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DOMtegrity : ensuring web page integrity against malicious browser extensions
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Toreini, Ehsan, Shahandashti, Siamak F., Mehrnezhad, Maryam and Hao, Feng (2019) DOMtegrity : ensuring web page integrity against malicious browser extensions. International Journal of Information Security . doi:10.1007/s10207-019-00442-1 (In Press)
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Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10207-019-00442-1
Abstract
In this paper, we address an unsolved problem in the real world: how to ensure the integrity of the web content in a browser in the presence of malicious browser extensions? The problem of exposing confidential user credentials to malicious extensions has been widely understood, which has prompted major banks to deploy two-factor authentication. However, the importance of the “integrity” of the web content has received little attention. We implement two attacks on real-world online banking websites and show that ignoring the “integrity” of the web content can fundamentally defeat two-factor solutions. To address this problem, we propose a cryptographic protocol called DOMtegrity to ensure the end-to-end integrity of the DOM structure of a web page from delivering at a web server to the rendering of the page in the user’s browser. DOMtegrity is the first solution that protects DOM integrity without modifying the browser architecture or requiring extra hardware. It works by exploiting subtle yet important differences between browser extensions and in-line JavaScript code. We show how DOMtegrity prevents the earlier attacks and a whole range of man-in-the-browser attacks. We conduct extensive experiments on more than 14,000 real-world extensions to evaluate the effectiveness of DOMtegrity.
| Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||||
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| Divisions: | Faculty of Science > Computer Science | ||||||
| Journal or Publication Title: | International Journal of Information Security | ||||||
| Publisher: | Springer | ||||||
| ISSN: | 1615-5262 | ||||||
| Official Date: | 11 June 2019 | ||||||
| Dates: |
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| Date of first compliant deposit: | 5 June 2019 | ||||||
| DOI: | 10.1007/s10207-019-00442-1 | ||||||
| Status: | Peer Reviewed | ||||||
| Publication Status: | In Press | ||||||
| Publisher Statement: | This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in International Journal of Information Security. The final authenticated version is available online at:https://doi.org/10.1007/s10207-019-00442-1 | ||||||
| Access rights to Published version: | Open Access | ||||||
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