An auction model of intellectual property protection: Patent versus copyright
UNSPECIFIED (2000) An auction model of intellectual property protection: Patent versus copyright. In: 10th International Conference of the Army-Data-Retrieval-Engineering-System, STRASBOURG, FRANCE, JUN 03-05, 1996. Published in: ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS OF INNOVATION pp. 225-241.Full text not available from this repository.
In this paper several firms compete for the right to obtain intellectual property protection for a basic idea which has subsequent potential applications. The modelling employs an auction analogy, taking the context to be an n-player all-pay auction, with a reserve. We find that, even taking only firms' own utilities into account, welfare has no interior maximum, so that either maximal, or minimal, protection is optimal. Through examining a simple version of this game, we suggest that software is socially better protected by means of copyright rather than patent.
|Item Type:||Conference Item (UNSPECIFIED)|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions|
|Journal or Publication Title:||ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS OF INNOVATION|
|Publisher:||KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS|
|Editor:||Encaoua, D and Hall, BH and Laisney, F and Mairesse, J|
|Number of Pages:||17|
|Page Range:||pp. 225-241|
|Title of Event:||10th International Conference of the Army-Data-Retrieval-Engineering-System|
|Location of Event:||STRASBOURG, FRANCE|
|Date(s) of Event:||JUN 03-05, 1996|
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