Programme, policies, people: 
the interaction between Bosnian refugees and British society

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A thesis submitted to the University of Warwick for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Submitted to the Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations

September 2001
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I wish to thank the following, who made this research possible:

Daniele Joly, my supervisor throughout this research;
Robin Cohen, who supervised me for part of this research;
The staff at CRER for their support and assistance;
The CRER resources centre;
My family, for their continuing support;
The ESRC, for funding this research;
And finally all the refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina who allowed me to share part of their lives.
Declaration

Some of the work contained in this thesis has been discussed in the following publications:


Refugees' Reception and Settlement in Britain: A Report for the Joseph Rowntree Foundation By Lynnette Kelly and Daniele Joly, April 1999


Mapping the field: asylum policy and process in Britain. A report for the Home Office. Lynnette Kelly and David Owen. 2001 (forthcoming)
Summary

This thesis analyses the situation of refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina that arrived in Britain as part of an organised programme. It represents a contribution towards the theoretical understanding of refugees, and develops and refines the theories of other authors.

The author used field research methods based on techniques developed in ethnographic studies to generate empirical evidence on the social organisation of Bosnian refugees in Britain. Throughout the thesis it is argued that the situation of the refugees can only be understood through an examination of the influences affecting the refugees, before, during, and after their arrival in Britain.

At every stage of the refugees' experience, control over the course of their lives has been taken away from the refugees. The war that took place in Bosnia-Herzegovina became constructed as an ethnic conflict, although there was no strong Muslim identification before the war. The programme removed options over country and place of residence, and created a measure of dependency. Longer term policies of community development, originally designed to meet the perceived needs of labour migrants, have been directed towards the refugees and imposed a model of organisation. Combined with temporary protected status, this has removed control from the refugees and prevented the formation of a new collective or individual positive life project.

Refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina represent a new type of refugee in Joly’s typology. This is a type of refugee that had no collective project in the country of origin, and also no collective project in the country of exile, and that is unable to make a decision on return because of the constraints around them.
Chapter 1: Introduction

The outbreak of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in April 1992 produced the largest flow of refugees and displaced persons in Europe since the Second World War. Thousands of people fled outwards and sought safety in other European countries, but although there was some public sympathy for their plight, the large numbers involved were a matter of concern for many European governments. In a pattern which has emerged with other refugee flows, the reaction of many governments, including the British government, was to impose visa restrictions in order to make it more difficult for persons from Bosnia-Herzegovina to travel to those countries and seek asylum.

The discovery by journalists of concentration camps eventually led to the closure of those camps, which in turn created a new humanitarian emergency. Some of the ex-detainees were able to join family members in safer parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but many were brought to camps in Croatia, as there was nowhere else for them to go. UNHCR appealed for governments to accept some of these ex-detainees, and suggested that offering temporary protection would be a humanitarian solution. Many countries did accept some of the refugees, and set quotas for the number of ex-detainees they would admit. Britain was reluctant to accept a quota at first, but eventually on November 5th 1992, the same day that visa restrictions were introduced, an announcement was made that a quota of ex-detainees would be admitted to Britain under temporary protected status.

In Britain a programme was quickly established for the reception of this quota, organised by voluntary organisations and funded by the Home Office. This programme became known as the Bosnia Project, and was responsible for the reception and housing of all
those that came as part of the programme. The refugees on the programme were housed in various parts of the country in what were called cluster areas after a stay in a reception centre, and were given support and advice by Bosnia Project workers. However, many of the cluster areas had not seen significant refugee arrivals before, and there were few other sources of support. In one area, there were concerns raised with the city council that the Bosnia Project workers were unable to cope with the volume of work, and local advice agencies and volunteers were struggling with the extra demand this created for them. In response, the council agreed to establish a post for a special worker whose role was to assist and support all refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina that were housed in that city. Thus began my involvement with refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina, as I was appointed to the post of Bosnian Refugee Resettlement Officer between July 1994 and June 1996. No other local authority made such an appointment, making it a unique post. The work involved considerable overlap with the work of the Bosnia Project, and required a degree of co-ordination and agreement between myself and Bosnia Project workers. This gave me a unique perspective, being among the workers of the Bosnia Project but not actually a member of the Project, from which to view the workings of the various organisations within the project and the interaction with the refugees.

During the time I held this post, I began to formulate ideas about the strengths and weaknesses of the programme as it applied to the refugees. This is an important topic, since it is only by fully evaluating the programme and its effect on the people it was supposed to help that we can understand the refugees' situation. It also seemed to me at the time that although the refugees were arriving in the city and not moving on elsewhere, they could not be described as settled. They appeared to be waiting for something, though
whether that something was the end of the war, the arrival of a relative, or an employment opportunity was not clear. Both the refugees and others that came into contact with them frequently asked how long they would be in Britain for, a question to which I was unable to give an answer. Through interaction with the refugees, I became aware that they were a diverse group, with widely different views on the future for Bosnia-Herzegovina, and displaying a wide range of attitudes towards each other. However, the main focus of support for refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina seemed to be encouraging the formation of community groups, and assumed that there was some form of 'community' of refugees.

This apparent contradiction between my experiences of the refugees and the expectations of those working with them provided the starting point for this research. I originally intended to focus upon the Bosnia Project, and address whether it had empowered or disempowered the refugees. However, it soon became apparent that a hypothesis based upon notions of empowerment or disempowerment by the Project would have little value. Firstly, empowerment is too nebulous a concept, and has been so widely interpreted that it has become almost meaningless (Ward & Mullender 1991). Secondly, the deeper I investigated the more apparent it became that the focus of this research could not be solely the Project and its effects on the refugees.

Using a grounded theory approach and utilising theories from sociology and social policy, it emerged that for a full understanding of the situation of the refugees, their interaction with British society, and not just the Project, was a more meaningful topic of research. It was also apparent that the situation of the refugees was dependent to a large extent on their situation in Britain, and the policies surrounding refugees and minorities
in Britain, but also on the background of the refugees themselves, as suggested by the theories developed by Kunz (1973, 1981) Zolberg (1989) and Joly (1996b).

This thesis therefore begins with an examination of existing theories on refugees. These suggest that in order to understand the situation of refugees in the country of exile, consideration must be made of the situation of the refugees in their home country and their attitudes towards it in exile. I suggest, though, that in addition a consideration needs to be made of the relationship between the refugees and the country of exile. Although refugees and labour migrants are different in law, and have different backgrounds and reasons for entering a country, they are often considered together when issues of settlement are discussed. Policies of community formation and encouragement of community associations and self-help organisations were originally intended to assist labour migrants and later minority ethnic groups in Britain, in line with the model of multi-culturalism developed in Britain. As the number of refugees in Britain increased, there was little discussion of settlement issues, and these policies were repeated for refugees groups. In this chapter I question the applicability of these policies for refugee groups, and the ability of refugee groups to form communities. However, refugee groups do form community associations, and I suggest that among refugee groups this can lead to the formation of ‘contingent communities’, which are consciously constructed as a response to policies and practices in British society.

Chapter three sets out the methodological basis for this study and the methods used. As will become clear from this chapter, I have drawn on my experiences working with refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina in this study. I have also used field work methods including interviews and participant observation, and the processes are described. In
order that this research goes beyond the actors' own accounts I have analysed the empirical evidence using a grounded theory approach. Together with the theoretical basis of this research, this pointed to an analysis that includes the situation of the refugees before and during the conflict, the policies of the Bosnia Project, and the policies of settlement that pertain in Britain, in order to understand the way that the refugees interact with British society.

The history of Bosnia-Herzegovina is described in chapter four. This includes an examination of the history of the country from the time of the invasion by the Ottoman Empire until the present day. This shows that the history of Bosnia-Herzegovina is one of repeated domination by outside powers, and also of co-existence of members of different religious beliefs. The circumstances leading to the war are briefly outlined, and an analysis of the causes of the war is made.

This is followed by an examination of the Bosnia Project in chapter five, including both the policies and the way those policies were implemented. The operation of the programme is described, and an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses is made.

Chapters six and seven focus on the refugees themselves. Chapter six looks at the refugees as individuals, and the way that their attitudes towards themselves and others has been affected by their experiences. Where possible, comparisons are made between refugees that came on the programme and those that came on relief convoys and remained outside the programme. The extent to which the refugees were able to control their own destiny is discussed, and the way that this has affected their attitude towards employment, language learning, and return. Chapter seven looks at the refugees as a group, and the linkages between the individual refugees. I begin by examining the
question of whether they form a community, and what kind of networks exist if there is no real community. I then go on to look at the community associations formed by Bosnian refugees, including their origins and their functioning. I discuss the difficulties that refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina have in forming community associations, and suggest that these might be better understood as being contingent communities, a theory developed in chapter two.

Chapter eight summarises the results of this research and the conclusions that can be drawn about the interaction of Bosnian refugees with British society.

Finally, I need to explain some of the terminology and spellings used in this thesis. First of all, I am examining refugees from the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is the full name of the state, but as can be seen from the bibliography it is sometimes referred to as Bosnia-Hercegovina, the hyphen may be absent, or the Bosnian name of ‘Bosna i Hercegovina’ is used. I have used Bosnia-Herzegovina throughout, although the others are also correct. Yugoslavia refers to the whole of the state of Yugoslavia when referring to the situation before 1992. The exception to this is where informants have used Bosnia instead of the full title and I have used a direct quotation. I refer to those from Bosnia-Herzegovina as ‘Bosnians’, since the term Bosnia-Herzegovinian is both rarely used and clumsy.

The phrase ‘former Yugoslavia’ refers to all that territory which used to be part of Yugoslavia. When the situation post-1992 is discussed, Yugoslavia refers only to that part of the former Yugoslavia which remained within the federation, that is Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro and throughout the war in Bosnia also included Macedonia.
The language which those from Bosnia-Herzegovina professed to speak when they first began arriving in Britain was called Serbo-Croat. Later it became known as Bosnian, and I refer to it within this thesis as Bosnian. The language utilises accents and letters that are not used in English, and for ease of writing these have been omitted or anglicised as appropriate.

I refer throughout to refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina, and by this I mean all those that sought or were given international protection, including those on the programme. Although they were given temporary protection and did not enter the asylum determination procedures, and so do not strictly qualify as refugees, they refer to themselves as refugees and were assisted by refugee organisations.

Some authors writing of Bosnian Muslims use the term 'Bosniacs'. This came into common usage around 1995, and is the term preferred by many international organisations. However, I have preferred to use the terms used by the refugees themselves, and none of the people that I had contact with used the word 'Bosniac' to describe themselves. I therefore refer to those from Bosnia-Herzegovina that describe themselves as Muslim as being Bosnian Muslims. Those that consider themselves Catholic or Orthodox Christians who are Bosnian are referred to as Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs respectively, which are the terms they use themselves. Where Croat or Serb is used without Bosnia at the beginning, it is referring to someone from either Croatia or Serbia, and not from Bosnia.
Chapter 2: Theory and literature review

Introduction

This chapter sets out the concepts and theories used in this thesis. The central question of this thesis was the nature of the interaction between refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina and British society, and this required an approach which was broad and encompasses the diverse nature of the refugee experience.

I begin by examining the need to distinguish between labour migrants and refugees, since refugees have a different legal status in the host country, and have different motivations for migration. I then examine the situation in Europe for refugees at the time of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the origin of the temporary protection policies that were developed in response to the refugee flow. These policies were predicated on the notion that refugees would return at the end of the crisis, and so did not require the evolution of policies towards their settlement and integration. However, many of those given temporary protection remain in Western Europe, and so questions of settlement and integration have become relevant.

In Britain refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina were met by policies originally designed to meet the perceived needs of labour migrants, which focussed on communities and self-help. As I establish in this chapter, refugees are different from economic migrants, but policies on their settlement have not developed separately. The effectiveness of these policies for refugees depends to a large extent on the formation of communities by
refugee groups, and their abilities to form effective community associations which reflect the needs of the group.

The need to distinguish between refugees and labour migrants

The settlement of in-migrants to a country is affected by many factors, but one significant factor is the background of the migrant (Joly 1996b, Kunz 1973). Since refugees and labour migrants may have different motivations and backgrounds, it is important that the differences are understood and defined theoretically in order that their settlement can also be understood.

Most states use the United Nations definition to define what is meant by a 'refugee', although this is not the only definition in use. This legal differentiation between refugees and other migrants is based on the belief held by the international community that there is a fundamental difference between the two, and a facet of this difference is that refugees are given privileged access to a country on the grounds of their need for protection. Understanding the difference between refugees and other migrants is important, not just as an academic exercise but to the individual, since their classification as one or the other may determine whether they gain entry to a country and once there determines their access to benefits, settlement rights and future family reunification. (Kay & Miles 1992).

The difference between refugees and labour migrants has been overlooked by many authors (Joly 1997). Eisenstadt (1954), for example, in analysing the settlement of in migrants in Israel, fails to make a distinction between the two. Kovacs and Cropley's (1975) work on immigrants to Australia draws on psychological theories to study the relation between immigrants and the receiving society, but although it claims to be a
study of immigrants it states in the preface that the persons studied were receiving assistance from the International Refugee Organisation. The dearth of theoretical work differentiating between refugees and labour migrants has been noted by Joly and Cohen (1989). Some attempts have been made, however, and these shall be discussed.

Most Marxist theories of migration focus on economic pressures and their impact on migration. Within an economic analysis, however, it is difficult to locate refugees except as an extreme form of economic migrant. Marxist theories, and non-Marxist theories focusing on economics, therefore tend to neglect the difference between refugees and other migrants (Kay & Miles 1992).

UNHCR recognises that as far as migrants are concerned there are a multitude of reasons why people migrate, but that what separates refugees from other migrants is the need for international protection. They recognise that there may be a variety of reasons behind departures, and economic, political ethnic, environmental or human rights pressures may be important factors, but that the specific cause for departure may be difficult to discern.

Spencer (1994) suggests that migration flows into and out of Britain can be divided into three types, settlement, temporary labour, and asylum seekers, but that these are often difficult to distinguish. Understanding the difference between asylum seekers / refugees and other in migrants is also important if the settlement process of those refugees is to be considered, since it has been accepted by many writers that an individual’s future as a settler is affected by their background prior to arrival, and the difference in background and circumstances leading to arrival in a third country is the distinction between refugees and immigrants (Kunz 1973, 1981). This difference in settlement according to background is hardly surprising, since though we may be tabula rasa at birth subsequent
events are carried around with us, and cannot simply be left like luggage at international borders.

**Refugee status**

A major difference between refugees and economic migrants is in their immigration status. A refugee in international law is someone who:

"...owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it." (UNHCR 1951)

International laws have been developed over time which regulate and control the movement of refugees, and whilst individual states can refuse to admit economic migrants if they wish, those that are signatories to the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (the Convention) must provide protection to refugees on their territory (Smyser 1987, Tuitt 1996). The Convention was initially intended to address the refugee problems that arose after the Second World War, although later Protocols removed its geographical and temporal limits. As well as providing a definition of a refugee, the Convention contains provisions to prevent 'refoulement'. States may not expel or return (refouler) a refugee to the frontiers of territories where their life or freedom would be threatened on account of their race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. However, despite the existence of UNHCR guidance on
the interpretation of the Convention (UNHCR 1979, 1992), which is generally considered to be authoritative (Sztucki 1999), the procedures for applying for asylum and the decisions on individual cases are the responsibility of individual states. The institution of asylum is therefore partly dependent on the willingness of states to accept responsibility (Rudge 1998).

The Convention is being continually analysed and interpreted in the courts, and the exact meaning of the terms used and the circumstances to which they apply are the subject of much legal and academic discussion (Goodwin-Gill 1996, Goulbourne 2000, Hathaway 1991). It has been argued that the way the Convention is interpreted in Britain, and in Western Europe as a whole, restricts the refugee definition to a small section of asylum seekers, and does not provide protection in all circumstances (Harvey 2000). According to Tuitt (1996), the 1951 Convention was not formulated solely for humanitarian purposes. She interprets its overriding aim as being the reduction of the costs to third countries of refugee producing phenomena such as civil wars. Tuitt argues that asylum law restricts the recognition of refugees to the Convention definition, and that this denies them their individual identity. Developing this criticism, she argues (Tuitt 1999) that one of the problems with the Convention is that it seeks to impose a single identity on a diverse range of experiences, while in reality there are a large number of people who might consider themselves as refugees but who do not meet the strict Convention definition.
Refugees in Western Europe

Since the mid 1980s there have been significant changes in the asylum regimes of European countries, with increases in restrictive measures (Berkowitz 1999, Shah & Doebbler 1999). At the same time that these changes have been occurring, there has been pressure for harmonisation of laws and policies from European Union institutions (Bloch et al. 2000). This has led to the introduction of some European measures on aspects of asylum, such as procedures for dealing with manifestly unfounded claims and asylum seekers who have travelled through safe third countries (Care 1995, de Jong 1999, Joly et al. 1997). Some authors argue that the asylum regime in Europe has fundamentally changed, and it is now marked by restrictionism, non-integration, selective harmonisation and temporary protection (Bunyan & Webber 1995, Joly 2001 forthcoming, Levy 1999). European states wished to severely restrict immigration, and to retain sovereignty over their own borders, and this could only be achieved through harmonisation (Joly 1999, 2002 forthcoming-b). Although these were initially directed towards the restriction of immigration and thus should not in theory have affected asylum seekers and refugees, governments and parts of the media have portrayed asylum seekers as economic migrants seeking to avoid immigration restrictions (Ferris 1993). Immigration restrictions have made it more difficult for economic migrants to enter the European Union, but the number of asylum seekers entering the EU increased dramatically throughout the 1980s and early 1990s (Joly et al. 1997). Whilst this has been interpreted by governments as resulting from an inflow of economic migrants in disguise, this overlooks the fact that in
the past some economic migrants could have been refugees, but had no need to make a
claim for asylum because they were able to enter without making a claim (Joly et al.
1997). However, the perception that asylum seekers were subverting immigration
controls led to measures which also affect asylum seekers. European states were unable
to prevent the admittance of all asylum seekers and refugees because they had signed the
Convention, but instead they could limit its scope through restrictive interpretations and a
combination of national and European measures which restrict or regulate entry (Boswell
argued that the liberal approach to asylum that the Convention represents is under threat
in Europe, and the rising number of asylum applications in Europe has been met by a
retreat from liberal universalism by governments (Boswell 2000). Although many of the
measures proposed at a European level have been broadly in line with British government
policy, the government in Britain has been reluctant to co-operate fully with European
proposals, and instead has continued to develop its own policies and regulations on

Refugees in Britain

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Britain introduced measures which reduced the
numbers of primary immigrants arriving in the UK, and by the beginning of the 1990s
primary immigration had virtually ended (Layton-Henry 1992). Politicians in Britain
have claimed that Britain has a history of favourable treatment of asylum seekers and
refugees (Ghose 1996, Stevens 1998). In fact, several researchers have argued that a close
examination of the history of asylum in Britain shows that this is not true. Asylum policy has been based on the needs of the state rather than the interests of the refugees, with humanitarian protection being given a lesser priority than tight border controls and the deterrence of asylum seekers (Stevens 1998). Policy on asylum tends to be restrictive (Kaye 1995, Schuster & Solomos 1999), and also reactive, responding to flows of asylum seekers as they happen and developing ad hoc responses (Bloch 2000, Bloch et al. 2000, Joly 1996b, Spencer 1994).

In 1987 Britain introduced the Immigration (Carriers' Liability) Act, which introduced fines on commercial carriers for each passenger arriving without the correct documentation. It imposed a statutory duty on carriers to inspect the documentation of all passengers, and made no distinction between ordinary passenger and those that might seek asylum on arrival in Britain. In effect it limited the admission of asylum seekers, since many who flee genuine persecution are not in possession of the necessary documentation (Cruz 1995, Nicholson 1997, Shah 2000).

Visa restrictions, especially when combined with carriers' liability legislation, also can limit the number of asylum seekers gaining entry to Britain (Harvey 2000). A requirement for entry visas for nationals of a particular country may be introduced whenever the government considers them necessary, but research has shown that they tend to be introduced in response to an increase in asylum applications (Guild 2000, Shah 2000). For example, the number of asylum seekers from Sri Lanka increased in 1984, and continued to rise in 1985. In response, the government introduced visa restrictions for all Sri Lankans seeking to enter Britain (Shah 2000).
Numbers of asylum applications in Britain continued to rise, however, and although the years 1984 to 1988 saw around 4,000 applications annually, in 1989 the number jumped to over 11,000 and in 1991 there were almost 45,000 applications for asylum in Britain (Home Office 1996, Joly et al. 1997). A bill was introduced in 1991 which aimed to address this rise in applications, which the government considered to be fuelled mainly by a large increase in the proportion of 'bogus' or unfounded applications. The bill had to be dropped when a general election was called, but the measures in the bill were reintroduced after the government was re-elected and formed the basis of the 1993 Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act. This Act can therefore be considered as setting out the government's opinion on asylum and asylum seekers in 1991 and 1992. The 1993 Act was not entirely negative, since it introduced the 1951 Convention into British law for the first time and introduced an in-country right of appeal for all refused asylum seekers. However, it also contained measures which made it more difficult for asylum seekers to gain access to the asylum determination procedures. The safe third country principle was introduced, which allows the removal of an asylum seeker without consideration of their claim if they had travelled through a safe country prior to arriving in Britain. Cases could also be classed as manifestly unfounded by the Home Secretary, and appeals would then be via a fast track procedure. Several authors have commented that the intentions of the 1993 Act were based upon a restrictive ideology and were an attempt to limit the number of asylum applications made in Britain, regardless of the genuine or 'bogus' nature of the claim (Grenier 1996, Justice 1997, McKee 1999, Randall 1994). Tuitt (1996) argues that the 1993 Act was part of a general process whereby refugees became reclassified as the lowest form of migrant, and whilst their refugee
situation should give them privileged access to countries in order to escape persecution, this reclassification means that those genuinely in need of protection find that protection much harder to obtain.

Refugees from former Yugoslavia

At the same time that attitudes towards refugees were hardening in Britain and the other Western European states, the nature of asylum applications in Europe was changed by the conflict in former Yugoslavia. For the first time since the Second World War, there was a massive movement of refugees in Europe who were of European origin. The break-up of Yugoslavia, which began with the secession of Croatia and Slovenia in 1991, created a flow of refugees from Yugoslavia towards the rest of Europe, who made a major contribution to the increase in asylum applications for Europe as a whole in 1991 and 1992. Those fleeing former Yugoslavia arrived in Western Europe at a time when, as discussed above, the attitude of governments was hardening towards asylum seekers. By the end of 1992, almost two million people had been displaced from their homes in Yugoslavia, and whilst most remained within the territory of former Yugoslavia, rising numbers were seeking asylum in the rest of Europe. In Britain, the government claimed that it was responding effectively to the ‘Yugoslav problem’ (Hansard 1992a), although it was reluctant to accept proposals from Germany for sharing the burden of asylum applications (Marshall 1996). Britain’s reluctance to accept refugees from former Yugoslavia became more apparent on November 5th 1992, when visa restrictions were announced, to become effective the next day. This effectively ended legal entry to Britain
for refugees from former Yugoslavia (Kushner & Knox 1999, Shah 2000). Under pressure from UNHCR, the government agreed that it would accept a quota of refugees, but instead of entering the normal asylum determination procedures, these refugees were given a new status, temporary protection.

The emergence of temporary protection

Although the concept of temporary protection had been discussed in the 1980s as a possible response to mass refugee outflows (Smyser 1987, UNHCR 1980, 1981), it did not appear as a specific policy proposal until the crisis in Yugoslavia (Goodwin-Gill 1996, Kalin 1996). It emerged as a formal proposal from UNHCR in the context of a call by UNHCR for a response which was both humanitarian and comprehensive (Joly 1998b, Koser & Black 1999). UNHCR had to respond to the refugee emergency which was developing, whilst remaining aware that governments within Europe were unwilling to accept large numbers of refugees, and temporary protection offered the 'least worst' solution (Joly 1998b). In the case of former Yugoslavia, it was also presented as an opportunity for states to admit people in need of protection without increasing the burden on their determination procedures, since in many states including Britain the recent increase in asylum applications had led to increases in delays and backlogs of applications (Luca 1994). UNHCR and some states argued that giving temporary protection instead of a permanent status would avoid accusations that they were contributing to ethnic cleansing (de Wenden 1997, UNHCR 1993).
Many states responded to the request from UNHCR, and although many utilised the concept of temporary protection (Thorburn 1995), it came to have a different meaning in each state. The rights it afforded, the length of time for which protection was offered, and the options at the end of the temporary period varied widely (Albert 1996, Joly et al. 1997, "Survey on the Implementation of Temporary Protection" 1994).

Temporary protection has been described as the cornerstone of a new asylum regime in Europe (Joly 1999), since it brings with it the right of states to repatriate refugees when a crisis is over, unlike refugee status, and so enables governments to meet their humanitarian responsibilities whilst obviating the need for development of integration and settlement policies (Goodwin-Gill 1996, Hathaway 1997, Joly 1999). In the context of states that are unwilling to differentiate between economic migrants and those in need of protection, temporary protection enabled a few to receive protection. However, it also enabled states to avoid confronting the way that they had begun to label all asylum seekers as economic migrants, when a distinction between refugees and economic migrants remained both in law and in practice. It also avoided the need to discuss issues of integration and settlement, since those given temporary protection were supposed to remain only whilst the conflict continued. Unfortunately, the conflict in former Yugoslavia lasted several years, and the majority of those admitted to Western Europe under temporary protection measures remain outside former Yugoslavia (Black et al. 1998). Since the first refugees to be given temporary refuge arrived in Europe in 1992, questions relating to their settlement and integration need to be addressed.
Settlement

There have been several studies of the settlement of migrants, some of which include refugees or people who could be considered refugees. Sociology began by considering that migrants would gradually become assimilated into the new country, eventually becoming just another citizen. Studies have shown, however, that this is often not the case.

Gold (1992) compared the settlement of Soviet Jewish and Vietnamese refugees in the United States in order to further understand factors affecting the settlement of refugees in general. He found there were some common factors between the two groups, but also important points of departure. He found that the existence of mutual assistance networks was important for the long term well being of refugees, but that the formation of these networks was not always facilitated by the services available to the refugees. He suggests that where there is a chain of migration, these networks are developed more easily, but that in the absence of chain migration networks of mutual assistance develop slowly, if at all. He suggests that this is due to the lack of authority figures amongst new arrivals and to a lack of social ties within a group. He found that refugees tended to restrict their patterns of social association to a small network of family and close friends. He suggests that at a later date these small networks may unite and form a larger community.

Gold's research is wide ranging, and a criticism that can be made of it is that it goes into so many aspects of the refugee settlement experience that it fails to fully account for any individual aspect. None the less, this is a valuable work since it illustrates three important areas. Firstly, it shows that the nature of the settlement policies enacted around a particular group affect their settlement. Secondly, it shows the importance of networks
and community associations for the well being of refugees. Thirdly it shows that the background of the refugee, both individually and in terms of their country of origin, affects their pattern of settlement.

Hansen and Oliver-Smith (1982), in a study of involuntary migration and resettlement, suggest that compulsory relocation of whatever type is a stressful experience for the individual. This stress can be divided into three components, physiological, psychological, and sociocultural. Physiological stress has never been thoroughly studied, but they suggest that it occurs and is evidenced in increased rates of morbidity and mortality as compared to before relocation. Psychological stress in refugees is likely to take the form of trauma at the circumstances surrounding relocation and guilt at surviving or escaping while knowing that others have suffered a far worse fate. There is also likely to be grief for the loss of their original home, and anxiety about the future. They suggest that this is likely to induce depression amongst those who are forcibly relocated, and that the psychological strain of voluntary migrants will be much less severe and so far less likely to lead to depression. The third component of stress, they suggest, is sociocultural stress. This is connected to the economic, political and cultural effects of relocation, and is affected by the lack of effective community leadership. This will be due to either the leaders who were in place before relocation being left behind or lost in the migration, or due to their becoming discredited for their failure to prevent the relocation. (This lack of leadership was also noted by Gold, above) Sociocultural stress is also caused by the dissonance between the original culture and way of life and the new one. They suggest that after relocation refugees will follow a conservative strategy, whereby they seek to change as little about themselves as possible. One way of doing this is by ensuring they
are close to kin. Hansen and Oliver-Smith suggest that governments and planners should be aware of this desire to be close to kin, since those refugees who are placed away from kin for policy reasons will try to relocate themselves again in order to recreate their previous close kinship relationships. They suggest that there will be a period of transition between the time of arrival at the new location and the time when the individuals can be said to have been successfully resettled. This period, they suggest, is rarely less than two years and can be much longer. Though they admit there is no generally accepted definition of when successful resettlement can be said to have occurred, there are some indicators which can be used, relating to economic activity and initiative.

"People still supported by food relief or welfare are obviously still in the transition stage, no matter how long they have been living on the new site. In terms of initiative, [an indicator is] ... when the conservative stance and closed-system behavior are replaced by at least a prerelocation degree of risk taking." (Hansen and Oliver-Smith, 1982, p 280)

A further possible indicator is whether the refugee "feels at home" (p280). Though this is a difficult notion to assess, one possible indicator of it is whether community leaders have emerged to support the interests of the community. Another facet is the re-establishment of prerelocation rituals and customs, such as house decorations, traditional handicrafts, language and dance.

In their summary of the policy implications of their work, they suggest that:

"During the transition stage, the emphasis should be on attempting to alleviate the stress of removal in as humane a fashion as possible without creating a dependency relationship between the relocatees and the resettlement authority." (Hansen & Oliver-Smith 1982 page 286)
McFarland and Walsh (1989) studied the settlement of refugees in Strathclyde, and found that two major difficulties faced by refugees were the attitude of the government towards refugees and asylum seekers, and the lack of co-ordination between local government, central government, and the voluntary sector, which is the result of the absence of a national settlement strategy. They note that the policy of dispersal (discussed further in chapter five) meant that in many cases refugees arrived in areas where support services were inadequate, which in turn meant that there was often poor language training provision and long term unemployment was chronic. They also report high levels of stress related ill health and psychological problems. Despite this, they suggest that the stereotypical view of refugees as victims should be avoided, since the individuals themselves often held potential, though this potential appears to have been rarely fulfilled.

The rejection of the image of refugees as victims is also a theme of Preis' work (1996). Preis draws on a diverse range of work, and suggests that the issues of compassionate and humanitarian action is by its very nature problematic, and even more so when the focus of the action, refugees, have themselves been defined as victims. Comparing the settlement of Tamil refugees in Britain and Denmark, Preis notes the valuable role played by the pre-existing Tamil community in Britain in assisting the settlement of refugees. She also suggests that the policies of the host country have an important effect on the settlement process, policies in terms of both legal status and settlement policies. Preis (1996) suggests that the victimhood status of refugees affects the attitudes of those that assist them. Action which is deemed by the actor to be compassionate and humanitarian
is in itself, according to Preis, problematic, especially when that action is directed
towards groups such as refugees who have been deemed to be victims.

McFarland and Walsh (1994) studied the responses to Bosnian refugees in Glasgow.
They found that the multi agency approach adopted in Glasgow, in part as a result of their
earlier study, resulted in a better level of co-ordination between agencies than was seen
with Vietnamese refugees. However, there were still gaps in provision and some of the
blame for this they lay at the feet of central government due to their lack of support for
refugee initiatives.

If the differences between refugees and migrants can be understood, and a theoretical
conception of the refugee developed, it may be possible to better understand the
settlement process of refugees (Kunz 1973). This has been attempted by some authors,

**Home country factor theories**

Many theories on refugees focus solely on the mode of and motivation for departure from
the country of origin, and whether this was forced or voluntary, and what were the
immediate pressures for departure, in order to draw a distinction between refugees and
migrants. These theories have been termed push - pull theories, and at their most basic
level distinguish between labour migrants and refugees according to the degree of 'push'
from the home country. Refugees, in this model, are characterised by the absence of
'pull' towards the host country.
Richmond (1994) has criticised those theories which speak of migration in terms of push and pull factors and which seek to locate the difference between refugees and other migrants in the issue of whether their departure was forced or not. He says that though refugee movements are usually represented as forced, “they are only an extreme case of the constraints that are placed upon the choices available to an individual in particular circumstances” (Richmond 1994 page 53).

Kunz (1973, 1981) has attempted to take into consideration factors preceding and succeeding flight, and has described a typology of refugees which he calls a kinetic model. The type of refugee, in Kunz’s classification, depends upon whether an individual is reacting to or anticipating events, and also whether they are identified with the majority or not, and their attitude towards displacement. Kunz suggests a basic division in the different types of refugee into reactive fate groups or purpose groups, according to their attitudes to displacement. Members of these groups can also be divided into majority identified, events alienated, and exiles. Majority identified refugees believe their opposition to events is shared by the majority of their fellow nationals. Although they identify themselves with the nation, they do not identify themselves with its government necessarily. Events alienated refugees are those who originally desired to be part of the nation, but events proved to them that they have been rejected, either by the whole nation or by a section of its citizens, and an example would be German Jews in the second world war. Exiles are those that have no wish to identify themselves with the nation, and whose departure is a logical result of their alienation. Reactive fate groups are typically refugees of wars and sudden revolutions, and tend to be mainly majority identified refugees. Within the group there may be a proportion of events alienated refugees, but the common
factor within the group is that they flee because they are reacting to a situation which they perceive to be intolerable.

Purpose group members are very different, and at times the members of this group may be termed voluntary migrants. They may be divided into self-fulfilling purpose groups and revolutionary activists. Self-fulfilling purpose groups are usually composed of:

"...people who became alienated because of their insistence on the over riding importance of a certain facet of belief, dogma, or their passionate pursuit of a form of society which derives its framework from minority ideologies inconsistent with those current in the home country. Whether they can be considered refugees or voluntary migrants depends on how much their ideologies clashed with those of their home country and whether their actual departure was caused by harassment and fear of prosecution or by their wish to start on the desired way of life" (Kunz 1981 page 45)).

Revolutionary activists are those who, once in exile, focus their energies on trying to engineer a revolutionary change in their homeland, and sometimes the whole world.

These different types of refugee have different characteristics and Kunz suggests that it is possible to discern patterns, for example anticipatory refugees will tend to be well educated, whereas civilian evacuees displaced by force as part of an acute refugee movement will contain few of the highest strata of educational attainment. The different refugee waves will also contain different patterns of ages and family groupings. These characteristics will then have a bearing on the settlement patterns of the different cohorts of refugees.
International factor theories

Zolberg et al (1986) suggest that it is important to look beyond factors in the country of origin of refugees, since international factors will impinge upon the conditions leading to the creation of a refugee flow both directly and indirectly. In any theoretical definition of refugees, these international factors must therefore be taken into account. Zolberg et al (1989) further developed their theory on the causes of refugee flows, and they describe this work as "the first attempt to provide a comprehensive, theoretically grounded explanation of refugee flows." (Zolberg et al. 1989 page v). They suggest that refugee producing factors need to be understood in order that patterns of refugee formation can be determined, to contradict the commonly held notion that the processes which lead to the creation of refugee flows are random, chaotic, unpredictable and therefore unavoidable. They suggest that it is not enough to look at factors solely within the country from which the refugee flow originates, as external factors also play a very large part. They affect the emergence and continuance of conflict in the home country, and also affect the emergence of refugees by their border control policies. They use the analogy of a bus to explain the importance of understanding refugee producing factors.

"For example, as of 1987 the refugee 'bus' contained only 46,000 Vietnamese, because nearly all of the several hundred who came aboard in 1975 and 1979 had been permanently resettled. But it contained over two million Palestinians, a majority of whom were the children and grandchildren of those who originally fled in 1948. Why some refugees got off the bus more easily whereas others linger on for so long can be explained mostly by why they got on the bus to start with." (Zolberg et al 1989 page 229)
Their analysis of contemporary refugee flows leads them to develop a threefold sociological typology of refugees, whereby refugees can be distinguished instead of being viewed as a homogenous huddled mass. These types of refugee are:

1. The activist, dissenters, and rebels, whose actions contributed to the conflict from which they flee;

2. The target, that is individuals who have been singled out for violent action because of their membership of a particular group;

3. The victims, who are randomly caught in the conflict or are victims of generalised violence.

Zolberg et al suggest that the moral claims to protection of each group are equally valid, but that as the international community narrows its criteria for the acceptance of refugees the third type of refugee, the victim, has been increasingly seen as an illegitimate refugee. Zolberg also suggests a typology of conflicts, and shows that international factors as well as national factors are important in the production of refugee flows.

**Refugee perspective theories**

Joly (1996b) has suggested that although Kunz has considered the situation of the refugee in the country of origin, in flight, and in the country of asylum, he does not adequately address the issue of those groups who “may not be majority identified but nonetheless display more of the characteristics of majority identified refugees rather than alienated refugees.” (Joly 1996b page 12).
Joly suggests that when the adaptation and settlement of refugees is under consideration, the attitude towards the country of origin is important for understanding the situation in the country of exile (Joly 1996a). An important factor is the presence or absence of a collective project of return. Those refugees with a collective return project see their exile as temporary, and intend to return to their original country. Through the formation of community associations and political activity this return project ideal can be maintained. Those refugees without a collective project in the country of origin, or who have forsaken that project, do not intend to return to their original country. This leads to one of two responses: the refugees may have a more positive attitude to their host country; or the refugee may feel a double alienation, first from their home country and secondly from their host country. The outcome for those refugees without a return project is, according to Joly, largely determined by host country related factors. These categories are not fixed, and an individual may be seen to belong in a different category at different times, as their attitude changes or factors concerning either the host or home country change.

This is an important note, since often those theorising about refugees focus solely on factors prior to their arrival in the host country, and fail to acknowledge the role the host country plays in the settlement of refugees.

**The need for a theory encompassing host country factors**

From these different theoretical perspectives, some clear notions emerge. It can be seen from Kunz’s work that labour migrants and refugees are different, and these differences between them, and between cohorts of refugees, will be evidenced in their settlement.
From Zolberg et al’s work it is clear that the circumstances which lead to the creation of refugee flows are not solely contained within the country of origin, and to fully understand the causes of refugee formation attention must be paid to international factors. Joly’s (1996a, 1996b) work suggests that the perspective of the refugee themselves must be understood and analysed, since their settlement in the host country will be affected by the presence or absence of a project of return held by the individual refugee. However, it is argued by Joly (1996a), and also emerged during the course of this research, that an understanding of the influence of the host country was also necessary, since the nature of policies and the society in the host country affects many aspects of refugee settlement. Joly argues that for a full understanding of the refugee situation the circumstances preceding and following exile, and the events in between, must be examined. In Britain in particular, policies designed originally to accommodate economic migrants have been used towards refugees, and these policies need to be examined.

**Multi-culturalism and community**

Policies on the settlement of migrants in Britain have not remained static, but since the late 1960s Britain has adopted a broadly multi-cultural stance. Before then, policy had been assimilationist in nature, with an expectation that a minority group would over time absorb the values and behaviour of the majority population, and eventually become indistinguishable from the majority. Assimilationist theories are associated with the work of Robert Park, who developed a model of assimilation that he called the race relations cycle. Park’s model suggests that migrant’s initial contact with the majority is economic,
and there is very little interaction between the groups. Later, competition develops between the groups and this gives rise to conflict as they compete for resources within society. Eventually the groups agree some rules regulating the relations between them, and they tolerate and accept each other's presence, a phase Park calls accommodation. Finally acceptance becomes such that the groups no longer see members of different groups but instead see individuals, and assimilation has occurred (Park 1950, Park & Burgess 1929). Park's model has been criticised as not reflecting the reality of American society, where questions of ethnicity continue to be salient for minority groups (Glazer & Moynihan 1963). Assimilationist theories were the predominant discourse in Britain in the early post-war period, when it was expected that migrants would assimilate into British society eventually, and any racism that they encountered was the result of the migrants' strangeness and would eventually disappear (Anthias & Yuval-Davies 1992). However, racism did not slowly disappear, in the manner predicted by assimilationist theories, and different theories had to be developed to cope with the reality that was emerging (Rex & Tomlinson 1979). One alternative approach is to consider the incorporation of migrants as proceeding via acculturation, a process which is thought to describe the process of contacts between different cultures, and also the outcome of those contacts. It sees migrants as altering their culture over time until it is closer to that of the majority, but also the culture of the majority is affected and changes, and eventually the two are so close as to be indistinguishable (Abercrombie et al. 1988). Like theories of assimilation, acculturation theories find it hard to account for the continuation of difference, but also fail to explain how the process of acculturation occurs. Refugee groups in particular often retain links with their country of origin, and maintain ideas of
return, and so cannot be considered as likely to become acculturated. Multi-cultural theories propose that individuals can maintain their individual identity, and their membership of a minority group, whilst at the same time becoming part of the wider society. These theories became popular in Britain from the 1960s onwards, and were adopted as the dominant political model for the incorporation of migrants into British society (Abercrombie et al. 1988, Anthias & Yuval-Davies 1992, Rex & Tomlinson 1979). Multi-culturalism recognises that different cultures can exist within one society, but that individuals at the same time are equal to each other. A multi-cultural society therefore is one which is equal in the public domain, but where diversity is encouraged in private or communal matters (Rex 1996). Implementation of multi-culturalism can take place in different ways (Alund & Schierup 1991, Favell 1998), and in Britain the model of multi-culturalism that has been adopted places great emphasis on the role and existence of ‘communities’. It is assumed that all individuals will be members of a community, which is culturally defined and has clear boundaries (Anthias & Yuval-Davies 1992, Goulbourne 1991). This assumption has some advantages for minorities, since it allows the expression of cultural values and behaviour, but assumptions on communities have been challenged by some authors. Divisions can occur within minority groups, and the preoccupation with community can obscure these differences (Werbner 1991). In addition the assumption of a community brings with it an assumption that there can be community leaders who can represent that community, although these leaders are rarely elected or democratically chosen (Anthias & Yuval-Davies 1992).

As the number of refugees in Britain increased in the 1980s, no new policies were developed to assist their settlement. Instead, the existing policies of multi-culturalism
were extended to cover refugee groups as well as immigrant groups, and assumptions of community were made of refugees (Wahlbeck 1999). These policies already emphasised self-help, and the role of communities and their formal associations in providing services tailored to the needs of ethnic communities (Candappa & Joly 1994, ECRE 1998, Majka 1991). When directed towards assistance for refugees, they merely transferred the focus to refugee communities. Only one government department directly funds work with refugees, and this is the Voluntary Service Unit (VSU). This provides funding to voluntary organisations and community associations, both directly and indirectly through other agencies, in order that they can provide services for refugees (Carey-Wood et al. 1997). Many local authorities also contribute to the community orientation of work with or for refugees. Political representation at a local level can often be obtained via local forums such as community relations councils and religious councils, but this route is only open to formally constituted groups. Local authorities often make grants of funds or services to established community groups, including refugee groups, and so play an important role in the creation and maintenance of formal associations.

The role of community associations

The role of associations in the settlement of immigrants and the incorporation of ethnic minorities has been examined by many authors and found to have many positive aspects. Rex (in Rex et al. 1987) found that community associations have four main functions: overcoming isolation, providing material help to community members, defending the interests of the community, and promoting the community’s culture. In addition, it has
been suggested that through networking and information sharing, associations can play an important role in assisting the adaptation of the community members to the host society (Joly 1996a).

As with immigrants and minority ethnic groups, the formation of refugee community associations can perform many useful functions. They can help to rebuild and reinforce a sense of belonging for people whose lives have been disrupted by exile, and they can play an important role in empowering the members of the community (Salinas et al. 1987).

The benefits of community association formation are well known to the different agencies involved in work with refugees, and organisations such as Refugee Action devote a considerable proportion of their time to community development work. The focus on association formation by various refugee agencies reflects an agreement with Rex’s assessment of the functions of associations, but fails to take into account the idea that rather than being a ‘natural’ process, it may be a reflection more of British society than of immigrant inclinations. It has been suggested that the basis for group formation may lie in the way British institutions create spaces for the recognition of groups rather than individuals (Joly 1996a), and individuals need to form themselves into an association in order to enter into dialogue with the state (Favell 1996). There is also a failure to consider whether the needs of the group are best met by a formal association, or indeed whether there actually is a community. The effectiveness of refugee community associations is dependant on the extent to which refugee communities can be said to exist and reflect the needs of their members.
The Community

The term community is widely and loosely used, and a careful definition is needed if the term is to have heuristic value. ‘Community’ is used without being defined by both civic authorities and minority groups, and has become an important feature and rationale for ethnic mobilisation (Vertovec & Peach 1997). It has been suggested that its use is now so widespread that its meaning has become elusive and vague, and that community has become a term largely without specific meaning (Abercrombie et al. 1988). However, as long as notions of community are used within social policy, the term must be engaged with and its meaning investigated.

There are two themes existing at the same time within the common sense notion of community. The first implies both a warmth and interconnectedness between members of the group, giving community strongly positive connotations. The second implicitly assumes that all the members will share values and goals (Alund and Schierup 1992; Vertovec and Peach 1997). Both of these themes can be seen within social policy towards ethnic minorities, for whom ‘community’ is considered to be the best way of organising and who are assumed by policy makers and funding organisations to have much in common with each other.

The question of what constitutes a community has been debated throughout the history of sociology. In the nineteenth century, Tonnies (discussed in Nisbet 1967) described two types of human collectivity, gemeinschaft and gesellschaft. Gemeinschaft is very close to common sense notions of community. In gemeinschaft relationships, there exists a complex web of traditions, habits and affective states. In contrast, gesellschaft relations contain a high degree of individualism, impersonality and contractualism. These relations

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arise from volition or interest, whereas those of gemeinschaft have a deeper origin and
cannot be conceived in such simple terms. Gemeinschaft is based upon three pillars:
kinship, neighbourhood and friendship, whereas gesellschaft is based upon rationality and
calculation.

"The theory of the gesellschaft deals with the artificial construction of an aggregate of
human beings which superficially resembles the gemeinschaft insofar as the individuals
live and dwell together peacefully. However, in gemeinschaft they remain essentially
united in spite of all separating factors, whereas in gesellschaft they are essentially
separated in spite of all uniting factors. In the gesellschaft, as contrasted with the
gemeinschaft, we find no actions that can be derived from an a priori and necessarily
existing unity; no actions, therefore, which manifest the will and the spirit of the unity
evén if performed by the individual; no actions which, insofar as they are performed by
the individual, take place on behalf of those united with him. In the gesellschaft, such
actions do not exist. On the contrary, here everybody is by himself and isolated, and there
exists a condition of tension against all others." (Nisbet 1967 page 75)

For Tonnies, then, members of a gemeinschaft form of collectivity are held together,
though Tonnies does not explain how or what forces keep them together. The implication
of Tonnies work is that a gemeinschaft collectivity has always been together and unless
there a major societal changes it will always be together. This may have appeared to have
been the case at the time Tonnies was writing, but his work was based on observation of
the effects of a move from a village based society to a town based society, and the effects
of modernisation. The two types of organisation he describes are therefore of only limited
relevance when considering present day forms of collectivity. Despite this, the positive
connotations of gemeinschaft relationships are echoed in the common sense notion of community.

Weber further developed a sociological understanding of community in his work on community and association. Weber proposed these as ideal types rather than absolutes. They differ in the motivation to action of the members of the two types of collectivity, and the role of emotion in the action. A relationship is associative when the actions of the individual in maintaining the association are based upon a rational calculation of interest, or on the will of the individual to perpetuate the association. In contrast, a communal relationship exists where there is a subjective feeling amongst the persons involved that they belong together, there is an emotional identification of the individual with the other parties in the relationship.

For Durkheim (1933), the members of a society or community have a totality of beliefs and sentiments which are common to the average members of the society. This totality can be considered as having its own existence, and he calls this the 'collective consciousness'.

Though Weber, Tonnies and Durkheim establish a definition of community or communal relationships, their work is based upon a consideration of society that was changing, in that it was moving through the process of modernity. Their works contain an evaluation of the changes taking place in society at that time. There was a process of urbanisation, and a movement of people from villages to towns and cities, industrialisation, and a move away from the localised rural community towards the looser relationships of the town and city (Plant 1974). Though Tonnies, Weber, and Durkheim differ in their interpretation of
community, they have in common some features, and from these a definition of community can be drawn.

Community has been defined as a form of relationship:
"...characterised by a high degree of personal intimacy, emotional depth, moral commitment, social cohesion and continuity in time." (Nisbet 1967 page 47).

Other definitions of community are possible, but an important feature of definitions of community is the notion of the community as a form of collective. There is something that the members of the community feel they have in common, and which provides a link between members of the community. This commonality can take many forms, and may be real or imagined (Jenkins 1996). Because of the feeling of interdependence and mutual interest, communities are able to act in unison in order to defend the rights of the group. The origin, for those in the community, lies within the community itself. “People construct community symbolically, making it a resource and repository of meaning, and a referent of their identity.” (Cohen 1985 page 118). For Cohen, the individual members of a community do not consciously create that community, instead the notions of community and interconnectedness are transmitted through the group via that groups' culture. The group conceives of itself as a community when its culture impinges on the culture of another group. The evidence of difference then strengthens the notion of community.

Different types of community can be identified, including ethnic communities, transnational communities, and diasporas or scattered communities. These different typologies have been created to try to account for both the continuing salience of notions
of community in the context of migration, and the different ways in which migrants adapt after migration.

The usage of ‘community’ within social policy concerning minority groups is usually referring to an ‘ethnic community’, and this ethnic community is assumed to be a bounded and easily identifiable entity (Inglis 1994). For an ethnic community, the sense of belonging together comes from a belief in a shared ethnicity. In this respect an ethnic community is similar to Barth’s (1969) ‘ethnic group’, which he defined as having four characteristics. The group is largely self-perpetuating, it shares certain fundamental cultural values, it forms an identifiable field of communication and interaction, and finally the group defines itself as being a distinct group and is considered by those outside the group to be distinct. Ethnic communities have been associated with many positive traits. They are considered to be of positive value to the community members, both socially and economically (Gold 1992). As previously stated, the usage of ‘community’ within social policy concerning minority groups usually refers to an ethnic community, and this ethnic community is assumed to be a bounded and easily identifiable entity (Inglis 1994).

The concept of a transnational community was developed as a result of observations that many migrants retained extensive links with their country of origin after migration. In response to globalisation, people have created “communities that sit astride political borders and that, in a very real sense, are ‘neither here nor there’ but in both places simultaneously.” (Portes 1998). The social relations and economic activities of members of transnational communities are not confined to any one nation state. Rather, they exist across borders a multiplicity of involvements is maintained (Basch et al. 1994). Although
originally the term transnational was applied to labour migrants, its use has widened somewhat and other groups of migrants, such as refugees, have been considered as transnational communities (Al-Ali 1999, Al-Ali et al. 2001). Al-Ali et al compare the transnational characters of refugees from Bosnia and Eritrea, and argue that although the populations display some transnational practices, they cannot as yet be considered to form transnational communities. This suggests that theories on transnational communities will be of only limited use in understanding the situation of Bosnian refugees in Britain.

The concept of ‘diaspora’ was originally only used to describe the situation of a few groups, who have been scattered as a result of traumatic historical events (Cohen 1995b). More recently its use has been associated less with victimhood, and it has become used to describe scattered communities. Members of a diaspora identify with co-ethnics in other countries, as well as those in the country they reside in. The classic diaspora differs from a transnational community in that the homeland is either non-existent or is not available to the community, whilst the transnational community retains links with the homeland. As the term diaspora has become more widely used, however, it has been applied to groups with a long history of migration without necessarily losing the link with a homeland. They do, though, strive to maintain intergroup networks, and their ethno-national identity. One definition of diaspora lists six features common to all diasporas: there will have been a dispersal from one original region to two or more different places; a collective memory or myth of origin will be maintained, even if the dispersal took place one or more generations ago; they feel a degree of isolation and alienation from their host society, and may not be fully accepted; they consider the site from which they were originally dispersed as the place to which they or their descendants should ideally return,
and feel that they should as a group seek to create conditions in the homeland so that return will be possible; finally, they continue to relate in some way to the homeland, and the homeland continues to be a defining feature of group solidarity and group identity (Safran 1991). Wahlbeck (1997, 1999) considered that the concept of diaspora was useful for understanding the situation of Kurdish refugees. However, for these theories to be of use in understanding the situation of refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina, it would need to be shown that there was some measure of group solidarity and group identity.

**Questioning community**

The idea that groups of refugees will form a community has rarely been challenged. Research on refugees often looks at one or more refugee ‘communities’, and more recently groups of refugees have been considered as transnational communities (Al-Ali 1999) or as diasporas, that is scattered communities (Wahlbeck 1999). I suggest that before taking this step, consideration should first be made as to whether a particular group of refugees can be described as a community.

Gold’s (Gold 1992) study of two refugee groups in the United States examined the settlement of refugees from the Soviet Union and from Vietnam. The study found that refugee populations are often highly internally diverse, and the creation or recreation of a group identity can take a considerable time. With some groups, it is better to talk of communities rather than a community, since although localised groups may appear to be becoming communities an identification with the rest of the group is absent.
The internal construction of community is of paramount importance. For all types of community, the prime defining feature is that the members believe themselves to be linked to the other members. If this linkage is based on ethnicity, then it is not important whether that ethnicity is real or imagined, only that the members of the community believe it to be real.

Community formation among ethnic minorities has been questioned by some writers. They have questioned whether the communities which have been formed are collectivities which will endure and which are based upon ethnic solidarity, or whether they are a response to external forces within society such as racism and discrimination (Inglis 1994). If community can be questioned for ethnic minorities, it must be examined even more carefully when considering refugees, whose experiences in the conflict that they have sought refuge from may mean that there is no political unity, and there may be strong differences within the group (Wahlbeck 1999). If the existence of communities is being questioned, then the effectiveness of policies towards refugees based upon assumptions of community and encouraging the formation of refugee community associations must also be questioned.

Problems of refugee community association formation

When considering the associations formed by refugees it must be remembered that there are important differences between refugees and members of minority ethnic groups, and these differences may adversely affect the nature and functioning of those associations.
One of the differences between refugees and minority ethnic groups, who in the British context were initially labour migrants, is that for labour migrants there is often a pattern of chain migration. This is where new arrivals are following in the steps of earlier arrivals, and gain support and advice from those people. This has been described by Shaw in a study of Pakistani immigrants in Britain (Shaw 1988). The immigration of Pakistanis to Britain began with the arrival of a few single men or men who came without their families. The primary motive was economic. Those that came were predominantly from a few particular areas of Pakistan. These early arrivals sent back remittances to assist those left behind, but also to enable another person to come to Britain. Those later arrivals would in turn support the migration of someone else, a relative or someone from the same village. The earlier arrivals would assist those that came later to find work and somewhere to live. Because of this chain of migration, there often exists a kinship link between Pakistanis living in the same area in Britain. These kinship or personal links were also influential in determining the initial pattern of chain migration from the villages in Pakistan. These pre-existing links between those who have migrated to Britain have meant that community formation has not been difficult, since the emotional link between the members of the group has already been established. The combination of chain migration and the pattern of settlement in areas close to others from the same country has created conditions which favour the formation of communities (Candappa & Joly 1994).

For those that come to Britain as refugees, the same pattern of chain migration is not evident. Refugees tend to arrive in Britain as a result of a sudden upheaval in their country of origin. They frequently arrive without knowing anyone in the country and
kinship links with other members of the group are often absent. The formation of an association can be very difficult for those who arrive en masse as opposed to groups who arrive through chain migration (Gold 1992). This is an important difference between refugee groups and other minority groups, as chain migration is far more common among labour migrants than refugees.

Not all refugee community associations will be the same. Joly (1996b) has suggested that the nature of association that is established will depend to a large extent on the orientation of the refugees to their homeland. Two broad types of refugee settlement can be distinguished: refugees who nurtured a collective project in their country of origin and take this project with them into the country of exile; and secondly those who did not have a collective project in the country of origin or who have given up that project. Patterns of group formation and interaction with the society of settlement will be different for the two groups. Those who held a strong collective project in the society of origin and have maintained their orientation towards the homeland, for example Chilean refugees, are likely to reproduce this in the associations they form. Associations formed by Chilean refugees were highly politicised and aimed to perpetuate the home-orientation of Chilean refugees in Britain. In contrast, Vietnamese refugees had little or no collective project and did not seek to orient themselves towards the homeland. Instead their associations aimed to improve the settlement of Vietnamese in Britain, and did not undertake campaigning work aimed at Vietnam. In addition those who did not have a collective project in the country of origin are less likely to have the organisational skills necessary to form a formal organisation, and are therefore prone to marginalisation (Joly 1996b).
Belief in a shared ethnicity is of itself not enough to produce an organised community (Gold 1992).

A factor influencing the formation of associations among refugees is the availability of support services. Generally, when refugee organisations are formed, they are organised in order to attempt to meet a specific need of the community (Salinas et al. 1987). The very existence of support services can be a disincentive to the formation of an association, since the provision of services takes away one of the main motives for forming an association (Gold 1992). An example of the effect of support services is given by Wahlbeck (1999) in his study of Kurdish refugees in Britain and Finland. He found that associations were formed in Britain in order to overcome problems associated with the lack of support services available to them, whereas Kurds in Finland, where there was a range of practical support available, formed associations with an orientation more towards social and cultural activities.

Among refugee groups there is often little group-wide organisation, and a typical feature is factionalism and segmentation (Gold 1992). There are often divisions within refugee groups based upon differences in class, politics, religion, and so forth (Salinas et al. 1987). This factionalism can inhibit attempts to create a formal association, or where an association is formed it may be unrepresentative.

Lack of familiarity with the working of a society can hamper attempts at organisation, especially for newly arrived groups. If this is combined with an internally divided and economically disadvantaged situation, then there will often be considerable difficulty in forming and maintaining community based organisations (Dorais 1991, Gold 1992, Griffiths 1998).
If what exists cannot be termed a community, then what is it? To describe this, I use the term 'contingent community'. For me, a contingent community is a group of people who will to some extent conform to the expectations of the host society in order to gain the advantages of a formal community association, but the private face of the group remains unconstituted as a community.

**Contingent communities**

Refugees are not merely objects of policy, but are social actors in their own right. As such they are affected by the policies around them, but since they remain social actors and individuals, their responses may differ. One way that refugees may respond to the particular form of multi-culturalism in Britain is through the formation of contingent communities. This is a concept I have developed through this research, in order to try to account for the apparent contradiction in the research findings, that there are formally constituted refugee community associations, yet there appears to be no refugee community on which they are based. A contingent community is one that appears from the outside to be a community, and to reflect the interests of that community a formal association is formed or an attempt is made at its formation. However, the interests that are articulated are not the common interests of the group, but rather their like interests. Conformity is apparent rather than actual, and among the members of the group there is no strongly held belief that they are interlinked and interdependent. Whilst there are benefits to be gained from constituting themselves as a formal community, then the group
may strive to appear as such. What is viewed from the outside as a community, may in
fact be a construction from the outside.

A contingent community enables members of a group to gain some of the benefits that
British society gives to communities, such as financial and practical support, when the
internal construction of a community is not present. However, the lack of an internally
constructed community means that the continuance of the contingent community is
dependant on the presence of a strong leader or leadership, and the suppression of
differences between members of the group. It is also dependant on the accrual of benefits
to the community, since its formation is in response to the perceived benefits of
community formation.

At a later stage, the members of the contingent community may develop an informal
community, and feelings of interdependence and interconnectedness may emerge. In that
case, a community may form and it will no longer be contingent. Without true
community formation, though, the continuance of a contingent community will require
consistent input and support from both those who take on the task of leadership, and of
outside agencies.

The notion of a contingent community rests on a particular notion of human action, since
it is describing the way that social actors can respond to structures and policies in society.
Conclusion

The conflict in former Yugoslavia occurred at a time when the climate in Europe had
changed for refugees. Refugees and asylum seekers were being perceived by
governments and sections of the media as economic migrants seeking to circumvent the
usual migration controls. The response of Western governments, including in Britain, was
to seek to limit the protection that they gave to refugees from former Yugoslavia. For
those that were originally from Bosnia-Herzegovina, access to Britain was limited by the
imposition of visa regulations and the introduction of safe third country rules to the
determination procedures. In order to meet some of the humanitarian needs, Britain and
other countries agreed to admit some refugees, but instead of accessing the normal
asylum determination processes these refugees were given temporary protection.
Temporary protection has several advantages for states, since it allows them to meet
humanitarian objectives without creating long-term obligation, since the refugees can be
returned when the crisis is over.

The use of temporary protection also obviates the need for policies of settlement and
integration. This leave a policy vacuum, which in the absence of new policies has been
filled by the policies used for the settlement and integration of labour migrants. In
Britain, these policies are based on notions of multi-culturalism, and place emphasis on
the role of communities and community organisations. Refugee groups face particular
problems in community formation, and consequently they may also face difficulties with
community association formation. However, in the absence of alternative integration policies, refugees have to adapt to the policies that exist. This means that although there may be problems of community formation, community associations may still be developed.

To accommodate this apparent conundrum of community associations without communities, I have developed the concept of a ‘contingent community’, whose existence is strongly related to the policies in British society. However, this concept alone cannot account for the situation of refugees, since as other authors have shown the factors which created a refugee flow, the nature of the conflict, and the orientation of the refugees towards the country of origin affect the situation of the refugees and also affect the extent of community formation.

Thus any study of refugees in the host society needs to take into account these diverse factors, of the refugees’ experience, but also must consider the policies of the host country and their impact on the refugees themselves.
Chapter 3: Methods

Introduction

This research investigates the way that Bosnian refugees are settling in Britain, and the factors affecting that settlement. I am trying to discover the way that the policies that were developed around the refugees affect the refugees themselves. I am interested in the amount of control that the refugees had over their own situation and their lives, and the effect that any lack of control may have had on them. I am also interested in the way that Bosnian refugees are incorporated into Britain, both from a group perspective and from an individual perspective. This means that as well as the views and experiences of the refugees, it is important to understand the development and operation of the policies surrounding them. I have used field research methods, involving both interviews and participant observation, in order to generate data (Burgess 1984, Schatzman & Strauss 1973). In order to go beyond description and develop a theoretical understanding of the interaction of policies with the refugees themselves, I have analysed the research findings using grounded theory modes of analysis (Strauss 1987), whereby the data which is obtained is not merely collected and ordered, but the ideas contained are analysed, compared, and used to develop a theory grounded in the data (Glaser & Strauss 1967).
Choice of research methodology

The choice of methodology for any research follows on from that which one is trying to investigate, and depends on the field of study and the research question. A grounded theory approach, as developed by Glaser and Strauss (1967), is a methodological approach which is not committed to particular forms of data or theoretical interests, but instead is a style of analysis that tries to ensure conceptual analysis (Strauss 1987). It enables a researcher to go beyond description of social life and to develop theories (Strauss 1987).

It also depends upon the ontological and epistemological positions of the researcher. Questions of ontology determine what the researcher considers to be social reality. In this case, I consider social reality to be meaningful interaction between social actors, rather than a collection of social facts. This leads to the use of research methods which do not impose categories on social action, but instead investigate the actors' own interpretations and perceptions. In this case, I am examining the policies and structures around the refugees from the perspective of the refugees. The methodology used during this research was determined by two factors. Firstly there was my own theoretical perspective of knowledge and the social world, which is broadly an interpretive approach (Rubin & Rubin 1995). For me, what is important about social life is not quantification and the search for immutable social laws, but the meanings of social life, how these meanings are constructed, and the differences that can be found in meanings and values. This requires a research process that can elicit the views of the participants and gain an understanding of
the way that they experience and interpret social life. Secondly, there is a shortage of demographic information on refugees in general, and on Bosnian refugees in particular, and therefore a statistical or quantitative approach would have been extremely difficult. Methodology in the social sciences can be broadly divided into two main types, quantitative and qualitative, and each has its own strengths and suitability. Quantitative methods have been characterised as placing emphasis on objectivity and the reproducibility of research (Silverman 1985). One branch of quantitative research, positivism, gives explanations of human behaviour in terms of causes and effects. It assumes that there are social facts which are in the social domain, waiting to be discovered. Research data is collected in order to test the accuracy of theory. In another form of quantitative research, empiricism, theory is generated from the data, and so the philosophical perspective of empiricism and positivism are slightly different. However both share a view of the world in which there are social facts that can be discovered through social research. They assume that there is a social world which can be analysed objectively, and is independent of people’s interpretations of it (May 1993). Whilst there is a place within sociological research for quantitative research, there is a limit to the information that can be obtained. Qualitative methods arose in part as a reaction to the qualitative methodological assumption that individuals exist as subjects or objects whose behaviour is determined by structures and facts within society. Some researchers have argued that the basis of quantitative methods, their objectivity, is not possible within the social sciences (Winch 1958). Social reality, which is the subject of sociological research, is pre-defined and pre-constituted by its participants, including social researchers, and it is therefore impossible to separate the researcher’s prior definitions from those generated
by the research. As a consequence, it is not possible to be wholly objective, since even issues such as which topics are to be researched will be influenced by the preferences of the researcher, and hence their subjectivity (Weber 1949). Thus true objectivity cannot be attained in the social sciences. The highly structured methods used in quantitative sociology involves the imposition of the researcher's assumptions of the social world on the subject of the research, and therefore make it difficult to discover evidence that may be at variance with the researcher's assumptions (Silverman 1985). Quantitative research can also lead to a 'black box' analysis of social life, whereby causes and effects are measured, but there is no understanding generated of the mechanisms whereby the two interact, and of any other factors that might have influenced the proceedings (Silverman 1985).

Instead of searching for objectivity and social facts, qualitative methods seek the meanings of social life. A qualitative approach to the social sciences was developed by several researchers in order to overcome some of the problems that they perceived in quantitative methods. Instead of being considered as objects of research, the people whose lives are being studied are considered to be social actors, and qualitative methods emphasise the point of view of the social actors, and the meanings that they ascribe to their actions (Silverman 1985). They derive from a Weberian perspective of social life, where individuals and groups are considered as agents. It is not structure alone which determines behaviour, but the interaction of the agents with the structures in society (Burgess 1982b). To research this interaction, an interactionist approach must be taken which emphasises understanding the actions of participants (agents) and the relationship between their actions and their experiences. This necessarily points to a research method
which examines social action from the perspective of the actor. This is in contrast to the
'objective' approach of much quantitative sociology, where the perspective taken is that
of a detached observer (Burgess 1984). There must also be an understanding that human
behaviour is complex and variable, and that behaviour can be a response to situations that
have meaning for the actors involved. That meaning is defined and redefined through
interaction. An interactive approach is also based upon an awareness that there are
structures which affect the actors, but that structures do not exist on their own, and there
is an interaction between the structures and action (Strauss & Corbin 1998). Qualitative
research can be any research which does not depend on quantification for its findings.
There can be some use of quantification, but the bulk of the findings are based upon an
interpretive analysis (Strauss & Corbin 1998). One method for carrying out qualitative
research which fulfils all these criteria of an interpretive approach and incorporating an
analysis of structure as well as action is the field research method (Burgess 1982b). This
interpretive approach involves not merely listening to the views and explanations of the
actors, but interpreting them and the analysis of contrasting interpretations, and
incorporates an analysis of structures in society as well as social action.

Field research has been described as being:

"..not an exclusive method in the same sense, say that experimentation is. Field method is
more like an umbrella of activity beneath which any technique may be used for gaining
the desired information, and for processes of thinking about this information."
(Schatzman & Strauss 1973 page 14)

Field research, the study and observation of people in real-life situations, requires
flexibility in the methodology used, using a variety of techniques in order to gain an
insight, rather than rigid adherence to a particular method (Burgess 1984). It is possible that during the course of the research aspects of a problem will emerge as important that the researcher had not foreseen, and so the methodology adopted must be able to be adjusted accordingly (Burgess 1982a). In addition data needs to be continually checked against the researcher's interpretation, in order to ensure that the full meaning of the data can be grasped (Fielding 1993). The researcher must be prepared to revise or abandon the original hypothesis that they used, if the data appears to indicate that this is necessary. This is one of the advantages of the ethnographic method, in that the hypothesis itself can be revised during the course of the research. This occurred with this research, since my original hypothesis was that the Bosnia Project had disempowered the refugees, and this was the cause of the failure of community associations to reflect the needs and interests of the whole group. The hypothesis had to be revised in order to encompass the other factors that impinged on the lives of the refugees, including their experiences before and during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the nature and expectations of British society, as well as the Project itself. It became clear from the data that was generated that the original hypothesis was incomplete and not likely to generate an analysis of all the factors involved, and so the hypothesis was revised and amended several times.

This research encompassed various aspects of the refugees' experiences, and required the use of several types of research method, based on the techniques used in ethnographic research. It is not, though, ethnographic research since it includes analysis of social structures and policies, as well as the actors themselves. Ethnographic research has been described as including:
"...some amount of genuinely social interaction in the field with the subjects of the study, some direct observation of relevant events, some formal and a great deal of informal interviewing, some systematic counting, some collection of documents and artefacts, and open-endedness in the direction the study takes." (Fielding 1993 page 157)

There is a tendency within research on refugees to omit the voices of the actors, that is of the refugees themselves. In a recent report for the Home Office a summary is given of recent research on asylum policy and process. The majority of the research identified in the report does not involve any interviews with refugees or asylum seekers. The research which does try to contain the views and experiences of refugees and asylum seekers tends to rely on the opinions and views of representatives, and relies heavily on community leaders and NGOs (Kelly & Owen 2001 forthcoming). To ensure that the voices of the refugees themselves are heard through this research, interviews were carried out. These interviews sought their views, experiences and opinions on a range of subjects. This research is not simply reporting the interpretations of the actors, however, and interviews, which try to find the views and opinions of the actors themselves, are not the sole source of information. The interviews are complemented by participant observation and contrasting the findings of this with the views of the actors. The techniques used were participant observation, interviews with refugees, interviews with staff, interviews with community association representatives, and analysis of primary data sources.
Location of the research

Several considerations affected the choice of locations used for this research. The location of the research was determined by considerations of access and by personal and practical reasons. As I am resident in the city where much of this research took place, it formed a convenient location. I had worked in the city for the local authority in a post where I was responsible for organising and assisting the settlement of Bosnian refugees, and already had a detailed knowledge of the refugees in the city because of this. The city in which most of the research was based was home to 10% of all refugees that arrived on the programme, and so contained a large sample of refugees on which the research could be based.

The majority of the participant observation fieldwork took place within a city in the Midlands, to be known for this research as Westham. Because I had worked with Bosnians housed in this particular city, I already had a lot of information on the Bosnians there and they also knew who I was. Gaining access is often the most difficult part of research with refugees, and even once the refugees have been located gaining a sufficient degree of trust to enable research to proceed can be difficult and time consuming. Refugees are often reluctant to trust those that they do not know because of the experiences that caused them to become refugees, and researchers must overcome their reluctance to participate. Since I was already known to the refugees in this city, the difficulties normally associated with gaining access were avoided. The initial stage of fieldwork, looking for the refugees, was much easier, since I already knew where
refugees in that city lived, their levels of English, and where and when they socialised. As they already knew me there was no need for initial introductions, although I still needed to explain my presence. In another city, I would have had to begin by finding out how many Bosnians were there, where they lived, and where they met, and this would have added considerably to the time needed for preliminary fieldwork. Living in the city and already being familiar with the refugees there meant that there was also accidental contact with refugees, and I would see and talk with people at locations such as supermarkets, clinics, and in the shopping centre.

In addition to the fieldwork in this city, visits were made to other cities and towns in order to observe meetings and social events and to carry out some of the interviews. I relied on informants in Westham to tell me about these events, and was often accompanied by one of them. My work with Bosnian refugees had involved visiting reception centres which sent refugees to be housed in Westham, and the discussion on reception centres is based primarily on my experiences of those three centres, but also on information given to me by Bosnia Project staff concerning reception centres in other areas.

There were two reception centres in particular that I developed very close links with and visited many times. My impressions and experiences of these have been used to base my findings on reception centres in general. Different reception centres operated in different ways, and it is possible that my findings might have been different if I had been basing my research on other reception centres. Robinson and Coleman (2000) carried out research on the reception centres and the cluster areas policy, and found that although there was variation between centres, at some centres residents were given a choice as to
where they were housed, choices for residents on the whole were 'illusory' (Robinson & Coleman 2000 page 1233). Although their research focuses on different aspects to my own, their findings regarding the reception centres and cluster areas are broadly similar to my own, suggesting that my findings are not location specific. In order to assess possible differences between reception centres I interviewed a worker from another reception centre that did not settle Bosnians in the area that I was studying. I have also used information in the evaluations that were carried out on behalf of the Project, since these cover all of the reception centres that were used.

There was very little planning in the allocation of individual refugees to particular areas, and there is no reason to suggest that these refugees were not representative of the whole programme. However, interviews were conducted with refugees in other towns and cities in order to ensure that there were no major differences based on location.

The five community associations that were studied were chosen partly for reasons of access, since informants in Westham were able to tell me who to talk to in the other areas, and also because they were each slightly different in character. As is described in chapter seven, the mix between programme and non-programme refugees varied, and the amount and type of support from Bosnia Project varied, so they present different case studies. I attended two meetings at which representatives of most Bosnian associations were present, and in informal discussions with these leaders afterwards I discussed my interim findings on the associations. I did this in order for them to tell me if the associations that I studied were exceptional in any way, or if my findings reflected their own experiences. These discussions lead me to conclude that my findings regarding the associations are generally applicable.
Participant Observation

Part of the methodology used during this research was participant observation. Gold (1958) says that there are four roles that can be adopted in participant observation. These roles are not mutually exclusive, and the researcher may move between roles at different stages of the research.

Complete participant: the researcher attempts to pass as a member of the group.
Participant as observer: researcher makes it known that they are undertaking research and this is the primary purpose of the observations and conversations.
Observer as participant: contacts with the informants are brief and are formally defined in terms of the research interests of the observer
Complete observer: researcher remains external to the group

Each of these has their own strengths and weaknesses, though the ability of a researcher to fulfil any particular role is dependant to a large extent on his or her own abilities. The role I took during most of this research was as ‘participant as observer’. In addition I make use of observations made and information gained during a two year period in which I was employed to work with Bosnian refugees in a Midlands city. Dawe (in Burgess 1984) suggests that the experiences of a researcher have an influence on the research which is carried out. Burgess (1984) suggests that for qualitative research those experiences are often highly influential in determining the research subject. In the case of this research, my experiences working with Bosnian refugees were a deciding factor in the research.

During the time I was working with Bosnian refugees I attended several social events organised by or for Bosnians. I attended one New Years Eve celebration, held in a church
hall and attended by around fifty Bosnians plus their children and a worker from a local advice agency. Members of all religious groups traditionally celebrated New Year’s Eve in Bosnia-Herzegovina. On two occasions I attended celebrations to mark the end of Bajram (Ramadan), which was traditionally celebrated by Muslims in Bosnia. I also went to an event organised to celebrate Bosnia’s national day. Each of these events were similar in format, with several people preparing food, and both soft drinks and alcoholic drinks were available. Music was played, and several people danced. I also attended two weddings and the celebrations afterwards. One of these was a very quiet wedding, as the bride’s father had been dead less than one year, and so the bride was still officially in mourning. This wedding was attended only by myself and one other person, and the wedding celebration was attended only by members of the groom’s family. The other wedding was a larger affair, attended at the registry office by around thirty people, and with members of both families present at the groom’s home for wedding celebrations. International Women’s Day was traditionally celebrated by all women in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and on two occasions I organised a coffee morning for women in Westham. These were attended by around twenty women each time, and coffee and cakes were served. I was invited to and attended several parties organised by Bosnian associations. These were usually held in a Working Men’s Club or a church hall, and were open to any Bosnian who wished to attend. A charge was made for entrance, and there was music and dancing. I also visited many people in their own homes for coffee and general socialising. I visited several women in hospital after they had delivered their babies, and visited others at home soon after returning from hospital. During the time that I was working with Bosnian refugees I was invited to the first few social events because of my position.
as a worker, and was one of several workers that were invited. However, at some of these events I was the only worker that accepted the invitation, and my presence (and the other workers' absence) was commented on. At later events to which I was invited I discovered that although some volunteers had been invited, there were no other workers invited. I was told that this was because I was considered a friend as well as a worker. I attended the weddings as a friend of the couple that were getting married, and not in my capacity as worker. After my post with the local authority ended I continued to receive and accept invitations to events. I attended these as a friend of one or more of the Bosnians present, although I explained to people that I spoke to that I was carrying out research. On many of these occasions I brought one or more of my children with me. This was partly because my children were too young to be left at home, and in order to attend I had to bring them with me. Also although I met the Bosnians through my work, I came to consider some as friends, and we had talked about our children. As a result they were curious to see my children, and several people mentioned that I should bring them with me. I was also told that everyone else was bringing their children, and some people might think I was rude, or a neglectful parent, if I left my children at home. I was also more comfortable bringing my children, since it meant that when I found the conversation in Bosnian too hard to follow I would still have someone to talk to. Their presence also served to provide a conversation opener, both for me and for the Bosnians. Women especially would come to me, admire the children, and begin a conversation in this way. Although my children were there mainly for personal reasons, I found that it enabled Bosnians to consider me as a friend rather than as a worker, and enabled greater participation and interaction. It enabled me to make greater contact and gain more
information about the women refugees that I came into contact with. I believe that many also found that since I was willing to share an aspect of my life with them, that is by introducing my children to them, they were more willing to trust me.

After beginning this research I maintained the links I had made during the time I was working with Bosnians, and attended several more social events organised either by Bosnian associations or by enterprising individuals. I was informed of the events by Bosnians that I knew, and again attended with some of my children.

I accepted the invitations from many Bosnians to have coffee with them in their home, and during these visits I learned more about Bosnian culture and general background. Having coffee in someone's home is an important part of Bosnian culture, and I was told by Bosnians when I first began working with them that traditionally women visited each other for coffee during the day. At these times coffee was served, and often a soft drink as well, and cakes or biscuit were served. Once in someone else's home, the visitor is treated with respect and any reasonable requests are accepted. It is also considered rude to refuse an invitation, or to refuse coffee or food when offered. Because of the etiquette involved in having coffee, I did not use these visits to conduct interviews, and instead treated them as participant observation and an opportunity to learn more general information and to practice my Bosnian language skills.

At all the events apart from the women's coffee mornings I did not have an interpreter, and relied on my own language skills, the knowledge of English of the people I spoke with, and sympathetic individuals who would translate when necessary.

As well as this observation in Britain, I spent six days in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2000, and although this was a short visit I made many observations which were useful for
understanding the situation of Bosnian refugees in Britain. I stayed in a town in the Herzegovina region which was mixed before the war but is now predominantly Muslim. I was able to meet and talk with the mayor, who was a member of the non-Nationalist Social Democratic Party. I also had long conversations with a Catholic priest and nun that lived in the town and was able to observe the way people lived in Bosnia in the post-war situation. I also met relatives of some of the Bosnian refugees in Britain.

**Employment to work with Bosnian refugees**

My employment in a post working with Bosnian refugees has been very important to this research. It gave me a broad base of knowledge from which this research could be developed, and it gave me a unique insight to the operation of the Bosnia Project, the policies that affected the refugees, and the way those policies were implemented in practice.

I was appointed in July 1994 to the position of Bosnian Refugee Resettlement Officer with the Social Services department of a midlands city. The position had been created as a result of concerns raised by voluntary organisations in the city that the needs of Bosnian refugees were not being met by the Refugee Council, and as more refugees were expected an alternative source of support was needed (Farrand 1994). The post had a broad remit, and the intention was that I would carry out tasks and coordinate with other service providers in order to assist Bosnian refugees in their settlement. As part of my role, I met with residents of reception centres before they moved to the city, and soon after their arrival. I had at least one meeting with each Bosnian refugee after they were
housed. I also had further contacts with those who approached me for assistance with particular tasks, those with children, those that were willing to act as interpreters, and those involved in establishing the community association. Since most of my contact with people took place in their homes, I also met their friends and relatives who were visiting, and was often invited to meet relatives that came from abroad.

Initially I could not speak any Bosnian (then called Serbo-croat), and had no official interpreter for several weeks. I therefore had to learn some phrases very quickly, in order to introduce myself, and although I relied on interpreters much of the time I became able to understand and converse on a limited range of topics through interaction with Bosnians, careful listening, and following a taped language course.

Although there was a worker from the Bosnia Project in the city, they had not developed procedures and systems for passing on information about new arrivals or future arrivals to the city, and departments such as the education department asked me to develop procedures so that they could plan interpreter and support provision. In order to do this, I developed close links with the reception centres that sent refugees to the city, and asked them to try to predict which refugees would arrive in the city and when they were likely to move into their accommodation. This meant that provision for children in schools could be pre-arranged, and an interpreter could be there to help them on their first day. In order to ensure as smooth a transition as possible I tried to ensure that all of the refugees that were to move to this city had met me before they arrived. In that way I could try to assess any other support that might be necessary, and also I could tell them how to contact me after arrival if any further problems arose.
The links I developed with the reception centres meant that I was a frequent visitor to two of the centres, and was able to observe their operation at close quarters. I also had conversations with staff which gave me insights into the issues that arose in the centres and the difficulties that existed. I was also able to observe discussions as to the way they operated, and the conversations between staff as to the best methods of working with refugees. As well as this, I was able to witness some of the interaction between staff and residents. After residents left the reception centre I kept the centre informed as to how their former residents were managing in their new homes. Once a resident had left the centre, staff sometimes disclosed information about people that had been 'difficult' in some way. This 'difficult' behaviour included the family that moved out and took the television with them, the family that tried to insist on having an interpreter every time they went out, and the man that had severe nightmares as a result of his trauma, and whose screams often woke the other residents. These insights were often not especially useful in assisting a family or individual, but were instrumental in enabling me to see the refugees as human beings rather than victims. Although it did not affect my compassion, or the sympathy that I felt for their situation, it discouraged feelings of pity, and I was able to see the individual refugees as people, with fully formed characters that included good and bad features.

The work brought me into close contact with workers of the Bosnia Project, the Red Cross, and Refugee Action, who were each involved with Bosnian refugees in some capacity. Working alongside them, without being part of their organisations, placed me in a unique position, whereby I could observe their actions, their interactions with the refugees, and their interactions with each other. I was in many ways in the Bosnia Project
without being of the Bosnia Project, and could observe the way it operated in practice in a way that both those working for the Project and those unconnected to it could not. I was at once an insider and an outsider, since I was within the circle of the various agencies but not under the direction of any of them. The staff that I came into contact with were aware of this, and responded in different ways. Some staff would share criticisms of the other agencies that worked with the refugees. These criticisms might be of working practices, of the qualification of staff, or the organisation of the agencies, and criticisms were made of both individual members of staff and of whole organisations. Although some of the criticism was unfounded, it was only because of my position as both an insider and outsider that I was party to their discussions. Because of my contacts with the different agencies, and the broad remit of my work, I was able to observe the operation of many different aspects of the Bosnia Project and obtain information that would not have been available to an outside researcher.

My employment ended in July 1996, at a time when the reception centres had already closed and the Mid Term Support team no longer operated in the area.

**Interviews**

Formal interviews were conducted with former employees of the Bosnia Project, Bosnian Community Association representatives, and a selection of Bosnian refugees. The six Bosnia Project employees had all been in positions of responsibility throughout much of the life of the project and so were in a position to give background information, as well as policy information. The five Community association representatives that were
interviewed were from several towns and cities in England. In addition twenty-eight formal interviews were conducted with Bosnian refugees.

I encountered some problems with arranging and conducting interviews which are specific to research with refugees. Refugees have been through traumatic experiences, and are often reluctant to talk of these experiences. Their experiences have often created a large degree of mistrust of others, and the process of gaining their trust in order to conduct an interview can be difficult. Many people that were approached refused to be interviewed. Honigmann (1982) says that resistance to interviewing is frequently encountered when small groups are being researched, and though some of the resistance may be due to hostility, it can also be due to a lack of experience with or taste for the introspection, forethought and reporting in response to seemingly unconnected questions that interviewing calls for. The response of Bosnian refugees as a whole seem to support this suggestion. Some claimed that they had no time, whilst others gave no reason. Others said that they had been interviewed before, and had found the experience very distressing, and would not be willing to go through the same experience again. Still others said they would not be interviewed, but that I was welcome to come to their house, have coffee, and talk. In these cases, I visited as part of the participant observation. Most people refused to be taped, and those few that were taped were people with whom a close relationship already existed before the research started. Some people agreed that I could make notes as we talked. In these cases I wrote down as much as I could at the time, trying to write down key sentences verbatim and writing the general gist of what the interviewee said. After the interview the gaps were filled in from memory. In those cases where the interviewee refused to allow me to make notes, I relied on memory and wrote
down as much as possible immediately after. There were also conversations which took place informally, for example at social functions, and notes of these were made immediately afterwards.

The reluctance to be formally interviewed stems from several factors. Firstly, many were under the (mistaken) impression that I mostly wished to discuss their experiences in the prison camps. These experiences were what they felt were most important, but discussing them revives memories, and can be extremely distressing. Since their experiences during the war were what seemed most important to them, they assumed that any interest in their situation would focus on this aspect of their lives. Secondly, there was a concern that any criticism that was made of others, whether in the UK or in Bosnia, could be traced back to them. This concern was not assuaged by assurances that the persons name would not be used, since the population of Bosnians in Britain is so small that very few clues would be needed in order to uncover a persons identity. As a result of these concerns, very few biographical details are given of informants in the results section. Concern about disclosure of information stemmed from their fears and suspicions which in turn arose as a result of the experiences which caused them to become refugees.

**Sample for interviews**

The interviewees in this research cannot be claimed as a representative sample, and indeed it is questionable whether it would ever be possible to construct a representative sample. For those that came as part of the Bosnia Project, a global arrivals figure has been kept but there was no systematic recording of outcomes, and so there is very little
information on where the individuals went within the UK. For those Bosnians that came outside the remit of the programme, there is no definitive answer to the question of how many are in Britain, and their distribution within Britain is unknown. The Home Office statistics for asylum applications give a figure for applicants from the former Yugoslavia, but this is not broken down into the constituent states. Although most of the applications for asylum may have come from Bosnians, some will have been from Kosovo, some from Croatia, and so forth.

Originally I had hoped to interview an equal number of programme and non-programme Bosnians. It rapidly became apparent, however, that this would not only be difficult but would not produce any meaningful comparisons in many cases. I found during the initial stages of assessing and consulting the population in Westham and Northam that there were major differences between the populations, and thus statistical comparisons would be of limited use. Of the non programme Bosnians in Westham, most were from a professional background, and most were from Sarajevo (the capital of Bosnia). In contrast, the majority of individuals on the programme were from towns and villages in Northern Bosnia, or the Herzegovina region. Though a few were from a professional background (there were two teachers and one trainee teacher in Westham) the majority were from a more working class or peasant background, and had worked as farmers, woodcutters or carpenters. The programme population in Northam had a similar background and membership to the population in Westham, but the non-programme population was more varied and much larger.

There are several methods of defining a sample for interviewing which can be divided broadly into purposive and probability samples (Arber 1993). Probability samples depend
upon a well defined population, so that each member of the population has an equal chance of being selected. It is the best type of sample to use where one is seeking to describe the characteristics of a population, or to test an empirical hypothesis. Since in this research I was not testing an empirical hypothesis, and there was no clearly defined population, I decided not to use a probability sample. A purposive sample does not depend on a clearly defined and enumerated population, since the chance of selection for a particular member of the population remain unknown. Purposive samples are best suited to exploration of theories and theory development, and also for pilot studies. Snowball sampling is a way of selecting participants when there is insufficient information with which to construct a sampling frame. It involves approaching one member of a population, interviewing them, and then asking if they know of friends or relatives that would be willing to take part in the research. This process is repeated until no more contacts are obtained, and then recommences with a fresh individual, who preferably should have some different characteristics. The technique is good for getting samples from small groups, though it depends on the target population having some form of network or linkage between its members. Though I had hoped to use snowball sampling, I found that few people would provide me with details of someone else willing to be interviewed. Instead, an opportunistic sample was used (Honigmann 1982), and there are several reasons for this. Firstly, there are no reliable statistics on the Bosnian population in Britain that could be used as a basis for any sort of probability sample. The lack of availability of reliable information on the location and demographic characteristics of refugee populations in general was noted by Carey-Woods et al (1997), and the lack of statistics and information on Bosnian refugees in particular was noted by
Robinson and Coleman (Robinson & Coleman 2000) Secondly, my skills in speaking Bosnian are limited, and I relied on volunteer interpreters for communicating with those who spoke no English. Because of this, I tried to focus interviews on those who spoke at least some English, and used interpreters for participant observation and for interviews with community association representatives. Thirdly, the interviews were complementary to the impressions gained from participant observation, and were not being used on their own. This meant that the interviews themselves did not need to be with a representative sample, as the rest of the research was looking at the group as a whole. Finally, the reluctance of many within the population to be interviewed meant that I could not afford to be too selective over who I interviewed. Although those that were representing community associations were willing to be interviewed, those who were not a representative were much more likely to refuse to be interviewed. This may have been because they had no experience of being interviewed, whilst representatives would have had some experience from liaising with funding organisations. It also may have been because they could see little to be gained from participation. Association representatives are aware that there may be gains from research, since funding and support can follow, but for individuals there are no benefits. In particular, I found arranging interviews with those that were not resident in Westham was difficult, since the refugees did not know me and although I was given many contacts, I was unable to find many that were willing to be interviewed. Of those interviewed, eleven were women and seventeen were men. A decision was taken early on in the research that there would be more men interviewed than women. One reason for this is that I felt during participant observation I was participating more with women than with men, and more interviews with men would help
to redress any imbalance this caused. Of the women, six lived in Westham, and four of these were from the programme, and of the remaining five there were three from the programme. Eleven of the men lived in Westham, eight of who were from the programme, and of the remaining six men that were interviewed four were from the programme.

**Interview guidelines**

An interview guideline was produced at the beginning of the research. After two interviews it was apparent that the guide contained too many questions, as the interviews were stretching to several hours. A revised guide was then used (see appendix). This revised guide was used as a basis for the interviews but was not strictly adhered to. Qualitative interviews are more like a guided conversation (Lofland & Lofland 1995), and unlike quantitative interviews the exact questions can vary between interviews. This enables the researcher to be flexible with the interviewee, who may produce a wealth of information in an unexpected direction (Rubin & Rubin 1995). Using a guide instead of a strict list of questions also allows for new areas of potential interest to be explored (Fielding 1993). I used a check list of basic areas of interest to try to ensure that all the fundamental research areas were covered during an interview. In some cases interviewees refused to answer all the questions, and sometimes questions had to be omitted because the interview was taking too long. Most interviews lasted for between one and two hours.
The actors' accounts

The statements made by those who participated in the research were not always taken at face value. The replies given by an individual may be affected by circumstances, and throughout the research the experiences gained through participant observation were compared and contrasted with the information gained in interviews. There were times when information was given in an interview that I knew to be untrue. Rather than discard the information, I have used it to understand the image some people were trying to project of themselves and the rest of the population. These statements were sometimes challenged, but it was not always possible to do so. In some cases, the contradictory information emerged later, and in others I felt it would be unsafe to challenge the individual.

Language

The first language of Bosnians is Bosnian, formerly known as Serbo-Croat. I acquired a limited knowledge of the language during the time spent working for the local authority, though for conversational purposes this knowledge was restricted to discussion of food, family, and treatment in concentration camps. During this time I was aware that there was often a degree of mistrust in the interpreters that were used. Sometimes this was connected to the background of the interpreter, and sometimes to a belief that the interpreter would not maintain confidentiality. Increasing knowledge of the language also
gave me an awareness that the interpreter did not always give a full translation. I therefore decided that wherever possible I would conduct interviews in English. This limited the pool of potential interviewees, since many Bosnians still have only a limited knowledge of English. Of the three interviews conducted through an interpreter, one was with the chairman of a community association using an interpreter that both the interviewee and myself were happy with. The other two were with individuals who said they wished to be interviewed, and using a relative of theirs as interpreter.

The ability to speak some Bosnian meant that I could attend social events without having to prearrange an interpreter, and could hold some conversations in a mixture of Bosnian and English.

**Documentary evidence**

Many documentary sources were examined as part of the research. Use was made of the two evaluation reports of the Bosnia Project that were written though not published. The first evaluation was released in 1996, and covered the Bosnia Project from its inception to the end of 1995 (Graessle & Gawlinski 1996). The second evaluation covered the period from 1995 to 1997 when the second stage of the Bosnia Project was in operation. These evaluations made several recommendations for the future organisation of any refugee programme, and according to Refugee Council staff they were used to inform the establishment of the later programme for refugees from Kosovo. The Bosnia Project also produced a newsletter for its staff and clients, and copies of this have been studied. I also obtained minutes of meetings where the establishment of Bosnian community
associations was discussed, and minutes of early meetings of some associations. I was
given copies of correspondence between a housing association and the Bosnia Project
concerning the availability of housing for refugees.
Information on the history of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the causes of the war that took
place was obtained from published books and articles by academics and specialists. I also
used internet resources to obtain information concerning the peace agreement in Bosnia-
Herzegovina (the Dayton Agreement), and the situation in the country after the war. The
Office of the High Representative in Sarajevo publishes on the internet the Bosnian
election results, and UNHCR Sarajevo publishes statistics on return of refugees and
internally displaced persons.
Statistics on the number of persons that arrived in Britain as part of the programme were
obtained from the Home Office statistical bulletins. Since there is a slight variation in the
numbers stated in the reports for 1996 and 1997, I have taken the later figures and
assumed that they are correct. However, the variation was very small, and does not affect
the research. Reliable data on the number of arrivals or on their distribution could not be
obtained from the Bosnia Project or the Refugee Council, as central records were not kept
during the course of the Project.

Ethics of the research

Because of the experiences that refugees have had, research involving refugees requires
an even greater degree of sensitivity than usual, and questions of ethics need careful
attention. Anonymity and informed consent, as discussed earlier, are important in many
types of research, but when working with refugees they become more important. Whatever the subject of research, the researcher cannot ever tell the participants everything about the research. This holds true even when the researcher is open about the fact that they are conducting research. In the initial stages, the researcher may not have a clear idea of the information they are seeking, and as the research continues aspects may prove to be of greater interest than had been thought initially. Members of a population may not believe or may forget that the person is carrying out research (Lofland & Lofland 1995). This was certainly the case with some people that I met at social functions or, with Bosnians I had known before beginning the research, on casual meetings in the street, shopping, or at the dentists. On these occasions, people might share some information with me, without consciously considering that I was involved in researching the Bosnian population as a whole. This raised an ethical dilemma as to whether the information could be used as part of the research. The dilemma was resolved as follows: where I was not sure that information was given to me in the knowledge that I was a researcher, I have not used any quotations from the individual. However, I have used it as part of my participant observation in such a way that the individual could not be identified. I felt that if I knew something, then I could not separate that knowledge from the research.

The period before beginning the research also raises ethical issues. During the two years working for the local authority I gained intimate knowledge of the Bosnia Project, and of the Bosnian population in the city where I worked, yet all of this was obtained without any of the people involved being asked if they consented to a later research project. How, then, could the information I had obtained be used in an ethical way? Since it was not
possible to unlearn the information, and since my work had uncovered invaluable and irreplaceable information, I decided to include it. Again, there are no quotations from this period, and I have attempted to make it difficult to identify individuals from what is written.

The British Sociological Association's guidelines on ethical research (BSA 1982) state that covert methods of obtaining data violate the principles of informed consent and may invade the privacy of those being studied. They suggest that participant observation without the knowledge of the participants should only be used when it is impossible to obtain the data in any other way. In these cases, the participants' anonymity must be maintained and the participants' consent should be sought after the research. In order to adhere to this guidance, I class my experiences before officially beginning the PhD as covert participant observation, and have informed as many of the participants as possible that I was researching the Bosnian population. I have tried to ensure that it would be difficult to identify particular individuals from this research, except in those cases where permission was specifically given to include biographical details.

Reliability of the research

Errors and bias can affect any kind of research, but Lofland and Lofland (1995) suggest that within qualitative research they are likely to be of the following types: directness of the report; the spatial location of the researcher; social location skewing of reported opinion; and self-serving error and bias.
Directness of the report

If the content of the research is not based upon first hand perceptions, then the reliability of the data needs to be questioned. It is therefore important that researchers are aware that the interpretations of others can be subjective, and to incorporate this into the research. In this research I am using mainly my own perceptions, but where I report those of others I try to ensure these are accurate, for example by speaking to reception centre staff as well as residents and ex residents, and by interviewing both current and former community association representatives. However, in many cases the perceptions of the participants conflict, and this is a finding in itself.

Spatial location of the researcher

It is possible that though the perceptions themselves are accurate, they may be affected by the location of the research, making the research findings skewed or partial. In this case the research was mainly confined to two cities in the Midlands, though interviews with community association representatives was over a wider area. However the two cities’ combined population of Bosnian refugees constitutes a significant proportion of all those that came from the programme (4-500 out of around 2,500). In addition, there was a degree of randomness in the way that individuals were allocated to particular cities (see section on Bosnia Project) which suggests that the geographical location of the project will not skew the results to any great extent. As a balance, though, I included questions about the populations in different areas in the participant observation and the interviews with community association representatives to ensure there were not wide discrepancies.
Social location skewing of reported opinion

The relationship between the researcher and the researchee may be such that the information given may be less than accurate. They may seek to omit or falsify details, or exaggerate, or say what they think the researcher wants to hear. This was a significant issue in this research, especially since many of the participants had prior personal knowledge of me but in a role in which I had a certain amount of power and influence in their lives. To some extent the reputation that I developed during the time I was working helped to prevent some skewing. Many saw me as honest and reliable, and able to maintain confidences. I also tried to avoid skewing by seeking out people with whom I had not been on especially friendly terms when working. In this way I hoped to gain the opinions of people who didn’t like me or didn’t care about me, as well as those that did, and so overcome researcher bias.

Self-serving error and bias

Researchers owe it to themselves and others to avoid only seeing what they wish to see. This can lead to research which is self-serving, and thus to be regarded with caution. One can never be completely free of bias, and in interpreting events there is always the possibility of the interpretation being self-serving or partial. Reflection whilst researching helps to avoid this, as does seeking out possible contradictions to ones expectations. In addition I had already realised that some of my perceptions were wrong when I began working with Bosnian refugees. In fact, it was the realisation of the differences between my initial perceptions and expectations and the reality that emerged which prompted this research.
Conclusion

This research uses ethnographic research methods to investigate the interaction between Bosnian refugees and British society. Using these methods, the situation and interpretations of the social actors, the refugees, can be analysed from their own perspective, but this is then analysed and interpreted using contrasting interpretations and an analysis of the social structures that impinge upon the refugees. The research focussed mainly on refugees in one particular city, but in order to obtain a wider range of contradictory and complimentary cases the study also examined some refugees in other areas.

A grounded theory approach was used to analyse and interpret the empirical evidence, as a result of which the original scope of the investigation was widened in order that all the factors affecting the situation of the refugees could be understood. The focus of the research needed to include an analysis of the situation of the refugees in their country of origin, as well as an analysis of the policies that were implemented in Britain. These policies include the explicit policies of the Bosnia Project, but also include the more general policies in Britain which are directed at minority groups. In addition the refugees themselves are investigated, from both an individual and a group perspective, to examine how they interact with the policies.
Chapter 4: Bosnia-Herzegovina

Introduction

The way in which refugees settle in their country of exile is dependant on several factors, but in particular their relationship with their country of origin. Issues such as their position in relation to the conflict in their country of origin, their situation as a member of a majority or a minority and their attitudes towards return will all impact upon their later settlement (Joly 1996b, Kunz 1973, 1981). It is therefore important to have an understanding of the nature of the conflict in Bosnia and the refugees' positioning within that conflict in order to understand the reason why they became refugees and the effects this has on their situation in the country of exile. The situation with regard to the possible return of refugees and their attitudes towards return also need to be understood, and in the case of Bosnian refugees this is especially important since the status of temporary protection meant that they were expected to return once the conflict was over.

Bosnia-Herzegovina was from 1946 to 1992 a constituent republic of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Slovenia and Croatia seceded from the federation in 1991, a move opposed by the government of Yugoslavia. In 1992, a referendum was held in Bosnia-Herzegovina to decide whether it too should secede from the federation. The result was an overwhelming call for secession, but the majority of the Serbian population boycotted the vote. A Serbian opposition to the secession quickly emerged, and soon after Bosnia-Herzegovina declared itself an independent state violence erupted in various
parts of the country. Sarajevo, the capital, was besieged, and a full-scale war erupted. In some areas, the Serb militia established camps where prisoners could be held. Many of the Muslims held in these camps were tortured and killed. The violence created a massive wave of refugees, which was largely stemmed by the imposition of visa requirements by Western governments towards the end of 1992. The discovery by journalists of the existence of concentration camps in Bosnia eventually led to the closure of those camps, and UNHCR appealed for countries to offer a place of safety for those who had been detained. Britain offered to take a thousand persons, plus their dependants, and eventually around 2,500 persons in total arrived as part of this quota, on what became known as the Bosnia Project.

In this chapter I summarise the history of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and outline the factors leading to the outbreak of war in 1992. To fully understand the causes of the conflict, it is necessary to examine the history of the country and ascertain whether the violence was simply inevitable inter-ethnic squabble with no other causes, or whether in fact the causes are more complex. This is important when trying to gain an understanding of the situation of the refugees created by the conflict. The conflict has been characterised as an ethnic conflict although asserting that ethnic differences exist is not sufficient to explain why war should have started or why its course was so violent. The notion that Bosnia contained three ethnic groups, each mutually antagonistic but whose enmity was subdued by communism, needs further examination.

The situation of the refugees is also dependant to some extent on the nature of the war and the peace agreement made in 1996, since the refugees on the programme were given temporary protection and were expected to return to Bosnia when it was safe to do so. I
therefore include a short description of the course of the war, and of the peace agreement which was made. Finally I look at the situation in Bosnia today and the conditions that refugees would face if they returned.

Life in pre-war Bosnia

The way that people lived their lives in pre-war Bosnia, and the nature of the society in which they lived, was the product of the history of the country. It was a constituent state of Yugoslavia, and although for several hundred years it had not been independent, it had existed as a part of another country or an empire for almost all of the previous four hundred years.

In Bosnia, as in the rest of Yugoslavia, the education system was secularly based and, coupled with a communist political culture and increasing Westernisation of society, religious observance declined. By the 1980s the majority of Muslims in Bosnia did not consider themselves religious believers, and in a survey only 17% classed themselves as believers. Instead they followed some of the practices of Islam as a matter of tradition and culture. Bosnia had become more urbanised - by the late 1980s between 30% and 40% of marriages in urban areas were between people of different religions (Malcolm 1996).
The census of 1991 shows that the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina was 4.3 million, made up of Muslims (43.6%), Serbs (31.3%), Croats (17.3%), and Yugoslavs (5.2%). The proportions of these varied in different areas of the country. For example, in Sarajevo 10.7% considered themselves Yugoslav, and there was no region which could be considered as having a population which was not mixed. There were five cantons (administrative regions) where the population was over 90% Croat, two where it was over 90% Muslim, and three where it was over 90% Serb. It was the only Yugoslav republic where there was not one group who could be said to form an overall majority of the population (Bennett 1995).

Life in Central Bosnia was the subject of an ethnographic study by Bringa (1995). Her fieldwork was carried out in 1987 and 1988, but she maintained links with the villagers she had studied and her account includes references to the war and its effects. In her study of the way of life for Muslims in Bosnia she found that there were differences in the way Muslims and Croats lived their private lives, but that friendships and at times marriages meant that their lives were closely linked. The people she spoke to and lived with were aware of differences between themselves and their Catholic (Croat) neighbours, but these differences were in areas such as religious practices and food and drink habits and preferences, and were not considered divisive. Bringa found that in the area she was studying there were differences between the style of houses built by Muslims and Croats, but on the whole people's identity as Bosnians was inexorably linked to a notion of a multiethnic and multireligious coexistence.

1 On the census forms people had to declare their nationality. The category 'Yugoslav' was introduced for those who felt they could not label themselves as one of the other national categories, but who considered themselves to be Yugoslavian.
It was customary for neighbours to assist in the building of houses, and Bringa found that Muslim and Catholic neighbours joined in this activity equally. Bringa notes that the building of a house often took many years, with parts being added as money was available and for many families their home was a "work in progress" for ten or more years. Because of this, they had a great emotional investment in their home, and Bringa suggests that the destruction of homes during the war was especially devastating.

Despite their awareness of differences, the people of the village studied by Bringa were unconcerned about these differences, and even as war developed in other areas of Bosnia most villagers seemed to have been sure that they would remain unaffected. The village, situated in Central Bosnia, remained peaceful until April 1993, almost a year after the outbreak of hostilities in many other areas of Bosnia, and the village was attacked by Bosnian Croat forces. Despite the fact that tension had been rising in the village for several months, and war was taking place in areas around the village from January 1993, until the fighting actually started the residents were still hopeful that they would avoid violence.

Although few of the people that I interviewed for my own research were from Central Bosnia, many of Bringa's findings are reflected in my own research. Bringa found that people of different religious background lived peacefully together, and the onset of violence came as a surprise. These were also findings of my research, discussed in greater detail in chapter 5 on individuals. There are some differences, although these can largely be explained by the fact that Bringa was looking at Central Bosnia and there were variations in practices throughout Bosnia.
The people I spoke to for my research said that there were no differences between the architecture of Muslim and non-Muslim houses, which contradicts one of Bringa’s findings. However, this may have been a regional pattern which was not replicated in Northern Bosnia or Herzegovina, where most of my contacts were from. In addition, many of the men in Northern Bosnia had worked abroad due to the lack of employment opportunities in the area, and the style of homes that they built on their return was often influenced by the style of homes they had seen in Austria and Germany. In addition, those from both Herzegovina and Northern Bosnia who lived in cities or large towns often did not build their own homes, and so the architecture of their home had no relationship with their religious background.

Bringa’s respondents were aware of the differences between themselves and those of other religions, whilst many of the people that I spoke to claimed they were not, or not until shortly before the war began. Again, this could be partly due to regional variations. Central Bosnia was considered by many in Herzegovina and Northern Bosnia as a relatively religious area, and the overt following of religious practices may have meant that differences in behaviour were more obvious. However, it should also be remembered that although she was not aware of it at the time, Bringa's fieldwork took place only a few years before the war began, and at a time when nationalist sentiments were already being expressed by some politicians and in some sections of the mass media. She was therefore in a position to collect people’s opinions at a time when ethnicity was beginning to become an issue, although the fact that there seems to have been no animosity based on religion means that her findings do not support the thesis that Bosnia-Herzegovina was an ethnic war waiting to happen.
Another ethnographic account of life in Bosnia is given in a thesis by Sivell-Muller (1994). He carried out fieldwork in Bosnia in an area close to that of many of the respondents of this research during 1992 and 1993. He spent time in the area before the outbreak of war, and interviewed some of the refugees after they had been displaced. Many of the refugees he interviewed maintained that religious affiliation had not been important. Sometimes they claimed that they could not know the religious affiliation of others, and at other times they claimed that they might have known but that it was not important and before the war it did not matter. However, Sivell-Muller’s own observations suggest that the divisions which became apparent when the war started must have been emergent before the war. He found that in the centre of a nearby town there were two bars close to each other but with different clientele. One was mainly patronised by supporters of the Serbian SDS, and the other by members of the mainly Muslim SDA and Croatian HDZ. He says this suggests that divisions were beginning to emerge, but also says that the majority of the population seemed to either not see these divisions or they ignored them. The importance of Sivell-Muller’s work is that it seems to suggest that the ordinary population, those not active in politics, preferred to overlook differences based on religion or ethnic background.

Another study looking at the same region as Sivell-Muller found that in Bosnia-Herzegovina culturally diverse communities were held together by neighbours and the importance placed on good neighbourly relations (Sorabji 1993). Those interviewed for this study repeatedly assured the author that they did not know who belonged to what religion, and that even names were not an indication. They also said that they celebrated each other’s major religious festivals. One Muslim boy told Sorabji that his godfather
was a Serb, and he found later that it was common practice in ethnically mixed areas for children to have a godparent of a different religion. Sorabji notes that choosing a godparent from a different religious background, and the fact that the child was aware of this, indicates that people were in fact aware of the religious background of others, despite their assurances to the contrary. However it also shows that they were prepared to accept differences and did not seek separation. Sorabji suggests that in the town he studied people were aware of cultural differences based on religion, and expressed these differences through their religious practices, the naming of children and through cultural festivals. Neighbours were able to celebrate each other’s differences by joining in their neighbour’s festivals, thus showing their respect for the differences and their desire for togetherness.

A picture emerges from these studies of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a country where people of different religious groups lived peacefully together. There was no strong call for independence for Bosnia until the collapse of Yugoslavia was started by the secession from the federation of Croatia and Slovenia, and although Bosnian Croats and Serbs identified to some extent with nationalists in those countries, Bosnian Muslims did not have a history of nationalism or separate organisation. Although they were the largest single group in Bosnia, they were not an overall majority of the population, and had no history of collective action, either as a majority or as a minority. The implication of this for the people displaced by war is that they themselves may not have identified themselves strongly as Muslim, Croat or Serb. Further, to identify oneself as Bosnian is not straightforward, since there remains the unresolved issue of whether the primary identifier in that is religion (Muslim) or geographical origin (Bosnia-Herzegovina).
remains to be seen how a group of refugees who are predominately Muslim can manage to mobilise themselves as an ethnic group on arrival in Britain. Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina have no history of organisation and mobilisation along ethnic lines, and instead have been divided when they have been forced to choose between competing powers.

Despite having lived peacefully together, as communism and the Yugoslav state collapsed, Bosnians turned to nationalist parties for a solution. To understand the reasons for this it is necessary to understand some of the history of the region.

**Ancient history**

The history of the territory now known as Bosnia-Herzegovina is complicated and confusing, and the waters have been muddied considerably by writers during this century and the last who have tried to impose particular racial or ethnic identities on the people who live there.

Like most, if not all, European countries, archaeologists have established that the territory has been settled by a succession of peoples over thousands of years. These included Illyrians, Romans, Goths, Slavs and many others. Each successive wave contributed to the population of the area in ancient times, and so none of the settlers and invaders can be said to hold the key to the ethnic origin of the inhabitants, since even the largest groups of settlers were never greater in number than the incumbent population (Malcolm 1996).
Malcolm (1996) asserts that there is no single ethnic origin for the peoples of the area and those claiming a unique ethnic heritage for each religious group are incorrect, and that in fact all three share a common history.

The Turkish army invaded Bosnia in 1463, and rapidly took control of the whole country. The Ottoman feudal system was installed, and the religion of Islam was introduced. In the fourteenth century, before the arrival of Ottoman rule, three religious groups were present in Bosnia. In the North and West there were Catholics, recognising the Pope as head of their church. In the South and East, there were Serbian Orthodox bishops, priests, and some churches. In the central region, covering the area to the Drina river in the East and as far south as the Neretva river in the South, there existed the Bosnian church, neither Catholic nor Orthodox. All three religious groups were rather remote from the majority of the population. The Catholic and Bosnian churches centred on monasteries, and large sections of the ordinary population would have rarely seen a priest (Fine 1994). The nature of the Bosnian church has been argued over by many scholars, with different scholars giving different explanations of its origins. These different theories in turn gain support from different historians and scholars, depending on which way they prefer to see the origins of Bosnia’s Muslims and the Bosnian State. Linking the Bosnian church to either the Catholic or Orthodox churches implies a close affinity between Bosnian and either Croatia or Serbia. Consequently identifying it as unique, in turn supports the view of Bosnia and the Muslim part of its population as having unique origins (Friedman 1996, Malcolm 1996).

In the 19th century, an important Croatian historian, Franjo Racki, argued that the Bosnian church was a branch of the Bulgarian heretical movement, the Bogomils.
(Malcolm 1996). Racki argued strongly that the Bosnian church was distinct from the Catholic and Orthodox churches, whose beliefs and customs were strongly rejected by the Bogomils. The distinctiveness of the Bosnian church is an attractive notion for those who wish to assert that Bosnia’s Muslims have distinct origins, and are not simply Serbs or Croats who converted. This theory gives a partial explanation for the number of conversions to Islam that took place during Ottoman rule. If much of the population allied itself with the Bosnian church, whose heretical beliefs were such that the church had been at odds with both Catholic and Orthodox churches, then conversion to Islam may have seemed preferable to becoming part of one of the two Christian Churches. This theory became popular with many Bosnian Muslims in the twentieth century, as it gave an explanation of their origins as a group distinct from Catholic and Orthodox Christians, rather than seeing them as converts from those religions (Friedman 1996, Malcolm 1996).

Other theories of the nature of the Bosnian church dispute the idea that the church was Bogomil. One historian, writing at the same time as Racki, argued that the Bosnian church was in fact originally a Serbian church, but over time it developed some ideas which were heretical, and had broken its links with the Serbian church. This gained support from those Serbian writers who sought to demonstrate that Bosnia was in reality closely linked to Serbia. Another theory was that the Bosnian church was essentially Catholic, but which developed some heretical tendencies. This theory became popular with some Catholic writers, who, similarly to Serbian writers, were seeking to demonstrate that Bosnia was closely linked with Catholicism and Croatia (Malcolm 1996). Fine (Fine 1994) argues that in reality by the time the Ottoman empire invaded in 1463, the majority of the Bosnian population were likely to have been largely indifferent
to organised religion. There were few priests, of either Orthodox or Catholic religion, and religious practices took place mostly within monasteries. The Ottoman conquest of Bosnia was not completed until 1482, and in the intervening period the only possible source of outside support in the Bosnia resistance to Ottoman invasion was from the neighbouring Catholic countries (Banac 1994). This led to increased influence for the Catholic church in Bosnia. The Orthodox church could not be considered as likely to offer any support, since the leader of the Orthodox community was based in Constantinople, at the heart of the Ottoman empire. The Catholic church considered the Bosnian church to be heretical, and insisted on the conversion to Catholicism of the Bosnian priests as a condition of support, and any that refused to convert were forced to leave (Malcolm 1996).

Although there were no forced conversions to Islam in Bosnia, many people did convert as there were advantages to being a Muslim within the Ottoman Empire. For example, peasants could gain some security of tenure and gain ownership of a small parcel of land (Malcolm 1996). Malcolm (1996) shows that the rate of conversions was slow, and it was not until around the late sixteenth or early seventeenth century that Muslims became a majority of the population. Ottoman records show that there was not a great rate of immigration into Bosnia from other regions of the empire, and conversions rather than immigration are responsible for the rise in numbers of Muslims.

The Ottoman empire was a Muslim empire, but other religions were tolerated, as is evidenced by the presence in Constantinople of the Orthodox patriarch. The collapse of the Bosnian church did not precipitate a large-scale conversion of the population of Bosnia. As was mentioned above the population as a whole was likely to have been only
loosely attached to their nominal religious group. The Ottoman empire did not have a policy of forced conversions in Bosnia, and though eventually many people did convert to Islam this was a very slow process, and throughout the period of Ottoman rule conversions occurred from and to each of Catholicism, Orthodoxy and Islam (Malcolm 1996). Though the Ottomans were tolerant of both Catholicism and Orthodoxy, they were more sympathetic towards Orthodoxy as it was not considered as subversive. The head of the Catholic Church, the Pope in Rome, actively supported and sometimes initiated the Crusades, which were mounted to oppose the Ottoman

The period of Ottoman rule, described in detail in Malcolm (1996), continued until 1878 when Bosnia was incorporated into the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The period until 1914 saw investment in Bosnia's infrastructure and the development of industries. The three main religious groups, Catholic, Orthodox and Muslim, as well as a Jewish population, continued to live in Bosnia, and Malcolm (1996) quotes an American journalist who visited Bosnia in 1902 as saying the members of the different faiths mixed together freely and showed mutual respect and toleration. Despite this, however, Bosnia remained unstable, and the object of territorial ambitions by several of its neighbours. Relations between Serbia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire were particularly tense, and in 1914 a Serb nationalist assassinated the heir to the Habsburg throne, Archduke Ferdinand, as he drove through Sarajevo. This incident is widely interpreted as the event which marks the beginning of a train of events which culminated in the outbreak of the First World War.
The First Yugoslavia, 1918 to 1941

After the outbreak of World War in 1914, the collapse of the Habsburg Empire looked possible for the first time. As the war progressed the Serbian army recaptured Serbia and gained control of Montenegro. Despite the reservations many people had about becoming part of a greater Serbia or Croatia, Slav politicians in the territory controlled by the Habsburg empire formed a National Committee, based in Zagreb, and this committee sought unification with Serbia at the end of the war in order to prevent their becoming part of yet another empire. This eventually led to the formation in 1918 of a Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was originally called the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and it was headed by Prince Alexander of Serbia.

Malcolm (1996) notes that during this period Muslim political power increased, but at the same time secularisation was progressing. Bosnian Muslims were slower to abandon traditional dress than Christians and Orthodox member of the population, and because of this they were a visible presence, but Malcolm (1996) quotes a journalist visiting Sarajevo in 1930 who comments on the dress of the Muslims but comments that the different religious groups seemed to fit happily together.

Despite its theoretical unity, the Kingdom of Serbs Croats and Slovenes was beset by divisions and rivalries, and in an attempt to create a greater degree of unification the King renamed the country ‘Yugoslavia’ in 1929, and imposed a centralised administration. This reorganisation saw the partitioning of Bosnia, as the new administration sought to create unity by redrawing the administrative map. This was the first time in four hundred
years that Bosnia-Herzegovina had been partitioned, and many in Bosnia were unhappy with this development. Croats within Croatia and Bosnia felt that the centralisation of power was in fact increasing Serbian influence, and one prominent Bosnian Croat politician, Ante Pavelic, left the country. He went on to organise a movement with support from Mussolini campaigning for Croatian independence known as the ‘Ustase’.

In an attempt to placate Croatian demands for autonomy, a plan was adopted in 1939 whereby Croatia would have its own parliament and a large measure of independence within Yugoslavia. The territory classed as Croatia included large areas of what had been Bosnia, whilst the remaining areas of Bosnia were mainly those with a Serb majority and were kept under the control of the centralised Yugoslav government. This in effect meant that Bosnia was controlled by Croatia and Serbia, as Serbia was the dominant power in Yugoslavia, and many Muslims were unhappy with this arrangement.

When war began in Europe in 1939, the government of Yugoslavia realised that it was unlikely to find support from other countries, since France had quickly collapsed and the countries of Europe were busy on other fronts. The annexation of Austria brought the German Reich to the borders of Yugoslavia, and in order to avert invasion the government followed a policy of appeasement. However, this appeasement was of only limited effect, and in 1941 the government was pressurised by Germany to sign a pact with the Axis powers. This in turn led to a coup against the government led by the army and some Serbian political parties, which introduced a government of national unity. Although this new government tried to behave in a conciliatory way towards Germany, after only ten days the country was invaded by a combination of German, Italian,
Hungarian and Bulgarian troops. Yugoslavia was soon overrun, and after eleven days the army surrendered.

The Second World War

The surrender of the Yugoslav army left Yugoslavia in the control of the Axis powers who divided control of the territory between them. The Germans established an independent Croatia with a fascist government which included the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Two main resistance movements to the Axis occupation were formed, the Cetniks and the communist partisans. Tito led the partisan group, and at the end of the war he became president of a reunited Communist Yugoslavia. During the war the Croatian fascists bitterly opposed the predominantly Serb partisans, and there are documented accounts of many atrocities committed by the Ustase. Despite being originally Serbian organisations, both the partisans and the Cetniks acquired members from other ethnic groups during the course of the war (Malcolm 1996).

The Ustase movement was openly fascist, and as well as actively supporting German anti-Semitic policies, ultimately leading to the death of 12,000 of Bosnia’s 14,000 Jewish population, carried out actions intended to remove the Serb population in the new Croatia. Many atrocities were carried out in the areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina controlled by Croatia, and Malcolm (1996) says that by July 1941 “even the Germans were complaining about the brutality of these attacks” (Malcolm 1996). These actions encouraged Serbs to join either the Cetniks or the communist partisans, which although fighting a common enemy were also rivals. Some Cetniks’ ambitions were for the
creation of a powerful Serbia, which should not contain any non-Serbs despite their desire to control territory covering Bosnia and beyond. There was also a measure of anti-Muslim feeling, as Muslims were considered to have collaborated with the Ustase in anti-Serb actions. Although there may have been some collaboration, in fact many Muslims simply failed to prevent the actions of the Ustase in their area, and Cetniks killed many Muslims in reprisal. Partisans also carried out attacks on Muslims at times, again for their failure to oppose actions against Serbs.

During the course of the war the partisans grew in strength, and by 1944 they were given backing by Allied powers including Britain, who had previously supported the Cetniks. The partisans fought a war not just against the Germans, but also against the Cetniks, and as German forces retreated the partisans, supported by Soviet troops, took control of most of the country. Bosnian Muslims rarely joined the Cetniks, due to the atrocities committed by them against Muslim villagers, but towards the end of 1941 the partisan commanders began controlling their forces more tightly and prevented further atrocities by their troops. This led to Muslims joining the partisans in increasing numbers, although some did join the Cetniks, and some continued to support the Ustase.

The importance of this period in Bosnia’s history is to underline two major facts about the area. Firstly, the country had been the focus of ambitions of other nations for many years, and the Second World War fighting which took place on Bosnian soil was not between Bosnians, but rather between competing foreign powers who were able to command support from only part of the population. Secondly, the response of the three religious groups differed, although Muslim Bosnians did not have a unified response.
Instead, they could be found among the ranks of the different factions, and could not be said to have behaved as a group.

During the course of the war the partisans became the pre-eminent opposition to the Axis powers, and eventually with support from Allied forces were able to gain control of the whole country. They had also been able to defeat the Cetnik forces, and emerged at the end of the war in a position to form a national government.


The Yugoslavia established by the partisans at the end of the war was a Socialist Federal Republic consisting of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Macedonia, and Montenegro. The constitution adopted in 1946 recognised that the state consisted of a federation of equal nations and national minorities, and sought to respect the national integrity of each republic (Necak 1995). The amended constitution of 1974 devolved substantial power to the individual republics as well as to the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina.

In 1945, Albania was the only European country which was poorer and less developed than Yugoslavia (Schierup 1991). However, there were great differences between the constituent republics in their wealth and development. Slovenia and Croatia in the North were in an economically stronger position than the Southern republics of Macedonia and Bosnia-Hercegovina (Schierup 1991). The government recognised that a process of rapid
industrialisation needed to be undertaken in order that the country could grow economically.

Despite being communist, Tito refused to be a puppet to the Soviet government, at that time ruled by Stalin, and sought to follow a path that was socialist without being Stalinist. This led to a break with the Soviet Union in 1948, and from then onwards Yugoslavia followed its own path. As it was situated between the Eastern bloc Communist countries and the Western capitalist countries, a new model of Socialism had to be developed if a Socialist Yugoslavia was to survive. The state which emerged was overtly Socialist, but did not slavishly follow the teachings of Marx as interpreted by Stalin, or indeed Lenin, but which drew on a variety of intellectual sources including early Marxism and social democracy (Dimitrijevic 1995). The ideological shift that occurred when Yugoslavia split from the Soviet sphere of domination deserves further analysis. Dimitrijevic (1995) suggests that this split can be regarded as the first indicator of the fallacy of a major aspect of the communist project, the universal proletariat. Tito’s embrace of national communism for Yugoslavia in 1948 led logically to the development of separate communist parties for the constituent republics, and Dimitrijevic considers this to be evidence of the legitimisation of nationalism.

As far as industrialisation was concerned, the principle of worker participation became important, as did the notion of distributing factories around the country in order that each region would benefit from economic growth. This led to local, as opposed to central, control of industry. This Yugoslav model of development, which was far less centralised and bureaucratic than that which existed in the other Communist countries to the East, was admired in both the West and the East (Cohen 1995a).
The system of political control was also less centralised than in the other Eastern bloc countries, and each republic had a degree of independence from the centre. It was hoped that this would allay fears of the state being dominated by its largest republic, Serbia. Seen alongside the federal system of government, a picture emerged of a state which felt it had overcome 'inter-ethnic' problems.

Areas such as Croatia and Slovenia were wealthier and more economically developed than areas such as Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia. In turn, this led to differing levels of unemployment, wages and GNP in the different republics. A series of economic reforms in the 1970s further accentuated these differences, and a fund established to bring about a measure of redistribution of wealth between regions became a source of conflict, as richer regions objected to the subsidies going to poorer areas. These complaints became louder in the 1980s when there was yet another economic crisis in Yugoslavia. This uneven development coupled with a decentralised economic system of state socialism led to inter-region rivalry, with each region wanting for itself whatever gains it considered another region to have. This in turn contributed to the regionalisation of the economy. In each region, trade took place largely within the borders of the region or with outside countries, with very little trade taking place between regions. In some cases this led to one region exporting a raw material, whilst another imported that same raw material from the world market. Decentralisation meant that each republic could largely take control of its own affairs, and this led to each republic having its own telecommunications company, its own railway company, and its own transport and energy organisations. The level of inter-regional communication was so low that Schierup (1990) suggests there was more co-operation between the rail companies of
neighbouring European countries than between those of the Yugoslav republics. This meant that each had their own standards, and there was no form of agreement on purchasing, so negotiations with foreign companies for purchases took place on a region by region basis, rather than at a national level.

Bosnia-Herzegovina in Yugoslavia

During the existence of the Second Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina was one of the constituent republics. Its population was a mixture of Muslims, Catholics, and Orthodox Christians, along with small Jewish and Roma populations. Catholics and Orthodox Christians had begun to call themselves Croat and Serb respectively from the late nineteenth century onwards, although this identification was based solely on religion rather than on descent (Malcolm 1996). Muslims in Bosnia, when forced to choose between these two labels, tended to opt for a label that gave the most advantages at that time, and at different periods in Bosnia's history the Muslim population has called itself Croat or Serb or a mixture of both in differing proportions. The first census in Yugoslavia allowed Muslims to choose between 'Muslim Serb', 'Muslim Croat' or 'Muslim, nationality undeclared', and although the vast majority of Muslims were 'undeclared' (nearly 800,000) there were some who chose the other categories (72,000 and 25,000 respectively). In the census of 1953 there was no category of 'Muslim', but instead a new category was introduced of 'Yugoslav, nationality undeclared', and almost nine hundred thousand chose this category. Although this number may have included
some non-Muslims, it was also the category chosen by Muslims who did not consider
themselves to be Serb or Croat. A later census allowed identification as ‘Muslim in the
ethnic sense’, but it was not until 1971 that a category of ‘Muslim in the sense of a
nation’ was introduced. This for the first time allowed Muslims to identify themselves as
such, without implying they followed religious practices, and the classification of
Muslims as a nation meant that they had the same status as a people as Bosnian Serbs and
Bosnian Croats (Friedman 1996, Malcolm 1996).

According to Friedman (1996), many of the senior posts within Yugoslavia’s republics
were filled according to ethnic criteria. So the identification of Muslims as a nation and
their emergence as the single largest group in Bosnia-Herzegovina meant that they had
increased influence within the Bosnian government. It is possible that the increased
power given to Muslims, which was necessarily at the expense of Croats and Serbs,
provided a basis for resentment among politicians and Communist party members which
nationalists were able to exploit later.

At the same time as these political developments were taking place in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, there was not corresponding economic development. Bosnia remained
relatively undeveloped and backwards economically compared to the rest of Yugoslavia,
and in fact its economic position relative to the other republics worsened during the
1950s and 1960s (Malcolm 1996). The economic situation and the poorer standard of
living contributed to a high rate of emigration to other parts of Yugoslavia, and the
numbers of Bosnian Serbs emigrating to Serbia was largely responsible for Bosnian
Muslims becoming the largest single group in Bosnia by the mid 1960s (Malcolm 1996).
Economic and political changes in Yugoslavia meant that in the 1970s the economic situation seemed to improve, and Bosnian authorities began renovation and improvement works. However much of this work was funded by borrowing and the economic difficulties of the 1980s affected Bosnia-Herzegovina badly.

**Kosovo and the emergence of Milosevic**

When Yugoslavia’s internal borders were created in 1945, two areas which had been controlled by Serbia in an earlier part of the century were given a large degree of independence. Vojvodina, where Serbs were less than half of the population, was declared an autonomous province. Kosovo, which had a large Albanian majority, was declared an autonomous region. Under the decentralisation reforms of 1974 these areas were given increased independence and their status became close to that of the republics (Bennett 1995, Malcolm 1996). As Kosovo increased control over its own affairs, some Serbs within Kosovo began to feel they were being treated unfairly by the ‘Albanianisation’ of the region. At the same time, the poor economic conditions of Kosovo induced some Serbs to leave to seek a better standard of living elsewhere. These two factors combined to fuel a growing Serbian nationalist movement within Serbia which felt that Kosovo needed to be brought under full Serbian control.

Kosovo, although it had not had a Serbian majority population for centuries, had a symbolic importance to Serbian nationalism, being the site of important battles in previous centuries and home to some of the Serbian Orthodox church’s holiest sites.
(Silber & Little 1995). Kosovo became a focus for Serbian nationalism, and since the Albanian population were largely Muslim, Serbian nationalist rhetoric began to include openly anti-Islamic references (Malcolm 1996).

Competing claims of the Serbian and Albanian populations led to unrest, which was not quelled by the imposition of martial law, and in 1986 a group of prominent Serbian intellectuals petitioned the Serb parliament demanding they intervene in Kosovo to prevent the 'genocide' of the Serb people there, and to bring Kosovo into Serbia proper (Magas 1993). 1987 the president of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, visited Kosovo to see the conditions there for himself. On being told by a crowd of Serbs that they were being mistreated, Milosevic assured them that no one had the right to beat them, and some commentators cite this as the incident which sparked the break-up of Yugoslavia (Almond 1994, Kellas 1991, Schierup 1991). From 1987 onwards, Milosevic became increasingly nationalist, and purged non-nationalists from the communist party (Magas 1993). It seems that at the time, the problems in Kosovo were blamed on inter-ethnic rivalries, and so were seized on by nationalists, and any economic causes for the unrest there were ignored by the majority of politicians.

**Economic difficulties of the 1980s**

During the 1980s Yugoslavia faced an economic crisis, as the mismanagement of previous years began to take its effect. Yugoslavia had invested heavily in large industrial complexes, financed by foreign loans, but many of these enterprises were never economic. As loans still had to be repaid, the country became poorer and some
enterprises were closed, causing unemployment. The rate of inflation began to increase, reaching 120% in 1987, and 250% in 1988. The dinar was devalued and, coupled with the spiralling inflation, many ordinary people saw the value of their savings disappear overnight. The economic crisis fuelled dissatisfaction with communism and with the economic arrangements of the country. As a result the federal government’s attempts at economic reform were met with widespread unrest and demonstrations (Malcolm 1996).

This was not the first time that Yugoslavia had faced economic crisis, and the 1960s had also been a time of economic stagnation, mass unemployment, rising inflation and labour unrest, although the situation in the 1980s was more severe. However, in the 1960s the discontent that this generated was channelled into the radical student movement, which supported the working class and was able to prevent further reforms to the economy. In the 1980s, the working class was just as unhappy as they had been in the 1960s, but this time there was no movement to which they could look for support. Instead, the reactions of party officials and many intellectuals was to look at the effects purely in their own region, seeking a local solution and so furthering nationalist claims.

Seeking local solutions meant that richer areas of Yugoslavia, such as Slovenia and Croatia, were aware that their economic situation was being negatively affected by the poorer regions, and attempts to improve their own situation inevitably meant overlooking the plight of the other regions.

At the same time that the economy was suffering, political changes were occurring, and soon Croatia and Slovenia were seeking to leave the Yugoslav federation.
Political unrest and the secession of Croatia and Slovenia

Both Slovenia and Croatia saw the increasing control over Kosovo as an indication of Serbian expansionist aspirations, whilst Milosevic’s open support for Serb chauvinism in Croatia and desire for increased centralisation enhanced nationalist feelings in both countries (Friedman 1996). Political leaders of both countries began to mobilise nationalist sentiments, and to consider ceding from the federation. During federal presidium meetings in 1990 and 1991 the issue of Croatian and Slovenian secession was discussed. Milosevic apparently said that he would allow Croatia to secede, so long as they did not take with them regions where large numbers of Serbs lived (Glenny 1992).

New political parties were formed in Yugoslavia from 1988 onwards, independent of the communist party (Malcolm 1996). At the same time as communist regimes collapsed in the rest of Europe, the communist party in Yugoslavia became increasingly divided, and in 1990 the party collapsed. In many of the republics, the communist party reformed under a new name, but with openly nationalist aspirations (Bennett 1995). Multi-party elections were held in Slovenia and Croatia in January 1990, which in Slovenia were won by a liberal-nationalist coalition, and in Croatia were won by a new Croatian nationalist party, HDZ, led by Franjo Tudjman, who had been leader of the communist party in Croatia.

In an attempt to prevent the break-up of the federation, Izetbegovic, the president of Bosnia, and Gligorov, the president of Macedonia, tried to propose a revised constitution, under which some republics would have large degrees of autonomy whilst remaining within a federation. They hoped that this would satisfy Slovenian, Croatian and Serb
demands, but the proposal floundered when shortly afterwards the Slovenian parliament announced that it was soon to declare independence (Silber & Little 1995).

Slovenia declared itself an independent republic on 25th June 1991, as did Croatia. On the same day the federal government discussed the issue of secession and agreed that Slovenia's independence would not be allowed. The Yugoslav army was sent to try to bring Slovenia back into the federation, but after ten days a peace agreement was brokered between the Slovene government and the Yugoslav government, and the troops gradually withdrew. Despite requests from Slovenia to prevent it, Croatia had not taken steps to prevent the movement of Yugoslav troops across its territory into Slovenia, considering it was not in Croatia's interests to become involved in a war between Serbia and Slovenia. President Tudjman thought that he had an agreement with Serbia, but as attention moved away from Slovenia, the troops instead turned to Croatia, and began opposing their withdrawal from the federation (Silber & Little 1995).

During the early part of 1991 Serb irregular soldiers began claiming parts of Croatia with significant Serb populations, and from July onwards the Yugoslav army was present in force but standing behind the irregulars. In September 1991, the fighting became an open war between Croatia and the Yugoslav army, which by then was Serb dominated. The war caused many deaths and casualties, but the Yugoslav and Croatian leaders were able to declare a truce in November 1991, and international monitors entered areas of Croatia with large Serb populations to try to ensure the maintenance of peace. By the end of the year, Croatia was fully independent apart from those Serbian populated areas.
Independence for Croatia meant that Bosnian leaders felt they had little choice but to also seek independence, fearing that otherwise their country would become part of a Greater Serbia (Malcolm 1996).

**1992: War in Bosnia**

In the Bosnian elections of 1990, there were five major parties competing for seats. The SDA, Stranka Demokraske Akcije, was led by Alija Izetbegovic, who had been imprisoned in the 1970s for his views on the role of Islam in public life and politics. The party formally supported the continuance of unity with Yugoslavia, though Izetbegovic had warned that this was conditional on the presence within the federation of Croatia and Slovenia. The party initially tried to appeal to all sections of the Muslim population, both secular and non-secular. The HDZ, Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica, represented Bosnian Croats, and was founded as a branch of the ruling HDZ of Croatia. Its policies were closely modelled of those of the Croatian party, and the party called for the secession of Bosnia. The SDS, Srpska Demokratska Stranka Bosne i Hercegovine, was led by Radovan Karadzic, and represented Bosnian Serbs. The party was opposed both to secession of Bosnia, and to any constitutional changes which might have led to Serbs being ruled by another group. The other two parties were not nationalist and attempted to appeal to all groups within the country. The SK-SDP, Savez Komunista- Socijalisticka Demokratska Partija was the party of reformed Communists and was led by a Muslim Communist, Nijaz Durakovic. The SSRJ, Savez Reformskih Snaga Jugoslavije, acted as an umbrella party for many smaller liberal democratic and reformist parties, but opposed
Bosnian independence and supported the federal president Ante Markovic and his economic reforms. There was no party which supported Bosnian independence and was also anti-communist; those who wished to express their opposition to Communism had to do so through voting for one of the nationalist parties (Almond 1994, Burg & Shoup 1999, Magas 1993).

The result of the election was that the majority of the electorate voted along ethnic lines, with Muslims supporting the SDA, Serbs supporting the SDS and Croats supporting the HDZ. Initially the three nationalist parties formed a coalition government, but after a year the coalition collapsed (Silber & Little 1995). Bosnia-Herzegovina was forced to confront the events happening in Croatia, as fighting between Croats and Serbs there threatened to spill over into Bosnia. Bosnian Serbs in Northern Bosnia had begun to form local defence units towards the end of 1990, and were mounting guard on villages to prevent any attack from Croatian troops crossing the border. These defence units received covert support from Serbia and the Yugoslav army (Ramet 1996), since the area was strategically important to them. It was important to be able to move men and weapons across the area to support the Serbs in the Krajina region of Croatia (Almond 1994).

As the coalition government collapsed, the SDS established its own ministries and departments in Northern Bosnia, allegedly to defend the interests of the Serb population there, and the Yugoslav army sent troops to the region. These troops remained in place even when Bosnia declared independence.

The international recognition of Croatia and the uneasy peace that they negotiated with Serbia prompted action in Bosnia. Without Croatia and Slovenia, the Yugoslav federation was dominated by Serbia, and leaders of the SDA and HDZ were concerned as to the
consequences of this. The SDA felt that unless they sought independence the whole of Bosnia would become a part of Serbia, and this would have strongly negative implications for the Muslim population, as Serb nationalists had been demonising Muslims for some time. Together the SDA and HDZ argued that Bosnia-Herzegovina needed to become an independent state, and in December 1991 they requested that the European Union give the country diplomatic recognition (Ramet 1996). The following day the Serb politicians in Northern Bosnia and Herzegovina declared the creation of a Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The European Community announced that a referendum on independence was needed before they would recognise Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent state (Almond 1994, Bennett 1995, Glenny 1999). Though this ballot, held on the 28th February 1992, resulted in a vote overwhelmingly in favour of independence, a large proportion of the Serbian population boycotted the process after the leaders of the SDS declared it was their duty to refuse to vote. In response to this result, Serb gunmen placed barricades around Sarajevo on March 1st (Bennett 1995). The government in Sarajevo ignored the barricades and declared independence on March 3rd.

Karadjic, the Bosnian Serb leader, openly talked of war as a response to independence, in order to keep the Serbian populated areas of Bosnia within Yugoslavia. There was sporadic violence between then and April, and on April 2nd Arkanovci, a paramilitary organisation led by a Serbian gangster, raided the town of Bijeljina. On April 5th Bosnian Serb gunmen fired shots from the Holiday Inn in Sarajevo at an anti-war demonstration. The event which marked the beginning of the war proper was when Bosnian Serbs, supported by the Yugoslav Army, formed a military front on the Eastern border of Bosnia
and on April 6th began to force their way west. That was the same day that the European Union recognised Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent state. After five weeks Bosnian Serbs controlled 60% of the country (Ramet 1996). The use of Yugoslav troops was the subject of international condemnation, and Milosevic announced that he would withdraw Yugoslav troops from Bosnia in May. However, of the 89,000 troops which the Yugoslav army had sent in, only 14,000 were withdrawn and the rest were transferred to the control of Karadzic and renamed the Army of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Ramet 1996).

As Bosnian Serbs took control of towns and villages in Northern Bosnia, the phrase 'ethnic cleansing' (etnicko ciscenje) entered the international vocabulary (Silber & Little 1995). The Serb paramilitary units were determined that areas under their control would be emptied (cleansed) of their non-Serb population by any means necessary, and often this meant large scale violence and mass killings. In some areas, such as the town of Orasac, the Serbian forces were militarily superior and the towns surrendered with little violence. In these cases the townspeople were ordered to leave their homes and the women and children were allowed to leave after being stripped of any valuables. The men were taken prisoner, and held in camps where they received beatings and maltreatment. Some of the men, whose names were on a list, were separated out and taken away. Their fate was never determined, although they are believed to be dead. In other areas, the process was even more brutal, with men being shot in front of their wives and children, and the rape of women. During this time many died or fled, and many men were taken prisoner.
Concentration camps in Bosnia

The men that were held as prisoners were kept in camps, and the most notorious of these were at Trnopolje, Manjaca, and the far worse Omarska and Keraterm. In all four, the prisoners, who were mainly Muslim but also some Croats were present, were predominantly from the surrounding towns and villages of Northern Bosnia, and they were held under shocking conditions. In Trnopolje and Manjaca there were appalling conditions and random beatings and sadistic practices. At Omarska and Keraterm the regime was worse, and there were random beatings, starvation rations as well as frequent executions. Some were tortured, and some were forced to torture others. The men were separated according to whether they had been important, such as politicians, leaders, or officers of the Bosnian militias and defence units, and most of these were killed soon after arrival. Men who had been members of the territorial defence units were held in Omarska and Keraterm, and those who were judged not to have been involved were either transferred to Trnopolje or Manjaca, or were exchanged for Serbs who had been taken prisoner by government forces.

Case study

Damir, who was eighteen, and his father Mehmet were taken prisoner at the same time. They had tried to defend their village, but had only rifles to oppose the heavy artillery of the Serbs. They surrendered when it became obvious that they would be killed if they resisted any longer. Damir's mother and sister were put with the other women and children on a truck taking them out of town, and Damir and Mehmet were taken with
many of the other men to one of the camps. They were very badly treated, but one incident stands out. One day they were taken out of the shed where they were being held and put in adjacent rooms. They could no longer see each other but could hear what was going on. First, Mehmet was beaten, but he tried not to scream too loudly because he knew his son could hear everything. Then they started beating Damir, and as Damir screamed he called out for his father. The guards opened the door and allowed Mehmet to crawl in, and both thought the beatings were over. But then the guards began beating Damir again, and this time forced his father to watch.

This account illustrates the horrific nature of their treatment, but it is by no means an unusual story. Most of the accounts that I was given were far more gruesome than this, and an indication of the severity of treatment which went on is that these men were not among those invited to give evidence at the war crimes tribunal held several years later.

An American reporter, who was the first to report on the existence of the camps, reported that at Omarska hundreds of men were held in sheds or warehouses with no sanitation and were not allowed exercise. They were given very little food or water, and many died as a result. Rumours began about the existence of these camps and reports by Gutman about the camp at Manjaca appeared in the American magazine Newsday, which led to questions being asked of Karadzic at a news conference in Britain. He denied the existence of concentration camps. Instead, he said, there were prisoner of war camps and journalists could visit them if they wished. Two journalists, from ITN and the Guardian, went to the area, and produced video and photographic evidence of the camp at Omarska. The images they produced have become notorious, showing as they did skeletal men
staring from behind a wire fence. The Guardian reporter reported that when it was time to eat, the men were given precisely three minutes to get to the room where the food was, eat the scalding hot stew, and return (Danner 1997).

The treatment meted out to prisoners in the camps, and to the general population, was often characterised by extreme violence and atrocities, and it is not clear why this is so. Lapeyronnic (in Joly 1998a), in a study of racism in France, suggested that as the distance between the racist and the racialised decreases, the virulence of racism increases. Perhaps there is a similar feature at work in Bosnia, with the closeness of the different groups and the similarities between them so strong, that it was necessary to dehumanise those being attacked in order to perpetuate the war. In addition, extremes of behaviour make reconciliation more difficult, and so increases the chances of long term success for separatist leaders.

Proof of the existence of the camps meant that pressure could be brought to improve conditions and release the inmates, a process that eventually happened with the intervention of the Red Cross. Karadzic agreed to close the camps with the proviso that the inmates were removed from the combat area (Silber & Little 1995), and gradually the detainees were decanted out to safe areas in Bosnia and Croatia.

**Refugees and displaced persons in Bosnia**

As a result of the use of ethnic cleansing and the concentration camps, as well as the general fighting, there was a massive population movement. A US Senate report of 18th August 1992 states that there was by then an area within Bosnia bordering Serbia which
was exclusively Serb populated (Almond 1994). Those that were not dead had been displaced, and had made their way or were sent by the Serb forces to other parts of Bosnia and to Croatia, and over a million were displaced by mid July 1992. Some of those that were displaced remained in Bosnia, but there were large numbers crossing into Croatia, and some travelled on to Slovenia, and some were able to travel further and reached the countries of Europe, where they sought asylum. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees called for a compassionate and humanitarian response (Joly et al. 1997), but many European countries felt that they had already received enough refugees from the region and began to impose restrictions intended to curb the flow of refugees. As the war continued there were more people displaced, and by the end of 1992 around two million people, nearly half the population, were unable to return to their homes (Silber & Little 1995). As the nature of the war changed and Bosnian Croats started fighting Bosnian Muslims, even more people were forced to leave their homes.

**Fighting between Muslims and Bosnian Croats**

For the first year of the war, the Bosnian Croats were officially on the side of the Bosnian government. However, the Bosnian Croats of the Herzegovina region had been organised militarily before the war, and some had fought with Croatian forces in that country’s war with Yugoslavia. They continued to receive military support from Croatia, which had been instrumental in allowing Bosnian Croat forces (the HVO) to prevent Bosnian Serbs taking over large parts of Herzegovina. Although many expected them to carry on from that and assist the government troops in Sarajevo, they failed to do so and instead
consolidated their positions in Herzegovina. In April 1993, the HVO attacked a Muslim village, murdering many of the residents and destroying the buildings, and thus signalling that they were no longer supporting the Bosnian government.

In July of 1993, the HVO began arresting Muslim men in areas which they already controlled and held them in concentration camps. They also sought to extend their control over territory, and attacked and captured more towns and villages. Although each side by this time had established prisoner of war camps and/or concentration camps, at least two thirds of detainees in August 1993 were Muslims held by Croats (Silber & Little 1995). The camp established at Dretelj, south of Mostar, had a regime similar to that of the Serb run camps at Omarska and Keraterm, with random beatings, torture, executions, and starvation rations. Eventually international pressure on Croatia was able to force the closure of these camps, and the surviving detainees were moved to safe areas in Bosnia and Croatia.

International efforts continued to try to broker a peace agreement between the three sides, and after intense American pressure Croatia was persuaded to withdraw the troops that it had supporting the HVO in Bosnia. After intense negotiations, an agreement was reached in March 1994 between Croatia and Bosnia, and fighting between Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian government ended. After that date there were some joint offensives, and inroads were made into Serb-controlled territory. The course of the war, and the myriad changes to the front line, are too complex to describe succinctly, but eventually a form of peace was negotiated. Yet more negotiations, this time taking place in the US and lasting three weeks, resulted in the Dayton Agreement, and this marked the beginning of peace in Bosnia.
The Dayton Agreement

The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Dayton Agreement) was announced on November 21st 1995, and signed by the presidents of Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia in Paris on December 14th. The agreement split control of the territory in the ratio of 51:49 between the Muslim and Croat Federation and the Serb Republic. These were to form two entities with their own parliaments and administrative systems, but with a handful of concerns being the responsibility of a country-wide parliament. As such, the Agreement performs the unusual feat of both conceding partition and creating a single country (Glenny 1999).

An important section of the Dayton Agreement is Annex 7, which gives all refugees and internally displaced persons the right to return to the area where they used to live and restores property rights.

“All refugees and displaced persons have the right freely to return to their homes of origin. They shall have the right to have restored to them their property of which they were deprived in the course of hostilities since 1991 and to be compensated for any property that cannot be restored to them. The early return of refugees and displaced persons is an important objective of the settlement of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” (The Dayton Agreement 1995 annex 7)

Some authors have been very critical of the peace process and the Dayton Agreement. Pajic (1995) is very critical of the European sponsored peace process. He suggests that the project is akin to the imposition of apartheid, since the core principle is the division of
Bosnia along ethnic lines. This project, he suggests, is fundamentally unworkable in the Bosnian context, where communities and often families were ethnically heterogeneous. He points out that apartheid has collapsed in South Africa, and partition has been tried in other situations such as Cyprus and Palestine, but has failed to provide a lasting solution. "While apartheid, which is based on the total segregation of ethnic groups, is falling apart in South Africa, it is being reborn in Southern Europe." (Pajic 1995)

Although the Agreement contains provisions on human rights, the return of refugees to their home, and the creation of a unified army much of the Dayton provisions have yet to be enacted, and although there is peace currently, Glenny (1999) suggests that the settlement is full of anomalies and frictions, and says that the Bosnian question remains unanswered.

Causes of war in Bosnia Herzegovina

History can only describe the incidents and events leading up to the outbreak of war, but it is important to consider the causes of the war carefully. There are three main schools of thought on the causes of the war in Bosnia. One common explanation is that the war was the expression of ancient hatreds which had been suppressed under communism but resurfaced after the death of Tito (Kaplan 1993). This was the explanation used by some foreign leaders at the time, and was used by them to explain the futility of intervention (Cox 1998). The second school of thought is that the cause of the conflict was elite manipulation by former communist leaders, who utilised the manipulation of historical
material and mass media (Almond 1994, Bennett 1995, Glenny 1992, 1999, Thompson 1994). The third school of thought is that the structural features of former Yugoslavia were such that the collapse of communism led inevitably to the rise of ethnic nationalism (Magas 1993, Schierup 1990, 1991, 1999). Study of the history of the region and the conduct of the war shows that the 'ancient hatreds' thesis fails to offer a supportable explanation. Instead, the truth probably lies somewhere between the two latter schools of thought, with the real causes of the war a combination of elite manipulation and the particular form of economic and political development in the region.

The ancient hatreds thesis

The history of the region, discussed earlier, shows that there is no biological basis for the assumption of three separate ethnic groups. In addition, there is no long history of conflict between the groups. In contrast, the earliest writers on Bosnia noted the absence of conflict despite the presence of several religions (Bennett 1995, Malcolm 1996). To gain an understanding of the conflict in Bosnia Herzegovina, and hence to learn more about the situation of the refugees thus created, it is necessary to understand the history of the whole region. Malcolm (1996) contains a thorough history of the inhabitants of what is now Bosnia Herzegovina, and asserts that the ethnic origin of Muslims, orthodox Christians and Catholics is the same. These religious differences have been assumed by John Major, and many other commentators, as indicative of different ethnic origins, which in turn inevitably led to conflict between them.
The British prime minister, speaking of the conflict in Bosnia Herzegovina, explained the outbreak of violence thus:

"The biggest single element behind what has happened in Bosnia is the collapse of the Soviet Union and of the discipline that that exerted over the ancient hatreds in the old Yugoslavia. Once that discipline had disappeared, those ancient hatreds reappeared, and we began to see their consequences when the fighting occurred. There were subsidiary elements, but that collapse was by far the greatest." John Major, Hansard 23.6.93

John Major suggests that the Soviet Union's influence over Yugoslavia forced the already existing inter-ethnic tension underground, but when the Soviet Union collapsed this tension could be fully unleashed, and it emerged in the form of extreme violence. This view is supported by Necak (1995), who suggests that one of the major contributory factors in the collapse of the communist states was their neglect of questions of nationalism and national aspirations. Nationalism is antithetic to Marxism, and so those states which based their ideology on Marxism left nationalist issues unaddressed. Necak suggests that despite the apparent ideological differences between the Titoist form of socialism and the ideology of the other communist states, there was nonetheless a common management of ethnic tensions through the use of ideological restraint, which rather than eliminating ethnic tensions merely pushed them under the surface where they festered, only to reappear in a virulent form once communism finally collapsed.

However, a look at the history of Yugoslavia shows that contrary to John Major's opinion, the hold of the Soviet Union over Yugoslavia was almost non-existent after 1948. The government of Yugoslavia had differed with the government of the Soviet Union over a fundamental aspect of ideology. This suggests, therefore, that whilst the
break up of the Soviet Union may have been a significant factor in the break up of Yugoslavia, it cannot be seen as a move which unleashed ethnic tensions since its influence over Yugoslavia was such that it could never have contained them.

Fine (1994) suggests that both Serbian and Croatian protagonists have attempted to portray the conflict as an ethnic war in order to justify their expansion into territory which would otherwise be controlled by the Bosnian government. Historically, the majority of the population of the whole region, that is Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia, share a common Slav origin. The arrival of Islam during the rule of the Ottoman Empire resulted in the conversion of some of the population to Islam, but there were a large number of religious conversions in many directions, not just to Islam. During the Ottoman rule, the categorisation of the population was on the basis of religion, not according to ethnic labels. It was not until the late nineteenth century, after the introduction of Austrian rule, that nationalism became a force in the region and taught the equation of Catholicism with Croatian origin and Orthodoxy with Serbian origin. Fine (1994) says that these terms were meaningless, since the multiplicity of religious conversions since the arrival of the Ottoman empire meant that there was no way of knowing from which religious origin a particular adherent of any of the religions had descended.

The portrayal of the conflict as an ethnic one also ignores the fact that the Bosnian government contains members of all three religious groups, and that the population of the besieged urban areas such as Tuzla and Sarajevo remained ‘mixed’ throughout the war. Serbia and Croatia were pursuing a modernist agenda, seeking political control over swathes of territory, and following the political realist model of politics they sought security through strength and a nation state with a single ethnic identity. The Bosnian
state can be considered instead to be a post-modern ideal. The Bosnian state for which many people voted was not a Muslim state, nor even a state dominated by Muslims but which tolerated non Muslims. The ideology underpinning Bosnia in 1992 was a multi-ethnic state where differences were accepted and putative ethnic difference were unimportant.

"We are not on the road to a national state, our only way out is towards a free civic union. This is the future. Some people may want that (to make Bosnia a Muslim state), but this is not a realistic wish. Even though the Muslims are the most numerous nation in the republic, there are not enough of them ... they would have to comprise about seventy per cent of the population." (Alija Izetbegovic, 1990, quoted in Silber and Little 1995 page 230)

The peaceful coexistence was a reality in the urban areas of Bosnia, where up to 40% of all marriages in urban areas between the end of the second world war and the outbreak of war in Bosnia were 'mixed', that is they were between partners of different religious background (Fine 1994).

Necak's (1995) argument that ethnic tensions predated communism and were exacerbated by it are not entirely convincing, since he also asserts that the economic fortunes of the country are important, and the economic mismanagement and severe economic problems they brought in their wake. He further asserts that right up until the day after Slovenia's declaration of independence there was a possibility of the continuance of Yugoslavia as a loose federation. This does not appear, then, to entirely support his argument that communism incubated inter-ethnic tensions in a deterministic way.
Reliance on ethnicity and ethnic hatred cannot explain another aspect of the war: the relative lack of effort expended by Serb troops on the Muslim enclave of Bihac. Despite being surrounded by Serb troops, the Bihac region remained under Muslim control. There had been an attempt to gain control in 1992, but this failed, and in 1993 fighting in the area tailed off. The Serb army made no attempt to overrun the area, and permitted trade to take place between the area and Croatia, as well as the surrounding Serb controlled territory. The survival of Bihac is indication of two things. Firstly, ethnic tensions alone cannot account for the war, since if they were the sole cause then there is no reason why Bihac's Muslims should have been allowed to remain in the area. Secondly, economic forces had a major role in the conflict and in people's loyalties. Bihac was led by Fikret Abdic, who first came to prominence in Yugoslavia some years before. He had been director of a company called 'Agrokomerc', which at first had been considered the most successful of all the enterprises in Yugoslavia. The company, based in Bihac, began as a small chicken farm, but developed into an agro-industrial enterprise employing over 13,000 people. In August 1987, the bubble burst and it was revealed that the wealth of the company was based on economic fraud. The collapse of the company had far reaching effects, and the economy of the whole region collapsed. The federal leadership tried to blame the whole affair on the Bosnian republic's leaders, though the leaders of Agrokomerc had done the same as many other enterprises, though perhaps on a larger scale, and the leadership in Belgrade was therefore just as responsible (Burg & Shoup 1999, Magas 1993). Despite the collapse of the company, Abdic remained popular in the region, which he used to win an election in 1990 and to gain a seat on the presidency (Friedman 1996). Both the federal and republican governments failed to intervene to
support the region, beyond ensuring that mass starvation did not occur, and the region was plunged into mass unemployment and poverty. The political repercussions extended beyond Bihac, and it has been suggested that the affair was used as an excuse to purge the Muslim political elites (Friedman 1996, Magas 1993). Hamdija Pozderac was in 1987 the highest ranking Muslim politician in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but he was also from a family who were prominent in building up Agrokomerc’s unsecured debts. The collapse of the enterprise forced his resignation, but the Bosnian Muslims lost not only their vice-president. Pozderac was the next in line in Yugoslavia’s federal presidium, so the opportunity to have a Muslim federal president was also lost (Friedman 1996).

Abdic himself remained in the SDA, and remained politically active. Abdic attempted to make a separate deal with Serbs and Croats in 1993, despite strong opposition from the government in Sarajevo (Burg & Shoup 1999). This in turn led to an important, though often overlooked, event: the fighting between the Bosnian Government’s Fifth Corps, who had defended Bihac during 1992, and Muslim forces loyal to Abdic. This event is important, as it illustrates that divisions within the Muslim population were at times very strong, and the government did not always represent all of the Muslim population. After three months of fighting, a cease-fire agreement was signed in January 1994, and the Fifth corps took control of most of the region. Soon after this, Serb forces attacked the Government forces to prevent them taking over the area where Abdic’s troops remained. The heaviest fighting of 1994 took place in Bihac, as Government troops fought both Serbs and Abdic’s troops, who received support from Serbs within Croatia (Burg & Shoup 1999).
Few scholars support the notion that the cause of the war in Bosnia was the re-emergence of ethnic hatreds, and instead alternative explanations have been sought focussing on the manipulation of the population by elites or the political economy of the country.

Political elites and the role of the mass media

Silber and Little (1995) suggest that to call the conflict inevitable is "to avoid addressing oneself to the central dynamic of the war" (Silber & Little 1995 page xxiii). They locate the origins of the conflict in the rise of Serbian nationalism in the mid 1980s among intellectuals in Belgrade, and suggest Milosevic consciously used nationalism in order to gain power in Serbia, and this in turn provoked other republics to try to leave the Yugoslav Federation.

Bennett (1995) agrees that the violence in the former Yugoslavia is not "a tale of ancient hatreds" (Bennett 1995) but rather the result of a media generated nationalist hysteria. Conflict between Serbs and Croats, which was visible in both world wars, was not the result of centuries of animosity, but of the extreme circumstances of those wars. Bennett says that when trying to locate causes of events in history, it is the perception of history which is important, rather than what actually happened.

"... to attribute developments in the 1990s to events which took place half a century earlier, as some propagandists would, is surely far-fetched. By the same logic the whole of Europe should be in a permanent state of war." (Bennett 1995)
Bennett suggests that the animosity between peoples of the whole of Yugoslavia is in fact a recent phenomenon. It may be in part the result of the failure of the two Yugoslav states to develop a sustainable coexistence, but owes much to the reinterpretation of past events by the media in the 1980s. Glenny (1992) agrees with Bennett's assertion that the three main religious groups in Bosnia are not distinct ethnic groups, and that religious differences are a result of the history of Bosnia.

Cigar (1995) says that the treatment of Muslims in Bosnia could be termed genocide. In the Bosnian situation, he suggests that the decisive factor in the instigation of genocide were "top-down leadership and official legitimisation" (Cigar 1995), and that these were far more significant factors than either history or tradition. In dismissing the argument that the conflict was inevitable given the way the different religious groups were intermingled with no one group in an overall majority, Cigar notes that Bosnia-Herzegovina was not the only country in the world with a diverse ethnicity. Indeed, there are many countries whose ethnic diversity is far greater than that of Bosnia, such as the United States, where genocide has not occurred. Cigar is of the opinion that rather than being an outbreak of primeval popular emotion beyond the control of the Serbian leadership, or the spontaneous eruption of historical antagonisms, the conflict in Bosnia was the result of the campaign waged by the Serbian elite, both within and without government, which sought to create a nationalist movement in order to extend its power. This campaign was conducted in such a way that relations between the Serbs and other groups deteriorated severely, making the idea of genocide both possible and plausible.

Nationalist ideology in Serbia was not Milosevic's creation. In the early 1980s some intellectuals in Serbia and the Serbian Orthodox church began supporting Serbian
nationalism openly. In 1986 a ‘Memorandum’ was produced by a group of leading intellectuals in Serbia, some of whom had political ambitions, which called for the creation of a Greater Serbia which would encompass all territory on which Serbs lived. Though the memorandum itself was explicitly rejected by the president of Serbia, Ivan Stambolic, the ideas contained within it did not. Gradually the Muslim population of Yugoslavia, whose presence would inevitably be a stumbling block for any attempt to create a greater Serbia, became demonised by the media and by Serbian intellectuals. The role of intellectuals should not be seen as any less important than that of the media, especially when it is considered that much of the work of the intellectuals found its way into the media where the ideas could be disseminated further and were given credence because of their intellectual roots. In 1982 Serbian author Vuk Draskovic published a novel set in wartime Yugoslavia, in which Muslim characters were portrayed as traitors and murderers, who came into being centuries ago by betraying their Serb relatives and converting to Islam (Cigar 1995).

Bennett agrees with Silber and Little that the rise to power of Milosevic in Serbia was a crucial factor. He suggests Milosevic’s intervention in Kosovo in 1989, which led to the end of autonomy in the province, was the decisive factor (Bennett 1995).

Janjic (1995) agrees that the conflict in Yugoslavia cannot be blamed on historical conflict re-emerging. He asserts:

"National antagonisms were not inevitable or predestined; they had been managed peacefully since the foundation of the Yugoslav state in 1918 until 1941-45, and then until 1991, when they erupted in the form of large scale armed conflicts.” (Janjic 1995 page 32)
The main cause of the outbreak of violence is located by Janjic in:

"an underdeveloped political culture and a heritage of authoritarianism compounded by growing nationalism, which diverted democratic aspirations into a purely nationalistic struggle for self determination." (Janjic 1995 page 33)

Magas (1993) also locates the collapse of Yugoslavia in the rise to power of Serbian nationalists in the 1980s. Since Yugoslavia was a communist state, and communism is theoretically opposed to nationalism, this emergence of nationalism as a political force needs to be accounted for.

Milosevic also harnessed the power of the media, and as early as 1987 the media in Serbia were "already on a war footing, spewing out a barrage of ethnic hatred." (Bennett 1995). Bennett is adamant that the role of the media was crucial in generating a distorted interpretation of the past. The Yugoslavia which existed after the Second World War was by no means perfect, but it was also not a hot bed of ethnic divisions.

"You must imagine a United States with every little TV station everywhere taking exactly the same editorial line - a line dictated by David Duke. You would have war in five years." (Milos Vanic, Belgrade journalist, quoted in Malcolm 1994 page 252)

The separate economic developments of the states of Yugoslavia was reflected in the development of separate radio stations, television stations and newspapers, each focussed on the interests of a particular state (Thompson 1994). Decentralisation in the 1960s and 1970s gave the local communist parties a large degree of control over news media in their region, but the absence of democratic control meant that the content of these media was largely controlled by and reflected the interests of the local parties.
During the 1980s and early 1990s, exhumations took place of mass graves of Serbians who died during the Second World War. The bodies were reburied with much ceremony to honour Serbian war dead, and the ceremonies were shown on Serbian television. This was a largely successful attempt to remind the population of the fighting that went on during the Second World War and to attempt to encourage Serb support for a Greater Serbia (Almond 1994). These reburials also served to encourage anti-Croat feelings.

Among stories used by the mass media to ignite anti-Croat feeling was a story in a magazine in August 1991 which said that in Zagreb it was possible to buy lamps made from skulls taken from a Serbian mass grave. As well as inducing ill-feeling, the story served to justify the reburial of war dead by suggesting that Croats were disturbing graves. This renewed Serbian interest in war dead was reflected in Croat, Slovene, and (later) Bosnian Muslim leaders, who also began to discuss the numbers that died during the Second World War.

"This exhumation of the dead whose spirits cried out for vengeance was the necessary prelude to the savage war which broke out in 1991, and spread across Yugoslavia. But it was not the cause of the war. ...[To see the war as having historical inevitability] is to commit the classic historian's mistake of seeking long-term roots for profound and far-reaching crises." (Almond 1994 page 8)

According to Almond, politicians and their sympathisers within the mass media manipulated events and images to provide a revised version of history, in order to incite divisions. The mass media and politicians also used inflammatory language, with Croatian nationalists being labelled as Ustase and Serb nationalists labelled as Cetniks. As the Ustase, a fascist organisation active during the Second World War, had been
responsible for many atrocities, the labelling of Croat nationalists as Ustase served two purposes. First of all it served as a reminder of the potential of organisations to carry out atrocities, but it also demonised Croat nationalists. If they were simply nationalists, they would be upholders of a particular political ideal. If, however, they were Ustase, they were fascist terrorists who sought the death of as many Serbs as possible.

Manipulation by political elites and the mass media were therefore crucial in igniting war in Bosnia, but their actions alone cannot explain the war that took place. It is important also to consider the conditions that existed in the country, particularly its economic and political developments, in order to gain an understanding of the situation.

**Economic and political development and the war**

Schierup (1991) suggests that the 'ethnification' of politics in Yugoslavia was not an expression of past ethnic divisions, but rather was the characteristic result of a socialist state system. Like many other commentators, he sees as decisive Milosevic's 'palace coup' of 1987, when spurious claims of persecution of ethnic Serbs in Kosovo were used to justify the ending of autonomy in that province, and which led to Milosevic gaining control of the Serbian communist party and ushering in an era of Serbian nationalism. From that point onwards, politics in Yugoslavia became more explicitly ethnicised. The role of the media must be seen as crucial in this process, but Schierup sees it as a process stemming not from the media or from historical antagonisms, but from the way the state was organised and conducted itself in Yugoslavia. A similar
process can be seen to have been at work in other former communist countries, but for a variety of reasons the process has been most acute in Yugoslavia.

Kellas (1991) suggests that the surge in nationalism in Yugoslavia was a direct consequence of the economic problems of the country.

"Nationalism feeds on economic discontent, and channels it into a nationalist perspective. It does this especially when there is regional uneven economic development, and where there is a cultural division of labour and many immigrant workers. Both the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia are economies in dire trouble with shortages, uneven development and a strong tinge of 'internal colonialism'." (Kellas 1991 page 114)

Schierup (1990) gives a detailed account of the economic history of Yugoslavia. He says that in 1945 Yugoslavia was the poorest country in Europe after its neighbour Albania. At that time, the communist party was "the only universal (non-ethnic, non-national) political movement in a heterogeneous and fragmented country." (Schierup 1990 page 26). According to Schierup (1990), when bureaucratic power is concentrated in the centre, there is a tendency for the centre to attempt to increase its administrative control, creating local economic monopolies which it then defends from competition. The bureaucratic power structures then defend these monopolies from competition. Within Yugoslavia, this process was more pronounced since decentralisation allowed local bureaucracies to create monopolies which were then defended by the central bureaucracy.

"Through transferring most economic responsibilities from the federation to the republics, the 1974 constitution provided a unique opportunity to resurrect divisive bureaucratic monopolies, which could now be defended through mechanisms such as particularistic tax policies [etc.]. ... increasingly solid and powerful links were forged
between traditionalist kinship and local community networks and local, and regional state apparatuses." (Schierup 1990 page 234)

The thrust of Schierup’s work is that Yugoslavia had become an economically divided country well before it became divided politically. There was little or no redistribution of wealth between the richer and poorer areas of the country. Croatia and Slovenia remained the wealthiest parts. Their secession from the federation must have been made considerably easier by the economic structure, since if they were not dependant on the rest of Yugoslavia for the import or export of goods, and trading links with other countries had already been established, then the task of establishing a republic as an independent state in the world market must have been greatly eased.

The implication of Schierup’s work, and remember he was writing before the outbreak of open hostilities in Yugoslavia, is that that the break up of Yugoslavia was not primarily the result of ethnic tensions. Rather, the way that Tito had implemented state socialism in Yugoslavia, even though his intention was to create a unified Slav state, meant that economic divisions were enhanced and internal borders became more, not less, important. The dissent brought about by economic problems could not be expressed politically because of the political regime, and instead was directed towards nationalistic modes of expression. The nationalism in Yugoslavia can therefore be seen as the result of economic problems and the mode of state socialism in Yugoslavia, which then was harnessed by politicians and amplified through the media. This seems to me to be a more believable account. After all, there is no inherent genetic difference between peoples in different parts of Yugoslavia or between those of different religions. Those who suggest the war is nothing more than an outbreak of tribal violence or ancient hatreds fail to
explain why the predominant mode of existence in the region has been one of peace rather than war, or to explain the degree of Yugoslav nationalism or the extent of marriages which took place between people of different religions. An examination of the way of life for the ordinary citizen in pre-war Bosnia-Herzegovina shows that people of different religions lived peacefully alongside each other until the outbreak of war, and in some areas were able to maintain a mixed society throughout the war.

Whatever one's opinions on the causes of the war the fact remains that the war took place, and hostilities were ended by the Dayton Agreement. Those living in Bosnia-Herzegovina today have a life which has been deeply affected by the war, and their future depends on the maintenance of peace and the reconstruction of Bosnian society.

The future for Bosnia

"With no common experience except war and atrocity, and no genuine consensus behind the project of nation building, there is not yet a Bosnian identity to counteract the centrifugal forces of ethnic separatism, and national ties across the borders with Croatia and Serbia are far stronger than civil identity within Bosnia. The most basic challenge of the peace process is to create a single society out of three sharply defined ethnic groups." (Cox 1998 page 9)

One of the major problems facing Bosnia today is the continuance of divisions based of ethnicity. As Cox says, the only common experience of the population of Bosnia is war and atrocities, and these took place mainly along ethnic lines. For many people it is difficult to transcend these experiences and forge a new Bosnian identity which can
encompass all three parties. This is the lasting legacy of the war, the continuing and heightened importance of ethnicity in post-war Bosnia.

Divisions based on religion are not set in stone, however, and in elections held since the end of the war non-nationalist parties have gradually increased their share of the vote. Analysis of the voting in the 1997 municipal elections shows that non-nationalist parties were more likely to gain support in areas where there were more than one religious group present (Pugh & Cobble 2001), although at that time the non-nationalist vote remained small. However, in the elections held in November 2000 the non-nationalist SDP gained roughly half the votes cast in predominantly Muslim areas (Thorpe 2000) and were able to take control in some municipal areas.

In considering the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina today, considerations of ethnicity and religion alone are not enough, it is important also to understand the economic situation of the country. As well as the damage to infrastructure caused by the war, Bosnia has also had to cope with the change from a centrally planned economy to a market economy. Much of the heavy industry in Bosnia-Herzegovina was operating at a loss before the war, and even if funds were available to rebuild those enterprises which have been destroyed, they are unlikely to be rebuilt since they would be unable to operate at a profit. There have been some new enterprises, but these are more modern and tend to employ far fewer people than the old enterprises. For example, a taxi driver in Sarajevo took me on a guided tour of the city, and among the sites he pointed out was a derelict factory which used to make engine parts for Yugo cars. The factory had been in the Serb controlled part of Sarajevo, and as the Serbs withdrew they took what equipment they could with them and destroyed the rest. Yugo cars are no longer produced, and there is little chance of the
factory being reopened. It used to employ several thousand workers. Nearby he pointed out the new factory built by Coca-cola. This plant makes and bottles cola and other soft drinks, and is a welcome investment, but only employs a handful of people (the driver told me thirty, but I have not been able to verify this). The result is that despite some new investment, unemployment is extremely high, running at over 40% in most of the country (Thorpe 2000), and aid workers I spoke to in Bosnia said that in some districts unemployment was around 80%.

There are many NGOs operating in Bosnia now, and many of these are seeking reconciliation and reconstruction. Their efforts have had some success, and there have been some people have returned to areas where they constitute a minority. However, thus far these moves have been small scale, and in some cases they have been violently opposed by the majority population in the area (Black et al. 1998, Cox 1998).

Cox (1998) argues that the focus of international organisations and their interventions should be towards ethnic reconciliation rather than reintegration. He says that for a long-term solution to the conflict in Bosnia, it is important that the living conditions of the greatest number of people is normalised as soon as possible. Minority return, the return of an individual to an area in which they would be part of a minority group, should be the favoured solution where it is feasible. However, where there is open hostility to minority returns, the forcing through of minority returns can increase ethnic tension and so make the process of ethnic reconciliation more difficult. Cox also argues that there should not be too great a reliance on minority return to solve the problem of displacement in Bosnia. The numbers displaced were enormous, and the nature of the conflict was such that many may choose not to return to areas where they would constitute a minority.
For those who are displaced within Bosnia, the question of whether they can or should return to their former home depends on many factors. Their home may have been destroyed during the war, and return will then only be possible if they have the resources to rebuild it. If their home still stands, it is likely to have been occupied by someone else who has been displaced from another area. For people whose homes are occupied, a scheme has been established whereby the ownership of a property can be registered and negotiations entered into with the inhabitant in order to seek repossession, compensation or rent from the occupier. There is also the question of employment in the area where they are from, and those who have been displaced and have found some form of employment may be reluctant to move if their economic future is uncertain. Finally, they may be reluctant to move to an area where they would be part of a minority population, regardless of their pre-war mode of living.

**Conclusion**

An examination of the history of Bosnia-Herzegovina shows that for several hundred years it has been home to people holding different religious beliefs. Despite this, the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina have only rarely fought each other on their own account. There have been many wars and battles on Bosnian territory, and the people of Bosnia have become caught up in these, but in rather than taking sides against each other, their actions can be seen as taking different sides in some else's wars.

There are no distinct ethnic origins for the three religious groups, and instead at different periods of history there have been conversions from and to each religion. As time has
past, the different religious groups have tended to identify themselves with one or other of the neighbouring states, and although most Catholics classed themselves as Croat, and Orthodox Christians as Serb, the self-identification of Muslims has varied considerably both over time and within the group. Bosnia’s Muslims do not have a history of separate identification, or of separate organisation.

The causes of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina are complicated, but one factor referred to by many politicians can be discounted by examining the history of the region and the course of the war. This is the notion that Bosnia-Herzegovina was the home of people harbouring ancient hatreds of each other, and although communism had been able to suppress these feelings they had re-emerged as communism collapsed. In fact the history of Bosnia-Herzegovina is one of people getting along peacefully. Even during the war, towns such as Tuzla and Sarajevo remained mixed, with those of different religious background working together. The Bosnian army contained senior officers who were Serb and Croat, as well as Muslims. An examination of the way people lived their lives immediately before the war shows that the lives of people of different religion were closely linked, with relationships of work, neighbourhood, friendship and sometimes marriage crossing and re-crossing between them. Instead of being the result of ancient hatreds, the war is a product of manipulations by political elites and the mass media they controlled, and the emergence of nationalism as the only coherent opposition to a crumbling communist economy. Devolution of power away from the centre, without the introduction of democratic control, meant that regional communist parties were able to tightly control the media in their area, and manipulate output to justify their activities. When the communist parties collapsed, there place was taken by a variety of parties, the
most powerful of which were the new nationalist parties, whose leaders were former
communist party members. These parties, as well as their communist predecessors,
sought to maximise the economic situation of their region, and opposed any redistribution
of wealth. Part of the reason for nationalist sentiment in Slovenia was that the country
perceived itself to be subsidising the rest of Yugoslavia, and considered it would be
richer if independent.

The rise of nationalism in Serbia was matched by the rise of nationalism in Croatia, and
leaders in both countries sought the support of Serbs and Croats in Bosnia, whilst seeking
to support national minorities within the other country. After Croatia became
independent, the government of Bosnia also sought independence, fearing that without
the balancing power of Croatia, Bosnia would become merely a part of Serbia.

Despite the Dayton Agreement, the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina is not yet stable, and
many people remain displaced from their homes. This means that for those who remain
outside Bosnia-Herzegovina, the question of return is very difficult. For many return to
their former home, if it exists, means returning to an area where they would be part of a
minority, and their experiences of the war mean that they are reluctant to accept that.
Even if return is an option, the Bosnia-Herzegovina they would be returning to would be
very different to the place they used to live. The economic and political situation, as well
as the distribution of people, is very different to that which previously existed.

Despite the experiences of the war, and the atrocities which were committed, many
people in Bosnia-Herzegovina remain convinced that peaceful co-existence is the only
option for the future. Non-nationalist parties have gradually increased their share of the
national vote, although nationalist parties remain powerful. The massive population
displacement that occurred as a result of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina has drastically altered the distribution of religious groups throughout the country. Whereas pre-war Bosnia-Herzegovina had very few areas which were monoethnic, post-war Bosnia sees the majority of the population in areas where there are few people from other religious groups. This means that the way of life that existed before the war, with people of different religion mixing freely and often working and studying side by side is no longer possible. Study of the pre-war society in Bosnia shows that Bosnian Muslims did not have a strong group identity, and instead occupied a complex and disunited position. They have little history of organisation and mobilisation as a group, and the quest for Bosnian independence can be considered as a reaction to events in other countries, rather than a group project. This suggests that policies based on the supposed group identification of Bosnian Muslims will struggle, since they have little history of group identification or group organisation. It is possible that in the future a Bosnian Muslim group identity will emerge, but its current existence cannot be deduced from the history of the country. This applies to policies for Bosnians outside Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as within the country.

The flow of refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina was the greatest outflow of refugees since in Europe since the Second World War. Although the countries of Europe were reluctant to accept them, the discovery of the concentration camps led to governments in Europe accepting quota's of refugees from the conflict. Britain's programme is discussed in detail in the next chapter.

The ethnicised nature of the conflict, and its incongruity with life in pre-war Bosnia-Herzegovina, has affected the way that Bosnians think about themselves and each other,
and these effects are discussed in chapter six. In chapter seven I consider the Bosnians as a group, and the difficulties they face now in trying to reconcile British policies on community with their experiences both before and during the war, and their lack of history of group organisation.
Chapter 5: The Bosnia Project

Introduction

The outbreak of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in April 1992, discussed in chapter four, produced the largest flow of refugees and displaced persons in Europe since the Second World War. Thousands of people fled outwards and sought safety in other European countries, but although there may have been much sympathy for their plight, the large numbers involved appear to have worried receiving countries. In a pattern that has emerged with other refugee flows, the reaction of many receiving countries was to impose visa restrictions in order to make it more difficult for persons from Bosnia Herzegovina to travel to those countries and seek asylum.

In Britain, the arrival of asylum seekers from Bosnia had been noticed, and as was the case with previous refugee flows, the reaction of the government was to introduce a requirement that all Bosnians entering Britain must be in prior possession of an entry visa. This made it much harder for those seeking asylum in Britain to enter, and indeed the swiftness with which the measures were instituted meant that some refugees were stranded in transit ("Refugees Stranded in Transit" 1992).

The discovery by journalists of the existence of concentration camps eventually led to the closure of those camps, and the International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (ICRC) together with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) took responsibility for the care of those who had been detained as
soon as the camps were closed down, but it rapidly became clear that the inmates could not be returned to their homes. They were from towns and villages where a policy had emerged, later to be called ‘ethnic cleansing’, whereby all non-Serbs were forcibly removed from the area deemed to belong to Serbs by whatever means were necessary. Later similar camps were discovered in the Herzegovina region, where Bosnian Croats held Muslims captive. These were also eventually closed by UNHCR, and their inmates also had to be given safer accommodation.

The war raging in Bosnia meant that it was difficult for the ex-detainees to be placed in a safe area of Bosnia, and for many a place of safety therefore meant a place outside of Bosnia. The governments of the world were called upon to offer refuge to those in need of protection, which would respect the principles of non-refoulement and basic human rights, but which would allow for repatriation when conditions allowed it (Joly 1998b). Many countries responded, and the British government agreed to accept 1,000 ex-detainees plus their dependants, though this was later revised to include those evacuated for medical treatment and ‘vulnerable persons’ nominated by UNHCR. Later an extension of the programme was announced, which made available a further 500 places, to include dependants. The initial estimate was that a total of around 4,500 persons would be admitted to Britain from Bosnia, though in fact the actual number of persons is around 2,500.

In order to cope with the expected influx of 4,500 people, the Home Office approached the Refugee Council and the British Red Cross to organise reception and resettlement facilities. At a later date the Scottish Refugee Council and Refugee Action also became part of the programme. Together these organisations formed ‘The Bosnia Project’, the
British programme for the resettlement of ex-detainees and vulnerable persons from Bosnia Herzegovina. The persons accepted on the programme were given temporary protection, and were initially housed in reception centres before being given more permanent accommodation. After leaving the reception centre, support was offered by the Mid Term Support teams, and longer term support was offered by the community development workers and Refugee Action.

The data in this chapter is based upon internal documents of the Bosnia Project, as well as participant observation and my experiences whilst working with Bosnian refugees. In addition I make use of the two evaluations of the Bosnia Project which were carried out on behalf of the refugee agencies and the Home Office. The first evaluation (Graessle & Gawlinski 1996) resulted in the modification of the second stage of the programme, and the second (Compass 1997) as well as giving the agencies an overview of the strengths and weaknesses of the programme informed the policies used for the more recent programme for refugees from Kosovo. I briefly examine the nature and operation of previous refugee programmes in Britain, and then consider the Bosnia Project in detail. I argue that the way the Project was operated and managed had an effect on the settlement of those refugees that came under its remit, and this effect was not altogether positive. The Bosnia Project took into account aspects such as mid-term support and longer-term strategies, which were a welcome development when compared to other programmes. However, unlike previous programmes, the status given to refugees on the programme was temporary protection, implying eventual return, and this affected both the way the programme operated and the refugees themselves. Those on the programme were treated
as victims and objects of policy, rather than as individuals, and this impeded their scope for initiatives and the formulation of positive life projects.

**Previous refugee programmes**

The Bosnia project was not the first programme for refugees in Britain, and there had been previous programmes for refugees from Uganda and Vietnam. The nature of these programmes differed, but the common involvement of some agencies and individuals has meant that to some extent each programme has been influenced by the one before. However, there has been little systematic evaluation of these programmes, and it has been argued that the policies they used have been characterised by ad hocery, rather than being a considered response to the prevailing circumstances (Joly 1996b).

**Ugandan Resettlement Board**

In Uganda in the 1960s, the government began introducing policies of 'Africanisation'. At first these policies gave priority to Ugandan citizens over Asian residents, who had largely chosen to retain British citizenship after Uganda's independence, but the policies gradually became more discriminatory and Ugandan Asians began to leave the country. In 1971 the leader, Idi Amin, began making openly hostile statements concerning Asian residents. In August 1972 Amin announced that all Asians who were not citizens of Uganda had to leave the country within 90 days, and later extended this to include all
Asians regardless of citizenship. Since most had British passports, they made their way to Britain (Robinson 1986).

The large numbers of people involved combined with the short period during which they were to arrive in Britain meant that it was necessary for the government to organise some form of reception system if it was to avoid appearing to be as inhumane as the country from which they were expelled. For this reason, the Ugandan Resettlement Board (URB) was established in 1972 by the Home Office in order to assist in the reception and settlement of British passport holders who were expelled from Uganda by Idi Amin’s government. Their British passports were a legacy of the colonial era, and though some had family links with Britain most had only tenuous links, other than their passport and the legal right to enter and remain in Britain. Though the persons involved were not technically refugees, they can be considered a form of de facto refugee, since they were forced to leave the country of their residence. The URB, established after Ugandans had begun to arrive, was intended to make plans for the reception of the refugees, in order that the process should be smooth and orderly, and to disperse the refugees as widely as possible (Dalgllish 1989).

The URB established reception camps where new arrivals could be accommodated, with voluntary agencies such as the WRVS and the Red Cross assisting with their immediate needs, since those expelled were permitted to take few belongings with them. The search for accommodation for the refugees was prioritised, as it was felt that the stay in the reception centres should be as short as possible (Dalgllish 1989). The Home Office established a policy whereby areas would be designated either red, meaning refugees should not go there, or green, areas which refugees should go to. The designation of areas
was based on an assessment of the levels of housing, education and social services resources, and local authorities in green areas were encouraged to accept refugees, with some financial support being made available to them. Dalglish (1989) argues that existing levels of Commonwealth immigrants in an area were also taken into account, since it was considered that the pressure of Ugandan Asians arriving would place too much pressure on the local authorities. However, the red and green policy was not tremendously successful, and only 38% of the Ugandan refugees who were initially under the auspices of the URB actually were accommodated in green areas (Bristow 1976).

The vast majority of funding for the Uganda programme was directed towards the reception phase, and once housed the refugees relied on support from existing agencies and community groups (Cunningham 1973). The major policy of initiatives of the URB, short reception centre stays and dispersal, were repeated in a revised form for refugees from Vietnam (Dalglish 1989).

**Vietnamese Refugees**

In the late 1970s, thousands of people fled Vietnam seeking refuge in other countries. They left in various ways, but the most popular route was by sea. The resultant mass of people became collectively known as ‘the boat people’. Neighbouring countries allowed the boat people to land, but rapidly made clear that they were unable or unwilling to accept the vast numbers of people involved permanently. At the same time, many of those seeking refuge expressed a desire to be accommodated in Western countries. Many Western governments agreed, at the request of UNHCR to establish programmes
whereby Vietnamese who had already left Vietnam could be relocated to a Western
country and settle there, thus relieving the countries neighbouring Vietnam of some of the
duty of care.

The programme established by Britain accepted over 22,000 Vietnamese between 1975
and 1988 (Dalghish 1989). Though the funding for most of the work with Vietnamese was
provided by central government, the work itself was mainly carried out by various
voluntary agencies. For many of the refugees, Britain had not been their first choice when
they considered which country they wished to go to, and the early arrivals usually had
few relatives or friends already present. There was no existing Vietnamese community to
which the refugees could turn for support, and so they were reliant on voluntary agencies
for support (Robinson & Hale 1989). Before the introduction of a quota for refugees from
Vietnam, some refugees had been arriving and these had been assisted by the British
Council for Aid to Refugees (which later became the Refuge Council) and the Ockenden
Venture who along with Save the Children had some prior experience of resettling
refugees in Britain. When the Home Office agreed to accept a quota of refugees in 1979,
the Home Office felt that these agencies had already shown their ability to respond
appropriately to refugee arrivals, and were already employing staff with the necessary
language skills and abilities. Later Refugee Action was also involved. The Home Office
also felt that, as with the Ugandan Programme, voluntary agencies were able to respond
more quickly and effectively than government departments. For these reasons,
responsibility for operation of the Vietnamese programme was passed to these agencies
(Dalghish 1989).
There was little co-ordination between the agencies initially (Joly 1988). At a later stage a Joint Committee for Refugees from Vietnam was established which co-ordinated the work of the different agencies. Although this provided a forum for discussion of policies and was intended to ensure the co-ordination of activities undertaken as part of the programme, in practice co-ordination and the discussion of experiences between agencies were minimal (Dalglish 1989, Joly 1988). All the agencies became involved in all aspects of reception and settlement, and the division of labour between the agencies was mainly on a geographical rather than a task basis. Refugee Action was responsible for those Vietnamese settled in Scotland, Yorkshire, South Midlands, and East Midlands; Ockenden Venture was responsible for those in West Midlands, Manchester, North East and North West England, and North Wales (Dalglish 1989). Initially the refugees were housed in reception centres, run by either the British Council for Aid to Refugees, which later evolved into the British Refugee Council, the Ockenden Venture or the Save the Children Fund, though after 1981 Refugee Action took over most of the reception work (Joly & Cohen 1989).

The stay in the reception centre was supposed to last around three months, during which time there would be some English classes and they could be given some orientation in order to prepare them for life in Britain (Home Office 1985, in Dalglish 1989) but the stay was frequently longer, largely due to problems with finding accommodation (Dalglish 1989, Robinson 1986). A policy was developed very early on whereby the number of refugees housed in any particular area was strictly limited, theoretically to avoid any one area being overburdened. Since it was intended that voluntary groups would provide much of the support to the refugees once they were housed, the devisers of
this policy wished to ensure that those volunteers would be able to cope with the number of refugees in their area (Joly 1988). This policy, 'no more than ten no less than four', was difficult to implement in practice because no additional funding was made available to local authorities, and consequently some authorities simply refused to accept any Vietnamese into their area. This led to the concentration of Vietnamese in areas where there was housing readily available, for example 21% settled in the North East of England, an area which at the time was suffering from the third highest male unemployment rate in Britain (Robinson 1986). The strict dispersal policy was abandoned in 1984, and later arrivals were allowed more choice in their area of settlement (Joly 1988). Resettlement was considered to have been achieved when the refugee was placed in accommodation, and the programme did not directly address employment issues (Dalglish 1989, Robinson 1993). The lack of job opportunities in those areas, combined with the social isolation experienced by those who fund themselves in an area with only a handful of other Vietnamese, led to large-scale secondary settlement, with many Vietnamese relocating themselves to areas such as London and Birmingham. It has been estimated that 51% of Vietnamese had left their settlement address within five years of arrival (Robinson & Hale 1989). The dispersal policy was abandoned in 1984, when it became apparent that it was no longer practicable (Joly & Cohen 1989). After that date, the refugees themselves were given far more choice over where housing should be sought for them, and many expressed a preference for London or Birmingham.

Under the Vietnamese programme, those selected for admission to Britain were given full refugee status on arrival. As with the previous programmes, the majority of funding
provided by central government (£21 million of the £23 million allocated) was directed towards the reception phase.

Some support was provided for the refugees once they moved from the reception centres, though the nature of this support varied over time and between agencies. As might be expected with a programme lasting over ten years, policy and practices evolved over time. One important policy development of the Vietnamese programme was the introduction of a community development approach. This policy was adopted in 1985, when it became apparent to the agencies involved that there was still a need for some form of resettlement support. The purpose of those appointed to the community development posts was to sensitize and mobilise statutory and voluntary services in the areas where the refugees lived, and also to assist the refugee communities to organize themselves and provide support to their members (Joly 1988).

Dalglish (1989) argues that the Vietnamese programme failed to involve local authorities sufficiently, despite the fact that the costs of longer term support, such as education, language tuition and employment training, would be the responsibility of local authorities. Dalglish is also critical of the use of a multiplicity of agencies. Voluntary agencies were used to implement the programme because the government felt that they were able to respond quickly and with greater flexibility than government departments. However, because they were not statutory organisations they were unable to exert much influence on local authorities or policy development, and had no power to ensure the provision of services which they felt the refugees needed.

The Vietnamese programme began to end in the late 1980s, although Refugee Action were still operating a reception centre as the Bosnia Project began in 1992. As some of
the same agencies and individuals were involved in both the Vietnamese programme and
the Bosnia Project, it is likely that the nature of the Bosnia Project was to some extent
influenced by the earlier programme.

The Bosnia Programme

The announcement that Britain would accept a quota of refugees from Bosnia-
Herzegovina was made on November 5th 1992, at the same time that visa restrictions
were announced for those travelling from the former Yugoslavia. 150 places were
promised for Bosnians who had been detained in the camps, plus their dependants. On the
30th November the government announced that the number of places was being increased
to 1000, and their dependants. This led to the creation of a programme whereby voluntary
agencies would receive funding from central government for work with those included in
the programme. The programme became known as the Bosnia Project, and the lead
agencies initially were the Refugee Council and the British Red Cross, though later
Scottish Refugee Council and Refugee Action were also involved. Refugee Housing also
became involved at a later stage to assist with the search for accommodation. Initially the
Home Office contacted organisations that might be interested in operating the
programme, and Refugee Council and the British Red Cross agreed to be the lead
agencies. According to Bosnia Project staff the Red Cross became part of the Bosnia
Project because of their involvement with Bosnian refugees in Bosnia and Croatia. They
had been instrumental in securing the release of detainees in the camps, who were later to
become clients of the programme, and also were involved in refugee camps in Croatia for
ex-detainees. Because of this the Red Cross was keen to become involved with the refugees after they arrived in Britain. Robinson and Coleman (2000) report that the Refugee Council 'represented the obvious NGO to co-ordinate the programme', and so the decision to share responsibility between the two agencies was questioned at the time due to the Red Cross's lack of experience in resettlement. They report that one staff member said that the Red Cross 'muscled in' on the opportunity, although this perhaps suggests that rather than the Red Cross acting in an opportunistic way, the Refugee Council was perhaps resentful of someone else acting in what they saw as their territory. Staff at Refugee Action said that they had been approached informally about the Bosnia Project, but declined to become involved when the Project started as they were in the process of ending their work with Vietnamese refugees. However, once this work ended they became a member of the Bosnia Project. Although the vast majority of funding allocated to the project came from the Home Office, the Home Office adopted a 'hands off' approach to management of the service, leaving it up to the agencies involved to specify the nature of their work (Compass 1997), which had also been the case with previous programmes.

In 1995, the UNHCR again appealed for countries to accept refugees from Bosnia, and on this occasion the British government offered 500 places, to include principals and dependants. These were housed in reception centres in Rugby, Derby, Yorkshire and Edinburgh. The quotas on both programmes were never filled, and the total number of persons who came on the programmes was around 2,500, far less than was initially expected. The reasons for this are discussed below in the section on family reunion.
Despite the official view that their stay in Britain was to be temporary, the direction and activities of the Bosnia Project were towards long-term settlement rather than temporary containment. This reflects the belief held by many of the refugee organisations and agencies from the outset that though return may be a possibility in the future, it was not imminent. It therefore was decided from the outset to use a model of resettlement rather than containment.

The Bosnia Project can be seen as having three distinct parts: the reception centres; Mid Term Support; and community development. Return is also discussed here, although there was no return component included in the programme. Reception centres were the first part to be developed, as the refugees had to have somewhere to stay when they first arrived. Agencies and policy makers were aware that there had been problems in earlier programmes if the refugees' stay in reception centres was too long, since they might become too dependant on the centre and struggle to manage once housed. Experiences with refugees on the Vietnamese programme had shown that the refugees often needed a measure of ongoing support once they left the reception centre, and local authorities were sometimes reluctant to offer housing to both Ugandan and Vietnamese refugees because it was thought that they might prove too great a burden on their resources. For this reason the policy of using mid-term support workers was developed. The agencies considered that the community development policy developed for the Vietnamese programme had been relatively successful, and were later able to obtain funds from the Home Office to fund community development work. The agencies were also aware from their own experiences and from research that the dispersal policies used under the Vietnamese and Ugandan programmes had been failures, and instead sought to develop a new policy
which would avoid some of the earlier mistakes. This policy became the cluster areas policy, and resulted in dispersal based on clusters or groups.

The intention of the reception centre stay was to provide the person with a period of orientation before moving them out into long-term accommodation. The average length of stay was between two and three months, but occasionally stays were much longer than this, a subject I shall return to later. After being moved into more permanent accommodation, assistance was to be provided by the workers of the Mid Term Support teams established by the Refugee Council. The Mid Term Support teams were established because the agencies involved in the programme felt that the lack of a pre-existing Bosnian community in Britain meant that there were no support structures in place. Without some form of support, Bosnians might find themselves becoming isolated and unaware of their rights and entitlements, and more vulnerable members of the population might escape the attention of statutory providers (Morrison 1994). The system was the same for those who were added to the quota on the grounds that they were 'vulnerable persons', who were often widowed women with children or dependent relatives of people accepted on the quota who did not meet the definition of dependent used by the British government. The community development phase was intended to address the long-term needs of the refugees and assist with their settlement into British society. The refugee agencies had seen that there were a large number of Vietnamese communities established in Britain, some of whom employ workers to advise and assist Vietnamese in their area, and they felt this was a good model for refugees from Bosnia. However, the programme was started at a time when the government had made a political decision to try to prevent refugees from Bosnia entering Britain, by introducing visa
restrictions. The programme was started as a result of pressure from UNHCR and other European countries to share the burden of looking after people who had been detained in the camps, and the government decided that all those admitted under the programme should be given a new status of temporary protection, rather than being given refugee status. Before they could get that temporary protection, however, they had to be accepted onto the programme.

**Joining the programme**

There were three ways in which an individual could be included on the programme in Britain, as a principal applicant, as their dependant, or as a medical evacuee. Places were allocated initially for one thousand principal applicants, who were originally intended to be people released from the concentration camps, although later the definition of a principal applicant was widened so that exceptionally vulnerable people could be included. These principal applicants could apply for places for their dependants, although the definition of dependant varied over time. Sometimes an application was made for adult relatives to be included as dependants, and they were accepted and redefined as principal applicants. Places were also made available for treatment of seriously ill people, who became part of the Medevac section of the programme. These were also allowed to bring dependants with them, but had slightly different rights to family reunion.

The process of gaining a place on the programme took place formally as follows. Firstly, UNHCR discussed the individual's options, which were usually very limited, and obtained the agreement of the individual to travel to Britain. UNHCR then nominated the
individual to the British government, who made the official decision whether or not to include them, although in practice it was virtually unknown for the British government to refuse a nomination. Once the nomination was accepted, the British government made a decision as to which dependants they were allowed to include on their application. Although UNHCR assisted with the filling of application forms, they had little influence over this aspect of the process. Any dependants that were accepted by the British government as dependants would be allocated entry visas. If they were present in Croatia with the principal applicant, they would all be flown together when places were available for them on the flights. Transport was organised jointly by the UNHCR and the Red Cross.

There are several reasons why the number of dependants was lower than initially expected. It had been assumed that most of the men in the camps would have been married with children, but a higher than expected number were single or married with older children. These older children were sometimes included, but not always. For example, the government usually would accept children up to the age of 18, but would sometimes allow unmarried girls up to the age of 21. There were some cases of places being allocated to young women as dependants, who subsequently refused to travel because their fiancé was not allowed to join them. These women’s visas were often kept on file in case they changed their mind at a later date.

Visas were also issued for dependants who never travelled to Britain, either because they chose to remain in Croatia with other family members, or because they died during the war.
Principal applicants and their dependants

The government announced in November 1992 that it would create a programme whereby 1,000 people plus their dependants would be allowed to travel to Britain. Their dependants were allowed to join them, and it was expected that there would be around 4,500 people in total. In the end, 976 people came as principal applicants, and they brought with them 1239 dependants (Watson & Danzelman 1998).

Gaining a place on the programme was via an opaque process administered by UNHCR in Croatia. Many of the refugees reported that they had no choice over which country they travelled to, and most knew little of Britain before they arrived (discussed in more detail in chapter six). If their relatives were with them in Croatia, they could apply on the spot for places and if accepted they could travel to Britain together. If their relatives were in Bosnia or missing, they could fill in forms to apply for visas for their relatives. If these were granted, the Red Cross would keep them on file until such time as they were able to travel, and their travel from Croatia to Britain was arranged for them. In the early stages of the programme some people were allowed to include their fiancée as a dependant, and others were able to include parents, although these concessions were removed later on.

When dependants were missing, the Red Cross, who operated a tracing service, assisted the principal applicant to fill in the relevant forms for tracing individuals. The visas were kept on file until such time as the individual was found. When they were found, if they were in a position to travel they were told about the visa and offered transport to Britain. Dependants who were in Bosnia were sometimes in a difficult position. If they were in territory controlled by rival forces, then safe passage out could often be negotiated, since those rival forces often encouraged the removal of those from a different ethnic group.
However, those who were in territory controlled by the Bosnian government were in a
different position, regardless of their ethnicity, because the Bosnian government was
opposed to the removal of people from its area and allowing people to leave was seen as
contributing to ethnic cleansing. In addition men over the age of seventeen were drafted
into the army, and attempts to leave were considered as desertion. Some people were able
to leave legitimately, but some were only able to leave by illicit means, for example by
bribery or by deserting their army post. Once they arrived in Croatia, they became the
responsibility of the Red Cross, who would inform their relatives that they had been
found, and with UNHCR arrangements would be made for travel to Britain.

On arrival in Britain, the principal applicant was given a paper stating that they had
temporary protection, and listing the names of those who were included as their
dependants. They could apply for family reunion for family that had not travelled with
them from Croatia, and they were entitled to social security benefits.

Medevac Programme

The system for those who were classed as medical evacuees was different to that of the
main programme. The first medical evacuees (Medevacs) arrived in September 1992.
They were supported by the British Red Cross, and no plans were made for their
treatment after leaving hospital. They were later incorporated into the Medevac
programme, established in August 1993, when ‘Operation Irma’ brought 21 medical
evacuees and their relatives to Britain (Graessle & Gawlinski 1996). Irma was a young
girl in a Sarajevo hospital whose mother had been killed, and who was desperately ill
with meningitis. The siege of Sarajevo meant that though doctors were available to treat her, they had few drugs and their ability to perform operations was severely limited. After a wealth of media attention focussing on her plight, the government agreed to admit Irma and several other ill persons for treatment in the UK as long as hospitals were willing to treat them. It was expected that the majority of medical evacuees would be sick children, but in the event the majority were adults, and though some were extremely ill others could have been classed as walking wounded. One worker had been at the airport when the plane arrived with the first group of medical evacuees. He later told me that he had been very surprised, and annoyed, when he saw that few of the people on the plane were children.

After a short medical assessment, those who needed outpatient treatment only were often placed in a reception centre and from there were housed in the community. Those who needed in-patient treatment were admitted to a hospital with the facilities to treat them and the persons accompanying them were often housed in bed and breakfast accommodation nearby. The funding for this accommodation and the interpreters required in hospital was separate from the rest of the programme funding. As patients became well enough to leave hospital they were housed in the same way as those from the main programme. Although some made a full recovery others are still receiving treatment, but on an outpatient basis. As these people were brought specifically for medical treatment they did not have the same entitlement to family reunion. When they left Bosnia they were allowed in most cases to bring a carer with them, and for children this was usually the mother, along with that person's dependent children. It was not usual for complete families to leave Bosnia together. In practice, though, most were allowed to
apply for other close family members to join them after they arrived in Britain. The fact that they were brought for treatment also meant that they had a right to return to Bosnia, and those Medevacs who decided to return, even when the war was still going on, were provided with flights by IOM. Medevacs were eventually incorporated into the main programme, and other than their family reunion rights were treated in the same way as the other people on the programme. A total of 68 people came on the Medevac programme, and they were accompanied by 120 dependants or carers (Watson & Danzelman 1998). Although the first arrivals were told that they could remain until their treatment was finished, this was later changed and all medical evacuees were given temporary protection (Graessle & Gawlinski 1996).

**Temporary protection**

The question of return to the country of origin has been more pertinent in the case of the Bosnia programme than in any of the previous programmes. Whilst those arriving from Uganda already had British passports, and those from Vietnam were given full refugee status upon arrival, the legal status of the Bosnian arrivals has been far less secure. All those arriving as part of the programme were issued with visas which stated that they had 'temporary refuge from the conflict in former Yugoslavia', and that they would be expected to return to Bosnia when the British government deemed it safe for them to do so. The visas were initially valid for six months, and needed to be renewed periodically after that. The length of any one visa subsequent to that issued on arrival was between one and four years, though I have been unable to determine any reason for the variation.
Those who have been in Britain for more than seven years are now able to apply for indefinite leave to remain (ILR) at the time they renew their visas. However the Bosnians have not been informed whether this change of status is automatic, or whether there are conditions which must be met for ILR to be granted other than seven years of temporary protection. They are also unaware of the reason for ILR being issued, and whether ‘indefinite’ means for a period of indeterminate length, and is thus in effect still temporary.

The emergence of large numbers of refugees from the former Yugoslavia occurred at a time when the countries of Europe were trying to restrict the entry of non-European Union citizens, and at a time when refugees and asylum seekers were being considered to be a burden on the receiving society (Goodwin-Gill 1996). UNHCR recognised that European states were reluctant to assist in the Yugoslav refugee crisis, and in July 1992 the High Commissioner called for a response to the refugees which was comprehensive and humanitarian, and which recognised the temporary nature of the problem and the need for emergency assistance (ECRE 1993). UNHCR felt that the numbers involved meant that it would be impossible for each claim to be individually assessed, and instead some form of group decision should be made.

As a result of UNHCR’s statements, and pressure to accept some of the ex-detainees, the British government agreed to accept a quota of ex-detainees, who would be given temporary protection. This required no legislative changes, since it was classed as a special category outside the normal immigration rules.

Temporary protection carried with it many benefits that were not available to asylum seekers. They were allowed to apply for family reunion, whereas asylum seekers have no
right to family reunion, and those with exceptional leave to remain must wait for four years before applying. They also were entitled to social security benefits at the normal rate if they met the relevant criteria, and were allowed to work without needing either permission from the Home Office or a work permit. In these respects their status was similar to that of people given full refugee status, but their status differed in one important respect: they were expected to return to their country of origin when the Home Secretary felt it was safe for them to do so. This meant that the issue of their status and return remained important to those on the programme throughout their stay. The notion that the refugees would be in Britain temporarily, and thus needed to be given temporary protection rather than refugee status, affected the organisation of the programme. Temporary implied short term, and so the funding arrangements were always short term. The Bosnia Project was given allocations of funds to last a short period, and extensions to the programme needed to be negotiated with the Home Office. In this respect the funding of the Bosnia Project was similar to the other programmes, since they also had short term funding (Joly 1996b).

**Funding of the Programme**

The Bosnia Project was established at very short notice, and the programme was originally established as a temporary feature, with the expectation that the refugees would only be in Britain for a short time. The government allocated funds, but in the beginning the agencies of the Bosnia Project were unable to plan more than a few weeks ahead and were making repeated requests for extensions to the funding. This led to short term contracts for staff, made planning more difficult, and increased costs (Graessle &
Gawlinski 1996). It was not until July 1993 that a six-month budget was set, and in April 1995 a one-year budget was set to cover the period until the Bosnia Project was supposed to end. This was revised in August 1995 when renewed fighting in Bosnia led to the introduction of a new quota of 500 places, although this was given a separate budget. The Bosnia Project finally ended in the summer of 1997.

Initially almost all the funds allocated by government were directed towards the reception centres. The voluntary agencies involved in the programme felt that it was necessary to focus more attention than previous programmes had to the process of settlement after leaving the reception centre. Their experiences with refugees from Vietnam and Uganda led to a belief that it was not enough to provide a person with somewhere to live after leaving the reception centre and give them no additional support. Refugees from Vietnam experienced extremely high rates of unemployment, and many quickly moved away from the area in which they were first housed and joined other Vietnamese in large cities such as Manchester and Birmingham. The development of Vietnamese community associations was thought by the agencies to have improved the situation of the refugees, since these associations could lobby for service provision and provide a measure of community based support to the refugees in their area. Agencies such as the Refugee Council and Refugee Action were also involved with refugee community groups and were aware that funding was often available to these groups for training and support services to their members. These were able to provide services that were not available in the statutory sector, and also they could tailor services to meet the needs of the group. To this end the agencies of the Bosnia Project lobbied the Home Office to make greater funding available for the later stages of settlement. The government eventually accepted
this, and made funds available for Mid Term Support in July 1993, and later for longer
term development work (Graessle & Gawlinski 1996).

Not all of the applications for funding made to the Home Office were successful. Although an argument was successfully made for community development funding, the Bosnia Project was unable to secure funds for trauma counselling. The refugees had been subjected to terrible treatment during their times in the camps, as well as experiencing war, and many were in need of psychological support. Many wives reported that their husbands had recurrent nightmares, and some would not sleep in the same room because of their husband’s disturbed behaviour. Others suffered from anxiety and depression, and many workers within the Bosnia Project felt that a counselling service would be beneficial. The Home Office refused to fund counselling services for the refugees, on the grounds that this was a health issue and so should be funded by the Department of Health. However, the Department of Health did not allocate any funds for this purpose.

The generous funding of the programme meant that some of the problems faced by earlier programmes could be avoided. The project was well resourced, both in terms of staff and in terms of technology. Each Mid Term Support team that was established had enough money to establish and stock their office, and funds to cover travel. The funding was specifically for support services for those who came as part of the programme, and no extra funding was made available from the Home Office for other refugee agencies who were dealing with refugees from Bosnia who were not part of the programme. According to senior Bosnia Project staff, the total amount spent on the Bosnia Project over the period of its existence was approximately £13 million over a period of almost five years. This compares favourably with the £23 million spent on the programme for refugees
from Vietnam when one considers that the Vietnamese programme was for a far larger number of people. Despite the introduction of Mid Term Support and community development, the reception phase of the programme accounted for over half the total funds spent on the Bosnia Project. As with previous programmes, funding was front-end loaded, with the largest part of funds concentrated on the initial reception phase.

Reception Centre Phase

First arrivals under the auspices of the programme were in December 1992, when 96 persons, predominately men, arrived. These were housed at the Goldhawk Road reception centre in London, which the Refugee Council had been using as a hostel for refugees. Soon a further centre was opened in Cambridge, managed by the Red Cross, another in Rugby also managed by the Red Cross, another in Derby managed by Refugee Action, and another in Dewsbury managed by the Refugee Council. In Scotland the Scottish Refugee Council established a centre in Edinburgh. Robinson and Coleman (2000) found that there were criteria for the location of reception centres, but that the availability of property was usually the deciding factor in the location of reception centres.

On arrival in the UK, those disembarking from the planes were subject to a brief medical, and then put on buses to reception centres. Usually those arriving would be divided between several reception centres rather than all going to one. This was for several reasons. Firstly, and most importantly, it was unusual for a single centre to have enough vacancies to house all the new arrivals. Secondly, it was often beneficial for new arrivals
to learn from the experiences of those who had arrived earlier. Thirdly, it was felt by the staff of the reception centres that it was often preferable to have a mix of residents, that is a mixture of single persons and families.

Those managing the reception centres often had little experience of or information on previous refugee reception centre practices, and were not always aware of developments and practices at other reception centres, and this meant that they developed their own procedures and practices in an information vacuum (Compass 1997). The problem of lack of information was compounded by the fact that the centres were being run by three separate agencies, and the managers did not initially have any fora for sharing or analysing their experiences.

The intentions of the reception centre phase were to give the residents a place of safety while resettlement was arranged, and to provide an introduction to British culture and the English language (Compass 1997). Although each reception centre had the same broad aims, there were differences between them caused by differences in staffing levels and service provider, and the different interpretations of the managers (Compass 1997). Some of the early reception centres initially had central catering, though this was soon changed so that all reception centres were self-catering. According to Bosnia Project staff, it was agreed in discussion between the agencies that reception centre facilities should be self-catering, in order to give the residents as great a degree of independence as possible. It was also felt that since the stay in a reception centre was planned to last three months, then the experience of shopping for food during that time, when assistance and translation was available, would help to acclimatise the residents to life in Britain. Each resident or head of family was paid an allowance with which to buy food, based on social security
rates. Residents were expected to shop for themselves, though in the first few days reception centre staff would accompany them. Visits to local doctors would be accompanied by an interpreter, as would early visits to a dentist. The exact level of support received by residents varied between centres, and was also dependent on the level of occupancy of the centre. Some centre staff in the early days had time to accompany residents on driving lessons, though as the centres became busier this practice was rapidly dropped. There were few formal rules on the exact role of reception centre staff, which was found to have led accusations by residents of favouritism by staff (Compass 1997).

An example of the variation between centres is their policies on interpreting. In some centres, interpreting for situation such as shopping was available for the first few occasions, whilst others were more flexible and would accompany clients whenever they had the time. One centre developed a strict policy that they would interpret for no more than three visits to the dentist. Although this may seem restrictive, they ensured that by the third visit the client was aware of what treatment to expect, and they also taught the dentist useful phrases. Other reception centres would send an interpreter for every visit.

The length of stay in a reception centre was intended to be around three months. However, some residents spent far longer in reception centres. Sometimes this was due to the inability to identify housing acceptable to the family concerned, and in other cases residents were allowed to remain in the centre whilst awaiting the arrival of close family members. The decision on whether a move should be delayed until the arrival of the remainder of a family was taken by centres on an individual basis. Some residents were housed in permanent accommodation before the arrival of their wives and children, who arrived up to twenty months later. Others remained in the reception centre for six months
or longer awaiting family. There was often little choice over housing. Each reception
centre sent residents to specific cluster areas, for example Rugby sent residents mainly to
Coventry, Solihull and Birmingham, whilst Dewsbury sent residents to Batley and
Newcastle. As initial offers of housing were accepted, the choice for later arrivals became
even more limited, as cluster areas became ‘full’. Housing choice was further limited by
the lack of availability of larger properties. Many residents wished to be housed in
extended family units, but most housing authorities and housing associations had very
few properties available with more than three bedrooms. Some families were allowed to
remain in the reception centre until suitable accommodation could be found, but in other
cases families had to be persuaded to accept two smaller properties instead of one large
one.

**Housing and cluster areas**

After a period in the reception centre, the residents were moved into longer-term
accommodation. In the very early stages of the programme the issue of resettlement was
discussed, and lessons appear to have been learnt from the experiences of the Vietnamese
programme, in that instead of scattering Bosnians in housing all over the country, they
were predominantly housed in cluster areas. Cluster areas were never clearly defined, and
in discussion during the early stages of the programme figures ranging from 150 to 700
were discussed (Robinson & Coleman 2000) but in practice the phrase came to mean that
Bosnian refugees were housed in clusters of between sixty and 250 individuals in a local
authority area. The agencies of the Bosnia Project felt that this would be sufficient for a degree of mutual support to occur, without having so many in one area that local service providers were unable to cope with their needs. Many Vietnamese moved from their original accommodation to London and other major cities, and the relatively low level of secondary resettlement of Bosnian refugees indicates that the policy of using cluster areas was fairly successful in that respect (Robinson & Coleman 2000).

During the debate in the House of Commons concerning the introduction of a programme for refugees from Bosnia, the Home Office minister stated that the Refugee Council would be asked to ensure that Bosnians were housed after reception in areas where there were fewer pressures on local services and where voluntary organisations would be able to offer support. In response to a question concerning the ‘burden’ placed on local authorities in London and the South East, he said that the existing pressure placed on these authorities by the refugees already present would be taken into account (Hansard 1992b).

The cluster areas selected initially were London, West Midlands, East Midlands, West Yorkshire, North East England, and central Scotland. In addition some refugees went to the Home Counties and a few to other parts of Britain. In discussions with the Home Office, the agencies of the Bosnia Project agreed to limit the numbers that would be settled in London due to the lack of housing generally available there, and because the Home Office felt that the authorities there were already under pressure from the existing refugees in London. The cluster areas appear to have been selected because of the

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2 Robinson and Coleman (2000) give different figures, but they are stating the numbers in general cluster areas, rather than individual towns or local authority areas
willingness of local housing providers (whether local authority, housing association or both) to allocate properties to Bosnian refugees. Robinson and Coleman (2000) give seven criteria that were used for selection of cluster areas and say that the presence of a regional refugee council (RRC) was important, as well as the sensitivity and adaptability of local authorities and the local voluntary sector, the availability of housing, the availability of suitable premises for reception centres, appropriate healthcare provision, and the ability to economically sustain a growing and sizeable community. They note that there were problems meeting some of these criteria, one of which is the lack of information on the location of refugees in Britain. Although it has been estimated that 85% of refugees are in London (Carey-Wood et al. 1997) very little is known of the location of those outside London, and so it was difficult to select cluster areas on this basis. The existence of Regional Refugee Councils was known, and so it was possible to use their existence as a rough guide, since the existence of a RRC suggests that there must be some refugees in the area. Of the other criteria, the availability of housing and the willingness of housing providers to make allocations to Bosnians from the programme seems to have been the paramount consideration. The fact that many reception centres were sited outside of cluster areas suggests that the availability of suitable premises to be used as a reception centre was not a major consideration. The lack of research into healthcare provision or employment prospects, noted by Robinson and Coleman, suggests that these criteria were also given lesser importance. Robinson and Coleman also found that there was a significant amount of staff hours devoted to housing issues, and this was one area in which the Bosnia Project staff carried out research, and this suggests that the availability of housing was the most important criteria for selection,
although the presence of RRCs may have been decisive in selecting which local authorities should be approached.

The vast majority of Bosnians on the programme were housed in public housing with security of tenure, that is rented accommodation provided by the local authority or a housing association. Wherever possible the use of property with short leases was avoided, although Robinson and Coleman found that many of those settled in London were placed in short lease properties due to the shortage of accommodation. The Home Office had asked that the refugees be housed in a mixture of tenancy types, that is with some in privately rented accommodation as well as using public housing (Robinson & Coleman 2000). Bosnia Project staff felt that the use of privately rented accommodation should be avoided, due to the insecurity of those housed there, since private tenants are usually given short-term leases. In addition, social security benefits limit the amount that can be paid towards rental of property, and in some areas this meant that only the poorest quality private accommodation was affordable to those on benefits. Senior Bosnia Project staff were aware that the refugees were theoretically only temporarily in Britain, since they had temporary protected status, but felt that finding housing with security of tenure was a preferred option. Privately rented accommodation is often only available on leases of six to twelve months, and those with short leases would need continuous housing support and assistance. This would create a demand for Bosnia Project staff, and would also make the situation of the refugees even more insecure than they already were. They therefore preferred to find housing with security of tenure and within the local benefits limit, and this meant that they strongly encouraged staff to avoid the use of privately rented accommodation wherever possible.
Robinson and Coleman (2000) found that 90% of refugees that came on the programme were settled in one of the cluster areas, which compares favourably with the Ugandan programme, for example, where only 38% went to the designated areas. They suggest that the relative lack of secondary migration is a reflection of the locations of the cluster areas being appropriate and liked by the refugees themselves, and of the lack of a pre-existing Bosnian community which could attract refugees to a particular area. In the next chapter I discuss secondary migration in more detail, but reach a different conclusion. From my own observations and interviews, it seems more likely that the temporary status of Bosnian refugees was a significant factor, in that there was little point in relocation if one was to return shortly to Bosnia.

Once housed in accommodation in a cluster area, the refugees were able to look to the local mid-term support team for advice and assistance.

**Mid Term Support teams**

Once housed in one of the cluster areas, the refugee became the responsibility of the local Mid Term Support teams. A team of workers was established in each region and provided a measure of support and advice. Theoretically this support was to be provided for six months, though in practice the demand-led nature of the service meant that it was difficult for individual workers to define their roles and duties.

The rationale for Mid Term Support work arose from a consideration of the experiences of those involved in the Vietnamese programme, and of the differences between the two programmes. It was felt that the temporary status of Bosnians would not encourage local
agencies and local authorities to offer the same kind of support they had offered to Vietnamese refugees. Although the Bosnia Project agencies felt that refugees from Bosnia were unlikely to return in the short term, they were not able to guarantee the length of the refugees' stay. Consequently, although the agencies of the Bosnia Project worked on the assumption that the refugees might be in Britain for good, other agencies were able to adopt a different approach. Because the refugees had temporary protection, local authorities and voluntary service providers outside the Bosnia Project thought that the refugees would soon leave the country, and thus felt they could not justify providing special services for them. It was also felt that settlement would be most successful where there was either an existing community from which support could be drawn, or some form of specialised support. Since there were no established Bosnian communities from which support could be drawn, some form of specialised support would therefore be necessary to avoid problems of isolation and to hopefully avoid the high levels of secondary migration noted amongst Vietnamese (Morrison 1994).

Mid Term Support was a new development in British refugee policy, and previous programmes had not incorporated staff whose role was to assist in the phase between leaving the reception centre and developing long-term strategies. Because the policy was new there was no existing practice on which to base the new service, and so the service was developed from scratch. The Mid Term Support workers carried out a problem solving and advocacy service for their clients on a casework basis, that is they worked mainly on solving individual problems rather than using a group approach (for example negotiating with local authorities or carrying out group training session). It is not clear why it was decided to operate the service in this way, but it probably developed as a
casework service since this was similar to the services available from local advice agencies. Every large town, and many small ones, have a Citizens’ Advice Bureau or similar agency, which can be approached for assistance. When the first refugees left the Bosnia Project reception centres and the mid-term support teams were still being discussed, these advice centres were often the only source of support for the refugees, and their service was based on clients approaching them on an individual basis and requesting assistance with a particular matter. Although the need for interpreting services was known, the nature of other problems, which might arise, was a matter of speculation, and it seems likely that the casework approach was deemed to be a flexible way of responding to the clients needs.

The mid-term support workers were office based, but would accompany clients to act as interpreters and advocates in certain situations. These situations were not clearly stated, which meant that the exact nature of the support provided, as with that provided by reception centre staff, was dependent to some extent on the number of clients the support worker had. The Mid Term Support system was a success in some ways, but the lack of a clear definition of Mid Term Support led to some confusion on the part of both clients and workers as to the level of service which could be expected.

An evaluation of the Bosnia Project states:

"Case-work management in Mid Term Support was frequently criticised by clients and there were a number of areas in which the procedures were not transparent, which made the management of client expectations problematic: for example, there were no clear procedures on needs assessment, the intensity of the intervention or case closure."

(Compass 1997 page 2).
There were clearly problems with the management and organisation of mid-term support, and senior Bosnia Project staff said to me that many of these problems were the result of the speed with which the Bosnia Project was established and the urgent nature of their work for most of the Project's lifetime. However, whatever the excuse that can be made, the fact remains that for over three years a service was provided that was the subject of a large amount of criticism from its clients. In one city, dissatisfaction with the Mid Term Support team led to demonstrations which were shown on the local television news. Some clients refused to use the services of the Mid Term Support team and instead preferred to go to local advice centres, although this option was only available for those who were able to speak sufficient English. Despite this being a clear indication of dissatisfaction with the Mid Term Support service, it did not appear to lead to any changes in the organisation and provision of the service. This suggests that the opinions of the service users were either overlooked or not seen as important.

[A Bosnia Project worker] said that the Home Office expects people to be able to be independent after one month, but in her experience six months is a more realistic period. The help provided by the Bosnia Project is discretionary, so this period is flexible. [The worker] was asked to clarify exactly what are the expectations of the caseworkers in her team. Due to the broad nature of casework it is difficult to specify what is/is not the responsibility of the caseworker. In general terms, they should deal with issues relating to benefits, health, education, grant entitlements of Bosnians and so on. Copies of the caseworker job description were circulated for the benefit of the other agencies. It was felt important to clarify exactly what the caseworker's remit is, to avoid confusion with the work of other agencies. [The worker] stressed that the casework with Bosnians should
be task limited rather than time limited. Doctors’ appointments are at present taking up a lot of caseworkers’ time, but the most vulnerable clients are being referred to Social Services.

Extract from minutes of a meeting of Bosnian support workers, 19.10.94

Above is an extract from the minutes of a meeting where the role of the Mid Term Support team was discussed. It is clear that the other agencies working with Bosnian refugees were unclear as to the role of the Mid Term Support team, and as to what could be expected from individual workers. The question was not clearly answered, and instead those present were told that anything related to benefits, education and grants could be considered part of the Mid Term Support team’s remit. However, this is an extremely broad remit, and although it makes no reference to employment almost any other issue arising in the lives of the refugees could be considered the responsibility of the Bosnia Project. In addition, the speaker, who was a senior worker, emphasised the nature of their work as being task led and not time limited. This is a different response to that given by another senior worker during an interview carried out for this research (and stated previously in private), who said that caseworkers were supposed to support clients during the first six months, but could give extended support to vulnerable clients. This reflects confusion over the nature of Mid Term Support and the length of time it should be available for (Compass 1997, Graessle & Gawlinski 1996). The suggestion that vulnerable clients were to be referred to social services departments suggests that the Bosnia Project was not prioritising work, and instead of identifying vulnerable clients and giving them priority, it was identifying them and referring them elsewhere. Defining the
service as task led, when there was only limited working time available, also meant that caseworkers were more likely to prioritise the work of those who were most insistent, rather than those who were more vulnerable.

The omission of employment from the list of tasks may have been accidental, but in practice caseworkers saw the seeking of employment as beyond their remit. In fact, some case workers were keen to have their clients avoid registering as unemployed, and preferred instead for them to be given some category whereby they no longer had to either sign on at the job centre or attend employment interviews.

[One city’s] Bosnians have been freed from signing on every week – we want this arrangement for every unemployed Bosnian in the region. Have any other teams come across this?

Taken from Projector, the newsletter of the Bosnia Project, Winter 1994

The leader of this team of Mid Term Support workers, quoted above, considered it a good thing that Bosnians in one city no longer had to sign on to collect benefits and instead had benefit books sent to them. However, the fact that they no longer had to register as unemployed removed the link between benefits and employment. It gave a message to the Bosnians that they were not expected to work, unlike ordinary residents of the city, and also removed one of the prime opportunities for finding work, looking at the advertisements in a job centre whilst registering fortnightly as unemployed. It also reflects a view of Bosnian refugees as victims, and people who are therefore incapable of work. This ‘victimisation’ of refugees should be avoided, since it leads to a failure to see
the potential of individual refugees (McFarland & Walsh 1989). However, this was an implicit assumption of much of the work with Bosnian refugees. Longer-term issues, such as employment, education, and the formation of community associations, were not addressed by the caseworkers, and these issues became the responsibility of the Community Development workers.

**Community Development Phase**

The community development phase was based on the model established in the latter stage of the Vietnamese programme, whereby community development meant facilitating links with the host community and local service providers, as well as assisting the members of the community to organise themselves as a community. In each regional team, development workers were appointed whose role was to assist in the development of community groups and to try to develop other sources of support for the refugees once the Bosnia Project was wound up. I was told at the time that the Bosnia Project had lobbied the Home Office for funding for community development work, and this had been successful. The Home Office then invited tenders for the supply of this work, and both the Refugee Council and Refugee Action submitted tenders. The Refugee Council bid was successful, and they appointed five Community Development Workers. In addition to these, Refugee Action worked with the newly formed community associations, in order to help with their organisation and funding applications. This was the only phase of the project when non-programme Bosnians could receive any form of
support from the Bosnia project, as the community associations were intended to serve the interests of all Bosnians in a particular area, regardless of status.

The Bosnia Project agencies actively supported the establishment of Community Associations in the cluster areas, with assistance from sympathetic individuals and groups in those areas. Initially it was hoped that the community associations would take over much of the support work carried out by the Bosnia Project’s Mid Term Support workers, but few have been able to do this. The formation and functioning of the community association is discussed in depth in chapter seven.

The Community Development workers attempted to create links with existing service providers, in order that clients would have a source of support once the Bosnia Project ceased to function. The effectiveness of these community development workers is difficult to assess, as there were no clear objectives or particular targets that they were expected to achieve. The main focus of the work seems to have been on the role of the community associations, and during the course of this research I did not discover any positive interventions by the Community Development workers that was not connected with the community associations. None of the Bosnians I spoke to was aware of work carried out by the Community Development workers, although since this aspect of work did not involve the refugees directly their actions may have remained hidden.

**Problems with the Programme**

Despite having learnt some lessons from the experiences of the Vietnamese programme, the Bosnia Project was not without its flaws. These problems can be divided as arising
from two main areas. Firstly, the refugees were given temporary protection. This led to a programme which suffered from a lack of planning, short-termism, and the development of working practices which did not benefit the refugees. The lack of professional training of workers, an effect of the short term nature of the programme, led to individual working practices and discrepancies between workers and agencies. Secondly, the refugees were assumed to be victims, and this led to their becoming objects of policy and interventions, rather than actors within those policies. This in turn lead to their being little or no opportunity for the voices of the refugees to be heard within the programme, or within policy implementation.

**Lack of co-ordination between agencies**

The programme did not operate in the same way in all areas, and the exact way in which it operated depended on which agency was providing the service and the area of the country in which the work took place.

In Dewsbury in Yorkshire, the reception centre and the Mid Term Support team were operated by the Refugee Council. Both teams used the same offices, and since the reception centre was close to the area in which refugees were being housed, it was easy for the refugees to maintain contact with the reception centre staff. By contrast those who arrived at the Oxford reception centre were looked after by the Red Cross, but when they were housed they were moved to Coventry, Birmingham, or Hertfordshire. Once housed, their Mid Term Support was provided by the Refugee Council. Both of these systems had their own advantages and disadvantages. For those in Dewsbury, moving from the
reception centre was not particularly difficult. Because they were in an area close to
where they had been staying they were already familiar with the geography of the area
and many of the Bosnian people there. Because the two teams of support staff were in the
same offices, the faces of the Mid Term Support team were already familiar and the
clients knew exactly where to go to find them. The disadvantage with this, though, was
that clients expected to receive the same high levels of support that they had been
receiving from the reception centre. This made it difficult for the Mid Term Support
team, since in the absence of clear guidance as to what they should and should not do,
their hand was often forced by the demands of the clients. Staff often found it difficult to
justify a refusal to carry out a task to clients. Clients also were able to approach reception
centre staff and ask for assistance, or ask for intervention in order that the Mid Term
Support team would provide assistance. This meant that the highly dependent relationship
that developed between staff and clients in the reception centre was maintained after the
client was housed. For those that moved from the Oxford centre, housing was a long way
from the centre and return visits could only be made occasionally. Clients quickly
realised that reception centre staff were unable to be of as much assistance as before,
simply because they were so far away. When staff were asked to intervene in a client’s
dealings with the Refugee Council’s Mid Term Support team, reception centre staff were
able to say that they had no influence since they worked for a different organisation. This
meant that the relationship that developed between former residents of Oxford and the
Mid Term Support teams was not as dependent as that of former residents of Dewsbury.
Workers adopting individual practices

The lack of clearly defined job descriptions and guidelines for working practices meant that caseworkers had to decide for themselves exactly what they would or would not do. Theoretically Mid Term Support was to be offered to people for the first six months after leaving the reception centre, and after that time they should manage on their own or be aware of other agencies that could help. The caveat was that the service could continue longer for those that were vulnerable. However, there was no definition of vulnerable, and workers were told informally that the service should be offered to all those that wanted it whilst there was funding to run the service. Many caseworkers were:

"...flying by the seat of their pants. They weren't sure how to go about it. Only certain people knew what the procedures were. They learnt by their mistakes, by trial and error. Gradually you got standardised team meetings, they'd discuss what was done and how. Often people were working against each other because they didn't know what they were supposed to do.” (Senior caseworker quoted in Compass 1997)

Lack of clear directions as to which tasks they should or should not perform meant that staff often developed their own individual working practices, with some refusing to do tasks that other workers carried out.

Case study
A disabled child had recently moved from a reception centre into permanent accommodation. The child needed to be enrolled in a school, and the special school staff asked if the mother and the child could visit before the first day in order that they could become familiar with the staff and the buildings. I made arrangements for this, and
contacted the local Mid Term Support worker in order that he could interpret and explain to the mother and child what was going on. He agreed to accompany the family on the school visit, but on the day of the visit he was on holiday and another Mid Term Support worker was taking over his caseload. This worker accompanied us as arranged, but afterwards said that he was very angry that he had been used in this way. He said that he was not supposed to interpret for me, only for Bosnia Project clients, and since I had arranged the visit I should have arranged an interpreter myself. I explained that the other worker had agreed to the visit, but he replied that what other members of staff did was nothing to do with him.

This case illustrates the difficulties faced by the staff, the clients, and those outside the Bosnia project, in knowing exactly what was the role of the Mid Term Support team caseworkers. One member of staff felt that a disabled child visiting a new school should be considered part of their caseload, whilst another did not. Some felt that their role was to interpret as well as offer advice, whilst others felt that they should not act as interpreters for other agencies.

Caseworkers sometimes took on tasks that should have been the responsibility of other agencies. At times this was because of pressure from clients and the lack of clear guidelines on working practices meant that they had difficulty refusing. At other times, the caseworkers were keen to be seen to be doing something, and so would carry out tasks themselves rather than refer the client to someone else. Although this was not always problematic, it could create tensions between staff of different agencies, and could be counterproductive.
When I began working with Bosnian refugees I was introduced to the Bosnia Project caseworker responsible for the area in which I worked. He was very helpful, and we agreed that I should share the room used for casework and take on some of the problems that people came with. One of the first clients that I saw wanted to know whether his brother would be arriving soon. The Bosnia Project worker explained to me that I needed to phone the Red Cross in London, and if they gave no answer then I should phone the UNHCR in Zagreb or IOM in Split. Despite making these calls I was unable to give him any news.

Around one month later I was introduced to the Red Cross’s refugee worker, whose role was to co-ordinate the Red Cross messaging and tracing service for all refugees, and to liaise with Red Cross Head Office in London concerning family reunion for Bosnian refugees on the programme. She was very annoyed when I told her that I had phoned these other agencies. I apologised, but told her that I had not been aware that I should not contact these people. The Red Cross worker said that they had very strict procedures to follow, and attempts to circumvent the procedures were often counterproductive. Normally, either Zagreb or Split would contact the Red Cross in London and give them information on people who were about to travel to the UK as soon as the information was available. London would then contact their local worker, who would inform them of the progress. Attempts to circumvent this process were counterproductive, since it sometimes resulted in a file being removed from the pile of cases about to be dealt with and being replaced lower down the list.
This is one example of a caseworker being eager to demonstrate that he is achieving something, and also he probably had a genuine desire to help and inform the clients. However, his actions were not productive in this case, and instead led to delays in family reunion. It was also an unproductive exercise in the sense that there were no known cases of family arriving for family reunion without relatives being informed, and the caseworker might have saved a lot of time and effort if instead he had reassured the client that news would be passed on as soon as it arrived. It also served to increase tensions between the workers, who were from different agencies. It is also worth noting that the Bosnia Project worker was fully aware of the presence of the Red Cross worker, but chose not to inform me of her existence. The reasons for his omission of this information was stated at the time to be a lapse of memory, although at the time I found this explanation barely credible.

Seeing the refugees as 'victims'

The length of time the project existed, combined with the generous funding and lack of clear guidelines, led to a way of working which promoted dependency among the clients. Caseworkers were unsure of when they could refuse to undertake a task, and refusals were often based on time constraints rather than a desire to see the clients do things for themselves. In the early stages of the programme workers would accompany people on driving lessons to interpret. Later, as more people arrived, there was not enough time for
them to do this, but they would go with them on the driving test to interpret. Caseworkers saw their role as one of helping people, and the way they helped was to do things for them. But by doing things for them, they deprived them of the opportunity to learn the skills for themselves. For the workers, it was often easier to fill in a form than to explain to someone else how to do it, but the legacy of this approach was that when the project ended the clients were still in need of substantial support. A senior member of the Bosnia Project staff wrote in the project newsletter:

"The aim remains the empowerment of clients in order to create self-sustaining communities but we must guard against creating dependency on what will be a time-limited casework service." (Morrison 1994)

So there was recognition at a high level within the project that the creation of dependency should be avoided. However, at the lower levels in the organisation, where contact with clients actually took place, the lack of clear guidelines for practice combined with a weak management system in the early stages of the project meant that there was a creation of dependency. Because they were unsure of which tasks they should or should not carry out, they tended to carry out tasks, which they thought they were capable of, and had the time to perform.

Caseworkers had very little training, and were not taught to carry out tasks in a way that would increase the independence of the clients. Consequently, when asked to assist in completing a form, they would simply complete the form for the client and then show them where to sign. Many of these forms were routine, such as free school meals applications, electoral role forms, council tax forms, and so forth. Unsurprisingly, the same clients would return one year later needing the same forms filled in again. It would
have been better if the caseworkers had assisted the clients, encouraging them to fill in the form themselves as much as possible, and giving them a photocopy so that next time they would know what to do. This would make the clients more independent, improve their self-esteem, and empower them, since it would show that they were capable of carrying out such tasks themselves. Instead, the way of working created dependence, since the client did not learn how to carry out the task, and doing it for them reinforced their lack of skills.

In the later stages of the programme this was recognised, and there were changes in the management and working practices for those clients who were part of the second stage of the project, but there was still a tendency to do things for the client rather than to show them how to do it themselves. In the short term this takes longer, but is better for the client in the long term, especially when a service is only available for a limited time.

The Bosnia Project should not take all the blame for creating a measure of dependency, and staff from the project also blame other factors. These include the temporary protection status. But another factor was the involvement of other agencies. In some areas a worker was appointed by an organisation outside the Bosnia Project to support Bosnian refugees in a particular geographical area. These were sometimes from the local authority housing department, the local authority social services department, the health authority or a local advice agency. In some cases the Bosnia Project found that as they worked to overcome the dependency that had already been created, these newly appointed workers would be working in a different direction. A person newly in post would wish to be seen to be doing something, and they would encourage a dependent relationship. This led to tension between the Bosnia Project and some of these workers. In one area, for example,
the Bosnia Project established links with the local Citizens Advice Bureau. The CAB had long established guidelines on what tasks it could or could not do, and as the Bosnia Project prepared to close down it was agreed that clients who needed ongoing support or for whom problems arose at a later date, referrals should be made to the CAB. However in the meantime the local authority Social Services department appointed a worker to work with the local Bosnian population. This worker stopped the referrals to the CAB and took on the casework themselves. The result was the continuance of a dependent relationship, as this worker was willing to take on tasks that the CAB would have tried to get clients to do for themselves. In another area, a similar situation arose in reverse. The worker appointed by the local authority found that attempts to encourage people to do as much for themselves as possible were undermined by the Bosnia Project worker’s willingness to do as much for the clients as possible.

The workers in the mid-term support teams were called caseworkers, and they carried out their role by being based in a particular place and waiting for clients to approach them with their problems. They were usually based in offices, although in one area they used a large room lent to them by the local Red Cross branch for over a year. This building was adequate in some respects, in that it had plenty of seats and clients could make coffee whilst waiting their turn. However, there was no separate room in which clients could talk to the caseworker in private, and so any issues discussed and the outcome were clearly heard by everyone else in the room. This could be excused for a short time, since the Bosnia Project was established with very little time for preparation. However, the fact that the building was used for over a year suggests that privacy for the clients was not given a high priority.
Lack of training and professional social work values

Younger caseworkers especially sometimes found the experiences of their clients during the war difficult to cope with. Clients often recounted their experiences, some of which were horrific, but there was no counselling available for the caseworkers to enable them to deal with this.

Case study
A worker from an advice centre explained to me why I should be careful when working with one of the caseworkers, and said that he failed to keep some information confidential and had a bad attitude towards his clients. To explain what she meant by this, she recounted an incident where a benefit claim by a particular client was being discussed by the two of them. This client had been subject to extremely severe treatment during his imprisonment and as well as physical scars he was impotent as a result. The caseworker had said his name, sniggered, and said he was the man that 'can't do it any more'.

The reaction of the caseworker was interpreted by the advice worker as a reflection of his uncaring attitude. The advice worker felt that he should not have disclosed the man's impotence to her, although she was already aware of it, and that his apparent amusement was unprofessional and showed poor judgement. To be fair to the caseworker, he was fairly young and was possibly laughing from embarrassment rather than because he did
not care. However, the lack of psychological support for the caseworkers meant that they had to develop a rather hard outlook in order to deal with what they were hearing from clients.

The absence of clear guidelines as to their role and duties meant that many Bosnia Project staff had a difficult relationship with their clients. Staff in reception centres were placed in a difficult position when they refused a client, especially if a subsequent request to a different member of staff elicited the response the client desired. Clients sometimes interpreted this as an unwillingness to provide help to them as an individual, rather than as a policy decision. Clients were aware of actions taken by staff previously, and a refusal to carry out a task which had been done for another client sometimes led to accusations of favouritism. Providing a greater level of support to those who were considered vulnerable or in greater need could also lead to accusations of favouritism, especially since the reason why one family or individual needed more support than another was not always clear to the clients.

As well as being accused of favouritism, staff were at times accused of corruption and theft, as was noted in one of the project evaluations (Graessle & Gawlinski 1996). These tended to arise as a result of misunderstandings, but they show the lack of communication between staff and clients, and also the lack of knowledge some of the staff had of the benefits system. Whilst in the reception centres, clients were given an amount of money each week with which to buy food. The amount was based on income support rates, but reduced slightly as the clients were not asked to pay towards heating, lighting and so forth. On moving into permanent accommodation the clients were given income support at the rate applicable to all persons in their situation, that is dependant on the number of
adults and children in the household. This was often more than they received in the reception centre, and led some clients to ask what had happened to the difference. There was in fact no missing amount of money, since the payments whilst in the reception centres were not income support but a payment direct from the Bosnia Project budget, but some clients failed to understand this.

The move to permanent accommodation was accompanied by an application for a Community Care Grant. These are grants made by the Department for Social Security intended for income support recipients to purchase items that their normal income support will not cover. The grants are discretionary, and the amount an individual is awarded is dependant on what they ask for, the DSS’s assessment of what they need, the amounts which the DSS will make available for different items, and the amount of money the office applied to has available in their budget at that time. To this combination of factors must be added the fact that many different people in a centre would fill in the application forms on behalf of the clients and would not always include the same items or ask for the same amount of money (the DSS will not give more for an item than is requested on the form, even if their internal guidelines suggest its cost is higher). The end result was that it was extremely unlikely that any two people would receive exactly the same amount of grant, even when their circumstances were broadly similar. However, the letters from the DSS merely state the amount given and the items it is intended to cover, and do not give a detailed breakdown of amounts awarded for different items. As well as leading to jealousies between clients, this also at times led to allegations of favouritism and corruption. Favouritism was alleged when clients felt that a worker had not tried as hard with their application as they had with another, or when they saw that they were not
awarded a grant for a particular item when another person was. Clients often failed to understand that the staff in the reception centre had no influence over the DSS and hence were not responsible for decisions made regarding community care grants.

When staff tried to explain the reasons for variations in grants, they were often hampered by their lack of knowledge of the benefits system. As noted above, many of the staff were themselves refugees and had only been in Britain a short time. They were given briefings on the benefits system, and were often advised by workers from local advice services and law centres, but the benefits system is very complicated and staff sometimes were unable to understand why there were variations between the amounts people received. This meant that staff sometimes became frustrated, and felt pressured when clients continued to question the amounts they received.

The Bosnia Project held several ‘awaydays’ for its staff, intended to give staff an opportunity to learn of the experiences of staff in other areas and to provide briefings and training. At one of these awaydays, staff from a reception centre presented a tableau illustrating the typical problems they faced. In this tableau, they showed a member of staff assisting two clients with their community care grant applications, and subsequently receiving different amounts of money. The clients were shown discussing the amounts they received and although both were initially happy the one who received the lower amount decided to confront the staff member to find out why. In the second scene, the client approached the member of staff angrily, demanding to know where their money is and why the staff member treated them less favourably. The staff member explained that they did not decide how much money the client received, but an appeal could be made against the decision if the client was not happy. In the next scene, the client gets a revised
grant, and now has more money than their friend, although they fail to thank the staff member for their help. The final scene shows the second client angrily approaching the staff member, demanding to know why their friend has more money than them, and asking what the staff member has done with their money.

This tableau was presented as a comedy, and many of those present found it very amusing, as it was a fairly accurate reflection of their experiences. I can remember that myself and a few others felt very uncomfortable, and felt that the staff were making fun of their clients, and also failing to understand the frustrations that clients sometimes felt. The fact that this tableau was created and recognised by staff in other reception centres shows that this lack of understanding of the benefits system was widespread, and also that the staff often failed to explain the system adequately to their clients.

Differing backgrounds of staff and clients

The Mid Term Support team caseworkers and the bilingual workers in the reception centres came from a variety of backgrounds. In the area I studied for this research all the caseworkers were bilingual, although in other areas the caseworkers were sometimes British and used interpreters to communicate with clients. As with the reception centre staff some were refugees themselves, having left Bosnia in the early stages of the conflict, whilst others were from other areas of former Yugoslavia, and others were originally from Yugoslavia and had lived in Britain for many years. Staff in the reception centres were a mixture of British staff with a background in social work or refugee work,
and Serbo-Croat speakers form a variety of backgrounds. The refugee agencies had strong anti-discrimination policies, and employed staff according to their skills and abilities rather than their religion, and this was at times a source of conflict and disquiet for the residents. The nature of the war in Bosnia meant that ethnicity became extremely important, and those who had been held in the Serb-run camps were very wary of those who were Bosnian Serbs or from Serbia. Later arrivals had been held in Croat-run camps, and were distrustful of Bosnian Croats and anyone from Croatia. In addition, some were so insecure as a result of the war that they found it very hard to trust anyone from former Yugoslavia who was not a Muslim. These feelings combined to create some difficult situations, and some clients were very uncomfortable with the Serbo-Croat speakers. In the reception centres, some level of harmony could develop, since clients were usually able to see that the staff of all backgrounds behaved in similar ways. However, for clients dealing with the Mid Term Support workers, they usually saw these staff in isolation and were not able to gauge whether a Muslim member of staff would behave in the same way. In the reception centres, arguments that developed over the ethnicity of staff had to be resolved, since the clients were resident and the staff continued to be on the premises for much of the time. This meant that when disputes arose, British staff or other Serbo-Croat speakers could intervene and calm the situation. When the dispute was with a member of the Mid Term Support team there was usually no other staff present to either support the staff member or to calm the client, and instead the client would refuse to work with the Bosnia Project again.

In all of the disputes that were reported to have arisen over the background of staff, I was unable to find an instance where the concerns of the refugees were given precedence over
the agencies' equal opportunities policies. All of the refugee agencies involved in the Bosnia Project had written equalities policies, and refused to use ethnic or racial criteria in their appointments of staff. However, these policies were unable to cope with the concerns of people who were recently arrived from a conflict where ethnicity was one of the major preoccupations of the protagonists. From the perspective of the agencies, they were asserting liberal principles which needed to be upheld. But from the perspective of the refugees, their concerns were being ignored and overlooked, and seen as unimportant.

**Failure to learn lessons of other programmes**

Although the Bosnia programme undoubtedly learnt some lessons from earlier programmes, some criticisms which were made of those early programmes can also be made of the Bosnia programme. Dalglish (1989), writing of the Vietnamese programme, suggests that the resettlement programme did not address the issue of employment, which directly contributed to the high levels of unemployment noted amongst Vietnamese refugees. She suggests that the use of several agencies may have “confused and complicated things” (p130). A further major weakness she identified was the lack of involvement of local authorities, despite the fact that local authorities were expected to provide various services to the refugees. These same three criticisms can be applied to the Bosnia programme. The Refugee Council (*The Development of a Refugee Settlement Policy in the UK 1997*) recognises that the question of employment for refugees has largely been omitted in programmes to date. The Bosnia programme's cluster areas were chosen according to the availability of housing and the willingness of housing providers
to accommodate those on the programme. Little, if any, attention was paid to the question of the availability of employment, contributing to high levels of unemployment among those on the programme. In the first few years of the project, unemployment levels were around 90% or higher. As time past some clients moved from benefits into employment, but there was little assistance from the Bosnia Project staff for those who wished to find work. There was also little encouragement to find work, as efforts were directed to maximising welfare benefits. By the end of 1999, most community associations estimated that around half to three quarters of their members eligible for work had moved from benefits to employment, though this does not include those who had been given disability benefits and were therefore no longer considered to be in the labour market.

Levels and nature of support from existing service providers varied widely between areas. In some areas, the housing department was especially helpful, providing support and services to tenants beyond their normal role. In other areas, the health authority gave support, in still others the social services department. According to senior Bosnia Project staff the reason these particular services were so helpful seems to have been the result of the expression of interest by particular individuals in positions of influence. Despite research on the Vietnamese programme suggesting that greater involvement of local authorities would be beneficial (Dalglish 1989), the explicit search for support from local service providers did not begin until the later stages of the Bosnia programme, when it became clear that the service provided by the programme would soon be withdrawn due to the curtailment of government funding.
Lack of planning

One of the lessons of earlier programme which had not been learnt when the Bosnia Project was established, was that although each refugee crisis may appear a discrete event and unpredictable, refugee crises may always occur. As such there is a need for a level of pre-planning, but at that time there existed no contingency plans to be used in the event of another refugee crisis (Graessle & Gawlinski 1996). Instead, refugee programmes in Britain have been characterised by ad hocery (Joly 1996b).

There was also little planning during the course of the programme. This was partly due to the urgent nature of the work, with the programme being established only a short time before the first arrivals, and partly due to the short term funding leading to short term thinking among staff.

One of the major problems with the Bosnia Project was the use of temporary protected status. This was introduced for those on the programme, despite intensive lobbying against it by the Refugee Council. It had a tremendous effect on the refugees themselves, discussed in more detail in chapter six, but it also affected the agencies that might have offered support. Many service providers were reluctant to make provision for Bosnians on the programme because they thought that they would shortly be returning to Bosnia. This was not because the refugees talked about going back, but because their status carried an expectation of return.
Return to Bosnia-Herzegovina

Return is a missing aspect of the British programme for refugees from Bosnia Herzegovina. Despite being implicit in the conditions under which they were allowed to enter the country, there has been no organised programme for return, and no official statement as to the expectation of return. The change to indefinite leave to remain for those who have been in Britain for more than seven years was carried out without explanation, and without a commensurate guarantee that they will be allowed to remain permanently. Consequently, the question of return remains pertinent for the refugees on the programme.

As the situation in Bosnia became calmer, some refugees did decide to return. The Refugee Council estimates that of the 2,500 who came under the auspices of the programme, 250 have returned to Bosnia thus far. This figure includes some medical evacuees who returned as soon as they were well enough to do so. The vast majority remain in Britain, and remain on short-term visas, although those that have been in Britain for seven years are now being issued with indefinite leave to remain.

There is no organised programme of return for Bosnian refugees, unlike in some other European countries, although assisted return is available through IOM for medical evacuees. A travel concession was introduced for all refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina, whereby they could travel at their own expense to Bosnia and remain there for up to one month, but retain the right to return to Britain and resume their previous status. This
concession had not been given to other refugees before this, and previously those with refugee status who returned to their country of origin were technically no longer refugees. The concession was intended to allow a visit to Bosnia-Herzegovina so that refugees could see the conditions for themselves and so make an informed decision on return. In 1996 Edinburgh Aid, an organisation taking convoys of relief to Bosnia, offered to transport those wishing to return to Bosnia, along with their belongings. IOM began in 1997 to pay passages for some refugees wishing to return by air, and recently began subsidising journeys made with Edinburgh Aid, although this ended in 1998. The leader of one Bosnian association told me that the subsidy was ended because very few people were choosing to return. Those travelling to Bosnia for an exploratory visit must pay their own travel costs.

Many people have taken advantage of the travel concession to travel to Bosnia in order to visit relatives and find out more about the situation there. Contacts with relatives and former friends have allowed them to make their own assessment of the country, though very few have chosen to return permanently. Although the war is over, difficulties remain in Bosnia, and many people are still not living in the area from which they came.

**Case study**

Munira was forced to leave her home in the Herzegovina region by Croat soldiers. Her husband was working away and so avoided being arrested when the other men were taken. She left with her children, and eventually arrived in a town in a government-controlled area, and was told that there was no one living in a particular home. She went there, as there was nowhere else to go, and forced entry to the property. At first conditions were difficult, but after a few months her husband found where she was living...
and joined her there. Throughout the war conditions were difficult, with shortages of food and fuel, and they were reliant to a large extent on food parcels from aid agencies. Now that the war is over they remain in the same house. Munira has made some additions to the property, such as a wood-burning stove in order to provide some heat, but the property of the former resident is still in the house, and the former resident's name is still on the door. When the television broke, instead of replacing it they bought a new one, which sits on top of the old one. Munira has a part-time cleaning job, and her husband has also been able to find work, but their wages are low and they have been unable to save. Munira said that she has never felt able to properly settle, as she always knew that the house belonged to someone else. In September 2000, almost seven years after she arrived in the house, she was told that the former owners had registered a claim to the property, but as yet she does not know what will happen about the claim. She is worried as she does not have the spare income to pay rent or the savings with which to buy the property. She does not consider that return is an option, as their former home was destroyed. If they went back to where they were from, they would have no income, no home, and as they would be the only Muslims in a Croat area they would not feel safe.

Munira and her family are reluctant to move back to where they are from, even though the property situation means that their future in their current home is uncertain. Munira told me that her parents had returned to the area where they were from, but they were able to do so firstly because their home was empty but not totally derelict, and because they were old. She said that old people were more likely to be accepted, as they were not considered to be a threat. In contrast, younger people could potentially become involved
in fighting if the conflict restarted, and so the local population was less likely to accept them. Her case also illustrates the continuing uncertainty faced by many displaced persons within Bosnia-Herzegovina, who may have been living in a property for many years but who have to always be aware that the owners of the property might one day return, leaving them homeless.

Many of those that are internally displaced are living in areas which were unfamiliar to them before the war, for example Serbs displaced from Sarajevo can be found in rural areas in Republika Srbska, and Muslims from Northern Bosnian villages can be found living in their vacated apartments in Sarajevo. Those who are displaced are often discriminated against when looking for employment, and often their skills are unsuited to the area in which they now live, and they may feel very frustrated by their situation. This makes them susceptible to propaganda and manipulation by nationalist politicians, who can exploit their fears of minority return and objections that some can return but they are unable to. Hostility and opposition to minority returns is often most fiercely expressed by those who are themselves internally displaced (Hallergard 1998).

The importance of Munira’s case is firstly that her story is typical of that of displaced persons within Bosnia, but also she is the sister of a refugee in Britain. This means that her relative in Britain is fully aware of the difficulties faced by those internally displaced and the difficulties involved in return. Those who have been displaced and are outside Bosnia face additional problems when considering whether to return (Who’s Living in My House? 1997). The law on return of property has not been especially effective, and there are variations in the way it has been implemented and the procedures to be followed in different parts of the country (Phuong 2000). For those outside Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is
often difficult to make a claim, and they often are not in possession of documents which would provide proof of pre-war ownership. Even if they overcome these difficulties and are able to find somewhere to live, they often face discrimination when seeking employment. Both aid workers and Bosnian citizens told me that when jobs became available that there was a hierarchy of allocation. At the top were former soldiers, who were given favourable treatment because of their role in the war. Next came the people who were not in the army but are local to the area. After them, came the internally displaced, and behind them were those who had returned from abroad, who were thought by many to have spent several years living in relative luxury. Many people who were displaced from the Prijedor, Kozerac and Banja Luka areas of Bosnia are now living in Una Sana. Refugees in Britain who have visited their family who are now in Una Sana say that there is a degree of discrimination against people who are not from the Una Sana canton, including poorer public services and problems with work and travel.

In addition, for many of those outside Bosnia-Herzegovina, they left when the country was newly formed. They spent the largest part of their life as a citizen of Yugoslavia, resident in the republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and if they return it is to a country that they have not lived in before, and often to an area where they have not lived before. Their pre-war mode of living is no longer possible, since whereas before they lived in a multi-ethnic state, the Bosnia of today is made up of a patchwork of mainly mono-ethnic districts. Everything about their old way of life would be different, from their neighbours through their employment to the coins in their pocket.

The result is that the number of returns to Bosnia-Herzegovina has been very low, and UNHCR estimate that between 1996 and June 2001 376,000 refugees have returned to
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and 385,000 internally displaced persons have returned to the area they were from. These figures may appear large, but at the end of the war there were around a million each of refugees and internally displaced persons. Of the internally displaced, almost half returned to their homes in 1996 in the period after the Dayton Agreement, and the number returning in subsequent years has been much lower. The figure for refugee returns includes over 180,000 who had been in Germany, and most of these were not fully voluntary returns. In the first six months of 2001 there were only around 8,000 refugees who returned to Bosnia-Herzegovina, and only a handful of these had been staying in Britain (UNHCR 2001).

Conclusion

The Bosnia Project, Britain’s programme for refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina, contained several features which distinguish it from previous refugee programmes. It was, though, an evolution of policy, rather than a wholly new set of policies. However although some of the changes were intended to benefit the refugees, the refugees themselves only appeared as objects or victims, and rarely were able to make informed free choices or have their opinions listened to.

Selection for membership of the programme was via an opaque process administered by UNHCR, and the refugees had very little choice as to which country they travelled. Although once they were on the programme they could nominate dependants and other family members that they wished to join them, there were constantly changing criteria for
acceptance of nominations, and these criteria were never fully revealed. Consequently the refugees had little control over who was on the programme and which friends and relatives they were able to have with them.

The decision to establish a programme was made at a time when Britain's attitude towards asylum seekers and refugees was the subject of much political discussion, and legislation was being formulated which was intended to discourage asylum seekers. UNHCR had recognised that many governments in Europe were questioning refugee protection, and supported the introduction of temporary protection measures in order to secure safety for the people who had been detained in camps in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The British government therefore agreed to establish a programme, but insisted that those on the programme have temporary protection rather than refugee status. This was a departure for British policy, since Ugandan refugees had mostly been British passport holders, and Vietnamese refugees were given refugee status on arrival, so both those groups had a measure of security as to their future. In contrast, refugees from Bosnia were admitted temporarily, and had no idea of the length of their stay. They were also made aware that the length of their stay would not be their own decision alone, since the British government had the right to return them to Bosnia-Herzegovina when it felt it was safe to do so.

The temporary status of the refugees affected many aspects of the programme. Because the refugees were supposed to be a temporary phenomenon, funding was initially only available for short periods of time, and the refugee agencies had to constantly return to the Home Office for extensions. The way the programme was funded, and the urgent nature of the work, meant that there was little time or opportunity for planning or
evaluation of practices. The short-term nature of the funding created difficulties with staffing, and often staff would leave at the point where they were becoming experienced, in order to gain more secure employment. The short term funding and the hurried way in which the Project was developed meant that there was little time to develop processes and systems, and little thought given to the arrangements for new services. There was very little central planning, and different agencies had different working practices for the same service. Consequently issues such as the creation of dependency were not considered until towards the end of the programme.

Although some of the senior Bosnia Project staff had been involved with the Vietnamese programme, many of the reception centre staff from that programme had gone on to work in other areas, and were not recruited into the Bosnia Project’s reception centres. Consequently many of the lessons learnt in the reception centre phase of the Vietnamese programme were not passed on the Bosnia Project reception centre staff. This meant that issues such as dependency and client independence were not given consideration at the outset, and were given attention later as a result of problems that arose from working practices. Reception centre staff were in many ways reinventing the wheel of reception policies, since there had been similar experiences in the Vietnamese programme’s reception centres.

The lack of an established Bosnian population in Britain meant that recruitment of staff was difficult, and there were very few trained interpreters at the time that the Project started. The bi-lingual staff that were recruited were from a variety of backgrounds, but the ethnicised nature of the conflict in Bosnia meant that many of the refugees were mistrustful of the bi-lingual staff and unhappy with their presence. Although it is
important for refugee agencies to support equal opportunities policies, this does suggest that policies need to be sensitive to the needs of the clients.

Mid Term Support was a new policy feature, and arose in part because experience with Vietnamese refugees showed that some level of support was necessary after leaving the reception centre. Although a welcome development, Mid Term Support suffered from the lack of clear guidelines as to the expectations of the service. Refugees had no way of expressing their dissatisfaction with the service that was offered or the way Mid Term Support operated, except by not availing themselves of the service, and even when they made demonstrations they had little or no effect on the operation of the service. Lack of staff guidance also meant that working practices were allowed to develop which created dependency, and so made it harder for the refugees to live independently. The use of caseworkers implied an individualised response to problems and issues that arose, and did not encourage the introduction of group services or the use of outside support services.

The policy of using cluster areas instead of dispersal in small numbers throughout the country was introduced because of the perceived failure of dispersal for Vietnamese refugees. The policy has been deemed a success by the refugee agencies because of the relative lack of secondary migration among Bosnian refugees on the programme. However, the policy failed to incorporate employment issues, which was also a criticism made of the Vietnamese programme. This suggests that although some lessons were learned from experiences of the Vietnamese programme, not all the criticisms were considered in the creation of the Bosnia Project. In addition, the use of cluster areas did
not increase the choices for the refugees, but merely meant that greater numbers were placed in the same area.

Return is the missing link of the Bosnia Project. Although the refugees had temporary protection and thus were expected to return, no programme for return was ever introduced. All refugees were free to return at any time, and medical evacuees could have their passage paid by IOM, but there was never any official announcement that it was safe to do so. Nor was there an announcement that since return was difficult for many, a change to a more permanent status would be made for the refugees. Instead, they remained on temporary protection status, despite remaining in Britain for many years. This sent conflicting messages to the refugees, since on the one hand they had only a temporary right to be in Britain, but on the other hand no arrangements were being made to return them and they were given long-term housing.

In chapter seven I consider the effect of the policies of the Bosnia Project, especially the policies on community development, on the refugees as a group. I turn now to the effect of the policies on the individual refugees. They were treated within the Bosnia Project as objects of policy, rather than as social actors or individuals with voices and opinions. This has in turn affected the way that the refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina live their lives in Britain. In the next chapter, I examine the effect that this has had, and also the effects of the conflict in Bosnia and the expectation of return.
Chapter 6: The refugees as individuals

Introduction

This chapter looks at the decisions made about the lives of the refugees, who made those decisions and what choices the refugees had. I include some case studies for illustration, chosen because they are typical of the experiences that were recounted to me, and demonstrate some aspects of the experiences that many people had.

I begin by looking at the refugees' perspectives of the war, and how they understand the conflict that took place, and then look at the processes involved in coming to Britain, and the extent to which they chose to travel here. Next I examine the effects of temporary protection on the refugees, and the relationship between this status and employment and learning English. I then look at the experience of the Bosnia Project from the perspective of the refugees, looking at what they thought of the project and the effect of the Project on the refugees. Finally I look at the way that Bosnian refugees are settling in Britain. Some have been in Britain for more than seven years, and I wanted to find out whether they were making long term plans to remain or whether their thoughts were geared towards questions of return. In each case, I am trying to find the extent of free choice in their decisions, and the amount of control they had over the events in their lives. It will become clear from the following discussion that there was in fact very little free choice, and the refugees had almost no control over what happened to them from the time that the
war started. They were largely disempowered, and control over the events of their lives rested with someone else or was dependant on events beyond their control. This manifests itself in different ways, and I examine the effects that this lack of control has had. All were to some extent caught up in a structure which disempowered them, and responded to this in different ways. Some people became angry with the Bosnia Project, and their rebellion against the Project workers acted as an impetus for action. Others seemed to be unable to act independently, and instead responded to their disempowerment by apparently being unable or unwilling to make positive decisions about their lives when the opportunity arose. This in turn led to the phenomenon that initially prompted this study, the situation where the majority of Bosnians seemed to be waiting for something to happen.

**Don’t talk about the war**

For all the informants, and many of the Bosnian refugee population, memories of the war are still fresh. Despite being questioned up to seven years after leaving their country and almost eight years since the outbreak of hostilities, minute details of their day to day existence during the conflict could be recalled. Such was the immediacy of these memories that many would begin talking about what had happened to them without direct questioning. The impression obtained is that these memories and experiences of war are what have determined the future course of their lives, and one cannot comprehend their situation now without understanding their history.
The exact causes of the war can be debated, and are discussed in detail in the chapter on the conflict in Bosnia. The relationship between the conflict and Bosnians as a group is discussed in the next chapter, but in this chapter I am trying to understand the relationship between the conflict and individuals. An interesting question, perhaps, is whether anybody saw it coming. With hindsight, one can point to the role of the media in Bosnia and Serbia and its use of propaganda, or the rise of ethnically or nationally based parties, but to what extent were ordinary people prepared for or expecting war? People offered conflicting reports of how the war began and why, but were agreed on one thing - they did not believe that what was going on in their country would result in war. Even when fighting started in other areas, they believed they would be safe because they had always got on with their neighbours. People’s perceptions and understanding of the conflict is important, as it is the conflict which has created their situation as refugees.

"The war was a big shock to me, I never thought I would see those things in my country. Even now I can't understand why these things start." Vahida.

Vahida lived in Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia, and despite the fact that a war had broken out in both Slovenia and Croatia after they declared independence from Yugoslavia, she did not believe that the same would happen in Bosnia. Though she had lived through the pre-war period and the early stage of the war in Sarajevo, reading reports in the newspapers and hearing the discussions of politicians on the television, the outbreak of the war came as a shock to her. As she says, she still cannot understand why the war started or why it continued for so long. This meant that when the war did start, she was not mentally prepared for it, and although she had voted for Bosnia's independence.
Vahida was shocked at both the outbreak of the conflict and the ferocity of the fighting. Samed makes similar comments:

“When the fighting started we all thought our village would be OK, because we never had any problems with the Serbs. By April you couldn’t just go into the town you had to show the [ID] card .... The radio and TV were all filled with the Serbs and fighting, and still we say ‘Oh, it won’t come’.” Samed

Looking back on the months leading up to the war, Samed thinks that perhaps he should have seen the war coming, but admits that he didn’t, and neither did most of the other people in his village. Although he lived in a village that was predominantly Muslim, he had friends who were Serbs, and had never experienced any problems connected with religion. In fact, everyone I spoke to claimed friendships with people of other religious backgrounds.

“Before the war I had friends that were Serbs. One man was a very good friend, he came in my house and I came in his house. [later, speaking of time in concentration camp] ..that Serb friend, he came and brought me food.” Suhro

The presence of close friendships with non-Muslims added to the confusion as to the meaning of the conflict. As I discuss in the chapter on the origins of the conflict, Muslims did not live their lives separate from those of Croats and Serbs, instead they were woven together by work, friendship, and sometimes marriage and kinship. To suddenly be singled out for treatment based on a category of identity that had not been important before was difficult to understand.

Saying that they thought their village would be safe, because the people there had never had any trouble with Serbs, suggests that people felt that there had to be some personal
reasons for the conflict. They seem to have thought that other places where the conflict had already broken out had somehow provoked their Serb neighbours, and hence prompted the fighting. Since they themselves had done nothing to provoke their neighbours and had always been on good terms, then logically their neighbours would not turn on them. To an observer this may seem like a naïve attitude, and perhaps it was, but it indicates how little the average person understood of what was going on around them. Even after the fighting had started, they thought what was going on was locally based, driven by personal motives, and led by people that could be reasoned with. Instead, when the fighting finally came to the village it emerged that it was not angry neighbours they were dealing with but professional soldiers following orders given many miles away. This realisation meant that the war was a double shock. First, they had not expected war to happen, but then when it did they found that they were targeted not for any particular action they had taken, but because of who they were. The war and their involvement in it was therefore outside their control, and although they could try to affect the outcome by defending their villages, they were not in a position to dictate the course that the war took. The arrival of the war in their village meant that they were targets because they were Muslim, and not because they had offended their neighbours. At the same time, though, they had not developed and had no commitment to a specifically Muslim project.

When their villages came under attack, it came as a surprise, even if the next village had been attacked the day before. All the people I met during the course of this research reported that they never expected the war to reach them, until the day it actually came. Those that took up arms did so in order to defend their village when it came under attack, and did not launch pre-emptive attacks themselves.
The war in some ways came out of the blue, though for some months leading up to the start travel between villages and towns in Northern Bosnia became more difficult. There were roadblocks at some villages, and to travel to nearby towns identity cards had to be shown. Rather than seeing this as the prelude to a war, many seem to have interpreted it as anxiety arising from the war in Croatia, and an anxiety that would soon pass. Friendships between people of different religions were maintained right up to and even after the start of the war.

At the time when Croatia declared independence, many Bosnian Serbs joined reserve units in Bosnia and prepared to join the fighting there in order to defend Yugoslavia. But there were also Bosnian Croats and Muslims that joined, though in lesser numbers. One man estimates that over 90% of Serbs in his area joined, and about 10 to 20% of Muslims. His Serb friends urged him to join, but he was reluctant to because he did not want to go to war. This suggests that though differences between the different religious groups were emerging there was still very little to indicate that the next battle would be within Bosnia.

One couple had a child that was taken ill and needed hospitalisation. They took him to the local hospital and were told to phone the next morning to find out his condition. On ringing the next morning, they were told that he was gravely ill, and had been transferred to Sarajevo hospital. They were poor, the husband had work to do, and they had another small child, so they were unable to travel to Sarajevo immediately, and instead planned to travel there the next day. Sadly, the next day was the day that the Post Office was bombed in Sarajevo, the war started and travelling to Sarajevo became impossible. The mother was reunited with her son eighteen months later, though the father died without
ever seeing him again. If the staff at the local hospital suspected that war was about to
break out, would they have transferred a child to the hospital in Sarajevo without either
informing the parents or suggesting that they go with him?

Differences between Bosnian Muslims, Serbs and Croats

The fighting in Bosnia was portrayed in the media and by many of the protagonist in
ethnic terms, but there is a question as to the reality of the alleged ethnic differences. Just
how apparent were the differences between these three groups? For the people I
interviewed, the differences only became relevant at around the start of the conflict. For
many, the differences were not apparent before 1990, and even then were not important.
Contrary to Bringa’s findings (Bringa 1995), the people I interviewed said that there was
no difference in the style of houses used by people of different religions.

“My house was one storey, with two side roof. Most were two or three storeys. More
modern houses had two side roof, and older houses usually had the four side roof.
Modern houses usually were one storey with rooms in the roof, and no cellar.” Ferid.

“No, there was no difference in the houses. You couldn’t tell from the houses. The next
village was all Serbs people, and the only difference was they might have pigs in the
garden. Muslim people don’t keep the pigs, just chickens and cows. They sometimes had
pigs as well. But that was the only difference.” Eldina

“You seen picture from my house. That house was built by my father, it was old house.
But people been in the Germany they come back and build new house, they build different
way. Some house is old, some house is new, that is difference in the houses, not the people in them." Suhro

So it seems that it was not possible to discern the ethnicity of a house’s inhabitants from the style of the architecture. How, then, was it possible to tell people apart? There had to be some way of distinguishing people in order for the level of violence that occurred to take place. Throughout the war, people were deliberately targeted because of their ethnicity, so how did the other side know this?

Informants repeatedly asserted that there were no physical differences between the different groups.

"We all look same, dress same, you can’t tell from looking." Zarfa

"If you see me and my friends walking in the pub you can’t say which is Serb or Croat or Muslim, we all same, same colour, same face, everything." Samed

"I can’t see any difference between me or Serb man or Croatian man." Sejo

Accents were also no guide as to whether an individual was or was not Muslim. People have regional accents in Bosnia, and in fact use different words for the same things in the Herzegovina region compared to the rest of Bosnia, but all the people in a particular town speak with the same accent regardless of religion. In Herzegovina, people use the word ‘kruh’ for bread, whereas in the rest of Bosnia they usually say ‘hleb’. Someone in Herzegovina, which is predominantly Muslim and Croat, would assume that a person using the word ‘hleb’ was Serb, but in the rest of Bosnia saying ‘hleb’ would not indicate anything at all. Language use and accents were regionally based rather than religiously based.
To explain how the Serb soldiers were able to identify Muslims, theories were proposed which may or may not be true, but which rely on the involvement of people from outside the area and the use of information held by the authorities. At its inception, the state of Yugoslavia recognised the categories of ‘Serb’ and ‘Croat’ as nacije- which translates roughly as ethnic group or nation. These categories were used in the census. For those who were Muslim and living in Bosnia, they had to choose to put themselves into one of these categories, or call themselves Yugoslavs. In 1960, the category ‘Muslim’ was added as a nacije. From that date on, Muslims could identify themselves as such in the census, but this also meant that the state could identify them.

“We didn’t know then, but after we find out. All the Muslim peoples have the same number in the same place on their ID cards. We didn’t know that. And so they could come on the buses and look at the cards, and know who is Muslim and who is Serbs. You can’t tell from the names, because some people have names the same as Serb or Croat people. So they could find out from the cards.” Eldina

Although I cannot prove this story to be untrue, I am fairly sure that it is not true. I have seen some people’s identity cards, and there did not seem to be a common number string that could have been used as a code of identification. The importance of this story, though, is that people have tried to understand why they were singled out, and one of the reasons they have fixed on stories such as this is it does not depend on assigning particular characteristics to Muslims. Another reason, and one which applies also to the other accounts, is that it suggests some degree of advance planning in order that Muslims could be distinguished from others.
"That man that questioned me in the camp. I knew him before. He was in charge in an office in our town and he sent people for their military service. He knew everything about us, he knew like who is Serb or Croat or Muslim." Alija

This account seems to me more credible, since all men had to perform national service and at the time of entering would declare their religion in order to receive the appropriate ceremony if they happened to be killed. Alija’s account again suggests that there was a degree of planning involved, in order that the person with access to this information was one of the men in charge of the camps.

“The census used to come and put head of household there and all your property there, all counted even which hen and chicken, and they realised how quick the Muslim people was developed and how rich they got in few years time, and that’s why, they realised, they took the census and saw, you know, the difference in property, maybe that’s why, they seized the best opportunity to start some sort of trouble.” Samed

Samed’s account again seems quite plausible, and although simple jealousy may not have been the cause of the war the information from the census may well have been used to determine which villages were to be targeted and combined with national service information would give a lot of information as to where Muslims were likely to be found.

Whatever the real causes of the war, for the ordinary people the causes were incomprehensible. They found themselves caught up in a war, and were involved without having been offered an opportunity to decide whether they wanted to be involved or not, and on identity criteria which had categorised that without their commitment to that identity.
Coming to Britain

When talking about coming to Britain, I asked the Bosnians why they were in Britain and not another country. Many had relatives in other countries in Europe, and yet they were in Britain with few, if any, close relatives. I wanted to know more about the decision-making process that they went through before arriving, and the range of options that were open to them. In other words, did they make a positive choice to come to Britain?

For those who came as part of the programme, there was little or no choice as to which country they would go. Whilst in Croatia recovering from their time in concentration camps, it was explained to the ex-detainees that they could leave and go to a safe country until the war was over. The government in Croatia was also unwilling for refugees that had been brought in by the Red Cross to remain indefinitely in Croatia, and was keen for as many as possible to be relocated to other countries. This meant that in considering their options, remaining in Croatia was not a long term solution as there was no reason to assume that they would be allowed to remain there. Many Bosnians had either worked abroad themselves or had family that worked abroad, and so they had pre-existing links to certain countries. In addition, some were aware that family or friends had already escaped the area and were in another European country, so many expressed a desire to go to a particular country, usually Germany, Austria or Switzerland. But these countries to which they had links were also the countries with the largest populations of refugees from the conflict in Yugoslavia and were unwilling to accept many more. After an appeal by the UNHCR, places were offered in other European countries. Ex-detainees were told that their names could go on a list for a country, and asked which country they preferred.
All the people I spoke to said that though they had asked to go to Germany, Austria or Switzerland they were told that the lists were full for those countries. Some were then given a choice between Britain and Norway or Britain and America, others were told that the only place with spaces on the list was Britain. Those who chose Britain did so either because it was the only country they had heard of, or because it was closer to Bosnia and so it would be easier when the time came to return. I have not yet spoken to anyone who made a positive choice to come to Britain. Some had no choice in the matter at all. Others were given a very limited choice, and they came to Britain because they felt there was nowhere else to go. Most knew very little about Britain, some were only vaguely aware that England and Britain were more or less the same place, and that London was a city not a country. The decision to leave Croatia was not a decision to go to Britain, it was a decision to follow the directions being given by UNHCR and get on a plane taking them out of the area of the conflict. Instead of feeling that they were going to somewhere, they felt they were getting away. It may have been possible to refuse to leave, and to insist on staying in Croatia, but none of those that came on the programme admitted to arguing with UNHCR and the Red Cross. They felt that they were dependant on these organisations, and since these were the people that had got them out of the camps they had to do as they were directed.

**Reception centres**

On arrival in the UK, the allocation of individuals to reception centres was via an opaque process. According to information given to me during interviews with Bosnia Project
staff, allocations were based on a loose formula taking into account the number of spaces in each reception centre and a desire to avoid having too many single men in any one centre. In addition, family ties were sometimes taken into consideration, so brothers would be sent to the same centre, but this did not always happen. However, only senior staff were involved in the discussion of who went where, and the staff at the airports meeting the refugees were given lists from which there were no deviations. If the allocations process was unclear to the Bosnia Project staff, it was even more unclear to the refugees themselves. They had no idea why they were going to one centre and not another, but since they had no idea where the different centres were or how long they would be staying there, most did not question their allocation.

One group of men did object to their allocations to different reception centres. Five men, three single and two whose wives’ whereabouts was at the time unknown, had been held in the same camp in Herzegovina and become friends. During their time in the camp they helped each other as much as they could, and when released from the camp by the Red Cross they stayed together. On arriving in Croatia they were housed in the same holding centre, and agreed to go to Britain since they seemed to have no opportunity to go elsewhere. They were put on the same plane to travel to Britain, and after they boarded they shuffled the other passengers around so that they could sit together. When they got off the plane, they heard their names being called and realised they were being put on different buses. One of them objected and asked if he could go on a different bus. He was told that was not possible, as the other bus wasn’t going to the same place. It was at this point that the men realised they were being split up, and were being sent to three different reception centres. They all then complained, and said they were only going if they all
went together. The discussion with Bosnia Project staff became quite heated, but they were told there was no possibility of changes, they had to go where they were told. Eventually, because everyone was tired and none of the buses could leave, they agreed to go where they were told on the understanding that Bosnia Project would try to move them as soon as possible so that they could be together. According to the men, it took two weeks of angry exchanges before they were reunited. These were the only people I knew who had changed reception centre, and their version of events suggests that it took a lot of persuasion for the change to happen. A member of staff at the reception centre where one of the men spent two weeks remembered the man a year later, when he passed me a list of all their residents and where they had gone. I pointed to the name and said that this man was now living in Westham and that his family had recently arrived. The member of staff said he remembered the man, and that he had done nothing but complain since he arrived and demanded to be moved to be with his friends. This group of five was an exception, as everyone else seems to have followed the directions given by the Bosnia Project and gone to the reception centre that they were told to go to. As I say in the chapter on the Bosnia Project, the reception centre that an individual was sent to was the prime determinant of their future housing location. Once within the structure of the Project, there was little room for personal choices, and those seeking to change the arrangements had to battle with the bureaucracy of the Bosnia Project.

For those who came to Britain on convoys, there was similarly little choice over where they ended up. They had been in a refugee camp in Croatia or Slovenia, when some people arrived and offered to take some of them to Britain. The people in the refugee camps were then offered a choice to be made in a very short period of time. Should they
get on this bus and go with these strangers, or should they stay where they were and hope things would get better? Those that came to Britain are those that made the choice to get on the bus, but it was not because the bus was going to Britain, it was because the bus was taking them out of the refugee camp. Indeed, some got on the buses not knowing which country they were being taken to, such was their desire to get to safety.

On arrival in the UK, convoy refugees were housed wherever their rescuers could find places for them. This led to great disparity between groups. Some were housed initially with sympathetic British families or in church halls until something more permanent could be arranged. Then they were given a place of their own. In some cases this was a house or flat rented from a housing association. In other cases they were given privately rented accommodation.

For both groups, then, control over where they lived was largely in the hands of someone else and at the whim of someone else. For the individuals themselves, there was little or no choice as to where they went, and the processes determining the choices made by others were not apparent. However, a crucial difference lies in the stage at which they became a refugee. Those on the programme did not in any way chose to become refugees, instead they report being put in a situation not of their making. Those from Northern Bosnia were involved in fighting defending their village, and then were either caught or surrendered to their captors. The decision to surrender was not a positive one, as they knew that there was no alternative. All the surrounding area was in the control of Serb forces, and there was a choice between surrendering or fighting to death. Many of the men from the Herzegovina region did not even become involved in fighting. Most were interred in the camps there after being arrested by Croat forces. On the first of July
1993, a highly organised process began whereby Muslim men were taken from their homes and placed in lorries, then transported to camps. Those who offered any resistance were severely beaten. A few days after the men were taken, soldiers went again to their homes and ordered any family remaining there to leave, and other people were allocated their home. One man’s home was very close to the camp that he was interned in. At night he could see his balcony, and after a few days he saw a man on his balcony in the evening, smoking a cigarette. He knew then that his wife and child were no longer in the home, but had no idea whether they were alive or dead.

For those that came on convoys, they had already made one positive decision about their future by deciding to leave. They left their home after hearing reports of fighting or when the conflict got closer, and most were not actually involved in the fighting.

Case study 1

Suhro was released from the camps by the Red Cross and brought to Croatia to recover. His wife, who had been taking refuge in Croatia since the men had been arrested, joined him in Zagreb. The Red Cross told Suhro that he could be put on a list to go to another country, and he asked if he could go to Austria. Suhro was born in Austria, as his father had been working there. His father was now of retirement age but had remained in his job in Austria when the war started. Suhro knew that his mother, brother, sister and various aunts and uncles were in Austria, so he was keen to go there to await the end of the war so that he could be with his family. He was told that the list for Austria was full, and that if he wanted to leave Croatia he could go to Britain. He was also told that Britain was still accepting family members, and since he had an aunt who was disabled who also could not go to Austria he decided to put his name on the list for Britain. He and his wife were
then given a flat in Westham after their stay in a reception centre, and a few months later his aunt joined them. He has a cousin also living in Westham, another relative in Southam and a few relatives in London. Most of his family are in Austria or have returned to Bosnia.

Suho, as can be seen from this case study, did not want to come to Britain. He realised when in Croatia that it would be almost impossible to join the rest of his family in Austria, and travelling to Britain represented the only opportunity to get his wife and aunt to a safe place. It was not a positive choice, but instead a decision was forced on him by circumstances beyond his control – the unwillingness of the Austrian government to accept any more refugees, and the willingness of the British government to take some of the people released from the camps. Suho was also aware that the war in Croatia had only recently ended, and there was no guarantee that Croatia would remain safe for Muslims, so he did not feel that staying in Croatia was a long term option.

Case study 2

Ferid was brought by the Red Cross to Croatia. He left the accommodation they had provided to stay with his brother in Zagreb. He knew he couldn’t stay long with his brother as there was not enough room. His wife and two children were already there, having made their way to Croatia after Ferid was arrested. The Red Cross told him he could go on the list for America but he didn’t want it because America was too far away. He was told that many countries were already full and didn’t want any more refugees. Then the next time he saw the Red Cross they told him that there were places on the list for Britain. He decided to take that, but says that if he had the choice he would have gone.
to Austria where he had a sister or Germany where he had several relatives. His wife’s family were mainly in Holland, and he would have liked to go there also. He has family now in America, Bosnia, Croatia, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, but in Britain he has just one brother, who arrived after Ferid. There are a few people here that he knows by sight from before the war, but no friends or relatives other than his brother. He was told nothing before he came. At the airport people started calling out names. A woman called out his name and said ‘he is for Rugby.’ Ferid heard her, and replied ‘No, I am too old for Rugby!’ Then the woman explained to him that Rugby was a place he would go to in England.

Again Ferid’s decision to come to Britain was not a positive decision. He had been presented with three options – to go to America, where he knew no one and which was a long way from Bosnia, to go to Britain, where he also knew no one but which was at least in the same continent, or to stay where he was, in a country that did not want him living in the house of a relative who didn’t have room or resources enough to support all Ferid’s family.

Ferid’s account of his arrival, and his misunderstanding of the meaning of ‘Rugby’, shows three things. Firstly, Ferid had very little knowledge about Britain before he arrived here, and was not aware that rugby was a town as well as a game. Secondly, he had not been given very much information before he arrived. Someone had made a decision as to which reception centre he would be sent to, but this was not discussed with him before he arrived and he was given no pre-arrival briefing on what to expect. Finally, if his account is correct, the people there were talking about him rather than to him. When
he recounted this story to me, it was clear that from his perspective the conversation that
was going on was being conducted between Bosnia Project employees, and he was
listening rather than being spoken to.

Case study 3
Zarfa's husband, Senad, was working as a chef in Slovenia when the war in Bosnia
started. When it looked to Zarfa as though her village would be attacked soon, she
decided not to stay there any longer. She loaded her children and a few possessions into
the car and set out to drive to join her husband. She got to Slovenia, but there was a road
block stopping any more refugees from travelling into Ljubljana. The soldiers there told
her she could not go into the city, and directed her instead to a refugee camp. Once there,
she phoned her husband to tell him where she was. He left his work to go to see how she
and the children were, and stayed with them in the refugee camp. A few weeks later a bus
arrived, and the people on it offered to take some people to Britain. Other buses had
arrived, and other people had left. The family decided that conditions were not very good
at the camp, and decided to take the next bus they were offered a place on. This was a bus
organised by a former social worker from the north of England, and all the people were
taken to the north of England initially. They were given rooms in the homes of English
people until permanent accommodation could be found for them. The former social
worker had links with a senior staff member of a housing association, and this association
had been offered temporary use of some homes in the Midlands. These were offered to
the family, as well as six other families. Zarfa and Senad accepted, as they found it
difficult living in someone else's house.
They have learned that their house has been badly damaged, and that it is now within the Serb controlled part of Bosnia. The parents of Zarfa, whose home was about two kilometres away from the family’s home, are still in their house. Though it was damaged during the war they have been able to repair their home.

Zarfa, in contrast to the other two cases mentioned here, made a positive choice to leave her home. She knew that the war was coming, she was scared, and she decided not to risk staying in her village because it was too close to a predominantly Serb area. She chose to go to Slovenia because that is where her husband was working, though by the time she arrived Slovenia had stopped allowing refugees into the towns and was sending them to camps instead.

The rest of her story, though, shows that later on her family was presented with a very limited range of choices, though the choice was not as stark as for Ferid and Suhro. There was no one to tell her that they had to go somewhere because their host country didn’t want them, or to say that other countries were full, but it was clear that there was no organisation behind the arrival of the buses, and so no guarantee that waiting would result in more options.

Religion

The majority of people that came on the programme defined themselves as Muslim, but this is not an unproblematic definition. There is an image that is prevalent in Britain of how a Muslim should be, based on the habits and practices of those Muslims who draw
their origins from Pakistan and India. This image is of women who cover their hair and
dress in long clothes, and with a notion of Islam as a way of life, incorporated into every
aspect of behaviour. Unlike British Christians, British Muslims are thought to pray
regularly and attend mosques. They are considered devout, even fundamentalist. Indeed,
the predominant image is one of fundamentalism.

This is in contrast to how Islam was practised in Yugoslavia. The regime in Yugoslavia
was Communist from 1944 until the country's collapse, and though it permitted religious
worship it was not strongly encouraged. The country embarked on a programme of
modernisation, and along with modernisation of industry and agriculture, there was
encouragement for the modernisation of the people as well, and towards the separation of
religion from the rest of society. Religion was a private act, and thus it was not proper to
be overtly religious or to display strong religious imagery when in public. Muslims in
Bosnia-Herzegovina were not a minority, and certainly not an oppressed minority. Hence
they had not developed a committed project to defend or protect their religious identity.

Networks and boundaries of social action were not well defined, either in public or in the
private domain.

In Britain, church and state are not separated in the same way that they were in
Yugoslavia, but ordinary society is predominantly secular. Religion is largely a private
matter, but public space is given to religion in some spheres. In education, religious
education involves the teaching of many faiths, not just Christianity, and pupils are taught
about the way different religions are practiced. When Bosnians arrived in Britain, they
arrived in a country that already had a strong Muslim community. Most Bosnians that
came on the programme were also Muslims, but the perception they had of themselves
was different to that initially held by the majority society. Because there was an existing Muslim population with a strong religious tradition, it was assumed by both the majority society and other Muslims that Bosnian Muslims would be broadly similar to British Muslims. However, Bosnian Muslims had a different perception of themselves, and were keen to point to the ways in which they were different to British Muslims.

"We are not like those Muslims from Pakistan, we are modern." Eldina

This is a quote from an interview in Yorkshire, but it could have been taken from almost any interview where religion was discussed. Bosnian Muslims considered themselves to be modern, and considered British Muslims as very different from themselves. This difference is important in understanding the level of support that Bosnian Muslims would receive from British Muslims.

Initially it was expected by the Refugee Council, local support groups and indeed most people working with Bosnians, that housing Bosnians in areas where there already existed a Muslim population would be beneficial. The rationale behind this thinking was that there would be cultural and behavioural similarities between both groups of Muslims, and so those British Muslims would be able to offer support and advice. In practice, though British Muslims often did offer help initially, this was often rejected after a short time. The 'help' offered by British Muslims was based on the fact that they perceived Bosnian Muslims to be the same, and to have the same religious beliefs and practises. But for Bosnian Muslims, what they were being offered appeared not help, but direction and guidance.

In many cases, the first support that was offered was directions to halal butchers. For British Muslims, eating meat that has been butchered in line with halal guidelines is
extremely important. But in Yugoslavia, many Muslims did not eat halal food. Halal butchers were rare, and many of the people I interviewed had never bought halal meat until they came to Britain. Instead they understood eating halal as meaning they should not eat pork, and did not consider the way that the animal was killed was of great importance. When they tried to tell their neighbours that they could buy meat cheaper at the local supermarket, they were met with shock and disgust.

"My neighbour tell me, you no eat halal you go to hell. I tell him in the camp I ate anything. We were all starving men. If we don't eat we die, and if they give me pork I eat pork." (Samed)

Samed was angry at his neighbour’s attitude, and insulted at their suggestion that God would punish him for not eating halal food. He had been held for a long time in the camps run by Serbs, and had been glad of whatever food he was able to get. He told me that his father had always told him that a sin is not what you put in your mouth, but what comes out of it. In other words, eating something that perhaps you shouldn’t eat does not offend God, instead it is your behaviour and what you say to others which is important.

"The Muslims here are different. Bosnian Muslims are European Muslims, we are white, we dress in European clothes. Old women wear headscarves, not young women." (Vahida)

As well as food, the question of dress was another area where friction occurred. In Bosnia, there were not the same strictures on women’s clothes that exist in Pakistan and some other Muslim countries. Although women would cover their hair when they went to the mosque, it was rare for younger women to wear scarves in other places, and styles of dress were similar to those in Britain. However, British Muslims expected Bosnian
Muslim women to dress the same as they did, wearing a headscarf when outside, and wearing long skirts and long sleeved tops. Bosnian women did not agree to this, and this caused disagreements between Bosnians and British Muslims.

**Case study 4**

Samed and Fata were both in their late twenties, and had a daughter. Samed had been working as a wood cutter, as although he had completed a year at university his family couldn't afford for him to complete his studies. Fata had been working in an office until just before their daughter was born, and would have gone back to work if the war had not intervened. One day, a few weeks after moving into a house in C, they received a visit from one of their neighbours. This man had visited them often, and each time he brought something that might help them, such as clothes for their daughter or kitchen equipment his wife no longer needed. On this occasion he brought a piece of cloth and some threads. He told Samed it was for his wife, so that she could embroider a scarf and cover her hair. They both told him that Fata did not cover her hair, and so would not need the scarf. The neighbour replied that as a Muslim she should cover her hair, and an argument ensued. Eventually the neighbour left with the cloth and needles, and never returned. Recounting this event, Samed told me that his wife did as she wanted. Not even he could tell her to wear a scarf, so why should this man dictate what she could or could not wear? Fata told me that she was insulted by the offer, and that only old women cover their hair.

British Muslims found it difficult to accept that someone from another country could call themselves Muslim, and yet behave in a way that was so different to themselves. This made Bosnian Muslims angry, as they felt that what was being questioned was not just
their behaviour, but whether they were really Muslim. For people who had been imprisoned and maltreated precisely because they were Muslim, this was one of the biggest insults that could be made.

Case study 5

Many people, including myself, made assumptions about the behaviour of Bosnian Muslims. One day I was walking along a street when I saw a young Bosnian woman who had recently had a baby. I stopped to say hello and admire the baby, and I noticed that Mina was wearing a headscarf, tied in the Muslim way, that is going under the chin and tied behind. I assumed that the scarf was symbolic, and since she has recently got married and had a baby this was a way of showing her modesty and unavailability. The idea intrigued me, since I knew that though her new mother-in-law wore a scarf, I had always found Mina to be very modern, and she always dressed in fashionable clothes. A few days later I visited her at home, and after coffee and a general conversation, I asked her why she had been wearing the scarf. She asked why I was asking, and I said it was because I was wondering if now she was married she was being more religious and covering her hair was a symbol of this. Her reaction was laughter. “It was a cold day and the wind was blowing. I put on the scarf because my head was cold.”

I include this example to show that it was not just British Muslims that had expectations as to the behaviour of Muslims. My enquiry was not met with the same anger as that of Samed’s neighbour, probably because I was not trying to insist that Mina should wear a
scarf. In contrast, Samed’s neighbour said that Samed’s wife should cover her hair, and that Samed should make her do so.

For people who had been targeted for persecution because of their religion, this questioning of their religious practices was extremely hurtful. An aspect of their identity, their religious background, assumed enormous importance when the war began, since it was the reason for their imprisonment and their involvement in the war. They had already attacked for being Muslim, and now they were being criticised for not being proper Muslims, and at times it was suggested that perhaps they were not Muslim at all. The result of this questioning and suggestions as to the correct manner of behaviour was that the vast majority of Bosnians reacted angrily and broke off close links with British Muslims. Some relationships were maintained, but very few close friendships.

As they got to know their neighbours, Bosnian Muslims also found that there were various superstitions held by British Muslims which they did not hold. Well meaning British Muslims would try to tell them that a particular practice was good or bad, and claim that this was what all Muslims believed. But the British Muslims often did not recognise that religions can be practiced in different ways in different countries, and still be the same religion. They were trying to impose a model of Islam based upon traditional practices in Pakistan on a group of people from a different background.

As the two groups got to know each other more, more areas of disagreement became apparent. Among British Muslims, it is common for marriages to take place between relatives, and the marriage of cousins is accepted. For Bosnian Muslims, this is a disgraceful practice. In Bosnia, there was a strong notion that marriage should never occur between people who were related, however distantly. This even extended as far as
strong societal disapproval of the marriage of two people with the same surname. One couple I was acquainted with had the same surname before marriage, and though I did not raise their names, other Bosnians that I interviewed used them as an example. It was common knowledge that their surnames were the same before marriage as both mothers-in-law were living in the same area, and of course they too shared a surname. Several people spoke of their disgust at the notion of marriage of cousins, but took great pains to point out that this couple were not related even distantly. Another Bosnian couple had married despite being distantly related, with the uncle of one having married the cousin of the other. This was considered a subject not to be discussed, and a matter of embarrassment for the couple. I was told about it after some neighbours fell out, and it was told as gossip, implying that the people were bad people because they had married.

"In Iran they can have two wives or more. Muslim in Bosnia can't do that, they can't have two wives. Muslim in Bosnia is different. They [Iranians] can marry family. If I marry someone the same name as me I will get killed. Maybe not killed but it is very bad for me. Even if not cousin, if just relative from long way back, still I can't marry them. They marry family. One man I know, his son marry his brother daughter. I can't do that, no way. Bosnia people think this is wrong." Suhro

When a Bosnian talks of their family, they often refer to cousins as brothers and sisters. The children of their father's brother are considered to be almost siblings. When learning English, they are taught that in English the word for that relationship is cousin, but this use of language is important if one is to understand their reaction to being told that for British Muslims marriage of cousins is acceptable. Not only is it not acceptable for Bosnian Muslims, it is akin to incest. When asked the difference between themselves and
British Muslims, the most common reply was that “We are modern, they are not”, or “we are European”, but then most went on to say “They marry cousins.” This was not stated as a matter of fact, it was said with incredulity or disgust.

For those Bosnians who actively practiced their religion, other differences soon became apparent. For Bosnian Muslims, mosques had separate seating for men and women, usually with the women sitting at the back of the room and men at the front. But for British Muslims, although women could go to the mosque if they wished, in practice attendance at mosques is predominantly male. For Bosnian Muslim women, this meant that the very act of worship that they had traditionally practised was now being called into question. Very few people actually said that they went to the mosque at all, either before or after coming to Britain. I was told stories about a Bosnian man who never went to the mosque in Bosnia, but since arriving in Britain had become extremely religious. This man, it was alleged, now prayed and went to the mosque regularly, and made his wife wear a scarf and long clothes. I never met this man, or found out his name, though his existence was reported to me by several different people from different towns. Those who spoke of him said they had seen him, but did not know his name or anything else about him. It is possible the man does not exist, that he is the Bosnian equivalent of an urban myth, but whenever he was spoken of it was in tones of disgust. He was in some ways a symbol of what the others did not want to become, and he was referred to in order to show that they had chosen not to go down that route. For Bosnian Muslims, religion was only a part of their life, and being Muslim was only one aspect of their identity. The way they lived their lives and practiced their religion was their own choice, and one of the few areas where they retained control. Their refusal to conform to British Muslim
expectations was a way of asserting their independence, establishing a measure of self-esteem and establishing that in this area of life they had the power to decide on their actions.

For some of those Bosnians who did not arrive as part of the programme, the issue of how their religion was practised was even more of an issue. Of those that came to Britain on convoys, some were brought by Muslim individuals or groups who were acting to support what they considered to be their religious kin. For some of the Bosnians, the relationship quickly deteriorated. To begin with, they were housed in properties owned by Muslims. These properties were often poorly maintained and overcrowded, but initially it was difficult to complain. Next the Bosnians found themselves being criticised for their dress habits. Women who did not wear scarves and long clothes were told they were going against God's wishes and behaving immodestly. There was constant pressure to behave in the same way as British Muslims. In some cases, the hosts retained keys to the properties in which the Bosnian families were housed, and started going into people's homes to ensure they were behaving properly. They would remove what they considered to be un-Islamic, such as photographs and pictures on the wall. In one town a letter was sent anonymously to all the Bosnian families, severely criticising their behaviour and attitude towards traditional Islamic practices.

Bosnians in England, Bosnians or beggars?

The behaviour of Bosnian people in B is generally very good. They are very kind, good and welcome.
Now you are in England, where you are safe. Everybody has money, food clothes and houses. The same as schools, college, general education and healthcare.

Also you don't have money problems. Even if you can't live like kings, you live in very good conditions, like many people in England, and much better than people in Bosnia, Slovenia, Croatia, Germany and also Austria. The exception to this is people who live with relations. Some people who have come to England are behaving like they are here on holiday, and often forget what has happened in Bosnia and what is still happening in Bosnia.

Some of these people use their refugee status to get money from friends and people in England. Also they use every chance to get help from different communities, but this help could do much more for Bosnian people. Everybody who visits you tries to get you television videos and radio equipment. If your friends or neighbours offer you their old television, video or furniture that you need, it isn't a mistake to accept this. But you must never ask for these things. If another person offers you food or money you don't have to accept this. You have your own money from the Government, it isn't millions but its enough to live on. You don't pay rent for your houses where you live. If you get money or food from a shop or friends say to them that they should give this to [an Islamic charity] for your people who stay in Bosnia because you have everything and you don't need more. I beg you, please don't fall so low, as Bosnians in England, with your behaviour as beggars. If you have problems with furniture, heating, water etc please contact [the Islamic charity].

Family or friends?
Everybody is accommodated now in their house. There is one negative problem we expected. Bills for electricity, gas and water are to share between people who live in the house. You must always remember that you are in this country because you couldn’t stay in Bosnia. You are all strong.

You must always remember that you are Muslim, and you must learn to live together with your Muslim brothers and sisters. If outsiders see that Muslims cannot live together how then can we all connect together to fight together against the Chetniks. If you go back to your house it is very possible that all houses and cities will have been destroyed. But if you stayed there it would have been dangerous. So you must be grateful to [the charity] who brought you here and accommodated you in England. They gave you houses, money, doctors, schools and what is most important ISLAM. You must respect everybody in your house and don’t argue with them, call yourself on faith in Islam.

Praying

From now, everyone must regularly visit to the mosque. If you don’t do this you must ask yourself why?

How can you expect a good end to this tragedy in Bosnia for your families and relations and how then can you expect them to be alive and safe if you only believe in the force of the Bosnian people and the UN.

All of you must know that one true real Muslim Mujahedin is worth ten non-Muslim soldiers. It is not just a phrase or a proverb we get used to in the propaganda, it is a fact. A true real Muslim is not one of the people who drink alcohol before they go to fight. It is not a real man who believes in Communism, Capitalism, or Nationalism or the Bosnian flag. Muslims are men who believe in Allah and his foundation of peace. Bosnian people
will never have success if they fight for things other than Islam. Only Islam can control Bosnian people in Bosnia. The West sees Islam as a barbarian and old fashioned medieval religion whose force must be over other people.

Today there are 1.2 million Muslims in the world. But just 1 or 2 countries practice Islamic law. This is why so many Muslim people have troubles.

If you want to follow and listen Islam then you must follow and listen, but if you don't follow and listen you cannot ask for help from Allah. If you live in a Muslim country you must follow the laws of that government, that is the same if you lived in another country.

You must accept this even the West see us as un-citizens. Muslims are the people who have the smallest number of murders, kidnappings of children, alcoholics, drug addicts, basically any crime. Because you must see Islam not like teachings from Islam, reading Koran, teaching about Mohammed and teaching about peace on his foundation.

Muslims

Every Muslim must believe in these things:

Believe in God Allah

Believe in God's angels

Believe in God's books

Believe in God's prophets

Believe in God's judgement day

Believe in God definitely.

If you don't believe in all these things you are not Muslim. Most important thing in Islam is to believe in Islam and pray. There exists just one God and if you think that someone
can save you or help you or give you good or bad luck then you are saying there is something more than God and that is a big sin.

If you think that something other than God can save your neck arms or legs you are a sinner. Allah says he forgives everything if you don't have this sin.

If you wear a necklace and you believe in this necklace it is a sin. Christians wear necklace with a symbol of the cross, they believe in the bible, Muslims don't wear necklaces and believe only in Allah. Therefore don't believe or listen to Christians. If you want more information about anything in this letter contact [address of Islamic charity]

(Letter sent by Islamic charity to convoy Bosnians in early 1993, translated on behalf of a housing association)

The implication of the letter was that Bosnian should try to be good Muslims, and should be grateful to those that had helped by bringing them over here. It provoked anger instead of a desire to learn more about Islam, and resentment that they were being told what to believe and how to behave. Gradually, as they found out more about Britain and their entitlements, the people housed by these groups moved away from the people who had brought them and many started up again. In most cases they went to another town, though in B there was a housing association which was sympathetic and some were able to move within B into housing association property. They often broke off contact with the group that had brought them to Britain, and this is one of the reasons that information on convoy Bosnians is hard to obtain.
Temporary protection

The status that refugees on the programme were given on arrival seems to have been the single most important factor creating their disempowerment. The letter each person was given by the Home Office stated explicitly that they would be expected to return to Bosnia once the Government thought it was safe to do so. It acted as a permanent reminder of the uncertainty of their situation, and the uncertainty affected their entry into employment and to education.

This document was originally valid for six months, then renewed annually, then given for up to four years at a time. Though the wording on the letter was changed after a few years the document still did not give them the right to remain or rule out their return and this led to uncertainty about the future. After the Dayton agreement, countries such as Germany announced that they would commence returning refugees to Bosnia. The question of whether they would go back to Bosnia was then not a question for the individual alone, it was also a question for the government, since if the Government decided they should go then they would have to return. Similarly the decision to remain in Britain was not a decision for them alone, since it depended on the Government giving them permission to remain.

"Our visa, it finish in 2000. ... When it finish I don’t know. We will go back or something else. If they give us four more years then we decide after 2000. I know I haven’t got a place there, but if president here says I have to go then I go." Senada

"My visa is temporary visa still. It means nothing. We are here now but tomorrow maybe you can’t be here." Ferid
The lack of permanent status means that these refugees were uncertain about their future. During the time of this research they did not have indefinite leave to remain, and their visas had to be sent to the Home Office periodically for renewal. Although as far as the Home Office was concerned this was automatic, for the refugees each renewal represented a source of anxiety. There were no cases that I became aware of where a visa was not renewed, but the Bosnians themselves seemed to believe that each individual visa renewal application would be considered separately, and that there could therefore be no certainty as to the outcome of the application.

In addition to anxiety caused by renewals, Bosnians on the programme were faced with the fact that the papers giving them permission to be in Britain only gave them permission for a limited time. Because of the clause stipulating that they would be expected to return when it was safe, they were aware that the visa could be withdrawn at any time. As Ferid says, although on one day they might be legally in Britain, the next day the government could decide that it was safe and order them to return. Ferid was therefore always uncertain about his future, and never sure that he would still be living in Britain the next day. Senada felt that her future lay with the government too. She realised that if the ‘president’ said that she had to go back to Bosnia, then she would be forced to go whether she wanted to or not. This lack of certainty about the future affected many aspects of their lives. Referring to a ‘president’ in Britain also indicates a lack of integration and a lack of knowledge about the basic structure of Britain.

"Many people have wasted seven years here waiting for something to happen to them or decide about their lives. All the time they are thinking they want to stay here but might have to go back. Some go black working [whilst claiming benefits] to get money to go
back with. They are not interested in learning anything. They just try to get some money for going back. That is all because of their status.” Maida

Because they were uncertain about their future, decisions that would affect their future were difficult to make. The biggest decision about their future, that is the choice as to which country they would live in, was in the hands of the British government. The refugees themselves had no power to decide to stay in Britain, because their status was temporary. In order to decide to remain, they had to first be given some form of permanent status. Maida talks of people having wasted seven years whilst they waited for something to happen. That ‘something’ was a decision as to whether they could or could not remain permanently in Britain.

“My visa now is finished. It was sent away but it didn’t come back yet. Sometimes I am worried about status. I have no house now. I worry about where I will go. It is problem if they say you have to go back to other house. Someone else is in my house now.” Asim

Temporary protection meant that the refugees had no power over their future, they were dependant on the decisions of the government as to whether they could or could not remain. Though all refugees might be expected to have anxieties, this was an added source of anxiety for Bosnians on the programme. It meant that for now they were safe, but there were no guarantees about tomorrow.

The granting of temporary protection on arrival encouraged the Bosnians to believe that they would soon be returning to Bosnia. This had several effects on their initial settlement in Britain, especially in the areas of learning English, looking for work, and changing their place of settlement. They could not be certain whether they would be
forced to remain in Bosnia or allowed to stay in Britain and so were unwilling to make long-term plans in case outside forces changed their circumstances.

"ILR [indefinite leave to remain] would make me more secure. It is insecure still now, 9 months visa left, everyone says will get ILR but in 9 months what will happen? Psychologically, it would be more secure. It is not good for Bosnian people kept for seven years not knowing what will happen." Almaz, in late 1999.

I visited one family on the day that forms had arrived to apply for indefinite leave to remain. They were very anxious, and asked me to check all the details and read all the instructions, to ensure it was done correctly. Though they did not know of anyone who had applied for ILR after being in Britain seven years who had been refused, they did not believe that ILR would be automatic. They repeatedly asked what I thought would happen if ILR was refused, and how long it would take to hear from the Home Office about their application.

"Temporary protection mattered a lot. At first people had six month visas, and thought then would go back. No one wanted to learn any English or buy anything for their house. Even when it was renewed, they thought they would be sent back. It wasn't anything firm. Everyone was thinking when their visa expires you will send them back." Lejla

Temporary protection affected how they lived their lives, and affected decisions such as how to spend money and whether to try to learn English. For many people, there seemed to be little point in trying to learn English if they were going to be sent back to Bosnia, and what money they had instead of spending it on their home they preferred to save in case they needed to buy goods for their return. One man has a garage full of gardening tools bought cheaply at car boot sales, and stored in case he is sent back to Bosnia.
Those who came outside of the programme were not given temporary protection. Some had to wait a long time for a decision on their application, sometimes three or four years, but were eventually given refugee status or exceptional leave to remain. Whilst awaiting a decision on their application they were uncertain as to the outcome, and faced some of the same insecurity that programme Bosnians faced. However, unlike programme Bosnians the decision on their application was dependant to some extent on the information that they gave, rather than on the government's assessment of the risk involved in returning them. They also had legal advisors handling their applications, and so had someone with whom they could discuss the progress of their applications. All of the non-programme Bosnians I spoke to during this research had received a decision on their case by the end of 1996, whilst those on the programme remained on temporary protection until they had been in Britain for seven years, although indefinite leave to remain was granted from late 1999 onwards to those who had been in Britain seven years. Convoy Bosnians therefore had a clearer idea about their future, and knew that it was extremely unlikely that they would be returned.

**Learning English**

The vast majority of Bosnians on the programme spoke no English before they arrived. A few had learnt English at school, but for many of those on the programme, their first opportunity to learn English was whilst in the reception centre. At one reception centre, English tutors from a nearby further education college came into the centre and gave lessons. On leaving the centre, they were given the opportunity to continue the lessons at
the college, and transport was provided to enable them to attend classes. These classes were initially well attended, but some expressed dissatisfaction, and said the classes were being used as a social occasion, an opportunity to meet with others, rather than as a learning experience.

"Some went to lessons just to see other Bosnians. Some people go there for friendship. They go by bus and have time for speaking." Izet

English classes were available at several locations throughout most of the settlement areas, but some chose not to attend. Levels of literacy varied widely within the group, with some educated to degree level and others barely able to write their own name, so there were immense problems for anyone trying to teach them as a group. However, an added problem was that many felt that there was little point in learning English as they would soon be returning to Bosnia. Because the Bosnia Project workers would interpret at almost all important occasions, English was only really needed by those who wished to work, or those who sought to distance themselves from the Bosnia Project.

As time went on more people decided to enter English classes, and others picked up English from their neighbours, children and the television. Some people were bored and needed to do something to occupy themselves, and chose to go to English classes. All of the children, and those who arrived as children, are now fluent or virtually fluent in English. Standards vary among the rest of the population, and though more now have a working knowledge of English there is still a large minority of people of working age whose knowledge of English is rudimentary.

For those who were not part of the programme, there was little or no access to interpreters, and so the need to learn English was much greater. Their greater security of
status combined with the lack of support organisations meant that they thought there was a point to learning English. Many of the convoy Bosnians enrolled in English classes soon after arriving, and a few were able as a result to find work with the Bosnia Project as caseworkers and interpreters. It is difficult to draw any conclusions as to the effect temporary protection and the provision of interpreters on the levels of English of the individuals, because the groups are so different. However, it does seem that those who came on the programme had far less reason to learn English than those who were not part of the programme.

**Employment**

Although all the men below retirement age and many of the women on the Programme had been in work in Bosnia, none were in work when I first began working with Bosnians. There was no employment advice or employment scheme incorporated into the Bosnia Project, which was also the case with other refugee programmes in Britain. Instead, emphasis was placed on ensuring that Bosnians had access to the full range of welfare benefits. For Bosnians who thought that they would shortly be returning to Bosnia, this meant that initially there was little or no incentive to find work, since with poor English skills and no British qualifications, they could only expect to obtain poorly paid work. One might have expected that as time went on, more would find work, and this indeed happened, but the movement towards paid employment was very slow. One of the reasons for this is the skills that most Bosnians had were either not transferable to jobs in Britain, or required a level of English which they did not have. But the reason that
the refugees themselves gave was that the temporary nature of their stay meant that there was little point in looking for work.

"Problem is just you haven't any future, you don't sure about that. From today till tomorrow. If you start working here and tomorrow they say you have to go it will be, oh, you can't take job." Izet

"If I take that job, I don't know how long I will stay here. Maybe is too late, I do the training and then go back. So why should I do the training?" Medina

They are aware that training will often be necessary in order to get British qualifications and to learn skills that are relevant, but they see no reason why they should make the effort.

Case study 6

Vahida came with her son and daughter after her son was admitted to the Medevac programme. Her husband was able to join her a year later. Ever since she arrived, she has thought that she might have to go back soon, and so her and her husband have not tried to find proper work and have remained on benefits. Vahida has been working part time as a cleaner, but he husband, who was a computer programmer in Bosnia, has not tried to look for work. He hasn’t tried any training courses either, as they don’t see what the point is if they may not be able to finish the training. Vahida says that it is difficult to get a job if you don’t know if you are staying here or not. When their visas are renewed, they will see if they get ILR, and if so then they will think they are staying and look for work, but for now they stay on benefit.
Case study 7
Suhro has been on several training courses, and enjoyed them, and is now a qualified painter and decorator. He has not worked at all, though, and is currently unemployed. Suhro said that he did the courses because they might help him find work when he goes back to Bosnia, but he doesn’t think he will be able to find work here. People here wouldn’t employ him because he may not be here long, and so there is no point in applying for jobs.

For both Vahida and Suhro, there seems to be little point in applying for work, and they believe that they would not be given a job even if they did apply, because employers want people who will stay. They remain unemployed as a direct result of their temporary status, and not because of their lack of skills or qualifications.

In common with other refugees, there are high levels of unemployment, but Bosnians rarely complain that they are unable to find work, instead they say that there is no point in looking for work, as they don’t know how long they will be in Britain for. Those that go into employment have made a conscious decision to no longer be unemployed, or have been forced to take work by the benefits agency. The first to move into employment were single men, who were initially targeted by programmes aimed at getting the long term unemployed back into work. Vahid was sent on a training course in engineering by the Department of Social Security, though he had worked in Bosnia as an electrician. After the course finished, the DSS threatened to withdraw his benefits unless he actively looked for work, and the local job centre helped him to find a job in a factory near where he was
living. His friend Damir found himself in a similar situation. He was told to go on a training course by the DSS, and afterwards found a job. Amir was a friend of both of these, and suddenly found that the two people he spent most of his time with were now working. They had more money than him, and much less free time, so when the DSS told him to go for training he was not surprised. He too is now working, though not as a carpenter, his trade in Bosnia. For single people, there is little risk involved in taking employment. They are only concerned with their own needs, and have no one else depending on them. For those who are married, though, especially if they have children, a move from benefits to low paid work can result in them being temporarily poorer, as the side benefits of income support are withdrawn. These side benefits include free school meals, uniform grants, free prescriptions and free dental care. Unfortunately their poor English skills and lack of equivalent qualifications meant that low paid work was the only type of work available for most of the refugees. This was not the deciding factor in their unemployment, though. A common feature of the vast majority of Bosnians from the programme was that they made no attempt to seek employment. They had no idea how to apply for a job in Britain, they did not understand the benefits system, and their prospects were not good, but these can be considered as excuses rather than reasons. Most did not try to find work, and the reason was mainly that they thought there was no point in looking.

The decision to find employment was not a positive choice taken freely by these three men, but instead was prompted by a welfare system that threatened to withdraw benefits if they did not actively look for work. However the end result was that they were more
independent, they developed a wider circle of friends, and they had money for a social
life.

Many of the men turned to other matters to occupy their time, and most either took over
shopping for food, or would accompany their wives on food shopping trips. For the
women, this meant that their social lives were restricted, as they had less time outside the
home on their own. Their husbands would do the shopping, and feel as though they were
making a positive contribution to the home, but the women sometimes resented this
‘help’. Although women would sometimes say to me in private that they wished their
husbands would ‘get away from their feet’, they rarely voiced these complaints to their
husbands. They felt because of the experiences their husbands had during the war and in
the camps, and the prolonged separation that many had suffered, that it was unfair to
complain about their husband’s presence.

Unemployment also gave men the time to visit each other for coffee, a Bosnian tradition
followed by men and women, but which men did more rarely because they were at work.
Again, they would often accompany their wives and this gave the women less time than
they would have liked for independent socialising. In addition, it also gave the men more
time to talk to each other, but as they were doing very little other than shopping and
going for coffee, the topics of conversation were limited. As a result there was a tendency
to talk about each other, and as I show in the next chapter this contributed to the rivalries
and resentments that Bosnians often expressed.
Welfare benefits

Levels of unemployment are difficult to assess. Only one Community Association has tried to produce a figure, and they estimate in 1998 of seventy-five people of working age, nine were in employment. In all areas, there is a number of people receiving disability benefits, and these do not have to be available for work, and their partner can sometimes be classed as a carer and so not available for work. There are no figures available for the number of the population in receipt of disability benefits. The group in C have estimated that ninety per cent of their population is receiving some form of sickness benefit, though my knowledge of the group suggests a figure of forty to fifty percent of homes with an adult or child receiving additional benefits. The initial focus of work with Bosnians was to get their benefits correctly sorted out, and to ensure they received everything they were entitled to. This meant that Bosnians quickly became aware that there were additional discretionary awards that you could get if you were ill enough. Though some of those who claimed the benefits were genuinely ill, not all claimants were genuine. In one case, a claim for additional benefit was refused, and with the assistance of a local advice centre the case was appealed. On the day the appeal was to be heard, the representative from the advice centre was waiting with a representative from the Department for Social Security for the Bosnian claimant to arrive. The woman, who had claimed great difficulty in walking more than a few steps, could be seen walking unaided across the footbridge to the benefits office. This obviously resulted in the claim being rejected. The fact that the woman was in pain as she walked was seen as irrelevant, as her claim was based on her alleged inability to walk more than a few yards. One man
successfully claimed disability benefit on the grounds that his experiences during the war made him psychologically unfit for work, but was able to play football regularly.

Welfare benefits based on sickness and disability gave some Bosnians a greater level of income, but also removed the requirement to look for work and sign on fortnightly. Workers from both the Bosnia Project and local advice agencies were happy to assist with applications, and the applications seemed often to be looked upon sympathetically by the benefits agency staff. However, of all those living in C who managed to claim sickness or disability payments, I am not aware of one case where the person or their partner subsequently found employment. Many of these individuals do not need care from their partner, and yet their partner remains at home with them and is not seeking work. These benefits have acted as a disincentive to work, since they give a standard of income which is acceptable, and removed the obligation to seek work and so removed any possible incentives that the benefits agency might otherwise have for encouraging them into work. People who are sick or disabled do not count towards the unemployment statistics, and so are not a target for back-to-work schemes. It also reinforces the notion of Bosnians as victims who are helpless, and so further disempowers them. They are to some extent objectified by the system, and are defined by the symptoms of their sickness or disability, and are no longer individuals seeking work. They are ‘sick’, or they are ‘disabled’, and are given money according to the degree of that sickness or disability. But this money comes with strings attached, and will only continue so long as the sickness continues. Sickness benefits therefore contribute to the further disempowerment of Bosnian refugees, since by removing the obligation to work it also removes the incentive to become independent.
Relationship with the Bosnia Project

As the organisation responsible for their welfare, the Bosnia Project had an enormous influence on the lives of its clients. It was the function of the Project to provide initial shelter in the form of reception centres when the Bosnians first arrived, to find them longer term housing, and to provide initial support and advice. These were the tasks that were agreed with the Home Office, but it was the agencies running the project that decided how these tasks were carried out. In the chapter on the programme I described how these functions were carried out, and in this section I discuss the effect on the Bosnians themselves.

Moving into long term accommodation

As discussed in the chapter on the Bosnia Project, the reception centre that an individual was sent to played a large part in determining the future location of their long-term housing. At the time that housing was being allocated, I have already noted in that chapter that there was little or no choice as to the location of the housing that was offered. On arrival in the UK, most refugees on the programme believed that it would only be a short time before they would return home. Some thought that they would stay in the reception centre for a while, and then would go home, and so moving into a home of their own was not a priority for them. This seems to be the reason why the vast majority did
not raise objections to the location of their new home, they thought it was going to be temporary, so there was little point in trying to be housed in one city rather than another.

**Housing**

After a stay in a reception centre of up to one year, Bosnians on the programme were transferred to long term housing in one of the cluster areas. The mechanism by which housing was allocated is discussed in more detail in the chapter on the Bosnia Project, whilst here I discuss the views of the refugees on their housing. Secondary migration rates were very low, for example of the thirty six families originally housed by the programme in Middleham, thirty four were still there in January 2000. However, there were a large number of house moves within the cluster areas.

In the city of Westham, there were seventy-four housing units initially allocated to Bosnians from the programme (Kelly 1996). By the end of 2000, there had been thirty-nine house moves from the properties that were originally allocated. Six were moved because the property owners were renovating and they were transferred to equivalent accommodation nearby, but the rest had applied for a move because their circumstances had changed or to obtain better quality accommodation, for example with heating or a garden. I do not have equivalent information on housing moves in other areas, and there is no way of knowing if what happened in Westham also happened in other places. However, it is worth considering why those that moved did so and where they moved to.

The allocations policy in Westham was that Bosnians would not be allocated hard to let properties, and this was agreed by both the city council and the housing associations. This
was also the desired policy of the Bosnia Project, who had discussed the nature of 'cluster' areas in early 1993 (Graessle & Gawlinski 1996). There were times when this policy was not adhered to, especially towards the end of the programme when the city was asked to provide more units than had originally been agreed.

When the time came to move out of the reception centre into long term housing, Bosnians would be given only one offer of housing. The normal procedure for applicants to local authorities or housing associations is that an applicant will be allowed to refuse two offers of housing, although refusal of the third offer would result in removal from the applications list. Because Bosnians were being offered housing outside the normal allocations procedures, these rules did not apply, and instead they were strongly encouraged to accept the first property that they were offered. Reception centre staff told the relevant housing department who their current residents were and what their housing needs were, and the housing department would then make an offer of accommodation when a suitable property was available. The area in which they were to be housed was usually already decided, and the only aspect of housing that was open for discussion was the nature of the property they were to be offered and who was to live in it. These became a major source of disagreement and discussion between Bosnians and Bosnia Project workers.

Case study 8

Mr and Mrs T were a very religious couple, and unlike the others in their reception centre they went regularly to the local mosque. They made many friends at the mosque, and told the reception centre staff that they did not want to go to a cluster area, they wished to
remain in the city where the reception centre was. They were told that this was not possible, as that city was not a cluster area and they would not be allowed to apply for housing. Instead they were told that they had to accept a property within a cluster area, and were taken to look at a flat in Westham. Their son was already living in Westham, and they had no other relatives in Britain. But Mr and Mrs T refused to accept the flat, and maintained that they would not leave the reception centre unless they were given accommodation in the area they wished. The reception centre staff maintained that this was not possible, and told them they would become homeless if they did not agree to move because the reception centre was closing soon. The dispute was eventually resolved when friends from the mosque arranged privately rented accommodation for Mr and Mrs T.

Mr and Mrs T were unusual, since they were actively religious and prayed and attended the mosque regularly. At the time they were in the reception centre they were the only people who ever attended the mosque, and they became much more friendly with the other worshippers than with the other Bosnians in the centre.

Case study 9
Mr and Mrs D were not happy at the offer of accommodation they were given. Although they were offered a three bedroomed house with a garden in a pleasant area of the city, they were unhappy because the house did not have central heating and because it was a long walk from the city centre. It was also a long walk to visit the homes of other Bosnians. The staff in the reception centre found it hard to understand their complaints, as the house had fires and heaters and so would not be cold, and since their children were
both over eighteen they were very lucky to have been allocated a house and not a flat. Mr
and Mrs D said they would not move into the house, and insisted that they be offered
something else. They felt that they were being treated badly because they had argued
with reception centre staff over other matters, and were adamant that on this occasion
they would not back down. The reception centre staff were equally adamant that they had
to accept this house, and for several days there were arguments over what should happen.
Eventually senior Bosnia Project staff intervened, and told Mr and Mrs D that they had to
accept this house or they would have nowhere to go. Because of this ultimatum, they
agreed to move into the house, but for the next twelve months they complained to
everyone they could about the house. After they had been in the house twelve months
they were allowed to apply for a housing transfer, and a few months later they moved to a
house in a poorer area of the city, but which had central heating and was within easy
reach of the centre.

Case study 10
Amir was a single man in his twenties, and he was offered a high rise flat close to the city
centre. It was in a block which was hard to let, and which was very unpopular because of
the high rates of crime and poor quality of the properties. Amir’s friends had been housed
in the same area, but in much better quality accommodation, some in low rise flats and
some in one bedroom homes. Amir protested, and demanded that an alternative be found.
The reception centre staff insisted that there was no alternative, and he had to accept this
flat. As they wanted to avoid too much confrontation they told him that after moving in
he could apply for a transfer, and so Amir agreed to accept the flat. After moving in he
discovered that a transfer could only be applied for after a year, and he was angry at this
discovery as he had believed he could apply straight away.

Mr and Mrs T were the only Bosnians that I knew of who from that reception centre who
had not gone into housing in a cluster area. In order to do so, they had to fight and argue
with Bosnia Project staff, and were only able to go where they wanted because of help
from someone outside the Project. Mr and Mrs D, and Amir, objected to the properties
they were offered, but found themselves powerless to change the situation. In their cases
they knew that they had no control over the area that they were offered housing, but
thought that they could influence the decision over which property they were offered.
This became the focus of much of their attention, and an attempt to assert themselves and
their views on housing.

Arguments over housing show that the Bosnians on the programme were not entirely
passive, and would try to assert their views if they thought there was a chance they would
be heard. Housing disputes became a focus for resentment, since there was a possibility
of wresting some control from those who were in charge. I found it hard to sympathise
with Mr and Mrs D, as the house they had at the time was better than my own, and their
complaints seemed unjustified. However, it acted to some extent as a diversion for them,
since whilst they were focussing on their house they didn’t think as much about the war
and its consequences. They were eventually allowed to move to another property which
matched their requirements, and are happy with the change. One of the reasons they say
that they are happier is that they were the ones who complained and it was only through

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their insistence that a transfer was arranged. In this area of their life, they had managed to regain a small piece of control. The decision to move had been theirs, and although they did not have control over what they were offered they were allowed to express an opinion and those opinions were listened to. Amir, too, found that complaining about his home gave him some control over his life. Although he had to wait for a year before he could apply for a transfer, on the application he was allowed to say which areas he wanted to move to, and he knew he could refuse a property that he felt was unsuitable. Because of this, he was able to exercise a limited choice, whereas before he had been presented with the option of acceptance or homelessness. The Bosnia Project had disempowered these people by taking away all control over where they live. Like some others, though, they found that through complaining they could eventually get some of the control back.

In the allocation of properties to individual families, decision making power was once again taken away from the refugees themselves. It was only through great effort and sometimes the involvement of others that they were able to exert any influence in this area. The only control that they had was to insist that certain family members remained together.

Case study 11

Djevad arrived in Britain as part of the programme accompanied by his wife and child, as well as his parents. He insisted that they all be housed together, as his parents needed his support. The reception centre staff told him that there was a shortage of larger houses and it would be much better if they agreed to accept separate properties although they would be close together. Djevad, and insisted that they only be offered a property big enough for
them all. This resulted in a long stay in the reception centre, and several times they were asked to reconsider. However, Djevad was related to Asim, who had also been accompanied by children and elderly parents. Asim had been asked to accept two properties close together, and although the properties were fine in most respects, the elderly parents were about one mile from the house allocated to Asim. Because he knew what had happened to Asim, and also that Mr and Mrs D were told that they had to accept what was offered, Djevad insisted they were all to be housed together. Although this resulted in a lengthy stay in the reception centre, a three-bedroom house was eventually found for them.

Djevad gained some control over his situation by insisting that his parents live in the same home. This was the first major decision that Djevad had been able to make since the start of the war. He had been taken prisoner along with his father in the early stages of the conflict, and his wife and mother had fled to Croatia. On being released from the camp they were taken by the Red Cross to a camp in Croatia, where they were reunited with their wives and Djevad’s daughter. In Croatia they were told that there was no possibility of returning to their homes at that time, as they were in Serb controlled territory, and also they couldn’t remain in Croatia. They were offered a place to go to Britain, which they accepted because they were not offered any alternatives. On arriving they had been allocated to a reception centre, which in turn allocated them to a settlement area. The decision as to whether or not he should live with his parents was the first positive decision in all that time. Djevad and his family are still living in the same house that they were originally allocated.
Place of settlement

There has been very little secondary migration of Bosnians from the programme. There has been some movement, mostly in order to join close family members who were housed in another part of Britain, but in each cluster area the vast majority of the original arrivals are still there. This is in contrast to the patterns of settlement of refugees from both Vietnam, who were initially dispersed around the country. Within a few years, there had been secondary migration on a large scale to a few large cites, mainly Birmingham, Manchester and London. In interviews both Bosnia Project and Refugee Action staff said that the main reason for the absence of secondary migration was that Bosnians were housed in clusters, and the larger numbers in each town compared to the Vietnamese programme meant that there were enough people to form a community and so there was not the same urge to move to be with others. The notion of whether there was indeed a community is discussed in the next chapter, but as well as considerations of community I wondered whether there might be another explanation.

Case study 12

Ismet had been placed in housing in Westham, but after he had been in Britain for a few months he found that his brother was living in another town about eighty miles away. Ismet approached Bosnia Project staff to find out how he could arrange to move to join his brother. He was told the Bosnia Project couldn’t help with moving, and if he moved he would no longer be able to get support and assistance from Bosnia Project staff. At first Ismet accepted this, as he thought that the war would soon be over and he and his
brother would be going back to Bosnia. After a few more months he decided to try again to move. His mother had arrived and had been told she could choose to live with one of her sons if she wished, and she had gone to Ismet’s brother. Ismet applied for a housing transfer with the assistance of a local benefits advice agency, but a year later the transfer had still not gone through and he remained in Westham. Ismet finally decided that rather than move within Britain he would return to Bosnia and rejoin the army, and he left Britain in 1995.

Ismet’s experience shows that moving to another area was not an easy matter. The Project tried to avoid using privately rented accommodation wherever possible, and instead relied on publicly rented properties. Offers were made in each area to provide a certain number of housing units, and once an allocation was made it counted against these units even if the tenant subsequently moved out of the area. If an individual moved and was given a housing unit in another area, then they would technically have used two housing allocations and so reduced the pool available for later arrivals. The Bosnia Project was aware of this and so was reluctant to encourage transfers. The benefit system also had a role to play, since regulations had recently been introduced which capped the amount of housing benefits each category of claimant could receive. This meant that some people in privately rented accommodation had to pay part of the rent from their ordinary benefits, since their rent was greater than the amount set for their area. This in turn discouraged Bosnians from moving, as without help in obtaining public sector housing they would be forced to turn to the more expensive private sector. The next hurdle was access to information on moving and making arrangements. Bosnia Project
staff were not supposed to help with arranging moves, and so they would not assist with tasks such as arranging for benefits to be sent to a different address or finding schools for children. The relationship between the refugees and the Bosnia Project staff was a highly dependent one, and the refugees usually did not know how to do these things for themselves. A major factor, though, in the lack of secondary migration, was that Bosnians on the programme did not think they were in Britain permanently. Ismet told me that there were times when he wanted to move in with his brother, even though it would be crowded, but felt that he couldn’t because the Bosnia Project had told him that wasn’t allowed. Then other days he thought there was no point in moving, because they might all be going back to Bosnia soon anyway, and it would be better to save his money for going back rather than spend it on a short term move.

Case study 13
Selim was from the Herzegovina region, and was accompanied by his wife and two children. Selim had been working as a cook in Croatia for most of his adult life, but was at home between jobs when he got caught up in the war. Selim was initially housed in Westham, but later moved to London. Selim had several friends in London, and before moving he had visited them often. These friends were mainly other Bosnians and Croatians who had travelled to Britain on convoys or independently, and most had managed to find work in some capacity. Selim became unhappy in Westham, and after his daughter quarrelled with some of her friends he told his friends in London that he wanted to move. He had already been told by Bosnia Project that it was not possible to move to London, and that they would give him no further assistance if he did move.
Selim’s friends found him a flat to move to in London, and said they would find work for him in a restaurant, and so he and his family moved to London.

Selim was unusual, as he was one of the few who moved out of the city but remained in the UK. The factors that made a difference in his case were that firstly he knew some people in London who had been friends before the war, and secondly that they were able to assist with finding accommodation and work. Most of the people on the project did not know many people who were not on the project, and so did not know others who were in work. When they looked at people in a different area, they saw other people living their lives in a very similar way, and the main difference was the scenery. There needed to be a compelling reason to drive a decision to move. There was, for most residents of Westham, a feeling of inertia, that is they saw little point in expending energy and time on moving if the end result would be the same as they already had.

Case study 14

Velid and Mehmet are brothers, and arrived together on the programme. They had a short stay in a reception centre, and were then given housing in Westham. Their families were still in Bosnia, but they expected them to arrive shortly and were allocated houses big enough to accommodate the families when they arrived. After they had been in their houses a few weeks they discovered that they had another brother in Britain, who had been in a different reception centre and had been housed around 100 miles away. They were delighted to be reunited, and stayed closely in touch. However, none of the brothers moved to be close to each other, and as far as I am aware they did not apply for a housing transfer. I asked Velid if he would like to move to be near his brother, and he asked me
why he should move? He might move to go to his brother, and then his brother might go back to Bosnia and then what good would moving have done? Or his brother's wife might find she has family somewhere, and decide they should move to there, and then Velid's family would be on their own again. And if his brother moved to be with him and Mehmet, he might find that Velid and Mehmet go back to Bosnia soon afterwards, and so he would be on his own again. And the other consideration was what would his brother do that was different if he moved? Velid said his brother did just like him, watched TV, drank coffee, visited friends, and waited for the war to end. If he moved to be with Velid, he would just be doing exactly the same thing but in a different place.

Velid, Mehmet and their brother remain living in two different towns.

For Velid, there was nothing to be gained by moving. There was no offer of work to look forward to, there would be no change in circumstances, the only thing that would be different is that he would have been close to his brother, but there was no guarantee that his brother would remain there.

The cases of Velid and Ismet show the importance of temporary protection status to the way people lived their lives. Temporary protection status reinforced the notion that return to Bosnia would take place soon, and because of this the refugees saw little point in making long term plans. Even after a few years of living in Britain, when it was increasingly obvious to the refugees that return would be difficult, the continuing temporary status reminded them that no matter what their own preferences were the British government could decide to send them back to Bosnia, and again this meant that long term plans were futile. Decisions which could be delayed until a later date, such as
whether to try to move to a different area, tended to be deferred whilst they waited to see what happened. Although potentially the refugees could have objected to the areas they were housed in and applied to move to somewhere else, they raised little objection. They had been effectively disempowered, and it required a significant incentive, such as the offer of work and a social network, to overcome this disempowerment and to take a positive decision about moving.

Little information is available on those refugees that came on convoys, but it seems that they were far more likely than programme Bosnians to move away from the area in which they were first housed.

Case study 15
Sajma arrived as part of a convoy arranged by a church group. They were given shelter in the homes of local people after arriving in Eastham, and gradually helped to find accommodation of their own. According to Sajma, most of the others had moved out of the area within eighteen months, most having gone to London. She said the reason they went to London was that they thought they could get work there, and they relied on other Bosnians there to help them find work and accommodation. She had stayed because her husband was not in Britain, although he arrived later on the programme, she had quickly found somewhere decent to live, and was keen for her children to avoid further upheavals.

Case study 16
A convoy of refugees was brought by an Islamic charity group to a Southam. They were initially given shelter by local Muslims, and were quickly found rented accommodation
in the area. Almost all of these had moved away within eighteen months, and although they may have moved to London no one is really sure where they have gone. I asked a resident from the programme why these others had left. She told me that when they first arrived, these convoy Bosnians were just happy to be alive and away from the conflict. After a while, though, they became unhappy at the way they were being treated. They had been given privately rented accommodation owned by one or more of the friends of the convoy organisers, and this housing was poor quality. In addition, the landlords retained keys to the property and would conduct checks every now and again to make sure the property was being treated correctly. Arguments soon developed over what the Bosnians could and could not do in their homes, with the landlords insisting that they adhered to traditional Islamic practices and the Bosnians resenting the interference in their lives. The landlords would apparently remove pictures from the wall and replace them with Koranic texts, and would become angry if they discovered alcohol in the houses. Because of this, the Bosnians decided individually that they would leave, and went without leaving any forwarding details.

Case study 17
Sejo arrived in Britain on a convoy organised by a church group in the North of England. He was originally found accommodation in a northern town, but through the communications networks that rapidly developed he heard that there were more Bosnians in Northam, and that they were getting a lot more help and better housing. He obtained the number of a housing association through another Bosnian in Northam, and asked if
they would accommodate him. A few months later he and five other families moved to Northam and remain there in housing association properties.

Those that came on convoys usually had very little to lose by moving to another town. They often found themselves on poor quality privately rented accommodation, and any move would be unlikely to result in poorer accommodation. If they decided to move to another town to join a friend or relative, that person would be able to seek out alternative accommodation through a local landlord. They were also aware of the mechanisms for finding accommodation, because they had to find their initial homes with limited assistance and did not have the resources of the Bosnia Project to fall back on. Those that came on the programme found that moving was much more problematic. The vast majority of housing used by refugees on the programme was publicly rented, with security of tenure. Moves to privately rented accommodation were discouraged, and the refugees were told how insecure housing was in the privately rented sector. Moves to publicly rented homes in another area were possible, but difficult to arrange. There are various schemes for exchanging homes or applying for a transfer between authorities, but these require knowledge of the housing system as well as the ability to fill in the forms. It was made clear that the assistance from the Bosnia Project was only for those who stayed in the town where they were put. Any secondary migration, even to a town where the Bosnia Project were operating, would mean that they would no longer be entitled to any support from the Bosnia Project. This was a huge disincentive, as the Bosnia Project carried out all the support tasks for the families, such as arranging visa renewals, filling
in forms, and providing interpreters for medical appointments. In order to move to another town, refugees on the programme had to make an enormous effort, and were repeatedly warned of the possible dire consequences of moving. The end result was that very few refugees from the programme have moved away from the town they were first housed in.

For those that came on convoys, the poor quality housing that they were often living in, combined in some cases with disputes over ‘correct’ behaviour for a Muslim, gave them a strong incentive for seeking change. It was often clear to them that moving to another area presented opportunities but no great risks, whereas for programme Bosnians a move presented no greater opportunities and a degree of risk.

Returns to Bosnia

There have been a few returns to Bosnia, but again the vast majority remain in Britain. The practical constraints on return to Bosnia are discussed in chapter four on Bosnia-Herzegovina, but here I discuss the effect that the question of return has on the individuals. The people I have known that have gone back to Bosnia returned because of a set of circumstances that were specific to them.

Case study 18

Omer arrived in Britain in 1993 with his mother, wife and baby son. The rest of his family were in Bosnia and Croatia. He was the first person from Westham to return to Bosnia, and went after his brother told him that even though he could not return to his own town, there was a job for him where his brother lived. Both Omer and his wife had
worked in factories before the war, and he agreed to return. His brother helped him find
somewhere to live and a job. A former Bosnia Project worker met him about a year later,
and said Omer was very happy and working as a policeman.

Case study 19
Mersiha came to Britain on the medevac programme, as her son was seriously ill, and
brought her other two children with her. Her husband died whilst she was in Britain, and
Mersiha was very distraught for a long time. About a year after her husband’s death, her
father-in-law contacted her and said he had restarted work on the home her husband had
been building, and if she wanted to go back she would be able to live there. Mersiha then
asked her sister, who said that it was now safe in their area, schools were open, and many
people including Mersiha’s parents had gone back to their own homes. Mersiha decided
to return, as it meant she would be with her family and friends and they would be able to
help with her children.

Case study 20
Mr K and his eldest son arrived in early 1993 as part of the programme. One and a half
years later they were joined by Mrs K, their daughter and their youngest son. However
their middle son was not able to join them, as he had reached the age of seventeen and
had been drafted into the army. Mrs K had been very upset at leaving her son, but came
to Britain so that she could see her husband and to make sure her other children were
safe. As the tide of the war turned in favour of the Bosnian government troops, the area
where their house stood was returned to government control. It also fell in an area
designated as Muslim under the Dayton agreement. Their son in Bosnia sent a photograph of himself standing in the garden of their house. Although the house was damaged and the doors and windows were all broken, the house was standing. Next to the son in the garden was the range cooker, which looters had tried to take but had been forced to leave because it was too heavy. Mr K was seriously ill, and had recently had treatment for cancer, and the family decided to return to Bosnia so that if he became worse he could die in his own home.

Another family that went to Bosnia to visit relatives called in on the family K, and brought back a video. In the video, all seem well, but Mr K's eldest son counsels others not to return. He says there is no work, little money, and they would be better off staying in England.

All the people that I know of that have returned had something particular to go to. In each case there was little risk involved in the decision, as others in Bosnia were willing and able to assist them, and a positive outcome was almost certain.

Most people that remain say that they would like to go back to Bosnia, but that there are various obstacles. Their home may be in an area now controlled by Serbs or Croats, and so return to there is not a safe option, or their house may have been destroyed and they have no home to go to. Some have telephoned their own number, and the phone has been answered, indicating that someone else has taken over their house. However, most seem to be waiting for a decision to be taken on whether they can remain in Britain or not, before they will commit themselves to one country or the other. They are aware that if they return now, they would not have the option of coming back to Britain if it all goes
wrong. They also know that no final decision has been taken on whether they can remain here, and so they cannot make a decision to remain and so must continue to consider the possibility of return. The fact that they know they no longer have a house, or that someone else is living in that house, means that the question of return is a source of anxiety. The power to decide whether to return does not rest with the refugees themselves, but with the British government, who can order them to return, and the Bosnian government whose actions will determine if they have anything to go back to.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have looked at the various ways in which Bosnian refugees were disempowered as individuals, and the way that control over their lives was taken away from the refugees at every stage. To begin, they had no control over the war and find the reasons for the conflict difficult to comprehend. From the time the war started, control over their destiny lay with other people. They did not make a positive choice to come to Britain, or to settle in a particular area of Britain. They were given temporary protection which meant that they were safe, but they had no security because they did not know how long they would remain in Britain. The decision as to their length of stay was not theirs to make, but instead was a government decision, and this in turn affected their attitude towards learning English and seeking employment. Temporary protection also meant that the question of return was always at the forefront of their minds, and acted as a reminder of how little control they had over the course of their own lives.
Chapter 7: The refugees as a group

Introduction

This section looks at relationships of Bosnian refugees in Britain with other Bosnians and with British individuals and organisations. I begin by looking at the networks that developed between Bosnian refugees, which began as ways of accessing information but have changed over the years. The war in Bosnia created one million Bosnians refugees, and a further million were displaced within Bosnia-Herzegovina. Combined with the deaths and casualties of the war, this meant that many people lost contact with their friends and relatives, and had a desperate need for information on the conflict. Networks developed that were new, and not based on previous links, in order that information could be shared. As the need for information lessened, these networks became less important, but they continued to share information on the situation in Britain and social events.

Next I look at the relationships Bosnians have with other Bosnians, and patterns of trust and friendship. Refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina lived pre-war lives in which there were interactions on many levels with people of other religions. Although these religious differences were important during the war, they held little importance in the pre-war period. Experiences during the war mean that many Bosnians find it difficult to trust people of other religions, and prefer to mix only with Bosnian Muslims. However, this is a new mode of association, since their pre-war relationships were with people of all religions. In addition, some Bosnian Muslims find it difficult to trust other Bosnian
Muslims, again because of their experiences during the war. The relationships between Bosnians are important for determining whether there is a community in existence or not, and what kinds of networks exist.

Finally I look at the formal structure of Bosnians in Britain, the community associations. I examine the origins of these associations, their functioning, and the factors influencing their success. These associations have had similar problems, and some have fallen into disuse. I examine why the associations were formed, and whose interests they serve. In chapter two I developed the concept of a contingent community, one which has a formal structure and will appear to conform to expectations of a community, but which has no informal community supporting it. In this chapter, I consider whether Bosnian community associations may in fact be contingent communities.

**Networks**

When Bosnian refugees first began arriving in Britain, the war was still being fought and many people had been separated from their friends and family as they fled. The first groups that came, the ‘convoy Bosnians’, quickly developed an information network. The telephone was used to communicate with friends and relatives in other countries, including Bosnia when the phone lines were operating, and pieces of information on other people could then be passed on. Because of this telephone chain, groups of refugees in Britain got to know of the existence of other groups. Some of the convoy organisers knew other convoy organisers, and would arrange visits so that the two groups could
meet. These occasions were used for socialisation, but also to find out and share news about the war and the location of other refugees.

Bosnians that came on the programme developed similar information networks, and these rapidly became linked with those of the convoy Bosnians. Several of the towns and cities where Bosnians from the programme were housed were also home to groups of convoy Bosnians. The convoy Bosnians were known to support agencies in the area, and so members of the two groups could be introduced to each other. This meant that the refugees knew quite soon after their arrival who of their family or town was living in Britain. News could also spread very quickly both within the UK and within Europe, as friends and relatives in Germany, Austria and France had similar information networks, and these networks overlapped.

Families were often divided because of the conflict, and people were often desperate to know who was still alive, and where everyone they knew had ended up. First contact was often by phone to family who were already known to be outside Bosnia, for example brothers or aunts living in Croatia, or those who had been living in Germany or Austria as labour migrants. They would share what they knew, and information could be passed on about others who had contacted the same person. The person in Britain would then share the information with those they knew in Britain, who might then tell someone else abroad. In this way, Information was spread quickly through several countries. This contact by telephone became tremendously important, and though the resulting phone bills were often enormous, great efforts were made to ensure that bills were paid, in order that news would always get through.
Whilst the war in Bosnia continued, these phone calls across Europe continued. Sometimes this telephone chain got information to people faster than official channels.

Case study 1
Amira waited over a year for news of her husband, Fuad. She had come to Britain with her son, having been allowed to accompany her parents since as a single mother she was classed as vulnerable. After arriving in Britain she was told that her husband had been held in the Serb comps, but was now in a refugee camp in Croatia. She applied for her husband to join her in Britain as part of the programme, but heard nothing for a long time. She became very depressed, and on several occasions neighbours found her sitting on the stairs to her flat crying inconsolably. She went to the Red Cross office every week trying to get news, and always arrived and left looking extremely sad. Finally, the Red Cross in Britain were told that Fuad was being accepted onto the programme and would arrive within the next few days. This was immediately conveyed to the local Red Cross worker, who was having her weekly advice session that day. Unusually, Amira did not appear, and a friend was sent to fetch her. She arrived, but looked happy. The Red Cross worker began explaining that her husband would be arriving soon, probably within a week. Amira laughed, and told the worker that he was arriving the next day, and would she mind if she left now because she wanted to get everything ready for Fuad’s arrival. A relative in Croatia, who Fuad had been able to call directly, had phoned Amira.

Personal contact with Bosnians in other countries was much more difficult, and remains difficult today. Refugees and asylum seekers from former Yugoslavia did not have
freedom of movement, and could only travel to other countries if they could get a visa. For several years visas were very difficult to obtain, and visas were often only granted when a close relative was seriously ill or had died. Because of the random nature of the programme, close family members were often placed in different countries, and because travelling to visit each other was almost impossible the phone assumed even greater importance.

Whilst in the reception centres the residents became acquainted with each other, and they were also introduced to people staying in other centres, as staff arranged joint social events. Reception centre residents were thus able to share information with others in their centre, and also those in other centres. They also found out who was in Britain that they knew, and were able to establish networks that were maintained after they left the centres. For some of those that came on convoys, the group that brought them to Britain remained in contact for a long time, and would arrange for visits to other groups of Bosnians that they knew of. Again, this was a social occasion, but it was used to circulate information about people and the situation in Bosnia. Through these phone calls across Europe, and social gatherings of people staying in different areas, links were developed and information about life in Britain could be shared as well.

"The people who brought us over did things to bring people together. It was usually in a church, a barbecue, party, then in home. Those people, we ask for news, they bring us to meet other Bosnians. Sometimes people tell us of [a city]. I have friends in [several cities], they told me of [this city]. We had contact and kept in touch. Soon after I visit [this city] and see big community, like in [one area] is fifteen families close together, and I see if I can move here. By the end of 1993, we knew each other where is, who is where,
we try to find out if people came that you know before. We spent a lot of time on the telephone. Information moved around very quickly. I tell you, someone sent me a tape from Germany. Within few days, you could hear the same tape in many towns. Next day, someone phone me and say ‘oh, you have new tape, can I have copy’. Someone in Germany told them that man had sent me tape." Sejo

So for those that came on convoys, these links gave them information about other parts of the country where conditions were better, or where there were more people, and so helped shape decisions about whether they should stay in a particular area or move to somewhere else. Some of the bilingual workers recruited by the Bosnia Project were themselves refugees, and so information links developed between programme refugees and some of the others.

As the war in Bosnia came to an end, and the flow of refugees dried up, the need for sharing information was reduced. This did not lead to the end of the communication networks, but it removed their driving force. There was still a sharing of information and gossip, but since the issues were less important, no longer centring on who was alive and where they were, the drive to pass on information was lessened. The networks that developed were maintained to some extent, although their focus changed from sharing information on the effects of the war and instead towards sharing information on conditions in different parts of Britain and on social events. When there were important events, such as elections in Bosnia, or when the sister of a refugee was murdered in Bosnia, this networking meant that information was shared and disseminated extremely quickly. For social occasions, the presence of a network meant that people in one city
would know what was going on in another city, and could ensure that events did not clash, and they could also share the musicians.

These networks that were established were not a replica of the networks that had existed in Bosnia-Herzegovina before the war. Instead, they were a new form of network arising from the circumstances in which the refugees found themselves. Pre-war networks were based on family relationships, kinship, and neighbours. Networks crossed and re-crossed between the different religions, and as shown in chapter four there was very little separation of the groups. These post-war networks are different, in that they are trying to reconstitute order from the chaos of war. The massive population displacement that occurred, and the number of deaths and casualties, meant that there was a desperate need for knowledge. They craved knowledge not just of the people they knew, but of the whole country. Consequently links were developed, and became a network, between people whose only connection was the fact of their country of origin. They did not have kinship or friendship links, and although the networks still exist, as the war ended the need for information was less desperate. Although some friendships developed through the networks, on the whole they were purposive, and did not develop past the level of information sharing.

Bosnian social events

One of the highlights of the calendar for Bosnians in Britain were the social events. Parties would be held in a hall, sometimes a church hall, sometimes a working men’s club, and might be held to celebrate an important date, such as the end of Bajram, the fasting month, or to celebrate New Year, but often they were held for no particular
reason. There would be music, and this was always Bosnian music, never English music. Alcoholic and non-alcoholic drinks would be available, though there was rarely any food. The first party organised by Bosnians in Westham that I attended was held to celebrate New Year. A church hall near the centre of the city was used, and about half of the Bosnian residents attended. Some felt that they were too old for dancing, a few were not interested in attending, but others felt that they could not be seen to be out enjoying themselves whilst the war was still going on. In Bosnia the traditional mourning period for a close relative is one year, and because for some it was not yet a year since their relative was killed they refused to attend. Tables were arranged in long rows on either side of the room leaving a large area for dancing, and music was provided by a tape player with a large speaker attached. Everyone had been asked to pay a small amount of money to attend, and this was used to buy soft drinks, coffee, and beer. Some Bosnian food was available, including pies and baklava, and this had been prepared by some of the women. Later social events did not have food, and had real musicians as well as taped music, but the arrangement of tables and the large dance floor were reproduced at each venue. When they were given the use of a room in a working men’s club, they stopped buying alcohol for the parties and left people to buy their own from the bar, and instead provided coffee and soft drinks.

Parties were attended by people from the town where the party was held and also from other towns in the area. One party, where the band was from France and the singer had travelled from Bosnia, had people who had travelled up to sixty miles to be there. A charge was made at the door to cover the costs of the room and the musicians, but there were no claims to be raising money for causes in Bosnia or even funds for the community.
association. If someone organised a party and it was suspected that they would personally profit from that, then many people would refuse to go. The organisers had to keep a fine line between charging enough to cover costs and charging so much that people accused them of exploitation. These parties sometimes were organised by the community association, and sometimes by individuals working outside the community association. The vast majority of Bosnians attending were Muslim, though I never attended a totally Muslim event. There were always some Bosnian Croats and/or Bosnian Serbs present. This is especially true of Middleham, where the proportion of non-Muslims was higher than other areas, and all Bosnians in the area would attend parties held in Middleham.

One informant told me:

"In [Middleham] I saw all people I never saw before. I said to my friend who is that, who is that. She told me, and that man he had Serbs names, and then she told me here we all are together. And there was no problem there, just everyone make party same as party here."

Although the party might be some distance away, it was rare for there to be organised transport. In the early years of the parties, those with cars would congregate at someone's house, fill up all the cars with everyone who wanted to go, and then the cars would set off in convoy. They would return the same way, and the journey would be almost part of the event. In later years, though, it has become more rare for this to happen. People still sometimes travel together in groups, but these are groups of relatives or friends usually consisting of two, or at most three, cars. This is partly because they no longer need to follow someone to find their way to the venue. In the early years in Britain, few Bosnians knew their way around the country, and it was difficult to locate venues in a strange city.
at night time, and this was one reason for travelling together. Later, as people became more familiar with the country, those that had cars knew the way to the usual venues and were able to travel on their own. As more learnt to drive and bought their own cars there was also less need to depend on others for transport, and travelling in ones own car gave an opportunity to show to people in another area that one had bought and could afford to run a car.

These parties were closely modelled on the parties held weekly in every Bosnian town and village. Some of those that have gone back to Bosnia have taken video cameras and filmed the parties they have gone to. They look very similar, except the ones in Bosnia have more young people at them and are more crowded. The reason for more young people is partly that the older people in Bosnia don’t feel the need to go to these parties as much. They have a circle of friends or relatives that they are close to, plus they can go for coffee to the homes of others, whereas for those in Britain their social circle is much smaller. Without these parties, the number of Bosnians that they speak to would be severely restricted.

These parties are an attempt to recreate an aspect of Bosnian social life. The fact that in Britain the parties are likely to have more older people than the parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina is a reflection of the reduced social circles for most people. Bosnians in Britain are not isolated in the real sense, since there are other people available to socialise with if they choose to. However, they remain isolated in a practical sense because they have not formed close links with the people that now live near them. Attending parties enables them to see and mix with other people from Bosnia-Herzegovina, and possibly to
meet friends that have been settled in other parts of the country, but without making a commitment to friendship with new people.

Women particularly enjoyed these events because it gave them the opportunity to dance. Both men and women do traditional Bosnian dancing, but women were always the first to dance and always danced in greater numbers. Because dancing is done in a circle, there was no need for a partner, and single women were able to participate fully in the dancing. Women always wore their best clothes, and the men were very smartly dressed. For younger women, best clothes meant the most fashionable clothes they had, and this often meant extremely short skirts. One young woman became the focus of much attention when she began dancing, as her skirt was so short it left little to the imagination. Her aunt laughed when she saw everyone looking, and her mother ran up and held a jacket up behind the daughter as she danced, though she laughed as she did this.

Children went with their parents, and although some parents of small babies took them home early, most children stayed with their parents until quite late. For the children it was an opportunity to speak in Bosnian if they wished, although as time went by children often would speak either English or a mixture of English and Bosnian to each other. It also represented an opportunity to absorb Bosnian culture, as outside of these social events they were mixing with English children most of the time. They would run around the dance floor, or play under and around the tables, and sometimes they joined in the dancing with their mothers.

There were subtle divisions apparent in the seating arrangements and although the tables were in long rows people sat in groups. People who had come on the Medevac programme tended to sit together, regardless of which town they were from originally or
where they now lived. Most of these were from Sarajevo or one of the other major cities of Bosnia, and came at the same time. They remained in touch with each other, and because many were still receiving treatment they were often dependant on support from others, especially if the patient was a child. Those on the Medevac programme, because they were accepted because of their illness or injuries, were even less likely than those on the main programme to have any friends or relatives in Britain, and so could not rely on family members for support or assistance with childcare. Another group of tables would have many of the people from Herzegovina, another would have members of an extended family. When there was a group of people visiting from another town, individuals would sit with any relatives that might be there, but the rest of the group would sit together. Some people would go around all the tables and mix with everyone, but others would remain with the group they were sitting with and did not speak to people at other tables. In many cases, the seating arrangements were dependant on factors from before the war, with people sitting with others from the same part of Bosnia, or with their relatives, or with friends from before the war. Some sat with people that they did not know before, but these were usually people who knew very few people from before the war and had few relatives in this country. It was common to see at one table a group of people who had come to Britain on the Medevac programme. These people had not known each other before the war, and were not all Muslim, but they met when they first arrived and shared some common features. They were mostly from Sarajevo, and had no other friends or relatives in Britain. Because they found themselves in similar situations, and often needed help with caring and hospital visits, they tended to be friendly with each other. At another table would be a group of people who were from Herzegovina, who may not have known
each other before the war but were drawn together by their shared background. At a third
table would be members of an extended family spanning three generations. Although
most people had few relatives in Britain, this extended family had been concentrated in
an area of Bosnia where most of the men were taken to camps, and they were fortunate to
all have arrived in the same country. This suggested that although the social events were
an opportunity to socialise and make new friends, for many people new friendships had
not developed.

Friendships

Most Bosnians, whether they came on the programme or on convoys, had few friends and
relatives in Britain when they first arrived. Their social networks had been severely
disrupted by the war, and could not be recreated in Britain because the members of those
networks were spread all over Europe. Instead, they had to create new networks and
make new friends, and through the reception centres, the social events and the
information network they soon got to know other Bosnians in Britain. The friendships
that developed were often very important for women, since they helped to overcome
feelings of isolation and provided a support network. Women sometimes found it difficult
to cope with children, especially if they had no male partner to offer support, and those
without relatives initially found that they had no one they could turn to for help with
childcare when they were ill or if they needed some time on their own. Friendships were
also important for men, although they were much less likely than women to say that they
felt isolated or needed support.
Case study 2

Azemina was widowed during the war, and arrived in Britain as part of the programme after being classed as vulnerable. She brought with her a son of thirteen, another of seven, and a baby boy of one year, who had been born after his father was killed. She was related to another family in the city, but was housed several miles from them. Nura arrived in Britain with her husband, who had been in the camps, and her son from her first marriage who was eight years old. Soon after arriving in Britain she gave birth to another boy. Her husband left her whilst they were staying in the reception centre, and he returned to Bosnia.

Nura and Azemina had not been in the same reception centre and did not know each other before arriving in Westham. They were both housed initially in flats about half a mile apart, and met at organised social events. After finding that they lived near to each other and had no relatives to support them, they agreed to meet regularly so that they could take it in turns to mind each other’s children and so get some time to themselves. Their youngest children were given places at a local nursery, and they sometimes collected or dropped off the other’s child. They also began to exchange children’s clothes, as their children were similar ages.

After two years in their flats, both women were offered transfers to houses, and coincidentally they were offered houses in the same street. They are now very good friends and as well as helping with each other’s children they attend social events together.
Case study 3

Sehrija came to Britain on the programme with her daughter, aged three, as a dependant of her brother. Her husband was missing, presumed dead, after having been imprisoned in one of the camps. When she left the reception centre she chose not to live in the same city as her brother, since she thought he would make her look after him as well as her daughter. She was given a house in Westham close to that of a man that she had become friendly with in the reception centre. This man lived with his parents, and his parents also became friendly with Sehrija. Although Sehrija could not openly have a relationship with this man, since there was a possibility that her husband was still alive, they became close, and he would help with work that needed to be done in her house and would sometimes take her daughter to nursery, and later to school. His parents would also look after the daughter at times, so that Sehrija could go shopping or visit friends on her own.

Even though friendship patterns and support networks were shattered by the war, new friendships and networks developed, and helped to overcome the sense of isolation that many people felt. However, although these friendships might have been close, Bosnians in Britain have a much smaller circle of friends than they had in Bosnia, and often they said that their closest friends in Britain were those who they had been friends with before the war. There was often a reluctance to become too friendly with others, since those friendships were unlikely to persist after returning to Bosnia.
Case study 4

Damir has one cousin in the same town, who he visits occasionally, and there are about ten other people that he knew before the war but he considers only one as a close friend. When Damir’s wife, Lejla, found out she was pregnant, I was the second person she told. I asked her who else knew, as she asked me not to tell anyone. She replied that she had no close friends here, and so far had only told family in Bosnia about the pregnancy. She would tell other Bosnians eventually, but there was no one that she was close to that she wanted to tell.

Case study 5

Nada said that she had no friends here. She had come as a medical evacuee, and was very popular. She had three small children, and often when I visited her there would be other Bosnians visiting. Many of these lived several miles away from Nada and so visiting her required extra effort, either a walk of around five miles, or two bus journeys. Yet when Nada discussed friends and family, she said these people in Britain were not real friends, all her real friends were in Bosnia. The neighbours [there were five other Bosnian families nearby] were just neighbours, not like the ones in Bosnia. In Bosnia she had real neighbours, ones that knew her and her family for a long time. She also said that she was from Central Bosnia, not like the others, and wanted to be with people from Central Bosnia.
Both Nada and Lejla reported feeling isolated, and said that friends here were not the same as the friends they had in Bosnia. Interestingly, they were neighbours, and spent a lot of time in each other’s homes and would look after each other’s children, and they seemed to get on very well. However, both missed the relationships that they had before the war, and in a way were mourning the loss of their previous friendships. They did not wish to concede that any friendships they now had were as good as those they had before the war. They were both also aware that they might return to Bosnia, and knew that if they did return they would not see any of the friends they made in Britain again. Because they might return, and had no idea how soon that return might be, they had no motivation to build new friendships. They would develop links with other Bosnians, and would be friendly with others, but they were reluctant to let new friendships develop.

Sometimes Bosnians were reluctant to let close friendships develop because they felt they could not trust other Bosnians. They believed that others would betray their trust, or would talk about them when they were not there.

**Case study 6**

Medina’s parents did not want her to have any boyfriends, and so whenever she was friendly with a boy she made sure that her parents did not know about it. Medina said that she had very few friends, and often you might think that someone is your friend but really they are not. She had been friends with Suada, and thought they were very good friends, but was no longer friends with her because she had gone to Medina’s father and told him all about her boyfriend. Medina said that all the Bosnians in Britain are like that, they
pretend to be your friend to your face, but behind your back they talk about you and say bad things about you.

Medina was reluctant to become close friends with others as a result of this betrayal of her trust, and instead relied on members of her family and the few people that she knew from before the war for friendship. Others said that they were reluctant to become close friends with people they met in Britain because they didn’t want to be talked about.

Case study 7

Damir says that he keeps away from most Bosnian people. He was offered a house transfer to an area where there were a lot of Bosnians, but turned it down, and instead lives about two miles from the nearest Bosnian family. He goes to the social events usually, with his wife and daughters, but the only houses he visits are those of his cousin and two men who were friends before the war. He knows other people, but doesn’t visit their homes.

Damir has chosen to keep himself apart from most of the other Bosnians, and although he will socialise with them he does not consider the others as friends. For Bosnians that came on the programme like Damir, their friendship patterns were affected by three factors. Firstly, their old friendships and support networks had been disrupted by the war. This resulted in friends and relatives being scattered, and although they were sometimes able to keep in touch they often could not meet as they were living in different countries.
Secondly, they were always aware that they might be returned to Bosnia soon, and any close friendships that they made in Britain would be disrupted by their return. Finally, their experiences during and after the war meant that they often found it difficult to trust others, and so many became reluctant to accept people as friends if they had not been friends before the war.

Whilst relationships have often been maintained between former neighbours, there does not seem to have been equivalent relationships between new neighbours. In one street of ten or twelve houses, there were at one time four Bosnian families. Families A and B were related, the husbands were brothers, and the two families had lived close to each other in Bosnia. The brothers had been in the camps together, and their wives had been refugees together in Bosnia. They remained very close, and they and their children were very friendly towards each other. The relationship with family C was very different. They had not known families A and B in Bosnia, though as they were from the same area they did know some of the same people. Originally only the men of the three families were in Britain, and their wives and children joined them a considerable time later (around eighteen months). The three men formed a close relationship, as they were in the same situation of not knowing where their families were or how they were. They sometimes cooked together, and when one was ill the others would help them. When one was depressed, the others would try to raise their spirits. When their families arrived, there was a change in the relationship. The three families at first got on very well, but after a few months arguments began. These increased until in the end family C was not speaking to A and B, despite living between their houses. Family D had come to know all three families since arriving in the city, and stayed out of the argument, remaining friends with...
all three. The family lived about a mile away, and all three families visited for coffee. After about two years in their house, family D was told that their house was in need of substantial repairs, and the housing association arranged for them to move to another property. They were given a house in the same street as A, B and C. Family D expressed reservations about the move to me, as they felt they did not want to be so close to the other families. Their feeling was that if people were too close, the family would have no privacy. The other families would see who was visiting them, and this could lead to jealousies.

**Helping each other**

It was widely expected that once they were in a cluster area, the Bosnians would begin to help each other, and this happened to some extent, for example some Bosnians learnt English quite quickly and were able to act as interpreters for others. However observation of who was providing help to whom showed that this help was often only given to a limited number of people, and many people did not feel that they were under any obligation to help others.

"People go to see each other, but it is not for help just to see." Sead

"Bosnian people is like this. You do something good for them, they is happy. Next time if you say I can't go, or I am busy, it's like you never did anything for them, they get angry and say bad things about you. Maybe you go everytime, ten times, eleven times, then on twelfth time you say no, or you say yes and it turns out wrong, they don't get the benefit"
or whatever, they hate you then. I can’t work with these people. Too many times they do this, now I go just with [my friends].” Mina

Mina’s story was repeated many times by different people, and it seems that this is the ‘Bosnian way’. It seems that it doesn’t matter what you have done for someone in the past, if you let them down once they are angry and take it personally. Not everyone was like this, but enough people were to disillusion many of the people who tried to help everyone, regardless of whether they were a friend, family, or an acquaintance.

**Divisions between Bosnians**

Conversations and observations over several years indicated that there were many divisions between Bosnians, and these mainly related to factors before and during the war. All Bosnians that I spoke to had been friends with people of other religions before the war, but many felt that this was no longer possible. Although they may have been willing to agree that not all Serbs or Croats had been their enemy during the war, they often found it hard to trust any that they did not know well. For most Bosnians, their friends after the war were predominantly Muslim, though there were also divisions based on regional, educational and employment background, and between those from the towns and those from the villages. Experiences during the war meant that many Bosnians felt unable to trust other Bosnians, even if they were from the same religious background, and made it harder to develop new friendships. A major factor in hindering the development of new friendships was the effect of temporary protection. As well as discouraging new friendships because of the ever-present risk of return to Bosnia, temporary protection
affected the way that their everyday lives were led. The high levels of unemployment noted in the last chapter gave people a lot of free time, and little with which to occupy themselves, and resulted in limited topics of conversation. This in turn led to gossiping and jealousies, and caused many developing friendships to become broken.

Divisions between Muslims, Serbs and Croats

All the Bosnians that I met reported that they had friends from other backgrounds before the war, but during the course of the war many of these friendships were broken. Some of the Bosnians had lived in very small villages inhabited only by Muslims, but most lived in towns and villages that were mixed. Schools were mixed, and those that worked outside the home had colleagues of different backgrounds. Many of these friendships were maintained up until the beginning of the war, and a few lasted longer than that, although most say that they have lost touch with their old friends. Some reported that their friends had tried to help them, but there was often little that their friends could do.

Case study 8

Vahid had worked as a teacher in a secondary school, and still had some photographs taken before the war. He showed me a photo of the staff taken on a sunny day about a year before the war started. They are all standing together, smiling, some with their arms around a colleague’s shoulder. Vahid said that many of them had been friends outside school, and visited each other’s homes and sometimes had holidays together. Once the
war started, some of the teachers had joined the fighting, and he pointed to each face in
turn, saying “dead, cetnik, cetnik, dead, Germany, ustase, cetnik\(^3\), ...”

Vahid found it difficult to understand what had happened when the war started these
people who had been friends and colleagues suddenly became enemies, joined one side or
another dependant on their religion. Until then, they had all been friends and religion had
not been important.

Case study 9

Amir says that he can no longer be a friend with Serbs. Before the war he had some
friends that were Serbs, one man was a good friend and they often visited each other’s
homes. When the fighting started in his area this friend was not involved. When Amir
was caught and sent to Omarska camp he was treated very badly. The guards were all
Serbs, and when he was first at the camp he was put in a large room with a lot of other
people, and it was three days before they got any food or water. The prisoners were
sometimes sent out to cut wood for fuel, and because there was a shortage of petrol for
the lorries they were made to carry the wood back to the camp. One day when he was out
cutting wood his Serb friend appeared, and persuaded the guard to let him give Amir
some food and clothes. Amir says that some of the guards weren’t as bad as others, but he
feels now that he can’t trust any Serbs. If he saw his friend again then perhaps they could
be friends, but it would not be like before. He feels that other Serb people could have

\(^3\) Cetniks were Serbian fighters opposed to the occupation of Yugoslavia during the Second World War.
Ustase were the fascist Croatian fighters during the Second World War responsible for many atrocities.
Both terms were used to describe Serb nationalist and Croatian nationalist fighters respectively in the
Bosnian war.
done bad things during the war, and so he cannot trust them. Their presence also reminds him of the camps and the experiences there were so bad that he does not want to think about them, and so he tries to avoid Serb people.

Despite their experiences of the war, many Bosnians retained a belief that all religious groups had a place in Bosnia, and that one should not label all people of one group as either bad or good.

"...even when I talks they say how come you got that sort of attitude, they beat you hard they done very bad things and kept you in the camp, but you can't say if one person or two persons or even ten persons did it to me that the million of the people are bad. If one Bosnians among the 260 done bad to you you can't say I am bad as well. He's bad, everybody bad. It depends on the person." Samed

Samed believed that he should be willing to accept all people, but despite professing to hold no grudge against all Serb people he found it hard to treat them equally. Whenever he met a Bosnian Serb he felt that he should treat them fairly until he found out they had done something wrong, but in practice he held himself back, and did not invite Bosnian Serbs into his house. The trauma that he had experienced during the war remained with him, and he was unable to trust those that were Serb in case they turned on him again.
Divisions between Muslims

As shown in chapter four, there was little history in Bosnia-Herzegovina of separate Muslim organisation, and there was no feeling of community before the war. There was little history of united Muslim activities, and little group identification. The outbreak of war made divisions between Muslims more apparent. One man reported that when refugees arrived in his village many people refused to help them. It did not matter to the people of his village that they were all Muslims, they were concerned to protect their own property and did not wish to provoke attacks on themselves. This meant that refugees were left on the streets, whilst many people in the village had rooms in their homes, which they could have offered to them.

"Some people came, some expelled from front line. They came to villages with the families. Our people had houses with room for somebody else, that's the way we build, for anybody to come, he can sleep. When that people come, most just on road, with nowhere to go, because the people in my village thought war would come if we took those other people. If you don't like your own people, there's no way you'd like other people. A man had a cellar, good shelter, with metal door. He locked it normally. He had his mother living in the house and the mother she would stick to whatever he said. When the Serbs start to bomb us I said I need to get into the shelter and she said no, he might
Another described when refugees began arriving in her town in large numbers. Various aid agencies began operating there, making sure that the refugees had shelter and food. But Sanella said that no one looked at the people in the town, they were getting no aid, and sometimes they had less food than the refugees. So people from the town didn’t do much to help the refugees, and they led fairly separate lives.

These experiences meant that Bosnians were aware that other Muslims would not always help them, and believed that they would not always be able to rely on them for support. For those that had been in the camps, this was even more apparent. The guards in the camp encouraged inmates to report each other, and some betrayed others in order to get better treatment for themselves. They also sometimes betrayed others to save their own lives, and acted out of desperation. The result was that after the war those that had been in the camps often felt that they could not trust others, as they had seen too many people injured and killed as a result of informants.

**Case study 10**

In the camp Mase was put in a shed which initially contained about 270 people. Every night, some people were taken away to be tortured, and some were killed. After a few months [he could not be accurate with the time] there were 111 of them left alive. Sometimes the people taken out at night were chosen randomly, and were those who were closest to the door. Other times, names were read out from a list, and if your name
was called you had to go with them. Trying to pretend you weren't there resulted in further torture, so most people went when their name was called. Some of the names on the lists were people already known to the Serbs as important people, but this informant says that most people in the camp died because of treachery. Many people betrayed others, and many gave names of others in order to try to avoid torture or death for themselves. The Serbs killed some people who they felt had wronged them, but most, according to this informant, were just people that another inmate had accused of wrongdoing. For this informant, one of the reasons that he agreed to come to Britain was that he thought there would be few Bosnians here, and so there might be people he could trust. He found it very hard to trust other Bosnians because of the experience of betrayal in the camps.

Case study 11
Suvad, who had hidden in the woods for several days before finally being forced to surrender, said that after he arrived at the camp he had denied that he had been involved in fighting. Then one of the other inmates reported to a guard that Suvad had been involved in fighting, and the guards took Suvad outside and beat him badly. He was only seventeen at the time, and before this man reported him the guards had been prepared to believe that he had hidden because he was scared of the fighting.

Case study 12
Nermin, held in a Croat run camp, reported similar instances of betrayal. In the camp where he was held, conditions were very bad for him, but there was another section of the
camp in which the treatment was far worse. In this section were held what he called political prisoners, but there were instances where people in the section he was in would report other inmates to the people running the camp, accusing them of political or military activity prior to their arrest. The accused would then be transferred to the section for political prisoners, or tortured and abused in front of everyone else. The informant would be rewarded with slightly better treatment or extra food.

For many of the men who had been in the camps, their experiences of betrayal meant that they found it hard to trust other Bosnians even if they were Muslims. Whilst they knew the behaviour of their friends and relatives, they could not be so sure of those that they did not know before the war, and so found it difficult to make close friendships. There were stories within the group, told to me when there were no other Bosnians around, that some of the people I knew had betrayed others whilst in the camps. Those that said this would not give names, but were adamant that they could never trust this man or men.

Suspicion of others also extended in some cases to suspicion of the Bosnian government. Amir said that when in the camp, the guards told him that their leaders had offered to release prisoners for twenty five kilos of flour per person. There were around three thousand prisoners in the camp, but the government refused. Amir doesn’t know if this was true, but he feels that it is true. He feels that no one thought they were worth twenty five kilos of flour, and that is not much for a life.

For those who weren’t in the camps, the feelings of mistrust can be difficult to understand. Most of the Bosnians that came on the convoys had only experienced the beginning of the war and few had been in the camps, and so they did not have the same direct experiences of betrayals and breaches of trust. Although it is difficult to generalise
because those that came on convoys had a wide range of experiences, they were sometimes much more willing to trust others and less likely to refuse all contact with non-Muslims.

Case study 13

Mirko was a Bosnian Serb from Sarajevo, and before the war had taught at a university. He spoke good English, and was given a job working for the department, which sent interpreters into schools. He spent one day at a school, but the next day the parents of the Bosnian children said that they would not send their children again if this man remained as their teacher. The department agreed to withdraw him from that school, but due to a shortage of interpreters they were reluctant to lose his services. Instead he was sent to another school where there were three Bosnian children. The parents were consulted in advance, and asked if they had any objection. They said that they would see what he was like, but if he was good for their children then they would accept him, although they would not promise that they would become friends. Mirko got on very well with these parents and remains friendly with them even though their children have not needed language support for some years. The parents at the first school were all from the programme, those at the second school were from a convoy.

The families at the first school were all from the programme, and although their experiences of the war were not identical, they shared a mistrust of non-Muslims as a result of the war. The family at the second school were not from the programme and were from a different area of Bosnia. They had left Bosnia-Herzegovina at a very early stage in
the conflict, soon after fighting began, and saw very little fighting themselves. Although they were from an area where the conflict was predominantly between Serbs and Muslims, and their house was now in territory controlled by Serbs, they did not have the same degree of mistrust. They felt that if someone wanted to help them or their children, they would give them a chance, whatever their background. Although the other families agreed with this in principle, their experiences during the war made it difficult to put into practice.

Being from different towns is also important to the refugees themselves. Because they are from different towns, they do not feel that they are obliged to each other, and they are aware of differences arising from the different towns of origin.

"We are all from different towns. In the beginning we are happy to be together, but later we see differences. Some can put them aside, but some cannot." Sejo

"You see, people from K, they is different. I can never have friends from there. They is all farmers, they just think about tractors. All their children go out of the school as soon as they can get out." Medina

Traditional prejudices about the different regions of Bosnia were not removed by the war, and people still maintained a loyalty to their own district and often looked down on those from other areas. People from one area might be considered as badly educated, and only interested in farming, whilst from another they might be thought of as ill mannered or more likely to engage in crime.
As well as seeing difference between towns, there is a regional divide. People from Northern Bosnia tend to see those from Herzegovina as ‘snobs’, who look down their noses at them. People from Herzegovina tend to see those from Northern and central Bosnia as peasants, implying they are lazy and stupid. Interestingly, these stereotypical views, though not universally held, apply to everyone from those regions, not to any one particular religious group.

Relationships between programme Bosnians and convoy Bosnians were not always good on an individual basis. Though convoy Bosnians will undoubtedly have suffered before and during their flight, some of the programme Bosnians resented the fact that those who had, in their view, run away were getting treated the same as them.

Case study 14
Jasmina had left Sarajevo as the dependant of a medical evacuee, was resentful of another woman from Sarajevo who lived nearby. Amira had left Sarajevo soon after the fighting started with her husband and children. They made their way to Slovenia and ended up in a refugee camp. Whilst in this camp a bus arrived offering to take people to Britain. They decided to join the people on this bus, and came to Britain. After spending a few weeks lodging in the home of an English family they were offered a house by a housing association. They left Sarajevo with what they could carry, and by the time they arrived in Britain had only a few possessions. When the daughter of Amira, who was around 14 years old, began attending school she was frequently asked about the war, and would tell teachers of some of her experiences.
The family of Jasmina had spent a year living under siege in Sarajevo, and had only been able to leave because a member of the family was seriously ill. They were only allowed to take one small suitcase each, and the journey to the airport was hazardous as it took them across the front line. A ceasefire was negotiated in order for the evacuees to travel, but the journey from the hospital to the airport, and the flight through ‘enemy’ controlled airspace, must have been incredibly frightening. After a stay in hospital, the family were placed in a house close to Amira. The two families initially appeared to me to be getting on well. One day, though, Jasmina was talking about the family she had left behind, when suddenly she started talking about the daughter of Amira. She became very angry, and asked what right this girl had to talk about the war, when she had seen none of it. The whole family, according to Jasmina, had run away as soon as there was any fighting. They knew nothing of the suffering of those who had stayed in Sarajevo, the terror of snipers, random shellings, or the lack of food, fuel, and water. In short, Jasmina felt that her family had suffered far more, and yet Amira’s family were being treated in the same way by most people, and had been given refugee status.

Case study 15
Three adult siblings were overjoyed when their parents finally managed to join them in Britain. The two brothers had been in the concentration camps, but their father had been able to get away. Their parents were given permission to join them in Britain as part of the quota on the basis that they were close relatives, at a time when close relatives could still be issued visas. However they were unable to leave Bosnia until the war ended, as they were in government-controlled territory. When they arrived, both were in fairly good
health and both were overweight. This was in stark contrast to the conditions of the people who came from the camps, who despite several weeks or months of decent nutrition were still slim, if not skinny. Again the relations between this family and others on the surface remained friendly, but on several occasions when the family were not there, resentment was expressed. One man asked me if I thought it was fair that this man, who had a good life through the war, should have been allowed to come to Britain. The proof of his good life, for this man, was the fact that this man was fat, and that he had not been in the camps.

"I know people that come from the house to the house, they can enjoy, it's nice country to live, if anybody offered me before war and say would you like to go to Britain for the holiday to live there one, two years, I would have accepted, very nice, everything is free, you just can sit and enjoy yourself." Samed

Resentment of others was not confined to the question of whether or not they had experienced the camps or the full effects of the war. Because some families had been able to bring out more relatives than others, the extent of ones' family became another source. Those who were in Britain with no relatives other than their spouse and young children were often jealous of those who had parents, grandparents, uncles, aunts, brothers and sisters. The reasons for the presence of some extended families are complex, and mainly a matter of good fortune. The extended families lived in close proximity, in the centre of the region from where the camp inmates were drawn, and most (if not all) the males had been in the camps. Because of this, when the camps were emptied and the residents moved to Croatia, they knew where most of the other family members were. Because
they remained together, it was easier to try to ensure they ended up in the same country. They also knew which of their sisters had been widowed, and were able to apply for her to join them on the programme as a vulnerable person. The family then were housed in the same city, and most of them were a short distance away from each other. Because of the opaqueness of the allocation system, the reason why they were able to do this is unclear. For several people who were unable to have their extended family with them, this situation was unfair and unjust. They wanted to know why their father could not get a visa. They wanted to know why their older children could not get a visa. And, in moments when they were feeling very bitter, they asked what underhand methods that family had used to get preferential treatment. From my perspective, it was a happy coincidence that some extended families were able to remain together. From their perspective, it was another example of an unjust system conspiring against them personally.

**Gossip and jealousies**

Because most Bosnian refugees were neither working nor in training schemes, they had a lot of spare time which needed to be filled. For many people, time was spent visiting others for coffee, but during these visits the conversations were often limited, as neither party had done anything since they last met. For many, the only things to talk about were the war, their life in Bosnia, their life in Britain, and other Bosnians. Since memories of the war were very painful, and the person they were visiting often did not know the other’s family and friends from before the war, these topics were often avoided. This left
only two topics of conversation, their life in Britain and other Bosnians, and it was easy for information sharing to slide into gossiping. However, the person talked about often heard that they had been talked about, and this would then cause arguments.

Case study 16
Ismet arrived in Britain with his parents when he was sixteen. He had been engaged to be married to Hatemina, a girl from the next village, but they became separated during the war. He later traced her through the Red Cross, and found that she was living in France. As he thought that he would never see her again he started seeing other girls. When he was eighteen the girl contacted him to ask if they were still engaged. Ismet replied that they were, if she could get to Britain they would be married. About six months later the girl and her mother were able to travel to Britain for a holiday on one week visas, and during that week Ismet and Hatemina were married. Hatemina remained in Britain at the end of the week, and her mother returned to France. They were happy to be together, but Hatemina started to hear stories about the girlfriends Ismet had whilst she was in France, and this caused some arguments between them. Ismet found that the source of these stories were friends of his who had been talking about him when visiting others for coffee, and is no longer friends with these people

Bosnian etiquette demands that if you are visited by someone for coffee, you should visit them in return. Whilst in another’s house you are their guest, and must be treated with respect. Visit too often, and you can become accused of taking advantage of another’s hospitality, and also of considering yourself better than others. This last accusation was
one that I had particular difficulty in understanding, although several people tried to explain. It seems that if you visit another person too frequently, you are implying that you are good enough for their hospitality, but by not waiting for reciprocal visits you are suggesting that they are not good enough to receive your hospitality. You are then open to accusations that you are putting yourself above others, and therefore looking down on them. In each town there were a limited number of Bosnian families, each with a lot of free time, and in the first few years there were many disputes based on visits for coffee. Although these rarely involved arguments, they did lead to gossip and talking about others when they weren’t there, and as a result many people curtailed their social visits and limited them to people that they considered good friends.

Case study 17

Emira was widowed during the war, and came to Britain as a vulnerable person with her daughter. There were a few other Bosnian families in the district where she was housed, but most were two bus journeys away. Because of the time involved in travelling, Emira would visit several households in a day when she went out visiting, and would sometimes call again on people she had seen only a few days before. Emira was from a city and had always worked full time, and as she was from a different region of Bosnia to most of the others she was less familiar with the etiquette involved in visiting. Eventually she heard that other people were talking about her, saying that she was putting herself over the others, and was upset by this. Some of her Bosnian neighbours explained that it was because she visited too often, and so Emira reduced the number of visits she made even though this meant that she had a vastly reduced social life as a result.
Bosnian Community Associations

By 1999, Bosnian community associations had been formally constituted and were in existence in at least ten towns and cities in Britain. Representatives of five of these associations were questioned for this study, and their replies along with my findings from participant observation and documentary evidence form the basis of this section. I am using as a definition of community association, a group which calls itself a community association, which claims to attempt to meet the needs of the Bosnian population in its area, and which has a written constitution. The associations, which I examined, were all outside of London, but cover a large area. I have called them Northam, Southam, Eastham, Westham and Middleham for the purposes of this study.

Origins of community associations

Community organisations existed in Bosnia, but took a different form to those in Britain. There were no ethnic minority associations, though during the 1980s political parties began to diverge along national lines. Some areas had Islamic associations, whose nature is discussed in more detail in the chapter on Bosnia, but many of those interviewed said that there was none in their area. Yugoslavia was a state socialist country, and there was little scope for formally constituted voluntary action. The exception to this was
involvement in youth groups and trade union activity, though these were closely linked to the state.

The vast majority of Bosnian refugees in Britain were not actively involved in politics in Bosnia, and most were only involved in the periphery of their trade union, if one existed. The majority therefore had little or no experience of independent organisation or of voluntary activity, and the notion of a community association was something that had to be explained to them by the Bosnia Project and other interested parties. The originators of the associations also learnt by example, since in every town and city in Britain there are community associations of some form. Bosnians were able to see that there were Bangladeshi community associations, West Indian community association, and associations linked to mosques and temples. These received funds from local authorities and charities, and were able to take action in support of their members. This, then, is how they learned about community associations, from being told by groups such as the Bosnia Project, Refugee Action, and local advice agencies, and from being shown what other groups in their area were doing. These organisations were also aware that once the Bosnia Project ended there would be no provision aimed specifically at Bosnians. However, Bosnians were likely to have needs such as for interpreting, counselling, and advice, and the only way to obtain funding for these kinds of activities is through the formation of a community association. In Britain general needs are met by central and local government service provision. Community associations are able to obtain funding from both these and from other sources in order to meet the specific needs of their members. As discussed in chapter two, refugee community associations are a formal construction aimed at meeting a specific policy objective. Refugee agencies are aware of
the benefits that accrue to associations, and that without this formal construction the various sources of finance and services cannot be accessed. Encouragement to form associations reflects these agencies’ awareness of British social policy, rather than a desire of the refugees themselves.

I begin by giving a description of the way the associations were formed in five areas, and then make an analysis of those associations.

Westham Bosnian Community Association

In Westham, the first refugees to arrive were convoy Bosnians. These were placed in Westham by a housing association which had a handful of short term properties available. The majority of people from that convoy were housed in a different city around seventy miles away. The group was fairly small, consisting of five families, and at first got most of the support and assistance that they needed from the local law advice centre. Workers at this centre also gave extra assistance, helping them find language classes and finding schools for the children. Later the city agreed to accept Bosnians from the programme, and to make a certain number of properties available. As they began to arrive, the Bosnia Project allocated a worker to the city for one day per week, though additional visits were made for doctors’ appointments and some social security problems. Many of the Bosnians became dissatisfied with the service Bosnia Project was offering, and there were several problems caused by the inexperience of Bosnia Project workers leading to poor advice being given. This in turn led to increased demand for the services of the law centre, where many of the problems were resolved. The law centre was not funded to assist with many of the problems the Bosnians were facing, and had little to spare to pay
interpreters. Some Bosnians who spoke a little English acted as volunteer interpreters, but they found that they were spending a lot of their time on work for which they received no recompense. Workers at the law centre advised them that their best course of action would be to form a community association. Once formed, the group could apply for funds and would then be able to pay people itself for interpreting and for other forms of assistance.

A meeting was arranged for all Bosnians, organised by the law centre, the reception centre, and Bosnia Project. At this meeting, the concept of a community association was explained and it was agreed that an association should be created. A man who had been acting as a volunteer for the law centre was appointed president. Refugee Action then got involved, and again their draft constitution was used as a basis for that of the community association. Later the city council became involved, and a representative of the council entered into negotiations with several other groups in the city, to try to find the Bosnian association some premises from which to base their activities. Through this representative the association was given the use of an office close to the city centre, and the council arranged that the rental would be much lower than was usual for the area.

Northam Community association
As in Eastham and Westham, the first Bosnians to arrive in Northam were convoy Bosnians. Several groups were brought to Northam, some by well meaning professional people, some by Muslim groups seeking to assist fellow Muslims. Those brought by Christian and charity groups were housed initially with the group’s supporters, then assisted to find rented accommodation. Much of this was provided by a housing
association, whose staff had personal links to organisers of a convoy. Those unable to find housing from the housing association or local authority turned to the private sector. From the time that the first refugees were offered housing, housing association staff became involved in other aspects of their support. Staff helped to organise places in schools for children, and sorted out problems with benefit claims. A furniture store was established in order that newly arrived refugees would have access to furniture for their new homes. The housing association had a history of actively supporting community groups, and suggested that the best way forward for the Bosnians would be to form their own community association. This association could then take over many of the roles that the housing association staff had been undertaking voluntarily, and act as a unifying force for the group. The housing association encouraged the refugees to form a group, helping them to organise meetings and offering a room which could be used for meetings and social events. The housing association were supported in this by a social worker who had been assisting Bosnians in the city since they first arrived, and who also had a history of involvement in community groups and community action. Despite this support, the association in Northam was at first slow to action.

As refugees from the programme moved into Northam, workers from the Bosnia Project arrived to assist them. The service that they offered is described in detail earlier, and while the staff were well intentioned problems soon arose. There was resentment that those who were not on the programme were refused assistance and advice, even when they were close relatives of someone on the programme. There was resentment from some of those on the programme that the Bosnia Project workers seemed to be offering a better service to some than to others, and though the workers claimed this was on the
basis of need some of the clients disputed this. Because of the tension this generated, Bosnia Project staff began to feel intimidated. The ‘Bosnian way’ when there is a conflict is to be very loud, rather aggressive, and to assert oneself, and this was very hard for many of the staff to deal with, especially as they were often young and with little experience of handling difficult situations. Because they felt intimidated, the office that they were working from ended its open door policy and instead introduced a service hatch. All clients were to be dealt with via this hatch, though a few were allowed into the office. This served to increase the anger of those who were already disaffected with the Bosnia Project, and led to demonstrations and a sit-in at the offices. One man commented that the hatch was like that used for animals, and they felt they were being treated like animals because of this. Eventually, a group decided that since the Bosnia Project was not going to change, they would no longer have anything to do with it. This proved to be the catalyst for the community association, and the leaders of the protest became the leaders of the association, along with some convoy Bosnians. A man who was involved in the protest and the subsequent community association says that in a way they should thank the Bosnia Project, because it was their anger at them that forced the formation of the association. The constitution was not devised by the Bosnians, as advisers from the housing association, social services, and later Refugee Action, gave them ideas and explained the format of a constitution, and ensured that it was written in such a way that the group would be able to register as a charity.
Southam Community association

The town of Southam used to have several convoy Bosnian families. Most of these were brought by an Islamic group, and were housed in overcrowded and substandard accommodation. Stories are rife in the area of how these people were mistreated by the group that brought them, but I was unable to verify the allegations because most have now moved away from the area. I was not able to ascertain where they had moved to. Programme Bosnians housed in Southam remained in close contact with the reception centre and its staff, as the Mid Term Support team operated from the same building as the reception centre. This led to a high degree of dependency, and the workers at the reception centre and Bosnia Project recognised that the group was likely to have problems when the support of the Bosnia Project was withdrawn. Because of this the group was strongly encouraged by the Bosnia Project and the reception centre to form a community association, in order that they could support each other. As the Bosnia Project was wound down, members of the Mid Term Support team organised meetings to explain what was happening, and to point out that once the project finished they would have no obvious source of support. The association was formed shortly before the project finished, and staff from Bosnia Project helped the association to make funding applications. Some of these were successful, and the association was able to rent an office and employ a worker.

"We were kind of pushed into it. We thought it was a great idea, but it wasn’t our idea, they told us what we can do and can have, and there was a lot of training on management.”
Middleham Community association
The group in Middleham has slightly different origins, in that there were no convoy Bosnians in the town. They were the first Bosnians there. They were also all from the same reception centre, and so were familiar with each other before they were housed in the town. In Middleham there are thirty-four families and single people, making a population of around one hundred and twenty people. They began arriving in Britain in December 1995, and from May 1996 began moving into homes in Middleham. As the Bosnia Project was in its second phase, it was clear to Bosnia Project staff that the project would soon cease to exist, so the residents in Middleham were strongly encouraged from the beginning to start an association in order to support each other. It was explained to them that the Bosnia Project would be finishing soon, and that there would be no other workers who would help them. If they still needed support, then that support would have to come from each other. The association began operating in October 1996, and the city council and Refugee Action provided organisational support.

In each of these cases, the idea for a community association has come from someone who is not Bosnian. In effect, the Bosnians in those areas were presented with a notion, that of a formal community association, and a model to follow, that of other community associations in the area. It was explained that if the association matched a particular pattern, then there was money available in order to let them carry out the activities that they wanted to carry out.

Knowledge on the existence of community associations was spread through the information networks that had developed, and areas where there was no Bosnia Project
input heard about them. In some cases, they also tried to establish community associations, with the help of local voluntary service councils or other NGOs.

**Eastham Community Association**

For one group of refugees in Eastham, the originator of the community association has a clear memory of when the idea was suggested to her. There are around one hundred Bosnians living in Eastham. In September 1992 thirty-three Bosnians arrived as part of a convoy. Most of those on the convoy had left Bosnia before fighting began in their area, but a few had husbands and other relatives held in the Serbian concentration camps. The convoy had been organised by a church group, and a coach had arrived at a refugee camp in Croatia offering to take a busload of people to Britain. The majority of those that came on the convoy have now left Eastham and settled in London. Those that remain are those that had relatives who came as part of the programme. From February 1993 onwards, relatives of those remaining in Eastham began to arrive in Britain as part of the programme. As they wished to rejoin their families, they went straight to Eastham and did not spend time in a reception centre. As Eastham was not one of the Bosnia Project's designated cluster areas, there were no caseworkers or Mid Term Support workers in the area, and those that arrived in Eastham had to find help wherever they could.

Semira, a woman who had arrived as part of the convoy and whose relatives began arriving in Eastham, felt that she should do something to help those that were arriving. She urged the Bosnia Project to begin sending a caseworker in order to help with organising housing and benefits, but they would not do so. As she had begun learning English, she took on some of this work herself, with assistance from another woman who
had arrived from Yugoslavia several years before and acted as an interpreter. This role began to take up more and more of her time, and expense was involved, as she had to travel to assist people and make phone calls. She had heard that other people in the area did voluntary work, and went to the council’s voluntary services unit to find out if she could get any assistance from them. A woman there told her that what she needed to do was start a community association, register as a charity, and apply for money to do things. She might even get enough so that she could get paid for the work she was doing. Semira was part of the informal information network, and had heard that other groups of Bosnians were doing something similar, so she arranged for a meeting to be held for all Bosnians in the area. She proposed that an association be started, and the people at the meeting agreed and made her president. The association officially started in September 1996, after assistance from the voluntary services unit and Refugee Action. These two groups showed the association how to write a constitution, how to organise meetings, and how to keep records. The constitution was based closely on the draft constitution that Refugee Action has developed for community associations.

Legacy of the Bosnia Project

The way that the Bosnia Project operated created a level of dependency for the refugees. As discussed in the chapter on the Bosnia Project, this was partly due to inexperience of the staff, partly to the speed with which the project was established, and partly to the lack
of a clearly defined role for the staff. This lead to staff being expected to carry out every task that they were asked, and the staff were unsure when to refuse.

The support that clients had was supposed to be time limited, but in practice any person that turned up asking for help was accepted. The help that was given may have been well intentioned, but often the worker would do things for the client that the clients could have learnt to do for themselves. However, showing someone how to fill a form in often takes far longer than filling it in yourself, and the combination of inexperience and lack of time meant that it was rare for clients to be taught how to carry out a task. This meant that they remained dependent on Project staff for assistance, as they never learnt how to do things for themselves.

This dependency has consequences for the community associations and the role they are expected to play, since the only model that most of those involved in the association had to work on was the Bosnia Project. The Bosnians could see that other organisations gave advice and organised events, but they did not have the knowledge of how the organisations operated internally, or the way that roles and responsibilities might be shared. In contrast, they had a clear image of the workings of the Bosnia Project, which was of workers performing most of the tasks that they were asked to perform, with little or no input or task sharing on behalf of the ordinary Bosnian. Many felt that the association should take over many of the functions that the Project had carried out, including form filling and benefit applications. Those running the associations found that they were expected to carry out these tasks, and had no experience of working in a way that tried to avoid dependency. This meant that a large proportion of the organisers’ time was taken up with tasks that were not strictly part of their role. One association leader
reported that they interpreted for driving tests, and an interview with another leader was
interrupted several times by Bosnians arriving and asking for help filling in forms.

The high levels of dependency induced by the Bosnia Project had repercussions not just
for individuals, but also for the formation of community associations. Because the
working of the programme did not teach people the skills they needed for independent
living, once the programme ended there was a need for support from some other area.
The place most looked to was the organisation that appeared to take over from the Bosnia
project, the local community association. An important role for all the community
associations that emerged was the provision of support, advice and interpreting for the
groups' members.

"The other Bosnians often think of me as a caseworker [the job title of the Mid Term
Support team staff]. ...Done a lot of rent and council tax things recently. They don't know
how it works. With the refugee council everything was sorted for them, nobody ever told
them all the forms. The system was never explained to anybody. They don't understand
about applying again when moving or if they start work they know some tax will be taken
off their wages but they don't understand council tax. The system was never explained.

Now I try, but sometimes five times you explain council tax, and they still come up with
'but we never paid it before'. " Ferida, worker for an association.

Whatever their stated aims, there is one common feature of the community associations.
In each case, there is an expectation from the members that the associations' presidents or
chairmen will carry out a large amount of work voluntarily. In Middleham, where the
president speaks very little English, the president takes a large number of phone calls
from the members, asking for advice and asking where they can get information. In other
associations where the leader speaks a reasonable amount of English, the leader and some of the committee members have been expected to do a large amount of advice work and interpreting. This has caused problems for two reasons: firstly, the individuals concerned resented the amount of unpaid work they were being asked to do; and secondly refusals or bad decisions become a cause of friction.

In Yugoslavia there were few NGOs, and there is little history of voluntary work. Though some people will undoubtedly have carried out work for others without payment, only a few of the people I came across had ever been involved in voluntary work. The exception to this is assisting neighbours and relatives, with whom there was a feeling of mutual obligation. Actions taken to support a relative or neighbour would either be reciprocated later, or were seen as repaying them for an earlier action. The upheavals of war disrupted the traditional networks of family and neighbours, and thus there were few people who felt they had a duty to help others living nearby.

Association leaders and activists

In each of the community associations I examined, the leader was someone who either had been involved in voluntary work in Bosnia, or whose employment had involved managing others and acting independently. In other words, they had some prior experience of organising others or working as a volunteer, and were able to draw on these experiences. Two of the current leaders speak very little English, another two speak excellent English, and in one area someone who spoke no English replaced the original leader, who spoke good English. The original leader of the association in Westham had been a volunteer fireman. He was a qualified fire fighter who worked in another town,
but whose own town was too small to run its own fire service. He did not have to act as a fire fighter in his own town, and was paid a small amount if ever he was called upon to work. The president of the community association in Middleham had been involved in projects working with young people and had management skills. He had also worked for a group similar to the Scouts, and organised events such as clean ups of parks and public spaces. The president of the group in Eastham had not done any form of voluntary work, but had worked in the administration of a hotel, and so was used to organising other people and taking responsibility. The original president of the group in Northam had worked for the local government in his region as an economist, and had been educated at university. He too was experienced in organising others and planning tasks.

The presence of a person willing to take on the role of leader and carry out most of the tasks required was important for the continuance of the associations. One man, whose work involved liaising between the different Bosnian associations, said that the reason for the collapse of the community association in one city was the absence of a leader.

"Westham need a leader, this is main reason for no association. They need someone who will work hard – I worked for years before I got this job. They don't respect what they've got, they were organised before, it was not easy, and now they got back to how they were six years ago.\" Eldin

Although those who were activists in the associations mostly had no experience of voluntary work, and only some had experience of work which involved managing others, they had in common with the leaders of the association a belief in and support for the government in Bosnia.

"Bosnia was multi-ethnic. We try to keep like that." Asim
Asim strongly supported the Bosnian government, and felt that since he was not able to fight on their behalf, he would instead try to keep together the Bosnians where he lived, so that when the time came for return they would be prepared for going back. He felt that it was important to maintain cultural traditions such as dancing and singing, and also the tradition of leading lives which were intertwined with those of other religions.

"I try to keep friendly to help anybody. ... In Bosnia in school all religion was together, equal, people start to marry each other and don't care about religion. We are in special situation here, have to do lot of work for children. Children need to learn Bosnian way or can't be Bosnian." Sejo

Sejo felt that it was important for children to learn Bosnian ways, and since he had worked with children before he felt it was his duty to become involved in the association. He organised Bosnian classes for children through the association, and arranged for a group of Bosnians to visit Bosnia in order to decide if they wanted to return.

All of these leaders said that they felt as though they did a lot of work, but were not sure that the others in the association appreciated the work that they did. The ordinary members of the associations often criticised them, questioning where money was being spent or expecting them to take on more work than they wished.

"People expect to do everything for them. Expect you must do that, go with them and translate, doing forms. I stopped because I thought it was enough time for me to be there. Was a lot of work, everyday, DSS, paperwork, but not paid." Ferid

Despite all the activities that the association undertakes, one association worker says there is still criticism from some Bosnians in the area.
"Always some people are against what you are doing. I don't know if it is all peoples or just Bosnian peoples. If it is all people then I think Bosnian people are the worst. Some people always find some criticism in it. They will never turn into community but will criticise what you do. If they see it is me, they won't come to the meeting. So I sent other people to invite them... that worked better." Sajma

**Understanding of voluntary work**

The ordinary members of the community associations, and those that chose not to become members, often have very high expectations of what the associations can and should achieve. When these expectations are not met, there can be a lot of anger and resentment, and accusations of fraud or incompetence.

All of the associations were dependant initially on the willingness of leaders and activists to work without pay, although some later obtained funding and were able to offer some of them a wage. For most people the concept of voluntary work was alien. Their experience of work was that work meant paid work, and they find themselves questioning the motives of those who undertake work without pay. For the average Bosnian, who had observed the conduct of the war in Bosnia and the way that some people seemed to profit from it, it was often difficult to believe that a person would take on work without getting any reward for it. They became suspicious, and sometimes believed that the individual must have been getting remuneration from somewhere. Their experiences in Bosnian society had not exposed them to voluntary work as it exists in Britain, and their experiences instead suggested that people are usually motivated by personal gain.
Activities of the associations

The problems that Bosnian refugees faced were similar in all the towns and cities in which they lived. The first major difficulty was language skills, as very few had any knowledge of English before they arrived. Secondly, they needed assistance with claiming benefits, as they had no knowledge of the workings of the British benefits system. There was also a need for some form of collective social events, in order to meet each other. The first need that the association in Eastham tried to meet was an interpreting service. They later realised that they could do more, and began to organise social and cultural activities. They now run English classes for those that wish to learn, a Bosnian school on Sundays, a gardening project, and a mental health project. This has been possible because in January 1997 the group was awarded three years funding from the National Lottery.

For the former president of the association in Westham, the initial aims were to help to improve life for Bosnians in the town, and also to help people in Bosnia. But for him an important function of an association, and the one he mentioned first, was socialising.

"We have no café, or place to go to meet other people. ...We need to be all together. If we have association we got centre where you have meetings. The main thing is place where people can get together." Ferid

The group in Middleham formed a cultural troupe, and perform traditional dances in traditional dress. This group has travelled to other parts of Britain to perform for other associations. The group in Westham also wished to establish a dance and music troupe.
An application was made to charities for funding to purchase musical instruments and costumes, and one application was successful. Unfortunately, no one was willing to take on the task of teaching the dances or organising the troupe. Eventually the money was returned to the funders, and the dance group was never started.

In Northam and Westham a need was identified for lessons in Bosnian for children attending English schools. The refugees had not made a decision on whether to return to Bosnia-Herzegovina or not, but they were aware that at any time the decision could be made for them by the government, in which case they would be returned regardless of their opinions on return. Because of this issues connected to their situation on return, and the way their children would cope, were important. Some parents became concerned that their children would soon lose the ability to communicate fluently in Bosnian, and some were concerned that their children would struggle in Bosnian schools on their return. Among the refugee population there were a small number of qualified teachers, and these teachers were asked if they would run a Saturday school. In both towns, classes were started and children were invited to attend. The classes ran for about eighteen months, and then they folded. The classes encountered several problems. The teachers were not willing to work for nothing, but the associations had only limited amounts of money that they could offer. This led to the teachers being resentful and becoming unwilling to teach. Some parents refused to send their children to the classes, arguing that their children spoke Bosnian at home and so needed no further instruction. Others argued that they might never be able to return to Bosnia, and so there was little point in teaching the children something they would never need. Many children were reluctant to attend, as they already had to spend five days a week in ordinary school, and resented their free
time being curtailed. The numbers attending the classes reduced after the free minibus service to transport the children was withdrawn, due to the association being unable to afford to continue the service. The introduction of a curriculum designed by the Bosnian government further reduced the numbers attending. The official curriculum included time set aside for religious instruction, and some parents objected to this. The final blow for the Bosnian lessons was the withdrawal of the classroom facilities by the school that was being used. There had been complaints that the rooms were being left untidy for several weeks, but when graffiti began appearing on the desks the school decided that the rooms could no longer be used. A member of the community association’s committee had visited the lessons to see what was going on, and to try to ask the children to behave better. He found that the children were indeed behaving badly, and were leaving rubbish lying around, talking instead of listening, and some Bosnian names had been written on the desks. He tried to ask the children to behave, but some were very rude to him, and his request had no effect. After the school withdrew the classrooms, the Saturday school folded and has not thus far been restarted.

The level of external funding of the associations is a particularly contentious area, with there being little correlation between the level of funding and the nature of the association. For example, one group with only seventy members was granted £100,000 by the national Lottery board, whilst another with a much larger membership which is better organised and carrying out a far wider range of activities received nothing. Areas where there were no programme Bosnians have been much slower to form associations, although most areas with a population of convoy Bosnians have either started or plan to start an association. It has been particularly difficult to establish and
maintain a community association in London, where a group was formed but ran into
difficulties and funding was withdrawn. The Bosnia Project believes that part of the
problem was that the Bosnian population is far more spread out than in other areas, and
that though the group is large compared to the Bosnian population in some other towns
and cities, it is small in relation to the other refugee and minority groups in London and
there may be a tendency for them to be overlooked. In other towns convoy Bosnians have
learnt of the existence of community associations through the information networks, and
have tried to create their own associations. Although these were not included as part of
the detailed study of associations, they appear to model themselves closely on the
existing associations, with an emphasis on advice and interpreting work.

Wahlbeck (1999), in his study of Kurdish refugees in Britain and Finland, found there
were differences in the type of community organisations found in the two countries and
suggests that this is due to the differing amounts of support available to the groups. The
community associations formed by Kurds in Britain were in an attempt to provide
support services to members of the group to make up for the lack of support available to
them. For Kurds in Finland, however, a range of practical support was available to them,
and the associations they formed were oriented more towards the provision of social and
cultural activities. This suggests that it is unrealistic to expect any formal community
associations to have more than a social role during the time when other agencies have
support systems in place, and this study in part supports Wahlbeck’s findings.

The association formed in Eastham was active earlier than those in other area, and took
on a role of advising and interpreting whilst the Bosnia Project was still in operation.
However, this was an area where the Bosnia Project did not operate, and there was very
little alternative provision. The groups in Middleham, Westham and Southam were all in existence when the Bosnia project was operating, but took on very few tasks and rarely carried out functions that would normally have been done by Bosnia project staff. All three became much more active after the Project finished, and all three had a population which was totally or predominantly drawn from the programme. In contrast, the association in Northam did become active whilst the Bosnia Project was operating. However, the population in Northam had many more convoy Bosnians than in others, accounting for around half of the total Bosnian population, and these convoy Bosnians did not have access to Bosnia Project support. A dispute between some Bosnians from the programme and Bosnia Project staff led to some choosing to boycott the Project provision, and so acted as a catalyst for action for the community association. None of the associations that I studied in detail had a predominantly convoy Bosnian population, but reports from the association leaders that I have spoken to suggests that in areas where there were no programme Bosnians and no Bosnia Project input the formation of a community association took place at a much later stage, with some not being constituted until 1998, six years after the members arrived in Britain.

As well as seeming to support Wahlbeck’s suggestion on the activities of community associations, the actions of these associations suggests that the Bosnia Project had a very large role in the decision to create these associations. The association in Eastham does not contradict this theory: the originator of the group there says that it was started as a result of a suggestion by a local community advisor, but also because she saw that other areas such as Westham and Northam were behaving in this way.
Football

Many of the men were interested in football, both playing and watching. In the early stages of the programme one of the Medevac caseworkers recognised this, and decided to help organise a football team. He found that there were enough men interested for there to be a team in Northam and arranged for a team to be formed and incorporated into the local Sunday league. As the Bosnians had recently arrived and had no football kit, he applied for a grant towards the cost of purchasing equipment, and this was used to buy shirts for the team. The team was relatively successful, and one year came second in a trophy competition, and every match was able to boast a full contingent of players and plenty of supporters. Other towns also began football teams, and in Westham the team played on a Sunday and had a training night once per week that all interested men could attend.

Playing football provided an outlet for many of the men, and through the physical exercise they could work off some of their frustrations and anxieties.

Case study 18

Meho had been married before the war, but his wife, who was a Bosnian Serb, left him when the war began and he has not seen her since. Meho has suffered from depression since he arrived, and goes through periods when his anxiety is such that he cannot eat or sleep properly. Because of his depression, he was able to obtain sickness benefit and did not have to be eligible for work. Even when he was feeling very bad, he joined in the
football training, and said that he made himself go because when he was training he
didn’t think about anything else. It helped him forget his problems, just for a short time.

Meho’s football skills were such that he was never part of the team, but like many of the
men he took part in training. Participation was loosely structured, and there were no
formal meetings that one had to attend before going to the training sessions, and many of
the men were happy to take part in those conditions. The football teams can be contrasted
with the associations that were formed which had a very rigid structure, and of which one
either was or was not a member depending on whether subscriptions had been paid. The
committees of the association were chosen mainly because of people’s personalities, and
those that were more forceful were selected. For the football team, footballing skills were
paramount, and popularity only became an issue if a player was so unpopular that no one
would pass the ball to them.

For some of the Bosnian Croats, who sometimes felt excluded or shunned by the
community associations, their footballing abilities meant that they could be included in
the football team, and were thus able to develop friendships and overcome some of the
prejudices against them.

Case study 19
Goran had been brought up as a Catholic by his Bosnian Croat father and Muslim mother,
and came on the programme after being released from the Serb run camps. He had been
to a few meetings of the association, but found that some people were rude to him and
some questioned his right to have been included in the programme, and whether he had
really been in the camps. He was very unhappy at the way he was treated, and stopped going to meetings. He was a keen football player, and when the football team started he joined in the training session and became a member of the team. Whilst playing, no one questioned his background and he felt as though he was being included. He developed several friendships as a result of being in the team.

The football teams were one of the few areas from which women were excluded. There was no formal rule that women should not attend training, but as is the case with other amateur football teams women do not attend. It was also rare for women to go to watch the matches, as they were much less likely to be interested in football. For the men, it gave an opportunity to behave as individuals and as men, and to act without reference to their past experiences. The vast majority of the men were not working, and relied on benefits to support their families. All had lost family members, and had been unable to protect their families during the conflict. Some had been subjected to extremely degrading treatment during their captivity, and all had been treated as either objects or victims by the programme, rather than as autonomous individuals. Through football, they were able to assert themselves and be proud of each other's sporting achievements.

Support in organising the football teams came initially from Bosnia Project staff and volunteers who were themselves interested in football, and later from other football teams and the league organisers. They were organised separately from the community associations, despite areas of overlap and some of the leading players being part of the committees of the associations.

"We organise from the football pitch" Emir
Emir said that the football team in his town formed the basis for the community association. The team was the first thing that Bosnians did together, and they acted as a team and not as individuals. Because he was captain of the football team, people were keen that when the association started he should be on its committee, and through organising the team he became confident that he could organise other activities as well. However, the people advising the associations seemed to have overlooked the role of football in team building and confidence development, and the two were seen as separate issues. The team in Westham has folded, as no one was willing to take on the management of the team and organise funds to pay for rental of pitches.

Football was considered by those advising the community associations as outside their remit, and so the football teams remained separate from the associations. This was perhaps a wasted opportunity, since it was one of the few activities that Bosnians became involved in soon after their arrival, and incorporation of football and other social activities into the community associations might have made them seem more relevant to the ordinary members.

The importance of the football teams is that it shows that Bosnians can come together in an organised way when there is a joint interest. Joly (1996b) suggests that refugee associations can be classified according to whether they further like interests or common interests. In the case of Bosnian football teams, they are pursuing a like interest, an interest which they share but which is not directly connected to the group. Those that take part in the football teams do so for their own enjoyment and to further their own interests, whereas the Bosnian associations are supposed to further the common interest, the interests of the group as a whole. This may help to explain why the football teams were
organised with very little assistance, whereas the associations needed a far higher degree of external support.

**Religion**

The friction between individual Bosnians and their British Muslim neighbours also affected the relationship between Muslim community groups and the Bosnian community associations as they began emerging. It led to Bosnian community associations becoming unwilling to take advice and support from British Muslim groups.

**Case study 20**

On one occasion a meeting of a community association was held during the month of Ramadan, when traditionally Muslims fast between the hours of dawn and dusk. A Bosnian Muslim who had lived in Britain for many years and his friend, who came on behalf of a local mosque, attended this meeting. Both these men were fasting, and as the meeting was due to start at around dusk they had brought with them dates with which to break their fast. Soon after arriving they commented on the number of people smoking, implying that one should not smoke when one is fasting. Then they noticed that a few people were drinking coffee. They asked these people why they were not fasting, as it was not yet time to break their fast. Some ignored them, one man said he couldn’t fast as he was taking tablets, and then, as the atmosphere became noticeably icier, one man told then that he had fasted long enough in the camps, and in future he would fast when and if he wanted to. Though the atmosphere did improve and relations became warm again and
the meeting continued, the Bosnian association did not ask that group for help after the meeting and none was offered.

Of the five associations in this study, none were affiliated to their local mosque, and none said that they had regular contact with or support from Muslim groups even though the membership was predominantly Muslim. Instead, most of them had received support from Christian groups, who did not discuss matters of religion with them and did not try to make any demands as to the behaviour of their members, and from non-religious associations in their area.

Despite their religion being the marker for membership of the Bosnian associations, the practice of Islam was not a major priority. In fact, Islamic strictures of dress and food as followed by many Muslims in Britain were largely ignored by Bosnian Muslims. Because they had no strong identity as Muslims in the religious sense Bosnians found it difficult, if not impossible, to identify themselves with British Muslims. Those advising and supporting Bosnian refugees in Britain had assumed that the presence of other Muslims in an area would be beneficial for the Bosnians. However, the Bosnians quickly found that they had little in common with these other Muslims, apart from a religion to which they were largely indifferent. Islamic associations, when they discovered that most Bosnians were not interested in religion, became uninterested in Bosnians. This suggests that assumptions of support from people of what is thought to be a similar background should not be made without an understanding of the group that needs support. Bosnian Muslims did not strongly identify themselves as Muslims before the war, and being Muslim was merely one part of their identity. Because of this, they were unable to
consider themselves the same as British Muslims purely on the basis of religion, because to Bosnians self-identity rested on factors such as family, neighbourhood and region, and religion was only a component of their identity.

**Membership of associations**

The association in Middleham is clear about whom their group is for – it is for all Bosnians in the town, regardless of background. All religions are represented on the committee. The president says that Bosnia was multi ethnic, and they try to keep the association multi ethnic. However, the group in Middleham is slightly different to the others, in that all the residents came from the programme, and all had stayed together in the same reception centre. This meant that they knew each other and knew why they were included in the programme. In addition, the president of the group had a clear political view of Bosnia as a multi ethnic state, and this political project was in the forefront whenever activities were being organised. There are also no convoy Bosnians in the town, and the membership consists solely of those that came on the programme.

Other groups did not have such a clear political project, and although one organiser said that they try to make sure everyone is treated equally he but would not discuss how they did this. In practice, the hostility that many Bosnian Muslims felt for Bosnian Serbs and Croats meant that few non-Muslims felt able to take part in meetings and activities. Bosnian Croats who had come as part of the programme were sometimes accepted, but Serbs and Croats who did not come on the programme rarely remained members of the associations. However, none of the associations saw themselves as being only for Muslims, even though the vast majority of their members were Muslim, and this meant
that there was a divergent attitude towards membership. Officially, the associations were open to all those Bosnians who lived in the area and wished to be members. In practice, the associations’ members were those from the programme, plus Muslims that did not come on the programme.

**Case study 21**

When the first open meeting of the Westham Bosnian Community Association was held, all Bosnians in the city were invited. A letter was sent to all those on the programme by a member of staff at a reception centre, and another member of staff who had come to Britain on a convoy informed the non-programme residents. The meeting was well attended, with most households sending at least one member. Although the people leading the meeting said that the meeting was for all Bosnians, some people present voiced objections to some of the non-programme Bosnians that were there. They argued that since they were not from the programme, no one could be sure of their role during the war, and since they were not Muslim it was possible that they had committed acts against Muslims. Others argued that those who were against Muslims were unlikely to try to be members of an association that was to be 90% Muslim, and the people who were being talked about said they had done nothing to be ashamed of. It was finally agreed that these people could be members, but most felt that they were not welcome and did not attend any further meetings.

Membership was open to men and women equally, and all adult members had votes at meetings. From the beginnings of the associations there was a consideration that women
should be represented on the committee, and a recognition that those women without male partners were especially in need of representation. Westham, at one of their first meetings, agreed that there should always be at least one woman on the committee of the association. In Northam, it was agreed that the committee should include a representative of the single mothers, and also of the pensioners. This formal inclusion was important, since women often chose not to attend the meetings of the associations. Of the five associations studied, one had a female president, and another had a worker for the association who was female.

A Bosnian Community?

An important question is whether these networks and friendships that exist constitute a community. Community has been defined as a form of relationship “characterised by a high degree of personal intimacy, emotional depth, moral commitment, social cohesion and continuity in time.” (Nisbet 1967). Other definitions of community are possible, but an important feature of definitions of community is the notion of the community as a form of collective. There is something that the members of the community feel they have in common, and which provides a link between members of the community. This commonality can take many forms, and may be real or imagined (Jenkins 1996). Because of the feeling of interdependence and mutual interest, communities are able to act in unison in order to defend the rights of the group. The origin, for those in the community, lies within the community itself. “People construct community symbolically, making it a resource and repository of meaning, and a referent of their identity.” (Cohen 1985 page
For Cohen, the individual members of a community do not consciously create that community, instead the notions of community and interconnectedness are transmitted through the group via that group's culture.

Refugees from Bosnia had very little to link them together, other than the war. For refugees from Bosnia, the experiences of the war are extremely diverse, and are not sufficient to create a permanent link between people. The main area of commonality is the war, but this is a negative aspect of their lives, rather than a positive one which can be celebrated. As can be seen from the description of the war in Bosnia in chapter four even the perception of who was the enemy during the conflict depends on the stage in the conflict and the geographical location, and the divisions noted above reflect this. In addition some refugees left Bosnia before fighting came to their area, whilst others have been born since their parents arrived in Britain, and so the war is unlikely to have created feelings of long-term unity.

There is no ethnic community, as Bosnians on the whole maintain that Bosnia should remain a mixed country, although as individuals they may wish to avoid mixing with people who are not Muslim. All the Bosnians in this study had friends, and some had relations, who were not Muslim before the war, and there seems little desire to create a new society which would exclude those relationships in the future. Individuals focus on the differences between them, rather on their commonality, and divisions based on region of origin and experience of the war are continually referred to, making it difficult to consider that there is a sufficient degree of social cohesion for a community to exist.

At the moment there seems to be no community at all. There is an absence of a feeling of interconnectedness with the whole group, and instead people feel connected only to a
small circle of family and close friends. There are, though, efforts to create a structure that can represent all the members of the group, and these structures are the Bosnian community associations which have been formed in many towns and cities. These associations did not arise independently, and are largely the product of support and interventions from agencies working with the group. They rely heavily on the willingness of a few individuals, and the availability of grants in order to provide services. As such they are not the formal expression of a community, since there is no community to formally express. Instead, they are a contingent community, and exist as a recognition of British social policy. In Britain, community associations have access to support and finance that is not available to individuals, and the only way that Bosnians can access these benefits is through forming a community association, despite the absence of a community.

Conclusion

The war in Bosnia not only ruptured family and friendship networks, it made rebuilding those networks more difficult, as many people found it difficult to trust others afterwards. Moves towards creating new friendship networks were hampered by the programme, though not intentionally. The scattering of individuals throughout Britain and Europe meant that many people had few relatives or friends from before the war living near them, and instead they needed to make new friends. However, thoughts that they might soon return to Bosnia meant that many people did not feel they needed to make lasting friendships. When this attitude was combined with the amount of free time that Bosnians
had due to their high rates of unemployment, it meant that petty squabbles and jealousies were allowed expression, and there was little compunction to strive to maintain friendships because these were people one would soon be leaving. The dependency created by the operation of the Bosnia Project led to Bosnians often being reliant on others for tasks such as interpreting and form-filling, but the absence of kinship and friendship networks meant that many Bosnians did not feel group-wide obligations. They were willing to help their own friends and family, but became increasingly reluctant to help others outside of that circle. There was an expectation that the associations would take over much of this work, but the associations' activists and leaders were usually unpaid volunteers, and either could not or would not do as much as some members expected, and this caused some friction. Ordinary members often valued the associations according to what they personally would gain, rather than what Bosnians as a whole would gain.

Some Bosnians have been able to conform to expectations and have been instrumental in creating and maintaining the associations. However, there remains no community of Bosnians, and the associations can instead be considered as contingent communities, whose existence is dependant on the continued efforts of a few individuals and the availability of funds which can only be accessed through a formal association. Rather than being a formal expression of an informal community, the associations are a formal construction of an ideal, and do not reflect the reality of their members. Bosnians were urged to form formal associations, and shown how to go about creating them, but there was little consideration of whether there was an informal community that could underpin the formal one. There are kinship groups, friends and networks, but there is no
community, and no feeling of obligation to others. The associations were formed because there was no other way for the group to get support or finance, and instead of reflecting the desires of Bosnians, they reflect the expectations of British society. They are another example of control being taken away from Bosnians, and thus of disempowering them, by presenting them with only one model of behaviour.
Chapter 8: Conclusion

This research focuses on refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina that were given temporary protected status in Britain as a result of the conflict in that country between 1992 and 1995. From the evidence obtained through this research and an examination of existing theories on refugees, a hypothesis was developed that these refugees represented a different type to the two main types of refugee identified by Joly.

Joly (1996a, 1996b, 2002 forthcoming-a) argues that to understand refugees in the country of exile, it is important to understand their relationship with their country of origin. Joly identifies two ideal types, which she calls Odyssean and Rubicon refugees. Odyssean refugees had a collective project in the country of origin, and maintain that project in the country of exile. Their social organisation in the country of exile will be determined according to their homeward orientation, through their return project, and they consider their exile to be temporary. Their return project is kept alive through their mode of social organisation, through their community associations and through political activity. Rubicon refugees either did not have a collective project in the country of origin, or they have forsaken their collective project. They do not envisage return to the country of origin, and their social organisation is focussed towards the country of exile, rather than the country of origin. This can lead to individuals having a more positive attitude to the country of exile, or it can lead to a ‘double marginalisation’, where the individual feels alienated from the country of origin and the country of exile. The outcome for Rubicon refugees will be highly dependant on country of exile related factors, especially socio-economic factors. Joly argues that communities and associations will be developed
and will play an important role in supporting refugee adaptation if the group identified itself as a minority within the country of origin. However, if they did not constitute a minority in the country of origin then both the formation of a community and the creation of associations may be delayed, and may not happen at all.

Although this typology is valuable, the research contained in this thesis suggests that a third type of refugee can be identified. Rather than being a sub-group of Rubicon refugees, these are refugees who have no collective project in the country of origin or in the country of exile, but whose orientation towards return is uncertain. Instead of focussing on their country of exile and developing a return project, or focussing on the country of exile and abandoning the return project, instead they are uncertain about return, and are waiting for something to happen which will determine their orientation. This, I suggest, is the typology that describes the refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina that arrived as part of Britain’s Bosnia Project. This study therefore constitutes a further development of Joly’s theory on refugees, expanding and refining the typologies.

A continual feature of this analysis is that refugees that came on the programme had almost no control over the events around them, and their temporary protected status has enhanced their insecurity. They had no clear group project in the country of origin, that is in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but this uncertainty and lack of control has prevented them from developing a collective project in the country of exile, in Britain.

The policies around settlement of refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina assumed the existence of a community, and that associations would act as the mouthpiece for that community. There were a number of assumptions made which guided the way that the refugees settled in Britain. Firstly, it was assumed that immigrant and ethnic minority
groups in Britain form ethnic communities, and these in turn establish formal community associations. These associations then play a crucial role in the settlement of labour migrants and the integration of labour migrants and minority ethnic groups. They are assumed to fulfil the functions that the Bosnia Project fulfilled for the refugees, and therefore were used as a model for the Bosnian refugee groups to take over when the Project ended. However, the refugees have come to Britain with ideas and experiences, which affect their later ability to conform to these expectations.

Chapter four examined the history of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the war that took place there between 1992 and 1995. This shows that there is no history of separate ethnic group formation by Muslims in Bosnia. The identity of Muslims has varied over time and between members of the group, with the majority considering themselves Croatian at some times, Serbian at other times, and even classing themselves as Yugoslavs for a while. The Muslim population has been closely linked to the Catholic and Orthodox populations for centuries. Although they sometimes took part in other people’s wars on different sides, there is no history or fighting between the groups on their own account. Instead, they tended to live peacefully together, with a large degree of socialising between the groups. Bosnians of the three main religions lived lives that overlapped with each other, and their social networks were often linked quite closely. Muslim households would have Serb neighbours, and at work they would have colleagues of different religions. They went to the same schools, and the rate of marriage between the groups was higher than in any other part of Yugoslavia.

The causes of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina are complex, and cannot be reduced to ethnic hatreds. The evidence from the refugees themselves, and from history, is that until
shortly before the war started, and in some cases for a time afterwards, the religious background or perceived ethnicity of others was not important. When the war began, it therefore came as a shock to many people, many of whom confidently predicted that although Croatia had descended into violence, the same would never happen in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The root causes of the war, rather than ethnic rivalries, lie somewhere in the economic and political history of Yugoslavia, and in the manipulations of politicians and the mass media that they controlled. Yugoslavia developed a distinctive brand of socialism which encouraged separate development of the member states of the Yugoslav federation. As the economy started to collapse in the 1980s, the leaders of the richer states began to resent any redistribution of wealth in the country, since it necessarily involved the transfer of wealth away from richer states such as Slovenia and Croatia. The states each had their own communist parties, and some of the leaders sought to increase their political power at the expense of the others. The easiest way for them to do this was through the encouragement of nationalism, since in most member states there was one ethnic group that formed an overall majority, and appeals to nationalism and ethnicity provided an easy rallying call. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, there was no overall majority, and although Muslims were the largest single group there were substantial Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat groups. Nationalist sentiments were slower to take hold in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and although the population eventually voted to secede from the federation, this decision was taken after Slovenia and Croatia had already left, and was a reflection more of anxiety about Serbian nationalism in the rest of Yugoslavia, rather than an expression of nationalist sympathies. However, the Bosnian Serb population and politicians were strongly influenced by the nationalism of Serbs in Serbia, and began
turning towards Serbian nationalism in the late 1980s. The same happened with Bosnian Croats, who were strongly influenced by Croatian nationalism. This process happened very rapidly though, and Bosnian Muslims were somewhat left behind in the race to nationhood. Although Muslims had lived in Bosnia for centuries, they had not developed separately from the other groups. They also had no strong influence from outside the state urging them to seek separate development, and although political parties emerged which were predominantly Muslim, they did not advocate a separate Muslim state.

When fighting began in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it became characterised as an ethnic conflict. This overlooks the fact that throughout the war the Bosnian government had members that were Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb, and the army contained high-ranking officers of all three religions. Large cities such as Sarajevo and Tuzla remained mixed throughout the war. For the ordinary Bosnian, though, ones’ perceived ethnicity became extremely important. Those men that were placed in concentration camps in Northern Bosnia were there because they were not Serb, those in the camps in Herzegovina were there because they were not Croat. For those that were detained, this was very difficult to understand. Firstly, they had not been aware of the animosity between the groups that was so evident in the camps. Secondly, it meant that everything that they thought they knew about their life was suddenly proved wrong. Those that they thought were neighbours were suddenly the enemy, and those that had been friends now sought to kill them. Finally, it represented the first of many processes which imposed an identity on them, and took control over their lives away from the individuals.

Those inside the camps were there either because they were arrested, or had surrendered to superior firepower. They were predominantly Muslim, and had been imprisoned
because of this. However, they themselves had not placed great importance on their religion, they did not have a strong ethnic identity, and they cannot be considered as having any collective project in the country of origin. In addition, policy in the camps run by both Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats was to kill those that were considered leaders. These two facts combined to affect the situation of the refugees later on in the country of exile.

When the existence of the camps became known and Bosnian Serbs were forced to release the detainees, some of the men were taken to Croatia for safety. This was not a matter of choice but of expediency, since they had to go to a place of safety and one of the conditions for their release was that they did not go to combat zones. Once in Croatia, many found that it was impossible to return to their home, as policies of ethnic cleansing meant that it was not safe to do so. As a result, UNHCR urged governments throughout the world to take in some of these refugees, as the government in Croatia was unwilling to support them all.

As discussed in chapter six, the ex-detainees found that the process of selecting which country to travel to was not a matter of expressing a choice. Instead, they could express a choice but they were offered what was available. None of the refugees that I interviewed had said that Britain was their first choice of destination. In fact, most would have preferred to go to Germany or Austria, where they had some relatives or friends already. Those that came to Britain on the programme reported that they came either because it was a choice of going to Britain or an uncertain existence in a refugee camp in Croatia, or they had a choice but it was between Britain and a country that was so far away they thought that they would never be able to return. Thus control over the choice of country
of exile was taken away from the refugees and instead was in the hands of refugee assistance organisations.

Once selected as a member of Britain's quota of refugees, transport was arranged and the refugees were brought to Britain. The organisation of the programme is described and the Project is analysed in chapter five. The organisation of the programme represents an evolution in policy, since it was based upon earlier programmes, but contained new aspects. These new aspects such as the use of cluster areas and mid term support were introduced in part because of a recognition of the failings of earlier programmes. However, there were several criticisms that could be made of the way that the programme was implemented, and its effect on the refugees. The refugees had little choice over which country they travelled to, and were unable to travel to those countries where there were pre-war Bosnian populations and pre-existing links. The programme that accommodated them was formulated at a time when official attitudes towards refugees were being questioned, and this resulted in the programme being formulated with temporary protection at its core. This temporary status affected both the refugees and the organisation of the programme.

The programme was formulated as an emergency response to a temporary situation, and the way the programme was funded reflected this. Funding was constantly being renegotiated in the early stages, and this made it difficult for the agencies involved to formulate long-term plans. However, their experience with work among other refugees should have led to the introduction of working practices which benefited the refugees in the long term. Instead, the way the programme was implemented in both the reception centres and in the mid term stage created dependency among the refugees. This
dependency meant that the individuals were not equipped with the necessary skills for independent living, and instead remained dependent on the Bosnia Project staff.

The way that the programme was operated left very little space for the opinions of the refugees to be heard or recognised. In some cases this led to frustration and anger, in others the response was more passive, but the effect was to remove control from the refugees and place the direction of their lives in the hands of others. The organisation of the programme and the way it was implemented prevented the refugees from developing a collective project in exile. However, it also prevented the formulation of new individual positive projects, because of the uncertainty of the situation for the refugees.

The use of cluster areas in the housing of refugees was a new initiative, and the agencies involved consider the policy to have been a success because there has been little secondary migration. However, as shown in chapter six, the reasons for the lack of secondary migration are more complicated than this. In fact, the refugees see little reason to move, not because they are happy with where they are, but because they are not yet settled in Britain, and they see little reason to relocate within Britain if they are likely to return to Bosnia shortly.

Chapter six also shows that for the individual refugees, the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and its aftermath dominate their lives. They often consider it the most important aspect of their lives, although the experiences are very painful to recall. This has implications for research, since many refuse to participate in research as they assume that researchers will be interested in this aspect of their lives. When individuals do talk of their war experiences, they seem to have found the reasons for the war almost impossible to comprehend. They continually assert that ethnicity was unimportant before the war, and
even that they were often unaware of other’s ethnic groups. This may not have been strictly true, but it is important to the refugees. It illustrates the dissonance between their pre-war life and their wartime experiences, when their ethnicity suddenly became important. As shown in chapter four, Bosnian Muslims have very little history of separate identification and separate organisation. The pre-eminence of ethnicity during the war therefore is another example of control over events being taken away from the refugees. They did not choose to be separately identified, the separateness was thrust upon them. Their assertions are also another indication of the absence of a collective project in the country of origin.

The lack of control over the course of their lives, both during the war and whilst members of the programme, affected many aspects of the refugees’ lives. It meant that they had no incentive for learning English, and little motivation towards seeking employment. They were also unable to make a decision on whether to remain or whether to return. Remaining in Britain was not their choice, since it depended on the British government, and even though some have now moved from temporary protection to indefinite leave to remain, they have no guarantees that they can remain permanently. The decision to return to Bosnia-Herzegovina is not wholly theirs to make either, and depends on factors within Bosnia-Herzegovina that are beyond the refugees’ control. If they wish to return to an area where they would be part of a minority group, then their safety cannot be guaranteed. If they wish to return to an area where they would be part of a majority, they are still dependant on the population in that area accepting their return, and on the availability of housing and employment. Consequently, most have deferred making a decision on return until some point in the future. When questioned about return, most refugees replied that
they might consider in the future returning to where they were from, but expressed no
desire to return to an area of Bosnia-Herzegovina that they did not live in before,
regardless of the population in that area. This indicates that Bosnians have not yet
constructed a collective project towards their country of origin, as their loyalties and
orientation is towards pre-war family and friends, and pre-war locations, rather than to
the whole of the Bosnian state.

Chapter seven looked at the refugees as a group. Although networks developed and
socialisation takes place between members of the group, I argue that at the moment a
community cannot be said to exist. Bosnians do not seem to have recreated the networks
that they had in the country of origin, but neither have they created equivalent new
networks. Instead, they consider their pre-war relationships as of continuing importance,
and the networks and friendships that have developed in the country of exile are seen as
temporary. Despite the absence of a community, Bosnian community associations have
been formed in every area where Bosnians from the programme were housed. This
apparent contradiction can be explained by an examination of the history of the
associations. It is clear that the associations were formed as a result of interventions by
refugee assistance organisations and other organisations, rather than from the
spontaneous ideas of the refugees. It was only through the formation of associations that
Bosnian refugees could obtain any form of assistance directed towards their needs after
the Bosnia Project had closed. However, these associations continue to struggle, and I
argue that they represent an attempt to conform to expectations in order to obtain the
specific benefits that British society gives to community associations, rather than a
reflection of the Bosnian community formation. As such they are contingent
communities, dependant for their continuance on the allocation of funding and the willingness of a small number of individuals to organise and lead the association. The associations are a reflection of social policy in Britain, which fails to distinguish between refugees and labour migrants or ethnic minorities despite the differences between these groups. Assumptions of community formation among ethnic minorities and labour migrants form the basis of policy, and the same assumptions are imposed upon refugees. I show in this thesis that refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina that came to Britain as part of the programme for ex-detainees and vulnerable people represent a third group in Joly’s typology. They had no collective project in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and instead represent a diverse range of experiences and backgrounds. The uncertainty of their situation, caused by their temporary protected status, has inhibited the emergence of a new collective project and of individual life projects, and they cannot be said to be oriented towards either return to Bosnia-Herzegovina or remaining in Britain. There is no real community formation, but community associations have been formed as a direct response to social policy in Britain. However, these are contingent communities, not the expression and representation of a Bosnian community. They are a reaction to prevailing policies rather than an example of refugee initiatives. Refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina have been unable to construct a positive project in the country of exile, either towards the country of exile or towards the country of origin, because of the constraints around them. These constraints include the mode of life in pre-war Bosnia-Herzegovina, the nature of the conflict, the organisation and implementation of the programme, and the long-term policies of British society which make assumptions of community. Each of these imposed constraints on the refugees’ actions and prevented the formulation of any positive
individual or group projects. Refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina form a new category in Joly’s typology, of refugees that had no collective refugees in the country of origin, and have not formulated a collective project in the country of exile. They have not maintained a return project, and neither have they abandoned it, instead their attitude to return is uncertain and they have been unable to make a decision for themselves on whether to return or whether to remain. This uncertainty results partly from factors relating to the country of origin, but is also a reflection of policies and practices of British society.
Appendix

Interview guidelines

How is your family? Ask about relatives/ friends that I know – check in advance who they know and who they are related to.

Where did you live in Bosnia? Ask about type of house, family that were near, friends.

What job did you do?

Did you go to the mosque / church often?

Did you have friends that were not Muslim? (if not Muslim ask if friends that were not Catholic/ Orthodox)

Were you involved in any political parties / trade unions/ voluntary organisations?

Before the war started, had you travelled outside Bosnia? Outside Yugoslavia?

I would like to ask you some questions about coming to Britain. How is it that you came to Britain and not another country? How was it decided what country you should go to?

What did you know about Britain before you came?

Now you are here, do you have any family members nearby? Or friends or neighbours from before the war?

I would like to ask some questions about after you arrived in Britain. What was it like in the reception centre? (only ask if programme and went to reception centre)

How did you come to be living in this house, and in this city?

Are you happy with this house?

Once you moved to here, did you have anyone that you could go to for help or advice?

How did you find out about them?

Did you have any information on jobs or English lessons?

Do you or did you go to English lessons? What were they like?

Have you looked for work since you came? How? Are you working now?

Do you see other Bosnians at all? Where, and for what reasons?

Are you involved in the community association? Why? What do you do?

Was there anything like a community association in Bosnia?

What is your status in Britain? What does that mean?

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Are you happy with that status? Why?
I would like to ask you some questions about Bosnia now. Have you been to Bosnia for a visit? Have other people you know?
Do you think you will go back to Bosnia for good one day? Why? Should people go back?
Did you register to vote in the elections in Bosnia? Did you vote?
That is all the questions that I wanted to ask. Is there anything that you would like to ask me, or anything else you would like to talk about?
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