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What’s wrong with risk?

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Parr, Tom and Slavny, Adam (2019) What’s wrong with risk? Thought : A Journal of Philosophy , 8 (2). pp. 76-85. doi:10.1002/tht3.407 ISSN 2161-2234.

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Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.407

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Abstract

Imposing pure risks—risks that do not materialise into harm—is sometimes wrong. The Harm Account explains this wrongness by claiming that pure risks are harms. By contrast, The Autonomy Account claims that pure risks impede autonomy. We develop two objections to these influential accounts. The Separation Objection proceeds from the observation that, if it is wrong to v then it is sometimes wrong to risk v‐ing. The intuitive plausibility of this claim does not depend on any account of the facts that ground moral wrongness. This suggests a close relationship between the factors that make an act wrong and the factors that make risking that act wrong, which both accounts fail to recognise. The Determinism Objection holds that both accounts fail to explain the wrongness of pure risks in a deterministic world. We then develop an alternative—The Buck‐Passing Account—that withstands both objections.

Item Type: Journal Article
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Law
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Risk -- Philosophy
Journal or Publication Title: Thought : A Journal of Philosophy
Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
ISSN: 2161-2234
Official Date: June 2019
Dates:
DateEvent
June 2019Published
7 February 2019Available
2 January 2019Accepted
Volume: 8
Number: 2
Page Range: pp. 76-85
DOI: 10.1002/tht3.407
Status: Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Published
Reuse Statement (publisher, data, author rights): "This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Parr, T. and Slavny, A. (2019), What's Wrong with Risk?. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy. doi:10.1002/tht3.407 which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.407. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions."
Access rights to Published version: Restricted or Subscription Access
Date of first compliant deposit: 10 January 2019
Date of first compliant Open Access: 7 February 2021
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