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How to simulate it in Isabelle : towards formal proof for secure multi-party computation

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Butler, David, Aspinall, David and Gascon, Adrià (2017) How to simulate it in Isabelle : towards formal proof for secure multi-party computation. In: Ayala-Rincón, M. and Muñoz, C., (eds.) Interactive Theorem Proving. ITP 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 10499 . Cham: Springer, pp. 114-130. ISBN 9783319661063

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Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66107-0

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Abstract

In cryptography, secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC) protocols allow participants to compute a function jointly while keeping their inputs private. Recent breakthroughs are bringing MPC into practice, solving fundamental challenges for secure distributed computation. Just as with classic protocols for encryption and key exchange, precise guarantees are needed for MPC designs and implementations; any flaw will give attackers a chance to break privacy or correctness. In this paper we present the first (as far as we know) formalisation of some MPC security proofs. These proofs provide probabilistic guarantees in the computational model of security, but have a different character to machine proofs and proof tools implemented so far—MPC proofs use a simulation approach, in which security is established by showing indistinguishability between execution traces in the actual protocol execution and an ideal world where security is guaranteed by definition. We show that existing machinery for reasoning about probabilistic programs can be adapted to this setting, paving the way to precisely check a new class of cryptography arguments. We implement our proofs using the CryptHOL framework inside Isabelle/HOL.

Item Type: Book Item
Divisions: Faculty of Science, Engineering and Medicine > Science > Computer Science
Series Name: Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Publisher: Springer
Place of Publication: Cham
ISBN: 9783319661063
Book Title: Interactive Theorem Proving. ITP 2017
Editor: Ayala-Rincón, M. and Muñoz, C.
Official Date: 21 August 2017
Dates:
DateEvent
21 August 2017Published
2 June 2017Accepted
Volume: 10499
Page Range: pp. 114-130
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-66107-0
Status: Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Published
Conference Paper Type: Paper
Title of Event: Interactive Theorem Proving - 8th International Conference, ITP 2017, Brasilia, Brazil, September 26-29, 2017, Proceedings
Type of Event: Conference

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