What works and for whom? The competing rationalities of 'BestValue'
UNSPECIFIED. (2001) What works and for whom? The competing rationalities of 'BestValue'. POLICY AND POLITICS, 29 (4). pp. 465-475. ISSN 0305-5736Full text not available from this repository.
This article argues that the UK BestValue regime is rooted in a 'rational' model of strategic planning that privileges performance management and external inspection and implicitly denigrades traditional forms of representative democracy. This poses important questions about how and by whom Best Value is to be defined. Central government has stressed the need for political leadership of and public involvement in BestValue. However, the regime suggests a managerial role for elected members that many councillors find unattractive. Current reforms also assume a much greater degree of public engagement than many authorities are achieving. As a result, key decisions about local public service provision may increasingly be driven by centrally determined priorities and the judgements of external inspectors whose local accountability is unclear and whose claim to superior technical knowledge remains unproven.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Subjects:||J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
J Political Science > JF Political institutions (General)
|Journal or Publication Title:||POLICY AND POLITICS|
|Official Date:||October 2001|
|Number of Pages:||11|
|Page Range:||pp. 465-475|
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