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An auction model of intellectual property protection: Patent versus copyright
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UNSPECIFIED (2000) An auction model of intellectual property protection: Patent versus copyright. In: 10th International Conference of the Army-Data-Retrieval-Engineering-System, STRASBOURG, FRANCE, JUN 03-05, 1996. Published in: ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS OF INNOVATION pp. 225-241. ISBN 0-7923-7800-8.
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Abstract
In this paper several firms compete for the right to obtain intellectual property protection for a basic idea which has subsequent potential applications. The modelling employs an auction analogy, taking the context to be an n-player all-pay auction, with a reserve. We find that, even taking only firms' own utilities into account, welfare has no interior maximum, so that either maximal, or minimal, protection is optimal. Through examining a simple version of this game, we suggest that software is socially better protected by means of copyright rather than patent.
| Item Type: | Conference Item (UNSPECIFIED) | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions | ||||
| Journal or Publication Title: | ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS OF INNOVATION | ||||
| Publisher: | KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS | ||||
| ISBN: | 0-7923-7800-8 | ||||
| Editor: | Encaoua, D and Hall, BH and Laisney, F and Mairesse, J | ||||
| Official Date: | 2000 | ||||
| Dates: |
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| Number of Pages: | 17 | ||||
| Page Range: | pp. 225-241 | ||||
| Publication Status: | Published | ||||
| Title of Event: | 10th International Conference of the Army-Data-Retrieval-Engineering-System | ||||
| Location of Event: | STRASBOURG, FRANCE | ||||
| Date(s) of Event: | JUN 03-05, 1996 |
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