Skip to content Skip to navigation
University of Warwick
  • Study
  • |
  • Research
  • |
  • Business
  • |
  • Alumni
  • |
  • News
  • |
  • About

University of Warwick
Publications service & WRAP

Highlight your research

  • WRAP
    • Home
    • Search WRAP
    • Browse by Warwick Author
    • Browse WRAP by Year
    • Browse WRAP by Subject
    • Browse WRAP by Department
    • Browse WRAP by Funder
    • Browse Theses by Department
  • Publications Service
    • Home
    • Search Publications Service
    • Browse by Warwick Author
    • Browse Publications service by Year
    • Browse Publications service by Subject
    • Browse Publications service by Department
    • Browse Publications service by Funder
  • Help & Advice
University of Warwick

The Library

  • Login
  • Admin

Coalition formation and history dependence

Tools
- Tools
+ Tools

Dutta, Bhaskar and Vartiainen, Hannu (2020) Coalition formation and history dependence. Theoretical Economics, 15 (1). pp. 159-197. doi:10.3982/TE2947

[img]
Preview
PDF
WRAP-coalition-formation-history-dependence-Dutta-2020.pdf - Published Version - Requires a PDF viewer.
Available under License Creative Commons: Attribution-Noncommercial 4.0.

Download (358Kb) | Preview
[img] PDF
WRAP-coalition-formation-history-dependence-Dutta-2019.pdf - Accepted Version
Embargoed item. Restricted access to Repository staff only - Requires a PDF viewer.
Available under License Creative Commons: Attribution-Noncommercial 4.0.

Download (694Kb)
Official URL: http://doi.org/10.3982/TE2947

Request Changes to record.

Abstract

Farsighted formulations of coalitional formation, for instance by Harsanyi (1974) and Ray and Vohra (2015), have typically been based on the von Neumann-Morgenstern (1944) stable set. These farsighted stable sets use a notion of indirect dominance in which an outcome can be dominated by a chain of coalitional ‘moves’ in which each coalition that is involved in the sequence eventually stands to gain. Dutta and Vohra (2017) point out that these solution concepts do not require coalitions to make optimal moves. Hence, these solution concepts can yield unreasonable predictions. Dutta and Vohra (2017) restricted coalitions to hold common, history independent expectations that incorporate optimality regarding the continuation path. This paper extends the Dutta-Vohra analysis by allowing for history dependent expectations. The paper provides characterization results for two solution concepts corresponding to two versions of optimality. It demonstrates the power of history dependence by establishing nonemptyness results for all finite games as well as transferable utility partition function games. The paper also provides partial comparisons of the solution concepts to other solutions.

Item Type: Journal Article
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Q Science > QA Mathematics
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Game theory, Cooperative games (Mathematics)
Journal or Publication Title: Theoretical Economics
Publisher: Econometric Society
ISSN: 1933-6837
Official Date: January 2020
Dates:
DateEvent
January 2020Published
15 May 2019Accepted
Volume: 15
Number: 1
Page Range: pp. 159-197
DOI: 10.3982/TE2947
Status: Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Published
Access rights to Published version: Open Access

Request changes or add full text files to a record

Repository staff actions (login required)

View Item View Item
twitter

Email us: wrap@warwick.ac.uk
Contact Details
About Us