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Following the 2008 financial crash, voices have called governments to re-embrace industrial policy and promote industrial development. Such calls presuppose that the past decades witnessed a relative retreat of activist industrial policies. Within international political economy the latter is explained by the limits posed by the structure of global economic governance and globalisation on the state’s interventionist capacities. This article argues that these constraints have enabled states to pursue the transnational depoliticisation of industrial policy and transfer decision-making responsibilities to spheres lying beyond the governmental arena such as transnational institutions. By appealing to supranational economic rules, governments can disclose their own preferences for certain industrial policies and resist pressures to assist declining activities. To substantiate these claims the article proposes an archival investigation of the French government’s management of the steel industry between 1980 and 1984 and its support for a European Commission-led management of restructuring. The findings suggest that the pressures of the Commission played a crucial role in strengthening the government’s effort to implement socially unpopular but economically vital industrial choices.

Keywords: Depoliticisation; France; Industrial policy; Open Marxism; Transnational institutions

Introduction

After decades of laissez-faire policies and continuous deindustrialisation, industrial policy has come ‘back into fashion’ (Criscuolo et al. 2016: 1). Recent events have testified to its rising importance for advanced capitalist countries: Trump’s recent tax on steel and aluminium imports, France’s commitment since 2015 to create a ‘New Industrial France’ by supporting the development of 9 high technology
sectors (Ministère de l’Économie 2016) or even the UK’s consecutive governments’ pledge to since 2008 undertake a more engaged stance towards industrial policy (Berry 2016). Equally, on an academic level, recent years have witnessed an impressive upsurge in debates over the merits and desirability of industrial policy in modern capitalist economies (Rodrik 2009; Naudé 2010; Aghion et al. 2011; Aiginger 2014). A major development prompting the revival of industrial policy has been the 2008 financial crisis as it questioned the viability of the neoliberal model of growth based on the free working of markets and the retrenchment of state interventionism (Wade 2012; Naudé 2010: 7; Bailey, et al. 2015: 2; Coates 2015: 56). A running theme in the renewed interest over industrial policy is thus the idea that the stimulation of industry should be inscribed into a government’s core policy priorities (Rodrik 2008: 1; Naudé 2010: 23; Aghion et al. 2011: 8). The calls for a ‘new industrial policy’ recognise the necessity of the state to return to the forefront and mobilise the resources necessary to remedy industrial decline (Cohen 2006: 101-102).

Such calls presuppose that the state could comfortably assume the responsibilities for devising more activist industrial policies. For this article however, to fathom the potential return of industrial policy it is important to analyse the pressures that led to the ostensible rollback of the state’s interventionist role in the first place. Often, it is argued that since the 1980s, a neoliberal consensus has emerged which proscribed the active intervention of the state in industrial affairs (Chang 2003; Wade 2012). Consequently, industrial policy shifted from a vertical to a horizontal form, that is from a set of selective measures actively supporting ailing industries or promoting national champions to measures enabling a market-driven allocation of resources among industries (Owen 2012). In addition to the influence of neoliberal ideals, within International Political Economy (IPE), the ‘retreat from industrial policy’ (Coates 2015: 52) is conceptualised as the state’s adaptation to the post-1980s structural and institutional constraints of the international economy. IPE scholars have stressed that the spectrum of policy tools available to national policy-makers has been redefined and transformed by states’ deepening participation in supranational organisations such as the European Union (EU) (Leibfried and Pierson
This article argues that such developments have enabled states to actively pursue a strategy of transnational depoliticisation whereby the responsibility over certain aspects of industrial decision-making is delegated to spheres lying beyond the reach of national authorities and in particular transnational institutions. The appeal to the externally imposed economic rules of transnational institutions allows governments to disclose their own preferences for unpopular industrial policies and bypass political pressures to financially assist uncompetitive industries. Rather than undermining states’ industrial strategies, transnational depoliticisation allows national governments to implement industrial policies thought necessary for enhancing competitiveness while discursively using their obligations towards transnational institutions as a source of legitimation.

The article begins by tracing the ideational, structural and institutional factors advanced to explain the relative roll back of the state’s interventionism in industrial affairs. It argues that national governments often evoke these constraints on policymaking to legitimise their own policy-preferences. The next section advances an Open Marxist framework for understanding depoliticisation strategies by tracing their origins back to the capitalist form of the state and the recurrent tension between the democratic/material aspirations of society and the accumulation imperatives weighing upon the state. It is purported that transnational depoliticisation is underpinned by an endeavour to circumvent pressures to assist the survival of declining manufacturing activities while allowing the flourishing of more competitive ones.

The second half examines the role of the European Commission (EC) in the case of French steel’s restructuring in the early 1980s through an archival analysis of the Ministry of Industry’s (MoI) primary documents and correspondence with European authorities. As a prime example of a sunset industry that has been a thorn in the side of Western economies for decades, steel constitutes fertile ground to examine
the depoliticising strategies deployed by states to manage the retreat from declining activities and the promotion of expanding ones. Equally, early 1980s France constitutes a particularly useful terrain upon which to problematise the relation between state, industrial policy and transnational institutions. Despite a state-led industrial modernisation in the post-war era, the early 1980s witnessed the retrenchment of the French state’s economic activism and a waning of its dirigiste traits (Schmidt 1997; Cohen 2007). This policy break has often been attributed to a trade-off between interventionism and compliance with the constraints imposed by European institutions or the changing international economic environment (see Hall 1986; Daley 1996a; Loriaux 1999). The case study demonstrates how the ostensible retreat from state-sponsored industrial policies since the 1980s was not exclusively the result of external constraints but also a domestic policy preference aided and abetted by the EC.¹

The empirical section initially examines how in 1980 Barre’s centre-right government, after a series of restructuring efforts in response to steel’s global overproduction crisis and rising labour contestation supported an EC-led management of the crisis. The Commission’s imposition of mandatory production quotas would legally force French firms to carry out capacity reductions and ensure the sector’s rationalisation. In this vein, the government sought to increase the competitiveness of steel as well as to gain the trade unions’ tacit acceptance of rationalisation measures by displaying the limited room for manoeuvre allowed by the Commissions’ mounting pressures. As subsequently shown, these motivations still permeated Mitterrand’s Socialist government. Despite the nationalisation of steel in 1982, the Socialists reinstated the desire to transfer the responsibilities for restructuring to the Commission in order to sidestep the heavy regional and labour pressures to halt plant closures. The recourse to the EC’s disciplinary powers allowed the consecutive French governments to gain more leeway to implement their own policy-preference for an extensive downsizing of the industry.

Steel is one of many cases where widely mediatised industrial policies have been cloaked in the name of EC directives. In 1991, the EC blocked a joint attempt of the French state-owned Aérospatiale and the Italian Alena to acquire Boeing’s de Havilland aircraft division given its disturbing effects on the
balance of competition within the common market (Schmidt 1996: 229). In 2003, the Commission initially barred the state’s attempt to financially rescue train manufacturer and national champion Alstom, only to accept a diluted state aid on the condition that the company underwent a strict restructuring program (Cohen 2004: 31; Thibault 2008: 88). The recurrent appeal to the EC’s rigid competition and state aid rules have reinforced the perception that French industrial policy is subordinated to the dictates of EC competition policy (Schmidt 1996; Cohen and Lorenzi 2000; Meunier 2004).

At the same time, Europeanisation has not been merely a hindrance on French state elites’ ambitions. French governments have consistently strived to manage international economic pressures by advancing their own policy preferences at the EU level (Meunier and Gordon 2001; Clift 2006; Abdelal and Meunier 2010). Policy preferences for capital movement liberalisation or disinflation have preceded European pressures and state managers have often used EC directives to anchor the pursuit of neoliberal market reforms (Jobert and Théret 1994; Perez 1998; Thatcher 1999).

By examining the apparent demise of traditional industrial policy since the 1980s as a process of transnational depoliticisation this article seeks to contribute to the burgeoning literature on the political economy of depoliticisation (Burnham 1999, 2001; Flinders and Buller 2006; Kettell 2004, 2008; Rogers 2013; Kuzemko 2016; Copley 2017; Sutton 2017; Copley and Giraudo 2018) and enhance its comparative dimension in two ways. Firstly, by exploring an area of policy-making that has only seldom been examined (Buller and Flinders 2005; Fawcet and Wood 2017). Secondly, by analysing the peculiar trajectories of depoliticisation in a state characterised by the traditionally dirigiste and politicised forms of economic management. Indeed, the literature is, with a few exceptions (Dönmez and Zemandr 2018; Dönmez 2019), largely Anglo-Saxon-centric and focuses mainly on depoliticisation strategies pursued in Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) (see Hall and Soskice 2001; Hancké, Rhodes and Thatcher 2007). Unlike in LMEs where the state had a traditionally arm’s length control over industrial financing, inter-firm competition or labour relations, in dirigiste France the state was pivotal in coordinating them
In fact, given this dirigiste heritage and the enduring expectations for state intervention (Clift 2012), the depoliticised rollback of industrial interventionism has been accompanied by massive increases in social spending to compensate the state’s withdrawal of support for lame duck industries and quell the labour market crisis that followed it (Levy 2008; Vail 2010).

On a broader level the article’s findings are salient for the IPE of global governance (Pierre, 2000; Hall and Biersteker 2002; Kahler and Lake 2003; Baker et al. 2005; Koenig-Archibugi and Zurn 2006). As Hall and Biersteker (2002: 7-8) argue, the transference of governing competences to international non-state spheres raises the issue of ‘state complicity’ and its willingness to resist or authorise such delegation processes. Within this line of questioning, the article’s findings elicit an understanding of transnational institutions, not as institutional ‘Leviathans’ (Brent 1995; Howarth and Loedel 2005) contravening national governments’ economic objectives, but as institutions working in complementarity with nation-states in the latter’s effort to reproduce effective conditions for capital accumulation while sidestepping the political obstacles undermining it.

**The retreat of industrial policy?**

According to existing narratives of the evolution of industrial policy, from post-war reconstruction until the 1970s industrial policy was commonplace and governments undertook an active role in selectively promoting the development of targeted firms and sectors. Using such means as import tariffs and quotas, financial incentives or nationalisations states sought to protect infant industries and develop high tech sectors (Pitelis 2006: 441; Hannon et al. 2011: 3696; Owen 2012: 5). During this era, the French dirigiste state was the archetypal adherent to this pattern of intervention. Its discretion over financial resources, allowed it to selectively allocate credit to the benefit of national champions and influence both public and private firms’ investment decisions in accordance with its own modernising objectives (Zysman 1983: Ch.3; Clift 2003: 174; Vail 2018: 71). The neoliberal turn that swept economic policy-making in the 1980s however put a halt to state-led industrial strategies (Bianchi and Labory 2006: 16; Cowling
and Tomlinson 2011: 834). In France and elsewhere, governments abstained from direct involvement in industrial affairs and restricted their actions to creating an optimum regulatory framework for the enhancement of all firms’ competitiveness in a ‘horizontal’, non-discriminatory, way (Owen 2012: 3; Warwick 2013: 19; Craig 2015: 112). Privatisation, deregulation and the accentuation of trade liberalisation allowed market competition, rather than government initiative, to determine industrial development (Ulltveit-Moe 2008: 13; Pryce 2012: 14). In the EU, the 1986 Single European Act and later the 1992 Maastricht Treaty consolidated the horizontal approach to industrial policy as the across-the-board removal of internal trade barriers became the key driver of European firms’ competitiveness (Bianchi and Labory 2006: 11; Stöllinger, et al. 2013: 23).

On an ideational level, the switch from ‘discretionary’ to ‘non-discretionary industrial policies’ (Craig 2015) is attributed to the dominance of neoliberal laissez-faire ideals and the intellectual influence of neoclassical economics (Arestis and Sawyer 2005; Pitelis 2007: 370; Salazar-Xirinachs et al. 2014). Put simply, the neoclassical argument purported that the state lacked the adequate knowledge and information to single out the sectors worthy of support and therefore its selective interventions hindered the efficient distribution of resources unlike the market’s price mechanism (Cowling et al. 1999: 18; Deraniyagala 2001: 81). Government interventions were solely to address identifiable market failures where the free operation of the market failed to match supply and demand, such as in the case of public goods like infrastructure or education (Naudé 2010: 11; Pryce 2012: 14; Craig 2015: 112). In addition, the targeted aid to specific industries permitted the proliferation of counter-market logics and encouraged rent-seeking behaviours on the part of firms (Burton 1983:56; Shapiro 2007: 6). Critiques raised against activist industrial policy also argued that selective government interventions, and those specifically aimed at lame duck industries, pursued electoral objectives or sought to assuage social tensions rather than promote industrial efficiency (Burton 1983: 58-61). The existing pitfalls in industrial policies contributed to their growing unpopularity among academic and policy-making circles and provided a
compelling argument for the state’s retreat from the industrial scene (Bianchi and Labory 2006: 16; Cimoli, et al. 2009: 1).

IPE scholars have stressed that the past 40 years have also witnessed structural developments that decreased the scope for formulating autonomous national industrial policies. The rising volume and velocity of international capital mobility have imposed severe limits on the spectrum of policy options that policy makers are able to employ (inter alia Kurzer 1993; Moses 1994; Ruggie, 1994; Strange 1994; Rhodes 1996). Globalisation has entailed a restructuring of state capacities away from direct industrial intervention and towards market-enabling, or horizontal, measures aimed at strengthening international competitiveness (Cerny et al 2005; Thatcher 2014). For instance, the domination of global production networks by Multinational Companies has reduced the state’s ability to carry out independently devised industrial policies and has forced a re-orientation of policy towards creating an investment-friendly environment to attract increasingly mobile capital within its territory (Perraton et al. 1997: 273; Perraton 2000).

On the other hand, the changing landscape of international economic governance and the growing powers of supranational institutions is equally said to constrain the state’s previously held policy autonomy in economic matters (Pierson 1996; Kassim and Menon 1996; Brenner et al. 2014; Schakel et al 2015). In fact, membership in certain supranational institutions can legally prevent the implementation of certain core components of industrial policy. The WTO’s rules on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) or Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCMs) restrict the ability of governments to distribute subsidies or impose certain criteria (e.g. local content) on foreign investment, and thus erode the industrial policy autonomy of states (Bora, et al. 2000: 557; Haque 2007: 5). Similarly, the EU’s prohibitive rules on state aids that distort competition within the single market gives the EC leverage to decline member’s states programmes of financial assistance to industry (Ulltveit-Moe 2008: 19-20; Ambroziak 2016: 95). Thus, in addition to the neoclassical turn in industrial policy thinking, the
contemporary institutional and structural framework of the global economy is also perceived to have posed significant limits on the practicality of ‘old style’ industrial policies (Clift and Woll 2012: 309).

However, in light of the resurgence of calls for greater state involvement in industrial development, it is worth asking whether there was ever indeed a ‘suspension of industrial policy’ (Mosconi 2015: 12). For instance, since the 1980s despite the free market rhetoric of the US and UK successive governments, both countries, by selectively channelling funds into R&D that benefits high-tech sectors, continued to implement selective industrial policies albeit in a concealed manner (Block 2008; Mazucatto 2013; Wade 2014; Coates 2015: 54-55). Moreover, Rodrik (2008: 2) argues ‘most governments do carry out various forms of industrial policy already, even if they call it by other names (“export facilitation,” “promotion of foreign investment,” “free-trade zones”…’). Thus, states have not been completely deprived of all their industrial policy tools. In fact, the external constraints that tie state managers’ hands (e.g. EU state aid rules, TRIMS, globalisation) have given states additional incentives to abandon industrially debilitating policies to the benefit of competitiveness-inducing ones.

In the process, it allowed states to delegate the responsibility for certain socially contested industrial measures outside the state sphere proper. Indeed, political discourses appealing to the constraining character of globalised markets or the necessity to conform to the rules of supranational institutions like the EU can be utilised by political elites as compelling justifications for the implementation of contingent policy preferences (Kallestrup 2002; Watson and Hay 2003). As explored below, the transnational depoliticisation of industrial policy helps states to both achieve industrial competitiveness objectives and circumvent domestic political pressures for the protection of unviable sectors.

**The transnational depoliticisation of industrial policy-making**

Depoliticisation, is here understood as the process whereby the political content of policy-making is outsourced/transferred to spheres extending beyond the governmental one (Burnham 2001). To understand policymakers’ inclination to depoliticise certain features of policy-making this article situates
itself within the Open Marxist tradition that views the state as an institutional form assumed by capitalist social relations (Holloway and Picciotto 1978; Clarke 1991; Bonefeld 1993; Burnham 1994). As such, the state reproduces the social relation based on the formally free and contractual exchange of commodities while at the same time reinstating the separation of labour from the means of production (Bonefeld 1992: 116; Holloway 1996: 121). Put otherwise, the state reproduces the conditions for capital accumulation while simultaneously demonstrating the neutrality of its rule (Gerstenberger 1991: 156). Rather than succumbing to the pressures and influence of society’s fragmented interests, the state must appear to pursue the general interest under the impartial confines of the rule of law. By doing so it de facto depoliticises capitalist exchange relations as their class character is obfuscated beneath the formal equality and economic freedom granted to all citizens (Bonefeld 2014: 176; Burnham 2014: 191). As succinctly put by Offe (1975: 127): ‘the state can only function as a capitalist state by appealing to symbols and sources of support that conceal its nature as a capitalist state’. Thus, a peculiar tension runs within liberal democratic states between conducting policies favouring the effective reproduction of capital and meeting the democratic and material aspirations of civil society within the confines of profitable accumulation (Clarke 1988: 135-136). To alleviate this tension, the state is inclined to reproduce and reinstate the depoliticised character of exchange relations to shield itself from the influence of ‘politicised social interests’ (Bonefeld 2017: 60).

Depoliticisation, as a governmental strategy is the concrete expression of the state’s struggle to maintain a capitalist order and gain governing autonomy from ‘politicised’ groups. On the one hand, nation-states must guarantee their territory’s competitive presence within the international market. Domestic conditions of valorisation are constantly commensurated to those of competing states through exchange in the world market and state managers strive to ensure that the profit yielded domestically matches or supersedes that of their competitors (Holloway 1994: 127; Bonefeld 2006: 51). In addition to securing its strictly speaking economic reproduction, the state must also endeavour to insure its political survival. In other words, when formulating industrial strategies state managers not only have to consider the
compelling forces of the world market but also respond to the domestic expectations of the demos. The
twin pressures of ‘accumulation and legitimation imperatives’ can entice governments to depoliticise
certain areas of decision-making as the improvement of accumulation might clash with the interests of
segments of civil society (Rogers 2013). By doing so state managers strive to circumvent domestic
pressures (from both workers’ groups and disadvantaged sectors/firms) while safeguarding their
Depoliticising policy devices, rather than weakening the state, permit state managers to, in fact, gain
newfound leeway to implement certain unpopular policy-preferences (Rogers 2013: 7; Burnham 2014:
195).

Policy-makers have an array of depoliticising strategies at their disposal such as preference-shaping (i.e.
invoking discourses aiming to persuade the polity that certain issues lie beyond governmental control),
rule-based (i.e. inscribing definite rules into the policy-making process such as inflation targets) and
institutional (i.e. delegating responsibilities to specialised non-elected bodies) (Buller and Flinders
2005). Such strategies are not confined to the domestic level but can be exported to the international
arena giving rise to a process of ‘transnational depoliticisation’ (Chalmers 2005: 649). This process
allows the channelling of political powers over certain sensible issues to international organisations with
weak democratic and public accountability (Majone 1999: 3; Mair 2005: 4; Hay 2007: 85). Empowering
non-majoritarian institutions operating at a transnational level, such as the EC, with executive and legal
powers can allow national governments to enhance the credibility of their policy-making commitments
and their efficient implementation while simultaneously shifting the responsibility over their potentially
negative economic or social consequences away from elected authorities (Tallberg 2004: 22-24).

Transnational depoliticisation does not involve the weakening of the nation-state. Rather than merely an
external constraint impinging on member states’ policy autonomy, European level disciplinary
mechanisms and institutions (e.g. European Monetary Union, EC, European Single Market) can
effectively constitute an arena in which member states export their own policy preferences while using
it as a buffer against domestic political contestation (Masi 1996; Buller 2000; Thatcher 2004). For example, Thatcher’s (2007) examination of certain member states’ telecommunications sector in the 1990s shows that the EC’s regulatory pressures did not contradict national policy preferences. Instead, EC directives concerning the outlawing of national monopolies and liberalisation of the sector were most decisive in providing an additional source of legitimation for ongoing efforts for economic reform pursued by domestic authorities.

Moreover, the depoliticisation of certain features of decision-making is particularly tantalising for state managers in the area of industrial policy. Intense international competition and technological change gives rise to a peculiar political dilemma as high-technology sectors and traditional industries benefit from different sets of policies. Governments are torn between adjusting policy-making to the benefit of lame duck sectors and promoting the rise of high technology industries (Block 1987: 127; Gilpin 1987: 99; Moraitis 2018: 47). More concretely, workers and firms operating in declining sectors are in quest of greater import protection and sectoral state aid. On the other hand, expanding sectors might benefit from more horizontal measures such as increasing internationalisation and greater public R&D funding. Clashes between the accumulation imperatives to replace obsolete industrial activities by modern ones and the legitimation pressures to safeguard threatened jobs are at the source of the depoliticising tendencies in industrial policy-making. The appeal to supranational institutions’ ‘sector-neutral’ rules on subsidies distribution, tariff barriers and fair competition arms governments with a powerful arsenal of measures to resist the pressures of displaced workers and firms for greater protection all while demonstrating the impartiality of their policies. In this vein, governments can ground their preference for measures that involve the retreat from certain sectoral activities in a ‘supranational economic rule of law’ (Warlouzet and Witschke 2012).

The next section will concretise these claims by examining the EC’s role in the restructuring of the French steel industry between 1980 and 1984. This period witnessed an acute crisis in Western Europe’s traditional manufacturing activities alongside a growing assertiveness of the EC in monitoring member
states’ aids to domestic industry (Warlouzet 2018: 167). As such the case study will illustrate how supranational regulations can facilitate governments’ pursuit of competitiveness-inducing industrial policies and the disengagement from outmoded industrial activities.

The case of French steel

Historical background

Hayward (1986: 504) characterised post-war state-steel relations as a form of ‘public control without public ownership’ given the state’s discretion over the sector’s finances and its role in coordinating certain major investments. This ‘business-state collaboration’ (Daley 1996b: 64) allowed the industry to benefit from low-interest public loans which lowered the financial costs of investment and permitted the uninterrupted flow of money into the sector. The propitious environment created by the state-steel partnership permitted the realisation of important projects such as the creation of two modern coastal sites in Dunkirk in 1963 and in Fos in 1971. Additionally, steel underwent a state-sponsored process of industrial concentration and by 1973 total production came to be dominated by two major firms, Usinor and Sacilor (Hart 1992: 104-105).

However, in 1974 the global steel industry entered a long-lasting crisis of overproduction as production levels exceeded the market’s absorptive capacity. The geographical re-orientation of production towards Japan and other fast-industrialising countries, the secular decline of demand for steel and the general recession following the first oil shock all contributed to the sector’s growing crisis (Mény and Wright 1987: 10-11). Within a context of modest consumption growth, the growing production capacities on a world scale contributed to the decoupling of supply and demand (Hudson and Sadler 1989; Alter and Steinberg 2007). The Western steel industry became burdened with excess capacities as the failure to sell profitably in a context of declining prices led to a dramatic under-utilisation of existing plants (Mény and Wright 1987; Tsoukalis and Strauss 1987: 195). The crisis found French industry in a particularly vulnerable position. Indeed, despite the presence of certain impressive coastal plants, it suffered from a
persistent technological disadvantage to its competitors (i.e. EEC, Japan, and USA) as it was slower to adopt the more modern production techniques such as continuous casting\(^2\) (Woronoff 1998: 561). Overproduction hit French steel in the form of an increasing indebtedness as the decline of prices forbade firms from selling above production costs. As the crisis progressed in the late 1970s, the ‘strong arm of the state was needed’ urgently to remedy the sector’s heavy indebtedness (Zysman 1983: 160).

This was attested during the implementation of the 1978/1979 rescue plans through which the state accorded financial relief to firms by partially converting private debt into state-held capital in exchange for the industry’s commitments to pursue further rationalisation efforts. Restoring accumulation required a fresh industrial policy centred on the ‘selective disengagement’ from specific manufacturing activities (Moraitis 2018). Indeed, through the plans, the government sought to encourage a targeted disinvestment from the most uncompetitive steel activities while fostering production around the commercially most promising units in order to raise steel productivity and enhance its trade performance.

Restructuring was met with intense revolt in the region of Lorraine which was the most affected by job cuts, while the state was increasingly perceived as the originating source of worker’s distress and became the locus of union contention (Daley 1996b: 145). To temper workers’ hostility, the 20,000 job cuts were accompanied by the Convention Générale de Protection Sociale (CGPS), a scheme co-funded by the state and firms to facilitate job shedding by incentivising workers’ departures through early retirements, professional reconversions and high severance pays. Nevertheless, labour’s revolt signalled that deeper state involvement run the risk of increasing the politicisation of the sector’s situation and limiting the government’s much needed ‘political space for manoeuvre’ (Daley 1996b: 126). Within this context the centre-right government led by Prime Minister Barre initiated a process of transnational depoliticisation. By seeking recourse to the EC’s disciplining powers, it attempted to deflect the blow to its legitimacy and transfer the responsibilities for the ensuing plant shutdowns to a supranational institutional body.
However, the multiplicity of state and non-state actors involved in supranational decision-making processes and their divergent interests complicates such form of depoliticisation as policy outcomes might depart from the initial intents of domestic authorities (Papadopoulos 2017; Snaith 2017). Indeed, EC policy can be influenced by actors who witness significant independence from national government such as the European Roundtable of Industrialists (Van Apeldoorn 2002), interest groups and lobbies (Courty and Michel 2013) or even consultative expert groups (Robert 2010). In the case of steel policy, decision-making involved a range of actors including the Commission’s DG III directorate on industrial affairs, EUROFER, the European steel trade association, and the Consultative Committee which represented producers, labour and consumers/traders (Grunert 1987). Equally, it was marked by tense intergovernmental bargaining given the diversity in national policy priorities (Tsoukalas 1987) thereby increasing the risk of steel policy derailing from the strategic objectives of French authorities.

Although, French interests eventually played an influential role in ECSC steel policy (Dudley and Richardson 1999: 233-234), certain officials apprehended this risk and were reluctant to transfer the responsibilities of steel policy to a supranational body. Haberer, director of the Treasury, feared the Commission would approve the subsidisation of projects that the government itself did not support. In this case, the state ‘being subject to the simultaneous pressure of the industrialists and the Commission, would find it difficult to resist the temptation to aid a project.’ French authorities’ were thus concerned that the Commission could induce a milder approach to capacity reductions contrary to their initial intents. To mitigate this risk French authorities were ready to authorise the power transfer to the EC only on the condition that it installed a strict supervisory mechanism over member states’ steel subsidies ‘to control more seriously all projects of capacity extension and to practically render them financially unrealisable.’ For all its uncertainties, delegation and strict EC rules were preferable to a deeply politicised and ‘costly subsidy race’ (Warlouzet 2017).

*The road to Brussels*
Mounting social dissatisfaction at home coincided with the increasing involvement of the EC in the management of member states’ steel policy. In 1978, European Commissioner for Industrial affairs, Étienne Davignon, presented a plan to tackle the European steel crisis through a system of mandatory minimum prices for certain products or fixed orientation prices for others. In February 1980 the Commission fully took advantage of its coercive powers as it installed a code of aids which allowed it to supervise domestic subsidy programs and reject them in case they distorted competition within the common market or if the recipient firms did not engage in extensive rationalisation plans. More importantly, in October of the same year, the Commission, by appealing to Article 58 of the Paris Treaty, enacted a system of mandatory production quotas on member states’ firms. In turn, the quotas were distributed among European producers based on their average production shares between 1977 and 1980.

Through the Davignon plan the government hoped to achieve three main economic objectives. Firstly, to secure price increases large enough to guarantee the profitability of Usinor and Sacilor, secondly, to ensure France was competing on an equal footing with its common market partners by sharing the cost of capacity reductions, and finally, to alleviate the budgetary burden of steel.

As far as the first objective is concerned, the French government was aware of its industry’s competitive disadvantage to its European Economic Community (EEC) partners. By September 1980, French firms could not profitably sell their finished steel products: long products were sold below and flat products at factory cost. The system of orientation prices was considered deceptive as ‘it seemed illusory to expect producers to spontaneously respect these prices.’ Instead, the MoI argued that ‘it belongs to the Commission to employ the means for a serious control of these prices.’ Recourse to Article 58 and the official declaration of a ‘manifest crisis’ was thus for French authorities the best course of action. The imposition of mandatory production quotas would, in theory, bring about a balance in supply and demand allowing prices to rise again in European markets and enabling French firms to sell at profitable levels.
In fact, the pan-European adoption of downsizing plans was a precondition for the effective implementation of the French selective disengagement strategy as it would ensure that French producers would not suffer a disproportionate share of total European capacity reductions. In fact, the MoI’s major concern during negotiations on Article 58 was that in the absence of a generalised, Commission-imposed, discipline on the European market, the internal plan would be compromised. In other words, the success of domestic measures depended upon the implementation of homogeneous rules on capacity reductions across the EEC market. This was confirmed by the council of Usinor’s shareholders who lamented that despite the fruits borne by the 1978 Rescue plan, the latter’s results were jeopardised by the ‘fall in the selling price of steel stemming from the undisciplined competition in which certain European producers engage.’

The third, financial, objective of an EC-led adjustment was to ensure budgetary discipline at home. In fact, the call for budgetary restraint constituted the rallying point around which the French government managed to coalesce the rest of member states. Indeed, during the negotiations in Brussels, the French delegation approached other members by claiming that on this front all governments were in the same boat:

It would be illusory to believe that benefitting from the crisis certain producers could suffer less than others. From then on, at risk of seeing the governments of all member states confronted to demands for massive financial aids, a precautionary approach is needed. This is the reasons for which the Commission is duty-bound to act, and France shares its point of view on the necessity of Article 58.

Common ground with Italy and Germany, the major opposition to the application of Article 58 given its more laissez-faire approach, was also found on the necessity to reduce state subsidies to the sector. Indeed, the MoI attempted to convince its interlocutors on the necessity of further ECSC discipline by arguing that the solicitation of national governments for further industrial subsidies would continue
indefinitely as the crisis worsened and thus further expenses would be incurred on their respective budgets.12

On the level of domestic politics, the European-wide harmonisation of restructuring measures was necessary to convince labour of the inevitability of job cuts. Referring to an aid package given by the Italian government to its steel industry, Giraud, the minister of industry, in a letter to Davignon explained that

in the dramatic context that characterises once again this vital sector for the economy and for employment, public opinion would not understand that the community authorities favour through aids or other incitements the creation of new capacities while the discipline necessitated in periods of overproduction are not applied.13

Thus, the non-homogenisation of downsizing measures could domestically discredit the French plan as it would signal that drastic cuts in production capacities were not the sole alternative to the crisis. More precisely, it run the risk of showing that these measures were not exogenously imposed but constituted a conscious policy preference of French state elites. Hence, the urgent necessity for the French government to come to a rapid agreement with the European partners in order ‘to dissipate the impression of grave divergences between the member states of the Community.’14

At a time when French authorities were domestically accused by trade unions of implementing stricter plans than other European countries15 the adoption of a common set of measures at the supranational level could help the government to secure a tacit, at least, acceptance of the necessity of restructuring at home. The government could in this way circumvent pressures for further funds or trade union demands to reconsider the shutting down of plants, as popular anathema would be brought upon the Commission. As Davignon succinctly explained: with the application of article 58,
the Commission knew that it would engage its authority and that of the community. Equally it knew that, in the eyes of the public, it would bear the responsibility on a social level of the measures it advocated… It was ready to take its responsibilities…

Given the supranational quality of its authority and its lack of democratic accountability, the Commission could comfortably assume the responsibilities of the coming plant closures in contrast to national governments.

Overall, the government’s objectives to secure the profitability of French firms as well as to politically shield its commitment to production cut-downs from labour’s costly material demands to safeguard Lorraine’s outmoded capacities interweaved as grounds to engage in a process of transnational depoliticisation. Indeed, the enactment of Article 58 and the attribution of production quotas to member states gave the French state an external impetus to disengage from unproductive units in a way that concealed its own policy preferences for a drastic rationalisation of the sector. However, these measures came at high social and political cost. Socially, employment in the steel industry decreased from 183,000 at the beginning of 1977 to 110,000 in 1980 with 44% of these losses concerning Lorraine (INSEE 1983: 23). As for the political backlash, it came in the electoral confrontation of May 1981 and Mitterrand’s ascendancy to presidency.

Socialist depoliticisation

The steel crisis played a prominent role in the Socialists’ victory as their pledge to nationalise the two major steel firms allowed them to construct a rhetoric concerned with the defence of French production against the upsetting forces of the international division of labour (Smith 1990: 77-80). However, both prior to and after its so-called U-turn from a Keynesian to a neoliberal-inspired economic policy in 1983 (Clift 2002: 327), the government had formulated like its predecessor a definite preference for a targeted disengagement from steel’s unproductive units and a commitment to the strategy of transnational depoliticisation.
Once in power, the socialist government’s reading of the crisis was not dissimilar to its predecessor’s as it acknowledged that overcapacities persisted in French steel.\textsuperscript{17} There were in fact great discrepancies between on the one hand the more competitive production of flat products in the modern coastal plants of Dunkirk and Fos and the insufficiently rationalised production of long products in Lorraine.\textsuperscript{18} Thus, the socialists had to resume the previous government’s selective disengagement from the elements inhibiting French steel’s profitable operations, namely the least efficient long products facilities in continental France.

To this end, the government commissioned academic expert Pierre Judet to provide a report sketching the mid-term evolutions of the steel market. The report provided three scenarios estimating the future volume of French steel production for 1986 ranging from 19 Million tonnes (Mt) to 24Mt.\textsuperscript{19} To mitigate the unions’ hostility to capacity reductions, the government opted to retain the optimistic, 24Mt, hypothesis of Judet.\textsuperscript{20} Nevertheless, the plans presented in late March 1982 by the firms’ directing boards on the basis of Judet’s 24Mt thesis, necessitated the suppression of 12,000 jobs.

By March 1983, less than a year into the plan, the government recognised the global steel market’s incapacity to absorb France’s projected 24Mt production and the burden that the plan brought upon firms. Indeed, at the end of 1982 the respective losses of Usinor and Sacilor combined reached 19\% of their revenues and they were expected to, only, minorly decrease to 15.8\% in 1983.\textsuperscript{21} It became evident that the formulation of an umpteenth, more austere, plan amounting to up to 20,000 job cuts was unavoidable since Judet’s hypothesis was replaced by a production goal of 17.6Mt for 1983.

Arguably, the incompleteness of the 1982 plans was a consequence of the tension between the socialist government’s decision to carry out restructuring by nationalising/politicising steel and the political backlash that could now be redirected at it given its newfound responsibilities towards this industry. The tension was to be dealt once again by way of the EC. Indeed, a revision of the 1982 plans would arouse
wide social discontent, and possibly ‘engender violent reactions’, as it would intensify the austerity of the initial restructuring measures. As the director of the MoI’s cabinet, Louis Gallois explained:

We are torn between the risk of trapping ourselves in the implementation of the rationalisation plan of September 1982 which would be overtaken by the evolution of the conjuncture, and the risk of calling into question, some months after their adoption – and only to amplify them- certain decisions that were already difficultly accepted by the social partners.

There was thus a real political difficulty in revoking the 1982 plan for which the government had already laboriously obtained consent from the unions. Concurrently, the Commission and other member states would disapprove the current plans and ask for further capacity reductions. Hence, the final arbitration over the plans’ soundness was transferred to Brussels.

The Davignon plan was indeed crucial to the politically unbridled realisation of the new plans. France’s membership to the EEC was uncontested domestically seeing that none of the unions or parties envisaged a withdrawal from the common market. Consequently, the government was able to build a sort of ‘common front’ with labour’s representatives at the European level. Indeed, without contesting the EEC regime itself, the latter were urging the government to achieve a re-equilibration of quotas distribution in France’s favour in order to reduce the volume of capacity reductions and by extension total layoffs. The alignment of workers’ representatives with the French delegation allowed the state to in a sense become the ‘sovereign embodiment of the national interest’ (Bonefeld 2017: 125) without compromising its rationalisation plans.

Equally, the Davignon plan was crucial to the economic success of the new plans. As explained by the Minister of the Economy, Jacques Delors, France was actually ‘protected by the community system of quotas and orientation prices’ adding that ‘once this protection disappeared…our industry will not be able to resist its competitors if it fails to adapt and re-establish its competitiveness.’ Consequently, the Commission’s supranational authority over steel matters was not a mere external constraint on French
industrial policy-makers since modernisation and the replacement of obsolete capacities figured as a priority of French policy-makers regardless of the Commission’s directives.

Job shedding was to be accompanied by a renewal of the CGPS in order to induce a smooth reduction of the workforce. Notably, its enticing early retirement schemes offered workers aged 50 years old or more between 70 and 90 per cent of their salaries thereby increasing incentives to exit the labour force. In fact, the CGPS reflected a wider pattern of the French state’s social management of industrial restructuring as it sought to temper workers’ hostility to restructuring by offering generous welfare compensation in place of straight layoffs (Daley 1996; Levy 1999; 2008). Put schematically, generous social compensation sought to demobilise workers while the Europeanisation of steel to limit the unions’ bargaining space on industrial matters.

The case of Gandrange’s ‘Universal Train’ (UT), arguably the most significant episode of the steel crisis under the Socialists, clearly attests the smokescreen effects of the Davignon plan. As mentioned earlier, French steel’s inefficiency largely stemmed from its long products sector which was responsible for 60% of the two nationalised firms’ losses. Hence, the MoI argued that within the sector’s structure certain units were maintained ‘against any industrial logic’ and the investments planned in 1982 had an ‘essentially symbolic dimension.’ Certain of Lorraine’s long product activities were maintained out of the political necessity to safeguard the steel vocation of a region heavily depended upon iron ore extraction and casting and whose decline bred the danger of an imminent ‘social implosion.’ However, in its orientations for the new plans, the MoI aimed at breaking with this conservatism as it called for a complete substitution of steel production relying on Lorraine’s iron ore and cast iron by electric steelmaking processes relying on steel scrap.

However, the governmental blueprint clashed with the industrial proposal already made by Sacilor in 1982. Sacilor had proposed the construction of a universal rolling mill at the site of Gandrange which would produce the majority of France’s long products by fusing the long product activities of nearby
cities. The UT project - which was approved in 1982 by then Minister Chevènement - had obtained the support of all metallurgical unions and local population as it gave a glimpse of hope to a region torn by deindustrialisation (Smith 1998: 102). Ambitious as it was, the project was criticised on many fronts. For instance, it increasingly took the form of a clash between Usinor and Sacilor as the former was weary of the UT’s repercussions on its own long product activities (Smith 1998: 164). Likewise, the MoI’s cabinet confidentially expressed its lack of enthusiasm for the UT as it had been judged financially unsound in the context of the new production goals set by the government. Finally, the Brussels authorities had communicated an equally reserved position as the UT was inconsistent with the volume of capacity reductions imposed on the French state. Although, the UT option was the socially more popular, it also run the risk of joining the category of ‘symbolic’ investments as it was too reliant on the casting of Lorraine’s iron ore thereby delaying the industry’s transition to the more productive electric furnaces.

For the government the main problem was thus the capacity to politically assume this choice. However, as Gallois had noted the reservations expressed in Brussels ‘could tactically speaking be used to put the Commission in a position of having to take the responsibility of questioning the investment at Gandrange.’ Indeed, confronted with the tough choice between undertaking a socially popular but industrially hazardous investment and abandoning it altogether, the Commission appeared Deus ex Machina to cut the Gordian knot. In a letter worth quoting in length, an (anonymous) member of the MoI’s cabinet dealing with the possible ways to handle the cancellation of Gandrange suggested that:

An argumentation centred on the lack of profitability of the project is not very convincing in light of the uncertainties and the social and regional stakes... I am wondering whether we could officially postpone Gandrange before we have a clear knowledge of the results of the negotiations between on the one hand the unions and the firms and on the other the negotiations between Usinor and Sacilor regarding the coordination of their long product plans. We could give solemnity to this
decision. Gandrange should progressively weaken like a bird with lead in the wing after receiving the knockdown blows of the Commission.\textsuperscript{37}

This stance allowed the government to open-mindedly keep the negotiations on Gandrange going while awaiting unfavourable feedback from Brussels. The final cancellation of the UT was announced after a ministerial council on the 29\textsuperscript{th} of March, and shortly after Mitterrand explained that the decisions taken were constrained by the obligations towards the Commission.\textsuperscript{38} Similarly, during an administrative council of Sacilor in which unions were being consulted over the council’s decisions regarding the new rationalisation plans, Pierre Gadonneix, explained that the ‘most acute problem of steel policy lies in Brussels’ and it was the Commission’s dissatisfaction with Sacilor’s overall plan for long products that had necessitated its revision\textsuperscript{39} leading to the abandonment of the UT. With the UT project being dismissed, the MoI found the breathing space to implement a more austere plan towards Lorraine’s steel.

Therefore, in 1989, a year after the European steel plan ended, French steel returned to profitability as it reached its lowest post-war debt levels (Mioche 1994) while managing to ‘phase out’ Lorraine’s outmoded blast furnaces and register the highest productivity gains in Europe between 1980 and 1988 (Daley 1996b: 154). As for the depoliticising effects, during negotiations within the firms’ councils, the unions, realised that the ‘predominance of Brussels’\textsuperscript{40} left them little room to contest the scope of capacity reductions.\textsuperscript{41} As affirmed within the MoI, during negotiations ‘none of the unions formally reject[ed] the Commission’s exigencies’ and instead used their bargaining functions to, mainly, negotiate the payoff of redundant workers.\textsuperscript{42} Following Kettell (2008) who proposes to assess depoliticisation strategies based on their economic results and ‘impact on perceptions’, the transnational depoliticisation of steel successfully carried out the government’s principal aims as steel regained its ‘competitive success’ (Daley 1996: Ch.7) while EC pressures bore a growing share of culpability for the measures in the eyes of trade unions.
Overall, before and under the Socialists the French state was able to undertake its own preference for an accelerated elimination of the industry’s excess capacities by abiding to the EC’s supranational dictates. The successive French governments’ management of steel demonstrates how the ostensible rollback of the state from certain areas of industrial policy-making can be conceptualised as a strategy of transnational depoliticisation that allows governments to implement their own industrial ambitions through their compliance with the disciplinary mechanisms and rules of transnational institutions.

Conclusion

The process of globalisation, deepening participation in supranational institutions and the emergence of a neoliberal intellectual climate hostile to government interference have been said to pose limitations to the states’ capacity to independently formulate national industrial strategies. This article argued that such processes have strengthened domestic efforts to disengage from inefficient industrial policies as states are increasingly able to transfer decision-making responsibilities over industrial matters to spheres lying beyond the governmental arena such as transnational institutions. Drawing from an Open Marxist lens, it was argued that depoliticisation is as an inner propensity of the capitalist state which has to juggle between meeting the democratic/material aspirations of society and creating favourable conditions for the reproduction of capital accumulation within their territory. By transferring the responsibility for certain industrial measures to supranational institutions, domestic governments can conceal their own predilection towards certain socially painful and unpopular measures and find a new source of legitimacy for their implementation. Thus, the transnational depoliticisation of industrial policy is conceptualised as an attempt to induce the greater competitiveness of domestic industry while sidestepping domestic political pressures for the preservation of uncompetitive units.

The case of the French steel industry’s restructuring in the early 1980s served as an illustrative example of such a process. Between 1980 and 1984, the French state’s obligations towards the EC served as a legitimation device for the government’s own preference for an extensive elimination of uncompetitive
activities. Given that no domestic political opposition envisaged France’s withdrawal from the EEC, rationalisation was presented as a binding condition of, or the price to pay for, France’s undisputed participation in the common market. The contention that state elites can further domestic policy preferences by relinquishing sovereignty to transnational institutions, such as the EC, elicits an understanding of such bodies as assisting nation states’ efforts to maintain conditions for profitable accumulation as opposed to undermining their accumulation strategies.

This article endeavoured to enrich the comparative scope of the depoliticisation concept by applying it to the study of industrial policy in a traditionally dirigiste political economy. Particularly, it argued that French depoliticised rollback was marked by the state’s attempt to balance withdrawal of support for declining activities by assuming greater role in palliating the social cost of factory closures. In addition to obfuscating the domestic sources of industrial reform, the state afforded redundant workers generous welfare compensation without surrendering its rationalisation objectives. Depoliticisation was not accompanied by the adoption of a neoliberal minimal welfare model typical of LMEs but with increased state responsibilities in welfare distribution (Levy 2000: 309; Vail 2010: 4). Future research could further illuminate how domestic institutional legacies are imprinted on the depoliticisation strategies in different varieties of capitalist economies.

Although, the appeal to the EC successfully induced a drastic rationalisation of French steel, the long-term viability of such strategies is uncertain. Mounting Euroscepticism and dissatisfaction with the political establishment across Europe and France point to the limits of transnational depoliticisation. France’s last elections were the last straw in a prolonged tumultuous relationship between the French and the EU which, in the past, has found expression in the quasi-defeat of the Maastricht treaty in the 1992 referendum and the rejection of the European constitution referendum in 2005. In 2017, the French electorate demonstrated its long-standing disenchantment with dominant political currents as both the Republican Right and the Socialist Party, which have consistently reaffirmed their allegiance to Europeanisation, failed to figure in the last round of the presidential elections. Macron’s victory aside,
the last elections were marked by the growing popularity of Eurosceptic parties including Melenchon’s la France Insoumise which questions the desirability of European treaties and the Front National which proposes to hold a referendum on France’s Euro membership. The rise of these parties, which together absorbed 40% of votes, manifests the French public’s growing distrust of EU institutions and according to a 2016 poll France constitutes the second most Eurosceptic country after Greece in the EU (Evans and Ivaldi 2018: 102). Echoing the calls of other scholars (Hay 2007; Fawcett et al 2017) the article implores further exploration of the rising tensions between depoliticised forms of economic management and collective democratic deliberation.

Notes

1 I owe this formulation to one of the anonymous reviewers.
2 Continuous casting is an automatable technique that reduces by four the number of steps necessary to convert molten metal into solid material.
3 AN 19910818/31, Note for the Minister, 9/02/1979.
4 AN 19910818/32, Note for the Minister, December 1979.
5 Long products refer to such steel products as bars, rods, rails or sheet piles whereas flat products have smoother surfaces and consist of mainly steel plates, sheet and strips.
6 AN19910446/1, Note for Mr Bour, 18/09/1980.
7 AN19910446/1, Note for the Minister, 29/09/1980
8 AN19910446/1, Note for the Minister, 29/09/1980
9 AN19910446/1, Note for the Minister, 12/09/1980; AN19910446/1, Giraud to Ortoli, 24/09/1980
10 AN19910446/1, Letter to the Ministry of the Economy, 25/09/1980
11 AN19910446/1, Note: the propositions of the commission for the Council of the 7th October
12 AN19910446, Note for the Director, 17/09/1980; AN19910446/1, European Council on Steel, 25/10/1980
13 AN19910446/1, Letter to Davignon, 24/09/1980
14 AN19910446/1, The reduction of steel production (art.58), 24/10/1980
15 AN19910445/9, Reunion of the Economic and Social Council, 10/04/1979
16 AN19910446, Telex on a confidential meeting, 1/10/1980
17 AN19910818/27, Situation of French Steel, 1/06/1981
18 AN19910818/27, Situation of French Steel, 1/06/1981
19 Indicatively, French crude steel production stood at around 23.2 Mt in 1980 and 21 Mt in 1981 (INSEE 1982)
20 AN19870344/2, Note for Mr Mandil, 3/04/1982
21 AN19910818/15, The Evolution of French Steel, 10/03/1983
22 AN19870344/14, Note for the Minister, 23/03/1983
23 AN19870344/14, Note for the Minister, 23/03/1983
24 AN19870344/14, Note for the Minister, 23/03/1983
25 AN19910818/15, The evolution of French Steel, 10 March 1983; AN19910818/15, Note for the Minister, 14/03/1983
26 AN19860204/1, Assessment of the negotiations with unions, 10/02/1984
27 AN19870344/14, Letter to the Prime Minister, 15/10/1983
Electric steelmaking is a modern process of steel production whose advantage lies in its high flexibility and energy-efficiency as steel is produced from recycled, scrap steel as opposed to iron ore.
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