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Abstract

The relationship of states to populations beyond their borders is of increasing interest to those seeking to understand the international politics of migration. This introduction to the special issue of International Political Science Review on diasporas and sending states provides an overview of existing explanations for why states reach out to diasporas and migrants abroad and problematizes in important ways the idea that the sending state is a unitary actor. It highlights the need to examine the extraterritorial behaviour of agents within countries of origin, such as parties, bureaucracies and non-state actors, and to account for why and how their outreach differs. This entails looking at how outreach is conditioned by a state’s sovereignty and capacity, type of nationalism, and regime character. This special issue starts a new conversation by delving deeper into the motivations of agents within countries of origin, and how their outreach is determined by the states and regimes in which they are embedded.

Keywords

Sending states, countries of origin, migration, diasporas, sovereignty, nationalism, political regimes, bureaucracies, political parties, nonstate actors

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Introduction

In April 2017, in a divisive constitutional referendum, a slim majority of voters endorsed enhanced presidential powers for Turkish President Tayyip Recep Erdogan. During the campaign, an important non-state actor became visible from abroad: the Turkish diaspora. For months, Erdogan and his governing party solicited Turks in Western Europe to support his plan to increase presidential powers. In March, Erdogan even had a diplomatic row with the Dutch government, which was objecting to Turkish officials holding
rallies among migrants on its territory. Germany and Denmark supported the Dutch government; Erdogan retaliated by calling them ‘Nazi’ and promising they would ‘pay for this’. At that point campaigning in the diaspora shifted from ‘low politics’ of a contested domestic issue to ‘high politics’ of strained relations between states. Extraterritorial campaigning bore fruit. In European Union (EU) countries with Turkish descendants from the ‘guest-worker’ generation of the 1960s and 1970s – such as Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, France and Norway – the diaspora supported Erdogan; the diaspora in the rest of the EU, North America, Australia and Eurasia did not (Yenisafak, 2017). A nation divided at home became divided abroad.

The importance of the diaspora in Turkey’s constitutional referendum is not an isolated occurrence. Latin American politicians often campaign in the United States, home to millions of Latinos. Even when they are not fully enfranchised or casting an absentee vote is difficult, they are considered important for the resources they can lend to campaigns or influence they wield over family members who can vote domestically. Overseas voters are also important for democracies that have emerged from conflict such as Croatia and Kosovo, or have seen many citizens disperse across Europe such as Romania and Bulgaria.

The politics of sending states and migration is attracting increased attention (Oestergaard-Nielsen, 2003; Fitzgerald, 2006; De Haas, 2007; Adamson and Demetriou, 2007; Kapur, 2010; Waterbury, 2010; Hollifield 2012; Naujoks, 2013; Koinova 2012, 2018a; Ragazzi, 2014; Collyer, 2013; Gamlen et al., 2013, Delano and Gamlen, 2014; Messeguer and Burgess, 2014; Tsourapas, 2016, 2018a). Many important questions remain little explored. Why do some sending states seek their migrant and diaspora abroad and others not? Why do some of them treat certain emigrant and diaspora groups differently from others? How do governments, parties and bureaucracies differ in engagement? How do diaspora institutions evolve over time? Does engagement vary for the sending states of various regimes?

These questions are at the core of this special issue, along with a novel approach to understanding the variety of actors that engage migrants and diasporas abroad. Beyond policies targeting remittances and micro-financing, the articles address state sovereignty, nationalism and political regimes, soft
power considerations, specific strategies and modes of engaging governments, parties, bureaucracies and non-state actors. Globalisation does not empower sending states evenly across the globe. Nor do institutions and non-state actors in weak and strong states behave similarly. These articles open the ‘black box’ of the sending state through middle-range theorizing based on comparisons from a variety of world regions.

**Prevalent explanations: Why do sending states engage diasporas abroad?**

Scholars have put forward a cluster of utilitarian, identity-based, governance and socio-spatial explanations of the relationship between sending states and their diasporas abroad. These perspectives each provide a core rationale for sending-state engagement, while sometimes overlapping. Utilitarian explanations see diasporas as sources of material power. Diasporas are considered important for attracting remittances, accounting for over 15 percent of some developing countries’ GDP, as in Armenia, Haiti, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Liberia, Tajikistan and others. Sending migrants abroad, including as guest-workers, is often a ‘safety valve’ against unemployment in cash-strapped domestic economies (Guarnizo, 1998; Tsourapas 2015, 2018a). Remittances sustain households and reduce poverty. Sending states seek to attract diaspora entrepreneurs as direct investors in small, medium and large enterprises (Brinkerhoff, 2008). Diasporas are also sought for philanthropy (Sidel, 2003; Brinkerhoff, 2008), homeland tourism (Coles and Timothy, 2004) and professional expertise, especially in the engineering, technology and medical sectors. To counter a ‘brain-drain’, sending states seek to attract diaspora returnees or engage them in temporary or virtual return programs if permanent return is not viable (Tsourapas, 2015).

A utilitarian perspective also sheds light on how migrants and diasporas may be instrumentalised for sending states’ domestic or international political agendas. Diasporas can lobby foreign governments and international organizations (Shain and Barth, 2003; Adamson and Demetriou 2007; Koinova 2012). Migrants, refugees and diasporas can also be pawns in interstate disputes. Sending and transit states may create ‘migration crises’ to force concessions from their adversaries (Greenhill, 2010) or employ the status of vulnerable migrants in coercive interstate relations (Tsourapas 2015; 2018a).
This cluster of explanations demonstrates avenues by which sending states ‘tap into the diaspora’ (Gamlen et al. 2013) for economic and political gains. Nevertheless, they are limited by reifying realist assumptions, regarding states as unitary sovereign actors, capable of opening and closing their economies (Hollifield, 2012), and executing foreign policies without divergence among institutions, capacities of statehood and regimes.

Identity-based explanations see diasporas as sources of symbolic power. Sending states seek to reproduce a diaspora’s symbolic link to the homeland as an ‘imagined community’ (Anderson, 2006). They support schools and curricula for diaspora pupils to study their history and language (Koinova, 2018a). They offer homeland visits to maintain their cultural heritage (Gamlen et al., 2013). They sponsor commemorative events and ‘diaspora days’ (Naujoks, 2013; Tsourapas 2015), enable trans-border media channels for the specific benefit of co-nationals (Waterbury 2010) and provide personnel and instruction for religious institutions in the diaspora (De Haas, 2007).

Identity-based explanations address the ways in which dual and multiple citizenships defy traditional understanding of the nation-state as a specific territory. Diaspora members with multiple citizenships have rights and obligations in different polities. ‘Transnational citizenship’ (Bauböck, 2005) facilitates political engagement through external voting and lobbying (Collyer, 2013), maintaining homeland property, and potential interest in return, among others. Sending states may foster citizenship abroad in identity-based ways: engaging all citizens despite multiple identities, narrow nationalist principles (Waterbury 2010; Koinova 2018a), or a combination of these (Bauböck, 2005; Ragazzi, 2014).

Identity-based explanations consider the diaspora as constructed, awakened and re-engaged through diasporisation or nationalist mobilisation (Shain and Barth, 2003; Adamson and Demetriou, 2007). These explanations see two major dimensions to the policies of the sending state. First is promotion of civic versus ethnic nationalism abroad by state and sub-state actors seeking to engage certain populations but ignore or exclude others. Second is understanding challenges to the sending state through attention to political regimes. Authoritarian regimes are much less tolerant of dual citizenship (Brand, 2014) than are democracies. Democracies with relatively highly educated emigration are more likely to tolerate dual citizenship;
autocracies are more restrictive toward such migrants (Mirilovic, 2014). How the civic or ethnic dimension of statehood intersects with regime type in these engagements has so far lacked scholarly attention.

The third cluster of explanations examines sending-state engagement with diasporas through a governance perspective, identifying multiple processes and channels of engagement. Sending states can govern migrants and diasporas through bilateral treaties and cooperation with international organisations (Hollifield, 2012; Gamlen et al., 2013). Embassies abroad can be strongly engaged in such governance processes, whether seeking to control populations or support them through various practices. In a Foucauldian ‘governmentality’ perspective, sending states can be seen as governing through practices associated with a neoliberal global order (Ragazzi, 2014). Such practices glorify markets and outsource state functions to private actors including diasporas, which need to be entrepreneurial, rely on self-help, and be handled through a ‘light-touch managerial approach’ (Délan and Gamlen, 2014).

‘Governance’ approaches started growing exponentially with the 2015–2016 global refugee crisis and efforts to develop coordination among state and non-state actors to manage migration flows. Sending-state activities have been primarily analysed in the context of regional and geopolitical dynamics. More recently, sending states have become involved in the United Nations Global Compact on Migration, seeking a global framework for migration governance through consultation with multiple agents. Empirical discussion of sending states and their relationships to refugees in the current crisis is outside the scope of this special issue. Yet as sending states’ engagement in global governance becomes more salient and therefore more scrutinized by a variety of global agents, this special issue highlights the need to consider the state not as a unitary actor, but as containing multiple actors with various agendas conditioned by the state sovereignty and political regimes in which they operate.

As for the socio-spatial dimension, few earlier attempts consider how actors within and beyond sending states engage migrant and diaspora groups abroad. Within sending states, political parties, bureaucracies and non-state actors can diverge from central institutions, often engaging with diasporas for partisan and self-preservation reasons (Fitzgerald 2006). Parties can develop
overseas branches to mobilise diasporas during elections. Beyond sending states, different diasporas can be engaged by the same state according to socio-positional rationale. Sending states factor in where diasporas are positioned and how they are empowered through being embedded or interlinked in a transnational social field (Koinova 2018a). Non-state actors make similar calculations (Adamson and Demetriou, 2007; Lyons and Mandaville, 2010; Koinova 2012). Sending states may develop multi-tier policies targeting different migrants and diaspora groups based on economic and foreign policy considerations (Tsourapas 2015). Building on these accounts, the articles in this issue bring new insights into the conditions and mechanisms through which agents within the sending state engage with migrants and diasporas.

**Theoretical and empirical contributions of this special issue**

This special issue builds on the growing understanding that the sending state is not a unitary actor. The articles articulate how domestic conditions affect policies of actors and institutions within the sending state. In democratic regimes, such actors include political parties and civil society actors. In authoritarian contexts, elite strategies develop within the ruling regime, focusing particularly on soft power goals. In weak states and transitional contexts, non-state actors such as radical groups may have a specific take on diaspora engagement, with politics that complement or contradict the central approach of the sending state. Sovereign and de facto states may differ in the ways they engage with diasporas. A variety of domestic conditions and approaches are theorized here, regarding world regions and time periods.

Mainstream International Relations scholarship has discussed the state, its sovereignty and capacity, with minimal consideration to the diaspora dimension. Sporadic accounts show that diasporas are ‘outside the state’ but ‘inside the people’ (Shain and Barth, 2003), without direct overlap between state and national identity (Adamson and Demetriou, 2007). People challenge state sovereignty through movement across borders, illicit trafficking and irregular migration. Challenges are tackled with migration control at the national or regional level, including European integration and deportation. Sovereign states with the ability to govern territories effectively are considered to have strong capacity. States without this ability and considered
\textit{weak}, are often subject to contestation by non-state actors and terrorist groups. Researchers within the ERC Project ‘Diasporas and Contested Sovereignty’ have shown that diasporas mobilise differently if the states to which they are linked are weak or merely \textit{de facto}. Carment and Calleja (2017) have also shown that state capacity and legitimacy are interlinked when diasporas become engaged with weak states. These emerging discussions still focus on diasporas as nonstate actors, not on sending states and how they reach out abroad.

This special issue takes the field further by demonstrating how state sovereignty and capacity are crucial to specific attitudes or policies on the part of agents of the sending state. Fragile states have limited institutional capacities and economic resources to develop expertise and enforce rules. To compensate for these limitations, they engage diasporas abroad to fulfil missing functions and provide remittances to sustain livelihoods. Formal remittances and other capital contributions have been crucial to states’ survival.

Many states discussed in this collection are relatively weak, such as Egypt, Kosovo, Mexico, the Philippines, the Dominican Republic, and Sri Lanka. As Ireland points out, female domestic workers have been a major external source of finance for the Philippines and Sri Lanka. These vulnerable populations have become pawns in the global market for domestic labour. Sending state response to migrant exploitation abroad has generally been weak; civil society organizations – with some independence and influence, as in the Philippines – have taken a more proactive role. Burgess and Koinova show that in the context of developing countries, diaspora outreach varies according to the objectives of ruling governments and parties, and the types of states in which they are embedded. In Tsourapas’ analysis, in the ruling military regime of Egypt an authoritarian state implemented strategies that reflected its foreign policy agenda.

This special issue also brings new insights to bear on the role of \textit{nationalism} in diaspora engagement. In classic debates, nationalism is considered built on a ‘given’ ethnic identity (Connor, 1994), entirely constructed (Brass 1991), or ‘primarily a political principle that holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent’ (Gellner, 2008:1). When

\footnote{See \url{http://www.diasporacontest.org}}
diasporas are engaged, sending states foster what Csergo and Goldgeier (2004) call ‘transsovereign nationalism’, reproducing the nation via co-nationals abroad without annexing territories (see also Mylonas 2012). Theoretically, sending states could extend policies abroad on cosmopolitan principles, but scholarship has so far indicated that it is nationalism that conditions outreach to diasporas from within the sending state. The difference between civic and ethnic nationalism is important: the former emphasizes belonging to the entire state and tolerance for the ethnonational diversity of all its citizens; the latter considers blood-connection or roots in an ethnonational community (Ignatieff, 1995). Given that diasporas operate in transnational social fields (Levitt and Schiller, 2004), primarily on an ethnonational basis (Koinova 2018a), actors in sending states that engage diasporas on a civic principle need to operate in civic ways, transcending ethnic allegiances to particular identity-based groups.

In Eastern Europe, *nationalism* and contentious minority politics, both markers of the postcommunist period, affect formation of diaspora institutions and the ways they approach their diasporas. Diasporas have been engaged with exclusively on a national basis in countries that have undergone war: Croatia, Serbia, and Kosovo. As Garding demonstrates, secessionist conflict made Croatia’s first post-communist government more interested in engaging the diaspora in state-building, even if it had designed the institution as weak. Serbia’s institutions reached out to the diaspora in more systematic ways after the wars of Yugoslavia’s disintegration, seeking to boost state-building. In Koinova’s account, Kosovo’s policymakers and functionaries have also engaged with the diaspora on a nationalist principle, strategizing for diaspora involvement in economic development, maintenance of identity, and public diplomacy for state recognition. One party has even shown a state-challenging approach, and advocating irredentism. Even without experiencing war during the post-communist period, Bulgaria and Hungary prioritized diaspora engagement on ethnic rather than civic principles, while Romania and Poland have been more interested in a civic principle, as Waterbury shows. Civil society approaches have proven highly important for sending-state agents in Sri Lanka and the Philippines, as Ireland demonstrates.
Sending-state policies towards diasporas have been challenged by sovereignty issues not only from sub-state actors, but through supranational and regional dynamics. In Waterbury’s account, the EU – a supranational institution – has opened its borders for intra-EU migrants from Eastern Europe, creating difficulties for sending states to engage diasporas through traditional mechanisms and more formal transnational networks. A regional dynamic is also visible in the Middle East according to Tsourapas, as authoritarian regimes promote emigration as an instrument of soft power.

This special issue also brings theoretical insights into the role of multiple actors in different political regimes. Current scholarship on democratic regimes focuses primarily on external diaspora voting and the importance of liberal regimes, particularly Mexico (Messeguer and Burgess 2014), or considers changes in the relationship between diaspora and state as part of the transition from autocratic rule (Collyer, 2013). In a key work, Kapur argues that emigration from India enhanced domestic democratization, bringing changes in ‘the locus of political power in the state to economic power in the private sector and outside India’ (Kapur, 2010: 184). Scholarship on authoritarian regimes’ diaspora engagement has already shown that diaspora voting from abroad can take place in certain authoritarian polities (Brand 2014, Collyer 2013) and that non-democracies are much more likely to restrict citizens’ emigration than liberal states. It is unclear to what degree migrant and diaspora engagement by democracies and non-democracies differs across the globe. Both regime types have shown they can benefit from financial remittances, and many emerging democracies actively encourage labour migration (Escribà-Folch et al., 2015), as do some authoritarian regimes (Tsourapas, 2015; 2018b).

The contributions to this special issue focus on political regimes through a distinct perspective: how they condition or provide openings for diaspora engagement by actors within the sending state. In Ireland’s account, civil society organizations were fairly strong in the democratic Philippines, seeking protection of vulnerable overseas female workers; not so in Sri Lanka, which experienced transition more recently. Koinova shows that transition from conflict and authoritarian rule bring parties in Kosovo to varied approaches to a proposal to introduce special diaspora representation in the national assembly. Burgess highlights state-led and party-led outreach on the
democratizing potential of emigrants in fragile democracies. More open democratic polities such as Mexico and the Philippines have led specifically to state-led diaspora outreach. The accounts of Waterbury on intra-European migration and Garding on bureaucracy building and diaspora engagement in Croatia and Serbia focus on a post-communist period after 1990. Finally, Tsourapas explicitly engages with authoritarian emigration states, examining political elites’ soft power aims as a determining factor shaping in the Egyptian state’s policy towards host states in the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa.

Beyond issues of statehood and political regimes, the articles are cognisant of historical processes that have shaped current sending state diaspora policies. Garding is particularly focused on institutional change. Waterbury speaks of legacies of regional ethnic politics that became salient after the end of communism and have shaped current policies of intra-EU engagement. Koinova shows how prior engagement with secessionism and post-war institution-building determine how political parties in a contested post-conflict state operate abroad, regardless whether in government or opposition. Tsourapas situates his analysis within a historical period to identify the importance of labour emigration at times of interstate conflict, both within the Arab Cold War and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Ireland shows that sending state engagement has endured despite critical junctures of democratization and war in Sri Lanka.

At the same time, the articles of this special issue speak to an incipient line of theoretical thought: how the same sending state engages different diasporas abroad. Diasporas could be in different states as defined by their sovereignty on the map of the world, but relate to their sending states through an ‘interstitial space’ both external and internal to the agents involved. Koinova and Waterbury show that the context in which diasporas are embedded and their international position—whether theorized in political, geographic or socio-spatial terms—play an important role in sending state policies. Similarly, Tsourapas examines how foreign policy objectives may lead to a sending state’s selective engagement with specific migrant populations according to their skill level, at the expense of others.

Beyond contributing to common theoretical themes, the articles bring methodological rigor to bear, develop novel typologies, and ground
arguments in comparative empirical evidence. They are also based on original archival and interview-based material gathered in multiple languages, and through fieldwork in different parts of the globe. The articles draw evidence from the Americas, Asia, Balkans, Eastern Europe, Middle East and North Africa, and contribute to understanding of regional variations.

**Individual contributions**

The individual papers open new avenues for the study of extraterritorial diaspora engagement of parties in government and opposition (Burgess and Koinova), interaction between global demands of neoliberalism and local civil society (Ireland), authoritarian emigration states and their soft power strategies (Tsourapas), intra-EU politics (Waterbury), and evolution of diaspora institutions (Garding).

Ireland’s ‘The limits of sending-state power: The Philippines, Sri Lanka, and female migrant domestic workers’ (2018) investigates why Sri Lanka and the Philippines, both associated with exporting domestic labour abroad, formulate different policies towards ‘their’ female migrant domestic workers. Process tracing and qualitative data collection are employed to construct a most-similar case comparison between the Sri Lankan and Philippine defence of these workers. State responses depend on the level of gender equality, the nature of civil society organizations, and their response to worker exploitation when states make efforts to compete in a lucrative global market for domestic workers and their remittances. A stock of workers with highly valued human capital, a stronger civil society, and greater gender equity compel and enable the Philippine state to adopt a more assertive approach than its Sri Lankan counterpart in defending overseas workers (Ireland, 2018).

Waterbury’s ‘Caught between nationalism and transnationalism: How Central and East European states respond to East-West emigration’ (2018) seeks to explain the political and policy responses to the large waves of post-1990 migration. The policy responses to emigration from Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania and Poland have been shaped and constrained by political and institutional structures driven by these states’ relationships to populations of historical kin in neighbouring states and, in some cases, to internal minority communities. Differing responses to intra-EU emigration depended in large
part on where the intra-EU emigrants fit within the politics of belonging. The post-communist politics of external engagement with ethnic diasporas and internal struggles over national identity privileged or excluded specific subsets of the citizenry abroad. The author analyses and compares the institutional position of intra-EU emigrants within the states’ diaspora management frameworks, and the degree of integration of recent emigrants into a transnational political rights framework encompassing dual citizenship and external voting (Waterbury, 2018).

Garding’s ‘Weak by design? Diaspora engagement and institutional change in Croatia and Serbia’ (2018) focuses on the institutional change of diaspora institutions in sending states. Drawing on archival research and field interviews, she traces institutional emergence and change across six diaspora ministries in Croatia and Serbia in 1990–2015. Garding identifies two explanatory factors for the variation in the level and mechanisms of diaspora engagement across these countries, and within them over time. Firstly, these institutions are often designed to be weak – symbolic rather than substantive – as indicated by small budgets, limited policymaking prerogatives, and overlap with other ministries and institutions that carry out diaspora policies. Secondly, while one might expect diaspora engagement policies to lie beyond partisan bickering, these policies and institutions can become highly politicized, and competition between parties and between intra-party factions drives change (Garding, 2018).

Burgess’ ‘States or parties? Emigrant outreach and transnational engagement’ (2018) explores the transnational implications of emigrant outreach dominated by states or parties by comparing two cases in which outreach is dominated by the state (Philippines and Mexico) and two by parties (Lebanon and Dominican Republic). Her main argument is that the types of outreach result in different trade-offs between electoral mobilization and partisan autonomy. State-led outreach encourages emigrants to transcend partisan divisions but does not mobilize overseas voters. Party-led outreach generates higher electoral turnout while reproducing and reinforcing sectarian or clientelist interest representation. She concludes by considering the implications of these differences for whether emigrants are likely to play a democratizing role in fragile democracies.
Koinova’s ‘Endorsers, challengers, or builders? Political parties’ diaspora outreach in a postconflict state’ (2018b) focuses on differential party outreach. How do parties in government and opposition in a contested state reach out to their diasporas? Do their policies overlap or differ, and why? She focuses on transnational party engagement of diasporas within one of these states, Kosovo, and analyses the approaches of four parties, two in government and two in opposition. The article conceptualizes three types of extraterritorial party outreach – state-endorsing, state-challenging and party-building – pursued actively or passively. It develops a typological theory showing causal pathways by which types of approaches emerged in post-independence Kosovo. Parties that emerge from political movements with credentials from engagement with secessionism and warfare behave like parties in fully sovereign states, and are more likely to seek the diaspora through a state-endorsing or party-building approach, depending on whether they are in government or opposition. Parties that are newly institutionalized in the post-conflict polity seek to engage the diaspora through an active state-endorsing or state-challenging approach.

Tsourapas’ ‘Authoritarian emigration states: Soft power & cross-border mobility in the Middle East’ (2018b) theorizes the foreign policy importance of cross-border mobility for ‘authoritarian emigration states,’ going against expectations that non-democracies aim to invariably restrict emigration or that they reach out to emigrant groups solely for developmental purposes. His analysis of Egyptian emigration policy between 1954-1970 demonstrates how the ruling regime subsidised the emigration of high-skilled professionals across the Middle East and Africa for soft power purposes. In particular, he identifies how the Egyptian state engaged with migration as an instrument of cultural diplomacy and as a tool of disseminating developmental aid. Tsourapas makes a broader point regarding the interplay between foreign policy and cross-border mobility, while also sketching an evolving research agenda on authoritarian emigration states’ policy-making.

**Concluding remarks**

The articles in this special issue on sending states’ engagement with migrants and diasporas abroad contribute to an emerging scholarship
drawing on utilitarian, identity-based, governance and socio-spatial explanations for diaspora policies. They also identify important questions and topics so far unexplored. These are especially related to how actors within sending states – parties, bureaucracies, civil society and non-state actors – behave extraterritorially, why and how their outreach is different, and how it is conditioned by statehood and regime-based dynamics. The authors show that in different countries, states or parties can lead the diaspora engagement processes (Burgess), and that parties can act in their own interest, or endorse and challenge states, especially in a post-conflict setting (Koinova). Even if interested in diaspora affairs, states can design diaspora-related institutions as deliberately weak (Garding), and engage citizens abroad on either civic or nationalist principles (Ireland, Koinova, Garding, Waterbury).

Besides giving a better understanding of how the state, its sovereignty, capacity and links to nationalism shape extraterritorial diaspora politics, the authors shed light also on regime-based dynamics. Authoritarian emigration states use labour migrants abroad in their foreign policy considerations (Tsourapas). Democratizing states can be more concerned with the well-being of their diasporas and civil society organizations can intervene to protect them (Ireland). At critical junctures of democratization, states and parties can become more open to diasporas and seek to reshape their policies (Ireland, Burgess, Koinova). In sum, this special issue initiates a new conversation by delving deeper into the motivations of agents within sending states, and how their outreach is conditioned by the regimes in which they are embedded.

**Funding**
This special issue is a result of three academic workshops organized by Maria Koinova and Gerasimos Tsourapas in 2015–2016 with sponsorship from the British International Studies Association, International Studies Association, and the ERC Starting Grant ‘Diasporas and Contested Sovereignty’, No. 284198.

**Acknowledgements**
We would like to express gratitude to these funding organizations for their generous support. Authors in this special issue Katrina Burgess, Sarah Garding, Patrick Ireland, and Myra Waterbury provided excellent comments on this introduction. We also would like to express gratitude for lucid discussions with other participants in these scholarly venues: Yehonatan Abramson, Fiona Adamson, Anastasia Christou, Žsuzsa Czergo, Alan Gamlen, Marlies Glasier, James F Hollifield, Michael Jones-Correa, Juanita Elias, Dzeneta Karabegovic, Jean Michel Laffleur, Ben Margulies, Nadejda Marinova, Covadonga Meseguer, Nikola Mirilovic, Dana Moss, and Daniel Naujoks. Wyn Grant and Ben Clift provided early support to initiate this
special issue, and two anonymous reviewers gave excellent comments to complete it. We also thank the editors of *International Political Science Review*, Marian Sawyer, Mark Kesselman and Theresa Reidy for their professionalism and excitement in this publication.

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