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Abstract

This article brings a fresh perspective to the causal mechanism of coalition-building among diasporas pursuing genocide recognition, particularly horizontal alliances between the Armenian, Assyrian, and Kurdish diasporas. Why, how, and how durably do diasporas build coalitions to address past atrocities? Building coalitions for genocide recognition requires three important factors: a common adversary, a host-land, conducive to proliferation of transitional
justice claims, and a single contentious issue on which diasporas can focus. Coalitions based on common experiences of victimhood and identity can elicit long-term cooperation and high-level involvement, as among Armenians and Assyrians. Coalitions primarily based on strategic interests to pressure a common adversary, without common experience, show less organizational involvement, as among Armenians and Kurds. The article discusses diaspora mobilizations around the 2015 Armenian genocide centennial and Turkey’s EU accession with a wider sociospatial perspective of political processes related to Armenia, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria.

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**Keywords:** diaspora, genocide, coalitions, Armenians, Assyrians, Kurds

**Introduction**

Transitional justice research has grown exponentially in the twenty-first century as civil wars multiply, leaving ethnic and other identity-based groups displaced, and searching for redress of suffering. Theoretical and policy debates have traditionally focused on whether to prosecute or pardon perpetrators, apply retributive or restorative justice, or mobilize through top-down or bottom-up activism (Kim 2014). Recent scholarship has shifted from this need to address perpetrators or victims in postconflict societies (Roht-Arriaza

The role of conflict-generated diasporas, many from forced displacement, has been almost absent.

In the Introduction to this special issue (Koinova and Karabegovic 2019), recent scholarship is featured as addressing global aspects of transitional justice, highlighting diaspora participation in truth commissions, legal tribunals, memorialization, and invocation of universal jurisdiction toward past crimes (Roht-Arriaza 2006; Young and Park 2009; Hoogenboom and Quinn 2011; Duthie 2011; Haider 2014; Koinova 2016; Karabegovic 2017; Orjuela 2017). How diasporas build coalitions with different agents has not been addressed. Studying coalition-building is important, as diasporas affect political processes in original homelands not simply on their own, but by drawing support from other agents in host-lands and other locations. This article puts forward a discussion about coalition-building for transitional justice in global diaspora politics, specifically genocide recognition. It shows the importance of coalitions built horizontally among diasporas as actors of similar
power, contributing to diaspora studies and transitional justice scholarship.

Why, how, and how durably do diasporas build coalitions with other agents to address grievances related to past atrocities? Why are certain coalitions more durable than others? I argue that value-based rationales might provide legitimacy for activism, yet the actual pursuit of transitional justice claims is subject to strategic and tactical calculations. Building coalitions for genocide recognition requires three important factors: a common adversary, a host-land context conducive to human rights and transitional justice claims, and a specific issue to focus on from abroad. Coalitions based on common experiences of victimhood and identities can elicit long-term cooperation and high-level involvement; those based on strategic interests to pressure a shared adversary, without common victimhood experience or identities, have less involvement.

This article offers empirical examples from coalitions built by the Armenian diaspora with other persecuted groups. Based on common Christian identities and experiences of gross human rights violations during the collapsing Ottoman Empire in the early twentieth century, Armenian and Assyrian diaspora built sustainable coalitions with high involvement. By contrast, Armenians and Kurds built loose coalitions with low involvement, seeking primarily to pressure Turkey, as evidenced in the 2000s and early 2010s when
opportunities to join the EU opened.

I review scholarship on diasporas and genocide politics and the causal mechanism of coalition-building from a social movements perspective. Against the backdrop of a well-developed literature on the Armenian diaspora, I present a fresh perspective about horizontal coalition-building with other persecuted groups—Assyrians and Kurds. I conclude with implications for the study of coalition-building for genocide recognition and transitional justice research.

**Diaspora mobilizations for genocide recognition**

I use “diaspora” in line with Adamson and Demetriou’s definition emphasizing connectivities: “a social collectivity that exists across state borders and that has succeeded over time to: 1) sustain a collective national, cultural, or religious identity through a sense of internal cohesion and sustained ties with a real or imagined homeland and 2) display an ability to address the collective interests of members of the social collectivity through a developed internal organizational framework and transnational links” (2007:497). *Diaspora entrepreneurs* are formal leaders within migrant organizations, or informal leaders organizing through restaurants, businesses, or social activities (Koinova 2016). *Diaspora mobilization* designates pursuit of claims and practices related to original
homelands through various trajectories—institutional or activist channels—and moderate (“contained”) or more radical (“transgressive”) means or combinations thereof.

As Waller argues, genocide research has witnessed an “explosion of interest” in recent years. Three journals—*Genocide Studies and Prevention, Journal of Genocide Studies*, and *Genocide Studies International*—alongside the *Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies* brought more comparative perspectives (2016:xxiii). The field grew because of ethnic cleansing and genocide during the wars in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and the formation of ad hoc international and “hybrid” tribunals, and the International Criminal Court, among others (Bloxham and Moses 2010). Nevertheless, atrocities such as the Holocaust and Armenian and Rwandan genocides remain part of public discourses; others, such as those committed on Assyrians or Iraqi Kurds, remain little known (Lemarchand 2011).

Diaspora mobilization remains marginal in mainstream genocide research, even if forced displacement of Jewish and Armenian diasporas has been foundational to the field of diaspora studies (Cohen 1999; Töлölyyan 2000; Shain 2002; Sheffer 2003; Vertovec 2004). Even with the Convention on Genocide,1 “genocide” remains “ubiquitous,” invoked “rhetorically” (Bloxham and Moses 2010:1), and bringing various meanings. Theorizing about diaspora mobilizations for genocide recognition is scattered. Diaspora
institutions can link current threats with past traumas (Shain 2002). Some build bridges with local actors to foster remembrance, as for the 1995 Srebrenica genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Karabegovic 2017). Where a contentious traumatic issue remains unresolved between diaspora and host-land, victim-based approaches proliferate in claim-making even during postconflict reconstruction (Koinova 2016).

Lithuanian, Latvian, Estonian, and Ukrainian diasporas, related to the post-Soviet space, have also invoked *claims* about genocide recognition. A “Soviet genocide narrative” developed in Western countries to discuss who was tortured, murdered, and deported during the Stalinist era (Budryte 2013:172). Diaspora Ukrainians were instrumental in developing a narrative of the famine “Holodomor” as genocide (Nikolko 2017). Rwandan and Tamil diasporas appropriated and strategized around norms and practices of transitional justice, “presencing a violent past” (Orjuela 2017). The UK-based Tamil diaspora framed the violence associated with ending the intrastate warfare with 2009 massive killings of Tamils in Sri Lanka as “genocide” (Walton 2015; Godwin 2017). Diaspora Kurds sought to recognize as genocide the chemical attacks on Iraqi Kurds during the rule of Saddam Hussein, known as Anfal (Baser and Toivanen 2017).

These works consider identity- and interest-based rationales
for diaspora engagement, but not coalition-building between diaspora groups, a central contribution here. I study mobilizations of the Armenian, Assyrian, and Kurdish diasporas for genocide recognition from the perspective of relations between them. These diasporas have different histories with somewhat intersecting current agendas. The durable alliance between Armenians and Assyrians is primarily based on demands for genocide recognition. Between Armenians and Kurds, the alliance further relates to Kurdish participation in the Armenian genocide, common experiences with more recent violence in Turkey, and fear of further killings. The desire of Iraqi Kurds to have the Anfal massacres recognized as genocide is a persistent verbal gesture more than a movement.² I discuss these shortly.

Coalition-building as a causal mechanism

Social movement theory has been at the forefront of studying coalition-building as causal mechanism characteristic for bottom-up mobilizations in domestic and global politics. Coalitions entail cooperation among actors in conscious, rational, interest-based ways, acting together for joint actions, with broadly defined objectives “to attract the widest array of adherents” (Smith and Bandy 2005:10). Fox (2002) places coalitions between networks and movements. Networks are informal with relatively few organizational ties;
movements integrate ties at the highest level; coalitions are more formal, often linking networks into movements (352). As Smith and Bandy note, alliances of social change often begin as short-term endeavors, but facilitate resources to tackle long-term problems (3-4). Transnational coalitions become common with the emergence of global issues concerning different populations: capitalism and labor, war and peace, environmental degradation and climate change (McAdam et al. 2001; Tarrow 2005; Smith and Bandy 2005; Della Porta and Tarrow 2005; Van Dyke and McCammon 2010). Apart from noting diasporas as "rooted cosmopolitans," inside and outside their societies (Tarrow 2005), this literature has not yet addressed coalition-building.

Social movement scholarship has considered why groups join coalitions. Political threats, classically considered inspiring for alliance formation (Van Dyke and Soule 2002), can be combined with economic crises, political opportunities (Van Dyke and McCammon 2010:xx), or responses to counter-coalitions and social movements (Isaac 2010:25). Although coalition-building involves rational calculation, social ties (Corrigall-Brown and Meyer 2010:5) are at the core. As Van Dyke and McCammon argue, common identities and ideologies are also important for coalition-building (Smith and Bandy 2005; Gerhards and Rucht 1992; Lichterman 1996), as are common interests (xviii). The political culture could provide
incentives for mobilization (Diani, Lindsay, and Purdue 2010), as could common history and experience with political systems such as democracy or communism (Guenther 2010; Wiest 2010).

Considering how coalitions are built, cooperation among actors to pursue a common goal can be forged “horizontally” with agents of similar power or “vertically” with more powerful agents, usually based in nation-states (Tarrow 2005:8), see also Stokke and Wiebelhaus-Brahm in this volume. Horizontal relationships are built through transnational coalitions “connecting common networks of actors from different countries with similar claims” (Tarrow 2005:32). Vertical relationships are built between local activists and external states and international organizations. They often create “boomerang effects” (Keck and Sikkink 1999) and “spirals” (Risse et al. 1999), through which governments are pressured to address problematic rights practices. Such models have also gained traction in analysis of diaspora politics (Wayland 2004; Brinkerhoff 2016).

This article addresses the little-explored “horizontal” dimension of coalition-building among diaspora entrepreneurs, of “bottom-up approaches” to transitional justice, characterized by agents of relatively equal power. It builds on Sikkink’s “insider-outsider” coalitions (2005:164-165), considering that actors of similar power could build coalitions in international and domestic contexts, relatively open and where the issue of interest (here genocide
Coalitions take different forms depending on *duration* and *level of involvement*. As Tarrow (2005) notes, they can be categorized as *instrumental* (short-term cooperation with low-level involvement); *event* (short-term cooperation with higher involvement); *federated* (low involvement of organizations, long-term cooperation) and *campaign* (high-level involvement, long-term cooperation). Regarding short-term coalitions, the lowest potential to sustain collective action comes from instrumental types, with event-based coalitions having more potential, responding to international events and depending on opportunities in the international environment (163-168). Durable coalitions are formed around single, yet long-term issues and require high-level involvement (Levi and Murphy 2006).

*Coalition-building* has been discussed minimally as a causal mechanism in diaspora politics. Diasporas become engaged by local secessionist elites in a conflict spiral; transnational coalitions then build, endure, or dissipate depending on the organizational strength of strategic centers and diasporic institutions (Koinova 2011). In the global city, identity-based actors create more durable coalitions with other actors or less durable ones to address events in the developing world (Adamson and Koinova 2013). Godwin raises ideas about diasporas building global coalitions to address issues of political prisoners (2017). Coalition-building in these accounts has not delved
deeper into motivations, modes of engagement or durability.

**Methodology, data, and scope**

This article explores the context of diaspora mobilizations for genocide recognition. Case study methodology is used, suited to a theoretically underdeveloped field (George and Bennett 2004). The Armenian case was selected from conflict-generated diasporas, displaced by mass violence and atrocities or socialized with a traumatic history, and claiming genocide recognition. These findings are methodologically relevant to other cases of diasporas linked to postconflict polities, such as Bosnia, Rwanda, Iraqi Kurdistan, and Sri Lanka. The article also uses an implicit comparison with a “negative case” of the Anfal campaign in Iraq related to gross human rights violations against Kurds, to tease out conditions under which diaspora coalition-building is not very likely to occur. Empirical evidence is informed by data from a 5-year European Research Council study of conflict-generated diasporas, more than 40 semi-structured interviews among Armenian and Kurdish diaspora entrepreneurs in Europe, and participant observation in London, Berlin, and Brussels (2009-2017).

I limit the scope conditions, valid for conflict-generated diasporas in liberal states, not in authoritarian or other illiberal states, where host-land contexts might not be open for mobilization
or be outright repressive. I also consider what Ben Anderson (1998) calls “long-distance nationalist” diasporas, not those adjacent to territories where genocide has previously occurred. I seek to understand how coalitions are formed and how durable and organizationally strong they become, not with how ideas are formed or coalitions dissipate. The article also excludes involvement of kin-states, particularly Armenia here. Genocide claims have not been central to independent Armenia since 1991, taking a backseat to foreign policy concerns to prevent escalating conflicts with long-term political rivals Turkey and Azerbaijan.

**Remembered and forgotten genocides and their diasporas**

Scholarship on the Armenian genocide developed substantially to document atrocities in 1915 during the collapse of the Ottoman Empire (Panossian 1998; Tölöyan 2000; Balakian 2003, Hovannissian 2007). The Young Turk regime rounded up and eventually massacred or exposed to imminent death an estimated 800,000 to 1.5 million Armenians in the Syrian desert (Panossian 1998:84; Armenian National Institute 2015). The centennial was commemorated widely in 2015, recognized by the European Parliament and 23 countries, in addition to Pope Francis, Bishop of Rome (Mullen 2015). But the atrocities are still officially denied as “genocide” by Turkey, successor state of the Ottoman Empire.
The Armenian diaspora is estimated to be about 5 million globally, approximately more than those in Armenia proper, though reliable data are scarce (Statistics Armenia 2014). Although this diaspora is considered “classic” (Sheffer 2003:75-77), scattered across the Caucasus and Middle East at the turn of the twentieth century (Pattie 1999:3), the 1915 genocide is at the core of Armenian identity, a “lens through which Armenians experience the world around them” (Becker 2014:64).

A sociospatial dynamic characterizes Armenian genocide recognition claims, predominantly spread in the diaspora in the Western countries and Middle East, from descendants of genocide survivors under Ottoman rule, but not in Russia, host-state to a large Armenian diaspora. The diaspora in Russia emerged especially after the end of communism primarily from territories of present-day Armenia [considered “eastern Armenia”], and is mostly economically driven (Galkina 2006:181). Survivors from former Ottoman territories [“western Armenia”] fled in 1915 to Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Greece, Eastern Europe, and elsewhere. The US, France, and other European countries became important for secondary migration, as refugees left because of the Lebanese civil war (1975–1990) and the Iranian Revolution (1979). Other states, such as the UK, Netherlands, and Sweden, have accepted Armenians more recently. Armenian diaspora-based parties and apostolic churches in Western
countries and the Middle East continue to maintain memory of the genocide, including coordinating reactions to counter-mobilizations among the Turkish and Azeri diaspora.

By contrast, the massacres committed by the collapsing Ottoman Empire against Assyrians, Pontus Greeks, and other Christian populations remain almost unknown. Lemarchand (2011:1) calls them “forgotten genocides,” little mobilized upon and overshadowed by the memory of others. The 1915 Armenian genocide overshadowed that against Assyrians (Khosroeva 2007:267); the Holocaust dominated debates to the expense of Roma and Slavs in Europe; and attention to the 1990s Rwandan genocide has surpassed those in Burundi in Africa (ibid; Travis 2011:134).

The Assyrians have roots in present Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria (McLure 2001), and ancient history in Mesopotamia (Roux 1964). Similar to the Armenians, Assyrians were subjected to inhumane treatment by the Ottoman Empire at the turn of the twentieth century, and in Iran, which the Ottomans attacked during the 1914 warfare. There are some estimates that 500,000-750,000 were killed, many during the “Death Marches” of starvation and dehydration (Khosroeva 2007).

At present, Turkey denies the Assyrian genocide as it does the Armenian (Travis 2011). From this perspective, the Armenian diaspora contributes to “politicization” of a historical question; all it
supposedly does is to mobilize for genocide recognition.\(^3\) In contrast, while the European Parliament recognized it as genocide, acknowledgment remains limited among many of its nation-states.

The visibility of genocide recognition claims among Armenians starkly contrasts with the minimal attention on Assyrians. There are several reasons for this anomaly. In Travis’s account, Assyrian genocide scholarship has been scarce, not least because until the early 2000s works focused the Armenian genocide and rarely mentioned atrocities committed to others. Discussions about Assyrians were criminalized in Turkey. Turkey and Iraq viewed Assyrians as rebellious populations, and sought to thwart their mobilizations. There are ongoing but little visible relations between Assyrians and Kurds due to a schism over the situation of Assyrians in Iraq in the Nineveh Plain, including with regard to the autonomous authorities in Iraqi Kurdistan. Developing a more coherent picture about Assyrians has also been difficult, because they are further called Chaldeans, Syriacs, Arameans, Kurdish Christians, and others (Travis 2011:123-128). Some have cooperation issues with each other, most notably among Assyrians and Syrians, eventually impacting the Armenian relationship.

By contrast to the Armenians, with a rather stable if not entirely monolithic identity, that of Assyrians is fragmented and complicated without a language or religion to relate to. Some

\(^3\) I thank a reviewer for this comment.
contested boundaries were eventually established to include Christians speaking a neo-Aramaic language or dialect (McLure 2001:109-110). Assyrians are concentrated in the Middle East, with significant numbers in the diaspora in Sweden (120,000, Radio Sweden 2015), Germany (100,000, Borkener Zeitung 2011), US (82,355, US Census 2000), Australia (around 80,000, Assyria 2017), Russia, and other countries. Assyrians migrated from the region in the 1910s and later during the Iranian Revolution (1979), the Gulf War (1990-1991), and during repression and warfare in Iraq, including because of the self-proclaimed Islamic State (ISIS). Nevertheless, Assyrians are much fewer in the Middle East and abroad, and their mobilizations remain little visible. There are a few exceptions, such as activism to support the Yezidi population, displaced through the war with ISIS in Iraq (Radio Sweden 2015). Yet, as a minority without a state or regional autonomy in the Middle East, and living in Christian-dominated environments in Western countries, Assyrians have faced stronger assimilation pressures than Armenians (McLure 2000; Khosroeva 2007; Travis 2011).

This article analyzes Armenian-Assyrian diaspora coalitions for genocide recognition, but also those between Armenians and Kurds. In Lemarchand’s (2011) and Hardi’s accounts (2011), the chemical attacks by Saddam Hussein against the Kurds of Iraq at the end of the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) is a “forgotten” genocide. As
Hardi argues, it is considered “a Kurdish Hiroshima” and likened “to what the Warsaw ghetto meant to Jews, Guernica to the Basques, and Wounded Knee to the Sioux” (109). Saddam Hussein’s Anfal campaign consisted of eight consecutive offenses in six geographical areas where Kurds lived. With no exact figures, estimates show around 2,600 villages destroyed, and 50,000-100,000 civilians in mass graves (107, 113). Recognition of the Anfal is high on the agenda of the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq. Recognitions were achieved also by the Iraqi National Assembly in 2008, the High Criminal Court in 2010, and UK, Norway, and Sweden in 2012-2013 (Baser and Toivanen, 2017:405-415).

Anfal is not the only grievance Kurds maintain in their long struggle for self-determination. Similarly to Assyrians, Kurds are stateless people inhabiting territories of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria. Yet Kurds have much more mobilized on self-determination, of which international recognition of genocide has been an important part. The Treaty of Sèvres (1920) briefly raised hopes for statehood, but actual self-determination “remained a distant objective” (Hardi 2011:111). Iraqi Kurds gained official autonomy, and are currently governed by the Kurdistan Regional Government within Iraq, with recurrent calls for independence, including a 2017 referendum. Moreover, Kurdish mobilizations have been tackled with repression and criminalization in Turkey. The Kurdistan People’s Party (PKK)
of Abdullah Öcalan has been put on a terrorist list. The alleged peace process between Turkey’s government and Kurdish leadership has been failing amid continuing violence against the Kurds (Tas 2017). The conflict has escalated, especially after the attempted 2016 coup against President Recep Erdoğan in Turkey. Furthermore, since 2012, Kurdish resistance has developed a *de facto* autonomous region within Syria, widely known as Rojava, advancing a political project of *democratic autonomy* and critiquing patriarchy and the nation-state as a whole (Kuçük and Özselçuk 2016:185-186).

Many mobilizations became magnified beyond the original territories through the large Kurdish diaspora, estimated at more than 1.1 million outside the Middle East, with significant presence in Western Europe, most notably Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Belgium, Austria, and Sweden, and more limited in the US (Kurdish Project 2018). The diaspora has been dispersed from Turkey, Iraq, and Iran by violence and repression in the twentieth century. They also migrated from Turkey to Western Europe due to guest-worker programs during the 1960s and 1970s, and more recently from Syria due to continuing warfare since 2012. Despite internal divisions, the Kurdish diaspora is highly mobilized in Western Europe, and a powerful nonstate actor supporting claims for autonomy and independence in the Middle East (Vohra 2017).

The following section unpacks the coalition-building efforts
among diasporas to recognize their genocides. Even if all three groups targeted Turkey after the 2005 opening of negotiations for EU accession, they acted not as a large coordinated coalition, but as two coalitions of which the Armenian diaspora was central, even if differentially engaged (Figure 1).

Figure 1: **Coalition-building between Armenians, Assyrians, and Kurds**

Legend:

**Link 1:** Armenians and Assyrians in coalition:
Long-term cooperation and high level of involvement:
Common victimhood experience, social ties, religion, shared common enemy;
Armenians as the *leading* partner.

**Link 2:** Armenians and Kurds in coalition:
Long-term cooperation, low level of involvement
Adversarial historical experience, no common religion or history, but shared common enemy;
Kurds as the *leading* partner.
Coalition-building among diaspora Armenians and Assyrians

Armenians and Assyrians have been in long-standing relationships in the Middle East. Joint diaspora efforts for genocide recognition developed more recently. Individuals and organizations acted on political opportunities associated with campaigns to recognize the Armenian genocide, and social ties of religious identity and genocidal experience. Their coalition-building is durable and could be considered alongside Tarrow’s ideas about coalitions with long-term cooperation and high organizational involvement.

Armenians and Assyrians shared conflict and cooperation as neighbors for nearly 3,000 years. Al-Jeloo (2010) argues that before the invention of the Armenian alphabet, religious texts were written in Aramaic or Greek. Later, the Armenian Patriarch represented Assyrians in the Constantinople court. Armenians and Assyrians inhabited territories of present Turkey and Iran, where some Assyrians assimilated into the Armenian way of life. Living side by side, they fell to the same genocide policies as the Armenians. The suffering created common bonds.

Armenian and Assyrian coalition-building for genocide recognition has grown in the first decade of the twenty-first century. As Travis points out, this is also the time Armenian historiography
started more explicitly mentioning the Assyrian genocide (2011). Also, a 2007 resolution of the International Association of Genocide Scholars proclaimed that “the Ottoman campaign against Christian minorities between 1914 and 1923 constituted a genocide against Armenians, Assyrians, Pontian and Anatolian Greeks.” It also asked Turkey to recognize the genocide, issue a formal apology, and “take prompt and meaningful steps towards restitution.” Khosraeva (2007) summarizes a common interest-based rationale to join forces: “A more complete picture of the Turkish massacres of other ethno-religious groups will further augment the powerful evidence contradicting Turkish denial of the genocide” (267). The implications are that for more success in genocide recognition, political mobilizers need to reach outside their comfort zone and raise awareness about suffering of other Christian peoples.

This rationale becomes visible in a discussion with a former politician in Sweden, involved in developing cross-party parliamentary work to recognize the Armenian genocide in 2010. Sweden’s context was highly conducive for recognition claims, with its explicit political culture emphasizing human rights and dignity, and open policies supporting refugees from conflict zones. This empowerment of diaspora entrepreneurs becomes even more visible considering that at the time Armenia did not even have an embassy in Sweden. An initial motion for recognition passed in parliament in
1999, but wording regarding “genocide” needed retraction due to strong Turkish opposition. Following these events, the politician argues that was approached by representatives of Assyrian organizations. They advocated that this genocide concerned not only Armenians, but other Christian people in the Ottoman Empire (author’s interview 2013). Thus, even with historically strong social ties between communities based on common Christian identity and traumatic experience, the initial motion for collaboration for genocide recognition came from Assyrians at a particularly opportune time, a result of counter-mobilization from Turkey.

As the politician continues, the coalition was formed around 2001-2002, when Armenian and Assyrian groups began working together to inform MPs and the wider public. Newspaper articles were published. Demonstrations were launched on the day of the Armenian genocide, 24 April, and among Assyrian people in Sodertalje near Stockholm, where many Assyrians and Syrians live. Such demonstrations coupled with exhibitions were held every year until 2010, when the motion successfully passed the parliament (2013). Even if the government did not align with this parliamentary decision (Horizon Weekly 2015), the 2010 recognition played an important symbolic role, as it recognized the mass killings of Assyrians and Pontus Greeks alongside Armenians as “genocide” (AINA News 2010). The campaign for Armenian genocide
recognition around the 2015 centennial also succeeded in other countries and important international institutions where Armenian and Assyrian populations live. In April 2015, the Dutch parliament passed a binding resolution recognizing the genocide of Armenians, Assyrians, and Greeks. Makris argues: “Assyrians have worked with Greeks and Armenians to pressure Turkey to recognize the genocide of World War One” (11/04/2015). The European Parliament passed a motion to label the mass killings “genocide,” considering Assyrians and Greeks besides Armenians. In 2016 the German Bundestag, by an overwhelming majority, passed a “symbolic and long overdue resolution,” recognizing the 1915 killings as genocide, mentioning also Assyrians, Syriacs, Chaldeans, and Aramaic-speaking Christians (Abraham 2016).

The 2015 genocide recognitions, a seeming blitz-campaign, were long in preparation, with Assyrian and Greek pressure groups band-wagoning behind the more mobilized Armenians. Hence, even if this coalition-building involved diaspora group as peers in “horizontal” relationships, a somewhat asymmetric power dynamic could be discerned: diaspora Assyrians behind the better mobilized and more powerful Armenians.

**Coalition-building among diaspora Armenians and Kurds**

Whereas Armenian, Assyrian, and other diasporas pressured
Turkey on a problematic past, coalition-building between Armenians and Kurds has been more future-oriented. Negotiations in 2005 for EU accession made improvement of Turkey’s human rights record imperative. Following the 1993 Copenhagen criteria requiring dignified civic and political treatment of minorities (Kanli 2016), Kurds and Armenians received an impetus to mobilize. A narrative of human rights violations became the basis for seeking political change. By contrast to the Armenian and Assyrian coalition-building, based primarily among diasporas in host-lands, these coalitions spanned Kurds and Armenian networks within Turkey, their diasporas in different countries, especially Europe, and marginally Armenia. Thus, analyzing diaspora coalition-building requires attention beyond simply host-states and home-states, but to consider transnational social field dynamics.

Armenians developed diaspora long-term coalitions with Kurds to pressure Turkey to democratize, but cautiously with little organizational involvement. At 2015 Armenian commemorations in Berlin, Kurdish organizations distributed leaflets and encouraged joint events. At gatherings such as a 2017 European Parliament session, leaders spoke of Armenian suffering during the genocide, linking past human rights atrocities to those toward Kurds at present, and advocated preventing future human rights abuses in Turkey (participant observation 2017).
Kurdish organizations took the lead in eagerness and initiative. Why is this so? In a 2013 conversation, an Armenian diaspora interviewee argued about the difficulty forgetting that Kurds participated in the genocide alongside Ottoman Turks, even after influential Kurdish leaders, organizations, and newspapers expressed apology. As Geerdink (2015) argues, during the 1990s warfare between the Turkish state and the Kurdish PKK, when thousands of civilians were killed, elderly Kurds started sharing with children and grandchildren their memories of the Armenian genocide. As Kurdish politician Abdullah Demirbas put it, fighting for Kurdish rights and national identity helped Kurds come to terms with their role in the Armenian genocide. Many felt ashamed, but others argued their ancestors were used by the state. Demirbas was quoted: “they should have resisted. Our silence makes us guilty” (Geerdink 2015). Once loyalists to the Ottoman Empire, Kurds started understanding that they “became the new enemies of the republic,” turning from perpetrators into victims (Ayata 2015:809). Acknowledgment of Kurdish participation in the Armenian genocide mounted in the late 1990s, reaching a new level related to Turkey’s EU accession.

The link between Armenian genocide and Kurdish diaspora activism for autonomy and democratization has been dominated by political dynamics related to Turkey. The liberalization of Turkey
opened space to ideas in the small Armenian minority, primarily in Istanbul. Armenians in Turkey are estimated at 50,000-70,000, with continuing assimilation and emigration. Most notable was Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink. Melkonyan argues that in his Akos newspaper Dink sought to bring Armenian questions to the Turkish public, including peace-building and genocide. His views did not initially coincide with mainstream or diaspora Armenian views, but his 2007 assassination by a Turkish nationalist made him an Armenian hero, a new victim of genocide (2013). During 2009 conversations with Armenian diaspora activists in London, Dink’s assassination was considered highly important for the small diaspora segment interested in prioritizing civil society in Turkey, rather than genocide recognition. The connection with the Kurdish issue became most potent, as joining forces for advancing democracy in Turkey concerned all minorities, including the numerous and better mobilized Kurds. Dink’s funeral, including some Armenian diaspora representatives, turned into a demonstration, where people chanted: “We are all Armenians, we are all Hrant Dink,” in Turkish, Armenian, and Kurdish (Eliot 2007).

Armenian issues, including related to genocide, became important for political activities of the left-wing Turkish People’s Democratic Party (HDP), advocating democracy, women’s and minority rights. The party has a strong Kurdish presence, and is in
alliance with the Kurdish Democratic Regions Party. Ethnic Armenian HDP Member of Parliament Garo Paylan spoke on genocide issues, and became quite visible in 2016, when physically attacked by other parliament members (Armenian Quarterly 2016). Paylan called on the Armenian diaspora to consider that the “Armenian genocide took place here [in Turkey] and coming to terms with the genocide should also take place here” (Janbazian 2015). The HDP, with its diaspora branches, also considers the Armenian issue important for pressuring Turkey, and seeks collaborative relationships (author’s interview, 2017).

While coalition-building became more institutionalized in Turkey, especially through the HDP, diaspora relationships between Armenians and Kurds remained long-term, yet less organizationally involved abroad. One reason is that Kurdish autonomy in Turkey is a major interest among Kurds, liberal and leftist groups in Turkey. These groups chastise Turkey’s leadership for not recognizing the Armenian genocide, but stop short of further supporting genocide recognition once its consequences come up, namely potential reparations and self-determination related to “Kurdistan” vs. “Western Armenia.” Such attitudes have played an important role for disallowing closer ties between Armenians and Kurds to form.4

Another reason for such lukewarm coalition-building is the almost exclusive Armenian diaspora interest in genocide recognition,

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4 I thank a reviewer for this comment.
with somewhat diverging interests from dynamics in Armenia as a kin-state, and from Armenians and Kurds in Turkey interested primarily in peace and civil society. A statement in a pro-democracy conference in 2017 at the European Parliament sums up: on an audience question whether the Kurdish and powerful Armenian diasporas could campaign to free political prisoners in Turkey, a delegate responded that they were talking with Kurds and Alevites, but “no Armenian came to me,” despite a large Armenian diaspora, which “I have not seen unfortunately” (author participant observation, June 2017).

No strong coalition formed between Armenians and Kurds who sought to internationalize Saddam’s Anfal campaign. Anfal-related activism has spread in representations of the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government, especially in Europe (Baser and Toivanen 2017). This does not suggest that there were no sympathies between specific Armenian and Kurdish activists and NGOs, but that a full-fledged campaign was not formed. In methodological terms, the pursuit of the Anfal campaign on its own terms rather than in a coalition serves as a “negative” case to tease out nonconducive conditions for diaspora coalitions for genocide recognition with other groups.

There are several reasons the Anfal recognition remained largely marginal to political dynamics. An Iraqi Kurdish official
confirmed that connections with the Armenian diaspora on the Anfal recognition have been minimal (author’s conversation, 2017). I argue that aversion to coalitions is based on lack of alignment of contemporary interests. First, the Anfal has been related to Iraqi Kurdistan, not Turkey, a common adversary also for Armenians. Second, Iraqi Kurds sought to claim the Anfal as an international crime against humanity after it was recognized domestically in Iraq, more clearly connecting genocide recognition claims and self-determination (Baser and Toivanen 2017:407-415). For Armenians, self-determination has not been a priority outside Armenia proper after the collapse of communism and the 1991-1994 war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which left the de facto state of Nagorno-Karabakh in a “frozen” conflict. This is despite the Armenian diaspora considering Nagorno-Karabakh (“Artsakh”) the “cradle of Armenianness,” and significantly mobilizing about it in the 1990s. Third, Kurds of Iraq, Turkey, Syria, and Iran have different national goals. Many contemporary concerns, most notably ISIS fighting in Iraq, have drawn diaspora attention, as did the 2017 independence referendum in Iraqi Kurdistan. As Levi and Murphy (2006) argue, a durable coalition with long-term involvement requires a single political issue. In Armenian-Kurdish relations, Turkey as common adversary has been of interest for durable collaborations, but multiple political issues among Kurdish groups, alongside
differences in religion and history between them, have prevented coalitions with high institutional involvement.

**Conclusions**

This article explored *why* and *how* diasporas join to pursue genocide recognition claims, and *how durable* and organized such coalitions could become. I argue that diaspora coalitions require a common adversary; a context enabling proliferation of human rights claims; and a single issue to focus globally scattered diaspora entrepreneurs. Value-based claims give legitimacy beyond particular diasporas; yet coalitions’ durability and organizational involvement depend on contemporary strategic and tactical calculations.

I offer empirical evidence based on multisited research in Europe. The 2005 opportunity to pressure Turkey on its EU accession provided an incentive for Armenians, Assyrians, Pontus Greeks, and Kurds to join against a common adversary on an issue of long-term importance. The Armenian diaspora played a central if not always leading role. A durable coalition with high-level involvement emerged between Armenians, Assyrians, and Pontus Greeks, who share traumatic experiences and religion and seek to redress a violent past. A long-term coalition with low-level involvement emerged between Armenians and Kurds, joining ranks in loose, ad hoc ways.
This article shows the need to study diaspora activism beyond established “boomerang effect” (Keck and Sikkink 1998) and “spiral” (Risse et al. 1999) models in political science. Coalition-building among diasporas for genocide recognition does not reflect these models. In their original version, such models feature human rights activists in a liberalizing or repressive state, seeking “vertical” relationships with states and international organizations to pressure home governments to improve their human rights practices. In our cases, coalitions formed “horizontally” on the basis of forging relations among actors with largely similar power. Yet, even if considered of “equal” power, these diasporas are in an asymmetrical relationship among each other: the Armenian diaspora is sought after by both Assyrians and Kurds but much more likely to build durable coalitions with Assyrians. The Armenian diaspora took a backseat regarding coalition-building with Kurds, not least because of mixed feelings related to Kurdish participation in the 1915 genocide and issues of possible future reparations and territory. Also, the civil society dynamics of Turkey, dominated by the Kurdish question and activism, has not been central to large segments of the Armenian diaspora, focused primarily on genocide recognition.

The uneven ways diaspora coalitions are formed in different contexts show that sociospatial dynamics in diaspora politics are not necessarily coterminous with a triadic nexus model incorporating
host-states, home-states, and diasporas only. Claims about genocide recognition could have political purchase only in parts of transnational social fields, like the Armenian diaspora in Western countries and Middle East, and of little interest elsewhere, as in Russia. Diasporas are not simply linked to Armenia as a kin-state, important for Armenian genocide recognition, but largely marginal to diaspora coalition-building dynamics. Important is another state, Turkey, successor of the state that perpetrated the genocide. Moreover, coalitions occur predominantly in host-land contexts for groups, such as Armenians and Assyrians, or in homeland contexts that span abroad, as for Armenians and Kurds.

This article speaks further to the broader “diasporas and transitional justice” agenda advanced by this special issue. It provides a clear instance of coalition-building with long-term effects, as genocide recognition is incredibly difficult to achieve. Such coalition-building has been more successful among agents with common identities and common victim-based past, leading to some successful genocide recognitions in Western countries and international institutions, especially around the 2015 Armenian genocide centennial. Coalitions without common identities and victim-based past, spanning countries of origin and settlement, are less successful, even with an opportune process, such as Turkey’s EU accession. Dissipation of such diaspora coalitions is more likely to
Coalition-building is only one form of diaspora groups seeking to build awareness with other groups about human rights violations and genocides as a “never again” experience. The Jewish diaspora, because of the Holocaust, has been looked to in this respect and sought by other diasporas. Bosnians, Palestinians, Rwandans, and Tamils have made such humanistic claims in solidarity with others. In 2016-2018 such solidarity was shown in diaspora circles in response to the chemical gas attacks against civilians in the war in Syria and ethnic cleansing of Rohingya in Myanmar. Yet such claims remain limited to discursive action, engaged in loose networks, or voiced in academic venues. This article shows that to join and sustain coalitions, diaspora groups need common unifying targets, conducive liberal contexts for human rights claims, and a single issue as focal point for mobilization.

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Article II of the UN Convention (1948) defines genocide as “any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”