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Cooperation in public goods games predicts behaviour in incentive-matched binary dilemmas : evidence for stable pro-sociality

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Mullett, Timothy L., Brown, G. D. A. (Gordon D. A.) and McDonald, Rebecca (2020) Cooperation in public goods games predicts behaviour in incentive-matched binary dilemmas : evidence for stable pro-sociality. Economic Inquiry, 58 (1). pp. 67-85. doi:10.1111/ecin.12796

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Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12796

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Abstract

We report the results of an experiment in which subjects completed second mover public goods game tasks and second mover binary social dilemma tasks. Each task was completed under three different incentive structures which were matched across tasks. The use of non-linear incentive structures, along with a novel categorization method, allowed us to identify behavioral subtypes that cannot be distinguished using conventional linear incentive structures. We also examined how well behavior could be predicted across tasks. Subjects’ average conditional cooperation levels showed significant cross-task predictability and stability. However, almost a third of responses (28%) demonstrated unambiguous preference reversals across tasks. We argue that pro-sociality is best described as an individual-level trait, similar to risk aversion in choice under risk.

Item Type: Journal Article
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School > Behavioural Science
Faculty of Science > Psychology
Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Public goods, Game theory
Journal or Publication Title: Economic Inquiry
Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc.
ISSN: 0095-2583
Official Date: January 2020
Dates:
DateEvent
January 2020Published
25 April 2019Available
23 March 2019Accepted
Volume: 58
Number: 1
Page Range: pp. 67-85
DOI: 10.1111/ecin.12796
Status: Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Published
Publisher Statement: This is the peer reviewed version of the following article:Mullett, T. L., McDonald, R. L. and Brown, G. D. (2019), COOPERATION IN PUBLIC GOODS GAMES PREDICTS BEHAVIOR IN INCENTIVE‐MATCHED BINARY DILEMMAS: EVIDENCE FOR STABLE PROSOCIALITY. Econ Inq. which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12796 This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions.
Access rights to Published version: Restricted or Subscription Access
RIOXX Funder/Project Grant:
Project/Grant IDRIOXX Funder NameFunder ID
ES/K002201/1[ESRC] Economic and Social Research Councilhttp://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100000269
ES/N018192/1[ESRC] Economic and Social Research Councilhttp://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100000269
RP2012-V-022Leverhulme Trusthttp://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100000275
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