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Haydn’s Impropriety

Published in *Journal of Music Theory* 62, no. 1 (2018)

Haydn’s String Quartet op. 33/5 opens with a cheeky veneer of propriety, but it does not take long to realize that this is one of those off-kilter openings for which the composer is especially known (example 1). Haydn has a particular penchant for beginning with a “gesture of destabilization” (Webster 1991, 127) that seeks its resolution over the course of the movement or sometimes the entire piece, as well as for then using further destabilizing strategies to generate continued momentum towards anticipated resolution and closure. In the first movement of op. 33/5 this instability takes the form of a gambit for which Haydn has notable fondness, namely deploying a closing gesture as an opening. Ever since his early quartets opp. 9 and 17 Haydn habitually reused opening material at the close of movements: we might recall similar instances of “contextual dissonance” (Meyer 1989, 26) in the well-known finale of op. 33/2 and in the first movements of the String Quartets op. 50/1 and op. 74/1 and the Symphonies nos. 46 and 100.

Example 1. Haydn, String Quartet op. 33/5, i, (a) mm. 1–10 and (b) mm. 301–5
For Charles Rosen, though, it is op. 33/5 that embodies “the simplest, wittiest and most superficial form” of displacing a conventional gesture out of its normative context (1997, 78). In this case, a pianissimo V–I progression supporting a melodic stepwise ascent from 5 to 8 tentatively sounds as an isolated gesture in mm. 1–2 before the primary theme gets under way with greater conviction. The very same gesture is used to conclude the opening sentence where the conventional melodic ascent is exposed as a liquidation of the theme’s basic idea. Unsurprisingly, the opening gambit is also reused as the movement’s closing cadence (example 1b). That such playful strategies, where ambivalence prolongs and confounds expectation, point to the role of listener engagement is readily apparent. More careful probing of the intricate mechanisms by which such moments achieve their effect reveals how they point specifically, via the modality of listening they produce, towards both appropriation and community.

Cadential gestures make an ideal platform from which to survey the relation of Haydn’s style to questions of belonging and community. In the Schoenbergian understanding of liquidation, cadential closure represents the endpoint of a process of eliminating all characteristic features until what is left is purely conventional (Schoenberg 1967, 58). To this extent, the punctuation model underpinning the Classical style is one of traits that contributes to its communal orientation. In liquidation all traces of what makes the material belong to this particular piece, shaped by this particular subjective expressivity, dissolve into the common pool of shared expressive gestures. If characteristic material is that which has been molded by the hand of the composer—that which the composer has seized hold of, taken possession of as their own—the conventional cadence is the release of subjective control and the relinquishing of ownership. If particular material has become proper through the appropriation of basic musical materials, the cadential formula has become improper (again) through a certain divesting or dispossession. In addition to this use of proper to signify possession, property, and that which is one’s own, at the same time I allow the word to resonate with its other senses of appropriateness and propriety. As we shall see, what is most proper in one sense is rather improper in the other. The cadence (as

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rhetorical formula and syntactical closure) is arguably one of the central organizing principles in Haydn’s music and plays a significant role in determining the distinctive modes of listening the style engenders. It is highly significant that it forms a focal point for this interplay of personal and common property, a claim that I consider in greater detail in the second part of this article.

What I am suggesting for Haydn’s style more broadly is that the relation between particular subjectively-shaped material and generic convention is a musical manifestation of the dialectic of the proper and the improper (of what is my own and what is outside my possession). My argument in this article follows a trajectory from the appropriation of the proper to a pure potentiality. My guiding thread throughout is the process of liquidation, which I see as a kind of contained laboratory for the formal processes in Haydn’s music more widely. I first analyze the double movement of convention and expression through the lens of Derrida’s notion of exappropriation (signifying the coincidence of appropriation and expropriation), but I also argue that this logic is insufficient to account for the intricacies of the style. Rather, a second binary of use and material cuts across that between convention and expression so as to render unstable any straightforward division. Instead of deciding between the two, I switch focus to the relation itself between them: on the act of appropriation by which convention passes into expression and back again. In a similar move, this time in the direction of appropriation itself, form is located in the interval between material and use, as a pure potentiality for use. The next step is to examine how this potentiality is preserved rather than exhausted in actual use. Form then becomes the relation between potential and actual use. These two sides of the coin that is use come to the fore in the idea of liquidation as usure. Looking beyond Haydn, this idea is illustrated through another look at the locus classicus of the Schoenbergian sentence, the opening of Beethoven’s op.2/1.

The upshot of this is that appropriation (whether by composers, performers, or listeners) is anything but inevitable and is in fact is radically contingent and incalculable. If use is genuinely potential and not simply something waiting to happen, we might find traces of this potential not to be used that coexist with actual use, a sort of friction and counter-movement of resistance at the moment of appropriation. I argue that moments such as the end of the finale of op. 33/2 in which Haydn shows his hand and his authorial power precisely at a moment of heightened conventionality and impropriety allow us to hear the contingency of appropriation. They let us
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I hear all this condensed into the process of liquidation towards a cadence. If liquidation is a form of expropriation, the Classical cadence exemplifies how this style takes as a presupposition the idea of belonging simultaneously as membership to a community and also as ownership and appropriation. We might not often notice the hand of the composer at work in characteristic material, but liquidation towards a cadence has the effect of making the particularity of the thematic material stand out against the backdrop of convention and of thereby retrospectively foregrounding the composer’s ownership of the material. At the same time, the conventional character of the cadence is what enables the formation of a listening community: only because listeners are able to recognize the hallmarks of a closing gesture—and, moreover, only because that recognition is shared collectively—does Haydn’s provocation raise a few eyebrows.

The exappropriation of musical material

It might therefore be fruitful to analyze Haydn’s manipulation of the conventional cadential formula as what Jacques Derrida calls the movement of “exappropriation” (2002, 110–11). Derrida describes appropriation as a relation to the other that moves towards identification and assimilation, but on the condition that this desire is motivated by a recognition of the otherness of the other (an expropriation): “It is necessary that I try to make the thing mine but that it remain other enough that I have some interest in making it mine” (111). In musical terms, this is to say that every attempt to make musical material one’s own comes up against the limit of an inassimilable otherness and meets with a counter-tendency to recede into common convention. This is readily apparent in the reuse of a conventional cadential formula as an opening: it is only because it is not fully appropriated into the particularity of the individual piece but to some extent retains its exteriority, as a generic cadence in the common pool of convention, that Haydn’s mischief gains its effect.

For Derrida, sense is determined by the logic of this finite appropriation: there is a double movement in which, as I move towards trying to appropriate the other, it nonetheless remains outside. Without this expropriation at the heart of appropriation there would be no sense. If there
were a complete appropriation, there would only be coincidence and identification with no room for sense; conversely, if appropriation were completely impossible, there would be no sense but only an absolute disconnection. On the one hand, there would be no musical play of expectations, were the cadential gesture to dissolve completely into particular thematic material and no longer be recognizable as a generic cadence, for no expectation would be produced in the listener to confound. On the other hand, there would be no wry smile if the cadential formula remained a disjunct musical idea and were not in fact usable as opening thematic material.

The idea of exappropriation helps to pinpoint why there is more to this gambit than a mere use of musical convention in place of particular thematic material. It would not raise any eyebrows at all but for the fact that it misuses the closing gesture as an opening. And what of the fact that Haydn’s compositional hand seem to reveal themselves most clearly precisely at the point when the material becomes most generic? How is it that the illusion of composerly propriety coincides with the point of greatest impropriety from the standpoint of the material? Haydn’s misuse shows why a simple Adornian dialectic of convention and expression is inadequate to the intricate nuances of the style. Adorno discerns in middle-period Beethoven what appears, at first glance, to be a very similar illusion of subjective expression coinciding with conventional types as one finds in Haydn’s misappropriated cadence. As Michael Spitzer writes of the first movement of the “Tempest,”

> For all its sui generis negativity, the sonata finds its way to confirm the normative sonata schema, so that the music’s conventional surface is heard to appear from within its expressive depths. The listener colludes in Beethoven’s illusion that Classical conventions are freely invented. (Spitzer 2006, 242–44)

The exact opposite happens in the late works. Here Adorno discerns the complete evacuation of subjectivity: here convention alone without any trace of particular expression is laid bare.² Spitzer analyzes the surprising conventionality of the late style through the lens of the

² Exemplary of this stance is Adorno’s reading of the string quartet op. 127: is it “supposed to sound as if it had not been composed…Has the subject passed over into the production, so that it is eliminated as the producer? An image of autonomous motion?” (1998 [1994], 154/223).
Benjaminian category of allegory. Adorno (1984 [1963]) develops his negative dialectic of expression and convention from Walter Benjamin’s notion of Naturgeschichte, formulated in his dissertation on the Baroque Trauerspiel (1977 [1928]): historical convention is formed from the petrified layers of subjective expression (nature), while what appears to be natural and spontaneous expression is actually reified convention. If the symbol marks a moment of identity, allegory is an instance of separation in which there is not a conventional representation of expression but an expression of pure convention itself. Thus, for Adorno, allegory would be the appearance of the non-identical (particular), freed from its subsumption under the reductive violence of the concept (universal). In the case of heroic Beethoven, much as when Haydn makes proper use of the generic cadence to conclude the phrase or movement, there is a seamless fusion of expression and convention. When Haydn uses the cadence improperly, if the listener is to appreciate the humor, they necessarily hear the gesture (in part at least) as a conventional cadence. To the extent that convention detaches from expression and acquires a certain autonomy, Haydn’s misuse of the generic cadence has something in common with Beethoven’s late style. But at precisely the same moment Haydn asserts his rights over this common property. Hence, in this case, it is less that expression coincides with convention or that they are irreparably separated than that their coincidence and separation coincide, that symbol and allegory—or what I propose may be reconfigured as appropriation and expropriation—coincide.

In the negative-dialectical model, in which the non-identical appears as an excess beyond the grasp of the concept/composer, there is an apportionment between convention and expression. Convention is what remains—what is left over—beyond subjective expression, but since the two poles are dialectically mediated, this remainder is an obstacle on account of which there can be neither pure expression without convention nor absolute convention unstained by the traces of expression. Arguably a similar logic persists in Derrida’s notion of exappropriation: insofar as there can be no complete appropriation of the other, the other is expropriated precisely to the extent that it is not appropriated.3 In other words, both the negative dialectic and

3 Throughout his writings Giorgio Agamben launches a sustained critique against Derrida on this very point, showing how deconstruction does not go beyond the horizon of metaphysics but takes its logic to
deconstruction hinge upon a repeated decision between the proper and the improper. Haydn, though, seemingly contradicts Derrida’s insistence on noncoincidence at every structural level, simultaneously owning his material while at the same time insisting on its absolutely generic character. To recognize how this is not a regression into metaphysical identity requires a model different from the dialectic or even the Derridean logic of iteration and therefore requires going beyond the horizons of Spitzer’s important work.

Unlike the laying bare of conventions as the subject takes its leave in late Beethoven, Haydn’s idiosyncratic hand reveals itself to be very much at work here. A convention put to conventional use would be fairly unremarkable, but this is an instance of convention used unconventionally. In other words, Haydn’s cheeky move relies on reinscribing the division between the proper and the improper (initially conceived here as the division between expression and convention) within convention itself. It thereby distinguishes between a usage collectively recognized as belonging to the norms of the style and a usage that lies outside the community’s norms. Or, if characteristic material points to composerly appropriation, there is also a second-order appropriation at the level of use, above that at the level of material, that likewise separates the particular from the conventional. There is particular material and convention, and then there is a particular and a conventional use or appropriation of material. The trick here is deactivate dialectical and even deconstructive thinking by taking two oppositions that do not map onto one another or divide cleanly into one another, so that they produce a left-over remainder.

The effect here of impropriety, if you will, anticipates the listener because it depends upon their recognizing the possibility of a more conventional use of the cadential gesture for which Haydn’s highly idiosyncratic use substitutes. Of course, the more Haydn exploits this possibility for misuse of the cadential gesture, the more he redraws the boundary so that these misuses themselves become conventional, rather than particular, for his own style. The point is that there are two distinctions here—between material and use and between convention and expression—

an extreme limit. Alexander García Düttmann (2001) gives a razor-sharp analysis of what is at stake between the two thinkers that also helps to model the form of relationality found in the listening practices engendered by Haydn’s style.
that cut across one another so that there is no straightforward alignment or apportionment of propriety and impropriety. Propriety, in other words, can sometimes be proper and sometimes improper. At the same time, this music provokes a smile because Haydn can sometimes be very proper in his impropriety.

**A theory of form between material and use**

My distinction between use and material adds a rider to the traditional one music theory makes between form and content. To some extent it echoes William Caplin’s insistence that cadential function be distinguished from cadential content: the presence of certain melodic, harmonic, or rhythmic gestures does not necessarily signal the cadential function of ending a formal unit (2004, 81–85). James Hepokoski and Warren Darcy find Caplin too ready to dismiss the cadential status of gestures such as the opening of op. 33/5, arguing that their effect depends precisely upon their being recognized as “cadences” (2006, 66–67n5). Their position turns out to be closer to Caplin’s than they admit, however, in that they argue for hearing this moment as “an isolated two-chord cadential formula presented starkly as a ‘bare fact,’ shorn of its normative functional role.” Both positions are helpful in identifying how formal function fits into the logic of belonging as it manifests itself in the relation between use and material. Caplin’s model has the virtue of highlighting the possible noncoincidence of content and form (something that is arguably a premise of the Classical style), while Hepokoski and Darcy provide the essential rejoinder that, even when there is seemingly pure content without function, examples such as the opening of op. 33/5 require that we infer the potentiality for functional closure even without its actualization. Following Giorgio Agamben’s analysis of potentiality (1998)—and noting Hepokoski and Darcy’s use of “bare fact” which fortuitously echoes Agamben’s notion of “bare life”—I conceptualize this as a cadence in the form of its suspension.

The possibility of separating form and content in the Classical style is often seen as a manifestation of the Adornian dialectic of generic convention and particular expression, but the

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4 For a discussion of the importance of the form-content dialectic for analyzing the Classical style, see Chua 1998.
appearance in this and countless other examples from the period of a formal potentiality apart from its actualization suggests an alternative configuration of form’s relation to the dialectic of convention and subjective expression. I do not suggest that the Classical style is unique in this, only that it exemplifies and exposes this logic with particular acuity. According to this reconfiguration, form would be neither conventional nor on the side of particularity but is what remains when one is divided from the other. It is impossible to divide convention and expression cleanly without remainder because the division of use and material sits perpendicular to and thus cuts across the first. This is why, one may find, as in op. 33/5, a cadential formula that is conventional by the criterion of material but idiosyncratic in its use. Moreover, convention does not crystallize in a static form within material but becomes conventional precisely through its use, by being recognized as such.

Hence there can be no straightforward division of “inner” and “outer” form, nor their synthesis in thematic development as Mark Evan Bonds proposes (1991, 203). What instead emerges from the debate of Caplin versus Hepokoski and Darcy is a conception of formal function as a pure potential for use that accompanies musical materials even in the absence of their actual use. If form is neither conventional nor subjective, it is because it is the very relation between material and use: it is the potential inherent on both sides for one to move towards the other. Form, conceived as the latent potential for use within material, is that on account of which composerly expression and convention never coincide absolutely, but also, more significantly, form is what prevents each from coinciding with itself. Composerly expression cannot coincide with itself as pure self-possession because it contains within itself the potential to give form to that which is outside itself. Likewise, material is not simply given but has the potential to take form in the hands of composers, performers, and listeners.

One consequence of this constitutive noncoincidence is that the potential inherent in material is not exhausted in its actual use. In this way, I am arguing for the plasticity of musical material. The signature concept of Catherine Malabou (2010), plasticity denotes a capacity both to receive form (think of shaping clay) and to give form (as in plastic surgery). More than this binary, though, plasticity also has the sense, if one thinks of plastic explosives, of destroying form. Intuitively, music analysts recognize plasticity in its first two senses. Take, for example, the first
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movement of op. 74/1. The $\hat{7} - \hat{8}$ dyad atop the opening V–I progression is merely generic raw material yet to be sculpted into any particular formal function (example 2). The cadential function of mm. 1–2 is still relatively undetermined and, in fact, is not explicitly actualized in the same way as in op. 33/5. Here the opening gesture is much less characteristic, displaying not even the minimal molding of the composerly hand. As bare, unformed material the $\hat{7} - \hat{8}$ motion easily dissolves into the textures without being marked. It gets tucked into the inner voices in the cadences in m. 10 and mm. 17–18. The B and C rise to the surface at the end of both halves, at the end of the exposition to become $\hat{4} - \hat{3}$ in V and then back to $\hat{7} - \hat{8}$ in the tonic at the end of the movement. In the cadences the dyad, having become thematic, returns as the conventional residue of liquidation. Ready to receive the imprint of other formal functions, it is once more freed up for other adventures. First, it dissolves into the stepwise rising contour of the theme. Then, it crops up in different melodic figurations and slips into other voices, revealing itself, for example, as counterpoint to the opening measure of the theme in the second group (m. 31).

Example 2. Haydn, String Quartet op. 74/1, i, mm. 1–10
The raw material is formed into thematic material. At the same time, though, the dyad seems to be what gives form to the movement, through a series of mutations designed to develop thematic and harmonic form. This is most noticeable in the way that the B–C pair assumes different formal functions as it morphs from $\hat{8}−\hat{7}$ in the tonic, $\hat{4}−\hat{3}$ in V, to $\hat{3}−\hat{2}$ in vi and even enharmonically respelled as $\flat\hat{6}−\hat{5}$ in $\flat$III. In other words, the dyad appears to generate the harmonic trajectory of the movement. Without completely determining it, it gives rise to a series of formal possibilities. However, in order to expand the movement, the dyad must move along the continuum from particular in the direction of the conventional so as to open up the possibility for uses beyond its immediate context. The tonic-dominant inversion derives from a common paradigm of functional flipping I discuss later, while the reinterpretation in A minor in the development (mm. 71 onwards) hinges on hearing the German augmented sixth as $V^7/vi$. Precisely insofar as it is appropriated to conventional harmonic gambits does the dyad create form. At the same time, this becoming-conventional releases the dyad from its local thematic determination (as particular to this movement) and shows it to be pregnant with possibilities for transformation beyond those actually explored. Another way of putting this is to say that use emerges from the simultaneous potential for particular material to mutate into conventions and for conventional material to be sculpted into particular expression. Material’s appropriability in use inheres in its plasticity.

Haydn demonstrates, though, that particular expression can transform itself beyond the limits of the conventional. It can pass through conventionality and return to a certain singularity, albeit one that is decidedly not proper to the context. The $\flat\hat{6}$ in op. 74/1 undergoes a further adventure. The first hint of this possibility is the Eb-major episode into which the development rapidly sinks, $\hat{2}$ reinterpreted as the 7th above the dominant in Eb. In this context $\hat{5}→\hat{6}$ in $\flat$III emerges only briefly in chromatic melodic ascents, but the memory of this moment is not lost and the C# returns to precipitate a sudden and last-minute disruption within C-space in the recapitulation (example 3). This time it forms the pre-dominant $vii^9/V$ in $\flat$VI. The movement

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5 I use here the terminology developed by James Hepokoski and Warren Darcy in their work on sonata theory. Without space to get into the finer details of their theory, we may note here that they divide a
from B (C♭) to C, which had been an index of tonal closure, now blows open a hole in the form. More than just a passive recipient of composerly form or even a pregnant host of formal possibilities waiting to be realized in use, musical material harbors within itself the capacity to destroy form. A certain mode of analysis might reduce this late detour to a resolution of unfinished business from an earlier structural dissonance, but even as if it does this, it is important not to ignore the impulse here for material to exceed formal control. This goes beyond Hepokoski and Darcy’s notion of deformation that leaves material subordinated both to composerly appropriation and to the formal convention negated. As material mutates in its plasticity from one formal actualization to another, it attests not only to material’s regenerative possibilities but also to its capacity to undo, dissolve, or even explode its own formal potentialities.

Example 3. Haydn, String Quartet op. 74/1, i, mm. 128–32

sonata exposition into three zones: (1) the primary zone (P-space) consists in the exposition of material in the tonic until the onset of the transition and roughly maps onto what we might also call the first group; (2) the secondary zone (S-space) is often more multi-modular and commences after a mid-exposition cadence with the presentation of material in the dominant or other non-tonic key; (3) C-space refines the definition of codetta and designates all the material that takes place in the second half of the exposition after the attainment of a perfect authentic cadence (PAC) in the new key, a moment that is labeled as the essential exposition closure (EEC) or essential structural closure (ESC) for the corresponding moment in the recapitulation.
The first movement of op. 74/1 might instructively be compared with that of op. 54/2, another C-major movement that plays with $b\hat{6}$ as chromatic upper-neighbor to $\hat{5}$ and its displacement by A minor. The disruptive potential comes to the fore much earlier in op. 54/2. This movement presents $b\hat{6}$ as a disruptive potential that must be exorcised before the movement can close (example 4). After an opening period of two six-measure sentences (each ending tantalizingly in a measure of general pause), a brick of $A\flat$ major is thrown in m. 13. While op. 74/1 gradually excavates the explosive potential of its generic thematic material (the $\hat{5}\to\hat{6}$ relation is buried in the half-step in m. 1–2), op. 54/2 works in the opposite direction, attempting to harness its destructive energy for more constructive purposes. This chiefly takes place through what might loosely be described as larger-scale liquidation. The particularity of the $A\flat$-major intrusion is quickly whittled down to its generic place in the hierarchy of the scale. At the first statement of the I:PAC in mm. 24–5, the disruptive potential of $b\hat{6}$ is subordinated to the cadential logic: reinterpreted as an upper chromatic neighbor to the G, the unstable $A\flat$ now supports a German augmented sixth and thereby finds its proper place fulfilling the pre-dominant function for the tonic’s cadential articulation. Too much particularity stills remains, however, so the second statement of the cadence replaces the augmented sixth with a $V_4$ chord, supplanting the $A\flat$ with an $A\natural$. The onset of the real transition in A minor immediately following this cadence confirms $A\flat$’s status as a chromatic substitution. The tension between $A\flat$ and $A\natural$ is played out throughout the movement, toying, as in op. 74/1, with the enharmonic reinterpretation of $A\flat=G\natural$ as $\hat{7}$ of vi.
Example 4. Haydn, String Quartet op. 54/2, i, mm. 1–29
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Op. 54/2 also has a last-minute resurgence of Ab (example 5), but this time it comes earlier as an interpolation to defer the ESC. The hugely expanded cadence at the moment shows that there has still not been enough liquidation to erase fully every trace of excessive improper propriety—improper insofar as Ab is an intrusion but proper in that it is particular to this movement. Locally, b♭ is resolved in the same way in both movements, but the different structural placement is important. In op. 54/2, the material’s explosive potential is an external other to be assimilated or purified for form to actualize itself. In op. 74/1, by contrast, the material’s plasticity is left over after the harmonic completion of the form as an inappropriable residue. On the first model, form is the encounter with alterity, but form can only perfect itself once material coincides absolutely with its use, its other latent possibilities set aside. On the second, form is always incomplete because an improper plasticity survives any actual use.

Example 5. Haydn, String Quartet op. 54/2, i, mm. 184–93

Form, I have suggested, emerges in the interval between material and its appropriation. Seen as plastic, though, musical material is always undergoing a process of metamorphosis. There is no stable pre-given distinction between raw convention and particular appropriation, nor even
a sliding scale that apportions between conventional and unconventional use. This is because, as we have seen, neither is a self-same category. This idea can be probed further. From the perspective of deconstruction, material is itself not self-identical but always already anticipates appropriations in excess of any proper usage. From the other side, appropriations are necessarily exappropriations and hence cannot fully incorporate the material. Even once Haydn is already underway in realizing the potential uses of the material, the possibility for other appropriations is never entirely exhausted in them but remains latent within. It is as though Haydn’s hand were always still on the point of seizing the material even as he seemingly has it in his grasp. In its inexhaustible potential for other uses material holds out against complete incorporation.

Malabou reverses—or we might even say, explodes—Derrida: plasticity, she insists, comes before deconstruction. For Derrida, nothing is self-identical because it is always already opening onto its outside. There is, before anything else, this constitutive relation to alterity. By contrast, from Malabou’s standpoint, musical material is open to use precisely because it originally differs from itself, because it has, before any relation to the other, the capacity to be other than itself. There is first before deconstruction an interior capacity for transformation. Malabou thus insists, against what she views as a transcendent alterity in Derrida, upon the immanence of change. What I propose is to allow deconstruction to transform itself under the explosive influence of Malabou, to discern, in other words, deconstruction’s own plasticity. This means thinking use both inside and outside. Form, on this model, is the use of material, objective and subjective genitives: on the one hand, a use to which musical material is put, is exposed, what happens to it, and, on the other, the use that musical material itself anticipates, constitutes, the use that material contains and evolves within itself as a concept and a possibility of expression.6 Form, then, is the articulation between the use of material as an object (its actuality) and use’s latency in material (both its potentiality and its impotentiality), tracing the boundaries between destruction and creation. So, it is to this double notion of use that we now turn.

6 On the double sense of this genitive of l’usure, see Szendy 2014, 136–7.
Liquidation as usure

It is no coincidence that what I am reconfiguring as a resistance to appropriation—to the synoptic and integrating aspects of its form and process—has for late eighteenth-century repertoires typically been figured as the recuperation of materiality. Think, for example, of Emily Dolan’s (2013) turn to orchestral timbre, Michael Spitzer’s (2004) theory of the metaphorical second glance, or of Adorno’s rescue of the sonorous particular from the concept’s totalizing domination. Particularly relevant to the issues at stake in this article is Spitzer’s compelling notion that the Classical style is capable of forming “functional flips” when material shifts from operating transparently (that is, undetected) as a cognitive cue to appearing nearer the foreground of perception as thematic substance. Spitzer thereby analyzes the movement from conventionality towards particularity.

The opening of Mozart’s Piano Sonata K. 283 exemplifies this tendency (Spitzer 2008, 193–94). The theme is constructed around what Robert Gjerdingen (1988) calls a “1 – 7… 4 – 3” schema: two semitonal dyads punctuate each two-measure unit of the presentation phrase. At this point the dyads recede into the normative operation of the style, but in the continuation phrase the dyads are reinterpreted thematically as pianti figures. In a reversal of the usual notion of liquidation as “the systematic elimination of characteristic motives” (Caplin 1998, 11), the process of what Spitzer calls “thematic liquidation” here realizes the potential of conventional material for particular local use as the dyads undergo a functional inversion from punctuating phrase-ending (Einschnitt) into thematic motive (example 6). Following the hierarchical construction of the Classical style’s periodicity, Spitzer projects this local shift onto the level of larger-scale form so that the move from transparent convention to marked thematic material takes place across the entire exposition. There is a negotiation between parataxis and synchrony laid out across the form such that the two halves of a Mozartian sonata exposition manifest these two aspects of the classical rhythmic-punctuation model: while P-material derives from phrase-endings, S-space proceeds from thematic material and builds additively. Spitzer translates this shift from Einschnitt to motive into the Adornian dialectic of convention and expression. The second group rescues the

7 Adorno 1982 gives a succinct account of his recuperation of the Kantian thing-in-itself.
material of the first by freeing it from the oblivion of conventional syntactical usage and allowing it to be perceived in its materiality. I suggest that Mozart’s progression from generalized convention to particular local usage in this way enacts a process of actualization.

Example 7. Beethoven, Piano Sonata op. 2/1, i, mm. 1–8

Haydn’s experiments with form foreground the exappropriative character of his style. At the same time, this exappropriation is not entirely reducible to Haydn’s particular use of material. Rather, Haydn’s improprieties reveal how the material is itself resistant to complete appropriation. Exappropriation lies in the interval between Haydn’s idiosyncrasies and the raw materials of late eighteenth-century style, upon which his contemporaries also drew: specifically, in the cadence and its emergence from a process of liquidation. Insofar as late eighteenth-century instrumental repertoires build upon a punctuation model of hierarchically organized cadential articulations, they make exappropriation available as a central organizing principle. Cadences provide a particularly acute way of examining stylistic impropriety because, as Agawu (1987, 4) and others have observed, the experience of closure is strongly shaped by generic conventions.

There has been much talk, though, of weaning the Classical style off the fixation with endings, especially in the form of cadences. Caplin’s work has been seen as a much-needed corrective to this focus, in particular the enshrining of teleology in sonata theory. There is a persuasive argument to be made that Caplin is the thinker of beginnings and potentiality against
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Hepokoski and Darcy’s privileging of forms, endings, and actuality. This is, however, an overdrawn opposition—one, I suggest, that Haydn deconstructs. What I argue is that Haydn’s (mis)use of cadential conventions and liquidations deconstructs the oppositions by which the Classical style has been theorized: beginning/ending, theme/cadence, expansion/punctuation. Haydn’s radical move is to deconstruct teleology and totality precisely where it is most expected: the cadence is not the index of complete actualization but is pregnant with potentiality.

Cadential liquidation is a laboratory for deconstructing above all the oppositions material/use and convention/particular by showing that they do not map onto one another. Take the classic example of liquidation towards a cadence in the sentence that opens Beethoven’s op. 2/1 (example 7). This much-analyzed little phrase is traversed both by the movement towards convention in its closing cadential formula and the process of deriving the arpeggiated chord in m. 7 from the opening basic idea. Beethoven’s illusion here, as elsewhere, is to make it seem as if convention derives from particular material. Spitzer (2008, 192) suggests that this is because Schoenberg’s notion of liquidation is already a twofold process of elimination and condensation of motivic material. Liquidation thus deconstructs the opposition of particularity and convention, showing that closure is a function of the relation between them: that is, of use.

\[\text{Example 7. Beethoven, Piano Sonata op. 2/1, i, mm. 1–8}\]

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8 This issue of temporality (what is really a question of modality) is very much at stake in the argument between sonata theory and form-function theory in Caplin, Hepokoski, and Webster 2009. See also Spitzer 2007 and Waltham-Smith 2017a, chapter 3 and 2018.
Other models of tonal closure have problematized the concept by highlighting forms of parametric non-congruence or that closure is an evolving process experienced in different ways at different points in time (McCreless 1991). These may show that closure is not internally consistent, but my emphasis on use is designed to show that, if closure is far from selfsame, this differentiation is inseparable from musical material’s relation to what is outside the “text,” from its communal impulse. This relation to alterity is encapsulated in the idea that material is expropriated by composers, performers, and listeners. This exceeds the standard claim that tonal closure is multi-dimensional. Rather, the focus on the relation between material and use shows why closure always already differs from itself. Closure does not coincide with itself because the plasticity of musical material, its capacity for myriad potential appropriations, is never exhausted in any actual use. Conversely, use actually restores generic material to potentiality.

Liquidation might, then, be thought of as what Derrida calls *usure* (1982). Describing the way in which philosophical concepts acquire greater currency precisely once all traces of their metaphorical use (i.e. their reference to contextual and sensuous particularity) have been erased through extensive use, Derrida brings out the double meaning of *usure* as both a wearing-out (usage) and the production of surplus value (usury). Derrida could almost be speaking of the basic idea at the beginning of op. 2/1 when he writes of “the ‘original figure’ of the coin that has been worn away (*usé*), effaced and polished in the circulation of the concept” (1982, 211). Liquidation, thought as *usure*, would have this double sense of a using up, an exhausting, of the characteristic material and a possibility of producing new sense. It is a process of abstraction through which concrete sense is lost as particular expression is washed out, faded, to the point of becoming common convention, but through which there is also an accrual of surplus possibilities.

The first sense of *usure*, as wearing out and erasure, is readily discernible in this musical process, whereby the distinctive material dissolves into a generic cadential formula. The rising arpeggio that assumes a motivic character, entirely proper to this particular piece, in the opening basic idea is now expropriated as a mere spread chord that opens up the prototypical cadential

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9 For a more thoroughgoing deconstruction of listening’s temporality, see Waltham-Smith 2017a chapter 6 and 2017b.
melodic descent. Caplin endorses Jonathan Kramer’s explanation (1982, 4) for this atrophying of proper material: “The reason for simplification and convention rather than contextual references at the end is to avoid any implications toward the piece’s future which would work against coming to a close.” What emerges from this explanation is an association between the propriety of musical material and its potential. It would seem, then, that (local) closure can come about through the (temporary) exhaustion of the material’s potentiality. The classic sentence falls back upon convention at its end once the potential of its particular material is worn out.

And yet this is only part of the story. That this liquidation is somehow also the production of a surplus potentiality is harder to recognize but becomes apparent when the appropriation of musical material is also seen as the actualization of its potential. The relation of musical convention to composerly expression can be conceived in the manner of the Saussurian relation of *langue* to *parole*, as the relation of the set of all possible utterances to actual speech. In much the same way that the act of enunciation transforms *langue* into *parole*, composerly appropriation realizes generic convention in the guise of individual expression. And just as *langue* is language in its potentiality and *parole* its actuality, convention may be thought of as music’s reservoir of potential in contrast to actual expression. The idea is that the *usure* of actual musical material frees it up for further adventures later in the movement, as in opp. 74/1 and 54/2, precisely because it shrugs off some of the burden of particularity.

Liquidation’s plasticity can be felt at the level of phrase reorganization. In op. 2/1 the liquidation process of the opening sentence later has the effect not of driving towards a cadential function but of destabilizing one. At the beginning of the development, the basic idea is extended by a measure, eclipsing any potential cadential function. The result is that what Caplin would describe as the pre-core is incomplete because it lacks a concluding function. In op. 74/1 the pressure of liquidation arguably motivates the interruptions in the recapitulation. In the consequent phrase of the opening theme the cadential function is expanded from four measures to six. The basic idea is truncated, allowing the liquidation process of the continuation-cadential function to take over most of the phrase. The first detour in the recapitulation (mm. 105ff.) is a fugato version of the consequent phrase, taking liquidation’s tendency to fragment even further. One of the functions of the A♭ sidestep within C-space is to open up space
for a final appearance of the main theme. The *forte* unison statement at m. 149 (example 8) fuses together the two liquidations from the antecedent and consequent, a possibility that is already suggested by the viola’s counterpoint in mm. 5–6. It thereby stitches together a seamless rising chromatic line leading up to the B–C dyad. At the same time, the dyad is revealed at the end of the movement as the condensation of this motivic liquidation. The opening two measures are truly the generic cadential formula, the liquidated residue that could have ended the theme.

![Example 8: Haydn, String Quartet op. 74/1, i, mm. 149–53](image)

The first movement of op. 50/1 plays with a similar possibility (example 9). It also opens with a melodic idea pregnant with the possibility of becoming a closing gesture: at the opening the fragment ends on ♯3, suggesting that we have entered *in media res*, but at the end of P-space (mm. 21–22 and 25–6) and at the end of movement, a transposition of this fragment this time it is not the cadential formula that emerges as the residue of liquidation but something even more generic. The movement begins with a pulsing tonic pedal that, at first glance, appears simply to provide a backdrop for the main action around the misuse of the closing gesture as the basic idea of the main theme. Instead, the movement gradually suggests with increasing forcefulness that the pedal is in fact the cadential residue. The closing gesture is first liquidated into a less motivically determined triplet turn figure. This in turn becomes a descending scale that leads back into the pedal in m. 12.
The onset of the recapitulation traffics in these connections. There is a fusion of retransition and reprise effects here as mm. 3–4 are expanded with a condensed repetition of the basic idea so as to return from vi to I. After a slightly varied restatement of mm. 5–12 (the primary change is the expansion of m. 11 into mm. 116–17), there is a significant ellipsis, jumping in m. 118 directly to the triplets from the second group. The passage that follows then feels like an expansion of mm. 6–8. Liquidation manifests itself in these recapitulatory diversions both as a tendency towards expansions with looser thematic construction and also with specific thematic reference. Throughout the movement we hear the triplets in turn or scale figures against the pedal in quarter notes. Only with the last statement of the thematic material in the movement’s final measures is the connection made more palpable with the appearance of the pedal now in triplets. The pedal is revealed as not simply a generic counterpoint to the improper concluding gesture but also the endpoint of the liquidation of that formula. It is as if the friction between the two were gradually eroding the traces of thematic particularity. This movement does not simply open with the movement’s cadential formula, as others do, but begins strictly with what is left over after
this convention itself has been worn away into an even more generic remnant. This barest of musical materials, a tonic pedal, is at once the movement’s creative “origin” (it is shown to be thematic) and the residue of the erosion that takes place with appropriation between material and use. It is a most improper source of inspiration.

In the liquidation process of the sentence, I suggest, there is not simply an exhaustion of potentiality but at the same time a returning to potentiality. Derrida’s pun on the French “plus de” neatly sums up this dual possibility: there is both a surplus potential and “no more” potential. This is possible because the division between convention and expression does not straightforwardly map onto that between material and use, unsettling any easy distinction between potential and actual, proper and improper. As noted above, there can be, for instance, a cadential figure whose melodic and harmonic construction is generic but which is put to a very idiosyncratic use: conventional in its material but expressive according to its use. But how to determine its propriety and impropriety? The material is uncharacteristic common property and to that extent is improper. At the level of use, on the one hand, there is a certain impropriety in deploying the material against its proper function: thwarting the potential that derives from its conventional associations, it does not actualize its potential use. On the other hand, the use is entirely proper to the extent that it betrays the appropriation of the composer who is putting it to different ends. To the fore comes the possibility of not realizing a potential within the material.

Undecidability of this kind plays out in the finale of String Quartet op. 33/2, arguably the leading case of Haydn’s wit. First, the “joke” depends upon a double entendre that in turn relies upon the recognizability of closing formulas in the Classical style. At a second level, the jest achieves its most potent effect when understood in the context of Haydn’s own personal usage of such formulas: specifically, that Haydn was especially fond of deploying a cadential formula as a movement’s opening gambit. Often these are marked as such, their incongruity and instability to be dissolved as they are integrated throughout the course of the movement; other times the process of stabilization begins from the outset with the use of a tonic pedal to undercut the gesture’s potential for closure. A rarer category is that of what Spitzer (1998, 190) calls the “bifocal cadence,” a gesture that has equal utility as opening or closing function and whose cadential character may in fact be veiled. This is the case here (example 10), where there is not
even a hint of impropriety in the opening, perfectly regular rondo theme. Upon closer inspection, however, the first two measures turn out to have a latent bifocality. The harmonic progression, I–V–I can be heard either as opening prolongation or as closing cadence, an ambivalence replicated in the melodic line that reduces to either 3–4–5 or 3–2–1.

Example 10: Haydn, String Quartet op. 33/2 “Joke,” iv, mm. 1–8

This ambivalence is matched by a destabilization of cadential force, not at the beginning of the movement as in Haydn’s more typical strategy, but at its end. The cadence drawn from the end of the theme’s initial statement in mm. 7–8 returns in reconfigured form just before the final deceptive extended pause at the end of the movement (example 10). At this point, the theme is distributed over sixteen rather than eight measures, with two-measure rests inserted after each two-measure unit. The result is to throw the cadential unit into a hypermetrically weak position that an attentive listener might detect as a subtle destabilization. Furthermore, in order to preserve the rhythmic profile of the theme’s first three units in this fragmented version, the final unit is rewritten, drawing upon the voice-leading of the Adagio’s closing cadence, to downplay the 4–3–2–1 melodic motion and to replace the root-position descending-fifths motion with a more stepwise bass. The overall effect here, then, is for the latent cadential potentiality of the
opening gesture to bubble up to the surface, just as the closing force of the theme’s original cadence is subtly dampened.

Example 10. Haydn, String Quartet op. 33/2 “Joke,” iv, mm. 152–71

On one level, the “joke” operates by contradicting two sets of expectations, one about the differentiation of opening and closing formulas and another concerning Haydn’s predilection for exploiting this very differentiation to generate a process of integration whereby the figure is reworked to perform different functions. Both depend upon a minimal disjunction between material its use. This mismatch, as we have seen, in situations where there is a detectable misuse, a notion that tends to reinforce the idea of a potential within material to be actualized in its use. But this is not an example of misuse but rather a demonstration of the capacity to realize multiple
potential uses of the same material. In this movement mm. 1–2 are capable of being used both as thematic material proper to the piece and as a conventional cadential gesture. This in itself points to the effects of prior use that permits new usages to be projected onto worn-out materials. Over the course of the movement, though, these bars, even with their repeated use with every rondo refrain, lose not so much their proper thematic character (which in fact they retain right until the very end) as their proper conventional association. Even this conventional component of propriety is worn out, which is precisely what allows the final cadence to come as a surprise. This suggests that there is not a proper use within convention simply waiting to be actualized, which is also to say not an inevitable appropriation. When the hands of Haydn-puppeteer are suddenly revealed through the confounding of expectation, what comes to the attention of the listener is the act of appropriation by which conventional material is transformed into particular use.

Furthermore, it is precisely because the Classical style is traversed by this double-movement of actualization and potentialization, of appropriation and expropriation, that it is able to show the belonging on which it is predicated. That is to say: every attempt to make musical material one’s own comes up against the limit of an inassimilable otherness and meets with a counter-tendency to recede into common convention. In such a hierarchical style, the binary operation materializes even at the local level of the phrase, which is why, at their limit, particularity and conventionality, actualization and potentialization, appropriation and expropriation—coincide. To the extent that Haydn’s music tends to dissolve particularity into convention (as opposed to Mozart’s predilection for excavating themes out of formulas), it exhibits a certain democratization of musical expression, a certain withdrawal from appropriation and ownership, and a resistance to actualization. The interplay of appropriation and expropriation is possible only because the musical material is not always-already determined by a proper use but must first be appropriated in an appropriation that, for this reason, is always incomplete, always exappropriation.

**Haydn prefers not to**

Returning to op. 33/5, this impossibility of deciding between actual and potential, appropriation and expropriation, arises at the movement’s end where there is a backward glance at the gesture’s derivation in the opening sentential liquidation. If in the “Joke” there is a surprise revelation of a
potential use always-already latent in the opening—the realization of another possibility—op. 33/5 is more radical in its refusal to privilege potential or actual over the other. Here instead in the final unison statement of the opening gesture Haydn simply prefers not to choose between opening and closing. Even as the material finally fulfills its hitherto unrealized potential for use as a closing formula the texture references a marker of openings, albeit one whose potential remains unactualized in this movement. Paradoxically, the gesture actualizes its potential for use as closure while revealing a potential for use as opening that is not actualized. There is at once an actualization of the potential to close and of the potential not to open, the actuality of use and the impotentiality of misuse. Haydn prefers neither to close nor to open, and appropriation does not quite coincide with use. Therein lies the impropriety of the proper.

10 I use “prefer not to” here in a conscious nod to Agamben’s highly idiosyncratic reading (1999) of the story of Bartleby, the scrivener who realizes the potential not to precisely in preferring not to write.
Bibliography


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