Manuscript version: Author’s Accepted Manuscript
The version presented in WRAP is the author’s accepted manuscript and may differ from the published version or Version of Record.

Persistent WRAP URL:
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/117752

How to cite:
Please refer to published version for the most recent bibliographic citation information. If a published version is known of, the repository item page linked to above, will contain details on accessing it.

Copyright and reuse:
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions.

Copyright © and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners. To the extent reasonable and practicable the material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before being made available.

Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge. Provided that the authors, title and full bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata page and the content is not changed in any way.

Publisher’s statement:
Please refer to the repository item page, publisher’s statement section, for further information.

For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk.
“Code Name SEKRETÁŘ”: Amílcar Cabral, Czechoslovakia and the Role of Human Intelligence during the Cold War

Dr. Natalia Telepneva, University of Warwick, British Academy Postdoctoral Fellow

Abstract

Since 1961, Czechoslovakia was a key supporter of the liberation struggle in Guinea-Bissau, providing the PAIGC with arms, monthly financial assistance, and scholarships for military training. The extraordinary extent of this assistance can be partly explained through the ‘special relationship’ developed between Amilcar Cabral and Czechoslovakia’s Ministry of the Interior. Based on newly released records from the Czechoslovak security archives, this paper examines this clandestine relationship, addressing Prague’s motivation for recruiting Cabral as ‘clandestine contact’ under code name SEKRETÁŘ (‘Secretary’ in Czech) as well as the ways in which its intelligence services sought Cabral’s help in order to make sense of African politics and to engage with leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah. Through the analysis of the ‘give and take’ between Cabral and Czechoslovak officials, the paper argues that, in many ways, the former shaped the relationship with Czechoslovakia to the benefit of the PAIGC. By demystifying the relationship between Cabral and Czechoslovak intelligence, the paper provides an insight into the agency of so-called peripheral actors and of human intelligence in the Cold War.

Word count: 10,405

Introduction

On 21 June, 1961, the Czechoslovak minister of the interior, Rudolf Barák, received a top secret letter from an intelligence officer based in Conakry, the capital of the Republic of Guinea. The author of the letter, ‘Lieutenant Alter Miroslav’, proposed to recruit one of his regular contacts in Conakry, SEKRETÁŘ, to collaborate with Czechoslovak intelligence. An agronomy engineer born in the neighbouring Guinea-Bissau, SEKRETÁŘ was the General Secretary of the African Independence Party (Partido Africana da Independeza – PAI), with whom ALTER had established
cordial relations since his first arrival in Conakry in 1960.\textsuperscript{1} In the course of their meetings, argued ALTER, SEKRETÁŘ had provided useful information about African politics and the role of the USA on the continent. As general secretary of the PAI, argued ALTER, SEKRETÁŘ had good opportunities to provide useful information. Additionally, SEKRETÁŘ was likely to gain a position of leadership in the movement for the independence of Guinea-Bissau, a small Portuguese colony in West Africa. ALTER’s letter was directed to Barák because it was he who presided over Czechoslovak intelligence, officially known as the First Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior. Barák approved the request.\textsuperscript{2}

“SEKRETÁŘ” (Secretary) was the Czechoslovak code name for Amílcar Lopes Cabral (1924-73). Born on 12 September in 1924 in Bafata, Guinea-Bissau, Cabral was the son of Juvenal Cabral, a schoolteacher, and Iva Panel Evora, the owner of a small hotel. When his parents divorced, Cabral’s family moved to Cape Verde, where he attended the Liceu Gil Eanes in Mindelo (São Vicente island)—the only school in the whole archipelago that offered education that prepared students for the university level. In 1948, Cabral received a scholarship to study agronomy at the University of Lisbon. Already steeped in the problems of Cape Verde, in Lisbon, Cabral formed friendships with other students from Portuguese colonies and engaged in nationalist activism. Marxist ideas were popular among students from the colonies, not least because the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) dominated the underground anti-fascist struggle in Portugal after the Second World War. Amílcar Cabral was inspired by Marxist ideas and envisioned a future free from capitalist exploitation. Having graduated from university the top of his class, Cabral took up a job at an agricultural research station in Bissau, where he organised a group to discuss the problems of Portuguese colonies.\textsuperscript{3}
While the British and the French had decided to give up formal rule over their African colonies by 1958, Portugal’s President of the Council of Ministers António de Oliveira Salazar believed that the empire was fundamental to the nation, entrenched in the constitution of the *Estado Novo* dictatorship (New State). At the time when most colonial governments entered into a dialogue with nationalist parties in their colonies, Salazar’s regime was adamant about retaining Portugal’s overseas possessions. In the late 1950s, repression of the nationalist activists intensified, pushing activists into exile. On one of his last visits to Bissau in 1959, Cabral founded an organisation that would become known as the Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC). In 1960, Cabral moved to Conakry, the capital of Guinea, from where he launched preparations for armed struggle across the border in neighbouring Guinea-Bissau. As of 1960 however, the PAIGC was only a small group of like-minded people who had to compete with a number of nationalist groups who had found safe haven in Guinea. In the following years, Cabral would manage to overcome his local rivals and secure international support for the PAIGC, which would come to dominate the nationalist movement. Czechoslovakia became the first international donor to the PAIGC, providing the first comprehensive assistance package, including cash, training, and arms, in 1961. It was in this context that ALTER proposed (and got approval) to recruit Cabral as a confidential contact (*důvěrný styk*) of Czechoslovak intelligence.

The ideas and life of Amilcar Cabral have been the subject of substantial historical research. Since Cabral’s assassination in January 1973, there has emerged a substantial literature on Cabral’s ideas and his contribution to the theory of African liberation. Cabral has also been celebrated as a shrewd politician and a talented diplomat, who managed to secure support for the PAIGC from a variety of
international donors: from the Soviet Union, Cuba, and the Nordic countries, to name a few. Works by Patrick Chabal, Pierro Gleijeses, and Mustafa Dhada all highlight the role of Cabral’s personal diplomacy in securing the necessary support that enabled the PAIGC to launch a successful offensive against the Portuguese army in 1973.\(^4\) We know that Cabral was a talented diplomat, yet we don’t fully know what this often entailed in the context of the global Cold War. At the same time, the field of Cold War studies has expanded since the 1990s with the declassification of archives in Russia and Eastern Europe. We know much more about the role of the so-called ‘peripheral actors’ such as Czechoslovakia, as well as the importance of the Third World in the global struggle.\(^5\) Since the end of the Cold War, there have emerged a number of memoirs by intelligence agents on both sides of the Cold War divide, which touch upon their experiences in the Third World.\(^6\) In *Near and Distant Neighbours*, Jonathan Haslam has provided many more details about the evolution of Soviet intelligence operations, especially highlighting the role of military intelligence (GRU, the Main Intelligence Directorate).\(^7\) The role of secret intelligence in the Cold War still remains somewhat of a black box, with a few exceptions.\(^8\) We are particularly in the dark when it comes to the role of secret intelligence in Africa—an important theatre of rivalry between the superpowers and their allies as the pace of decolonisation accelerated in the 1950s.

This paper focuses on Cabral’s relationship with Czechoslovak intelligence from 1961-73 as a case study of ‘human intelligence’ (HUMINT, in the jargon of the intelligence services) in the Cold War. ALTER forged first contacts with Amílcar Cabral in 1960, when the latter arrived in Conakry to establish the headquarters for the organisation that would be known, after several name changes, as the PAIGC. ALTER established what he believed were close personal relations with Cabral and
facilitated his trip to Prague in 1961. After Prague ‘recruited’ Cabral in August 1960, Czechoslovak intelligence and Cabral forged a close relationship, which entailed Cabral sharing information about events and participating in so-called ‘active operations’ of the Czechoslovak *rezidentura* (jargon for the Czechoslovak intelligence station) in Conakry. After the first president of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, was toppled in 1966 and exiled to Conakry, Cabral offered Prague a window into Nkrumah’s plans. As he became an increasingly popular and influential figure, Cabral’s contacts with the Czechoslovaks dwindled towards the late 1960s.

This paper argues that Cabral managed to direct his relationship with Czechoslovak intelligence to the advantage of the PAIGC. By demystifying the nature of Cabral’s relationship with the Czechoslovak intelligence, this paper rejects claims that leaders of the liberation movements like Cabral were mere pawns of Moscow. On the contrary, it provides insight into the strategies that Cabral used for his cause—the liberation of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde. The paper also highlights the agency of Czechoslovakia as an active actor in the Cold War in its own right. In as much as Cabral did not follow orders from Prague, Czechoslovakia pursued an active policy in Africa for their own internal goals. As such, this paper highlights the agency of non-peripheral actors: the strategy they used for their own goals, as well as the limitations of their projects in the Cold War context.

**Recruitment, 1961**

The expansion of the Czechoslovak presence in Africa was enabled by tremendous changes in the Soviet Union in the 1950s. In March 1953, Joseph Stalin died and was succeeded by Nikita Khrushchev, a dynamic leader who launched an activist policy in the Third World. Khrushchev believed that the USSR and its allies in Eastern Europe should pursue and active policy in the Third World to enhance the
power of the Soviet bloc. At the same time, Nikita Khrushchev’s denunciation of Joseph Stalin at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in February 1956 led to calls for reform across the socialist bloc and leadership changes—in Poland and Hungary, on waves of massive social protest. In Czechoslovakia, the situation was relatively quiet. The first secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPC), Antonín Novotný, was not a popular figure at home and relied on continuous support from Moscow. Khrushchev’s new policy in the Third World allowed Novotný and the Central Committee of the CPC Politburo to prove their worth to the Soviet leadership and also carve out for Czechoslovakia a significant role in the Warsaw Pact and in the international arena. Besides Novotný, one man who was allegedly interested in pursuing a much more activist foreign policy in Africa was the minister of the interior, Rudolf Barák. Originally a Social Democrat, Barák emerged as a functionary of the CPC in the Brno region in 1945, rising steadily within the party hierarchy. In September 1953, he was appointed minister of the interior, which had subsumed the state security (StB; Státní Bezpečnost) and foreign intelligence bureaus. A dynamic and ambitious man, he was rumoured to harbour ambitions to supersede Antonín Novotný as the CC CPC first secretary. Known for his pleasant, outgoing manner, Barák also established good contacts with Soviet security advisors. He was keenly interested in foreign affairs and often met with foreign dignitaries coming to Prague with requests for assistance.

Besides internal politics, Czechoslovakia had economic reasons to pursue activist policy in Africa. One of the most industrialised states in Eastern Europe, Czechoslovakia had developed an advanced arms manufacturing industry, supplying weapons to its ‘Little Entente’ allies Romania and Yugoslavia in the 1920s, to Soviet Russia in the 1930s, and to Israel in 1948. Czechoslovakia had long-standing
commercial relations countries that dated to the pre-war period and did not end when the CPC took control of the country in February 1948. Africa was a potentially a big market for Czechoslovak arms and goods, and Prague quickly became a supplier of small arms to the continent. The potential of Soviet and Czechoslovak cooperation became apparent when, in September 1955, Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt announced that Czechoslovakia had agreed to sell US$45.7 worth of weapons to Egypt, as part of an agreement underwritten by the USSR. While the deal was initiated by Czechoslovakia, it was widely seen as a sign of new Soviet assertiveness in the region. Another reason for Czechoslovak involvement was political. The expansion of Czechoslovak intelligence in Africa was a response to Prague’s new activist foreign policy in the continent—in parallel with similar developments in the USSR.

The Soviet KGB and Czechoslovak StB first developed close ties in 1948. After the Soviet-sponsored takeover of Czechoslovakia by the CPC, the Czechoslovak security organs went through a process of ‘Sovietization’: institutional models were transported directly from the USSR to its Eastern European satellites with assistance from Soviet advisors. After Stalin died, direct forms of control were superseded by bilateral and multilateral cooperation, in line with Khrushchev’s new policy prioritising consultations with Eastern European allies. As part of de-Stalinization, Khrushchev wanted to reduce the powers of the KGB inside the USSR, so he redirected its activities abroad, which aligned with the expansion of Soviet policy in the Third World. As a result, the 1950s saw an expansion of the KGB’s foreign intelligence in sub-Saharan Africa under Khrushchev’s personal protégé, Alexander Shelepin. Similar developments took place in Czechoslovakia, where Rudolf Barák presided over the expansion of the First Directorate in the 1950s. Czechoslovak intelligence employed only one hundred men in 1950, with the number
rising to 520 in 1957, 930 four years later, and 1,236 in January 1968, of whom 352 were stationed abroad.\textsuperscript{13}

1960 also ushered in a new era of Soviet-Czechoslovak intelligence collaboration in Africa. With many African countries expected to reach independence in 1960, all eyes were on the continent, now a new arena for superpower competition. 1960 was also a crucial year for the expansion of Soviet intelligence started in sub-Saharan Africa. The first democratically elected prime minister of the Congo, Patrice Lumumba, appealed to the Soviet Union for assistance in dealing with the secession of the resource-rich Katanga province. Before 1960, the majority of communications with leaders of the liberation movements were undertaken by the KGB \textit{rezidentura} in Cairo. In August 1960, the crisis in the Congo moved Shelepin to expand the Africa desk at the KGB’s First (intelligence) Directorate.\textsuperscript{14} Due to its long-standing contacts in the region, Czechoslovak intelligence became a close partner. In July 1960, Shelepin and Barák presided over the meeting of representatives of these two bodies to coordinate intelligence activities across the world, which included a pledge to share operational information on the ground. In August 1960, Soviet and Czechoslovak intelligence launched their first joint operation to support the government of Patrice Lumumba, the first democratically elected prime minister of the Congo.\textsuperscript{15} While their operation in the Congo failed since Lumumba was toppled in September 1960 and subsequently murdered in the breakaway Katanga province, Czechoslovakian intelligence continued to expand its operations in sub-Saharan Africa. It was in this context that ALTER arrived in Conakry to forge contacts with representatives of African liberation movements who had found refuge in Guinea.

ALTER’s name was Miroslav Adámek. Born on January 12, 1927 into a workers’ family, Adámek had previously been a locksmith. In 1947, he volunteered
for the military service and joined the CPC a year later at a factory in Kuncicky. Three years later, he was recruited for the StB. Internal StB reports described him as a ‘calm-tempered man’ who was a ‘passionate chess player’ with a clear ‘class consciousness’ who followed the party line. After undergoing basic training in Opava, he was transferred to the First Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior, and in 1960, he was posted to the Czechoslovak *rezidentura* in Conakry. At only 33 years old, Adámek was not a particularly experienced officer. However, he was part of a small *rezidentura*, which allowed greater room for personal initiative and, potentially, career progression. It is perhaps unsurprising that Amadek was quick to establish contacts with Cabral, who was in the process of harnessing international support for armed struggle against Portuguese colonialism.

Their first meeting took place on November 22 1960, when Adámek invited Cabral for lunch to obtain information about the movements ‘in accordance with our plan for the Portuguese colonies.’ Adámek had apparently already met Cabral in Prague and, according to his report to Prague, he used the opportunity to establish contact with him in Conakry. The lunch took place in a ‘friendly atmosphere,’ with Cabral arguing that his movement had the support of the people in Guinea-Bissau and that his land could be free within two to three years. On 13 January 1961, Cabral met Adámek again to argue for a reception in Prague. He had already been invited to visit the Soviet Union, but he wanted to stop in Prague together with his right-hand man, Aristides Pereira. Cabral seemed to have impressed Adámek, as he argued that he could have asked for support from the capitalist countries, but he did not do so because he saw that there were no strings attached to aid from Czechoslovakia. He also underlined that the PAIGC had the best prospects for armed struggle because it was based in Guinea-Conakry, which bordered Guinea-Bissau and could be used as
a launching pad for operations there. In fact, a rebellion in Guinea-Bissau could serve as a catalyst for rebellion in other Portuguese colonies, Angola in particular. Adámek supported Cabral’s request.\textsuperscript{18}

Cabral’s trip to Czechoslovakia in March 1963 went well. Aristides Pereira recalled that in Prague they met with Rudolf Barák, who was apparently impressed by Cabral and promised to help with the provision of war materiel.\textsuperscript{19} There is no record of Cabral and Pereira ever meeting Barák in Prague. However, Cabral and Pereira definitely met Barák’s deputy Karel Klima, whom they asked for weapons, financial assistance, experts who could provide training in security, and instructors in ‘subversive activities.’ \textsuperscript{20} One way or another, the Czechoslovak intelligence supported Cabral’s request for assistance. In a note to Barák on 27 March 1961, the chief of the First Directorate, Jaroslav Miller, argued that Cabral’s requests should be satisfied because PAIGC (he still used the earlier name, PAI, in the original) had support among the broad masses and had already gathered support for armed struggle inside the country. The PAIGC was an anti-imperialist and an anti-capitalist organisation, which was led by Cabral, a ‘Marxist-orientated’ politician. Most likely, the lengthy note was drafted with help from the Conakry rezidentura and Adámek personally.\textsuperscript{21}

The timing of Cabral’s request was opportune. In February and March, a series of popular uprisings broke out in Angola, the largest of Portugal’s colonies in Africa. Salazar was determined to hold onto the empire and crushed the uprisings with overwhelming force, and crackdown became an international scandal. Portugal was condemned at the UN, and on 27 May, the Soviet daily \textit{Pravda} released a stern declaration in support of Angola.\textsuperscript{22} On 18 April 1961, Czechoslovakia was the first country to approve an assistance package, providing regular financial assistance,
scholarships, and military training to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), which was also based in Conakry at that time. These developments reflected the heating up of the Cold War. In a meeting with USA. President Kennedy at Vienna in June, Nikita Khrushchev threatened to cut Western access to West Berlin, sparking what would be known as the Berlin Crisis, which eventually led to the construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961.

It was in this context of increased interest in liberation movements that Miroslav Adámek proposed recruiting Cabral for collaboration with Czechoslovak intelligence. In his letter to Barák, Adámek emphasised his good relations with Cabral and proposed that recruitment should take place shortly after Prague approved the latter’s request for financial assistance and arms. That would be ideal timing, he argued, since Cabral believed would feel a sense of debt to Adámek. He also proposed keeping his real identity hidden, even though Cabral probably suspected the real nature of his job. Besides, common ideology and goals had to be the basis for the recruitment: ‘I will emphasise that as he himself could see that the politics of Czechoslovakia in Africa are conducted for the benefit of independent African people and support their efforts for political and economic independence, which means that are our interests are alike’. We don’t fully know what consultations went into the decision to approve Adámek’s proposal and how much the Soviets knew about it. From 26-30 June 1961, the Soviet and Czechoslovak intelligence services held their second round of coordination meetings to discuss joint operations in the Third World. Among a lengthy list of mutually-binding agreements on coordination of intelligence operation across the world, the KGB and StB agreed that they would aim to establish contacts and recruit agents from among the leadership of the liberation movements in the Third
World. They also established a common plan on Angola and the Congo.\textsuperscript{25} The Soviet-Czechoslovak proposal does not contain any references to Guinea-Bissau. However, a KGB document from July 1961 contained a similar list of proposals to help organize anti-colonial mass uprisings in British Kenya and Rhodesia and ‘Portuguese Guinea’ (i.e. Guinea-Bissau) by arming rebels and training military cadres to tie down Western powers during the settlement of the Berlin question.\textsuperscript{26} On 1 August 1961, Czechoslovakia approved the first assistance package to the PAIGC: monthly financial assistance worth 2,500 Czech crowns; a shipment of light weapons for 3,000 armed men, and a commitment to organising a course for training eleven men in Czechoslovakia.\textsuperscript{27} Given the timing of joint consultations and of Prague’s approving the package, it is possible that the Soviet intelligence knew about Czechoslovak plans for Cabral and gave their approval.

While the possibility of using Cabral as an ally in a Cold War in Africa was crucial to the Czechoslovak decision to provide assistance, ideology mattered too. In his reports to Prague, Miroslav Adámek consistently highlighted Cabral’s left-wing views, his Marxist views and his unwillingness to seek assistance from the West. The note attached to the resolution from 1 August 1961 also underlined that Cabral’s political philosophy aligned with that of the Czechoslovak government. Cabral did not like the thesis that there was no working class in Africa and rejected the notion of ‘African socialism’. The Czechoslovak were also impressed with Cabral’s ‘deep knowledge’ of Marxism-Leninism, which, they believed, he had acquired as a political activist in Portugal through contacts with the Portuguese communists.\textsuperscript{28} Once Prague approved requests for assistance, Adámek could break the news to Cabral and proceed with his ‘recruitment’.

The ‘recruitment’ meeting took place on 13 August at Adámek’s house in
When Cabral arrived at 10am, Adámek informed him that his request for assistance from Czechoslovakia was granted. Then, as Adámek reported to Prague, he used the opportunity to say that they should strengthen their cooperation even further because their interests in Africa were alike. To do so, Czechoslovakia would require ‘as much precise information as possible’ about the situations in African countries and liberation movements. According to Adámek, Cabral “reacted well” to the pitch. He appreciated Czechoslovak support because they were the first country to provide him with ‘specific and effective help’ in the fight against the Portuguese. As for political information, he continued, his options in Guinea were limited because he did not always agree with the actions of the authorities, but that he would do ‘whatever is in his power to help us’. As for any conferences he may attend in person or about which he would be informed, he promised to forward this information to us, as well as any information about the political situation in Africa. Adámek concluded: ‘The cooperation with Secretary looks very promising and in my opinion we will be able to influence and guide him quite well given his function in PAI (African Independence Party)’. From then on, Cabral would be a ‘clandestine contact’ (‘důvěrný styk’ or ‘D.S.’ in Czechoslovak classification) of the Czechoslovak intelligence.

It is clear why Adámek played up Cabral’s ‘recruitment’. This was a big ‘win’ for a young intelligence officer on his first foreign assignment. It was also a ‘win’ for his superiors, who could claim to be running a wide net of intelligence contacts in a region still dominated by former colonial powers. However, in actual fact, Adámek’s meeting with Cabral was not too different from their previous ones. There is no evidence to suggest that Adámek broke his diplomatic cover. No papers were signed. Adámek and Cabral continued to meet openly in various locations across the city. As
opposed to ‘agent’, the category of ‘clandestine contact’ was flexible enough to allow for a casual relationship without formal commitments from either side. While Adámek was actively ‘recruiting’ Cabral, the meaning of the meeting was likely very different for Cabral, who was generally quite non-committal, albeit courteous. In the following years, Czechoslovakia would proceed to extend ever-increasing support to the PAIGC, receiving little in return. Indeed, after two years in Conakry, in late 1961, Adámek was recalled to Prague, where he continued work at the Africa desk of the First Directorate. He was evaluated to have performed well and was promoted to the rank of captain. In 1964, he would go on to work as a standalone operative in Kinshasa before going back to Prague in 1968.30

Information Gathering and “Active Operations”

Once the Politburo approved the assistance package to Cabral, the Ministry of the Interior went into high gear. In December, Prague shipped its first supply of arms to Conakry. The shipment was seized by the Guinean authorities, an issue that became an ongoing problem that would only be reserved in early 1963. In August 1961, the Ministry of the Interior arranged for eleven members of the PAIGC to receive military training in Prague. In the following years and up until 1969, the Ministry of the Interior would accept about a dozen men a year for security training.31 In 1962, the Czechoslovak intelligence also devised an active operation code-named ‘Hanibal’, which involved spreading anti-government propaganda leaflets among the Portuguese army. Besides demoralising the army, ‘Hanibal’ was supposed to strengthen the position of the PAIGC. The whole operation was to be discussed with Cabral, who was supposed to help with the contents of the leaflets.32 Although Czechoslovak support was substantial, it was ultimately Cabral who determined
strategy in Guinea-Bissau.

One issue of disagreement between Cabral and Prague was about the starting date for military action in Guinea-Bissau. The central issue remained the unwillingness of Guinean authorities to release Czechoslovak weapons or officially accept any new military shipments for the PAIGC through the port of Conakry. By end of 1962, Prague had became increasingly worried that lack of armed action would open up the PAIGC to competition from local rivals. The Czechoslovak Ministry of the Interior thus advised that the PAIGC should launch acts of sabotage in the countryside to prove they represented the nationalist movement in Guinea-Bissau. These actions would serve to obtain weapons from the Portuguese and would prove to the Guinean authorities that the PAIGC could engage in armed action, even if they continued to block the weapons.33

Cabral disagreed. While sabotage could be effective, he argued it could also alarm the Portuguese, leading to the strengthening of their military presence, making it more difficult to launch guerrilla actions. Instead, Cabral’s strategy was to find alternative routes and suppliers of weapons in Algeria, Morocco, and Ghana. Again, Prague lamented that these trips would not be effective and they were too costly. Cabral disagreed and went ahead.34 Actually, it was in Morocco and Algeria, where he found support from the local authorities to smuggle a small number of weapons to Conakry. In fact, Prague used the Morocco to smuggle Czechoslovak weapons to Conakry.35 In early 1963, the issue of weapons for the PAIGC was resolved after almost two years of negotiation with the Guinean president, Sékou Touré. With the Guineans no longer blocking weapons transfers, on 23 January 1963, the PAIGC launched its first armed action in Guinea-Bissau.

Once the PAIGC launched military actions, Czechoslovak assistance
expanded. Besides a monthly subsidy of 2,500 Czechoslovak crowns to the PAIGC, Prague would yearly approve shipments of weapons and humanitarian goods to the PAIGC. Although we don’t know all the figures, in 1965, the monetary value of the weapons shipment was 1.85 million crowns; in 1966, it was 400,000 crowns.\textsuperscript{36} Upon Cabral’s request, in September 1964, the Czechoslovak interior ministry also dispatched an arms expert, František Polda (code name PETÁK). An arms expert and an intelligence officer, Polda had a dual role of acting as a point of contact with Cabral and providing advice and intelligence training for PAIGC cadres.\textsuperscript{37}

František Polda was of course not the only military advisor to the PAIGC. Starting from 1966 onwards, the PAIGC received substantial assistance from Cuba, including arms, material support. Fidel Castro also dispatched advisors and arms experts to help build up and train Forças Armadas Revolucionarias do Povo (FARP), the armed wing of the PAIGC. We know that there were important disagreements between Cabral and the Cuban advisors on military strategy. Cabral preferred a war of attrition in order to avoid high casualties, while the Cubans argued in favor of larger operations. We also know Cabral was vigorously independent and often resisted Cubans’ prescriptions.\textsuperscript{38}

The same held true for Cabral’s relations with Polda. Similar to the Cubans, Polda believed that the FARP should engage in decisive offensive actions against fortified posts, such as against Madina do Boé, in the east of the county. Having suffered heavy losses and the death of a friend, Domingos Ramos, Cabral preferred to proceed with caution. In a meeting between Polda and Cabral on 9 February 1968, Cabral shared that he wanted to test out the impact of the newly acquired 120mm mortars by firing them at Madina do Boé. Polda objected, saying that the focus should be on destroying the fort rather than on testing the Portuguese reaction. In fact,
‘combat operations’ increasingly resembled a game of soldiers rather than a war of liberation. Cabral smiled in response, saying that putting psychological pressure on the Portuguese was part and parcel of their strategy.\(^{39}\) In the end, the offensive operations proceeded apace, devised by the PAIGC central command. Madina do Boe was finally captured in 1969. Cabral’s strategy and decisions took priority. Czechoslovakia was heavily involved in supporting the PAIGC, especially in the early years of the war. What did the Czechoslovak intelligence obtain in return?

One of their first requests for Cabral was to obtain information about the proceedings of the first Non-Aligned Conference, held in September 1961 in Belgrade, Yugoslavia. Sponsored by Joseph Bros Tito of Yugoslavia, Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser, and Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru, the Belgrade conference was supposed to launch a movement opposed the creation of blocs, presenting itself as an alternative force that placed itself outside of the Cold War. Fearing a string of anti-Western proclamations, Washington was originally noncommittal about the conference at Belgrade. However, as the Berlin Crisis heated up over the summer of 1961, US President John Kennedy became increasingly concerned about the weight of world of opinion over Berlin and dispatched a message to conference attendees. The Soviets also believed that they could use the Belgrade conference to rally nonaligned countries behind their interpretation of the German question.\(^{40}\) Cabral was also invited to attend the Belgrade conference, and Czechoslovak intelligence requested some specific information. In a meeting with Cabral prior to the conference, the Czechoslovaks asked him to obtain information on a wide range of issues: the delegates’ definition of nonalignment, divisions, views on the German question, attitudes towards the Western countries, and opinions on socialist policy in Africa. Prague also singled out the Nigerian delegation, asking Cabral to determine whether
they would be ‘divisive’, and wanted to know the contents of a special letter from Tito to Nehru. Upon returning from Belgrade, Cabral made a stopover in Prague, where he gave a comprehensive overview of the conference.

Cabral’s information on the Belgrade conference was fairly general. He lamented that the conference was mainly dominated by declaratory statements; delegates failed to criticise ‘neocolonialism’, with the exception of Cuba’s address, which targeted the USA. In terms of divisions, Cabral described the delegations as divided into three main groups. Containing key organisers India, Egypt, and Yugoslavia, the first group was led by Prime Minister Nehru and represented the ‘reactionary’ stance at the conference. Ghana and Indonesia formed the basis of the second, more ‘progressive’ group, with Sukarno and Nkrumah proposing a number of measures to deal with neocolonialism and provide a solution to the Berlin Crisis. Finally, Cuba represented the ‘most progressive’ position, as its delegation lashed out at US imperialism and underlined the importance of socialist countries. Cabal also underlined divisions among African and Arab states. Cabral didn’t share any details of conversation with the delegates and did not know anything about Tito’s letter to Nehru. Indeed, the Belgrade conference was divided between those who, like Nehru, openly criticised the Soviet decision to resume nuclear testing and focused on questions of peace and others like Nkrumah, who prioritised questions of colonialism and poverty and called for the recognition of both German states. Intentionally or not, Cabral’s evaluation of the Belgrade conference did not contain any sensitive information or anything one could not obtain from open sources.

In general, detailed conference reports were quite rare. The vast majority of interactions between Cabral and Czechoslovak intelligence concerned problems of the PAIGC and of armed struggle. Cabral would regularly share his views on military
progress and the leadership of other liberation movements, such as the Angolan MPLA and Mozambican Frelimo—and their local rivals. In early 1962, Cabral journeyed to Ghana, Mali, and Morocco to find a route to ship weapons to Conakry after the debacle of 1961. In its 1962 plan for Guinea-Bissau, Prague instructed the rezidentura in Conakry to find out through Cabral the details of Holden Roberto’s trip to Ghana. Holden Roberto was the leader of the Union of People’s of Angola (UPA; União das Populações de Angola) and was a key rival of the MPLA, which also received assistance from Czechoslovakia. In 1962, Roberto was also harnessing international support for his organisation at that time, and Prague naturally wanted to know if Kwame Nkrumah, the president of Ghana, supported to the UPA. In 1962-63, the MPLA itself was riven by internal contradictions. For example, Cabral supported Agostinho Neto in his dispute with Viriato da Cruz and encouraged Czechoslovakia to support the MPLA. Cabral also shared his observations about the meetings of the CONCP (CONCP; Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguesas), an organisation established in 1961, which united liberation movements from the Portuguese colonies. In 1965, members of the CONCP met in Dar es Salaam to discuss common action, including in the military sphere. In meeting with Czechoslovak officials, Cabral expressed critical views of FRELIMO’s leadership, who, in his opinion, was not particularly interested in cooperation.

Czechoslovak intelligence also wanted to use Cabral’s resources for ‘active operations’ in Africa. In intelligence jargon common both to the KGB and the StB, ‘active operations’ or ‘active measures’ (AO) were agent-operational measures, directed at exerting influence on the foreign policy of target countries. These involved surveillance of Western intelligence services and disinformation campaigns, among many other actions. In August 1963, Prague instructed the rezidentura in Conakry to
approach Cabral with the task of finding two ‘reliable’ persons who could ‘fulfil espionage tasks’. These individuals had to belong to the PAIGC and have good recommendations. If such persons could be selected, they would undergo training in secret intelligence in Czechoslovakia before being deployed for special tasks. The issue came up again during Cabral’s talks in Prague. In a meeting with Cabral on 23 October 1963, Czechoslovak intelligence again reiterated their request to find two persons who could collaborate with the rezidentura on a variety of tasks. The candidates for such a role had to be reliable, discreet, and dedicated to the party, know French, and have the ability to easily forge contacts with people. The list of characteristics did not end there. The suitable candidates could not be known PAIGC members, and thus Czechoslovak intelligence suggested they could come either from Guinea-Bissau or Senegal. Cabral was non-committal. In response to the request, he said that the process of finding men with appropriate characteristics had proven much more difficult than he had previously thought. The best option would be to find an appropriate candidate in Guinea-Bissau and then dispatch them Senegal to acquire the necessary skills. Cabral never found appropriate candidates, so the Czechoslovak proposal was never put into action.

Czechoslovak counterintelligence also requested Cabral’s help with African students studying in Czechoslovakia. As the student body expanded in the 1960s, African students were commonly a problem for authorities across the socialist bloc, as many complained about racism, surveillance, and difficult living conditions. Many of these accounts reached the Western press. Since such incidents became a tool in Cold War propaganda on both sides, it became a common task of the counter-intelligence services to weed out potentially troublesome students. There were spies among African students in Czechoslovakia, argued Czechoslovak officials to Cabral
in a meeting on 21 April 1965, and they needed help in identifying them. Prague thus wanted Cabral to find a person who was not a known member of the PAIGC and who could be enrolled as a student in Czechoslovakia. The idea was for this person to develop friendships with other African students and report back to Czechoslovak counterintelligence. Again, Cabral did not reject the plan outright. However, he did point out that it would be very difficult to find someone from Guinea-Bissau who didn’t belong to the PAIGC and who could command respect among the students. The best option, he continued, was to find a person who did belong to the PAIGC, but who could pose as someone who was not happy with the organisation. Cabral also mentioned that he would have to share that information with his closest circle—his brother Luis Cabral and Aristides Pereira.49 We don’t know if this plan was put into action. However, it reveals Cabral’s evasive tactics, showing his unwillingness to use his people for such tasks.

One exception was the case of RIGOLETO. A member of the PAIGC, RIGOLETO was among the first cohort of eleven men who went for military training in Prague in August 1961. The Czechoslovak intelligence first approached RIGOLETO at a hospital in Prague when he was undergoing medical care. While others finished the course, RIGOLETO stayed on in Prague, undergoing special training in security and counter-intelligence, with Cabral’s approval. Czechoslovak intelligence seemed to like RIGOLETO, whom they described as ‘decisive, organised, and disciplined’. In a dispatch to the rezidentura in Conakry, Czechoslovak intelligence noted it had already obtained useful information from RIGOLETO, especially regarding rival nationalist movements based in Guinea-Bissau and Senegal. The Czechoslovak intelligence and RIGOLETO also agreed that he would help in ‘active operations’ against Western intelligence services in Conakry.
They also agreed on a special password for communication:

‘Do you know Mr. Abel from Bafata?’
‘I do know him and his whole family.’

One of such active operations was code-named operation ‘GOLD’—a rescue mission for Antoine Gizenga in the Congo. Gizenga was a Congolese politician, a minister in Patrice Lumumba’s first government. After a coup in Leopoldville in September 1960, Gizenga left to organise armed resistance against the government for a stronghold in Stanleyville, in eastern Congo. However, Gizenga was unable to get supplies to sustain his armed effort. In July 1961, supporters of Gizenga and representatives of the government in Leopoldville brokered a power-sharing agreement at the University of Lovanium. Cyrille Adoula became the new prime minister of the Congo and Gizenga was elected his deputy in absentia. However, key posts were still occupied by members of the so-called Binza Group who coalesced around Joseph Mobutu, the chief of the army. In early 1962, Gizenga was placed under house arrest in Leopoldville. There were fears that Gizenga could follow the fate of Patrice Lumumba who was murdered in a breakaway province of Katanga in January 1961. To enact the plan, Czechoslovak officials asked for RIGOLETO’s help.

It is not clear exactly the role that RIGOLETO was to play in Gizenga’s escape. Most likely, he was to collect intelligence on the ground in Leopoldville and serve as a go-between. The Czechoslovak rezidentura in Conakry was to deliver RIGOLETO to Leopoldville. There, he was supposed to meet another contact, ‘our man in Leopoldville’, who would explain what was required of him. Prague had high hopes for RIGOLETO, ‘a confidential contact who had been previously tested in our American surveillance operation in Conakry’. We don’t know how much Cabral
knew about the Czechoslovak plan to rescue Gizenga, but he apparently let them have RIGOLETO. 51 While the rescue mission never went ahead, Czechoslovak intelligence continued contacts with RIGOLETO. In 1966, he was transferred to the CONCP Secretariat in Rabat, Morocco. Cabral apparently ‘fully agreed’ that RIGOLETO should work with Prague. To avoid any suspicion, he asked that Czechoslovakia pay RIGOLETO’s salary in Conakry, which the PAIGC would then transfer to Rabat so that RIGOLETO could receive an official source of income. Cabral described RIGOLETO as a ‘capable comrade’ who was reliable and dedicated. Only women were his ‘weak spot’.52

SEKRETÁŘ and Kwame Nkrumah

On 24 February 1966, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, was overthrown in a coup d’état. The coup was a loss for the Soviet Union and other socialist countries that had forged close relations with Nkrumah in previous years. After the coup, Nkrumah settled in Conakry upon the personal invitation of Guinean president Sékou Touré. While the coup was bloodless, Nkrumah was determined to return to Ghana as the legitimately elected president, and the socialist countries wanted to help. It is well known that Amílcar Cabral was among those who visited Nkrumah in Conakry during his years of exile. The two men had known each other since the early 1960s, when Nkrumah provided some assistance to the PAIGC. However, it is not widely known that Czechoslovak intelligence wanted to influence Nkrumah’s actions after the coup via Cabral. The main goal was to convince Nkrumah to launch a resistance movement in Ghana.

Czechoslovakian intelligence had a series of conversations with Cabral about Nkrumah between 1966 and 1968. In a conversation with Frantisek Polda on 13 May 1966, Cabral shared his opinion that Nkrumah should have established an
underground resistance movement right after the coup. Otherwise, he risked losing any support he had left in Ghana.\textsuperscript{53} Cabral discussed Nkrumah with the head of the StB’s African department, Josef Janouš, when he came to Prague in November 1966. This time Cabral was more optimistic, saying that Nkrumah still enjoyed some support in Ghana, that his prospects were quite good, and that he deserved help. He still did not know Nkrumah’s plans first-hand, but he had learnt from Sékou Touré that at least one group was undergoing training in Guinea for the purposes of infiltrating Ghana. Czechoslovakian intelligence in turn asked Cabral if he could speak to Nkrumah, promise help, and, above all, convince him to focus his energies on organizing a resistance movement in Ghana.\textsuperscript{54}

Cabral became increasingly sceptical of Nkrumah’s capacity for decisive action. When Cabral met Janouš next on 6 February 1967 in Prague, he spelled out his frustration with Nkrumah, whom he had eventually managed to meet in person in Conakry. Describing the meeting with Nkrumah to Janouš, Cabral said that he did not think it was a wise idea for Nkrumah to publish his book, \textit{Handbook on Revolutionary Warfare}, in which he proposed the creation of an all-African working class vanguard party and the all-African people’s army and militia. The book was unrealistic and risked exposing Nkrumah’s strategy to the imperialists. He also said that Nkrumah was unresponsive to criticism and had asked Cabral to allocate a group of guerrilla fighters from among the PAIGC militants who could organize resistance in Ghana. Janouš agreed that Nkrumah had to put aside his Pan-Africanist theories and focus on organizing the resistance in Ghana. Yet again, Janouš asked Cabral to use his influence with Nkrumah for this purpose, but without him knowing about Czechoslovakia’s involvement.\textsuperscript{55} On 25 February 1968, meeting František Polda in Conakry, Cabral said that Nkrumah knew very little about the internal situation in
Ghana, that he had become more of a philosopher than a politician, and that his plan to liberate the African continent was not realistic.\textsuperscript{56}

Czechoslovak concern for Nkrumah’s plans was part of operation ‘ALEX’—an attempt to sponsor a left-wing counter coup in Conakry. It is not clear what role Nkrumah was supposed to play in the coup. Certainly, Cabral relayed some messages about preparations for a coup attempt in Conakry. In case any of these proved successful, Nkrumah could perhaps return to Ghana as the head of state or other official capacity. These efforts were not successful, and at least one person in regular contact with Czechoslovak intelligence was arrested on sabotage charges in August 1968.\textsuperscript{57} Nonetheless, Czechoslovak intelligence seemed pleased with Cabral’s role playing the unofficial go-between. On 4 April 1969, looking back at relations with Cabral over the previous nine years, Czechoslovakian intelligence specifically noted Cabral’s role in relations with Nkrumah, both before and after the coup in Ghana.\textsuperscript{58}

In the late 1960s, contacts between Czechoslovak intelligence and Cabral subsided. This was because Cabral was very busy as the liberation struggle unfolded and as he became an African leader of major importance. In addition, the PAIGC by that point received an increasing supply of donations—from the Soviet Union, but also from the Nordic countries in the early 1970s. By 1968, Czechoslovak intelligence lamented the fact that it was very difficult to obtain information about African issues. Cabral had the status of an African leader and was always travelling and meeting with high officials. In a three-month period, the rezidentura could only organise one dinner with the [Czechoslovak] Ambassador. As a result, the rezidentura in Conakry could no longer use the PAIGC against Western intelligence. Still, Czechoslovak intelligence found that their relationship with Cabral had been useful in helping in the organisation of certain ‘active operations’ and in participating in ‘influence measures’
with regards to Kwame Nkrumah. Given Cabral’s status, he could no longer be asked to participate in small and local events. However, the relationship could still be usefully employed at a ‘high level’, especially in the future.\textsuperscript{59}

Czechoslovak intelligence made every effort to portray their work with the PAIGC and Cabral as a success. In an overview of Frantisek Polda’s term in Conakry in 1968, Josef Janouš gave a stellar review. Polda had done a great job of using the PAIGC cadres to exert influence in regional organisations and influence the exile group around President Nkrumah in Conakry. On top of that, Polda had secured such prestige within the PAIGC that was him, boasted Janous, and not the Cuban advisers, who was considered the main military counsellor on matters of military strategy. Janous also commended Polda for showing and ‘extraordinarily sensitive approach to Africans’, knowledge of the fighters, bravery, and ‘high devotion in the fulfilment of his tasks’. As a result of his excellent service, Janous thus granted him a reward of 2500 Czechoslovak crowns for the period 1967-8 and promoted him to the job of senior referent of the fourth department of the First Directorate.\textsuperscript{60}

The Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in August 1968 played a crucial role in the scaling down of StB operations in Africa. Many StB intelligence agents either participated or were sympathetic to the ideals of the Prague Spring. After the Soviet invasion, many defected from field operations. Those who stayed in active service but were suspected of sympathies for Dubcek’s movement underwent internal reviews, were dismissed, or worse. One of many who got in trouble was Miroslav Adámek, the intelligence officer who recommended recruiting Cabral in 1961. After leaving Conakry in 1961, Adámek obtained a number of foreign assignments, but in 1968, he ‘surrendered to the anti-Soviet psychosis’ and signed a resolution condemning the Soviet invasion. However, his career did not end there, apparently
because he ‘joined the consolidation process at his workplace’. It is not clear what this exactly meant. Most probably, this involved Adámek admitting to his mistakes and getting involved in the consolidation of the new regime.61 Others chose not to give public support for Dubcek’s government in August. Such was Frantisek Polda. In a service evaluation from 1977, the StB commented that Polda relied ‘firmly on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism’ during 1968 and helped the ‘consolidation process’ at the StB.62 In the post-1968 period Czechoslovakia turned inwards, with the government trying to mend the fabric of the social order after the Soviet intervention. The Czechoslovak rezidentura tried to maintain contact with Cabral, but the meetings were quite irregular. The official explanation was that Cabral was often absent from Conakry, yet the general volume of intelligence activity declined in that period.63

Only in 1973 did Czechoslovak intelligence try to revamp its relationship with Cabral. Unsurprisingly, the man chosen for the mission was no less than Frantisek Polda, who arrived in Conakry in mid-January 1973. Polda’s report shows him going around Conakry trying to strike up conversations with people he knew. He found Cabral and Aristides Pereira working at PAIGC headquarters. In his report to Prague, Polda reported that Cabral looked ‘somewhat on edge,’ but he thought that this stemmed from his role as the party leader and not because he was uneasy about Polda’s arrival. Polda proceeded to explain the situation in Czechoslovakia to Cabral ‘according to instructions’, answering why he could not pay much attention to the PAIGC in the previous years. According to Polda, attitudes towards Czechoslovakia had not changed and that everyone had received him very well. On 16 January, Polda met Cabral, and the two decided to meet later for a proper conversation. However, the conversation never took place because on 20 January, Cabral was murdered in a
coup attempt in Conakry. In an overview of the Czechoslovak relationship with Cabral since 1961, Prague admitted that the character of the relationship was mainly ‘political’. As a leading politician, Cabral was used to influence Africa, public opinion in a variety of forums. In addition, Cabral was intended to influence Nkrumah. Regular contacts lasted only up until 1970 and declined because Cabral was rarely in Conakry.64

How much did the Soviets know about the nature of the Czechoslovak relationship with Cabral? Among thousands of page of files on Cabral and the PAIGC, there are only a few references to consultations with the ‘comrades’ in the USSR. Most of it was likely related to questions of military strategy for Guinea-Bissau. In a 1966 report from a consultation meeting with the Soviets, both sides agreed to come up with a ‘tactical plan’ for Guinea-Bissau and train cadres who could enact the military vision in consultation with the Cubans. Among the conclusions, the last one concerned Cabral, who was to be used for ‘intelligence purposes, against Western intelligence organisations and ‘politics of influence’.65 Another piece of evidence comes from a Czechoslovak note drafted in preparation for the meeting with the intelligence service of the German Democratic Republic. Answering a request for information from GDR intelligence, Prague prepared a detailed report about the military situation in Guinea-Bissau. Summing up, Czechoslovak intelligence stated that they used Cabral and other PAIGC representatives to obtain first-hand information about African countries and to implement ad-hoc ‘active operations’.66 Although it is not clear exactly what was shared with colleagues from the GDR, the special relationship with the PAIGC and Cabral (no matter the official status) was most likely not a secret. While we don’t have complete information, the few documents show that Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union did consult with each
other and tried to coordinate their support for the PAIGC.

Conclusion

Czechoslovakia was a crucial early ally of the PAIGC in its early years in Conakry. While the Soviet Union would come to occupy the central role as the PAIGC’s international donor, Czechoslovakia was crucial in the early stage, providing the first weapons, training, and cash for the movement in 1961. Its involvement in supplying the PAIGC with its first arms and cash was much larger than was previously known. We also know why that part of the reason was the importance of Amílcar Cabral as ‘D.S. SEKRETÁŘ’ for Czechoslovak intelligence. Czechoslovak intelligence believed that by enlisting Cabral as an ‘agent of influence’ and by providing assistance to the PAIGC they would acquire an important ally in the Cold War in Africa. That explains why Czechoslovakia was so closely involved in supporting the PAIGC in the 1960, despite financial difficulties.

The story also illuminates a previously unknown side of Cabral’s diplomacy. In 1960, the PAIGC was an unknown movement with limited international support, forced to struggle against rival organisations based in Conakry and Dakar, Senegal. To ascertain leadership status, the PAIGC required external support to launch an armed struggle, which could only be obtained from the socialist countries. Cabral entered into a relationship with Czechoslovak intelligence for pragmatic reasons: to obtain support for the PAIGC. In the environment of the Cold War, talking and engaging with intelligence services was part of the deal. While we will never know how Cabral himself envisioned his relationship with Czechoslovak intelligence, he was an independent agent who managed to shape the relationship to his advantage. In terms of relaying information about events and people, Cabral never went much
beyond a general conversation about what he saw and believed. The same was true for his role in relation to Kwame Nkrumah. Cabral seemed to have agreed with Prague that Nkrumah should have organised resistance to the coup, so their opinions were quite alike. When the Czechoslovaks ask him to find men for ‘special operations’, he did not refuse outright, but didn’t fulfil the requests either. In the end, even Czechoslovak intelligence had to admit in internal documents that the relationship with D.S. SEKRETÁŘ was mainly based on Cabral’s status in African politics and that they did not get much in terms of hard intelligence from him.

This story sheds light on the role of human intelligence during the Cold War. Like their Western counterparts, the socialist countries were keen to deploy secret intelligence to fight the Cold War in Africa. As opposed to Europe or the USA, it was cheaper and potentially easier to ‘contacts’ or ‘agents’ in the context of post-colonial Africa. This was a consequence of European imperialism. As European empires withdrew from Africa, they did not leave strong institutions that could deal with the influx of rival Western and Eastern intelligence agencies. However, we should not overestimate the significance of human intelligence. As the case of D.S. SEKRETÁŘ shows, Cabral’s engagement with Czechoslovak intelligence gave Prague little power over the PAIGC or Cabral and few advantages. While Czechoslovak intelligence ran D.S. SEKRETÁŘ on paper, in reality, Cabral obtained support from Prague without giving much in return. Cabral was a man who skillfully used international diplomacy for the advantage of his movement, thus securing the support that would allow the PAIGC to win the war.
Notes

1 Partido Africana da Independência (PAI; African Party for Independence) was one of the first names of the PAIGC. It was still used in early Soviet and Czechoslovak documents in reference to the organisation.
12 Leonid Mlechin, Zheleznyi Sharik (Moscow: Eksmo, 2004).
16 Personal File of Miroslav Adámek (codename ALTER or ALT), ABS, “Miroslav Adámek” 4143.
17 Meeting with Amílcar Cabral, November 23, 1960, ABS, 43197/000.
18 Alter (Conakry) to Prague, 14 January 1961, Record of conversation with Cabral, ABS 43197/000
20 From Vaclav David to Antonín Novotný, July 20, 1961, National Archives, Czech Republic (hereafter NA, Národní Archiv), NA, KSC/ÚV/ANII, č.f. 1261/0/44, inv. č. 394, ka.166.
27. From Václav David to Antonín Novotný, 20 July 1961, Národní Archiv, f. 1261/0/44, KSC-ÚV-AN2, Inv. 394, ka. 166, 4.
28. Ibid.
29. Alter to Prague, Report on Secretary’s recruitment, 14 August 1961, ABS, 43197/000, 16.
30. Major Rivet (chief of the 8th department) to First Directorate of the Ministry of Interior, Regarding the proposal of the promotion in the rank of captain from 1961 until 30.3.1963, ABS, ‘ALTER’ 119.
31. Jaroslav Kodad (chief of the course), Final report about the course for the members of the PAIGC, 28 February 1964, ABS, 11853/102/2/4, 119; Final report on the security course for the PAIGC members from Guinea-Bissau, ABS, 11853/102/3/4, 203-205; Antonín Janovec (Director of the Central School of the Ministry of the Interior) to the First Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior, 6 November 1963, ABS, 11853/102/2/4, 104-109; Antonín Janovec (Director of the Central School of the Ministry of the Interior) to the First Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior, 22 December 1961, ABS, 11853/102/1/4, 56-59.
33. Vaclavik to Prague, Conversation with Cabral, 10 November 1962, ABS, 43197/020.
34. Ibid.
35. Houska (chief, First Directorate) to Lubomir Strugal (Minister of the Interior), December 29, 1962, ABS, 11853/103.
37. Houska to Kudrna, 3 April 1965, Meetings with Amílcar Cabral in Prague, ABS, 43197/000; Josef Janouš (Fourth department of the StB First Directorate, chief), 23 February 1965, ABS, 11853/000.
39. Peták (Conakry) to Prague, Secretary – meeting after his return from Dakar, 10 February 1968, ABS, 43197/020
42. Vaclavik, Report about the meeting with Secretary, 20 September 1961, ABS, 43197/000.
44. Houska to Kudrna, Information about Cabral’s meeting with the minister of the interior Kudrna, Prague, 19 May 1965, ABS, 43197/000.
45. Conakry, Secretary’s views about Frelimo, 8 September 1966, ABS, 43197/000.
46. Work plan: Portuguese Guinea, 1963-64, 19 August 1963, ABS, 11853/000
47. Josef Houska to Lubomir Strugal, 23 October 1963, Note about negotiations with Secretary in Czechoslovakia 8-14.10.1963, ABS, 43197/000.

49 Prague, 21 The request of second (counterintelligence) directorate, ABS, 43197/020.

50 Prague, 4 May 1962, ‘Secretary’, ABS, 11853/000.


52 Marik (Prague), A record from a meeting with Secretary on 2 February 1966, 25 February 1966, ABS, 43197/020.

53 Peták (Conakry) to Prague, 14 May 1966, ABS, 43197/020.

54 Josef Janouš (Fourth department of the StB First Directorate, chief), Prague, 25 November 1966, ABS, 43197/020.

55 Josef Janouš (Fourth department of the StB First Directorate, chief), Prague, 13 February 1967, ‘Record of talks with Amílcar Cabral’, ABS, 43197/020.

56 Peták (Conakry) to Prague, 26 February 1968, ‘Secretary-Meeting with Nkrumah’, ABS, 43197/020.


58 Vašata (StB), Prague, 4 April 1969, ‘Evaluation of cooperation with confidential contact, SEKRETÁŘ’, ABS, 43197/000.

59 Vasata (Prague), Conclusions about joint work from 1.3.1967 to 1.2.1968, 1 February 1968, ABS, 43197/000.

60 Colonel Josef Janouš (chief of the 4th department) to Miloslav Čada, Prague, 6 December 1968, ABS, “Frantisek Polda” 6125.


63 Pechacek to Prague, 28 January 1969, ABS, 11853.

64 Zdenek Lensky, Results of work with confidential contact SEKRETÁŘ, 24 August 1973, ABS, 43197/000.


66 ‘PAIGC: Foundation for the meeting with GDR’s Intelligence’, Prague, 30 May 1967, ABS, 11853/011.