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How migration policies moderate the diffusion of terrorism

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Abstract. There is an ongoing debate among practitioners and scholars about the security consequences of transnational migration. Yet, existing work has not yet fully taken into account the policy instruments states have at their disposal to mitigate these risks, and we lack reliable evidence for the effectiveness of such measures. The following research addresses both shortcomings as we analyze whether and to what extent national migration policies affect the diffusion of terrorism via population movements. Spatial analyses report robust support for a moderating influence of states’ policies: while terrorism can travel from one country to another via larger migration populations, this only applies to target countries with extremely lax regulations and control mechanisms. This research sheds new light on the security implications of population movements, and it crucially adds to our understanding of governments’ instruments for addressing migration challenges as well as their effectiveness.

Keywords: terrorism; diffusion; immigration; national migration policies

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Replication Materials: The data, code, and any additional materials required to replicate all analyses in this article are available on the European Journal of Political Research Dataverse within the Harvard Dataverse Network at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/*****.
Introduction

The size of transnational migration has risen significantly worldwide over the last two decades. The United Nations Population Division (UN DESA 2015) suggests that the global population of international migrants, i.e., people residing in a country other than their country of birth, has more than doubled since the year 2000 to about 244 million by 2015. Permanently moving to another country offers valuable opportunities and gains for both migrants and their host societies (Dustmann & Frattini 2014; Hainmueller et al. 2017; Zanfrini 2016). However, several challenges may be emerging when managing and hosting larger populations of foreign-born individuals. Especially relevant to this research, there is a considerable body of work suggesting that population movements may have security implications for receiving countries (e.g., Algan et al. 2012; Bloemraad et al. 2008; Hainmueller et al. 2017). Given the increasing interconnectedness among states in the international system, the size and scope of global migration at the present time, and the complexity of state responses to address the challenges stemming from population movements, migration is now one of the most salient political issues worldwide, although our understanding of its impact is far more limited than ever before (see e.g., Constant & Zimmermann 2013; Dustmann 2015 for recent overviews).

Most governments have long integrated migration laws and border controls into national security frameworks, and there is a growing number of studies on the relationship between migration and security (see Adamson 2006; Dowty & Loescher 1996; Milton et al. 2013; Salehyan & Gleditsch 2006). Transnational population movements can directly or indirectly lead to social unrest, potentially affect the ethnic composition of host nations, and may thereby induce challenges for internal security (Dowty & Loescher 1996). At the same time, there are likely external security challenges as migration flows might influence the state’s ability to keep control over its territory, whereas political movements abroad can strategically leverage migration networks as a resource for transnational action (Adamson 2006). We also know that conflict travels across borders and large population movements facilitate its diffusion from one state to another (Buhaug & Gleditsch 2008; Salehyan & Gleditsch 2006). Consider in particular Bove & Böhmelt (2016) who find that the degree of terrorism ‘at home’ increases with migrants from countries with a high level of terrorism. In other words, migration can be a vehicle for terrorism to diffuse across nations. In the following article, we examine whether such diffusion of terrorism may be mitigated or exacerbated through states’ national immigration policies. To this end, we contribute in important ways to the previous work by providing empirical answers to two unresolved questions: how can national policy instruments affect the diffusion of terrorism via migration flows? And are these policies effective?

Migration policies are defined as a ‘government’s statements of what it intends to do or not do (including laws, regulations, decisions or orders) in regard to the selection, admission, settlement and deportation of foreign citizens residing in the country’ (Helbling et al. 2017, 4; see also Andreas 2003). Two somewhat competing theoretical mechanisms linking domestic migration controls and regulations to the diffusion of terrorism can be identified. If domestic migration laws ease the admission, settlement, and mobility of foreign citizens residing in a country, political and economic integration into host societies may be facilitated; this makes it less likely that radicalization is fueled and more difficult for terrorist organizations to exploit migrant communities as a recruitment pool. In turn, this implies that receiving states could experience lower levels of terrorism as terrorism is less likely to diffuse via migrants. Conversely, stricter regulations and more rigorous control mechanisms at the border as well as within a country could allow the government to monitor more closely and exert greater control over specific segments of the population, including migrants. Therefore, more stringent regulations may well be effective in suppressing the diffusion of terrorism and decreasing the level of terrorism at home. By theoretically elaborating on these mechanisms
and empirically evaluating their validity, we contribute to the ongoing debate among practitioners and scholars about the security implications of transnational migration; this is particularly important as previous work has neither fully taken into account the policy instruments states have at their disposal to address cross-border population movements and their impact, nor has the effectiveness of such measures systematically been assessed. In fact, it remains less well understood which effect, for example, immigration restrictions have on the risk of terrorism (Dreher et al. 2017, 7). We overcome existing shortcomings by analyzing whether and to what extent state policies on migration affect the diffusion of terrorism via transnational migration.

Rigorously evaluating how national migration policies moderate terrorism diffusion is key for furthering our knowledge of which of the two theoretical mechanisms apply, and our research hence informs ongoing debates about what policies should be designed and which ones ought to be implemented. Until now, ‘policy makers are struggling with the design of policies to facilitate integration and ease social tensions, but we know distressingly little about the impacts of these policies’ (Hainmueller et al. 2017, 256). We provide a new and comprehensive empirical analysis that is based on spatial econometrics and employs recently released data from the Immigration Policies in Comparison (IMPIC) project to capture immigration policies in OECD countries between 1980 and 2010 (Helbling et al. 2017; Helbling & Leblang 2019). We directly consider the influence of states’ policy instruments and assess their effectiveness. While earlier work (e.g., Bandyopadhyay & Sandler 2014; Enders & Sandler 1993) has approached the relationship between immigration quotas and counterterrorism efforts, this largely occurred at a more theoretical level and we lack systematic empirical evidence for the effectiveness or impotence of such policies. Another contribution of our research is explicitly formulating and testing the conditions under which the diffusion of terrorism emerges. Neumayer & Plümper (2012, 820) highlight that ‘almost no empirical studies explicitly test for heterogeneity among recipients of spatial effects’. We show that the diffusion of terrorism – and the diffusion of violence more broadly – is likely to be conditional. Immigration policies mediate the security impact of migration flows and can mitigate their negative externalities. Failing to take into account relevant forms of heterogeneity in spatial models ‘can lead to wrong inferences with respect to spatial dependence’ (Neumayer & Plümper 2012, 839). Our study is a critical step in this direction.

Ultimately, we shed new light on the security implications of transnational population movements, and this research significantly adds to the understanding of governments’ instruments for addressing immigration challenges as well as their effectiveness. While migration populations can be associated with an increased risk of terrorism ‘at home’, this effect is only visible for what can be called more terror-prone sending countries and it does not apply to the clear majority of transnational migration flows. That said, we show that there is also a lot governments can do to address the challenges stemming from migration populations. Common fears of widespread terrorism due to or via migration flows are less likely to be borne out if the state implements the right policies. We do find evidence that more restrictive immigration policies can contain and dampen the diffusion of terrorism; yet, we also highlight that more restrictive regulations and controls can have the opposite effect if migration populations are small and/or if they stem from countries with low levels of terrorism. Unjustified and excessive restrictions to immigrants’ rights and migration inflows do not seem to be a default solution that is suitable for most countries, at all times, or for all immigration-induced security challenges. Considering this, our research will assist policymakers and public responses to develop more adequate policies to the challenges and opportunities of immigration at the present time and in the future.

**Migration policies, population movements and the diffusion of terrorism**

Immigration usually offers significant benefits for host countries and migrants (Bove & Elia 2017; Ottaviano & Peri 2006). Economic growth, added skills to labor markets, increased
personal wealth, or an improvement of human capital are just a few of those ‘positive externalities’ associated with migration inflows. However, immigration is also a contentious issue as large movements of people across national borders can lead to a variety of economic and social challenges, in particular in destination countries. The underlying issue that we focus on in this article is whether population movements can affect terrorism diffusion, i.e., that populations of foreign-born individuals facilitate as a vehicle that terrorism travels from one state to another. The literature has extensively dealt with institutional and economic causes of terrorism (Enders & Sandler 2006; Gaibulloev et al. 2017; Krieger & Meierrieks 2011; Li 2005; Wilson & Piazza 2013) and the impact terrorism might have (Abadie & Gardeazabal 2003; Gaibulloev & Sandler 2008; Young & Findley 2011). However, the works most closely related to ours are those on the spatial dimension of terrorism and those on how regime type, specific institutions, or policies help predict terrorism (Aksoy et al. 2012; Findley & Young 2012; Gaibulloev et al. 2017; Nemeth et al. 2014; Neumayer & Flümer 2010; Wilson & Piazza 2013). On one hand, Braithwaite & Li (2007) identify ‘hot spots’ of terrorist attacks and quantify the impact of these neighborhoods on countries’ exposure to terrorism. Nemeth et al. (2014) explore the social, economic, and geographic characteristics that are more likely to be associated with domestic terrorism and its clustering in space. On the other hand, Aksoy et al. (2012) argue that legislatures in authoritarian regimes can give opposition groups an opportunity to express grievances and shape policies, thus reducing the chances of anti-government groups to turn to terrorism. Wilson & Piazza (2013) find that, compared to those regimes tied by civil liberties or the lack of civil administration, single-party regimes have fewer terrorist incidents given their richer toolkit of repression and co-optation strategies.

We move beyond the debate on whether regime type or the presence of particular institutions can explain the root causes of terrorism by exploring how the policies that regulate a nation’s immigration system, from immigrant-selection mechanisms to immigrant integration programs and border controls, matter for the degree of terrorism diffusion. At the same time, our study is beyond mere spatial clustering or purely geographic ties between spatial units. We focus on a genuine diffusion effect as we consider population movements as a vehicle for terrorism to diffuse from one state to another. But although we suspect that terrorism is spatially dependent and, hence, larger migration populations work as a direct cross-national diffusion path (Bove & Böhmelt 2016), we contend that this diffusion is unlikely to be uniform across countries. We advance the idea that this spatial dependence is conditioned by national immigration laws implemented by destination countries. Migrants from terrorist-prone states can be an important vehicle through which terrorism diffuses, but states’ immigration policies are potential moderators that can be employed to address – and potentially mitigate – these risks. Previous analysis on conflict or terrorism diffusion assumes that the strength of the spatial effect is independent of the political context (Neumayer & Plümer 2012), but we claim that this varies with the permeability of a country to a given spatial stimulus: migration policies. Note, however, that this does not imply that we assume that countries equally implement migration policies. We return to this issue in the appendix.

Bove & Böhmelt (2016) discuss several macro and micro-level mechanisms to explain terrorism diffusion via population movements. At the macro level, migrant populations can be characterized by strong social bonds, which connect individuals to each other within such groups. This facilitates the establishment of ‘terror networks’: a pre-existing social framework tends to be an important requirement for individuals’ consideration of joining, forming, or engaging with terror organizations (Sageman 2004; 2008). Such social frameworks are made of social bonds that facilitate the development of a common identity and views. And it is precisely migration flows that comprise social ties and linkages, and thus can be this necessary, pre-existing social network. Terrorist organizations may then exploit those networks of migrant communities as a recruitment pool. Consistent with this argument, the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs recently warned in a policy memo to its state
governments that ‘migrants are more vulnerable for getting recruited by terrorist organizations’. Therefore, migrant populations from countries with more terrorism facilitate the diffusion of terrorism, since they help ‘creating and shaping social identities and ideological commitments to a particular cause through a process of interaction and socialization’ (Bove & Böhmel 2016, 576). Having said that, this mechanism through which migration can make terrorism diffuse across borders, and then increase the risk of terrorism at home, is likely to be conditional on and mediated by countries’ immigration policies. In turn, some states are more strongly exposed to terrorism and its diffusion than others. Applying the definition of immigration policies from above (Helbling et al. 2017), we concentrate on regulations and control mechanisms (see Table 1). The former are ‘binding legal provisions that create or constrain rights’, whereas the latter ‘monitor whether the regulations are adhered to’ (see Helbling et al. 2017, 7). For example, a regulation might demand that immigrants require a permit to accept a job, whereas the associated control mechanisms include the penalties for employers hiring migrant workers without a legal work permit. Alternatively, a regulation might require a number of months of residence, whereas the corresponding control mechanism is whether illegal residence is considered a criminal or an administrative offense. For both regulations and controls, we can further distinguish between policies that have an external or internal focus. Finally, there are sub-dimensions of regulations: external regulations consist of eligibility requirements and additional conditions, while internal regulations comprise the security of status, i.e., all policies that regulate the duration of permits, the access to long-term settlement, and rights associated such as access to the labor market or how immigrants are monitored within the territory. All items’ scales in the data vary between 0 and 1, from low to high levels of restrictiveness, therefore the scale measures ‘the extent to which a regulation limits or liberalizes the rights and freedoms of immigrants’ (Helbling & Kalkum 2018, 7). But how do regulation and control policies moderate the way migration acts as a vehicle for the diffusion of terrorism? Put differently, can migration policies affect whether and how social bonds among immigrant communities facilitate the creation of terror networks (Sageman 2004; 2008)?

In line with Doosje et al. (2013, 589), feelings of personal uncertainty, injustice, and perceived intergroup threats are among the key determinants of a radical belief system (see also Rahimi & Graumans 2015). A perception of injustice is, in fact, one of the ‘staircases to terrorism’ as individuals with feelings of deprivation might be particularly encouraged to see terrorist organizations as legitimate (Moghaddam 2005). When coupled with social ties that typically exist in migration populations, symbolic and realistic threats, e.g., to the cultural and economic status can induce strong negative out-group attitudes and violent actions, which facilitate radicalization and eventually increase the risk of terrorism (see e.g., Stephan et al. 2002). Moreover, groups offering a sense of identity might attract marginalized communities that lack a sense of clear belonging – and immigrants are more likely to feel ‘insignificant’ and are, thus, more susceptible to radicalization (Hoffman et al. 2007; Lyons-Padilla et al. 2015). As people joining violent extremist movements often look for ‘personal significance’, terrorist organizations could then exploit diaspora communities, the pre-existing social bonds therein, and minorities who feel ‘culturally homeless’ (Kruglanski et al. 2009; Lyons-Padilla et al. 2015; Sageman 2004; 2008). Ultimately, individuals’ radicalization perceives traditional state authorities as illegitimate and forms attitudes toward violent behavior (Doosje et al. 2013), with terrorism being an unlikely exception here. In addition to feelings of injustice and uncertainty, there are also material factors, in particular the lack of economic opportunities, which can favor the emergence of terrorism (Caruso & Schneider 2011). Unemployed individuals face lower opportunity costs when engaging in violent behavior due to lack of legal opportunities (Becker 1968). At the same time, relative deprivation can lead to political violence when individuals perceive a significant discrepancy between their expected and actual economic conditions and prosperity, which can be due to lack of employment opportunities (Gurr 1968). The lack of job opportunities and unmet
economic expectations may lead to grievances and make it easier for terrorist organization to recruit individuals (Bagchi & Paul 2018).

Table 1. The IMPIC conceptualization of immigration policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modus operandi</th>
<th>Locus operandi</th>
<th>Policy sub-dimensions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regulations</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Eligibility (e.g., residence requirements, asylum quotas)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Conditions (e.g., language skills, minimum income)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Internal</td>
<td>Security of Status (e.g., permit validity, access to citizenship)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rights associated (e.g., free movement, integration measures)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>External (e.g., information sharing/international cooperation, biometric information)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Internal (e.g., marriage of convenience, identification documents)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Helbling & Michalowski 2017)

However, we claim that immigration policies have the potential to decrease the appeal of fundamentalist groups in several intertwined, yet different ways and, thereby, address the mechanisms that give rise to individual radicalization. On one hand, rather open regulations and controls may help immigrants to integrate their host-land values with their other cultural identity. On the other hand, more open migration policies could mitigate perceptions of injustice and experiences of discrimination, and increase the sense of inclusion, purpose, and self-worth (Doosje et al. 2013; Kruglanski et al. 2009; Lyons-Padilla et al. 2015; Moghaddam 2005). Eventually, less restrictive regulations and controls that make it easier for immigrants to qualify for a certain entry track (e.g., in terms of residence or financial requirements) and improve the access to long-term settlement (e.g., through a more generous work permit validity) should lower the odds of radicalization and, thereby, potential grievances of the immigrant community toward the host state. The right to move freely within the host country and measures such as language classes, accommodation, or financial and labor-market support can reduce barriers and improve social and economic integration. The access of migrants to the labor market through ad-hoc skill acquisition programs allows countries to reap the benefits from access to a greater pool of skilled workers, which stimulates economic development (Aiyar et al. 2016; Bove & Elia 2017). This is not only key to ensure their effective integration into the host societies and their positive impact on the economy, it also reduces the sense of grievance and frustration that can lead to political violence. In addition, improving the access to the labor market shapes the opportunity costs of migrants and their incentives and willingness to be involved in violent activities.

Integration policies and less restrictive controls or regulations might reduce support for extremism and make migrants less likely to be targeted by or to join extremist organizations – and turn to terrorism. This is in line with the so-called ‘catalyst paradigm’ (Hainmueller et al. 2017, 256): integration efforts, policies, and regulations should be relatively open and inclusive as they then provide ‘immigrants with the necessary incentives and resources to
integrate and invest in a future in the host country’. Conversely, over-restrictive migration policies may lead to a limited access to safe territory and increase illegal movements of people, which can be targeted by terrorist organizations. These conditions could well assist terrorists and be conducive to terrorist activities. Dreher et al. (2017, 3) argue the same when stating that ‘stricter policies segregating foreigners already living in a country lead to alienation and thus increase the risk of terror’. Lyons-Padilla et al. (2015, 9) conclude furthermore that many of the current counterterrorism policies in place, due to their exclusive character, further marginalize migrants and thus ‘may actually paradoxically fuel support for extremism’. Finally, Caruso & Schneider (2011) show that unemployment and poor expectations about future economic scenarios increase frustration and terrorist activity. This argumentation leads to the following hypothesis:

**Less-restrictive hypothesis**: Migration populations are less likely to be a vehicle of terrorism diffusion when host countries have less restrictive migration policies.

Having said that, more integrative and open policies may not have a major impact on immigrants’ integration and, thus, on whether or not terrorism diffuses. Instead, more restrictive control and regulation policies could well dampen the diffusion of terrorism via migration flows (see also Enders & Sandler 1993). As Abadie (2004) reports, more repressive policies ‘help keep terrorism at bay’. Reconnaissance and surveillance activities, the use of biometric information, or increased controls on forged documents can help identifying potential terrorists and prevent attacks already in their planning phase (Bellair 2000; 2000). Moreover, information sharing and international cooperation over intelligence and evidence-gathering, as implemented by immigration regulations and controls, may improve the identification of potential terrorists. For example, data gathered by law-enforcement agencies across Europe are now shared under the ‘principle of availability’, defined in the EU’s Hague Program (Brown & Korff 2009). Therefore, tightened immigration policies with increased surveillance of specific segments of the population can assist counterterrorism initiatives in the identification of potentially violent extremists. This mirrors recent studies suggesting that intelligence to anticipate terrorism is the most effective anti-terrorist policy (Faria 2006). Not surprisingly, there is plenty of anecdotal evidence illustrating ‘success stories’ of intelligence-led policing stemming from stricter laws and policies that made it less difficult to identify individuals or groups preparing a terrorist attack. Moreover, to tackle the ‘internationalism’ of Al-Qaeda, Western democracies have introduced new regulations allowing the withdrawal of entry and stay permits and the revocation of citizenship for danger to (rather than a serious breach of) public order and the immediate deportation of any alien who commits acts against democratic rights (Epifanio 2011). And recall the memo from the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs, which outlines the tightening of several immigration laws and regulations in light of the possible security threat posed by immigration, including more power delegated to state police to arrest foreign nationals living in India illegally. Ultimately, stricter regulations and controls can give countries more flexibility in granting some migrants temporary access and exert greater control on specific segments of the population, in particular when potential threats are anticipated. At the same time, stricter control mechanisms can help governments to identify, control, and expel more effectively potential terrorists and, thus, likely have a better chance to prevent terrorist attacks. This implies a second, competing hypothesis:

**More-restrictive hypothesis**: Migration populations are less likely to be a vehicle of terrorism diffusion when host countries have more restrictive migration policies.

**Research design**
Data, dependent variable, and methods

We evaluate the two hypotheses empirically with a unique data set we compiled using the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) (Enders et al. 2011) and recently released data on OECD countries’ immigration policies between 1980 and 2010 (Helbling et al. 2017; Helbling & Michalowski 2017). The country-year is the unit of analysis and, after accounting for missing values and temporally lagging all our explanatory items, our sample comprises 32 potential host states from the OECD, which corresponds to 911 observations.

The dependent variable refers to the level of terrorism in each country-year. We rely on the GTD’s definition, i.e., terrorism is ‘the premeditated use or threat to use violence by individuals or sub-national groups against noncombatants in order to obtain a political or social objective through the intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the immediate victims’ (Enders et al. 2011, 321). The GTD codes the number of terrorist incidents and their nature, i.e., whether they are domestic or transnational ones, in a given country-year. For our analysis, we use the variable’s natural logarithm (after adding the value of 1), which accounts for the skewed distribution of terrorism and its events.8

Our main interest is to examine whether and how immigration policies affect the diffusion of terrorism via population movements, i.e., whether and how national migration regulations and controls influence that a country’s level of terrorism at time t is systematically affected by other countries’ level of terrorism at t-1, which are linked to the focal country via migration. We estimate spatial temporal autoregressive models based on ordinary least squares (spatial-OLS) to this end and specify a weighting matrix on population populations to capture linkages among countries. In structural terms, we model:

$$y_t = \varphi y_{t-1} + \beta X_{t-1} + \rho W y_{t-1} + s$$

with $y_t$ standing for our outcome variable, $y_{t-1}$ pertains to the (one-year) temporally lagged outcome item, $X_{t-1}$ is a series of explanatory variables, which are also one-year temporally lagged and that we define below; the last component, $s$, stands for the error term. The main component of our analysis is the spatial lag, $Wy_{t-1}$, which is the product of the temporally lagged dependent variable and a row-standardized weighting matrix ($W$). The values ($w_{ij}$) in $W$ measure the relative connectivity of state $j$ to state $i$ (with $w_{ii}=0$). When using temporally lagged values of the dependent variable to construct the spatial lag, spatial-OLS is justified (Franzese & Hays 2007; 2008; Ward & Gleditsch 2008). In addition, the underlying theoretical rationale behind this is that the diffusion effect we argue for takes time to materialize.

When estimating any spatial effect, we must control for a number of relevant ‘exogenous-external conditions or common shocks and spatially correlated unit level factors’ (Franzese & Hays 2007, 142). The literature highlights that this is necessary to address concerns about common exposure, i.e., when what might appear to be a diffusion effect is actually driven by unit-level features that spatially cluster or common trends and exogenous shocks shape the results. Following Franzese & Hays (2007; 2008) we therefore incorporate a temporally lagged dependent (described above) and fixed effects for countries and years. Dummies for years capture influences from temporal shocks, which affect the entire system of countries. The state dummy variables control for any time-invariant forces at the country level. In combination with several control variables that we describe below, we can thus credibly ensure that terrorism diffusion ‘cannot be dismissed as a mere product of a clustering in similar [state] characteristics’ (Buhaug & Gleditsch 2008, 230; see also Neumayer & Plümper 2010).

Explanatory variables: Terrorism diffusion and migration policies
Our first explanatory variable is a spatial lag based on a matrix that links countries via migrant populations, i.e., the variable’s matrix measures the yearly migrant stock from a foreign state in the country under study. Following Özden et al. (2011), which constitutes also our data source for migration flows, international migrant stocks are defined as the number of people born in a country other than that in which they live. Note that the spatial lag’s underlying matrix focuses on OECD countries only as destination countries, but all states in the world are potential ‘senders’ of migrants. That is, non-OECD states are not destinations of migration movements, but all states worldwide between 1980 and 2010 are countries of origin. We follow Özden et al. (2011, 14), and omit refugees from total migrant numbers. From these raw data, we calculate the total number of immigrants, with missing data being interpolated. Ultimately, each element $w_{i,j}$ of the connectivity matrix measures the migrant population in country $i$ that has country $j$ as the state of origin in $t-1$. In the absence of any migration population from $j$ in $i$, $w_{i,j}$ takes the value of 0. As indicated in the previous section, this row-standardized matrix $(W)$ is multiplied with $y_{t-1}$ to create the spatial lag, which then measures the average degree of terrorism in other countries weighted by migrant populations.

The second core explanatory variable is taken from the Immigration Policies in Comparison (IMPIC) project, which offers a detailed conceptualization of immigration policies across four dimensions in OECD countries between 1980 and 2010. As elaborated above (Table 1), the data set makes a broad distinction between regulations and control mechanisms, internally and externally, while regulations refer to eligibility, conditions, status, and rights. In each area, the IMPIC project measures on a quasi-continuous scale between 0 and 1 how restrictive a policy is. The IMPIC also includes an aggregated variable, i.e., an average across all items in the data set to capture the total level of restrictiveness of immigration policies in a country. Countries in the dataset have different immigration histories, from traditional destinations of mass immigration (e.g., the US) to countries that only recently experienced a positive net migration such as Italy to countries with limited immigration, e.g., Finland (Helbling et al. 2017). In the appendix, we show the variation in the aggregate level of Immigration Policy Restrictions across countries and within countries over time. For example, while the index has remained stable in Chile or Luxembourg over time, the Czech Republic shows substantial fluctuations in 1980-2010. Whereas in Greece or the United Kingdom more restrictive policies have been implemented since 1980, Poland experienced considerable movement towards moderately liberal policies, although during the 1980s the country had the most restrictive immigration regime in our sample. Immigration Policy Restrictions is the variable we focus on for our main models below, but we disaggregate it along its internal dimensions after our main set of estimations.

We multiply $Wy$: Migrant Inflow and Immigration Policy Restrictions to create an interaction term, which captures whether and how a country’s immigration policies can moderate the diffusion of terrorism via migration. In the appendix, we follow Hainmueller et al. (2018) and examine the linearity of the effect and the common support of the moderator in detail.

Control variables

We include a series of covariates that control for alternative influences leading to a higher level of terrorism, which may also plausibly be associated with immigration policies and population movements (Alarian & Goodman 2017; Breunig et al. 2012; Helbling & Michalowski 2017). This helps addressing concerns over omitted variable bias and it controls for observable determinants of our main explanatory items. First, there is a variable measuring a state’s level of democracy based on the combined polity score from the Polity IV project. This is 21-point scales ranges from -10 to 10, with
higher values standing for more democratic forms of government. In our sample of OECD states, it is not surprising that this item has a mean value of 8.905 (though it ranges between -8 and 10). On one hand, democracies might be particularly prone to terrorism as they are the more open, tolerant societies and less repressive than autocracies. On the other hand, democracies allow for non-violent means to express grievances against the state, which could also lower the level of terrorism (Li 2005).

Second, we incorporate standard socio-economic controls in the form of GDP per capita and population. Both variables are taken from the World Bank Development Indicators. The former is measured in constant 2005 US Dollars and defined by the World Bank as ‘the gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products’. Moreover, there is a country’s midyear total population to control for population size. Both items are log-transformed and, similar to all other items, temporally lagged.

Table 2. Descriptive statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Obs.</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std.Dv.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist Attacks (ln)</td>
<td>911</td>
<td>1.364</td>
<td>1.442</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Dependent Variable</td>
<td>911</td>
<td>1.401</td>
<td>1.459</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wy: Migrant Inflow</td>
<td>911</td>
<td>1.271</td>
<td>0.425</td>
<td>0.539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration Policy Restrictions</td>
<td>911</td>
<td>0.429</td>
<td>0.096</td>
<td>0.290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction Term</td>
<td>911</td>
<td>0.550</td>
<td>0.240</td>
<td>0.189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>911</td>
<td>8.905</td>
<td>3.151</td>
<td>-8.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Migration Population</td>
<td>911</td>
<td>9.445</td>
<td>8.716</td>
<td>0.424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (ln)</td>
<td>911</td>
<td>9.943</td>
<td>0.696</td>
<td>7.972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (ln)</td>
<td>911</td>
<td>9.648</td>
<td>1.371</td>
<td>5.898</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Globalization</td>
<td>911</td>
<td>70.183</td>
<td>15.063</td>
<td>28.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Third, we control for economic openness and the total number of migrants in a country. The latter is operationalized as the total migrant stock (summed across all sending countries) as a share of the total population. If our findings hold even when controlling for the ‘unweighted’ migrant population, the confidence in our results pointing to a genuine diffusion effect is increased. Moreover, immigrants generally tend to go to wealthier and more democratic states that are less conflict-prone (Breunig et al. 2012). Total Migration Population controls for this self-selection and is theoretically and empirically different from Wy: Migrant Inflow. Finally, economic openness pertains to a country’s integration in the global economy as measured by its economic flows and restrictions. The data are taken from Dreher (2006). Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics of all variables.

Table 3. Terrorism: The moderating effect of immigration restrictions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Dependent Variable</td>
<td>0.473***</td>
<td>0.471***</td>
<td>0.468***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Migration Population</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (ln)</td>
<td>-0.300</td>
<td>-0.403*</td>
<td>-0.484**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (ln)</td>
<td>0.956**</td>
<td>1.179**</td>
<td>1.070**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Empirical findings

Table 3 summarizes three models. Model 1 comprises the control variables only next to the country and year fixed effects. In Model 2, we additionally include the migration-spatial lag, \( Wy: \text{Migrant Inflow} \). Model 3 constitutes our main model as we consider Immigration Policy Restrictions and its interaction with the spatial lag next to the control covariates. Due to the row standardization, we can directly interpret the spatial lag in Model 2. However, due to the inclusion of the temporally lagged dependent variable, the table entries, including the estimates pertaining to the spatial lags, are only short-term effects (impact in the current year). The short-term impact of \( Wy: \text{Migrant Inflow} \) is depicted in Figure 1, while the asymptotic long-term impact of our spatial lag is calculated according to Plümper et al., (2005, 336) and discussed in the text below. In addition, as for our variables of interest and their interaction in Model 3, neither their size, signs, nor standard errors can be directly interpreted. Figure 2 thus plots the average marginal effects of \( Wy: \text{Migrant Inflow} \) for given values of Immigration Policy Restrictions.

First, \( Wy: \text{Migrant Inflow} \) is positively signed and significant at the 10 percent level in Model 2. This finding underlines that migration populations can be a vehicle for terrorism to diffuse from one state to another. In substantive terms, the marginal effect in Model 2 shows that a one-unit increase in \( Wy: \text{Migrant Inflow} \) leads to a rise in terrorist attacks of about 1.64. As indicated above, this is merely the short-term effect, though. The asymptotic long-term marginal effect of our spatial lag is at 0.932 (with a 90 percent confidence interval of \([0.102; 1.935]\)), which translates into 2.54 attacks. Figure 1 emphasizes this as we plot the predicted values of our dependent variable against the values of \( Wy: \text{Migrant Inflow} \). For low levels of the spatial lag, the expected values of Terrorist Attacks (ln) cluster at around 1, which corresponds to about 2.71 terrorist attacks. When increasing \( Wy: \text{Migrant Inflow} \) toward its mean of 1.27, the predicted values of the outcome approach 1.5 already. At the maximum of \( Wy: \text{Migrant Inflow} \) while holding all other items constant at their means, the predicted value of Terrorist Attacks (ln) is about 2, which translates into about 7.39 attacks.
These results mirror Bove & Böhmelt (2016), but they do not directly take into account that states have instruments at their disposal to address the diffusion of terrorism via migration. To this end, Model 3 incorporates Immigration Policy Restrictions and its interaction with the spatial lag. In turn, we estimate the moderating effect of countries’ immigration policies by examining whether the positive impact of Wy: Migrant Inflow from Model 2 prevails regardless of what level of restrictiveness is imposed on the migrant population. Figure 2 plots the average marginal effects of the spatial lag conditional on the values of Immigration Policy Restrictions. On one hand, the graph shows that there are very few country-years in which extremely restrictive policies have been implemented. The rug plot at the bottom of Figure 2 becomes rather sparse with higher values of Immigration Policy Restrictions. On the other hand, while Wy: Migrant Inflow exerts a positive marginal affect for low levels of Immigration Policy Restrictions, this impact is statistically insignificant for higher values of that item, i.e., more restrictive policies. The marginal effect of the spatial lag becomes insignificant for a level of restrictiveness of about 0.48. The empirical analysis discussed here, and the series of robustness checks in the appendix, provide more support for the More-restrictive hypothesis, which claims that more stringent migration policies can mitigate the diffusion of terrorism via population movements.
Figure 2. Terrorism: The moderating effect of immigration restrictions.
Graph shows average marginal effects of \( W_y \): Migrant Inflow for various values of Immigration Policy Restrictions, while holding all other covariates constant at their means; dashed lines signify 90 percent confidence intervals; rug plot at horizontal axis illustrates distribution of Immigration Policy Restrictions; red dotted line marks marginal effect of 0.

Having said that, this should not imply that or be interpreted as overly restrictive policies ‘naturally’ follow from and must be implemented at all times in light of this research. First, note that the coefficient estimate of Immigration Policy Restrictions in Model 3 is positive and highly significant. Due to the interaction with our spatial lag, this marginal effect only applies to values of 0 – and, by extension, rather low values – of \( W_y \): Migrant Inflow. Specifically, the effect of Immigration Policy Restrictions is positive for values up to about 1.00 of \( W_y \): Migrant Inflow, which relates to scenarios of countries that have a rather low migration population or larger foreign-born population segments that come from less-terrorism prone countries. In our data set, 40 percent of the cases, including the US and Germany in 2010 or the UK in 2009, are such countries. Our findings show that more restrictive policies under those circumstances may well be counterproductive: overly restrictive regulations and controls then work against the integration of migrants, and rather foster and perhaps even increase their grievances against the state. It is under those circumstances that the level of terrorism could well rise.

Second, while more restrictive immigration policies can lower the diffusion of terrorism, this finding does not fully take into account other implications than that. For instance, immigration is commonly linked to a series of ‘good’ outcomes such as higher economic growth, which may at least indirectly affect terrorism in the focal country. That said, when imposing overly restrictive policies to begin with, these effects are lost. Third, note the insignificant impact of Total Migration Population. This result could well demonstrate that migrants as such, i.e., when not taking their country of origin and the degree of terrorism in
these home states into account, have very little to do with the degree of terrorism in a receiving country. This highlights that we have to thoroughly distinguish between the countries of origin of an immigrant; indiscriminate immigration laws are likely counterproductive. At the same time, the insignificant result may also be explained by a self-selection process, i.e., that migrants go to those countries with less restrictive policies as they feel ‘welcome’ there. If more restrictive policies are in place, fewer migrants are likely to choose a state as a potential new home and the overall positive effect from migration on the economy or the pool of human capital is lost – and due to the opposing effects of two different mechanisms, the overall effect of Total Migration Population is statistically insignificant.

Coming to the other control variables, their associated effects are mostly expected. The most consistent significant findings are given for Population (ln) and Economic Globalization. In line with previous works’ results, the larger the population of a state, the more terrorist attacks (all else equal). Furthermore, the more open a country as defined by its integration into the world’s economic network, the higher the degree of terrorism. We also find a negative and statistically significant effect for GDP per capita (ln) in Models 2 and 3, which mirrors several other studies that claim a higher income leads to fewer terrorist attacks (Young & Findley 2011). Third, the lagged dependent variable shows that terrorism is characterized by temporal dependencies in that a higher level of terrorism in the previous year is associated with more terrorism in the current period. For each additional terrorist attack in \( t-1 \), we expect to see an increase of about 60 percent in the geometric mean of Terrorist Attacks (ln).

Finally, Table 4 disaggregates Immigration Policy Restrictions that captures the level of restrictiveness pertaining to regulations and control mechanisms, internally and externally. Specifically, some policies may dampen terrorism, whereas other policies could aggravate it. In fact, the typology of the policy index suggests that there could be different dimensions to policies. Given our theoretical argument, we may be particularly interested in the internal regulations and controls for immigration, while making a distinction between regulations and controls. To this end, Model 4 focuses on the security of status, an internal immigration regulation that includes all policies that regulate the duration of residence, the renewal of the permit, and the access to settlement in the long-term. We interact this variable with \( W_y \): Migrant Inflow. Model 5 is based on the level of restrictiveness of the rights associated with the immigration status, another internal regulation that captures training and labor rights for migrants as well as how immigrants are monitored within the territory. As such, both categories may contain provisions that could have effects in opposite directions. For example, more monitoring lowers the impact on terrorism, but more restrictive regulations that also inhibit labor-market access increase its level. The net effect is not obvious, though, and this is an empirical question that we determine from the data analysis. Model 6 concentrates on the average of security status and rights associated, i.e., we focus on internal regulations more generally. Model 7 is an analysis of the average value of restrictiveness across both internal regulations and internal controls. That is, this model is similar to those based on Immigration Policy Restrictions in Table 3, albeit Model 7 omits the external control-and-regulation dimension completely.

**Table 4.** The moderating effect of immigration restrictions: Disaggregating policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 4 (Status)</th>
<th>Model 5 (Rights)</th>
<th>Model 6 (Regul.)</th>
<th>Model 7 (Regul. and control)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Dependent Variable</td>
<td>0.469***</td>
<td>0.468***</td>
<td>0.467***</td>
<td>0.469***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
When studying Table 4, the findings are similar to what is discussed in Table 3. In other words, our results are not driven by a particular component of the aggregated restrictiveness index from Helbling et al. (2017), and we feel confident in concluding that migration policies can moderate terrorism diffusion. The decisive aspect of these policies is thus less their nature (e.g., regulation vs. control), but their degree of restrictiveness: and higher levels of restrictiveness of any immigration policy then have a moderating impact on the diffusion of terrorism.

In the appendix, we also provide a number of extensions to demonstrate the robustness of our main conclusions. In particular, we build on Gaibulloev et al. (2017) and include additional control variables. We also control for other sources of transnational diffusion by including spatial lags based on geography. We further address issues of self-selection and endogeneity by restricting the sample to countries characterized by overly restrictive external migration policies and by means of a simultaneous equation model. We also control for a spatial effect of migration policies, consider migration influx rather than stocks, and distinguish between immigration from within the European Union and outside of it. Finally, we present the out-of-sample prediction power of our main models and differentiate between domestic and transnational terrorism using the GTD (Enders et al. 2011) and ITERATE (Mickolus 1982), comprising information on international terrorism only.

**Conclusion**

The potential security implications of migration flows have received a great deal of attention from both practitioners and scholars. To be clear, only the vast minority of migrants – if any – arrives or lives in a country with hostile intentions or plans to stage a terrorist attack. However, several studies suggest that terrorist organizations may exploit networks of migrant communities as a recruitment pool and fuel their radicalization, particularly when they stem from terrorist-prone countries. This can give rise to security threats in recipient states and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Migration Population</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (ln)</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (ln)</td>
<td>-0.502**</td>
<td>-0.502**</td>
<td>-0.527**</td>
<td>-0.459**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Globalization</td>
<td>1.128**</td>
<td>1.062**</td>
<td>1.076**</td>
<td>1.120**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wy: Migrant Inflow</td>
<td>0.010**</td>
<td>0.010**</td>
<td>0.010**</td>
<td>0.009**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration Policy Restrictions</td>
<td>1.068*</td>
<td>1.265**</td>
<td>1.484**</td>
<td>1.929**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wy: Migrant Inflow * Immigration Policy Restrictions</td>
<td>-0.779**</td>
<td>-0.830**</td>
<td>-0.988**</td>
<td>-1.267**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-10.556*</td>
<td>-9.632</td>
<td>-9.790</td>
<td>-10.997*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations: 911
Country fixed effects: Yes
Year fixed effects: Yes
Prob>F: 0.000

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
simply ignoring possible security consequences stemming from population movements is unhelpful for research or policy. Using data on terrorism and migration, we replicated the results from previous work (Bove & Böhmelt 2016) as we find that migration can indeed be a vehicle for terrorism to diffuse. We moved beyond this result, though, and sought to contribute to the debate in a two-fold way. First, can immigration regulations and controls moderate terrorism diffusion? And, second, can national immigration policies be effective instruments? Our research highlights that more restrictive immigration policies may indeed make it more difficult for terrorism to diffuse across borders. This finding is robust across a series of changes in model specifications and substantive in size.

Migration policies are therefore a potentially mitigating factor. Yet, it would be misleading to derive that implementing more and more restrictive immigration policies is the default policy implication we suggest. In fact, terrorism can travel from one country to another via larger migration populations, but this only applies to target countries with exceptionally lax regulations and control mechanisms. The unconditional effect of our measure on immigration policies highlights that more restrictiveness actually leads to more terrorism in countries with low migration populations or migrants coming from countries that are less terror-prone. In addition, as Brown & Korff (2009) argue, overly restrictive policies including surveillance and profiling programs significantly challenge democratic core values and the rule of law. Hence, implementing more restrictive policies may only be effective in preventing the diffusion of terrorism under rather narrowly defined circumstances, and by no means should this be seen as a ‘default’ tool in trying to address terrorism. While our work thus stresses that states can have effective tools at their disposal for dealing with the security consequences of transnational population movements, the key task for future research will be to identify which specific policies – and their respective levels of openness or restrictiveness – have an impact and which do not (see also Dreher et al. 2017). With Table 4, we provide an initial analysis in that direction, but more disaggregated work seems necessary. Equally important, while we model the impact of policies’ restrictiveness, the issue of specifically integration policies is only indirectly captured due to the lack of data. European states established for a long time language-training or labor-market integration programs for migrants, which is vital for ‘migrants’ economic independence, and a precondition for a positive economic impact of migration’ (OECD 2015, 13). Similarly, Australia, Canada, or the US have extensive experience in so-called ‘settlement services’ for migrants (OECD 2015). Such programs and policy tools may well be more and directly effective in lowering the risk stemming from terrorism diffusion, but data limitations prevent us from explicitly assessing their impact and effectiveness. Finally, there is plenty of anecdotal evidence suggesting that refugees and migrants are often targeted by politically-motivated violence, such as the Rohingya refugees who have sought refuge in India and have become victims of persecution from native populations (Böhmelt et al. 2019). It is also possible that terrorist attacks are organized by anti-immigrant groups, thus coding efforts to distinguish between migrants as the source or target of terrorism seem urgently in need.

Dealing with the security implications of population movements is at times challenging for any country, but not an impossibility. And there is also no automatic link between migration populations and the transnational diffusion of terrorism, or more restrictive immigration laws and preventing terrorist attacks. But our research might help clarify the impact that can be expected and what policies may be enacted. Blaming migrants for higher levels of terrorism or simply closing borders entails large humanitarian consequences or can be outright counterproductive, as we show. We nonetheless recognize the significant challenges to immigration policies, their level of restrictiveness, and the difficulty in choosing the ‘right’ policies to effectively deal with terrorism and its diffusion. In many countries, simply increasing the level of restrictiveness will not be adequate or help at all, and to us it seems more important and potentially more effective to implement comprehensive, well-tailored
policies to support integration efforts than merely raising the restrictiveness of immigration laws.

References


OECD. (2015). *Is This Humanitarian Migration Crisis Different?* No. 7 OECD, Migration Policy.


Notes

1 As an exception, Dreher et al. (2017) find some empirical support for that stricter regulations on migrants’ rights do not prevent terror attacks. Yet, this does not address whether national migration policies can be an effective instrument for containing the influence of migration as a ‘diffusion vehicle’, i.e., Dreher et al. (2017) do not focus on the spatial diffusion of terrorism, but immigration per se.

2 Available online at: [https://tinyurl.com/y89uodsb](https://tinyurl.com/y89uodsb).

3 Regulations can be further disaggregated into policy fields, i.e., labor migration, asylum, family reunification, and co-ethics (Helbling et al. 2017). Our theoretical arguments apply equally across those policy fields.

4 This mirrors a recently released report by the UN Special Rapporteur on counterterrorism and human rights. Available online at: [https://tinyurl.com/y7u74rmx](https://tinyurl.com/y7u74rmx).

5 For example, Sadiq Khan, the mayor of London, claimed that seven terror plots were foiled in the six months since the Westminster attack (Telegraph, September 25, 2017). Similarly, the head of MI5, Adam Parker, argues that the security service prevented 20 terror plots in four years (Guardian, October 18, 2017). And, German state authorities arrested a Syrian national in October 2017 who was suspected of preparing a terrorist attack (Telegraph, October 31, 2017).

6 Available online at: [https://tinyurl.com/y89uodsb](https://tinyurl.com/y89uodsb).

7 This mirrors theoretical arguments suggesting that immigration policies affect terrorism specifically when labor immigrants are targeted. Bandyopadhyay & Sandler (2014) find that migration laws and regulations can be employed as an effective counterterrorism tool, e.g., when imposing limits on labor quotas.

8 We do not distinguish between national and transnational attacks as the theory applies to both cases. In addition, due to the lack of coding in the GTD, we cannot distinguish between terrorist attacks perpetrated by or against migrants. Depending on the source of an attack, though, either domestic or transnational attacks might be more strongly affected. We return to this issue in the conclusion and the Appendix, where we do distinguish between domestic and transnational attacks and employ data from The International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE) project (Mickolus 1982).

9 Migrants tend not to get involved in terrorist activities immediately after their arrival in a host country. According to case-specific narratives, there is usually a longer period of radicalization and, hence, we focus on the stock of immigrants rather than recent entrants (Dreher et al. 2017, 5). Hence, our focus on migrant stocks is based on the radicalization mechanism and migrants’ experience in host states, which takes time. In the Appendix, we summarize an estimation based on ‘recent entrants’, i.e., migration influx, and show that the corresponding results are, in fact, inconclusive.

10 According to Özden et al. (2011, 14), ‘[f]or the cases that rely on the Trends in International Migrant Stock database, the number of refugees is subtracted from the totals, with the intention of removing refugees in camps from the total’.

11 Available online at: [http://www.impic-project.eu/](http://www.impic-project.eu/). Unlike previous data, the IMPIC data focus on the absolute levels of restrictions, which allows to compare different countries over
time. Helbling & Michalowski (2017) offer a comprehensive review and assessment of available data sets on immigration and citizenship policies.

For example, in terms of possibility to renew a residence permit for e.g., recognized refugees, 0 stands for the possibility to apply right away, 0.1 is the possibility to apply after less than 1 year, 0.2 after 2-4 years, 0.3 after 5-6 years and so on, up to 0.9 which stands for no renewal possible and 1 for no asylum policy. When the item captures sanctions to employers hiring illegal immigrants, the scale is based on the amount of the sanction, which 0 meaning no sanctions.

Available online at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ny.gdp.pcap.kd.

Recall that $W_y$: Migrant Inflow is also based on the number of immigrants from other countries, but weighed by terrorism.