Learning, uncertainty and central bank activism in an economy with strategic interactions
UNSPECIFIED. (2001) Learning, uncertainty and central bank activism in an economy with strategic interactions. JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS, 48 (1). pp. 153-171. ISSN 0304-3932Full text not available from this repository.
In this paper we examine the optimal level of central bank activism in a standard model of monetary policy with uncertainty, learning and strategic interactions. We calibrate the model using G7 data and find that the presence of strategic interactions between the central bank and private agents creates an additional motivation for caution in the optimal monetary policy. An activist policy designed to help learning and reduce future uncertainty creates extra volatility in inflation expectations, which is detrimental to welfare. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HG Finance
H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
|Journal or Publication Title:||JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS|
|Publisher:||ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV|
|Official Date:||August 2001|
|Number of Pages:||19|
|Page Range:||pp. 153-171|
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