UNSPECIFIED (2000) An auction model of intellectual property protection: Patent versus copyright. In: 10th International Conference of the Army-Data-Retrieval-Engineering-System, STRASBOURG, FRANCE, JUN 03-05, 1996. Published in: ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS OF INNOVATION pp. 225-241. ISBN 0-7923-7800-8.

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Abstract

In this paper several firms compete for the right to obtain intellectual property protection for a basic idea which has subsequent potential applications. The modelling employs an auction analogy, taking the context to be an n-player all-pay auction, with a reserve. We find that, even taking only firms' own utilities into account, welfare has no interior maximum, so that either maximal, or minimal, protection is optimal. Through examining a simple version of this game, we suggest that software is socially better protected by means of copyright rather than patent.

Item Type:	Conference Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
Journal or Publication Title:	ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS OF INNOVATION
Publisher:	KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS
ISBN:	0-7923-7800-8
Editor:	Encaoua, D and Hall, BH and Laisney, F and Mairesse, J
Official Date:	2000
Dates:	Date Event 2000 UNSPECIFIED
Number of Pages:	17
Page Range:	pp. 225-241
Publication Status:	Published
Title of Event:	10th International Conference of the Army-Data-Retrieval-Engineering-System
Location of Event:	STRASBOURG, FRANCE
Date(s) of Event:	JUN 03-05, 1996

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