Although Quemoy is almost self-sufficient in food (its major crops are sweet potatoes, peanuts, vegetables, soy beans, etc.) it does not grow rice. Hence the supply line from Taiwan either by sea or by air is of vital importance to the viability of Quemoy, The China Yearbook, 1979, p. 88.
islands, with about three-quarters of that contingent on Quemoy), then it not only provokes tension along the Taiwan Straits but increases the risk of a Communist invasion of the islands. On top of this, the Communist government may attempt to prevent their resupply. Consequently, the Nationalist government may risk losing one third of its army as well as international (U.S.) sympathy. However, paradoxically, if the Nationalist government reduces its garrisons on the offshore islands, which may have the effect of reducing the chances of a Communist invasion on them, then the Communist government may mistake the purpose of this withdrawal as an attempt by the Nationalist leaders to opt for independence from the mainland. An additional consideration has been that the Nationalist government has maintained a rather weak navy and air force. 1 The significance of the offshore islands to the defence of Taiwan as well as their relevance to the unfinished civil war will be discussed again in Chapters Three and Four.

Finally, internal support for, and external opinions on, the Nationalist government’s programme of mainland recovery are also relevant to the military strength of the ROC’s national capability. That is, if both internal and external opinion was in favour of the programme, i.e. if the local Taiwanese majority and the Mainlander minority supported the Nationalist cause and the U.S. etc. were

willing to supply military equipment to Taiwan, then it might be often conducive to a more effective operation of the Nationalists' programme. Conversely, lack of these supports might cripple the ability of the Nationalist government to carry out this programme. Thus it is essential for the Nationalist government to secure support, and hence its national position, both at home and abroad. The two issues are inter-related and will now be examined.

To augment support from the local Taiwanese as well as to promote integration of the latter and the mainlanders (in other words, to imbue the Taiwanese with the value system of the Nationalists), the Nationalist government has since the 1950s adopted several measures to meet specific demands. For instance, with respect to the Taiwanese, the Nationalist government's policies are aimed at, essentially, a substantial improvement of their economic position whilst very slowly but positively responding to their political aspirations for participation in government. With respect to the mainlanders, the Nationalist government has concentrated its efforts on improving the life of two key groups of people: the functionaries of the national government and the retired servicemen.¹ The government has also encouraged integration and communication between the two communities.

Here it is necessary to say a few words about the government structure of the ROC on (as well as the pattern of political participation in) Taiwan since 1949.

Despite, or rather because of, the fact that Taiwan is but a province of China, the Nationalist government has adopted a two-tiered government system on the island. That is, the ROC on Taiwan has: on the national level, (1) a President (Head of State), (2) a national (central) government, dominated by the KMT and its members (mainly the mainlanders), temporarily located in Taipei, (3) the National Assembly (the electoral college), (4) the five branches of government (the five Yuans); and on the local level, a Provincial government and two special municipal governments, led by the Taiwanese.¹

Since 1948 there has been almost no popular selection of members of the national representative institutions.²


2. The Nationalist government began to improve its democratic image gradually after Chiang Ching-Kuo came to power. Prior to this, elections, mainly on the local level, seemed to have only a routine function. It was dominated by the KMT which was (and still is) run by the mainlanders. A recent election on 6th December 1980, which saw 403 candidates vie for 97 seats in the Legislative Yuan and 76 seats in the National Assembly, however, may be seen as Taiwan’s first national election. It was also precedent-setting in a number of other ways: new election laws had just been written, the government allowed one-party or “without party” opposition candidates to say almost anything they wished, many new issues were voiced during the campaigning, and the KMT seemed to reassess the need to appeal to the population as a competing party. For further details, see John F. Copper, “Taiwan’s Recent Election: Progress toward a Democratic System”, Asian Survey (October 1981), pp. 1029-39.
These institutions include the National Assembly (the normal term is six years), the Legislative Yuan (the normal term is three years), and the Control Yuan (the normal term is also six years). Thus, the current National Assembly under the Constitution was elected in November 1947 with 2691 delegates; the Legislative Yuan was elected in December 1948, with 760 delegates; and the Control Yuan was elected in the same year, with 180 delegates. The National Assembly, which elected KMT Director-General Chiang Kai-shek to the presidency in 1948, subsequently renewed his term four times, the Executive Yuan (the cabinet) has since 1949 been under the exclusive control of the KMT without participation by other parties.

In other words, there has been a lack of popular election at the "national" level. According to the Nationalist government, this is because a national election could only be justified if it were carried out on the mainland with all the mainland population involved. "The Chinese leaders did not wish to absorb a large number of Chinese from one province (i.e. Taiwan) into a government intended to rule all of China." An additional consideration has been that: "Right now Taiwan's survival is more important to the people than whether it has more or less democracy." Thus the terms of the original members of these elective bodies were extended for the

duration of "the Period of Communist Rebellion".
Nevertheless, the membership in these bodies has gradually declined over the years because old members slowly pass away. At the same time it was not possible to hold new elections throughout China. Thus by 1969, it was evident that new members would have to be added. Thus, special elections were held in Taiwan since 1969, adding new members to all three bodies. ¹

In contrast to this, the Nationalist government has encouraged local self-rule (by the Taiwanese) since 1949 by holding numerous elections at the provincial and local

1. Taking 1969, 1972 and 1973 as examples, new members adding to the three elective bodies were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National elective bodies</th>
<th>Original Membership</th>
<th>Remaining Original members</th>
<th>Members elected in 1969</th>
<th>Members elected '72-'73</th>
<th>Total membership in Dec.1979</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Assembly</td>
<td>2,961⁽¹⁾</td>
<td>1,281</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>1,185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Yuan</td>
<td>760⁽²⁾</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Yuan</td>
<td>180⁽²⁾</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

⁽¹⁾ elected November 1947
⁽²⁾ elected in 1948.

levels. ¹

In terms of functions of the two tiers, the provincial and special municipal governments are responsible for management of local affairs; namely they should take charge of problems involving educational, social or rural developments. They should also help the central government in carrying out its duties. The duties of the central government are concentrated on matters such as national defence (including military affairs and the policy of mainland recovery), foreign affairs, national finance, foreign trade policies, and national economy, etc.

Thus, even to the present day, the Nationalist government is predominantly and deliberately kept as a mainland government, controlled by the KMT and its members.² This situation has been described by Tai Hung-chao as a "one-Party authoritarian government".³ At the top of the

1. The system of local self-government in Taiwan was introduced in 1950. The KMT, however, has had the responsibility of putting forward and supporting candidates for elections as city mayors, county magistrates, provincial assemblymen, city and county councilmen, and village and township chiefs. Normally candidates backed by the KMT have had a substantial advantage over independents or those KMT members who sometimes ran without party approval. During the election held between 1964 and 1968, for example, the proportion of KMT-backed candidates elected at all levels ranged from 78% to 92%, see The Kuomintang, A Brief Record of Achievements (Taipei, n.d.), p. 59. However, this one-party dominance seemed to have improved for a democratic image afterwards, see also footnote no. 2, p. 66.

2. Despite the fact that Taiwanese now constitute an overall majority of the party membership, for instance, 70% in May 1976, the top positions remain in the mainlanders’ hands. Figure supplied by Hsueh Jen-yang, deputy secretary-General of the KMT from 1968 to 1976.

3. Tai Hung-chao, op.cit.
government structure, there are the minority mainlanders and the KMT party; at the lower levels, however, there are the majority Taiwanese and the two minority parties, the Young China Party and the Chinese Democratic Socialist Party.¹ Both Parties are staunchly anti-Communist but rent by factionalism. The former generally supports KMT positions, while the latter has displayed greater independence.

The rationale behind this dual government structure is clear: if the system could be effectively implemented in Taiwan with sufficient support at home (i.e. Taiwan or even perhaps the mainland) and abroad (i.e. the Chinese overseas and the world community), then the Nationalist government's claim for legitimacy, its prospects for political survival and return to power on the mainland, would have a strong basis. In this connection, the province of Taiwan is administered like a nation—the State of China—with the existence of the fully-fledged governmental structure. From this perspective, the Nationalist government could never afford to abandon the dual governmental structure, nor its declared policy of "mainland recovery", nor allow a majority representation of Taiwanese at the national government.

Nevertheless, seen in these terms, the Nationalist government is faced by another profound dilemma: on the one hand, it has to stick to the claim of legitimacy and to the "mainland recovery" policy regardless of the costs involved and

¹. The two minority parties have their history on the mainland, see note no. 1, pg. 47.
however unrealistic these positions may have become; on the other hand, in view of the political reality, the Nationalist government has to secure the existing power status quo on Taiwan in the expectation that it will be the only remaining permanent power base for the ROC in the very long run, while continuing its task of searching for more support on the island. This also explains the reasons why the Nationalist government has since the late 1960s gradually but subtly increased the percentage of Taiwanese participation in the island's national affairs.1

It is essential for the Nationalist government to increase and to secure support from the Taiwanese community, to imbue it with the value system brought by the mainlanders, and to improve its political image which was damaged in the "February 28th Uprising". Thus, as noted earlier, the Nationalist government has begun to improve the living conditions of the native Taiwanese and, above all, towards the end of the 1960s, to increase slowly but progressively the percentage of their political participation in the government, though still mainly at the lower levels. Also through the years, tension and friction between the two communities seem to have lessened. They have become more tolerant towards each other and more cooperative. Thus, it can be argued that, in view of Taiwan's internal stability (which can be seen as an expression of domestic support for the government's position), the Nationalist government has achieved some kind of consensus among the people on the

1. See footnote no. 2, page 66; and no. 1, page 68.
island, and that its authority, though still challenged by some natives, is largely accepted and rather firmly established internally.

However, what worries the Nationalist government most has been the problem of the continuation and stability of external support, namely the perpetuation of the U.S. commitment. Since the 1950s, the Nationalist government has depended on the U.S. heavily for national purposes, such as security, diplomatic competition against the PRC, and political, and economic development on the island. Nevertheless, such an overdependency can be counterproductive in that, since the Nationalist government has very little influence upon the U.S. policies towards the two Chinese governments, the U.S. support has undergone several modifications, since the Nationalist defeat in 1949. In this regard, the Nationalist government has to calculate very carefully and to make predictions accurately regarding the trend, the value and cost of the U.S. commitment. It also has to search for a balanced relationship between the two governments. It is understandable therefore that the Nationalist government should regard its relationship with the U.S. as its top foreign policy priority. In other words, U.S. support for the Nationalist government has tremendous influence upon the latter's confrontation with the Chinese Communists, because the U.S. could use its position in world affairs to influence international opinion on the status of Taiwan.
This linkage, i.e. external support as an important element either contributing to or weakening the Nationalist government's national capability, can be better understood if related to the concepts of legitimacy and recognition.

The remaining section of this Chapter will first of all present the different claims made by the two governments concerning the issue in dispute, then, through a brief examination of the concepts and their inter-relationship, study the impact of external support—as a source of national capability—on the issue.

III. The controversy over legitimacy

1. Struggle for legitimacy between the two Chinese governments

The ROC's retreat to Taiwan and its intention to make the island a base for the "mainland recovery" programme has caused anxiety to the Communist government. For the latter, the existence of the Nationalist government on Taiwan, with assistance from the U.S., has not only challenged its authority as the sole legal government for all of China, but also, as a consequence of this, prevented political unification of the state of China (under the Communist system). By implication, it offers a political alternative for the Chinese people living on either side of the Taiwan Straits, and in other parts of the world, i.e. the overseas
Chinese concentrated mainly in Southeast Asia.\footnote{According to the Nationalist government, at the end of 1978, there were 24,037,274 overseas Chinese. In its opinion, the term of "overseas Chinese" should be broadly understood. They are the Chinese residing abroad, the naturalized citizens of Chinese descent and the descendants of Chinese parents. Most overseas Chinese are from Kwantung and Fukien provinces by birth of descent. Others are from Taiwan, Shantung, Yunnan and Kwangsu provinces. Most Chinese living in Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and the U.S. are from Kwangtung and Cantonese and Chaochowese are their chief spoken dialects. The Chinese in the Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore are mainly from Fukien. In Indonesia and Burma, the Chinese are mainly from Fukien, Kwangtung and Yunnan provinces. The geographical distribution of overseas Chinese in December 1978 is like this: in Asia, there were 22,066,838 (constituting 91.80% of the total figure); in the Americas, there were 1,497,071 (6.23%); in Europe, there were 322,148 (1.34%); in Oceania, there were 77,521 (0.32%); and in Africa, there were 73,696 (0.31%). The China Yearbook, 1979, pp. 361-2. More information on the ROC's policy towards overseas Chinese will be given in Chapter Four.} For the Nationalist government, however, the existence of the Communist system constitutes a more serious threat not only to its claim as the sole legal government for all of China but, more importantly, to its political survival as, geographically and demographically speaking, the Nationalist government is in a less advantageous position than its Communist rival.

Along the Taiwan Straits, this intra-China conflict was marked by the two Quemoy crises in 1954 and in 1958, and subsequently by sporadic shelling which contained largely propaganda leaflets. Internationally, the conflict is over world recognition, as both Chinese governments insist that they are the only legitimate government for the whole of China. This diplomatic campaign involves the condition that the legitimacy of the other system should be totally denied, the so-called "one China" principle. Both governments
uphold the same position, i.e. that there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of it, and that they would enter diplomatic relations with other countries only if the latter agree to respect the above-mentioned principle through denying the legitimacy of, and/or breaking relations with (the two conditions are inter-related), the other.

The arguments employed by the two Chinese governments in the defence of their respective legitimacy have been many. The Nationalist government's claims are based mainly on two assumptions, one historical and one cultural, whereas those of the Communist government are based on the power reality that came into being on the mainland in 1949.

The historical assumption: The Nationalist government argues that the Communist regime has unlawfully occupied the mainland because its power was consolidated at the expense of the Nationalist government during the course of their collaborations, particularly during the Second United Front while the latter was deeply involved in resisting Japanese aggression. It follows from this that the national government of the ROC, though now located in Taipei, continues to be the sole legitimate spokesman for all of China because it was the founder of the Chinese Republic; it was officially elected (in 1928) by the Chinese people on the mainland, and it has its mandate--i.e. the Constitution adopted in 1947 on the mainland.
The cultural assumption: The Nationalist government argues that the Communist rule on the mainland is un-Chinese in its orientation because it is based on principles of terror and therefore conflicts with the traditional Chinese principles of governing through humanity and "peaceful ordering". In this respect, the Nationalist government argues that it alone represents the true Chinese expression because its rule, based upon Sun Yat-sen's ideology of San Min Chu I, is within the framework of Chinese tradition (see Chapter Two). Thus it is part of the mandate of the Nationalist government to terminate the un-Chinese Communist system on the mainland, to save the Chinese populace from totalitarianism and bring them back to the great Chinese cultural system, now to be found on Taiwan.

In relation to the above assumptions, however, the Nationalist government has also counted on international opinion to reinforce its arguments. That is, the Nationalist government could argue that western (particularly U.S.) diplomatic support for its position as demonstrated in the ROC's diplomatic victory during the 1950s and the 1960s reflected the justification of its claims. This issue—dependence on external support for domestic purpose—will be dealt with shortly.

The Communist government disputes these assertions. It contends that the national government of the ROC lost its mandate in 1949 as a result of the civil war and that therefore it is now a rebellious group and has no grounds whatsoever to continue its authority on Taiwan.
and/or to make claims of legitimacy on mainland China. The argument is supported by the fact that the Communist government is now in effective control of almost all of the Chinese territory and population; it too has a Constitution (adopted in September 1953), its legitimacy is therefore constitutional. Consequently, the claim of the Nationalist government to be the sole authentic Chinese spokesman is absurd. It is Peking's legitimate right for the protection of its rightful position to "liberate" Taiwan from the control of "the KMT cliques" and return the island to the "motherland". As for U.S. support for the Nationalist government, the Communist government is of the opinion that this constitutes interference in China's internal affairs. 1

As we will see shortly, these contentions have become less important than international opinion (i.e. external support of the claimants) in determining the issue of legitimacy. The following study will limit discussion of the concept of legitimacy to the political context. That is, it will focus on the issue of legitimacy of "states" in the international community. The study will also discuss the concept of recognition, especially its effects upon the legitimacy of states in international community.

1. See, for instance, the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs, ed. Oppose U.S. Occupation of Taiwan and "Two China" Plot: A Selection of Important Documents (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1958); Oppose U.S. Military Provocation in the Taiwan Straits Area: A Selection of Important Documents (1958); and Oppose the New U.S. Plots to Create "two Chinas" (1961).
2. Some definitions of "legitimacy" and "recognition"

The concept of legitimacy has a long history, especially in the field of constitutional law. A large number of definitions have been given to it, but most of them seem to pay rather little attention to the significance of external influence on the political institution in a state. For instance, D. Sternberger defines legitimacy as "the foundation of such governmental power as it exercised both with the consciousness of the government's part that it has a right to govern and with some recognition by the governed of that right".  

S. M. Lipset, while taking much the same view, defines legitimacy as an achievement of the political system itself: "The capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society."  

Another definition given by W. J. Raymond regards legitimacy as "a notion applicable to statecraft whereby, as long as the electorate (or the people in general) obeys the government in general (provided that it is not a despotic dictatorship) and obeys the laws to the extent that the government can sustain itself, that government is considered legal and legitimate. Also, it can be the basis on which the government--of-the-day may command obedience and use power of authority."  


In fact, the issue of legitimacy can be divided into two aspects for analysis: the internal and the external, mutually complementing each other. The former, as defined above, usually refers to the extent of domestic consensus (recognition) and/or the level of internal political support for the government concerned, whereas the latter, which will be discussed later in connection with the issue of recognition, indicates the degree of international recognition given by a third party for the existence, viability and functions of such a governing body.

To begin with, and with the above definitions in mind, there are inevitably two sides, one, the rulers, claiming legitimacy in the sense of the right to exercise authority, to call for sacrifices and to receive recognition, and the other, the ruled, accepting this right and showing its readiness to accord recognition to the other's legitimate claims. This mutual relationship in action also requires that the party demanding legitimacy must possess the capacities to enforce its claims.

Such an understanding of legitimacy—which can be loosely termed as internal legitimacy—however is not sufficient when applied to today's environment. That is because today the acceptance of a government's legitimacy by its own people (i.e. internal legitimacy) can be significantly affected by external influences (e.g. international recognition). In order to understand this linkage better, let us now take a look at the term recognition.
According to W. J. Raymond, recognition of a state is:

"The act of acknowledging the actual existence (de facto recognition) or legal existence (de jure recognition) of a sovereign state as a legal entity, or capacity of entering into legal obligations (e.g. capable of conducting international relations and living up to the traditional norms of international law). Recognition of a state is voluntary and can be withdrawn at any time upon termination of diplomatic relations or dissolution of the state (e.g. through joining another state in a union). In the strict practice of international diplomacy any act, such as contracts by one state with representatives of another, may be construed as recognition (explicit or implicit) although such may not be the intention of the actor." 2

Similarly, M. A. Kaplan and N. deB Katzenback give their views:

"Recognition of a state (or a government) is normally an acknowledgement by the recognizing state that it will for all purposes treat the recognized state (or government) as being entitled to the rights and privileges normally attached to that status under both international and domestic law. The new entity thus, at the moment of recognition, is endowed, insofar as the recognizing state is concerned, with a whole bundle of customary rights, the most important of which is that its independence is supported against adverse claimants. Non-recognition—a failure to acknowledge this status—does not carry converse inferences. States refusing formal recognition do not say that none of the rights ordinarily attached to the status of statehood or government will be accorded to the claimant. They say nothing, but may in practice accord some rights and refuse others." 3

1. The recognition of a state is not to be confused with the recognition of a government, although the two issues are very closely related. That is, the existence of an effective and independent government is the essence of statehood and, significantly, recognition of states may take the form of recognition of a government. But, non-recognition of a particular regime is not necessarily a determination that the state represented by that regime does not qualify for statehood. In the ROC's case, the Nationalist government suffers from both, i.e. non-recognition of the Nationalist Government as the only Chinese government, and of the statehood of the ROC.

Recognition then is an optional and political act. That is, the decision to recognize, or to withdraw recognition from a state or a government, is a matter not of legal duty but of discretion. Thus, although recognition implies a legal acknowledgement for acceptance of statehood (in this respect a state becomes a legal personality in accordance to international law with capacity to act in international relations), an absence of recognition may not rest on any legal basis at all. That is, recognition does not bring into legal existence a state which did not exist before. A state may exist without being recognized, and if it does exist in fact, then whether or not it has been formally recognized by other states, it has a right to be treated by them as a state.¹ This is because non-recognition may simply be a part of a general policy of disapproval and boycott. Conversely, recognition may be part of a policy of aggression and the creation of puppet states.² In other words, the granting or withholding of recognition can be used by the recognizing states to further a national policy, they can refuse it as a mark of disagreement and they can grant it in order to establish the very independence of which recognition is supposed to be a mere acknowledgement. Thus recognition is not essential to the continued existence of a state and it cannot be the factor determining a state's status. After all a state "is in existence when a people is settled in a


country under its own sovereign government".¹ This definition, given by L. Oppenheim, includes four distinct elements for statehood: a people, a territory, a government, and the attribute of sovereignty. Nevertheless, it does have important consequences: recognition normally facilitates the usual courtesies of international intercourse, namely, the establishment of formal, optional and bilateral relations, including diplomatic relations and the conclusion of treaties, between the recognizing state and the recognized state or between the recognizing government and the recognized government; whereas non-recognition may discourage the practice of the above-described relationships which are important channels enabling to either to consolidate or to minimize relationship and/or to dissolve conflict. As Stanley K. Hornbeck observed:

"Diplomatic recognition obviously demonstrates awareness of a political reality, and it of course facilitates the conduct of business between the states concerned and between their respective nationals. But recognition is not essential or indispensable for any of those purposes...

Diplomatic recognition gives birth to a corpus of rights and duties. In theory these rights and duties are reciprocally identical as between the according state and the recipient, but in practice the according state imposes upon itself obligations and confers upon the recipient rights without assurance that the latter will reciprocate. The consequences to the accorder may be either a gain or a loss, but to the recipient they can be only a gain."²

However, non-recognition, precisely because it ignores the existence of a reality, can have awkward practical consequences in addition to refusal to enter into relations.¹

In similar vein, recognition of a government normally results in increased prestige, popularity and stability at home; access to state funds on deposit in other states; access to private and governmental loans because of the legal ability to pledge the state's credit; diplomatic and consular status for its agents in the recognizing entity; access to foreign courts and immunity from foreign process; establishment of normal trade relations; a capacity to request assistance from the recognizing government in the form of financial assistance, supplies, and even military aid; respect in other states for its laws and decrees; and benefits of existing treaty arrangements. In this regard, recognition of a government by an outside force tends to increase the legitimacy of the recognized government. The absence of formal recognition has thus the effect of suspending most of all these rights insofar as the non-recognizing state controls them. They may be accorded to another claimant, or they may simply be suspended. As a consequence, non-recognition may upset, or weaken, the legitimate status of a particular government.

The relationship between internal legitimacy and international recognition is therefore established in that, while the decision to recognize, or to withdraw recognition from a state or a government, can be used as an instrument of policy in advanced the national interests of the recognizing states, the granting or withdrawal of recognition has an important effect upon the political (but not the legal) status of a particular government, or even of the state itself. And such a phenomenon—which can be loosely described as external legitimacy—has become increasingly significant during the 20th century, especially since the Cold War. This is because, as a result of the development of modern technology, and the policy of alliance politics of the Cold War, the growth of international communications has considerably increased the ways in which states have become "penetrable" by outside forces. Penetration was sought especially by the two Superpowers, because as far as they were concerned, it helped them not only to create and consolidate ideological, political and military alliance with other countries but also, as a result, to expand their respective bloc influence. In this regard, states, as the proper and basic political units in the international arena, have become steadily "penetrable" and "vulnerable" through the creation of modern communication networks, characterized by political, economic, technological, ideological, or military interactions, dependences and interdependencies. Instead of remaining completely separate, the outside world can, and often does, influence the internal situation of states. That is, the outside world can always make known its
stance regarding a particular state or a government through either the extension, denial or withdrawal of recognition or through the granting of membership in international agencies, particularly in the United Nations. The latter, legally speaking, "does not possess any authority to recognize either a new State or a new government of any existing State." Nonetheless, it has the practical political effect of the so-called "collective legitimization".

As history has shown, almost all the separate parts of states, split by ideological divisions after the Second World War, such as the two "Koreas" (South Korea and North Korea), the two "Germanies" (West Germany and East Germany), the two "Vietnams" (South Vietnam and North Vietnam) until 1975, and the two "Chinas" (the Nationalist China and the Communist China), etc. have suffered from recognition problem. During the 1950s and the 1960s, all of these divided halves sought to win recognition, both domestic and international, for their respective claim as the only legitimate ruler of their countries. They placed national reunification as the top priority of their national objectives, and their policy toward the competing regime was often directed towards impugning its legitimate status as a step toward its destruction. In these cases each bloc sought the isolation and weakening of


adherents of the opposing bloc. Thus, until the early 1960s, while South Korea, West Germany, South Vietnam and the Nationalist China were recognized by the western bloc, their Communist counterparts were recognized by the Communist bloc. Although this recognition had almost no direct bearing upon the legitimacy of either the recognized parts or the un-recognized parts--at least it said little concerning their legal existence--its political consequences were significant. It could upset the capacity of these divided halves to carry out their functions and policies properly and effectively at home and especially abroad. At its extreme, it could even affect its legitimate status, as in the case of Nationalist China. Evidently international recognition was considered an important factor by respective claimants in the winning of their struggles for national legitimacy and recognition.

As a matter of fact, according to L. Oppenheim's definition of a state, which was mentioned earlier, all of these divided halves could be declared sovereign states providing the opposing halves and the world do not challenge their positions. Nevertheless, only towards the end of the 1960s have the two "Koreas" and two "Germanies" partially resolved their problems through some sort of political arrangement; namely, despite the political aspiration for national re-unification, the hostile units concerned acknowledge and accept the current (i.e. temporary) existence of each other. Dialogues between the divided units on an equal and friendly basis are therefore made possible under this status quo. More importantly, this situation of mutual acceptance enables
other countries to establish relationships with, and even to recognize the existence of, each of the divided units. The situation with the two "Chinas" however is far more complicated. After more than three decades of division since the end of 1949, during which time both military and non-military means have been used to try to settle the problem, the principles underlying the divided situation remain almost unchanged, and yet the relationship is substantially different. The Communist unit was denied legitimacy, and refused recognition, by the majority of the western bloc countries after its establishment until the early part of the 1970s. It was also not accepted as a member by international agencies, notably the U.N., despite the political reality existing on the mainland. On the contrary, the Nationalist unit, by holding a tiny part of Chinese territory and with a small population in relation to the huge population on the mainland, was recognized as the legitimate government of China, though this recognition was accorded to it only by the western bloc countries. The Nationalist unit also represented the State of China in many important international organizations, namely, the U.N. and its specialized agencies. The situation remained unchanged.

1. The other divided states, i.e. the two Germanies, the two Vietnams and the two Koreas, have also suffered from the representation problem in the U.N. Nevertheless, since none of them were original members of the U.N., their problems seem to be less complicated and controversial than that of China. The two Germanies were finally admitted to U.N. membership at the same time in September 1973. Vietnam, after re-unification in 1975, was admitted in September 1977. The Korea problem is still unsolved, but both have permanent observers to the U.N. and they are members of many U.N. specialized and related agencies, e.g. FAO, UNESCO, WHO, etc.
until October 1971, when the Nationalist delegates were expelled by the U.N. as "illegal representatives" and were replaced by Communist delegates. Since then the Nationalist unit has gradually been deprived of recognition by its former allies. It has also denied membership rights by many international organizations of which it was originally a member. All its advantages held in international relations during the 1950s and the 1960s have therefore slowly but progressively been transferred to the Communist unit. This situation, namely external recognition of internal legitimacy, can be regarded as a type of "external" legitimacy.

Hence, there are two aspects of legitimacy, internal legitimacy and external legitimacy, complementing each other. For a state, its (internal) legitimacy can become more stable and more enduring when external legitimacy (i.e. international recognition) is accorded. By implication, it can become more precarious if this external legitimacy is withdrawn or threatened. Thus the legitimacy of a state (or a government) can be effectively reinforced or undermined because of international opinion. And such opinion can change unpredictably because, for example, it can be influenced by the development of international power relationships. The latter are normally beyond the control of any single state.

Thus Joseph Frankel noted:
"Legitimacy is increasingly more achieved by what is sometimes termed 'organized persuasion', international debates about what the norms should be, in which individual states become so strongly aware of the views of others and of the repercussions of their behaviour that they can be persuaded, sometimes more or less coerced, to accept rules which they do not readily find acceptable. When the cost of opposing the opinion of other states becomes prohibitive, it becomes rational to adopt the prudential policy of adaptation, of abandoning or attenuating the pursuit of national interests, however much cherished.”

The concept of legitimacy has now become more vague. Namely, the legitimacy of a state is not narrowly defined in accordance with international law but it has become complicated, politicized and internationalized because a state, however strong its "internal" legitimacy, could still have its legitimacy challenged not from within (which can be controlled through the use of force, or the adoption of martial law, etc.) but by international pressure. Consequently, it is obvious why the search for international recognition has been one of the most important foreign policy objectives of the Nationalist government since 1949, and why external support is so vital to the ROC's survival.

However, if the Nationalist government declared itself the legitimate government only on the island of Taiwan and on the offshore islands, thus abandoning its claim to the mainland, then, according to L. Oppenheim's four elements of statehood, legally speaking, the existence and the authority of the Nationalist government should not be denied. That is, the ROC on Taiwan is qualified as a sovereign state in the sense of the international law, because it has a fixed

territory (however small it is), a population larger than that of two-thirds of the members of the U.N.; moreover, it has a stable and strong government, running both domestic and foreign affairs adequately for more than three decades.

The problem is, however, that the Nationalist government continues and has to continue to make claims that it is the only legitimate government of China, no matter how unrealistic its assertions have become, and no matter how loosely such claims are connected to the issue of survival. The Nationalist government is aware of the fact that it is only by insisting on these claims that its rule on Taiwan—since Taiwan is a part of China—can be justified. Otherwise, as a minority force, the Nationalist rule on the island might be forced out one day by the Taiwanese majority, if the latter demanded majority rule.

In conclusion, then, China since 1949 has been divided into two ideological units competing for final control. Fundamentally this is an internal issue, but it has acquired significant foreign-policy dimensions for both sides. Indeed the ROC's foreign policy since 1949 has been constrained by the fact that it has had to maintain survival as its top priority. Chapters Three to Six will examine the ways in which it has developed its foreign policy in pursuit of that goal.
Chapter Two
The State Ideology

The main purpose of this Chapter is to introduce the essence of the ROC's ideological foundation, San Min Chu I, known to the West as the Three Principles of the People (Nationalism, Democracy and People's Livelihood), its relationship to the ROC's current policy of anti-Communism, and its significance in the formulation of the ROC's foreign policy. Our study will include examination of the role played by the founding father of the Chinese Republic, who was also the creator of San Min Chu I, Sun Yat-sen, and his political successor, Chiang Kai-shek. The latter took over Sun's legacy and made it the basis of the ROC's official ideology.1

1. Sun Yat-sen and the background of his political thought

Sun Yat-sen was born in 1866 when China, then under the Manchu dynasty, had already begun to experience national decline and humiliation. In Sun's view, China's decline and humiliation were caused primarily by its internal weaknesses. But these internal weaknesses reinforced the opportunity of foreign aggression against China. It was to rescue China from the danger of extinction that Sun encouraged revolution and formulated the ideology of San Min Chu I. According to Sun himself, San Min Chu I was a set of inter-related ideologies which should be upheld as the highest guiding

1. See Chapter One, footnote no. 1, page 30.
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¹. See Chapter One, footnote no. 1, page 30.
principle for the Chinese revolution as well as the blueprint for the KMT in the tasks of national reconstruction and regeneration during the post-revolution period.¹

What is San Min Chu I? What are the Principles involved? How should they be implemented? And to what extent are they related to the ROC’s post-1949 foreign policy? Before discussing the above issues, let us first say a few words about its composition.

Sun's proposed strategy to rebuild China was based on a selection and combination of both Chinese learning (as the essence) and Western learning (for use). That is to say, China, in its process of modernization, should adopt western thoughts and institutions, etc. only if they were suitable for, and meaningful to, Chinese society and mentality. China should avoid those western elements which could destroy China's internal stability, prosperity and ancient civilization. The same attitude should also apply to China's policy toward its own (old) principles and institutions. That is, in learning from the West, China should not ignore the value of its own traditional virtues of li (courtesy),

¹. Sun's political thoughts can also be found in his other writings, for instance, Wu Ch'uan Hsien Fa (The Five-Power Constitution), Chien Kuo Fang Lo (The Programme of National Reconstruction) and Sun-wen Hsueh-shuo (The Theory of Sun Yat-sen). Most of Sun's writings and his speeches can be found in Tsung-li Ch'uan-shu (Complete Works of the President), 12 Vols. (Taipei: The Central Committee of the Kuomintang, 1956).
Thus, as can be seen from his writing of the *San Min Chu I* doctrine, Sun spoke highly of western democratic principles and technological advancement, on the one hand, whilst on the other hand he stressed the importance of strengthening and perpetuating traditional Chinese virtues. He had openly declared that his *San Min Chu I* doctrine was derived from a careful study of both western sources and traditional Chinese ideas. In this regard, Sun's early education in the West provided him with the opportunity to become acquainted with, and at times critical of, western (particularly socialist) literature, including, for example, the writings of Karl Marx, as well as the works of the American economist Henry George, whose ideas on taxation and

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1. The meanings of these virtues, like the meanings of classic Confucian texts, are subject to a range of interpretations. In general, however, they can be defined as follows: **Li** stands for regulated attitude, or etiquette in its broadest sense. The stress is laid on the essential rightness of a thing and not on its empty, ceremonial trappings. **Yi** means right conduct, or the visible manifestations of **li**. It also has the meaning of justice. **Lien** means integrity, the ability to distinguish right from wrong. **Ch'ih** stands for conscience, the sense of knowing shame when a wrong has been committed. The four virtues should be considered as inter-related.

2. Sun was born in the province of Kwantung. Nevertheless, he spent much of his childhood in Hawaii, where he was educated at a college founded by the Church of England missionaries. He seems to have been much influenced by Christian teaching and Western ideas there. Later he studied at Hong Kong, became a Christian and a doctor of medicine. Sun had also learned Chinese classics during his childhood. Yet, comparatively speaking, Sun's western background was more prominent than his knowledge of his own country. For biographical sketches of Sun and his political philosophy, see Chester C. Tan, *op.cit.*, Chapter 5, pp. 116-223; Howard L. Boorman, *op.cit.*, Vol. III, "Sun Yet-sen", pp. 170-189; and Chong Key-ray, *op.cit.*; see also footnote no. 1, p. 92.
land rent exerted considerable influence upon the development of his social and economic thought. In addition, his intensive travelling aboard for fund-raising purposes and/or for winning international sympathy for the Chinese Revolution had reinforced further his knowledge of the western world. This background, together with some learning of Chinese classics during his childhood, enabled Sun to make judgements as to the strengths and weaknesses of both the western and eastern cultures. Sun made selective use of both of them, and the San Min Chu I ideology was, as he claimed, a hybrid product of different cultures.

According to Sun, the formulation of the San Min Chu I ideology was inspired by Abraham Lincoln's famous phrase, "government of the people, by the people and for the people." They first appeared in writing in 1905 in Sun's

2. The major part of Sun's revolutionary activities were actually conducted from outside China. One reason was that Sun was in exile for 16 years. Another reason was that, while in exile, Sun drew support from Chinese overseas and from foreign countries. See Sun Yat-sen, "The Revolution is the Path to the Regeneration of China". An extract from his Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionary (London: Hutchinson and Co. Ltd., 1918), pp. 184-224, is reprinted in F. Schurmann and O. Schell, eds. Republican China (London: Penguin Books, 1967), pp. 9-20.
4. Kuomintang--Key to China's Future, compiled and issued by Department of Overseas Affairs, Central Committee, Kuomintang, Taipei, Taiwan, August 1976, p. 29.
statement introducing the initial issue of the T'ung Meng Hui magazine, the Min-pao. However, little more than a vague outline was presented in this statement. Although later on Sun frequently referred to these principles in speeches and writings, he did little in fact to elaborate upon them. Sun finally gave a concrete version of the San Min Chu I in transcriptions of three series of lectures in Canton in 1924. The first six lectures, which were concerned with the Principle of Nationalism, were published as a booklet by the KMT Central Executive Committee's Bureau of Propaganda in April, with a preface by Sun; the next six dealing with his Principle of Democracy, were printed in August; and the final four lectures, expounding the Principle of the People's Livelihood, appeared in December. Subsequently, the sixteen lectures were published as a single work in numerous editions.

There is one point worth mentioning here. Sun modified his version of San Min Chu I several times during the prolonged period of its construction and elaboration. In a way, such modifications, which was caused by China's changed conditions, reflected Sun's thoughtfulness and his dynamic view of the ideology and of the methods of its implementation. Nevertheless, because of this, Sun has often been criticized—and
even dismissed— as a poor, inconsistent ideologist.¹
Worse than this have been the varying, conflicting
interpretations surrounding Sun's ideology given by his
political opponents. The main attack on Sun was that he
was not only a poor ideologist but a Communist sympathizer
in disguise.

Ironically, the above issue put the KMT leaders at both an
advantage and disadvantage in their programmes to carry out
Sun's ideology. The advantage was that they could modify
certain elements of the interpretations of Sun's ideology
to suit their own political purposes; the disadvantage was
that, in so doing, they could easily be criticized for
misusing Sun's original formule. In this study, we
recognize that there exists a certain degree of conceptual
difference between Sun's original version of San Min Chu I
and the later one of Chiang. Such differences—according to
Chiang they were products of changed circumstances—have been
justified since 1949 in the Party programmes of the KMT.
Nevertheless, we will not dwell on those criticisms of Sun
as a vague ideologist, etc. as this is not really relevant

¹. Sun's work was translated into several foreign languages
after his death, but since there were both Chinese and
Western translators, confusion and ambiguity frequently
occurred in their translation. Brian Crozier suggested
as an additional reason for this the "paradoxical
concrete vagueness of the Chinese language". For
instance, he said, "in principle the written language
is monosyllabic, but in practice the spoken language
is polysyllabic, since two or more monosyllabic
ideographs cohere to form a longer word. Most abstract
concepts—such as 'nationalism' or 'democracy'—are
thus formed by separate components brought together,
but each of which, taken singly, suggests a concreteness
which the whole lacks." See Brian Crozier, op.cit.,
p. 69.
to the purpose of our present inquiry. Rather, our emphasis is to review some of the different interpretations given by Chiang to Sun's ideology. We will first give a very brief outline of some of the different stages of development of Sun's ideology. Then we will describe the role of Sun's Principle of Nationalism in the formulation of ROC's foreign policy. Finally, we will describe Chiang Kai-shek's view of San Min Chu I and its relations to the ROC's current foreign policy.

II San Min Chu I: The Three Principles of the People

San Min Chu I consists of the Principle of Nationalism, the Principle of Democracy and the Principle of People's Livelihood. Nationalism (or min-tsu) means literally "People's Race", and has been more generally held to mean "National Solidarity". Democracy (min-ch'uan) means "People's Right". And People's Livelihood (min-sheng) means "Social Well-being".

1. Nationalism—the state belongs to the people

In its earliest form, the Principle of Nationalism aimed at the overthrow of the alien Manchu dynasty and the restoration of the (Han) Chinese as rulers of their own

1. For a detailed study of the Three Principles, see Sun Yat-sen's San Min Chu I, translated into English by Frank W. Price (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1927). Price's translation was later abridged and edited by the Commission of the Kuomintang for the compilation of the Kuomintang history, published in Taipei by China Publishing Company (n.d.).
country. After the Manchus abdicated in 1911, Sun had little to say about nationalism until the time of the 1924 KMT reorganization when, as a result of his growing disenchantment with the western powers, and his new orientation toward the Soviet Union, he reinterpreted his first Principle in terms of a nationalist revolution against the domination of the imperialists in China. The first step in this revolution was the abolition of the unequal treaties that the foreign powers had imposed upon China.

Thus the short-term objective of Sun's nationalism was the furthering of China's national freedom and independence. Its long-term objective was the realization of Confucius' highest political aspiration of the ideal world of Ta-t'ung, or T'ien-hsia wei-kung, meaning the "Great Commonwealth".

As mentioned earlier, Sun's nationalism was directed against foreign aggressors. That is, Sun thought that to attain national independence, equality and freedom, China had to free itself first of all from imperialist control, to recover all its lost territory and sovereignty, to unify itself by the elimination of all separate elements and to create a sense of solidarity among its people. Sun looked

1. There were five major racial groups in China: the Hans, the Mongols, the Manchus, the Moslems and the Tibetans. The Hans regarded themselves as the authentic Chinese. Thus, the Mongol rule in China during the 14th and 15th centuries and the Manchu dynasty from 1664 until 1911 were considered as alien. Sun was not against the alien rule of the Manchus. What he actually opposed was their inability to govern China. Moreover, in view of their inflexible opposition to any institutional and social reform, Sun was convinced that China needed to undergo a total transformation with the abolition of the monarchic system.
forward to a day when the Chinese nation would represent the whole people rather than certain classes, and China would be a melting pot for all races: all would then be equal.\(^1\) He believed the lack of any spirit of nationalism in China was due to long periods of subjection to alien rule, namely the Manchus, and to the traditional Chinese belief in universalism.\(^2\) The Chinese people needed a new surge of patriotism, which would lead to a transfer of loyalty from the family to the state and the sacrifice of individual freedom for national freedom.\(^3\)

1. Sun suggested that the Hans give up their sense of superiority towards other racial groups in China and take the initiative in integrating with them so as to build China into a great nation. Lo Chia-lun, ed. Ke-ming wen-hsien (Historical Materials of the Revolution) (Taipei, 1954), Vol. V, p. 57.

2. The ideal of great commonwealth can be understood as "universal brotherhood". One disadvantage of this mode of thinking was that the Chinese could become very vague in the sense of national solidarity since they could not really differentiate the boundary between "internal" and "external" matters. In this regard, Sun argued that, it was because of this transformation from "familyism" to "universalism" that the Chinese had for centuries failed to appreciate the importance of "nationalism". Hence, China had allowed itself to be ruled by the Mongols and the Manchus and to be attacked by foreign powers. See also the following footnote.

3. In ancient China, the basic social units were either the clan or the family. Loyalty was normally given to these units rather than to the nation. Otherwise, influenced by Confucius' moral principle of "universal brotherhood" (see footnote above), the Chinese often ignored the importance of "nationalism" and placed emphasis on the promotion of "internationalism". Consequently, according to Sun, the Chinese were like "a pan of loose sand", not knowing how to regulate relationships among individual, family, and the state, and how to unify themselves into a strong force. See Chong Kay-ray, op.cit., pp. 72-75.
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Thus, there were two aspects to Sun's proposed nationalism, one internal (nationalism) and one external (internationalism). Sun held that China, while fighting for its own equality with foreign powers (internal and external), should also help smaller nations in the world to attain their equality (external). "Rescuing the weak and lifting up the fallen was a traditional virtue and that," Sun said "should apply to China's international relations."1 Here lie the foundations of Sun's foreign policy doctrine—a moralistic and idealistic approach—which will be further explained in due course.

In Sun's Ta-ya-chou Chu-i ("Great Asianism"), he called on the Japanese to become China's partner in the defence of Oriental virtues. In his opinion, the Oriental virtues were wang-tao, or the "Kingly way", of persuasion and peace which could successfully challenge pa-tao, or the "tyrannical way", of force and aggression which the Western powers had adopted in dealing with weak nations. 2 Sun however stressed the point that his "Great Asianism" had none of the exclusiveness that characterized the so-called Asian Monroe Doctrine advocated by the Japanese militarists before the Pacific war. Instead, it was "a sort of regionalism aimed at the defence of the Asian continent against Western aggression; but secondarily it would promote peaceful relations with all


countries". Sun's ideal was of a great commonwealth of nations, founded on equality and fraternity. But before China could become cosmopolitan, Sun stressed, it had first to become an independent state.

Thus, in short, there were two elements in Sun's proposed Principle of Nationalism--nationalism and internationalism. On the basis of the wang-tao spirit, China was to unite all its racial groups peacefully into a solid single state, and then it could devote itself to resisting international imperialism and aggression, while promoting a world of great commonwealth.

2. **Democracy--expert administrations selected by the people**

Similar to the Principle of Nationalism, Sun's Principle of Democracy underwent a number of modifications that reflected changes in his political attitudes. For example, as originally outlined in the "manifesto of the military government" of the T'ung Meng Hui in 1905, Sun's concept of democracy closely resembled that of the Western democracies, particularly the U.S. However, taking into consideration China's monarchical tradition, Sun held that it would be necessary to effect the transition to democratic government in three successive stages. As Sun became more critical of the West in later years, he revised and expanded his Principle of Democracy to include a number of concepts which he believed to be improvements upon the Western systems of representative democracy.


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2. See Chapter One, p. 20.
That is, Sun combined the three Western democratic powers of executive, legislative and judicial with the two traditional Chinese powers of civil service examination and control. Sun explained the reasons for the extreme importance of civil service examination, which have long been the practice in China: "Without the examination system, there was no way of determining who were trained and talented; a condition such as this resulted in many capable men not being employed by the government. At the same time, a great many ignorant and incapable people, who were anxious to become officials, found their way into the government service through corrupt means." With regard to the power of control, or the censoring power, Sun felt the censors in the past had been vested with too much power. The censors, appointed by the emperor, could investigate not only matters of law but of morals, could impeach persons not only for proven unlawful activities, but also on suspicion and before the commission of unlawful acts. They could even censure the actions of the emperor. Sun proposed that the power of officialdom in this branch of government, when exercising the power of consent, impeachment, censure and audit, should be disciplined. Namely, the Judicial Yuan should be invested with the power to review the Control Yuan's impeachment. These are the so-called five separate government branches.

And this, i.e. the independence of the examining and censoring powers from the other three powers as generally practised in Western nations, is Sun's unique contribution to the political theory of democracy.

Sun proposed the Principle of Democracy because he wanted to break the mystique of the divinity of the Son of Heaven. Sun believed that China's traditional mode of governing, though it had its merits, was principally unsound because it was not based on equality and practically obstructed the development of a modern political system. The traditional mode of governing placed a tremendous gap between the ruler and the ruled. They were not only isolated from, but indifferent to, each other as long as their respective duties were done. In this regard, the political consciousness of the people became very weak. They normally did not care who the ruler was. Sun felt this lack of political consciousness was one of the factors that had led to China falling under the political and economic domination of foreign countries. Thus, it was important to rearrange the relationship between the two classes.

The solution was to establish a democractic government which, Sun hoped, would on the one hand, give the people a full degree of sovereignty and enable them to control directly the affairs of the state; and, on the other hand, create an effective, powerful government which would manage all the nation's business. The former was popular sovereignty or retention of "political power" by the people; the latter was

1. See Chapter One, p. 11.
the exercising of "governing (or administrative) power", by the government. The idea behind its operation was this: if the people had a full measure of political sovereignty and the methods for exercising popular control over the government had been well worked out, then there would be no need to fear that the government would become too powerful, uncontrollable and unapproachable. At the same time, it would raise the political consciousness of the people.

Thus, the sort of democracy Sun had in mind was one with a clear distinction, and yet a balance, between "governing power" and "political power". The former, or the Five-Power constitutional system, consisted of the five powers mentioned earlier. The latter consisted of the four sovereign rights of the people: election, recall, initiative and referendum. When the four political powers of the people control the five governing powers of the government, then a complete democratic government would be established, and the strength of the people and of the government would be well balanced.¹

Sun also considered that since the majority of the people were incapable of government work, the operation of the "governing power" was to be given to those qualified, i.e. experts, who must not be hampered by constant interference by the people or representatives of the people. Nevertheless, it was essential to a democracy that the government be subject to the control of the people and that its policies and actions be responsive to popular will. Thus, if the government with five powers is considered as a great

machine, the four rights of the people constitute checks and balances on this powerful machinery.

In short, Sun's theory of separation of power was intended to provide a powerful and sound government on the one hand and effective popular control on the other.

3. People's Livelihood—social well-being

Sun's third Principle--People's Livelihood--represented an amalgam of ideas culled over a period of years from a variety of western socialist writings. As it first appeared in 1905, it called for reorganization of China's social and economic system into a socialist state and for the "equalization of land rights", a formula based on Henry George's thesis that private appropriation of increases in land values was the cause of modern social inequities. By 1912 Sun had added the concept of state ownership of railways and major industrial enterprises, an idea which in the following years was restated in more general terms as the state control of capitalism. Although he claimed that his doctrine of the People's Livelihood was both socialism and communism, Sun averred that Marxism, while meriting study as a form of western socialism, was not only impracticable in China but also was demonstrably erroneous in its thesis of surplus value and the class struggle. His own doctrine, Sun maintained, was a special branch of socialism suitable to Chinese conditions--a programme by which China, in the course of its modernization, could avoid the social evils and injustices that had attended the industrialization.

of the capitalist nations of the West.¹

Thus Sun's Principle of People's Livelihood seeks to promote economic well-being, freedom, justice and happiness for all the people. The methods include "equalization of land ownership" and "regulation of private capital". The latter is to be accomplished through the establishment of state enterprises.

Sun held that as China was traditionally an agrarian society, it was essential to tackle the land problem caused mainly by the unequal distribution of land ownership. Thus, he proposed the "Land to the Tiller" programme hoping that the man who worked the land would also own it, and have the means of providing for himself and his family.

With regard to the second method—regulation of capital—Sun recommended that the state should have some control over the country's essential industries, such as railways, power and shipbuilding, etc. and help in their development. At the same time all the people should be guaranteed sufficient food, clothing, and other necessities, and the right to develop their own enterprises. In other words, it aimed to promote economic development within a mixed economy which combined key features of both "capitalism" and "socialism". (It is within this context that Sun has most severely been criticized as a communist.) In all, Sun hoped that the nation's wealth would be used to benefit the people.

To sum-up, the long-term goal of Sun's San Min Chu I ideology, as written into the Constitution of the ROC and which has been mentioned earlier, is to pursue the ideals of "a democratic republic of the people, to be governed by the people and for the people". According to Sun and his supporters, this ideology is identical to the French Revolutionary slogan: "Liberty, Equality and Fraternity."\(^1\) Ultimately, it is to pursue the great cause of a world commonwealth. Thus, this is the ideology China should adopt in terms of foreign policy, as well as in the realm of national revolution and construction.

III. The Principle of Nationalism and Sun's foreign policy principles

Sun's foreign policy was based primarily upon the Principle of Nationalism which included five fundamental elements. Some of these elements have already been mentioned previously but not treated systematically. They were: (1) the principle of independence, (2) the principle of freedom and equality, (3) the wanq-tao spirit, (4) the principle of international cooperation and (5) the principle of promoting world peace and friendly relations between states.\(^2\)

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2. Ibid., pp. 8-16.
1. **The principle of independence**

In Sun's view, Nationalism was the prerequisite of national existence; without it, China could not conduct an effective foreign policy.

As mentioned earlier, Sun started the national revolution chiefly for the domestic goal of overthrowing the Manchus and establishing a republic. But he believed that this revolution was necessary because of the external factor of imperialist aggression against China, which led him to worry that China might cease to be a sovereign country under intensified aggression by foreign powers. "Our nation today is in a very perilous position," Sun said, "because we have lost our national spirit, we have opened the gates for foreign political and economic forces to break in, which would have happened if we had preserved our nationalism".¹ Thus, only when China became independent would it be able to conduct an independent and viable foreign policy, and thus assume its rightful position in the world.

2. **The principle of freedom and equality**

Sun said in his Last Will, "The aim of my revolution is to promote China's national freedom and equality." To achieve these aims, Sun proposed two strategies: "to inspire the public at home and to unite the people who are sympathetic towards our cause abroad".² Whilst the former depended on internal support, the latter required good manoeuvring in

1. Ibid., p. 17.
2. Ibid., pp. 8-17.
foreign relations. Meanwhile Sun advocated the "freeing of all the oppressed people in the world". This principle implied China's great responsibility to promote international equality and freedom. That is, for the moment China was one of the oppressed awaiting to be elevated; thus, China should befriend others who were in a similar position so as to ease their way towards national freedom and equality.

3. The wang-tao spirit

Sun claimed that Nationalism in China should be derived from the spirit of wang-tao, or the "kingly way". He said it was because of this quality that China had been able to survive the storms of foreign aggression. Other small countries such as Annan (Vietnam), Burma, Korea and Siam (Thailand) had benefitted from the fact that China had it. All of them had been annexed by the Chinese in ancient time and had been under the tributary system and yet all had been able to preserve their national identity, i.e. they had preserved their culture and tradition. According to Sun, this was because the Chinese "governed" them through wang-tao and not pa-tao. Sun argued, that a difference could be seen when European influence (i.e. imperialism) spread to the East: Annan was overthrown and then colonized by France, Burma by Great Britain, Korea by Japan. Even China itself had been downgraded from the "Middle Kingdom" to a "second class" colony. Sun strongly urged a promotion of the wang-tao

1. Ibid.
spirit as one of the foreign policy principles for the pursuit of a peaceful world order.

Sun further explained the notion of **wan-tao** as the law of nature, or Confucius' "peaceful ordering", a philosophy which could be found fully expressed in **Ta-hsüeh**, the Great Learning: "Search into the nature of things, extend the boundaries of knowledge; make the purpose sincere, regulate the mind; cultivate personal virtue, rule the family; govern the state and keep the world in peace".¹

According to Sun himself, this philosophy also coincided with U.S. President Woodrow Wilson's 14-Point Peace Proposal which included such suggestions as the right of self-determination of peoples and the abolition of secret diplomacy.²

The right of self-determination is identical to the Principle of Nationalism, because it also advocated freedom for all nations, big and small, in the world. In this connection, we can draw the conclusion that the notions of "anti-imperialism" and "rescue the weak and lift up the fallen" proposed by Sun are two inter-related aspects of this Nationalism. That is to say, to adopt one is to implement the other. To illustrate fully their relationship, Sun's words are worth quoting at length:

2. Teng Kung-hsuan, "Dr Sun Yat-sen's View of Internationalism and his Foreign Policy", *II, 2 Issues and Studies* (Taipei, November 1965), pp. 2-4; see also Sun's Lecture 6 on the Principle of Nationalism, *op.cit.*
"What should China's foreign policy be when and if she does become a first-rate power?...A common phrase in ancient China was 'Rescue the weak, lift up the fallen'...We must aid the weaker and smaller peoples and oppose the great powers of the world. If all the people of the country resolve upon this purpose, our nation will prosper; otherwise, there is no hope for us. Let us pledge ourselves today, before China's development begins, to lift up the fallen and to aid the weak; then when we become strong and look back upon our own sufferings under the political and economic domination of the Powers and see weaker and small peoples undergoing similar treatment, we will rise and smite that imperialism. Then will we be truly 'governing the state and pacifying the world'."1

4. The principle of international cooperation

International understanding and cooperation were essential to national development, Sun said. In conjunction with this, he also pointed out that "Isolation is the enemy of foreign relations and of national development....Thus China should carefully avoid being isolated from the rest of the world and ally, on the basis of 'righteousness', with other countries who are friendly and useful to us".2 Regarding the former, Sun argued strongly that China, in adapting to the existing environment:

"should ally with the United States and Japan.... China and Japan are closely inter-related in security or in danger, in survival or in collapse. Without Japan, there would be no China, and vice versa. For the long-range peace and security of both countries, there should be no shadow of suspicion between the two countries. (In this connection Sun advocated the policy of pan-Asianism or great-Asianism.) Then comes the United States. Though separated from China geographically, the United States naturally will befriend us and not aggress on us, because of its locality. Besides, both countries are republics and should be mutually assisting. If China has a chance for development, it will inevitably need the assistance of the United States.

2. Shih Cheng-nai, op.cit., p. 11.
States and Japan. Talent, capital and materials will all come from these two allies....China, in fact, holds the position of mediator between the United States and Japan, and has the duty to do so...." 1

At the same time Sun put forward his viewpoints toward Great Britain and Russia—they should be carefully watched as China's formidable foes. Sun was of the view that Britain, in protecting its interests in India, would not hesitate to sacrifice China. As for Russia, it was a country occupying the largest piece of China's territory and most cruel in persecuting the Chinese people.2

It seemed logical therefore that Sun should advocate China's alliance with the United States and Japan to cope with Great Britain and Russia. Nevertheless, he insisted that such a policy suggestion was not to be compared with China's old foreign policy of "i-i chi-i". The "i-i chi-i" policy was a strategem of the "Middle Kingdom" in its dealings with "foreign barbarians". The idea was to contain the "barbarians" by manipulating them into fighting against each other. In this regard, China could avoid becoming involved directly in any military or coercive actions (pa-tao) and meanwhile secure its position within the ideal framework of "peaceful ordering" (wang-tao).

2. It needs to be mentioned here that this hostile attitude towards Russia does not conflict with Sun's later policy of "allying with the Soviet Russia and admitting Communists into the KMT". Sun's view on Russia had changed and the turning point of this change was the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. See Chapter One, pp. 22-26.
Sun firmly rejected this ploy, contending it unwise, deceitful, dangerous and similar to the secret diplomacy which Woodrow Wilson had condemned. Because, Sun believed, foreign powers were very well aware of China's internal capacities, both strengths and weaknesses, they would therefore assume the right tactics to fight against China. They could form alliances with each other and then take pre-emptive action against China. Thus, to Sun, secret diplomacy was similar to disguised imperialism which should be condemned. Instead, honest diplomacy should be upheld in international contacts.

Sun encouraged international cooperation, but his emphasis was on economic aspects: foreign investment and technical cooperation. His motive was to rebuild and strengthen China economically through modernization, and to promote its industrialization with the assistance of foreign capital. Nevertheless, any such economic interaction must be a cooperative venture, Sun said; it must be for mutual benefit and not a means of economic exploitation.

5. The principle of promoting world peace and friendly relations between states

China should never talk about using force or launching war lightly, Sun held. In international relations, if conflicts occurred, they should first of all be tackled through peaceful diplomacy, i.e. negotiation or conciliation. War should be avoided except for self-defence. Sun stressed the point that since the Chinese were traditionally peace-loving, they should perpetuate this virtue and help the world in maintaining peace and promoting fraternal relations.
Finally, mention should also be made very briefly of Sun's views on foreign policy strategy. Sun considered that foreign policy strategies should be flexible and pragmatic. That is, foreign policy strategies, unlike foreign policy principles, should not be static. They should be adaptable and responsible to the changing environment. This explains why Sun denounced Russian Communism and sought alliance with western powers at one stage whilst later adopting an opposite course. Thus, Sun's proposed strategies of "pan-Asianism", "anti-imperialism", and "alliance with the Russian and Chinese Communists", etc. were purely products of a particular time and a particular environment.

IV. Chiang Kai-shek: his view of the San Min Chu I and their relation to the ROC's post-1949 foreign policy

Before discussing Chiang's perception of the San Min Chu I ideology, it is necessary to discuss briefly the man himself and the factors that influenced the formulation of

2. See footnote no. 2, p. 112.
his political philosophy.\(^1\)

Chiang was born in 1887, in Chekiang Province. His father, a salt merchant, died when Chiang was nine, leaving the family almost destitute. Only the dedication and perseverance of his mother kept the family intact and her example imparted to Chiang a strong sense of self-reliance. In 1905, Chiang decided upon a military career, and eventually attended a military school in Japan. He returned to China in 1911 to support Sun's revolutionary cause. After that Chiang's affiliation with the KMT Party grew, as did his political career.

Chiang's early life with his mother had a tremendous influence upon his political beliefs in later years. Chiang often recalled: "she impressed upon my mind that to be merely a dutiful son does not fulfil all the exacting conditions of filial piety; the principle also demands an unflinching devotion to the cause of the nation".\(^2\) It was


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from his mother’s teaching and a strict up-brining, that Chiang later developed a strong sense of patriotism and the quality of tight self-discipline. In Chiang’s mind, his own life experience—rising from the ordinary family into which he was born to become the leading political figure in modern China—provided an example for the revitalization of China. He believed that all Chinese, in particular himself, were responsible for the rebirth of the Chinese nation. The national salvation and unification of China thus became Chiang’s overriding goals and to these ends he dedicated his life.

However, Chiang was never able to fulfill his life’s ambition. On the contrary, the fact that he lost China to communism in 1949 deeply distressed him. This ambition, allied to the effect of his mother’s teaching, made him believe that he alone was responsible for the loss. He had to recover what he had lost because it was a personal loss as well as a great loss for the whole Chinese nation. Thus, after 1949 Chiang became convinced that he carried the sacred missions

1. Chiang often recalled the deep influence of his mother on him either in the shaping of his conception of his role in history or on his personal life. Among the deep impressions of his life, Chiang related, was the "indelible memory of my mother who endured so much in educating and bringing up the fatherless boy" in a nation devoid of proper leadership. See Hsiung Shih-i, op.cit., p. 373. The love of his mother, however, was more than mere motherly love, for she was "a very strict disciplinarian", which made her love all the more precious and meaningful to him. As a disciplinarian, his mother told him of the importance of self-reliance in this world of change and uncertainty. "For a poor widow and a poor orphan, or anyone who is trying to support himself in this cruel world, there is nothing better than the strict observance of self-reliance and self-betterment." see Hsiung Shih-i, op.cit., p. 375.
of resisting the spread of communism and recovering the lost mainland.

It was mainly against this background that Chiang, who was also profoundly influenced by his wife's religious faith of Christian Methodism, gradually formulated his own political thinking.¹

On the whole, Chiang's political philosophy, as a combined product of his political experience, his personality, his childhood and influences from his mother and his wife, consisted of a synthesis of neo-Confucianism, traditionalism and San Min Chu I.² In other words, San Min Chu I constituted only one aspect, but certainly the most important aspect, of Chiang's whole ideological system. Nevertheless, for the purpose of this study, while giving a brief account

1. Madam Chiang, born in 1896, was in her own right a westernizer. Educated in the U.S., with a profound knowledge and liking of the western world and being a devoted Christian, she is apparently different from her husband, who was an almost orthodox Confucian, and a traditionalist and whose religious thinking had been moulded by his mother's Buddhist faith. Nevertheless, the marriage between the old and the new seemed to enable Chiang, to quote Pichon P. Y. Loh, "to update his traditional philosophy, broaden his communication channels, and, equally, to prevent a centrist cultural posture commensurate with his political centrism". See Pichon P. Y. Loh, "The Politics of Chiang Kai-shek: A Reappraisal", pp. 433-6. Another thing deserves our attention here. It was Chiang's conversion to Christianity in 1927 that created a linkage between his political aspirations and his American supporters during the 1940s and 1950s. A large number of missionaries who had been to China wanted to see Chiang retain power rather than the Communist forces as he would provide them with a better chance for carrying on religious missions there. This group has been severely criticized for being connected with the "China Lobby" during the 1950s. For more information on the Lobby and its activities, see Chapters Three and Four.

2. For information on Chiang's political thinking, see footnote no. 1, p. 115.
of Chiang's ideology, emphasis will be put on the aspect of San Min Chu i. It is hoped that the following study will help to illuminate elements of differences between the political philosophies of Sun and Chiang.

During his schooling, possibly while in Japan, Chiang became a follower of neo-Confucianism, especially Wang Yang-ming's intutionism and activism. It was Wang's emphasis upon independent judgement, as well as his insistence upon the importance of both thought and action--Wang declared that "Knowing is easy and doing more difficult."--that held great appeal for Chiang.\(^1\) It is worth mentioning that Sun had also been deeply impressed by Wang's thinking but he had said rather "action is easy and knowledge is difficult."\(^2\) Chiang retained Sun's doctrine but concentrated more on action. Chiang then worked to embue his compatriots with the spirit of action; for he believed it was the key to the whole psychological reconstruction of the nation.\(^3\)

Chiang paid high tribute to Chinese tradition. But Chiang's emphasis on this, perhaps influenced by his mother's teaching and his early learning of Chinese classics, went further than Sun's. He believed in the notion of "a modernized China on a Confucian foundation". That is, in the task of rebuilding China, Chiang, regarded himself as a "reform traditionalist".\(^4\)

and was of the view that China's traditional Confucian ethic, based upon the four virtues,¹ should assume a more prominent place than the programme of western modernization. Chiang's standpoint, as later concretely expressed in the New Life Movement inaugurated on 19th February 1934 and in the Cultural Renaissance Movement launched on 28th July 1969, was meant to serve as a bridge or balance between the traditionalists and westernizers. However, Chiang's position was at slight variance with that of Sun. Sun, in his proposal to reconstruct China, tended to put more emphasis on western modernization, hence his concern with democracy and the Principle of the People's Livelihood. It was also here that a difference can be shown between Sun's and Chiang's perceptions of communism: Chiang sternly rejected communist ideology by arguing that it was an alien ideology and that therefore it should be eliminated, while Sun merely maintained the unsuitability and impracticality of the communist ideology if applied in China.

Without doubt, Chiang wholeheartedly adopted Sun's San Min Chu I as his own. Considering himself as the legitimate heir to Sun's ideological mantle, Chiang's devotion can be seen from a statement made by himself:

"The only purpose in my revolutionary career is the realization of the teachings of the Tsung-li. That is to say we must make our party a revolutionary and democratic party, our government a modern constitutional government based upon the exercise of the five powers and the principle of efficiency and integrity, and our country into a country where the Three Principles of the People prevail".²

1. For the meanings of the four virtues, see footnote no. 1, p. 93.
Though Chiang demonstrated this dedication throughout his lifetime, such an assertion also implied that Chiang, by holding Sun’s doctrine, could theoretically and effectively claim legitimacy over the whole of China.

Of the three Principles, Chiang, during the immediate post-1949 period, emphasized nationalism. Its purpose can be said to be to consolidate his and the KMT's position on the Taiwan island. Or to put it more precisely, during the 1950s as well as the early part of the 1960s, Chiang's policies were directed towards arousing the people's support for his course, to sustain people's revolutionary zeal, to legitimize his authority in the remaining territory under his control and to integrate the peoples residing there. It was to create a sort of identity between himself and the people in Taiwan. It was only toward the end of the 1960s that Chiang gradually shifted his emphasis from nationalism to the implementation of the Principles of Democracy and People's Livelihood. In saying this, however, it is worth repeating the point that, without nationalism as the foundation, realization of the other Principles would be meaningless and impossible.

The fullest exposition of Chiang's ideology can be found in his book Chung-kuo chih ming-yun—China's Destiny—published in 1943, although even it is to some extent still incomplete.1

1. The first complete authorized English translation of this book, prepared by a group of Chinese and assisted by Frank W. Price, was published in the U.S. in 1947 under the title China's Destiny. A competing, unauthorized translation, with highly critical notes and commentary by Philip Jaffee, was published in New York by Roy Publishers the same year.
For instance, in the book, Chiang blamed most of China's ills on the unequal treaty system and western imperialism. He sharply attacked the presence of western ideologies among the Chinese intellectuals, condemning western liberalism as well as communism. He reaffirmed his belief in the unity of action and knowledge, and in intuitive knowledge. He restated his goal of political and military unification of China, which was to be achieved by a five-point plan of national reconstruction, emphasizing psychological, ethical, social, political and economic reconstruction. This programme called for the revival of China's traditional culture and cultivation of scientific knowledge, a return to Confucian virtues, restoration of a system of group responsibility and group aid (pao-chia), democracy which rejected 19th century democratic theories of individualism, and a long-range plan of economic development based on Sun's earlier "Industrial Plan".¹ Chaing also wrote on economic reconstruction in his China's Destiny. Here, under the title of "Chinese Economic Theory" he rejected the western free enterprise system and advocated a system of state control of economic life based upon Chinese tradition. Although he also paid attention to science, it seems that he really saw it as a means of organization to direct China's industrialization towards building a strong system of national defence.

China's Destiny was written and published when Chiang was still the recognized ruler in China and when the international power relationship was fluid. After 1949, particularly

¹ Chiang Kai-shek, China's Destiny, by Philip Jaffee, pp. 167-172.
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when the international Cold War was prominent, Chiang began to associate his domestic programme of anti-Communism with the world-wide anti-Communist movement. In this regard, it can be argued that, prior to 1949, Chiang, like hundreds of thousands of traditional Chinese bureaucrats, was less concerned with, or was even unaware of the importance of either the concept of foreign policy or the terminology of foreign relations. As Joseph W. Esherick described:

"While Chiang is a very astute operator in his own country, his statesmanship and knowledge of the rest of the world are very limited. It is also a reflection of a common Chinese trait: as sophisticated as the Chinese are, they have a habit, when confronted with an almost hopeless situation, of simply refusing to face it, taking refuge in unrealistic and blind optimism." 1

Obviously, Esherick's comment is not totally correct but it does contain some truth. Another explanation for Chiang's negligence in promoting China's external relations during the mainland period is that Chiang, besieged by internal problems, had no choice but to leave it as it was. The division of China into two political units forced Chiang to bring his part of China into the international arena, where Chiang had to act rapidly and skilfully so that he could secure his position, the survival of his Party, his Republic and most of all carry out his life-long ambition. This explains how Chiang, still little versed in international affairs in 1949, shaped his perception of world order (i.e. a new world order of bipolarity to replace the

traditional order of "Sino-centricism") upon which his foreign policy direction was based.

Perhaps to put it more precisely, Chiang's perception of world reality as well as his foreign policy direction gradually took shape after his retreat from the mainland. In his view, the post-War world, like his China, had been split into two forces: western democracies and communist totalitarianism, competing against each other for world domination. Western democracies represented the "good force", or in Chinese terms, the spirit of "wang-tao", whereas communist totalitarianism represented the "evil force" or the force of "pa-tao". In their struggle, Chiang no longer seemed concerned by the western democracies' imperialist history, and believed that the good would finally triumph over the evil.1 Certainly, in addition to this conviction, Chiang had obviously several other practical reasons for allying with the West, as will be shown in the following Chapters.

Chiang had always incorporated a strong measure of anti-communism in his interpretation and implementation of Sun's *San Min Chu I* ideology, seeing in the latter not only general principles for rebuilding China but also a source of justification of his authority as Chinese leader and a powerful weapon against Communist ideology. Needless to say,

1. Speeches like this and Chiang's perception of the two camps can be found in his presidential messages, such as the New Year's Day Message, World Freedom Day Message, and National Day Congratulatory Message, etc. A selected collection of Chiang's speeches is *Chiang tsung-t'ung yen-lun hui-pien* (Collected Works of President Kai-shek) 24 Vols. (Taipei: Cheng-chung, 1956).
anti-Communism was also the backbone of Chiang's foreign policy. As Richard L. Walker remarked:

"They (the Nationalists) based many of their claims for support in the world against the communists on a contention that they stood within the framework of Sun Yat-sen's ideology for a democratic future for China." ¹

Thus, like Sun, the Principle of Nationalism was the basis of Chiang's foreign policy. And yet in Chiang's perception, his Nationalism was something equivalent to anti-Communism.

ROC's current leader, Chiang Ching-kuo, inherited the San Min Chu I ideology laid down by Sun and modified by his father. Nevertheless unlike his predecessors, Chiang Ching-kuo had a rather unusual personal experience of the Communist system.² This experience, which will be dealt with in Chapter Six, may have had some influence upon his later political conduct and hence his leadership style in Taiwan.

In summary, the ROC's current state ideology is the amalgamation of Sun Yat-sen's San Min Chu I system and Chiang's anti-communist sentiment. The whole system is based on what the Chinese believe are their traditional virtues of morality and humanity and is, in the realm of foreign affairs, directed towards pursuing a better world order. As the Constitution declares:


2. For a biographical sketch of Chiang Ching-kuo and his political thinking, see Chapter One, footnote no. 1, p. 37.
"The foreign policy of the Republic of China shall, in a spirit of independence and initiative and on the basis of the principles of equality and reciprocity, cultivate good-neighbourliness with other nations, and respect treaties and the Charter of the United Nations, in order to protect the rights and interests of Chinese citizens residing abroad, promote international cooperation, advance international justice and ensure world peace."  

The Constitution was proclaimed on 25th December 1947. Since then ROC has repeated this principle in almost all its foreign policy formulation, despite the fact that it has had no relations at all with the United Nations since October 1971.

1. Article 4, section 2, Foreign Policy, Chapter XIII, the Constitution of the Republic of China.
Chapter Three
The Strategy of Military Counterattack

1. Introduction

The strategy of military counterattack refers to one, perhaps the most essential, of the ROC's foreign policy instruments during the Cold War era. The strategy was directed chiefly against Communist forces, notably the Chinese and Russian Communists, but it also needed U.S. support to be effective.

The strategy sought both to maintain the status quo and to prevent its consolidation. The ROC's programme to maintain the status quo can be defined as the need to establish the permanence of its jurisdiction on Taiwan and to prevent any weakening of American commitment. Of equal importance was the ROC's interest in preventing the stabilization of existing conditions in the Far East as long as the Communist Chinese sat in Peking. This was because as long as the situation in the Far East remained fluid, the ROC's goal of returning to the mainland seemed possible. As long as there was still some credibility in the theme of counterattack, the Nationalist leaders could continue to rule on Taiwan because they would have the support of both the mainland immigrants who wanted to return to the mainland and the local Taiwanese majority who would like to have the mainlanders leave. The indefinite extension of crisis in Asia also had the effect of persuading the U.S. to continue in its role as "policeman" in the area, which was of vital importance to the security interest, hence, the survival of the ROC. In other words, the policy of preventing stabilization would guarantee
continued American military aid to the Nationalist government, as well as to other non- or anti-Communist countries in the region, and held open the possibility that either the U.S. or the Communists would lose patience and the full impact of American power would be brought against the ROC's enemies in Peking.

This was the so-called "strategy of military counterattack"—for convenience, we will refer to it as the "military strategy"—which the ROC employed as the basis of its foreign policy after October 1949, particularly from the outbreak of the Korean War to the conclusion of the ROC-U.S. Joint Communiqué on 23rd October 1958, which said:

"The Government of the Republic of China considers that the restoration of freedom to its people on the mainland is its sacred mission. It believes that the foundation of this mission resides in the minds and the hearts of the Chinese people and that the principal means of successfully achieving its mission is the implementation of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's three people's principles (nationalism, democracy and social well-being) and not the use of force." 2

Efforts to restore and maintain American confidence, which the Nationalists had lost by the end of the Chinese civil war, extracting maximum benefits from U.S. commitment (which was formally expressed in the 1954 U.S.-ROC Mutual Defence Treaty), and/or manipulating the U.S. into another new

1. The term "military counterattack" and "political counterattack" are popularly used by Chiang Kai-shek, other Nationalist leaders and in the academic circle in Taiwan. See Central Daily News (CDN) (Taipei) 18th, 19th, 20th, 21st, February, 1961, p. 2.

commitment, if at all possible, thus became the primary foreign policy objectives of the Nationalist government. In other words, the U.S. commitment was used by the Nationalist government to achieve its political objectives, both domestic and foreign.

With this in mind, we can now proceed to the subject matter. The Chapter has two parts. The first part deals with the U.S.'s post-1949 involvement in, and commitment to the Nationalist government of the ROC on Taiwan. Here, mention will also be made very briefly of the immediate post-War international environment and the U.S. "containment" policy. The second part, on the other hand, concerns the ROC's policy and actions toward the U.S. Our study will concentrate on the period from the release of the U.S. White Paper on China on 5th August 1949 to the end of 1958.

II. The international environment, and relations with the U.S.

1. The Cold War and the U.S.' "containment" policy

Immediately after the Second World War, the world was divided into two ideological blocs: "western democracy" and "communism", which was generally known as the Cold War bipolarity, but which affected countries throughout the world, large and small.
On 12th March 1947, the U.S. Administration published the "Truman Doctrine", which was intended to contain Communist expansion and aggression, especially by the Russians, through mobilization of U.S. military, economic and political assistance abroad. The criterion for deciding who should be granted such assistance was that those "free people who are seeking to preserve their independence and democratic institutions and human freedoms against totalitarian pressures, either internal or external, will receive top priority for American reconstruction aid."¹

Reconstruction aid was essential in American's view because "without economic health, there could be no political stability and no assured peace",² and thus few obstacles to Communist infiltration.

Accordingly, the U.S. poured a very substantial amount of military, economic and political aid into programmes overseas, involving itself actively in other countries' national affairs for the encouragement of a solid anti-Communist and pro-America sentiment, and promises of security protection and/or national development.³ The ultimate goal of the programmes was to enhance the U.S. sphere of influence vis-a-vis that of the Russians, and thus lead to the latter's

2. Ibid., p. 42.
3. During the Cold War period, the U.S. set up several security treaties abroad, including NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), CENTO (Central Treaty Organization), SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization), ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, and the U.S. Security Pact), and many others.
isolation. After the outbreak of the Korean War these programmes were extended to include the Chinese Communists.

It was in this context that the ROC came to be included in the U.S. global containment perimeter, although with much uneasiness. This was because, unlike other alliance relationships of the U.S., the ROC's dialogues with its patron were rather unequal and precarious, especially during the initial period of the 1950s, to which we will now turn.

2. The U.S. policy towards the ROC

As noted in Chapter One, U.S. support for the Nationalist government began during the latter period of the Second World War when the U.S. provided China with economic and military aid and made it one of the "Big Five" with veto power in the U.N. Security Council. At that time, U.S. aid to China was channelled entirely to the Nationalist govern-

1. Originally, neither the ROC nor South Korea were included in the U.S. security zone in the Pacific. This position was made clearly by Secretary of State Dean Acheson in a speech in January 1950. Obviously he considered neither of them vital to U.S. security interests at that time. See "Acheson States Policy in 1950", in China: U.S. Policy Since 1945, pp. 304-311.

ment. Many reasons could account for the U.S. support. Very briefly, it has been held that it was an emotional action, because in the U.S. executive branch of the government there were forces which supported and even acted on behalf of the Nationalist government (these forces later became known as the "China Lobby" in the U.S. Administration). Or, perhaps in more political terms, it was because the U.S. was of the view that China might become a stabilizing factor in the Asian political scene during the post-War era. That is, a strong and stable China could check Japanese militarism in Asia on the one hand, on the other hand, it would continue cooperation with the U.S. for maintaining peace and order in Asia.¹ Whatever the motivations were, the U.S. at that time wanted a united and strong China, free from foreign (especially Russian) domination. Later, however, in view of developments in the Chinese civil war (i.e. the growing strength of the Communist forces against the weakening Nationalist government), and the failure of U.S. mediation efforts there, the U.S.'s policy toward China gradually changed. That is, the U.S., though it still wanted a strong and united China, was less concerned with who (either Chiang Kai-shek or Mao Tse-tung) or which political parties (either the KMT or the CCP) would gain final control of the whole of China. Particularly after

¹. However some people held different views. Nicholas J. Spykman, for instance, argued that a strong China would be in a position to dominate much of Asia, and that the U.S. should seek to balance China by working with a defeated (but not destroyed) Japan and other Asian countries. Nicholas J. Spykman, America's Strategy in World Politics (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1942), pp. 469-70.

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the Soviet-Yugoslav split in 1948, the State Department had the hope that a Communist China might prove to be Titoist. This expectation was clearly expressed in the final pages of the Letter of Transmittal for the White Paper, of which D. Acheson reported that in his judgement, the Chinese could be expected to resist foreign domination whether it be American or Russian. Acheson said that although for the time being the Chinese people were controlled by the CCP in the interest of Soviet imperialism, the Chinese people would ultimately "reassert themselves and throw off the foreign yoke". Acheson further noted, "... we should encourage all developments in China which now and in the future work toward this end".¹

Thus, when the news of the "Chiang Kai-shek Tragedy" reached Washington, President Harry S. Truman's reaction was to modify his China policy according to the existing political development in China, i.e. to terminate the previous U.S. support for the commitment to the Nationalist government and to prepare the way for accepting the new political reality on the mainland.

This was the time when U.S.-ROC relations reached their lowest point, i.e. from the moment of the release of the U.S. White Paper on China on 5th August 1949 until the outbreak of the Korean War on 25th June 1950.

The White Paper declared, among many other things, the U.S. loss of confidence in, and hence its decision to abandon, the Chiang Kai-shek government.\(^1\) The decision was reinforced in January 1950 when President Truman announced that the U.S. government, "in according to the Cairo Declaration, accepts the view that Taiwan belonged to China", and that "it will not pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China", and that "it will not provide military aid or advice to Chinese forces on Formosa".\(^2\) In other words, the U.S. government would not have prevented a Communist take-over of Taiwan, had it happened. This was Truman's position with regard to the Nationalist government and Taiwan before the outbreak of the Korean War.

At this time, the Nationalist government on Taiwan was in an appalling state. Internally, it had not only "lost" the mainland, meaning the loss of territory, power and prestige, but also was physically under the threat of Communist attack and of possible opposition from the local resistance movement. Externally, the Nationalist government began to experience assaults on its status—the question of its rightful place, hence its legitimacy, in the U.N. and many

2. Department of State Bulletin (DSB), 16th January 1950, p. 79.
other international agencies was raised.¹

In this connection, the point needs to be emphasized that the U.S. post-1949 policies on China (ROC) developed simultaneously with its policies toward the new regime in Peking. From the formation of the PRC up to the outbreak of the Korean War the U.S. attitude towards the Communist government was one of "wait and see".² At that time, two major issues, recognition of the PRC and its admission to the U.N., most concerned the U.S. administration. However, during the process of formulating this new China policy, the U.S. administration was confronted with three other unsettled political issues. First, could the Communist government maintain effective control over the vast mainland? Second, would the Nationalist government on Taiwan collapse or be overthrown by the Chinese Communists? And third, would there be a change in the relationship between the Chinese Communists and Soviet Russia? As for the final point, as mentioned briefly earlier, the U.S. was of the

1. Despite the fact that, under the terms of the Cairo Declaration, Taiwan was returned to the ROC and since 1945 administered by the government of the ROC, several alternatives had been recommended in respect to the disposition of the island. For instance, in 1950, the U.S. proposed as alternatives that Taiwan: (a) continue as a province of and the seat of government of the ROC; (b) be placed under a U.N. trusteeship; or (c) become an independent nation. The ambiguity of Taiwan's legal status became more complicated when the PRC's Foreign Minister Chou En-lai filed a complaint against the ROC's position on the island to the President of the Security Council and the Secretary General of the U.N., on 24th August 1950. His complaint demanded the immediate expulsion of the ROC delegates from the U.N. and its associated bodies because they "illegally" occupied these places. The dispute over the "China Issue" will be dealt with in more detail in Chapter Five. For more information on Taiwan's post-War status, see Chapter One.

2. See footnote no. 1, p. 133.
view that the Chinese Communists would perhaps become the "Tito of Asia".

While these matters were still being examined, the Korean War began. This event, together with two other reasons, motivated the U.S. administration to reshape its China policy again. The new China policy was pro-ROC and anti-PRC and it lasted for the next two decades. As for the two additional reasons for this just mentioned, one was that the Chinese Communists seized the property of the U.S. consulate in Peking on 14th January 1950. This action indicated their indifference to the U.S. overtures concerning diplomatic relations. And the other reason was the Sino (PRC)-Soviet Alliance Pact, signed on 14th February the same year. The Pact, together with two subsidiary agreements, one promising eventual return to China of Soviet-held properties in Manchuria and the other extending to China a $300-million loan for industrial equipment, indicated a new epoch of collaboration between the two Communist countries, hence an end to the U.S. "Titoist" expectation. Nevertheless, in the shaping of the U.S. new China policy, the most crucial factor was the sudden outbreak of the Korean War.

The War, broke out on 25th June 1950 when North Korean forces launched an attack on South Korea, convinced the U.S. of two things. One was the aggressive nature of the Chinese


2. For more information on the PRC-U.S.S.R. collaboration during 1949 and 1950, see Michael B. Yahuda, China's Role in World Affairs (London: Croom Helm Ltd., 1978), pp. 43-64.
Communists. The other was the strategic importance of the Taiwan Island to the U.S. security interests in the Pacific Ocean, and some U.S. senators such as W. F. Knowland and B. B. Hickenlooper proposed increasing military assistance to prevent Taiwan falling into enemy hands. Consequently, the U.S. resumed its support for the ROC. Meanwhile, it abandoned its hope of either recognizing the Communist regime on the mainland or of favouring its admission to the U.N.

The situation at that time can be summarized as follows: immediately after the outbreak of the War, the case was brought to the U.N. Security Council for solution. The U.S., in compliance with the U.N. resolution of 27th June which recommended that U.N. members furnish aid to repel the attack, authorized on 30th June the employment of U.S. ground forces to repel the invaders in South Korea, the use of U.S. military aircraft against military objectives north of the 38th Parallel and a complete blockade of the Korean coast by the Navy.

Meanwhile, in order to prevent the War from spreading further, on 27th June, President Truman announced the decision to "neutralize" the Taiwan Straits by ordering the 7th Fleet "to prevent any attack on Taiwan".¹ At the same time, he called upon the Nationalist government on Taiwan "to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland".² To

2. Ibid.
justify his action, Truman declared the legal status of Taiwan as undetermined. That is, unlike his January speech which declared that Taiwan was a part of China, Truman's reversed position was: "The determination of the future status of Taiwan must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations."¹

On 7th July, the Security Council adopted another resolution, setting up a unified command, and named U.S. General Douglas MacArthur as "Commanding General, United Nations Command in Korea".

Truman's concern to localize the Korean War was because he feared that involvement of the Chinese from either side in this conflict might provoke a general war, involving the two Superpowers, and consequently lead to a third world war.

However, despite Truman's efforts, Chinese Communist forces did become involved. The Chinese Communists entered the War in October under the slogan of "Resist America and aid Korea" (the North Koreans). Their explanation was that they considered U.S. action in Korea and its assistance to the Nationalist government to be evidence of interference in China's domestic affairs. As Communist Chinese Premier and Foreign Minister, Chou En-lai charged, the U.S. action was

¹. Ibid.

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"armed aggression against the territory of China". ¹

He also declared that:

"...the fact that Taiwan is a part of China will remain unchanged forever.... All the people of our country will certainly fight...to the end to liberate Taiwan from the grasp of the U.S. aggressors. The Chinese people...will surely succeed in driving out the U.S. aggressors and in recovering Taiwan and all other territories belonging to China." ²

The U.S. responded by taking action to isolate China. One such action was the imposition of a complete embargo on all U.S. exports to China. This embargo announced on 6th December 1950 lasted for 21 years until April 1971. The U.S. also imposed other restrictions, e.g. on travel by Americans to the PRC, on trade and on cultural exchanges. Thus, relations between the U.S. and the PRC became worse and that between the U.S. and the ROC improved.

American support for the ROC reached its height during the Eisenhower period (1953-1961). Compared to his predecessor, Dwight D. Eisenhower had a more positive attitude towards the ROC. He believed that, in view of the American security interests in the West Pacific area, it was imperative to protect and assist the Nationalist government in all respects, i.e. militarily, politically, economically, morally, logistically and psychologically.


². Ibid.
Very briefly, Eisenhower's supports for the Nationalists can be divided into three aspects for discussion: military, political and economic support. Militarily, it can be seen in three actions taken before, during and after the first Quemoy crisis. The crisis, broke out in September 1954 and dragged on for 9 months, was caused mainly by Chinese Communists' attack on Quemoy and Matsu. First of all, shortly after his inauguration in January 1953, Eisenhower reversed Truman's neutralization policy, i.e. the 7th Fleet would no longer prevent the Nationalists from attacking the mainland, thus "unleashing" Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist army. Eisenhower was of the opinion that in performing merely a neutralizing role, the 7th Fleet was in effect protecting the Chinese Communist hold on the mainland. In this manner, Chinese Communists could spare some military forces for the Korean War (in fighting against the U.S. forces under the U.N. Peace Keeping Forces there). It is necessary to point out here that Eisenhower's decision was not meant to be an approval of the Nationalists' programme of "massive counterattack". Nevertheless, in doing so, the decision helped the Nationalists to create a military threat to the enemies on the mainland. Secondly, in December 1954, Eisenhower signed a Mutual Defence Treaty with the Nationalist government. The Treaty—which pledged that, in case of armed attack against the territory of the one in the West Pacific (in respect to the ROC, the defined territories include Taiwan and the Pescadores—that means excluding Quemoy and Matsu; and in respect to the U.S., the island territories in the West Pacific under its jurisdiction), the other would act to meet the common danger
in accordance with its constitutional processes\(^1\)--showed a most solid U.S. commitment toward the ROC. It also gave a boost to its international status. Thirdly, in view of the persistent tension in the Taiwan Straits - during the first Quemoy crisis, the Chinese Communists were said to have fired 17,243 rounds of shells at Quemoy and after the crisis the PRC continued its bombardment,\(^2\) the Treaty was ratified with the addition of the Formosa Resolution. The Resolution empowered the U.S. President "to employ American armed forces as he deems necessary to protect Taiwan, the adjoining Pescadores islands and 'related positions and territories'".\(^3\) On 23rd August 1958, the second Quemoy crisis broke out. This time Chinese Communist shore batteries launched an even heavier bombardment of Quemoy and Matsu, which developed over the next days and weeks into an effort

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to prevent by artillery fire the resupply of Quemoy. More information on the second Quemoy crisis will be given in due course.

Politically, Eisenhower continued with firm resolve the recognition policy laid down by his predecessor. He maintained:

"We do not recognize the authorities in Peking for what they pretend to be....It is not the government of China....We recognize the Nationalist Government of the Republic of China, even though the territory under its control is severely restricted. We believe it more authentically represents the views of the great body of the people of China....That government will continue to receive important aid and assistance from the United States." 2

Economically, a considerable financial contribution which took the form of "grants", "loans" or "technical assistance"


2. DSB, 28th May 1951, p. 847. This policy was originally suggested by Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs.
was funnelled through the Nationalist authorities in Taiwan.\(^1\) The aid was supposed firstly to put an end to Taiwan's post-War economic and political strains and thereafter to help develop Taiwan's industry and modernization. However, in order to ease the burden, a significant sum from the U.S. assistance fund was re-allocated to the ROC's military expenditure needed for military build-up and modernization.\(^2\)

Finally, another indication of Eisenhower's support was his visit to Taiwan in 1960. In fact, Eisenhower was the only U.S. President ever to visit Taiwan. This visit, which had a significant psychological boast on the Nationalists, was marked by tremendous displeasure from Chinese Communists. The latter fired 85,965 shells at Quemoy on 17th June, the day of Eisenhower's arrival in Taipei; and 88,978 shells on 19th June, the day of his departure.\(^3\)

Here, one thing deserves our attention with regard to the U.S. large-scale support for the ROC. That is, despite his strong

1. From 1951 to 1965, U.S. economic aid to the Nationalist government totalled U.S. $1,520 million, including $950 million in grants, and $220 million in development loans, and $350 million in farm surpluses. See The China Yearbook, 1965-1966, p. 3. For more information on U.S. aid to Taiwan, see Chapter Six.

2. Taiwan's military expenditure throughout most of the aid period (1950-1965) was per G.N.P. the highest in the world--about 85% of all Nationalist government outlay--although most heavy equipment, planes, ships and vehicles were supplied by the U.S. as a grant. An inflationary spiral would have resulted had not the massive U.S. injections begun to stabilize the economy. See F. A. Lumley, The Republic of China under Chiang Kai-shek: Taiwan TODAY (London: Barrie & Jenkins, 1976), p. 85.

commitment, Eisenhower was very cautious not to get involved in the ROC's mainland recovery programme or in the defence of Quemoy and Matsu. For the ROC, the Mutual Defence Treaty had definitely a positive effect in that it protected Taiwan from Communist invasion. However, the Treaty had also a negative effect in that it put Chiang's army back on a leash, hence constraining its military attempts to retake the mainland. This was because, according to the Treaty, the 7th Fleet was again to operate in the Taiwan Straits. Furthermore, the Treaty was finalized with an inclusion of notes exchanged between the two sides. The notes, known as the Dulles-Yeh letters, committed the ROC to consult with the U.S. with regard to any offensive action against the mainland. In other words, it committed the Nationalist government not to attack the mainland, except for self-defence. The U.S. further made clear that it would not support aggressive military action by the Nationalist government.

As a matter of fact, Eisenhower was not at all happy about Chiang's military build up on the offshore islands--especially on the Quemoys--the largest and closest to the mainland of the various island groups retained by the Nationalists after 1949. Chiang increased his military buildup on Quemoy during the second Quemoy crisis in 1958 from 50,000 to 100,000, nearly a third of his effective ground forces. In Eisenhower's view, this buildup was not only unwise but provocat-


tive. It was unwise because, as Secretary of State John F. Dulles pointed out at a news conference, "if there were a ceasefire in the area which seemed to be reasonably dependable, I think it would be foolish to keep these forces on these (offshore) islands. We thought it was rather foolish to put them there".\(^1\) Furthermore, it was provocative because, as Eisenhower recalled in his Memoirs, Chiang's action of building up his offshore strength "had helped complicate the problem". He said, "it seemed likely that his heavy deployment to these forward positions was designed to convince us that he was as committed to the defense of the offshore islands as he was to that of Formosa".\(^2\) In other words, Eisenhower himself recognized that a primary purpose of Chiang was to put pressure on the U.S. It was "a reflection of his hope of promoting a fight between the U.S. and the Chinese Communists as a prelude to a Chinese Nationalist invasion of the mainland".\(^3\)

Consequently, the U.S. reached the conclusion that if Chiang had intentionally and unwisely put himself and the U.S. into this predicament, "he must get himself out of it".\(^4\) the U.S. was determined not to get involved in any unwanted war. Thus Dulles, in order to persuade the Nationalist government to reduce its troop deployment on the offshore islands as well as to minimize tension in the Straits, made plain that the U.S. had "no commitment of any kind" in bringing about

3. Ibid., p. 301.
4. Ibid.
the return of the ROC on the mainland. Later on the ROC-U.S. Joint Communiqué was issued which, as mentioned earlier, pointed out that the task to achieve ROC's mainland recovery programme should not rely solely on military means but on "an implementation of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People".¹

The American government was then of the view that the fact of the ROC's continued existence on Taiwan was a source of inspiration to the people still suffering from Communist dominance on the mainland and to the vast numbers of overseas Chinese, as well as constituting forceful proof that the Chinese Communists would not be able to control the mainland for an extended period of time. As Dulles said: "International Communism is merely a passing and not a perpetual phase....and we will do all that we can to contribute to that passing".² Nevertheless, Eisenhower repeated the position that his administration had no intention whatsoever of overthrowing the Chinese Communist government by force, but hoped that the application of military pressure would force internal changes in the Chinese Communist regime and all peaceful methods were employed to deepen the internal crisis and encourage the mainland people to revolt.

In 1959, as a result of the ROC-U.S. Joint Communiqué, also as the Nationalists came to realize that their efforts to recover the mainland would be drawn out, the emphasis of the

1. See footnote no. 2, p. 127.
countries were elevated to the ambassadorial level, in Warsaw, when Peking held out the prospect of releasing Americans imprisoned in China, but they were broken off in mid-December 1957. The main purpose of these talks, according to the U.S. State Department, was to bring about agreement on the return of U.S. civilians detained in China and facilitate further discussions and settlement of other practical matters involving the two countries. The two sides, though achieving some agreement on the first agenda issue, failed to compromise on the second one. The deadlock lay in the fact that Peking demanded an immediate withdrawal of the U.S. 7th Fleet from the Pacific Ocean as well as of its military support to the Nationalist government, whereas the U.S. refused to enter talks at a higher level as long as U.S. citizens were still imprisoned on the mainland and as long as the latter refused to "renounce the use of force in the Taiwan area". Thus relationship between the U.S. and the PRC remained cool and strained.

To sum up, under the containment policy, the U.S. had involved itself in various security commitments and/or assistance programmes abroad. In Asia, the anti-Communist government of the ROC on Taiwan had also been included in such a programme. Nevertheless, between its inception in the early 1950s and the end of 1958, the U.S.-ROC relationship witnessed several modifications. Such modifications, as will be studied later, have tremendous impact upon the subsequent development of the ROC's foreign policy.

ROC's mainland recovery programme as well as its anti-communist policy gradually shifted from an all-out offensive military confrontation against the Communist enemies to a long-term political struggle. As old slogan, "Thirty percent military action and seventy percent political struggle", which the Nationalists used in their anti-Communist campaigns in the 1930's, was revived and since then used frequently by the leaders of the ROC in the 1960's. Thus, Chiang announced in his New Year's Message that:

"A new principle is in the making in our 'mainland recovery' programme... Now it is to be accomplished by efforts which are '70% political and only 30% military'."

This message indicated the official turning point in the ROC's foreign policy strategies from a belligerent, offensive stance (to destroy the status quo along the Taiwan Straits) to a relatively moderate posture of national defence (to secure the status quo inside Taiwan as well as along the Taiwan Straits). The latter, i.e. the adjusted foreign policy of "political counterattack", will be discussed in the next Chapter.

Finally, mention should also be made of negotiations attempted by both the U.S. and the PRC. The negotiations took place from time to time, starting in the spring of 1954. At that time, they were at consular level and carried on in Geneva. In August 1955, talks between the two

1. Hungdah Chiu, *op.cit.*, p. 84.
III. The ROC's foreign policy strategy of military counterattack

Chiang Kai-shek was well aware of the fact that had it not been for the Taiwan Straits, and for the outbreak of the Korean War, the ROC might not have been saved. Consequently to Chiang, it was essential to defend the shores of Taiwan and to prevent any weakening of the U.S. commitment to his government.

At the same time Chiang made it clear in his anti-Communist position that his campaign was not a narrow one directed against the "Chinese Communist traitors" only, but one determined to crush the Russian aggressors as well. In Chiang's view, the existence of Communist forces constituted a threat to world peace, it was this "Communist conspiracy" that had caused the Chinese tragedy in 1949, and he claimed that the Nationalist government had been too trusting towards the Russian Communists.¹ After 1949, Russian imperialism continued to encroach on China, and it might spread to other parts of the free world. "The nation of China has become a slaughter house of traitors", Chiang said in his National Day Message on 10th October 1950:

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"Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh and our people will be converted into slaves of the Russian imperialist who demands that the puppets Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh supply the blood and sweat of our people as capital for her war of attrition in the conquest of the world, the Chinese Communists, with the backing of the Soviet Union, were avowedly seeking to conquer Taiwan, to eliminate Free China and to expel the U.S. from the Western Pacific generally, compelling the U.S. to abandon its collective security arrangements with free countries of that area." 1

Consequently, in order to save China and the whole world, Chiang declared his government's fundamental policy in these words: "First, concentrate all armed strength; second, safeguard Taiwan; third, rescue our compatriots on the mainland, and fourth, rejuvenate the Chinese Republic."2 Chiang set forth two strategies in his anti-Communist campaign: "(military) counter-offensive upon the mainland" (i.e. to recover the mainland through military means) and the "modernization of Taiwan". Priority was laid on the former. According to Chiang, it would take a good five years to complete his task: "the first year for preparation; counter-attack in the second year; mopping up in the third year;...completion in the fifth year".3 However, Chiang was aware of the fact that the strength of his armed forces in Taiwan alone were not sufficient to carry out the tasks. Chiang believed, instead, that the U.S., as the leader of the Free World, should come to support this "good cause."

Accordingly, there were two complementary tactics in Chiang's

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid. - 149 -
military strategy. One suggested direct military confront-
ation with the Communist rivals on the mainland, whereas the
other assumed an indirect military threat against inter-
ational Communist forces--the Russians as well as other
Communist countries--through an alliance with the U.S. and
the Free World.

Chiang Kai-shek's expectation of U.S. support was in
accordance with his perception of the world political situ-
tion and U.S. containment policy. Considering the "two-
camps" theory of the world as valid, and considering the
role of the U.S. as the "policeman" in this framework,
Chiang believed that as long as he could ensure that the
ROC remained in the "democratic" camp, i.e. as long as he
could hinge his island nation upon the U.S. security ring,
he could eventually safeguard the political survival of
the ROC on Taiwan, assume a return to power to the mainland,
and preserve the traditional Chinese way of life, which was
now threatened on the mainland by the imposition of what
Chiang called "an alien revolutionary ideology". In return,
he would assist the U.S. to fight against international
Communism and to search for a better world order.

The ROC hoped to involve U.S. support in three ways. Firstly,
there were the ROC's direct military campaigns against the
mainland which were made independently of the U.S. but which
subtly involved the U.S. because they could have been
perceived as provocations by the mainland government. In
this regard, the ROC also manoeuvred in the course of crises
to make the most of its opportunities, to build on American
fears, to widen the conflict, and to begin its massive counterattack. Secondly, the ROC could try to persuade the U.S. to join in the task of aiding the people of the mainland who had now been subjected to the "tyranny" of "Communist totalitarianism". The Nationalist government was trying to change some minds, to make Americans more responsive in supporting its armed forces. Thirdly, the ROC was attempting to prolong some of the major conflicts, such as the Korean War and the Taiwan Straits crises, in post-War Asia.

1. **Direct military campaign: guerrilla warfare**

Throughout his lifetime, Chiang never gave up hope of returning to the mainland and the determination of "saving his mainland compatriots from the Communist domination". These thoughts were clearly and repeatedly expressed in his anti-Communist slogan of "Fan-kung K'ang eh", i.e. "Opposing the Chinese Communists and Resisting Soviet Russians". Nevertheless, his actual military campaigns for such purposes were concentrated mainly during the 1950s and involved guerrilla activities and direct military assaults on the mainland.

Immediately after 1949, Chiang and other Nationalist leaders declared that the Nationalist armies would stage a counter-offensive soon, perhaps within the next year. Since then such a proclamation was reiterated with determination and

1. See Chapter One, p. 59.
2. Chiang on his inauguration speech in March 1950. See also O. E. Clubb, *op.cit.*, p. 517.
only slight variation almost every year. It could be argued that such a theme of military counterattack was unrealistic because the ROC was in no position whatsoever to achieve such an operation alone in view of the limited means available. Thus it was meant to raise the Nationalists' morale and courage to continue their unfinished civil war with the Chinese Communists. Nevertheless, the ROC's claim had its justification in that there were continued guerrilla operations on its behalf on the mainland.

The ROC claimed that there were some 400,000 guerrillas in June 1950 operating on the mainland against the Communist government. Later in August, this number was said to have increased to 1,600,000. Among them, it was held, 55% were under the direction of Nationalist officers, 30% under local militia or popular local organizations, and 15% were defected Communist troops. It was also reported that these underground guerrillas had fought 1,800 pitched battles, great and small, with the Communists, inflicting 300,000 casualties.

Other information was that several thousand, or even more, armed Nationalist soldiers were recovering from their losses and attempting to regroup themselves in the border region of

3. Ibid.
Burma and Yunnan Province of China. Later on, in November the same year, a ROC report claimed that one million of its troops were still fighting on the mainland, and at the same time a Communist report said that they had repulsed a Nationalist landing attempt on the Chekiang Coast. The Communist report on the opposition strength might have been a deliberate exaggeration to instill enthusiasm in the local militias. Nevertheless, it would be justifiable to say that these guerrilla activities, though mainly small in scale, were a considerable nuisance to the Chinese Communists. From Chiang's point of view, however, they helped to relieve frustration, boost morale, and strengthen the claim to sovereignty over the mainland. In this respect, the evidence of continuing guerrilla activities on their behalf reinforced the Nationalists' conviction that they would one day return to power, whether through military or other means.

According to Lieutenant General Lo Fou-ning, the Military Attaché of the ROC Embassy in Washington D.C. from 1956 to 1964, the existence of the guerrillas either inside the "enemy" territory or those based on Quemoy and Matsu, as well as their anti-Communist campaigns there, were facts. "Most of the guerrillas were either previously ROC supporters", Lo said, "or the remnants of the ROC forces. They were either too slow to evacuate from the troubled mainland, or they were merely not convinced of its necessity. Consequently, they continued their anti-Communist crusade with only limited

1. NYT, 6th July 1950, p. 4, and 13th July 1950, p. 4.
3. Interview with Lieutenant General Lo on 9th December 1980 during his visit to London.
weaponry left behind by the Nationalist troops and with the hope that one day Chiang would return with victory.\textsuperscript{1} This conviction supported them in continuing sabotage for many years; however, they could not receive any military supplies or instructions of any sort from the Nationalist government on Taiwan. Nor could they unite into a more effective combat force. According to Lieutenant General Lo, most of the guerrillas and their saboteur actions were concentrated in Kwangtung province, scattered in villages and forever trying to set up local cells of resistance, but without spectacular success. There were also reports of widespread guerrilla activities in Chekiang, Kiangsi, Fukien, Yunnan and Hainan Island. "Certainly", Lieutenant General Lo continued, "the Nationalist government had been hoping to provide military supplies or make a direct intervention; but because of the tight control of the Communist forces on the mainland, as well as the geographical distance between the mainland and Taiwan, such supplies were unthinkable".\textsuperscript{2} Besides, at that time, the Nationalists themselves were preoccupied with other

1. Interview with Lieutenant General Lo.

2. The Nationalist government had provided limited assistance to the guerrilla forces during the early 1950s. It had parachuted teams of guerrillas and saboteurs on to the mainland and conducted raids there. It also trained leaders for these guerrilla bands, and some of them were shipped into the mainland by boat or plane. As Hollington K. Tong noted: "In November 1951, Prime Minister Chen (Cheng) reported that 3,000 such leaders had been sent singly and in small groups from Taiwan, to take command of guerrilla bases." Hollington K. Tong, op.cit., pp. 522-523. Most of the guerrillas and saboteurs were in Kwangtung province, because the Nationalist air force could not drop supplies further than that.
internal matters. Thus solid communication between the Nationalists on Taiwan and the guerrilla forces on the mainland could never be properly established. Consequently, instead of growing strong, the guerrilla strength began to fade away, especially after the second Quemoy crisis in 1958.

Lieutenant General Lo was of the view that if the guerrillas could respond immediately from inside the mainland when the Nationalist troops struck from Taiwan (see Figure No. 1), then they could "encircle" the "enemies", and thus fulfil the policy of mainland recovery. Nevertheless, the reality was that, during the 1950s, neither force ever took any coordinated actions. Eventually what the Nationalist government could and obviously did try to do before the total collapse of guerrilla forces was to undertake provocative actions, which meant either putting pressure on Peking or widening the hostility between it and the U.S. government.

1. Apart from integrating the mainland immigrants with the local Taiwanese and smoothing relationships between them, the Nationalist government was constrained by other internal problems. An obvious instance, according to Lieutenant General Lo, was the internal splits of the KMT Party which had upset it since the mid-1920s. See Chapter One. Even Chiang Kai-shek himself admitted the existence of division within the Party. He said: "We must make Taiwan the base for national recovery, a vanguard for the struggle of the people of Asia, and a champion of world peace. To achieve this, we must... do away with the conflicts between the various groups in the Party. We must not tolerate any longer the selfish behaviour and ideas which have caused the collapse on the mainland and may cause the collapse of Taiwan if unchecked." See Chiang's Address to the Standing Committee of the Central Executive on 22nd July 1950.
FIGURE NO. 1: ROC's "Mainland Recovery" Policy under the Strategy of Military Counterattack

One such provocative action taken by the Nationalist government was its decision to ignore President Truman's neutralization policy. As noted earlier, Truman had requested that the Nationalist government comply with this policy by halting offensive operations by its navy and air force. The Nationalists agreed initially in June 1950 to respect Truman's request, but after a while they renewed their pledge to counterattack, claiming that the American ban on mainland attacks would probably only be temporary.\(^1\) Later in July when an invasion scare hit Quemoy, the Nationalist air force responded by bombing the Communist mainland near Quemoy.

The Nationalist explanation was that this action was for defensive purposes and should not be precluded by the Truman order.\(^2\) Within a month the Nationalist government announced the success of a guerrilla raid against the Communists near Ninghai.\(^3\) In this regard, Truman's neutralization policy enforced by the 7th Fleet was not totally effective because the Nationalist government seemed to ignore his request; repeated attacks, though small-scale, on the mainland demonstrated this; thus, it was not anything near a complete protection for the Communists. Nonetheless, to be fair, Truman's neutralization policy did prevent the Nationalist government from attempting a massive counter-attack.

\(^1\) **NYT**, 5th July 1950, p 3.
\(^3\) **NYT**, 24th August 1950, p. 6.
In reality, Truman was rather critical of Chiang's government, pointing out many times that Chiang showed little interest in improving conditions on Taiwan and was, instead, only interested in getting the U.S. involved in a war with Peking which would make it possible for him to get back to the mainland.¹

The ROC's hopes for a military counterattack were again raised in October when Peking entered the Korean War. It can be argued that the Nationalists' expectation at that time was: if Truman could be persuaded to lift his ban on operations against the mainland, then a Nationalist invasion could open a second front and relieve pressure on the United Nations forces in Korea.

Meanwhile, Chiang continued to tell the Communists that they could expect to be attacked in the "near future". In retaliation, the Communists declared that "force will be used to liberate Taiwan and to expel U.S. imperialism there".² Nevertheless, it is doubtful that the Communists took the Nationalists' threat seriously until 1953 when Eisenhower decided to "unleash" Chiang's forces. This decision lent great credence to the ROC's slogan about military counterattack, despite the fact that Eisenhower stated explicitly soon afterwards that it was not a prelude to a Nationalist counterattack. For instance, the China Post, one leading English-language newspaper published in Taiwan,

1. William M. Bueler, op.cit., p. 15.
indicated that Chiang was prepared to hit the China mainland "tomorrow" with "fully-trained and newly-equipped" combat teams of 20,000 men which involved a number of guerrillas. Later on, another report said that there were 580,000 guerrillas now organized on the mainland waiting to support a counterattack at any time, and that Nationalist commando raiders had struck at 8 main bases and had destroyed 9 Communist battalions. Actually, the Nationalist government had conducted raids and supported guerrilla units long before the "unleashing"; but, it used this new opportunity to step up its guerrilla propaganda.

Another tactic of the military strategy was "psychological warfare". The idea was to win the hearts and minds of mainland compatriots rather than provoke direct fighting with the Communist forces. In other words, it was to encourage an internal rebellion on the mainland on a large-scale and/or provoke an internal split in the CCP before attempting to attack the mainland. To implement this project, the ROC air force went into action delivering "psychological warfare" blows against the mainland which included propaganda leaflets and--for the relief of the

1. The China Post, 1st February 1953, p. 3. A short while later the Nationalists' estimate of guerrilla forces working for them on the mainland was raised to 1.6 million, see NYT, 24th February 1953, p. 2 and 21st July 1954, p. 1.

2. Lieutenant General Lo suggested that the guerrilla forces were not necessarily supporters of the Nationalist government, although they might have had some connections with it during the civil war period. They were fighting against Communism as well as against the San Min Chun ideology. The Nationalist government merely used this opportunity to step up its anti-Communist campaign.
starving masses on the mainland—tons of rice over widespread areas in Kwangtung and Fukien provinces.\(^1\)

In addition, Chiang also sought to make use of the U.S. security commitment for his military programme of returning to the mainland. Evidence for this can be found in the two Quemoy crises.

As far as the ROC’s security interests were concerned, as noted in Chapter One, Quemoy and Matsu were of vital importance to the Nationalist government because, being geographically so close to the mainland, they constituted valuable links between Taiwan and the mainland. Moreover, by holding these islands (the status of Taiwan might be in dispute, but that of the islands of Quemoy and Matsu was not, as they were beyond question Chinese territory), the Nationalists could contend that they actually maintained the de facto government of China proper. They had therefore been regarded as the springboards by the Nationalists for either military invasion or action of other sorts on the mainland and, more importantly, as a "shield" for the protection of Taiwan.\(^2\)

Consequently, it was essential for the ROC to safeguard these islands at all costs. Thus, the Nationalist government had always wanted the U.S. security commitment to Taiwan and the Pescadores to be extended to the offshore islands, that is, Quemoy, Matsu, plus a few small islands nearby.

1. Since 1949, famine had affected about 40 million people in China. On 15th April 1950, Peking openly declared that 7 million Chinese were in a "most serious plight". See Congressional Quarterly, op.cit., p. 90. The situation became worse because of Peking’s military involvement in the Korean War. Chiang seized this opportunity to drop rice to some of the coastal provinces with the clear intention of winning "hearts and minds" of the Chinese people there.

However, as noted earlier, the U.S. security commitment to the ROC had excluded the defence of these islands. In the view of the U.S., these islands clearly belonged to mainland China, and, therefore, the question of their disposition was an internal matter outside the scope of legitimate U.S. security interests. Nevertheless, in view of the ambiguity of the Formosa Resolution, the U.S. feared that the Nationalists, in their efforts to regain the mainland, would use this "fatal ambiguity" over the offshore islands to manoeuvre the U.S. into a war with Communist China.

Chiang’s military deployments on the islands as well as any military operation there could be and in fact were regarded by the U.S. administrations as manufacturing a tie between the defence of the offshore islands and the protection of Taiwan. They had even alleged that this was a "provocation" designed to bring the U.S. to the brink of war with Peking.

Even Eisenhower admitted in his Memoirs:

"...the (Quemoy) crisis had forced President Eisenhower and Secretary of States Dulles to the conclusion that the loss of Quemoy to Peking would be so catastrophic in its 'domino' effect on Taiwan and subsequently on U.S. influence throughout Asia that it had to be prevented, even at the cost of using nuclear weapons." 3

This is the so-called Nationalist exploitation of U.S. commitment which could also be found in the American charges of Chiang’s exaggeration of the strategic value of the offshore islands, and his excessive military deployments

1. Ibid., pp. 56-67.
there during the crisis. For instance, it was held that
the Nationalists had consciously devised means to exaggerate
the importance of Quemoy in U.S. estimates. According to
John W. Lewis, author of "Quemoy and American China Policy":

"First, they raised the military value of the coastal
islands by committing one-third of Taiwan's armed
strength to their defense. Second, they concocted the
propaganda manoeuver of 'shell counting' with special
troops assigned to small sectors to count the Communist
shells fired and rush the daily number to central
collection points which in turn put the total count on
the world's news wires. Finally, the Nationalists
played heavily on the freedom theme. Quemoy, they
said, is the soil of free men." ¹

From the American point of view, however, Chiang's military
arguments for maintaining control of Quemoy were spurious.
They claimed that this was clearly demonstrated by his
policy of overcommitment of troops to defend the offshore
islands. According to John W. Lewis again:

"The argument that Quemoy is vital to Taiwan's air
defense is invalidated by the pattern of newly
constructed airfields on the China mainland....
if air defense was even a valid argument, it
certainly applied more to the Tachen Islands,
which Chiang abandoned under U.S. pressure in
1955. The contention that Quemoy could serve as
a springboard for an invasion or even to introduce
anti-Communist agents is false. As Chiang's command
staff on Quemoy admits, establishing a beach-head
or even landing a small party on the rugged, well-
defended Fukien coast would be next to impossible." ²

Nevertheless, by reinforcing the garrisons on Quemoy and
Matsu, Chiang was able to argue persuasively that defeat on
Quemoy would be ruinous. He was quoted as saying that, with
the completion of the offshore islands build-up, he had cleverly

2. Ibid., p. 15.
achieved his purpose, i.e. "to create an artificially manufactured tie between the defense of the offshore islands and the protection of Taiwan." ¹

In this respect, the U.S. was confronted with the dilemma of either defending the offshore islands by striking at the gun positions on the mainland or risking the loss of Taiwan. According to Lewis, such was the situation the U.S. had perceived during the 1958 Quemoy crisis:

"From the American viewpoint at least, Quemoy's strategic position vanishes under analysis. Nevertheless, the military argument, the Communist shellings, and the moral plea effectively persuaded American policy-makers to support a Nationalist Quemoy. While Washington planners thought that the U.S. retained the initiative or at least the ultimate veto by not formally committing the U.S. to defend Quemoy, in fact both Chinese sides achieved the level of American involvement and vulnerability desired. The U.S. Navy accepted the limited convoying of troops and supplies, and the State Department prided itself on 'saving' a situation which neither of the principal adversaries had any intention of change. With this material, logistical, and tacit political support, the U.S. lost its ability to manoeuver and placed its China policy in the hands of Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung." ²

Such a sardonic assessment supported speculation about Chiang's attempt to manipulate the U.S. Just before the bombardment in August 1958, for example, a report was circulated at the U.N. which told of secret negotiations between the two Chinese rivals. The rumour was that the Nationalist government might in the end have to come to terms with Peking if the U.S. lost enthusiasm for China's

war. Despite Nationalist denials, rumours persisted that there were unofficial contacts between Chiang's agents and the Chinese Communist government to provide for the contingency of a change of U.S. policy. It was suggested that these rumours of Taipei-Peking negotiations might have been released by the Nationalists to increase American fear of losing Taiwan and, thus, improve the Nationalists' leverage on the U.S. While it cannot be said with confidence that these stories were contrived by Taipei, the point was made that they were useful to Chiang. Even Eisenhower disclosed later in his Memoirs that throughout the whole 1958 Quemoy crisis, he was continually pressed, "almost hounded", by Chiang and his own military to delegate authority for immediate action in the case of an attack on the offshore islands and that "to restrain (Chiang) from his cherished ambition of aggressive action against the mainland was not always easy."  

The Nationalists' actions could be visualized as a ploy to provoke a Sino-American war, and to put paid to the American proposal for "renunciation of the use of force" in the Taiwan Straits area (which would have stabilized the status quo on both Taiwan and the offshore islands, frustrating Chiang's hope for a return to the mainland through military means, and hence creating a fait accompli of "Two Chinas").

Other Nationalist actions which could be (and were) suspected of being directed towards provoking further confrontation and

3. Ibid., p. 296.
even war between the U.S. and Communist China included military exercises on the offshore islands and in Taiwan by the three services, high-level inspection tours and visits, propaganda leaflet drops over the PRC coastal provinces, sabotage missions along the coast by Nationalist agents, reconnaissance over-flights of PRC territory, air and naval clashes, and belligerent rhetoric of the Nationalist propaganda machine on the theme of the mainland recovery programme. Melvin Gurtov, in his article "The Taiwan Strait Crisis Revisited: Politics and Foreign Policy in Chinese Motives", compiled a Table (Table No. 1) which provides sources and data and brief descriptions of this information:

# Table No. 1

Summary of Reported KMT Military Activity in the Taiwan Straits Area, January - July, 1958

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source/Date</th>
<th>Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CDN, Jan. 10</td>
<td>Military exercise in Penghu Islands (Pescadores)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDN, Feb. 8</td>
<td>&quot;Full-scale&quot; military exercise for one week in Matsu chain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fujian Ribao, Mar. 6</td>
<td>Capture of 4 Chiang agents, who are named and who had mission of collecting military information; newspaper says such sabotage has been going on &quot;constantly&quot; in past year and represents &quot;only a portion of similar cases we have smashed.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NYT, Mar. 15</td>
<td>Visit by Dulles to confer with Chiang KMT Defense Minister and U.S. advisers inspect Matsu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDN, Apr. 9</td>
<td>KMT Defense Minister and U.S. advisers inspect Matsu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDN, Apr. 11</td>
<td>Military exercise by Penghu Garrison Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDN, Apr. 17</td>
<td>Joint military exercise by army, navy, air force on Matsu for first time, attended by deputy cmdr. US Military Assistance Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDN, Apr. 28</td>
<td>KMT deputy cmdr. of navy leads inspection tour of Quemoy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDN, May 1</td>
<td>KMT Defense Minister inspects Matsu islands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDN, June 1</td>
<td>Military exercise by naval headquarters at a southern base for atomic defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDN, June 2</td>
<td>Armed clashes in Matsu Strait reported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDN, June 4</td>
<td>KMT Defense Minister inspects Matsu defenses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDN, June 8</td>
<td>Military exercise in Taiwan for defense against special weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDN, June 12</td>
<td>Naval battle in Matsu Strait reported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCNA, Fuzhou</td>
<td>One of two KMT RF-84 aircraft shot down over Fujian (Fukien)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDN, June 19</td>
<td>KMT forces on Matsu reportedly repulse PRC gunboats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDN, June 22</td>
<td>KMT forces on Matsu reportedly again clash with PRC gunboats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source/Date</td>
<td>Activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDN, June 23</td>
<td>Third report of naval battle off Matsu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDN, June 24</td>
<td>Armed clash off Fujian coast reported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDN, June 25</td>
<td>KMT Defense Minister inspects Matsu; naval units have entered state of war preparedness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDN, July 4</td>
<td>Propaganda leaflets dropped over Guangdong (Kwangtung) and Fujian under heavy artillery fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDN, July 5</td>
<td>Propaganda leaflets dropped over Guangdong and Guangxi (Kwangsi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCNA, Canton, July 6</td>
<td>Seven KMT agents sentenced to death for subversion in Guangdong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dagong Bao, July 7</td>
<td>Four more KMT agents arrested in Guangdong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDN, July 7</td>
<td>U.S. assistance secretary of army visits Taiwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDN, July 8</td>
<td>Mobilization exercises completed in southern Taiwan following those in north</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDN, July 14</td>
<td>Visit to Taiwan of U.S. cmdr., 7th Fleet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDN, July 18</td>
<td>All military leave in Taiwan cancelled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDN, July 20</td>
<td>A number of KMT jets flown to Quemoy to carry out patrols</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDN, July 26</td>
<td>KMT 6-day air defense exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCNA, Canton, July 29</td>
<td>PRC air force reports shooting down two of four RF-84's, and recent sightings of other RF-84's over Fujian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCNA, Peking broadcasts, July 31</td>
<td>Three KMT agents captured after being airdropped into China</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Abbreviations: CDN (Central Daily News, Taipei); NYT (New York Times); NCNA (New China News Agency, Peking); SCMP (Survey of China Mainland Press, Hong Kong)

Source: Table obtained from Melvin Gurtov, "The Taiwan Strait Crisis Revisited", Modern China, II, 1, 1 January 1976, p. 73.
2. **ROC tactics in soliciting U.S. support for a counterattack**

Evidently Chiang's direct military campaign against the Communist forces on the mainland was more concerned with the domestic issue of anti-Chinese Communists than with the ROC's foreign policy objective of anti-world Communists. Nevertheless, taking the anti-Communist stance, Chiang had skilfully involved himself in the global anti-Communist crusade. According to him, his threat to the mainland implied a challenge to the Russian Communists, and a defence of the Free World. For these purposes, Chiang lost no time in mounting persuasion campaigns to achieve American acquiescence in the counterattack.

The objectives of the campaigns were to convince the U.S. that the time was ripe for the "Free" Chinese to return to power on the mainland; that conditions were currently most favourable and that similar opportunities might not be available in the future; that the Communist army would mostly defect when the Nationalist soldiers landed on the mainland coast, and that the Soviet Union would not intervene to save Peking. In order to make its appeals more convincing and promising, the Nationalist government had also declared that its proposed military operation against the mainland needed no help from U.S. ground forces, but merely U.S. "moral and material support, and sympathy". As Madame Ch'ang Kai-shek claimed, "We have no intention of dragging the U.S. into our domestic conflict. We only hope the U.S. will provide us with the right tools, and we will"
do the job alone."

Related to these objectives were the major issues such as preventing international recognition of the PRC, preventing it gaining U.N. membership, discouraging moves towards internationalization of the so-called "Taiwan problem", achieving maximum American protection for the offshore islands, enlarging American commitment to counterattack, and even arranging for a joint U.S.-ROC invasion of the mainland. Nevertheless, if these objectives were to be attained, one inevitably raises the question as to how, and to what extent, the ROC could persuade the U.S. to give greater support?

Now we will turn to the channels through which the Nationalist government conducted its persuasion campaign for policy influence and to the issues which it endeavoured to turn to its advantage. We will deal largely two sorts of channels: diplomacy through state visits (conducted mainly on Taiwan) and the China Lobby (conducted mainly inside the U.S.). The chief issue considered will be the Korean War.

(1) Channels used by the ROC to influence the U.S. administrations

(A) Diplomacy through state visits

George F. Kennan (an American diplomat, specializing in Russian politics) once declared:

"...the Chinese had, over the decades, succeeded in corrupting a large proportion of the Americans who had anything to do with them--particularly those who had resided for long periods in China. The

Chinese were infinitely adept at turning foreign visitors and residents, even foreign diplomats, into hostages and then, with a superb combination of delicacy and ruthlessness, extracting the maximum in the way of blackmail for giving them the privilege either of leaving the country or remaining there, whichever it was that they most wished to do...the Chinese had made fools of us all—a thousand times.”

Kennan's view, although it may not be totally correct, is not without justification.

During 1951-52, Chiang used some visiting U.S. dignitaries to convey his messages to the Americans. Since 1950, Chiang had invited a large number of Americans to visit Taiwan—what he called the bastion of "Free China"—to see what they wanted to see there and, hopefully, in return, take good news back home about how the Chinese in Taiwan, under the Nationalists' leadership, made such good use of American aid. Included in Chiang's project at that time were Congressmen who came on fact-finding missions, American military leaders who made their routine inspections of security arrangements, and journalists who came for interviews with either Chiang Kai-shek himself or other senior Nationalists. For instance, among the dignitaries who were received and entertained by President and Madame Chiang Kai-shek during 1951-52 were Thomas E. Dewey, Governor of New York; Dan Kimball, U.S. Secretary of the Navy; General Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff for the U.S. Army; Admiral Arthur Radford, Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. 7th Fleet; General Douglas MacArthur, and many others. Among those visiting in 1952, there were 3 U.S. Senators, 23 Represent-

atives, 25 high-ranking military officials, 6 important envoys of the Truman Administration, 2 well-known American journalists, and 2 federal judges. By the years 1955-56, the list had grown extensively. There were 38 top military personnel, 8 U.S. Senators, 20 Congressmen, as well as some 28 other well-known scholars, journalists, and organizational leaders from the U.S.¹ In addition to this, Vice-President Richard Nixon toured the island in 1953, and President Eisenhower stopped there briefly in 1960.

The usefulness of these visits to the ROC was manifold. They could serve either to strengthen the Nationalist government's prestige, or to bolster the Nationalist army's morale. Or, they could impress the visitors with Taiwan's rapid economic recovery and capacity for growth, and thus convince them that their support and assistance was not being misused and that, because of this, more aid should be given to the ROC for such a "good cause". Or they could try to implant into the visitors' mind a picture of what "Free China" was really like. In short, many American dignitaries were urged, during the 1950s, to visit Taiwan so that they could make "better" and "more objective" appraisals either of the strategic value of the offshore islands or "the military, political and economic strength" of the ROC on Taiwan.² Consequently, they could influence the Administration back home to provide the Nationalist

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government with more solid support so that it could prevent the "bastion of freedom in the Pacific" from collapsing.

(B) The China Lobby

Another important channel was the so-called "China Lobby", most prominent in the U.S. during the 1950s but gradually disappearing as such after that.

The China Lobby of the late 1940's and the early 1950's was little more than a series of individuals and groups who applied concerted pressure on the American Congress to pass legislation beneficial to the Nationalist government. Although the China Lobby was later accused of acting conspiratorially, this charge erred in the assumption that because these various groups had a common interest and their propaganda was mutually supportive, they must have been centrally directed by the Nationalist government through "remote control" from Taiwan. As Professor Ross Koen noted, there was an outer core and an inner core to the China Lobby. The outer core reassembled the amorphous and

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Another important channel was the so-called "China Lobby", most prominent in the U.S. during the 1950s but gradually disappearing as such after that.

The China Lobby of the late 1940's and the early 1950's was little more than a series of individuals and groups who applied concerted pressure on the American Congress to pass legislation beneficial to the Nationalist government. Although the China Lobby was later accused of acting conspiratorially, this charge erred in the assumption that because these various groups had a common interest and their propaganda was mutually supportive, they must have been centrally directed by the Nationalist government through "remote control" from Taiwan. As Professor Ross Koen noted, there was an outer core and an inner core to the China Lobby. ¹ The outer core reassembled the amorphous and

disconnected groups who acted in a collective capacity. The inner core were a group of Chinese and Americans who acted overtly as lobbyists and provided the continuity for the outer core. The inner core, Koen stated, were undoubtedly paid by the Chinese (Nationalist) government and planned propaganda in order to further Chiang’s cause in the United States. Similarly, Gordon Schaffer charged the Lobby with being "a sinister organization set up in America with money racketeered by the Chiang Kai-shek regime, with the set purpose of launching a new war of intervention against the Chinese revolution". Actually, the major portion of the China Lobby was composed of American individuals and groups who voluntarily chose to support Chiang for reasons of politics or ideology, or because of their ideas about the requirement of American security. For instance, Koen later suggested that some Christians wished to continue their religious efforts in China and this required the ousting of the Communists. Others merely used the China issue for what it was worth to weaken the Democratic Party and the Truman administration. Furthermore, in more objective terms, the Nationalist government, devastated by the War, lacked the financial means to conduct lavish lobbying activities. Nevertheless, the assumption that the Nationalist government utilized the organization as a private diplomatic channel either to

3. Ross Y. Koen, op.cit., p. 29. See also Chapter Two footnote no. 1, p. 117.
4. Ross Y. Koen, op.cit., p. 29
influence U.S. government decisions or to bring about a policy more beneficial to the Nationalist cause, was not mistaken. As Professor Koen concluded:

"The Chinese planned and executed the exploitation of their claims and grievances through the skillful use of Americans who, motivated by fear, ambition, missionary zeal, and the desire for profitable markets, were disgruntled and upset at what they considered the loss of China. To some extent, the success of the Chinese--especially with the United States Congress--in gaining acceptance for their point of view was the result of fortuitous events over which they had neither control nor foreknowledge. The important point, however, is that as each opportune moment arrived, the Chinese and their American spokesman were on hand with an explanation--an explanation which was emotionally satisfying whether or not it fitted the facts or contributed to an effective American policy." 1

The China Lobby was most active during the so-called "McCarthy era". Major figures in the China Lobby included Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, Alfred Kohlberg, General Douglas MacArthur, and Senator William F. Knowland. McCarthy's accusations of communist influence throughout the government led to investigations by the FBI and a purge of the State Department's Asia section, which created an atmosphere wherein scholars and officials who favoured improved relations with the PRC were reluctant to speak out. Thus, during this period, a large number of government officials, academics, and scholars were charged by the China lobbyists as Communist sympathizers. In the State Department, for instance, Philip Jessup (editor of the China White Paper), John K. Emmerson, Raymond P. Ludden and O. Edmund Clubb were accused. Scholars like Owen Lattimore and John King Fairbank were also attacked.

1. Ibid., p. 198.
McCarthy's stern anti-communist stance did not necessarily mean that he was therefore in favour of the Nationalist government. Nonetheless, his attacks on the U.S. administration—for instance, on 20th April 1950 he openly declared that "General George C. Marshall was completely unfitted to be the Secretary of State during the China crisis" and later on 7th December 1954, shortly before he lost power, he assailed President Eisenhower because he "on the one hand congratulates the Senators who hold up the work of our Committee, and on the other hand urges that we be patient with the (Chinese) Communist hoodlums who at this very moment are torturing and brainwashing American uniformed men in Communist dungeons"—certainly helped the Nationalists in advancing their cause in American politics.¹

McCarthy's career, like the strength of the China Lobby, reached its climax in the spring of 1954. Up to that time, McCarthy had been able to create effectively a "climate of fear" in many government agencies. But, his power and actions were censured toward the end of the year, because many of his charges had been found to lack either evidence or substantiation. Even President Eisenhower remarked in his Memoirs:

"...Senator McCarthy's general and specific accusations were, from the start, so extreme, often involving unsupported and unjustified allegations of the gravest kind, that his attacks, which at times degenerated to persecution, became known as 'McCarthyism'. Protected as he was by congressional immunity, anyone could be irresponsibly attacked. Strong resentment against McCarthyism developed among the educators, the press,

and the clergy—indeed, among all informed groups. The question was often—and justifiably—asked, "Who is safe?"  

McCarthy died in 1957 but as a political force he was already finished by the end of 1954. McCarthy's departure also affected the strength of the China Lobby. After 1954, the China Lobby, though continuing its efforts to campaign on behalf of the Nationalist government, became less and less influential in determining American China policy, and its decline was clearly shown by President Nixon's overture to the PRC in 1971-72, and finally by President Carter's decision to recognize the PRC in January 1979.

Related to the China Lobby were other associations with similar functions, such as the "Committee to Defend America by Aiding Anti-Communist China", the "American China Policy Association", the "Committee of One Million Against the Admission of Communist China to the United Nations", the "Committee of National Affairs", and the "China Emergency Committee", and others. These organizations often published books and issued statements denouncing American post-War policies toward China as the cause for Communist takeover there and impugning the loyalty and the motives of the men who were responsible for the policies. For instance, on 15th September 1958, Marvin Liebman, secretary of the "Committee of One Million" said the organization was "redoubling and tripling our efforts to stem this tide of pro-appeasement sentiment" concerning China. Liebman said

the Communist shelling of Quemoy and Matsu helped the Committee's campaign because it "shows up the Chinese Reds for what we always said they were; proves they are prepared and willing to shoot their way into the United Nations".

The strength of the Committee--formed in 1953--can be seen in the composition of its members, which included 23 Senators: Paul Mansfield, Everett M. Dirksen, Jacob K. Javits, and A. S. Mike Monroney, etc., 4 Governors, and some influential news columnists and commentators.1

Other organizations, for instance, the "Committee to Defend American by Aiding Anti-Communist China" became active in the latter half of 1949 and urged aid to Chiang and his government. On 1st October 1950, it issued, over the signatures of 200 clergymen and missionaries, many of whom had spent years in the Orient, an appeal to President Truman and D. Acheson (who had helped Truman to formulate the Truman Doctrine and was charged by Republicans as the "Red Dean") urging them to "remain firm in not recognizing the Communist regime". The statement said that recognition of Communist China would be a "moral compromise" and a "political mistake".2 It also issued literature now and then in support of the Nationalists. On the Committee's board of directors there were men like Frederick C. McKee, a Pittsburgh industrialist; ex-ambassador Arthur Bliss Lane; David Dubinsky, President of the International Ladies Garment Workers; and second vice President of the American Federation of Labour, James A. Farley, etc.

1. Ibid., p. 117.
The "American China Policy Association" was headed by Alfred Hohlberg. Its treasurer, Emma Delong Mills, in a letter to the editor of the New York Times, asserted that Communist China was the enemy of the U.S., and that she should not be recognized and be admitted in the U.N.  

Finally, in addition to the above groups, there were a few more that were not organized for the specific purpose of opposing Peking but did express views on issues concerning mainland through resolutions, statements, public speeches and reports. The theme of all these was: no admission of Communist China in the U.N.; no diplomatic recognition by the U.S. government; and no trade or cultural relations with it. Included in this category were, for instance, the "Common Cause Inc.", "American Association for the United Nations", the "American Veterans Committee", the "American Legion", the "U.S. Military Academy at West Point", the "Catholic War Veterans of the U.S.A.", and the "American Assembly".  

Having identified ROC's channels for putting pressure on the U.S. government, we now turn to look at Chiang's attempts to use them. Our emphasis will be on the case of the Korean War.

(2) **Chiang Kai-shek's persuasion efforts: use of the Korean War**

It would not be a mistake to state that Chiang wanted to use the Korea conflict for his political objective of mainland recovery. Nevertheless, assessments of Chiang's intentions and actual actions are often distorted and contradictory. On various occasions, U.S. and the ROC held opposing views in interpreting their positions, and such differences have often been described as the Nationalists' actions of "manipulation". In this section, we will only present some of the "incidents" that occurred during the period under investigation and leave the final judgements open.

The Korean War and the concomitant U.S. support to the Nationalist government provided the latter with new prospects for a counteroffensive. During the years of the conflict, the Nationalist government's persuasion efforts took two forms: troop contributions to the Korean War and lobbying of the U.S. administration.1 The two efforts reinforced each other.

With regard to troop contributions, Chiang offered 33,000 of his "best equipped troops" for use in Korea only 4 days after the outbreak of the Korean conflict.2 This offer was repeated several times afterwards during the conflict. With regard to lobbying, Chiang tried to influence the U.S. administration in the widening of the conflict.

1. Interview with Mr. Carl Liu in Taiwan on 29th March 1981. Liu was the ROC's U.N. War Correspondent from 1952 to 1953 in Korea. He was also Press Attaché of the ROC embassy in Korea from 1959 to 1965.
2. Congressional Quarterly, *op.cit.*, p. 91
In the first phase of the Korean War, before the Chinese Communist "volunteers" had engaged in the fighting, the Nationalist government intended to convince the U.S. that the Soviet Union planned to involve its Chinese allies either in Korea or in an attack upon Taiwan as soon as Korea had been conquered. The rationale was that if the U.S. could be persuaded of this fact, the decision might be taken to use Nationalist ground troops against the North Koreans, and thus realize the policy of mainland recovery.

Thus Chiang offered troops to the United Nations' forces in Korea, with the expectation that such a proposal, if accepted, would turn limited U.N. military action into a Chinese people's war. That is, the Nationalists expected, if their troops were introduced into South Korea, that the Chinese Communists might enter the conflict on behalf of North Korea. Chiang's proposal was welcomed by some American politicians, such as Senator William F. Knowland and Representative Walter H. Judd. It was also hailed by General MacArthur, who recommended not only that Chinese Nationalist troops on Taiwan be used against the Communists, but that the U.S. should really provide "logistical support" for those troops.1

The Nationalist government was very disappointed when this offer was turned down by Truman. Even today, the Nationalists still remark on this occasion as a "missed opportunity" for their soldiers to gain a "free ride" on to "enemy" soil.2

2. Interview with Mr. Carl Liu.
In conjunction with this effort, the Nationalists also tried to convince the U.S.—as the U.S. was trying to keep the war and its costs limited—that the Korean War was not a local incident and could not be ended with limited involvement. Truman, apparently in an attempt to keep the Korean War and its cost limited, emphasized that the U.S. aimed only "to restore peace and...the border". At the U.N., the Americans announced that their purpose was the simple one of restoring the 38th Parallel as the dividing line. The policy, in other words, was containment, not roll-back.1 "Limited warfare is cowardly behaviour," the Nationalists often asserted, "it could not settle the Korean problem". Meanwhile, they made a point of informing the American government of Communist Chinese troop movements toward Manchuria which Nationalist agents had supposedly detected.2 The China Lobby made the same point, and it has been suggested that its propaganda attempted to convince Americans that "the Korean War was an unnecessary war fought at the wrong place at the wrong time, and that the U.S. had been unsuspectingly dragged into the war by traitors in American universities and in the government. The way to end war and to establish permanent security in the Pacific was to destroy the Peking regime with the use of Nationalist forces".3

2. *NYT*, 5th July 1950, p. 3.
Later, when the Communist Chinese entered the War, Chiang made it known that his previous offer of troops still stood, hoping for a change of mind in the U.S. administration. Again, Chiang asserted that if the ROC's armed forces moved into Korea, they would have "an important psychological effect" on the Communist Chinese and would bring a quicker end to the war.¹ Chiang's message was transmitted to the American administration in different fashions, and was given verbal support by visiting American dignitaries. For instance, Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., then Commanding General of the U.S. Marine Corps, said in Taiwan in 1952 that "the day when the Republic of China was carrying out its 'sacred duty', the Nationalists could be sure that their friends the Americans would 'always' be at their side".² Also, in the same year, the Secretary of the Navy, Don Kimball visited Taiwan and stated that the U.S. 7th Fleet "would stand by and cheer a Nationalist invasion of the mainland".³ It is also known that General MacArthur did have the intention of using Chiang's troops in Korea and had advised the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff to accept Chiang's offer, but his suggestion was rejected.⁴

In this connection, it is necessary to point out very briefly that there was a marked divergence of views about the conduct of

3. _Ibid._
the War between the General and President Truman.
MacArthur, as the U.N. Forces Commander, stuck to the view that victory should be the aim of any war in which he was engaged. President Truman took a more cautiously political view of the conflict. As an undeclared war, it was juridically a U.N. police action against aggression from the outside. In his exchanges with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, MacArthur had been calling for permission to bomb military targets in Manchuria. MacArthur was of the opinion that the U.S. should stop fighting a limited engagement and switch to all-out war. The U.N. should accept Chiang's offer of troops and back Taiwan in launching a second front in China. Anticipating the criticisms of those who felt that absolute priority should be given to the European theatre, MacArthur further remarked that "if we lose the war to communism in Asia, the fall of Europe is inevitable". MacArthur's hawkish attitudes eventually cost his military career. On 10th April 1951, President Truman relieved MacArthur of his command and ordered him to return to the U.S.

Thus, despite the fact that the Chinese Communists were now the principal enemy in Korea, neither the U.S. nor the U.N. were prepared for the complications which Chiang's troops would bring. Also at this stage, Chiang still considered the strategy of opening a second front against the mainland as much more desirable than sending troops to Korea.

1. B. Crozier, op.cit., p. 359.
2. ROC spokesmen declared that the South Koreans had told Chiang they did not need Nationalists fighting on their soil. The China Post, 29th June 1953, p. 2.
Related to the Korean conflict, Chiang was also said to have sought a revision of Truman's neutralization policy which he considered as preventing his government from attacking the mainland. Chiang's opportunity was created as a result of different interpretations. In the Nationalists' view, they had agreed only in principle to Truman's proposal and had reserved the right to seek more effective measures of resisting aggression if international communism was not suppressed within a "reasonably short time".\(^1\) The Nationalist government spokesman declared that the ROC had never intended to depart from its policies of resisting the Chinese Communists and restoring unity to China.\(^2\)

The Nationalists seemed to understand Truman's request as applying to a general offensive but not prohibiting "defensive" action which the Taiwan forces might wish to take. As mentioned earlier, the Nationalists had, only a month after Truman's announcement, resumed their air operations against the Communist mainland. This action apparently had upset Truman because it indicated the Nationalists' hope of manipulating him into a revision of the neutralization scheme and into an acceptance of their idea of breaking the Korean stalemate with a Nationalist landing on the China coast. The message was carried in many Chinese newspapers. Among them, one contended that the time had come for President Truman to "make good" the loss of China by "dealing

\(^1\) China Handbook, 1951, p. 115.
\(^2\) Ibid.
blows" directly on the mainland. Otherwise, such a two-sided neutralization, the Nationalists complained, was akin to treating "friend" and "foe" alike.

Chiang's hopes for a joint military efforts with the U.S. were once again boosted in 1953 when Eisenhower announced the "de-neutralization" decision, and in 1954 the Mutual Defence Treaty was concluded. With de-neutralization, the Nationalists' immediate response was to try to persuade the U.S. that if the latter now intended to support the counter-attack, it needed only to make public its determination to "set free" the Chinese mainland and provide material aid to the Nationalist forces. The press in Taiwan further hailed the American move as an effective step in carrying out the policy of "delivering" captive peoples and an effective way of ending the Korean War. Chiang even suggested to South Korean President Syngman Rhee the establishment of a ROC-South Korean alliance which might result in a two-pronged offensive against the Communists. Chiang's calculation was that, in view of the existing conditions in the Far East, the U.S. needed him in protecting its security interests in the West Pacific area as much as he needed the U.S. Thus, even as a small ally, Chiang lost no time in making the most of his opportunities. Chiang's assessment could be found in one of his speeches in 1953:

"Our plan for fighting Communism and regaining the mainland will necessarily form...an important link in the general

plan of the free world to combat world-wide Communist aggression".\(^1\) Such a statement has subsequently been interpreted as Chiang's strategy of provoking a Third World War.\(^2\)

Eisenhower immediately responded by making his "unleashing" decision explicit: i.e. it was not at all a prelude to a Nationalist "counterattack",\(^3\) and there was no intention of backing a Nationalist bid to recover the mainland. As seen by Dulles, the recover of the mainland, if it were to come at all, would presumably come at some indeterminate time in the next decade or two.\(^4\)

As far as Eisenhower was concerned, his position was clearly indicated in the Mutual Defence Treaty which, accompanying the Dulles-Yeh Exchanges, said:

"...the use of force will be a matter of joint agreement, subject to action of an emergency character which is clearly an exercise of the inherent right of self-defense. Military elements which are a product of joint effort and contribution by the two Parties will not be removed from the territories described in Article VI to a degree which would substantially diminish the defensibility of such territories without mutual agreement." \(^5\)

Nevertheless, as with the previous de-neutralization controversy, both Eisenhower and Chiang held opposing views. Eisenhower was of the view that the agreement was a "written

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4. Ibid.  
guarantee" to keep the Nationalist government from any unilateral attack on the mainland. It precluded the offshore islands serving as "bridge-heads" for an invasion and applied as well to sporadic attacks against the mainland. But, from the standpoint of the Nationalist government, the Treaty carried no restrictions on counter-attack. For instance, George K. C. Yeh, who was responsible for the negotiation and signing of the Defence Treaty in 1954, "clarified" the point as meaning that the two parties were bound to "consult" one another, implying that full agreement was not entirely necessary. In other words, in the view of the ROC, the Mutual Defence Treaty should not restrict a Nationalist counterattack against the mainland. Self-defence should be given a broad interpretation, the Nationalists argued, for any treaty, including the U.N. Charter, does not restrict the means of self-defence. Consequently, the right of the ROC to self-defence against its enemies, the Nationalists maintained, should not be restricted by any treaty. Thus, Shen Chang-huan, official spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1959 to 1961, and later from 1968 to 1971 Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, indicated at a press conference that the recovery of the mainland was still entirely within the jurisdiction of his government, that it was the basic national policy and that efforts to reach this objective would be continued.1

The conclusion was that the Nationalist government continued to launch its sporadic raids against the mainland, and to

make belligerent speeches encouraging forceful encounters with the mainland Communists. Such a policy remained largely unchanged until the 1960s.

3. The policy of expanding the conflict

Another way in which the ROC could be considered to have been attempting to win U.S. political support was its policy of expanding conflict in the Far East. The Nationalists were of the view that as long as fighting with Communists continued somewhere in Asia, and as long as the U.S. was involved, they could maintain a realistic hope of becoming the government of all of China one day. Thus if any dispute directly or indirectly involved the Chinese Communists, the Nationalist government's position was always to oppose suggestions of cease-fire or peace negotiations. In the view of the Nationalist government, any such proposal should be deferred until it (the Nationalist government) was restored to power in Peking. The argument was that China was still in a stage of civil war, and that the ROC still had the strength to fight, so how could it seek peace, especially when the "rebels" were still established on the mainland? For this reason, it was suspected that the Nationalist government had the intention of sustaining conflict in Asia. In other words, it wanted to prevent stabilization of the status quo in Asia. Nevertheless, during the 1950s there were very few chances available to the ROC for exploitation. Even so, the two occasions—the Korean armistice and the Taiwan Straits cease-fire—when Chiang had put forward his government's position
to the Americans can only be regarded as suspected exploitations because there is no way that the Nationalists' real motives can be proved.

(1) The Korean armistice

The Korean truce talks lasted two years and 17 days, and included 575 separate meetings. The Korean armistice was finally signed on the 27th July 1953. In principle, the Nationalist government opposed the U.N. armistice negotiation with the Communists. Charging that the Communists were the "aggressors", the Nationalist government was of the view that the Communists' real intention in entering peace talks was to clear the way towards controlling all of South Korea by force. According to the Nationalists, this situation was identical to the 1949 Chinese tragedy because at that time the Nationalists had agreed to accept peace negotiations with the Communists when conflict erupted, but they had failed to realize Mao Tse-tung's strategem that "Peace talks are nothing but political preparations for another war". The North Koreans backed by the Communist forces had only this objective in mind. Consequently, the Nationalist government opposed the U.N. limited objective of cease-fire and status quo ante. Instead of this, the Nationalists proposed that the main objective of the U.N. and the U.S. should be to help unite the two Koreas--the South and the North--under one democratic (i.e. United Nations-sponsored) government.

1. Speech delivered by Foreign Minister George K.C. Yeh at the Dr. Sun Yat-sen Monthly Memorial Service at the Presidential Office, 2 June, 1953, in Free China Review, III, 7 (July 1953), pp. 53-54.
When the news from Korea made it clear that an armistice was on the way, on 20th July 1953, Chiang said the U.S. should encourage the creation of a West Pacific Security Pact, to include Taiwan and all other countries bordering on China.¹ Similarly, Senator William F. Knowland summoned all Asians to fight Communism, observing in passing that those who failed to cooperate in the fight would receive no American aid. Also Senator Alexander Wiley, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, called for a "third great pact" for the Far East, to parallel NATO and the Organization of American States.² Both of these politicians were regarded as consistent and vocal spokesmen for the China Lobby.

As far as the Nationalists were concerned, their proposal was intended to further the national interest of South Korea, the free countries of Asia, and eventually, the whole "Free World". Nevertheless, this call for a united anti-Communist front was also taken as either "uncooperative" or "provocation". The Nationalists further complained that the peace talks disregarded the criminal nature of the "Red" Chinese assistance to Kim Il Sung of North Korea and that the Communists were being offered a place in the U.N. as an inducement to quit the war. Moreover, North Korea was likely to remain in Communist hands. This, as the Nationalists declared was a compromise with the "aggressor" which contravened the wishes of the Korean people and which

2. O. E. Clubb, op.cit., p. 519.
ignored the objectives of the U.N. Accordingly, the Nationalists repeated their call to the U.S. and other Pacific Powers to form an anti-Communist alliance. 

Nevertheless, no notice was taken of the Nationalists' recommendation, and the Korean armistice negotiations were concluded in July 1953.

(2) The Taiwan Straits cease-fire

Similar to its position over the Korean cease-fire, the Nationalist government refused to accept the UN-sponsored cease-fire proposals during the Taiwan Straits crisis. To understand it, the following fact must be taken into consideration. If the Nationalist government did accept the cease-fire proposals, it would mean that the injured party (Taiwan) would in effect be recognizing the fait accompli of the "aggressors". Consequently, any cease-fire would be rejected by the ROC, the Nationalist government declared, unless it first clarified the responsibility of the aggressor (Communist China) and the justified position of the Nationalist Chinese.

The Nationalists further remarked that they had no guarantee that the Communists would accept a cessation of war in the Taiwan Straits. If Taiwan had first appeared inclined to accept the cease-fire, the Communists would have never

1. Speech delivered by Foreign Minister George K. C. Yeh at the Dr. Sun Yat-sen Monthly Memorial Service at the Presidential Office, 2nd June 1953. See Free China Review (Taipei), 7th July 1953, pp. 53-54.
agreed to it. Or they would have used Taiwan's moderate position as proof that the Nationalists on Taiwan could be made to compromise further.¹

Thus the Nationalist government had to reject a cease-fire because it considered the Taiwan Straits crisis not an international problem (although it might have severe international repercussions) but as part of the Chinese civil war. This position is emphasized very frequently by the Nationalists even today: "Ours is not an international war". If the U.N. cease-fire were put into effect (i.e. by putting U.N. Forces between the Nationalists and mainland Communists), Taiwan would be forced to accept separation from China, hence the end of any hope of being the government of all China. As one Chinese newspaper put it, the cease-fire movement was not confined to a mere cease-fire over the Taiwan Straits but, by implication, it was "a trap to 'neutralize' Taiwan and to divide China into two".² Consequently, Chiang remarked on U.S. talks in Warsaw over either cease-fire or a renunciation of force by the Communists as "superfluous".³

Finally, it is necessary to say a few words with regard to the military situation along the Taiwan Straits after the second Quemoy crisis. It is generally assumed that the Nationalists and the Communists had deliberately come to a tacit agreement to keep the Quemoy battle protracted. That is, after the Communists announced their intention to bombard

Quemoy only on odd dates of the month (so the offshore islands could get supplies on even dates of the month from Taiwan) on 25th October 1958, the Nationalists, in response, decided to bombard the coastal provinces on alternate days. In the meantime, both parties seemed to have chosen restricted targets for their artillery in order to minimize severe damage. In fact, the PRC, despite or because of the growing consolidation of ROC rule on Taiwan and the offshore islands, had not shown great eagerness to attempt to retake the offshore islands by force, perhaps because, if it succeeded, it would create a situation when the ROC might be driven to secede from the mainland and declare an independent Republic of Taiwan. Thus, the state of civil war has continued, preventing the U.S. or any other outside body from adopting a two China policy.

IV. Conclusions

The strategy of military counterattack characterized the essential feature of the ROC's foreign policy during the Cold War bipolarity. The basic ideas of the strategy were to utilize the American security commitment in East Asia as well as its global containment policy for the promotion of the ROC's political objectives of national survival and unification.

Unfortunately, coincidence of national interests in anti-Communism did not always assure coordination of national objectives. American involvement in East Asia had indeed provided the Nationalist government with tremendous strength in
blocking Communist advances against the island bastion, in diplomatic campaigns overseas and in the task of national construction. Certainly the Nationalist government had taken advantage of U.S. support for its domestic and foreign purposes and, in return, had proved itself at times a useful ally to the U.S. in its programme of resisting Communism in East Asia. Nevertheless, such an alliance relationship was not evenly balanced, because while the ROC was only one of the U.S. many allies, the latter was beyond question the only major friend of the ROC and while the U.S. anti-Communist programme was a global issue, the ROC's was mainly domestically orientated. A clash of national interests might occur, and the ROC, as a small ally, might face the threat to make compromise over its own national interests.

Two examples were the different opinions held by the two governments regarding: defence over the offshore islands and ROC's mainland recovery programme. Another look at these issues will help us to assess the effectiveness of the ROC's military strategy.

In principle the U.S. did not want to commit itself to help defend every islet off the China coast occupied by the Nationalists. This was because the U.S. did not want to risk the danger of war with the PRC and/or possibly with the Soviet Union. Thus, in both Quemoy crises, the U.S. faced a perplexing dilemma, i.e. either to defend the offshore islands at the expense of risking war with the Communist world or to risk the loss of Taiwan. During the first crisis, the U.S. assumed a degree of moral responsibility for some of the
islands by encouraging the ROC to strengthen their defence.\(^1\)
The U.S. was of the view then that conquest of the larger islands would inflict a severe defeat on Nationalist forces and seriously weaken defences on Taiwan itself. The ROC army was indispensable to the free world position in the Western Pacific—especially after the departure of the French army from Indochina. In a letter to British Prime Minister W. Churchill in early February 1955, Eisenhower wrote that the ROC forces were held together by a conviction that some day they would go back to the mainland. To surrender Quemoy and Matsu—their stepping-stones to the mainland—would thus destroy the reason for their existence, which "would mean the almost immediate conversion of that asset (Taiwan) into a deadly danger, because the Communists would immediately take it over."\(^2\) The ROC made certain that the stakes in this international poker game remained high by placing one-third of its forces on Quemoy and Matsu, where they remain today.

The U.S. resolved its dilemma for the time being by adopting the Formosa Resolution. Thus, as a result, the probability of U.S. intervention was increased enough so that the PRC refrained for a time being from pressing its attack on the two islands. After tension in the Taiwan Straits had somewhat subsided, Eisenhower tried but failed to persuade Chiang Kai-shek, in exchange for a promise to station U.S. marines and an air wing in Taiwan, to withdraw the bulk of troops from Quemoy and Matsu, converting them into outposts rather than strongly defended territories whose loss would severely damage the ROC's morale and prestige.

It is true that the first offshore island crisis left the U.S. more firmly committed to the defence and support of Taiwan. The provision in the defence treaty granting the right to station forces on the island strengthened the view of Taiwan as a vital link in the chain of the U.S. bases or potential bases in the Western Pacific. However, the crisis, which was highlighted by conflicting interests between the two governments over the defence of the offshore islands, and which was to arise again in more acute form in the second crisis, certainly did not help Chiang at all to fulfil his mainland recovery programme. The latter obviously was another issue of disagreement between the two governments.

Whereas the ROC's intention was to establish a connection between the defence of the offshore islands and Taiwan so that it could launch military attack on the mainland, the U.S. tried to play down the theme of mainland recovery by the imposition of the 7th Fleet. The Nationalists often remarked that had it not been for their over-dependence on the U.S., they would probably have been able to realize the mainland recovery policy. The remark was directed mainly against the constraining effect of the 1954 Mutual Defence Treaty. Thus, however effective Chiang's persuasion efforts were upon the U.S. administration, and however vociferous the China Lobby in promoting Chiang's interests during the 1950s, the ROC was unable to fulfil its objective of national reunification. On the contrary, Communist rule on the mainland had been slowly but steadily consolidated. Meanwhile, it had gained support in the world. To be fair, however, ROC's
military strategy had had its successes in that, after the U.S. reversed its previous anti-Nationalist and anti-Chiang attitudes that had dominated the *White Paper* in 1949, it had made use of the U.S. commitment which was then badly needed for the Nationalists to ensure their survival.

Finally, it is important to recall that the consolidation of U.S.-ROC relations in the mid-1950s took place during the brief honeymoon in Sino-Soviet relations. That is, when these two Communist countries appeared to be cooperating closely and coordinating their effort to expand the area of Communist control in Asia. The slogan "Learn from the Soviet Union" was in vogue in China. Thousands of Chinese students were studying in the Soviet Union. The PRC had embarked on its first five-year plan, based on the Soviet model, and Moscow had committed itself to a massive transfer of technology to China. The People's Liberation Army of the PRC was being modernized with large quantities of Soviet weapons. Although hidden strains existed between the Communist allies even then, to the outside observer the preponderance of evidence at that time seemed to show that the Sino-Soviet alliance was solidly established.
Chapter Four

The Strategy of Political Counterattack

I. Introduction

During the 1960s, the ROC's strategy for survival entered another stage of development. This was caused primarily by the transformation of the international power relationship and, in conjunction with this, a gradual decline in U.S. support.

In the international arena, relations between the two Superpowers had gradually been modified. Instead of the strident Cold War ideological confrontation, a progressive improvement in relations—commonly known as détente—between the two Superpowers had begun. A new, multipolar world, with the PRC, Japan, and the newly independent countries—the so-called "Third World Countries", predominantly in Africa—as the emerging forces, came into being.

The PRC, after more than a decade's alliance with the Soviet Union and isolation from the U.S., now broke away from its "big brother" and began to assume a new role in developing its own role in the international area. Similarly Japan had recovered from its defeat and gradually taken a more independent stance vis-a-vis its one-time protector, the U.S., wielding tremendous economic power practically unchallenged in Asia. Even the Third World countries had decided to form a power bloc for a better and safer position in the world. As a consequence, the structure of states' interactions became increasingly complicated and fluid with
ideological lines becoming increasingly blurred and less significant.

Inevitably, these developments had a tremendous impact upon the political structure in the Far East as well as upon the role of the U.S. in the region. The Far East used to be a Cold War battlefield during the 1950s. And the U.S., regarding itself as a Pacific power, was the policeman in this area. Now, with the emergence of the five-power equilibrium—the U.S., the Soviet Union, the PRC, Japan, the Third World countries, and later, towards the end of 1960s, Western Europe (or more precisely the EEC countries)—on the international scene (hence a four-power balance in the Far East), the region of the Far East experienced a gradual erosion of ideological bonds and U.S. support.

The U.S. responded to these developments by taking a somewhat different view of Communist expansion in this region. That is, despite the fact that Communism was still considered as the most immediate threat to world peace, the U.S. gradually modified its strategies to deal with this threat: from a strict policy of Truman's "containment with isolation" it moved to a more general and flexible theme of "containment without isolation".\(^1\) Finally, towards the end of 1960s, the U.S. position shifted to one of pursuing normalization with the PRC. The U.S. approach to the PRC involved two issues. On one hand, it suggested a less hostile attitude towards the PRC, while on the other hand, a less committed relationship

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with the ROC. It was argued that, although for political, strategic, and moral reasons, the U.S. should continue its defence commitment of Taiwan, it was also important that it encourage "self-determination by the 13,500,000 inhabitants of Taiwan". In other words, the U.S. government should, in conformity with the existing political "reality", gradually abandon the "myth" that the Nationalist government on Taiwan was the government of mainland China, but only recognize it as the legal government of those areas over which it held effective control, i.e. Taiwan and the Pescadores, and meanwhile adopt a step-by-step approach for a normalization with the Communist government on the mainland. This was the mood dominating the U.S. administrations and academic circles during the later period of the 1960s.

In October 1967, Richard M. Nixon, in an article published in the journal *Foreign Affairs*, outlined his proposal to approach the PRC. Entitled "Asia after Viet Nam", Nixon's viewpoint was that the U.S. "must recognize the threat posed by (Communist) China, and work to meet it, but not by direct intervention". In other words, the U.S. should try "to persuade (Communist) China that it must change: that it can not satisfy its imperial ambition, and that its own national interest requires a turning away from foreign adventuring and a turning inward toward the solution of its own domestic problems". In a foreshadowing of his later

3. Ibid., p. 121.
4. Ibid.
Guam speech of 1969, Nixon also called for the non-Communist nations of Asia to play a greater role in their own defence, and for the formation of new Asian organizations to replace the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), which he called an "anachronistic relic".¹ Once this had been accomplished, concluded Nixon, we could then "pull (Communist) China back into the family of nations".²

On 5th November 1968, Nixon was elected as the 37th President of the U.S. In his inaugural address in January the following year, Nixon maintained that he would move to make fundamental changes in U.S. foreign policy: "After a period of confrontation, we are entering an era of negotiation."³

Thus, on 25th July the following year, Nixon announced the Guam Doctrine which, unlike Truman's Containment Doctrine, urged a gradual withdrawal of U.S. commitment abroad. The Doctrine, which later became the "Nixon Doctrine", was a concrete plan for subsequent American disengagement in the world, in particular from Asia.

The impact of the Nixon Doctrine was tremendous. It created uncertainties in the international environment probably unprecedented in post-War Far Eastern politics. Foreign policies grew more flexible and leaders appeared more capable of compromise. The range of options for each of the major powers seemed to have expanded. As for the smaller powers, their status as allies was meanwhile becoming less

1. Ibid., p. 116.
2. Ibid., p. 122.
3. President Richard M. Nixon's inaugural address on 20th January 1969. For the text of his address, see International Herald Tribune (IHT), 21st January 1969, p. 4.
and less meaningful. On the positive side, this allowed greater freedom for independent action on their part. Yet, on the negative side, they received less security protection from their patrons. This made intense caution necessary, because smaller nations had to be quick to discover and make use of any new possibilities in international relations which seemed most likely to provide them with the prospect of maximum security.

The Nationalist government was not slow to realize these facts. Since the beginning of the 1960s, the Nationalists had already perceived the trend of increasing threat of international isolation and hostility caused by a possible erosion of U.S. support, by a U.S. rapport with the PRC, and by the unfavourable development of international politics. All of these factors, inter-related in some ways, motivated the Nationalist government to adopt a more effective foreign policy strategy to tackle with the issue of national survival. Nevertheless, in pursuing this new course, the Nationalist government continued to declare that its principal national positions-anti-Communism and mainland recovery—remained unchanged. In the view of the Nationalist government, the political world of the 1960s was still more or less identical to the two camps of the 1950s, and hence it was still unsafe because of the continued existence of Communist ideology. In other words, the Cold War had not come to an end totally, despite the fact that the world was now witnessing the growth of détente. This was because, according to Chiang Kai-shek and other Nationalist leaders, the Communists could use détente as a disguise to promote
their goal of world domination. The Nationalists therefore urged the democratic world to be aware of the Communist trick, and meanwhile, to continue its support for Taiwan as the frontline of international anti-Communism.

Seen in these terms, ROC's foreign policy seemed to be rather static and rigid, partly because while the whole world was now moving towards the tune of peaceful co-existence with the Communist world, the Nationalist government still held firm to the theme of "no compromise under whatever circumstances with Communist ideology"; and partly because while the existence of the Chinese Communist government had become more and more a political reality, the Nationalist government still probed for a return to the mainland. However, despite its belief in the two camps and its insistence upon these unchangeable national positions, if one observes carefully the actual policies taken by the Nationalist government, one can conclude that adjustments and flexibilities became apparent in the ROC's foreign policy during the 1960s, although such transformation were subtle and at times scarcely noticeable. One can even conclude that, similar to other anti-Communist countries in the Far East, the ROC delicately and skillfully balanced the issue of ideology with, say, a less aggressive attitude towards Soviet communism (as a response to the Sino-Soviet split), hence laying a foundation for greater policy flexibility in the future.

The new foreign policy strategy of the Nationalist government has been characterized as "Cheng-chi fan-kung" or "political
counterattack".¹ This period really lasted from the signing of the Dulles-Yeh Joint Communiqué in October 1958 until the end of 1971, when the ROC was expelled from the U.N. The transition was reflected in President Chiang Kai-shek's 1959 New Year's Message. Chiang said: "Now the task of mainland recovery is to be accomplished by efforts which are '70 percent political and only 30 percent military'".²

The declared objectives of this new strategy remained more or less similar to those announced under the military strategy; but the priorities were rearranged. For instance, the military strategy emphasized the importance of destroying the status quo (through military actions), whereas political counterattack—or the political strategy—was more and more inclined toward the preservation of the status quo (through a long-term political struggle to win the hearts and minds of the Chinese people), although ultimately, they both aimed for a unified China under the San Min Chu I system and a World Commonwealth. Here, we have to stress the point again that political counterattack was not a strategy directed against the "domestic" enemy of the Communist Chinese on the mainland alone, but against all the Communist forces in the world. As Chiang often maintained: "The war is not a mere civil war, it is a part of the international

2. See Chapter Three, footnote no. 2, p. 146.
anti-Communist war.\footnote{Chiang Kai-shek, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 267.} Moreover, the period of its operation was not limited to the years, 1958-71, it was continued afterwards. It did, however, play a less prominent part in the ROC's foreign policy in other periods.

In this Chapter, in addition to a general understanding of the meaning of and tactics involved in the political strategy, we will consider two aspects of the ROC's foreign policy, that is, the changes and continuities of the ROC's foreign policy during the 1960s as compared to its foreign policy during the previous decade. Our purpose is to illustrate ROC's strategies for survival through an examination of the extent of the flexibility and adaptability of its foreign policy formulations. The continuities concern the ROC's intransigence, i.e. power struggle, against the "enemy" on the mainland; whereas the changes refer to the ROC's modified relationships with the U.S., with the newly independent countries, and with some neighbouring countries in Asia. Also noted in the changes was the ROC's attitude toward the Soviet Union.

We will begin with a brief review of the evolution of U.S. policy towards the two Chinese governments during the period concerned, and its interplay with the international environment, so as to examine, at a later stage, the ROC responses to these developments.
II. U.S.-ROC relations revised: 1958-71

In theory, both John F. Kennedy (presidential term 1961-63) and Lyndon B. Johnson (presidential term 1963-69) respected the policy foundations laid down by their predecessors. That is, they continued to support the Nationalist government politically, militarily, economically and morally, and to maintain international isolation of the PRC. Nevertheless, both Administrations indicated their intentions indirectly on several occasions of considering the possibility of reducing the U.S. commitment to the ROC, and in the meantime of acknowledging the existence of the "PRC".

Kennedy's intentions could be found in an article published in October 1957 while he was still a Senator; in his election debate with Nixon, then the Vice-President, of the 1960 presidential campaign; and in a speech delivered in June 1961 when he was en route to Vienna to meet with Soviet Premier Khrushchev. Senator Kennedy's article, entitled "A Democrat Looks at Foreign Policy", criticized U.S. policy as "exaggeratedly military" and "probably too rigid". In other words, Kennedy maintained: "these have been--and still are--compelling reasons for the nonrecognition of (Communist) China; but we must be very careful not to strait-jacket our policy as a result of ignorance and fail to detect a change in the objective situation when it comes." With regard to the election debate, Kennedy held the view that defence of Quemoy and Matsu was not actually vital to the U.S. security interests. He said:

2. Ibid.
"...we have never said flatly that we will defend Quemoy and Matsu if it is attacked...I think it is unwise to take the chance of being dragged into a war which may lead to a world war over two islands which are not strategically defensible, which are not...essential to the defense of Formosa (Taiwan)."¹

Later in a speech delivered on 2nd June 1962, President Kennedy said: "we desire peace and we desire to live in amity with the Chinese people (on the mainland)".²

Similarly, on one occasion President Johnson was quoted as saying:

"...eventual reconciliation with (Communist) China is necessary and possible...the U.S. will persist in efforts to reduce tensions between the two countries...A peaceful mainland China is central to a peaceful Asia. A hostile China must be discouraged from aggression. A misguided China must be encouraged toward understanding of the outside world and toward policies of peaceful cooperation."³

It can be seen, then, that the whole process of transformation of U.S. China policy had begun well before Nixon's 1969 Guam Doctrine, although it developed very slowly.

Next, we will discuss some of the factors that caused the change of mood in the U.S. administrations over China. Very briefly, there was (1) the Sino-Soviet split, (2) the growing strength and prestige of the PRC in the world, and (3) the cost of U.S. military involvement in the Vietnam War.

2. Ibid, p. 126.
3. Ibid., p. 164.
1. **Factors that influenced America's China policy**

(1) **The Sino-Soviet split**

During the 1950s, the PRC was a close ally of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, by the end of the decade, the two Communist countries began to show signs of disagreement, and it widened to involve virtually all of the fundamental issues facing them. The first public indication of the split was revealed on 16th April 1960 when the CCP's journal *Hongqi (Red Flag)* published an article entitled "Long Live Leninism". The article sought to demonstrate the theoretical legitimacy of Chinese Communism and Mao Tse-tung, and the deviation and heresy of the Soviet Union. It argued that Mao, not Khrushchev, was the heir to the Communist tradition, and the logical successor to Marx, Lenin and Stalin. In retaliation, the Soviet Communist Party charged the Chinese Communists as "dogmatists" (i.e. adhering too rigidly to earlier communist writings) while claiming that Khrushchev's tactics represented an application of creative Leninism. ¹ After that, the two countries openly assailed each other. In 1969, relationships between them reached their lowest point when serious fighting flared up on the Sino-Soviet border. In view of this development, the U.S. administrations sought to turn the situation to their advantage. That is, the U.S. could opt for a better relations either with Peking or with Moscow so as to widen the split between them. This can be described as playing either the "China card" or the "Russian card".

(2) The growing strength and prestige of the PRC

There were three inter-related factors which led to the rise of the PRC in international politics: first, the changed power structure in the U.N.; second, French recognition of the Peking government; and third, the explosion of the first Chinese atom bomb in October 1964 and of many afterwards.

During the 1950s, the U.N. power balance was in the favour of the U.S. The U.S. then was able to muster a majority for its cause in the U.N., which included diplomatic recognition and political support for the ROC and a rejection of Peking's admission into the organization. Nevertheless, U.S. strength in the U.N. began to deteriorate after 1960 when a large number of newly independent countries were admitted into the organization. A direct consequence of their admission was its impact on the U.N. voting patterns—voting in the General Assembly on the China issue showed only a very marginal victory for the U.S. after the mid-1960s.1 Thus, despite continued U.S. efforts to help the ROC win support, there was a marked decline of international sympathy for the U.S./ROC position in the U.N., hence an increase of support for Peking. The situation was reinforced by France's new China policy.

On 27th January 1964, the French government extended recognition to the Peking government and subsequently supported its seating in the U.N. This move reflected three

1. For detailed information on the changing patterns of U.N. voting on the issue, also the importance of the newly independent African states on this balance, see Chapter Five.
important decisions taken by the French government:
(i) The evolution of policy from hostility to the PRC
during the French involvement in the Indochinese war and
during the Cold War period, to a neutral position immediately
thereafter, and subsequently to outright support; (ii) in
conformity with this new China policy, the French government
terminated its support for the Nationalist government. The
French decisions included withdrawal of diplomatic relations
and objections to the Nationalists' right to sit in the
U.N.; and (iii) French policy toward the PRC coincided with
President de Gaulle's moves toward an independent policy
vis-a-vis the U.S. Since France was a traditional ally of
the U.S., and it was also the first major western country
to recognize the PRC after Britain in 1950, i.e. after the
Korean War, its new China policy thus constituted a direct
challenge to U.S. leadership in the western democracies.
According to de Gaulle, France could no longer ignore "the
fact that for 15 years almost the whole of China is
gathered under a government which imposes its laws, and
that externally China has shown herself to be a sovereign
and independent power".\(^1\) Finally, France had been a world-
wide colonial power, and it maintained strong influence on
its former colonies. The impact of the change on world
opinion was therefore tremendous. That is, since quite a
large number of the newly independent countries were
previously French colonies, they, with little experience in
international affairs after decolonization, had the tendency
to follow their colonial administrator for policy formulation

\(^1\) Congressional Quarterly, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 141.
in dealing with their foreign affairs. Consequently, French recognition of the PRC helped the latter to win diplomatic support from these newly independent countries.

International support for the PRC was also reinforced by the fact that Peking had begun an active campaign to achieve leadership among the newly independent countries, particularly in Africa. PRC's Premier Chou En-lai, seeking his objective, visited 10 African countries in early 1964. In the course of this visit, and shortly thereafter, 7 countries extended diplomatic recognition to Peking.\(^1\) Also in order to win more support, Peking concluded several economic and technical cooperation agreements with African countries. This programme of economic and technical assistance was also extended to some countries in Asia.\(^2\)

Finally, the PRC's growing strength during this period was related to its atomic development. On 16th October 1964, Peking exploded its first atomic bomb. The significance of this experiment was manifold. It indicated that the PRC, as the first non-white country to make such a bomb, had now

1. Chou's famous "African Tour" had taken him to the United Arab Republic (UAR), Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Ghana, Mali, Guinea, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia. The seven countries that extended diplomatic recognition to the PRC were Tunisia, Kenya, Tanganyika, the Central African Republic (CAR), Dahomey, Zambia and Senegal.

2. Since 1964, Communist China had concluded economic and technical cooperation agreements with Algeria, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda and the UAR in Africa, and with Afghanistan, Cambodia, Indonesia, North Vietnam, and Pakistan in Asia. However, not all these agreements survived. In 1965, the upheavals in Africa and in Indonesia brought an abrupt end to economic as well as political agreements. These shifts were obviously felt in the subsequent U.N. votes on the China issue. See Chapter Five for more information on the impact of French recognition of the PRC, and on Communist China's relations with Africa.
attained some proficiency in the nuclear field. The second and the third tests on 15th May 1965 and 9th May 1966 respectively further proved its important progress in nuclear technology. Certainly, these explosions had political significance as well. On the one hand, newly independent countries felt proud that a country in the early stages of economic development could achieve as much as the U.S., the United Kingdom, France and the U.S.S.R. On the other hand, however, this respect was tempered by disquiet since many newly independent countries felt anxious that Peking had refused to take part in the 1963 test ban treaty which had been signed by the U.S., the U.K., the U.S.S.R. and many other nations. Nevertheless, many of these newly independent countries did not like the U.S. and its role in Asia (partly because they considered the U.S. as an imperialist power), and they viewed the Chinese government of the A-bomb as a beginning in creating a new and more desirable balance of power.

(3) The cost of U.S. military involvement in the Vietnam War

Since 7th February 1965, the U.S. had embarked on an ever-growing programme of bombing North Vietnam. The bombing, which created a severe financial burden on the U.S. economy, approached the borders of Chinese mainland, bringing with it a widespread fear that the PRC would become embroiled. The threat of a U.S. war with the PRC was felt keenly at the U.N., where many countries bitterly criticized the U.S.

1. For instance, Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie openly expressed his disappointment that the PRC has refused to sign the accord. Congressional Quarterly, op.cit. p. 232.
It was also felt keenly at home, where anti-war feeling was high. Consequently, the war led the U.S. to weary of its role as world policeman and weakened American confidence in the justice and value of intervention in foreign countries. Thus Nixon, after assessing the impact of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam on U.S. society and pointing out his intention to disengage the U.S. from this involvement, remarked that the U.S. would be reluctant, after Vietnam, to become involved once again in a similar intervention on a similar basis:

"...The War has imposed severe strains on the United States, not only militarily and economically but socially and politically as well. Bitter dissension has torn the fabric of American intellectual life, and whatever the outcome of the war the tear may be a long time mending. If another friendly country should be faced with an externally supported communist insurrection—whether in Asia, or in Africa or even Latin America—there is serious question whether the American public or the American Congress would now support a unilateral American intervention, even at the request of the host government..."

Also,

"For the United States to go it alone in containing China would not only place an unconscionable burden on our own country, but also would heighten the chances of nuclear war while undercutting the independent development of the nation of Asia."1

Nixon's speech also indicated the concern that the U.S. would have no allies in a war with the PRC, a position which had already been mentioned by Kennedy in 1960.2

2. William M. Bueler, op.cit., p. 44.
Against this background, U.S. China policy began to waver. And it was under the Nixon Administration, that a new China policy began to materialize.

2. The evolution of America's China policy

In November 1963, President Kennedy indicated in a press conference that the U.S. would not stick stubbornly to a policy hostile toward the Chinese Communists. If the latter expressed a willingness peacefully to co-exist with the U.S. and with other countries surrounding it, Kennedy asserted, then the U.S. would reconsider its China policy.1 Later, on 12th December, Roger Hilsman, then Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, delivered a speech on an "open-door policy" toward Peking. Stating that the U.S. was "determined to keep the door open" until changes occurred on the Chinese mainland.2 At the same time, Hilsman stressed that U.S. defence of Taiwan was a matter of "basic principle" and there could be no "basic improvement" in U.S.-Communist China relations until the latter accepted that fact. In this respect, it seems that the real intention behind Hilsman's statement was to probe the PRC on the "two China" theory--the significance of which was that if the PRC gave its approval to such a possibility, further negotiations would be facilitated. In this way, the U.S. made its first official move towards a rapprochement with the PRC. Thus, it is no exaggeration to say that Hilsman's speech was a milestone in the consequent transformation of the U.S. policy toward the two Chinese governments.

1. NYT, 15th November 1963.
2. NYT, 14th December 1963; see also Congressional Quarterly, op.cit., p. 139.
Later on, this policy change was made more positive in a speech of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, when he was touring Taiwan in April 1964. Instead of reiterating the U.S.'s previous support for the Nationalist government as "the only Chinese government which legally represents China", Rusk merely stressed America's treaty obligations with the ROC and opposed handing over its seat in the U.N. to the Chinese Communists.¹ In other words, the U.S. seemed to be no longer in opposition to the Communist government's admission into the U.N., as long as Taiwan was not expelled.

In July 1965, the U.S. terminated its programme of economic assistance to Taiwan on the grounds that the post-War economic reconstruction of the island had now been completed and that its development had now reached a level where it could qualify for loans on non-concessional terms and therefore no longer needed U.S. aid. In terminating this economic aid programme, the U.S. government, however, continued to provide military assistance and surplus farm products to the ROC.²

After that, the U.S. move toward a new China policy gradually gained momentum. In December the same year, for instance, the U.S. government announced that the ban on travel to mainland China was lifted for doctors and medical scientists. After 1966, scholars, writers and journalists were added to the list and in July, the State Department announced that it would now allow Americans in public affairs, cultural,

¹. CDN, 17th April, 1964, p. 1.
². Congressional Quarterly, op.cit., p. 154. For more information on U.S. economic aid to the ROC, see Chapter Six.
athletic, commercial, educational, and other fields to visit the mainland. All of these restrictions had been put into force during the 1950s. Moreover, in order to facilitate a smooth transition for the China policy, experts and scholars of the "China problem" were invited to take part in a debate over government policy. They expressed their opinion, with the majority advocating an improvement of relations with the Peking government by all possible means. It was against this background that the policy of "containment without isolation" gradually emerged.¹

On 16th March 1966 Dean Rusk proposed a ten-point policy.² Among many other things, Rusk said that the U.S. had no intention of overthrowing the Chinese Communist government by military force; that the U.S. acknowledged that the Chinese Communists had established a stable political force on the Chinese mainland; and that should the Chinese Communists renounce their belief that "force is the best means of resolving dispute", and also abandon their strategic line of a violent world revolution, then the U.S. would welcome the establishment of friendly relations between the two countries. Other proponents of "bridge-building" with Peking were, for instance, Vice-President Hubert H. Humphrey and President Lyndon Johnson. Humphrey shared the view that U.S. policy toward Communist China should be one of "containment without isolation". Johnson's view was similar; "American policy toward the Chinese Communists would be firm but flexible".³ It was apparent that the U.S. was making

1. See footnote no. 1, p. 199.
all efforts to reach a rapprochement with the Chinese Communists.

Nevertheless, despite all these efforts, relations between the U.S. and the PRC seemed to make little progress. This was because, after mid-1966, the latter was plunged into unprecedented chaos caused by the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" (1965-69). In addition, the escalation of the Vietnam War slowed down the promise of a quick rapprochement.

The breakthrough in U.S.-PRC relations finally came during the Nixon administration (1969-1974). As mentioned earlier, President Nixon indicated very clearly in his Guam speech that the U.S. would reduce its military presence on the Asian mainland and would concentrate on providing Asian nations with the means to defend themselves. This new policy framework had the effect of forcing all the nations on the periphery of China to reappraise their positions, and of opening the way for the normalization of relations with the PRC by complying with a fundamental Chinese demand which dated from 1950, namely the removal of U.S. troops which "encircled" China.

The Doctrine obviously had a direct effect upon the ROC in terms of its role in the Chinese civil war, as well as upon its struggle for international recognition. In October 1970, for instance, Canada extended recognition to the Peking government, thus terminating its relations with the

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The Canadian decision was reached on the basis that:
"The Chinese (Communist) government reaffirms that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the PRC. The Canadian government takes note of this position of the Chinese (Communist) government." This sentence was the result of 18 months of negotiations between the two countries, and the handling of the "Taiwan problem" in this way later became a model - the so-called "Canadian model" - for many other countries. One month later, Italy, using the Canadian example, followed suit. Since both countries were close American allies, their actions therefore encouraged other western countries, who had wanted to modify their China policies, to approach Peking.

On 25th February 1971, Nixon in what amounted to a formal enunciation of the Nixon Doctrine, stressed again his desire for improvements in U.S. relations with the PRC. But this time he added the very alarming statement that "The U.S. is prepared to see the People's Republic of China play a constructive role in the family of nations." This was the first time Nixon had used the formal name adopted by the government of mainland China since 1949. At the same time, Nixon also indicated that he wished the conflict between Taipei and Peking could be resolved in a peaceful manner. By this time a trend was developing in official American policy towards China which contradicted Nixon's

2. The theme had obviously changed from a "China problem" to a "Taiwan problem", indicating a changed opinion on the nature of the Chinese civil war and consequently on the legal status of Taiwan and the Nationalist government.
3. NYT, 8th October, 1960, p. 11.
previous positions when he was the Vice-President. He had said:

"Recognition of Communist China and its admission to the United Nations have been firmly opposed by the Republican administration. We will continue in this opposition."

And,

"I think as far as Quemoy and Matsu are concerned, that the question is not these two little pieces of real estate. They are unimportant... It is the principle involved... We should not force our Nationalist allies to get off them and give them to the Communists. If we do that, we start a chain reaction, because the Communists aren't after Quemoy and Matsu. They are after Formosa (Taiwan)."

Nixon's new China policy clearly reflected a change of mind with regard to the two Chinese governments. Later, on 28th April, this policy transition was officially announced by the U.S. Department of State in its Statement on the Status of Taiwan. With regard to mainland, the U.S. took the view that:

"Mainland China has been controlled and administered by the People's Republic of China for 21 years and for some time we have been dealing with that government on matters affecting our mutual interest."

With regard to the question about who exercises sovereignty over Taiwan, the U.S. said:

3. Ibid.
"In our view sovereignty over Taiwan and the Pescadores is an unsettled question subject to future international resolution. Both the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China disagree with this conclusion. Both consider Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands are part of the sovereign state of China...Obviously we cannot hope to resolve the dispute between these two rival governments...our position has been and remains very firmly that whatever the ultimate resolution of the dispute between the Republic of China on Taiwan and the People's Republic of China on the mainland, it should be accomplished by peaceful means." 1

The above statement implied that there were two ways this issue could be resolved—either through international resolution or through direct negotiations between the two Chinese governments. With regard to the Nationalist government, the U.S. now stated that:

"We regard the Republic of China as exercising legitimate authority over Taiwan and the Pescadores by virtue of the fact that Japanese forces occupying Taiwan were directed to surrender to the forces of the Republic of China." 2

The U.S. was now clearly treating the Nationalist government and the Communist government as two separate nations. Afterwards, as part of a policy of seeking improved relations with the PRC, the U.S. avoided adopting any action which could be interpreted by the Communist government as hostile, and made a large scale reduction in military aid to Taiwan. This included casting aside proposals to supply weapons that would increase the offensive strength of Taiwan, 3 reducing

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. For example, a bill submitted by various Congressmen to supply Taiwan with a squadron of Phantom jets and three submarines was vetoed by the White House, see NYT, 10th July 1966, p. 13.
and finally halting altogether patrols of the 7th Fleet in the Taiwan Straits,\textsuperscript{1} and consequently blocking commando raids on the mainland by Taiwan.

On 15th July 1971, Nixon officially announced his proposed trip to the mainland.\textsuperscript{2} Despite the fact that Nixon, in an effort to reassure Taiwan, had said that "Our action in seeking a new relationship with the People’s Republic of China will not be at the expense of our old friends", the repercussions of this "shock" on the ROC were profound.\textsuperscript{3}

On 2nd August, the U.S. secretary of State William Rogers declared that the U.S. "will end its 20-year opposition to the seating of the People’s Republic of China in the U.N., and will therefore support action at the General Assembly this fall calling for seating the PRC...."\textsuperscript{4} On the subject of which government should have China’s seat on the Security Council, Rogers said that the U.S. would abide by the majority decision of the U.N.

The repercussions of these statements and U.S. pro-Peking actions were clearly felt in the October U.N. vote which was the last on the China representation issue. That is, despite the fact that the U.S. continued to make efforts to retain the ROC membership at the U.N., in the 26th session of the U.N. General Assembly, many delegates of other

1. On 7th November 1969 the U.S. ended the 19-year presence of the 7th Fleet in the Taiwan Straits. Since its assignment to patrol the Taiwan Straits, the 7th Fleet had become a symbol of U.S. commitment to the ROC. At the same time, it indicated an open hostility between the U.S. and Communist China.


nations, especially those from the Third World, considered the U.S. position on the issue self-contradictory and its efforts to save the ROC seat merely halfhearted. For on the very day when George Bush, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., was trying to win votes to support the U.S.-initiated "Important Question" resolution, which required a two-thirds majority vote for the expulsion of the ROC, Henry Kissinger, then National Security Adviser, was in Peking, making arrangements for Nixon's visit to the PRC. Consequently, by the switch of a few votes, the "Important Question" resolution was defeated in the General Assembly on the evening of 25th October 1971. Facing almost sure passing of the Albanian proposal, which called for the seating of the PRC in the U.N. and the expulsion of the ROC, the delegation of the ROC, led by Foreign Minister Chou Shu-Kai, walked out of the General Assembly, after declaring the withdrawal of the ROC from the U.N. membership. Thus, after 21 years of controversy in the U.N., the problem as to who should represent the State of China in this world organization was finally settled with the PRC replacing the ROC in both the Security Council and the General Assembly. After that, the triangular relationship among the ROC, the U.S., and the PRC entered a new phase. With the Chinese Communist government gradually replacing the Nationalist government as the legal Chinese government, having relations

1. For a discussion on the seating of the PRC in the U.N., see "Why Majority in U.N. Turn on the U.S.", U.S. News and World Report, LXXI, 19 (8th November 1971), pp. 17-19. See also Chapter Five. For the texts of the "Important Question" resolution and the Albanian Proposal, see Appendix No. 1.
with the U.S. government as well as with the majority of states in the world, and with a gradual consolidation of the PRC's national status and international prestige, the ROC's status became less and less certain. Thus, the term "pariah state" has often been used to describe the ROC's ambiguous status during the post-U.N. period. It was because of this growing uncertainty and ambiguity that the name "Taiwan" has been used increasingly to describe the Nationalist government of the ROC on Taiwan, or in references to the two-China's confrontation. Thus, in order to avoid confusion, it is necessary to point out that in the remaining part of this thesis, "Taiwan" will be used interchangeably with the ROC to mean the same Nationalist government of the ROC on Taiwan.

Confronted by these unfavourable developments in the international environment, one immediately raises such questions as: How did the ROC cope with the situation? Could it continue to depend on the U.S. and on the policy of "western alignment" as in the 1950s for the purpose of national survival? If not, what policies did it adopt? Were these new policies successful?

1. Joseph Frankel, op.cit. p.27. Frankel defines the term "pariah states" as "states whose recognition had been withdrawn or was threatened." See also Leonard Unger, "Taiwan: The Prosperous Pariah (1): Derecognition Worked", Foreign Policy, No. 26 (Fall 1979), pp. 103-121; and Frank Chang, "Taiwan: The Prosperous Pariah (2): A Most Envied Province", ibid., pp. 122-146.
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121; and Frank Chang, "Taiwan: The Prosperous Pariah
During the 1950s the ROC had depended on the U.S. almost entirely for its security protection, and national development. Foreign policy was pre-occupied with the twin issues of "mainland recovery" and the "survival crisis". The Nationalist government did little to promote relations with countries other than the U.S. American support was granted to the ROC mainly as part of its strategy of containment, and partly out of moral considerations. Indeed, for the purposes of containment, Taiwan and the offshore islands did at one time assume a strategic value in the Pacific. Thus, Chiang Kai-shek had been able to "manipulate" U.S. protection for maximizing his policy objectives. Nevertheless, since the early 1960s, with the international power structure so changed, the utility value of Taiwan to U.S. strategy began to dwindle. Correspondingly, the U.S. support for the Nationalist government decreased. As a consequence, Chiang Kai-shek's bargaining position vis-a-vis the U.S. became weaker. In spite of this, Chiang still retained faith in the recovery of the mainland, if not through military means, then through non-military means, and this led him to search continuously for new opportunities in his foreign policy, however difficult the situation.

Chiang's new strategy was to de-emphasize Taiwan's total dependence on the U.S. and yet at the same time consolidate the ties already established between the two countries. The former indicated the need for Taiwan to look around for other
foreign policy options, whereas the latter indicated the necessity for Taiwan to preserve the established dependent relationship with the U.S., and meanwhile, to search for chances to exploit it to its advantage whenever possible. It is important to bear in mind that however modified the ROC's foreign policies were, the U.S. was always regarded as its most valuable foreign friend and that the ROC's changing course of foreign policies was mainly a response to the evolution of U.S. China policy and to the existing international political reality.

During the 1960s, Taiwan attempted on several occasions to exploit its alliance with the U.S. Two most notable instances were the Vietnam War and the "Great Cultural Revolution" on the mainland. In the remaining part of this Chapter, we will first outline Taiwan's foreign policy toward the U.S., then its foreign policy strategy of political counterattack and other foreign policy options. It is hoped that this study will explain how the Nationalist government gradually came to distinguish between its internal struggle against Chinese Communists and its over-all resistance to international Communism.

(1) The opportunity of the Vietnam War

"...the Vietnam crisis offered renewed hope to those seeking to invigorate the mainland return philosophy. In recent years, the Nationalists have been realistic in emphasizing that their opportunity will come within the context of a larger international confrontation. Could the Vietnam crisis be such a confrontation?... The Vietnam crisis, however, will serve to reinforce those factions on Taiwan who oppose the mounting costs of a ongoing modernization program on the island, and in the future may lead the Nationalists to a more direct participation in the Southeast Asia crisis."1

This description indicates clearly the fact that, as with the Korean War, the Nationalist government wanted to utilize U.S. military involvement in Vietnam for a possible realization of its foreign policy objectives of military counterattack. The process by which this intention could be realized was either to manoeuvre a direct tie between Nationalist power and South Vietnam or to urge the U.S. to more intensive military involvement in the Vietnam crisis. Nevertheless, by the end of the War in 1975, such efforts had proved fruitless.

As in the Korean case, the war in Vietnam was coloured by the Cold War hostility. The Nationalist government's position was that the Vietnam War was not a local struggle but rather a part of the Asia-wide or world-wide life-and-death battle of the "Free World" against "Communist totalitarianism". In other words, the traditional U.S. policy of containing Communism through limited warfare, as in the case of Korea, was, at the most, only a minimum strategy. This was why the U.S., according to the Nationalists, had been unable to insure against any further Communist aggression, despite the fact that it had been able to halt their expansion at various points in Asia. Moreover, to fight an "unwinnable" war was meaningless, Nationalist officials asserted, instead the way to win the war was to widen it with combined assaults on the Communist forces in North Vietnam and on the mainland.

The Nationalist government's position was clearly disclosed in a policy suggestion made by Hu Lien, the ROC's Ambassador to South Vietnam, i.e. the Republic of Vietnam (RVN). He said:
"The U.S. army should first of all have a clear view of the geographical features of Vietnam before entering into the country. Confining the war to South Vietnam alone could actually help nothing and thus could not at all resolve the Vietnam problem. Rather, it is essential to occupy Hainan Island first, then talk about the prospects of advancing into North Vietnam. Meanwhile, it is necessary to secure Cambodia so as to protect Saigon from attack from the rear....With regard to the task to gain the winning position in the battlefield and thereafter to control Hainan Island, nobody is better qualified than the Nationalist forces on Taiwan...."  

This suggested two things. First, it was essential to involve the Nationalist forces physically and militarily in the War; and second, it was necessary to enlarge the conflict and to encourage further American military engagement there. The interesting point here is that Hu Lien was originally an army General. He had been also strategic adviser to President Chiang Kai-shek, and Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist army. Whether or not his appointment as the Ambassador to the RVN was merely a matter of coincidence, it can be argued that Hu's military assessment of the Vietnam situation had intentionally been linked with his concern for his own government's military counterattack policy.

Therefore, as with Korea, the Nationalist government offered troops to Saigon with the intention of spreading the anti-Communist war northward.2 Or, as mentioned earlier, it was


2. Ibid., p. 113. Also members of the Legislative Yuan had passed resolutions to send "volunteers" to Vietnam, see Hsin-sheng pao (New Life Daily), 24th October 1966, p. 1; and P. H. M. Jones, "Crusaders All", FEER, IL, 10 (2nd September 1965), p. 30.
suggested that Taiwan could land troops near the border region between North Vietnam and the China mainland to assist the Saigon government. The Nationalist government even indicated support for an air strike on mainland China's nuclear installations. Otherwise, it was claimed, "the U.S. will be repeating the same mistake it made in the Korean War, because it failed to... use Formosa-based forces in a multi-pronged counter-blow to Communist aggression."\(^1\) The Nationalists tried to convince the Americans of the above viewpoints, so that the U.S. would allow Nationalist soldiers to join the allies in South Vietnam. (The Nationalists could not intervene in the fighting militarily because according to the 1954 Mutual Defence Treaty, any such actions would require the U.S. consent and, except for self-defence purposes, the latter would not provide military assistance.) In any case, the prospect of finding a new pathway for counterattack was better than being just confined to Taiwan waiting indefinitely for an opening on the China coast—which had become more and more illusory since the second Quemoy crisis. After all, the Nationalists maintained, Peking was the source of aggression in Vietnam, and, either in Vietnam or elsewhere in Asia, no problem could be settled until the Chinese Communists had been totally defeated. Thus, "it was better to attack the centre than the periphery".\(^2\)

1. Hu Lien, *op.cit.*, p. 82.
2. *Ta-hua wan pao* (The Great China Evening News), (Taipei), 18th May 1964, p. 11.
Thus, the Nationalist government still believed that military counterattack directly across the Taiwan Straits, accompanying the war in Vietnam, remained a practical strategy for mainland recovery. However, in view of the overall situation in Asia, and in order to bring peace to Asia and to the whole world, a direct attack on North Vietnam would be even more effective, because in so doing not only could the Vietnam unification problem be resolved but also the China problem. Thus, the Nationalist government was very willing and anxious to make available air-base and many other military facilities on the island to the U.S. for its military operations in Southeast Asia. Such an offer, although less direct and dramatic than actually sending "volunteers" to Vietnam, had a double value for Taiwan, because it could boost the Nationalist morale for a continued programme of military counterattack in the future on one hand; on the other hand, it could inspire the

1. During the war period, the U.S. stationed a wing of C-130 transport aircraft and a KC-135 tanker squadron at Ching Chuan Kang (formerly Kung Kuan) airfield. The U.S. also made use of the runway at this air base. The C-130s provided tactical airlift support for U.S. forces in Vietnam, while the tanker refuelled B-52s carrying out bombing missions there. U.S. military personnel attached to these two units numbered nearly 6,000, bringing total U.S. military personnel stationed in Taiwan in the latter 1960s close to 10,000. Also beginning in 1962, the U.S. stationed Detachment One of the 405th Fighter Wing (part of the 13th Air Force, based at Clark Air Base in the Philippines) on the air base at Tainan and in 1969 added Detachment Two. Meanwhile, Taiwan had also provided overhaul and repair facilities for U.S. fighter aircraft, tanks, and personnel carriers. See U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Republic of China, Hearing, 91st Congress, November 24th, 25th and 26th 1969, and May 8th 1970 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), especially pp. 1113-1130. See also "Support for the War in Vietnam", in the China Yearbook 1965-66, pp. 10-11.
U.S. to reassess Taiwan's strategic value as long as the conflict was prolonged.

Nevertheless, despite its intensive military involvement in the Vietnam conflict, the U.S. had no intention whatsoever of allowing Nationalist troops to become involved. On the contrary, as noted earlier, towards the end of 1960s, the American government was looking for a way to disengage from the conflict. The U.S. position regarding the Nationalists' scheme can be seen in the fact that the 7th Fleet continued to patrol the Taiwan Straits during this period, and that, at the same time, U.S. military assistance to the ROC was limited to items essentially defensive in nature. Moreover, the U.S. turned down a proposal made by Senator Everett M. Dirksen, who called for an increase of one hundred million dollars in the foreign aid bill to modernize the Nationalist military establishment.

Gradually, the ROC's hopes of linking its military programme with the Vietnam War were dissipated by the American policy of "Vietnamization" and the overall promotion of the Nixon Doctrine. Indeed, the U.S. decisions did more harm than good to the Nationalist government, because they facilitated a rapprochment between the U.S. and the PRC.

After President Johnson's sustained bombing of North Vietnam, the U.S. administration was deeply disturbed by anti-war sentiment. The Nationalist government was careful not to

1. The Nationalist air force therefore received F105 fighter planes in 1965 to replace their older F86's, but their bombers and transports remained antiquated.
2. Congressional Quarterly, op.cit., p. 29.
join in any criticism. On the contrary, in order to sustain U.S. involvement there, it proclaimed that the U.S. could not shed its responsibility in Asia, and that regardless of what the "doves" said, the U.S. simply had to police the area. Moreover, since the Communists' final goal was to overthrow the status quo in Asia so that they could communize the whole world in the long run, and while U.S. interests demanded that the status quo be maintained, the Nationalists argued such a divergence of objectives meant that a clash between the U.S. and Communist China was unavoidable. Another point emphasized was that, however conciliatory the U.S. might be, the Chinese Communists would continue to believe that world revolution would never be successful until "American Imperialism" was exterminated. That is to say, the Americans had to realize the facts before it became too late—world peace and American security were indissolubly linked with peace in Asia, and a free and peace-loving China (i.e. the ROC) was the key to such a new world order.

The above arguments were based mainly on the "domino theory" which held that the loss of a single country of Southeast Asia would lead to the fall of the whole region into Communist hands. Thus, in the view of the Nationalists, if Communist advances were not stopped in Vietnam, the whole of Asia would be overrun one day, and if the U.S. withdrew from Asia, there was bound to be a power vacuum which either the Russians or the Chinese Communists would hasten to fill.

Had this been the case, the argument went on, even nationalism—as a new force in small Asian countries—would not be sufficient to resist the Communist grab for power. Despite American assurances to the contrary, Asian countries would fear the prospect of being abandoned. Withdrawal from Vietnam would therefore mean that the U.S. was in effect "delivering the lives of countless Vietnamese into the hands of the enemy", and the burden of this terrible act might destroy the spirit of the U.S.\(^1\) This implied that other small nations, including the ROC, would inevitably suffer the same fate eventually. And this danger might "spill over" to other parts of the world. As Madam Chiang Kai-shek pointed out:

"Should South Vietnam fall to the Communists, Thailand and Malaysia would be next followed by Indonesia, Australia and Japan. Once the Communists had these areas under their control, who would say that the U.S. would not be in serious danger or that the Communists would not next try to reach Hawaii, Guam and San Francisco?"\(^2\)

Thus, the Communist invasion of Vietnam was seen really as an attack on one of the peripheral points of the U.S. defence. By fighting in Vietnam the U.S. was not only protecting the security of Asia, but also, in the long run,

\(^1\) It had been argued that by withdrawal from Asia, the U.S. would open itself to the accusation that it sought to pit Asians against Asians, which would be considered a sinister racist plot to control the "yellow peril". Also had been mentioned was the prediction that U.S. withdrawal would precipitate a third world war. See Ho Hao-jo, "Why I Bring Up My Criticisms of American Appeaser Fairbank", China Magazine (Taipei), 20th April, 1968, p. 9.

that of the U.S. itself.\textsuperscript{1} It is evident therefore that the Nationalist government's strategy was to try to make the most of the American fear of Communism and their security concern in the West Pacific—although both were gradually diminishing—for its own political purposes.

With regard to the criticism that the U.S. by its policy of intervention in Vietnam was imperialistic, the Nationalists replied that the U.S. had no territorial ambition in Asia at all. Rather, such an "intervention" was a responsibility which destiny had thrust on to the American nation; it was the natural and inevitable outcome of international developments in the post-War period.\textsuperscript{2} As one editorial in the \textit{China Post} put it, America's crucial role in the world was the "will of God". "Almighty God should be given credit for having brought into being a nation with such a high sense of justice and prosperity."\textsuperscript{3}

Later on, when the U.S. began to show signs of wanting to withdraw from Vietnam, the Nationalist government put forward its recommendation for the establishment of an effective anti-Communist alliance, similar to NATO, backed by the

\begin{itemize}
\item 1. Hsin-shen pao, 7th February 1968, in PPS 68/2677 (9th February 1968), p. 10. To complete the domino argument, spokesman from Taiwan had also argued that the North Vietnam Communists were agents of the Chinese Communists. As Chiang said in 1966, the Chinese Communists were not only behind the Vietnam war, they were "exercising full control of it". \textit{Free China Review}, XVI, 2 (February 1966), p. 89.
\item 3. Editorial in the \textit{China Post}, 4th July 1968.
\end{itemize}
The argument was that, if the U.S. was not willing to deepen its military involvement in Asia, then, at least, for the sake of morality, it should encourage the formation of a collective security organization of some sort in the Far East such as, say, a "Pacific Treaty Organization" or a "North-east Asia Treaty Organization". Although the U.S. had already set up SEATO, the argument went on, it was not and could never be an effective organization to resist Communist aggression because the two strongest anti-Communist nations in this region—the ROC and the Republic of Korea (ROK)—had been excluded. Thus, an important condition of any such organization was that it should include these two countries. Shen Chang-huan, then Foreign Minister of the ROC, on a tour to Australia and New Zealand in 1965 had also suggested in a similar proposal that these two countries join Japan, "Free China", and the ROK in forming an alliance.

In this connection, it is worth mentioning that, in fact, Chiang Kai-shek's hope to set up an anti-Communist military alliance of Asian nations was originally conceived in mid-1949. And his idea derived from Sun Yat-sen's proposal of regionalism. In 1949, Chiang flew to the Philippines and the ROK on 10th July and 2nd August respectively. The main purpose of his trip was to encourage these countries to

form an anti-Communist alliance. Nevertheless, although Chiang had obtained agreement from both countries, his idea had never been materialized. This was because the U.S. did not show any enthusiasm to back it up. Thus, it was understandable that, in view of the mounting crisis in Southeast Asia, Chiang would again propose the formation of such a security organization.

However, this idea faded because the U.S. remained deaf to it. Consequently, the ROC's aggressive stance of military operations vis-a-vis the mainland gradually turned into a matter of speech-making.

(2) The hope of using the "Great Cultural Revolution" on the mainland (1965-1969)

The development of the Cultural Revolution on the mainland seemed to offer the Nationalist government another avenue for strengthening its alliance with the U.S. But this hope lasted only for four years. The Nationalists sought to convince the U.S. that the internal turmoil on the mainland caused by the Cultural Revolution was a rare opportunity for the "Free World" to bring the vast continent back to peace, humanity and prosperity. The central theme of the argument was that the Revolution had brought unprecedented chaos to the people on the mainland. It was a reflection of the continued power struggle among the Communist leaders, and it could possibly lead to internal revolt of some sort or even the total collapse of order and stability there. In the case of such a collapse, the Nationalists should be ready to take sufficient military action, with U.S. approval, to put an end to Communist rule there.
The connection between this "altruistic" argument and the ROC's hopes for mainland recovery could be found in a speech delivered by Chou Shu-kai, then Ambassador to the U.S., in a press conference: "Due to the present chaos on the Chinese mainland, 1967 may be a decisive year for the ROC to recover the mainland." Also, in order to provoke the U.S. to "intervene" in the crisis on the mainland, the Nationalists asserted that one political objective of the Cultural Revolution was to "declare war on the United States and the Soviet Union". The response of the U.S. was simply to remind the Nationalists once again of the restrictions imposed in the 1954 Mutual Defence Treaty. Thus, the Nationalist government could do no more than merely try to prevent further U.S. disengagement from Asia.

By 1969, the Cultural Revolution had come to an end, and so had Chiang's hopes of taking advantages of the opportunity. Increasing American reluctance to support the ROC together with the changing course of international power relationships caused the Nationalist government to reconsider the validity of its foreign policy strategies. Was continued, total reliance upon the U.S. for the ROC's political objective of

2. Ibid.
3. See Hsiao-tao iih pao, 12th January 1967, p. 1. In fact, the Nationalists often assert that the restriction of the Treaty had cost them three excellent opportunities other than the Quemoy crises to counterattack the mainland. The first was during the "hundred-flowers movement" in 1958, the second during the "May exodus of refugees" in 1962, and the third during the "Great Cultural Revolution" in 1966. See editorial, "It's Time to Revise the Mutual Defence Treaty--The Major Mission of Rusk's Visit to China Next Week", in Kung-shang Daily News (Hong Kong), 28th June 1966, p. 1.
national survival still prudent? Was an offensive military policy vis-a-vis the Communist world still practical? There were arguments both for and against each question. With regard to ROC's future relations with the U.S., some people, mainly the Nationalists officials or the Chinese émigrés, held the view that, despite waning U.S. support, the ROC should still work hard to convince the U.S. not to abandon its faithful ally—American support was considered as a prerequisite for the ROC's continued survival in the world, as, otherwise, losing U.S. support was like losing the means to obtain international assistance, and would imperil national survival. Conversely, some people, mainly the young generation who were born either shortly before 1949 or in Taiwan, seemed to have become irritated with the ambiguous American attitudes. Arguing that the U.S. was not at all trustworthy, because if the U.S. could abandon Vietnam, it could and would one day abandon Taiwan, they proposed that the ROC be prepared in advance for the worst, i.e. it should look around for other sources of support.

Nonetheless, whatever divergent domestic opinions were, the Nationalist government had demonstrated its intention to modify its foreign policy strategies, to which we will now turn.
III. Changes and continuities in the ROC's foreign policy

ROC's new foreign policy strategy was "political counterattack". As mentioned earlier in this Chapter, the period of political counterattack lasted from 1958 Dulles-Yeh Communiqué until the end of 1971; and the declared objectives of this new strategy remained more or less similar to those announced under the military strategy, except the priorities were rearranged. Our purpose in the remaining part of this Chapter is to explore the changes and continuities, i.e. the extent of flexibility and adaptability, of the ROC's foreign policy during this period through a comparison of the two foreign policy strategies. We will first define the meaning of political counterattack, then discuss the continuities and changes.

1. The meaning of political counterattack

The overall meaning of the strategy of political counterattack was given by Chiang Kai-shek as follows:

"In the process of our counter-offensive and restoration of the Republic, military operations shall always be subordinate to politics which will play the main role, principles will be the pioneers backed up by armed forces and mainland China will be our main battlefield with the Taiwan Straits as a branch one. Militarily, the guidance must be so applied that the military undertakings in the Taiwan Straits shall be so directed as to keep pace with the revolutionary movement on the mainland." 1

Later on Chiang further elaborated his position:

"(1) The counter-offensive war of our national restoration is militarily a revolutionary war to defeat the many by the few and, politically, a war of free will which by nature is to defeat the few by the many...In other words, the war will be a war of 'humanity vis-a-vis tyranny' to 'free the people and to punish the rebellious'.

(2) The counter-offensive war of national restoration is a double-fronted war of both internal uprising and external attack. It will be conducted by way of supporting the tyranny-resisting revolt on the mainland with counter-offensive actions from the Taiwan Straits.

(5) The war is not a mere civil war; it is a part of the international anti-Communist war and the principle of '30 percent military and 70 percent politics' must be applied..." 1

2. The continuities of the ROC's foreign policy

(1) Counterattack on the mainland

Despite the fact that the ROC had now modified its foreign policy strategies, the theme of counterattack (on the mainland) continued. Chiang's above definition on political counterattack made clear that the basic strategy of anti-Communism did not merely depend on armed strength, but more and more on political strength and influence too and that his domestic programme of anti-Chinese Communism continued to play a part in the international anti-Communist war. Thus, despite the 1958 Dulles-Yeh Joint Communiqué and numerous statements made by Chiang himself on the theme of political counterattack, Chiang had not totally abandoned his earlier strategy of military counterattack--this can be seen from the moves made by the ROC during the Vietnam War and the Cultural Revolution on the mainland. Rather, in view of

1. Ibid., 265-272.
unfavourable situation for a direct, offensive military operation against the Communists, Chiang's emphasis on the counterattack programme assumed more and more a defensive character. Thus, the short-term objective of this modified strategy was to build up Taiwan into a modern province of China based on Sun's San Min Chu I. The long-term goal was to demonstrate to Peking and to the whole world that Sun's ideology was indeed more suitable for China than Communist ideology, and that, consequently, the Communist system on the mainland would peacefully collapse ready for the adoption of Sun's ideology.

Thus, Chiang never ceased to call for a counterattack. Nevertheless, as a result of détente between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. and of the development of Sino-Soviet split, Chiang's counterattack programme during the 1960s became less concerned with the Russian Communist threat but continued to focus on the Chinese Communists. Chiang's hostility towards the latter was fully expressed in the following statement: "Either we exist to return to the mainland or we have no existence worth mentioning at all." 1

Chiang's insistence on the mainland-return policy, though it had become more and more illusory, had its reasons. As mentioned in the earlier Chapters, the Nationalists government could not abandon the counterattack theme however unfeasible and unrealistic it was because, in theory, it was the raison d'être of the ROC's legitimate existence. The dilemma for the Nationalist government was therefore that it had to

continue the futile counterattack theme against the Chinese Communists at the expense of modernizing Taiwan.

(2) Objections to the "two Chinas" idea

Closely related to the ROC's counterattack against Chinese Communists was its continued insistence on the "one China" principle. Any formula suggesting the "two Chinas" idea would be resisted. Similar to the theme of counterattack, abandonment of the insistence of the "one China" thesis would mean a recognition of the existing status quo (i.e. a Communist-controlled mainland and a Nationalist-held Taiwan) or, even worse, an admission of Communist China into the U.N., or a termination of the Nationalist rule on Taiwan. Thus, similar to the ROC's position on the counterattack theme, the Nationalist government was torn by the dilemma that, in theory, it had to continue the theme of "one China" by insisting that it was an unchangeable national position and that, therefore, it would break diplomatic relations with any country that recognized the PRC; but, in reality, its policy from the late 1950s was to preserve the status quo along the Taiwan Straits and inside Taiwan island. The latter meant to preserve and to modernize Taiwan into a permanent power base for the ROC. This indicated a tacit acceptance of the two Chinas reality.

Nevertheless, in official terms, the Nationalist government never openly agreed with the two Chinas reality and regularly protested when others suggested it did exist. For instance, in 1961, during the U.N. General Assembly debate, the Nationalist delegates maintained: "In the course of this
debate some speakers have, directly or indirectly, suggested a solution along the line of 'two Chinas'. Such a solution is not acceptable to my government."¹ Also, in 1966, Nationalist delegates openly criticized a proposal for permitting representation of both Chinese governments in the U.N. as "ill-timed" and "unrealistic".² They maintained that the proposal would "encourage the extremists in the Chinese Communist Party to believe that their policy has proved effective and that Peking is to be accepted into the U.N. because of that policy".³ Two further instances—the Outer Mongolia incident and the French recognition—indicated the ROC's intransigence on this issue during the 1960s.

After 1946, Outer Mongolia—or the Mongolia People's Republic, the MPR—began to apply for U.N. membership, but it was not accepted until 27th October 1961. The issue was debated in the U.N. annually. According to the Mongolians themselves, the delay was caused primarily by "the irrational 'cold war' policy of the Western powers which were backing the allegations of the Chiang Kai-shek clique regarding the MPR".⁴ Here, it is necessary to say a few words concerning the background of the issue. At the end of the 17th century Outer Mongolia came under nominal Chinese control. As far back as the 18th century its borders were in dispute between

3. Ibid.
Russia and the Chinese Empire; later Japan joined in the attempt to control or take over the weakly governed country. In 1920, a Japanese-White Russian expedition seized the capital, now called Ulan Bator, and set up a puppet government. The next year a Soviet-inspired revolution overthrew the regime and in 1924 the MPR was proclaimed. The Treaty of 1950 between the PRC and the Soviet Union recognized the "independence" of the Republic. But the PRC has its own treaty of friendship and economic aid with Mongolia, and has made efforts to strengthen its influence there. Chiang Kai-shek strongly rejected international recognition of the MPR or its admission into the U.N. because in his opinion, the MPR was a client of the U.S.S.R. and if it were to be admitted, it would possibly increase the vote in favour of Communist China's pending application for membership, hence facilitating the creation of two Chinas, or even worse, undermining the ROC's status in the organization.¹ Thus, the Nationalist government strongly protested against Mongolia's application even at the risk of using the veto. The repercussion of the veto was that the issue of Outer Mongolia's admission was then subtly linked with that of Mauritania, a newly independent state in Africa. The linkage was deliberately arranged by the Soviet Union. That is, should Nationalist delegates veto Mongolia, the Soviet Union would presumably retaliate by vetoing the

parallel application of Mauritania; and the two dozen or more African states in the Assembly could then be expected to vote in favour of Communist China's participation as a matter of revenge against the Nationalist government.¹

This was a dilemma for the ROC because whatever its decision, the admission of Communist China into the world organization was only a matter of time. Nonetheless, with great reluctance, and under strong U.S. pressure,² Nationalist delegates finally absented from the vote in the Security Council on the MPR's application.³

Another example was the French recognition of the Peking government in 1964. The French decision was reached not on the premise that it would have to, as it did eventually,

¹ Eleven states which sponsored Mauritania's membership, Dahomey, Cameroon, the Central Africa Republic, Chad, Congo, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Niger, Senegal and Upper Volta, told the ROC that if it provoked a Soviet veto of Mauritania by blocking Outer Mongolia, they would vote for Peking on the "Chinese Representation" issue. See Free China Weekly, III, 17 (20th July 1965), p. 1; see also the China Yearbook, 1965-1966, p. 243.

² The U.S. initially supported the ROC's position regarding the MPR. Nevertheless in 1960, Washington began to consider the possibility of according diplomatic recognition to the MPR. The U.S. decision was reached because since the mid-1950s the MPR had gradually emerged as an important element in the Sino-Soviet rivalry (see Richard P. Stebbins, ibid., p. 225). In view of the fact that Mongolia had been Chinese for so many centuries, it was therefore understandable that the two Communist powers were vying for dominant influence in Outer Mongolia. (See Harrison E. Salisbury, "Soviet and Red China Compete for Power in Outer Mongolia", Special to the NYT, 4th August 1959, reprinted in O.E.Clubb, ed. China: The Great Contemporary Issues (New York: The New York Times Company, 1972), pp. 343-345.) Thus, for the U.S., the establishment of a diplomatic listening post at China's backdoor would have obvious advantages. The ROC opposed the U.S. plan but in vain. (See Thomas J. Hamilton, "The Chinese Problem: Pitfalls Are Seen in Washington's Plan to Again Bar Peking from U.N.," NYT, 29th October 1961, reprinted in O.E.Clubb, ibid., pp. 375-376.

³ Richard P. Stebbins, op.cit., pp. 221-222.
terminate its bilateral relationships with the ROC. Actually, despite its new relations with Peking, and despite the "one China" thesis, the French government would have preferred to retain ties with Taipei. Nevertheless, the Nationalist government refused to accept this idea and denounced it as a "most unfriendly act", and "a plot to create two Chinas." Furthermore, it demanded that all the French leave Taipei and it severed ties with France, in spite of the impact this would have upon the ROC's future status. This connection and its impact will be examined again in Chapter Five, the strategy of foreign aid.

Thus, prior to ROC's departure from the U.N. in 1971, it had showed only very slight evidence that it was preparing for a shift of policy. The official pronouncements still insisted on the theoretical validity of the "one China" thesis despite the fact that the Nationalist government had already begun to show signs of recognizing of the fact that its interests would be best served if it recognized the status quo and set about living in peace permanently separated from mainland China. Another example was that, although the Nationalist government broke relations with almost all nations that sent ambassadors to Communist China, it continued to tolerate private business exchanges with some of those nations. Britain, for example, had recognized the PRC in 1950 but had since then conducted two-way trade with Taiwan. In fact, as an exception, there was even a British consulate in Taiwan until 1972. Similarly, Japan, which did not

2. Ibid.
recognize the PRC until 1972, had engaged in "private"
business transactions with the latter, and at the same time,
enjoyed official bilateral relations with the Nationalist
government. (This will be further elaborated shortly in
the section on the changes of the ROC's foreign policy,
also later in Chapter Six.)

In short, the Nationalist government opposed as strongly as
during the 1950s the "two Chinas" proposal and any other
similar suggestions. Even in 1971 when the Nationalist
delegates were expelled from the U.N., they still insisted
on the "one China" principle. In fact, it may well be argued
that it was because of this principle that the Nationalist
delegates had no alternative but to leave. Nevertheless,
the ROC could hardly ignore international political
reality.

3. The changes in the ROC's foreign policy: the search
   for new foreign policy options

   (1) The Soviet option

After the Sino-Soviet split became evident, western political
observers often suggested that the ROC had the intention of
establishing some kind of rapport with the Soviet Union
(just as the Soviet Union might have wanted to establish a
rapprochement with the Nationalist government).

During the 1950s, the Nationalist government regarded the
Soviet Union as one of its chief enemies. But this position
subtly altered during the 1960s. In this section, we will
deal with three things. First of all, we will analyze the
ROC's motivations in playing the "Russian card"; secondly, we will outline some of the ROC's anti-Russian attitudes during the 1950s; and thirdly, we will examine the evolution of the ROC's modified attitudes toward the Soviet Union during the 1960s. Our purpose is to establish the fact that the ROC did indeed modify some aspects of its foreign policy strategies during the 1960s.

(A) The ROC's motives in approaching the Soviet Union

The ROC's changed posture towards the Soviet Union could be considered as a response to: the new American policy of détente with the Soviet Union; the new American policy of "bridge-building" with Communist China; and the Sino-Soviet split. The ROC's calculation can be summarized as follows: if the U.S. planned to ally with the Russians against Communist China, and if such an intention was promising, this would be the best policy option for the Nationalist government. Otherwise, an anticipated improved relationship between the ROC and the Soviet Union might help somewhat to prevent the U.S. from creating a prompt rapport with Communist China, meanwhile, preventing the U.S. from any weakening of its Taiwan commitment. As one writer observed:

"Taiwan obviously hopes to use such a belief to deter the U.S. from extending full recognition to the PRC, or at least to insure that normalization is carried out on terms which the ROC can live with. Taipei hopes that the belief in Washington in Taiwan's 'Russian option' will keep the U.S. from abandoning Taiwan to attack or pressure from the mainland....

Taipei also feels that concern in Peking over Taiwan's 'Russian option' might make the PRC more willing to compromise with the U.S. over the Taiwan question or, if that failed, make Peking more
hesitant to apply military pressure on Taiwan because of fear of forcing Taiwan into Soviet arms." 1

Nevertheless, whatever the Nationist government's motivations were, it did not want military ties with the Russians. As far as the Nationalist government was concerned, Taiwan could enhance its bargaining positions vis-a-vis either the U.S. or Communist China if it could promote a rapport with the Soviet Union on the level of political, economic and cultural exchanges. Military collaboration was too much of a risk. It would have broad effects on the current system of international relations in East Asia. Or, even worse, it might have countereffects on the ROC in that it might escalate tension between the two Chinese rivals; it might arouse American antagonism, hence leading to a reduced commitment towards Taiwan; or it might even speed up American normalization with Peking. On top of this, the Nationalists still had a vivid memory of their military collaboration with Russian Communists during the 1920s. 2 According to them, this memory was bitter and unforgettable, and military ties with the Russians was therefore like a prelude to "inviting wolves into the chamber".

1. John W. Garver, "Taiwan's Russian Option: Image and Reality", Asian Survey, XVIII, 7 (July 1978), p. 752. At that time, Communist China's three conditions for the full normalization of U.S.-PRC relations were: (1) the severance of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Taiwan; (2) the complete withdrawal of U.S. military personnel from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits; and (3) the abrogation of the 1954 Mutual Defence Treaty between the U.S. and Taiwan.

2. See Chapter One.
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2. See Chapter One.
(B) The ROC's anti-Soviet attitudes during the 1950s

During the 1950s, both the Soviet Union and Chinese Communists were regarded by the Nationalists as their "No. 1" enemies. They were also the "No. 1" enemies of the "Free World". According to the Nationalists, the Communists were untrustworthy, evil, treacherous, "bandits", and aggressive. Moreover, it was because of their conspiracy, the Nationalists asserted, that China was lost to Communism in 1949. The Communists were therefore dangerous because their aim for world domination would never change.

Chiang Kai-shek published two books, The Basic Essay on Anti-Communism and Resisting Russia (1951) and Soviet Russia in China (1957), as well as many articles dwelling on his personal experience of the horror of Communist conspiracy and his determination and dedication to overthrow this conspiracy.

The Basic Essay on Anti-Communism and Resisting Russia contained eight chapters and about 40,000 words. It pointed out firstly Soviet Russia's aggressive tradition and explained the special features of the ROC's anti-Communist war, and then finally declared "that traitors are destined to be exterminated; that the anti-Communist war is to win; that aggression is to fall; and the deed of resisting Russia ought to succeed".¹

In 1957, Chiang published Soviet Russia in China, which was said to be based on his 30 years of bitter anti-Communist

experience. The book, originally in Chinese, contained some 300,000 words and was divided into three parts. Its prime purpose was likewise to bring to the attention of the world the history of China's prolonged struggle against Russia's constant aggression as well as the basic strategy and operational outline of anti-Communist warfare. For instance, in the Introduction, Chiang said:

"In presenting this record to the public, though I am filled with mixed feelings, my confidence in the future of the Republic of China is absolutely unshaken. On the other hand, China is the first nation to taste the bitterness of 'coexistence' with Communists, and our experience of dealing with them is also the longest. Though we had a clear idea of the intrigues and subversive designs of International Communism, and though our anti-Communist policy was firm and clearcut, yet we failed to win the support of people at home or to enlist the sympathy of friendly powers abroad. We were thus condemned while we were on the mainland to reverses on the way and failure at the end."  

During the 1950s, Chiang constantly made the point that had it not been for the Russians, he would not have lost his "mandate", and that post-1949 Chinese history would have had to be rewritten. Six months after the publication of this book it had been translated into more than ten languages and reprinted several times to a total over 10 million copies. Such a massive publication was meant to alert the "Free World" and put it on guard against Communist movement.

In addition to these two books, Chiang made hundreds of speeches and messages, all on important occasions both at home and, through propaganda, abroad. The most popular

occasions for Chiang's anti-Russia speeches were his annual messages to the Chinese people on New Year's Day, National Day (10th October), Freedom Day (23rd January), Youth Day (29th March), and Constitution Day (25th December). Also popular were his addresses to, or "Answers to Questions" submitted by, the foreign press. Like his books, most of Chiang's speeches were devoted to "ideological exhortation", which described China's contemporary suffering caused by the Communist evil and the need to have it eliminated, and to the notion of "spiritual determinism" in that world interest would be better served by spreading the teaching of Sun's Three Principles of the People, and eliminating Communist ideology.

The foregoing may serve to explain Chiang's (personal) resentment against Communism and his determination to destroy both the Chinese and Russian Communists during the 1950s. Nevertheless, when the Soviets were no longer America's number one enemy, and when the Soviets were no longer on good terms with the Chinese "brothers" on the mainland, Chiang's attitudes altered accordingly, for: (1) the promise of fighting together with the U.S. and the "Free World" against the "common enemy" of Communism was gradually diminishing, and (2) the ROC could play a "Russian card".

1. Most of these speeches are compiled in the China Yearbook (Taipei: China Publishing Co., annually).
The evidence of the ROC's intention to promote a link with the Soviet Union could be found in a few newspaper editorials. The Nationalist government never declared such an intention in any official sources. In fact, it was still taboo to talk about this "Soviet option" openly. Nevertheless, one needs to realize that, at this time in Taiwan, almost all the press and the mass media were (and still are, although in a slightly more relaxed manner) under government censorship. Hence any publications containing these sorts of articles could be regarded as the "correct" expression of the government position, and this will be the information on which this study of Soviet option is based.

For instance, in 1963, one editorial in an evening newspaper remarked that the two Communist powers were definitely split and that there was even the possibility of an outbreak of war between the two. It then suggested that perhaps the Russians really were prepared to compromise with the "Free World" and it implied that just as the U.S. might now be planning to ally with Russia against the Chinese Communists so, likewise, the Nationalist government should lose no time in taking advantage of this new situation. Also,

1. Editorial in Ta-hua wan pao, 7th January 1963. It said: "The Moscow-Peiping split has made international relations so complicated and difficult that our traditional view of the world situation will be no longer applicable to the changes to come. What is more important to us is that the United States and the West have already begun to study the possibility of allying with Russia against the Chinese Reds. If Khrushchev should repeatedly give in as he did in the Cuban crisis, the possibility could be translated into reality. To meet the great change satisfactorily, we must ourselves be well prepared and should not remain hard-headed."
"In the future, we must make a new appraisal of international relations since the policy of the U.S. and other democracies definitely will be affected by this new factor (i.e. the Sino-Soviet split). Although we are not yet able to decide how to make use of this new situation, we must not overlook its importance." 1

And,

"If the 'Free World' were to take advantage of this 'major development'...the U.S. should strive for a temporary compromise with the right-wing of the international Communist bloc while concentrating its force to deal blows against the left-wing Communists." 2

Accordingly, the editorials recommended that the "Free World" should seek temporary friendship with the Soviet Union in order to isolate the Communist forces on the mainland. The message was that the policy of anti-Communism should now be redefined as "anti-Mao first and anti-Communist next". This was not because the ROC now assumed that Russian foreign policy had become harmless or less aggressive, or was now in tune with that of the "Free World", but because Communist China's war-mongering behaviour against the Soviet Union put the Russians and the "Free World" into a more or less similar situation.

"The Communists are used to the employment of the united front operation against the 'Free World'. We (i.e. the ROC and other democratic countries) may also use a united front operation against the same tactics of Communists. In doing so, we must

pool our strength to defeat the enemies one by one. If our temporary 'association' with the enemy should damage our solidarity, we would be trapped by the enemy's united front operation." 1

Even Chiang was said to have approved this plan of making use of the Sino-Soviet schism for a counterattack.2

In 1965, Chiang made an interesting remark. He said in the National Day Message that the Chinese Communists (and not the Soviet Union) were the chief offenders against world peace, although they were (including the Russians) the public enemies of all mankind.3 Here, for the first time Chiang introduced the accusation that now Chinese Communists were intent on stirring up a racial war, which would have to be anti-Soviet as well as anti-American. Chiang even referred to the nuclear tests of the Chinese Communists (in 1964) as a contravention of the spirit of the partial nuclear test ban treaty which had already been signed by many nations including the Soviet Union. By conducting their tests, the Chinese Communists were making a mockery of all those nations which were trying to restore sanity to the world; consequently, Chiang said, they stood condemned not only by the "Free World" but also by nations in the Communist bloc.4 Later on in 1967, then Premier Yen Chia-kan made the statement "those who are not our enemies (implying the Russians and other

Communist countries) are our friends", a position which clearly contradicted his government's previous assertion that "those who are not our friends are our enemies".¹

Conversely, the Soviet Union also made some "friendly" gestures. According to John W. Garver, there were three types of such actions which could be interpreted as possible Soviet intention to create a link-up with Taiwan. First, Soviet publications had intentionally printed the ROC flag on several occasions, for instance, in 1965 the magazine For the People of the World and in 1967 Newbooks, USSR.² These actions were taken by the PRC as tacit acceptance of the notion that "Taiwan is a separate country and not a province of China".³

Second, Taiwan was mentioned openly in the Soviet press as either a "country" or a "state". Here, John W. Garver provided three evidences: Taiwan was referred to as a "state" in two issues of the Soviet magazine Abroad in 1966 and in a Tass news item in 1967, and it was referred to as a "country" and as "the government of the Republic of China" in the early 1970 when the U.S. Vice-President Spiro Agnew was touring in Asia.⁴

Third, the Soviet Union had indicated intention to accept the notion of "two Chinas" in the United Nations, namely, it might support the admission of both the PRC and the ROC to the United Nations. This action was different from its previous position that admission of the PRC required the immediate

3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
removal of the Chiang Kai-shek delegates. In this connection, John W. Garver suggested two examples. One example was the Soviet representative's indirect suggestion in the 1967 U.N. General Assembly session that the solution of the China problem could be related to that of the German problem to admit both Germanies into the organization. Another example was a quotation of a U.S. official in Pravda in February 1969 which said "both Taiwan and Peking should be members of the U.N." 1

This informal rapprochement became more pronounced in the later 1960s and early 1970s. A crucial symbolic move was the visit by a Soviet journalist to Taiwan in October 1968. Victor Louis, Moscows correspondent for the Evening News published in London, paid the first visit by a Soviet citizen to Taiwan since 1949 and there was speculation that he also acted as an unofficial envoy of his government. There were reports that Louis had talks with Chiang Ching-kuo, then Defence Minister. 2 Concurrently with this Russian's unprecedented appearance in Taiwan, in May 1969, a member of the ROC's National Assembly and former Deputy Minister of

2. Harold Munthe-kass, "Rosy Glow", FEPR. LIV, 13 (3rd April 1969), p. 7. In 1969, Taiwan confirmed the fact that V. Louis had indeed visited Taipei the previous year and had held conversations with Chiang Ching-kuo, but it refused to confirm rumours that the journalist had returned to Taiwan several times since then. For more information about possible links between Taiwan and the Soviet Union, see also Ralph N. Clough, "The Soviet Option", in his Island China, pp. 168-170; and Chan Wai-wang, "What is the relationship between Taipei and Moscow", in his Hong Kong, Taipei, Peking: A Trilateral Relationship (Hong Kong: International Affairs College Press, December 1980).
Education, Professor Ku Yu-hsin, visited Moscow. It was also revealed that in June 1969, three Nationalist officials had visited a World Intergovernmental Conference on Tourism in Sofia, Bulgaria. Moreover, in 1969 and 1970, increasing informal contacts were said to have taken place between Soviet and ROC diplomatic personnel in Tokyo, Washington, and elsewhere.\footnote{John W. Garver, op.cit., p. 756.} Although the reasons for such exchanges have never been disclosed officially by either side and the Nationalist government has denied from time to time that they had any political implications, speculation continued on the possibility of a possible Soviet-ROC rapprochment, if only at a low level.

By and large, during the 1960s, the ROC had wanted to develop a rapport with the Soviet Union as one of its foreign policy options. However, it is still unknown whether the Soviet Union had the same calculation in mind, or whether Soviet "responses" were merely coincidence. By the end of the decade, a Soviet-ROC rapprochment had failed to materialize. (This theme however has been continued and expanded since 1971, and will be examined in Chapter Six.) In conclusion, a point to be made here is that however conciliatory the ROC's attitude might have been towards the Soviet Union, it never officially and entirely dropped its charges of the Soviet conspiracy towards China. Its approaches to the Soviet Union were very cautious and no direct formal ties were established at all during the 1960s.
(2) **Approaches to the newly independent countries**

After 1960, the Nationalist government began to approach the newly independent countries, mainly in Africa. It also paid more attention to improving relations with its neighbouring countries. The former can be understood as the ROC's foreign policy strategy of "foreign aid" or "agricultural diplomacy" which will be discussed in the next Chapter, whereas the latter can be considered as the strategy of the "pan-Asian movement" to which we will now turn.

(3) **The pan-Asian movement**

This movement was originally initiated by Sun Yat-sen who proposed that all the Asian countries in their search for a peaceful and prosperous Asia for the Asians should unite to fight against their "common" enemies. In a slight variation, Chiang Kai-shek's proposal for a pan-Asian movement was to arouse Asia's non- and anti-Communist countries' sentiment through a strengthening of their mutual understanding and cooperation (militarily, politically, economically, ideologically and culturally). Chiang's proposal was not only to win support from governments in Southeast Asia but also from the large number of overseas Chinese who lived there. Most of Chinese overseas lived in Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and Burma. Their support could be a decisive force in winning the Chinese civil war.

1. At that time, the common enemies were the imperialists.
(A) Relations with Chinese overseas

Sun Yat-sen frequently said: "Chinese overseas are the mother of our revolution".¹ As mentioned earlier in Chapter One, this was because Sun had depended substantially upon Chinese overseas for financial and moral support for the Chinese Revolution. Thus, with China now divided into two parts, the contest for the support, loyalty and patriotism of overseas Chinese has become an essential part of the national policies of the two Chinese governments.

The competition for the loyalty of overseas Chinese focused principally on Southeast Asia where more than 95 percent of the 20 to 24 million overseas Chinese live.² The importance of overseas Chinese, in addition to the above-mentioned contributions to their homeland, are manifold. First, they provide a valuable link between their host countries and the Chinese governments. In Southeast Asia, there was almost no fixed line between Communists and anti-Communists among overseas Chinese. Even governments in this region changed their political stance at times owing to the fluid political situation in the area. Generally speaking, countries in this region were rather unstable, with almost no local initiative or will to resist either Communist

¹. Kuomintang—Key to China's Future (Taipei, Department of Overseas Chinese Affairs, Central Committee of the Kuomintang, August 1970), p. 64.

influence or political changes. Under such circumstances overseas Chinese tended to align themselves, at least outwardly, with the diplomatic relations of the host country. As a result, until the 1970s, Taiwan was protected against more serious losses by the continuance of diplomatic relations with the ROC by most of Southeast Asia, and if diplomatic relations did not exist between the host countries and either of the two Chinese governments, overseas Chinese could be used as important middlemen for either trade or financial transactions. This was particularly true during the 1970s, because after 1971 Taiwan's survival depended more and more on foreign trade and industrial growth. Since the Nationalist government has been deprived of official channels for dealings with most foreign governments, friendly overseas Chinese were valuable not only as traders, investors, but also as go-betweens.

Secondly, overseas Chinese might serve as suitable go-betweens if talks between the two Chinese governments were contemplated. Thus, both governments have devoted substantial resources to the competition for the loyalty of overseas Chinese. But only a small fraction of them, at least so far, have been willing to involve themselves in the political struggles between the two Chinese governments. This was mainly because for the vast majority of overseas Chinese, their principal concern was to protect their interests and improve their livelihood in the host country. They were either not politically motivated or afraid to get involved. In this regard, it seemed rather unlikely that they would have a significant influence on its outcome. Nonetheless, their support, however minimal, did serve to give a psychological boost.
Thirdly, overseas Chinese had an economic function. Most of the overseas Chinese were businessmen or industrialists. In this respect, they were also potential investors. For years, overseas Chinese investment in Taiwan made an important contribution to the island's foreign trade development and economic growth. Their importance was only second after Taiwan's two major trading partners, the U.S. and Japan. Equally, the Chinese Communist government regarded the overseas Chinese as a potential source of enormous foreign exchange for China.

Finally, it has been suggested that some branches of the two Chinese governments, such as intelligence and propaganda agencies, attempted to use the overseas Chinese to gather information and to influence the politics and policies of local Southeast Asian countries. Nevertheless, even if this were so, these efforts were not effective because the majority of overseas Chinese were afraid of creating tension or hostility either between themselves and their countries of residence or between themselves and the local populace.

In all, the objectives of the Nationalist government's policies on overseas Chinese were to win the support of, and to unite, overseas Chinese, in particular in Southeast Asia, for the fight against Chinese Communists first and international Communists next, and for the struggle for the survival and restoration of Chinese Republic. The emphasis on overseas Chinese after 1949 can be contrasted with the vagueness of the Nationalist government in its policies on overseas Chinese during its rule on the mainland. In fact,
it did not then have any constructive policy at all. Chiang Kai-shek began to pay attention to overseas Chinese only after 1950, and on 18th October 1952, the ROC officially adopted policies for dealing with overseas Chinese affairs. Chiang’s position was indicated in his speech, "Defend our Fatherland". He said:

"My fellow countrymen in Malaya, the Philippines, Indo-China, Burma, Thailand and Indonesia! Abide by the laws and orders of the governments in the countries where you reside, and participate directly or indirectly in any work that will help resist Communism and save your country. Call attention of the people in the places where you live to the atrocities committed by the Communists in your own country and in your own home town and villages. Let them understand the significance of the anti-aggression war in which your country is now engaged, thereby promoting all solidarity among all democratic countries. Create a chance that will be of advantage to all of us, and prepare yourselves for the moment when you will be able to play your part in the coming offensive against the mainland and for the restoration of the country. The time of uncertainty furnishes a golden chance for all of us to fulfill a historic mission." 1

The ROC's overseas Chinese policies adopted at the 7th National Congress of the KMT, held on 18th October 1952, can be summarized as follows:

(a) Protect the rights and interests of the overseas Chinese, especially those living in countries which have recognized the Communist regime;

(b) Promote cooperation among the various overseas Chinese organizations so that they may be able to solve their own problems, develop their respective enterprises, and more effectively combat Communism and Soviet imperialism;

(c) Encourage education for overseas Chinese and promote cultural work among them. Also provide special facilities for young Chinese abroad who return to China (i.e. Taiwan) to study or work; and

(d) Give every possible assistance and facility to overseas Chinese who return home to undertake productive enterprises in the matter of importation, financing, remittance, electric power supply and technical skill. Also encourage them to come home to work and take up public office. 1

In addition, an Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission was set up to carry out the aforementioned decisions. The appeal to overseas Chinese became more pronounced during the 1960s when the whole of Southeast Asia was threatened by Communist infiltration and when people on the Chinese mainland were deeply disturbed by the Cultural Revolution.

Nevertheless, what deserves our attention here is that the Nationalist government, despite its appeals to overseas Chinese, has never made any particular effort to encourage large numbers of overseas Chinese to leave their (host) countries of residence and resettle in Taiwan. Apparently, this was and still is because of the population pressure already existing on the island.

(B) Relations with the Republic of Vietnam (RVN)

The ROC's relations with the RVN focused on trade and technical assistance, although on top of every thing was the Nationalists' political support for RVN's battle against Communism.

Until 1961, the ROC's relations with the RVN were hardly worth mentioning. It was the war in Vietnam and their common cause to resist Communism that brought the two countries together, and, because of the war, the RVN became

Taiwan's third most important export market (behind the U.S. and Japan) during the 1960s. For instance, in the spring of 1958, only one Chinese was sent from Taiwan to the RVN for a technical assistance programme, and, between 1956 to 1960, average trade was valued at S 3 million annually.\(^1\) In 1961, Taiwan's exports to the RVN, mainly light industrial, textile and construction materials, came to S12 million and this figure continued to increase in the following years. Paralleling the dispatch of 125 technicians in 1962, Taiwan's exports to the RVN had climbed to S22 million, S33 million in 1963, S38 million in 1964, and S41.5 million in 1965.\(^2\) It was apparent that the war had its effect upon Taiwan's trade, as in 1966 (possibly as a result of the escalation of the War) its exports rose to S89.7 million, or 16 percent of Taiwan's total export trade.\(^3\)

In fact Taiwan's trade to the RVN was almost one-way as between 1960 and 1966 RVN exports were only approximately S1 million annually. In this regard, it is necessary to point out that, although the RVN had become an important export market for Taiwan, it was the U.S. who actually assisted the RVN to purchase goods from Taiwan. Nevertheless, technical cooperation was mutually beneficial. About 250 Chinese came from Taiwan to work in transport (especially air services), civil engineering (construction materials),

1. CDN, 22nd August 1966, p. 1; see also M. Gurtov, "Recent Developments on Formosa", The China Quarterly, No. 31 (July-September 1967), p. 53.
2. The China Post, 5th July 1966, p. 6; see also M. Gurtov, ibid.
3. See M. Gurtov, ibid.
industry and trade: in exchange about 6,000 Vietnamese visited Taiwan for special training in the sugar industry, electric power, electronics, agriculture, education, etc.¹

As noted earlier, Taiwan also offered to assist the RVN with war-related aid (such as troops), but this offer was rejected. Consequently, the Nationalist government assisted the RVN only indirectly through offering to the U.S. some air transit facilities in Taiwan. Meanwhile, it provided a military advisory group and a medical team to the RVN, and it accentuated its anti-Communist propaganda so as to encourage the Vietnamese soldiers' morale and the "spiritual cooperation" between the two countries.

(C) Relations with the Philippines

The Nationalist government approached the Philippines, hoping that a minimum offer of technical assistance would help to cement ties between the two countries and the latter's anti-Communist fervour. The Philippines were considered a useful friend to the ROC in that they had a security pact with the U.S., that they were anti-Communist, and that they had a large number of overseas Chinese. Otherwise, at this stage, the ROC had rather limited trade and technical know-how exchange with the Philippines. In 1966, for instance, the ROC sent 7 experts to help Philippino farmers increase rice and corn production and to establish model farms;² in the same year, Philippine exports to Taiwan exceeded imports by $6 million in a total trade of only $23.4 million.³

1. CDN, 22nd August 1966, p. 1; see also M. Gurtov, ibid.
2. CDN, 3rd July 1966, p. 3; see also the China Yearbook, 1966-67, p. 193.
Apparently the ROC was willing to accept the shorter end of the deal so long as Manila remained anti-Communist.

(D) Relations with the Republic of Korea (ROK)

As noted in Chapter One, "China" and "Korea" were historically brotherly nations--Korea used to be one of the "Middle Kingdom's" tributaries. Now with these two countries politically and ideologically divided, and physically under the threat of Communist aggression, the ROC and the ROK felt that they had only too much in common. Besides, the ROC still had a vivid memory concerning the significance of the Korean War in its survival struggle.

On 27th November 1964, the two countries signed a treaty which called for closer economic political and military cooperation. As a result, frequent high-level contacts took place through a series of exchange visits. The two most important visits were the ROK President Park Chung-hee's state visit to Taiwan in February 1966 and, in return, a visit by Chiang Ching-kuo, then Defence Minister, to the ROK in the following April.¹ The outcomes of these exchanges included an agreement to assist the RVN so as to restore peace and social order in that country, to protect other Asian countries from Communist influence, and to assist each other if a common enemy were to attack. Also mentioned during the meetings were the issues of broadening their mutual economic, cultural and scholarly exchanges, and trade relations such as removing trade barriers, and of solving economic problems without direct U.S. involvement.²

(E) **Relations with Japan**

Japan was an exceptional case in the ROC's diplomatic history. This was not only because Japan had a colonial relationship with Taiwan and had fought an 8-year bloody war with the Nationalist government, but also because Japan was neither a very strongly anti-Communist country nor a Communist sympathizer. Moreover, its post-War foreign policy line was predominantly concerned with economics. Thus, although in appearance Japan supported the ROC's position during this period and had extensive trade relations with it, in reality, Japan also conducted trade relations with the Communist mainland.

Japan's two-pronged "China" policy put Taiwan in an awkward position, because on the one hand, it could not afford to lose Japan as a powerful political supporter and a potential trading partner in Asia; on the other hand, Japan's continued relations with the two Chinese governments conflicted with the ROC's insistence on the "one China" principle. One of the fundamental conditions of this principle was a clear division between "friend" and "foe", which could be made according to the following criteria put forward by a newspaper editorial in 1966:

"Opposing the Communists and recovering the Mainland constitute the basic national policy of the Republic of China. Any nation which, by its actions, helps or does not hinder our basic national policy is our friend; those acting to the contrary are not our friends. We use this standard to distinguish friend from foe, and our attitude is thus clear." ¹

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Accordingly, Japan's "two separate channels"—one with the ROC and the other one with the PRC—constituted a violation of this friend-and-foe dichotomy. Nevertheless, the ROC remained quiet on this matter. In this respect, the ROC's attitude can be considered as rather tolerant and flexible. A fuller description of the ROC's relations with Japan will be given in Chapter Six.

In addition to the above, the ROC approached other non-Communist (but not necessarily anti-Communist) countries in Asia, such as Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia (all of them had a large number of overseas Chinese), Australia and New Zealand. But no substantial results in terms of political, security or economic agreement came about. It can be argued that perhaps the Nationalist government did not work hard enough to convince these countries; or perhaps, it was difficult for the ROC to get access to them due to their individual attitudes; or perhaps, ROC's friendly gestures were not appreciated. Nonetheless, in all, during the 1960s, the ROC was indeed more active in pursuing a better relations with its neighbouring countries.

IV. Conclusion

To sum up, ROC's foreign policy was not entirely static and unrealistic. The 1960s had witnessed both changes and continuities in its policy for survival and in its external relations. What could be changed and where compromises had been made had been over those issues concerning the ideology of anti-
Communism, and what could not be changed had been the power struggle between the two Chinese governments. Consequently, when the 1960s came to an end, the ROC's new foreign policy strategy of political counterattack showed both strengths and weaknesses in coping with the issue of national survival. The strengths were that the political strategy allowed the Nationalist government to concentrate more energy on its internal development and, with less military expenditure, to conduct an active foreign aid policy. In this respect, the strategy had also effectively safeguarded the status quo inside Taiwan and along the Taiwan Straits. However, the weaknesses of the strategy were its limited success in countering the increasing influence of Communist China in international politics, as well as in ensuring continued U.S. support. In this regard, the ROC failed to secure its right to membership in the U.N., as well as its international status. Concomitantly, its objective to isolate Peking internationally was also unsuccessful.
Chapter Five

The Strategy of Foreign Aid

I. Introduction

The ROC's strategy of foreign aid was developed during the 1960s as an adjunct of its overall political strategy with the aim of countering Peking's pending application for U.N. membership. The targets were the newly emerging countries in Africa. The ROC's foreign aid programme also reached other areas such as Southeast Asia and Latin America, but in terms of priority and the volume of aid during the 1960s, Africa was the most important.¹

In this Chapter, we will introduce the ROC's aid relations with Africa, that is, the motivations, objectives, and tactics involved in these relations. Our purpose is to find out the effectiveness of such aid, namely, how far did it protect the ROC's membership of the U.N. and prevent Peking's admission? In all, it proposes to look at the instrumental value of the ROC's aid strategy in the promotion of its foreign policy objectives. Also to be included in our study are a general understanding of the so-called politics of "foreign aid", a brief background on the ROC's legitimacy struggle in the U.N., and the role of the newly independent

1. In Southeast Asia, ROC development assistance programmes reached Vietnam, the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia. In Latin America, they included the Dominican Republic, Brazil, Chile, Panama, Peru, and many others. ROC programmes were conducted either unilaterally or through some sort of joint venture. For detailed information, see "Tables of Development Assistance", in Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China, 1979 (Taipei: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, 1980), pp. 504-508.
countries in international politics. To do this, however, we will also touch upon the role of the PRC in Africa.

1. The politics of "foreign aid": aid as an instrument of foreign policy

Philip Babcock Grove defines foreign aid as "economic or other assistance provided by one nation to another especially as a tool in molding opinion in the recipient nation". In a slightly different manner, Jess Stein defines foreign aid as "government assistance, usually on a large scale, from a great power to a war-devastated or underdeveloped nation, consisting of economic, technical, or military aid, given primarily in the form of monetary or material grants or financial loans, for purposes of relief and rehabilitation, for economic stabilization, or for mutual defense". Put together, foreign aid can be regarded as actions taken by people or institutions in one country towards people or institutions in another country, which help, or are at least intended to help the latter. It is a form of transfer of resources from the "have", the "developed", or the "richer" countries to those "have not", "less-developed", or "poorer" countries.

3. Foreign aid also takes place on the international level. For instance, international bodies like the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the specialized agencies of the United Nations, e.g. UNESCO, have been set up to provide aid or deal with matters relating to aid activities.
This phenomenon of foreign aid gradually became an important aspect of international relations during the Cold War period of the 1950s when a large number of economic assistance plans and security pacts were set up by the two Superpowers, i.e. the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

In the immediate post-War period, U.S. aid was largely granted to repair war damage and to support economic reconstruction, such as the Marshall Plan to Western Europe. In 1949, however, the first major post-War programme of military assistance, the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, was passed by the U.S. Congress to provide military aid to the Western European countries that had become members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Under this Act such aid could also be made available to non-member countries. From the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, however, the lines between different kinds of aid were blurred, and defence became the umbrella for most forms of U.S. foreign assistance. Meanwhile, although military aid continues to be provided, with few exceptions, on a grant basis, U.S. aid for economic development has increasingly taken the form of loans. The geography of U.S. aid distribution has also changed. From the end of World War II until the middle 1950s, Europe, receiving 75% of all U.S. aid, was the first aid priority of the U.S. With the implementation of the Marshall Plan which eliminated the need for aid to Europe, the U.S. began to channel an increasing share of foreign aid to the underdeveloped countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America. As a matter of fact, the main reason for this growing U.S. concern for the underdeveloped world was that
the latter, in particular the African continent after the process of decolonization, had gradually become an area of competition between itself and the Soviet Union. In other words, the underdeveloped world had become the focus of East-West confrontation. The reasons for the growing importance of the African countries in international politics will be dealt with later.

In the early 1950s, the Soviet Union, followed by other Communist bloc countries, already began a programme of technical and economic aid to the underdeveloped countries for reasons just mentioned above. Thus, its original objectives were to expel western influence in the underdeveloped world and to replace it with Soviet influence and presence there. Nevertheless, during the 1960s, when the Sino-Soviet split became a reality, Soviet objectives in the underdeveloped world expanded. That is, it sought not only to destroy western leverage and influence in the underdeveloped world, but also to check Communist China's bid for a leadership role there.¹

The PRC embarked on a foreign aid programme officially in 1953 and, since then, has used foreign economic assistance as an important tool of diplomacy. Nevertheless, the PRC has used foreign aid as an instrument of its foreign policy

slightly differently from the two Superpowers. In this regard, John Franklin Copper has given an almost complete description. He said:

"Mao found that foreign aid was a useful tool of foreign policy for a variety of reasons. It was a way of competing with the Western 'imperialists' without risking nuclear war. Later this applied to the Soviet Union as well. Aid-giving allowed Peking to relate to a number of Asian countries as it had prior to the era of Western imperialism. Also China's economic aid made it possible for Chinese leaders to embarrass the richer countries and maintain an attitude of moral superiority—which in the past was a Chinese custom in dealing with foreigners. Frequently aid-giving served as a convenient means for Mao to manipulate, or further, revolutionary movements or wars of national liberation that China, because of its strong anti-status-quo feelings, but weaker capabilities, found compatible with its own views of the world. Chinese leaders also discovered that many of the underdeveloped countries were dissatisfied with Western aid, and many were disappointed equally with Soviet efforts in the realm. They were receptive to Chinese aid, China found diplomatic recognition difficult to attain in an arena of world politics dominated by a United States' effort, and later a Soviet effort as well, to keep China isolated. A little aid often paved the way for better relations, including eventually diplomatic recognition." 1

The only objective to be added to this list was that of eliminating Taiwan's chance to win friendship and support in the underdeveloped world. Since its inception, Communist China's aid had reached Communist bloc countries, non-Communist Asian countries, Middle East countries, and African countries.

Thus, in the immediate post-War period and during the 1950s, foreign aid was largely the preserve of the developed

countries. Nevertheless, during the 1960s, an unusual phenomenon occurred. In addition to the aforementioned case of the PRC, some countries, themselves still developing and in great need of assistance from others, also began to undertake foreign aid. Taiwan was one of these countries; on one hand, it still required U.S. material and military support, and yet, on the other hand, it took steps to "penetrate" Africa. (The motivation for Taiwan's aid to Africa will be introduced shortly.) Other instances were Israel, Yugoslavia, Tunisia, etc. All of them were less developed countries in comparison to the Superpowers and yet, for varying political reasons, all became involved in aid activities abroad. D.V. Segre described these countries as the "marginal states" since they were located at the periphery of large ideological "empires" and that they constantly felt the threat of either war or elimination. "For marginal countries of this type", D.V. Segre maintained, "to engage in aid activities means, first and foremost, an attempt to transform the liability of their being a border state into an asset. This is particularly true when the situation of marginality is not a temporary one but is permanent and rooted in history." As far as Taiwan was concerned, its foreign aid programme to Africa was initiated to try to ensure their recipient states supported its claim for legitimacy at the U.N.

1. Besides these two Superpowers, there were other donor countries such as Great Britain, France, Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and some of the countries of Eastern and Western Europe. Nevertheless for the purpose of this study, we will not include them here.

2. The "China Issue" at the United Nations

According to Article 23(1) of the U.N. Charter, the "Republic of China" was one of the founders of the United Nations, and one of the five permanent members of the Security Council. There probably would not have been a "China Issue" in the United Nations if the ROC had either won the Chinese civil war or had been totally defeated. Instead, the ROC lost most of China but retained the island of Taiwan, and thus survived as a functioning government for millions of Chinese, rather than as a powerless government in exile on foreign soil. Although this division of China between two governments had rough parallels in Germany, Korea, and Vietnam, none of those countries had been United Nations members before the division. The partition of China therefore created a unique dilemma: not whether "China" should be admitted to the United Nations, but which government—the Nationalist Republic on Taiwan or the Communist People's Republic on the mainland—was entitled to represent China in the United Nations. Thus, from 1949 until October 1971, a vote was taken almost every year in the General Assembly on the question of which government should be the "rightful" representative of China. At first, during the 1950s, the dispute was dominated by two opposing forces: the majority pro-Taiwan, anti-Mainland group, which was sponsored by the U.S. and its western allies;


2. The same issue was debated in other United Nations agencies, for instance, the FAO, UNESCO, and WHO, etc.
and the minority pro-Mainland, anti-Taiwan group, backed by the Soviet Union and its Communist associates. (Communist China's application for membership was made on the express condition that Taiwan be expelled from the Organization.)

Thanks to the U.S. "moratorium" device which called for postponement of all debate on the China Issue, this power relationship was more or less stable at the U.N. during the 1950s, so Taiwan was assured of a comfortable majority. Nevertheless, after 1960, when a large number of new African and Asian countries had been admitted into the U.N., this power relationship was upset by the fact that the number of countries favouring Communist China's admission increased every year. The U.S. then retreated to a procedural defence of Taiwan's position. From 1961 onwards, the U.S. and a group of allies (Australia, Colombia, Italy and Japan) annually submitted a resolution making any proposal to change the representation of China an "Important Question", that is, one which (under Article 18 of the U.N. Charter) required a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly for approval. In other words, while the moratorium

1. From 1951 until 1955, the moratorium resolution was approved by at least a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly. In 1956 it gained only 59 percent of the votes; thereafter, the percentage dropped steadily to a low point of 42 percent in 1960, well below a simple majority of total UN membership. The 1960 resolution was adopted only because 23 countries abstained, leaving a margin of 42 votes in favour, 32 opposed. Fourteen of the 23 abstentions were by new African members. For a more detailed description of the votes on the moratorium resolution 1951-1960, see Sheldon Appleton, The Eternal Triangle? Communist China, the United States and the United Nations (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1961), pp. 7-10.

2. The General Assembly approved the U.S. proposal—the 1960 5-power resolution 1668 (XVI)—by 61 votes to 34, with 7 abstentions. GAOR, 16th Session, II, 1080th Plenary Meeting, 15th December 1961, pp. 1068-1069; and UN Yearbook 1961, pp. 128-129.
resolutions of 1951-1960 postponed a direct vote on the question of replacing Taipei with Peking, the important question resolutions of 1961-1971 permitted a direct vote annually on this question (i.e. the proposal of seating the PRC and ousting Taiwan), but required a two-thirds majority on it. Thus, as long as the U.S. could muster a simple majority for the first vote (i.e. the "Important Question" Resolution), it could then block the PRC by mustering one-third plus one votes on the second (i.e. the Proposal of "Seating the PRC and Ousting Taiwan"). (For texts of the Resolution and the Proposal, see Appendix No. 1.)

Nevertheless, this delaying tactic to prevent the seating of the PRC in the U.N. also gradually became less effective as the U.S. found it more and more difficult to obtain majority support. As a matter of fact, as noted in Chapter Four, towards the end of 1960s, the U.S. was in any case less enthusiastic about supporting Taiwan's cause. As a consequence of this, the PRC became increasingly popular in the U.N. at Taiwan's expense. It is this that explained Taiwan's need to intensify its diplomatic efforts in African and other newly independent countries so as to win their voting support at the U.N.

However, the tide of pro-Peking votes receded in 1966, 1967, and 1968. This probably was due less to the ROC's efforts

1. In the first 3 years of the "Important Question" strategy (1961-63), the ROC actually gained ground in the voting on the pro-Peking resolution. This was why there were no votings on the "Important Question" resolution in 1962 and 1963. There was no vote in 1964 because of financial crisis in the U.N., but the 1965 vote alarmed the ROC; for the first time, Peking received as many votes as Taipei (47 for, 47 against and 23 abstentions). See Appendix No. 2.
than to the PRC's preoccupation with its Cultural Revolution. As soon as Peking renewed its diplomatic efforts after the Cultural Revolution ended in mid-1969, the voting trend was again reversed in favour of the PRC. In 1970, for the first time, Peking received more votes than Taipei, although not a majority, because of 27 absententions (including 1 absent and 1 not participating). In the 1971 voting, Peking at last received a majority of the votes (58 percent). Although not a two-thirds majority, this was sufficient to decide the issue, because the "Important Question" resolution was for the first time defeated by 59 votes to 55, with 15 abstentions.¹ After the rejection of this resolution, and before the vote on the pro-Peking resolution, ROC Foreign Minister Chou Shu-kai, in view of the then critical situation, decided to withdraw. Without the presence of the ROC delegation, the General Assembly then adopted the pro-Peking resolution by 76 votes to 35, with 17 abstentions and 2 absent.² Hence the so-called "China Issue" on which the United Nations voted in 21 years had finally come to an end. Also ended was the ROC's relations with the United Nations. On 26th October 1971, the PRC delegation declared its entry into the United Nations. Shortly afterwards, Chou Shu-kai issued an official statement declaring that the ROC "has now decided to withdraw from the organization which it helped establish" 26 years before.³

3. For full text of Chou's statement, see Asian Outlook (Taipei), VI, 11 (November 1971), pp. 9-11.
3. The role of African states at the United Nations and their connection with the "China Issue"

When the China Issue first came up for debate at the U.N. in 1950, the African countries as a whole were not at all a significant force in the Organization. At that time, there were only four of them—Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, and South Africa—in the U.N., accounting for only 6.8 percent of the total U.N. vote (see Table No. 2).\(^1\) The rest of the continent was split up under European rule. Even among these four states, there was no diplomatic cohesion. As one author put it: "Africa did not constitute an important identity and was not a force to reckon with."\(^2\) Indeed, on the basis of U.N.'s "one state one vote" rule in the General Assembly, the African continent had no effective weight on the China Issue during the 1950s in terms of its voting strength.

Nevertheless after 1960, when the number of African states began to increase in the U.N., their importance increased correspondingly. Not only did they constitute a much larger bloc of votes, but also, as a direct consequence, they could

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1. All of them were original members of the U.N. Egypt obtained independence on 28th February 1922. The others, Ethiopia, Liberia and South Africa, on 5th May 1941, 26th July 1847 and 31st May 1910 respectively. Egypt represents an unusual case. Egypt and Syria were both original members of the U.N. from 24th October 1945. Following a plebiscite on 21st February 1958, the United Arab Republic (UAR) was established by a union of Egypt and Syria and continued as a single member. On 13th October 1961, Syria resumed its original status as an independent State and simultaneously its U.N. membership. On 2nd September 1971, the UAR changed its name to Arab Republic of Egypt. Since Syria is not geographically in Africa, our study will not include it.

| Year | '50 | '51 | '52 | '53 | '54 | '55 | '56 | '57 | '58 | '59 | '60 | '61 | '62 | '63 | '64 | '65 | '66 | '67 | '68 | '69 | '70 | '71 |
|------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Total UN Members | 59 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 79 | 82 | 81 | 82 | 98 | 104 | 110 | 111 | 115 | 117 | 121 | 122 | 126 | 126 | 127 | 131 |
| African Members | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 8 | 9 | 9 | 10 | 26 | 29 | 33 | 34 | 36 | 37 | 39 | 39 | 42 | 42 | 42 |
| African mems. as % of tot. | 6.8 | 6.7 | 6.7 | 6.7 | 6.7 | 6.7 | 10.1 | 11.1 | 11.1 | 12.2 | 26.5 | 27.9 | 30.0 | 30.6 | 31.3 | 31.6 | 32.1 | 32.0 | 33.3 | 33.3 | 33.1 | 32.1 |

Sources for the construction of this table:


* These were changes of status between Egypt and Syria in 1958, 1961 and 1971. For more details see footnote No. 1, p. 280.

+ Tanganyika was a U.N. member from 14th December 1961; Zanzibar was a member from 16th December 1963. Following the ratification on 26th April 1964 of Articles of Union between these units, the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar continued as a single member, changing its name to United Republic of Tanzania on 1st November 1964.
### TABLE NO. 2: African States as a Proportion of the Total

**United Nations Members, 1950-1971**

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Sources for the construction of this table:


* These were changes of status between Egypt and Syria in 1958, 1961 and 1971. For more details see footnote No. 1, p. 280.

+ Tanganyika was a U.N. member from 14th December 1961; Zanzibar was a member from 16th December 1963. Following the ratification on 26th April 1964 of Articles of Union between these units, the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar continued as a single member, changing its name to United Republic of Tanzania on 1st November 1964.
press for influence in the voting patterns in the U.N. This is because, after de-colonization, the newly independent states felt the need to assert their new national identity. Most of them therefore adopted the "non-aligned" stance as the political philosophy for their foreign policy, i.e. avoiding commitment to either camp of the Cold War antagonists. In doing this, however, African countries often used their non-alignment for political bargaining. For instance, African countries attempted, sometimes successfully, to influence U.N. voting on various issues through voting as a bloc--for, or against, or abstention. Another point with regard to African countries' foreign policy was that, as a consequence of a prolonged colonial history, most of them had had relatively little experience in diplomatic practice. Thus, despite their position of non-alignment, during the initial period of participation in U.N. voting on the China Issue they tended to abstain from voting. In 1960 more than half (14) of the total African voters (26) preferred to abstain. On the other hand, their votes were sometimes based on their previous "colonial connection". That is, they tended to relate themselves either with the French or with the British. An example of this can be found in the 1964-1965 U.N. voting results when some of previous French colonies changed their voting patterns because of France's new China policy. This "French connection" will be dealt with again in due course.

Even so, however, the African countries were divided among themselves. Roughly speaking, judging from their voting

1. See Appendix No. 2.
patterns on the China Issue, they could be divided into three main categories. Category A were those African countries that always voted for or at least never against Taiwan (hence against Communist China's admission). Category B were the states that always voted against, or at least never, for Taiwan (hence always for Communist China's admission). Category C were the states that were inconsistent in their support. They switched their votes from either of the claimants as they saw fit, or abstained from voting. Further elaboration of these groups and the effect of their voting upon the China Issue will be given later in this Chapter.

The foregoing suggests the complication and fluidity which the newly independent African states had introduced to power relations in the U.N. With the number of African states increased by more than ten times in 1971 compared to 1950, and constituting 32.1% of the total U.N. members in 1971 (see Table No. 2), Taiwan and its main supporter, the U.S., faced more problems in mustering a simple majority. In other words, African states constituted the gap between the solid Taiwan supporters of the 1950's in Western Europe and Latin America and the majority needed to keep the China Issue as "Important Question" in the 1960's. Here lay therefore the importance of the African countries, either individually or collectively, in that they could deliberately and easily upset the U.N. power pattern, hence influence the voting outcomes, not because of their national capabilities, but because of their numbers. In this regard, the connection of the African countries with the China Issue in the U.N. was thus established.
II. Foreign aid as the ROC's foreign policy strategy

1. The role of the government

As mentioned earlier, foreign aid is generally conducted either through governmental or international channels, but some is also conducted through private channels. In many countries, international technical cooperation, as one aspect of foreign aid, is mostly reserved for the private sector. However, the case of Taiwan is different. The government in Taiwan is generally involved in most of the economic and technical activities and this includes "international technical cooperation". To understand this, we need to emphasize a few points about Taiwan's economy under Nationalist rule after 1949.

The Principle of People's Livelihood suggested that China's economic system should assume a mixed character in which private industry and state-owned enterprises would complement each other. Thus, in Taiwan, the government involves itself in many large projects. Typical examples of such governmental activity are to be found in energy, water control and irrigation; large-scale agricultural production and processing of sugar; telegraph, telephone and radio communications, transportation, and many others. These activities are usually organized under large and well-staffed corporations which normally develop with full governmental support and without problems of competition.

1. See Chapter Two, "Principle of People's Livelihood".
To some extent, this can provide automatic access for the government to the best quality technical personnel and expertise for any and all of its purposes, including the planning and operation of international technical cooperation programmes. Furthermore, it can be argued, such an arrangement serves political purposes too. That is, internally, it enables the government to control such corporations indirectly but effectively (as noted in Chapter One, it also helps to legitimize Nationalist authority on Taiwan island); externally, where no diplomatic relations exist between Taiwan and the foreign country requiring such work (which is often the case), the necessary agreements relating to the conduct of the work can be negotiated between the foreign governments involved and one of these "private" corporations in Taiwan. Corporation representatives, therefore, instead of official diplomats from Taiwan, can negotiate the necessary agreements, finance the work, recruit the personnel from their own ranks, train them, and, in fact, operate the entire technical cooperation project in the foreign country involved, under the legal fiction that no actual inter-governmental relationships are involved. This convenient device has been widely used by the government in Taiwan since the need to "open" a dialogue with the non-aligned African countries became urgent during the 1960s. The utilization of this tactic developed further after 1971--this will be discussed again in Chapter Six--when Taiwan's diplomatic life deteriorated. This explains why Taiwan wanted and was able to undertake the aid strategy without revealing too explicitly its real political motivation, and hence without encouraging too much resistance from the
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recipients. Here, we only need to take a very brief look at the administrative and organizational aspects of Taiwan's international technical cooperation, for example, the "Operation Vanguard" project—a code name given by the Nationalist government in referring to its aid to Africa—to understand that the over-all policy direction of the programme actually centred in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.¹

In Taiwan, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has primary responsibility for the making of general policy in this field. The responsibility includes the development of any project for technical cooperation with foreign countries, the carrying through of the negotiations, the formalization of agreements with the individual countries involved, and the overall administration of the projects in the countries themselves. This is not only because the private sectors are less interested in making such long-term projects, but also more importantly, they are actually not financially capable of it. On the other hand, however, it is difficult for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs alone to play a leading role in working out and implementing such technical expertise

¹ Initially the Nationalist government thought to call the project "Operation Safari", but in January, 1961, it was given the name "Hsien-feng-an", i.e. "Operation Vanguard", an English name proposed by Yang Hsi-k'un, the major architect of the aid project. Chung-Fei chi-shu ho-tso (hsien-feng-an) ti yang-chi yu fa-chan (Sino-African technical cooperation--"Operation Vanguard"--its origins and development), (hereafter referred to as Hsien-feng-an) (Taipei, 1975), pp. 2-3.
required.\textsuperscript{1} Thus, the Sino-African Technical Cooperation Committee (SATCC) was specially set up in 1961 in Taiwan to assist with projects in Africa. On this Committee were represented all the various elements of the government of Taiwan which were likely to be involved with the work. Here the actual coordination could take place between major elements of the government, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of National Defence, the Council for International Economic Cooperation and Development, the Sino-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR),\textsuperscript{2} and the Taiwan Provincial Government's Department of Agriculture and Forestry. The SATCC is still in function today although its significance has declined considerably since 1971.

\textsuperscript{1} Interview with Yang Hsi-k'un on 21st May 1979. Yang was then Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, also Director of the Department of Western Asian Affairs. Yang had been the ROC's delegate to the U.N.; a member of the U.N. Visiting Mission to West Africa Trust Territories in 1963; a member of the Goodwill Mission to West and East Asia in 1971. In Taiwan, Yang is a leading expert on African affairs. He had personally conducted more than 10 ROC goodwill missions to Africa during the 1960s.

\textsuperscript{2} JCRR—Joint Commission of Rural Reconstruction—is an institution originally set up by the U.S. and the Nationalist government during the early 1950s to help Taiwan's economic construction. Nevertheless, it also covered a wide range of activities other than economic promotion. For more information on JCRR, see China Yearbook, 1965-66, pp. 320-338; also Neil H. Jacoby, U.S. Aid to Taiwan (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1966).
2. The "Operation Vanguard" project: motives and objectives

Operation Vanguard project began in January 1961. Its declared motivation was humanitarian. However, there should be little doubt that its real aim was essentially political and to a lesser extent economic.

From the humanitarian point of view, the decision to offer aid to Africa stemmed from Sun Yat-sen's ambition that the "wang tao" spirit of China, "having achieved its own national independence and freedom should also 'rescue the weak and lift up the fallen'". According to the Nationalists: "Our own anti-colonial tradition stemming from bitter experience with foreign encroachment during the Manchu period, is somewhat identical to the African aspirations. Thus, it is our 'divine obligation' to assist the Africans." In other words, as far as Taiwan was concerned, the Operation Vanguard project was just a "simple desire to assist friendly neighbours in developing agriculture and accelerating economic growth." It consisted of helping Africa's rural population

1. As a result of a series of meetings among government officials between late 1960 and early 1961, an Executive Committee for "Operation Vanguard" was founded in October 1961. However, "Operation Vanguard" proceeded rather rapidly after its first mission to Liberia and soon grew beyond the administrative capacity of its initial executive committee. To cope with the rapid development and to facilitate cooperation between its components, the Executive Committee was expanded and renamed the Sino-African Technical Cooperation Committee on 18th April 1962. Hsing-feng-an, p. 4.

2. See Chapter Two, pp. 110-111.


to "increase their agricultural production, to work to improve their lot and to build up their self-confidence through self-reliance."¹ The Nationalists therefore declared that the objectives of the Vanguard project were to:

(i) introduce Taiwan's agricultural technical know-how and experience to "friendly" countries,

(ii) assist the Africans in the training of farmers and agricultural technicians,

(iii) aid the Africans in agricultural extension work, and,

(iv) help the Africans to attain self-sufficiency in food production. ²

All these, they believed, would eventually lead to the realization of Sun's aspiration of a world of great commonwealth based upon universal independence, freedom and equality.

Nevertheless, whatever the motives and objectives were said to be, Taiwan's aid effort in Africa was also undoubtedly a manoeuvre to trade for more votes in the U.N. General Assembly which would protect Taiwan's position in this world organization as well as in the world in general. It was therefore designed to improve Taiwan's "marginal" status. Consequently, when Taiwan withdrew from the U.N. in 1971, its aid activities in Africa seemed to become less meaningful.

Thus, regardless of the claim of Yang Hsi-k'un,
the chief architect of the Vanguard project,\textsuperscript{1} that Taiwan's policy to Africa was "to be sympathetic with legitimate political aspirations of emerging countries; 'whenever possible' to give wholehearted support; and to welcome diplomatic contacts with as many African countries as desire them,"\textsuperscript{2} Taiwan's real intention was to solicit African votes and support.\textsuperscript{3} Indeed, by establishing a Taiwanese presence in Africa, however modest, Taiwan would have the opportunity to "tutor" the Africans in the horror of international Communism. Meanwhile, by furthering African economic development based on its own model, Taiwan could expect to discredit Chinese Communist blandishments of an "economic shortcut".\textsuperscript{4} These political and economic objectives need further elaboration.

In conjunction with the strategy of political counter-attack, the political objective of Taiwan's aid to Africa was to create Taiwan's presence and influence in the African continent (i.e. to create a good political image) as a peaceful method of counteracting Communist China's approach to Africa. In the view of the Nationalists, the emergence of the African countries offered Taiwan a challenge, and also potentially a problem, for its legitimacy struggle at the U.N. Since the PRC had already taken the initiative to develop relations with Africa in 1956 through the methods of aid and promises of technical cooperation, Taiwan could not

\textsuperscript{1} See footnotes no. 1, p. 286 and no. 1, p. 287.
\textsuperscript{3} Yawsoon Sim, "Taiwan and Africa", \textit{Africa Today}, XVIII, 3 (July, 1971), p. 7.
\textsuperscript{4} Ann P. Munro, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 7.
In this regard, Africa seemed to become an extension of the Chinese civil war "battlefield". George T. Yu, an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science, University of North Carolina, once described this phenomenon of "Chinese rivalry in Africa" as follows:

"Except for token artillery exchanges along the Fukien Coast today, the major theatre of conflict between the Chinese Communists and the Chinese Nationalists has been transferred from China soil onto foreign territory. The world now provides the arena in which these two contenders compete for supremacy. The Middle East, Latin America, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and other regions have all experienced Chinese competition, but nowhere has the rivalry become more intense than in Africa." 2

This helps to explain the political motivation behind Taiwan's aid activity in Africa. Indeed, as far as Taiwan's interests were concerned, it would call for immediate and intensive efforts to develop diplomatic relations with Africa. However, our next concern, before dealing with the realization of its

1. The PRC entered Africa in 1956, four years earlier than the ROC. Its aid activities covered more than 30 African countries until the end of 1979. The programme also spread to other Asian and Communist countries. The nature of the PRC's aid was different from that of the ROC's. As will be seen in this study, in addition to railroad construction projects (for example, the Tanzania-Zambia railroad project, etc.) and more sophisticated military support (for example, to Ghana, North Vietnam, Cambodia and Pakistani guerrillas), the PRC also granted interest-free loans (for example, to Albania, Romania, Pakistan, etc.). See John F. Copper, op.cit.

political objectives, will be: How did Taiwan approach the Africans? The Chinese in Taiwan entered the African continent under the agricultural programme of Operation Vanguard. But why did Taiwan concentrate its aid effort on the agricultural aspect and its related fields? Could something else have been more effective than agriculture, requiring less time and effort to achieve concrete results, and hence appealing more to the Africans? All these questions are inter-related.

Taiwan's position was as follows. For those African countries who had obtained their political independence, the next immediate concern was to attain economic independence. Nonetheless, since they had only just thrown off their colonial status, any political actions, or even direct economic involvement, taken by a foreign country, would probably be suspected by the Africans of being political infiltration, or another face of imperialism. More importantly, direct economic cooperation with the African seemed premature at that stage since the latter could offer very little, except unskilled labour, uncultivated land and natural resources. In fact they were not yet ready for active, bilateral economic relations or intensive cooperation of any sort with the outside world. Consequently, the Nationalist government reached the conclusion that aid relations based on agriculture, less sensitive than formal political or economic relations, could be a proper and practical means of approaching the Africans. Moreover, foreign aid based on agricultural and technical assistance was less risky because, since foreign aid could be anything, and since it could be operated either officially or privately,
individually or collectively, it could therefore facilitate Taipei's entry onto the territory of its African recipients. Finally, foreign aid can be a long-term investment. The Nationalists hoped that "Africa would look to Taipei, not Peking for an economic development model".¹ Also, when the African economy reached the scale of self-sufficiency, it could perhaps provide Taiwan with valuable foreign markets.² Or, even more significantly, such economic interactions could perhaps promote a more solid political relationship.

Accordingly, the Vanguard project in Africa, emphasizing agriculture and related projects, was established. Nationalist officials further explained their position concerning the project by saying that: "in the field of agriculture its (Taiwan's) experience gained under difficult conditions in the past ten years would be of use to similar developing countries in Africa".³ The term "similar" referred to "small units" and "labour-intensive" types of farming because in Africa, as in Taiwan, labour was not a problem at all in itself.⁴

To sum up then, the primary objectives of the ROC's aid were to persuade African countries to vote for its claim to the

2. Interview with Yang Ksi-k'un on 21st May 1979 in Taipei. This however was a very long-term goal. Even until the end of 1979, the relationship was still basically one-way.
3. SATC, (August 1966), p. 2; also see footnote no. 2, p. 289.
4. The Nationalist government regarded "small unit" and "labour-intensive" as common features of both Taiwanese and African agricultural structures.
Chinese seat in the U.N. (i.e. to preserve the status quo in the U.N.), and to extend diplomatic recognition to the ROC. The secondary objective was economic investment in order to open up African markets for mutual commercial interests in the very long-run. Although the political motivation of this aid policy was not openly declared by the ROC, on one occasion, Yang Hsi-k'un was quoted as saying:

"Politically, while nationalism is roaring over Africa and it (Africa) is very vulnerable to the penetration of Communists, we offer our most painful experience from the aggression of international Communists and our most valuable experience in fighting them. We want to tell (Africans) about our experience so that our African friends can escape what we have suffered." 1

Also in another occasion, in 1962, Chou Shu-kai, then ROC's delegate to the 17th U.N. General Assembly meetings, declared: "the good results of the technical assistance programmes lead to the support of the African countries (for Taiwan) in the United Nations". 2

3. Measures to approach the Africans

The Nationalists initially believed that the vast majority of the new African countries entered the international community with little or no predetermined preference for either Taipei or Peking, and that therefore "they (the newly independent African countries) are likely to turn to those Chinese who first come to their attention". 3

1. See Yang Hsi-k'un, "Wo kuo tui fei-chou wai-chiao cheng-tse" (Our country's foreign policy toward Africa), CDN, (14th August 1960), p. 1; see also Ann P. Munro, op.cit., p. 7.
gaining their independence, almost every African country received immediately a message of congratulation from Taipei (also from Peking), together with an offer to extend diplomatic recognition and of establishing formal bilateral relations. Such gestures were expected by the Nationalist government to be reciprocal.

Following this, the ROC began to develop what is called "personal diplomacy", which operated on two levels. On one level, the ROC would dispatch numerous government leaders and official delegations as so-called "goodwill" or "survey" missions, to Africa. One of the first such missions, led by Yang Hsi-k'un, visited 11 African countries on one trip in 1960.1 At that time, Yang was the Director of the Western Asian Department, which was then in charge of all African affairs. But this Department was soon expanded to set up the SATCC to deal with the increasing demands of relations between the ROC and Africa. In 1962, Yang toured 14 African countries. The trend progressed until by the end of 1971, the ROC had in all conducted 87 such missions to 25 African countries. 2 In 1963, an African Affairs Department was especially established, independent of the Western Asian Department. This indicated the increasing importance of the African countries in the ROC's foreign relations.

The second level of "personal diplomacy" was to invite African leaders to Taiwan, to "see what they want to see". Several took advantage of the opportunity, including President Hubert Maga of Dahomey in 1962, President Hamani

2. See Appendix No. 3.
Diori of Niger in 1969, President Philbert Tsiranana of the Malagasy Republic in 1962, President Hastings Banda of Malawi in 1967, President Jean-Bedel Bokassa of the CAR in 1970, President Joseph Mobutu of Zaire in 1971, and many others. In this respect, it seemed that the door to Africa had opened, as more African dignitaries—until mid-1971, about 881—visited Taiwan.

In conjunction with this "personal diplomacy", the ROC introduced the system of Vanguard projects, each of which was intended to develop through a sequence of five stages:

1. **General survey**—In order to identify promising projects, Taiwan would send agricultural specialists to Africa on a survey mission.

2. **Demonstration teams**—These were made up of farmers and agricultural technicians who went to start new farm projects in Africa.

3. **Seminar exchanges**—Taiwan invited African agricultural technicians to participate in seminars and "on-the-job-training" in Taiwan.

4. **Invitation programmes**—Selected African leaders were invited to visit and observe Taiwan's agricultural methods and development. To some extent, this programme overlapped with the programme of "personal diplomacy".

5. **Technical assistance**—This included the signing of the Technical Cooperation Agreements and the dispatching of "

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1. SATC, (October 1971), pp. 4-9.
agricultural and other related technical missions to African countries. The sending of the missions could be regarded as the most concrete expression of Taiwan's aid operation.¹

Finally, Operation Vanguard was also supposed to strengthen friendship and improve mutual understanding between the ROC and various African countries by (1) establishing news agencies or branch offices of the ROC Government Information Office at strategic locations in Africa;² (2) increasing book, magazine and audio-visual propaganda directed toward Africa; and (3) sending acrobatic and other performing troupes to visit Africa.³ However, none of these methods had been appropriately promoted. In fact, propaganda was the weakest link of the whole Vanguard project.

In 1961 Liberia, a traditional ally of the U.S. in Africa, was the first country to sign an assistance pact with Taiwan. By 1971 the number of African countries which had participated in at least one of the above-mentioned Taiwan aid programmes had reached 31. These included Botswana*, Cameroon*, Central African Republic (CAR)* (now Central African Empire), Chad*, Congo, Dahomey* (now Benin), Ethiopia*, Gabon*, the Gambia*, Ghana*, Ivory Coast*, Kenya, Lesotho*, Liberia*, Libya*, Malagasy Republic* (now Madagascar), Malawi*, Mauritius*, Niger*, Rhodesia, Rwanda*,

¹.  Hsien-feng-an, p. 3.
².  For example, the ROC official Central News Agency (CNA) once opened an office in Addis Ababa in Ethiopia in March 1965.
³.  Hsien-feng-an, p. 3.
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1. *Hsien-feng-an*, p. 3.
2. For example, the ROC official Central News Agency (CNA) once opened an office in Addis Ababa in Ethiopia in March 1965.
Senegal*, Seychelles, Sierre Leone*, Somalia, Swaziland*, Tanzania, Togo*, Upper Volta*, Zaire* and Zambia, totalling 583 participants. Nevertheless, among these 31 countries only 24 (denoted by *) had actually been involved in Taiwan's aid projects to the point of assistance missions (stage (5)) being sent to the countries concerned. The other 7 countries were merely involved at a very preliminary stage, for instance, stage (1) or (2), with no subsequent bilateral agreements reached.¹

Having reviewed Taiwan's aid programme to Africa, now we turn to assessing the effectiveness of its operation.

III. Effectiveness of the aid diplomacy

It is very difficult to evaluate an aid programme objectively in terms of absolute success or failure. This is because since most of the declared objectives of the aid programme are so grandiose, and vague, the specifics of the programme are sometimes hard to relate to these objectives. In most cases the gap between the technologies and economies (let alone the socio-political system) of donor and recipient is so great as to preclude any final assessment as to success or failure except in very general terms. Nevertheless, we will attempt a provisional assessment of the effectiveness of Taiwan's aid strategy. Our study will emphasize the political aspect since the main purpose of the Vanguard project was political, i.e. to obtain African voting support.

¹. See Appendix No. 3.
in the U.N., however we will begin with a general assessment of the humanitarian objectives.

Taiwan's declared aim in its aid efforts was to assist the agricultural and/or economic development of the African countries. As time went on, up to 1971, Taiwan's programme was extended to include developments other than agriculture such as veterinary medicine, sugar refinery, edible oil plants, highway engineering, fishing, handicrafts and many others.¹ From the inception of the Vanguard project in 1961 to the end of 1971, Taiwan dispatched over one hundred agricultural teams to 24 African countries, all registering promising results. Other forms of technical cooperation such as veterinary teams in Chad and Ethiopia for the control of animal deseases, an edible oil plant (peanut and cottonseed) in Chad, handicraft teams in Madagascar and the CAR, building a small sugar mill in Rwanda, a seed multiplication and supply centre in the Ivory Coast, etc., although rather modest in scale, all had impressive outcomes. There were altogether about 1,000 technicians from Taiwan working in African countries at that time including some 250 medical doctors and nurses employed by the government of Libya.

In Cameroon and Gabon, for instance, model villages financed by Taiwan were established to help local peasants start a new life as settled farmers working small land holdings under the supervision of technicians from Taiwan not only for self-sufficiency, but also to produce a surplus for sale.

¹. Ibid.
Furthermore, as training constituted an important aspect of the Vanguard project, training centres were established at the headquarters of many Taiwanese agricultural teams; at places where the establishment of a centre was not justified, training facilities would then be provided in order to make sure that the work which was being done in one area would eventually be extended to other areas.

In addition, the SATCC organized 12 agricultural seminars in Taiwan during the 12 years 1960-1971, involving the above-mentioned 31 African countries and 583 African participants. As mentioned earlier, such seminars were directed towards training and exchanges of know-how.

Other results achieved by Taiwan's aid programme can be discovered in facts and some statements made by African leaders. For instance, most of Taiwan agricultural demonstration teams achieved their scheduled objectives in the host countries and set impressive records. In almost every African country with an ROC agricultural mission, the average rice yield was increased several times. In Togo, the increase reportedly reached nearly 2,000 percent. In Zaire, where only a few varieties of vegetables were grown before the arrival of ROC agricultural technicians, by 1969 53 different vegetables were produced, while the rice yield had tripled. Also, the Premier of Cameroon once

1. SATC. (October 1971), p. 58.
claimed that Taiwan's aid was "the most useful aid that anybody was giving to his country". Likewise, the Malagasy ambassador in Taiwan was quoted as saying that "China (i.e. Taiwan) is our greatest friend because it is helping us in the agricultural field, and there are evident achievements in such activities". Moreover, in an article "What the Chinese of Taiwan did for Botswana", the author openly praised the fact that "...one of the countries which contributed much to our development is the ROC...The ROC has realized the need of Botswana in its struggle to mount self-help projects in terms of poverty and starvation...". Also, the Malawi News Agency recounted that "the ROC mission introduced new agricultural methods especially in the field of rice growing, increased the farmers' productivity and thus improved the agricultural output and economy of Malawi". There were numerous similar reports indicating the achievements of Taiwan's aid programme in increasing agricultural production in Africa and its consequent contribution to developing national economies. Even U.S. President R. Nixon declared approvingly in 1969 that "the ROC Vanguard Program has been highly successful in getting developing countries to increase food production".

2. Ibid.
3. The article was originally published in Kutlwano magazine (Botswana), later reprinted by CSATC in November 1971.
Seen in these terms, the ROC's aid programme seemed rather successful. Up to its gradual decline after 1971 it had partially fulfilled its declared objectives of assisting the Africans in agricultural and economic development. However, such accounts are not sufficient to answer our second question: Did this aid strategy achieve the ROC's political-economic, especially political, objectives, of increasing African pro-ROC votes at the U.N. during the period concerned, and promote an African commercial market in the long run? Was it effective in improving the ROC's "marginal" international status? Was it effective in deterring, or at least restraining Communist influence in Africa? Was it effective in winning African sympathy and friendship (i.e. diplomatic ties)? If not, what were the reasons? The remaining part of this Chapter will be devoted to answering the above questions.

The answer with regard to the "effectiveness" of the ROC's foreign aid strategy, in all, is only partially positive. This conclusion will be shown mainly through an analysis of empirical data, i.e. the General Assembly voting records of the African countries on the China Issue during the 11 years concerned, 1961-1971.¹

However, before proceeding to the subject matter, it is necessary to emphasize very briefly some of the reasons that affected the general attitudes of the African countries towards the China Issue. Generally speaking, African attitudes can be divided into 4 categories corresponding to

1. See Appendix No. 2.
their voting patterns: pro-ROC, pro-PRC, non-aligned, and inconsistent. The reasons which determined these (changing) attitudes were complex. There were either domestic reasons, notably a change in the head of state, usually by a coup; or external reasons, such as ideological differences, or external influence in a state's internal affairs, notably the involvement of the PRC in the secessionist movement in Africa, or the aid factor, or the Sino-Soviet split, or the PRC's "Cultural Revolution"; or reasons still unknown. Here we will only point out the ideological factor as this influenced the overall African attitudes towards the China Issue and leave the others to be dealt with later in individual cases.

As a whole, African attitudes were determined by the broader issue of ideological confrontation between the East and the West. Despite their declared foreign policy stance of non-alignment, African countries were split ideologically into the pro-West (i.e. the conservative or moderate) group and the pro-East (i.e. the radical) group. The pro-West group, which was also generally pro-ROC (hence anti-PRC), were largely former French colonies. Located south of the Sahara, they were also known as the Union Africaine et Malgache (U.A.M.), consisting of 12 countries, Cameroon, the Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, the Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Gabon, Niger, Senegal, Upper Volta, Malagasy Republic, Ivory Coast and Mauritania. Ideologically they were oriented towards France. Since France also supported the U.S. position (though only until January 1964), it would seem that French and the U.S. influence contributed to the
voting behaviours of these states. The pro-East group, which was generally pro-PRC (hence anti-ROC), was ideologically more inclined to the Soviet Union. It was concentrated mainly in East Africa, but was also scattered throughout North and West Africa. These were largely connected with the British Commonwealth, such as Ghana, Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya and Nigeria, or with the Arabs, such as Algeria, Mauritania and Libya. Thus, in between these groups, there were the non-aligned and the inconsistent. And their attitudes, or changes of attitudes were due to either domestic reasons, such as a change of government, or to external issues, such as concern about subversive activities of the PRC against various African governments. In this regard, African attitudes towards the two Chinese governments were also influenced by any changes of relationships between the latter and the two Superpowers. A pro-ROC U.S. might result in more African support due to the latter's pro-West bias. At the same time, however, some African countries would oppose the ROC's position simply because of this imperialist connection. Similarly, the PRC might benefit from its collaboration with the Soviet Union, on the one hand. On the other hand, when relationships between the two Communist powers turned sour, African support tended to become more diversified. Most of the African countries would try to ally with either side or to remain neutral so as to gain more profit from big power disputes. "The most important thing for Africans", as one African leader stated, "is to have a feel for events and know how to exploit them".1

Toward the end of the 1960s, the non-aligned group gradually became a minority group, and so did the inconsistent countries. More detailed study of these factors that influenced African China policy will be dealt with later. Let us now turn to discuss the effectiveness of the ROC's aid strategy in Africa.


From the perspective of the ROC, foreign aid was politically effective only if: (a) it increased the African recipients' votes at the U.N. to keep the ROC in and the PRC out of the organization, (b) it transformed the ROC's marginal status, and promoted PRC-African diplomatic ties, and (c) it protected the African continent from Communist influence.

All of these issues are inter-related. The first issue (a) will be examined independently whereas (b) and (c) will be treated simultaneously.

Foreign aid was only partially effective in terms of ROC's legitimacy struggle in the U.N. Our conclusion is reached on the basis of the voting records of the 24 African aid recipients on the China Issue at the U.N. in comparison to those 18 remaining African countries (i.e. those that normally did not have aid relations with the ROC). The 18 countries were Algeria, Burundi, the Congo (Brazzaville), Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Nigeria, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia,
United Arab Republic (UAR), Uganda and Zambia. Except for the Congo, Mauritania and South Africa, none of them had diplomatic relations with the ROC. But except for South Africa, all of them have diplomatic relations with the PRC. Also all of them, except Nigeria and South Africa, received aid from the PRC at different times during the 11 years.¹

The importance of the African votes as a whole in determining the UN voting outcome has already been mentioned. Our task now is to show that the voting patterns of the 24 African recipients were different from, i.e. more favourable to the ROC than, the above-mentioned 18 African countries, and consequently, to establish a correlation, if any exists, between the 24 African recipients and their pro-ROC votes. Here 6 Tables will be provided to support our hypothesis, namely that African voting support to the ROC was partially determined by whether or not aid was granted. Tables Nos. 3 - 6 are about the voting patterns of the two groups on the China Issue for the 11 years after 1961. In conjunction with these Tables, Tables Nos 7 and 8 indicate the percentage of African voting support on the Issue for either of the claimants.

1. One of the factors why Nigeria did not receive aid from the PRC was that Nigeria was one of the richest countries in Africa, both in terms of petroleum and in terms of number of educated citizens. Therefore it had less need of PRC assistance than poorer and more backward countries. Another reason was probably Nigeria's suspicion of PRC involvement in aid to the attempted secession of the Biafran province from Nigeria. In the case of South Africa, the reasons were more complex. Not only was South Africa ideologically anti-Communist in general, but also it was hostile to Peking in particular due to the latter's involvement in its domestic affairs. More details will be given later in the main text.
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TABLE NO. 3: Voting Records of the Total UN Members, of Total African Members and of African ROC-Aid Recipients on the "Important Question" Resolution, 1961-1971

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>General Assembly Session</th>
<th>Total UN Memb.</th>
<th>Total Afri. Memb.</th>
<th>Afri. Aid Recl.</th>
<th>&quot;Important Question&quot; Resolution</th>
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Sources for the construction of this table:
United Nations General Assembly Yearbooks, 1961-1971, in 10 volumes;
Voting Records of Total U.N. Members on the China Issue at the United Nations, 1950-1971, and

Key: For = for the ROC   Against = against the ROC

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<th>Total Afri. Memb.</th>
<th>Afri. Aid Reci.</th>
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**Key:** For = for the ROC  \ Against = against the ROC
TABLE NO. 5: Votes on the "Important Question" Resolution of the Total African Members and of African Countries Never Receiving Aid from the ROC

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<th>Year</th>
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Key: For = for the ROC  Against = against the ROC
TABLE NO. 6: Votes of the Total African Members and of African Countries Never Receiving Aid from the ROC on the Proposal to Seat the PRC

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Key: For = for the ROC  Against = against the ROC
TABLE NO. 7: The Distribution of African Votes in the U.N. from 1961-1971 - % of African Countries Voting for the ROC on the "Important Question" Resolution and on the Proposal to Seat the PRC

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### TABLE NO. 8: Test of Hypothesis that the Pattern of Voting was Partially Determined by Whether or Not Aid was Granted to the African Countries Concerned

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</tbody>
</table>
Looking at the Tables, we notice that most of the African aid recipients voted in favour of the ROC's position, although a few exceptions (notably Ethiopia and Ghana) always cast a negative vote. In other words, the voting pattern of these 24 recipients can be divided into the majority pro-ROC (or anti-PRC) group (the category A countries) and the minority anti-ROC (or pro-PRC) group (the category B and/or C countries)

African voting records do indicate that there existed a correlation between their voting patterns and ROC's aid because the aid recipients tended to vote for the donor's position on most occasions, whereas those countries that did not received aid from the ROC, except for South Africa, tended to vote for the reverse. However, this does not suggest that ROC's aid programme alone brought about the African vote changes. One could always argue that most African countries had no real reason to change their votes: they could have continued to abstain on the China Issue as they did in 1960, or to vote for or against as they had done previously.

Nevertheless, empirically speaking, the majority of the African recipients voted in the ROC's favour. Libya, for example, which abstained in 1960, voted for the ROC after 1961 (until 1969), after the latter began rendering technical assistance. Other examples include Dahomey which abstained in 1960 and 1961, but voted for the ROC from 1962 after promises of assistance programmes, as well as Rwanda which voted against the ROC in 1965, but after agricultural aid was launched always voted in its favour.¹ Eleven countries, ¹. Rwanda began to receive aid from the ROC after 1964, but it did not vote for the latter in the following year. Its support for the ROC resumed in 1966 until 1971.
Zaire, Gabon, the Gambia, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Lesotho, Malawi, Malagasy Republic, Niger, Swaziland, and Upper Volta never cast an anti-ROC vote on both the "Important Question" Resolution and the Proposal (these were the category A countries). Undoubtedly, the ROC's aid programme did contribute to promoting African's economic advancement. However, we can also conclude that the ROC's aid programme constituted a practical method of purchasing political favours from the Africans, namely, to increase African support for the ROC's struggle against the PRC. This could be demonstrated by the positions the aid recipients took in explaining their votes or in defending the ROC's position in the U.N.

For instance, Niger, when arguing in favour of the ROC's retaining its seat, told the Assembly in 1966 not to "deliver up 12 million people living in Formosa to the fury and the hatred of the Red Guards in Peking". At the same time, the Malawi delegate maintained: "the PRC has not demonstrated that it has accepted the rules of the United Nations. Moreover, its participation should not result in the eviction of the Taiwan government." Lesotho, on entering into the U.N. in 1966, took the stance that it could not accept the expulsion of Taiwan so that Communist China could rejoin the organization. It favoured the U.S. position, i.e. that Communist China had not applied for membership. Rwanda's attitude was even more extreme when it stated in 1968 that only the Nationalist government in Taiwan was qualified to be

Furthermore, it said that it would not consider the idea of "Two Chinas", a notion rather popular among some African countries since the early 1960s. Even Ghana, which never established diplomatic ties with the ROC, also argued once in favour of the ROC. The representative of Ghana said in 1970 that Taiwan had as valid a claim to represent China as Communist China. In fact, "both should be represented and the 18 power draft resolution should drop the request that sought to expel Taiwan from the Organization". This statement, in effect, was inclined to creating a "Two Chinas" solution. Although the ROC was principally opposed to this idea, at a stage when the PRC's admission was clearly inevitable, such a statement could be considered as rather sympathetic towards the ROC.

Seen in these terms, ROC aid did register some sort of political effectiveness. It did achieve its political objectives by increasing African support both in words (verbal support) and in deeds (voting support). In addition, in view of the lengthy period of time involved, this support did serve to keep the ROC in, and hence prevent the PRC from entering into the world organization. Yet even so, to what extent can we assert our conclusion? That is, to what extent did this aid instrument fulfil its desired policy objectives?

1. Interview with Chou Hong-ben, Executive Secretary of the Committee of International Technical Cooperation, in Taipei on 26 May 1979.
In this regard, one can easily argue that the changes in the African votes, before and after receiving aid from the ROC, do not explain neatly the existence of such an aid-voting support correlation. There were two reasons. First, some African recipients, whose voting patterns had always been consistent with the ROC's position (category A countries) such as Liberia, Upper Volta, etc. might have voted for the latter even without receiving aid from it. Secondly, and on the contrary, some recipients such as Cameroon in 1970 and 1971, Libya from 1969 to 1971 and Togo in 1971, might still cast a negative vote, or change their voting patterns totally, regardless of their aid relationships with the ROC.

The question remaining then is how we know exactly why the African recipients voted as they did, and if they would still have supported the ROC's cause as they did during the 11 years if they had not received any aid from the latter at all. As we have already noted, some recipient countries actually voted for the ROC before aid operations were established. Does this indicate that the ROC's aid-initiation to those countries was based primarily on their "friendly attitudes" or "quasi-friendly gesture" as perceived during its goodwill missions of the pre-aid period?

It seems impossible to come to a definite conclusion as to whether aid was indeed the only, or indeed the prime cause of the African pro-ROC vote, or whether it was the other way around. A pro-ROC vote, or even a change of it, can be attributed to other external factors such as relationship between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., between the U.S. and the ROC, between U.S.S.R. and the PRC, and even between the two
Chinese governments. Thus, they might in effect be two factors that were either independent of, or reinforce, each other. This discovery does suggest that the claim that "aid buys friendship" must be qualified.

Nevertheless, the value of the ROC's aid as a foreign policy instrument could also be assessed by (i) the ROC's diplomatic establishment in Africa and (ii) its effectiveness in countering Communist influence in the African continent. The two issues will be treated simultaneously.

2. The ROC's diplomatic establishment in Africa and the effectiveness of its aid in deterring recognition of the PRC

The development of the ROC-PRC diplomatic contest either in Africa or in other parts of the world advanced like a zero-sum game; a gain for one almost mechanically meant loss to the other. However, during the 11 years, there were quite a large number of African countries that preferred to remain neutral in the two Chinas' competition. (See Tables Nos 9 and 10). That is, they either recognized neither China right from the beginning of their independence or withdrew recognition. (As noted earlier, some of the reasons that affected their (changed) positions will be dealt with later.) It was understandable therefore that these countries should become the target of ROC-PRC competition. Thus, one way to assess the relationship between the ROC's aid effort and its success in deterring the PRC's influence in the African continent is to examine the evolution of their diplomatic competition in the area concerned.

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TABLE NO. 9 continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>African Countries recognizing the ROC but not voting for the ROC, 1960-1971</th>
<th>Diplomatic Relations with the ROC</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country</strong></td>
<td><strong>Abstained</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Congo (Braz.)</td>
<td>1960, 1961</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>1963</td>
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<tr>
<td>S. Leone*</td>
<td>1963</td>
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<tr>
<td>Upper Volta*</td>
<td>1961</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chad*</td>
<td>1965, 1966</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rwanda*</td>
<td>1965</td>
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<td>Malagasy*</td>
<td>1960</td>
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</table>

* Countries receiving aid from the ROC

Note: Senegal and the CAR broke relations with the ROC during 1965-1968, and 1964-1967 respectively, and then resumed them.
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<tr>
<td>Total African Countries</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>39</td>
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<td>42</td>
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<td>% Recognizing the ROC</td>
<td>9(35%)</td>
<td>11(38%)</td>
<td>16(48%)</td>
<td>19(56%)</td>
<td>15(42%)</td>
<td>16(43%)</td>
<td>16(41%)</td>
<td>18(46%)</td>
<td>20(48%)</td>
<td>22(52%)</td>
<td>22(52%)</td>
<td>18(43%)</td>
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<td>% Recognizing PRC</td>
<td>6(23%)</td>
<td>8(28%)</td>
<td>10(30%)</td>
<td>11(32%)</td>
<td>16(44%)</td>
<td>14(38%)</td>
<td>14(36%)</td>
<td>13(33%)</td>
<td>13(31%)</td>
<td>13(31%)</td>
<td>14(33%)</td>
<td>22(52%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>% Recognizing Neither</td>
<td>11(42%)</td>
<td>10(34%)</td>
<td>7(21%)</td>
<td>4(12%)</td>
<td>5(14%)</td>
<td>7(19%)</td>
<td>9(23%)</td>
<td>8(21%)</td>
<td>9(21%)</td>
<td>7(17%)</td>
<td>6(14%)</td>
<td>2(5%)</td>
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* This table does not include Mauritania in 1960 because it recognized the ROC on 28 November after the U.N. voting on the China Issue, also because it was then not a member of the organization.
In this connection, another two Tables-Nos. 11 and 12--have been provided. Table No. 11 lists all the African countries which, regardless of whether or not they received aid from the ROC, had (or still have) formal bilateral ties with the ROC. In this Table, we also include some information regarding the dates of changes in their policy towards China; and the date of the initiation of the ROC's aid operation in the African recipient countries, and its duration. That is, except for Dahomey whose aid relations with the ROC were suspended for over a year (from March 1965 to October 1966), all of the aid programmes continued from their inception, until 1971. Table No. 12 presents all the African countries which never had diplomatic ties with the ROC but, except for Mauritius, had diplomatic relations with the PRC.¹

From Table No. 11 we discover the following findings:

(a) Out of a total of 42 African countries in 1971, 27 had had either aid and or diplomatic contacts with the ROC. Except for Ethiopia, Ghana, and Mauritius, the 21 aid recipients had all had occasional diplomatic relations with the ROC. This shows that, one way or the other, the aid factor was not isolated from the diplomatic factor. Nevertheless, if we take a further look, we soon discover that most of the aid relationships took place not before, but after the setting up of the ROC-African diplomatic ties.

¹. Mauritius recognized neither China until 1972, when it established relations with Peking.
TABLE NO. 11: Diplomatic Relations of African Countries with the two Chinese Governments (as of March 1979)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date of Opening Diplomatic ties with the ROC</th>
<th>Date of Break of Diplomatic ties with the ROC</th>
<th>Date of Opening Diplomatic ties with the PRC</th>
<th>Initial Aid</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8. Mauritania</td>
<td>28-11-1960</td>
<td>11-09-1965</td>
<td>27-07-1965</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>22. Swaziland *</td>
<td>06-09-1968</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Never</td>
<td>1969</td>
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<td>27. Congo(Braz)</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Feb. 1964</td>
<td>22-02-1964</td>
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</table>

* Countries still recognizing the ROC as of March 1979.
TABLE NO. 11: Continued

This Table shows all African countries having diplomatic relations with the ROC until March 1979. Most of these countries now have diplomatic ties with the PRC. Congo (Brazzaville) recognized the ROC from 1960 to February 1964. On the 18th of that month it transferred recognition to the PRC and established diplomatic ties on the 22nd.

Sources for the construction of the Table:

TABLE NO. 12: **African countries Never having Diplomatic Relations with the ROC, but having Relations with the PRC, 1961-1971**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Algeria</td>
<td>03-07-1962-</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Burundi</td>
<td>21-12-1963- 29-02-1965; 13-10-1971-</td>
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<td>3. Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>10-15-1970-</td>
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<td>4. Ethiopia</td>
<td>24-11-1970-</td>
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<td>5. Guinea</td>
<td>4-10-1959-</td>
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<td>6. Kenya</td>
<td>14-12-1963-</td>
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<td>7. Mali</td>
<td>27-10-1960-</td>
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<td>8. Mauritius</td>
<td>15-10-1972-</td>
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<td>9. Morocco</td>
<td>1-11-1958-</td>
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<td>10. Nigeria</td>
<td>10-02-1971-</td>
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<tr>
<td>11. Tanzania</td>
<td>9-12-1961-</td>
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<tr>
<td>12. Tunisia</td>
<td>1-10-1964- 27-09-1967; Oct. 1971-</td>
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<td>13. Somalia</td>
<td>16-12-1960-</td>
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<tr>
<td>14. Sudan</td>
<td>1-12-1958-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Uganda</td>
<td>18-10-1962-</td>
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<tr>
<td>16. United Arab Republic</td>
<td>30-05-1956-</td>
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<td>17. Zambia</td>
<td>25-12-1964-</td>
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</table>

Note: Tunisia broke relations with the PRC during 1967-1971, then resumed them; Burundi broke relations with the PRC during 1965-1971, then resumed them.
In this respect, we can only conclude that aid alone was not the most essential element in building up the ROC's diplomatic presence in Africa, although it is very likely that the existence of such an aid operation might have served to consolidate their mutual understanding and relationships at a later stage.

(b) Three countries, the Congo (Brazzaville), Mauritania, and South Africa never received any aid from Taiwan, and yet for different reasons, they had officially recognized the latter. The Congo, possibly because of its colonial connection with France, recognized the Nationalist government from February 1960 until February 1964, as did Mauritania (1960-1965). South Africa exchanged recognition with the ROC in 1931, but they did not exchange diplomats until 26th April 1976. The reasons for these decisions will now be offered as follows. South Africa is one of the original members of the U.N., and yet, for a different reason— the government's racial policy of "apartheid"— it is another disputed country suffering from international isolation. In other words, its status has also been challenged by other U.N. members, by the world in general, and by neighbouring African countries in particular. Prior to 1976, the ROC had been hesitant about establishing a diplomatic tie with South Africa despite the fact that the latter had always voted for its position in the U.N., that the two countries shared the same problem of international isolation, and that both of them were (and still are) strongly anti-Communist. The reason was that the apartheid policy was (and still is) distasteful to the majority of the African
countries. Thus, during the 1960s, the ROC, in order to win and retain influence in black Africa for voting support in the General Assembly, could not afford to display friendship for the white minority government in South Africa. After 1971, however, when this consideration became gradually less important as a result of deteriorating diplomatic relations between the ROC and other African countries, the ROC had reason to reevaluate its earlier policy. Conversely, South Africa also had its reasons to refrain earlier from diplomatic relations with the ROC. It can be argued that South Africa's U.N. policy was not so much pro-Taipei as anti-Peking. It was because of the PRC's harsh criticism of South Africa's apartheid policy and because of the fear that a closer relationship with the ROC might provoke Peking into more active support of South African dissident movements. This needs further explanation. South Africa has suffered severely from black nationalist movements since the 1960s. There are two major African nationalist organizations in South Africa: the African National Congress (ANC), founded in 1912, and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), set up in 1959. Like all other liberation movements in southern Africa, these organizations soon became embroiled in the Sino-Soviet conflict. That is, both Moscow and Peking regarded South Africa as a major battleground between Eastern communism and Western imperialism. While the Soviets viewed the confrontation as one based on ideological and economic conflicts, Peking saw it as a racial war with Moscow in the "white racist" camp, and with Peking leading the "coloured people". At first, Peking tried to maintain friendly relations with both the ANC and
countries. Thus, during the 1960s, the ROC, in order to win and retain influence in black Africa for voting support in the General Assembly, could not afford to display friendship for the white minority government in South Africa. After 1971, however, when this consideration became gradually less important as a result of deteriorating diplomatic relations between the ROC and other African countries, the ROC had reason to reevaluate its earlier policy. Conversely, South Africa also had its reasons to refrain earlier from diplomatic relations with the ROC. It can be argued that South Africa's U.N. policy was not so much pro-Taipei as anti-Peking. It was because of the PRC's harsh criticism of South Africa's apartheid policy and because of the fear that a closer relationship with the ROC might provoke Peking into more active support of South African dissident movements. This needs further explanation. South Africa has suffered severely from black nationalist movements since the 1960s. There are two major African nationalist organizations in South Africa: the African National Congress (ANC), founded in 1912, and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), set up in 1959. Like all other liberation movements in southern Africa, these organizations soon became embroiled in the Sino-Soviet conflict. That is, both Moscow and Peking regarded South Africa as a major battleground between Eastern communism and Western imperialism. While the Soviets viewed the confrontation as one based on ideological and economic conflicts, Peking saw it as a racial war with Moscow in the "white racist" camp, and with Peking leading the "coloured people". At first, Peking tried to maintain friendly relations with both the ANC and
the PAC. However, the ANC, strongly influenced by the Moscow-oriented South African Communist Party (SACP), gradually took a pro-Moscow stand, while the PAC, which originally opposed cooperation with Communists, fell into the pro-Peking group.¹

Despite general acknowledgement that Peking was behind the PAC, there is little data to show the extent of Chinese support. The PAC's own reports stated that two PAC missions had visited Peking, each receiving $20,000 from the PRC.² Various reports confirmed also that PAC guerrillas had been trained in China, Tanzania, and Zambia by Chinese instructors.³ The South African government took Peking's involvement very seriously. Thus, although Moscow appeared to have given more and better aid to southern African liberation organizations than Peking, the government of South Africa has regarded Peking as the more dangerous of the two, and expressed grave concern over Peking's expansion in southern Africa.


2. Bruce D. Larkin, op.cit., pp. 190-191, note no. 53.

Africa in general and its increasing influence in Tanzania and Zambia in particular.\(^1\) This anxiety was probably a factor which finally decided South Africa to strengthen relations with the ROC.\(^2\) Thus, in 1976, out of mutual sympathy and practical necessity, the ROC and South Africa formally elevated the status of their consular relations to full diplomatic ties, and established embassies in each other's capital. The two countries now share very close political and economic ties. Reportedly, the ROC has purchased uranium from South Africa.

With regard to Mauritania and the Congo, these two countries scarcely voted for the ROC's cause in the U.N. despite their brief diplomatic relations with the ROC. Mauritania became independent on 28th November, 1960, and established diplomatic relations with the ROC on the same day. There were probably two reasons which prompted Mauritania to break relations with the ROC in 1965: (1) Mauritania's decision was influenced by France's new China policy in January 1964, and (2) Mauritania's decision was affected by the ROC's obstruction in 1960 of its admission to the U.N. Factor (1) will be dealt with later in connection with the section on the "French connection". Factor (2)--the connection between Mauritania's case and the ROC's attitude towards Outer


2. Dr. H. Muller, South Africa's foreign minister, reportedly said: "Viewed from the Angolan issue, Nationalist China's efforts in Africa in the past 10 years had delayed Communist Chinese penetration into the continent for at least a decade". See Yu Ssu-chou, "Fei-chou kuo-chia yu wo chia-ch'iang Kuan-hsi" (African countries strengthen their relations with the ROC), *CDN*, (3rd June, 1976), p. 1.
Mongolia—has already been mentioned briefly in the previous Chapter. Here all that needs to be emphasized is that Mauritania had unluckily become involved in a political dispute between the ROC and the Soviet Union. Thus, while new African countries were admitted to the U.N. quickly and without controversy soon after achieving independence, Mauritania—because of the ROC’s unwillingness to support Outer Mongolia’s application for U.N. membership—had to wait almost one year. Although the ROC finally agreed not to block Outer Mongolia in case it would provoke black African into retaliation by voting for Peking on the China Issue, relations between the two countries were never close. This ROC action certainly had consequences beyond its immediate context.

The case of the Congo may be explained as a result of the latter’s internal political development. The ROC’s diplomatic relations with the Congo—a former French colony, lasted only 4 years. During this period, the Congo was ruled by President Fulbert Youlou who was strongly pro-Western and his policy was mainly anti-socialist. Thus under his rule the Congo invariably voted against the PRC. However, when in 1963 he was overthrown by the left-wing trade unionists, Alphonse Massamba-Debat took power, as head of both government and the military. The new head of state, and his successor Marien Ngouabi, deeply influenced by Marxist socialist ideas, made the Congo one of the most ardent supported of the PRC in Africa. Also possibly influences by the French decision in 1964, the new Congo established

1. See Chapter Four, pp. 242-244.
diplomatic relations with Peking in February. Relations with the 
ROC were therefore broken off in April.\(^1\) It was 
natural therefore that the Congo, like Mauritania, should 
not support the ROC's cause in the U.N.

These three countries, although they were only untypical 
instances, indicate that aid might be irrelevant to the 
ROC's diplomatic establishment.

(c) Similarly, the voting behaviour of Ethiopia and Ghana 
as well as their China policies were not influenced by their 
limited aid relations with the ROC. Like the Congo, Ghana's 
policy towards the two Chinese governments was subject to 
more general foreign policy shifts towards either the East 
or the West. And this in turn was again the result of a 
change in the head of state. It was the fall of President 
Kwame Nkrumah in February 1966 that resulted in a pro-ROC 
government, though only for some years. Previously President 
Nkrumah, who came to power in mid-1957, had not only been 
pro-Peking but in fact had been one of Peking's staunchest 
and most outspoken supporters. Believing that cooperation 
with the PRC, a potential superpower, would help him to 
realize his own ambition of becoming sole ruler of a united 
black Africa, Nkrumah had adopted some of Mao Tse-tung's 
revolutionary tactics in his political career. That is, 
Nkrumah had been building secret camps in Ghana since 1961 
to train recruits from various African nations for the 
purpose of overthrowing government unwilling to submit to 
his grandiose plan for a united "Socialist Africa". As a

consequence, a large number of PRC instructors were stationed in Ghana for training in subversion. The ROC therefore had no chance of developing any relations until 1968, two years after Nkrumah was ousted by a military coup whilst on a visit to Peking. Although an ROC agricultural demonstration team was sent to aid the new Ghanaian government in November 1968, which remained in Ghana until May 1972, and, during this period, Ghana also sent agricultural trainees to Taiwan to attend the ROC "Seminar for African Agriculturalists", Ghana never established diplomatic relations with Taipei. Instead it continued to vote for Peking's admission to the U.N., though insisting that the ROC should have the right to retain its membership at the same time.

Ethiopia's case is rather unusual. Ethiopia recognized neither government of China until 24th November 1970, when it at last established diplomatic relations with Peking. During the 1960s, Ethiopia received agricultural assistance from the ROC, despite the lack of diplomatic relations, and supported the ROC in the U.N. until 1959 when it abstained on the China Issue. The fact that Ethiopia received ROC's


2. Under Nkrumah, Ghana's position on the China Issue was straight support for the PRC. Nevertheless, possibly due to ROC aid, plus the new government's anti-Peking attitude, by the end of the 1960s, Ghana's attitude was modified to a "Two Chinas" solution. Ghana and the PRC resumed diplomatic relations in February 1972. The PRC immediately renewed two aid projects in Ghana, which had been cancelled in 1966 after the severance of relations between the two countries. As expected, the ROC withdrew its missions there.
aid was possibly due to the fact that Ethiopia had diplomatic and economic relations with the U.S. Nevertheless, Ethiopia never recognized the ROC, possibly because it never regarded the latter as a winning force in the Chinese civil war. On the other hand, however, Emperor Haile Selassie had not granted recognition to the PRC either, despite the latter’s willingness to establish diplomatic relations. Four reasons can account for Ethiopia’s reluctance. First of all, Peking had involved itself in the Ethiopia-Somalia border dispute. For example, during the fighting between Somalia and Ethiopia in the Ogaden and Hodh regions in 1963 and 1964, it is said that Peking gave support to 50,000 Somali guerrilla tribesmen who were making raids into Ethiopia. Secondly, Peking had also involved itself in the Eritrean secessionist movement. Eritrea, a former Italian colony, became an autonomous region within the Ethiopian Empire in December 1950, in accordance with the U.N. recommendation. However, the Ethiopian government annulled Eritrea’s autonomy in 1962 and made it a province. The Eritreans started a guerrilla war against the Ethiopian government and formed a separtist movement calling itself the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), based in Sudan. The ELF, whose main aim was to demand independence for Eritrea, received support from the PRC during the mid-1960s. Thirdly, like most other African countries, with the

1. Mao Tse-tung wanted to establish relations with Ethiopia not only because the latter was influential among a number of other countries but also because it had considerable following among several regional organizations, i.e. if Ethiopia supported the PRC, other nations would follow suit. See John F. Copper, *op.cit.*, p. 114.

notable exception of the PRC's close friend Ghana, Emperor Selassie was a strong supporter of the nuclear test ban treaty. Thus he felt disappointed that the PRC refused to sign the accord. Finally, it is possible that Emperor Selassie did not trust revolutionary Communism. This was possibly due to Ethiopia's feudal tradition which tended to be opposed to any Marxist-socialist principles. After the Cultural Revolution was terminated in 1969, the PRC's involvement with the ELF seemed to lessen. Meanwhile, anti-Americanism began to grow in Ethiopia as a result of a cutback in American aid, and Mao Tse-tung saw an opportunity to replace the U.S. as supplier of aid to Ethiopia. Consequently, the PRC and Ethiopia established diplomatic relations. These two examples of Ghana and Ethiopia also illustrate the limited success of the ROC's aid programme.

(d) Nevertheless, the two Tables combined show clearly that during the period when the ROC's African aid was most active, most of the recipients maintained diplomatic relations with their donor. Table No. 11 especially provides us with a clear view of ROC-PRC diplomatic life during this

1. Message delivered in a speech given by Haile Selassie in a banquet to Chou En-lai. For the full text of the speech, see Afro-Asian Solidarity against Imperialism (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1964), pp. 253-256. President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia also criticized PRC's opposition to the treaty. The reasons why the PRC refused to sign the treaty were largely due to its hostility towards the Soviet Union, plus the fact that the ROC had become a signatory. In the PRC's view, this was a plot to create "a situation of Two Chinas". Adie, W.A.C., "Chou En-lai on Safari", in Roderick MacFarquhar, ed. China under Mao. Politics Takes Command (Cambridge, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1966), pp. 474-475, 480.

period. It not only demonstrates that more African countries maintained formal ties with the ROC than with the PRC but also, consequently, it reflects the effectiveness of the ROC's foreign aid—as it might have the effect of consolidating relations already established. Moreover, most of the African aid recipients switched their recognition from the ROC to the PRC after 1971. This, in conjunction with the gradual withdrawal of the ROC's aid missions in Africa, explains well the subsequent decline in the usefulness of this tool. It is true that the PRC was already active in Africa prior to the ROC's departure from the U.N. in 1971; nonetheless, it is also true that the ROC's presence in Africa during this period was a factor, however small, restraining the rise of Communist influence in the African heartland. Consequently, the ROC's departure from the African continent facilitated the PRC's rapport with the Africans.

Finally, three aid recipients, Senegal, the CAR and Dahomey, which switched their diplomatic relations between the two Chinese governments on more than one occasion before the end of 1971, deserve special attention. Senegal, an ex-French colony, provided an early test of the one policy on which Taipei and Peking agreed: that no nation could have diplomatic relations with both Chinas. Senegal granted recognition to the PRC on 14th March, 1961, without breaking relations with the ROC.1 Peking refused to establish diplomatic relations on that basis. Taipei, although dis-

pleased with Senegal's action, did not break relations. Instead, the ROC signed a technical cooperation agreement with Senegal on 13th September 1963, and sent a 12-man agricultural demonstration team from Taiwan in April 1964.¹

In 1964 relations between the ROC and Senegal were broken off under circumstances that remain unclear. Nevertheless, Senegal was reported to be very anxious for the ROC agricultural team to remain in Senegal, possibly due to the impressive result that the ROC's agricultural team had achieved in raising Senegal's rice yield.² Rather surprisingly, the ROC not only permitted this, but enlarged the team to 16 members and renewed its stay every two years after 1965.³ However, diplomatic relations between the two countries were not resumed until July 1969, and lasted only two and a half years after that. Thus, from 1964 until 1969, Senegal had no diplomatic ties with either China, but it recognized the PRC and had aid relations with the ROC. Senegal voted for Peking's admission to the U.N. in October 1971, but established diplomatic relations with the PRC on 7th December.⁴

¹. See Appendix No. 3
². The previous record had been 500 kilograms per hectare; the Chinese boosted this to 6,000 kilograms in August, 1965. See Free China Review, VI,6 (2nd October 1966), p. 4.
⁴. But Taipei did not close its embassy at Dekar until 12th April 1972, and then only at Senegal's request. Even then, Taipei's 43 agricultural technicians remained in Senegal another full year to May 1973. Senegal evidently appreciated the ROC aid, but possibly because of increasing pressure from its pro-Peking neighbours, Mali, Mauritania and Guinea, it finally changed sides. See Hsien-feng-an.
Immediately upon its independence in August 1960, the CAR was recognized by both Taipei and Peking, but only the ROC was invited to the independence ceremony. The CAR action was probably due to its colonial connection with the French government. Nevertheless, formal diplomatic relations with Taipei were not established until April 1962. In May 1964, the ROC began to launch its aid programme—a handicraft demonstration team—to the CAR. Nevertheless, the CAR, land-locked, with few natural resources, and receiving only French aid and a small amount of aid from the U.S., urgently needed more constructive help from outside. Thus, upon hearing of the PRC's willingness to ease its transport and communication problems, CAR President David Dacko switches recognition from the ROC to the PRC. As expected, the ROC withdrew its embassy and the handicraft demonstration team shortly. In January 1966, President Dacko was overthrown by a military coup, led by Colonel Jean-Bedel Bokassa. Bokassa immediately broke relations with the PRC and expelled the PRC embassy staff on the ground that he had discovered a cache of Chinese weapons and documents indicating that pro-Chinese elements in the CAR had intended, with Peking's aid, to overthrow the Dacko


government. Nevertheless, diplomatic relations between the CAR and the ROC were not restored until more than two years later in May 1968. This was followed by a technical cooperation agreement between the two countries and a 16-man ROC agricultural mission to the CAR.

After that the ROC's aid to the CAR grew steadily and in response Bokassa demonstrated his support for the ROC in the U.N. Nevertheless, for reasons that remain unclear, Bokassa abstained in the vote on the China Issue in 1970, much to the dismay of the ROC government.

In the case of Dahomey, an ex-French colony, a change of the head of state—which had undergone 6 coups in 10 years since its independence in 1960, always resulted in a new China policy. Its first President Hubert Maga, established diplomatic relations with the ROC in January 1962, and was overthrown in October 1963, while visiting Taiwan. The new leftist government established diplomatic relations with the PRC in November 1964, although the ROC did not sever relations with Dahomey until April one year later.

3. William Glenn, op.cit., p. 31. Following the abstention of the CAR in the U.N. voting, a statement was issued by Bokassa in an interview with the magazine Africasia that he was ready to resume relations with Peking, if it wished.
After a second coup in November 1965, and a third in December, a new military government was set up which broke off relations with Peking in January 1966, and reinstated relations with Taipei in April, thus ending the PRC's first brief period of official relations with Dahomey.\(^1\) However, after three more coups in December 1967, December 1969, and October 1972, Dahomey again reversed its China policy by resuming diplomatic relations with the PRC in November 1972.\(^2\) Despite these rather erratic diplomatic relations, Dahomey had always voted for the ROC since 1966.

To sum up then, the above findings justify our hypothesis that the Operation Vanguard project was largely effective politically until the ROC's loss of membership of the U.N. in 1971.

Having said this, however, we have another reservation: we could not really come to a final assessment on the value of the ROC's aid based solely upon its 1971 defeat in the U.N. This is because there were still 18 African countries (of these 17 were ROC aid recipients, the only non-aid recipient was South Africa) supporting the ROC in the 1971 vote when the majority of African countries cast a negative vote.\(^3\)

Another point worth mentioning is that there were two major shifts of African support for the ROC: the first

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shift occurred during the years 1963-1965, and the second after 1969. This raises another question: Were these periods of decline in African support an indication of ineffectiveness of the ROC's aid? Can the rise in African support during these two time periods be attributed to the ROC's aid? To answer these questions, we need to consider some other external factors which contributed to changes of African voting patterns.

3. Factors that influenced the African voting patterns: changing international environment

Since some of the external factors have already been discussed earlier, we will now concentrate on only a few issues which, though not directly related to the ROC aid programme, may help to explain more fully the effectiveness of the ROC's aid strategy. From 1960 to 1971, the most important issues external to Africa but which had a profound influence upon the China policy of African states were: (1) the growing tide of opinion in favour of admitting the PRC to the U.N., (2) France's new China policy after 1964, (3) the PRC's diplomatic setbacks in Third World countries, (4) the PRC's Cultural Revolution and (5) the modification of U.S. pro-ROC policy. The issues will be examined with a view to explaining two shifts of African support for the ROC, 1963-1965 and 1969-1971.

(1) The mood in favour of admitting the PRC to the U.N.

Prior to the Korean War, the main argument heard against seating Peking was that the representation question should be deferred until a majority of countries recognized the PRC.
After 1950 when the U.N. characterized the PRC as an aggressor, those opposed to seating Peking used the argument that the Peking government did not meet the U.N. Charter’s requirement that members be “peace-loving states”. The U.S., in addition to citing the Korean aggression, pointed to Peking’s intervention in Indochina—Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia—and to its attacks on the offshore islands.

Nevertheless, there were always countries sympathetic to the PRC and this feeling grew stronger after the early 1960s. These countries, for instance Cameroon, Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone, etc., impressed by the greatness of its size, population and potential power, and possibly by promises of aid, often expressed the urgent need to admit Peking into the U.N. Their arguments for the PRC were thus largely based on the so-called “Chinese reality”. For instance, Bakoto of the Cameroon stated: “Cameroon acknowledges...the existence in continental China of an authority which exercises effective control over the population. The reality is manifested not only by the Government’s ability to lead the country towards its destiny, but also by the influence which the People’s Republic of China wields in international affairs." 1 Similarly, Alex Quaison-Sacky of Ghana maintained “We believe that the People’s Republic of China, representing some 630 million people, and with the vast economic, scientific and technological resources that it is rapidly developing, can make a

useful and constructive contribution towards the maintenance of peace and the advancement of civilization in our time".\(^1\)

Moreover, "it is the People’s Republic of China, not part of China (Taiwan), which is a great power. If we ignore it, we do so at our own peril".\(^2\) Also Diallo Telli, the Ambassador of Guinea, regarded the PRC as the only effective government of China because "...the Taiwan Government is a refugee government, under the military protection of the U.S.".\(^3\) Ambassador Collier of Sierra Leone also argued that the "Taiwan delegation is in no way adequate to represent China", rather, "the PRC should be admitted to the United Nations in keeping with the best traditions of an organization which has accepted the principle of universality as one of the foundation stones of its existence".\(^4\)

Another example was Nigeria, which advocated the "Two Chinas" solution seating in 1961, but after 1965 supported the seating of the PRC at Taiwan's expense.\(^5\) Even Pope Paul VI and UN Secretary General U Thant shared the view that the PRC should be represented in the U.N. for the peace of Asia and the world. Pope Paul VI was quoted as saying: "Your vocation is to bring not only some of the peoples,

1. GAOR, Plenary Meetings, 1072nd Meeting (16th December 1961), GAOR Fifteenth Session, Plenary Meetings, 869th (Paragraphs 77 and 78).
2. GAOR Fifteenth Session, p. 345.
but all of the peoples, to fraternize." ¹ This included bringing in 700 million Mainland Chinese to the U.N. Similarly favouring universality of UN membership, U Thant said in 1966, "I believe in universality. I believe that all countries and all States should become Members of the United Nations." ²

Consequently, the argument went, many international problems especially international disarmament, could not be discussed adequately or reach a fruitful settlement without the PRC's participation in the international institutions through which negotiations normally took place.

It was argued that with the explosion of its first nuclear bomb in 1964, in conjunction with its military manpower and aggressive nature (as indicated in the Korean War) plus the fact that it was not a signatory of the nuclear test ban treaty, the PRC could very possibly be a threat to international peace and security. Thus, it was a political necessity to bring the PRC into the U.N. The situation became less favourable to the ROC when the PRC undertook a more active programme in developing its external relations. For instance, it not only showed more interest in applying for U.N. membership, but also began to pursue a friendly course towards the outside world, especially, like the ROC, with those newly independent African countries. In this regard, Chou En-lai's African tour which covered 10 African countries on one trip in early 1964 was a big boost to the

¹. GAOR 1308th Meeting, p. 8. Or General Assembly, 4th October 1965, UN Document A/PV. 1347, p. 3.
². Secretary-General/Statements and Messages/436.
PRC's diplomatic life because, shortly afterwards, several countries including Tunisia, Kenya, Tanzania, the CAR, Dahomey, Zambia and Senegal extended diplomatic recognition. In July 1965, Mauritania also followed suit. This was clearly a diplomatic loss to the ROC not only because 3 pro-ROC countries, the CAR, Dahomey and Mauritania, had switched their diplomatic ties but also because former non-aligned countries had decided to extend recognition to Peking. This helps to explain why the ROC's aid effort in Africa was not fully appreciated there.

Simultaneously, after 1964, the PRC further intensified its overseas aid programmes with the conclusion of a large number of economic and technical cooperation agreements with countries in Africa (Algeria, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda, and the U.A.R.), in Asia and in Latin America.¹ Hardly any of these countries voted for the ROC in the U.N.

(2) Shift of French position and its impact upon world opinion

Another external development which brought Peking new prestige in a part of Africa—the West—was France's new China policy. On 27th January 1964, France and the PRC established diplomatic relations. Two days later, a Jen-min jih-pao editorial acclaimed this as "another major achievement of China's foreign policy" proving that "the scheme of U.S.

1. For the PRC's aid to these regions, see John F. Copper, op.cit.
imperialism and its followers to isolate China is doomed to complete failure”. The repercussions of the French decision were obvious, not only because France was a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, but also because France under Charles de Gaulle was trying to establish its credentials as a "non-aligned" power in East-West rivalry, and France still had close relations with numerous French-speaking countries in Africa which had not yet recognized Peking.

The PRC considered the French recognition could increase Peking's prestige in countries of the Third World in general and in former French Africa in particular. The results were indeed favourable, but much more limited than Peking expected. That is, generally speaking, de Gaulle's decision was less well received in former French Africa than in the rest of the continent. There were then 14 former French colonies in black Africa. Two of these, Guinea and Mali, had been unfriendly to France since independence, and had recognized Peking since 1959 and 1960, respectively. As expected, they openly praised de Gaulle's action in 1964. The other 12 ex-French colonies--or the U.A.M. members--however, all had diplomatic relations with the ROC, and as mentioned earlier, only 3 (the Congo, the CAR and Dahomey) followed France's example in switching to recognize Peking. Senegal switched recognition from the ROC to a neutral position. And Mauritania recognized the PRC a year later, bringing the total number of African countries.

recognizing the PRC to 16. Also affected was the voting behaviour of these countries: the CAR switched from opposition to support for the PRC seating. Mauritania, switched from abstention to a similar position of support. Senegal, abstaining from the vote previously, no longer voted in opposition to the PRC. Seven countries—Cameroon, Chile, Cyprus, Iran, Jamaica, Libya, Rwanda and Nigeria—which had voted against the PRC in 1963, voted in favour of its admission in 1965. Among these "inconsistent" countries there were 8 from Africa, and with 6 of them the ROC had had aid relations. But other countries rejected the French example and maintained relations with the ROC, partly because of their apprehension regarding the PRC's covert support of dissident groups in various African countries. Three of these countries—Malagasy Republic, Ivory Coast, and Upper Volta—sharply criticized France's action.1

In all, then, there were several factors that influenced the U.N. voting on the China Issue during the period 1963-1965. In addition to the growing mood in favour of accommodating the PRC, and France's new China policy, there was concurrently the waning influence of the U.S. on its allies, and, in contrast, the increasing weight of the PRC in the Third World. All these reasons made the ROC's position less popular and more controversial, as shown by the increasingly tight votes on the China Issue at the U.N.2

1. Interview with Yang Hsi-K'un, 21st May 1979.
2. See Appendix No. 2.
Thus, we find that the ROC's aid was not sufficiently rewarding to be effective in maintaining support on its own. This can be seen in the fact that in 1963 the ROC dispatched only 7 aid missions to African and yet obtained 14 favourable votes against the Soviet proposal to seating the PRC. This level of support was identical to the number of African countries which recognized the ROC. Later on, however, despite a continuous increase in the number of ROC's aid missions to Africa in both 1964 and 1965, the patterns of African voting support declined sharply. In other words, the level of the pro-Taipei African countries was disproportionate to the level of ROC aid dispatched. Thus, on the contrary, the pro-Taipei vote decreased from 14 to 8 in 1965 whilst the number of aid missions increased from 6 to 16.

(3) The PRC's diplomatic setback in the Third World countries

Despite Peking's aid efforts in the Third World countries, not all its aid programmes brought favourable results. In 1965 and after, for example, domestic upheavals in some African countries and in Indonesia actually brought reverses for the PRC's diplomatic campaign there. This was largely due to criticism of the PRC's involvement in these countries' internal affairs. Through the granting of aid, the PRC also involved itself in the encouragement of coups or in clandestine support for political factions in several countries, for instance, in Burundi and Indonesia in 1965, in the CAR in 1966, in Tunisia and Kenya in 1967, and in Nigeria from 1967 to 1971.¹ This political involvement significantly affected

1. See Bruce D. Larkin, op.cit., pp. 125-147. For the PRC's involvement in the attempted coup in Indonesia in 1965, see Congressional Quarterly, China: U.S. Policy since 1945, pp. 156 and 160.
its diplomatic reputation abroad. For instance, all the aforementioned countries which accused the PRC of political infiltration, severed ties with Peking (Nigeria refrained from recognition of Peking until 1971). As a result, Peking's aid operation (except for Nigeria because it did not receive aid from Peking until 1972) in these countries were also disrupted. Naturally, one should not ignore the fact that the PRC's diplomatic setbacks after the mid-1960s were also partly due to the fact that some formerly pro-PRC countries, e.g. Ghana, Dahomey, the CAR and Indonesia, had changed their political stance as a result of coups at home. Thus, they were less keen on supporting the PRC. In this regard, we can argue that this fluid situation helped the ROC to deter PRC's gain in the U.N. At the same time, one should also take into account the fact that after the mid-1960s, the ROC's aid in Africa began to show results. Despite its inception in 1961, the Vanguard project only began to expand at a steady pace after 1963. It was only after 1965 that concrete results of the project began to register. In a way, we can argue that there existed a certain correlation between African voting support for the ROC and the latter's aid to the former because the increase of African pro-ROC votes developed in line with the volume of the ROC's aid activities. Yet even so, it is risky to conclude that the ROC's aid alone was the cause of upsetting Peking's diplomatic build up in African, and some of the reasons have just been mentioned. We can merely assume that the above issues, put together, created a diplomatic obstacle for the PRC, hence a lift to the ROC's strength, or at least helped the ROC to retain its previous diplomatic level in Africa.
The PRC's Cultural Revolution

The domestic upheavels in some African countries coincided with the domestic upheavals of the Cultural Revolution in China. The Cultural Revolution brought to China not only some years of internal confusion and economic regression, but also, externally, a suspension of its normal diplomatic life. For instance, on 20th September 1966, the PRC ordered all foreign students, numbering approximately 1,000 and mostly from Afro-Asian countries and Albania, to leave the country.\footnote{1} Also in December, Peking began calling its ambassadors home to be "re-educated" and to answer charges levelled against them by Red Guards. By late 1967, 45 of the 46 PRC ambassadors had returned home, only Huang Hua, ambassador to Cairo, remaining at his post. All other PRC embassies around the world were headed by chargés d'affaires.\footnote{2} The situation was obviously discouraging. And it certainly had very negative effects on PRC's relations with many Third World countries. For instance, in Africa, as noted earlier, diplomatic relations between the PRC and Dahomey, Burundi, the CAR, Ghana and Tunisia were broken or suspended; those


2. Daniel Tretiak, "Disappearing Act", FEER, LIX, 6 (8th February 1968), p. 216; and "China's Foreign Policy and International Position during a year of Cultural Revolution", Current Scene, V, 20 (1st November 1969), p. 3. For the list of the recalled diplomats, see Shu-chiu mei-jen yu ssu-hsiang tou-cheng (Fine wine, beautiful women and ideological struggle). (Hong Kong, 1968), pp. 62-65. Huang Hua was recalled to Peking on 14th July 1969, when the Cultural Revolution was already over.
with Kenya were reduced to a state of fiction by the mutual withdrawal of all diplomatic personnel without formal severance of relations. It is true that some of these breaks were precipitated by governmental changes in African countries, but the violence and political instability in China was at least a major contributing factor. Consequently, by the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1969, when the number of independent African countries had increased to 42, the number that continued to maintain diplomatic relations with Peking had fallen to 13, compared to 16 in 1964 and 14 in 1965 when PRC activities in Africa reached a peak. This diplomatic setback, however, does not suggest that those non-committed countries would therefore favour extending ties with the ROC despite that it maintained 22 formal African relations in 1969. Rather, it meant that there was no concrete diplomatic gain for the PRC, and consequently, by implication, no diplomatic losses for the ROC.

Despite the promising situation for the ROC at that time, pro-Taipei sentiment in the U.N. began to drop again after 1969 and this time it was fatal not only in terms of the ROC's legitimacy struggle in the U.N. and in other world organizations, but, above all, in terms of the subsequent evolution of the ROC's foreign policy and external relations.

Two inter-related reasons can account for this anti-ROC development: (a) the changing international environment and (b) the modification of the U.S.'s pro-Taipei policy. They will be examined briefly and simultaneously because most of them have already been discussed in Chapter Four.
The changing international environment and the modification of U.S. pro-Taipei policy

To some extent, the emergence of international détente had lessened tension between nations and encouraged economic cooperation instead of ideological and military confrontations characteristic of the Cold War. Even the two Superpowers had, though still with some hesitancy and with extreme caution, and despite the Vietnam War, come to see the declining utility value of direct military and ideological warfare as means of achieving national objectives. As noted in the last Chapter, the U.S. had modified its conventional foreign policy framework of "containment".

At this time by the end of 1960s, the pro-PRC faction in the U.S. administration had gained strength. This group of people often argued that a continued insistence on military containment, hence a continued isolation of Peking and prevention of its admission into the U.N., was not only unrealistic but harmful to the U.S.'s national interests. Conversely, the strength of the pro-ROC faction in the U.S. administration began to decline, and this was particularly evident with regard to the gradual disintegration of the China Lobby.

In a way, it can be argued that the modified American attitude was developed in conformity with the trend of international development, but it is hard to tell to what extent the international tides had influenced the process of U.S. decision-making, or vice versa. Thus, America's new China policy might have had enormous impact upon world
opinion, or it might have been the other way around. Probably, a balanced judgement would be to consider that both factors actually reinforced each other culminating in the fatal vote on the China Issue in 1971. Such a conclusion seems plausible since, towards the end of 1960s, international support for the ROC began to dwindle, whilst support for the PRC increased. Concurrently, international confidence in U.S. prestige and supremacy faded. As a result of this anti-U.S. sentiment, some former pro-ROC countries also adopted an indifferent attitude or cast a negative vote on the China Issue, and thus affected the ROC's fate at the U.N.

All in all, as far as the ROC was concerned, nothing was more critical than the new American China policy. The U.S. no longer insisted on its previous claim that "the Nationalist government on Taiwan is the only rightful Government of all China, including the Mainland", but that "both Nationalist China on Taiwan and Communist China on Mainland are facts of life". This, expressed by U.S. delegate to the U.N. Christopher H. Philips, was interpreted as being aimed at creating "Two Chinas".¹

IV. Conclusion

Foreign aid was used during the 1960s as an adjunct to the strategy of political counterattack by the ROC to help ensure national survival. The priority targets of the policy were to retain the ROC seat in the U.N., to challenge the PRC for diplomatic recognition on the African continent, as well as to preserve the status quo of the Nationalist government's power position on Taiwan island.

Between its inception in 1961 and October 1971, the ROC's aid to Africa showed both strengths and weaknesses. However, after more than two decades of struggle, the ROC still failed to block the PRC from entry into the organization. Since then, the ROC's aid programme in Africa has evidenced substantial decline. This was caused partly by the changing political climate in Africa and partly by the ROC's continued insistence on the "one China" principle. That is, on the one hand, most of the "friendly" African countries, either with or without aid relations with Taipei, after the latter's departure from the U.N., preferred to establish relations with Peking and considered it as the Chinese reality. On the other hand, Taipei made its position clear that as soon as the host country entered into diplomatic relations with Peking, the ROC would withdraw its aid missions. An additional point was that, after the ROC's departure from the U.N., the utility value of foreign aid seemed to have lost its original significance. Consequently, by early 1979, the ROC maintained diplomatic relations with only 5 countries in Africa: Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland and South Africa (see Table no. 11). And there
were only seven technical missions from the ROC with 179 members still stationed in Africa. Compared to the situation in the mid-1960s, it was apparent that a large number of the established technical missions had been withdrawn since 1971. The 5 countries with whom the ROC still shared bilateral ties consisted of South Africa and four others whose foreign policies were either bound up with, or dependent upon, South Africa. Two of them, Lesotho and Swaziland, are actually located inside the territory of South Africa. Whilst Ivory Coast and Malawi both advocated dialogue with white-ruled South Africa and were estranged somewhat from many other African countries. It is also worth mentioning that Malawi is the only black African state to have diplomatic relations with South Africa, and moreover, like South Africa, it is also strongly anti-Communist.

Finally, mention should also be made of the strengths and weaknesses of the Vanguard project itself. Our approach has been to point out some of the advantages and disadvantages of the project in comparison to the PRC's aid operations in Africa.

One important factor affecting the Vanguard project was the size of Taiwan in comparison to the huge mainland. The PRC is about 266 times as large as the ROC, with 50 to 60 times as many people. The difference in natural resources is of similar magnitude. Indeed, the PRC is of course much larger than any African countries, and has a population more than double that of the entire African continent. Impressed or probably frightened by this enormous size, it was quite
natural to presume that most Africans would prefer Peking to Taipei. Of course, one could equally argue that it was because of this small size that the ROC held certain advantages: at least the ROC did not frighten Africans, or arouse suspicion or anxiety. Nevertheless the limited amount of resources available was a very important constraint. Secondly, by refraining from subversive activity, Taipei could claim that it had no imperialistic or expansionist intentions in Africa. Naturally, as a UN member, the ROC felt obliged to carry out its diplomatic activities through conventional methods. Moreover, because of its limited resources and its preoccupation with the Chinese civil war, the ROC was unable to undertake any such actions in a remote area. Although on the one hand, this "no politics but friendship and aid" sounded rather impressive, on the other hand, it served little to meet the demands of some radical African countries. In this regard, the PRC was never hesitant about using clandestine means when necessary. This had brought it quick results. In conjunction with this, the third factor affecting the performance of the Vanguard project was the ROC's vagueness in ideological commitment. Despite its basic principle of anti-Communism, Taipei never emphasized, as Peking did, any Cold War ideological preference, in its dealings with African countries. On the one hand, this enabled the ROC to base its aid programmes totally on local needs and the economic conditions of the recipients,

except for the condition that the latter must not recognize the PRC. On the other hand, however, precisely because of this refrain from political involvement or ideological commitment, African recipients felt that aid committed them to nothing. They normally exploited the situation (i.e. the ROC-PRC competition) to their advantage, or, if possible, preferred to receive aid from both Chinas without committing themselves to either side. Fourthly, and finally, the ROC's aid, though impressive to some African countries, was unable to compete in size and number of projects with the PRC, which could afford large projects of highway or railway constructions. In fact, shortage of aid funds was one of the main reasons why many African countries who had received aid from Taipei during the 1960s turned to Peking in the 1970s. In this connection, it is necessary to say a few words about the financing of the Vanguard Project. Initially most of the aid projects were financed solely by the ROC government. By the late 1960s, it cost Taipei U.S.$7 million a year, and in 1969 alone, African missions and training programmes cost Taipei U.S.$10 million dollars. Actually since the beginning of 1968, the U.S. had indirectly provided most of the necessary money.

1. Generally this principle has been strictly followed. One notable exception was Libya, which recognized Peking in 1971 but still received agricultural aid from Taipei. Taipei made this exception apparently because Libya had not established official diplomatic relations with Peking and there was still an ROC embassy in Libya. The ROC withdrew its mission from Libya in mid-1978 when Libya officially extended diplomatic relations with Peking.

2. Interview with Yang Hsi-k'un.

Whether or not the ROC's aid served as an indirect channel for U.S. aid to Africa in this context was unclear, but some African countries did at times feel unhappy about supporting the ROC because of this imperialist connection.
Chapter Six
The Strategy of Economics-and
Trade-first Diplomacy

The ROC's defeat in the U.N. in October 1971 represented a remarkable turning point in the history of its foreign policy and external relations. This was because since then the ROC, with increasing international recognition of its Communist rival as the rightful spokesman for all China, has faced a heightened identity crisis and even more severe international isolation. The ROC has had therefore to display a high degree of adjustment and flexibility in the conduct of its foreign policy and external relations. Such revolutionary adjustments and extraordinary flexibility will be the main theme of our present study.

This Chapter will first introduce the environment that confronted the ROC after 1971, and the foreign policy options available to the ROC during the 1970s to develop its foreign policy strategy of "economics-and trade-first diplomacy". Then, focusing on this strategy, we will examine the motivations, objectives, principles and measures involved, as well as the structure and operation of the strategy. We also include in our study a very brief history of Taiwan's post-War economic development to facilitate understanding of the operation of the economic strategy. In a brief concluding section, we will provide a preliminary assessment regarding the effectiveness of the strategy, and review a few of the problems now confronting policy-makers in Taiwan.
I. The ROC after the U.N.-expulsion and the international environment

During the 1970s the political landscape in Asia as well as in the international arena experienced another rapid change with the communist victories in Indochina. The U.S. was decreasing its attempts to block this advance and, while preparing itself for a gradual but overall military and political withdrawal from the Asian mainland, had now definitely turned to efforts at détente with the PRC and the Soviet Union, the big powers behind the Indochina communists. The situation implied the development of a more complicated pattern of international power relationships in which the PRC and, to a lesser extent, Japan, Western Europe, and the newly independent countries, all had acquired almost equal influence to that of the two Cold War leaders in the international arena.

The Southeast Asian countries were also adjusting to this new situation by moving into relationships with the PRC and were to varying degrees placing less reliance on the influence of the U.S. in Asia. Many other former allies of the ROC had also taken similar steps--whether through the "Canadian formula" or the "Japanese model"--to desert it and establish bilateral relations with the PRC. The "Canadian formula" meant agreement to terminate diplomatic relations with the ROC as a condition for establishing them with the PRC. Almost all major western nations shifted their China policy in this manner. The "Japanese model" differed from
"Canadian formula" in that Japan, after switching diplomatic relationships with the ROC to the PRC, still maintained quasi-governmental relationships with the ROC, an outcome which was unintended by the PRC but which it has tolerated, as it has the new U.S. China policy after 1979. More than 100 countries since the end of 1970 have shifted their China policies, leaving, until January 1979, only 21 countries, most of them small, still recognizing the Nationalist government officially. Among these countries, in Asia, the ROK is the only one left having diplomatic ties with Taipei. In Europe only the Holy See still maintains diplomatic contacts with Taipei; and in the Americas and Africa (except for South Africa and Saudi Arabia) only a handful of less influential countries continue recognition. The ROC's main foreign and only big-power supporter, the U.S., after prolonged internal debates and struggles on the issue, also decided to terminate its commitment. In actuality, when the U.S. implicitly recognized that "Taiwan is a part of China" in the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué, the U.S. had already ended, if not officially then at least theoretically, its Cold War policy. The Communiqué was issued on 27th February 1972 at the conclusion of President Nixon's trip to the PRC. One of the declaration in this Communiqué was that:

"The U.S. acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interests in a peaceful

1. See Appendix No. 4.
2. Ibid.
settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, the United States reaffirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes. 1

On 1st January 1979, the U.S. moved its embassy from Taipei to Peking.

A very significant implication of the U.S. de-recognition proposal was the automatic termination of the 1954 Mutual Defence Treaty—a Treaty which had served to protect Taiwan's security and to sustain the Nationalist soldiers' morale for the last two and a half decades. Four months later the U.S. pulled out its remaining military personnel from Taiwan. Although the U.S. continued to maintain an intensive degree of commercial, cultural and other sorts of relations with the Nationalist government (which was now commonly referred to as the Taipei or the Taiwan government), this diplomatic loss and its repercussions for the ROC were incalculable. Consequently, except for Saudi Arabia, South Africa and those other smaller countries, the ROC's diplomatic life almost ceased to exist.

Conversely, the PRC had moved more and more towards big power status with countries eagerly looking to it for political, diplomatic, economic, social and cultural exchanges. As noted earlier, corresponding to the changed world environment, the PRC had already taken a more active foreign policy line after the ending of the Cultural

1. For the text, see Congressional Quarterly, China, U.S. Policy Since 1945, pp. 323-325.
Revolution in 1969. Now Peking sought to expel Taipai from various international organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA), the Asian Development Bank and many others. The purpose of such actions were to relegate the ROC to the status of "non-country", to push it further into the diplomatic dead-end of complete isolation, and to persuade it to disavow its decades-long struggle against Peking and Communism and to allow itself to be incorporated into the PRC, thus fulfilling the objective of national unification.

Here, it is necessary to mention very briefly the domestic political situation of the ROC during the 1970s. The loss of the ROC's seat at the U.N. and the serious impact of this upon its international status temporarily united the people on Taiwan. As R.N. Clough observed: "Mainlanders and Taiwanese agreed, particularly after the ROC lost its UN seat and the U.S. changed policy toward the PRC, that all their resources and efforts should be concentrated on the development and defense of Taiwan". This sense of the need for national unity was enhanced in 1975 with the death of President Chiang Kai-shek. As mentioned in Chapter One, Chiang Kai-shek, though not an effective leader when he was on the mainland, and despite the damage to his prestige suffered as a result of the loss of the mainland to the Communists, and Taiwanese dissatisfaction under Nationalist

1. See Appendix No. 5.
2. R.N. Clough, op.cit., p. 46.
rule, was regarded by the people on the island as a stabilizing factor for the internal unity of the island nation. It was Chiang alone who held the Nationalist system together in Taiwan under his leadership and he was widely accepted among the Chinese on Taiwan, both mainlanders and native Taiwanese. In other words, from the time that Chiang assumed control of the national government of the ROC on Taiwan, the general acceptance of his legitimacy as a national leader was an important stabilizing factor for Nationalist government in Taiwan. His death did not weaken the internal stability of Taiwan. On the contrary, the orderly and constitutional transfer of power to his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, plus the latter's rather flexible and less formal style of leadership demonstrated both in domestic political reforms and in external relations seemed to promote further national unity.¹ In 1976, Chiang Kai-shek's opponent Mao Tse-tung died. With the departure of these two most powerful figures in recent Chinese history, relations between the mainland and Taiwan seemed to relax in a very subtle manner.

Two reasons can account for this development. Firstly, the new generations on both sides of the Taiwan Straits have less personal experience of the Nationalist-Communist hostility than their parents, despite strenous efforts by the two parties to indoctrinate them in the history of the struggle. Hence there is a possibility that they may adopt a different approach to resolve the unification problem.

¹. For information on Chiang Ching-kuo's leadership style, see Chapter One, footnote no. 1, p. 37. For information on his domestic political reform, see Chapter One, footnote no. 2, p. 66, also the following footnote.
(i.e. through peaceful means). Secondly, there was the gradual decline in U.S. support for the Nationalists' cause, which forced the Nationalists to accept the reality that if they decided to continue their hostility against the Chinese Communists, they would have to fight alone. Consequently, Chiang Ching-kuo reckoned that the way to national survival was not only to resist Communist ideology, but also, more importantly, to build up a democratic government with a strong economy and military strength, and sufficient internal political and social stability in Taiwan. Hence under Chiang Ching-kuo's leadership, the emphasis of the Nationalists' fight for survival and legitimacy have shifted from a purely ideological confrontation with the Communists, a persistent territorial claim against the mainland government, and an intransigent power contest with the CCP, to a defensive position of preserving the Nationalists' ideology, of safeguarding those territories still under the Nationalists' control, of creating a good political image, and, ultimately, of cultivating a unique identity. Thus, internally, Chiang Ching-kuo made explicit efforts to increase Taiwanese participation in the political system. Chiang's efforts began towards the end of 1960s. For example, in the early 1950s only about half of those taking civil service examinations were Taiwanese but towards the end of 1960s, when Chiang Ching-kuo was already in charge of the ROC's national affairs due to his father's ill health, the figure rose to about 92%. At the same time, over 90% of those passing the examination were Taiwanese,
and of the very highest scores 94.87% were Taiwanese.\(^1\) This trend continued after Chiang Kai-shek's death in 1975. Young Chiang's purpose was to increase the level of democracy as well as to promote his political popularity (hence legitimacy) among the local Taiwanese majority. At the same time, Chiang Ching-kuo recruited a group of intelligent, well-educated and relatively young technical experts into top leadership positions in the Party and the government, with the clear indication that the priority of his strategy for survival would be to place emphasis on economic planning, science and education.\(^2\) It was against this background that the ROC developed a new foreign policy strategy during the 1970s. Loosely defined, this was (and still is) the strategy of "economics-and trade-first diplomacy". The strategy became possible only because of the internal economic development on Taiwan. This was a strategy which, instead of the traditional norm of bilateral official state-to-state (or government-to-government) political relations, put emphasis on the "economic" and "unofficial" aspects of exchanges.

In addition to the economic strategy, however, the ROC also considered other foreign policy options, such as the "Japan option", the "Soviet option", the "nuclear option", and the "Independence option". However, this does not suggest that the ROC, in searching for alternative foreign policy options,

1. J.B. Jacobs, "Recent Leadership and Political Trends in Taiwan", The China Quarterly, 45 (January/March 1971), p. 141. The article provides a good account of Chiang Ching-kuo's efforts before he took office to increase Taiwanese participation in the political system.
2. Ibid., especially pp. 143-149.
has therefore ignored its relations with the U.S. The ROC continued to regard the U.S. as its foremost foreign friend and placed cooperation with it as its top foreign policy priority, despite the latter's "unsympathetic" attitude expressed in the Shanghai Communiqué. Indeed, afterwards, the ROC continued, and to some extent intensified, its attempts to impress on the American people the importance to the U.S. of retaining its connections with Taiwan. This can be seen from the fact that since the early 1970s, the ROC's programme to invite U.S. dignitaries, particularly those who had been to mainland China, to visit Taiwan was stepped up. Special arrangements were also established, after 1979, to cope with possible awkward situations caused by the termination of diplomatic relations. Nevertheless, as a natural consequence of U.S. de-recognition, the ROC's dependence on the U.S. had definitely declined towards the end of 1970s. The role of the U.S.—and hence the ROC's policies towards and relations with the U.S.—will be discussed merely occasionally in this Chapter. In other words, emphasis will be placed on the ROC's economic strategy and other foreign policy options.

II. Alternative ROC foreign policy options

1. The Japan option

After the Second World War, Japan conducted a very unusual

1. The material relating to this Japan option is drawn chiefly from R.N. Clough's Island China, section on "Japan's Relations with Taiwan", pp. 173-202; also from John F. Copper's "Taiwan's Strategy and America's China Policy", Orbis, XXI.2 (Summer 1977), pp. 261-276.
China policy of "one China in principle and two Chinas in practice". This peculiar relationship has already been described very briefly in Chapter Four. Thus, our focus here will be on the factors that discouraged the ROC in an active pursuit of the Japan option.

Japan's fundamental policy towards the two parts of China has been to develop as profitable relations as possible with each. In following this policy, however, Japanese governments have been constrained by many considerations: for example, deep differences among political parties—the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and the oppositions, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and the Japan Communist Party (JCP)—over relations with China, constant domestic conflict over this issue, compounded by varying pressures from the U.S., and from the two Chinese governments. The three political parties hold very different views on Japan's relations with the two Chinese governments. The LDP, which has governed Japan throughout almost the entire post-War period, tends to be sympathetic towards the ROC, while the oppositions take the side of the PRC. To make the issue more complicated, there are splits within each of the major parties. For example, the pro-Peking figures in the LDP will criticize government policy and press for close relations with the PRC. They will even make remarks on government policies towards the U.S., or the Soviet Union, or the ROC.¹

In brief, until September 1972, Japan's diplomatic and other official relations were only with the ROC, but trade was conducted with both "Chinas". Or to put it more precisely,

¹. For more information, see R.N. Clough, op.cit.
Japan was pursuing a policy of "frontdoor relations with Taiwan and simultaneous backdoor relations with mainland China". After the establishment of diplomatic relations with the mainland government in September 1972, however, Japan performed an entirely reversed policy—"a frontdoor relations with mainland China and a backdoor relations with Taiwan". All official relations were therefore with the mainland government, but Japan continued to conduct trade with both mainland China and Taiwan. In order to manage trade and extensive people-to-people contacts in the absence of diplomatic ties, the Japanese government devised a number of institutions and techniques, first to deal with the mainland government (prior to September 1972) and later (after September 1972) with the Taiwan government. Thus, in 1962, two trade offices - the Liao Ch'eng-chih Liaison Office in Tokyo and the Takasaki Liaison Office in Peking - were set up for long-term trade between the PRC and Japan. Those who staffed the liaison offices, although not recognized as representatives of their governments, were in fact government officials and carried on a variety of quasi-diplomatic functions. After diplomatic relations were terminated between Japan and the ROC, Japan opened a Japan Interchange Association in Taipei, and the ROC opened an Association of East Asia Relations in Tokyo. These offices, with similar functions to legation, represented the Japanese solution to the problem of how to maintain unofficial relations with the ROC after recognizing the PRC. The offices were staffed by regular diplomats who were on "temporary" secondment.1

Clearly, neither the Taiwan government nor the mainland government accepted in principle the concept of "separating politics and economics" used by the Japanese government to justify its policy, nor the sharp distinction between "official" and "unofficial" relations in dealing with the two Chinese governments, but they went along with these so-called "pragmatic" policies in practice.

The ROC's acceptance of Japan's "unprincipled" action was based on the estimation that relations with Japan were too important to be jeopardized, because Japan was not only its number one political supporter in Asia (after 1972, Japan has refrained from supporting the ROC politically and diplomatically) but also the most important trading partner in this region.

For decades after the 1952 Peace Treaty, the ROC's attitudes towards Japan were mixed. On the one hand, it wanted to promote close collaboration between the two island countries. On the other hand, the ROC was constantly haunted by the fear that such a collaboration would one day lead to a sort of "economic domination" or "political conspiracy" by the Japanese. The ROC was convinced that it was essential to encourage economic relations between the two islands as it might contribute to Taiwan's rapid economic growth. More importantly, it also reckoned on political advantages from increasing Japan's economic stake in Taiwan. Nevertheless, the Nationalists had not forgotten the colonial connection between the two islands, and the difference between the Taiwanese majority and the mainlander minority on Taiwan island. In other words, the Nationalists had to take into
account a possible political link between "business circles" and the Taiwanese Independence Movement in formulating their policies towards Japan.

There were almost 50,000 Chinese residents in Japan, mostly Taiwanese, and they had friends and relatives in Taiwan. They could be roughly divided into three groups: the pro-ROC (whether pro-Nationalist or pro-Taiwan), the pro-PRC, and the indifferent. Prior to 1972, the Nationalists knew that they could not prevent trade and other forms of unofficial relations between Japan and the Chinese mainland, but whenever the Japanese government seemed about to confer a more official character on those relations, the ROC would act to mobilize the influence of the pro-Nationalist politicians and businessmen in Japan to discourage the government. Indeed, certain businessmen from Taiwan who were both close to the government and well-connected in Japan were indispensable as intermediaries for handling delicate political matters. Nevertheless, there existed a fundamental difference between the so-called pro-Nationalist group and the pro-Taiwan group. The latter was (and still is) associated with the Taiwanese Independence Movement. The Movement had headquarters in Tokyo. Thus the mainlander-dominated government in Taiwan feared that too intimate a relationship between Japan and Taiwan might be dangerous either in encouraging support in Taiwan for the Independence Movement or serving as a conduit for pro-Communist ideas. Consequently, the ROC acted very cautiously in pursuing its relations with Japan. And this may explain partially why the ROC, despite all the advantages, did not cultivate the "Japan option" to the maximum.
The ROC's "Japan option" assumed the possibility of a security alliance between Taiwan and Japan. In the wake of the Nixon Doctrine and the U.S. loss in Indochina, the ROC became increasingly concerned with its military strength at home and arms supplies from abroad. Obviously when the U.S. finalized its decision to withdraw all U.S. military personnel from Taiwan, the ROC's fears about security and national defense increased. The ROC recognized that Japan assumed no obligation for Taiwan's security and that, for decades, the Japanese government, while acknowledging that security in the Taiwan area was essential to the security of Japan, and hence East Asia, had relied almost entirely on the U.S. to ensure it.\(^1\) The point was that the U.S. regarded Japan as the cornerstone of its Asian defence policy and so would continue to defend Japanese interests even after the Nixon Doctrine. And so presumably, an alliance between Japan and the ROC would indirectly continue the U.S. commitment to Taiwan. Furthermore, the U.S.-Japanese defence treaty, signed in 1951, contains provision for cooperation in the event of overt hostile acts against Taiwan.\(^2\)

1. In November 1969, Eisaku Sato signed a joint communiqué with President Nixon declaring that security in Korea and the Taiwan area was vital to Japan's security. The message implied that Japan assumed some sort of security responsibility toward this area. For the text of the communiqué see *NYT*, 22nd November 1969, p. 14.

2. The Treaty in fact does not include Taiwan explicitly as an area of security cooperation between Japan and the U.S. Nevertheless, article 1 of the Treaty says: "Japan grants, and the U.S. of America accepts, the right...to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about Japan. Such forces may be utilized to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East and to the security of Japan against armed attack...caused through instigation or intervention by an outside power or powers." Thus, implicitly, it includes protection and maintenance of peace and security in and around the Taiwan area. See *American Foreign Policy 1950-1955: Basic Documents*, Vol. 1, pp. 885-886.
Consequently, the ROC did not object, and actually was rather approving, when Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato declared that Taiwan was "within Japan's defence zone"—even though this might have been construed as a violation of sovereignty. After that, it appeared that the ROC was working to encourage the continuation of this "contingency thinking". It was said that the Nationalist officials from Taiwan held frequent meetings with officials from Japan's ruling party, the LDP, particularly those with ties to the Japanese military, to discuss the future of East Asia. Or through some private but politically orientated organizations in both countries, such as the Committee on Japan-China Cooperation on the Japan side, or the World Anti-Communist League on the Taiwan side, the ROC would transmit to the Japanese government messages for promoting mutual collaboration and advancing pan-Asian sentiment. Nationalist officials used these talks to point out the problems Japan would probably experience if Taiwan were to be incorporated into mainland China, such as the vulnerability of Japan's oil life-line, disturbances to trade, and reduction in its influence in South and Southeast Asia.

1. See footnote no. 1, p. 370.
2. John F. Copper, op.cit., p. 269.
3. For more information on the functions and activities of these organizations see R.N. Clough, op.cit., p. 183.
4. John F. Copper, op.cit. p. 269. Similar argument had been given by John Kefner, in "The Future of Taiwan" in America (Jesuits of the U.S. and Canada), CXXXVIII, 8 (4th March 1978), p. 163. In Kefner's opinion, the importance of Taiwan to Japan is not simply as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier", but indirectly, it facilitates Japan's ocean commerce.
Despite all these efforts the ROC's "Japan option" was not effective. Japan remained consistently calm and cautious in conducting its China policy, making itself busy in improving relations with both parts of China, either politically or economically, officially or unofficially, and leaving Taiwan with no choice but merely to follow Japan's policies.

2. The Soviet option

During the 1970s, the theme of ROC's the "Soviet option" was given increased attention. As John F. Copper observed:

"Taipei wants the Soviet Union as a friend and ally in reserve, and it seeks to convey the message to Peking that if the United States evacuates its forces, Taipei has alternatives. Although switching defense ties from Washington to Moscow would be problematical for Taipei, and would involve political and economic bonds that would doubtless be less advantageous, its 'Russian connection' serves as a big bargaining card vis-a-vis Peking. Some even suggest that Taipei's return to the mainland policy is maintained partly at the Krelmin's request and that, as a quid pro quo, Moscow will initiate hostilities on the Sino-Soviet border should Peking prepare to launch an invasion against Taiwan. On the other hand, it is possible that Taipei hopes to achieve an agreement with Peking that there will be no Soviet bases on Taiwan in return for no Chinese military build-up in Fukien Province across the Taiwan Strait." ¹

Similarly, a newspaper editorial commented:

"The issue for Taiwan...is survival. It is true that Taiwan is utterly dependent economically on its trade with the West, particularly with the U.S. But there would be no chance for Taiwan's economic survival if it were to be overrun militarily by force from the mainland. So neither Washington nor Peking should be greatly surprised if, in the not too distant future, a task force of the Soviet Navy should make a courtesy call at the island. Or if"

¹. John F. Copper, ibid.
Taiwan should begin buying MiGs. For the Soviets, the possibility of using Taiwan with its huge shipbuilding and industrial capacity, its airports and manpower, as an impregnable fortress 100 miles from the mainland—a permanent aircraft carrier anchored in the South China Sea—must be an enticing thought indeed..." 1

If the above policy calculations were correct, then the creation of a Taipei-Moscow rapprochment seemed to offer benefits to both parties. Nevertheless, as they did previously, the Nationalist officials flatly denied this "rumour". For instance, then Premier Chiang Ching-kuo outlines specifically four "unchangeable foreign policy principles" in his administration report to the Legislative Yuan in September 1972 with the intention of ending this speculation. One of these principles was said to be the unequivocally "anti-Communist principle" that his government "would never cooperate with the Soviet Union". 2 And this position has been repeated since then in many of his official speeches.

In reality, however, the ROC rather welcomed the circulation of this rumour. There were occasional shreds of information released either officially or in private indicating the possible application of the option. For instance, immediately after its withdrawal from the U.N., ROC Foreign Minister Chou Shu-kai announced that since the ROC had withdrawn from the U.N., it would develop relations both governmental and non-governmental whenever possible and have trade dealings with

2. Two of the four principles clearly implied that the ROC would not become the Republic of Taiwan, and it would not cooperate with the Soviet Union. Chiang's speech was reprinted in the China Yearbook, 1972-1973, p. 9.
nations regardless of diplomatic relations. "There would be no political ties to our trading", Chou remarked "and we are prepared to trade with Communist countries, aside from the Communists in China, if we feel it is to our advantage."

In a similar vein, Chou said, in March 1972, that Taiwan was willing to develop economic and other relations with Communist countries providing they were not "puppets of Communist China". Also, later in February 1973, a report said that Taiwan would lease a naval base in the Pescadores to the Soviet Union if the U.S. recognized Communist China. In May, a squadron of Soviet warships passed through the Taiwan Straits for the first time since 1949. There were also rumours regarding additional trips made by Victor Louis, occasional contacts between Soviet and Nationalist diplomats, and occasional references to Taiwan in the Soviet press.

More explicit messages of a possible Soviet connection appeared in several Chinese newspapers in Taiwan. On 18th July 1978, for example, the China Times carried an article entitled "Exceptional Charges and Exceptional Diplomacy", which argued that the U.S.-Mainland relation was so important that it necessarily had an effect on all other secondary relations in the international system. No one really knew what the U.S. and the Chinese Communists were

3. South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), 17th February 1973.
5. "Intelligence: Comradeship in Taiwan", FEER, LXXXVIII, 26 (27th June 1975), p. 5; see also Chapter Four, the Soviet option.
talking about, the article went on, but regarding Taiwan the central problem was clearly its security from armed attack by the Chinese Communists. Since World War II, it continued, the Soviet Union had been the major opponent of the U.S. and now the U.S. wanted to unite with the Chinese Communists to oppose the Soviet Union. The conclusion of the article was that such an unholy alliance would never come about for a number of reasons. Were it to come about, however, the arguments and logic advanced could easily lead to the conclusion that Taiwan would have to look to the Soviet Union in order to deal with its central problem—Chinese Communist pressure. Later, on 22nd December 1978, a very subtle message was carried in the same newspaper:

"...the U.S.-Chinese Communist deal will open the way for the Kremlin to try to fish in the troubled waters of the Taiwan Straits...This country will never negotiate or deal with Moscow. We want none of Communism in any disguise. The U.S. seems to have dismissed Taiwan's strategic importance. Russian strategists know better. They are aware that this island can outflank the Chinese mainland and that it could make Okinawa untenable.

The ROC will never play such games. If the Russians do so, we cannot stop them. At least the Polar Bear's efforts might serve the purpose of awakening the U.S. to the fact that as an Asian power, it is going to be much weaker with the military departure from this island bastion." 1

In this respect, it is evident that there was a connection between the ROC's Soviet card and its intention to delay U.S. plans for military withdrawal from Asia.

Meanwhile, the Nationalist officials could have calculated that, although an open dialogue with the Soviet Union would

1. Editorial, the China Times, 22nd December 1978.
provide the island with substantial benefits, certain negative costs might be involved. This was why Nationalist officials were very hesitant about playing this Soviet card and downplayed its attractiveness at times. In a way, the ROC had hoped to use this option to enhance its bargaining position vis-a-vis the U.S.-PRC normalization. Prior to President Carter's decision to abandon Taiwan, the Nationalists' intention in using this card was to delay or deter, if at all possible, the U.S. from extending full recognition to the PRC, or at least to ensure that normalization should be carried out on terms acceptable for Taipei. The first newspaper article cited above clearly illustrated this point. Equally, Taipei may have felt that concern in Peking over its Soviet option might make Peking more willing to compromise with the U.S. over the Chinese unification problem. Or, if that failed, it might make Peking more hesitant in applying military pressure against Taiwan for fear of forcing Taiwan into Soviet arms. In this regard, the Nationalists could also have hoped (in conjunction with its Japan option) to cause Japan to use its considerable influence with the U.S. to prevent conditions which might lead to a Soviet presence on Taiwan.

After 1979 the objectives of ROC's Soviet option shifted to ensuring the ROC's continued military supply from the U.S. and modernization of the old weapons whilst continuing to try to undermine Peking's intention to take Taiwan by force. Ultimately, however, the most significant gain for the ROC if this option materialized would be legitimization and survival. Were the ROC to develop close ties with the Soviet
Union and its allies, while also maintaining such ties with the U.S. and Japan, the ROC could create a situation of de facto recognition of its special status by three of the Pacific powers. Were this the case, it might work to create a sort of Superpower consensus on the maintenance of ROC's status quo, hence securing its national survival and legitimacy.

Whether or not these speculations were correct, and whether or not this did represent a promising bargaining strategy vis-a-vis the U.S. and Peking, the Soviet option might involve great costs in several respects. Firstly, it might endanger U.S.-ROC relations, or the ROC's relations with the whole western world. The ROC always placed great emphasis on the role of popular opinion in the U.S. in preventing the American government from "abandoning" Taiwan. As noted in Chapter Three, the ROC was rather skillful in the manipulation of people-to-people diplomacy (or diplomacy through state visits) to maintain its good standing with the Americans. In this endeavour, the ROC considered that it held two high cards: the ROC was (and still is) an old friend and faithful ally of the U.S., and it is firmly anti-Communist. Talk of a rapprochement between the Soviet Union and the ROC would undermine both of these principles—it would probably undermine sympathy and support for Taiwan among the American people and in Congress. Furthermore, developing a relationship with the Soviet Union ran counter to the ROC's traditional policy laid down by Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek of maintaining the closest possible relations with the U.S. as well as with
Japan, and meanwhile keeping away from the Russians.  

Secondly, Nationalist leaders were suspicious of the Soviet government. There is no doubt that after an unpleasant experience with the Russian Communists during the early 1920s as well as the post-War experience of total dependence on the U.S., the ROC did not wish to become dependent on the Soviet Union (or on any other country again) for it suspected that Moscow would dump it ungraciously if it ever served Moscow’s purposes or, coming to our third point, that the ROC would one day be "sold out" by the Soviet government. A more important point was that, the Soviet Union itself had so far shown no concrete evidence that it would like to develop a significant and lasting friendship with the Nationalists. In fact, on several occasions, the Soviet Union was found to have worked towards a possible reconciliation with Peking. If this should happen, the ROC’s situation could only become more critical and complicated.

Consequently, with the above considerations in mind, the ROC acted with extreme caution and at times ambiguity. It had to deny time and again any interest in a rapprochement with the Soviet Union, but it also had to keep this Soviet theme going. In January 1978, for example, Chiang Ching-kuo, in repeating his Government’s foreign policy principles set forth in 1972, said that the ROC would not establish ties with any Communist countries whether near or far, big or small.  

1. See Chapter Two, pp. 111-112.
U.S. T.V. interview that the national policy of his Government was anti-Communism, implying that the ROC would never follow the U.S. example of uniting with the Chinese Communists by collaborating with the Soviet Union. Regardless of all these official pronouncements, however, the ROC did not stop the continued speculation.

3. The nuclear option

There was speculation that the ROC was seeking to develop its own sources of arms and a weapons industry which could not only enable the country to stand on its own feet but improve its status and bargaining position. The most important item in this industry was of course nuclear weapons. Thomas N. Thompson made a remark on this: "Taiwan's nuclear option reflects a general attraction among small powers for developing nuclear weapons in the hope of deterring certain actions on the part of greater powers."

It might be thought that the fact that the ROC signed the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty would be an obstacle to its developing nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, there might be a possible way out. Since the PRC is not a signatory of the Treaty, if it is accepted that "Taiwan is a part of China (i.e. the PRC)", then Taiwan's relations with the Treaty need to be reassessed. In other words, as George Quester pointed out: "the legal gymnastics that have burdened the China-recognition problem may now complicate any effort to keep nuclear weapons from coming into the hands of the Taiwan regime--and the Kuomintang may now have reasons to seek such weapons". ¹

Taiwan's technical capability to build nuclear weapons and delivery system is impressive. According to several reports Taiwan possesses an extremely sophisticated scientific establishment, including theoretical and practical expertise in advanced electronics, heavy industry, nuclear physics and nuclear power, and key military technologies. It also possesses an advanced air force, is coproducing F-5E aircraft with Northrop, and has become a major shipbuilder. Furthermore, Taiwan operates a Canadian research reactor, of the type India used for its nuclear explosion, and expects a total of 8 power reactors to be in operation by 1986. The Chung Shan Research Institute, a key to any future Taiwan nuclear ambitions, is having 15 missile guidance specialists trained at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).²

1. George Quester, op.cit., p. 140.
2. See footnote no. 2, p. 379.
No doubt Taiwan has begun to develop its own nuclear programme, and it has the technology and capability to go ahead with nuclear weapons production, if needed, as declared by Chiang Ching-kuo officially on several occasions. Nevertheless, in considering Taiwan's current political and economic circumstances, and in view of the fact that the PRC is a nuclear power, this go-nuclear option did not seem to be a practical alternative. That is, although the fact that the PRC is a nuclear power automatically creates an incentive for Taiwan to acquire nuclear weapons, there is reason to believe that the PRC would not employ nuclear weapons directly against Taiwan. The PRC has enunciated a non-first-use policy, and has repeated that policy on numerous occasions. There is every reason to believe that this policy is based on careful consideration of the long-run costs and benefits to the PRC of such a policy in dealing with other nuclear powers, and also that such firm policy statements provide a good guide to actual Chinese behaviour. Legally, such a statement would not necessarily apply to a territory which the PRC regards as part of itself rather than as a foreign nation. But as a practical matter the policy would have stronger force for Taiwan than for any


other state. The international repercussions of using nuclear weapons against Taiwan would be at least as great as for use against any other small state. In addition, the identification of Taiwan as a part of China might be expected to restrain Chinese leaders from applying nuclear weapons against "their own" population, and the moral repercussions within China of using nuclear weapons in what is perceived as an essentially domestic conflict would be incalculable. Moreover, as will be noted later in this Chapter, the PRC will be reluctant to destroy Taiwan's established economic system and its social stability. Thus, the normally implicit belief that nuclear weapons enhance developing nations' security is not always correct. Non-nuclear powers usually are not nuclear targets, but nuclear powers always are. For instance, a conventionally-armed India will possibly dominate South Asia, but a nuclear India will possibly face a nuclear Pakistan and will therefore have to fear Pakistan. Also a nuclear India will—at best—not have improved its power vis-a-vis the PRC. Consequently, a nuclear Taiwan would not necessarily deter a nuclear attack by the PRC, not only for the reasons suggested above, but also because a nuclear Taiwan might arouse international hostility, particularly antagonism from the U.S. That is, although it is of course true that "a policy of calculated ambiguity toward nuclear weapons may have the merit of placing potential conflicts on a 'threshold', beyond which no protagonist would wish to move for fear of lessened ambiguity",¹-- as weaker states develop deterrents which they

assume enhance their independence—alliance commitments may also be diluted, and even disavowed. Indeed, what would be most important for Taiwan in the production of nuclear weapons would be not so much its deterrent capability but its success in creating "prestige", in the sense of international recognition of its viability, independence, and power, and in cementing continued U.S. support, both diplomatic and material. A nuclear explosion by Taiwan in response to nuclear threats or demonstration explosions would undoubtedly heighten domestic morale and encourage international sympathy. Nevertheless, dropping a nuclear bomb in the absence of direct nuclear provocation could make Taiwan an even worse international diplomatic pariah than at present, despite the fact, that, if properly handled, it could conceivably restore Taiwan instantly to the world diplomatic map. Consequently, after careful assessment, the Nationalist government concluded: "We seek to continue developing energy for peaceful uses (such as power generation) so as to improve the livelihood of our people."

4. The independence option

Could the ROC declare independence? Would this make it easier to survive and prosper as a political entity in the


2. It is necessary to point out that this Independence option is different from the generally so-called "Taiwanese Independence Movement", although the two are closely related. The former suggests an independent island nation freed from mainland or any outside dominance, but administered by "the people on the island", either the mainland émigrés or the native Taiwanese. The latter, however, implies the principle of "self-determination", most likely a Taiwan run by the native Taiwanese only.
international community? Support for this alternative seemed to be very popular at times as the influence of local Taiwanese in the central government in Taiwan has increased steadily during recent years.

Indeed Taiwan could make a good claim for it. Taiwan has been de facto a separate country for three decades. As noted in Chapter One, it has ties with the mainland for only 4 years (1945-1949) in this century. More remote historical connections were likewise weak. Taiwan could be regarded as a viable nation, since its size, population and economy were all larger than at least one-third of the member states in the U.N. Nevertheless, under current circumstances, this option could provide the ROC with nothing but disadvantages.

It can be argued that the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué—which reaffirmed that both Taiwan and the mainland agreed that "Taiwan is a part of China"—had already undermined the cause of Taiwanese independence; because of this agreement, Taiwanese and mainlanders (both those on Taiwan island or currently on the mainland alike) were now in the same predicament regarding the threat of incorporation. It is true that the local Taiwanese majority still considers the minority Chinese mainlanders on Taiwan as "outsiders", but because of international isolation, they have learned to live together and to accommodate to each other, for fear of a Communist take-over. As Chiang Ching-kuo once asserted: "Nobody in Taiwan wants a Communist take-over." 1 And it


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should always be borne in mind that the two parts of China have already developed into two completely different systems. Any attempt to integrate them into a single entity by either side would be not only extremely difficult but practically unworkable.

Nevertheless, there are disadvantages facing a "Republic of Taiwan" and they can be briefly summarized as follows: first, as far as the ROC is concerned, an independent Taiwan would mean the end of Nationalist rule. According to the principle of "self-determination", Taiwan should then be governed by the majority native Taiwanese community. This action might also provoke Peking as it would openly disavow the principle underlying the Shanghai Communiqué, thereby increasing the danger that the PRC would attempt to use military force to gain possession of Taiwan.

Second, since the reason for declaring Taiwan's independence would be to increase the chance of national survival and international recognition, could this new Republic therefore acquire sufficient international support for its new status? The chances would hardly seem promising. Neither the U.S. nor Japan would be likely to recognize this new state formally because of the damage it would do to their relations with the PRC. The PRC would regard U.S. recognition of the new Republic as a proof of violation the spirit if not the letter of the Shanghai Communiqué. The crux of this option is this: if the U.S. and Japan declined to recognize the new state of Taiwan—which would very likely be the case, then few countries would be likely to do so.
Consequently, by declaring independence, the ROC would hurt rather than improve its international position. Even worse, by its own action it would have terminated the existing treaties and agreements with other countries who might not choose to renegotiate those arrangements with the new government. Indeed, given the situation facing the ROC today, some countries might even use this opportunity to terminate all remaining ties.

Third, a "Republic of Taiwan" would openly disavow the sacred historical principle of the ROC which was laid down by the founding father and his successors. Nationalist officials put forward their position regarding the independence issue as this:

"The ROC has always been an independent sovereign state. Nothing regarding its diplomatic life would change this reality. Since the Chinese Communist set up their regime through armed rebellion, and they controlled the mainland with tyrannical measures (i.e. Communist rule), the regime has never gained the support of the Chinese people. By contrast, the democratic way of life in the ROC continued to be the common aspiration of the Chinese people. Thus, the ROC affords hope for all the Chinese people. A declaration of independence by the ROC on Taiwan cannot solve the 'China Problem'. On the contrary, it would dash the hopes of the 800 million Chinese on the mainland for freedom, democracy and a better life."  

Accordingly, the Independence option was not at all attractive unless there were drastic changes in U.S. China policy again; or in U.S.-Peking relations; or in the whole political landscape in Asia. Frankly speaking, for the ROC, the best solution for the time being regarding its present survival, physical security and the future of a

non-Communist Taiwan was to perpetuate the island's present ambiguous status for the near future, and meanwhile to develop Taiwan peacefully into an independent economic force of a unique kind. Consequently, some day Taiwan would become simply another representative of the Chinese people, perhaps something like Singapore. Obviously, as noted earlier, this is the policy of maintaining the status quo: to defend and to preserve the current state of affairs rather than to change it (through force). In other words, this is a moderate strategy of national defence different from the previous offensive practice of destroying the existing reality. This leads us to examine the ROC's other foreign policy option—the economic strategy, which, due to its significance in the formulation of ROC's current foreign policy and external relations, will be considered exclusively in the remaining part of this Chapter.

III. The economic strategy: the strategy of economics- and trade-first diplomacy

In a conventional sense, the term "diplomacy" usually refers to either "the process by which governments (or states), acting through official agents, communicate with one another", or "the modes or techniques of foreign policy affecting the international system". By implication, therefore, diplomacy can be regarded as "the art of state-to-state (or government-to-government) interaction". It is not only reserved for the official level but meant

almost exclusively political interactions between or among states (governments). Nevertheless, in the contemporary world, these characteristics have gradually been attenuated by the emergence of growing international (economic) interdependence and the increasing volume of transnational activities. Consequently, the term diplomacy has been greatly stretched, becoming more and more ambiguous to the extent that almost all actions or interactions between states, whether high- or low-level, political or non-political, formal or informal, or actions and interactions between or among different entities (not necessary political bodies, i.e. state or government), have been included. Thus, international trade and investment, economic contacts, social or cultural exchanges, even transport and communication facilities between different units can all be regarded as aspects of diplomacy.

In a similar vein, during the 1970s, the ROC adopted a rather unorthodox approach in conducting diplomacy. As Tsai Wei-ping, the ROC's former Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, once maintained: "In my thirty years of diplomatic service, diplomacy has seemed mostly for trade, exchanges, and similar business, so even though we can not prevent the continued erosion of official relations we can replace them with substantive unofficial relations".¹ This conviction of Tsai was shared by many economic technocrats in the ROC's official hierarchy. Consequently, the ROC's international trade and economic exchanges became the essential

¹. Douglas H. Mendel, op.cit., p. 11. Tsai was the ROC's Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs between 1968 and 1975.
features of its external relations, replacing, to a very substantial degree, the traditional form of diplomacy.

1. The economic strategy as ROC's foreign policy instrument

The ROC's economic strategy was not a new device after its UN debacle. On the contrary, it can be traced back to the 1960s when Taiwan, with its increased economic capability, began to launch its "Overseas Development Assistance" programme directed at the less-developed world. This was discussed in the previous Chapter. The economic strategy of the 1970's, however, envisaged exchanges, not only with the less-developed countries but also with the developed ones, with the clear purpose of achieving a dynamic flow of trade interdependence. The section following will first of all outline the motivations and objectives of the strategy, then define the principles and measures involved.

(1) Motivations

The motivations behind the economic strategy can be discovered in some of the ROC's official pronouncements. Through these pronouncements, we can also discern the extent of flexibility involved in the formulation of ROC's current foreign policy in terms of ideological modification.

Along with the aforementioned Tsai Wei-ping's unconventional viewpoint on diplomacy, Han Lih-wu, a delegate of ROC's National Assembly, once pointed out:

"We admit that diplomatic relations are important. However, the severance of diplomatic ties (of the ROC) with other nations does not necessarily mean the exclusion of all other avenues of international intercourse. Indeed, the maintenance of diplomatic
relations alone is not sufficient to strengthen the bond of friendship subsisting between different nations. Thus, by trade, cultural exchanges, technical cooperation, participation in international organizations and promotion of tourism... we (the ROC) would cultivate our non-diplomatic and substantial relations with nations and areas where full diplomatic relations are void." 1

Also, in the words of Sun Yun-suan, ROC's Economic Affairs Minister, "Our international and diplomatic position in the past relied on military strength. This is gradually being replaced by economic power, trade and technology." 2 A more radical view was given by Sun I-shuan in 1973. Sun, who was a close associate of Chiang Ching-kuo and later President of the government-owned Central Trust of China, was quoted as saying:

"All the important people in the government think we cannot carry on anything political or economic with a rigid attitude. We have to be more flexible and realistic. Why shouldn't we trade with countries like Bulgaria and Hungary? Trade will be our weapon to make friends." 3

Even Chiang Ching-kuo admitted frankly in his 1974 Administration Report (at that time he was the Premier):

"...we are doing our best to maintain relations with friendly countries and to expand in various ways our substantial relationships in the international community...Our strategy is to forge the political, economic, spiritual and other forces of our country into a strong combat entity." 4

3. Ibid., p. 193.
The above statements support our claim that the ROC was flexible in operating an "economics first" foreign policy strategy with the prime motivation of maximizing Taiwan's external contacts and of furthering the survival of a non-Communist Taiwan.

However, underlying this flexibility, we see the continued unremitting ideological opposition to (Chinese) Communism. That is, if trade with some of the Communist countries were possible, could Taiwan then trade with the mainland? There were rumours that the two parts of China—via Hong Kong trading firms—had trade relations: Taiwan imported small amounts of Chinese herbs and medical ingredients known to be of mainland origin, whereas the mainland imported Taiwan's electronic products such as televisions, watches etc. ¹ Nevertheless, with regard to this matter, the ROC's position was clearly pointed out by Melinda Liu:

"Many Taiwanese theoretically see no harm in trading with the mainland, the majority of them vehemently reject the possibility of ideological accord. One Taiwanese put it this way: 'Importing mainland pears and Shanghai seafood—why not? Mao jackets and little red books—no way.'" ²

Here, it is necessary to make a few comments regarding the PRC's intention to "liberate" Taiwan, i.e. incorporate it, into its political system.

For decades since 1949, the PRC has employed various strategies, with or without force, to attain the objective of national unification. Since the Shanghai Communiqué, the

2. Ibid.
PRC's strategy toward Taiwan has been steadily geared to a step-by-step peaceful absorption, meaning the isolation of the island through efforts to have it debarred from official bilateral ties with other countries and membership of international organizations, while repeatedly offering it an "intra-China postal service, telecommunication, transportation (i.e. air links) and commercial relations". Since Taiwan was now theoretically a part of China, military actions against the island thus were by implication improper means for resolving this "domestic issue" because, as pointed out earlier in the ROC's nuclear option, it could either provoke public resentment or damage economic strength on both sides. Gradually, the emphasis of the "two Chinas" confrontation seemed to have shifted from a strictly ideological, political and legitimacy dispute to a lower level of economic competition. That is, in order to resist from a Communist takeover, and to consolidate the Nationalists' legitimacy, in addition to an internal programme of political reform and cabinet change, the ROC tried to demonstrate to the world its vitality through its economic performance both at home and abroad, and it launched a vigorous campaign to compete with the mainland in international markets.

Nationalist leaders were clearly aware that, economically speaking, Taiwan was (and still is) much better off than the mainland despite the latter's economic potential and, because

2. The programme of political reform was to increase the level of political participation by the local Taiwanese in the political system. The Cabinet changes were intended to absorb intelligent, well-educated and relatively young experts into top Party and governmental position, which used to be dominated by older KMT members. See J.B. Jacobs, op.cit.
of this fact, that the Communist government would reconsider any damaging actions which were likely to upset Taiwan's established economy since the mainland might one day need to use Taiwan's economic strength to build up its own economy.

Moreover, Nationalist leaders believed that a totally different economic system guided by Sun Yat-sen's principle of a planned free economy with emphasis on advanced technology and sophisticated industry would make their Communist rivals' plan to integrate Taiwan more difficult. The idea was to widen the economic gap between the two entities so that incorporation would be less beneficial for Peking; Peking would have to maintain Taiwan's ties with the world economy—meaning the acceptance of capitalism—or engineer the destruction of Taiwan's economic progress and relocate a sizeable portion of the population.

Related to this point, another reason for the adoption of the economic strategy, was that, according to the Nationalists, economic relations would be more difficult for the PRC to interfere with. As noted earlier, economic relations are not necessarily always directly operated by governments. Being private in orientation, it would be less vulnerable to official Communist Chinese intervention.

(2) Objectives

The political objectives of the economic strategy were therefore:
(i) to safeguard the survival of the ROC as well as of the mainland emigrants on Taiwan;

(ii) to safeguard the physical existence of Taiwan island as an independent entity free from outside (especially Communist Chinese) influence;

(iii) to preserve the traditional Chinese way of life, namely, the continuation of Chinese culture and history, and the standard of living that had been built up in Taiwan; and,

(iv) to promote the possibility of any future political contacts (i.e. official ties) between Taiwan and its trading partners, through the existing (unofficial) trade relations.

Closely intertwined with the aforementioned, the economic objectives of the strategy were:

(i) to promote Taiwan's economic strength, stability and growth, also to upgrade its industrial structure, and to reach economic self-sufficiency, by attracting foreign investment and technology in more sophisticated industries; in other words, internally, it was to build Taiwan up as a model province of China based on Sun Yat-sen's economic theories, and externally, to reach the status of a developed country;

(ii) to search for more foreign markets for Taiwan's goods and technology and to strengthen Taiwan's international trade contacts (i.e. diversification of Taiwan's foreign markets) and
(iii) to realize fully Sun Yat-sen's economic objectives of economic justice and prosperity for all.¹

(3) Tactics

In dealing with this issue, it will be beneficial to review the background regarding the structural change in Taiwan's post-War economy.

(A) The background of Taiwan's post-War economic development

Taiwan was originally an agrarian society with limited natural resources. Prior to the termination of Japanese colonial administration, Taiwan's foreign trade was negligible with only two markets available: the Chinese mainland and Japan, and by 1949 both of these markets were cut off. Japan's policy in Taiwan was geared to building it up as an agricultural colony, developed primarily to supply additional foodstuffs for the growing population of rapidly industrializing Japan. An Anthony Y.C. Koo observed:

"The strategy of development when Taiwan was under the control of Japan (1895-1945) was to emphasize agriculture, especially in the production of rice and sugar cane. These were then in great demand in Japan. With an assured export market, enough foreign exchange was generated so that the development was financed with little or no foreign capital."²

Japan created the basic mechanism which the Nationalist government was able to take over to manage quite effectively

the agricultural development of Taiwan. The Nationalist government took over the existing rural infrastructure but later introduced changes and refinements to make the system respond to Taiwan's own needs more than, of course, Japan's. A key instrument in effecting change was the Sino-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR), which was originally established during the final days of the Nationalist government on the mainland and after 1949 relocated in Taiwan, hence becoming the sinew of the U.S. aid mission there. Here a few comments must be made regarding the role and functions of the JCRR in terms of its contribution to ROC's economic development programme.

The JCRR originally had two American commissioners and three Chinese commissioners, and it served both as the de facto ministry of agriculture of the ROC and as the agricultural section of the U.S. aid mission. This unique organization existing outside the regular bureaucracy of both governments, was able to recruit a well-paid, highly skilled staff. With sizable amounts of U.S. aid funds to disburse, it played an important role in introducing innovations in agriculture, expanding agricultural production, and improving the quality of rural life.

1. R.N. Clough, op.cit., p. 73.
2. For more information on the JCRR, see T.H. Shen, The Sino-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction: Twenty Years of Cooperation for Agricultural Development (Ithaca and London: 1970)
Between 1951 and 1965, U.S. aid flooded into Taiwan averaging $100 million a year—in 15 years the U.S. altogether injected $1.5 billion into Taiwan's economy. Protected by the stable inflow of this aid, as well as benefitting from the advantages of a hardworking labour force and sufficient foodstuffs, and many other factors, the ROC was able to introduce a series of economic planning policies, including, e.g. the land reform programme (originally proposed by Sun Yat-sen in the Principle of People's Livelihood and carried out in Taiwan between 1949 and 1957) and several Four-Year Economic Development Plans (e.g. 1953-56, 1957-60, 1961-64, 1965-68, 1969-72, and afterwards a Six-Year Plan for Economic Development). The fundamental aim of these actions, in combination, was to transform Taiwan's economy gradually from a purely rural one into an advanced industrial one, from an underdeveloped society into a developing one and, finally, into a developed unit. In doing this, the Nationalist government was very careful to avoid over-emphasis on either rural development or rapid industrialization by paying equal attention to, and looking for a balance between, the two. Ralph N. Clough commented:


2. Other important measures, for instance, included currency reform and credit policies which were mainly to tackle Taiwan's highly accelerated inflation and to regulate the economy on the island. For the promotion of foreign trade, from 1956 to 1961, there were policies of foreign exchange reform, liberalized imports, and programmes for the encouragement of foreign investment.
"The ROC did not make the early mistake common to many developing countries of devoting all its attention to industrializing, while neglecting rural development. The efforts devoted to improving agriculture paid off richly in the contribution that agriculture was then able to make to the overall economic development."  

As a consequence of this careful balancing of the needs of rural economy and industrialization, Taiwan’s agricultural sector was able to contribute immensely to its subsequent industrialization. In this respect, the rural economy provided the island with not only sufficient foodstuffs and gradually a surplus to export in the first place, but also, later on, a substantial share of the resources needed to finance industrialization; both were necessary for a rapid industrial take-off. The transfer of resources was accomplished in several ways: by government taxation, by payment to landlords and money-lenders, through farmers’ savings deposited voluntarily in financial institutions and then invested in the non-agricultural sector, and by the terms of trade between farm and factory products, which were unfavourable to the farmer throughout the period 1950-1969. Thus in Taiwan’s case, not only did agriculture play a vital role in providing capital for industry, but also exports of agricultural products financed at least one-half of total imports during the early period of industrialization, 1953-1962, when the effective constraint on Taiwan’s development was a shortage of foreign exchange.  

1. R.N. Clough, op.cit., p 75.  
The ROC's policy of a limited squeeze on agriculture caused substantially more resources to flow out of that sector than to flow in. Yet agricultural production continued to increase at a satisfactory rate, and the farmers' per capita income, although still lower than that of the non-agricultural population, increased fairly steadily at a rate commensurate with that of the non-agricultural population until the mid-1960s. With this additional income, the rural population, constituting around half of the total population from 1952-1962, made another important contribution to industrialization by providing an expanding market for industrial products.

From another angle, however, the process of Taiwan's economic structural change can be outlined in conjunction with the different stages of its Economic Development Plans. The Plans began in 1953 when Taiwan's post-War economy had been restored to a level where further development was possible and desirable. Prior to 1960, the major emphasis of the Plans was basically internally orientated, that is, to reorganize and restore internal economic order of the island and to maintain at least a minimum level of economic growth and stability. At this stage, two events were most necessary to pave the way for Taiwan's consequent economic performance: the land reform programme and, as mentioned earlier, the influence of the U.S. aid mission (the JCRR programme) which had created a favourable climate for private investment by liberalizing economic controls and reducing bureaucracy.¹

¹. F.A. Lumley, *op.cit.*, p. 89.
By 1960, a foundation had been laid for both agriculture and light industries. Overseas investment and industrial expansion were encouraged, and monetary stability had been achieved. In 1964, a year before the termination of U.S. aid, Taiwan's economy was beginning to take off. It was at this time that the Nationalist government began to place strong emphasis on export expansion. In 1965, a tax and duty free industrial processing zone—a Free Port—was established at Kaohsiung. The creation of this processing zone indicated the moment of transition of Taiwan's economic structure from an inward-looking rural economy to an increasingly modern outward-looking industrial unit based on a high level of import-export transactions. The development of Taiwan's economic structure was also demonstrated by the fact that the U.S., in view of Taiwan's promising economic prospects, decided to terminate its aid to Taiwan and to replace it with the policy of "Trade—not aid".

Since the Fifth Four-Year Economic Plan, 1969-1972, Taiwan's economic planning has been geared to aspects of rapid industrialization, to the adoption of sophisticated technologies and a further encouragement of foreign investment and international trade. In other words, this Plan, and subsequent ones, urged the expansion and modernization of existing industries as well as the establishment and promotion of basic and sophisticated industries and technology-

1. In these zones, manufacturers could import their basic materials, process them, and export the finished products free of duty. The establishment of these export processing zones were a solid part of the Nationalist government's export encouragement programme, which had quite impressive results.

intensive export industries. The stage was set for rapid industrialization. The progression from labour-intensive industry to heavy industries which are capital-intensive and based on advanced technology and a high level of manufacturing sophistication was becoming more and more apparent. Meanwhile, local manufacturers were invited to co-operate with well established foreign factories "for the purpose of acquiring the know-how needed in developing heavy and precision industries". All these are orientated towards creating some sort of trade interdependence, making Taiwan an economically self-sufficient unit and advancing its international trade. In this connection, it needs to be mentioned very briefly that during this period, Taiwan's major foreign investors were American, Japanese, and overseas Chinese, and its major trading partners continued to be the U.S. and Japan. Exports to the Netherlands, Italy, Australia and Malaysia were promoted, but still at a rather low level, whereas imports, in addition to those from the U.S. and Japan, came mainly from South Korea, the Netherlands, Indonesia and West Germany.

The results of this long-term economic planning have been shown by the fact that Taiwan, towards the end of 1979, was recognized as being among the top 20 trading "nations" in the world, the 8th among all U.S. trading partners. This made Taiwan a recent example of the "economic miracle"—with

2. For a detailed information on Taiwan's economic structural changes, see Walter Galenson, ed. Economic Growth and Structural Change in Taiwan: The Postwar Experience of the Republic of China (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979). The material relating to the above matter in this part of the Chapter is based upon F. A. Lumley, op.cit., Chapters VII-XI, pp. 84-130.
a gross domestic product ranging from an annual average increase of 7.2 percent for the first 7 years after 1953 to a high of 11.5 percent in 1972; and a per capita income which grew from $103 U.S. dollars to $372 over the same period. Income distribution among the people also improved: the comparison of the top 20 percent to the bottom 20 percent wage earnings showed a 20 to 1 ratio in 1953 vs. a 4 to 1 ratio in 1972. F.A. Lumley commented:

"In thirty years a new generation has grown up and a second generation comes forward. Already the mainland Chinese who arrived in the late forties are now completely integrated with the local Taiwanese (themselves of Chinese origin). During these years Taiwan has emerged from the status of a poor ex-colonial dependency with its industry and infrastructure destroyed by the war, and an economy based on agriculture, to that of an industrial nation, a blue print to serve as examples for any underdeveloped country."

Indeed, despite the effect of large amount of U.S. aid in contributing to the Taiwan's economic development, Taiwan's post-War economic performance was impressive. Evidently, this was because the Nationalist government had utilized its internal economic strength and stability plus its external aid from the U.S. as the foundation for development and then as the springboard for its foreign trade expansion. The outcome was that Taiwan's exports of goods and services in the 1970's amounted to 33% of the GNP, and its trading partners had increased from 2 (the U.S. and Japan) in 1949 to over 140 today. As Taiwan's foreign trade increased, its composition changed as well. In 1952, agricultural products

constituted 22% of total exports, processed agricultural products (mostly sugar) 70%, and industrial products only 8%. By 1974, 84% of Taiwan's exports were industrial products and 16% agricultural or processed agricultural products. Moreover, not only the quantity but also the variety of Taiwan's exports expanded. For example, both the export of canned foods, which in 1952 amounted to only 3% of the value of sugar exports, and fisheries products, which were not exported at all at that time, by 1973 surpassed sugar exports, which themselves had more than trebled in value.¹

The composition of Taiwan's imports likewise changed over this period. In 1952, consumer goods constituted 20% of imports, agricultural and industrial raw materials 67%, and capital goods 13%. By 1975, consumer goods had dropped to 7% of total imports, agricultural and industrial raw materials amounted to 61%, and capital goods had increased to 32%. By becoming more self-sufficient in consumer goods, Taiwan was then able to divert large amounts of foreign exchange to the purchase of the capital equipment needed for the continued expansion of the industrial plant.²

(B) The structure and operation of the economic strategy

With the above information in mind, we can now proceed to

1. Taiwan Statistical Data Book 1976 (Taipei: Council for International Economic Cooperation and Development Executive Yuan, 1976), pp. 182, 197, hereafter referred to as TSDB. In 1974, Taiwan's sugar exports had more than trebled again because of a temporary world sugar shortage and a sharp rise in sugar prices.

2. Ibid., p. 183.
look at the structure and operation of the ROC's economic strategy and its relevance to its current foreign policy strategy of survival. ROC's policy was to place Taiwan deliberately at the centre of trade relations between the developed and the less-developed world. And the reason for this was to try to establish Taiwan's indispensability to many nations and economies and thus create an economic basis for continued political independence.

Taiwan's international trade has been conducted with both developed and less-developed countries. The strategy for promoting its external trade is, in conformity with the process of its internal economic development, to regard itself as a "trade intermediary", interacting with the two different types of economic unit. For analytical clarity, we will outline a model which shows the pattern of Taiwan's international trade (Figure No. 2). The model involves a continuous flow of economic interactions among three types of economic actors: the "developed" (DV), the "intermediate" (ID) and the "less-developed" (LDV). This categorization is only relative.

According to the model, Taiwan, in terms of technology development, falls into the ID category. This is because of its capacity to conduct and cope with a skillful two-way trading traffic with both the DV and the LDV. Trade with DV countries suggests the import of technology, either in the form of products and processes, as well as the export of labour-intensive products. Trade with LDV countries involves less sophisticated, more practical and suitable
FIGURE NO. 2: The Pattern of Taiwan's International Trade

SUPPLY

Raw Materials

(SUPPLY)
Raw Materials or Labour-intensive Goods

(DEMAND)
Advanced Technology, Processed Goods, or Capital Intensive Commodities

(DV) Developed Countries

(ID) Taiwan Intermediate Countries

(DEMAND)
Manufacturers, Intermediate Technology (know-how), or Capital Intensive Goods

(SUPPLY)
Raw Materials or Labour-intensive Goods

(1DV) Less Developed Countries

Advanced Technology, Machinery, Equipment
technology, plus various capital-intensive goods exports countries. Limited raw materials are imported from LDV to ID countries as well.

In most cases ID countries and LDV countries have an advantage in that they can benefit by copying the more advanced (or higher level) technology of the DV countries, save research costs, and hopefully develop more rapidly. This is because they adapt advanced technology to less developed countries' needs. The advanced industrial countries' (i.e. the DV) technology employed in their manufacturing of machinery and equipment is in some ways inappropriate for immediate utilization by the LDV countries because the former's technology is normally geared to less labour-intensive goals where the labour aspect is not a critical factor; rather it is a plus, in LDV countries. Thus what the LDV really need are machines and equipment that are inexpensive, easily operable and efficient. In other words, they need a work-horse instead of a thoroughbred.

As E.F. Schumacher commented:

"It is surely an astonishing error to assume that the technology developed in the West is necessarily appropriate to the developing countries. Granted that their technological backwardness is an important reason for their poverty; granted, too, that their traditional methods of production, in their present condition of decay, lack essential viability; it by no means follows that the technology of the richest countries is necessarily suitable for the advancement of the poor. It must never be forgotten that modern technology is the product of the countries which are 'long' in capital and 'short' in labour, and that its main purpose, abundantly demonstrated by the trend towards automation, is to substitute
machines for men. How could this technology fit the conditions of countries which suffer from a surplus of labour and a shortage of machines?"¹

Meanwhile, there is a world-wide demand for a highly sophisticated and expensive machinery whereas the need for the work-horse type machinery is still limited. Taiwan, therefore, takes advantage of being the "mediator" between the two.

For instance, Taiwan used to depend heavily upon Japan and the U.S., for its staples, raw materials and a variety of labour-intensive products, such as clothing, plywood, plastic articles, and transistor radios. Its capital-intensive goods like ungraded petroleum products, chemicals, pulps and paper, rubber goods, and certain machines and electrical supplies are exported mainly to the LDV countries.

The growth of exports to the less-developed countries would have been slower and less impressive had it not been for the escalation of the Vietnam War and the concomitant increased demand of the countries in the area because of reconstruction efforts and the operation of the "Overseas Development Assistance" programme. Being such an intermediary in trade (i.e. technology transfer) and producing for two different types of markets, Taiwan's economic growth and foreign trade began to expand intensively.

As mentioned earlier, it can be argued that the "Overseas Development Assistance" programme commenced in 1960 marked

the transition of the Taiwanese economy from being a mere "aid recipient" to, especially after 1965, an "aid donor", transmitting its technology and know-how to the LDV countries. In other words, through aid-giving, Taiwan departed from the LDV and moved up into the ID category. And since the mid-1970s Taiwan's economic planning gradually has arrived at developing DV-type industries and infrastructure.¹

In short, Taiwan's economic strategy can be understood in the words of Ramon H. Myers: "import raw materials, create additional selling value by processing, and export finished products".² Indeed, Taiwan produces and exports commodities that use relatively less capital per unit and imports items requiring more capital. According to Ramon H. Myers again, this framework of intermediate industries based upon import-export interactions could achieve cost reduction through economies of scale and new technology. And the industries

1. Since 1972, the ROC has launched the Ten Major Construction Projects. Among the 10 projects, 6 were related to transportation, 3 projects were devoted to the development of heavy and chemical industries, and one project, the construction of nuclear power plants, involved energy supply. Following the completion of these projects toward the end of 1970s, the ROC has started to carry out 12 new projects aimed at further building up the infrastructure for industrial development by opening up the less-developed eastern part of Taiwan, and accelerating rural reconstruction to ease the labour shortage and slow down the migration of population toward urban centres. Thus, unlike the 10 major construction projects which placed emphasis on industrial development, the ultimate aim of the 12 new projects is to elevate Taiwan's economy status to the developed level. See China Yearbook, 1980, pp. 12-15.

2. Ramon H. Myers, "The Economic Development of Taiwan", in Hungdah Chiu, ed. China and the Question of Taiwan, pp. 52-53.
dependent upon exports therefore benefit by (or take advantage of) learning from more advanced competitors and borrowing technology across the board.\(^1\)

It is through this strategy that the ROC is slowly setting up its own pattern of trade interdependence, linking itself and its future with the world economy, while at the same time, searching for a national self-sufficiency and an independent identity. In this regard, the Nationalist officials hoped the absence of ROC's diplomatic life could do less harm to Taiwan's national economy and its aim for survival as these could be complemented by the island's intensive "unofficial" contacts overseas.

(4) The implementation of the economic strategy

To facilitate the implementation of this strategy, in July 1970, the ROC established the China External Trade Development Council (CETDC), and later in 1971, a supplementary institution, the Far East Trade Service, Inc. (FETS). Nominally, the CETDC is said to be a non-profit-making private organization, with the purpose of promoting sales of commodities made in Taiwan and of developing the two-way trade of the ROC.\(^2\) Its major activities are to survey overseas markets; to collect, compile and disseminate trade information; to explore trade opportunities and introduce trade partners; to receive visiting traders and assist them in establishing relations with local businessmen; to organize trade missions and participate in international

1. Ibid.
trade fairs; to sponsor shows of Taiwan products in Taipei and in major cities overseas; and to provide assistance in procuring raw materials and capital goods from abroad. In addition, however, also in the light of the nature of the activities mentioned above, the CETDC is to take the place of commercial attaches in diplomatic missions or official trade missions. It operates with the full support of both the business community and the Government, and it is supported by compulsory donations from exporters of 0.06 percent of their earnings. The CETDC had 33 overseas offices by the end of 1979. These offices go by a variety of names, such as the Officina Commercial de Taiwan in Buenos Aires, the CETDC Correspondent in Melbourne, the Far East Trading Co. Ltd. in Montreal, the CETDC Representative's Office in Jakarta, and the CETDC Branch Office in New York. In countries where the use of the word "China" might cause problems, the name FETS will be substituted. For instance, there are the FETS Honorary Representative in Kuwait, the FETS Representative Office in Zürich, Switzerland, and the Tokyo Office of the FETS.

Similarly, in order to promote Taiwan's substantive trade relations with European countries, another non-profit-making private organization, the Euro-Asia Trade Organization (EATO), was set up in November 1975. Its purpose is to provide a wide range of free services for the development of Taiwan's

1. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., pp. 162-163.
trade with Europe. The primary functions of the EATO consist of the following: (1) initiating contacts and establishing working relationship with trade promotion organizations, chambers of commerce, federations of industries and other relevant agencies in European countries; (2) assisting European manufacturers or exporters and importers in finding sales outlets and suppliers on Taiwan; (3) assisting local manufacturers or exporters and importers in developing business contacts in European countries; (4) arranging or sponsoring visits to Taiwan for business leaders, journalists, and trade or industrial missions of European countries; (5) collecting and disseminating trade information on European countries; and (6) disseminating information on the economic progress and trade potential of the ROC.

As a consequence of EATO's efforts, several European trade offices have been set up in Taiwan despite the absence of diplomatic ties. There are, for example, the Belgian Trade Association, Taipei, established in August 1979; the France Asia Trade Promotion Association, established in September 1978; the Hellenic Organization for the Promotion of Exporters, established in January 1979; the Spanish Cervantes Center, established in May 1974 and the Anglo-Taiwan Trade Committee, established in February 1976.

There are also two cultural representatives, the Centre

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p. 35. Several other trade offices were set up after 1979, e.g. The Austrian Trade Delegation and the Netherlands Council for Trade Promotion, both established in January 1981, and the German Trade Office, established in May the same year.
Culturel et Scientifique Français and the German Cultural Center. More important than these developments has been the plan of opening of offices by several European banks in Taiwan to facilitate financial transactions. Equally, Taiwan has set up several commercial banking facilities in Europe: 3 in Paris and 1 in London.

The items of Taiwan's two-way trade relations with the European countries were many-faceted. West Germany has been Taiwan's largest trading partner in Europe. Next have been the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, France, Italy, and Belgium. Taiwan's major export items to this region are textiles products (to West Germany and the U.K.) electrical machinery and apparatus (to West Germany), and canned goods (to West Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and the U.K.), etc. On the other hand, principal import items include machinery and tools, and chemical and pharmaceuticals (mainly from West Germany), transportation equipment (from West Germany, the U.K. and France), electrical machinery and equipment (from West Germany, the Netherlands, the U.K. and

1. Ibid., p. 36.
2. This plan became a reality with the opening of the Banque de Paris et des Pay-Bas, and the Societe Generale (of France, both offices were established in August 1980); the East Asian Bank (of West Germany, established in July 1980); the Amsterdam-Rotterdam Bank N.V.; and the Holländische Bank Unie N.V. (of the Netherlands, the former established in May 1981, the latter established in August 1980); and Grindlays Bank Limited, and Lloyds Bank International Limited (of the United Kingdom, the former established in June and the latter in March 1981). Ibid.
3. The name of the bank is the First Commercial Bank.
Switzerland). None of these trading partners have official ties with Taiwan.

With regard to the African continent, Taiwan's economic and technical assistance programme continued during the 1970s, but it was limited to only 4 African countries: Malawi, Ivory Coast, Lesotho and Swaziland. All of them were less-developed and have diplomatic relations with Taipei. Except for Malawi, which exports tobacco leaves to Taiwan, the others have no significant two-way trade ties with Taiwan, despite the latter's efforts to expand trade with them. Nevertheless, they all have very close cultural and social exchanges programmes with Taiwan, and Taiwan's assistance missions there extended to many fields, as noted in Chapter Five, mainly agriculture, handicrafts and medical services. Moreover, in recent years, there has been substantial demand for Taiwanese consumer goods and light industrial machinery in the African market. Finally, it is necessary to mention Taiwan's trade relations with South Africa. Since the two countries exchanged diplomats in 1976, bilateral trade between them has increased. In 1979, for instance, it amounted to U.S. $200 million. The principal import item from South Africa to Taiwan was maize (corn), whereas the latter exported agricultural development know-how to the former. Recently there has been speculation that the two have developed a joint programme for scientific and industrial research into nuclear energy.

1. Board of Foreign Trade, TSDB, 1980, pp. 214-249, and Board of Foreign Trade, FTDROC, p. 10.
2. FTDROC, p. 13.
The ROC's overseas assistance programme has also extended to Central and South America and the Caribbean. Ever since the first agricultural mission was sent to the Dominican Republic in 1963, the ROC's assistance programme in these areas has grown. It is true that during the 1960s, the ROC's foreign aid priority was the African continent. Nevertheless, during the 1970s, as a result of the new state of affairs in the UN, the emphasis of the ROC's foreign aid programme has shifted to the Latin American countries. In 1979, 15 technical missions, composed of 141 Chinese specialists were assigned to work under government-to-government arrangements in 12 countries in the region.¹ 12 of them were agricultural technical missions stationed in Bolivia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, and Uruguay; 2 of them were fishery technical missions stationed in Honduras and Panama; and 1 other was an electrical technical mission assigned to Honduras.² Except for Ecuador, all other 11 countries have diplomatic ties with the ROC. Through these missions, the ROC was to transfer its experience in land reform, etc. to this region. Meanwhile, the ROC has become a good market for agricultural products and raw materials from Latin American countries, even with those countries that had no official relations with it. e.g. Chile, Columbia, Peru, and Venezuela.³ Apart from trade relations, the ROC has maintained close cultural and athletic ties with the Latin American countries.

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., pp. 353-354; and 357-358.
Despite the absence of diplomatic ties, the ROC has also put intense effort into developing substantive relations with all its neighbours. In Southeast Asia, for instance, Taiwan's machinery products and equipment are rather popular. On the other hand, Taiwan has relied on this region for the supply of crude oil (from Indonesia), lumber (Malaysia), maize (Thailand), rubber, and mineral products, etc. Particularly worth mentioning here is Hong Kong, which has become Taiwan's third largest export market (bananas, textile products, plywood, metal manufactures, plastic articles, iron and steel, etc.) in recent years. In return, Taiwan also bought machinery and tools from Hong Kong.

As emphasized in Chapter Four, the importance of this region to the ROC lies in the fact that it has a large population and a heavy concentration of overseas Chinese. The latter serve not only to promote foreign investment in Taiwan, but are also a target of political propaganda vis-à-vis the mainland.

In recent years, Australia has become one of Taiwan's principal trade partners. Taiwan's major export items to it have been textile products, plastic products and electrical apparatus. Conversely, Taiwan imported farm produce, animal and dairy products, iron ore, and coal from Australia.

The ROK, the only country still recognizing Taiwan in Asia, also has bilateral trade relations with Taiwan. Nevertheless, since both countries export similar items, e.g. textile products and electronic goods, their relations often suffered from the problem of competition for foreign markets.
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Needless to say, in Taiwan's trading with its neighbouring countries, Japan played a dominant role. As mentioned earlier, Japan has been one of the 2 leading trading partners of Taiwan. Despite the absence of official ties since 1972, bilateral trade has continued to grow. Similar to their previous trading patterns, Taiwan's export trade to Japan consisted mainly of low-cost agricultural products and light industrial goods. What Taiwan imported from Japan were high-cost raw materials and machinery and equipment which were essential for the promotion of Taiwan export trade and economic growth. In other words, Taiwan still depended on Japan for the supply of raw materials and capital equipment. These items would then be reprocessed into finished products for either domestic consumption or export.

In discussing Taiwan's foreign trade development, one can not ignore the growing importance of two Middle Eastern countries, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The former has no diplomatic ties with the ROC but, like the latter which does have formal relations with the ROC, has been a major supplier of crude oil to it. To facilitate the oil business, the ROC has set up a branch office of the Chinese Petroleum Corporation in Kuwait in 1979.¹ Kuwait also imported a large quantity of textile products, canned foods and foot-wear from Taiwan. In fact, in recent years, in order to cope with Taiwan's rising demand for oil and in view of the value of the Middle East market, the Nationalist government

has set up a "Middle East Trade Promotion Group".\(^1\) Particularly after the termination of U.S.-ROC relations, Saudi Arabia has become more and more an indispensable ally as well as a major trading partner of Taiwan. The importance of Saudi Arabia lies not only in the fact that it still recognizes the ROC, that it is strongly anti-Communist and that it has traditionally had a close friendship with the ROC, but also, that it is a reliable source of oil for Taiwan. For instance, during the 1973 oil embargo, Saudi Arabia classified Taiwan as a friendly country and hence did not intercept its oil supply to Taiwan.\(^2\) In addition to oil, Saudi Arabia sold to Taiwan chemical fertilizers, hides and skins. The leading export items from Taiwan to Saudi Arabia have been textiles, chemical, machinery, canned foods, plywood, plastic products, tea and sugar.

Finally, it is necessary to mention the ROC's economic ties with the U.S., its largest trading partner for decades. In this connection, it is also necessary to say a few words regarding the ROC's relations with the U.S. since the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, the foundation of current U.S.-Taiwan relations, came into force on 1st January 1979.\(^3\) A relevant issue here is that of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.

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1. Board of Foreign Trade, FTDROC., p. 12.
U.S. relations with Taiwan differ from all Taiwan's other external relations in that, as noted in Chapter Three, the U.S., after the relocation of the ROC on Taiwan in 1949, has not only had political and military commitments to Taiwan but also it has had very close economic relations with the island. Regardless of its normalization with the mainland government during the 1970s, with Sino-Soviet relations still in a stage of fluidity, the U.S. has acted carefully in developing its China policies. Thus, despite pressure from the mainland government, the U.S. has not wanted total termination of relations with Taiwan. Instead, the U.S. and Taiwan have worked out arrangements for continuing commercial, cultural and other relations.

On the U.S. side, the Taiwan Relations Act was adopted with the clear purpose of giving general direction and policy guidance to U.S. policy-makers in handling continuing (unofficial) relations with the Nationalist government on Taiwan. Meanwhile, the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), the new office of the U.S., was registered and incorporated in the District of Columbia on 15th January 1979. The Institute then set up an office in Taipei and a branch office in Kaohsiung. Its counterpart organization, the Coordination Council for North American Affairs (CCNAA) was established on the 23rd of the following month, under the order of the Executive Yuan of the ROC. The Council later established an office in Washington D.C. and branch offices in New York, Chicago, Houston, Atlantic, Seattle, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Honolulu.¹


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Offices of the two counterpart organizations have assumed most of the functions previously performed by the embassies and consulates. Since the establishment of the offices of the counterpart organizations, they and their personnel have been accorded proper privileges and immunities by the receiving authorities. The two organizations started talks on the agreement on privileges, exemptions and immunities in June 1979. According to the draft of the agreement, the receiving authorities will accord to the offices and personnel of the sending counterpart the privileges, exemptions and immunities equal to those of international organizations and their personnel. ¹

As a result, cultural relations, exchange visits and economic relations have continued to grow steadily between the two countries. Nevertheless, the key issue remains U.S. military relations with Taiwan. For instance, section 2 (Findings and Declarations of Policy) of the Taiwan Relations Act reads: "it is the policy of the U.S...to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character, and to maintain the capacity of the U.S. to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people of Taiwan."² Accordingly, the U.S. is still in charge of Taiwan's security, hence it continues to supply defensive weapons to Taiwan. The issue of whether or not the U.S. should continue its arms sales has already caused resentment from Peking. It has also become a domestic issue in the U.S. Even today,

¹. Ibid.
². Articles (5) and (6) of Section 2, see Congressional Quarterly, op.cit., p. 343.
the issue is still unsettled and it continues to strain relations between Washington and Peking.

Despite this complication, bilateral trade between Taiwan and the U.S. has continued to grow. The U.S. has bought canned food, sugar, textile products, plywood, metal manufactures, plastic articles, rubber products, toys and games, etc. from Taiwan, whereas Taiwan has obtained supplies of soybeans, wheat, cotton raw, machinery and tools, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, transportation equipment, iron and steel, etc. from the U.S. Thus, in spite of the severance of official ties, the U.S. and Taiwan have continued to enjoy close two-way trade links and, hence, a continuation of practical and substantive relations through unofficial dealings.

Finally, there are many other similar civic organizations playing an important role in promoting Taiwan's contacts with the outside world. Just to name a few, there are the Chinese and Philippines Cultural and Economic Association, the Chinese Public Relations Association, the Federation of Taiwan Importers' and Exporters' Association, the General Chamber of Commerce, and the International Trade Association, etc.¹

2. Findings

The operation of the economic strategy indicates that ROC's foreign policy has been transformed under the notion of "economics first". In addition to the practice of "One

¹ The China Yearbook, 1980, p. 333.
China' in theory and 'Two Chinas' or 'One China, One Taiwan' in reality", or "One China but Two economic realities", the ROC's foreign policy reflects the intention to draw clear distinctions between "official" and "unofficial" matters, between "politics" and "economics", and between "domestic" and "foreign" affairs. It also reflects the fact that relations with countries other than the U.S. are becoming increasingly important. With the exception of the PRC, the Nationalist government would even consider a rapprochement with the Communist world, especially on economic matters. As the ROC's Foreign Minister Chou Shu-kai said in his post-UN speech on his Government's future foreign policy:

"(i) The ROC should strengthen its existing official, bilateral interactions, that is, stabilize the number of countries still recognizing us and make efforts to reinforce such existing relations,

(ii) With countries which at present do not have formal relations with us, we shall maintain and further promote trade and cultural exchanges to our mutual benefit, and

(iii) With all other countries, so long as they are not hostile to us and so long as they have no hostile intentions towards us, we may promote trade, travel or such other relations without political implications or complications."  

The above speech clearly implied that no political strings should be attached to unofficial interactions. Since the latter often referred to matters like economic links, trade, social exchanges or other lower-level dealings rather than

political contacts, "economic interests" should be placed as the top foreign policy priority. Nevertheless, this position should not be construed as contradicting the ROC's decades-old political or ideological stances.

According to Chou Shu-kai again, there was a need to stress unofficial dealings because it would enable his Government to delineate effectively the boundary between "domestic" and "foreign" affairs.¹ This distinction was vital because during those years the ROC's foreign policy was conducted in such an ambiguous manner that it constantly treated its "internal dispute" with the PRC as the dominant foreign policy issue. As noted in Chapter One, its foreign policy position of "anti-Communism" was fundamentally an extension of its domestic confrontation with the Chinese Communists. It was because of this linkage that the ROC rejected almost all potential dialogues with countries which had, or were inclined to have, any form of contact with either Peking or countries which had relations with Communist ideology--the official dictum of the Nationalists' position was that "all those who are not my friends are my enemies". In a way, this was a self-destructive policy because, with the departure of the Cold War bipolarity, it merely led the ROC into its current predicament of isolation and hostility. It was only after leaving the U.N. and the creation of the

¹. Chou Shu-kai's speech to Japan's Foreign Minister Fukutake. Chou said that after leaving the U.N. the foreign policy of his country had changed. "Our external relations will now emphasize economic contacts rather than official political interactions..." Chou's speech implied that the Nationalist government would not break diplomatic relations lightly (as it had done previously) with countries having diplomatic relations with its Communist rival on the mainland. See Japan Times 29th December 1972, p. 1.
new international power order unfavourable to it that the Nationalist government began to realize the importance of differentiating between "domestic" and "foreign" affairs. Confrontation with the Chinese Communists was, therefore, merely an internal matter. Consequently, the Nationalist government's position had modified--"all those who are not my enemies are my friends"--indicating vividly a new theme of the ROC's anti-Communist programme, i.e. the Chinese Communists alone were the number one enemy. Clearly, this was a positive shift in the ROC's ideological outlook.

Thus, during the 1970s, the ROC foreign policy reflected a certain degree of flexibility and adaptability. The Nationalist government was prepared to adopt flexible responses to new developments both at home and abroad and such reactions would be conducted in conformity with the trend of international developments even though this required certain alterations in its national positions.

IV. Effectiveness of the economic strategy

The effectiveness of the economic strategy cannot, however, be accurately measured, because the actual period of time involved in its application is not long enough to make a definitive judgement. Besides, even if a tentative assessment could be made, no solid prediction of future development is possible because the ROC's present situation is almost unique in the contemporary world and dependent upon too many imponderable factors. We shall therefore deal with the issue by reviewing the development of some of the
ROC's post-UN external relations with regard to the policy objectives (political and economic) outlined previously and by presenting some of the problems that confront the operation of the strategy today.

When the ROC was ejected from the U.N., the PRC's representatives promptly replaced those from Taiwan in the Security Council and other organs of the U.N. The PRC demanded that all reference to the ROC or Taiwan be excluded from UN publications. Hence, even basic compilations of statistics such as the Statistical Yearbook and UN trade and demographic reports contain no data on Taiwan from 1972 on. Most of the inter-governmental organizations related to the U.N., including UNESCO, WHO, the FAO, WMO, IHB, ICAO, ITU and IMCO, one by one expelled Taipei and seated Peking. The ILO and the IAEA also expelled Taipei, but Peking chose not to enter.

Needless to say, concomitant with this unfavourable development, the ROC's diplomatic ties became considerably circumscribed. The speed with which it lost diplomatic recognition developed almost at the same rate as its Communist counterpart gained it. And the situation has been deteriorating ever since. Thus, towards the end of 1979, the ROC maintained diplomatic relations with only 21 countries, most of them small and uninfluential. It retained membership in only 4 U.N. Specialized Agencies

1. R.N. Clough, op.cit. p. 156. For information on Taiwan's economic development after 1971, see Taiwan Statistical Data Book, and Monthly Statistics of Exports & Imports (Taipei: Ministry of Finance), etc.
2. See Appendix No. 5.
(IMF, IBRD, International Finance Corporation and International Development Association, and although the ROC had not yet been expelled from these organizations, Peking had already taken measures to attack it); in 9 other inter-governmental organizations (the International Union for Publication of Custom Tariffs, the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the International Committee of Military Medicines and Pharmacy, the International Office of Epizootics, the International Cotton Advisory Committee, the Asian Productivity Organization, the Afro-Asian Rural Reconstruction Organization, the Asian and Pacific Council, and the Asian Development Bank); and in 257 international non-governmental organizations.\(^1\) The nature of these non-governmental organizations are: science and technology (31), medicine and hygiene (34), communications and travel (16), economics and finance (41), politics, administration and law (25), journalism (8), culture (10), arts (7), education (7), sports (44), religion and social welfare (22), and women, family, youth, etc. (12).\(^2\) This situation was hardly comparable with the early 1970s. In January 1970, for instance, the ROC had diplomatic ties with 68 countries, while membership of inter-government or international non-governmental organizations was certainly not a major source of worry.\(^3\)

2. Ibid.
The above shows that by 1979 the ROC was limited to a low-profile diplomatic and political life abroad, as seen in the fact that most of the inter-government organization or international non-governmental organizations to which the ROC was still affiliated were either economic, cultural or scientific in orientation. In this respect, it can be concluded that, under the current economic strategy, the ROC had had to put aside political considerations and had made substantial progress in promoting its unofficial ties. It also reflects the fact that the PRC's goal, as noted earlier in Chapter One, was thus not merely to prevent the ROC from claiming to represent China in the international community but also to eliminate representatives of Taiwan from all international organizations, whether such representatives used the name "China" or not. From the PRC's viewpoint, it was just as necessary to oppose "One China, One Taiwan" as it was to oppose "Two Chinas".

Communist influence had at any event been kept away from Taiwan island. Meanwhile, on the island, the traditional Chinese way of life and culture, and a high living standard had been preserved and promoted. Another achievement of the economic strategy was that decision makers in Taiwan had managed to diversify Taiwan's overseas markets—which used to be concentrated in the U.S. and Japan—and sources of supply in the light of the uncertainties and difficulties looming ahead. Taiwan's external trade had been expanded intensively to both the DV and the LDV. Western Europe had been given new emphasis because of its importance as a
potential market, source of technology, supplier of capital and even, conceivably, as an important future supplier of military equipment.\(^1\) Increased emphasis had also been placed on the Middle East and the African continent.\(^2\)

Although the absence of diplomatic ties had hindered somewhat the expansion of trade, the trade figures showed that progress was being made. For instance, the severance of diplomatic relations in September 1972 had little effect on Taiwan's trade with Japan, for Taiwan's exports to Japan which had amounted to $245 million in 1971, increased to $694 million in 1975. Imports from Japan increased from $827 million in 1971 to $1.8 billion in 1975.\(^3\) Also on the increase were Japanese visitors to Taiwan - from 278,000 in 1972 to 419,000 in 1975.\(^4\) Similarly with Europe, although by 1976 the ROC's only diplomatic relations there were with the Holy See, its European trade had increased from $400 million in 1971 to $1.6 billion in 1975.\(^5\)

By the end of 1979, Taiwan's principal markets had expanded with the inclusion of Australia (ties with Taiwan ended in December 1972), Canada (ties with Taiwan ended in 1971), U.K. (ties with Taiwan ended in 1950), Saudi Arabia and Indonesia (ties with Taiwan also ended in 1950), and major suppliers, Kuwait (ties with Taiwan ended in 1971), Saudi Arabia, West Germany (ties with Taiwan ended in 1972), Australia, Indonesia, Indonesia,

1. See Board of Foreign Trade, *FTIFOC 1979*.
3. *TSDB*, p. 117.
the U.K., and Malaysia.¹ Trade with Latin America and African countries, though still growing slowly, had also been promoted. For instance, Taiwan used to have little trade with Latin American countries because of geographical distance and different commercial practices.² But now the Nationalist government has set up 5 trade promotion offices to step up trade activities.³ Taiwan has slowly become a potential market for agricultural products and raw materials from Latin America.⁴ As for the African countries, which Taiwan had very limited commercial relations with during the 1960s except for the aid programme, the Nationalist government also began to pay attention to it during the 1970s as it is anticipated that there would be a substantial demand in the African market for Taiwan's consumer goods and light industrial machinery.⁵

So far, this expansion of trade and foreign markets has enabled the Nationalist government to continue its sovereignty on the island (preserve its internal legitimacy) as well as safeguard the physical security of the island. Nevertheless, there was no guarantee as yet that the present situation based on unofficial contacts could be long-lasting and elevated into the political sphere. Nor was there any promise that Taiwan, under the Nationalist rule, could be converted in the very long run into a sort of autonomous unit, remaining self-governing, or that the Nationalist government

1. Ibid., p. 13.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
could promote its external legitimacy. This was because there was no way the Nationalist government could predict totally, or influence, let alone control, the future trend of the international environment on one hand or, on the other hand, the policy the PRC might launch for Chinese re-unification.

Therefore, behind these informal methods of international dealings, the Nationalist government remained deeply anxious and frustrated: international de-recognition, as discussed in Chapter One, though not indispensable to its survival, still played a major part in determining the state's international relations. Otherwise, the Nationalist government would encounter fewer problems in its international trade. For instance, despite its desire to promote economic relations with the European Economic Community (EEC) countries, the ROC, being uncertain in status, faced several obstacles. Statistics show that Taiwan's trade with the EEC countries has grown steadily since 1971. However, businessmen in Taiwan found it extremely difficult and inconvenient to obtain visas for these countries. Also, since there were no diplomatic ties, Taiwan suffered from import controls, unfair quota limitations and countervailing duties on its export of sensitive items to the EEC. As a consequence, there were problems of insufficient representation and promotion of manufacturers and traders, also insufficient after-sale services. As R.N. Clough described the situation:

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
"...officials cannot negotiate quotas for textile exports to the EEC countries, which places the ROC at a disadvantage relative to its principal competitor, the Republic of Korea. Quotas on imports of textiles from Taiwan are unilaterally imposed by the EEC countries...Another problem is the refusal of some countries to allow Taiwan the trade preferences given other developing countries or to permit Taiwan to participate in trade fairs...The difficulty of negotiating solutions that require government action for problems impeding trade is a continuing headache for ROC officials. Foreign officials may refuse to see ROC officials because of their sensitivity to possible PRC reactions or, in extreme cases, may even refuse to admit ROC officials to the country. ROC officials travel on ordinary passports and receive no diplomatic privileges or immunities in countries with which Taiwan does not have diplomatic relations. Even when ROC officials are able to see the appropriate foreign officials, their representations are weakened by their lack of official status in the eyes of the foreign government. Consequently, ROC officials must rely more heavily than the representatives of most other countries on personal connections and influence to accomplish their purposes." ¹

Indeed, trade cannot be promoted effectively unless freedom to travel exists, especially for the traders themselves, but also for officials who must negotiate solutions to problems with which the private businessmen cannot cope. The inconvenience caused by Taiwan's political circumstances does curb Taiwan's foreign economic relations, however impressive its internal economic development. Thus, after all, a total separation between political and economic matters, official and unofficial affairs is theoretically possible but practically unfeasible. The likely effectiveness of the economic strategy is therefore weakened.

Another reason for adopting the economic strategy was to discourage Peking's interference. By the end of 1979, Peking had not launched any intensive campaign to interfere with

¹ R.N. Clough, op. cit., pp. 165-166.
Taiwan's external economic relations (except for U.S. arms sales to Taiwan). One way to explain this is that the Peking government still wanted to absorb Taiwan into its system, hopefully with a high level of economic development. Otherwise, if the absorption turned into reality only in a political sense, the Peking government could still show to the world that there was at least a part of China, under its leadership, which was economically not backward, however small this part was. Thus, it would prefer an economically viable Taiwan. Yet even so, there were scattered examples of such interference. The Mexican government, for instance, responded to PRC representations by closing the ROC's commercial office in that country.\(^1\)

The Toronto Dominion Bank was struck off the list of banks in the U.S. through which trade with the China mainland could be conducted, apparently in retaliation for the bank's having opened a branch office in Taipei in February 1975.\(^2\) Also the PRC's banks once stopped accepting American Express travellers' cheques, probably because the company had joined the USA-ROC Economic Council established in the U.S. in 1976 to promote trade with Taiwan.\(^3\)

Actually, Peking's attack on the ROC's position in intergovernmental organizations and in all kinds of international non-government organizations was far more severe than its interference in Taiwan's external economic relations. For instance, under Peking's pressure the ROC was excluded from

most of the important intergovernmental organizations and international non-governmental organizations, even from some of international sports organizations such as the Olympic Games and the International Basketball Federation. Pressure was also placed on several other less significant international sports federations such as Judo, Equestrian, Archery, etc. although towards the end of 1979 the fight to retain Taiwan's membership was still continuing.¹

In all, the ROC's unorthodox methods of diplomacy have indeed served to compensate for its international isolation after the U.N. expulsion, and hence ensured its survival and economic viability. At least Taiwan remains a non-Communist area, even though "the new policy of economics first (was) leading Taiwan to increase trade with nations that recognize the mainland and to do business, if only indirectly, with Eastern Europe."² With the expansion of trade, Taiwan's living standards were rising at the same rate. All these, however, are not sufficient to prove at this stage that the strategy of "economics- and trade-first diplomacy" could achieve the ROC's political purposes of national survival and unification, or the long-term aspiration of a San Min Chu I world system. It could nevertheless at least temporarily avoid international isolation caused by the absence of diplomatic ties.

1. Private conversation with Mao Ming-tsue in London on 5th September 1981. Mao is the President of the ROC's Judo Association, and Vice-President of the Judo Federation of Asia.

2. Louis Kraar, op.cit., p. 129.
V. Conclusion

To sum up, as a consequence of changes in the international political environments, the ROC's post-UN expulsion foreign policy has demonstrated a significant level of flexibility and adjustment. Instead of relying on the U.S. totally for national security and survival, the ROC developed its own foreign policy strategy - the strategy of "economics- and trade-first diplomacy". This method placed emphasis on Taiwan's international economic, trade and other unofficial contacts rather than the traditional diplomacy of political and/or official interactions. It was to step up Taiwan's international trade network of interdependence (with both the developed and less-developed world), linking Taiwan and its future with other parts of the world. In this regard, except for the Chinese Communists, all countries in the world, Communists and non-Communist alike, developed and less-developed, were regarded by the ROC as either desirable or potential trade partners. Resistance to Soviet Communism was equally reduced to the level of ideological and political argument. In actuality, it was almost replaced by the new theme of seeking accommodation, via some East European countries, between the two sides. Other foreign policy options had been also considered by the Nationalist government as well, but almost all of them had a price to pay and thus remained only possibilities. Indeed, in view of ROC's present situation, decision-makers recognized that there would be too much to lose if they adopted any of the options lightly. Even with regard to the current economic strategy, in spite of its promising results, no one can be sure what it will achieve in the very long run.
Chapter Seven

Conclusion

Basis of ROC's foreign policy

Since 1949, the survival of the ROC regime on Taiwan has been permanently in question. Challenges to its legitimacy have come from the world community and from the native Taiwanese population, but above all they have come from the PRC on the mainland. This struggle for survival and for the recovery of the mainland has dominated almost all the ROC's external relations and foreign policies.

The basic principle of the ROC regime was and still is an ideological one--anti-communism. The main policies adopted to consolidate its legitimacy and to ensure national survival include the realization of the San Min Chu I ideology (as a counter force to Chinese Communism), the implementation of the mainland recovery programme and the promotion of close relationships with the democratic world, particularly with the U.S. Its ultimate foreign policy goal was and still is to promote the world of a great commonwealth in which, under the San Min Chu I system, China would be treated equally among other states.

The bedrock of the ROC's foreign policy strategies has been U.S. support which stemmed from the Korean War in 1950 and also partly from its global containment policy. This relationship turned out to be the ROC's principal and crucial lifeline in the face of threats from the PRC and of international isolation.
Yet one of the chief arguments of this thesis has been that
the ROC's post-1949 foreign policy has not been entirely
static and rigid. The ROC adopted several foreign policy
strategies to further the task of national survival, and
such strategies, while all based upon the unchangeable
principle of anti-communism, increasingly demonstrated
significant elements of flexibility and adaptability.

General considerations affecting the formulation of the
ROC's foreign policy

As was emphasized in Chapter One, Taiwan is a very small
island with virtually no natural resources, and as a result
of these limitations, as well as the ROC's unusual political
situation after 1949, the ROC's national capability has been
severely constrained. That is, as a small country, the ROC
has been unable to make any impact upon world opinion on
major issues such as World Communism and the Cold War. It
was unable to influence changes in opinion in other countries
and at the U.N. Some examples were given in Chapters Five,
and Six: the ROC's inability to prevent or delay France and
some African countries from seeking diplomatic relations with
the PRC in 1964 and afterwards in spite of strong U.S. support
and a favourable international climate at that time; and the
ROC's diplomatic setback at the U.N. in 1971 and its
consequent failure to prevent its major ally, the U.S., and
the world community from recognizing the PRC.

The fact that the ROC was a small country with no international
influence also made it vulnerable to outside influence. This
included ROC's dependent relationship with the U.S. Since the
U.S. was and still is a Superpower and leader of the democratic world, its China policy could thus have a powerful effect upon general world opinion. Thus the U.S. support for the ROC, however vital and advantageous to the latter, could have a negative effect because this support could be weakened or withdrawn at the will of the United States.

The ROC's vulnerability to the U.S. and ultimately to outside forces can briefly be explained in this way: if U.S. support was positive, i.e. in favour of the ROC, as it was during the Cold War period, the ROC's capability to tackle national affairs was strengthened, as was its national security, and its legitimacy was enhanced. Thus, as seen in Chapters Three and Four, from the outbreak of the Korean War until the mid-1960s, the ROC was able to pursue its national goals, such as, internally, resisting the PRC military challenge to take Taiwan by force, consolidating Nationalist rule on Taiwan (i.e. internal legitimacy); and, externally, protecting the ROC's legal position at the U.N. and securing international recognition (i.e. external legitimacy), by making use of U.S. support as well as of the general mood of anti-communism in the world. Naturally, in return, the U.S. and the democratic world benefited, even if only very marginally, from Taiwan's strategic position in the Pacific for containing communist influence there. Yet even then, the ROC was not granted a free hand to do as it wished by the United States. This was chiefly because of the unequal relationship between the U.S. and the ROC: while the U.S. was and still is the only major friend of the ROC, the latter was merely one
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element in the whole range of U.S. global security calculations. In other words, as a small country, the ROC's political survival as well as the development of its anti-communist programme have depended almost entirely upon U.S. support, whilst the U.S. obviously does not depend on the ROC for either its programme of anti-communism or for its political existence. Moreover, as a Superpower, the U.S. had to cope with other wider issues in international power relationships than the ROC's problems. One example given in Chapter Three was the U.S. policy of restraining the ROC from military attack on the mainland, however promising such a strategy may have seemed during the 1950s when Communist rule on the mainland was less stable and when it still suffered from severe internal problems and external isolation, because the major concern of the U.S. at that time was to avoid direct military confrontation with the communist world for fear of provoking a third world war. Instead, the ROC had to play down its theme of military counterattack and to concentrate its efforts on improving its democratic image in Taiwan and on promoting its economic modernization programme.

Later, since the mid-1960s, when the U.S. has become more and more concerned with some other issues in East-West relations, such as the SALT disarmament talks, the Vietnam War, its own political image at home and abroad, and, above all, its relations with the PRC, and less and less concerned with ROC's domestic problems of anti-(Chinese) communism and of mainland recovery, the disparity in the unequal relationship between the U.S. and the ROC made itself increasingly
felt. Thus, as U.S. foreign policy goals altered and the ROC came to occupy a decreasingly prominent place in its considerations, the ROC's capabilities were seriously undermined by U.S. actions. This was especially evident in the 1970s when the U.S. reversed its pro-ROC China policy and steadily moved towards détente with international communism. Consequently, as a result of the new China policy of the U.S., the ROC not only lost its international status but also became increasingly isolated.

The ROC's predicament could be contrasted with that of Israel, which also suffers from the problems of national survival and international recognition, and which also has a dependent relationship with the U.S., but which is still not only recognized but actively supported by its patron. In comparison, the ROC's bargaining strength vis-a-vis the U.S. was relatively weaker and even quite insignificant. Although this partly stemmed from the ROC's weaknesses mentioned above, it was also partly because of the ROC's inability to muster public support in the United States which could put pressure on the U.S. government. For example, one can draw a comparison between the China Lobby and the Jewish Lobby--both lobbies sought to influence U.S. policies to their respective advantages. In spite of the fact that the China Lobby was once very active in the U.S. administration and was reportedly one of the ROC's chief diplomatic channels during the Cold War period for influencing American China policies, it was never as powerful as the Jewish Lobby in determining U.S. policies. Indeed, where the Jewish Lobby has obtained a unique and almost unalterable commitment
to the survival of Israel, the strength of the China Lobby generally diminished. Many reasons can account for this difference. Very briefly, first of all, the size of the China Lobby was rather small compared to the Jewish Lobby. The latter for a variety of reasons was and is relatively better organized, better financed, better staffed and, above all, more homogeneous in its views about Israel. Secondly, unlike the Jewish Lobby, the China Lobby lacked strong support from either Americans or ethnic Chinese-Americans. Perhaps because historically the Chinese have generally been rather apolitical, or perhaps because as immigrants to America, they were reluctant to engage in politics, or perhaps because, as time goes by, the younger generation has come to feel less strongly about the "two Chinas" conflict, ethnic Chinese-Americans were not active in supporting the Nationalist cause. Although, as noticed in Chapters Three and Six, there were some non-Chinese Americans behind the Nationalist cause who promoted the ROC's interest, and who were still anti-Communist, they found it increasingly difficult to mobilize public support because of overall changes in U.S. China policy, and because of the deaths of some key members of the Lobby, not to mention that of Chiang Kai-shek, to whom they were strongly committed. Senator Charles Mathias' remark is indicative of the change. He said:

"...The once formidable 'China Lobby', now a Taiwan Lobby, failed to mount an effective campaign against the Carter Administration's decision in late 1978 to transfer American recognition from the Republic of China on Taiwan to the People's Republic of China."
The efforts of American conservative groups (who complained of Taiwanese acquiescence in the change) were ineffective, although they might have been highly effective if these groups had won the united support of an aroused Chinese-American community.

A final point regarding the negative effect of the ROC's dependence on the U.S. is that the ROC, having once been tagged a staunch ally of the U.S. suffered from that reputation as far as some other states were concerned even after the U.S.-ROC relationship had begun to decline. One example given in Chapter Five was of some newly independent non-aligned African countries rejecting the ROC's offers of foreign aid because they wanted to preserve their non-alignment and avoid any taint of contact with an "imperialist lackey". Also in Chapter Five, it was noted that one of the reasons for the French President de Gaulle's new China policy was his intention to increase French independence from U.S. influence.

The ROC's weakness was further aggravated by the fact that, after 1949, Chiang Kai-shek, who had ruled the ROC for more than half a century, continued to perceive the ROC as a big country, governing both the vast mainland and Taiwan, and standing side by side with other major countries in the world. Consequently, Chiang's foreign policies have been seen by foreign observers as unrealistic, unadaptable and inflexible.

Chiang's "mis-perception" was no doubt due in part to the fact that he was affected by the continuing influence of traditional "Sino-centricism" and the Confucian philosophy.

of "peaceful ordering". As mentioned in Chapter One, both of these elements encouraged a strong belief among the Chinese leaders that foreign policy was principally an extension of domestic government and that by managing the internal affairs of China well, they could equally well determine external affairs. Thus, largely due to their ignorance and lack of experience of the outside world, they tended to be inflexible, reserved and very conservative in their handling of diplomatic matters. Perhaps it was because of the above reasons or because of the fact that the pre-1949 ROC was preoccupied by a wide range of major domestic problems, or both, that Chiang Kai-shek had not himself actively engaged in international diplomacy. The fact that China had had bitter experience of the imperialists who had raped China during the 18th and 19th centuries, and made it sign a series of unequal treaties, also helps to explain why the Nationalists were suspicious of dealings with the outside world. Indeed, Chiang had only limited success in promoting China's international relations and its national status when he was on the mainland except for the event in 1945 when China, under his leadership, was elevated to the superpower league and most of the unequal treaties were terminated. Nevertheless, this success was soon undermined by the renewal of the Chinese civil war and the subsequent division of China. The enforced retreat of the ROC to Taiwan constituted a severe blow to Chiang's international prestige. But it was only on this island that Chiang gradually found out more about the outside world. That is, in order to realize the ROC's programme of mainland recovery, to secure the ROC's
"rightful" position as well as to ensure its continued existence in the world, and in view of the political environment of the ROC after 1949, Chiang had to seek collaboration with the U.S., and to approach other anti- and/or non-communist countries to gain their support for his cause. This made it essential for Chiang to keep his government in good standing internationally. Nevertheless, probably influenced by the historical factors mentioned above, Chiang still tended to regard the ROC's dependent relationship with the U.S. as one where the ROC would assist the U.S. in fighting the international anti-Communist war, and not the other way round. Also, as noted in Chapter Two, Chiang often made the point that his anti-Communist struggle represented the struggle between "wang tao" (i.e. the good force, representing the democratic world) and "pa tao" (i.e. the evil force, representing the communist world) and that the former would eventually conquer the latter. Even so, Chiang showed some elements of flexibility in his foreign policies, but such adjustments were indeed very limited.

This feeling of self-importance was characteristic of Chiang's unrealistic and inflexible attitudes in conducting foreign policies and external affairs. It also reflected his political naivety. His mentality was still that of the supreme leader of China, a big country with an enormous reservoir of natural resource and with the potential to balance East-West relations. He failed to realize, or perhaps he deliberately ignored, the reality that after 1949 his authority was confined to only 0.38 percent of the whole
Chinese territory, that he had obviously lost the "Mandate of Heaven" as a result of the civil war in the 1940s, and that the political survival of the ROC and the fate of Taiwan depended mainly upon conflicts in East-West relations, e.g. hostility between the two Superpowers, and/or between the Soviet Union and the PRC, or between the U.S. and the PRC. Thus, it is fair to say that had it not been for Chiang's insistence on the "one China" principle which was clearly expressed in the mainland recovery programme and which was closely followed by the ROC in its foreign policies and external relations, the ROC might still be a member of the U.N.—though probably only in the General Assembly. Even its security might have been stronger and it would have been less isolated today had Chiang accepted the offer of a "two Chinas" solution as early as the 1960s.

Having said this, however, one needs to bear in mind the point emphasized in Chapter One, that one of the main reasons why Chiang felt he could not afford to consider a "two Chinas" solution or to abandon the "one China" principle was the problem surrounding the ROC's legitimate position on Taiwan. During the first two decades after 1949, the ROC's position on Taiwan was less assured than it is today. At that time, the ROC faced a potential military threat from the PRC. It also suffered from internal instability because the native Taiwanese majority had not yet been entirely won over to its rule and their support for the ROC's value system of San Min Chu I was limited. To them the San Min Chu I ideology was a set of theories which meant very little in the way of concrete improvement in
their conditions. Moreover, after fifty years of colonial administration, some Taiwanese aspired for an independent Taiwan ruled by Taiwanese alone. This unfavourable situation was aggravated by the unpleasant memory of the "February 28th Uprising" in 1947 and by the history of ROC rule on the mainland. Since the pre-1949 Nationalist-led national government of the ROC had had the reputation of being divided, ineffectual, and riddled with corruption, and had quite obviously lost the civil war, Taiwanese found it difficult to accept the ROC's authority on Taiwan without reservation. Moreover, it was the ROC's defeat in 1949 that had led to the Communist threat to, and the flight of 1.5 million "outsiders" to, Taiwan. Thus, many Taiwanese only supported the ROC's mainland recovery programme because of the hope that, if it succeeded, they could get rid of the ROC, i.e. Taiwan could perhaps remain autonomous. Under such circumstances, it is understandable that Chiang would make almost no compromise over the "one China" principle. And he continued to regard his government as the government of all China and to declare his determination to return eventually to the mainland. To him, abandonment of these positions would mean that he would not only legitimize the permanent political division of China but also accept his personal responsibility for the Nationalist defeat in 1949. Thus, under Chiang Kai-shek's leadership, the ROC would scarcely enter into relations, either official or unofficial with countries which supported communist ideology and/or which had relations or any sort of contacts with the PRC, the only exceptions being: the ROC's consular relations with Britain despite the latter's recognition of the PRC in 1950,
the ROC's diplomatic and aid relations with Senegal in the early 1960s despite the latter's recognition of the PRC in 1961 and the ROC's tolerance of Japan's "two Chinas" policy.

ROC's foreign policy gradually began to show signs of flexibility and adaptability in the 1960s. For example, Chapter Four indicated that the ROC, in view of the Sino-Soviet split and rapprochment between the two Superpowers, had considered a "Russian option". It also began more vigorously to seek support from other neighbouring countries and overseas Chinese for its anti-communist programme, instead of relying totally on the U.S. A more striking example of flexibility and adaptability was given in Chapter Five when the ROC took the initiative of launching the Vanguard Project in Africa. This task reflected not only the ROC's growing capability in conducting an independent foreign policy and external affairs, but also the Nationalist leaders growing awareness of developments in the outside world. Although the ROC continued to follow the "one China" principle strictly as the criterion for its foreign relations, a few exceptions cited above help to point out that great scope for policy adjustments was on the way.

During the 1970s, particularly after its defeat at the UN in 1971, the ROC's foreign policy and external relations displayed even greater flexibility. Although anti-communism was still its unchangeable principle, the ROC encouraged limited contacts with selected communist countries basically in the economic, social and cultural spheres. Thus, the ROC began to approach Eastern bloc countries as well as some other countries which recognized the PRC. Also as in the case of
Senegal, for example, the ROC continued to provide agricultural aid to Libya at its request and retain an embassy there until mid-1978, regardless of Libya's recognition of the PRC in 1971. Also, as mentioned in Chapter Six, despite Japan's and the U.S.'s increasing contacts with the PRC, the ROC decided to retain contacts with Japan and the U.S. even at a semi-official level. At the same time, the ROC encouraged unofficial contacts, or what the Nationalists described as "practical relations", with the outside world and participation in international governmental or non-governmental organizations so as to build up connections overseas, hence avoiding the fate of complete international isolation. Naturally, the theme of the mainland recovery programme was also soft-pedalled. That is, it no longer focused on an immediate massive military take-over of the mainland, but more and more on winning over support for the realization of the San Min Chu I system on Taiwan.

Outline of the four foreign policy strategies for survival
In this thesis, the study of the evolution of the ROC's post-1949 foreign policy strategies and its external relations has been divided into three periods which saw four different strategies in operation.

The strategy of military counterattack: Chapter Three dealt with the first period of the ROC's foreign policy strategies which dated from the relocation of the Nationalist government in Taipei in October 1949 until the signing of the U.S.-ROC Communiqué in December 1958. During this period, the dominant
foreign policy strategy of the ROC was that of military counterattack which was adopted immediately after the outbreak of the Korean War in January 1950.

This strategy was formulated in conjunction with the U.S. policy of global containment aimed at halting communist expansion beyond areas already under communist control. The success of this strategy depended primarily on U.S. support and secondly on anti-communist sentiment world-wide. As a result of this dependence, and also due to the internal instability of the ROC at that time, very few relations with other countries were developed. It was believed that concentration on the special relationship with the U.S. would facilitate the subsequent establishment of other ROC missions abroad.

Nevertheless, the U.S. never committed itself to direct involvement in the ROC's mainland recovery programme. Nor did it commit itself to defending more than the area of Taiwan itself, thus reserving its position vis-a-vis the offshore islands. Instead, it acted at times to restrain the ROC's military ambitions and operations along the Taiwan Straits.

During this period, the Nationalist government regarded Taiwan as having two interrelated functions: (1) as a transit port for the ROC in its preparations for launching a massive military attack on the Chinese Communists (the task to be carried out as part of the international programme of anti-communism) and (2) as a strategic post in the Pacific vital to the security of the Western world.
Thus, this was largely an offensive and aggressive strategy for survival, which aimed at destroying the status quo along the Taiwan Straits (otherwise it would mean tacit acceptance of the Communist victory on the mainland and/or the existence of the two Chinas) and eliminating communist ideology on a global scale.

The strategy of political counterattack: Chapter Four described the second phase of the ROC's foreign policy strategy which can be characterized as one of political counterattack, and it lasted from the end of 1958 until the ROC's expulsion from the U.N. in October 1971. During this period, which was marked by international détente and also by the Sino-Soviet split, the prospect of direct military confrontation between the East and the West declined. Consequently, the prospect of U.S. support for the ROC's military programme diminished even more.

With U.S. support becoming less whole-hearted, the ROC was forced to revise its long-held assumptions. Instead of depending on the U.S. totally, the ROC began to search for other foreign policy options. At one stage the Russian option was considered but rejected because of the fear of ending up as a pawn in the political chessboard of the Superpowers and of the harm that communist influence would cause to the country. Although, despite much speculation, this Russian connection was never turned into official policy, it did indicate the fact that the ROC now perceived the Russians as less of a threat to world peace than the Chinese Communists. Meanwhile, the ROC also considered seeking more active support from overseas Chinese and from
neighbouring countries in Asia. The ROC's efforts did not enjoy success, but they did demonstrate that the ROC was at least diplomatically now more enterprising and active than in the previous decade. And, above all, the ROC gradually reduced its dependence, although very reluctantly, on the United States.

In effect, since the signing of the U.S.-ROC Communiqué, the ROC's military threats to return to the mainland had already lost their original significance. Instead of being the principal national objective, it sounded increasingly like a ritual incantation. It was in this Communiqué that the ROC conceded that its mainland recovery programme and its overall anti-communist strategy of military counterattack were now only "30 percent military and 70 percent political".

This modified strategy suggested a long-term plan of "political influence" in winning over the hearts and minds of enemies rather than one of drastic military confrontation. It was clearly less aggressive and more defensive in nature than the previous military strategy. Meanwhile, the role of Taiwan in the ROC's national programme had also been modified. It was no longer seen as a mere transit port but more and more regarded as a permanent base for the Nationalists. In other words, Taiwan was to be developed into a San Min Chu I model province of China, which would serve as a bastion in the Pacific against communism.

The strategy of foreign aid: Chapter Five discussed the ROC's foreign policy strategy of aid in Africa between 1961 and 1971. This strategy was developed as an adjunct of the ROC
overall political strategy, but the priority of its aim was to counter Peking's pending application for U.N. membership. Thus, potential allies among the African countries were offered aid as part of the ROC's diplomatic campaign for international recognition, particularly at the U.N. By this stage, it had become even more obvious that the ROC's strategy for survival had changed its course, i.e. from an aggressive posture of wanting to overthrow the status quo through military recovery of mainland and through a direct military confrontation with the whole communist world to a more defensive one of preserving the status quo by strengthening its internal legitimacy on Taiwan island and by maintaining and promoting its international status. Indeed, it was considered better and wiser to keep a small portion of China free (from communism) and for it to prosper, than to engage futilely in a programme which had little support and which had become increasingly illusory.

The aid programmes concentrated on agriculture and although they were rather small in scale and limited in funds, they managed to achieve quite impressive results in the 24 African countries to which assistance was given. Since 1971, the ROC has maintained very few aid relations with Africa, and the focus of its foreign aid programme has shifted to some Latin American countries.

The strategy of economics- and trade-first diplomacy: Chapter Six examined the fourth phase of the ROC's post-1949 foreign policy development which has been the strategy of economics- and trade-first diplomacy, from the expulsion of the ROC from the U.N. in October 1971 to the present, although our
The most marked change (and also the most positive evidence of flexibility) in the ROC's foreign policy during this period has been the major shift of emphasis in its diplomatic activities from largely political and official dealings to more and more economic and unofficial or semi-official dealings (although it is true this has been an element in that policy since 1949), and from the insistence on a strict "one China" principle—the ROC in principle and in practice—to a principle of one China in theory but two Chinas in reality. Although ideology (i.e. anti-communism) continued to play an essential part in the formulation and direction of the ROC's foreign policy and external relations, it has been less rigidly applied. That is, in a politically unpredictable world in which ideological boundaries have become increasingly blurred and less important, the ROC has gradually accepted the reality that the wider objective of anti-communism should play a less prominent role in determining its foreign policies. The "one China" principle remained unaltered but it would not, as it had done previously, restrict the ROC from entering into relations with other countries (regardless of their ideological stance) which recognized the PRC, as long as these countries were not hostile towards the ROC. In other words, the ROC no longer insisted on a total termination of relations with countries which had either official or unofficial relations with the PRC. Nor did it insist on a total blockade of relations with countries which were by nature communist sympathizers. This enabled the ROC to extend the dimensions of its external relations. Thus, trade and commercial relations with the
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communist world, notably with East European countries, were not only permitted but also incorporated into the ROC's external trade promotion programme.

These revolutionary adjustments were made partly because of political necessity, and partly because of the ROC's new leader, Chiang Ching-kuo. Chiang Ching-kuo is obviously more flexible in style, more pragmatic in attitude and less affected by China's historical legacy than his father, Chiang Kai-shek. There are various complementary reasons for this, being his father's son and the new leader of the Nationalist Party, Chiang Ching-kuo naturally has had to accept the burden of the mission to reunify China through the implementation of the mainland recovery programme, i.e. he has to continue the "one China" principle and the anti-Communist ideology adopted by his father. However, bearing in mind that Chiang Ching-kuo never ruled the mainland as his father did and hence was not the one responsible for its loss, it is quite plausible to argue that Chiang Ching-kuo is less susceptible than his father to the "Sino-centricism" mentality, that he can afford more flexibility in the ROC's foreign policy and that, consequently, he has more foreign policy options open. Equally, one can always argue that Chiang Ching-kuo's different leadership style is not a product of the above factors, because they will only lead to decreasing support for the ROC's cause--Chiang can see more clearly that the ROC would need powerful allies to help re-take the mainland and that such help is unlikely to be forthcoming. Thus in this sense he is merely accepting the inevitable. Naturally, another argument is that Chiang
Ching-kuo has a better opportunity than his father to undertake a less restricted foreign policy and to promote the ROC's external relations because the ROC in the 1970s has faced less domestic constraint, i.e. less threat of its legitimacy at home. The ROC has consolidated its rule on Taiwan, and the Taiwanese are more convinced that the San Min Chu I ideology is not merely a set of empty theories but has shown practical results in Taiwan, and that their fate is more and more intertwined with the Nationalists. The increase in internal support (i.e. internal legitimacy), together with Chiang Ching-kuo's "two Chinas" strategy, has subtly transformed the nature of the China problem, and hence the direction of the ROC's foreign policy. That is, for Chiang Ching-kuo, the predominant concern is not so much to recover the lost mainland, as to secure Taiwan as the last foothold of the Nationalists. At the very least, Taiwan must be kept as a small China, free from communist domination, and imbued with traditional Chinese values and the traditional Chinese way of life.

Thus, Chiang Ching-kuo's policies have been directed at widening the differences between the mainland and Taiwan with the aim of making reunification of the two parts of China difficult, and keeping Taiwan away from communist influence. One of the purposes of the economic strategy was therefore to attempt to enmesh other countries in a network of trade, economic and technological relations with Taiwan so that it would be against, or even be harmful to, their interest for the PRC to take over Taiwan. (although it would admittedly be difficult for the ROC to make itself so
indispensable to such countries that they would actually restrain or bring pressure to bear on the PRC). Meanwhile, the programme of mainland recovery, though still ostensibly an unchangeable national principle of the ROC, became more and more an official rhetoric which carries little weight. As Brian Crozier noted: "It had begun as a fierce resolve; it became an inspiration, then a myth, t'en a liturgy".¹

Or as Joseph R. L. Sterne remarked in the wake of diplomatic setbacks in 1971 and 1972:

"Officially, the government is adhering doggedly to the dogma that it is the only legitimate authority for the Chinese and that one day there will be a return to the Mainland. But in actual practice, this concept is being soft-pedalled. The government is pragmatically pursuing more immediate concerns—survival, prosperity, domestic cohesion. Or as one observer put it, 'This government professes to be the government of China but it is behaving more and more as the government of Taiwan'.”²

Indeed it had become unrealistic and unthinkable for the ROC to commit itself to the mainland recovery programme at the expense of Taiwan's modernization and survival. Thus, as long as Taiwan enjoys economic prosperity, viability and social stability, and as long as the Nationalist government exercises effective control over it and the offshore islands, and above all, as long as it obtains a certain level of domestic consensus, the ROC's survival and identity in the world is a matter of fact. In other words, no one could deny the existence of the ROC in Taiwan as a political reality, despite increasing international de-recognition and isolation and diminishing support from the United States and the world.

Thus, today, although in theory both the ROC and the PRC continue to agree that there is but one China and that Taiwan is only a part of it, in reality, it is obvious that China has developed increasingly into a divided nation. With the mainland and Taiwan developing steadily their drastically different systems and with the new generations much less concerned about the personal hostility between Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung, and the power struggle between the Nationalists and the Communists, the task to terminate the ROC's survival has become equally as difficult as the task of reuniting the two parts of China. Indeed, even today, there seems to be little prospect of a predictable end to the thirty years of confrontation between the little China on Taiwan and the big China of the Chinese Communists on the mainland. The ROC, in spite of U.S. de-recognition, is still fighting for its cause. And the focus of its foreign relations has obviously widened. In addition to the U.S., the ROC has turned its attention to other openly anti-communist regimes, e.g. South Africa, Saudi Arabia, and some Latin American countries for support.

To sum up, the ROC's foreign policy strategies have elements of flexibility. The ROC certainly has made adjustments to meet changing political reality. Nevertheless, underlying this flexibility, most noticeably in its decision to trade with selected communist countries and in its application of the "one China" principle, one notices that there is a strong aspect of consistency, i.e. continuity, in the ROC's foreign policy. That is, in its anti-communist programme, which the
ROC is gradually able to distinguish Chinese communism from international communism, the Chinese Communists (but not the Russian Communists) are still regarded as the chief (foreign) enemy. Thus, the ROC began to dissociate its internal programme of anti-Chinese-Communists and its overall programme of anti-communism, although the two were still closely related. The point was that during the Cold War bipolarity when U.S.-PRC relations were still strained, the ROC had intentionally and skillfully attached its domestic programme of anti-communism to, and, in effect, made it the backbone of, its external programme of anti-communism. It was only after the U.N. defeat and U.S. de-recognition that the ROC gradually began to draw a line between its domestic politics and foreign policies. However, another way of looking at this issue was that although the Chinese Communists were still the enemies, if the ROC's post-UN foreign policy was to establish a fait accompli of "one China, two states", then this intention of developing Taiwan as a different state (i.e. different from the PRC) showed that, as far as the ROC was concerned, the PRC could be treated as a domestic as well as a foreign enemy.

Thus, the current ROC's foreign policy strategy for survival is a synthesis of all preceding strategies, i.e. the elements of each strategy still continue and are effective, for example, the appeal of anti-communism to Saudi Arabia in the 1970's. Moreover, although it continues to seek support from the U.S., it has gradually realized that strong domestic institutions and stability which can provide national unity and consensus (i.e. self-reliance) are the most important elements for an effective foreign policy.
Consequently, it is possible to view the future of the ROC on Taiwan with some optimism. The Nationalists' success in gaining greater domestic legitimacy, and incorporating more Taiwanese in the administration during the 1970s indicated less domestic constraint on its task to pursue political survival. It obviously reckons that self-reliance is more vital to the issue of survival. For the time being, despite its political disadvantages, the ROC does seem to possess certain assets in its survival battle, as Ralph Clough remarked:

"Its population is larger than that of two-thirds of the members of the United Nations and its people are more highly educated than those of most developing countries. It has built a strong and diversified economy based on large-scale trade with many countries, despite an absence of diplomatic relations with most of those countries in recent years. It has devised ingenious unorthodox substitutes for diplomatic relations and has earned the sympathy of many people in the United States, Japan and elsewhere. Up to the present time, PRC's efforts to isolate Taiwan, while complicating the island's international relations, have not significantly weakened its ability to survive and prosper independently. The opposition of the people of Taiwan to being incorporated into the PRC also seems substantially unaffected." 1

Theodore Hsi-en Chen similarly commented:

"So far, Taiwan has managed to survive and prosper in spite of her expulsion from the United Nations and the diplomatic desertion of erstwhile friends and allies...As long as most nations adhere to the present policy of recognizing one China in principle, and dealing with two Chinese governments in practice, Taiwan will probably continue to be a stable and prosperous country where 16 million people are living in peace and relative contentment." 2

These assessments, although saluting the effectiveness of the ROC's strategies for survival so far, carefully avoid the thorny question of the ability of the Nationalist government to resist possible international pressure to terminate its position in the very long run. It is true that so far, the ROC is still in control of Taiwan and the offshore islands and it has managed to keep these territories intact from either communist or outside domination. Yet, of course, the ROC's future in the end remains uncertain.
Both the Resolution, adopted on 17th November 1960 and the Proposal, proposed on 17th November 1961, were accepted and debated as agenda items 90 and 91 in the Plenary Meeting of the 16th Session of the General Assembly in 1961 and through the years until October 1971.

(1) The Text of the Resolution reads:

The General Assembly,

Noting that a serious divergence of views exists among Member States concerning the representation of a founder Member who is named in the Charter of the United Nations,

Recalling that this matter has been described repeatedly in the General Assembly by all segments of opinion as vital and crucial and that on numerous occasions its inclusion in the agenda has been requested under rule 15 of the Assembly's rule of procedure as an item of an important and urgent character.

Recalling further the recommendation contained in its resolution 396(V) of 14 December 1950 that, whenever more than one authority claims to be the government entitled to represent a Member State in the United Nations and this question becomes the subject of controversy in the United Nations, the question should be considered in the light of the purposes and principles of the Charter and the circumstances of each case.

Decides, in accordance with Article 18 of the Charter of the United Nations, that any proposal to change the representation of China is an important Question. (Resolution 1666 (XVI), 17 November 1960.)

(2) The text of the Proposal reads:

The General Assembly,

Considering it necessary to restore the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations,
Hearing in mind that only representatives of the People's Republic are competent to occupy China's place in the United Nations and its Organs,

Resolves to remove immediately from all United Nations Organs the representatives of the Chiang Kai-shek clique who are unlawfully occupying the place of China in the United Nations.

Invites the Government of the People's Republic of China to send its representatives to participate in the work of the United Nations and all its Organs.

(UN Document A14873, 17th September 1961)
### APPENDIX NO. 2: Voting of Total UN Members in the General Assembly on the

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<td>22. Swaziland</td>
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<td>23. Togo</td>
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<td>24. Upper Volta</td>
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<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>Vote against Taiwan (i.e. vote for the PRC)</td>
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<td>a</td>
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<td>( ) = Year of Receiving ROC Aid</td>
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Substance to Resolutions

I = "Indian Resolution" to seat the PRC
S1 = "USSR Resolution" to unseat the ROC
S2 = "USSR Resolution" to seat the PRC
"US Moratorium Resolution": U.S. Resolution not to consider any changes in Chinese representation
R = "Important Question" Resolutions: any proposal to change the representation of China requiring a two-thirds majority for approval
P = "Proposal" to oust the ROC and seat the PRC

Notes

(1) Two-thirds majority required for adoption
(2) The China Question was on the provisional agenda for the 1964 session but did not come to a vote because of the U.N. stalemate over peace-keeping arrangements
(3) In 1956 Egypt and Syria merged to form the United Arab Republic and were counted as one member until 1961
(4) The Congo (Kinshasa) - Zaire - had been admitted to the United Nations in 1964, but was not seated early enough to be able to vote
(5) Indonesia withdrew from the U.N. in 1965 for domestic reasons
(6) There was no voting record at 5th UN General Assembly Session because the ballot was taken by a show of hands.

Sources

APPENDIX NO. 3: ROC "Operation Vanguard" Project to African Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country &amp; Category of Mission</th>
<th>Number of Mission Members</th>
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<td>24. Zaire</td>
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<td>Pineapple and Sugarcane</td>
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<td><strong>Total: 24 Countries, with 41 missions</strong></td>
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APPENDIX NO. 4: ROC Diplomatic Relations,
January 1971 - January 1979

(a) List of Countries Ending Diplomatic Relations with
the ROC, January 1971 - January 1979

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<th>Name of Countries</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>19-02-1972</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Australia</td>
<td>22-12-1972</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Austria</td>
<td>28-05-1971</td>
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<td>4. Barbados</td>
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<td>5. Belgium</td>
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<td>7. Botswana</td>
<td>05-04-1974</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Brazil</td>
<td>16-08-1974</td>
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<td>9. Cameroon</td>
<td>03-04-1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Chad</td>
<td>27-12-1972</td>
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<tr>
<td>12. Chile</td>
<td>05-01-1971</td>
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<tr>
<td>13. Cyprus</td>
<td>12-01-1972</td>
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<td>14. Ecuador</td>
<td>17-11-1971</td>
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<td>15. Gabonese Rep.</td>
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<td>17. Greece</td>
<td>05-06-1972</td>
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<td>18. Iran</td>
<td>17-08-1971</td>
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<td>19. Jamaica</td>
<td>01-11-1972</td>
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<td>20. Japan</td>
<td>29-09-1972</td>
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<td>22. Kuwait</td>
<td>29-03-1971</td>
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<td>23. Lebanon</td>
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<td>24. Liberia</td>
<td>23-02-1977</td>
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<td>25. Libya</td>
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<td>27. Maldives</td>
<td>15-04-1972</td>
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<td>28. Malta</td>
<td>31-01-1972</td>
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<td>29. Mexico</td>
<td>16-11-1971</td>
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<tr>
<td>30. New Zealand</td>
<td>22-12-1972</td>
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<td>Name of Countries</td>
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<td>Peru</td>
<td>02-11-1971</td>
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<td>Philippines</td>
<td>09-06-1975</td>
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<td>Portugal</td>
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<td>Rwanda</td>
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<td>U.S.A.</td>
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<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>29-06-1974</td>
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<td>Western Samoa</td>
<td>06-11-1975</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>30-01-1973</td>
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</table>

(b) List of Countries still recognizing the ROC as of January 1979

Name of Countries
1. Bolivia (Latin America)
2. Colombia (L.A.)
3. Costa Rica (L.A.)
4. Dominican Republic (L.A.)
5. El Salvador (L.A.)
6. Guatemala (L.A.)
7. Haiti (L.A.)
8. Holy See (the Vatican City, Europe)
9. Honduras (L.A.)
10. Ivory Coast (Africa)
11. South Korea (Asia)
12. Lesotho (Africa)
13. Malawi (Africa)
14. Nicaragua (L.A.)
Name of Countries

15. Panama (L.A.)
16. Paraguay (L.A.)
17. Saudi Arabia (the Middle East)
18. South Africa (Africa)
19. Swaziland (Africa)
20. Tonga (the Pacific)
21. Uruguay (L.A.)

Adhering to the principle of "one China", both Chinese Nationalist and Communist regimes have since 1949 made it a policy not to establish diplomatic relations with those who maintain diplomatic relations with the rival regime. Hence some countries recognize and maintain diplomatic relations with the former, and some with the latter. Some grant recognition but fall short of exchanging envoys. Some have switched their diplomatic relations from one side to the other. Others have recognized neither. Thus, in presenting the above lists, we can also discover the number of countries which recognized the PRC as of January `1979.

In January 1979, the total number of states in the world were 166. Total UN membership was 155. Among them, there were 21 countries still recognizing the ROC; 125 recognized the PRC (almost 6 times more than that recognized the ROC); 20 countries - Andorra, Angola, Bahamas, Bophuthaswana, Dominica, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Nauru, Qatar, Singapore, Solomon Islands, St. Lucia, Transkei, Tonga, United Arab Emirates, Kiribati, Bahrain, Bhutan, Ecuador and Israel - had relations with neither.

Sources for the construction of the lists: The Republic of China's Relations with the World (Taipei: Treaty Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 1979).
APPENDIX No. 5

1. **ROC Membership in Specialized U.N. Agencies**

<table>
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<td>1. International Monetary Fund</td>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>27-12-1945</td>
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2. **ROC Membership in Inter-Governmental Organizations**

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<td>01-04-1891</td>
<td>1894</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Permanent Court of Arbitration</td>
<td></td>
<td>29-07-1899</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Int'l Committee of Military Medicine and Pharmacy</td>
<td>ICMMP</td>
<td>21-07-1921</td>
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</table>
3. Diplomatic Pressure from the PRC resulted in the Expulsion of the ROC from the following International Inter-governmental Organizations

<table>
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<th>Date of Entry</th>
<th>Date of Expulsion</th>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>11-04-1919</td>
<td>Original Member</td>
<td>16-11-1971</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>16-11-1945</td>
<td>Original Member</td>
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<td>3. World Health Organization</td>
<td>WHO</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Universal Postal Union</td>
<td>UPU</td>
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<td>09-10-1874</td>
<td>09-10-1874</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Inter-Government Postal Union</td>
<td>IMCO</td>
<td>17-02-1928</td>
<td>17-02-1928</td>
<td>17-02-1928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Int'l Hydrographic Bureau</td>
<td>IHB</td>
<td>21-06-1921</td>
<td>21-06-1921</td>
<td>21-06-1921</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. Diplomatic Pressure from the PRC Resulted in the Expulsion of the ROC from the International Non-Governmental Organizations shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Organization</th>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Date of Entry</th>
<th>Date of Expulsion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Int'l Union of Geodesy &amp; Geophysics</td>
<td>IUGG</td>
<td>24-09-1967</td>
<td>16-08-1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Int'l Union of Geological Sciences</td>
<td>IUGS</td>
<td>03-03-1961</td>
<td>19-08-1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Institute of Air Transport</td>
<td>IAT</td>
<td>01-01-1973</td>
<td>01-01-1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Int'l Assoc. of Lighthouse Authorities</td>
<td>IALA</td>
<td>03-09-1960</td>
<td>09-11-1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Int'l Air Transport Association</td>
<td>IATA</td>
<td>1944</td>
<td>17-08-1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Int'l Amateur Athletic Federation</td>
<td>IAAF</td>
<td>1914</td>
<td>05-10-1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Int'l Weightlifting Federation</td>
<td>FHI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. **Continuing Diplomatic Pressure from the PRC to Expel the ROC from International Non-Governmental Organizations, for instance:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Organization</th>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Date of Entry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. International Council of Scientific Union</td>
<td>ICSU</td>
<td>1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. International Astronomical Union</td>
<td>IAU</td>
<td>Sept. 1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. International Geographical Union</td>
<td>IGU</td>
<td>Aug. 1957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. International Mathematical Union</td>
<td>IMU</td>
<td>Jan. 1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Int'l Union of Physiological Sciences</td>
<td>IUPS</td>
<td>Aug. 1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Int'l Union of Biological Sciences</td>
<td>IUBS</td>
<td>July 1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Int'l Union of Pharmacology</td>
<td>IUPHAR</td>
<td>July 1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Int'l Archery Federation</td>
<td>FITA</td>
<td>1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Int'l Amateur Cycling Federation</td>
<td>FIAC</td>
<td>1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name of Organization</td>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Date of Entry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Int'l Yacht Racing Union</td>
<td>IYRU</td>
<td>1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Int'l Judo Federation</td>
<td>IJF</td>
<td>1956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Int'l Modern Pentathlon and Biathlon Union</td>
<td>UIPMB</td>
<td>1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Int'l Federation of Football Associations</td>
<td>FIFA</td>
<td>1954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Int'l Amateur Swimming Federation</td>
<td>FINA</td>
<td>1954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Int'l Boxing Association</td>
<td>AIBA</td>
<td>1956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Int'l Shooting Union</td>
<td>UIT</td>
<td>1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Int'l Handball Federation</td>
<td>IHF</td>
<td>Aug. 1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. Int'l Skiing Federation</td>
<td>FIS</td>
<td>1967</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Yang, Hsi-kung
Yang was the ROC's Technical Assistance Chief Delegate on UN and Alternate Representative to the Trusteeship Council, UN, from 1948 to 1959; he was also a member of the UN Visiting Mission to West Africa Trust Territories in 1963, head of the ROC Goodwill Mission to Africa from 1963 to 1972; Representative of the ROC's Delegate to the 20th, 21st, 22nd, 23rd, 24th, 25th and 26th UN General Assembly, from 1965 to 1971; Special Representative to Negotiate with U.S. Government on Sino-American Future Relationship After the Rupture of Diplomatic Relations Between the two countries in 1979. After 1979, he is the Ambassador to the Republic of South Africa. In Taiwan, Yang is a leading expert on African affairs. He is also the pioneer of the ROC's "Operation Vanguard" project. Interview with him in Taipei on 21st May 1979.

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