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Delusional beliefs and reason giving

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Bortolotti, Lisa and Broome, Matthew R.. (2008) Delusional beliefs and reason giving. Philosophical Psychology , Vol.21 (No.6). pp. 821-841. ISSN 0951-5089

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515080802516212

Abstract

Delusions are often regarded as irrational beliefs, but their irrationality is not sufficient to explain what is pathological about them. In this paper we ask whether deluded subjects have the capacity to support the content of their delusions with reasons, that is, whether they can author their delusional states. The hypothesis that delusions are characterised by a failure of authorship, which is a dimension of self knowledge, deserves to be empirically tested because (a) it has the potential to account for the distinction between endorsing a delusion and endorsing a framework belief; (b) it contributes to a philosophical analysis of the relationship between rationality and self knowledge; and (c) it informs diagnosis and therapy in clinical psychiatry. However, authorship cannot provide a demarcation criterion between delusions and other irrational belief states.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
Divisions:	Faculty of Medicine > Warwick Medical School > Mental Health and Wellbeing Faculty of Medicine > Warwick Medical School
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Delusions, Schizophrenia, Pharmacology
Journal or Publication Title:	Philosophical Psychology
Publisher:	Taylor and Francis
ISSN:	0951-5089
Date:	December 2008
Volume:	Vol.21
Number:	No.6
Page Range:	pp. 821-841
Identification Number:	10.1080/09515080802516212
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Open Access
Description:	Version accepted by publisher (post-print, after peer review, before copy-editing)
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URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/116