The Impact of Democratisation on Environmental Governance in Indonesia: NGOs and Forest Policy Networks

By

Ko Nomura

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Politics

University of Warwick
Department of Politics and International Studies

October 2006
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First of all, I would like to thank my supervisors, Dr Peter Ferdinand and Professor Wyn Grant, for their invaluable support for this project.

I am indebted to a number of friends in Indonesia for assisting my fieldwork there. Among others, I would like to thank Latipah Hendarti, Chusnanto, Hamonangan Siringo-ringo, and the staff members of ARuPA and KOLING.

I would also like to express my profound appreciation to all the interviewees, listed at the end of this thesis, who spared their precious time for my research.

I benefited very much from my ex-colleagues at the Institute for Global Environmental Strategies, where I worked for almost seven years, who gave me various opportunities to learn about environmental issues in general as well as in Indonesia. I am particularly grateful to Professor Akio Morishima and Professor Osamu Abe.

Lastly, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my family for their help in countless ways. This thesis is dedicated to my late father.

DECLARATION

This thesis is entirely my own work and it has not been submitted for a degree at another university.
A NOTE ON SPELLING AND CURRENCY

All Indonesian words are spelt according to the new spelling system introduced in 1972: for example ‘u’ instead of ‘oe’ (e.g. ‘Suharto’ instead of ‘Soeharto’), ‘j’ instead of ‘dj’ (e.g. ‘Jakarta’ instead of ‘Djakarta’), ‘y’ instead of ‘i’ in the old spelling (e.g. now ‘Yogyakarta’ and not ‘Jogjakarta’), and ‘c’ instead of ‘tj’ (e.g. Cirebon instead of Tjirebon).

Exceptionally, old spellings are used when referring to the publications in which the authors’ names are spelt in the old style, to avoid confusion (e.g. Moertopo, 1972, instead of Murtopo, 1972). The personal names once referred to in this manner are spelt in the old style even in the text as well (e.g. General Moertopo said...).

The concept of a surname is not common in Indonesia. Many Indonesians, particularly the Javanese, have only one name (e.g. Suharto). Even if a person has a first and a last name, both of them can be his/her given names, and s/he is often called by the first name in the media (e.g. former Environment Minister Sarwono Kusumaatmadja tends to be referred to ‘Sarwono’ in the Indonesian media). However, following the common usage in English-speaking countries, the last name (in this case ‘Kusumaatmadja’) is used in this thesis to refer to the person regardless of the common Indonesian usage.

The only exception is Megawati Sukarnoputri (neither ‘Megawati’ nor ‘Sukarnoputri’ is her surname). This thesis uses ‘Megawati’ to refer to her, because she is normally called Megawati (or Mega), even in the foreign as well as in the Indonesian media.

The word ‘Ministry’ is chosen as the translation of ‘Departmen’ in Indonesian, although the literal translation of the word should be the ‘Department’. This is because the Indonesian government itself tends to use ‘Ministry’ for the English name of the ‘Departmen’ (e.g. the Ministry of Forestry is used in the English version of the website of Departmen Kehutanan).

The head of the Province, ‘Gubernur’, is translated as the ‘Governor’. The head of the District, ‘Bupati’ is translated as the ‘District Mayor’, although it is often translated as the ‘District Governor’ or ‘Regent’. Also, Kabupaten is translated as District, although it is often translated as Regency.

For the abbreviations of organisations, this thesis tends to use the spelling used by the organisations themselves, including capitalisation. For example, ARuPA (a non-governmental organisation) is not spelt as ARUPA and KpSHK (a network of non-governmental organisations and activists) is not spelt as KPSHK.

The official currency of Indonesia is the Rupiah (or rp). It fluctuates considerably, but it has normally been around US $1 = 10,000 rp for the past 5 years before the time of writing.
# ABBREVIATIONS AND GLOSSARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACF</td>
<td>Advocacy Coalition Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMAN</td>
<td>Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara or Indigenous Peoples’ Alliance of the Archipelago</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMDAL</td>
<td>Analisa Dampak Lingkungan or Environmental Impact Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APKINDO</td>
<td>Asosiasi Produsen Panel Kayu Indonesia or Indonesian Wood Panel Producers Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APRIL</td>
<td>Asia Pacific Resources International Holdings Ltd.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARuPA</td>
<td>Aliansi Relawan untuk Penyelamatan Alam or Volunteers’ Alliance for Saving Nature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAPEDA</td>
<td>Badan Perencanaan Daerah or Local Planning Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAPEDAL</td>
<td>Badan Pengendalian Dampak Lingkungan or Environmental Impact Management Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>BAPEDALDA</td>
<td>Badan Pengendalian Dampak Lingkungan Daerah or Local Environmental Impact Management Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAPPENAS</td>
<td>Badan Perencanaan dan Pembangunan Nasional or National Development Planning Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BKPM</td>
<td>Badan Koordinasi Penanaman Modal or the Investment Coordinating Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPS</td>
<td>Badan Pusat Statistik or Central Statistics Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBOs</td>
<td>Community-based Organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGI</td>
<td>Consultative Group for Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIFOR</td>
<td>Centre for International Forestry Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSOs</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAK</td>
<td>Dana Alokasi Khusus or Special Allocation Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAU</td>
<td>Dana Alokasi Umum or General Allocation Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>UK Department for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DML</td>
<td>Dana Mitra Lingkungan or Friends of Environment Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPR</td>
<td>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat or House of Representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPRD</td>
<td>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah or Local House of Representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECF</td>
<td>Elementally chlorine-free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELSAM</td>
<td>Lembaga Studi Advokasi Masyarakat or Institute for Policy Research and Advocacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EM</td>
<td>Ecological Modernisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENGOs</td>
<td>Environmental NGOs</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESCAP</td>
<td>United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FKKM</td>
<td>Forum Komunikasi Kehutanan Masyarakat or Community Forestry Communication Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FKPPPH</td>
<td>Forum Konsultansi Penanganan Penjarahan dan Penataan Hutan or Consultation Forum on Forest Looting and Arrangement (of</td>
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FoE  Friends of the Earth
FWI  Forest Watch Indonesia
G10  Kelompok Sepuluh Pengembangan Lingkungan Hidup or Group of Ten for Developing the Environment
GBHN  Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara or General State Policy Guideline
GEF  Global Environment Facility
GOLKAR  Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya or Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups (Political Party)
GONGO  s  Government-operated or Government-organised NGOs
GTZ  Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit or German Corporation for Technical Cooperation
HI  Hotel Indonesia
HKBP  Huria Kristen Batak Protestan or Batak Protestant Christian Church
HRW  Human Rights Watch
HSF  Hanss Seidel Foundation (Germany)
HTI  Hutan Tanaman Industri or Industrial Plantation Programme
HuMa  Perkumpulan Untuk Pembaharuan Hukum Berbasis Masyarakat dan Ekologis or Association for Community and Ecology-Based Legal Reform
ICEL  Indonesia Centre for Environmental Law
ICRAF  World Agroforestry Centre
IGGI  Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia
IMF  International Monetary Fund
INFI GHT  Indonesian Front for the Defence of Human Rights
INGI  International NGO Forum on Indonesia
IPB  Bogor Institute of Agriculture
ISO  International Organization for Standardization
ITTO  International Tropical Timber Organisation
IUCN  World Conservation Union
JAMIDI  Jaringan Mitra Dieng or Friends of Dien Network
JANNI  Japan NGO Network on Indonesia
JAPHAMA  Jaringan Pembelaan Hak-hak Masyarakat Adat or Indigenous People’s Rights Advocacy Network
JATAM  Jaringan Advokasi Tambang or Mining Advocacy Network
JICA  Japan International Cooperation Agency
JKPM  Jaringan Kerja Pendamping Masyarakat or Network for Working with Communities
JKPP  Jaringan Kerja Pemetaan Partisipatif or Participatory Mapping Network
JPL  Jaringan Pendidikan Lingkungan or Environmental Education Network
KEHATI  Keanekaragaman Hayati Indonesia or Indonesian Biodiversity Foundation
KEMALA  Kelompok Masyarakat Pengelola Sumberdaya Alam or Community Natural Resource Managers Program
KKN Korupsi, Kollusi, Nepotisme or Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism
KOLING Yayasan Konservasi Lingkungan or Environmental Conservation Foundation
KPRI Korea Pollution Research Institute
KpSHK Konsorsium Pendukung Sistem Hutan Kerakyatan or Community Forestry System Supporting Consortium
KRAPP Kelompok Relawan Anti Penyalahgunaan Pesticida or Volunteer Group against the Misuse of Pesticides
KSBH Kelompok Studi untuk Bantuan Hukum or Study Group for Legal Aid
KSPPM Kelompok Study Pengembangan Prakarsa Masyarakat or Study Group for the Development of People’s Initiative
KUD Koperasi Unit Desa or Village Co-operative Unit
LATIN Lembaga Alam Tropika Indonesia or Indonesian Tropical Nature Institute
LBH Lembaga Bantuan Hukum or Legal Aid Foundation
LEAD Leadership for Environment and Development International
LKMDs Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa or Village Community Resilience Institutions
LP3ES Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan, dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Social or Institute for Social and Economic Research, Education and Information
LSD Lembaga Sosial Desa or Village Community Institution
LSMs Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat or Self-reliant Community Institutions
MAPALA UI Mahasiswa Pencinta Alam Universitas Indonesia or University of Indonesia Nature Lovers Group
MFP Multi-stakeholder Forestry Programme of DFID
MoU Memorandum of Understanding
MPI Masyarakat Perkayuan Indonesia or Indonesian Timber Society
MPR Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat or People’s Consultative Assembly
NGOs Non-governmental Organisations
NKK Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus or Campus Normalisation Act
NRDC Natural Resources Defense Council
NWF National Wildlife Federation
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPSUS Operasi Khusus or Special Intelligence Operations
ORMAS Organisasi Masyarakat or Social Organisations
ORNOP Organisasi Non Pemerintah or Non-governmental Organisations
PAD Pendapatan Asli Daerah or Locally Derived Revenue
PAR Participatory Action Research
PARBATO Partungkoan Batak Toba or Batak Toba Forum
PDI Partai Demokrasi Indonesia or Indonesian Democratic Party
PDI-Perjuangan Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan or Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle
Perhutani State Forestry Corporation (in Java and Madura)
Perum Perusahaan Umum or State Corporation
PHBM Pengelolaan Hutan Bersama Masyarakat or Joint Forestry
Management Approach (Perhutani’s Version of Participatory Forestry).

PIRAC Public Interest Research and Advocacy Centre
PKB Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa or National Awakening Party
PKI Indonesian Communist Party
PKK Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga or Association for Promoting Family Welfare
PMDH Pembinaan Masyarakat Desa Hutan or Forest Village Community Development (A State Version of Participatory Forestry)
PNLH Pertemuan Nasional Lingkungan Hidup or National Environmental Meeting
PP Peraturan Pemerintah or Government Regulations
PPLH-Seloliman Pusat Pendidikan Lingkungan Hidup-Seloliman or Environmental Education Centre in Seloliman
PRA Participatory Rural Appraisal
PROPENAS Program Pembangunan Nasional or National Development Programme
PSDHBM Pengelolaan Sumber Daya Hutan Berbasis Masyarakat or Community-based Natural Resources Management (Wonosobo Version of Participatory Forestry)
PT Perseroan Terbatas or a Limited Liability Company
QUANGOs Quasi-NGOs
REC Regional Environmental Center for Central and Eastern Europe
REPELITA Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun or Five-year Economic Development Plan
RGM Raja Garuda Mas Group
RMI Rimbawan Muda Indonesia or Indonesian Institute for Forest and Environment
SEKDA Sekretaris Daerah or District Secretary
SEPKUBA Serikat Petani Kedu dan Banyumas or United Farmers in Kedu and Banyumas (a farmers’ network group in Wonosobo)
SK Surat Keputusan or Decision Letter (Decree)
SKEPHI Sekretariat Kerjasama Pelestarian Hutan Indonesia or Joint Secretariat for the Conservation of Indonesia Forests
SKREPP Sekretariat Kerjasama Relawan Pengelolaan Polusi or Joint Secretariat for Pollution Management
SRB Suara Rakyat Bersama or United People’s Voice
TEI Thailand Environment Institute
TEPU Taiwan Environmental Protection Union
TNC The Nature Conservancy
TNCs Trans-national Corporations
TPTI Tebang Pilih dan Tanam Indonesia or Selective Cutting and Replanting Scheme
UNCED United Nations Conference for Environment and Development (Rio Summit)
UNCHE UN Conference on the Human Environment
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNEP</td>
<td>United Nations Environment Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRPAD</td>
<td>Development Research and Policy Analysis Division of UNESCAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UU</td>
<td>Undang-undang or Law</td>
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<tr>
<td>WALHI</td>
<td>Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia or Indonesian Forum for Environment</td>
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<tr>
<td>WARSI</td>
<td>Warung Informasi Konservasi or Conservation Information Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WCED</td>
<td>World Commission on Environment and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIM</td>
<td>Wahana Informasi Masyarakat or Community Information Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>WRI</td>
<td>World Resources Institute</td>
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<td>WWF</td>
<td>World Wildlife Fund</td>
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<td>WWI</td>
<td>World Watch Institute</td>
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<td>yayasan</td>
<td>Foundation</td>
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<td>YIH</td>
<td>Yayasan Indonesia Hijau or Indonesia Green Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>YLKI</td>
<td>Yayasan Lembaga Konsumen Indonesia or Indonesian Consumers Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YPPDT</td>
<td>Yayasan Perhimpunan Pencinta Danau Toba or Lake Toba Heritage Foundation</td>
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ABSTRACT

This thesis argues that democratisation affected environmental governance in Indonesia in two aspects: the development of environmental NGOs (ENGOs) and their involvement in policy networks. The former is analysed from three perspectives of social movement theories: ‘political opportunities’, ‘framing’ and ‘resource mobilisation’. The perspectives on the latter are derived from theories of the policy process: the ‘policy network’ and Kingdon’s ‘multiple streams’.

Indonesian ENGOs developed significantly after the late 1980s, together with the democratisation movement. Democratic ideas ‘re-framed’ environmental issues, which stimulated and politicised ENGO activities, while increasing ‘political opportunities’ by shifting the values of government officials. They also enhanced ENGOs’ accountability and their embedding in local communities. The democratisation of formal institutions after the late 1990s facilitated ENGO activities, but it was not the decisive factor for their development. Neither was economic growth: the impacts of economic changes were not straightforward.

The case studies of the pulp-rayon company Indorayon and the policy-making process of participatory forestry in Wonosobo District show that the spread of democratic ideas resulted in the incorporation of ENGOs in policy networks, which had previously been a ‘politico-business oligarchy’ in the authoritarian Suharto period, by increasing their resources, particularly ‘legitimacy’. Also, ENGOs significantly facilitated the inclusion of other actors in the networks. On the other hand, conventional informal institutions still remained and they constrained actors. This helped conventionally strong actors (e.g. the state and large businesses) to preserve their political leverage.

The spread of democratic ideas influenced agenda-setting and policy formulation. It is suggested that utilitarian arguments for democratisation (i.e. democratisation for better ecological consequences) could produce policies that neglected the social aspect of sustainable development, which in turn negatively influenced their ecological and economic impacts. ‘Rights-based’ arguments (e.g. participation is a right) seem more conducive to the efforts for sustainable development in the South.
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Few would disagree that changes in political institutions and ideas have environmental impacts, for they can shape the behaviours of the related actors. Some of the changes support or constrain activities to protect the environment, while others facilitate or restrict these, and degrade it. Thus, it is not surprising if we wonder what the environmental implications of democratisation are like, for it is 'perhaps the most important' global political development of the late 20th century (Huntington, 1991:xiii), which is still continuing up to now.

Despite its importance, the issue has been studied insufficiently. This is especially true in the context of the Third World, while more ink has been spent on the cases in the transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe. However, its potential impacts are more significant in the former. Ecologically, the world’s precious natural resources are disproportionately located there, and are being depleted rapidly. Economically, the demand for development is higher there, particularly using valuable resources. Under such conditions, how to balance the economy and ecology while achieving social equity - or sustainable development - is an essentially difficult political task.

To solve this difficulty, using the words of Dryzek (1997), many argue that it is better to 'leave it to the experts' than 'leave it to the people'. The consequences of democratic decision making are uncertain and can be 'irrational' for achieving sustainable development, as it involves various interests and people without sufficient environmental

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1 There are arguments that the term 'Third World' should be rephrased as '(global) South', 'developing countries/world' or 'emerging areas' for such reasons as the collapse of the Soviet bloc (Second World) and the diversity of the countries included; however, it still retains relevance and usefulness for geopolitical analysis, showing a major axis of economic and political inequality (Randall, 2004). This thesis interchangeably uses these terms, including Third World, in this context.
knowledge and awareness. Some may consider the educational level of the poor in the Third World is not high enough for people to make rational decisions concerning such a subtle issue. If they see less value in participation or democracy itself, they would prefer to give more discretionary power to experts for utilitarian reasons. This tension would be more distinct if experts like bureaucrats succeeded in raising economic growth in a state-centric manner, such as the countries in East Asia.

This thesis examines the environmental implications of democratisation by studying the case of a developing country in East Asia: Indonesia. Indonesia was selected for several reasons. In ecological terms, it is a country of great biodiversity, with the third-largest area of tropical forests in the world. The forests are disappearing very fast: 1,312,000 ha of forests went annually between 1990-2000, which accounts for about 50% of the deforestation in Asia (FAO, 2003). This poses a major threat to wildlife: Indonesia is the home to 833 threatened species, which ranks it fourth in the world (IUCN, 2004).

In economic terms, demand for natural resources is very high. Indonesia is a developing country with its GDP per capita still around US $1,000 (see Appendix A). Forests have been the largest source of foreign currency after oil. Just before the economic crisis in 1997, forest related activities accounted for 10 percent of GDP or about US $20 billion (World Bank, 2001). The state gained more than US $1.1 billion per annum from forest operations in terms of royalties and other government revenues (World Bank, 2001). The significance of the forest ecosystem can also be understood in view of the impacts on the livelihood of its 220,000,000-strong population: about 44 percent of the labour force in Indonesia is in the primary industries, namely Agriculture, Forestry, Hunting and Fishery.2

The state has set up formal institutions to monopolise the control over forests since colonial times, which was legitimised by local political cultures, 'scientific' knowledge of the experts (mainly state officials), and the remarkable record of economic growth. This interaction of formal institutions, informal institutions and ideas to constitute the

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state-centric approach to economic growth is also seen in other neighbouring countries, and is often termed the 'East Asian Development Model'. In other words, Indonesia could learn from the forerunners of the model, but now it is facing the need to find a new way of development in the context of democratisation.

Finally, studying the Indonesian case is justified because its formal institutions started democratising only within the last decade after the fall of Suharto in 1998, who ruled the country for 32 years and established strong control over natural resources and civil society activities. This means important information is still fresh and accessible to illuminate the impact of democratisation on the behaviour of various political actors.

This chapter first provides an outline of the argument in 1.1 by focusing on the research question, the key concepts, and the structure of this thesis. The regional contexts are reviewed in 1.2 for a better understanding of the situation of Indonesia. This is followed by a description of the methodology used in this thesis in 1.3.

1.1 Key Concepts, Research Question and the Structure of this Thesis

Examining the environmental implications of 'democratisation' means, in a recently fashionable term, examining the 'democratisation' of environmental 'governance'. This section first clarifies these key concepts, 'democratisation' and 'governance', in addition to the key actors in this thesis, environmental non-governmental organisations (ENGOs).

**Democratisation**

Democratisation can be defined as the shift of *institutions* and *ideas* in a democratic direction. So, what is 'democracy' and how is the transition process defined? The concept of democracy contains multiple elements. One cannot expect the progress in each of these elements at the same tempo and to the same degree, in a linear manner, in the process of democratisation. Although it is almost impossible to produce incontrovertible answers, there have been many scholarly efforts to respond to these questions, and it is necessary to have working definitions or concepts of these key issues for analytical purposes.

Basically, democracy emphasises two dimensions: 'who' participates and 'how' in making collectively binding rules and policies. As for the former, *popular control* is a key
principle of democracy, as the term ‘democracy’ consists of demos (people) and kratos (rule) in Greek, which contrasts with the rule by particular people. In relation to the latter, many consider equality is important. Corresponding to these two dimensions, Beetham (1992: 40) describes the most democratic arrangement as that ‘where all members of the collectivity enjoy effective equal rights to take part in such decision-making directly’.

Some have argued there are several patterns of democratisation, despite its diversity. Echoing the two dimensions of democracy, ‘who’ participates and ‘how’, Dahl (1971) argues that institutional democratisation tends to follow developments in ‘participation’ (or inclusiveness) and ‘political liberalisation’ (or public contestation). Participation refers to the proportion of citizens who can participate in the political process, such as voting in elections and holding office. Political liberalisation refers to the extent to which rights and liberties are provided to at least some members of society. Political liberty is an essential condition for a sound mechanism to reflect people’s will over decisions made. By putting the former on the X and the latter on the Y axis, the increase in these is considered as democratisation.

It is reasonable to argue that his two dimensions in this form fall short of the purpose of this thesis and need to be modified. This is particularly because they focus mainly on formal institutions. Formal institutions are certainly necessary for democracy. Schumpeter (1976: 260) argues that ‘the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote’.

However, there are more factors that shape the democratic process in practice, such as social and economic conditions, as has been pointed out, in particular, by social liberals. Held (1996) argues that the advocates of liberal democracy have tended to focus on the government or institutions, paying little attention to the difference between formal and actual rights and obligations, commitments to treat citizens as free and equal, and practices which do neither sufficiently. The right to enjoy political liberty in law does not

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3 Dahl’s model also considers socio-economic factors, but as the drivers of institutional transition rather than as constraints on the democratic process under democratic institutions.
4 Held (1996: 315) says, ‘the structures of civil society (including the prevailing forms of productive and financial property, sexual and racial inequalities)...do not create conditions for equal votes, effective participation, proper political understanding and equal control of the
always produce the same result in practice in different contexts, as it is constrained by factors such as poverty, economic disparity and political culture, which is related to the equality principle of democracy mentioned earlier. Lower economic levels of development tends to mean that fewer financial and human resources are available for civil society activities. A disparity of wealth can result in inequalities in political resources in favour of the rich. Some political cultures may hinder the political actions of certain people, such as women.

Partly due to the lack of viewpoints on such non-institutional factors, Dahl mainly regards ‘participation’ as a quantitative matter, in that the number of participants matters, although participation in a qualitative sense (for instance, to what degree people can participate) is equally important in the arguments of the policy process in particular. It can be constrained by conditions like education level and political culture. Also, participation cannot contribute to popular control without the public accountability and internal democracy of major non-state participants such as large corporations (see Beetham, 1994, for example). Besides, pro forma participation, which may end up with co-option, will not bring about ‘people’s rule’. In institutional aspects, the case in which right of participation is limited in elections and office should be different from the case in which people can participate in public consultations, referenda, and other important opportunities to influence the public choice for which open and accountable government are necessary.

In addition to formal-legal settings, this thesis pays attention to other elements, such as informal institutions and socio-economic conditions, given their significance in analysing the case of developing areas. By doing so, this thesis examines the ‘qualitative’ aspect of participation as well. Although it is true that the simple advancement of political liberalisation and participation does not always promise ‘people’s control’, these two dimensions can help us to conceive the process of democratisation after taking into account the political agenda.

3 ‘Participation’ can also mean taking part in associations such as ENGOs. To avoid confusion here, it is included in the dimension of liberalisation, while the dimension of ‘participation’ only refers to the involvement in the decision making process.

6 Accountability ‘depends upon public knowledge of what government is up to, from sources that are independent of its own public relations machine’ (Beetham, 1994: 29).
consideration these issues.

Accordingly, the terms ‘democratic ideas’ and ‘democratic institutions’ include these points in this thesis, and they are defined as follow. Democratic ideas are the ideas that value the efforts to further ‘political liberalisation’ and ‘participation’. Democratic institutions are the institutions that help achieve these two dimensions.

There are two variants in democratic ideas. The ‘rights-based’ (or ‘liberal’) ideas emphasise political rights or liberties in particular. In contrast, ‘utilitarian’ ideas value democracy because it is considered to result in better consequences. Utilitarianism or the utilitarian approach in this thesis means a view that an action is right if it maximises good consequences for the general population. Bentham argued that ‘it is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is the measure of right and wrong’ (Bentham, 1776: 3; italics in original). In the scope of this thesis, utilitarianism, which is often labelled as ‘consequentialism’ in the sense that decisions are made based on their consequences (see for example, Sen and Williams, 1982), is an approach which prioritises ecological (and/or socio-economic) consequences in decision-making.

One may also have to mention that decentralisation can increase the quantity of participants and processes of decision making. A decentralised state system is not a requisite for democracy, and vice versa. Nevertheless, in addition to Rousseauist arguments in favour of a small territory to enable direct democracy and popular control, democratisation very often entails decentralisation in practice, partly because authoritarian regimes take centrally dominated social order to suppress oppositions (Dahl, 1971: 48-61). Since this is the case in Indonesia, this thesis also deals with decentralisation in the context of democratisation.

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7 See also Bentham (1789), Chapter 1. Another influential advocate of utilitarianism, J.S. Mill, joined Bentham in defining ‘utility’ or ‘the Greatest Happiness Principle’ in this ‘consequentialist’ manner – ‘actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness’ (Mill, 1861: 7) – regardless of the different accounts of ‘happiness’ between the two philosophers.

8 Utilitarianism is ‘the most familiar version of Consequentialism’, whose purest and simplest form is a moral doctrine that the right act in any given situation is the one that will produce the best overall outcome (Scheffler, 1988a: 1, 2). See Scheffler (1988) for consequentialism.

9 This thesis follows the World Resources Institute’s definition of decentralisation (Ribot, 2004). It involves political decentralisation (or democratic democratisation or devolution), such as transfers of power to elected local authorities to enable people to make decisions for themselves, and administrative decentralisation (or deconcentration), such as transfers of power to local
There are studies which have tried to distinguish phases of democratisation, although each phase overlaps with the next (or the previous) phase. Such simple models can, at least, be powerful heuristic devices, although one has to be cautious of the relations with 'modernisation' theories which consider that democratisation proceeds in a certain direction in a unilinear manner.

Democratisation can be divided into three phases. First, there is always a 'historical context' leading to institutional democratisation, for it does not come overnight. Second, democratic institutions have to be established. Third, democracy needs to be consolidated based on these institutionalised democratic elements. In Rustow’s terms, they are the preparatory phase, the decision phase, and the habituation phase (Rustow, 1970). He uses the 'preparatory phase' to refer to 'a prolonged and inconclusive political struggle', which 'is likely to begin as the result of the emergence of a new elite that arouses a depressed and previously leaderless social group into concerted action' (Rustow, 1970: 352). The decision phase comes when leaders of each party in the inconclusive political struggle decide to compromise and institutionalise some crucial democratic rules. This is when actual institutional changes mainly take place. In the next phase (the habituation phase), some rules made in the decision phase become a habit. Democracy is developed further and ingrained in the political culture in this phase.

The 'preparatory phase' is important for this thesis as it includes important changes in civil society. It is the phase mainly referring to the struggles of individuals, groups and classes against the authoritarian state. In this phase, the changes in ideas and socio-economic conditions start to take place. In his book on Indonesian democratisation, Uhlin (1997: 156) mentions that in this phase (he calls this the 'pre-transition phase'), 'state dominance over society is still strong, but not as complete as the authoritarian leaders wish. A civil society with a large number of relatively independent NGOs is emerging and it becomes increasingly hard for the authoritarian state to control and

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10 Rustow (1970: 350) also mentioned 'national unity' as one background condition for democratisation: '[T]he vast majority of citizens in a democracy-to-be must have no doubt or mental reservations as to which political community they belong to', for example, we are Indonesians. He fails to mention the cases of democratisation without these phases, like the ones which result from military defeat, where institutions are often implanted by a foreign power. However, this does not undermine the usefulness of this concept in this thesis.
repress dissenting sections of society'.

Rustow’s ‘habituation phase’ is the phase in which democracy is ‘consolidated’. Since the latter is nowadays more commonly used, this phase is called the ‘consolidation phase’ in this thesis. These three phases can be illustrated as Figure 1-1.

![Figure 1-1 The Phases of Democratisation](image)

**Governance**

The concept of ‘governance’ should help us to understand the impacts of democratisation, because it also includes the participation of non-governmental actors. Boäs (1998: 120) states that governance ‘is embedded in and interwoven with state-civil society interaction in any given nation’ and it ‘embraces governmental institutions, but it also subsumes informal, non-governmental institutions operating within the public realm’. The term ‘governance’ became fashionable after the 1980s, reflecting changes in the way of governing in the real world. At that time, civil society involvement was increasingly considered to be more important to address the issues in the public sphere. This is because the transformations of the issues and the society have challenged the traditional institutional strength of the nation state (Pierre, 2000).

For analytical purposes, it is necessary to have a working definition of this somewhat vague concept. The meanings of ‘governance’ tend to vary according to the people and contexts. According to Hirst (2000) and Rhodes (1997, 2000), the major versions of the term include governance as ‘the new public management’, ‘international institutions and regimes’, ‘networks’, ‘good governance’, and ‘corporate governance’.

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11 This is not applicable to ‘corporate governance’.
12 According to UNDP (1997: 1): ‘Governance includes the state, but transcends it by taking in the private sector and civil society’. The Commission on Global Governance (1995: 2) states that governance is ‘the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private manage their common affairs’.
13 Rhodes also includes ‘a socio-cybernetic system’ and ‘the new political economy’ here.
Governance as ‘new public management’ is advanced in the context of the ascendance of neo-liberal regimes in Western countries. It refers to such features of public sector management as the involvement of non-state actors through privatisation of public services and companies, as well as the introduction of commercial practices and management styles, for (cost-)effectiveness. The increasing influence of businesses and NGOs has supported this trend.

Globalisation has enhanced the importance of governance in terms of ‘international institutions and regimes’, which emphasises the incorporation of non-state actors. The expansion of trans-national business activities has increased not only the political leverage of private companies but also the issues that cannot be handled by each nation-state alone, such as global environmental problems and international trade. On the other hand, the advances of information technology and transportation have facilitated the development of international ties and the activities of NGOs, which can make a significant contribution to the management of global issues.

Instead of the centralised and hierarchical corporatist representation of interests in the policy process, a self-organising ‘network’, which involves a complex set of organisations from the public and private sectors, has become the ‘analytical heart of the notion of governance in the study of public administration’ (Rhodes, 2000). This version of governance has attracted attention especially in Europe, reflecting not only the neo-liberalisation of regimes, but also the shift of authority to the local level through decentralisation and to the regional level in the course of European integration which have ‘differentiated’ polities (Rhodes, 1997). These have resulted in an increase in actors and the significance of their management. In this context, Rhodes (1997) defines governance as being about ‘managing networks’.

In the field of international assistance, governance has been related to the capacity building of actors in the South for a more democratic process under the banner of ‘good governance’, which is ‘among other things, participatory, transparent and accountable’ (UNDP, 1997: 4). Hirst (2000:14) says that good governance ‘means creating an effective political framework...stable regimes, the rule of law, efficient state administration

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14 See Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan (1999) who linked governance with networks and tried to
adapted to the roles that governments can actually perform, and a *strong civil society independent of the state*’ (italics added). This is partly because, together with the trend of democratisation, neo-liberal ideas have influenced organisations such as the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP; see Weiss, 2000). In addition, it has been increasingly recognised that assistance to countries with a state-dominated (or undemocratic) approach to economic and social development has tended to turn out to be a failure, as well as suggesting that it is necessary to develop the relatively weak civil society in the Third World. In this context, more emphasis is put on the capacity building of the state and non-state actors to adapt to and strengthen a new participatory way of governing.

Governance in this thesis must consider the increase in the participants and the ‘differentiation’ of polities as well as the context of developing countries, which means governance as ‘network’ and ‘good governance’ (or the capacity building of actors especially in a democratic direction). Accordingly, in this thesis, (environmental) governance is about *‘managing networks and developing the capacity of each political actor’* (to steer the economy and society in order to cope with environmental issues). While ‘good governance’ emphasises the democratic development of the state, this thesis puts more emphasis on that of civil society actors, particularly environmental non-governmental organisations (ENGOs). One reason is that democratisation can potentially have greater impacts on their hitherto-constrained activities. Another is their capacity to connect the ‘differentiated polities’ (which are a major aspect of democratisation, as was mentioned earlier), for example, between local and national levels (see below). Based on this definition, this thesis tries to examine how the democratic transition of formal institutions and ideas enhances or weakens the environmental governance.

**Environmental NGOs (ENGOs)**

Civil society is, taken as an observable reality, ‘the population of groups formed for collective purposes *primarily* outside the state and marketplace’ (van Rooy, 1998:30).
Accordingly, civil society groups are diverse in size and interests, ranging from large charity groups and national-level academic societies to local leisure clubs. ENGOs are one of these, and need to be delineated from the other groups for analytical purposes.

Potter defines an ENGO as 'an organisation that is non-governmental and non-profit making' and engaged primarily 'with an environmental problem or problems' (Potter, 1996b: 26; italics in original). His first emphasis brings our attention to the difference between an organisation and a 'movement'. Although one can see ENGOs as movement actors (see Rawcliffe, 1998: 32-63), as many sociologists do, a movement could either involve multiple organisations or do without any. Either could be ephemeral while the other remains active. Because their impacts are more recognisable in the policy process, this thesis focuses on ENGOs with reference to the environmental movement.

The key to defining a NGO is that their activities are not those of governments or private companies, but of civil society. A boundary problem arises here, reflected in the existence of GONGOs (government-operated or government-organised NGOs) and QUANGOs (quasi non-governmental organisations). These are set up by the state or governmental agencies, professional groups, or profit-making companies. Although they operate in the public sphere, they often represent the interests of, and are financially dependent on, the state or a certain section of society as 'sectional' groups. Especially in developing countries, GONGOs are often established by states to qualify for foreign aid, which has shifted since the late 1980s to NGOs bypassing the state.

By the same token, a boundary problem is posed by community-based organisations (CBOs), whose membership are based on a particular community or communities. There are many environmental CBOs and their roles are significant in environmental governance. Yet they may not go beyond NIMBY ('not in my backyard') attitudes, and they may pay insufficient attention to environmental issues in other areas, even if they may be contributing to causing them. Recognising the blurred line of borders, this thesis distinguishes NGOs from GONGOs, QUANGOs and CBOs.

So, what does the term 'environment' mean? Having considered the diverse needs in...

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15 QUANGO should also include religious and political organisations.
16 NGOs have attracted researchers particularly in development studies. See Korten (1990), Edwards and Hulme (1992), and World Development Vol. 15, Supplement 1.
developing countries, this thesis considers ‘environment’ in a broader sense of sustainable development, which encompasses not only environmental but also economic and social objectives, such as poverty alleviation and equity\textsuperscript{17}. ‘Many NGOs have broader remits than just the environment... This is particularly true in the South, where nearly all environmental NGOs direct their attention more broadly at development problems within which a particular environmental aspect may be only one of several concerns’ (Potter, 1996b: 26). On that basis, as Bryant and Bailey (1997: 130) state, what distinguishes a development NGO and an ENGO is the latter’s ‘emphasis on the need to pursue such objectives via the mechanism of environmental conservation’. In line with their arguments, this thesis uses Potter’s definition of ENGOs by inserting the word ‘primarily’ between ‘engaged’ and ‘with’, as is shown above, to distinguish ‘environmental’ NGOs from other NGOs.

The significance of ENGOs is largely based on the above-defined features. Their political independence enables them to work in a trans-boundary and cross-sectoral manner without constraints of particular interests. In particular, their capacity to study economic and social conditions and politicise them at local, national and international levels, or their capacity to make ‘translational linkage’ between the biophysical and political as well as the local and global (Princen and Finger, 1994), makes it difficult for them to be substituted by other actors.

ENGOs as pressure groups can enhance democracy especially when they are representing the politically weak or marginalised, as ‘they permit citizens to express their views on complex issues which affect their lives’ (Grant, 2000: 35). Each vote is counted equally, as in most voting systems, ‘but numerical democracy finds it difficult, without elaborate systems of weighting votes, to take account of the intensity of opinion on a particular issue. Democracy cannot be simply reduced to a head-counting exercise: it must also take account of the strength of feelings expressed, and of the quality of arguments advanced’ (Grant, 2000: 36). The significance of this point in developing countries is evident. In addition to being an important service provider, especially at the

\textsuperscript{17} See Chapter 2 for the definition of sustainable development. For the three aspects of it, see Munasinghe (1993) and Adams (2001) for example. Chapter 2 elaborates on its connection with democracy and participation.
community level, these features of ENGOs make them important in environmental governance.

**Research Question and the Structure of this Thesis**

Defining governance as ‘managing networks’ and ‘developing the capacity of each political actor’, this thesis hypothesises that the major impacts of democratisation on environmental governance are twofold: (A) the development of civil society actors (ENGOs) and (B) their involvement in policy networks.

‘Political liberalisation’ improves the conditions for civil society’s political activities, which can lead to (A). Individuals have the right to gather and disseminate information as well as to develop collective actions such as associating and lobbying. The media can raise public awareness in many regards without the fear of being censored or banned, which plays a very important role in increasing public support for civil society activities as well as their political influence. The rise of economic and educational levels as well as the dissemination of democratic ideas can substantiate political liberalisation and push forward the citizens’ environmental actions. They can also enhance the capacity of each actor, which contributes to enhancing democracy. Increasing the opportunities to ‘participate’ can stimulate ENGOs. Open and responsive government motivates political activities and support for non-governmental actors, as there are more chances for them to influence policies.

Democratisation increases opportunities for the political ‘participation’ of civil society, leading to (B). Along with institutional changes such as the increase in the entry points, democratic ideas shared among actors help citizens to work with governments and others. ENGOs can play an important part in this, not only in terms of their own

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18 In addition to the ‘individual rights and the open marketplace of ideas’ and ‘regime responsiveness’, Payne (1995) suggested that the ‘political learning’, ‘internationalism’ and ‘open market’ embedded in democracy make it more suitable for environmental conservation, largely through facilitating civil society activities.

19 Political liberalisation influences environmental policy outcomes. Based on comparative studies of environmental policy successes in 12 OECD countries, Jänicke (1996: 82) argues that ‘it is not primarily the institutional set-up of representative democracy which is advantageous for positive policy outcomes, but rather the constitutional civil rights of western democracies - participatory, legal and informational opportunity structures available to proponents of environmental interests - which appear to be most decisive’. He also mentions that ‘the strength...
contribution to decision making but also by involving peoples who used to be ‘outsiders’ like the marginalised.

In view of this, the research question of this thesis is: ‘How did democratisation affect ENGOs and policy networks in Indonesia?’. Attention is paid to the role of not only formal institutions but also informal institutions, ideas, and socio-economic conditions. Studying the case of a Southern country will help us think about the impact of democratisation on environmental governance by providing good information on the last three aspects. This thesis also examines the environmental implications of democratisation (understood as the political outcomes of these twofold changes of governance) as a subsidiary topic, because they have an impact on the decisions made: according to Payne (1995), there are more ENGOs, and they are more influential in democratic context.

Figure 1-2 shows the conceptual framework of this thesis, illustrating the relationship between these four viewpoints (ideas, socioeconomic conditions, informal and formal institutions), and the two dimensions of democratisation (political liberalisation and participation), the two dimensions of governance (development of actors and their involvement in networks), and the two major arguments for the congruencies of democracy and the environment (rights-based and utilitarian arguments), which relate to the subsidiary topic.

Figure 1-2 Conceptual Framework

and professionalism of environmental organizations’ matters to make a difference.
This thesis pays particular attention to democratic ideas. Almost by definition, in most of the cases, democratic ideas do not get along well with informal institutions developed in the pre-democratisation period. Neither do they fit with the conventional state-centric approach to development and vested interests in Indonesia. The perspective of how democratic ideas conflict with conventional informal institutions and economic interests will help understand the impact of democratisation on environmental governance.

This thesis consists of eight chapters. The impact of democratisation on one of the two dimensions of governance, ‘(A) the development of ENGOs’, is studied in Chapter 4. The other dimension ‘(B) the involvement of ENGOs in policy networks’ is studied in Chapters 5, 6, and 7, which is followed by the Conclusion in Chapter 8 (see 1.2 for the selection of cases in these chapters).

The analyses in these chapters are made based on the theories reviewed in Chapter 2. The first section (2.1) reviews social movement theories to identify the factors contributing to the growth of ENGOs with reference to their relations with democratisation. To support and illustrate the theories, the historical development of ENGOs in other countries is included. The second section (2.2) reviews theories of the policy process. Attention is paid to the applicability of theories of the policy process, as they have been developed in the context of relatively politically stable countries in the better-off North and are rarely used in a Third World context, especially in the transitional period. The third section (2.3) studies the discussion on the relationship between democracy and the environment, particularly arguments for democratisation of environmental politics. Based on these literature reviews, some analytical checkpoints are set out at the end of Chapter 2 for the analysis in the following chapters.

Chapter 3 outlines environmental governance in Indonesia in the Suharto period before democratisation started, which is necessary in order to see the impacts of democratic transition. Besides, the section on the ENGOs in that period will make a contribution to the literature together with that in the post-democratisation period, given that there are few comprehensive studies on the historical development of Indonesian
1.2 The Regional Context in East Asia

Economy and the Environment: the Conventional State-Centric Approach

As was mentioned at the beginning of this Chapter, studying the impact of democratisation on environmental governance in East Asia\(^{20}\) is significant. One reason is that 'the rule by experts' has proved to be effective for economic growth there. In such circumstances, one can expect a tension between the state and democratic ideas. In addition, the study of East Asian countries is meaningful in terms of the global environment, given the current and future ecological impacts of their rapidly growing economies. The study of successful developmental East Asian states can also contribute to the debate on whether growth should come first for environmental conservation. Besides, the similarity of the style of governance within the region suggests that the study of Indonesia can provide useful viewpoints for the cases of other countries.

To put it the other way round, learning about the pattern of environmental governance in its regional context is suggestive for the study of Indonesia. In fact, the related literature is reviewed in Chapter 2. For a better understanding of the Indonesian case, this sub-section outlines the trend of environmental governance in East Asia.

East Asia has been the fastest growing group of economies in the world since the Second World War. In particular, Japan, Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand have grown three times as fast as Latin America and South Asia, and 25 times faster than Sub-Saharan Africa, in the three decades from the 1960s (World Bank 1993: 2). Regardless of the temporary slump due to the regional economic crisis in 1997, the economy is still growing steadily (see Appendix A).

The state, or its bureau-technocrats, has arguably played a key role in this 'economic miracle'. Strong state intervention in the market has brought about an efficient resource

\(^{20}\)This thesis regards East Asia as consisting of two sub-regions, namely Southeast Asia (Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Cambodia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Myanmar, Thailand, Viet Nam) and Northeast Asia (China, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mongolia). Categorisation of countries is based on that by United Nations' (although the Russian Federation is not included in Northeast Asia in this thesis, unlike the UN's categorisation). See for example, ESCAP and ADB (2000).
allocation. This state-centric style is often termed the ‘East Asian development model’ or ‘developmental state’. In addition to the experts’ superiority in (scientific) knowledge, the traditional political culture has underpinned the state institutions. This has often been endorsed by the political leaders as ‘Asian values’, which respect harmony, seniority, loyalty towards groups (e.g. family, corporation and the nation), the forgoing of personal freedom for the sake of society’s prosperity, and the pursuit of academic and technological excellence. Starting with Japan, this model has spread to the other late industrialisers in a ‘flying geese’ manner.

East Asian developmental states have responded to environmental issues in a similar state-centric manner. The rapid industrialisation in the 1950s and 60s made Japan one of the most polluted countries in the world; however, the government quickly coped with it by developing and implementing strong and multi-faceted policies. The OECD (1977: 83-84) reported that Japan ‘won many pollution abatement battles’ by relying on the government ‘planning mechanisms’. Japan has now become one of the most ‘clean and green five’ countries in the world (Dryzek, 1997). Other countries in the region (especially in Northeast Asia) took a similar style of pollution control measures, to a greater or lesser extent.

The path Japan took has often been argued as a model of ‘ecological modernisation’ (EM), although one would not see the term explicitly used by local policy makers. Since the experiences of Japan seem influential for the other countries, the basic ideas of EM deserve our attention here. EM has become a dominant policy discourse in Western industrial countries, especially in Europe (see Hajer, 1995, Dryzek, 1997 for example).

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21 For the arguments on developmental state, see White (1988); Aoki et al. (1998); Woo-Cumings (1999); and World Bank (1993).
22 Sukarno and Suharto (Indonesia), Lee Kwan Yew (Singapore), Mahathir Mohamad (Malaysia), Sarit Thanarat (Thailand) are among the national leaders who advocated this ‘Asian way’.
23 See for example, Akamatsu (1965) and Cumings (1984).
24 O’Connor (1994) and Harashima (1996; Harashima and Morita, 1995, 1998) found that late Asian industrialisers developed environmental policies with lower GDP per capita than Japan with strong state initiatives, possibly by learning from the earlier cases of neighbouring countries. Harashima concludes that South Korea finished the ‘consolidation period of environmental policy development’ when its GDP per capita was US $6,800, while it was around US $8,000 for Japan.
25 See Barret (2005) for EM’s application to Japan. The concept of EM was first introduced by Huber (1982, 1985), and developed by scholars such as Jänicke (1985, 1988), Weale (1992), Hajer (1995), and Mol and Spaargaren (1993, 2000).
26 The contentious report of the World Bank (1992) can also be included here.
Although it contains many variants, one major common characteristic is to see the win-win or positive-sum relations between economic growth and environmental conservation. It is 'late twentieth-century capitalism's response to the emerging environmental challenge' through 'avoiding the need for structural economic change' (Young, 2000: 27-28). The key concept is that 'there is money in it for business' (Dryzek, 1997: 142), for instance, pollution prevention pays as it makes production more efficient; it would be more expensive to solve the problem in the future; and green goods and pollution prevention products sell. Although this may sound 'too good to be true' (Giddens, 1998), the ecological achievements in such countries as Germany, the Netherlands, Japan, Norway and Sweden have enhanced the EM arguments, and it has also been interpreted in a 'prescriptive manner' (Mol, 1995) (see Chapter 2 for more about EM).

The experience of colonization is another aspect of the state-centric model in the case of resource-rich Southeast Asia. Policies are made by the state to maximize the economic utility of the environment. Colonization shifted the control over land and natural resources from local communities and traditional rulers to a national administration through the introduction of central government institutions, such as ministries of forestry, for efficient exploitation of resources for the colonial ruler.

It is not surprising that post-colonial regimes sustained the system in an effort to develop the economy. Lacking human and economic resources for industrialisation, most of them after independence had to maximize natural resource exports in order to import expensive capital goods from the First World for further development (Elliot, 1994). For example, 'Indonesian central government decision makers view forests as a valuable, yet expendable resource, useful for generating foreign exchange to finance industrialization' (Dauvergne, 1993/4: 507).

In EM, 'environmental management is seen as a positive-sum game: pollution prevention pays' (Hajer, 1995: 3). Weale says (1992: 75) 'Environmental protection... is no longer seen as a burden upon the economy, but rather as a potential source of future growth'.

27 In EM, 'environmental management is seen as a positive-sum game: pollution prevention pays' (Hajer, 1995: 3). Weale says (1992: 75) 'Environmental protection... is no longer seen as a burden upon the economy, but rather as a potential source of future growth'.

28 Bryant and Bailey (1997: 8) put it: 'A colonial legacy of integration in a global capitalist economy, natural resource dependency, environmental degradation and centralized political control have conditioned environmental use and conflict in post-colonial times. That legacy, in turn, continues to distinguish the Third World from elsewhere'. See also Pas-ong and Lebel (2000) and Shiva (1992) for the case of Southeast Asia.
In addition, these post-colonial governments had to face the immediate goal of nation-building and establishment of political control over the people in the territory, often through coping with social unrest. For this purpose, many political leaders and military officials exploited natural resources for short-term revenue and security reasons without considering the environmental impacts (see Peluso 1992 for the Indonesian case and Bryant 1997 for Burmese one). Starting with natural resources management, as these countries engaged in rapid industrialisation, the centralised approach was extended to other environmental issues (See Pas-ong and Lebel, 2000).

As one can expect, the environmental ministries and agencies are weaker than their counterparts in natural resource management and industrial development in the hierarchy of the post-colonial states (see Dauvergne 2001 Ch.4). This is because the state prioritised rapid economic growth and ‘resource departments have usually been around much longer than their environment counterparts, and hence can draw on a much more extensive network of political contacts than their colleagues in environment departments or agencies’ (Bryant and Bailey, 1997: 69).

Underpinned by local political culture, the state’s dominant rule was legitimised by its capacity to maximise the economic growth in East Asia29, and its view of the environment can be understood in this utilitarian way, although the routes and environmental problems are different between resource-scarce early industrialisers in Northeast Asia and resource-rich post-colonial Southeast Asian countries.

In such a situation, the participation of the ‘weaker’ citizens was minimised. Regardless of the long history of environmental struggles, the citizens are outsiders in the policy process, although they have made some achievement in agenda-setting. Whether successful or unsuccessful, their struggles have been documented in various works30.

29 This does not exclude socialist states such as China (Smil, 1984; Hershkovitz, 1993) and Vietnam (Beresford and Fraser, 1992) partly because, by nature, they concentrated more power in the state for economic issues.

Challenges to the State’s Dominant Rule: Utilitarian and Rights-based Demands

The conventional state-centric approach has been challenged recently by demands for more democratic governance. These demands mainly emphasise two points. One relates to the limit of the state’s capacity to manage some (or many) environmental issues. In other words, the participation of non-state actors is increasingly required in a utilitarian sense for better environmental consequences. Even if the state were capable of developing the economy in an effective way, it is increasingly understood that the steps of industrialisation to reach ‘ecological switchover’ are not equally proportional to the improvement of all kinds of environmental conditions. Matsuoka et. al (1998) argue that a positive relationship between environmental quality and economic growth following a certain period of ecological degradation (or the ‘environmental Kuznets curve’) can only explain the case of SOx emission. Even the proponents of the positive-sum relationship admit that there are exceptions, such as CO₂ emissions (World Bank 2004; Mol and Spaargaren, 1993) and municipal waste (World Bank, 2004).

Natural resources depletion is another issue that cannot be explained by the environmental Kuznets curve. Needless to say, biodiversity cannot be recovered once lost. People need a certain amount of resource extraction for survival, while they can do without (in fact better do without) pollution. The records in East Asia show less evidence so far, if any, of a positive relationship between state-led development and nature conservation. Forest cover rates in Thailand and the Philippines have dropped to 28.9% and 19.4% respectively, which are less than a half of what they were in 40 years ago (FAO, 2004). In Indonesia, as was mentioned above, forests of more than half the size of the UK’s total land area disappeared in the 1990s. The deforestation rate of Malaysia and Myanmar is almost the same as Indonesia’s (FAO, 2003).

One can think of various reasons for this, such as population growth and warfare (as in Vietnam, Thailand, Burma and Indonesia). However, many have emphasised the political-economic aspect as the major cause of the destruction of most of Southeast Asia’s forests (for example, Hurst, 1990; Bryant et al., 1993; Dauvergne, 2001). The developmentalist policies of the state have prioritised rapid economic growth through commercial logging and land-use change for industrial purposes in partnership with big
businesses, and these policies have largely disregarded the traditional forms of livelihood as well as ecological sustainability. As a result, the local people tended to have no choice but to 'illegally' log from the 'state forests' unless working for the logging companies. Or they had to extend the swidden agriculture to an unsustainable extent to countervail the income loss. Thus, in addition to the direct impact on the forest, state-business logging activities have resulted in social impacts and the 'tragedy of enclosure' (Ecologist, 1993), leading to further deforestation. In other words, the economic growth with the 'East Asian Model' in Southeast Asia has been achieved, to a considerable extent, at the expense of the well-being of local people. Besides, these countries have had trouble in shifting from dependency on the production and export of primary products due in part to the policies of the First World states and multilateral institutions (e.g. the World Bank and the practices of TNCs). Such dependency on natural resources may lead to their exhaustion before reaching a certain economic turning-point (if it exists), to reverse the environmental degradation trend.

The failure of the conventional approach may be partly because natural resources depletion cannot be slowed down in an 'end of the pipe' technological manner. The solutions to pollution problems can be technological, and experts can easily show the effectiveness and rationale of this, but this is not the case for nature conservation because of the ecological and social complexity of the issues. Such 'correct measures' may be imposed more easily by developmental states in a top-down manner. On the other hand, nature conservation requires more participation in decision making as it is more value-laden and not calculable, making it difficult to impose measures in an authoritative manner.

The state-centric approach was challenged by economic factors in the region as well. The Asian economic crisis in 1997 and 1998 questioned the future of the state-centric approach. The failure of the conventional approach may be partly because natural resources depletion cannot be slowed down in an 'end of the pipe' technological manner. The solutions to pollution problems can be technological, and experts can easily show the effectiveness and rationale of this, but this is not the case for nature conservation because of the ecological and social complexity of the issues. Such 'correct measures' may be imposed more easily by developmental states in a top-down manner. On the other hand, nature conservation requires more participation in decision making as it is more value-laden and not calculable, making it difficult to impose measures in an authoritative manner.
approach to achieve further economic growth\textsuperscript{35}. At the same time, it is increasingly recognised that the centralised administration and public services delivery are inefficient due to the remoteness of decision-making from implementation. The policies of international aid organisations, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which became more influential after the economic crisis, promoted the decentralisation of power in their recipient countries\textsuperscript{36}.

The successful Japanese experience of the ‘corporatist’ involvement of non-state actors also questioned the state’s single-handed environmental governance in a utilitarian sense. According to EM, ‘political modernisation’ (e.g. the shift from the conventional regulatory approach to co-operative and voluntary arrangements to increase the efficacy and efficiency of environmental policies) is significant, just as is the shift from ‘end of pipe’ to anticipatory and precautionary solutions in the industries (see Weale, 1992; Hajer, 1995; Christoff, 1996; Mol and Spaargaren 2000; Mol, 1997), and the mainstream of EM theories places the corporatist non-state actor involvement in the centre of their arguments (see Chapter 2). In the sense that the argument is less based on the recognition of the people’s rights to decide the policies affecting their life, EM is ‘ambivalent on participation, taking a fairly technocratic, top-down approach to community involvement’ (Hajer 1995: 78-79; see Chapter 2 for details).

The other major challenge to the state’s rule was the emergence of actors who demanded or who were granted their \textit{rights} of participation in decision making. One of those actors is local authorities, as a result of decentralisation (see Appendix B for the examples of recent legal developments for decentralisation in Asia). In Thailand, the \textit{Tambon} Administrative Act (1994) enabled the \textit{Tambons} (sub-districts) to draw up a local development plan in various policy areas, including natural resource management.\textsuperscript{37} The Philippines stipulated decentralisation in the 1987 constitution, and enacted a law concerning local autonomy in 1991, which allowed local governments to protect and

\textsuperscript{35} See Dauvergne (2001) for the impact of the crisis on forest businesses in Asia.

\textsuperscript{36} Chinese decentralisation, for example, can be explained in this context, in addition to the reduction of the fiscal burden of central government. See Smoke (2000) for the rationale of decentralisation for a more effective and equal sustainable development governance.

\textsuperscript{37} Since 1994, more than 7,000 \textit{Tambon} Administrative Organisations (local authorities) have been newly established in Thailand.
regenerate forests as well as manage community-based forest projects (the case of Indonesia is examined in the following chapters).

Other notable actors are the trans-national corporations (TNCs) and local businesses, which are not tied to the traditional power structure. They developed as a result of the economic globalisation. For example, the region’s share of trade as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) jumped from 19 percent to 58 percent over the period of 1970 to 1996 (UNESCAP-DRPAD, 2000). For good or bad, their activities have environmental impacts and with their political clout, it is getting more difficult for the state to neglect their preferences in decision making.

International ENGOs have also become active. Since the 1990s, the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) has established its offices in many East Asian countries, such as Indonesia, Vietnam and Mongolia, and expanded its activities to countries like Cambodia and Lao PDR. The increase in the international funds available for Southern ENGOs has resulted, without doubt, in their growth. The international connections of Southern NGOs have also developed. Since the late 1980s, Friends of the Earth (FoE) International have welcomed member groups from East Asian countries such as Indonesia, the Philippines, and South Korea. States in East Asia cannot be exempt from their international pressure nowadays.

The development of domestic ENGOs has been rapid in the last few decades (see Chapter 2 and Appendix C for more information). More than a third of the groups recorded in the ENGO directory of Japan were established in the 1990s (Nomura and Abe, 2001). Even in China, ‘there has come out a large number of NGO environmental protection organizations and environmental volunteers’, including the Friends of Nature, the Global Village and the Green Home (Pei, 2001). (See Chapter 4 for more on the Indonesian case).

Democratisation can be a driver of these emerging actors and can further their inclusion in the environmental policy process; however, there are only a few studies referring to this point (see Chapter 2). This gap is significant considering the rapid

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38 Economic globalisation can also provide new environmental technologies, services and managerial techniques. For example, China is a world’s fastest country in terms of the increasing rate of ISO 14001 certificates, mainly led by export-oriented companies.
democratisation in the region in the last decade (see Appendix B for the trend in Asia in well-known indicators of democratisation). The changes in formal institutions are widely reported (for example, Kato et. al, 2001); however, they alone do not promise the democratisation in practice, especially in East Asia, considering local political culture and states’ considerable achievements in economic growth and pollution control.

East Asian countries are facing a choice - either to optimise the resources from the emerging groups of civil society and the market for environmental measures with the state steering in a utilitarian way, or to move towards ‘popular control’ over environmental decision making by respecting people’s right to participate and determine their own future.

One may ask a question here, whether the latter can be made successful. Within mainstream modernisation theory, it has been argued that a certain economic level is a precondition for ‘political modernisation’ or democratisation in general\(^39\). One may want to argue that the high economic level is a necessary condition for an effective liberal public involvement in environmental governance, although it may not be a sufficient condition. If economic growth plays the central part in EM’s evolutionary path to the ‘super-industrialisation’ (Huber 1982, 1985), one can assume that ‘growth should come first’ by minimising civic participation in a liberal democratic sense if the state is doing a good job in economic growth\(^40\). Then, how do and should developing countries handle this issue? The case study of Indonesia, which is also facing these two demands, can help us to think about these points.

1.3 Methodology

**New Institutionalism**

This thesis situates itself in one of the mainstreams of theoretical approaches in politics - ‘New Institutionalism’, especially ‘Historical Institutionalism’ among others - because it involves four major viewpoints (formal institutions, informal institutions, ideas and economic conditions; see Figure 1-2) in an effective manner for the analysis in this thesis.

\(^{39}\) See for example, Almond (1960). Also, see Chapter 2.

\(^{40}\) By analysing the policies of regional development agencies in the UK, Gibbs (2000: 16) argues that ‘[g]rowth must come before environmental problems are tackled, reflecting Huber’s
For institutionalists, institutions matter because how they are configured shapes the behaviour of political actors and thus political outcomes. The institutional approach has been a central pillar of political studies. It traditionally emphasised the study of formal administrative, legal and political structures and their comparison over time and across countries (See Eckstein, 1963, for example).

The rise of behaviourism in the 1950s and 1960s, however, challenged the ‘old’ institutionalism. It pointed out that the formal-legal settings did not explain the actual differences in political behaviour, and argued the need for focusing on the behaviour and attitudes of the actors themselves in a ‘scientific’ manner, to see how political outcomes or powers were distributed in society. It was followed by rational choice theorists, who consider political outcomes as the result of the interplay of actors based on their self-interests. In addition, neo-Marxists emphasised the systems or structures in society. What these contenders had in common was the message that ‘there was much, much more to politics than the formal arrangements for representation, decision-making and policy implementation’ (Lawnders, 2002: 90).

New Institutionalism emerged to counter these claims. It regards institutions in a broader manner than ‘old’ Institutionalism, to encompass not only formal institutions but also informal institutions such as informal rules, norms and procedures ‘embedded in the organisational structure of the polity or political economy’ that structure the interaction of actors (Hall and Taylor 1996: 938). According to Peter Hall’s oft-cited definition, institutions are ‘formal rules, compliance procedures and standard operating practices that structure relationships between individuals in various units of the polity and the economy’ (Hall, 1986: 19). The inclusion of informal institutions has enabled institutionalists to see the relations between not only institutions but also institutions and actors. In other words, Institutionalism widened its scope from the official structures of ‘government’ to cover ‘governance’ and ‘policy networks’.

Through this evolution, New Institutionalism tried to respond to the criticisms and prove that institutions remain the key factor in understanding politics. It sees arguments for more industrialisation as the solution to ecological critics’ (italic in original).

Behaviouralists as ‘reductionists’ in explaining ‘politics as the outcome of individual actions’, while ‘downgrading the importance of the state as an independent cause’ (March and Olsen, 1994: 735-6). They ‘often missed crucial elements of the playing field and thus did not provide answers to...why these political behaviours, attitudes, and the distribution of resources among contending groups themselves differed from one country to another’ (Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 5). Institutionalists consider that the claims by rational choice theorists are ‘utilitarian, explaining individual actions as motivated by rational self-interest’, and crude by emphasising political outcomes as straightforward derivatives of these individual actions (March and Olsen, 1984: 736-7). Neo-Marxist accounts do not explain ‘why interest groups demanded different policies in different countries and why class interests were manifested differently cross-nationally’ (Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 5). In addition, these theoretical approaches deal with three primary factors for political outcomes - interests, powers, and the rules of the game (constitutions) - as exogenous to the political system, while New Institutionalism considers that these develop endogenously within the polity and society (March and Olsen, 1984: 739). New Institutionalists argue ‘the whole range of state and societal institutions’ shape ‘both the objectives of political actors and the distribution of power among them in a given polity’, and therefore it is important to focus on them to understand political outcomes (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 2, 6).

Given the theme of this thesis, the benefits of using New Institutionalism instead of the other major approaches seem to be clear. Democratisation is the changes of institutions and ideas in a democratic direction, and therefore institutions have to be examined as an important factor. Besides, New Institutionalism can provide a better explanation of the influence of ideas, social-economic conditions, and informal institutions such as the political culture (see the account of Historical Institutionalism below) which is important especially when considering the Indonesian case, as mentioned earlier. However, the literature on New Institutionalism is diverse and it does not constitute a unified approach: one has to narrow this down before moving on to case studies.
A most widely accepted subdivision seems to be ‘Historical Institutionalism’, ‘Rational Choice Institutionalism’, and ‘Sociological Institutionalism’ (see Hall and Taylor, 1996)\textsuperscript{42}. Hall and Taylor (1996: 938-942) emphasise four features of Historical Institutionalism. First, it tends to conceptualise the relationship between institutions and individual behaviour in relatively broad terms by taking both ‘calculus’ and ‘cultural’ approaches. Not only considering that actors seek to maximise the benefits and that institutions are there to provide certainty about the behaviour of others, it also considers that actors turn to informal rules, routines and procedures which work as ‘moral or cognitive templates’ for their action (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 939). Second, it considers the power asymmetries in relation to the development and operation of institutions, and it tends to think ‘some people win and some others lose’ (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 941). Third, it considers that institutional development is ‘path dependent’ and generates ‘unintended consequences’ in the sense that ‘it rejects the traditional postulate that the same operative forces will generate the same results everywhere in favour of the view that the effect of such forces will be mediated by the contextual features of a given situation often inherited from the past’ (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 938, 941). Fourth, it is ‘especially concerned to integrate institutional analysis with the contribution that other kinds of factors’, such as ‘socioeconomic development and the diffusion of ideas’ (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 938, 942).

These features seem to fit with the theme of this thesis. On the first point, this twofold conceptualisation can provide perspectives on both the behaviour of the actors which is based on ‘utilitarian’ ideas and also behaviour which is shaped by moral or cognitive factors. On the second point, ‘asymmetries of power’, one has to see the difference and changes of power between actors before and through democratisation, while Rational Choice Institutionalism tends to see actors as relatively equal and independent.\textsuperscript{43} The third point, the ‘path-dependent’ view, helps to understand the local context over time, which is important for the case analysis through transition process. For Historical

\textsuperscript{42} Some divide New Institutionalism into more variants. For example, Peters (1999) and Lawnders (2002) provide seven versions of it.

\textsuperscript{43} See Hall and Taylor (1996). They argue that, on the other hand, Rational Choice Institutionalism has produced the most elegant accounts of institutional persistence because of the characteristics of the theories.
Institutionalists, history makes institutions and actors are not fully knowledgeable about institutional consequences (i.e. what happens when actors participate in institutional venues), while Rational Choice Institutionalists consider that actors make institutions to constrain the self-interested behaviour of other actors to achieve objectives (See Blyth, 2002).\footnote{Thelen and Steinmo (1992: 8) state as follows: 'In short, people don’t stop at every choice they make in their lives and think to themselves, ‘Now what will maximise my self-interest?’ Instead, most of us, most of the time, follow societally defined rules, even when so doing may not be directly in our self-interest'.}

This is related to the fourth point, the inclusion of ideas and socioeconomic factors, particularly the former. For Historical Institutionalists, ideas are regarded as a factor to explain institutional change because ‘when ideas change, preferences change’, while for Rational Choice Institutionalists, ‘ideas are seen as instruments to help actors to achieve their ends’ (Blyth, 2002: 307, 304). For the latter, preferences are fixed and their formation is exogenous to the institutional venue. Historical and Rational Choice Institutionalisms ‘diverge rather sharply on the issue of preference formation. While rational choice deals with preferences at the level of assumptions, historical institutionalists take the question of how individuals and groups define their self-interest as problematical’ (Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 8). In the context of this thesis, it seems difficult to consider the institutional changes of democratisation especially at the local level merely as a ‘strategic’ choice of local actors. Also, it is important to look at how ideas as well as institutions have changed the preferences of actors. Besides, the preference of actors on environmental issues, or that of some actors at least, cannot be ‘calculated’ in many cases.

Sociological Institutionalism has developed in sociology.\footnote{See Powell and DiMaggio (1991) for more about Sociological Institutionalism.} It emphases the cultural aspect of institutions to shape preferences of actors, such as the symbols, myths and ceremonies which are incorporated in organisations.\footnote{Some even include ‘discourse’, which is a core component of Constructivism, within institutions (Rosamond, 2000).} It does not regard institutions as a creation of actors to achieve certain goals, but as a result of the transmission processes of cultural practices. Therefore, Sociological Institutionalism defines institutions more broadly so as to include culture in general, and it focuses on how institutions are created...
(Hall and Taylor, 1996). Actors embrace institutions not because they are instrumentally constrained but because they conceive it is socially appropriate to do so and how they would look if they did not. In addition to the assumption that institutions are created by society, this point shows its affinity with Social Constructionism or Constructivism (hereafter Constructivism; see Hall and Taylor, 1996; Rosamond, 2000)\(^{47}\).

However, if environmental governance is considered as a social or cultural construction, as is argued by Sociological Institutionalists, ‘it can miss the extent to which processes of institutional creation or reform entail a clash of power among actors with competing interests’ (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 954)\(^{48}\). This issue is especially significant when the individuals and their ideas are a key subject in the case study (e.g. the idea of an MP in a policy network), because differences among individuals tend to disappear in favour of collective meanings in Constructivism.

In this context, this thesis deals with ‘ideas’ in terms of Historical Institutionalism and not of Constructivism. Constructivism regards reality, such as environmental problems and democratisation, as ‘socially constructed’ rather than objectively given. Ideas are important because they construct ‘reality’, and therefore Constructivists emphasise methods such as discourse analysis. Constructivism is indeed a strong approach to understanding how institutions are made and in fact is mainly used in such contexts\(^{49}\). Also, its effectiveness in looking at environmental issues and actions has also been discussed (see Hannigan, 1995). Having recognised such strengths of the Constructivist approach, this thesis does not consider environmental problems and democratisation as a product of social construction through the interaction of ideas, in epistemological conformity with Historical Institutionalism. Accordingly, although this thesis employs ‘framing’ theories of social movements (see Chapter 2), it regards ‘framing’ simply as changes in how actors see the reality (environmental problems) that exists out there rather than how reality itself is constructed.

There are some points to consider when drawing on Historical Institutionalism. One is that Historical Institutionalism has a broader concept of institutions. If it ‘means

\(^{47}\) See for the basic idea of Social Constructionism, Berger and Luckmann (1967).

\(^{48}\) Hall and Taylor also pointed out there are some notable exceptions among the works of Sociological Institutionalists.
everything, then it means nothing' (Rothstein, 1996: 145). Bringing informal institutions into the analytical scope on the one hand has enhanced the approach but on the other hand has increased the risk of reducing all the differences in political outcomes to the differences in the ambiguous concept of 'culture'. As Rothstein (1996; Lawnders 2002) suggests, this thesis pays attention to 'standard operation procedures' (Hall, 1986), as they show ambiguous informal institutions such as culture and norms in a more recognisable manner\textsuperscript{50}.

The widening scope results in the need to sort out the relationship between formal institutions and the newly-included factors (ideas, socio-economic conditions and informal institutions) and their interaction (see Figure 1-2 above). Thelen and Steinmo (1992: 14) state: '[W]hat has been missing is more explicit theorising on... the interaction of ideas, interests, and institutions', which they attribute to the existing studies' emphasis on analysing 'comparative statics' and 'the relative underdevelopment of theories of institutional formation and change'. As noted by Blyth (2002) above, for Historical Institutionalists, ideas are selected and moulded by (static) institutional configuration, which results in political outcomes (including institutional changes) (see Hall, 1992; King, 1992; and Weir, 1992). This thesis will hopefully make some contribution to the literature by studying cases where democratic ideas resulted in the changes of institution (environmental governance) through dynamic institutional changes (democratisation).\textsuperscript{51}

**Case Studies**

As in most of the works of the Institutionalist school, this thesis employs the case study method. Yin (2003) suggests identifying the research method by referring to the types of

\textsuperscript{49}The construction of the European Union is a notable example. See Rosamond (1999, 2000).
\textsuperscript{50}The wider concepts of institutions resulted in the eclectic characteristics of Historical Institutionalism, which involves both 'calculus' and 'cultural' approaches. The ontological problems embedded there are pointed out by Hay and Wincott (1998), which is responded to by Hall and Taylor (1998).
\textsuperscript{51}Thelen and Steinmo (1992:16) identify four sources of this 'institutional dynamism', and this thesis deals with two of them: 'broad changes in the socioeconomic or political context' that 'can produce a situation in which previously latent institutions suddenly become salient, with implications for political outcomes', and 'changes in the socioeconomic context or political balance of power' that 'can produce a situation in which old institutions are put in the service of different ends, as new actors come into play who pursue their (new) goals through existing institutions' (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992:16).
research questions. One may use ‘case study’ or ‘survey’, if the research cannot control behavioural events (otherwise ‘experiment’ can also be used), if it focuses on contemporary events (otherwise ‘history’ is a useful method), and if good archival information is not available (which is the case of this thesis; otherwise ‘archival analysis’ can be used). A survey is suitable when the question is ‘who’, ‘where’, ‘what’, ‘how many’, or ‘how much’. Case study method is appropriate when the research question is ‘how’ or ‘why’. It is also useful when the ‘what’ questions are exploratory; but it may not be so when the ‘what’ questions are in the forms of ‘how much’ or ‘how many’, while surveys can answer these questions (e.g. ‘How many people are planning to vote for political party X?’ or ‘How much are customers satisfied with product A?’). Surveys are advantageous when the research tries to see the prevalence or degree of a phenomenon.

Given that the research question of this thesis is ‘how’ (i.e. How did democratisation affect ENGOs and policy networks?), the case study method is more suitable to answer it. The case study is useful ‘when it is important to investigate complex phenomena’, such as the interaction of the factors involved in governance (Agranoff and Radin, 1991: 229-30). To see what has happened and how in governance over time, one cannot put the process in brackets (or a black-box) by examining merely inputs and outputs, or assume actors’ preferences are fixed and political outcomes are the result of their rational behaviours.

One of the major concerns about the case study method is its capacity for generalisation (see Gomm, Hammersley and Foster, 2000). In the context of this thesis, one may question if the method can permit conclusions about the impact of democratisation on environmental governance in Indonesia in general, especially for a single case study. Accordingly, this thesis avoids a single case study and selects cases in consideration of the contexts they occur in (see below), as is suggested by some case study researchers as a means to increase the method’s generalisability (Yin, 2003; see also Schofield, 2000). This thesis also complements the method by reviewing existing studies related to the cases.

In addition to the historical development of ENGOs, two case studies of the policy process are included in this thesis. They are selected from the forestry sector among other environmental sectors for its significance in the context of political ecology in Indonesia
Considering the balance of geographical settings, this thesis studies the case of the state forestry corporation in Java (*Perum Perhutani*) (Chapters 6 and 7) and the case of a large private corporation outside Java (or in the Outer Islands; Chapter 5). Forest management on Java is different from that of the Outer Islands, as all the forests are in the operational area of the state forestry corporation. On the Outer Islands, concessions are granted by the state to large private businesses as well as to state-owned stock corporations. Because some of the former are larger and more powerful than the latter (see Chapter 3) and the case of state forestry corporations is covered in the context of Java, the case of large private businesses is studied here.

**Table 1-1 Geographical Settings of the Case Studies**

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<th>Outer Islands</th>
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<td></td>
<td>(Chs. 6 and 7)</td>
<td>(Ch. 5)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>State Forestry Corporations</strong></td>
<td>Perhutani</td>
<td>Inhutani(s)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Private Logging Companies</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
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In addition, attention is given to the following points in identifying cases. This thesis puts its emphasis on the process of policy making rather than its implementation, as the impact of democratisation is seen more clearly in the former. Given the focus of this thesis, it is better to have cases in which ENGOs are committed to prominent political activities (e.g. advocacy). Moreover, this thesis argues that cases involving the local level allow one to see more clearly the impacts of democratisation on environmental governance because local people tend to be the ones who suffer more from ecological degradation while being marginalised in natural resources management in the authoritarian period (see Chapter 3): in other words, cases that exclusively concern the national level are not taken up.

Taking account of these points, for the case study of large private businesses, the problems caused by PT Inti Indorayon are selected. The case is one of the best-known

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52. The Outer Islands in this thesis refer to the islands except for Java and Madura. This seems to conform to the normal usage of the term, although some people exclude a few more islands from it.

53. Although the implementation deficit such as forest fires is a major cause of forest loss in Indonesia, the relationship with democratisation (or the shift of decision making style) may not be strong. See Chapter 3.
environmental problems in Indonesia, and the political struggle over the issue lasted (or has been continuing) for a long time during the democratic transition. As for the study of the state forestry corporation in Java, the forest policy making in Wonosobo District in Central Java is selected, not only because it meets the criteria mentioned above, but also it is related to the issue of illegal logging, which became a growing and important issue especially after the end of the authoritarian regime (see Chapter 6). Seen from a different viewpoint, these two case studies look at the two dimensions of forest policy in Indonesia: one is forest management (the case of the state forestry corporation), and the other is the production of forest products (the case of Indorayon).

The analysis is mainly based on qualitative information collected through interviews with multiple stakeholders (see Table 1-2 and the 'List of Interviews' at the end of this thesis). Most of the interviews were tape-recorded with the permission of the interviewees. The number of interviewees and interviews are not identical because several interviews were conducted with some interviewees and some interviews turned into 'group interviews' involving multiple respondents (see below). The median and the average of the length of one interview were 1.12 and 1.24 hours each.

Table 1-2 Interviews and Interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewees</th>
<th>Local</th>
<th>National</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government Officials</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPs</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO Staff</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Community Members</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private and State-owned Company Staff</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding Agencies</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academics and Researchers</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This thesis also draws on written raw data such as government documents and NGO publications where available. Having said that, in the absence of official records, the sources of general information on the political events (such as what happened when) tend to be newspapers and records published by NGOs, in addition to interviews. There is no public record office which provides official documents to the public, and the idea of
information disclosure is not yet understood well by local bureaucrats\textsuperscript{54}. As a result, after double-checking with other sources, much information on the events in the case studies is cited from interviews and newspaper articles; the use of which may seem disproportionately high in comparison with case studies in Western developed countries. Chapter 4 in part uses quantitative data collected from simple questionnaire surveys of ENGOs and some NGO directories, although this is only to a limited extent.

The interviews were basically made in a semi-structured manner by preparing certain questions beforehand. However, the author often tried to create a casual atmosphere to facilitate the interviews by having a conversational style, which made interviews more informal. One of the reasons for this is that people in Indonesia tend to prefer ‘chatting’ to formal conversation, and an informal atmosphere seems more suitable for interviewees to express their genuine opinions in their usual language. Another reason is that there often seems to be a sense of caution with interviewees. Some NGO staff are still often careful about with whom and of what they talk when it comes to political issues, which would come from their experiences from the authoritarian period. The staff of companies and the bureaucrats who are allegedly responsible for environmental issues are also often careful about what they say, even relating to general matters, partly because the idea of information disclosure is not yet ingrained in them, as mentioned. Accordingly, it was even more important under such conditions to make a friendly atmosphere instead of using a business-like approach as in many other countries.

Also, partly due to the local culture, personal contacts and networks were very important to get in touch with key informants and obtain important information. As a result of the nature of this thesis and the author’s personal working experiences with Indonesian NGOs, more interviews with ENGO staff were conducted than with the other respondents. Sometimes there were difficulties in meeting with the staff of the government and private companies, especially those who were considered responsible for environmental degradation. To cope with this disproportion of primary information sources between ENGOs and other actors, therefore, the author tried to collect secondary information disclosure is not yet understood well by local bureaucrats\textsuperscript{54}. As a result, after double-checking with other sources, much information on the events in the case studies is cited from interviews and newspaper articles; the use of which may seem disproportionately high in comparison with case studies in Western developed countries. Chapter 4 in part uses quantitative data collected from simple questionnaire surveys of ENGOs and some NGO directories, although this is only to a limited extent.

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\textsuperscript{54} The author of this thesis can recall how much time and effort he spent merely to obtain the list of local parliament members from the local government office after being told it was not for the public.
information (such as from newspapers) to keep the balance.

In many cases below, the personal names of NGO staff are replaced with the name of their organisation (e.g. staff member of NGO A). This is because, first, the cases dealt with in this thesis are not events that have happened in the past, but are still live political issues. Although this was unlikely, the author tried to be careful to avoid the possibility of causing problems for the interviewees by citing their personal names in this thesis. The second reason is more practical. Many of the interviews were made in an informal manner at the offices of NGOs, which tend to be refurbished local houses. Mostly they were conducted in the ‘sitting rooms’, and the other staff often came in and out during the interviews, depending on topics. Rather than identifying staff from one to n and citing their interviews separately, if it is the interview of the same group at the same venue and time, they are simply referred to as, for example, ‘staff of NGO A’, unless there were no differences of opinions among the interviewees.

Field studies were made six times between October 2002 and January 2005. As for the time frame, the case studies cover the time period until the end of Megawati regime (October 2004), with necessary recent information added.

Thus, after clarifying the methodological basis of the thesis, it is now time to turn to more theoretical perspectives.
CHAPTER 2
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

This chapter identifies perspectives on the impacts of democratisation on environmental governance - namely the development of ENGOs and their involvement in networks. Section 2.1 reviews how democratisation contributes to the development of ENGOs by drawing on three major perspectives of social movement theories with reference to the history of the growth of ENGOs in the world (see Appendix C for the data of their numerical growth). The section ends by raising issues concerning the resources of ENGOs and democracy.

In 2.1 this thesis refers to the literature on the growth of ENGOs in the US, Western Europe, Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and East Asia, among other areas. The work on the cases of the US and Western Europe is rich and provides good information. The studies of the environmental movement in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union can help us understand the implication of democratisation, although economic levels and the political system and culture are very different from Indonesia. The cases of East Asian countries which seem to have a similar state-led development path can also assist the analysis of the Indonesian case.

There is a growing literature on the environmental movements in the developing countries in East Asia, especially works in the field of ‘Third World political ecology’ (Bryant and Bailey, 1997). Yet, there are few works on the impacts of democratisation on East Asian ENGOs, except for Ku (1996), Tang and Tang (1997) and Lee et al (1999) on South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines and Thailand (in fact, this topic is rather neglected worldwide). Allowing for the differences of socio-economic conditions and

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the different nature of the environmental problems (for example, pollution problems are
the major issues in Northeast Asia while natural resources depletion is relatively more
significant in resource-rich Southeast Asia), this thesis refers to these works.

Section 2.2 reviews the theories to see how democratisation contributes to the
changes in the policy process or policy networks. 'Policy', which is defined in this
thesis as 'a plan or course of action by governments for tackling political issues', is
produced through the process involving a large number of actors, and it is influenced by
many factors including wider political, economic, social changes\(^3\). Given this
complexity, one has to find 'a lens' or 'lenses', through which it can be seen more
simply, among the theories of policy process.

Then, in 2.3, the theoretical implications of the environmental impact of
democratisation are reviewed with reference to several empirical studies. This chapter
concludes by identifying the analytical checkpoints for the following chapters.

2.1 Democratisation and the Development of ENGOs
ENGOs do not grow one step at a time, but by leaps and bounds during a certain period
of time. So, what are the factors influencing this process? How does democratisation
affect it? These questions can be understood in three aspects, drawing on three major
perspectives of social movement theories for each (in parenthesis): (1) institutions
(political opportunities perspective); (2) ideas (grievance and framing perspectives); and
(3) socio-economic conditions (resource mobilisation perspective)\(^4\). After reviewing
these three perspectives in relation to democratisation, this section considers the issues
concerning resources of NGOs and democracy.

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\(^3\) A government 'decision' on each 'action' is one component of policy (see also Jones, 1977: 4),
and it is not made independently of the policy. Accordingly, the theories of the 'policy' process
help us to see the making process of decisions (e.g. decisions by the government to open or
close a factory's mill causing pollution in the case of Chapter 5).

\(^4\) Another influential approach to social movements - theories of 'new social movements' - is not
reviewed here because it grew largely out of the experiences in Europe with focus on cultural
aspects of why 'new' social movements (vis-à-vis 'old' labour movement) emerged. Given the
theme of this thesis, the three theories reviewed here are more appropriate for their focus on
how movements developed. See Canel (1997) for related arguments.
### Institutional Change: the Political Opportunities Perspective

'Political process theory' or 'political opportunities theory'\(^5\) can help us understand the implications of the impact of institutional democratisation on the growth of ENGOs. It emphasises a broader set of political constraints and opportunities for the development of social movements. They include (i) the state's capacity and propensity for repression; (ii) the relative openness or closure of the institutionalised political system; (iii) the stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a policy; (iv) the presence or absence of elite allies (McAdam, 1996: 27). The first two points are considered as the changes in formal institutions and the others are those in informal factors.

The first point overlaps largely with political liberalisation. It includes, on top of the rule of law, the legal provision of basic rights and more liberties such as freedom of speech and expression, association, assembly and movement.

Examples to show the impact of this point are numerous. In South Korea, political opportunities were significantly increased after the 1987 Great Uprising and under the more democratic Roh Tae-woo regime (1988-93). This has increased the number of ENGOs established; while it was only two and six groups in the 1960s and 1970s respectively, and eight groups between 1981-1986, it became 65 groups between 1987-1992 (Ku, 1996)\(^6\). During Park Chung-hee's developmentalist military regime (1963-79), 'anti-pollution' activity was often equated with 'anti-regime'.\(^7\) Victims of the

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\(^5\) Major works in this school include Eisinger (1973), Tarrow (1998), McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1986, 1996), Kitschelt (1986). People in other fields than sociology also have not overlooked the importance of civil and political rights for ENGOs and environmental actions of the citizens (see for example, Payne, 1995; Kane, 1993, HRW and NRDC, 1992).

\(^6\) Jeong and Cheong (2001: 188)'s research, which seems to be based on a different definition of ENGOs, shows the same trend of their growth; they state that the number of ENGOs in South Korea has increased from 33 before 1980 to 442 in 1999.

\(^7\) The state tightly controlled the negative information concerning the development policies. For example, the rector of a fishery's college was dismissed due to the report on marine pollution made by a professor there; a research institute of Pusan city locked up the 100,000 reports on
pollution problems could only take sporadic action without resources mobilised from the public at large, demanding small amounts of compensation for damage to health and economic loss. However, from the late 1980s, the terms ‘environment’ and ‘environmental protection’ ‘no longer carried any nuance of opposition and/or militancy’ (Ku, 1996: 105). Protests were even made on a highly political agenda such as nuclear power plants.

In Taiwan, the anti-pollution movement was not very significant for a long time under the Kuomintang (the nationalist party), which was heavily committed to capitalist growth by developing export-oriented manufacturing industries. It became active under Chiang Ching-kuo’s relatively relaxed rule (1978-88), after the abolition of martial law in 1987 and the democratic transition led by Lee Teng-hui (1988-2000) (see for example, Hsiao, 1999). While there were 13.75 environmental conflicts per year on an average between 1980 and 1987, this increased to 31.33 between 1988 and 1990 and to 258 in 1991. While there were no nationwide ENGOs up to the mid 1980s, there were more than 200 registered environmental groups in Taiwan in the late 1990s.

The decreased fear of oppression after the fall of Marcos in 1986 had an impact on both small and large scale ENGOs in the Philippines. While the large groups such as Haribon Foundation became more vocal, there was an increase in the small local ENGOs, businesses’ social activity groups, and local church activists in this period (Magno, 1999; JEC and JCIE, 1997a). The development of various ENGO networks such as the Green Forum (established in 1989), which has around 720 member NGOs (JEC and JCIE, 1997a), can also be attributed to the changes in political conditions (see Magallona and Malayang III, 2001).

In Thailand, relaxed government policies made by General Prem Tinsulanonda’s regime (1980-88), such as the amnesty for the ex-student guerrillas and the

9 See Tang and Tang, 1999. The groups established in this period include the Taiwan Environmental Protection Union (TEPU) in 1987, which has become a leading ENGO in Taiwan.
10 For instance, it called for ‘democratisation of our national resources’ with reference to the ‘Save Palawan campaign’ to conserve the wildlife of the island (Rush, 1990).
establishment of an NGO coordination body at the national level, are considered as one major factor to promote environmental movement in the 1980s (Hirsch and Lohmann, 1989; So and Lee, 1999). Except for some nature lovers’ clubs, there were no ENGOs in Thailand in the 1970s (Quigley, 1996); by the 1990s, however, there had emerged some 200 environment-related organisations (So and Lee, 1999; JEC and JCIE 1997b)\(^\text{11}\).

The second political factor, the shift from closed to open government, can be understood in terms of institutional arrangements for public participation and information disclosure. They can motivate the citizens to take political actions on environmental issues\(^\text{12}\). The environmental movement which developed rapidly in the late 1980s in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union can be put in this context (mentioned later; see Appendix C). Filipino ENGOs were animated by the following: their importance in the promotion of national welfare was mentioned in the new Constitution; the new head of the Forest Management Bureau brought many NGO staff to the office and involved NGOs in its programmes; NGO Outreach desks were established within the Department of Agriculture and Environment and Natural Resources; and the 1991 Local Government Code decentralised environmental policy areas (Magno, 1999; Rush, 1990; Lee et. al, 1999; Cleary, 1997).

The lack of political opportunities in Japan up to the early 1970s seems to be a reason for the emergence of relatively few ENGOs in spite of the active anti-pollution movement from the late 1950s and its impact on the subsequent environmental activism. As Kajita (1990: 180-4) mentions, social movements were often considered as a socialist movement under the developmentalist regime. In conjunction with the political culture of dispute avoidance, this made the anti-pollution movement focus on the demand for compensation without considering the development of pressure groups for focusing on broader social change.

On the other hand, the opening of the government structure was a major factor in

\(^{11}\) They include the Foundation for Ecological Recovery (established in 1986) and Wildlife Fund Thailand (in 1984), the Seub Nakhasathien Foundation (1990) and Think Earth (1990).

\(^{12}\) Eisinger (1973) argues that the relation between the openness of the structure and the protest is not straight but curvilinear. Full political access does not produce the greatest degree of protest because it is unnecessary. According to his study, the protest more frequently occurs in places with mixed open and closed characteristics.
the growth of Japanese ENGOs after the 1970s, especially that of amenity groups. After the rapid institutionalisation of anti-pollution measures\textsuperscript{13}, the government shifted policy priority to the improvement of the living environment. The Environment Agency formed a discussion group on amenity (1977) and treated this issue as one of the important policy areas. The agency’s financial support for local government initiatives for amenity activities was followed by the other ministries (Kihara, 1992). The tendency for amenity groups to avoid confrontational strategies like lawsuits and demonstrations can be a reason for the public and government support for these groups because it conforms to the local political culture\textsuperscript{14}. As a result, more than 90% of existing local ENGOs were founded after the 1970s\textsuperscript{15}, and the mainstream ones were neither pollution nor conservation types but amenity groups\textsuperscript{16}.

One may want to add the following to the increase in the political opportunities: the world trend towards ‘smaller government’ since the 1980s, which increases the demands for NGOs, in the public sphere (Potter, 1996b); decentralisation, which can increase local groups as is seen in Western Europe (Lowe and Goyder, 1983: 23-4); and changes in the policies and structures of the government, which gives birth to new groups as the offspring of existing ones (Lowe and Goyder, 1983: 24)\textsuperscript{17}.

History shows that the relations between institutional changes and the growth of ENGOs are not simple and straightforward. Even before political liberalisation, there were conservation groups in most countries, although they were weak and few. In Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, they were able to organise ‘because the environment had never been put on the black list as a subject for public discussion’ (Jancar-Webster, 1998: 70). Environmentalism was exceptionally permitted by the

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\textsuperscript{13} For example, the Environmental Agency was established in 1971. The OECD report (1977: 83) states the situation as follows: ‘Japan has won many pollution abatement battles, but has not yet won the war for environmental quality’.

\textsuperscript{14} See Kihara (1992) and Lowe and Goyder (1983) for amenity group’s strategies.

\textsuperscript{15} Data of around 1,500 ENGOs who are primarily engaged in environmental issues among 4,000 NGOs recorded in a directory made by Kankyo Jigyoudan (the Japan Environment Corporation; 1998). See Nomura and Abe (2001: 57) for details.

\textsuperscript{16} This is also represented in the total size of membership of Japanese ENGOs; 60% in amenity groups, 38% in conservation groups and only 2% in the pollution and energy type of groups (Kankyo Jigyodan, 1998). See also Nomura and Abe (2001).

\textsuperscript{17} Legal arrangements such as facilitating the provision of legal status for civil society groups and allowing tax exemptions for business donations to NGOs can also be included under institutional factors.
government, since nobody could object to the improvement of environmental quality, and the movement was not a direct political challenge to the regime (although environmental issues could be considered as the failure of centralised planned economy) (Waller and Millard, 1992). Accordingly, the environmental movement attracted activists with various motivations, especially those who sought to promote democratisation.

Similar cases can also be found in East Asia. The establishment of Filipino ENGOs and their umbrella groups such as the Philippine Federation for Environmental Concerns (established in 1979) started before the end of the martial law period, and many of them were single-issue groups and nature-lover groups. Local environmental protests tended to be sporadic livelihood struggles rather than a continuous movement producing ENGOs.

Also, further political participation does not guarantee the commensurate growth of the environmental movement. The environmental movement waned in many countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in the 1990s. There are several reasons for this, but one major reason is that the leaders of the movement have moved into institutionalised politics, for example, as members of political parties and the parliament (Waller and Millard, 1992; Jancar-Webster, 1998). When the region held its first democratic elections in 1990, environmental activists joined and supported new parties including green parties, which resulted in the break-up or stagnation of ENGOs. The recruitment of scientists to the government brought about the same result, as is seen from the case of the Danube Circle in Hungary (Waller and Millard, 1992; Jancar-Webster, 1998). Such a shift of resources into electoral politics can also be seen in Hong Kong (Chiu, et. al, 1999). In Taiwan, in the development of electoral democracy, the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) shifted their emphasis away from environmental issues to win more votes, which was a loss of political allies for ENGOs (Lee, et. al, 1999).

On the other hand, the shift to closed government in the environmental policy

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18 This contributed to the splits, mistrust and fragmentations within the movement, which has been pointed out as another major reason for the decline (Jancar-Webster, 1998; Waller, 1998; O'Toole and Hanf 1998).
process can increase support for ENGOs. Partly due to the environmentally negative policies and decreased opportunities of access for ENGOs in the Reagan administration, the membership of the Wilderness Society grew 144% and that of the Sierra Club went up for 90% in the first few years of Reagan's presidency (Mitchell, et. al, 1992; see also Boerner and Kallery, 1995).

One has to note here that the differences in political opportunities shape the strategies taken by environmental movements. In comparison with other West European countries such as Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland, Heijden et al (1992) argue that the relatively closed and centralised political structure of France explains why the French environmental movement takes a rather radical strategy and why it attracts fewer participants to ENGOs and the Green Party, because the formal conventional politics provides less chance for their success (see also Kitschelt, 1986). This is similar to the victims' protests against environmental degradation in developmental states in East Asia. By contrast, the widening of political opportunities, or the involvement of ENGOs in the policy process, has made the relations between the government and ENGOs more collaborative, as the case of Philippines shows (Magno, 1999; Lee et. al, 1999).

In countries where government initiatives played an important role in the growth of ENGOs, the government-ENGO relationship tends to be collaborative. Many of the Japanese ENGOs are established in collaboration with government especially at the local levels, which has likewise influenced their strategies (Nomura and Abe, 2001)\(^{19}\). According to Lee and So (1999; So and Lee, 1999), Thai environmentalism, which was created 'from above' by the businesses and the government, has taken what they term 'the corporatist path', with an emphasis on cooperation rather than confrontation between the major stakeholders in the environmental arena.

**Ideas and Informal Institutions: the 'Framing' Perspective**

Almost by definition, the existence of environmental problems and people's discontent with them are the prerequisite for the emergence and development of environmental

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\(^{19}\)This can be seen from the fact that about 20% of the ENGOs in Japan have offices in public space such as city halls (Nihon Kankyō Kyokai, 1996). These groups may fall into the 'grey zone' according to the definition of the ENGOs in this thesis.
movements. As classic social psychological theories for social movements suggest, increases in the 'grievances' or 'deprivation and generalised beliefs' are an important precondition for the growth and decline of social movements\(^{20}\). For example, if people nurse a grievance about environmental conditions and share a belief that governments or private companies are responsible for them, they can possibly resort to some kind of collective actions to demand remedial measures from them.

Yet, direct experience of environmental degradation and its damage to human health and livelihood (e.g. noticeable air and water pollution) is not necessary. Changes in how people interpret or 'frame' the issues can develop an environmental movement\(^{21}\). For example, works by natural historians and romantics helped to spread the aesthetic value of nature among a large population in the Western countries\(^{22}\). It resulted in the emergence of the first generation of environmental groups in the late 19\(^{th}\) Century, such as *Fédération Française des Sociétés de Protection de la Nature* (1857, France), the Commons, Open Spaces and Footpaths Preservation Society (1865, UK), the Selborne Society (1885, UK), the Audubon Society (1886, US), the Society for the Protection of Birds (1891, UK), the Sierra Club (1892, US), and the National Trust (1895, UK). Conservation groups were founded in Holland in 1905 and in Sweden in 1909. Bird protection groups in Germany and France were founded in 1899 and 1912 respectively\(^{23}\). Publications such as Carson's 'Silent Spring' in 1962 and events such as the Earth Day in 1970 changed how people see environmental issues and contributed to the emergence of the new environmental (ecology) movement in the late 1960s to early 1970s in the West. Carson's best-seller warned of the danger of insecticides and pesticides and widely publicised the fact that nature was vulnerable to human intervention, which could in turn affect the people's life\(^{24}\). Environmental disasters in this period, such as the large scale oil-spill from the tanker Torry Canyon off the shore of the Southwest of England and from a platform of Union Oil off California raised

\(^{20}\) See Smelser (1963), Gurr (1970), Turner and Killian (1972), for example.

\(^{21}\) See Snow et. al, (1986) and Tarrow (1998) for the arguments on the 'framing' approach.

\(^{22}\) They include White's 'The Natural History of Selbourne', Audubon's 'Birds of America' in the late 18th century, the poems by Wordsworth (UK), Emerson's 'Nature' and Thoreau's 'Walden' in the mid 19th century.


\(^{24}\) Elrich (1968) and Meadows, et. al (1972) were also influential in this period.
public awareness of pollution problems.

These increased the ENGOs dealing with pollution, energy and related amenities (e.g. recycling and clean-up activities). Friends of the Earth (FoE) and Greenpeace were established in 1969 and 1972 respectively\textsuperscript{25}. The national branches of these were soon after established in Western Europe\textsuperscript{26}. The emergence of research and advocacy types of groups such as the World Watch Institute (WWI, 1974) and the World Resources Institute (WRI, 1982) show another type of activism which developed in this period.

'Framing' is underpinned by important components of liberal democracy, such as the freedom and alternative sources of information, which are related to the development of the media and the information disclosure of the government. Open and accountable states can increase the flow of environmental information. The concurrent environmental movement in each country in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union was no coincidence. In addition to the reports on the Chernobyl disaster in 1986, Gorbachev's perestroika and glasnost policy after 1985, which was (willingly or not) followed by the leaders in the Eastern Europe, provided critical opportunities for the dissemination of environmental information\textsuperscript{27}. When South Korean ENGOs grew rapidly from the late 1980s, articles on environmental issues on major newspapers multiplied 20 times in six years from 1986, according to a government report (quoted by Ku 1996: 61)\textsuperscript{28}.

Importantly, the frame is changed and expanded with the influence of other social movements. The rise of student and women's movements in most Western developed countries in the 1960s overlapped with the environmental movement and politicised the latter by providing resources and activism, which re-framed environmental issues. Fox

\textsuperscript{25} Conservation/preservation type of ENGOs also grew in this period. Their total membership in the US grew 7 times in the 1960s (Mitchell, et. al, 1992). The members of five major US conservation groups increased by 177% from 1966 to 1975 (Fox, 1981: 315). The same trend can be found in the UK (McCormick, 1989: 133).

\textsuperscript{26} The national branches of FoE were established in the UK (1970), France (1970), Sweden (1971), the Netherlands (1972), Germany (1975/ formally joined FoE in 1989), and Italy (1976). By 1987, Greenpeace had branches in Denmark, Germany, UK, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria, Spain, and Sweden (Heijden, et. al, 1992).

\textsuperscript{27} See for example Waller and Millard (1992), Janker-Webster (1998), Wolfson and Butenko (1992), Manning (1998), Pryde (1991) for the cases of Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, the former Soviet Union.

\textsuperscript{28} In particular, the reports on tap water contaminations in major cities in 1989, 1990 and 1991 raised public environmental awareness (Lee, 1999; Ku, 1996).
(1981: 325) stated: 'Whether from hippie, feminist, civil rights or proto-Marxist backgrounds, young people flooded into the conservation movement as never before, providing most of the foot soldiers as it assumed the character of a mass crusade'. In the context of this thesis, the emergence of the democratisation movement can bring about changes in the framing structure.

Anti-regime movements of intellectuals and green protests were mixed together in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, which were later powerfully advanced by the participation of the masses when political opportunities widened. In South Korea, ENGOs started to emerge on a small scale along with the development of the democratisation movement (although it developed in earnest mostly after institutional changes, as mentioned)\(^\text{29}\). Professional environmental groups such as the Korea Pollution Research Institute (KPRI) were run and supported by 'pro-democratic' people who regarded the anti-pollution movement as part of the democratisation movement because they considered the military regime as being mainly responsible for the pollution. The relationship between the democratisation movement and the environmental movement was indirect in the sense that 'the former produced many key environmental activists and the origins of today's diverse environmental organizations can be traced back to the campuses of the 1970s' (Lee, 1999: 108).

The nature of the issues is an important factor in shaping ENGO strategies. For the nature 'preservation' or 'protection' movements in the West, the main causes have been aesthetic (the recent biodiversity protection movement to a lesser extent), which attracted a large number of supporters who sympathised with such movements\(^\text{30}\). Since the expansion of the scope of the issues from the 1960s in the West included human health, lifestyles and ideological choices which required political solutions among more interest groups and the collective actions of the larger public, it produced many advocacy groups (see for example, McCormick, 1989: 48)\(^\text{31}\).

\(^{29}\) KPRI (est. 1982) was actively involved in the protests against pollution problems in this period (Lee 1999; Ku, 1996).

\(^{30}\) In contrast with the preservation movement, 'conservationists' played an important role mainly within groups of government officials and professionals for an efficient exploitation of natural resources. See Hays (1959), Scheffer (1991), Fox (1981), and McCormick (1989).

\(^{31}\) The traditional conservation groups have also put more resources into advocacy and have transformed themselves into professional groups by hiring experts in such fields as lobbying,
By contrast, the victims of pollution in Northeast Asia or nature degradation in Southeast Asia have not formed many ENGOs. For example, the victims of pollution in Japan demanded compensation by bringing cases to court, because of the serious damage to the health conditions and the livelihood (Iijima 1993; Kajita 1990)\(^{32}\). It was a life struggle by victims and community members to solve particular problems, so it did not develop into ENGOs with a high membership from among the public at large\(^{33}\). The same pattern can be seen in other countries. In Taiwan, according to Hsiao’s study (quoted in Hsiao, 1999), of 1,211 protest cases between 1980-1996, most of the protests can be characterised as victim activism; as a result, only 13% of them have established more or less formalised groups for long-term struggle against polluters\(^{34}\). As Shiva (1992: 195) says, ‘the green movement in Asia, unlike in Europe or the United States, began with marginalised communities of forest-dwellers, peasants and fisherfolk’. Likewise, these protests by the victims of nature degradation did not produce many ENGOs.

This may partly be attributed to the local political culture as well as institutional constraints. For example, people may resort to other measures than forming ENGOs and taking collective environmental action in countries where the avoidance of open criticism of authority is a part of political culture like in East Asia (Pye, 1985). The existence and variety of variables that can be referred to as ‘social capital’ may also be another influencing factor\(^{35}\). Putnam (1993: 167) argues that ‘voluntary cooperation is easier in a community that has inherited a substantial stock of social capital’.

The dissemination of democratic ideas may ease cultural constraints by working on the third and fourth points raised by political opportunities theorists mentioned above, although the empirical studies on this in the context of democratisation are few. The

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\(^{32}\) Exceptionally, there are some Japanese ENGOs which have developed from the anti-pollution movement, such as the Aozora Foundation in Osaka.

\(^{33}\) This may be because other social movements did not join the environmental movement in the 1960s in Japan, unlike Western countries (Ishi, 1998), although the activists later joined the amenity movements in the 1970s and the 1980s.

\(^{34}\) Unlike the mainstream anti-pollution protests, ENGOs were the key actors in the middle-class based conservation movement in Taiwan (Hsiao, 1999).

\(^{35}\) Putnam defines ‘social capital’ as a feature of a social organisation ‘that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions’ such as ‘trust’, ‘norms’, and ‘networks’ (Putnam, 1993: 167).
diffusion of democratic ideas can change the third point (the shifts in political alignment and informal structure of power relations) and open opportunity for protests. For example, the weakening or division of once-stable (and possibly authoritarian in a democratisation context) elite allies can turn a section of them (perhaps who hold democratic ideas) to support the civil society movement to enhance its position. Tarrow (1998: 79-80) argues that ‘challengers are encouraged to take collective action when they have allies who can act as friends in court, as guarantors against repression, or as acceptable negotiators on their behalf’, which is ‘especially important in nondemocratic systems, where new movements have access to few internal resources’.

Economic Growth: the Resource Mobilisation Perspective

Liberals argue that political and economic freedom are closely related to each other, in that private property can provide political opposition with resources which support the pluralisation of power. In fact, overall economic growth at the macro-level and poverty reduction are major factors in developing civil society activities as they facilitate resource mobilisation. 

People cannot enjoy political rights and liberties without basic needs including adequate health care and education. In a situation of absolute poverty, life is a struggle for survival every day. People cannot afford to go to school or collect information, which are necessary to become active citizens. As Kitching (1983: 54) puts it, ‘gross material poverty and isolation as well as the illiteracy and narrowed intellectual vision which accompanies these material conditions make the majority of their citizens inactive or ineffective as continuous monitors and controllers of the use of public power’. The potential success of association and collective action can be restrained in such conditions. ‘The most deprived appear unlikely to sustain more than momentary insurgency’ and the conditions produced by prosperity, such as rapid communication, the expansion of the intellectual classes and the development of new social technologies, increase the level of grievance production in a society (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1986: 702).

36 See McCarthy and Zald (1973, 1977) and Oberschall (1973) for resource mobilisation theories.
Economic development has been argued to create politically active citizens who demand democracy. Modernisation theorists like Lipset (1960) argue that economic development and subsequent improvements in social conditions decrease the inequalities between higher and lower classes and bring about the growth of the middle class, whose values are essentially pro-democratic, eschewing extremist views, and so such improvements pluralize the civil society. Socio-economic improvements level up education, which creates more politically active citizens with higher comprehension and participation ability, as well as elites who can enforce their claims in the political arena. Also, the growth of the middle class implies an increase in the financial resources for citizen movements. Although how economic growth results in these changes varies according to countries, it has in fact supported the environmental movement in some countries. For example, Quigley (1996) points out that the expansion of the middle class made a significant contribution to the growth of environmental activism in the 1980s in Thailand. This contribution from democratisation theorists implies a relation between democratisation and the environmental movements.

The expansion of education and concentration of population in the urban areas can promote social movements by facilitating recruitment and communication as well as producing experts with progressive values and shared life circumstances, who dominate employment in the service sector and the professions of modern industry (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1986: 711-2, 703). Indeed, students have played a significant role in social movements in many cases, and Asian environmental movements are no exception. In South Korea, student participation in campus environmental groups and ‘circles’ ‘played crucial roles in giving birth to environmental movement organisations’ (Lee, 1999: 109). This partly reflected the rapid increase of university students in the 1980s. (See Appendix A for the socio-economic development of the countries mentioned in this chapter.)

Structural theorists, such as Moore (1966) and Rueschemeyer et al (1992), argue the economic impact on civil society from a different perspective. They argue that capitalist development produces social classes which are concerned with democratisation such as ‘the urban bourgeoisie’ or ‘the urban working class’, while it weakens the landed class. Structural changes in favour of subordinate classes make it difficult for the state to rule in an authoritarian way.
Meeting basic material needs can turn people’s attention to the non-material quality of life (Inglehart, 1977), which can raise environmental awareness and the resources available for environmental activities. Economic development can also create the opportunities for entrepreneurs of grievances to develop social movements (Jenkins, 1983) by the development of transportation and media for communication, social marketing, and advertising.

Having studied the growth of environmental groups in the UK since the late 19th century, Lowe and Goyder (1983: 25) note: ‘it is perhaps no coincidence that each of the periods of sudden growth of new environmental groups in the 1890s, the late 1920s, the late 1950s and the early 1970s occurred at similar phases in the world business cycle - towards the end of periods of sustained economic expansion...We would suggest that environmental groups arose at these times as more and more people turned to count the mounting external costs of unbridled economic growth and sought to reassert non-material values’.

Economic development alone does not seem to be a sufficient and straightforward factor for the growth of ENGOs. Japan experienced rapid economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s. However, as mentioned earlier, it was only after the 1970s that ENGOs started to grow, except for a few conservation groups38. It was rather economic slow-down caused by the oil shock in the early 1970s that raised the public’s environmental awareness and contributed to the growth of amenity groups, especially in the field of recycling. In Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, economic growth was not a major factor, although the economic slump may have developed the people’s grievances against the regime.

On the other hand, limited socio-economic improvements under new regimes after democratisation in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union decreased the support for the environmental movement and pushed environmental issues off the political agenda (Waller, 1998; Jancar-Webster, 1998; O'Toole and Hanf, 1998; Fagin and Jehlicka, 1998; Wolfson and Butenko, 1992). Opinion surveys show that the ‘worries about economic issues, especially employment and crime are of greater concern to the

38 They include the Wildbird Society of Japan (established in 1934) and the Nature Conservation Society of Japan (established in 1951).
general public' (Manning, 1998: 111). Admiration for the Western type of lifestyle also enhanced this attitude (Jancar-Webster, 1998). To put it another way, post-materialist values were not yet developed in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union at that time (Doktorov, et al. 1993; Wolchick, 1991). In fact, the economic stagnation that took place in most countries in the region in the early 1990s eased pollution through the decrease in production, which reduced environmental grievances\(^\text{39}\). For example, by 1993 in Russia and Estonia, production was down to little more than half its level of the late 1980s (Manning, 1998).

**Issues concerning the Resources of ENGOs and Democracy**

One also has to note that there are many local ENGOs in poor countries, which exist largely due to the assistance from domestic and overseas governments as well as private funding organisations. While such aid can enhance civil society, the financial dependency of ENGOs may raise question from the point of view of democracy, particularly about their ‘legitimacy’ and ‘representation’ as civil society organisations (Edward and Hulme, 1996). It can make NGOs merely an extension of funding parties such as state, businesses or international institutions, as NGOs become susceptible to their policies and strategies, which do not always match the local situation. This is especially problematic if NGOs have a thin base of local initiative and support. It ‘may call into question the extent to which they are truly civil society actors of their own country’ (Diamond, 1999: 253). This issue should be noted when examining the development of ENGOs in the South, although few studies have been made, if any, of how the spread of democratic ideas among ENGOs has changed their strategies concerning this issue.

Examples of this issue are abundant, including the cases in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union\(^\text{40}\). For instance, 1/4 or more of the budget of more than 20% of

\(^{39}\) Although modest, governments’ environmental policies were another reason for the decrease in *grievances*. See Waller and Millard (1992: 172-176) and OECD (1999). It was furthered by the motivations of the government and private companies to meet the EU standard to join the EU market. (See Baker and Jehlicka, 1998).

\(^{40}\) They range from international NGOs such as the IUCN and the WWF to multilateral organisations such as UNEP, bilateral agencies like USAID, and private donors like the Soros Foundation and the Environmental Partnership for Central and Eastern Europe.
ENGOs in the region was accounted for grants from the Regional Environmental Centre for Central and Eastern Europe (REC), which came from various foreign donors (REC, 1997)\(^41\). In the Philippines, ENGOs grew considerably, regardless of the country's less successful economic growth than the neighbouring East Asian countries, due to the support from foreign donors such as USAID, Global Environment Facility (GEF), the Asian Development Bank, the Japanese Government, EU, Rockefeller Bros Fund, and Keidanren Nature Fund (JEC and JCIE, 1997a).

International linkages require a high ability for communication, which grassroots people often lack. The middle class constitutes a small part of the population and is concentrated in urban areas in developing countries. As a result, it can happen that 'the more representative social movement leaders are of marginalized and oppressed peoples, the less effectively they may be able to present their cause to the outside world' (Diamond, 1999: 253), and so less 'representative' people lead NGOs and speak for local people. If NGOs cannot represent the voice of the minorities and disadvantaged groups and how strong their feelings are over the issues, it may lose its significance in the democratic system. It could even hinder democratic governance from the viewpoint of 'popular control'.

These problems can be found in the cases of ENGOs in Eastern Europe (see Jancar-Webster, 1998). In order to have access to funds, ENGO staff must be fluent in English and computer-literate to be able to write persuasive applications. In the process of the strategic transition of ENGOs from confrontation to participation, which was supported by western donors, 'professional' rather than 'popular' grass-roots organisations tend to be highly regarded. As a result, the former tend to grow with more funds and the latter tend to contract; '...few external resources have reached local groups' (OECD, 1999: 85). The problem here is that 'the professionals who head the more successful NGOs risk alienating themselves from a public that no longer sees them as representatives of its interests, but rather as a hierarchy and part of the power structure' (Jancar-Webster, 1998: 88). The Western funds provided 'in the name of democracy building' may have weakened the ENGOs' significance as the representatives of the citizens, as they may be

\(^{41}\) REC provided ENGOs in the region with a grants programme of more than 1 million EUR in 2001, as well as other programmes such as training courses (REC, 2001).
‘labelled as Western agents’ and subject to the criticism that they are susceptible to the policies of the foreign donors rather than the local people, while ‘the great strength of the pre-democratic environmental movements was that they were all indigenous’ (Jancar-Webster, 1998: 85, 88). Magno (1999: 170) pointed out the negative effects of the dramatic expansion of donor funds in the Philippines as follows: an increase in the quasi-NGOs affiliated to private entrepreneurs and politicians; corruption on both sides of NGOs and bureaucrats, leading to the misuse of the funds; and diversion of NGOs’ accountability away from grassroots and internal constituencies (which overemphasise quantitative achievements).

How, how much, and what kind of resources are mobilised for ENGOs is an important factor for shaping their strategies. ENGOs in Western developed countries are mostly a part of the middle- or upper class movement. Lowe and Goyder (1983) show that the members of UK ENGOs live more in wealthier regions (Lowe and Goyder, 1983: 28). The supporters and staff of national level ENGOs in the US are the white middle class (Morrison and Dunlap, 1986). A survey in 1973 showed that 98% of the members of US ENGOs were white and 61 % were college graduates. After the 1980s, the grassroots environmental movements mobilised people from various classes, occupations and races mainly to protect their health conditions from pollution, especially after the Love Canal incidents in 1978 (Freudenberg and Steinsapir, 1992; Dowie, 1995). However, the mainstream Western ENGOs are still supported by middle and upper class people.

As a result, they have considerable political and financial resources. Most of them are not ‘community-based groups’ but national level ‘cause groups’ which anyone can join when s/he shares the values, beliefs or principles which are represented by them. This has enabled a system in which the members make financial contributions and the staff work professionally as their agents. The number of members represents the amount

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42 See Zinger et. al (1973). Although ENGOs started to attract people from various backgrounds in the 1960s and the 70s, they ‘still appealed mainly to an elite constituency. In the Sierra Club, 52 percent of the members held professional jobs, 19 percent were students, and only 7 percent worked in clerical and blue-collar occupations. Audubon Society members in 1976 claimed an average income of $35,700; 85 percent had gone to college, 43 percent to graduate school’ (Fox, 1981: 355-6).
of constituencies who share the same interests. Therefore, the more members ENGOs have, the more political leverage they can exercise under the democratic system. There are many NGOs with a membership of over hundreds of thousands in the US, such as the National Wildlife Federation (NWF) with more than 4 million members (The National Wildlife Federation, 1999).

The situation is very different in Asia, not to mention the developing area of it. The total number of the members of Japanese ENGOs recorded in the ENGO directory (about 1,500 groups) only amounts to 754,403, which is much smaller than one single large ENGO in the Western countries (Kankyo Jigyodan, 1998). The ratio of total population and the membership of the largest ENGO of each country is 18:1 in the Netherlands, 70:1 in the US, 65:1 in the UK, 210:1 in Germany, while it is 2400:1 in Japan, 1840:1 in South Korea and 5500:1 in Taiwan. There are few groups with membership systems (in that people join as financial supporters) in Southeast Asia (See Appendix D for the comparison of the membership of the largest ENGOs in Western countries and East Asia.).

The financial aspect largely shaped the strategies of ENGOs in Thailand, where the ‘top-down’ environmentalism was supported by businesses who wanted to respond to the criticism of being polluters. They established environmental institutes such as the Thailand Environment Institute (TEI) in 1993 and the Thai Environmental and Community Development Association (Magic Eyes) in 1984. The government also started to provide ‘Environmental Funds’ to the ENGOs. The decrease in foreign funds by the 1990s, on which 80 to 90 % of Thai ENGOs’ budget depended (Quigley 1996; So and Lee 1999), turned them more to look for funds from government and the business sector (Thai Development Newsletter, 1995, No. 29, quoted by So and Lee, 1999). In addition to other structural constraints, such as the fact that ENGOs have to be under supervision by the government through licensing, the funding issue has promoted
'corporatist' relations between the state, businesses and ENGOs in Thailand (see Lee and So, 1999).

The membership differences are greater in the case of ENGOs in the new environmental movement, which tend to apply a more confrontational approach than conservation and amenity groups, reflecting local political culture. Greenpeace Japan, for example, had only 5,000 members in 1999, while it had more than 500,000 members in the Netherlands and Germany and more than 300,000 in the US, which ranks Japan only 20th in the world45. Although the strategy taken by Greenpeace Japan was more moderate than that which was taken by its international counterparts, to suit the local culture (Greenpeace Japan Staff, interview, 16/July/1999), their political image and actions may still be too confrontational to attract many supporters46. FoE Hong Kong split with the FoE International as they preferred a less confrontational approach than its international allies (Chiu, et. al 1999,; 82).

This issue of strategy is not only the case for the groups in the new environmental movement. The survey of Japanese ENGOs made in comparison with that of the UK ENGOs (Lowe and Goyder, 1983) implies that Japanese ENGOs are generally less confrontational (i.e. collaborative), less political (i.e. practical), more participatory, and more community- and volunteer-based (Nomura and Abe, 2001). Japanese ENGOs make more of ‘providing voluntary assistance in the practical work of the group’ and ‘disseminating the group’s message at the grassroots’ as the benefits that they derive from their members. Ninety-three percent of the staff work as part-time volunteers there. Decisions are largely made with reference to the members in a participatory manner47.

To put it differently, without a large membership, their legitimacy derives especially at each locality by representing the community members who largely overlap with their members and staff through a participatory approach48.

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45 Interview with Greenpeace Japan Staff (16/July/1999).
46 Many of the staff of FoE-Japan (which has only a few hundred members) mentioned similar opinions while the author was involved in their activities in 1997-8. ENGOs with more confrontational approaches such as Earth First! are not seen in Japan.
47 In response to the question ‘It is the duty of the leaders of the society to safeguard and promote its aims not to represent the opinions of its members. There’s no need to consult the members much: they would not expect it’, 50% of British ENGOs agreed while it was only 34% who agreed among Japanese NGOs (Nomura and Abe, 2001).
48 In fact, 9 out of 10 largest local NGOs in terms the membership in the ENGO directory
2.2 Democratisation and Involvement of ENGOs in the Policy Process

One has to be careful to find appropriate and flexible theories of the policy process to analyse the cases in a developing country in the process of democratisation, since most of these theories have been developed in democrtised better-off Northern states. One important criterion is the theory's capacity to examine the agenda-setting phase. Even in a pluralistic world, powerful policy makers keep issues off the agenda, if they are regarded as threats to their interests, values, ideologies and the current political system (see for example, Bachrach and Baratz 1962; 1963). This account is even more applicable to authoritarian regimes since the states tightly control the agenda and the specification of alternative policies.

Another is the aspect of inclusion (or participation). Democratisation can lead to the inclusion of former 'outsiders', such as ENGOs, in the face of the developmentalist policies of the authoritarian state and business interests. Accordingly, the frameworks for this thesis should be elastic enough to analyse such dynamism in policy networks or communities.

From the viewpoints of these criteria, this thesis draws on (1) the 'policy network' and (2) the 'multiple streams' perspectives, which are reviewed below with reference to their relationship with democratisation.

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The Policy Network Perspective

The 'policy network' is a widely-used analytical perspective on the policy process. A network is defined as 'a cluster or complex of organizations [and individuals] connected to each other by resource dependencies and distinguished from other clusters or complexes by breaks in the structure of resource dependencies' (Benson, 1982: 148).

mobilised existing community organisations (such as youth groups and neighbourhood associations) and involve them as members (Nomura and Abe, 2001).
This framework focuses on the role of the informal contacts and relations between actors rather than merely formal interactions between institutions, when analysing how network members interact and try to reflect their interests in the policy process.

The strong point of this approach is that it can 'map out' the participants in a policy area; namely, it can show and explain the changes in 'who is in' and 'who is out' in the process of democratisation. The policy network addresses 'questions of exclusion and inclusion in the decision-making process and how various interests can be mobilised to assist in effective policy implementation' (Grant, 2002).

There are some differences between the American and the European literature on policy networks (see Marsh, 1998, for example). The former started in response to the critiques of the pluralist model by the sub-government theorists (including the proponents of the 'iron triangle'). Scholars such as Heclo (1978) argue that there are more actors, and that policy making in most policy areas is more open than what is conceived as the 'iron triangle'. Actors in such policy areas, he argues, form 'issue networks'.

On the other hand, the debate between corporatism and pluralism has had a significant impact in Europe (Daugbjerg, 1998a). Major differences from the American literature include the following: (i) the European literature 'sees the growth of networks as having much broader significance; as marking a new form of governance, which they distinguish from two other forms, market and hierarchy' 49, and (ii) it emphasises structural relations between institutions rather than personal relations between key actors, which the American literature highlights (Marsh, 1998a: 5-6). The studies on networks 'have been developed primarily in Europe' (Peters, 1998: 21) for the conformity to European politics, which is more structured around central bureaucracies with fewer actors and entry points than in the US.

This thesis draws mainly on the European literature. The compatibility with one of the key concepts of this thesis, 'governance', is one reason. Viewpoints of structural relations between institutions are another reason. More importantly, in the European context, policy networks are developed into a model of interest group representation

49 There is a slight difference on this point within the European literature (Marsh, 1998: 8).
that can 'subsume' pluralism and corporatism (Marsh, 1998: 6). This means the model can cover the changes in the interest group representation from 'authoritarian corporatism' in Indonesia (see Chapter 3) in the course of democratisation.

The 'policy network' is flexible in examining the changes in interest group representation in the process of democratisation, because it is a generic concept covering different types of networks in such terms of membership, integration and institutionalisation. Based on Rhodes (Rhodes, 1986; Marsh and Rhodes 1992), it can be presented as a continuum encompassing various kinds of networks, ranging from highly integrated policy communities to loosely integrated issue networks (see Daugbjerg, 1998a, Marsh 1998b)\(^5\). The policy community has a limited number of members with narrow interests represented, while the issue network has many members with wide interests represented (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992). The policy community can bargain and negotiate with frequent interaction, although the members of an issue network are only consulted in a sporadic manner. Within the policy community, there is a consensus on policy principles and procedures to approach policy problems, which is not reached within the issue network (Daugbjerg, 1998a).

This theory explains how the characteristics of and the changes in policy network affect policy outcomes. Some who focus on the agents, be it groups or individuals, argue that the participants' resources and interests are the significant factor in policy making (see Dowding, 1995, for example). Others emphasise that the network structure is the key factor. Marsh and Rhodes (1992) argue that a tight policy network results in policy continuity and a weak one in discontinuity. Similarly, Daugbjerg (1998a) argues that the more cohesive a policy network is, the fewer opportunities for change are provided, which results in moderate policy change. These two are not mutually exclusive and it is important to see both aspects when trying to explain policy outcomes (Marsh, 1998b).

So, how can the policy network explain the influence of exogenous factors such as

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\(^5\) Rhodes (1986) specified five types: 'policy communities', 'professional networks', 'intergovernmental networks', 'producer networks' and 'issue networks'. These are not the only categorisations. For example, Wilks and Wrights (1987) consider that networks differ by different policy levels: policy communities at sectoral level (e.g. chemical sector) and policy networks at each policy level (e.g. drug licensing).
the changes of political and economic structure as well as those of knowledge (such as ‘democratisation’)?

51 Marsh and Rhodes (1992; Marsh 1998b) suggest that exogenous factors cause network change, especially in terms of the resources, interests and relationships of the actors within a network, which results in policy change. ‘Resources’ include ‘information, legitimacy [and] implementation resources’ and groups within network exchange them ‘for a position in the policy process’ (Smith, 1993: 63). Nevertheless, how and when networks translate the external factors (e.g. democratisation) into actual public policies and programmes ‘has been a neglected topic’ (Atkinson and Coleman, 1992: 175).

The spread of democratic ideas can be an important factor for network change among other impacts of democratisation. It can change the resources of ENGOs such as ‘legitimacy’ and increases their influence on policy outcomes. This point is significant in theoretical terms, for it is argued to be important to include ideational factors and external changes to enhance the theories of the policy network (Atkinson and Coleman, 1992: 172-6). In addition, the institutional liberalisation, such as freedom of speech and association, and socio-economic improvements can enhance ENGOs’ ‘expertise’ (information), ‘legitimacy’ and ‘implementation resources’ by changing their staff, membership and capacity. This thesis attempts to make contributions to the literature by examining the interaction of these factors and network.

One has to note here that ‘[a]ll such exogenous change is mediated through the understanding of agents and interpreted in the context of the structures, rules/ norms and interpersonal relationships within the network’ (Marsh, 1998b: 196-7). When applied to this thesis, one has to take account of the role of conventional informal institutions (e.g. norms and standard operating procedures) which can conflict with the democratic ideas and constrain resource exchange in a policy network (e.g. legitimacy)52.

Still, the concept of policy network seems to be weak in explaining the agenda-

51 See Daugbjerg and Marsh (1998) for the significance of connecting the policy network with meta-level variables such as political system for the former to offer an explanation of policy outcomes.

52 In fact, they have been argued as a critical factor for the success of democracy and democratic transition. See Almond and Verba (1963); Linz (1978); Diamond (1992), for the role of political culture in democracy and democratisation.
setting phase, namely when and how an issue gets on the agenda of the policy network. In this regard, scholars such as McLeay (1998) and Daugbjerg (1998a, 1998b) suggest the possibilities of incorporating the role of public opinion, which can be manifested in such forms as demonstrations and opinion polls, particularly through media coverage. Public opinion demands a policing network to deal with new issues. A strong network tries to deny such demands. Despite this, the theories still seem to provide inadequate explanation of what goes on to a policy agenda and why. Marsh only states that ‘politicians’ interpretation of public opinion was clearly crucial and, of course, politicians can manipulate, as well as respond to, public opinion’ (Marsh, 1998b: 188). The issue of how to incorporate external factors, especially in relation to the agenda-setting phase, needs to be clarified for the use of this theory in this thesis.

*The Multiple Streams Perspective*

The ‘multiple streams’ (Kingdon, 1995, 1984) is another perspective with widespread appeal among scholars in the area of policy studies. The multiple streams is not complex, consisted of only four elements - namely, policy windows and three ‘streams’: policy, political, and problem. The three steams normally operate independently of each other. They can be coupled by policy entrepreneurs when a ‘window of opportunity’ opens, which results in major policy change.

The ‘problem stream’ explains how policy makers pay attention to certain problems among others. Kingdon mentions three mechanisms which bring problems to policy makers’ attention. The first one is ‘indicators’. Some numerical data and information are produced by governmental and non-governmental agencies. They can show the existence, the scale and change of problems in a clear manner, which have a significant role in shaping governmental attitudes and positions. For example, a report on the rapid increase in the deforestation rate may turn policy makers to this issue. Second is ‘events, crises and symbols’ (‘events’, for short). Events of this sort include such episodic incidents as crises and disasters. The huge oil spill by the super-tanker Exxon Valdez in 1989 and the radioactive contamination by Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant in 1986 made not only the US and Soviet government but also the international community take
action for the prevention of such problems. ENGOs' impressive eye-catching activities, especially outsider strategies such as demonstrations and direct action, can be included here. The third is 'feedback', which refers to the information on the performance of current programmes. It shows, for example, a failure to meet goals, or unanticipated consequences of current policies. People are convinced through these three mechanisms that there is a problem to be solved. Political liberalisation resulting in the freedom of speech and association and the increase in the flow of information can facilitate this stream.

The 'policy stream' produces a list of solutions. Ideas float about in the 'policy primeval soup' generated in 'policy communities'. Policy entrepreneurs push ideas that would benefit them, by investing various resources. Some ideas can survive, and are listed as viable proposals if they meet criteria such as value compatibility and technical feasibility. For example, if the policy community starts to value democratic ideas, it would be reflected in the contents of policies.

The 'political stream' is composed of following elements: the national mood (public opinion, climate of opinion); consensus-building (bargaining, bandwagons and tipping); organised political forces (parties, legislative politics, pressure groups); and government (change in personnel and jurisdiction). These elements can determine the status of agenda items. They can push some subjects high on the agenda, while inhibiting other subjects from attracting the attention of government. The democratic arrangement of formal institutions can change the organised political forces. It can change the components of parties and legislative politics by adapting electoral politics, while ENGOs grow as a result of political liberalisation. It can also change the jurisdiction of the government as well as personnel in a democratic direction. It may increase the opportunities for citizen participation, such as through public hearings.

The spread of democratic ideas can shift the national mood and develop ENGOs.

53 On the other hand, insider strategies of NGOs are included in the political stream, as is mentioned below.
54 Kingdon uses the term 'policy community' to refer to 'specialists in a given policy area' (1995: 117). This looks at the role of ideas like the concept of 'epistemic community' (Haas, 1992) rather than resources or interests to connect members, and pays less attention to interest groups. Yet, this can also be taken as 'policy network' as Zahariadis and Allen (1995) argue, which can combine these two theories.
ENGOs can in turn contribute to shaping the public opinion. Democratic ideas can also shape the practice of parties and legislative politics in favour of the inclusion of civil society groups. Coalitions are ‘being built through the granting of concessions in return for support of the coalition, or as actual or potential coalition members make bargains’ (Kingdon, 1995: 159). This echoes the resource exchange model of the policy network. The increased value or legitimacy of having support from civil society groups can enhance the bargaining power of ENGOs, together with the increase in their enhanced ‘expertise’ and ‘implantation resources’.

‘Policy windows’ couple the streams, and change policies when they are opened either by the problem or the political stream. ‘The separate streams of problems, polices and politics come together at certain critical times. Solutions become joined to problems, and both of them are joined to favourable political forces. This coupling is most likely when a policy window - an opportunity to push pet proposals or one’s conceptions of problems - is open’ (Kingdon, 1995: 194). Policy entrepreneurs ‘couple’ their pet policy to a problem when it comes up, or they wait until politics streams are developed.

There are a few advantages of using the multiple streams in this thesis. Importantly, based on the ‘garbage can’ model or organisational behaviour (Cohen, et al., 1972), it is good at explaining the agenda-setting and alternatives specification. This is partly because, unlike the policy network, it successfully incorporates exogenous factors. Zahariadis (1999: 78) states, ‘Kingdon’s adaptation of the garbage can model to policymaking at the national level is particularly useful because it integrates policy communities with broader events and because it addresses the ideas-versus-interests dilemma...Broad political events are connected to narrow sectoral developments in specific ways’. These characteristics help us to analyse ENGOs’ contribution even when they are outsiders.

This approach seems flexible enough to travel outside the US, to which Kingdon’s work has been limited. It has also been used in European contexts, where politics are less fluid than the US (see Zahariadis, 1995a, 1995b, 1996; Kendall, 2000). In addition,

55 Zahariadis argues that consequential coupling happens when the problem windows are open (which means finding a solution to a given problem), and doctrinal coupling happens when the politics windows are open (which means finding a problem for a given solution; e.g. new government tries to apply promised policies to problems).
the democratisation of Indonesia might create a situation like a 'garbage can', which makes the multiple streams highly useful. Zahariadis (1999: 88) states that:

'When a society is in the process of reordering its values, established norms that underlie state-society relations are challenged. As a result, conventional wisdom is questioned, and dissenting groups are brought to the forefront of change. In turn, the activation of new groups and the wide disagreement as to the relevant values upon which to base the policy decision increase ambiguity and permit the evocation or appearance of new problems and solutions. Such desegmentation of previously established links between windows, problems, and politics complicates the process as new and perhaps unrelated elements are dumped into the can' (Zahariadis, 1999: 88).

The weak points of the multiple streams can be complemented by the policy network. The multiple streams may provide insufficient description of the politics within and between 'organised political forces' or 'coalitions', which can shape the contents of policies. Some proponents of the multiple streams have tried to explain policy formation with reference to the structure of the policy community (e.g. less/more integrated), which they argue influences the trajectory of ideas in the 'policy stream' (see Zahariadis and Allen, 1995). However, their analysis is 'static' in the sense that they give perfunctory attention to how the structure changes, which is important in view of the theme of this thesis. This dynamic aspect can be supported by the 'resource exchange' model in the policy network.

Thus, this thesis draws on the policy network and the multiple streams in a complementary manner to look at the policy process. This approach matches the major criteria for the framework: their flexibility in examining the transitional period, the ability to explain the earlier stages of policy process (i.e. agenda-setting and alternatives specification) and the ability to see the influence and inclusion of outsiders. One may ask here if these two are more appropriate than the other 'lenses'; at least, among others, Sabatier's Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) cannot be overlooked in reviewing the theories of policy process.\footnote{For a fuller account of ACF, see Sabatier (1988, 1998), Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993,}
The ACF focuses on ‘advocacy coalitions’ (normally between one and four) which consist of various actors in the ‘policy subsystem’. ‘Policy oriented learning’ and external perturbations bring about changes in the briefs of actors in advocacy coalitions, which results in policy change. In the sense that the major driver of policy change in the ACF is ‘beliefs’ in tripartite structure (‘deep core’, ‘policy core’ and ‘secondary aspect’), the ACF can be regarded as an ‘idea-based’ framework.

Although the ACF is a very powerful and sophisticated analytical tool, it may not be appropriate for use in this thesis. First, it is not suitable for analysing a relatively closed policy system, like the authoritarian period of Indonesia. This is largely because the ACF does not distinguish types of coalitions (unlike the policy network) nor emphasise their changes.\(^{57}\) Parsons (1995: 201) noted that the ACF ‘may be less appropriate to those political systems with a tradition of greater centralization’ (Parsons, 1995: 201).\(^{58}\)

At policy level, as Greenaway, Smith and Street (1992) suggests, there are some areas in which advocacy coalitions are not evident and where decision making is not pluralistic (e.g. defence policy). Besides, the ACF is less appropriate when environments are less stable (Zahariadis, 1998).

Second, the ACF seems unclear about how external factors influence the policy subsystem (see Parsons, 1995: 201). This weakness is reflected in how it looks at the agenda-setting phase. For example, it is not very clear how the elite’s opinion, which the theory emphasises in agenda-setting, is influenced by ‘external events’ such as ‘public opinion’. Accordingly, it does not account for the impact of ENGOs’ ‘outsider’ strategies in attracting public concern by campaigning and demonstrating, together with the impact of the media.\(^{59}\)

The policy network also has these weak points in terms of its linkage with...
exogenous factors and its perspective on the agenda setting phase; however, these can be covered by the multiple streams. Besides, the combination encompasses two different viewpoints, namely ideas and interests.

2.3 Democratisation and the Environment: Two Major Arguments

The discussion on the relationship between democracy and environmental sustainability became prominent in the 1990s (see for example, Lafferty and Meadowcroft 1996; Doherty and de Geus, 1996). One can divide it into the arguments over (A) the democratisation of environmental politics (e.g. environmental implications of democracy or democratisation) and (B) the ‘ecologisation’ of democracy (i.e. the search for a more ecological style of democracy or ‘ecological democratisation’).

The latter includes the demands for deliberative and discursive democracy (e.g. Dryzek, 1995, 2000; see also Achterberg, 2001, Hayward, 2001; Barry, 1996; Goodin, 1996), assuming that open decision making and discussion among participants are to produce the right answer for the environmental issues (see for example, Dobson, 1996a) rather than preferences merely being aggregated. Deliberative democracy can promote pedagogical debate over environmental issues as generalisable interests, which can transform the preferences and avoid merely aggregating multiple opinions and bargaining in the policy process. Arguments of associative democracy can also be included here (Achterberg, 1996). The debate on social capital, which is important for effective policy performance (see for example Putnam, 1993, 1996), can also be explored in this line of arguments (see for example Morotomi, 2003).

These normative theories are important, but this section focuses on the review of (A), considering the topic of this thesis, the democratisation of a formerly authoritarian developing country. The discussion on ecological democratisation currently does not seem to go beyond the context of the North where democracy itself is more or less consolidated and poverty and social inequality are not major obstacles to the implementation of a more progressive style of democracy.\textsuperscript{60}

\textsuperscript{60}Eckersley (1996a: 218) notes that ‘many of the green arguments for stronger democracy fail to confront the question of power. Given existing social inequities and resources, knowledge and power disparities among different social classes and groups, it is unclear how the abstract
The core of the arguments in (A) is the tension between the proceduralism of democracy and the ‘consequentialistic’ concern of greens and others. Some care more about what is to be done than how it gets done.

In principle, people must be ‘free’ to make any environmental decisions in a ‘liberal-democratic’ context. On the one hand, it is reasonable to argue no one can authoritatively decide the meaning of the public good, as no one has superior knowledge or the ultimate truth about this. On the other hand, this may not always result in ‘green’ outcomes since liberal democracy accommodates diverse preferences from the wide public, involving ones that are environmentally damaging. For example, business may mobilise its vast political and economic resources on behalf of economic profits, which can harm the environment. ‘Green citizens’ can fail to exert political leverage at the time of decision making. Scholars and activists especially in the 1970s, were sceptical about the ability of democracy to cope with the ‘tragedy of the commons’ and the ‘limits to growth’ under liberal democracy.

Accordingly, if one sees less value in the citizen’s right to participate or to self-determination, it is not surprising for him or her to demand ecological paternalism, as Heilbroner (1974) and Ophuls (1973, 1977) did, because it can impose environmentally optimal policies like efficient resource allocation and population control. Ophuls (1992: 285) puts it as follows: ‘[a]s the community and its rights are given increasing social priority, we shall necessarily move from liberty toward authority, for the community will have to be able to enforce its demands on individuals’.

Besides, the time-limited nature and boundary problems embedded in democracy have been argued as environmentally negative factors. While environmental issues are generally longer-term public interests, a democratic government may prefer short-term

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62 It may be worth noting here that their arguments did not deny the importance of ‘social unity’, which is compatible with democracy but may not be so with liberalism (Paehlke, 1988).
63 See for example, Lafferty and Meadowcroft (1996b). These boundary problems are argued to be overcome by the traits of democratic regimes such as ‘political learning’ between open and accountable governments, the existence of ‘global civil society’ or trans-boundary networks of ENGOs, and their susceptibility to international criticism and tendency to support international efforts (see Payne, 1995).
policies in favour of pressing and straightforward demands such as those from capital and labour to win the elections. Without a powerful coordinating body, it is argued to be difficult to deal with bioregions crosscutting political boundaries and environmental problems caused in different jurisdictions. Taking environmental measures from place to place may be more expensive, without ‘economies of scale’ and the comparative advantages of each.

Despite these opinions, however, the pro-democratic arguments (i.e. arguments ‘for’ democratisation of environmental governance) have developed and become dominant in the last few decades. There seem to be mainly two sets of arguments, which are related to each other: (1) rights-based and (2) utilitarian arguments, like the two variants of democratic ideas mentioned in Chapter 1. This section reviews both of them, together with existing empirical studies on this issue.

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<th>Table 2-3 Two Major Arguments for Democratisation of Environmental Politics</th>
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<td>(1) Rights-based Arguments</td>
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**Rights-based Arguments**

Rights-based arguments maintain that democracy and environmental governance are inseparable and that people are endowed with ‘rights’ to participate in environmental decision-making. There are several factors that pushed these forward. One is the spread of democratic ideas in the ‘third wave of democratisation’ and the convergence of human rights issues and conservation, taking account of the situation of the South. This is exemplified by a joint report by Human Rights Watch (HRW) and the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) on the abuses of human rights through ecological degradation, which argues the importance of political liberties and participation for environmental purposes (HRW and NRDC, 1992; see also Kane, 1993). Another is the heightened scientific uncertainty and complexity surrounding the causes and outcomes of environmental problems. Environmental issues often resist purely technical solutions based on scientific knowledge. Democracy provides the chances to reassess and improve policies on a regular basis by having public participation through elections,
public debates and accountability. 'Only an informed and active public, and effective public-interest organizations', Paehlke (1996: 36) argues, 'can press the right points within tangled jurisdictions, can appreciate the limits to (and impossibility of) scientific 'certainty' and can convey the urgency of responding to early and subtle impositions on ecological systems'. Authority should not make decisions by itself. Based on the up-to-date information provided by experts, they must be made by the people themselves.

The development of the concept of 'sustainable development', which encompasses not only environmental but also economic and social objectives, is another contribution to the rights discourse. This concept was largely developed by the report of the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED 1987; Brundtland Report) and popularised at the United Nations Conference for Environment and Development (UNCED; Rio Summit) in 1992. It is a vague and variously defined concept\(^\text{64}\); but the one proposed by the WCED is the most oft-cited definition of it: 'the development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs' (WCED, 1987: 43). With the concerns on equality within developing countries, between North and South, and between generations, 'needs' were conceived in particular as the essential needs of the world's poor, to which overriding priority should be given. Poverty is seen as a 'major cause and effect of global environmental problems' and the 'reduction of poverty itself' is seen as a 'precondition for environmentally sound development' (WCED, 1987: 44, 69).

Partly derived from this concern for the South, sustainable development has not overlooked the conflicts of interest that emerge in the process of development and the aspect of social justice, and emphasises the importance of participation\(^\text{65}\):

'The search for common interests would be less difficult if all development and environment problems had solutions that would leave everyone better off. This is seldom the case, and there are usually winners and losers. Many problems arise from inequalities in access to resources'... '[M]any problems of resource depletion

\(^{64}\) By the year of UNCED, the major definitions of sustainable development had reached 40 (Togerson, 1994: 303).

\(^{65}\) See UNDP (2002) for the significance of participation for the issue of poverty and social inequality. See also Munasinghe (1993), who suggests the trade-off relations between social, economic and environmental objectives of sustainable development.
and environmental stress arise from disparities in economic and political power. An industry may get away with unacceptable levels of air and water pollution because the people who bear the brunt of it are poor and unable to complain effectively...effective participation in decision-making processes by local communities can help them articulate and effectively enforce their common interest' (WCED, 1987: 48, 46-7).

Plumwood (1998) points out the issue of social inequality in decision making and environmental consequences by using the term ‘remoteness’, and argues the importance of participation:

There is a convergence between minimising remoteness in a decision-making system and maximising democracy in Mill and Dewey’s sense that those who bear consequences in a democratic system must have a proportionate share in the relevant decision-making. The concept of remoteness provides a way to focus on the kinds of political patterns that make some places better at the price of making other more distant places ecologically worse. Remoteness covers not only those direct consequential forms in which those who make decisions are enabled to avoid their adverse ecological consequences, but also communicative and epistemological forms of remoteness, in which they are remote from news or knowledge of these consequences (Plumwood, 1998: 565).

She argues to ‘create contexts in which both harming and harmed parties can communicate, in which the harmed group is not disadvantaged as communicators and the harming group is neither remote (consequentially or epistemically) nor privileged in some other way in the decision making process’ to reduce remoteness and solve environmental conflicts (Plumwood, 1998: 574). Her normative demand for ‘communicative participatory democracy’ may be more suitable in relatively advanced democracies in the North in the context of ‘ecologising democracy’. Yet, her concept of ‘remoteness’ provides an insight into the social aspects of the issue. Besides, the case studies in this thesis may contribute to her arguments by suggesting the role of ENGOs in existing liberal democracy (which she criticised because it can reflect such inequality), because they can help the disadvantaged and reduce ‘remoteness’ in the
decision making process, while they ‘democratise’ themselves by increasing accountability, transparency and representation, which she may have underestimated.

Besides the issue of social equity, the comprehensive nature of sustainable development, including economic, social and environmental aspects, underlines the citizen’s right to participate, as it is essentially subjective and value-laden. ‘The essential indeterminateness and normative character of the concept of sustainability implies’, Barry argues, ‘that it needs to be understood as a discursively “created” rather than an authoritatively “given” product’ (Barry, 1996: 116). This is especially applicable to the issues of natural resources extraction in the South, as nature there is more closely related to the life of the people (especially the poor) than is industrial production, and the solution to the latter can be technical.

This rights-based approach has developed to circumvent the conflicts between the instrumental and contingent nature of democracy and consequentialism in the language of liberalism (see for example, Barry and Wissenburg, 2001). In this context, this approach can be rephrased as ‘liberal’ arguments. Pressing environmental claims as rights is to ‘make such claims non-negotiatable - or at least, less negotiatable than they currently are’ (Eckersley, 1996a: 216; see also Hayward, 2001 for the reasons for including environmental rights in the Constitution). In fact, degrading environmental conditions can hinder effective participation by deteriorating and making unequal people’s lives within and over generations66. In other words, curtailing liberty in activities bringing about environmental degradation means increasing liberty in many other areas in such forms as reduction of illness for the case of pollution (see Attfield, 2001)67. The rights approach can also be developed to include the rights of non-humans as well as future generations (see for instance Wissenburg, 1998, 2001; Mills, 1996; Eckersley, 1996b; Barry, 1996; Dobson, 1996b; Hayward, 2001), although this thesis does not emphasise this point.

66 See the argument by Barry (2001) that the Millian ‘harm principle’ in the liberal tradition can be ecologised to overcome this issue. Hayward (2001) and Wissenburg (2001) employ Rawls’ equality, difference and saving principles to cope with the intra and inter-generation inequality.

67 Barry and Wissenburg (2001) argue the importance of dividing the liberalism tradition into Lockean liberalism linked to libertarianism and free market and social liberalism from Mill to Rawls. The support of liberalism for achieving sustainability mainly draws on the latter.
Utilitarian Arguments

The utilitarian arguments are focused on the aspect of (cost-) effectiveness; namely, democracy is good for the environment. There are several contributions to the development of this perspective. One is from fieldwork in the last few decades that has found that it is wrong to perceive local people (especially in the South) as lacking the capacity for sustainable development (see Chambers, 1983; Ostrom, 1990; Peluso, 1992, for example). In line with this, findings from the field raised awareness that democratic participation at the local level provides better conditions for effective environmental governance. Another is the increasing recognition that making the most of civil society resources, which entails the participation or involvement of them, is more (cost-) effective. This is partly related to the reconsideration of the potential of market mechanisms to facilitate environmental activities, including recently emerged civil society movements such as ‘green consumerism’ (see for example, Payne 1995), as well as the re-evaluation of it as a resource provider for civil society activities. In the context of the Third World, it is significant to note the conceptual development of ‘good governance’, which emphasises the role of civil society for better implementation of international aid.

These arguments went hand in hand with the changes in political and environmental settings of the times. The collapse of communist regimes and the reports of their poor environmental records threw considerable doubt on the ability of top-down management to deal with economic and ecological difficulties. Paehlke (1996: 19) says, ‘there is no evidence that any authoritarian regime anywhere has ever been very effective as regards either environmental protection or the equitable distribution of scarcity’. The new findings about environmental issues such as climate change have attracted more attention to the green movement, which has shifted the strategies of the greens to

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68 Ostrom (1990) mentions that local political participation creates people’s sense of ‘ownership’ of decisions, leading to better implementation of them. The WRI group (e.g. Ribot, 2004) points out the importance of knowing local knowledge and environmental characteristics. Goldsmith, et. al (1972) described the normative benefits of smaller communities, including the possibility of deepening democratic governance and increasing the social capital (although they did not use this term), as well as the benefits of a small scale economy. See also Achterberg (1996).
‘develop new relationships with both political opponents and the general public’ with a
‘certain kind of realism about liberal democracy’; namely, the ‘accent is now less on
absolute rejection’ of it (Doherty and de Geus, 1996: 2).

One cannot miss the discussion on Ecological Modernisation (EM) here. In the last
few decades, the scope of environmental measures have been expanded from top-down
command and control type to more decentralised, flexible and consensual styles of
governance. In EM, this ‘political modernisation’ is an important step after the
environmental shift of the economy, in addition to the new environmental policy
principles such as the precautionary principle (see for example Mol and Sonnenfeld,
2000). Civil society engagement is considered important to cope with the
implementation deficit and to appease and accommodate the environmental movement
without fundamental structural change (Young, 2000b).

Unlike a pluralistic view of participation in which diverse interests compete for
political power, many have mentioned the concept of ‘corporatism’ to describe this
approach (see Weale, 1992; Dryzek, 1997; Neale, 1997; Mol and Spaargaren, 2000)69,
by which they mean that interest groups were involved in the policy process in return
for their assistance in its effective implementation. Naming Germany, Japan, the
Netherlands, Sweden and Norway as the ‘clean and green five’ nations in the world,
Dryzek (1997: 141) argues that these countries ‘are all, to greater or lesser degrees,
corporatist systems’ and it is a key to successful environmental governance. This
approach is possible as EM sees no serious conflict of ideas between actors and
envisages win-win relationships for each actor’s interests, especially between
environmental and economic ones, unlike the concept of sustainable development70.

In this context, participation may not be the right of the people in itself. EM accepts
the need to give a stronger role to NGOs in order to reduce conflicts (Weale 1992)71;
however, participation is permitted to selected actors only when the government sees the

69 Christoff (1996) divides the EM discourse into ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ EM, and he suggests the
latter prefers deliberative and open democracy. However, the mainstream seems to be the former.
Langhelle (2000: 314) notes that the ‘features that Christoff relates to the notion of ‘strong’ EM
...are so removed from the conventional uses of the concept that it is hardly recognisable’.
70 Hajer (1995: 26), a leading EM theorist, argues EM approaches to environmental problems as
calculable, as a positive-sum game and, in principle, as reconcilable to economic growth.
71 See also Jänicke (1996: 82) for this ambivalence.
needs for the collaboration or cooperation with them for its successful implementation. Groups with considerably different ideologies or opinions are excluded. As Young (2000b) puts it, an important part of EM is 'about adopting more inclusive approaches and marginalising the radicals'. The perspective on political opportunities is lacking here (van der Heijden, 1999).

In EM theory, the state or bureaucrats and businesses take the initiative in environmental governance, with the emphasis on 'scientific' knowledge to plan and guide the ecological transformation (e.g. Young, 2000b). While EM emphasises the environmental consciousness, knowledge and capacity of civil society (in particular ENGOs; see Weale, 1992), EM regards participation as an effective means to enhance the implementation of the technocratic approach, and therefore values it as long as it does not hamper the 'calculus' decision making.

This utilitarian view of participation may be attributed to the fact that EM has been developed mainly in the industrialised North, especially in Western Europe, on pollution issues. Its 'postulates, hypotheses and empirical references still partly mirror this geographical focus' (Mol and Spaargaren, 2000: 42; see also Christoff 1996; Fisher and Freudenburg 2001; Frijins et al 2000). EM has not fully considered issues such as biodiversity, poverty and social inequality, and the impact of the Northern development on the Southern environment, while they are emphasised in the framework of sustainable development, which overlaps with EM in many other respects (Dryzek, 1997; Janicke, 1997; Blowers, 1998; Hajer, 1995; see Langhelle, 2000 for the comparison of these two concepts).

As for the first issue (biodiversity), in EM, '[n]ature is treated as a 'source of resources and a recycler of pollutants' and not with 'its own intrinsic value, and its own open-ended developmental pathways' (Dryzek, 1997: 144).

On the second point, as Gibbs (2000: 17) puts it, there is 'little or no attempt to

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72 EM is strongly technocentric, using technology to get around finite limits to growth (Hajer, 1995: 32).
73 Similarly, Christoff (1996: 485) argues that 'the environment is reduced to a series of concerns about resource inputs, waste and pollutant emissions'; however, 'cultural needs and non-anthropocentric values...cannot be reduced to monetary terms, they tend to be marginalised or excluded from consideration'.
address issues of equity or democratic participation, which by contrast are central to sustainable development'. By overlooking social aspects, EM sees positive-sum relations between the economy and the environment. Therefore, the involvement of diverse views in decision making is not emphasised. Dryzek (1997: 146) states that ‘[u]nlike sustainable development, it makes no claims that this happy coincidence of values extends to social justice, still less social justice across the rich and poor nations of the world. In fact, ecological modernisation is completely silent about what might be the appropriate developmental path for the Third World Societies’.

On the third point, Christoff (1996: 489) argues that, in the First World, ‘a version of ecological sustainability may be created in the wasteland of a vastly depleted biological world’ and therefore ‘it may be positively dangerous if taken prescriptively by those nations where the conservation of biodiversity is a more fundamental concern or opportunity and/or which depend on primary resource exploitation to fund their traditional forms of economic growth’. The growth of the North has largely depended on natural resources from the South. Therefore, it is difficult for the South to follow the same path as the North for the risk of depleting resources.

There arises the concern (or danger) of the use of EM as a normative policy guideline (Seippel, 2000; Christoff, 1996) in the Third World without fully examining these three points. Christoff (1996: 497) argues that ‘there is a danger that the term may serve to legitimise the continuing instrumental domination and destruction of the environment, and the promotion of less democratic forms of government, foregrounding modernity’s industrial and technocratic discourses over its more recent, resistant and critical ecological components’.

However, because of the simplicity of its arguments, the ‘successful’ environmental management of the North and the influence of international environmental assistance

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74 Mol and Spaargaren (2000: 41) argue by quoting Beck’s risk society theory: ‘Beck is right in observing the tendency that socio-economic categories (classes) and environmental risks no longer run parallel by definition’. Their view reflects EM’s insufficient attention to the issue of inequality.

75 The state would ‘deliver the ecological modernisation through corporatist relationships between government and industry, although co-opting environmental movements where necessary, thus ignoring issues of participation and reducing the rest of society to passive consumers to be provided with enough information to make informed (but market-based) choices’ (Gibbs, 2000: 17).
from the North to the South, the idea of EM sounds good in the ears of bureaucrats in developing countries. EM indicates the possibility of overcoming environmental crises without leaving the path of modernisation (Mol and Spaargaren, 1993). Accordingly, EM has a ‘sharper focus than does sustainable development on exactly what needs to be done with the capitalist political economy’ (Dryzek, 1997: 143). In fact, the idea of EM is often (consciously or not) embedded in the policies of developing countries. One may find this idea in the environmental laws in Indonesia (see Chapter 4).

Thus, it is important to note that the utilitarian approach to democracy is ambivalent. Utilitarians may support democracy; this is because individuals are the best judges of their own interests, and decisions favoured by more people can provide more happiness than their alternatives. However, this consequentialistic approach does not always result in supporting liberal democracy, as is seen from that fact that Bentham excluded females, children, illiterates, and others from the constituency of participants because they were considered incapable of judging what is good. Again, here, a decision making system is right when it brings about the greatest good. This issue is even more significant when this approach is applied to environmental problems which tend to be accompanied by scientific uncertainty and complexity. For example, issues like global warming are highly technical and the public may not comprehend what are good decisions to cope with the situation, and it takes too much time to ‘educate’ the public (especially the poor in developing countries); therefore, utilitarians may conclude that the best possible decisions can be made by the experts rather than by the people.

Empirical Studies

Empirical studies on the relationship between democratisation and the environmental policy process in the Third World are still limited - in fact, the literature on advocacy by Southern ENGOs itself is limited (Potter, 1996). This is also true in East Asia, except for a few studies like Tang and Tang (1997) on Taiwan. Moreover, the impact of democratic ideas, which can often be the catalyst and key to successful transition, are a

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76 See Walker (1999) for the case studies in Africa.
77 The publications by Potter (1994, 1996; Eccleston and Potter 1996) on the relationship between democracy and the environmental policy process in Asia are also noteworthy for the theme of this thesis, although they were not on the impact of democratisation.
less studied subject, which this thesis examines with particular focus.

Having said that, there is an increase in important empirical studies on the impact of decentralisation on forest/natural resource management, which includes the World Resource Institute (WRI)'s research in more than 15 developing countries (for example, Ribot, 2004, Ribot and Larson, 2005, Dupar and Badenoch, 2002) and the works by the Centre for International Forestry Research (CIFOR; see Chapter 3). Given the relationship between democratisation and decentralisation (see Chapter 1) and the experience of Indonesia, the environmental implications of decentralisation are worth noting here.

They suggest the importance of paying attention to the state-local relations in the study of the policy process. One cannot miss the more complex power relations implied by the increase in the local actors. The WRI research assumes that, in theory, the 'downwardly accountable or representative local actors with significant discretionary power constitute the necessary infrastructure for effective decentralisation' (Ribot, 2004: 1; italics in original).

Yet, in law and in practice, this does not happen in most cases. This is because of 'the entrenched resistance that decentralisation reforms encounter at every step...groups that fear losing power in decentralisation reforms pose staunch resistance to adequate policy making and implementation' (Ribot, 2004: 2; see also Ribot and Larson, 2005). High level state officials and urban-based commercial interests are among the opponents to the process, as well as local and conventional leaders who already had vested interests in the pre-reform system. In short, the WRI research outcomes suggest, economic interests is a major obstacle to the democratic decentralisation of natural resource management in the South.

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78 Some proponents of decentralisation among greens may not support democratic systems. Bahro (1986) prefers 'communes' to parliamentary democracy. Bioregionalists such as Sale (1984) think it does not have to be a democracy, depending on the regional conditions.

79 See ESCAP and ADB (2000) for the Malaysian case, in which support to local institutional and capacity building were insufficient for sound implementation of environmental policies.

80 Such incomplete decentralisation include the following among others: management burdens are transferred without resources; the mobilisation of local people as mere labour rather than empowering them to make decisions for themselves; the double standards that require complex management plans from local communities while allowing large-scale commercial interests to enter and use the resource with little planning and even less monitoring; and the delegitimizing of fledgling local democracies by failing to give them discretionary powers (Ribot, 2004: 2).
The existing empirical research also suggests the need of looking at the issues of accountability and representation in the case studies. Ribot (2004: 3) notes: ‘[m]any reforms are now encouraging a plurality of local institutions - such as committees, associations, NGOs and customary authorities. But such proliferation of institutions that are unaccountable to representative authorities may be a formula for elite capture’. Customary authorities ‘represent only people of certain origins, ethnicities, lineages, and religious identities, while NGOs represent interested parties. Identity- and interest-based inclusion in public decision making may reinforce differences, fragment community, and produce conflict’ and therefore, presently, ‘scaling up and sustaining broad-based participation remain significant limiting factors for community-oriented natural resources management’ (Ribot, 2004: 3; italics in original).

The issue of accountability and transparency is entailed in the participation of the new actors in governance, as is pointed out elsewhere (e.g. Rhodes, 1999). The involvement of new actors without these would not enhance democratic governance. This is significant especially in developing countries, where civil society groups tend to depend on other funding sources than local civil society (see 2.1).

2.4 Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed various theories that help analyse the impact of democratisation on environmental governance in two dimensions - the growth of ENGOs and their involvement in the decision making process. To avoid the complexity it may cause, this chapter concludes by identifying analytical checkpoints, four for each dimension.

The impacts of democratisation (changes in institutions and ideas) on the growth of ENGOs can occur in three aspects: changes in the (1) ‘political opportunities structure’, in (2) ‘framing’ and in (3) ‘economic levels’. The case of Indonesia responds to the following questions that are yet to be answered in similar economic and environmental conditions (in the context of developing countries and natural resources depletion):

- How did the ‘developmental state’ in the pre-democratised period constrain the
growth and activities of ENGOs?

(e.g. What kind of groups and activities were allowed to exist?)

- What were the impacts of the democratic arrangement of formal institutions?
  (e.g. Did the start of electoral politics sap the momentum of the environmental movement? Did political liberalisation facilitate ENGO activities?)

- How did democratic ideas change ENGO strategies and the elites?
  (e.g. Did elites provide ENGOs with more political opportunities? Did ENGOs change their fund-raising approach to enhance legitimacy and representation?)

- What were the influences of economic conditions (growth, slump, poverty, and the expansion of education) on ENGOs?

To see the impact of democratisation on networks in the decision making process, this thesis draws on two different perspectives: (1) the interrogative policy network perspective with a focus on the analysis of the interaction between actors in the ‘policy stream’, and (2) the chronological ‘multiple streams’ perspective, covering from the agenda-setting phase. These theories have rarely been applied to the cases of developing countries, especially in a transition period, in which external factors have significant effects on the policy process.

The existing studies of the decentralisation of environmental governance in the South suggest the transition can be hindered by the politics between the local (or emerging) actors and the central actors (or the state, businesses and others with vested interests), as well as by the issue of accountability and representation of new actors (the latter is included in the third checkpoint above).

Drawing on the literature review of existing studies related to democratisation and networks in environmental decision making, the following four checkpoints are identified for case studies. In each point, the role of democratic changes in formal institutions, informal institutions and ideas will be examined:

- How did democratisation change the participants in policy networks?
(e.g. What was the role of ENGOs in involving local people? How can it be explained by the changes in the exchange patterns of resources?)

- How did the existing components of networks (i.e. informal institutions such as conventional norms) mediate the impact of democratisation?
  
  (e.g. How did democratisation change the relations between the emerging local actors and the hitherto powerful state actors?)

- What was the role of ENGOs as network outsiders, and of democratisation, in setting the policy agenda and opening policy windows?

- How did different democratic ideas come up through network changes and influence the alternatives specification?

Through case studies using these checkpoints, in addition, the implications for the two major arguments for democratisation of environmental governance, namely (1) ‘rights-based’ and (2) ‘utilitarian’ arguments, will be explored. How the actors value democratic decision-making in environmental governance is reflected in the degree of participation in practice. Through examination of the Indonesian case, this thesis tries to contribute to these arguments, especially the utilitarian ones, because they have not been examined well in the context of the developing world. In fact, the case of East Asia is appropriate, as the states have taken a utilitarian approach to the economy and the environment as is mentioned in Chapter 1.

Before moving to the case analysis, this thesis reviews how elites (the state and businesses) maximised natural resource extraction for economic growth and how this resulted in environmental degradation and the marginalisation of grassroots actors in the next chapter to examine what democratisation means in the Indonesian context.
CHAPTER 3

ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE AND ENGOS
BEFORE DEMOCRATISATION IN INDONESIA

Following Sukarno, who became the first president of Indonesia right after independence in 1945, Suharto ruled Indonesia for more than 30 years from 1967. Intensifying demonstrations and various political pressures forced Suharto to resign on 21 May 1998. This chapter first describes the characteristics of formal and informal institutions and the political ecology of natural resources management in the Suharto era (in 3.1). It is followed by the two dimensions of environmental governance in the period, namely the major actors and their relations (or ‘networks’; in 3.2), and the emergence and development of ENGOs under authoritarian political conditions before the democratisation movement started in the late 1980s (in 3.3).

3.1 Political Ecology in the Suharto Era

The Settings of Formal Institutions

Indonesia has an extensive land area (about 1,900,000 km²) and a large population (more than 200 million) with much cultural diversity. It consists of more than 17,000 islands, stretching over 5,200 km east and west and 1,900 km north and south. Indonesians are made up of over 300 ethnic groups approximately (they exceed 3,000 when subdivided), and more than 80% of the people speak languages other than Indonesian, the national language, in everyday life¹. There are about 580 languages in Indonesia. This embedded diversity and the size of the country may explain the emergence of strong leadership in Indonesia, to bring order and stability to the country, especially when it was in its infancy after independence.

¹ Biro Pusat Statistik (1996).
On the day after the end of World War II, 16 August 1945, Indonesia proclaimed its independence after the 300 years of Dutch rule. Sukarno was appointed two weeks later as the President by the leaders of the independence movement, based on the Constitution drafted a few days before (the 1945 Constitution). After four years of resistance against the Dutch after the War, who tried to re-establish the control over Indonesia, sovereignty was officially transferred from the Queen of the Netherlands to the Indonesian Government on 27 December 1949. In 1950, Indonesia adopted a new (provisional) constitution which provided for a parliamentary system. In response to the political instability and disorder which resulted from the parliamentary system, however, President Sukarno decreed the return of the 1945 constitution, which concentrated power on the President. He called it 'guided democracy', in which the leader or leaders guide the people with their own 'wisdom'.

After Sukarno failed to stabilise and develop the economy or politics, Lieutenant-General Suharto came to power on 11 March 1966, with a Presidential Order to transfer

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2 The Japanese had taken their place between 1942 and 1945.
3 Reflecting the diversity in the society, by 1950 some thirteen major parties were politically active. This hyper-pluralistic party politics paralysed the government.
all executive powers to him. The aim was to restore peace after the military-led massive 'Red purge' (around 50,000 people were estimated to have been killed), which started as retaliation for the murder of six right-wing anti-Communist generals on 30 September 1965 by Sukarno's closest guards, who claimed they were stopping a CIA-backed military coup (Sukarno was inclining towards the Indonesian Communist Party or PKI at that time). In the following year, Suharto formally became the President of Indonesia by being named at the provisional Parliament.

Suharto's Orde Baru or 'New Order' regime was characterised by the concentration of power on the President, government officials, the military, and the GOLKAR party (Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya or Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups), owing to the 1945 Constitution on which the regime was based. It stipulated that the MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat or People's Consultative Assembly), the highest organ of the state, was composed of the members of the DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat or House of Representatives), regional representatives and organisational representatives (Article 2)⁴. Yet, without any clause to specify their election, it was possible for the President to appoint them, especially the regional and organisational representatives, because it also said that 'prior to the formation of the MPR, the DPR and the Supreme Advisory Council in accordance with this Constitution, all their powers shall be exercised by the President assisted by a national committee' (Transitional Provisions: Clause IV)⁵.

Owing to this 'hole', a series of laws (Undang-undang or UU) were issued on the structure and status of the MPR and the DPR (UU No. 2/ 1985, which is the revised version of UU No. 5/ 1975 and UU No. 16/1969). According to the 1985 law, 100 out of 500 seats of the DPR went to the armed forces, which were under the President himself; 51, 100, and 147 out of 1,000 seats of the MPR went to the armed forces, representatives of organisations, and those of the regions respectively (500 seats of the

⁴ In the 1945 Constitution, the MPR is held at least once every five years to make or amend the constitution, elect the President/Vice-President, and decide the General State Policy Guideline (GBHN) for the President's term of office. Under the MPR, there are five high state organs: DPR, the President, the Supreme Court, the DPA (Dewan Pertimbangan Agung or Supreme Advisory Council), and the BPK (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan: the Board of Audit).

⁵ Based on the 1945 Constitution, Sukarno appointed more than three-quarters of the provisional parliament.
MPR are DPR members). This meant that around 40% of the members at the MPR were appointed by the President.

Even though 60% of the MPR members were elected by voting, the government tightly controlled the party politics. GOLKAR is the government-sponsored ‘functional group’ incorporating hundreds of associations from diverse social groups such as civil servants, workers, farmers, fishers, youth and women. The Joint Secretariat of GOLKAR was developed into a political party in 1970 to be the New Order’s instrument in the 1971 elections (Reeve, 1985). Since then, all the government officials were pressured to vote for GOLKAR. All the opposition parties were merged into two parties; they were required to be based on the Pancasila (the five basic principles of the Indonesian State) and not on religion, which undermined the hitherto popular Islamic parties. In addition, the opposition parties were always under constant surveillance by General Ali Moertopo’s OPSUS (Operasi Khusus or Special Intelligence Operations; Crouch, 1978). The emphasis on Pancasila and other controls over political activities made political liberalism impossible.

The New Order regime was keen on controlling societal forces. Large civil society organisations such as religious groups were required to have Pancasila as their sole ideological basis by a so-called ORMAS (Organisasi Masyarakat or Social Organisations) law, and they were put under the supervision of the state. In addition to the overarching-body GOLKAR, the regime expanded the formation of societal forces according to functions (e.g. fishermen, farmers, youth, journalists, and middle-class Muslims) and put them under state control.

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6 As Suharto himself mentioned the importance of this ratio stipulated in these laws, this number was shrewdly decided. In order to change the 1945 Constitution, two-thirds of the MPR members had to be present and more than two-thirds of them had to agree to the approval. All the laws in 1969, 1975 and 1985 made it possible for the President to appoint more MPs than that number (see Kawamura, 2002).

7 Pancasila was promulgated by Sukarno to unite the diverse groups of a hyper-pluralistic society. The five principles are: Belief in the one and only God; just and civilized humanity; the unity of Indonesia; democracy guided by the inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of deliberations amongst representatives; and social justice for the whole of the people of Indonesia.

8 They are Himpunan Nelayan Seluruh Indonesia (National Association of Indonesian Fishermen), Himpunan Kerukunan Tani Indonesia (Association of Farmers), Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia (National Committee for Indonesian Youth), Ikatan Advokat Indonesia (the Lawyers’ Association), Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia (the Journalists Association) (Robision, 83
This style of interest accommodation and societal-forces control is often termed ‘authoritarian corporatism’ (Robison, 1993; Santoso, 1999; see also King, 1982). Schmitter defines corporatism as follows:

‘a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organised into a limited number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories recognised or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and support’ (Schmitter, 1974: 96).

Drawing on Schmitter’s definition, Robison (1993: 45) argues that ‘Indonesian corporatism is less concerned with interest representation than with state control and social discipline’ and was rather ‘a mechanism for domination by an authoritarian regime’, resembling ‘state corporatism’ instead of ‘societal corporatism’ in Schmitter’s terms, or ‘authoritarian corporatism’ instead of consensual ‘liberal corporatism’ in Lehmburuch’s (1977) terms (see Cawson 1986 for the variants of corporatism including these).

It is also important to notice the dwi-fungsi (dual function) of the military, to participate in social and political affairs in addition to its ordinary role in defence and security, as this underpinned the state’s capacity for oppression. Suharto stated in his speech right after his assumption of office that the armed forces had a role to play in stabilising politics for economic development by facilitating investments from overseas, which was the primary object of the New Order regime9. This might have sounded appropriate after the PKI’s alleged coup on 30 September 1965 and the chaotic situation resulting from party politics before Sukarno’s introduction of Guided Democracy. In addition to having seats in the Parliament as mentioned earlier, the armed forces (especially the army) developed organisations for political oppression and ideological surveillance10. Along with censorship and other measures such as the banning of the

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9 See Honna (2002) for the significance of the dwi-fungsi in the New Order period. Also, Moertopo (1972a) was widely read and referred to as an explanation of it.

10 KOPKAMTIB (Komando Operasi Pemelihan Keamanan dan Keterbitan or Operational
activities of political parties at grassroots level (except for the brief pre-election campaign period), this contributed to the 'de-politicisation of the masses'. Suharto also appointed military officers to non-military posts in the government and as heads of local government to 'secure development'.

Human rights were mentioned only perfunctorily in the 1945 constitution. For example, Article 28 only said 'freedom of association and assembly, of verbal and written expression and the like shall be prescribed by law', and failed to secure the observance of these rights. Accordingly, rulers exploited this incompleteness for their own good and used it to control citizens' political activities and secure their positions. The description of the separation of powers is also incomplete. The Supreme Court was under the MPR, which was controlled by the President. The Constitution only mentioned that the 'judicial power shall be exercised by a Supreme Court and such other courts of law as are provided for by law' (Article 24), which again could be exploited by the authorities.

**Informal Institutions**

These formal-legal arrangements are considered to be underpinned by the local political cultures of Indonesia, especially that of the Javanese who dominate the political scene. To a degree beyond their population ratio (the Javanese are by far the largest ethnic group, more than 45% of the total population), the Javanese took up the important positions in politics - not to mention the presidency itself. For example, about 70% of the senior positions in the military were occupied by the Javanese in the late 1980s (Anderson, 1989). Historically, the dominance of Javanese culture in Indonesian politics started in the Dutch era, as the Dutch utilised its hierarchical nature to unify the archipelago under their hegemony (Geertz, 1995).

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Command for the Restoration of Security and Order; Suharto himself was its Commander) played a central role in the political oppression starting from the massive Red purge. Also, the establishment of KODAM (Komando Daera Militer or the Military Regional Command) made possible the surveillance of local political activity.

1 The Suharto regime adopted the concept of the 'floating mass', who are 'not permanently tied to membership of any political party'. According to the concept, the mass of the people 'always fell prey to the political and ideological interests of these parties' who try to mobilise their support while ignoring the necessities of daily life, and therefore it is important to free the people from political struggles for them to focus on the development efforts. (Moertopo, 1972b).
There are some important characteristics in Javanese culture which are necessary to understand Indonesian politics. One is ‘kekeluargaan’ (the family principle), opposite to Western individualism. Individualism was not considered by the local intellectuals to lead to ‘order and peace’, which is valued in Indonesian culture. Open contestation should be avoided. What is important in Javanese culture is not competition but ‘mutual cooperation’ (gotong royong): the spirit goes back a long way into traditional customs, to work together to cope with hardships as well as everyday labour. Decisions are supposedly made through deliberation (musyawarah) to reach a consensus (mufakat), while age and seniority are important in the process. The communication between the elite and the mass is one way - the will of the benevolent ruler is conveyed to the obedient populace and not the other way round. This reflects traditional relation of a leader and followers (gusti-kawula), in which the followers’ obedience is reciprocated by the former’s benevolence in such forms as opportunities for personal profit. These characteristics resulted in the importance of connections such as family ties, education and ethnicity, which have often been used to explain the problem of KKN (Korupsi, Kollusi, Nepotisme, or corruption, collusion and nepotism) that has been a major issue in Indonesia for long time (see Robertson-Snape, 1999 for cultural explanations of KKN).

The idea of ‘power’ in Javanese culture, as Anderson (1972) argued, significantly differs from the concept of power developed in the West. The quantum of power in the universe is constant, so that its concentration in one place or person is important because it means a proportional diminution elsewhere. As a result, on the one hand, power can be measured by proximity to the centre (the closer, the more powerful); on the other hand, such a concept as a multi-party system and the separation of powers can...
be interpreted as a decline of state power.

These characteristics of Javanese political culture have had a strong influence on the institutional development. The process of creating the 1945 Constitution is a good example (see Kawamura, 2002). As for the human rights aspect, there were some people such as Muhammad Hatta (the first Vice President) who insisted on the importance of stipulation of political rights in the Constitution. In opposition, Sukarno and Supomo (the Chair of the Small Committee Drafting the Constitution under the Investigating Committee for the Preparation of Independence) argued that it conflicted with the traditional family principles. Supomo said: ‘The constitution we are drafting is based on the doctrine of family principle, not based on the doctrine of individualism which we have rejected’ 16. As a result, power is concentrated in the head of the state as the head of a big family in the 1945 Constitution, and parliament is established only to guarantee that s/he can identify with the ‘spirit of the nation’.

*Policies for Natural Resources Exploitation*

Natural resources exploitation was critical for the New Order regime to strengthen its rule as well as to develop the economy. The regime made the most of foreign funds in the form of investment and international aid to raise the necessary resources for these purposes 17. This also meant a shift from Sukarno’s socialistic ‘Guided Economy’ to private market development with capitalistic policies. The helm was taken by a group of US-trained economic technocrats at BAPPENAS (*Badan Perencanaan dan Pembangunan Nasional* or National Development Planning Agency), especially Widjojo Nitisastro, Mohammad Sadli, Emil Salim and Ali Wardhana. ‘Because the state itself was then still too weak and chaotic to undertake measures to raise the necessary resources domestically, Widjojo had little difficulty in showing Suharto that massive external support was essential and that gaining this support required policies designed to

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16 He went on to say ‘if we declare the freedom of assembly and association in our constitution [which are based on individualism], we will challenge the rationality of the family principle doctrine.... In the system of family principle, the attitude of the nation (warga negara) is not always asking ‘what is my rights’, but asking ‘what is my duty as a member of the big family, that is, this Indonesian State’. Secretariat Negara Republik Indonesia (1995), Risalah Sidang BPUPKI-PPKI 28 Mei 1945-22 August 1945, quoted by Kawamura (2002: 53-54).

win the sympathy of the Western capitalist powers and Japan' (Anderson, 1983: 488).

This quickly resulted in a massive increase in the influx of financial resources. One of these was official aid. The Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), a group of donors to Indonesia, was established by the Western donors and Japan in 1967. Foreign aid financed nearly 80% of the development budget and accounted for 27.2% of the government revenue in 1969/70 fiscal year (Hill, 1996: 46; Robison, 1986: 171). Almost all the time, it accounted for more than 10% of the government revenue during the Suharto era and reached even 39% in 1988 (Chowdhury and Sugema, 2005).

Foreign investment in Indonesia also increased rapidly for natural resources exploitation after a series of reforms starting with the end of price controls (1966), the establishment of a relaxed Foreign Investment Law (1967) and the rationalisation of banking and interest rates (1968). The 1967 law granted foreign as well as domestic logging companies five-year tax holidays, which many of them were able to extend up to 15 years. Except for 1974, foreign direct investment was positive in all years, and private sector flows became especially important in the late 1980s after the oil boom (Hill, 1994: 101-2). Not to mention the official aid, the increase in the foreign capital also enhanced the power of the centre vis-à-vis periphery because Jakarta controlled the access to natural resources.

Along with the efforts to mobilise financial resources, the state made legal arrangements to facilitate natural resources exploitation. In tandem with the 1967 Foreign Investment Law and the Domestic Investment Law (UU 6/1968), the Basic Forestry Law (UU5/1967) and the Basic Mining Law (UU11/1967) were passed. The Basic Forestry Law gave the state legal authority to manage and exploit the nation’s forest resources. Government Regulations (Peraturan Pemerintah or PP) on Forest Exploitation Rights and Forest Product Harvesting Rights (PP 21/1970) and Forest Planning (PP 33/1970) facilitated the commercial exploitation of forest resources. The forest laws made later gave privileges to logging companies as well as the state over forest land use, and the rights of forest peasants were disregarded.

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18 After the Netherlands criticised Indonesian Government for the human rights issue concerning East Timor, the latter refused to receive the aid from the former. As a result, IGGI was reformed as Consultative Group for Indonesia (CGI) in 1992 without the Netherlands.
Among the natural resources, oil and timber are particularly important. The export of oil played a central role in economic growth in the early period of the Suharto regime. Revenues from it were used for various development projects, except for a considerable amount that went into the pockets of powerful figures. Oil and gas accounted for 82% of the total export revenue in 1981, where it had been 37% in 1970 (Vatikiotis, 1994). After the recession in the oil market in 1982/83, the economic technocrats relaxed regulation over the economy, and promoted non-oil exports. The share of non-oil exports in the total exports increased from 31 to 50% between 1978-87 (Vatikiotis, 1994). In addition to some light industries, timber industries played an important role in these. Forest-based exports (plywood, furniture, and pulp) increased from around US $200 million in the early 1980s to more than US $9 billion per annum in the mid 1990s, and total output from the forest sector accounted for 10% of GDP in 1997 (World Bank, 2001: 6).

Within the forest sector, the government shifted its priority from logs to plywood in the early 1980s. The major objectives included generating employment and more profit through developing domestic wood-processing industries (see Gills, 1987). In 1978, the Ministry of Finance doubled taxes on log exports. This was followed in the 1980s by a joint decree of the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Industry and Trade to ban log exports by 1985 after a gradual decrease. Indonesian logs once accounted for more than 41 percent of the world’s log market, but this had fallen to only 21 percent in 1979 (Gillis, 1988), while by the late 1980s Indonesia dominated the world’s plywood market, with more than 70 percent of trade share (Dauvergne, 1993/4). The government later started to engage in the development of pulp and rayon industries from the late 1980s (see Chapter 5).

The economic policies of the Suharto regime, which depended on natural resources extraction, were significantly successful in figures. The average annual growth rate from 1970-89 was 4.86%, while that of 1960-64 under the Sukarno regime had been only 0.16% (World Bank, 2003). The MPR in 1983 bestowed on Suharto the official title of ‘Bapak Pembangunan Indonesia’ (Father of Indonesian Development). In fact, Suharto’s paternalistic style of governance somehow managed to retain legitimacy (in
terms of the local traditional context) and maintain stability, because of its successful
(although significantly uneven) record of economic development.

Yet logging activities were not very conducive to the welfare of local communities:
government data shows the proportion of poor villages was correlated with the
proportion of forest land allocated for concessionaires (Santoso, 1999). In fact, most of
the revenue from Indonesia forest exploitation went to a small number of private
entrepreneurs and their political patrons, while the government failed to capture it or to
re-distribute it to the public (see Santoso, 1999; Brown, 1999).

3.2 Environmental Governance (1): Networks in Decision-making

Limited Actors: The Politico-business Oligarchy

The actors involved in decision-making over natural resources were limited; this rule by
a small number of actors is called politico-business or politico-bureaucratic oligarchy
(Robison and Hadiz, 2004). They became the insiders of the oligarchy because they
conformed to the regime’s ideology, which is best termed as an ‘ideology of
development’ (MacAndrews, 1986) or ‘developmentalism’ (see Santoso, 1999). With
this ideology, the emphasis of forest policy is put on its utility for macro-level economic
growth.

In this context, people like forest peasants were alienated from the forest policy
process. For the regime, forests were valuable and expendable resources for generating
foreign exchange (Dauvergne, 1993/4: 507). Decision makers regarded the traditional
agriculture practiced by local indigenous people, such as swidden (or shifting)
ariculture, as a cause of deforestation and not conducive to economic growth;
according to this logic, forest peasants were deemed incapable of participating in forest
management (see, for example, Dauvergne, 1993/4).

In addition to the ideological criteria, they had to have good political patrons to be
insiders, reflecting local informal institutions. Some characterise this patron-client
relationship by comparing it to Max Weber’s ‘patrimonial state’ model. In a
patrimonial state, ‘the central government is essentially an extension of the ruler’s

Studies of Indonesia’s patrimonial aspects include Anderson (1972), Crouch (1979) and
Robison (1978).
personal household and staff. Officials are granted their positions, and the perquisites that go with them, as personal favours of the ruler...Payment of officials is essentially in the form of benefices allotted by the ruler for the period of tenure of each particular office’ (Anderson, 1972: 46). Proximity and loyalty to the centre, rather than formal rank, was the key to rewards and power, in the form of appointments of military and government officials to potentially lucrative civilian posts. Those who were appointed to a post could also distribute patronage such as licenses, credit, contracts and other favours for businesses, as well as other government posts with prospects of material gain. This patron-client system replicated itself in a series of concentric circles throughout Indonesia, not only within government but also involving other actors such as the military, business, and GOLKAR.

This patrimonial style was underpinned by the state’s monopolisation of the economic use of natural resources, such as oil and forest products, which were important ‘benefices’ to be allotted. The state ‘owns’ around 90% of the total forest land as state forests (designated as such in the late 1960s) regardless of the existence of people who have lived in the forests and used the resources over generations.

There were two styles of their exploitation, and the patron-client relations can be found in both of them. One was to take advantage of state corporations. Examples include the state oil corporation Pertamina, whose control was given to a Suharto crony Ibnu Sutowo. Pertamina allocated drilling leases to foreign companies, and vast amounts of revenue were diverted to the military, political leaders, and government officials as well as to major development projects (see Robison, 1986). State corporations in the resources sector were essentially the channels ‘through which the state establishes production and work-sharing agreements with foreign companies which make the bulk of the investments and carry out production’ and their responsibilities included the collection of royalties and taxes as well as the allocation of concessions and contracts (Robison, 1986: 217). At the same time, the Jakarta-based decision making of such state corporations enhances the dominance of the centre over peripheries. Although the resources tend to be located in the latter, especially the Outer Islands such as Kalimantan and Sumatra, many provinces depended on central grants
for up to 90 percent of their revenues in the early 1980s (Dauvergne, 1993/4).

As for the forest sector, a state corporation Perhutani manages all the state forests in Java. (plus Madura) and another state corporation Inhutani(s) has concessions of a part of the forests in the other islands. Largely drawing on the Dutch forest management system in colonial times, the state institutionalised forest laws and agencies like state corporations, which enabled top-down, coercive, and utilitarian `scientific' forest management without paying sufficient attention to the life and the rights of participation of the locals, especially forest peasants (see Chapter 6 for details).

The other and more popular form of natural resources exploitation is through private companies owned through political or military favours (see also Chapter 5 for the forestry sector). Some powerful figures, such as Suharto’s family, established private companies by themselves. However, ‘because the bureaucratic capitalists seldom have the capital, technology, know-how, or even the intention of becoming directly involved in investment and production, they must necessarily ally themselves with actual entrepreneurs, usually foreign or Chinese…The terms of such alliances are an exchange of access to the market for a share of the product’ (Robison, 1978: 27).

Suharto’s business associations dated back to the late 1950s when he was commander of the Diponegoro Division in Central Java. People like Liem Sioe Liong, who later created the Indonesia’s biggest conglomerate the Salim Group, became close to Suharto during this period and received his favour by bringing financial benefit to his division and later to his family. Thee Kian Seng a.k.a. Bob Hasan, who was later called the ‘timber tycoon’ of Indonesia and became the Chairman of the influential APKINDO (Asosiasi Produsen Panel Kayu Indonesia or Indonesian Wood Panel Producers Association), also became a Suharto crony during this period.

Forest concessions were also allocated as a means of political reward to military officers, government officials and leaders of political parties, in exchange for their loyalty to the New Order regime (see for example, Crouch, 1988; Robison, 1986; Robin, 1995; Winters, 1996). For example, Wahono, who was a retired General and became the chair of GOLKAR and the Governor of East Java, had concessions in Kalimantan; the Minister of Forestry Sudiarwo issued a concession to a company he represented
(Santoso, 1999). In addition, the Indonesian military raised funds by establishing foundations to which concessions were allocated.

The political influence of these cronies can be seen from the proportion of concessions allocated to them and the market share of their products. By 1990, fifteen business groups controlled 54% of the plywood production capacity of Indonesia’s timber sector, which boasted over 70% of global tropical plywood in the 1980s; around 30% of the total concession areas were occupied by five biggest concession holders (Brown, 1999). The biggest, Barito Pacific, provided directorships of its group of companies to a brother of the late wife and the husband of the eldest daughter of Suharto; Bob Hasan’s group provided shares and posts to Suharto’s three sons, his eldest daughter, half brother, and his private company (Brown, 1999). In 1980, 24 out of the 34 local timber companies were linked to high-ranking military personnel (Bresman, 1993: 212).

‘Networks’ in Authoritarian Corporatism

Institutionally, the Ministry of Forestry is the major organ responsible for forestry policies, including concession (forest licences) allocation, royalties and licence fees collection, reforestation and reforestation fees collection, the stipulation of harvesting methods, and others. Other ministries were also engaged in the forest sector. For example, the Ministry of Agriculture deals with the conversion from forests to agricultural land; the Ministry of Industry and Trade designs policies related to the export of natural resources products and thus influences their extraction; the Transmigration Ministry’s policies affect the forests by clearing them for the resettlement of families from heavily populated Java to the Outer Islands; the Energy Ministry is related to oil and mineral concession on forested lands; the Ministry of Finance influences the commercial activities of forest industries by introducing, for

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20 Excluding Inhutani I (2,422,000ha), which is a state company, the top five groups and their concession areas in 1994/5 are: Barito Pacific (6,125,700ha), Djajanti (3,616,700ha), Alas Kusuma (3,364,200ha), KLI (3,053,500ha), and Bob Hasan Group (2,380,800ha) (Brown, 1999).

21 The Indonesian Ministry of Forestry became independent from the Ministry of Agriculture by 1983. The Ministry had Directorate Generals of Forest Utilisation, Forest Protection and in Preservation, and Reforestation and Rehabilitation.
example, tax policies; BAPPENAS's economic policy design affects forest industry development, as mentioned earlier; and the State Ministry for the Environment tries to include environmental considerations in the policies of the other agencies (see Gills, 1988).

However, it is difficult to see who is involved and influential in the policy process merely from the arrangement of formal institutions. One of the reasons for this is that Suharto allocated loyal allies to the important positions concerning natural resources exploitation. For example, Sudjarwo, who had family ties to Mrs. Suharto, was appointed to be the Director General of Forestry when it was under the Ministry of Agriculture (Barr, 1998). Second, partly due to the lack of clear legal arrangements, the government actions were dependent on informal factors. For instance, concessions were given through non-bidding procedures, and informal power relations and partnership within the Ministries and with businesses were important in this.

Accordingly, the people who were closer to the centre of power, namely Suharto cronies, were more influential in decision making, regardless of their formal positions. This is well exemplified by Bob Hasan and APKINDO22. Hasan went into the forestry business after Suharto introduced him as a partner of the American timber giant Georgia Pacific as early as 1970. After that, he was favourably allocated forest concessions and played a critical role in forest industry policy making. After founding and chairing the Indonesian Timber Society (Masyarakat Perkayuan Indonesia, or MPI), he was asked to reconstruct APKINDO, when the government shifted its emphasis from logs to plywood23. Hasan had made it a well-disciplined cartel of all the plywood producers in Indonesia, as the Chair of Board of Directors from 1983 (until the end of Suharto regime). APKINDO was given the authority by the state to issue export licences, and Hasan's signature was necessary for all export permits. Hasan controlled the volume and prices of Indonesian plywood, which dominated the world market. He also accumulated profits for himself, the Suharto family and the military, with the monopoly of plywood distributorships: it was a requirement to use his shipping and insurance

22 For Hasan and his influence on Indonesian forest industries, see Barr (1998).
23 Being Suharto's major advisor on forestry policies, it is very likely that Hasan had some influence on the decision of the shift of policies, such as the ban on log exports, although the details are unclear. See Barr (1998).
Hasan and APKINDO were the key actors of forestry policy making. A senior forestry official said 'the forestry department cooperates with APKINDO, but APKINDO really makes policy' *(Far Eastern Economic Review, 6 April, 1989: 86)*. Hasan was even able to block cabinet appointments (Santoso, 1999). Forest policy process was largely controlled by APKINDO's Chair (Hasan) and other board members; its 1985 board members included Raja Garuda Mas (RGM) group's Sukanto Tanoto (see Chapter 5 for the case study of his PT Indorayon) and Perhutani's Hartono (see Chapter 6 and 7 for the case study of Perhutani) (Barr, 1998).

On the other hand, the Ministry of Forestry was less influential in comparison with these powerful clients, although powerful vis-à-vis other state apparatus. In fact, the Ministry had a limited capacity, with insufficient resources. For instance, 'the availability of manpower in 1977 only satisfied 24% of the required professional foresters...and 13% of the required forest guards'; besides, most of them were concentrated in Java (Santoso, 1999: 169). Everyday supervision of logging practices was done by the local forestry offices (*Dinas Kehutanan*); however, on average, one staff member had to be in charge of as much as 12,620 ha of land (Santoso, 1999). As a result, the government depended largely on the information from the logging companies themselves and it was highly difficult to check if their practices complied with laws and regulations such as TPTI (*Tebang Pilih dan Tanam Indonesia* or Selective Cutting and Replanting Scheme) 25, and community development programmes which was an obligation of logging companies. In fact, only 52% of TPTI provisions were implemented in 1995 (Resosudarmo, 2002) 26.

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24 Hasan, who was later appointed as the Minister of Industry and Trade in Suharto's last cabinet, stated in his first press conference as Minister: 'Monopolies are okay. As long as the monopoly serves the interests of many people, it's okay' (Barr, 1998: 1).

25 According to TPTI, concession holders were obliged to make a master plan for the entire period of exploitation, medium term plans (5 years), and annual plans, which needed permission each year. Trees of more than 50 cm diameter could be logged and at least 25 commercial trees should be left in each hectare.

26 Their quick and rough (but cheap) logging methods resulted in direct and indirect environmental disturbances such as damage to the residual trees. This was facilitated by the desire of loggers for fast gains because of the uncertainty of the duration of their ties with political patrons (Dauvergne, 2001). Besides, there was little incentive for concession holders follow the plan and pay social and environmental costs, because concessions were given
In the face of economic and political interests, the Environment Ministry was often powerless to incorporate environmental concerns in policies and in practice concerning logging activities (see Dauvergne, 2001). The second Environmental Minister in the Suharto period (from 1993 to 1998), Kusumaatmadja, said that the Ministry was an ‘outsider’ within the government (interview, 17/Dec/2003). Environmental civil society groups such as ENGOs emerged and developed even in the authoritarian period (see below); however, they were often oppressed by the state, especially when they tried to touch upon this aspect of political economy concerning environmental issues.

3.3 Environmental Governance (2): ENGOs in the Suharto Era

The development of ENGOs in the Suharto period is a topic that has sporadically attracted researchers from time to time, although their studies have not yet been pulled together. This thesis tries to study and integrate them with a view to identifying the factors for their growth, drawing on the theories reviewed in Chapter 2.

Until the Early 1970s: Before The Emergence of ENGOs

One has to wait until the late 1970s to see the start of the history of Indonesian ENGOs, which is a little later than the developmental NGOs. Needless to say, grassroots environmental collective actions, especially in terms of natural resources management, have a much longer history than the ‘environmental movement’; for example, there were examples of people’s resistance against the suppression concerning the control over natural resources (see for example Peluso, 1992). In addition, the dissemination of sustainable practices of natural resources extraction may be regarded as a form of environmental movement. Having said that, ENGOs and the environmental movement as commonly perceived today (see Chapter 1 for the definition of ENGOs) are relatively new in Indonesia, as in other Asian countries.

basically for only 20 to 25 years, and actual regeneration of forests often takes more than 35 years. See Dauvergne (1993/4) for example.
27 The ‘environment’ of the Indonesian environmental movement is ‘emphatically defined in terms of access to and control over resources’ (Mayer, 1996: 179).
28 Examples from Indonesia include Sasi, which is a traditional cultural system of managing natural resources seen in the Eastern part of Indonesia (e.g. Maluku). Natural resources are harvested in accordance with Sasi for only a particular period, not to deplete them.
Indonesia has a long history of civil society organisations (CSOs). In addition to organising on the basis of traditional 'mutual cooperation' (gotong royong), CSOs existed even before independence in 1945. Most of them were active in the fields of religion, welfare, education and charity.29 During the 1950s, in the relaxed political climate of the Sukarno regime, some of them developed alternative programmes to the government. LSD (Lembaga Sosial Desa or Village Community Institution) was among the leading organisations during this period of time. However, many of them were community organisations or co-operative associations, which were somewhat dissimilar from what the term 'NGO' refers to today, especially with regard to organisational structure (staff, employment, scale, and decision making processes). Besides, many of them were, often forcefully, disbanded during the political turbulence from Sukarno to Suharto (Corrothers, 1998). Accordingly, it seems that the basis of the NGO sector in Indonesia today can be found in the organisations created since the late 1960s, namely the Suharto era, when NGOs for rural development started to develop.

Unlike Sukarno, Suharto tried to enhance state control over communities by establishing LKMDs (Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa or Village Community Resilience Institutions), which can be regarded as another example of the authoritarian corporatist approach. They had to be established in each village, while Sukarno's LSDs were formed based on local needs and voluntary participation at the grassroots level (Eldridge, 1995). In addition, the regime established other similar quasi-government or government-supported institutions, such as Koperasi Unit Desa (KUD/ Village Cooperative Unit), and Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga (PKK/ the Association for Promoting Family Welfare). These 'can also significantly hinder the growth of independent group formation', which may have served the regime's purpose, and even when informal co-operatives and other community groups on social welfare were established, 'they often seem to be led by village or sub-village officials or their wives' (Eldridge, 1995: 32).

Regardless of their policies, NGOs were very active. There were more than 4,000-8,000 groups existing at the end of the Suharto period in Indonesia (Corrothers, 1998; 29 They include the well-known Budi Utomo, which is an organisation focused on education founded in 1908 in line with Javanese tradition.)
Suharto seems to have thought that NGOs should have their own place as long as they were not against the regime, considering the community’s self-help tradition, the poor socio-economic condition, and NGOs’ service delivery capacity. The fields of activities varied, but ‘the centre of gravity of most NGOs remains in the micro-developmental rather than macro-political arena’ (Eldridge, 1995: 2).

Confrontational strategies were not common. According to Eldridge’s three-fold categorisation regarding NGOs’ relation with the state, they either (1) cooperated, (2) critically collaborated with policy advocacy or (3) kept distant, with a focus on pragmatic grassroots level activities (Eldridge, 1995)30. The mainstream of Indonesian NGOs took the first strategy because ‘this non-political approach is designed not only to safeguard their own freedom of operation from government interference, but also to give confidence to the people that they are neither an agent of the government nor biased in favour of any political or religious group...the values of conflict-avoidance are deeply rooted in many of Indonesia’s various cultural systems, most notably among the Javanese’ (Eldridge, 1995: 37). Because all the groups in these three categories, even the second group, tried to strengthen communities to cope with the social needs of the poor, their activities did not conflict with the interests of the New Order regime and they were able to develop without major oppression.

There were associations in the environmental field before the early 1970s, which had an impact on the development of ENGOs in later days. The oldest records of environmental groups in Indonesia can be found in the pre-independence period, although most of the members were the Europeans who stayed in the ‘Netherlands Indies’. For example, the Netherlands Indian Society for the Protection of Nature had been formed in 1912, and lobbied for the expansion of nature reserves (Dammerman, 1929; Westermann, 1945)31.

30 The examples of the major NGOs in each group and their year of establishment are as follow: (1) Yayasan Dian Desa (YDD/ 1972), and Bina Swadaya (BS/ 1967); (2) Lembaga Studi Pembangunan (LSP/ year unknown) and Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan, dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Social (LP3ES/ 1971); (3) Kelompok Studi untuk Bantuan Hukum (KSBH/1992) (Eldridge, 1995).

31 The decline of the number of wild animals due to hunting became an issue at that time. In particular, the population of bird-of-paradise decreased as its feathers were popular for ornaments. The establishment of this society can be a reflection of the rise of conservation movement in the Netherlands in the same period (see Chapter 2). See Westermann (1945).
This did not result in the establishment of local environmental groups for more than fifty years because of the political position of the locals in the pre-independence period and their reaction after independence to conservation policies in the colonial times. Cribb (1988: 6) notes that ‘restrictions on hunting and woodcutting were regarded as another example of Dutch colonial oppression, and there was probably a broad feeling that the country’s natural resources should be exploited for immediate economic benefit rather than preserved for what were perceived as aesthetic reasons’, and the 1945 Constitution stated that ‘[l]and and water and the natural resources contained therein shall be controlled by the State and shall be made use of for the people’ (Article 33[3]). The socio-economic conditions after independence also increased the demands for development. Government institutions were very weak in the area of the environment: for example, the enforcement of conservation was in the hands of local military and civil authorities in most of the Sukarno period, who saw no value in conservation (Cribb, 1988). Most organisations established in the 1960s put their focus on religious and/or social activities. Environmental issues were not yet publicly discussed.

Nevertheless, during this period, there were two civil society groups which began a preliminary form of environmental education, namely boy/girl Scouts (Pramuka) and nature lovers’ groups (Perkumpulan Pencinta Alam). They introduced nature to the youth by emphasising an appreciation of nature and increased environmental awareness. The Scouts in Indonesia started in 1912, when a branch of the Netherlands Scout Movement was established 32. Scout activities have been greatly favoured by Indonesians since their early days, particularly by various sections of nationalist and independence activists who were eager to instil ideals of service in and amongst youngsters. Presidential Decree No. 238 of 1961 enacted by President Sukarno coined a new term, Gerakan Pramuka Indonesia (Indonesia Scout Movement), and officially recognised it. It united then-different scout groups from all over Indonesia. The Scouts have been one of the mediums for the youth to become involved in outdoor activities. They have become a source of extra-curricular outdoor education from primary to tertiary levels, which provides a good opportunity for students to experience the natural

32 It was later developed into the Netherlands Indies Scout Movement. See http://www.pramuka.or.id/ for more information about the Indonesian Scout Movement.
environment. Now, it is one of biggest organisations in Indonesia, involving the younger generation in every part in Indonesia.

The emergence of individuals with strong feelings of solidarity both with human beings and with nature during this period encouraged the establishment of the nature lovers' groups. The first groups were formed in 1964. They included WANADRI, which is an association of mountaineers and jungle explorers in Bandung, and MAPALA UI (Mahasiswa Pencinta Alam Universitas Indonesia or University of Indonesia Nature Lovers' Group) in Jakarta. The focus of their activities was on outdoor activities such as hiking, rafting, caving, diving, and organising community-based cleaning-up activities and other related social activities. The environmental messages delivered by these groups are considered as somewhat 'romantic', in that they emphasise an appreciation of the beauty of nature and at the same time encourage people to respect it as God's precious gift. They have produced key players in the Indonesian environmental movement, such as the former Environment Minister, Sarwono Kusumaatmadja.

Also, one cannot dismiss international groups when it comes to the groups later influenced the emergence of ENGOs. In particular, the WWF started an Indonesian programme in 1962, which stimulated environmental action later on (see below).

The Late 70s to Early 80s: The Emergence of ENGOs

ENGOs began to emerge in Indonesia from the late 1970s33. One major reason for this was the rise of environmental awareness. This was partly due to the deteriorating environmental conditions. By the middle or late 1970s, deforestation was becoming noticeable in the wake of the expansion of logging activities, an unsustainable concession system, and weak environmental institutions after the start of the New Order regime in the late 1960s. Timber exports reached some 18 million m³ of timber per year by 1973, while the budget for the nature conservation section under the Forestry

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33 Prior to this period, Yayasan Pendidikan Kelestarian Alam (Nature Conservation Education Foundation) existed, which Cribb considers the 'first true conservation organisation since the demise of the colonial era' (Cribb, 1988: 22). However, this group was largely an elite circle supported by former Vice-President Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX as a patron, and the wife of a former ambassador to the Netherlands as secretary (Cribb, 1988), which may not fit with the definition of ENGOs in this thesis.
Directorate General was only about US$ 300,000 (Cribb, 1988). In addition, cases such as the pollution in Jakarta Bay were widely reported by the media in the early 1980s. The dark side of the ‘green revolution’, which helped Indonesia to achieve self-sufficiency in rice by the early 1980s, were becoming clearer toward the early 1980s, especially concerning the impact of chemical excesses (Mayer, 1996: 180).

At the same time, people started to extend their scope of interest from mere appreciation of the beauty of nature to broader ‘conservation’, owing to the activities by the groups mentioned above. For example, the field experiences of WWF’s orang-utan protection project in Gunung Leuser (Sumatra) in the early 1970s made concerned people realise that the lack of public environmental awareness was a main cause of the degradation of forests as a habitat for orang-utan.

These changes in ‘framing’ developed environmental groups. The WWF project gave birth to an ENGO called Yayasan Indonesia Hijau (YIH) on 12 January 1978. YIH actively conducted environmental awareness-raising projects. Starting their activities in Bogor, YIH expanded its activities in other big cities such as Surabaya, Ujung Pandang, Palembang, and Bandung. The establishment of YIH in this period became a milestone in the emergence of ‘environmental’ NGOs which went beyond mere outdoor adventure activities towards broader conservation issues. YIH was very significant in another sense, in that it produced many environmental activists later on.

Likewise, nature lovers’ groups at universities also became increasingly active in this period by extending their scope of activities. The group at Bogor Agricultural University (IPB), known as Kelompok Pencinta Alam Lawalata IPB (L-IPB) played an important role there. It organised a workshop attended by many nature lovers’ groups in October 1979, resulting in the spread of this wider approach (Pieter, 2003).

The environmental awareness and efforts of the state also started to increase in this period, which gradually increased ‘political opportunities’ for citizen’s environmental action. One of the important factors was the UN Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE or Stockholm Conference) in 1972. After its delegation (headed

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35 It is debatable if YIH is the first ‘local’ ENGO in a strict sense, as it is represented by a British activist and one can see the influence of the WWF in its establishment, although the founders were Indonesian intellectuals (Hafild, Interview by Author, 7/Feb/2005).
by Emil Salim) came back from Stockholm, Indonesia set up an inter-departmental Committee for the Formulation of a Government Environmental Action Plan (Presidential Decree No.16/1972). At that time, the State Policy Guidelines of 1973 were being drafted, and the environmental concerns were included in them because the head of BAPPENAS, Widjojo Nitisastro, liked the idea (Santoso, 1999: 36). The nature conservation section under the Director General of Forestry (which was within the Department of Agriculture at that time) was expanded in this period.

What seems to be more important for the growth of ENGOs was the appointment of Emil Salim, a major economic technocrat, as the first Minister of Environment in 1978 when the Ministry was established. This was critical because he changed informal institutions by increasing ‘political opportunities’; that is, although the political structure remained closed, the presence of elite allies in the government supported ENGO activities. Suharto’s purpose behind this appointment, which was a surprise to Salim himself (Santoso, 1999), was not clear; but presumably Suharto wanted to respond to the increasing conservation demands from international society, which was triggered by the UNCHE, to maintain good relations with foreign allies, and he thought an economic technocrat would play a better job in formulating environmental measures without hindering economic growth.

Salim made a critical contribution to the development of environmental institutions and the civil society’s environmental efforts during the 15 years of his tenure in the post. As for institutional development, for example, the government enacted the Basic

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36 Santoso (1999) argued that environmental ideas were not unfamiliar to the technocrats because most of them were educated in the US in the 1960s and experienced the environmental movement there. Yet it was not until the 1980s that concrete environmental procedures were seen in REPELITA (Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun or five-year economic development plan), due to the oppositions from within BAPPENAS.

37 It was then called State Minister for the Development Supervision and the Environment. The name was then changed into the State Minister of Population and the Environment in 1983 and the State Minister of the Environment in 1993. To avoid confusion, this thesis hereafter uses the term the Minister/Ministry of Environment to refer to all of these.

38 Although his appointment as the Minister can be considered as a formal arrangement, it should be regarded as the informal factor because it was his attitudes, commitment and capacity to change the government-ENGO relations that was important for the latter’s growth. In other words, the same impacts could not have occurred if others had been appointed.

39 In contrast with his current reputation, Salim was not sympathetic to inserting environmental concerns in development policies in the beginning (Santoso, 1999: 40).
Provisions for the Management of the Living Environment in 1982 (UU No 4/1982; hereafter 1982 Basic Environment Law). The government developed a national conservation strategy and established its first five national parks in 1980, with assistance from international institutes such as the FAO and the WWF (Sumardja, 1981). Salim also served as a watchdog on conservation and development issues\(^{40}\). Although the close ties between the Suharto regime and business forced him to walk ‘a tightrope between taking action on the environment and holding onto his position within the government’ (Riker, 1994: 162-3), this period marked the start of environmental efforts in Indonesia.

Cribb (1988) suggested two reasons why Salim and his weak Ministry were able to make achievements in the face of the priorities of developmental state. One was Salim’s ability to attach environmental issues to other political issues. For example, he put them in the context of North-South relations, and he criticised the North, arguing that they should pay the cost of maintenance of the Indonesian environment (e.g. forests), because they were the main consumers of the forest products, and their environmental demands were in order to perpetuate an international economic order which they dominated\(^{41}\). The other was to use environmental policies to strengthen the state by controlling private companies, which were becoming more influential through economic growth, in the name of environmental purposes.

What seems to be more important is that, domestically, Salim presented environmental problems as non-political issues and emphasised a technical and consequentialistic approach\(^{42}\). Therefore, Salim drew on scientific discourse in pushing environmental policies with assistance from technocrats. In fact, it was the best (and the only) way to persuade other government apparatuses to adopt environmental policies,

\(^{40}\) For example, he stopped providing further forest concessions in Gunung Leuser reserve. They had been given to PT Raja Garuda Mas via Suharto’s intervention after 1967. See Flora Malesiana Bulletin No. 30, 1978: 3029-31; No. 33 1980:3426)

\(^{41}\) See Salim (1982; 1983b). He reiterated the importance of development as well as that of conservation in a Southern context. From the beginning of his career in environmental field, he used the term *Pembangunan Linkungan* or eco-development far before the term ‘sustainable development’ became commonly used after the later 1980s.

\(^{42}\) For instance, one can see this from his positive attitude to the government’s trans-migration programmes for the optimal land use (see Salim, 1982), although it seems to contain many socio-political and cultural problems.
since technical arguments were important to enhance the legitimacy of policies by the New Order regime which were not the product of political participation (see for example, Santoso, 1999).

Salim had to face the insufficiency of human resources at his weak ministry and in the civil society in the field of the environment to pursue this technocratic approach with public support. One of his major efforts to solve this problem was to establish a multi-disciplinary environmental study centre (ESC) at each state university in cooperation with the Ministry of National Education from the late 1970s. The other was to develop civil society groups.

For Salim, it was much faster and more effective to cultivate civil society support than that within the New Order government. Since the Ministry was almost the ‘outsider’ of the government, it needed to collaborate with NGOs to increase its influence (Kusumaatmadja, interview, 17/Dec/2003). Salim asked for collaboration with NGOs and nature lovers’ groups, which were growing in that period.

In 1978, Salim hosted a meeting with attendance from around 350 organisations in related fields such as hobbies, environment, nature lovers, religion, research, students, and professional groups (including journalists) from all over Indonesia. This meeting produced an important environmental group known as Kelompok Sepuluh Pengembangan Lingkungan Hidup or ‘Group of Ten for Developing the Environment’ (G10) on 23 May 1978. The major aim of G10 was to act as a bridge between the Ministry and civil society and to support the government in the environmental field. G10 was allocated an office in the Ministry.

G10 was active in addressing environmental issues, such as the pollution in Jakarta Bay. It was followed by an awareness-raising campaign over the danger of mercury, and industrial pollution in Dukuh Tapak, Semarang (Central Java), which reduced soil fertility and destroyed local communities’ paddy field irrigation systems. Taking the

43 After two months as the Minister, Salim said to the Governor of Jakarta that ‘I want to make a snowball effect so that the efforts to the environment can quickly develop’. The Governor suggested having a nationwide NGO meeting (Parlan and Adi, 2004).
44 Members of G10 include YIH and Pramuka. G10 was expanded later with the participation of organisations such Yayasan Lembaga Konsumen Indonesia (Indonesian Consumers Organisation/YLKI) and LP3ES, although the name remained as G10. See Parlan and Adi (2004) for the full members of G10.
case of Jakarta Bay for example, G10 held seminars, conducted research, and gave suggestions to a Commission at DPR, Emil Salim, and the Jakarta District government.

However, G10 was small and could not coordinate environmental groups sufficiently to enhance civil society’s environmental efforts. From this concern, Salim and G10 held another meeting - the first PNLH (*Pertemuan Nasional Lingkungan Hidup* or National Environmental Meeting) on 13-15 October 1980 in Jakarta, in which 130 people from 78 organisations participated. This PNLH was a watershed for ENGOs in Indonesia because the largest ENGO (and a largest in the whole NGO sector as well), WALHI (*Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia* or Indonesian Forum for Environment), was established as a result on 15 October 1980. Since WALHI was (and still is) a forum, groups were able to join it easily, which significantly contributed to the growth of the environmental movement. Its nationwide activities cover most environmental issues in Indonesia, from nature conservation to pollution, ranging from local to global levels.

One can see an aspect of the ‘corporatist’ approach to enhance state’s control in the environmental field from the way in which this meeting was held. The regime officially acknowledged the establishment of WALHI; Salim reported the meeting to Suharto beforehand (*Kompas*, 8/Oct/1980: 1), and Suharto invited the activists to his office just a few days after the meeting (*Kompas*, 20/Oct/1980: 12). Whether or not Suharto considered this an opportunity to co-opt the environmental activists is uncertain. Yet, as a WALHI report says, it is very likely that the government considered it a good opportunity to organise ENGOs under the umbrella of WALHI, as it was more ‘sterile’ in a political sense (Parlan and Adi, 2004).

The participants from the non-governmental sector were very careful to avoid co-

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45 Financial and technical support was given to this meeting by Sri Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX (former Vice President of Indonesia who headed the Indonesia Wildlife Fund), the Minister of Forestry, Minister of Public Works, Salim himself, and others.

46 Although it is a forum of environmental groups and activists, WALHI has also been considered as an organisation since then due to its prominent secretariat located in Jakarta, which has become a *yayasan* (foundation) itself. WALHI has 445 member groups in most of the provinces in Indonesia in 2003.

47 Suharto said to the participants that communities’ self-help activities were necessary to cope with environmental issues because the government could not handle all of them. Suharto seemed to have overlapped WALHI with the family planning project, in which government and NGOs collaborated and achieved a success (*Kompas*, 20/Oct/1980).
option by the government. For example, they paid attention to the name of WALHI so that it did not sound like a quasi-governmental organisation such as GOLKAR (Noeradi, 2000). In this context, they set the principles of WALHI as self-reliance, collaboration without association (so that it would not be recognised as a single body), and tangible work for the community.  

WALHI's first executive director (1980-86) was Erna Witular, who was a consumer activist from YLKI. Her appointment was 'politically correct' because of her husband's position as an MP at the DPR from GOLKAR. WALHI in Witular's period focused on raising public awareness about environmental issues and WALHI, and constructing a good relationship with Salim and the government without a confrontational approach. One WALHI member (originally a representative from YIH) worked for Salim as a secretary and WALHI had an office in the Ministry's building. The second PNLH was held at a military school in Bandung, which also suggested the good relations with the regime. During this period, WALHI developed quickly in quantitative terms: by the mid-1980s, the number of member groups (including some individuals) reached 350.

Under the authoritarian political conditions, it was necessary for ENGOs to cooperate with the government, especially the Environment Ministry, and have Salim's support. Salim often protected environmental activists from oppression. For instance, when a number of NGO staff were arrested for running an environmental protest in Bandung, they called Salim; he contacted the Head of the Regional Police and the Regional Army Commander, and they were released the following day (Santoso, 1999: 91-92). Witular mentioned that, at that time, 'it was getting commonly recognised that the government and its policies were degrading the environment. Yet, there was an atmosphere that it was not conducive to be oppositional...because the New Order

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48 See WALHI's publication Tanah Air, No 1, Nov 1980.
49 WALHI had Presidium system until 1992, although the executive director was usually considered as the representative of WALHI. The executive director and head of the Presidium were elected every three years at the PNLH, which became more like a WALHI meeting later on.
50 For comparison with the size and the development of the NGO sector as a whole, Bina Desa's 1981 Catalogue identified 152 foundations and institutions, plus 40-50 contacts for smaller groups in all the NGO sectors in Indonesia (Eldridge, 1994: 4). A survey in 1988 shows 57% of NGOs were established within a decade (and 86.2% in two decades; Tempo, 4/May/1991).
regime was very strong’ (Parlan and Adi, 2004, translated by author)\(^51\).

In this political context, NGOs have called themselves LSMs (*Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat* or Self-reliant Community Institutions), especially from the late 1970s and the early 1980s, instead of the literal translation of NGOs, ORNOP (*Organisasi Non Pemerintah*), to avoid the appearance of confrontation with the Suharto regime and avoid being categorised as ORMAS\(^52\). Being an LSM implies that the groups work at the grassroots level within the existing political framework and ideology, without political action. As mentioned earlier, Suharto tolerated apolitical developmental groups especially based on the spirit of *gotong royong*, traditional civic engagement and the custom of civil society cooperation.

This rhetorical shift of terminology was strongly encouraged by Salim. In *Prisma*, a magazine published by an NGO LP3ES, Salim wrote that Indonesian NGOs had never been rooted in an anti-government stance, unlike Western NGOs, and they had common aims with the government with only differences in approaches\(^53\). He said: ‘as long as the differences concern problems of implementation, then the NGOs’ right to exist is guaranteed. But if the differences concern more ‘philosophical’ differences in ideology or differences in national aims, then clearly any NGO with those sorts of differences with the government will not have the right to exist’ (Salim, 1983a: 71). WALHI’s Witular in the same volume said that ‘my observation and experience in Indonesia suggest that LSMs here can have quite a close relationship with the government...Here LSM can, I think, help ease the government’s burden’ (Witular, 1983: 74)\(^54\).

The good relations with the government brought an opportunity to WALHI to participate in the process of making the first major environmental law, the 1982 Basic

\(^51\) In fact, environmental activists when Suharto was strong were wary of being labelled as communists or its metaphor ‘watermelons’- green outside but red within (Mayer, 1996: 184). Because it had not been long since the 30 September 1965, the people’s attitude as well as the government’s was very negative about communists.

\(^52\) The term LSM (and LPSM/ *Lembaga Pembangunan Swadaya Masyarakat* or Institute for Developing Community Self-reliance) was first proposed by Sarino Mangunpranoto, the former Minister of Education and Culture (Eldridge, 1995). This term was recognised and popularised at a workshop organised by Bina Desa in April 1978.

\(^53\) Salim also argued that the Western style NGO-government relationship is only possible in Western context because of its tradition of democracy and political maturity, and it is too early for Indonesia where ‘nation building is still in its process’ (Salim, 1983: 72).

\(^54\) Hadad (1983: 19), another well-known NGO activist notes NGOs works ‘must be carried out within the framework of the REPELITA and the Broad Outlines of State Policy (GBHN)’.
Environment Law. WALHI’s participation resulted in the stipulation of the role of NGOs (LSMs) in this law: LSMs shall perform a supporting role in the environmental management (Article 19; translation by author; italics added). In other words, the regime admitted ENGOs’ participation in order to support policy ‘implementation’ (but not policy making).

WALHI was significant partly because it produced a number of spin-off groups and networks (often with a focus on a specific environmental sector). They include SKEPHI (Sekretariat Kerjasama Pelestarian Hutan Indonesia or Joint Secretariat for the Conservation of Indonesia Forests; see more in Chapter 4), KRAPP (Kelompok Relawan Anti Penyalahgunaan Pesticida or Volunteer Group against the Misuse of Pesticides), SKREPP (Sekretariat Kerjasama Relawan Pengelolaan Polusi or Joint Secretariat for Pollution Management) and JATAM (Jaringan Advokasi Tambang or Mining Advocacy Network)\(^5\). These have developed into major groups in the Indonesian ENGO sector.

Among the three perspectives on the growth of ENGOs, ‘resources’ probably does not provide as much explanation as ‘framing’ and ‘political opportunities’ here. Not surprisingly, financial resources from domestic civil society could provide little (if any) support for the activities of ENGOs at that time, while they welcomed international assistance from institutes such as the WWF (although these were also limited too). Despite the rapid improvement of macro-economic figures, the GDP per capita was still less than US$ 500 at that time (constant 1995 US$; see Appendix A).

In terms of human resources, the number of University students were still small (Appendix A). Nevertheless, there was an increase in human resources for CSOs after the Campus Normalisation Act (Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus or NKK) in 1978, which banned political activities on campus and made student activists become ‘NGO’ activists\(^5\). This influx of student activists who criticised the regime did not result in

\(^5\) They may also include many other ENGOs created by former staff of WALHI, such as Plangi, which focuses on climate change issues, established by Agus Purnomo (former Executive Director of WALHI), and others.

\(^5\) See for example, Naipospos (1996). Purnomo (1994) also pointed this out from the viewpoint of a 1978 activist who later became an ENGO activist. Apart from NGOs, students created study clubs, which became very popular in many cities. NKK had almost disappeared by the end of the 1980s (the government thought it would be harder to control the protest outside the campus) and was abolished in 1990. An observer sees this as Suharto’s confidence in controlling students’ activism (Sato, 2002).
changing the ‘framing’ of environmental issues and in politicising the environmental movement at that time, unlike the later period (see Chapter 4). They tended to engage in pragmatic activities. The ex-student activists ‘turned their youthful idealism into “practical” work with poor communities’ (Mayer, 1996: 185). This seemed to be mainly due to the political climate at that time. Also, groups such as the nature lovers’ groups at Universities provided ENGOs with many staff members.

3.4 Conclusion
The New Order’s authoritarian rule was enabled by various factors. Institutions were arranged to support it, ranging from the Constitution to the expansion of the role of the military into politics, which was often used to oppress the political activities in civil society. These are arguably underpinned by the Javanese political culture, which tends to accept consensual decision making and defers to age and seniority. Personal connection and proximity to the power centre was a major determining factor of political influence rather than official position and procedure. The family principle contributed to undermining the legitimacy of political liberalism.

As a result, only a small number of actors who conformed to the state’s ideology were allowed to join the policy process concerning the lucrative natural resources management. In addition, one had to have powerful political patrons to be an insider.

Natural resources were a critical tool to strengthen the regime’s authoritarian rule as well as national development. Forests, which were the second largest source of foreign currency, were no exception. While playing an important role in national economic growth, forests were used to enhance patrimonial relations between patrons and clients and increase their personal wealth. Forest concessions were favourably allocated to cronies and loyal subordinates of the powerful figures within the state. Rush (1991: 36) writes that concessions were ‘consigned on a non-competitive basis to individuals closely related to the military government and its senior officials, and to business organisations controlled by the military directly’. In contrast, the system hardly contributed to the improvement of local people, who were ‘remote’ from the power centre.
Interest groups' representation was made in a so-called 'authoritarian corporatist' manner, in which the state organised functional groups by sectors, unlike the liberal democratic manner, to achieve common national good. In the forest sector, Bob Hasan and other board members of APKINDO, who were private entrepreneurs and the managers of state corporations, made a tight network (or a community) with their political patrons and the relevant Ministries in making policies. In such an oligarchic system, not surprisingly, civil society actors were alienated from environmental governance. Besides, their political activities were largely constrained by the state.

Despite such conditions, ENGOs started to emerge in the late 1970s, after some environment-related groups had existed before that period. One reason is the changes in framing or views of the environment. The environmental conditions started to become serious enough to interest the media around that time. The field activities of groups such as Scouts, nature lovers' groups, and international ENGOs in the 1960s and the early 1970s changed the perception of concerned citizens and shifted their strategies from mere nature-loving to conservation activities, particularly green education, which produced environmental groups.

The appointment of Emil Salim as the Minister of Environment provided political opportunities to environmental groups. Salim made various critical efforts towards the emergence and development of ENGOs, including nation-wide environmental meetings of the citizens which resulted in the emergence of ENGOs such as G10 and WALHI. He often protected ENGO activists from political oppression. At the same time, he made formal-legal arrangement for ENGO participation, such as the 1982 Basic Environment Law.

He needed the participation of ENGOs to support the Ministry, which was not intended to accommodate the interests of the local people in a liberal democratic way. Their participation was valued in a 'utilitarian' sense; it was considered necessary for the effective 'implementation' of policies, and not because the rights of their participation were valued.

Under authoritarian political conditions, the strategy Salim took to further ENGO growth and participation did not go beyond the regime's ideology. NGOs were called
LSMs to emphasise their collaborative and complimentary relations with the government. The causes of ENGOs were not ideological but practical ones (including some aesthetic ones). Environmental problems were labelled as non-political issues. Environmental activists in this period more or less took a cooperative approach like NGOs in other fields, without significant ideological conflict with the regime.

The formation and development of WALHI was acceptable in the context of 'authoritarian corporatism'. In fact, Suharto seemed to have regarded WALHI as a means to cope with environmental degradation and to enhance state control over civil society activities in that field, as in other sectors. WALHI was officially recognised by the President on its establishment, and the post of its executive director was given to a politically-appropriate person.

In terms of 'resources', the ban on political activities on campus provided human resources to ENGOs; however, the numerical increase in students was not very prominent, and economic growth did not reach a level for civil society to provide resources to ENGO activities. Also, one may want to note that the environmental movement in this period did not involve local environmental victims to any great degree.
CHAPTER 4

DEMOCRATISATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF ENGOS

Indonesian ENGOs developed considerably in the decade after the late 1980s, when the democratisation movement started. Their areas of geographical operation were expanded and their strategies were shifted. They also grew in a quantitative sense, which can be seen from the years of establishment of existing ENGOs (Figure 4-1)\(^1\). These trends seem to have continued through the changes in regimes after the late 1990s. This chapter examines the impacts of democratisation on these developments with reference to the theories reviewed in Chapter 2. It is divided according to the phases of democratisation mentioned in Chapter 1. Section 4.1 deals with the preparatory phase (from the late 1980s to the early 1990s) and 4.2 examines the decision phase (from the late 1990s), followed by a Conclusion.

Figure 4-1 ENGOs in Indonesia: Their Years of Establishment

\(^1\) The data is compiled from LP3ES (2000) and JANNI (2001). The data for the former covers the 181 groups engaging in environmental issues as their primary objective (not as secondary objective); the data for the latter covers the 212 groups engaging in environmental issues.
4.1 The Late 80s to Early 90s: Preparatory Phase of Democratisation

The Democratisation Movement

Although there was no change in formal institutions, the first stage of the democratisation process, or the 'preparatory phase', began in Indonesia in the late 1980s (Uhlin, 1997; Sato, 2002). During this period, there was an increasing pressure from below for democratic reforms, resulting from various causes such as the international trend towards democratisation and economic liberalisation, the development of communications technology contributing to the dissemination of democratic ideas beyond borders, and economic growth followed by the rise of the middle class.

Uhlin (1997) categorises the democratisation movement actors in Indonesia into four groups: (i) elite dissident groups and individuals; (ii) the old generation of NGOs; (iii) student activists; and (iv) the new generation of pro-democracy and human rights NGOs. Among the first group, keterbukaan (openness or glasnost) became a popular issue in 1989, as is seen from the contents of journals such as Tempo and Editor. It started with retired General Soemitro's article asking for openness in politics, which showed a split between major sections of the armed forces and President Suharto. It gave birth to several pro-democracy groups such as the Forum for the Purification of People's Sovereignty (Forum Pemurnian Kedaulatan Rakyat) and the Democratic Forum (Forum Democrasi), both of which were established in 1991. The Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) elected Megawati Sukarnoputri as leader in 1993, and became more active against the Suharto government. There was also an increase of journalists, academics, MPs, NGO activists, religious leaders and government officials who were

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2 Uhlin (1997) calls this period 'pre-transition phase'. Sato (2002) calls it 'transfiguration period'.

3 Although many of the middle class in Indonesia did not favour democratisation (such as the bourgeoisie) or tended to be conservative (such as clerks, managers and executives), there was an increase in others who preferred democratic society, such as students, lawyers, NGO activists, journalists, artists and religious leaders. See Uhlin (1997).


5 These followed the Petition of 50 (Petisi 50) which was formed in 1980 by retired generals, ex-politicians, intellectuals and student figures, and which sent many letters to the government, parliament etc, to demand political reforms.

6 Government intervention in 1996 before the 1997 general election, which brought her down as the party leader, united the democratisation movement behind Megawati.
more vocal as regime critics.

The Legal Aid Foundation (*Lembaga Bantuan Hukum; LBH*) is a good example of the second group, the existing NGOs (the old generation of NGOs in Uhlin’s term), which became more oppositional in this period.7 LBH provided legal assistance to activists in various fields for a broad range of issues, which has contributed a great deal to the civil society movement in general (and the pro-democratisation movement in particular)8. The merging of civil society movements towards democratisation can also be seen from the Joint Declaration on Human Rights signed by 52 NGOs and NGO networks and 109 individuals, which was reached on LBH’s initiative (Eldridge, 1995). The establishment of the International NGO Forum on Indonesia (INGI) in 1984/85 by international NGOs from IGGI countries as well as by Indonesian NGOs shows the trend in the second category. INGI criticised the government and its use of foreign aid from bilateral and multi-lateral donors, which was a major resource of the regime as mentioned earlier, and demanded more participation in development projects9. INGI was renamed INFID (International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development) in 1993.

After the NKK (Campus Normalisation Act; see Chapter 3) in 1978, the student movement became relatively inactive; however, it became active again in the late 1980s and early 1990s with different strategies. According to Uhlin, this ‘new wave’ of the student movement focused on democracy and human rights while the older protests were focused on development policies and militarism. The new movement was also active outside major cities, and it made much of local issues to assist the poor on land and environmental issues, while they had tended before to work with elite actors (Eldridge, 1995). This focus on social inequality may have been a result of the influence of leftist ideologies such as ‘left populism’ with an emphasis on ‘people’s power’, which came from the neighbouring East Asian countries like the Philippines and South

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7 LBH became the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (Yayasan LBH Indonesia; YLBHI) in 1980 with the establishment of several regional offices. This thesis uses only LBH to refer to both.

8 LBH’s focus was on labour, environment, land disputes, and criminal and political issues in the 1990s. An LBH leader said LBH helped and cooperated with other groups to develop a pro-democracy force (Setiawan, 1996). LBH’s cross-sectoral activities contributed to linking and enhancing social movements. See Uhlin (1997) and Eldridge (1995).

9 Eldridge (1995: 224) notes that ‘INGI’s dual Indonesian and overseas-based organisational structure, in some ways, protected it from co-option by the Indonesian government’.
Korea as well as from Eastern Europe (Uhlin, 1997). In response, the government intensified its oppression. Many meetings and demonstrations were violently broken up and many student activists were imprisoned.

The emergence of the new generation of pro-democracy and human rights NGOs, the fourth group in Uhlin’s categorisation, was also seen in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Uhlin, 1997; Eldridge, 1995). They include INFIGHT (Indonesian Front for the Defence of Human Rights; formed in 1990), which was led by Indro Tjahyono and others. They were critical of the conflict-avoidance strategies of the mainstream NGOs and made more effort to mobilise peasants and workers for the struggle for change. This is partly because the major supporter and provider of human resources to this radical movement, namely student activists who emerged in the late 1980s, was largely influenced by left-wing ideologies such as neo-Maxism (especially dependency theory), and tended to take radical strategies (Setiawan, 1996). Despite their ideological position, they demanded political democratisation such as the assurance of political rights and regime change, like liberal democrats (Eldridge, 1995; Uhlin, 1997).

The Development of ENGOs and Their Strategies

The strategies of ENGOs shifted considerably in this preparatory phase. While having large-scale partnership projects with government, many existing ENGOs were ‘politicised’, with some being radicalised, although some groups kept a distance from this trend. There was also an increase in advocacy-oriented groups. ENGOs increasingly mobilised people at the grassroots level, and expanded their operation areas to the Outer Islands.

For example, at the end of the 1980s, WALHI took PT Inti Indorayon Utama, a

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10 Other groups include PIJAR (Pusat Informasi dan Jaringan Aksi untuk Reformasi; Information Centre and Action Network for Reform; formed in 1989), PIPHAM (Pusat Informasi dan Pendidikan Hak Asasi Manusia; Centre for Human Rights Information and Education; formed in 1993), and Yayasan Geni (Geni Foundation; formed in 1988).

11 There was an increase in the works which introduced neo-Marxist and Socialism theories to Indonesia at that time (Setiawan, 1996). The development of alternative Islamic theories also facilitated the movement (Naipospos, 1996; Uhlin, 1997).

12 They include PROKASIH (Program Kali Bersih or Clean River Programme), a national-level programme to monitor and raise public awareness about river pollution.

13 Eldridge (1995: 133) states that the emergence of environmental issues has shifted NGO’s centre of gravity towards both critical collaboration and popular empowerment.
private pulp and rayon company, to court for causing pollution and deforestation problems along the Asahan River in North Sumatra (see Chapter 5). This first court case brought by NGOs on environmental problems was made regardless of the ‘advice’ from Admiral Sudomo (then Panglima Komando Operasi Keamanan dan Keterlambat or Military Operation Commander for Security and Order) as well as their allies such as Emil Salim. Despite losing the case, WALHI was able to establish its legal standing in the lawsuit as a result, which is considered a landmark in the environmental movement in Indonesia.

A project by US-based Scott Paper and local company PT Astra International, which went public in 1989, faced strong opposition not only from domestic ENGOs like WALHI and SKEPHI but also from their international allies such as the Rainforest Action Network and Survival International. This project planned to exploit more than half a million ha of rainforest in Irian Jaya, which would have impacted the livelihood of around 20,000 indigenous people, who were mostly hunter-gatherers. As a result of their effective campaign to boycott Scott products, Scott Paper cancelled the project in October 1989.

At the domestic level, the first consumer boycott campaign took place in the beginning of the 1990s against the products from the companies polluting wells, rice paddies and artisanal fish ponds with toxic waste water in the village of Tapak, Central Java. Regardless of the threats by the companies to fire the workers, BAPEDAL (Badan Pengendalian Dampak Lingkungan or Environmental Impact Management Agency; established in 1990) and the regional government suspended their operation, and allowed them to resume only after an agreement with the Tapak villagers. As a result of the long discussion between BAPEDAL, the companies and NGOs which received

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14 Sudomo advised WALHI activists that they postpone the plan by saying that WALHI would lose the case because the government would hire the best lawyer in Indonesia (Parlan and Adi, 2004). Salim advised that it might be too early for ENGOs to take such political action, although he himself was ‘enjoying’ being sued when the then WALHI Executive Director reported it to him (Purnomo, interview, 17/Dec/2003).

15 See Far Eastern Economic Review, 2/Nov/1989; Purnomo, 1994; Setiakawan 1989 no. 3 December (from SKEPHI, Jakarta), Environesia 1989 Vol 3, No.4. The success of the advocacy seems mainly due to the fact that Scott Paper was producing consumer products, unlike many logging, mining and oil-exploiting companies, and the project was only at the stage of planning. These factors made the campaigns in the US effective.
mandates from local villagers (mainly LBH), the companies agreed to pay compensation and land rehabilitation costs to the villagers, as well as to tighten their standards of pollution criteria. A major reason for the success of the protests seems to be that this was a pollution case of local and small industries, which involved few major vested interests. Besides, this was not a direct challenge to the regime (see for example, Mayer, 1996; Purnomo, 1994; Santoso, 1999). Other 'political' cases followed in the 1990s, such as a lawsuit by six ENGOs against the President of Indonesia over an interest-free loan from the government's 'reforestation fund' to his Minister Habibie's aircraft company.

This trend of politicisation can be seen also from the establishment of advocacy-oriented organisations on natural resources and environmental management. In addition to the above-mentioned offshoots of WALHI, they include ICEL (Pusat Hukum Lingkungan Indonesia or Indonesia Centre for Environmental Law) and a human rights group ELSAM (Lembaga Studi Advokasi Masyarakat or the Institute for Policy Research and Advocacy; formed in 1993) which was actively engaged in environmental issues. Grassroots-level groups such as KSBH (formed in 1992) were formed with an emphasis on empowerment rather than litigation (Eldridge, 1995).

Apart from the groups with a legal background, there emerged groups established by students who majored in forestry, such as LATIN (Lembaga Alam Tropika Indonesia or Indonesian Tropical Nature Institute; formed in 1989) and RMI (Rimbawan Muda Indonesia or Indonesian Institute for Forest and Environment; in 1992). Since most of the staff at the existing NGOs had not majored in forestry even though they were engaged in forest issues, these groups with expertise facilitated the advocacy by ENGOs.

ENGOs started to develop in the Outer Islands in this period. East Kalimantan-based Plasma has worked intensively on issues related to forest resources since its establishment in 1988. Yayasan Hualopu (Hualopu Foundation) in Ambon has concentrated on coastal and marine issues in the Molucca (Maluku) Islands since 1989. Yayasan Wisnu (Wisnu Foundation) in Bali was established in 1993 and has prioritised land and water management as well as pollution issues, and has disseminated
information to communities. Following this trend, since the early 1990s, local NGOs have started to set up regional forums. Examples can be found in Lampung, Central Java, Yogyakarta, South Sulawesi, etc (Setiawan, 1996). WARSI (Warung Informasi Konservasi or The Conservation Information Centre), a network of 12 NGOs working in four provinces on Sumatra Island (South Sumatra, West Sumatra, Bengkulu and Jambi), has been engaged in biodiversity conservation and community development as well as participatory research since 1991. WALHI extended its outreach through regional forums by reforming its structure towards a more decentralised style, especially after the PNLH in 1992.

In line with these trends, groups working for indigenous people’s rights and community-based natural resource conservation started to increase, including Yayasan Sejati (Sejati Foundation; Jakarta), Lembaga Bela Banua Talino (West Kalimantan), and Lembaga Bina Benua Puti Jaji (East Kalimantan). These organisations have worked to empower indigenous peoples to gain rights to manage their land and natural resources, and to protect their traditional knowledge from any threats. By the mid 1990s, many local WALHI members were working together with indigenous people’s organisations (Moniaga, Interview, 1/Aug/2003).

Apart from the trend of politicisation and the grassroots mobilisation in the Outer Islands, there also was a development in ENGOs in more practical fields such as environmental education (see Hendarti and Nomura, 2005). One prominent example was PPLH-Seloliman (Pusat Pendidikan Lingkungan Hidup or Environmental Education Centre in Seloliman), which was officially opened in 1990. KIH (Klub Indonesia Hijau or Indonesia Green Club) was a spin-off from YIH in the same period.

The strategic changes in WALHI and one of its offshoots SKEPHI illustrate the politicisation trend. For WALHI, the third PNLH in 1986 was a turning-point. Although Emil Salim emphasised the maintenance of the government-WALHI relationship at the meeting, there was a sign among the activists to shift the orientation towards advocacy.

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16 See also Chapter 5 for the groups in North Sumatra.
17 The founder of PPLH, Suryo said that the separation from the politicising trend was deliberate, as he recognised that raising environmental awareness and knowledge enhancement were more important (Suryo, interview, 11/Nov/1998).
(Parlan and Adi, 2004). In the discussions there, the participants argued for the importance of people’s rights to natural resources management and emphasised the responsibility of government for the degradation of the environment (Parlan and Adi, 2004). In other words, activists at that time started to recognise that environmental issues could not be solved without changing government policies.

The changes in personnel facilitated the politicisation of WALHI’s strategy. PNLH III elected Agus Purnomo as Executive Director, who was a 1978-generation student activist, and Abdul Hakim Garuda Nusantara as the Chair of the Presidium, who was an activist with a legal background from LBH. This provided WALHI with the legal assistance from LBH, as is seen from the WALHI’s lawsuit on the Indorayon case (see Chapter 4)\(^{18}\). WALHI started to develop international ties in Purnomo’s period and became a member of FoE in 1989, to enhance international advocacy, because ‘many environmental problems in Indonesia are created by foreign companies’ (Purnomo, interview, 17/Dec/2003).

The politicisation of SKEPHI was much more radical than that of WALHI. SKEPHI started as a network on forest conservation issues in 1982 as a result of a workshop held by WALHI and Yayasan Mandiri, a Bandung alternative technology group. Although SKEPHI’s activities were initially issue-specific and complementary to WALHI’s, SKEPHI increasingly became independent and widened its scope, with its Secretariat becoming more vocal. The study of forest issues in the Outer Islands, like the workshop in Kalimantan in 1985, helped the members to recognise the underlying causes of forest degradation. In a 1987 workshop, SKEPHI changed its vision, organisation and programmes to be more politically active. What is more, the leadership of 1978 student activist Indro Tjahjono since 1987 was critical in radicalising the group\(^{19}\). He ‘kicked out’ the then executive secretary Emmy Hafild (who later became the Executive Director of WALHI) because she was not ‘political enough’ (Hafild, interview, 7/Feb/2005; Purnomo, 17/Dec/2003).

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\(^{18}\) This direction was further emphasised in the fourth PNLH in 1989, in which WALHI decided to work for the rights of vulnerable people who were marginalised by development policies (WALHI, 1997; Purnomo, interview, 17/Dec/2003). This mandate was strengthened in PNLH in 1996 by including indigenous peoples and women in the vulnerable people.

\(^{19}\) He was the Chair of the student council of Bandung Institute of Technology.
According to SKEPHI, the mainstream ENGOs failed to challenge dominant modernisation and development paradigms with their acceptance of technological fix to environmental problems, resulting in the alienation of local people and their lack of contribution to problem-solving (Eldridge, 1995: 142)\(^{20}\). Tjahjono (interview, 4/Aug/2003) says that "the old movement' failed to recognise the need for changes in social structure or social transformation...it only saw technical issues and not policy, politics and superstructure'. Although the other ENGOs began to have similar views, SKEPHI was more articulate in its arguments. SKEPHI's ideology was very much influenced by neo-Marxist discourse emphasising structural problems with an international viewpoint, as mentioned above, and emphasising social justice\(^{21}\).

Skipper Tjahjono radicalised SKEPHI further after he started to lead a major democratisation NGO, INIGHT, which shared membership, administrative staff, office, and strategy with SKEPHI (Uhlin, 1997; Eldridge, 1995; Tjahjono, interview, 4/Aug/2003). This SKEPHI-INIGHT alliance radicalised a section of civil society and attempted to mobilise students, farmers, workers, women and other activist groups\(^{22}\). SKEPHI-INIGHT started to see environmental issues as 'instrumental for more general political and economic struggles, rather than as ends in themselves' (Eldridge, 1995: 196).

SKEPHI often took a less compromising strategy than WALHI, because SKEPHI paid more attention to structural aspects, and was against neo-liberalism and the strong regime, while WALHI was often case-specific (Aditjondro, 2003). In contrast, WALHI recognised the need for communication with the regime to seek solutions, although it sometimes had conflicts with the regime (Hafild, interview, 7/Feb/2005). For example, in the later 1980s, WALHI continued participation in the Indonesian Forestry Action

\(^{20}\) A SKEPHI leader, Hira Jhamtani, says that 'the problem in Indonesia is not just a problem of technicalities; it is not a problem of people not knowing how to manage a forest sustainably. It is actually a problem of social justice. And that is how SKEPHI looks at the forests problems in Indonesia and why we go further than just talking about the forest and the environmental problems to the rights of the community on the land and the traditional wisdom that goes with it in environmental management' (Koffel 1990:32).

\(^{21}\) SKEPHI/INIGHT had a close relationship with student activists in various cities, who tended to be influenced by the leftist ideology at that time.

\(^{22}\) Due to its radical strategy, the big NGOs in Jakarta (or mainstream NGOs) were more or less negative towards SKEPHI-INIGHT strategies, as they preferred to take a collaborative approach (Eldridge, 1995: 108).
Plan process of the Ministry of Forestry, although WALHI opposed the content of this and recognised that they might be being used only as a token of civic involvement. This was because WALHI thought it was still important to keep in touch with the decision makers. SKEPHI, on the other hand, condemned the process as a ‘farce’ after the initial meetings (WALHI, 1990; Mayer, 1996: 188). While WALHI was active in INGI/INFID, SKEPHI kept distance from it, and severely criticised international aid agencies and international NGOs such as the WWF for their tactics to develop national parks and other preservation areas without paying much attention to local people (Mayer, 1996).

SKEPHI tended to refuse support from international agencies, to avoid ‘foreign control’, and criticised this as ‘co-optation’ and ‘new colonisation’ (Tjahjono, interview, 4/Aug/2003). This is partly because SKEPHI tried to remain a network of small-medium sized NGOs, as large ones needed to rely more on foreign funds, and it tried to organise at the community level (Tjahjono, interview, 4/Aug/2003). The activists’ sensitivity to foreign funds may in part be because of the anti-capitalism tradition of intellectuals since the pre-independence period.

**The Framing Perspective: Two Major Developments in Democratic Ideas**

There were two important changes in democratic ideas (or arguments) concerning environmental governance in this period, which contributed to the development of ENGOs and the shift of their strategies: the enhancement of both ‘rights-based’ and ‘utilitarian’ arguments.

The development of rights-based arguments owed a great deal to the influx of former and contemporary student activists and pro-democratisation groups, especially human rights / legal assistance groups, into the mainstream of the environmental movement, as is seen from the cases of WALHI and SKEPHI. This created a momentum for the environmental movement, partly because many of these activists who moved into the environmental movement seem to have prioritised regime change. One activist says ‘the only way to be anti-Suharto was through the environmental

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23 They include Sukarno, Hatta, Tan Malaka, and the leaders of PKI, although there are many differences in the other points among their writings.

24 According to Aspinal (1990:45), there were 88 student protests between 1989-1990 based broadly on the issues of social/political justice, including land disputes and human rights abuses.
movement. In addition, it brought a view of social inequality and ‘left populism’ to the environmental movement. It is the poor who suffer most from environmental degradation, because they tend to rely on natural resources for their livelihood; accordingly, it is not surprising that environmental groups focus on their basic human rights and rights to participate in natural resources management. This was facilitated by the support from legal groups.

Activists in this period started to realise the importance of enhancing influence and legitimacy of their activism by working for the people, especially the marginalised. Learning from previous experiences (particularly protests in 1978 which failed to mobilise communities), the former student activists thought that popular support (especially from the poor) was necessary for political change (Naipospos, 1996). The relationship with local communities and groups added legitimacy to ENGOs’ claims to be representatives of victims, which also helped the latter to take problem solving actions. ‘We were getting to know that environmental problems were not technical problems’ (Moniaga, interview, 1/Aug/2003), unlike the arguments from the government, as was articulated by SKEPHI (above).

International actors and their ideas sensitised Indonesian NGOs about the issue of human rights and democracy. The increasing ties with international NGOs (for example, through INGI/INFID) brought (Western) democratic ideas to Indonesian NGOs. As is seen in the case of the Kedung Ombo dam project, the international NGO ties through INGI seem to have strengthened and spread the liberal democratic values held by Western NGOs and critical views of the authoritarian regime among the Indonesian NGOs. The 8th INGI Conference in 1992 argued for the importance of democratisation

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26 As Lipset (1966) argues, this is partly due to the youthful idealism to take upon themselves the leadership of the working classes.
27 For example, Mayer notes that ENGOs provided local people in Kalimantan with legal assistance for their actions concerning demonstrations, sabotage, and court cases when they were arrested. Also, ENGOs undertook advocacy for the local people at national and international meetings to discuss issues in a broader political context (Mayer, 1996: 205).
28 In 1988, the INGI sent a letter of concern to the World Bank and ADB about their Kedung Ombo dam project, which required the forced migration of a number of locals. In response, the Bank re-evaluated the entire project (See Eldridge, 1995).
for the majority of Indonesians (Eldridge, 1995). The World Conference on Human Rights at the UN in 1993 and its preparatory meeting in Bangkok ‘appeared to have provided a catalyst’ for a significant reshaping of NGO ideology and resulted in a Joint Declaration on Human Rights by Indonesian NGOs for Democracy in the same year (Eldridge, 1995: 212). In addition, in the environmental field, the UNCED (the Rio Summit), which emphasised ENGOs’ participation, had an impact on policy makers and NGO activists.

Democratisation in neighbouring Asian countries also influenced Indonesian activists. For example, a founder of WIM (Wahana Informasi Masyarakat or Community Information Forum) mentioned that democratisation movements in the Philippines stimulated the activists involved in the establishment of the group in 1986 (Soekirman, interview, 25/Jul/2003).

The increased land struggles as a result of the expansion of top-down development projects contributed to the argument. The common pattern among them was, first, that there were conflicts and confusions between national and customary law as well as between various levels of use and lease, short of freehold (hak milik) title. Secondly, ‘even freehold title can be overturned by compulsory acquisition in the name of national development’ (Eldridge, 1995: 115). As a result, local people’s rights of participation in environmental management were recognised. This explains why 62.6% and 52.2% of ENGOs deal with human rights and democracy respectively, which shows the clear contrast with Northern ENGOs (LP3ES, 2000)\(^29\).

The development of the utilitarian arguments was also due in part to the increasing understanding of the worsening environmental conditions and their impact on local people’s livelihood, and how the regime’s policies were responsible for this\(^30\). This went hand in hand with the expansion of ENGOs to the Outer Islands, where natural resources are much richer than in Java. Local people were more dependent on the

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\(^{29}\) The data is compiled by Author from LP3ES’s NGO directory \((n=203)\). The JANNI directory also shows that 61.7% of ENGOs are engaging in human rights (JANNI, 2001; data compiled by Author; \(n=204\))

\(^{30}\) WALHI’s Emmy Hafild comments that environmental problems in the Indonesia are political problems because at the bottom line environmental destruction is a result of policies made from various interests and politics (Parlan and Adi, 2004).
natural resources, while the demand by capitalists for their exploitation was very strong. ENGOs’ fieldwork there helped them to understand the problems from a political-ecology perspective. In this period, NGOs started to apply skills such as PAR (Participatory Action Research) and PRA (Participatory Rural Appraisal), which are effective in fieldwork in rural areas and helped to understand the situation at the community level\textsuperscript{31}.

Local ENGOs and some international scientists started to realise that local people were capable of sustainable natural resources management, in contrast to the discourse among the policy makers at that time\textsuperscript{32}. According to the latter, even if the swidden agriculture had a negative impact, it was mainly caused by immigrants from Java in the governments’ large transmigration programmes who did not understand the locally sustainable agriculture\textsuperscript{33}. Rather, environmentalists considered that it was the government’s development policies over forest resources and the operation of logging companies that were more responsible for forest degradation. This increased the demands for participation of local people in natural resources management\textsuperscript{34}.

\textit{The Political Opportunities Perspective: Limited Institutional Changes}

The configuration of formal institutions seems to be less significant for the growth of ENGOs than ‘framing’, as the state continued to dominate civil society. The censorship became stricter; in 1994, the major magazines Tempo, Detik and Editor were banned\textsuperscript{35}. LSMs managed to keep away from being the target of the ORMAS law by claiming that

\textsuperscript{31} SKEPHI’s Tjahjono mentioned that he started a study group on PAR in 1987 and PRA later on (Tjahjono, interview, 4/Aug/2003)

\textsuperscript{32} For example, together with international agencies such as the IUCN, the Indonesian government blamed farmers as the culprits of deforestation by burning the trees for cultivation. In a paper presented at a conference in Perth in 1990, IUCN said that ‘shifting agriculture is the major destroyer of tropical rainforests’ (quoted in Koffel, 1990: 42).

\textsuperscript{33} See Budiardjo (1986) for the political ecology of transmigration. Dove (1988: 20) also notes ‘resettlement of forest-dwelling peoples is often followed by - and hence clearly stimulated by as well - the granting of commercial logging concessions’.

\textsuperscript{34} In 1990, NGOs demanded democracy for sustainable development at a seminar sponsored by Salim, by laying aside the meeting agenda (Jakarta Post, 27/Sept/1990).

\textsuperscript{35} This was because of their report on government decisions such as the purchase of the former East Germany’s naval fleet. Due to the pressure from the government, the lawsuit by NGOs on the money transferred from the Reforestation Fund to Habibie’s aircraft company was not covered by most of the media (see ‘High Anxiety’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 29/Sept/1994)
they were small self-help organisations, and the law targeted only at organisations such as political parties and youth groups. Some observers note that the law accelerated the trend of NGOs to make networks rather than one big organisation in order to avoid being considered as an ORMAS (see for example, Eldridge, 1995)\(^\text{36}\).

Yet there were some institutional arrangements which helped the activities of ENGOs, such as the Government Regulation on Environmental Impact Analysis (Analisa Dampak Lingkungan or AMDAL) in 1986 (PP29/1986). These increased the chances for NGOs to participate in environmental management. Even though it was only to a limited extent, ENGOs such as WALHI participated in the AMDAL commission and provided EIA training courses. A WALHI leader said that Emil Salim encouraged NGOs to make use of these legal tools to stop the environmental degradation activities of private companies (Purnomo, interview, 17/Dec/2003). As is seen in the Indorayon case (see Chapter 5), NGOs did make use of this opportunity. The appointment of Kusumaatmadja as Salim’s successor as Minister of Environment helped to maintain, by and large, a ‘good’ relationship with the NGO sector, (although WALHI often felt uneasy about communicating with him compared with his predecessor)\(^\text{37}\).

Cribb suggests that the reason why the regime allowed ENGOs to participate in AMDAL, was really to control the businesses, which were becoming powerful as a result of rapid economic growth, as well as to monitor the environmental impact of the projects of private and government enterprises (Cribb, 1988). What can be added is that the regime presumably wanted to alleviate anti-pollution protests by co-opting activism, for fear of this developing into an anti-regime movement\(^\text{38}\).

The attitudes of the state towards civil society participation in environmental governance remained ‘utilitarian’ and limited to policy delivery (i.e. not policy making), as is confirmed by the role of ENGOs in AMDAL. The Environmental Management

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36 Also, most LSMs made legal registration as yayasan (foundation) which brought them under the authority of corporate regulations (Purnomo, 1994).

37 Interviews with Hafild (7/Feb/2005) and Purnomo (17/Dec/2003). While Kusumaatmadja was an MP from GOLKAR, he was often sympathetic to and supportive of NGOs because he had been also a student activist and a member of a nature lovers’ group.

38 Riker (1994) regards the establishment of BAPEDAL in 1990 as a government effort to control the increasing NGO pressure on the government and its projects.
Law (UU23/1997), which was passed in the last years of the New Order regime to replace the 1982 Basic Environment Law, mentioned that ‘natural resources are controlled by the state and are utilised for the greatest possible public welfare, and the arrangement thereof are determined by the government (Article 8; Environmental Impact Management Agency, 1998; emphasis added). Given that almost the same article can be found in the 1982 Law (Article 10), the attitudes remained the same from the beginning of the regime until the end.

The Resource Mobilisation Perspective: Funding Agencies and Students

The role of foreign agencies as a source of financial resources for ENGOs became increasingly important at that time. For example, WALHI members received funding from USAID, CIDA, the Asia Foundation, and others. In this period, international funding started to go to small/medium size NGOs and NGOs in the Outer Islands, although 13 large established NGOs (mostly the ones founded in the 1970s) tended to dominate as recipients in the 1980s (Setiawan, 1996; Tjahjono, interview, 4/Aug/2003). Since large NGOs tended not to be able to separate themselves from the developmentalist government policies, this shift was conducive to environmental advocacy, especially at the grassroots level. The increase in the foreign support to Indonesian civil society activities was partly due to the international trend of the increase in assistance to NGOs from the late 1980s.

However, there are problems with NGOs’ excessive reliance on foreign donors. One is the issue of legitimacy and accountability (see Chapter 2). Another is that it was an unstable source under the Suharto regime. The decision to ban all Dutch aid included the financial assistance from Dutch NGOs to Indonesian NGOs. This could have caused great damage to NGOs such as LBH, as 80% of its funds came from the Netherlands at that time (Uhlin, 1997). Although the Dutch support to NGOs continued, this incident showed that the government could cut NGOs’ financial resources if the relationship with NGOs worsened.

In response to the situation, Emil Salim established a non-profit funding agency, DML (Dana Mitra Lingkungan or the Friends of Environment Fund), in 1983 by
involving private companies as a financial source. DML’s purpose was to assist ENGOs, especially WALHI. In the first six years, DML provided WALHI with more than Rp 156 million\(^{39}\). By early 1991, DML was raising Rp 110 million annually, representing around 25% of WALHI’s funds (Eldridge, 1995: 52-53)\(^{40}\). This innovative effort to create the first funding agencies in the Third World was made possible by the strong initiative of Emil Salim. Apart from DML, there was no major domestic funding source for ENGOs, but local groups were supported by sporadic donations\(^{41}\). Alternatively, ENGO staff increasingly worked as consultants for foreign agencies as well as the Indonesian government, and used this remuneration for the group’s activities.

The number of funding sources increased further in the early 1990s. The Global Environmental Facility (GEF), established in 1991 on the initiative of UNEP, UNDP and the World Bank, started a Small Grant Programme (SGP) in Indonesia in 1993. New funding sources from Northern Europe, like Finland, Norway and Sweden, started to support small-medium groups, although such funds were small (Tjahjono, interview, 4/Aug/2003). A German funding agency, the Hanns Seidel Foundation (HSF), started its operation in Indonesia in 1993.

The establishment of Yayasan KEHATI (KeaneKaragaman Hayati Indonesia or Indonesian Biodiversity Foundation) in 1994, as a part of the Biodiversity Conservation Programme in Indonesia, by the governments of Indonesia, Japan, and the US, made another significant contribution to the environmental movement. Drawing on a US $16.5 million endowment fund from USAID, KEHATI has been supporting ENGO activities as grant provider since its establishment, and is highly accessible to many groups, unlike foreign donors.

University students were a significant source of human resources\(^{42}\). Many ENGOs were established by students. RMI in Bogor is an example. It was established by the students of the Bogor Institute of Agriculture (IPB), and its activities are supported by


\(^{40}\) Within the period of 1987-1993 there were 71 NGOs benefiting from DML (Santoso, 1999).

\(^{41}\) For example, KSBH relied mostly on donations from supporters, with volunteers assisting on an ad hoc basis. (Eldridge, 1995: 119)

\(^{42}\) Setiawan (1996) notes that this has also been seen in the Outer Island since the 1980s.
many University volunteers. A survey by the author in 2003 (see Appendix E) shows that around half of the ENGOs (48%) were directly established by students (n=65). Given that 84% of the other groups were formed by NGO activists who were very likely to be former student activists, the survey shows that students were the major human-resources provider for the growth of the majority of ENGOs. One can say that ENGOs in Indonesia were underpinned by the idealism and voluntarism of youth, despite the state’s oppression. It is also important to note a significant role was played by the overseas-educated University staff, who changed the perceptions of the students by providing up-to-date environmental information and activism to them (Hermawan, 2005).

There were also socio-economic developments (see Appendix A) and an increase in the middle class after the late 1980s (see Robison, 1996; Ogata, 1998). However, this did not simply mean an increase in the support to NGOs. One reason is that Indonesian middle class were the beneficiaries of economic development led by the Suharto regime. Their businesses were embedded in the New Order’s economic system, so that they preferred status quo rather than social change. Robison (1996: 85) states that the new middle classes ‘are prepared to fight only for narrow personal interest and not abstract ideals. This is not surprising, according to many of the commentators, given that the middle class is the creation of the state and sees its opportunities in term of improving its position within the channels of state institutions and within the confines of its ideology’.

Another reason is that the population share of Indonesia’s middle classes was still small even in comparison with the neighbouring countries: in 1988 it was estimated to be only 8%, while that of Thailand and the Philippines was 12%, and that of Malaysia was 15% (Huges and Woldekidan, 1994). The comparison of GDP per capita of these countries shows the domestic resources available in Indonesia were also limited compared with the other countries. Uhlin (1997) notes that ‘only about 0.6 percent of the Indonesian population are students’ and that of this group only a very small minority, 43 The government often resorted to physical oppression of student activists, as is seen from incidents such as the shooting by the military of the students participating in the demonstration in Ujung Pandang in 1987, and the shooting by the security forces of the Trisakti University students in Jakarta, which killed 6 people in 1998.
one observer estimates it, 'less than one percent can be labelled activists' (Uhlin, 1997: 106). This suggests that ENGOs at that time were supported by only a small group of the elite, and that the economic growth did not simply result in commensurable support to ENGOs. Accordingly, it is relatively difficult to study the growth of Indonesian ENGOs by drawing mainly on socio-economic improvements (Appendix A).

4.2 After the Late 1990s: The Decision Phase of Democratisation

In addition to the increasing pressure for democratisation from within and outside the country, the economic crisis that hit Indonesia in 1997 undermined the 'legitimacy' of the authoritarian rule by the 'father of development'. Suharto resigned on 21 May 1998, replaced by his Vice-President, Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie. In the first general election after Suharto, Abdurrahman Wahid was chosen as the 4th President of Indonesia in October 1999 with Megawati Sukarnoputri as Vice-President, as a result of parliamentary politics, although Megawati's PDI-Perjuangan emerged as the largest party in parliament, but without an absolute majority. Wahid was forced to resign before the end of his term because of reasons such as his own health and his worsened relationship with the Parliament, especially in relation to the accusation that he tolerated corruption in the administration. In July 2001, Megawati was duly installed as the new President. In the 2004 general election, which was the first direct presidential election in Indonesian history, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono became the 6th president of Indonesia. This means that Indonesia had four Presidents in seven years.

Considering that most of the democratic changes of institutions came into force during the Wahid era, institutional democratisation, or the 'decision phase', continued from Habibie era up to (at least) some point of the Wahid regime. It is debatable whether the Megawati era is already the beginning of the 'consolidation phase', in which informal institutions are also democratised, because the formal institutions created in the Wahid era were often revised later, which suggests the continuation of

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44 A major magazine Tempo's surveys of the students of the University of Indonesia and Bandung Institute of Technology respectively revealed that only 16% of students were from the middle to low classes of society and that 2.43% were from farmers or workers who constitute the majority of Indonesians (Tempo, 22/Apr/1989: 31; 20/Oct/1990: 25).

45 According to Rustow (1970), decision does not have to be a single decision, and several...
the decision phase. For the sake of simplicity, this thesis regards the period from Habibie to the end of the Megawati regime (i.e. October 2004) as the decision phase of democratisation. This section examines the impact of democratic changes in institutions and ideas in this period, with necessary recent information added.

**The Democratisation of Formal Institutions**

Institutional democratisation was promoted by the Habibie regime in its haste to respond to international (particularly from the IMF) as well as domestic pressure. He liberalised political activities, such as assuring the freedoms of speech and association. For instance, the authority of the Minister of Information to license the mass media was abolished and a registration system was introduced. The new press law (UU 40/1999) stipulated that anyone who infringed the freedom of the press would be punished. While the decision by the Minister of Home Affairs and the Minister of Defence in 1995 meant that demonstrations and political meetings of more than 10 people required permission from the security authorities, the new law on freedom of expression of views in public places (UU 9/1998) requires only reports on such political activities.

The people’s rights of political participation were stipulated in the Constitution. The establishment of political parties and their participation in election were liberalised (UU 2/1999). Government officials became free to be members of political parties (Government Decree 12/1999). The new election law (UU 3/1999) made fair election more possible by, for example, establishing a neutral general election committee. The seats of the Military in the DPR were reduced from 75 to 38. The representatives of organisations and regions, who used to be chosen by the President, are now appointed by the DPR for the former and regional DPRs for the latter (UU 4/1999)\(^46\).

A significant step in institutional democratisation was marked by the first vote to elect the President at the MPR and the first changes of the 1945 Constitution in 1999. The maximum tenure of office for the President and Vice-President was restricted to decisions can be made over a considerable period of time.

\(^46\) While the seats of the DPR remained 500, that of the MPR reduced to 700 in the new law. 500 of MPR members are DPR members, and 135 seats and 65 seats each go to regional and organisational representatives. MPR has also begun to be held annually. In the later revision of the Constitution in 2001, the President was to be elected by direct election from 2004.
two five-year terms. Under the old Constitution, the President was able to enact laws with the consent of DPR, but it was revised to give the President only the authority to submit legislative bills to the DPR (Article 5, Clause 1). It stipulated that DPR members and regional-level the DPR members should be chosen by election. This also means that it legally stipulated that the military seats in the MPR and the DPR were to be abolished. Human rights were also mentioned in the Constitution in the second amendment in 2000.

In this series of institutional democratisations, which was promoted under the banner of reformasi (reform), the centralisation of power was also reviewed. The Habibie government enacted two decentralisation laws: one was the Law on Local (Regional) Administration (UU 22/1999) and the Law on Fiscal Balance between the Central and Local Governments (UU 25/1999), which came into force in January 2001.

There are several important features of these laws. The government system of Indonesia consists of the first level (propinsi or provinces), the second level (kota and kabupaten or city and district) and the third level (kecamatan or county), which consists of villages (desa). According to the laws, local governments are responsible to local parliaments, whereas they used to be responsible to the President (via the Minister of Home Affairs). The heads of local governments, such as the Governors (at provincial level) and the Mayors (district level) must report to local parliaments, on which they can be dismissed. The District Mayors are no longer regarded as being subordinate to the Provincial Governors. By and large, the new laws stipulate the power of local MPs as being stronger than their previous ones, especially vis-à-vis the executive.

The authority of the lower level governments was increased. The proxy function for the central government remains only at the provincial level. Their functions as outpost agencies of the state were merged into the provincial governments. The governments at the other levels do not have to act on behalf of the central government. Except for issues such as foreign affairs, national economic plans, national defence, the judiciary, finance, religion and others, authorities have been transferred to the second level governments (see Chapter 6 on this point in relation to natural resources management).

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47 These two laws were further revised and replaced with UU 32/2004 and UU 33/2004 in the last days of Megawati regime. However, given the chronological scope of this thesis, the description here is confined to the 1999 laws.
With a view to rectifying the inter-regional inequity of resources as well as to financing the increased activities of local governments, national revenues from natural resources exploitation were allocated to local governments. Out of the central government revenues, financial support is given to local governments in the form of DAU (Dana Alokasi Umum or the General Allocation Fund), which is calculated based on a certain formula made in consideration of various indices like population and economic level. In addition, DAK (Dana Alokasi Khusus or Special Allocation Fund) is given to finance the activities of specific needs such as education.

This new system seems to contain certain issues. Among others, there is a regional inequality between resource-rich and resource-scarce regions, as a consequence of giving much weight to the former. As a result, the former became able to spend more funds for development, while the latter spend more on maintaining basic services (Alisjahbana, 2005). Another issue is the local governments’ unchanged financial dependency on the central government. Although local governments are encouraged to raise PAD (Pendapatan Asli Daerah or the Locally Derived Revenue) in the form of tax and levies through promoting industries, central transfers comprise about 92% of the total regional revenue and the DAU accounted for most of it (68%) in 2003 (Alisjahbana, 2005).

The Development of ENGOs and Their Strategies

In this period, ENGOs linked up further with the democratisation movement, and they increasingly emphasised ‘advocacy’. ‘As other NGOs working for democratisation in Indonesia, we also took part in the whole movement’ (WALHI 1998a: 13). ENGOs emphasised political reform more and more, which culminated around the end of the Suharto regime in May 1998. In April 1998, WALHI set the priority of the next six months as ‘70% politics and 30 % regular issues’ (WALHI, 1998a). This was also a reflection of the recognition that environmental problems could not be solved without changes in the government (Hafild, interview, 7/Feb/2005).

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48 According to UU25/1999, roughly speaking, the central government takes 20% and local governments take 80% of the revenues from forestry, mining and fisheries. In the case of natural gas and crude oil, the central government takes 70% and 85% for each and the rest goes to local governments. See Alisjahbana (2005) for a more detailed account.
However, importantly, their strategies have shifted to conform to democratic decision making. The radical element of the movement has weakened, while ENGOs utilised the democratic system more for exercising their political leverage. At the same time, they started democratising their organisation (these points are examined more below).

The trend of the emergence and development of local small-medium sized groups, established particularly by former students not only in Java but also in the Outer Islands, continued through and after the reformasi period. Many of them recognised the importance of having a good relationship with local people and collecting information through fieldwork by drawing on their expertise. In addition to conducting pragmatic activities, they often participated in the environmental policy process at the local or national level though NGO networks. One good example is the ENGO ARuPA (see Chapter 6)\(^49\).

This trend led to the development of ENGO networks. They tend to emphasise the need for participation by the local community to solve environmental problems. Many of them do not seek to scale-up because they wish to avoid bureaucratisation, a hierarchical organisational structure, and detachment from community level activities, as well as the financial cost of these. Rather, they tend to form a participatory egalitarian network.

There are many examples of such networks. FKKM (Forum Komunikasi Kehutanan Masyarakat or the Community Forestry Communication Forum) was established in September 1997 by researchers, activists and local people to develop the community forest movement in Indonesia, recognising the environmental sustainability of community forestry and the negative impact of the state’s forest management. FKKM has members all over Indonesia with 17 regional facilitators\(^50\). KpSHK (Konsorsium Pendukung Sistem Hutan Kerakyatan or the Community Forestry System Supporting

\(^{49}\) See Hendarti and Nomura (2005) for examples in the field of environmental education.

\(^{50}\) Information on FKKM is obtained from Awang (Executive Secretary of FKKM/ interviews, 8/Nov/2001; 24/Oct/2002) and the pamphlet of FKKM published in 2000. According to Awang, the establishment of FKKM was also stimulated by information on community forestry from abroad, such as Thailand.
Consortium) was also established by NGOs such as WALHI and by researchers\(^5^1\). With a coordinator and a representative in each of 5 regions (Java, Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Papua), KpSHK covers most of the forested regions in Indonesia (see also Chapter 6 for the community forestry movement). JKPP (Jaringan Kerja Pemetaan Partisipatif or the Participatory Mapping Network) was established in May 1996 by some institutions (mostly NGOs) to promote and disseminate the ideas and skills of participatory mapping, which came to Indonesia in the early 1990s. JKPP now has 33 member organisations\(^5^2\). The Sawit Watch was started in 1998 as a network of NGOs with concerns about the initiatives by government and industries to expand the oil palm (sawit) plantations, which can have negative impacts on the environment (excessive chemical use, biodiversity loss due to monoculture, and forest fires caused by the land-clearing process, etc) as well as on local peoples’ livelihood. The development of JPL (Jaringan Pendidikan Lingkungan or the Environmental Education Network), which was formed in 1996, is another example\(^5^3\). The establishment of AMAN (Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara or the Indigenous Peoples’ Alliance of the Archipelago) to support indigenous people’s struggles, which include the ones concerning natural resources management, is also considered as a part of the movement, although it may not be considered as an ‘environmental’ group.

One can also find an increasing trend of research-advocacy types of NGOs. Forest Watch Indonesia (FWI) started its activities in 1997. FWI developed from a programme by some NGOs in the previous year, based on the recognition that the data and information gained through monitoring was important for their activities. FWI provides wide information on forests and related issues for the activities of NGOs engaging in forest management and advocacy\(^5^4\). Telapak Indonesia, together with the Environmental

\(^{51}\) Information on KpSHK was from its pamphlet in 1998 and Website (www.kpshk.org/ accessed on 10/Jul/2005) as well as informal interviews with some KpSHK members.

\(^{52}\) Participatory mapping is an important tool to support customary community rights to land and natural resources especially in a country where only the government makes maps without paying attention to community’s land use, which are used to restrict community’s activities for development purpose. Information of JKPP was from Achmadiali (interview, 8/Nov/2001)

\(^{53}\) Environmental education by NGOs outside Java Island started in earnest in the mid-late 1990s (see Hendarti and Nomura, 2005, for example). Starting with less than 30 members, JPL has grown rapidly and currently has around 200 members.

\(^{54}\) Information on FWI is from its Director Togu Manurung (interview, 6/Aug/2003). FWI also
Investigating Agency (a UK-based ENGO), worked on and exposed rampant illegal logging from 1997 with the use of video cameras and other innovative tools, an activity which would have faced more difficulty in the middle of the New Order regime as it implied some criticism of government officials and politicians.

**The Political Opportunities Perspective: Increased Liberty**

Political opportunities were significantly increased in this period. Since the beginning of the post-New Order period, ENGOs have tended to participate more in the policy process (see the following chapters). Activist networks such as FKKM and KpSHK influenced the 1999 Basic Forestry Law (see Chapter 6). In the post-Suharto era, the policy makers, even the President himself, became accessible to environmental activists (see Chapter 5).

There have been some changes in the attitudes of MPs at the national level. GOLKAR approached WALHI for their input, when creating PROPENAS (*Program Pembangunan Nasional* which was formerly known as REPELITA) (WALHI Staff, interview, 31/Oct/2002). The decree from Indonesia’s highest legislative body MPR (TAP MPR) on agrarian reform and natural resources in 2001 (No IX/MPR/2001) was significant both for its content and the way in which it was formulated. It emphasised democratic values in managing natural resources, such as human rights, participation, and respect for the culture, social situation and customary law of the local people, which should require changes in each environmental sector to restructure the ways to control natural resources. This was a result of active participation and lobbying by ENGOs such as WALHI, ELSAM, ICEL and LBH. At the regional level, WALHI has also successfully promoted the formulation of 68 regional policies concerning people’s environmental rights.

However, activists tend to feel that MPs have not been prioritising the environment. The majority of WALHI members feel that the initiatives to take WALHI into the policy process may often be a mere gesture to obtain legitimacy for the process itself and the

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55 Environmental education is another area in which government-NGO collaboration is active. See Hendarti and Nomura (2005).

56 This has not met desirable responses from each sector of the government yet.
decisions taken\textsuperscript{57}.

Unlike Eastern Europe, the resources of Indonesian ENGOs did not shift to parliamentary politics. ENGOs stayed outside it although they made much of electoral politics. In fact, in July 1999, WALHI was listed as an \textit{Utusan Golongan} (fraction delegate) to the MPR on environmental issues and natural resources management; however, PNLH VII refused the offer (Hafild, interview, 7/Feb/2005; Parlan and Adi, 2004). This may be because the Indonesian environmental movement had a longer history before the democratisation movement started, and the core motivation of the bearers of it were environmental rather than political, in contrast with those in Eastern Europe, where anti-regime activists seem to have played a more central role.

ENGOs, especially small and medium sized groups which are politically vulnerable, have enjoyed the freer political environment. This is even true in the Megawati era, although she was considered more conservative and ‘undemocratic’ than Habibie and Wahid. One activist noted that NGO activities became significantly easier after it became unnecessary to report meetings to the authorities (Hendarti, interview, 12/Dec/2004). In fact, a questionnaire survey showed that many activists felt that the political atmosphere became much better for NGO activities (JANNI, 2001).

The political liberalisation had little influence on many groups which do not have a problem to work within the framework of \textit{Pancasila} democracy. They are more based on the tradition of \textit{gotong royong} (mutual cooperation), and their approach is more pragmatic and hands-on to help people suffering from environmental degradation who have less political advocacy. According to a survey by this author in 2003, ENGOs consider lobbying as the fifth most important strategy for them after other non-political strategies\textsuperscript{58}. According to the JANNI survey (2001), about 30\% of ENGOs answered that their activities were the same as before and after the end of Suharto regime and most of them answered that this was because their activities were not political.

\textit{The Framing Perspective: The Spread of Democratic Ideas}

ENGOs by and large shifted their strategies from radical ‘confrontation’ to

\textsuperscript{57} See Munggoro et. al (2003).
\textsuperscript{58} See Appendix E.
'collaboration' (or critical collaboration in Eldridge's term), although this does not mean they support the government's policy without question. The radical section of the environmental movement lost its momentum in the post-Suharto era because the major motivation had been to remove Suharto from the presidency. Besides, the strategies taken by the radical groups now seem to be eschewed as 'un-democratic', in the sense that they avoid 'participation' in the policy process, inter alia, in discussions with the government. This would not conform either with the democratic ideas which spread among NGOs through the democratisation movement or with the traditional political values such as musyawarah and mufakat.

SKEPHI typifies this trend. SKEPHI was becoming weak due to an 'internal crisis' (Setiawan, 1996) towards the end of the Suharto era, which, according to interviews with former SKEPHI members, was due to Tjahyono's over-strong orientation towards political and radical strategies (for example, Nugroho, interview, 11/Aug/2003). Although WALHI changes its leaders every few years in a democratic manner at the PNLH meeting, SKEPHI has been led by the same person for a long time; this 'undemocratic' style may have caused stagnation within the organisation and its network (Purnomo, interview, 17/Dec/2003). In the more democratic Indonesia, SKEPHI seems to have retreated from the forefront of the ENGO movement, although it still operates. It seems to have lost its confrontational approach and started to be funded by the World Bank and other organisations that it used to harshly decry.

In contrast, there was a shift of ENGO strategies to make the most of the democratic system to increase political influence. For example, WALHI started the 'voter education' project (Pendidikan Pemilu) to shift the attitudes of political parties, since no major parties put environmental issues on their political agenda in a concrete manner although they paid lip service to prioritising environmental issues (Hafild, interview, 7/Feb/2005). Like most of the ENGOs, WALHI also advocated democratic reform of environmental governance.

Due to the increasing democratic values, WALHI has tried to democratise itself and

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59 See its six suggestions for reform proposed in this period, which includes 'decentralisation', 'strengthening community (social) control', and 'fair utilisation [of natural resources] for the mass people' (WALHI, 1998b).
its activities by enhancing its representation, legitimacy, credibility and accountability as a political actor in democratic settings. In other words, it has increasingly recognised its role not only as an advocate of democratisation but also as a bearer of democratic governance. For example, WALHI developed a democratic decision-making system: decisions are made by meetings and councils at national and regional levels, which are conducted by national and regional executive offices and supervised by the Code of Ethics Committee.

Another important effort was information disclosure. WALHI has to show that it is representing the people, which is the point always questioned by, for example, the government (Ginting, interview, 21/Oct/2002). Due to its financial dependence on foreign agencies, some people have tended to regard it as an organisation representing foreign interests, which is problematic in a democratic context. To cope with the situation, WALHI has made efforts at information disclosure. In 1996 WALHI produced a comprehensive annual report for the first time and disseminated it to the larger public, so that people could know if WALHI was working for foreigners or Indonesians (Hafild, interview, 7/Feb/2005).

Also, WALHI started a ‘membership’ system called ‘Sahabat WALHI’ (Friends of WALHI) to attract supporters from the wider public. This is different from WALHI as a forum in which NGOs and activists participate. They are individuals from the public who provide human resources (as volunteers) or financial resources (as donations) to support WALHI. It could mean a lot in financial terms, since WALHI aims to raise 50% of its funds from this source in 5-10 years (Ginting, interview, 21/Oct/2002). Yet what is more important is that WALHI can show in a political sense that ‘WALHI is supported by this many people, especially Indonesians’ (Ginting, interview, 21/Oct/2002). This system can also help distinguish it from quasi-NGOs established by government officials and business persons, which are quite common in Indonesia.

60 Sahabat WALHI has two components: WALHI Aktif (WALHI Active), a system for volunteers, and Kotak Lingkungan WALHI (WALHI Environmental Box), a system for donators.
61 Other WALHI staff members made almost the same comment (Nasution and Priyanto, interview, 2/Feb/2005).
62 This point was recognised by activists themselves. For example, Mohammad, (JATAM Coordinator), interview, 30/Jul/2003.
Ginting said that, although an NGO only had to have 'bravery' to be an NGO in the Suharto era, it now has to show legitimacy and accountability (Ginting, interview, 21/Oct/2002).

In addition, WALHI enhanced its relationship with communities. In fact, there was an increase in cases in which local people approached WALHI not only on environmental issues in a narrow sense but also on other related issues such as human rights (Winoto, WALHI staff, interview, 11/Feb/2005; see also Munggoro, et. al, 2003). This is why, in the term used by Ginting (Executive Director of WALHI 2002-2005), WALHI shifted its strategy even more towards 'people's organisation' (Ginting, interview, 21/Oct/2002) than it used to do. In other words, WALHI decided to work with the people even more for their welfare, with a broader scope of activities although its emphasis is still on environmental issues. This role of NGOs is significant given that the actors in parliamentary politics such as politicians and political parties tend not to have satisfactorily consulted people at the grassroots level due to their lack of previous experience.

ENGOs also increasingly engaged in community organising. For example, WALHI helped to establish 67 new people's organisations (or CBOs) where the figure was only seven in 1997 (WALHI, 1998a). Although the number is limited, some have succeeded in enhancing people's voice. Community organising is an ENGO approach to enhance democratic participation of the local people, who tend to lack resources and experience, while collaboration with such groups also supports the legitimacy of ENGOs' advocacy, who have tended to lack representation from locals.

_The Resource Mobilisation Perspective: Strategies of Funding Agencies_

Given the regional economic crisis which hit Indonesia in 1997/98, socio-economic development was not a major explanatory factor for the growth of Indonesian ENGOs

63 Another trend of ENGO activities that accelerated in the post-reformasi era was the expansion of scope or engagement in related issues such as human rights, gender issues, poverty alleviation, and others. This was seen in the expansion of issues involved in environmental education programmes (Hendarti and Nomura, 2005).

64 WALHI East Java and local CBOs have developed local regulations that guarantee people's rights over the management of natural resources. (Munggoro, et. al, 2003; see also the case in North Sumatra in Chapter 5).
in this period. As for the resource mobilisation perspective, there was a significant shift of resources from funding agencies to ENGOs engaging in advocacy and participatory natural resource management, especially at the local and community levels, although the total amount of funds available for ENGOs may not have increased\(^6\). For example, Yayasan KEHATI has started a programme approach since 2002, which sets target areas at the local level and uses a multi-stakeholder approach, although it has not increased the amount of total grants\(^6\). The funds from HSF, which is active in supporting environmental education by NGOs, remained constant throughout the reformasi period (Hegemer, interview, 27/Jan/2005), while it became more able to support political activities than it used to in the Suharto period, in which it had to be careful not to be labelled 'subversive' (Hegemer, interview, 30/Oct/2002).

KEMALA (Kelompok Masyarakat Pengelola Sumberdaya Alam or the Community Natural Resource Managers Program) is another example of a funding agency which has shifted its strategies. KEMALA has provided a considerable amount of financial support to ‘partner’ ENGOs engaging in participatory natural resources management since 1996. It started as the Indonesian Biodiversity Support Programme (BSP), a consortium of the WWF, TNC (The Nature Conservancy), and the WRI, with the funding support from USAID (US$10.5 million). BSP-KEMALA tried to build politically active NGOs concerned with community-based natural resources management, and supported decentralisation during its project period (1996-2001). After the end of the project, it became a yayasan (foundation) and has continued supporting ENGOs in the field of community natural resources management with funds from DFID (UK Department for International Development) and USAID. According to its staff, KEMALA is supporting community level groups more directly after reformasi, as it became easier to do so (Pellokila and Rochaeni, interview, 28/Jan/2005).

DFID's Multi-stakeholder Forestry Programme (MFP) started substantial grants in 2002 to ENGOs engaging in multi-stakeholder forest management (the MFP itself

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\(^6\) The funds to some ENGOs seem to have decreased due to this shift. In response to the question about the changes after Suharto regime in the survey by JANNI (2001), the decrease in the resources was raised by many groups as a major negative change.

\(^6\) This is because KEHATTI's budget is based on the endowment fund, which is managed in the US. Therefore, the amount of its budget is determined by the interest rates in the US.
started in 2001). In 2002, US$ 10.9 million was allocated to its partners, of which 62% were domestic NGOs and 13% were people organisations or CBOs. Since the MFP is trying to promote ‘forest management reforms which would help stop the destruction of this major asset and which will benefit the poor people who depend on forest resources’, funds tend to go to local level groups, which is a significant support to local small/medium size ENGOs. MFP is the only environmental programme from DFID; importantly, however, the major objective is to alleviate poverty, reflecting the policy of the Labour Government of the UK to strongly engage in the issue of global poverty. In other words, the start of the MFP is more related to the political change in the UK and not in Indonesia, although the latter facilitated the funding to and collaboration with local groups (interviews with MFP staff: Nugroho, 11/Aug/2003; Royo, 26/Jan/2005).

The Ford Foundation is another major donor for ENGOs in the field of participatory natural resources management. The current programme officer of environment and development at the foundation provides around US$ 2million to 45 grantees a year (Pradhan, interview, 28/Jan/2005). The Ford Foundation has recently been emphasising the enhancement of groups and people for poverty and injustice alleviation through natural resources management, which is a part of its Asset Building and Community Development Programme conducted worldwide. Although it looks ideal for the situation in Indonesia, the Indonesia office’s support in this field should therefore be understood in the context of the foundation’s worldwide strategy. Besides, there has not been an increase in the amount of funds since reformasi, as this depends on the US economy.

The GEF has increased its funds. In the pilot phase of the GEF-Small Grant Programme (GEF-SGP; 1993-1996), it was only US $449,820 to 23 grantees; but in the Operational Phase I (1998-2000), it became US $599,301 to 62 grantees and US$850,000 to 50 grantees during 2000-2002. In addition, UNDP plans to launch another SGP in Indonesia which focuses on sustainable livelihood for forest-dependent communities. However, not surprisingly, this increase did not result from the democratic

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67 The programme officer in charge was moved from India to apply what he learnt from the successes of participatory natural resources management there. (Pradhan, interview, 28/Jan/2005)

68 Data provided by Yayasan Bina Usaha Lingkungan, which is in charge of GEF-SGP in Indonesia.
transition or other changes in Indonesia, but from international trends.

The economic crisis that hit Indonesia decreased what few domestic resources there were from the private sector in Indonesia. Due to the decline in donations from the companies, the funds from DML were more than halved after the economic crisis (on an average Rp 33.9 million between 1998-2004 compared with Rp 71.3 million between 1984-1997); in fact, the disbursement between 2001-2003 was nil\(^69\). Nowadays, companies tend to conduct environmental activities, if any, by themselves, because they cannot publicise their names if funded through DML (Susilorini, interview, 26/Jan/2005).

Although some officers in charge of grants for ENGOs acknowledged that it became much easier to work with local level ENGOs after domestic institutional democratisation, most of them have pointed out that the increase in the support to local groups is due to the international trend to support a multi-stakeholder approach to environmental governance and participatory natural resources management\(^70\). In other words, what was significant was the global strategic change of funding agencies.

Some ENGOs have started to win supporters from the public. In addition to WALHI, examples include WWF-Indonesia, Telapak, and Profauna. WWF has around 300 supporters called *Krabat*. Profauna has more than 1,000 members. Yet these people have not made a significant financial contribution; rather, considering the cost for putting organisational efforts to deal with this system, it may have been a constraint for the group (interviews with Nasution, 2/Feb/2005; Sitorus, 27/Jan/2005). In the case of Profauna, the membership fee accounts for only 1\% of its activity budget, although it emphasises the political aspect of it, showing how many people support its activities (Profauna Indonesia, 2003; Suparno, interview, 31/Jan/2005). In fact, it is difficult to increase the supporters. The staff of WWF and Profauna unanimously said that nature conservation is not yet regarded as important compared with other issues (interviews, Suparno, 31/Jan/2005; Adriani, 1/Feb/2005). Also, WWF staff join WALHI staff in

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\(^{69}\) Date obtained from DML. Now DML is turning into an implementation agency by receiving funds from elsewhere.

\(^{70}\) The ‘Community Empowerment Programme’ of Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) increased after *reformasi* but it was mainly due to the other reasons such as Asian economic crisis and the global trend to support NGOs (Fukunaga, interview, 25/Jan/2005).
saying that they are considered as ‘rich’ organisations as they receive funds from abroad (interviews, Adriani, 1/Feb/2005; Nasution, 2/Feb/2005).

Nevertheless, there seem to be untapped resources for ENGOs. According to the research by a Jakarta-based NGO, Indonesia has a culture of giving/charity, which may be due to religious beliefs: 96%, 84% and 77% of Indonesians have donated to individuals (such as the poor), to religious organisations and activities, and non-religious groups and activities respectively (PIRAC, 2002). The yearly donation for each of these three categories is Rp 371,000, 255,000 and 233,000 per capita (PIRAC, 2002). In view of the average wage of Indonesian ENGOs, 10 donors would be enough to hire a staff member for a month (depending on the region). In fact, donations from individuals increased somewhat after the economic crisis (PIRAC, 2002). However, only 3% of the people among the donors to non-religious organisations/activities contributed to environmental groups/activities, and the amount is only Rp 10,200 per year (PIRAC, 2002). In this context, researchers, staff of ENGOs and funding agencies agree that ENGOs have to change the perception of the public so that they regard donations and other kinds of contributions to ENGOs as no less important than those to religious groups (interviews, Sitorus, 27/Jan/2005; Abidin, 2/Feb/05; Adriani, 1/Feb/2005).

Also, ENGOs increasingly finance their activities through ‘collaboration’ (kerja sama) on projects/programmes with other NGOs and donor/aid implementing agencies. This has assisted the activities of small and medium scale NGOs which have less chance to gain access directly to the donor agencies. This has been facilitated by the increase in the funds to networks like FKKM as well as to large ENGOs directly, which has supported their members’ activities. This has lessened each group’s workload for reporting and its dependency on funding agencies, at least ostensibly, even though the source is foreign donors.

Some NGOs are engaging in income-generating activities to secure the budget of activities. Some run informal (usaha bersama) or formal co-operative enterprises

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71 For example, average monthly wage in manufacturing is Rp 559,436 (2001), although this represents significant underpayment in that it is difficult to make one’s own living only with this (International Labour Office, 2002).
(koperasi), arisan (traditional social-cum-lottery clubs in Java), savings and loan groups, and credit unions (Eldridge, 1995). PPLH-Seloliman, which is an ENGO-run environmental education centre, has had a high level of financial achievement. Around 70% of its income comes from its own activities, such as participants' fees for its education programmes, sales of educational materials, food at the restaurant, accommodation, organic farming products, and souvenirs (Nomura, Hendarti and Abe, 2004)\(^2\).

The economic crisis seems to have increased human resources for NGOs because it made it more difficult for students to find a job in private companies. Enhanced anti-government attitudes in the process of democratisation made the government a less attractive employer\(^3\). As Appendix A shows, this means that ENGOs are still underpinned by a small number of people, although this period marked an increase in the tertiary education enrolment rate.

4.3 Conclusion

In the preparation phase of democratisation in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, ENGOs developed and diversified strategies and geographical fields at the height of the Suharto regime, along with the democratisation movement. ENGOs increased and were politicised while linking up with communities. The geographical expansion of ENGO activities resulted in the emergence of regional networks.

This cannot be fully understood only from the political opportunities perspective. The political structures remained authoritarian and oppressive, although Suharto did not try to eradicate such movements, which was presumably because he valued NGOs for providing useful and inexpensive services for development as long as ENGOs did not attack the regime and its policies directly\(^4\). There were a few institutional developments

\(^2\) RMI and Yayasan Kaliandra Sejati have also started a similar kind of environmental education centres in Bogor and East Java respectively.

\(^3\) Robison (1996: 88-89) notes that there was a transformation of the student movement towards the mid 1990s, 'from liberal, upper middle-class movement to ones more heavily dominated by lower middle-class youth less satisfied with demanding accountability and liberal reform and becoming involved in the politics of labour and landownership', and these people are the ones 'being hit hardest by growing unemployment and underemployment among graduates'.

\(^4\) MacAndrews (1994: 376) also suggested that the regime regarded it a 'politically attractive way to channel student frustration'.
such as the enactment of AMDAL; however, ENGO participation was limited to the policy delivery.

The spread of democratic ideas politicised ENGOs (and radicalised some groups) in the late 1980s and the early 1990s; in other words, their causes became more 'ideological' rather than practical ones. There are two major developments in the ideas in this period - one is 'rights-based' and the other is 'utilitarian' arguments. Both of them were influenced by the democratisation movement and increasing knowledge about the people and the environment in the Outer Islands, resulting from the spread of ENGOs and skills such as PAR and PRA in those regions.

The influx of former student activists and legal groups into the mainstream environmental movement changed the perception toward environmental issues by bringing in the viewpoints of 'rights'. A section of these people might have been 'environmentalists in disguise' who held a political cause as their primary objective; nevertheless, they also made a significant contribution to the expansion of the frame, to include social and political aspects such as human rights and participation. This rights discourse was furthered by a series of international conferences on human rights and the environment in the early 1990s. The strengthening linkage with the grassroots-level communities and groups enhanced the legitimacy of their claims to represent the interests of these groups. This trend was enhanced by the increasing awareness of the socio-economic inequality in the Outer Islands through the expansion of ENGO activities there.

The geographical expansion of ENGOs also contributed to the development of utilitarian arguments. With the use of new techniques for fieldwork (e.g. PRA), the studies in certain places helped people to understand more about the capacity of local people for sustainable farming and forestry, structural causes of environmental issues, and their social and economic impacts. Environmentalists increasingly felt the need for policy change for natural resources management to accommodate more participation. This was facilitated by the emergence of activists with expertise in such areas as forestry. To put it another way, the relationship between democracy and ENGOs is not one-way,

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75 See Uhlin (1997) for the spread of democratic ideas in this period.
in the sense that the former developed the latter, because democratisation was also
demanded by arguing that a participatory approach is more effective than a top-down
approach for natural resources and environmental management.

In the decision phase of democratisation (from the late 1990s), the strategies of
ENGOs were ‘democratised’; namely, their activities and organisations were changed to
conform more to democratic ideas. This was facilitated by the democratic arrangements
of formal institutions, especially political liberalisation. ENGOs’ human resources were
retained without shifting to parliamentary politics, unlike in Eastern Europe, which was
also good for Indonesian ENGOs in the post-reformasi period.

However, one has to pay sufficient attention to the critical impacts of ideas and
informal institutions for a better understanding of the continuity of the trend of ENGOs’
development (particularly their qualitative or strategic changes) from the Suharto period.
Their strategies were changed from confrontation to (critical) collaboration, and radicals
seem now to be withering. This can be understood in the context of the spread of
democratic ideas and local political culture, as radical activities do not get along with
either of them. One can also point out that the public support for the radical element was
mainly for overthrowing the New Order regime, and this goal was achieved by 1998.

Other examples of democratisation of ENGO activities range from WALHI’s voter
education project to ENGOs’ community organising activities and working for people’s
welfare. ENGOs increasingly tried to legitimise themselves in the context of democracy
by strengthening the ties with local people. The victims at the grassroots level
increasingly joined the environmental movement in this period, and started to be
involved in the preparation phase of democratisation.

ENGOs’ organisational democratisation can be seen in their efforts towards
information disclosure, development of supporters’ systems, and enhancing
participatory decision making76. By so doing, ENGOs can legitimately play a significant
role in democratic governance, assisting and working for the people at the grassroots
level.

76 This seems to be different from the Latin American cases criticised by Bebbington and Thiele
(1993) in which NGOs failed to develop democratic internal mechanisms as actors in
democratic settings (see Chapter 2).
These efforts by Indonesian ENGOs to 'democratise' themselves were their responses to the issues concerning NGOs' legitimacy, accountability and performance in a democratic system, which can be questioned due to their financial dependence on foreign donors (see Chapter 2). Democratisation in Indonesia seems to have sensitised ENGOs about these concerns, possibly more than those in other countries.

Economic growth and slump does not simply bring about commensurate changes in the resources of ENGOs. While economic growth may have not produced a sufficient population of the middle class to financially support ENGO activities, the economic slump increased unemployment rates and shifted human resources to the civil society sector. The students have played a pivotal role in providing human resources for ENGOs, which enabled the latter to act with limited funds. They were still considered as elitist - just a small number of people in comparison with the rest of the population.

For the growth of Indonesian ENGOs, the international strategies of funding agencies were more important. Funds from international and domestic agencies increased from the later 1980s (although the domestic element was much more modest). More resources were allocated to community-based and small-medium size ENGOs as well as networks from the late 1990s, which significantly developed them. However, the rise and fall of the funds from international agencies depended on their international strategies and much less on domestic political conditions in Indonesia, although the latter facilitated the activities of funding agencies after the end of authoritarian rule.

People's attitudes towards environmental issues seem to have remained unchanged after the economic crisis, unlike in Eastern Europe, which could have shifted their concern to economic growth. This is probably because the major issues in Indonesia are natural resources; they are related to the livelihood of the poor, unlike pollution problems, which can be technologically fixed in a relatively short term and tend to decrease when the production declines because of economic stagnation. These issue-related characteristics have to be noted when considering the different strategies taken by ENGOs in Indonesia and other countries.
In the Outer Islands, local governments and communities became vocal about their rights to the benefits from natural resources extraction in their localities after reformasi. These islands tend to be resource-rich, and therefore have been exploited by Jakarta. What underlies their demand is not only the potential economic gain but also their cultural and ethnic differences from Java as well as resentment at the oppression they were subject to in the authoritarian period, aimed at the maximum exploitation of the resources.

The state has made more concessions to the regions where there are strong independence movements and where there is the worst 'legacy' of the New Order's oppression. The prominent examples are Aceh and Irian Jaya (Papua). Aceh is rich in natural gas. The independence movement was oppressed by the Suharto government, which killed, allegedly, thousands of people. The operation of companies like Exxon-Mobil was protected by the police and the military, which often had conflicts with local people. This story can be replicated in Irian Jaya, if the name of the company is replaced with the American-based mining giant Freeport. In response to the breakout of their resentment after reformasi, the state enacted special laws for these two regions, to provide an affirmative allocation of the revenues from natural resources.

In other regions, the decentralisation in forest management went back and forth. Examples include forest concession policies, as widely reported. The government

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1 An earlier draft of this chapter was presented as a paper at the 2004 Political Studies Association Conference at the University of Lincoln (6-8 April, 2004).
2 See Dermawan and Resosudarmo (2002), Casson (2000); McCarthy (2000), Barr et al (2001) for the analysis of this issue. Responsibilities such as the supervision of logging operations and
regulation PP 6/1999 and a following government degree (Surat Keputusan or SK) from the Minister of Forestry (Menteri Kehutanan or Menhut) SK Menhut 310/1999 provided district governments (in the Outer Islands) with the authority to issue small scale forest concessions. This caused several problems. For example, while the major aim of this was to empower local communities, who became eligible for the concessions, their limited resources forced communities to cooperate with businesses in practice. This resulted in only partial benefits to the former, often causing conflicts between the two. The concessions were also over-issued for a rapid increase of local government revenues (or PAD), without sufficient social and ecological consideration. Besides, corruption of the local government elites in the process was widely reported. Many timber extraction permits were made in the existing concession areas and often the size of permitted areas were larger than the stipulated maximum size (100 ha). In response, the Ministry issued another decree (SK Menhut 541/2002) and regulation (PP 34/2002), without consulting local actors, to bring the authority to allot the concessions back to the state; yet, many of the regions continued issuing them.

Powerful private entrepreneurs and their political patrons made efforts to retain influence concerning the decisions on the downstream processing of forest products, such as plywood, pulp, and furniture. Despite international pressures, such as from the IMF, to dismantle the power of APKINDO, the politico-business oligarchy relating to timber policies in Jakarta seems to have remained intact since the Suharto period (Gillert, 2005). Regardless of the donor countries’ pressures, Indonesian banks wrote off huge debts of wood industries, and the government provided institutional support to revitalise them by, for example, banning rough-sawn wood exports to secure materials for their operations. The government also formed a new industry organisations, BRIK (Badan Revitalisasi Industri Kehutanan or the Forestry Industry Revitalisation Agency) to cope with illegal logging and increase forestry product exports. Gillert (2005: 159) writes, ‘[m]ost of the actions taken by the oligarchy’s key players in government and industry have been ‘rearguard’ measures to shore up a threatened industry and

environmental services were left with local governments. See also CIFOR’s report series on the impact of decentralisation on forests in the Outer Islands. http://www.cifor.cgiar.org/docs/_ref/highlights/decentralisation.htm
oligarchy's power for as long as the forests will sustain them'.

This chapter examines the impacts of democratisation on the actors’ network in the decision making process concerning environmental problems caused by PT Inti Indorayon Utama Ltd (hereafter referred to as Indorayon), whose operation is conducted in Sumatra. Indorayon is Indonesia's first rayon and pulp project, which was established by Sukanto Tanoto (a.k.a. Tan Kuang Ho), the timber tycoon of Sumatra. Tanoto was a golfing friend of Suharto, and one of the most influential figures in forest policy making as a board member of APKINDO (see Chapter 3). The issues caused by Indorayon represents one of the best-known environmental problems, for their severe ecological and social damage as well as for the long-lasting struggles of local people, which has continued for almost two decades.

5.1 Background and Outline

*Indonesian Pulp and Rayon Industry and North Sumatra*

As is shown in earlier chapters, trade and investments related to forests rapidly increased after Suharto took power, especially from the beginning of the 1980s. Indonesia quickly became the world's largest producer and exporter of plywood and rattan. At its peak, the export of plywood was valued at US $ 4,257 million in 1993, whereas it had been just US $ 509 million in 1983 (ADB, 2001).

After the success in plywood, the government started to expand the pulp and paper industry from the late 1980s. From 1987 to 2002, the pulp and paper production capacity grew more than 10 times: from 515,000 to 6,087,000 metric tons for pulp and from 980,000 to 10,066,000 tons for paper (GTZ-SMCP, 2004). One major enabling factor for this rapid growth is Indonesia's cost-competitiveness; it is three times cheaper to produce paper pulp in Indonesia than in Sweden (see Sizer et. al, 1999). This was made possible by the government's various arrangements such as subsidised loans and tax incentives as well as the initiation of the industrial plantation programme (*Hutan Tanaman Industri* or HTI) (GTZ-SMCP, 2004). With relatively minimal royalty payments (currently US$ 2.00 per m³) and logs supplied by clearing forests for HTI plantations, 'the pulp producers have obtained the bulk of their fibre at prices that were
only slightly above the cost of harvesting the wood and transporting it to the mill’ (GTZ-SMCP, 2004: 1). Like other sectors of forestry, the pulp industry is also monopolised by a small number of companies. In the early 1990s, four companies produced most of the virgin pulp in Indonesia, and Indorayon was one of them (Sonnenfeld, 1998).

The rapid expansion of pulp and paper industries caused ecological and social impacts, such as deforestation, pollution and the exclusion of tens of thousands of forest-dependent people (see Carrere and Lohmann, 1996). Examples range from small mills in Java to large mills such as Tanjung Enim Lestari in South Sumatra (Carr 2001).

Indorayon situated its mills in Porsea in North Sumatra Province on the Asahan River, which drains Toba Lake to the east. Lake Toba is one of the deepest lakes in the world, with a maximum depth of approximately 500 meters (Acreman, 1993). It is the largest fresh water reservoir in Southeast Asia, extending over 80km North and South, at an altitude of around 1,000m. The island of Samosir, which is about the size of Singapore, is positioned in the centre of the lake.

For its rich pine forests, as well as water reservoirs for the electricity and production process, and collection/storage ponds for the wood, the Toba-Samosir area had been considered an ideal place for the paper and pulp industry for a long time. A FAO (Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations) report in 1954 already pointed out the potential of the area and recommended Porsea, a sub-district by Toba Lake as an alternative for the industrial site for its sufficient supply of labour (von Monroy and Maronne, 1954).

Lake Toba is special to around 4 million Batak people, who are generally expressive and forthright in contrast with the Javanese, lacking the complex social hierarchy of other peoples of Indonesia (while around 90% of Indonesian are Muslim, most of the Batak were Christianised). The Batak inhabit the interior of North Sumatra Province, including Indonesia’s third largest city, Medan. Since the ancestors of the Batak chose it as their permanent site for settlement, the area has developed the Batak culture and become the centre of their ethnic identity. The rich natural surroundings of Lake Toba -

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3 An Indorayon staff member suggested that the report was one of the reasons for choosing the factory site (Depari, interview, 30/Jul/2003.)
abundant fresh water and dense tropical forests as well as fascinating scenery - have provided sources of livelihood for the Batak. Since agriculture, fishing, and tourism have been the major sources of living, their well-being is largely dependent on the environmental quality of the region.

Figure 5-1 Map of North Sumatra/Toba Samosir

Environmental and Social Impacts of Indorayon’s Operation

Indorayon has a long history of conflict and environmental degradation. Deforestation is one of these issues. Since the start of its operations in 1988, Indorayon is calculated to have felled approximately 100,000 hectares of forest in a crude manner, which is equivalent to more than 50 % of the water catchment area of Lake Toba (Tambunan 1999; Manurung and Sinamo, 2000). Followed by insufficient re-planting, this has caused problems such as soil erosion, flooding, and the decline of water supplies to rice fields, fisheries, and livestock. Some have also attributed the fall in water level of Lake Toba to climate change resulting from deforestation caused by Indorayon (see LAPAN,

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4 The importance of tree-planting as a prevention of natural disaster in the area was already emphasised in the above-mentioned FAO report. In fact, most of the pine trees were planted by the Forest Department since 1927 to stop the heavy erosion which became an increasing danger to the local livelihoods. (von Monroy and Maronne, 1954).
Another problem was air and water pollution, which caused respiratory and skin diseases among local villagers. Fish in the Asahan River and livestock in Porsea have been poisoned, and crop productivity reduced. As a pulp and paper company, 'plants such as this Indorayon facility are generally categorised as heavy chemical operations and involve the use of large quantities of chemicals potentially hazardous to human health and the environment' (Labat-Anderson Inc., 1996: 1). Such hazardous chemicals include chlorine, caustic soda, sulphuric acid, and carbon disulphide, which are used in the processing of wood to make pulp and rayon.

Indorayon's air pollution control was extremely poor. For example, the H2S level within a 2km radius of the mill was 56.34µg, although 41.70µg is the ambient air quality standard (Rahman, et. al, 1998). Indorayon releases over 10,000 tons of CS2 per year, which is more than the total amount of CS2 released in the US in 1996. SO2 was 0.57-1.00ppm within a 2-4km radius from the mill, far above the international regulation level (USA=0.14ppm, Mexico=0.13, Japan=0.04; Rahman, et.al, 1998). What makes this situation worse is that these gases, being heavier than air, float close to ground level, especially in the Asahan River basin. Directly or indirectly (through soil pollution by rainfall), the toxic gases damaged human health, livestock, and the nature.

Indorayon's liquid effluent control was even worse. The plant used 400,000m³ of water from Asahan river, which was then discharged back into the river through a poor waste water treatment plant that failed to remove various toxic materials. Moreover, this

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5 According to LAPAN (National Institute of Aeronautics and Space; 1999), the water level of Lake Toba dropped by 2.86 meters between 1984 and 1998.
6 H2S is a highly odorous gas (smelling rotten eggs): the human nose can detect its odour as low as 0.4ppb. At high concentrations (300-500ppm), it paralyses the human olfactory senses. H2S is a chemical asphyxiant, i.e. it has specific blocking action, which prevents oxygen from reaching the body. It causes disorders to and eventually results in the total loss of consciousness (Manurung and Sinamo, 2000).
CS2 is a highly neurotoxic substance. At low concentrations (below 3ppm) it can cause functional deficits in intelligence, memory, spatial relations, coordination and speed. Also, it causes skin-irritation, eye-irritation, watery eyes, respiratory tract-irritation, chronic coughing, gastrointestinal-epigastric pain, nausea, gaseous dyspepsia, anorexia, liver enlargement, metabolic disorders, disorder of lipid metabolism, increase of cholesterol, impotence, and thyroid functional disorder (Manurung and Sinamo, 2000).
poor system breached its dyke twice, in 1988 and 1993, and untreated water was spilled into the river basin, causing panic in the surroundings districts. Beside these accidents, BAPEDAL (the Environmental Impact Management Agency) found a channel dumping wastewater directly into the river, bypassing the treatment system (in Manurung and Sinamo, 2000). The Labat-Anderson report, which is the one and only environmental audit on Indorayon’s operation so far, stated that the ‘audit team observed evidence that uncontrolled discharges of pollutant...still find their way into the Asahan River via the stormwater discharge system’ (Labat-Anderson, 1996: 25).

A study by the University of Indonesia demonstrated the degradation of the health conditions of the people in and around Porsea as a result of the pollution problems (Rahman, et.al, 1998). Symptoms found by the study include skin disorders (redness, swelling, itching, red blotches, blisters without pus, blisters filled with liquid, and watery wounds), respiratory disorders (throat dryness, inaudible breathing difficulties, yellow-greenish mucous from the nose, and runny nose with white-coloured mucous), gastro-intestinal disorders (nausea and stomach ache), eyesight disorders (tingling, itching, watery eyes and blurred vision), and nervous system disorders (headaches and starry vision).

Indorayon’s operation also had negative impacts on society. Land disputes occurred as almost 75% of its concession area was considered community forest (Rajit, interview, 29/Oct/2002). The increase in non-local population, such as factory workers, truck drivers, woodcutters and other manual labourers, has brought night clubs, prostitutes and entertainment spots, which were traditionally considered immoral.

Coupled with Indorayon’s arrogant attitude, the above-mentioned environmental and social problems have resulted in intense conflicts between community-NGOs and the Indorayon-authorities. A large number of complaints, protests and demands from the community around the Indorayon factory site and the local governments occurred, and were dealt with by the armed forces in most cases, resulting in several deaths, dozens of injuries and many arrests. The conflicts were aired in the mass media, making the case an extremely well-known environmental dispute throughout the country.
Chronological Outline

During the conflicts, which are ongoing even today, there have been various government decisions on the closure and re-opening of Indorayon’s operation, which are seemingly related to democratisation.

The state could make decisions to ‘close /open/ relocate’ (operation) the ‘part or whole’ (scale) of the factory ‘for good/ only temporary’ (time span); and the government can make ‘strong or weak commitment’ to any implementation. Since the start of operations in Porsea, the ‘policy window’ has been ‘pushed’ on five occasions: in 1988, 1993, 1999 (1998-9), 2000 (1999-2000), and 2002. The decisions made at each time have been summarised in Table 5-1. The policy windows of 1988 and 1993 are grouped together, having taken place in the preparatory phase of democratisation in the Suharto period, and are examined in the next section, followed by an examination of the remainder that occurred in the more democratic post-Suharto period.

Table 5-1 Decisions Made relating to the Indorayon Issue

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Time span and Scale</th>
<th>State’s Commitment to the Implementation of the Decision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Close/ Open</td>
<td>Temporary Closure (only for 5 days)</td>
<td>(Temporary closure was company’s own decision; the government supported re-opening)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Close</td>
<td>Temporary (until audit)</td>
<td>strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Close</td>
<td>Permanent (rayon mill)</td>
<td>strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Open</td>
<td>Permanent (pulp mill)</td>
<td>weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>strong (to re-open the pulp mill)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.2 Policy Windows in the Preparation Phase of Democratisation

1988 Window: The Democratisation Movement and ENGOs as ‘Outsiders’

The 1988 window was significant for the environmental movement. It is true that there was no change in the decisions concerning Indorayon’s operation. This was because, despite the developments in the ‘problem stream’ and ‘political stream’ in 1988, there was no commensurate development in the ‘policy stream’, or within the tight and small network of decision-makers in the politico-business oligarchy. However, the Court granted NGOs a ‘legal standing’ to sue companies, or even the government, over environmental issues, as a result of this first such lawsuit made by WALHI with support
from LBH. Although the court’s verdict was made in favour of the government and company, it refuted the claims of the District Attorney representing the government that the NGO had no legal ground to file a lawsuit because it was not the victim of any of the environmental abuse. Also, to some extent, it resulted in changes in the attitude of business and the government concerning environmental issues.

From the outset, the Indorayon factory was controversial because of its high pollution potential. After establishing Indorayon in 1983, Sukanto Tanoto obtained the permissions and approvals concerning its operation, such as pulp production in North Sumatra, from BKPM (Badan Koordinasi Penanaman Modal or the Investment Coordinating Board) in 1983; concerning the location of the factory from the North Sumatra Governor in 1984; concerning forest concessions and land use permits of around 150,000 ha from the Ministry of Forestry in 1984; and other permissions from the Ministry of Trade and Industry. However, Indorayon could not begin its operations immediately, mainly due to environmental concerns. Emil Salim, the Minister of Environment, voiced his concerns about Indorayon’s potential environmental impacts if the factory were to be located in the Asahan river basin. The Asahan Hydro Power Authority was also worried that chemicals discharged from the factory could cause damage to their electricity generation turbines. The major user of the electricity, PT Asahan Aluminum Smelter, was another major adversary of Indorayon’s operation. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) showed concern about Indorayon’s potential negative impact on its irrigation project in the area.

The task of settling the issue was given to B.J. Habibie, although he had little concern with the issue, as the Minister of Research of Technology and the Head of BPPT (the Agency for Assessment and Application of Technology). The reason for his appointment is considered to be that ‘scientific’ legitimacy was emphasised in policy processes under the Suharto regime, and that he was Suharto’s confidant. Habibie held a ‘scientific meeting’ and established an interdepartmental team to handle this issue. Regardless of dissent from scientists, with Suharto’s support, Habibie managed to push through the start-up of Indorayon’s operation. Salim and Habibie signed a joint decree on the conditions to be fulfilled by Indorayon. Following the start of logging in its
concession area, Indorayon started its factory operation at the beginning of 1988.

On 9 August 1988, during its trial run, Indorayon’s aerated lagoon for the storage of waste materials broke, and hazardous chemicals spilled on to the land and into the Asahan River. This was in the headlines of the national newspapers for several weeks. Local people complained of damage to livelihoods, such as the death of fish, as well as damage to their health, such as skin irritation conditions. WALHI, the biggest environmental NGO in Indonesia, started studies on Indorayon’s environmental impacts from its beginning.

After these incidents, WALHI took several actions. First, letters were sent to all the institutions involved in the preparation of the project. According to a WALHI leader, ‘surprisingly...this could not encourage the concerned institutions to take action’ (Zulkarnaen, 1996: 226). Secondly, WALHI considered filing a lawsuit and started to seek support from groups and individuals, both within and outside Indonesia. A questionnaire was sent to about 180 constituent NGOs and individuals of WALHI, with 80 valid responses. These gave WALHI a ‘vote of confidence’, as none was against the idea of the lawsuit (Purnomo, 1994: 108). WALHI held several meetings with the local people and NGOs in North Sumatra, including capacity building programmes such as what the local people called ‘Barefoot Environmental Assessment Training’ (Purnomo, 1994). WALHI also asked LBH to represent them in court, due to its experience with human rights, land disputes and consumer complaint cases.

Indorayon, the Chairman of BKPM, the Minister of Trade and Industry, the Minister of Forestry, the Minister of Environment, and the Governor of North Sumatra were prosecuted by WALHI through its lawyers of LBH in the Central Jakarta State Court. WALHI was able to establish its legal standing in the lawsuit, which is considered a landmark in the environmental movement in Indonesia. However, this did not revoke the permit for Indorayon, which WALHI had demanded for the violation of environmental laws, particularly the regulations on Environmental Impact Analysis in 1986 (PP29/1986)\(^8\). Indorayon started full operation in 1989, resulting in a profit of

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\(^8\) WALHI charged that the company and government apparatuses did not conduct environmental impact analysis, and as a consequence they were legally responsible for the environmental and social problems.
Table 5-2  Chronology: 1988 Window

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Apr 26</td>
<td>Establishment of PT Inti Indorayon Utama (Indorayon). The government's Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM) gave Indorayon a permanent approval for the pulp &amp; rayon production in North Sumatra.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oct 31</td>
<td>The proposal for factory location was approved by the North Sumatra Governor covering as much as 200 ha of land in Porsea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Nov 19</td>
<td>The Ministry of Forestry granted the necessary forest concessions and land use permits for the area, totalling about 150,000 ha. Other licences were obtained from the Governor of the Province and the Ministry of Industry and Trade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May 17</td>
<td>BPPT (The Agency for Assessment and Application of Technology) scientific meeting was held on the plan to build pulp and rayon project. There was disagreement between the Minister of Population and Environment (Emil Salim) and the Minister of Research of Technology and the Head of BPPT (BJ Habibie) on the appropriateness of the factory location due to environmental concerns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May 20</td>
<td>Prof Otto Sumarwoto sent a letter to BPPT to say that he did not want to take any responsibility for what had been decided at the 'scientific' meeting on 17 May.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May 28</td>
<td>Habibie asked for advice from Suharto on the matters related to the environmental impact of Indorayon project. The President directed the Minister to fulfil any conditions and requirements exactly as needed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aug 15</td>
<td>An interdepartmental team was instituted to discuss the ways how to prevent pollution caused by Indorayon. The discussion was followed by a recommendation entitled 'Project Memorandum V 6970/5 Environmental Appraisal'.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Feb 12</td>
<td>Indorayon gained a permit/licence from the North Sumatra BKPM to build a factory in Porsea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nov 13</td>
<td>Joint Decree of two Ministers (the Minister of Research and Technology and the Minister of Environment) was made on the conditions to be fulfilled by Indorayon on the construction and operation of the pulp and rayon mills.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jul-Aug</td>
<td>The first opposition from people. The representatives of the Sianipar I and II, and Sianombak Villages staged a protest against Indorayon about a landslide which was considered to be caused by the poor road construction that did not meet the required procedures. As much as 15 ha of ricefield of 43 households was hit by the landslide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oct 7</td>
<td>The second landslide hit Natumingka Village in Habinsaran Subdistrict, 16 kilometers away from the location of the first landslide. It claimed 15 lives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aug 9</td>
<td>An aerated lagoon used by Indorayon as a place of storage for waste materials sprang a leak during a trial run. One million cubic meters of waste was estimated to have polluted Asahan River. Tests conducted only hours afterwards found harmful chemicals in the river. Fish died and local people complained of skin irritation. This incident triggered considerable media attention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aug 14</td>
<td>WALHI sent questionnaires on the issue to about 180 NGOs. 80 NGOs returned the questionnaire, all approving the idea of suing the government and the industry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dec 29</td>
<td>WALHI filed a lawsuit against Indorayon and related government agencies including ministers and the provincial governor for violation of the environmental acts, demanding the revocation of the permits for Indorayon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dec 15</td>
<td>Commercial pulp production of Indorayon started.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Aug 14</td>
<td>The court rejected all the prosecutions, and the prosecutor (WALHI) was even charged Rp 79,500 to pay the case administration cost.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dec 15</td>
<td>16 people of Sugapa, Silaen Subdistrict, were arrested because they pulled out the poles/stakes belonging to Indorayon on their land, which was as large as 52 ha.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kompas, 8 June 2003 (translation by author).
US$ 50 million for that year, while that in 1988 had been only US$ 7,000 (Purnomo, 1994: 113).

The major factor in the ‘problem stream’ in 1988 was the rupture of the aerated lagoon for waste water and materials, which triggered great media attention as the incident was considered to be directly harmful to human health and livelihoods. The then executive director of WALHI wrote about the significance of the incident: ‘WALHI finally had the opportunity... Using the momentum created by the lagoon burst, WALHI and Indonesian Legal Aid (LBH) filed a lawsuit’ (Purnomo, 1994: 107). The momentum and the following lawsuit seem to have been important in agenda-setting at that time.

There were also landslides in 1988 and 1989 which took more than 20 lives, and which were allegedly caused by Indorayon’s indiscriminate tree felling practice on a massive scale. Yet, there was no clear impact on the policy process, because the relationship between the landslide and Indorayon’s practice was not ‘scientifically’ clear enough, and a landslide can be considered as ‘a natural disaster’ (as argued by the authorities and the company) (Manurung, 2001).

Partly because of the weak connection between communities and ENGOs, the impact of social problems was also not significant at that time, which disadvantaged the ENGOs’ political influence. There were small demonstrations9. However, these protests did not grow to be a large movement due to tight governmental control. This made ENGO advocacy susceptible to being labelled as ‘protests’ by a section of ‘the elite’. The then WALHI executive director wrote: ‘at the local level, repression from the local military created a shaky ground for WALHI and the victim’s lawsuit. In retrospect, WALHI realised that the local support would need to be strengthened before any advocacy effort proceeded. Without strong support from the local people, the NGO’s advocacy effort could not go to its full scale’ (Purnomo, 1994: 117).

Factors in the ‘policy stream’ were not significant for the 1988 window, because ENGOs like WALHI, the major actor at that time, were complete ‘outsiders’ in relation to the policy network. Decisions were still exclusively made within the politico-business oligarchy, consisting of the President, related Ministers, the high-ranking

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9 Examples include the land right conflict in Sugapa village next to Porsea, between Indorayon and the original owners of the land to which the company ‘obtained’ the right (Manurung, 2001).
government officials, the military and the private entrepreneurs. WALHI did have close
ties with the Ministry of Environment, especially the Minister Emil Salim, who can be
considered an 'insider'; however, the Ministry recognised the difficulty in realising
WALHI's idea of revoking the permissions that Indorayon had received. In a discussion
with WALHI, the Minister, and his assistant Nabil Makarim (who later became
Minister) showed reservations that WALHI should choose Indorayon as their first
lawsuit, and suggested starting with an easier target than Sukanto Tanoto; they thought
the result could have a negative impact on the whole environmental movement
(Purnomo, 1994: 112). Apart from the Ministry of Environment, most of the high-
ranking officials in the related ministries and departments were offended by WALHI's
action; some refused to meet with WALHI staff and others told WALHI to cancel the
legal procedure. The Ministry of Industry and Trade and the company accused WALHI
of being 'used' by Japanese rayon industries and hindering Indonesia's 'own rayon'
industries, appealing to the developmentalist ideology of the time (Purnomo, 1994)10.
This underlines the difficulty of being a 'policy entrepreneur' who pushes against the
ideas of the authoritarian state, namely to close Indorayon or revoke its operation
permits.

In terms of the 'political stream', the democratisation movement joined the
environmental movement, which politicised the latter by the influx of former student
activists and activists with legal backgrounds. Purnomo and Tjahjono, activists in the
1978 student movement, became executive directors of WALHI and SKEPHI
respectively (see Chapter 4). SKEPHI increased its political advocacy, which influenced
WALHI's strategy. Abdul Hakim Garuda Nusantara, the leader of LBH, was also a
member of the WALHI presidium. His assistance was, as Purnomo (1994) mentioned,
an essential factor enabling WALHI to bring the case to court.

Also during this period, there was a development in the NGO movement from the
late 1980s, which supported WALHI's action. NGOs in North Sumatra created a forum
called WIM in 1986, as a result of the expansion of government development projects in
North Sumatra and the impact of the democratisation movement in other countries

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10 The accusation was so serious that Purnomo cancelled going to Tokyo for a NGO meeting at
that time to avoid trouble (Purnomo, 1994).
Soekirman, a founder of WIM, was also a member of the WALHI presidium. He ‘tried to convince his colleagues [at WALHI] that the operation of pulp and paper plants in North Sumatra would have negative impacts on the environment and eventually harm the economy and the social and cultural conditions of the people’ (Zulkarnaen, 1996: 221). WIM in North Sumatra helped WALHI Jakarta on the Indorayon issue, especially at the local level, by collecting information and data as well as organising meetings and workshops; a major factor enabling WALHI to move on to take political action (Zulkarnaen, 1996).

The 1993 Window: ‘Utilitarian’ Involvement of ENGOs without Policy Change

After the above-mentioned incidents in the late 1980s, Indorayon went on to expand its operation with support from the government, regardless of continuous protests. The government approved the increase in foreign investment in Indorayon, and more forest concessions were provided to the company. Its rayon plant started operation in 1993, and would later make higher profits than its pulp production.

In November 1993, Indorayon caused another problem. On the 5th, its boiler and chlorine tank exploded and hundreds of thousands of local people were evacuated to avoid the poisonous gas. On the 6th, thousands of people demonstrated against the factory site. One hundred and twenty five employee housing units were burnt and an Indorayon radio station, five trucks and cars, one tractor and several motorcycles were destroyed (Manurung and Sinamo, 2000; Kompas, 2003). Also, many of the demonstrators were injured as a result of the clash with the authorities. On 10 November, a group of students in Medan demonstrated at the Provincial Parliament to demand the closure of Indorayon.

As a result of this incident, the company temporarily shut down the factory and tried to appease the protest. A meeting was held on 20 November between the management of the company, local communities and government officials. A luncheon ceremony was held by inviting 5,000 people. The Indorayon CEO apologised to the communities in Porsea, and promised to donate contributions to community development. There was also an agreement to conduct an audit on Indorayon’s
operation (the US-based company Labat-Anderson Inc. was selected as auditor at a later date). Secretly, the Minister of Industry Ir. Tungki Ariwibowo permitted Indorayon to operate after perfunctory inspections by BAPEDAL. Within a month of the incident, Indorayon re-started its factory operation.

Table 5 -3 Chronology: 1993 Window

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb -</td>
<td>The people of Sugapa, with the help of LBH Medan, prosecuted Indorayon in Tarutung State Court.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 11</td>
<td>Indorayon changed to a foreign investment project with the approval from Suharto, to increase foreign investments for its expansion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 20</td>
<td>Suharto agreed on the expansion of Indorayon's operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- -</td>
<td>Indorayon added a rayon plant to its complex (it started production in 1993).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 1</td>
<td>The concession of Indorayon was extended to become 269,060 ha under the Forest Minister's Decree.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug -</td>
<td>KSPPM was closed down by the authorities for 2 months without explanation and allowed to resume its work on condition that it discontinue its legal aid programme for local people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 5</td>
<td>A chlorine tank and boiler at Indorayon's factory on the Asahan River exploded, causing hundreds of thousands of people to panic in five sub-districts, fearing the chlorine gas spread in the air was dangerous.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 6</td>
<td>About 2,000 people demonstrated in front of the factory demanding that operations be halted and an explanation given of what had happened. Upon hearing unsatisfactory answers, people damaged the houses and properties of the factory and its workers. There were also many casualties among the demonstrators resulting from the clash with authorities. Indorayon decided to stop operation temporarily (which was later confirmed by the announcement of the Head of Public Relations in the office of the Governor of North Sumatra).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 10</td>
<td>Students in Medan demonstrated in front of the Provincial Parliament.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 15</td>
<td>Lundu Panjaitan (the Mayor of North Tapanuli) and Alimuddin Simanjuntak (the Deputy Governor of North Sumatra Province), held a press conference in Medan explaining the accident on 5 November.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 20</td>
<td>A meeting was held between the company, community and local government officials. Indorayon apologised and promised to give a donation and help to the people through an NGO. Indorayon would audit the environmental impacts and hire an international auditor to do this. Secretly, the Minister of Industry Ir. Tungki Ariwibowo permitted Indorayon to operate after perfunctory government inspections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 21</td>
<td>Indorayon resumed its operation, with a new management 'paradigm'.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 1</td>
<td>A four-hour meeting was held in Medan between the owner of the company (and his staff) and the representatives of seven local NGOs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 2</td>
<td>The aerated lagoon leaked again. Asahan River was polluted and many fish died.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr -</td>
<td>Labat-Anderson Inc.'s Audit Started.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun -</td>
<td>A meeting was held between the Labat-Anderson auditing team, an advisor from the Ministry of Environment, a representative of the Ministry of Forestry and local NGOs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 28</td>
<td>Labat-Anderson submitted the preliminary report to Indorayon.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The government set stricter standards for pulp mill emissions as a result of this incident (Sonnenfeld, 2000). Environmental Minister Kusumaatmadja declared that new pulp mills had to adopt environmentally-friendly ‘elementally chlorine-free’ (ECF) pulping technology (Sonnenfeld, 1998, 2000). In fact, all bleached kraft pulp mills were built with ECF technology (or better) after the incident, with technological help from Nordic companies (Sonnenfeld, 2000).

In the context of the multiple streams perspective, the ‘problem stream’, or environmental problems and the following protests, ‘pushed’ the window of opportunity in 1993, as in 1988. The chlorine tank burst caused panic among local people, and was followed by demonstrations. The demonstration one day after the burst was of particularly large scale, resulting in damage to factory property amounting to US$ 2.4 million (Potter, 1996: 21). There were many casualties in the clashes with the military and the police caused by rubber bullets, beatings by clubs and rifle butts, as well as stone throwing (Manurung, 2001). However, the government was able to control the protests using force and they were not sufficiently prolonged to become a ‘problem’.

It should be noted that these sort of ‘symbolic events’ were necessary to ‘push’ the policy window. As has been mentioned, Indorayon had been dumping waste water into the Asahan River at night, bypassing the proper treatment process, causing environmental damage. Local NGOs conducted studies on the river and publicised the practice (Rajit, interview, 29/Oct/2002). NGOs were also publicising the negative impacts of the Indorayon tree-felling practice, which was causing environmental problems such as deforestation and shortage of water. However, none of these problems were able to attract the attention of decision makers until the symbolic events narrated above occurred.

There was no major change in the policy concerning the operation of Indorayon, because the oligarchic system remained intact. No decision was made by the government to halt Indorayon’s operation. Indorayon itself closed its operation for security reasons, caused by protests by the local people\textsuperscript{11}. The government controlled (or ignored) the local protests, and the Minister of Trade and Industry gave the green

\textsuperscript{11} It was later followed by the announcement from the public relations office of the local government to confirm the halt of the operation (Manurung and Sinamo, 2000).
light to Indorayon’s re-starting (Kompas, 2003). Labat Anderson Inc. was chosen to audit the environmental impacts of the factory. But it was chosen from a list that Indorayon made. Indorayon nominated 8 companies first, the government selected 3 from them, and the final decision was made by the company. NGOs and the people were not involved in the selection process; they regarded the Labat-Anderson report as not objective enough, as the payment for it was made by Indorayon itself (Rajit, interview, 29/Oct/2002; Down to Earth, 1999)\(^{12}\).

As for the ‘political stream’, one can note the further development of local NGOs and their network with national and international groups. In particular, one local group called KSPPM (*Kelompok Study Pengembangan Prakarsa Masyarakat* or the Study Group for the Development of People’s Initiative), which was located near the factory site, made significant efforts\(^{13}\). ‘KSPPM focused on organising people, while WALHI took care of the lobbies, especially from the environmental viewpoints…LBH from the legal viewpoint….we had a good role allocation’ (KSPPM Staff, interview, 22/Jul/2003). National level NGOs, such as WALHI and SKEPHI, continued to work on the issue. These NGOs publicised the case through various media such as newsletters and personal communications even to their international counterparts such as FoE International, Rainforest Action Network, and the World Rainforest Movement.

In response to the rise of political demands from the people, the New Order regime had tightened its control over organisations that could possibly cause ‘social disorder’. For example, KSPPM activities were banned for two months by the local military commander in August 1992 with no explanation. Since no other NGOs involved in the case were banned, the reason was felt to be that KSPPM was close to the community and was assisting people, especially the Indorayon victims (KSPPM Staff, interview, 22/Jul/2003; Rajit, interview, 29/Oct/2002)\(^{14}\). Those people assisted by KSPPM were

\(^{12}\) The fact that the company was later awarded ISO 9002 in 1995 and a good rating under the Clean Rivers Campaign of the government in 1998 enhanced the peoples’ distrust in the audit (Down to Earth, 1999).  

\(^{13}\) Its establishment was in 1983, as *Kelompok Studi Penyadaran Hukum* (the Legal Awareness Raising Group), before Indorayon started operation. It is one of the oldest NGOs in North Sumatra.  

\(^{14}\) The ban was revoked after two months because, a KSPPM member considers, international and national ties with their fellow NGOs were so solid that government feared further pressure from the international community (KSPPM Staff, interview, 22/Jul/2003).
labelled as ‘PKI’ (Indonesian Communist Party) or ‘PDI’ (Indonesian Democratic Party), meaning rebels against the Suharto regime, and the meetings with community members became very difficult (KSPPM Staff, interview, 22/Jul/2003).

The central government started to involve ENGOs to strengthen the implementation of its policies concerning pollution from the pulp and the rayon mills. BAPEDAL worked with ENGOs on this issue, including public education campaigns (Eldridge, 1995). The technological up-grading concerning emissions and the implementation of community development programmes by PT Indah Kiat Pulp and Paper Co. were the result of the memorandum of understanding reached between LBH, WALHI, BAPEDAL and the company (Sonnenfeld, 2000).

Importantly, these NGO involvements were neither to have their inputs into decision-making nor to accommodate people’s (especially local victims’) preferences. Potter (1996a) argues that, based on his study of the Indorayon case in the Suharto era, ENGOs had little influence on policy choice but more influence on policy implementation with reference to the implementation of the environmental audit by Labat Anderson and some slight technological improvements and community development efforts of the company.

Sonnenfeld (2000) explains the technological improvements in pollution emission from the pulp industry in Indonesia in the context of Ecological Modernisation (EM). In addition to the cooperative relations on policy implementation between the government and NGOs, he suggests other EM characteristics there. The strategies were followed to improve environmental conditions without hindering profit-making. Economy and ecology were considered as ‘win-win’ relations. The largest pulp and industry producers, Sinar Mas Group and Tanoto’s Raja Garuda Mas Group (which owns Indorayon), considered the risk of social conflicts in the stock market as well as environmental costs. The efforts by Nordic companies to sell environmentally-friendly technology were backed up by the governments of their home countries. International NGOs played an important role in disseminating information on environmentally-friendly technologies. As for the objectives of EM, he concludes, Indonesian pulp industries have achieved partial EM because of their success in waste reduction and ENGOs have played an
important role in this\textsuperscript{15}, while ‘dematerialisation’ or decrease in raw materials is yet to be achieved by them\textsuperscript{16}.

5.3 Policy Windows in the Decision Phase of Democratisation

\textbf{The 1999 Window: Political Liberalisation and the Changes in the Oligarchy}

More than a decade of accumulated and suppressed grievances against Indorayon exploded right after Suharto’s resignation on 21 May 1998. On 8 and 9 June 1998, the local communities staged a demonstration at the provincial council and governor’s office. The protest escalated in late June and local people started to resort to force. They barricaded the highways and road towards Porsea to stop the Indorayon trucks. The blockade halted supplies to the factory until security forces broke through into the factory site about a month later, which resulted in several people being injured and some missing.

There was a further clash four months later, when Indorayon re-started operations in late October, with the backing of the Ministry of Trade and Industry and the protection of hundreds to thousands of armed personnel (Manurung, 2001). On 22 November, a soldier guarding an Indorayon truck shot a youth, which triggered violent confrontations between the factory/security forces and the local people. Within two days, 25 Indorayon-owned trucks, 4 cars and 7 motorcycles were burned; 23 houses damaged; 2 policemen injured; 1 patrol car and 1 official car of the local government destroyed; 4 people shot dead by police and 79 people arrested. Indorayon’s operation in the latter half of 1998 was virtually halted\textsuperscript{17}.

The protests continued into 1999 at both local and national levels. Local clerics staged a demonstration and Batak intellectuals also made protests in Jakarta. The conflicts between the security forces and local people also intensified. In March 1999, three out of four missing Indorayon workers were found dead. Some said that they had

\textsuperscript{15} His study of the Indonesian case is made in comparison with the Thai case.

\textsuperscript{16} Resosudarmo (2002) warns that, like the plywood industry, the pulp mills in Indonesia have an over-capacity for sustainable forest management and this encourages over-exploitation of forests to pay back the high capital costs of establishing such plants.

\textsuperscript{17} An Indorayon staff member mentioned that the stoppage of operations was based on Indorayon’s internal management policy to avoid further problems, and not a governmental decision (Depari, interview, 30/Jul/2003).
been murdered by the local people; some suspected the security forces of carrying out the murders to provoke more conflict in the community (Down to Earth, 1999). In the words of the Indorayon Finance Director, David Pile, ‘We now believe this is a political and not an environmental issue’ (Bannikoff, 1998), and the situation had to be handled at a high political level.

In response to a series of incidents, President Habibie first met the representative of the NGOs and the North Sumatra Governor on 21 December 1998 and asked them to prepare a report on the issue. On 19 March 1999, the YPPDT (Yayasan Perhimpunan Pencinta Danau Toba or Lake Toba Heritage Foundation) and Forum Bona Pasogit held a meeting with Habibie to present the report18. In the meeting, the Governor of North Sumatra (Rizal Nurdin) reported on social problems and Dr Midian Sirait and Dr Firman Manurung of YPPDT on environmental problems and the value of Lake Toba for the Batak. The report made three recommendations: (i) Indorayon should stop its operation (closure) at the present location within the shortest possible time; (ii) if Indorayon wished to continue its operations, it should relocate on a conditional basis; (iii) the government should instruct Indorayon to fulfil its obligation to finance the ecosystem restoration programme for Lake Toba and its surroundings (Manurung and Sinamo, 2000).

On receiving the reports, the President made decisions including those to: (i) stop the operation of Indorayon and assign YPPDT to carry out an audit with the help of an internationally reputable auditor; and (ii) use the results of the audit to make a decision on the further status of Indorayon (Manurung and Sinamo, 2000) 19. Although temporary, it was the first decision by the Indonesian government to stop a company’s operation for environmental reasons.

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18 The participants were the President Habibie, the Governor of North Sumatra Province, Acting District Head of North Tapanuli, Acting District Head of Toba Samosir, Dr Midian Sirait and Dr Firman Manurung (YPPDT), Secretary General of the Ministry of Defence and Security, Minister of Forestry, Minister of Public Works, Minister of Mines and Energy, Minister of Tourism, Art and Culture, Minister of Environment, Minister of Investment, and Secretary of Development Operations Control (Manurung and Sinamo, 2000).

19 Decisions also included (iii) to determine Lake Toba as an ‘environment, art, and culture reservation area that had to be preserved’, with increasing potential as tourism spot; (iv) to recommend UNESCO to determine the area as ‘world heritage’. After the consultation with UNESCO, it was suggested that the more suitable designation for the region was as a Biosphere Reserve rather than World Heritage (Manurung and Sinamo, 2000).
Table 5-4 Chronology: 1999 Window

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Jun</td>
<td>20-27</td>
<td>Labat-Anderson finished audit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>A research on pollution conducted by Public Health Faculty of the University of Indonesia in cooperation with WALHI in Porsea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jun</td>
<td>8-9</td>
<td>The people living around the factory and university students staged a demonstration at the Provincial Parliament, which attracted national media attention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jun</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>The Minister of Environment proposed in a working session of the House of Representatives that Indorayon should be closed or relocated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jun</td>
<td>19-23</td>
<td>People in Porsea rallied around the factory site. On 21st, people started to block the roads towards the factory to stop the trucks going inside. Until the middle of July the local people closed the factory in this manner.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>July</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>One thousand security force members arrived to break through a blockade set up by villagers and students at Indorayon factory in Porsea. Thirteen local people are reported seriously injured and some are missing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Around two thousand Indorayon workers demonstrated in front of the North Sumatra Government in Medan, demanding that their jobs be protected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Truce between Indorayon and villagers. Indorayon pledged to hire more local people and build schools and roads.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>A soldier guarding Indorayon's truck shot a youth, which resulted in a clash between people and the armed forces. Demonstration was staged in front of the factory. The police shot them. 25 trucks, 4 cars and 7 motorcycles of Indorayon were burned. 23 houses belonging to the people who were accused of supporting Indorayon were damaged.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Around 10,000 people clashed with the armed forces: 2 policemen injured; a patrol car and a government's official car were destroyed by the crowd; 3 other cars were smashed up and burnt. At least 4 people were shot by anti-riot police. Seventy nine people were arrested.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Panuju Manurung, a young University graduate who was shot on 22nd died. Thousands of university students from Medan insisted that the 79 arrested people be released immediately. Clash with police. 39 wounded and 15 people were treated in hospital.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>The President Habibie met NGOs (Forum Bona Pasogit and YPPDT) and North Sumatra Governor. They discussed the government's position over the Indorayon issue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>mid Jan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Eight people involved in the November riot were released but not allowed to leave Porsea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>In the meeting with Indorayon, a member of the local parliament accused Indorayon of breaking its agreement with the government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Five thousand people led by Christian and Muslim clerics demonstrated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Protest in Jakarta by Batak professionals. It was held outside the Raja Garuda Mas Group office.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Workers of Indorayon staged a protest against PT Inalum and accused it of having financially supported and provoked the anti-Indorayon movement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>The violence and intimidation by the security forces continued.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Four Indorayon workers were missing. Three of them died and the rest received medical treatment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Habibie halted Indorayon’s operation temporarily; he asked YPPDT for a new environmental audit.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kompas, 8 June 2003 (translation by author), Manurung and Sinamo (2000), Down to Earth (1999)
Apparently the major factor that opened the 1999 window in the ‘problem stream’ was not environmental problems. It was the protests against Indorayon, which intensified as a result of weakened suppression by the authorities. Depari, the Senior Advisor to Indorayon, noted that the security forces had become cautious since democratisation and they were not able to provide back-up as they had during the Suharto era (Depari, interview, 30/July/2003).

It is especially notable that actions at the local level became more organised and the relations (or the network) between ENGOs and local communities were strengthened (interviews, WALHI North Sumatra Staff, 28/Oct/2002; Anto, 28/Oct/2002; KSPPM Staff, 22/Jul/2003, etc). The community organisation, SRB (Suara Rakyat Bersama, or United People’s Voice), was established in 1998, which had developed from its forerunner, KAPAL (Kelompok Anti Pencemaran dan Perusakan Lingkungan or the Anti-pollution Group), with support from KSPPM. SRB was established, not because of KSPPM’s initiative, but because of the people’s initiative; KSPPM merely gave support (KSPPM Staff, interview, 22/Jul/2003). In addition, local church groups, for example HKBP (Huria Kristen Batak Protestan or Batak Protestant Christian Church), made their standpoint clear, to support local communities against Indorayon. A local journalist said that people became ‘braver to express and speak of their interests after Suharto’ (Anto, interview, 28/Oct/2002). As a result, the movement became more ‘solid’ and intensified, which enlarged the scale of confrontation with the authorities. Local NGO staff mentioned that the intensified protests attracted the media as well as government officials and politicians in Jakarta (KSPPM Staff, interview, 22/Jul/2003).

Also, political liberalisation eliminated the psychological barrier to Batak elites in Jakarta joining the movement. YPPDT, which was established mainly by Batak intellectuals in Jakarta and Medan in 1995, stepped up its activities concerning the Indorayon issue after Suharto’s resignation. PARBATO (Partungkoan Batak Toba or the Batak Toba Forum) was also established as a group of intellectual Bataks, especially in North Sumatra, which also promoted the movement. As a result, the movement’s network (although loose) expanded and reached almost every group and level of society, especially as it gained access to the policy makers in Jakarta and to the media (Anto,
Dr Midian Sirait and his fellow NGO staff acted as 'policy entrepreneurs' and coupled the political and the problem streams in 1999. This means, importantly, that they entered the hitherto exclusive oligarchic network of decision makers.

YPPDT was chosen by the government and acted as a 'policy entrepreneur' for several 'informal' reasons. Since YPPDT had not been a major actor in the movement during the Suharto era, especially at the local level, this role could have been taken by other groups if the regime had wanted to involve the representatives of local people by appreciating their rights of participation. Nevertheless, Habibie asked Dr Midian Sirait because they were not unfamiliar with each other. They had studied in Germany during the same period, and, while there, both had been members of the Indonesian Student Society. Owing to this 'German connection', YPPDT was able to approach the President (interviews with Sinamo, 30/Jul/2003; Depari, 30/Jul/2003, etc). A further reason seems to be that the Governor of North Sumatra (Rizal Nurdin) was a member of YPPDT, which gave the organisation political legitimacy. Also, advocacy by 'intellectuals' holding doctoral degrees or professorships gave their arguments scientific legitimacy, which, as a scientist, Habibie favoured in policy making.

The major aim of involving NGOs was to render legitimacy to government decisions and to increase public support for the government. After Suharto's authoritarian rule, the Habibie government emphasised the democratic aspect of its policies. In addition to international pressure, the approaching general election in 1999 also motivated Habibie to make decisions by listening to the people's demands. Activists unanimously pointed this out. 'Habibie, you know, wanted to get the support from the people...I think he still wanted to be the President after the election' (WALHI Staff, interview, 31/Oct/2002). 'We can see that during the Habibie era, Indorayon was closed...he gave so much ease to people, even East Timor was given opportunity to be independent. It is because he wanted to gain popularity. He issued the Act on local autonomy....he was really eager to be the President again' (KSPPM Staff, interview, 22/Jul/2003).

The involvement of civil society actors in the decision-making seems to have
resulted in a relative decrease of the influences of business; nevertheless, Indorayon continued its advocacy to open the factory operation in the context of the economic consequences of the decisions. According to Bannikoff (1998), Indorayon’s financial manager estimated the lost revenues at US$ 20 million a month. If it were to permanently close, the government would lose US$ 5.5 million in annual taxes and some 7,000 workers would be jobless. The company would also default on US$ 285 million in international bonds. Investors had already taken a hit – Indorayon’s stock price had plummeted 70% since June. In a letter to Habibie, APRIL (Asia Pacific Resources International Holdings Ltd, a Singapore-based group which held more than 60 percent of Indorayon’s share at that time, and which was owned by Sukanto Tanoto’s Raja Garuda Mas Group) shareholders in New York warned about the case’s ‘negative effects’ on confidence in Indonesia. Hamzah Haz, head of the country’s Investment Coordinating Body, noted that ‘the problems faced by Indorayon will make foreign investors afraid to [put money] in certain areas’ (Bannikoff, 1998).

Despite such pressure, the President made the decision to close Indorayon, while he did not fail to mention that future decisions (after audit) must be internationally market-friendly (Manurung and Sinamo, 2000). The comment by the Minister of Environment Panangian Siregar indicates the political atmosphere at that time: ‘Indorayon has caused damage, destruction and loss to the local community. What does foreign exchange and employment for thousands mean if the factory hurts millions of people?’ (Asiaweek 8/11/98).

The local parliament also supported the people’s demand to close Indorayon at that time. The relationship with the 1999 election was unclear, but a local parliament member mentioned that it was because of the people’s demand (Simanjuntak, interview, 23 Jul/2003).

*The 2000 Window: Tug of War in the Oligarchy and Expanded Network*

There was no progress on the issue until Habibie was replaced by Wahid at the end of October 1999. The planned audit by YPPDT was not conducted due to the lack of further instructions from the government. The factory operation remained closed, as raw
materials could not be taken into the site because of the local people's blockade.

On assuming the post of Minister of Environment, Sonny Keraf indicated Indorayon as one of the most important projects to be reviewed from an environmental viewpoint. He visited Porsea in December, which was the first visit by a cabinet member to the location. He was welcomed enthusiastically by the people. He cancelled a seminar sponsored by Indorayon, and attended a local festival and gathering with the Deputy Governor of North Sumatra. He 'pleased the crowd by saying "Natural resources should be for the community", and told reporters that he would raise the Indorayon issue with President Wahid on his return to Jakarta (Down to Earth, 2000).

Indorayon and pro-Indorayon authorities enhanced the arguments on the economic consequences of the closure of Indorayon. Within a few days of the environmental commission's advice, the Minister of Industry and Trade, Jusuf Kalla, said that Indorayon should start operating again. 'Such a factory today will need US$ 1 billion investment to establish. The export value, which reaches about US$ 100 million a year, and the ability to absorb 7,000 workforce mean something to the state and the people' (Down to Earth, 2000). The local parliament also made similar statements. The trustee of the company's shareholders, Palgunadi T. Setyawan, said that the company had received support from the government to find a way for the immediate reactivation of its mills without having to wait for the audit process (The Jakarta Post, 2/Dec/1999).

A few weeks after his visit to Porsea, Keraf proposed the closure of Indorayon's operations in the present location at a cabinet meeting. In his letter requiring the head of BKPM to stop the company's operation, he mentioned the following reasons: first, Indorayon had caused environmental damages and a huge number of complaints, protests, and demonstrations staged by local people; second, the Office of the Minister of Environment had conducted a study on the environmental problems created by Indorayon, and all the eight results of the study indicated the carelessness of Indorayon (Kompas, 8/Jun/2003).

Inevitably, his recommendations invoked opposition from Indorayon and its supporters. They criticised his recommendation by saying that it used out-of-date information. Ministers such as the Minister of Industry and Trade expressed their fears
Table 5-5 Chronology: 2000 Window

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>The new Environment Minister, Sonny Keraf expressed his intention to review controversial development projects including Indorayon. The environmental commission of Indonesia's House of Representatives (Komisi VIII DPR) advised the new government to revoke Indorayon's operating licence. Within a few days, the Minister of Industry and Trade Jusuf Kalla said Indorayon should start the operation again. Meanwhile, Indorayon demanded the resumption of its operation from the economic point of view, and the DPRD (local parliament) also made the same statements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>Sonny Keraf visited Porsea. He told reporters that he would raise the Indorayon issue with President on his return to Jakarta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Jan 17-18</td>
<td>Sonny Keraf recommended to the Cabinet that Indorayon's paper pulp and rayon fibre plant should be closed down or relocated. The recommendation was met with a swift and strong opposition by Indorayon and its supporters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Feb 24</td>
<td>Sonny Keraf sent a letter to the Head of BKPM to stop the Indorayon's operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Feb 26</td>
<td>Academic review of the Labat-Anderson report at the Center for Development Study, IPB (Institute Pertanian Bogor/Bogor Agricultural Univ.) was held. It concluded that there were many weaknesses, so that the report was not academically reliable. Labat-Anderson admitted that there was pressure put on them during the audit execution so that they were not any longer independent and objective.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mar 1</td>
<td>DPRD Toba - Samosir agreed in its general session to stop Indorayon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>Foreign investors of Indorayon threatened to file a suit against the Indonesian government to the Center for Settlement of Foreign Investment Disputes, Washington DC, for not having been serious in coping with the dispute that had inhibited the operation of Indorayon since 1998. Wahid commented he had to take care of foreign investors according to international law as well as people's demands to close Indorayon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May 8</td>
<td>An idea was proposed by the Minister of Environment on how to solve the Indorayon problem.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May 10</td>
<td>After the cabinet meeting, the government announced the closure of Indorayon's rayon mill and re-opening of its pulp mill in Porsea. Keraf also said that the government would evaluate the pulp factory's operation within the next year to see if it should be relocated or be closed down.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Down to Earth (2000); Kompas, 8 June 2003 (translation by author)

of the message that would be sent by the case to foreign investors (Down to Earth, 2000).

This resulted in what Keraf called 'a win-win solution' (The Jakarta Post, 11/May/2000). After a few months, the Wahid cabinet held a meeting on 10 May, led by Vice President Megawati. After the meeting, the government announced the permanent closure of the rayon mill in Porsea, while approving its pulp operation. On the one

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20 The decision was made with three conditions: (i) Indorayon had to meet the strict special requirements would replace 1986 joint minister’s decree; (ii) Indorayon could resume its
hand, Keraf’s ‘pet policy’ was, supposedly, to close the whole mill in Porsea, and thus it was not a complete victory. The continuation of Indorayon’s operation, whether pulp mill or rayon mill, was not what the local people wanted. Keraf commented that he felt powerless among the decision-makers against the pro-Indorayon allies. On the other hand, he managed to close its rayon mill, which was considered theoretically more polluting than the pulp mill. The closure of Indorayon’s rayon mill was the first ‘official’ close-down of such a large industrial operation on environmental or any other grounds. ‘Hailing the government’s decision, Indorayon’s President Commissioner Palguandi P. Setiawan said the company will soon resume pulp production’ (Indonesian Observer, 11/May/2000).

The ‘problem stream’ was not significant in ‘opening’ the 2000 window. After the virtual halt of factory operations in 1998, environmental conditions in Porsea had made considerable improvements (HKBP Member, interview, 22/Jul/2003, etc). Social problems such as demonstrations were no longer a major factor, as there were now very few on a large scale, whereas the anti-Indorayon movement continued.

In the ‘political stream’ perspective, the major factor was clearly the cabinet change, which expanded a network between the decision makers, communities and ENGOs. As is mentioned above, the new Minister of Environment Keraf tried to strengthen communication with communities and acted as a ‘policy entrepreneur’. Since he was not such a well-known figure in the field of the environment as his predecessors had been, Keraf was concerned about the reaction of NGOs (WALHI Staff, interview, 31/Oct/2002). This professor of ethics at Atma Jaya Catholic University had no ties with business. According to NGO Staff, he was not a ‘politician’, but an outspoken person who acted according to his opinion without playing political games (WALHI Staff, interview, 31/Oct/2002). The policies of the Wahid regime to promote communication with the people supported Keraf’s action and his initiative to put the issue on the cabinet operation of pulp, not rayon, which was subject to audit a year after to determine whether they could continue or not; (iii) ‘socialization’ (i.e. contribution for the community development and environmental restoration as well as sufficient communication with communities) had to be carried out (Kompas, 8/Jun/ 2003).

21 Interview with a journalist who talked with Keraf after the meeting. (Parakitri, interview, 3/Dec/2003).
In fact, the regime was more accessible for NGOs. The executive director of WALHI, Emmy Hafild, was able to meet and speak to the President directly about the Indorayon issue (WALHI Staff, interview, 31/Oct/2002). Wahid even met Musa Gurning, the community leader in Porsea, to discuss the issue (WALHI North Sumatra Staff, interview, 28/Oct/2002).

The ‘network’ was influential on decision making. The participants were connected to each other by resource dependencies, and the increase in the resources of civil society actors such as ‘legitimacy’ resulted in their involvement in the network. The network may not be considered as a ‘policy network’ because it might have been too loose and a network of ‘insiders with outsiders’ rather than one of ‘insiders’; yet its changes and its influence on the government’s decision can be understood well in terms of the policy network theories, especially the resource exchange model among actors; namely, why civil society actors were ‘involved’ (e.g. there was an increase in their resources such as ‘legitimacy’) and how this affected the decisions made.

Elections were also a key at the local level to change the relation between civil society actors and the MPs. After the election in 1999, the majority of the Parliament of the newly established district of Toba Samosir, where Porsea is located, was held by Megawati’s PDI-Perjuangan. This was not only because Megawati was the symbol of the democratisation movement, but also because PDI-P promised, in its campaign, to close down Indorayon (Manurung, interview, 23/Jul/2003)\(^{23}\). SRB supported and voted for PDI-P. SRB even put a few of their own candidates in the list of PDI-P (interviews with Manurung, 23/Jul/2003; KSPPM Staff, 22/Jul/2003; WALHI North Sumatra Staff, 28/Oct/2002). The District Mayor was also supported by SRB, as he promised to help to close Indorayon.

As a result, there was an increase in the local MPs supported by local people who were (at that time) against Indorayon, although it was uncertain to what extent they were concerned with environmental and social issues there. The Toba Samosir local

\(^{22}\) Wahid was the leader of the largest Muslim group, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), with at least 30 million members. As an opposition figure in the Suharto years, Wahid developed close ties with civil society groups. His inauguration was welcomed by NGOs.

\(^{23}\) In fact, most of the parties used the Indorayon issue for their campaign in the district in 1999 (interview with KSPPM Staff, 22/Jul/2003).
parliament was 'forced' to take a stand against Indorayon's operation on 1 March 2000 due to the mass demonstration (*Kompas, 8/Jun/2003; Simanjuntak, 2003*).

The democratic transition also provided political opportunities for people from the business side. In addition, economic conditions enhanced the argument emphasising economic consequences. Indorayon intensified their lobbying and emphasised the international aspect of the issue to open the pulp mill. In that period, President Wahid had to do his utmost to attract foreign investors to recover from the economic crisis which had begun in 1997. A section of the government argued that the closure of Indorayon, which increasingly transferred its ownership to foreign holding companies as mentioned above (although still controlled by Sukanto Tanoto), would drive away foreign investors or deter them from investing in Indonesia, and emphasised the protection of the rights of foreign investors. A representative of foreign shareholders, who owned 86 percent of Indorayon, said that the 'immediate reopening of the mill was very important to restore foreign investors' confidence in Indonesia' (*The Jakarta Post, 2/Dec/1999*). In April 2000, foreign investors in Indorayon threatened to file a suit against the Indonesian government at the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, for not being serious in coping with the dispute that inhibited the operation of Indorayon (*Kompas, 8/Jun/2003*). The impact of arguments from this international economic perspective was emphasised by almost all the concerned parties: government officials, Indorayon's staff, NGO staff and community people. In fact, President Wahid commented that he could understand the people's demands for closing the factory but that he was also bound, as head of state, to honour international law and protect the interests of foreign investors (*Down to Earth, 2000b*).

The new post-election regime respected the involvement of civil society to enhance its legitimacy, which influenced the policy concerning Indorayon's operation; however, it was unclear if the regime respected the 'rights' of participation of civil society in decision-making, as is seen from the fact that the decision itself was made in the cabinet meeting or within the oligarchic policy community, lacking any process of listening to the people's voice, such as public hearings. Without assuring people's rights of participation, the values of the regime seem to have started shifting towards economic
growth from the environmental conservation perspective, once the election was over. This increased the political leverage of the business side.

The 2002 Window: Increase in Economic Demands and Contraction of Network

Protest at the local level continued after the cabinet decision in May 2000 to re-open the pulp mill. A clash happened on 21 June 2000, which resulted in the death of a 17 year-old student. However, it was less intense, as people still succeeded in preventing Indorayon trucks from transporting raw materials into the factory.

The local and national governments enhanced their commitments to re-open the pulp mill. After having two preparatory meetings, the Governor of North Sumatra hosted a ‘scientific’ meeting in September 2000 to show that the environmental impact of the Indorayon’s pulp mill operation would be scientifically acceptable24. Then the governor issued a 5-page pamphlet entitled ‘Appeal for the Solution of the Problem of the Pulp Mill in Porsea’ (Himbauan Penyelesaian Masalah Fabrik Pulp di Porsea) and expressed his opinion supporting the re-opening of Indorayon’s operation, citing the result of the meeting. The Governor directed the District Mayor of Toba Samosir to promote reconciliation between the company and the community for the former to re-start operation at Porsea (Ref. No. 100/19369). The Toba Samosir government conducted several meetings for this purpose.

The company tried to improve its public image by publicising the ‘new management paradigm’25. It changed the management staff, and its name to Toba Pulp Lestari (TPL; in this thesis, the new name is not used to avoid confusion) in November 2000. The ‘new’ company attempted reconciliation with the local community by, for example, providing one percent of its sales for community development. The re-opening was becoming more and more urgent for the company, as it was running out of finances as a result of the 2-year halt of operations. In fact, the company laid off hundreds of

24 However, the scientists against Indorayon’s operation felt their opinions were not fairly treated at the meeting and, in fact, most of the scientists invited were pro-Indorayon (Manurung, 2003).

25 As Manurung (2001) pointed out, Indorayon’s management realised that, although the security apparatus might still protect the company, the company could no longer rely on the use of force for suppressing protests - at least not as it used to.
workers (*Kompas* 16/ Nov/ 2000).

The new Megawati cabinet increased its support for Indorayon. The Minister of Manpower and Transmigration, Jacob Nua Wea, was sent to the factory site in January 2002, where he made a comment backing Indorayon's operation. Also, in response to Megawati's request, the Minister formed a group of eminent persons called 'Tim 11' (Team of 11), headed by the Minister himself, to promote the resumption of operations. In Porsea, Medan and Jakarta, 'Tim 11' promoted Indorayon's reopening vigorously, with government backing. Jacob Nua Wea visited Porsea again later that year.

His visit was, however, considered simply as 'political manipulation' (KSPPM Staff, interview, 22/ Jul/2003). While he was visiting Porsea, a number of NGO staff were detained for fear of the trouble they would cause (Down to Earth, 2003). His car passed by the main demonstration at high speed, and he then addressed a speech to people gathered by the company and the local government, saying that Indorayon could create jobs and help the nation's economy (Down to Earth, 2003). Then he reported to Jakarta that there were few people in Porsea against Indorayon resuming operations (*The Jakarta Post*, 5/Nov/2003; KSPPM Staff, interview, 22/ Jul/2003; Down to Earth, 2003).

Indorayon increased its lobbying, requiring 'political and security back up', as the company's senior advisor mentioned (Depari, interview, 30/ Jul/2003). Lobbying was undertaken at the local and national levels; for the latter, the company mainly approached the Ministry of Trade and Industry. Consequently, the Megawati cabinet decided to send yet another team headed by the Minister of Industry and Trade, Rini M.S. Suwandi, to Porsea. Suwandi coordinated the activities of the other related Ministers; the Minister of Manpower and Transmigration, the Minister of Forestry, the Minister of Environment and the National Intelligence Body (*Badan Intelijen National*), responsible for security issues.

In addition to the above-mentioned political back-up, in mid-November, the government permitted the police, *brimobs* (mobile brigade police), and soldiers to break

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26 It is an 'official' group made by the 'Keputusan Menteri Tenaga Kerja dan Transmigrasi - Nomor: Kep 171/MEN/2002 (Decision by Minister of Manpower and Transmigration No. Kep 171/MEN/2002). It consists of 11 persons including a Navy officer, government officials, a journalist, NGO staff, etc.
Table 5-6 Chronology: 2002 Window

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jun 21</td>
<td>There was a clash in Porsea between people and the police. A 17 year old student, who happened to pass the clash area, was killed.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug 28</td>
<td>A meeting was held by the North Sumatra Governor on environmental impacts of the technologies used at Indorayon's factory, in which foreign investors and experts participated.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug 31</td>
<td>Further discussion on the technological aspect of Indorayon's operation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sept 1</td>
<td>Foreign banks and bondholders who own 86% of Indorayon stopped making monthly US $1 million operational payment.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sept 22-23</td>
<td>Indorayon announced it could hold out no longer and started to lay off its 7,000 workers within weeks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept 15</td>
<td>At stakeholders' meeting in Jakarta, Indorayon decided to change its senior management as well as its name to Toba Pulp Lestari (TPL). Also 'New Paradigm' of its management was proposed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 23</td>
<td>The President of Indorayon asked for a security guarantee from the government.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Feb 13</td>
<td>Indorayon sent a letter to the North Sumatra Police Chief to ask for the help of the police for its restart of the operation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mar 21</td>
<td>The North Sumatra Governor recommended Indorayon to postpone its re-operation because Indorayon was experiencing shifts in share ownership, Board of Director structure, and name.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mar 31</td>
<td>Demonstration by thousands of people. Indorayon cancelled re-operation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mar 23-24</td>
<td>The Minister of Manpower and Transmigration visited Indorayon and supported its re-operation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 2</td>
<td>The North Sumatra Governor said that Indorayon was allowed to re-operate.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sept 13</td>
<td>The Minister of Manpower and Transmigration formed the 'Team 11'.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 11</td>
<td>Eighteen demonstrators were arrested in Porsea for damaging government property.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 21</td>
<td>The Minister of Manpower and Transmigration visited Toba-Samosir. He said 'I will report to the government that the company deserves re-operation.'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 4</td>
<td>Forty nine NGOs urged the government to close Indorayon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 27</td>
<td>Indorayon secretly started its operation on a limited scale.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Feb 14</td>
<td>A letter was sent from the Minister of Environment to the Minister of Industry and Trade, which included the environmental requirements to be met by Indorayon.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Feb 18</td>
<td>Komnas HAM (National Commission for Human Right) staff recommended a class action on the Indorayon issue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 1</td>
<td>Indorayon started the production process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 10</td>
<td>Parents agreed to have their children absent from schools as a form of strike for opposing the operation of Indorayon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 24</td>
<td>An open letter was sent from 13 Heads of Churches in North Sumatra to the government to close Indorayon in Porsea.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kompas, 8 June 2003 (translation by author); etc.
the blockade of the factory site; an action which resulted in the detention of 18 people 
(Down to Earth, 2003). Finally, in January 2003, Indorayon was able to restart its 
operation. In 2003, its pulp production was 200,000 ton/year, which is still increasing 
(Indorayon staff, interview, 12/Dec/2003). Depari, the senior advisor to the company 
describes the situation at that time as follows: ‘we need to calm down our shareholders... 
It will really have impact on, you know, er...Indonesian investment policy. We 
lobbied...then Ibu Rini [Suwandi] and the other three ministers decided, after several 
meetings with all the ministries and National Intelligence Body, that it’s about time to 
reopen’ (Depari, interview, 30/Jul/2003).

The series of actions taken by the government up to the factory’s resumption did not 
end the conflicts. Not to mention NGOs such as SRB and WALHI, church groups such 
as HKBP also increased their protests against Indorayon. On 24 March 2003, the leaders 
of the churches sent a letter to the government to stop the operation. Parents agreed to 
have their children absent from schools as a form of strike opposing the operation.

The impact of environmental ‘problems’ in the 2003 window was insignificant. 
Before operations were resumed, environmental problems were not tangible at the local 
level, although since then, perceptions toward environmental conditions have varied 
according to the actors. Local people who were interviewed said that there was a 
decrease in agriculture yields and that, once again, they started to suffer from the strong 
odour (HKBP Member, interview, 22/Jul/2003, etc). But others mentioned that there 
was no significant decrease in environmental quality and the smell was within 
acceptable levels (e.g. BAPEDALDA North Sumatra Staff, interview, 25/Jul/2003). Indorayon staff said that there was no evidence whatsoever showing the degradation of 
environmental quality so far, including what had been claimed by the local community, 
and mentioned that the reaction of the people seems to have been due to their traumatic 
experiences (Depari, interview, 30/Jul/2003).

The Megawati regime did not seem to respect the citizens’ rights of political 
participation nor to regard the people’s movement as significant. Not only did the 
regime make little effort to enhance relations with local communities and ENGOs, but 
also it had little hesitation to use force to suppress the protests - a reminder of the
Suharto years, although to a lesser extent. At the November 21st clash, it was reported that people were beaten up by the brimobs and many of them were arrested (as of December, the number arrested totalled 23 people; Manurung, F. 2003). Besides this incident, it is not difficult to find other examples of oppressive actions taken by the regime. One activist mentioned that she and her husband were arrested and tortured by the police for nothing, and later brought to the court without any lawyers and put in jail for several months (HKBP Member, interview, 22/Jul/2003). An old community leader, Musa Gurning, was caught by the police in Balige, which is 20 km away from Porsea, for instigating the protests. NGOs took many actions in response.

It was the changes in the politics that ‘pushed’ the 2003 window. Megawati tried to implement the policy to open the pulp mill with strong political commitment against people’s protests, which Wahid had not had because he had valued people’s voice. In other words, the new cabinet valued economic consequences more, and NGOs were largely alienated from decision makers, while Indorayon enhanced its lobbying.

Pro-environment actors were also alienated within the government. This is apparent from the appointment of the Minister of Manpower and Transmigration and the Minister of Industry and Trade to handle the issue. The ‘manpower’ or ‘labour’ issue is, objectively speaking, not significant in this case, especially at the local level. A company spokesman estimated that Indorayon could create jobs for about 1,800 people (Depari, interview, 30/Jul/2003); however, as is argued by many NGOs and local community members and admitted by Indorayon staff, these people do not mean ‘local’ people - many of them were migrants from Java and other areas, due to the allegedly low level of local people’s skill. What mattered here was to show internationally as well as domestically that PDI-P was protecting the rights of investors and businessmen. Nabiel Makarim, the Minister of Environment, was not the major actor. Makarim said in a meeting with WALHI that ‘I personally say that what you are struggling for is right, but there are still higher decision makers in Jakarta [than me]’ (WALHI North Sumatra Staff, interview, 21/Jul/2003).

One may say that Megawati and her party came to emphasise the economic aspect,

\footnote{WALHI appealed over this case to the National Human Rights Commissions (KOMNAS HAM). NGOs also set up ‘crisis centre’ to support the protest.}
although it had been against Indorayon in the 1999 election. Habibie and Wahid rendered legitimacy to their decisions by involving people, as the democratic ideas were valued at that time; yet, as time went by, economic consequentialism became more ‘legitimate’ for the government. One may say that a ‘developmental state’ mentality was revived within the government, especially after it failed to recover from the economic crisis with a ‘democratic’ regime, and it tried to reconstruct close ties with businesses. This aspect of international economy has been emphasised by almost all the stakeholders interviewed. As mentioned above, foreign investors were able to demand compensation amounting to US$ 600 million, or file lawsuits through international arbitrators (Down to Earth, 2003). The debt owed by Indorayon to international investors could be decreased if the government could re-open the pulp mill. Also, the government had to show that it was making efforts to create a good environment for investors in other industries. A country like Indonesia needs foreign investment for economic growth, as it experienced in the 1980s. The government needed to regain investors’ confidence.

Also, various NGOs pointed out that the approaching general election, scheduled for 2004, was the major motivation for Megawati to support Indorayon. At that time, ‘PDI-P often visits industries to ask for help for the campaign (for the election)’ (KSPPM Staff, interview, 22/Jul/2003). ‘She was once popular among the people, but now she needs money for the campaign.... If she closes the operation of Indorayon, she or PDI-P will not get money. But if she lets Indorayon open she will get money. Which one to choose?’ (WALHI North Sumatra Staff, interview, 21/Jul/2003). Even a local parliament member commented: ‘Indorayon can generate money...this money can be used to energize the campaigns. You know, that the general election is coming nearer’ (Simanjuntak, interview, 23/Jul/2003). While the parties had to listen to the people’s demand in order to gain votes in the 1999 election, in order to win the 2004 election, PDI-P, headed by the once-symbol of the democratisation movement, shifted its emphasis to the demands from business.

Tax revenue from Indorayon’s operation was also a major reason for the government to support Indorayon, especially at the local level. A pro-company
spokesman commented that Indorayon is ‘the only economic opportunity for the Toba Samosir area’ (Down to Earth, 2003). A senior advisor to the company said that ‘without the company, the revenue of Toba Samosir government is only around six to seven billion rupiah a year....but with the company, they could expect around 28 billion rupiah a year’ (Depari, interview, 30/Jul/2003). Also, one percent of the net sales of Indorayon was to be donated to a quasi-NGO for community development, according to the ‘new paradigm’ of Indorayon’s management. This also seemed to have motivated the local government to support Indorayon.

Besides, the local government was financially dependent on the state, which made it very difficult for the former to oppose the latter’s policy. The General Allocation Fund (Dana Alokasi Umum or DAU) from the central government to Toba Samosir district in 2003 totalled 74% of the total income of the district (Kabupaten Toba Samosir, 2003).

As for local governments and MPs, the paternalistic political culture of Indonesia still exists. It is true that local government cannot revoke Indorayon’s operation rights, as UU 22/1999 states that foreign investment is taken care of by the central government; however, they could at least take some actions, such as issuing a recommendation to ‘relocate’ the factory site, even though it would not be feasible, for it would provoke resistance of the people around the new location. However, ‘whatever happens’, a local MP says that the local parliament ‘does not say anything because it has been the decision of the central government’, although they were supportive of the anti-Indorayon movement right after the 1999 election (Simanjuntak, 2003)\(^\text{28}\). WALHI North Sumatra Staff (interview, 21/Jul/2003) mentioned the difficulty in voting for the MPs with determination and commitment to the issue, because the election in Indonesia has a proportional-representation format in which votes are made for parties and not for individual candidates.

\(^{28}\) This pro-industry policy was taken by PDI-P Jakarta, and also some PDI-P members at the Provincial and the District levels are against Indorayon. However, it was difficult for local PDI-P members to be against Megawati’s policy, as the major factor for their getting seats was her popularity as the symbol of the democratisation movement (Laoly, 2003).
5.4 Conclusion

As we have seen, democratisation was a significant factor in the policy process concerning Indorayon. Democratisation in the preparation phase facilitated ENGOs' activities for agenda-setting and policy delivery, although it had little impact on the policy choice. Local NGOs started to emerge at that time. ENGOs became more active and politicised with the influence of the democratisation movement. Taking the opportunity of symbolic events such as the bursting of the tank and boiler at the factory, NGOs politicised the issue by filing a lawsuit and protesting with the communities, which was facilitated by the considerable media coverage.

However, ENGOs were unable to change the government’s decision, with a limited or weak network with local actors such as communities (especially environmental and social victims of the issue) and national actors (the President, MPs, high-ranking government officials, etc). In this period, community mobilisation and elite involvement, which could have significantly strengthened ENGO advocacy, were difficult in the face of the regime’s oppression.

The expansion of ‘networks’ both at the local and the national levels in the decision phase of democratisation led the government to make decisions on Indorayon’s factory operation. Political liberalisation promoted the participation of local communities in the anti-Indorayon movement and ENGOs assisted them to organise. With the participation of local people, ENGOs enhanced their legitimacy. Political liberalisation also changed the attitude of intellectuals. Batak elites started to join the movement in the Habibie and Wahid era, which was significant for activists to reach decision makers in Jakarta. Actions at the local and the national levels attracted attention of the decision makers and made them regard the issue as an important ‘problem’. Decision makers involved NGOs in the decision making because it attached legitimacy to the regime at that time. Wahid and Keraf were very accessible to the activists. Habibie even involved

29 Describing the local situation at that time, WALHI North Sumatra Staff (interview, 21/Jul/2003) said: ‘the most obvious change was, actually, after Suharto, military force was not used to put pressure (on civil society activities), although they were used to ‘guard’ Indorayon’.

The military was at that time prosecuted for many human rights abuses in the Suharto years, such as the cases in Aceh, East Timor and Papua, which was another reason to keep them from using force to suppress the movements.
YPPDT as an insider of the network. These changes in the network resulted in the halting of Indorayon’s operation in 1999 and the closure of its rayon mill in 2000.

However, the following Megawati regime made efforts to re-open the pulp mill. This seems largely because the improvements in the national-level economic consequences became more important for the regime than gaining legitimacy by involving people and creating liberal society, which resulted in neglecting the social objectives of sustainable development. Although the people’s protests at the local level continued and maintained the closure of Indorayon operation until the end of the Wahid regime, the Megawati government tried to open it by force, because the national-level economic consequences became more important for the regime\(^{30}\). The elections in 1999 and 2004 show clear differences of the changes in the ideas held by Megawati and her party. In 1999, the PDI-P supported the people’s movement. When Megawati visited Medan before the election...in that campaign, she said she supported the people's movement against Indorayon...that’s why people voted for PDI-P’ (WALHI North Sumatra Staff, interview, 21/Jul/2003). By contrast, in 2004 there was much greater support for business. One may also point out the ‘conservative’ characteristics of Megawati, which may have resulted in the ‘return’ to the conventional oligarchical decision making system. The decisions taken concerning Indorayon would have been different if the Megawati government had valued the rights of people’s participation.

This case study showed the significance of paying attention to informal factors. For example, the informal connection between YPPDT and Habibie was important in determining the network participants, which partly reflected local political culture. Besides, importantly, the paternalistic relationship between the local and central governments still remained, which hindered the local people’s political influence. In fact, many of the interviewed local legislators and government officials commented that the decision was up to the central government (Simanjuntak, 2003; BAPEDALDA 2003; Laoly 2003, etc). A combination of economic interests (the potential increase in the local revenues and the financial dependency on the state) and pressure from Jakarta shifted the attitude of local government further towards a pro-Indorayon stance.

\(^{30}\) Also, one may point out that police and military force regained their ‘confidence’ due to a series of anti-terrorism initiatives at that time.
This state-dominant local-national relationship seems to be different from the widely-reported cases of concession allocations, in which the local governments inclined to issue concession licenses in opposition to the decisions made by the state. Given that the rights of local governments to issue concessions were revoked, this case study on the downstream forest product processing industry therefore raises issues concerning the decentralisation of environmental governance in Indonesia.

The protests against Indorayon continued after the alleged improvement in pollution levels. Local people still ‘feel’ the environmental degradation, in opposition to the arguments by the company and the government. This thesis does not try to go into the degree of actual environmental improvement by Indorayon after its pro-environmental efforts. The local environment may in fact still be polluted by Indorayon, or local people feel it because of some psychological factors. Yet many still claim to be suffering from the environmental conditions.

This can be attributed to the lack of people’s participation in the decision-making; otherwise, their grievances and protests would have been less intense. In the first half of the 1990s, the government took a ‘utilitarian’ approach to the participation of ENGOs and communities; their participation was allowed as long as it helped the regime to reach its goals. It collaborated with ENGOs to strengthen the *implementation* of its policies concerning pollution emission, but not to accommodate the preferences of the people (especially the local victims). The involvement of ENGOs, in fact, seems to have contributed to the achievement of (a part of) the ecological objectives of sustainable development as is shown in the improvement of the end-of-pipe technologies to reduce pollution. The mills of Indorayon were not exceptional in taking these environmental measures. In addition, the allocation of economic benefits to local people may have increased but the share was determined by the regime, not by participation, in the form of community development programmes and others. However, this has not contributed to achieving the social objectives, which has resulted in keeping environmental issues unsolved as well. This point suggests the importance of including social objectives in utilitarian arguments of participation, such as EM theory.

The idea of the government did not shift to prioritising citizens’ rights of
participation in decision-making after democratisation. In the Habibie era, YPPDT was able to participate in the decision-making process. Yet the reason for choosing YPPDT was not because YPPDT was representing local people. If the government wanted to choose groups in view of the people's rights of participation, it could have been other groups. Except for YPPDT in only a limited period, ENGOs were not able to be significant lobbyists or insiders of the decision-making network. NGOs were mainly outsiders and their role was limited to agenda-setting and policy delivery. The Wahid government was closest with the civil society actors; however, the decisions were made in the small policy community.

This case study raises several issues. One of them is the election of politicians. People voted for the parties which supported the closure of Indorayon, but this did not result in electing real 'green' politicians in most cases. MPs merely supported Indorayon either because it is the party's policy, or they themselves thought it would gain more votes, without knowing the issue very well. As a local journalist pointed out, most of the MPs did not have experience in politics and 'they were not ready to be politicians', lacking the capacity and beliefs of politicians (Anto, 2002). The proportional representation election system adopted in Indonesia may have been an obstacle to the choice of quality candidates, as their selection is made by the parties and their background information (e.g. area of interests and policies) is rarely publicised widely. They are susceptible to strong demands by the businesses, and many Indonesians believe that they are 'corrupted'. Such distrust of politics is now resulting in the distrust of the democratic political system.

Also, neither legislators, bureaucrats, nor the citizens yet know how to use the new democratic system to influence the policy process. People do not know how to lobby in a democratic manner, while legislators are not used to listening people's demands. As a consequence, people have to resort to demonstration, a strategy of 'outsiders' to influence the policy process. The immaturity of the media has also been identified as a reason why people could not be as influential in the policy process as business in the

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31 One of such politicians at the local level admitted this situation himself (Manurung, 2003).
32 The phenomena of 'Golput', the acronym for 'Golongan Puth' (white group), which was coined to describe people who refuse to vote, was an expression of such distrust of the political system.
Megawati regime (Anto, 2001)\textsuperscript{33}.

Thus, democratisation affected the policy network related to the issues caused by a large private company in North Sumatra Province, Sumatra Island, which is one of the resource-rich Outer Islands. The next chapter examines the policy process concerning forest management in Wonosobo District on Java Island, where all the state forests are within the operation area of the state corporation Perhutani.

\textsuperscript{33} Anto (2001; 2002) has shown examples how the media were co-opted by Indorayon.
Some causes of environmental degradation have become more serious in the post-Suharto period. One of them is the illegal extraction of natural resources, including forests. NGOs calculate that illegal log supply can reach more than two-thirds of the logs consumed in Indonesia (FWI and GFW, 2001).

There are various reasons for the increase in illegal logging (see for example, Dudley, 2002; IGES 2002). One is the economic crisis which increased the demand of local people and business for short-term gains. Another is the rapid decrease of authoritarian policing power. It facilitated corrupt practices of the officials (especially at lower levels) within the government, forest authorities, military and the police, all of whom had not previously tended to commit illegal acts for fear of infringing the vested interests in the Suharto period. It is almost impossible for plunderers to bring the logs out from the forests for processing or selling though various checkpoints and patrols without their help\(^1\). As local NGO staff said, hundreds of thousand trucks are necessary to carry the illegal logs in Java each day, and it is almost impossible to be 'undetected' without the help of the authorities (ARuPA staff, interview, 19/Mar/2003).

This poses a big challenge to environmental governance in the transition period. Democratisation had impacts on the growth of ENGOs (see Chapter 4), and the shift from the centralised authoritarian system provided political opportunities for actors such as local-level governments, MPs, and communities as well as environmental groups. It

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\(^1\) Illegal logging involves various actors. See for example, IGES (2002), Dauvergne (1997), Soetarto et al. (2001), and McCarthy (2000). There are various types of illegal practices, ranging from overlooking plundering to illegal activities of the authorised companies, such as condoning logging from restricted areas or going beyond quotas, as well as manipulating the assessment of their activities. See IGES (2002) and Contreras and Hermosilla (1997) for example.
is now required to establish effective governance by involving these actors, after the rapid change from the authoritarian regime.

The transition from the state-centric system is more meaningful in Java, because the forest management there was more state-centric, established and stringent than in the Outer Islands. It was only the state corporation Perum Perhutani (hereafter referred to as Perhutani) that was in charge of the whole forests on the island in the Suharto period, unlike the forests in the Outer Islands where private as well as state concessionaires operated (see Chapter 3 and 5). Java is the birthplace of state forest management in Indonesia during the colonial period, and its ideas remain significant up until today (Peluso, 1992), with some modifications through the democratisation process (mentioned later). The practice in Java spread to the other areas during the New Order era; accordingly, ‘the analysis of the evolution of Javanese forest policy and its use is relevant not only to the specific problem of forest conflict and degradation on a single island, but also to emerging conflicts in other forested regions’, although most of the forests are located outside Java (Peluso, 1992: 5). Considering that about 58% of the nation’s 206 million people are living in Java, the forest issue itself is significantly related to the people’s life there.

To see if and how democratisation has brought about changes in environmental governance, this and the next chapter examine the process of creating and introducing a regulation issued by Wonosobo district, Central Java, on participatory natural resources management (hereafter ‘the regulation’ or ‘Wonosobo regulation’). The focus is put on ‘networks’, which is one of the two dimensions of governance: namely (i) the configuration of actors in the local-level politics, and (ii) their relations with the state. This chapter focuses on (i), and the next chapter examines (ii).

The Wonosobo regulation process is a highly relevant case. One of the aims of the regulation is to cope with the environmental degradation caused by forest looting. The

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2 The description of Java’s forest management in the colonial and the Suharto period in this chapter draws largely on Peluso (1992).

3 2,567,583 ha or about 20% of Java’s land area is state forest land or Perhutani’s operational area, which consists of production forests (1,932,271 ha) and protection forests (635,312 ha) (Perhutani, 2005)

regulation was made in 2001 on the initiative of NGOs and local MPs, who both emerged in the process of democratisation. The regulation respected the rights and participation of local communities in managing forest resources in the district, including the areas designated as state forests, based on the decentralisation laws. Before moving to the case study, this chapter first reviews the forestry in Java with reference to participatory forestry there.

6.1 Background

The Colonial Legacy: Scientific and Utilitarian Approach to Forestry

As Peluso (1992: 7-8) illustrated, the characteristics of state forest management in Java can be summed up as 'scientific' forestry, to provide 'the greatest good for the greatest number of people for the longest time' - which was a phrase by an American forester and conservationist Gifford Pinchot, who studied 'modern' forestry in Europe. Such 'utilitarianism' in state forestry is seen in other parts of the world where state forestry is implemented, although the understanding and application of this concept varies according to contexts.

The Dutch introduced the state forest management which had been developed in Europe (especially France and Germany) to make the most of its timber resources in Java (mainly teak) from the 19th century. They first drew (or created) the boundaries between forests and agricultural lands; then they made plans to 'optimise' the forest resources for themselves. Since all the forests were put under state control, a restriction on the access to the forests by the local people, especially forest dwellers, was the major component of forest management. Land control became particularly emphasised there, among other access control measures such as species and labour controls. The Dutch established a police force for this purpose. Local people, even forest dwellers who had used the forests for generations for their livelihood, were required to purchase the

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5 This phrase quoted by Peluso can be found in Pinchot (1910:48), when he defines the term 'conservation'.
6 Not only the forest officers who established forest management systems in the colonial era, but also many of today's Third World foresters are trained either in these European traditions or its subsequent interpretations in the United States (Fortmann and Fairfax 1985: 2). As a result, this utilitarian view of forests has dominated the politics of forestry in many developing countries (Westoby 1987: 69).
timber (although only a few were rich enough). They had to obey government stipulations and supervision of their use of non-timber forest products as well.

Such state forest management practices were legally institutionalised following the first forest laws for Java in 1865. Accordingly, most traditional use of forests by the local villagers was 'regarded' by the officials as 'crimes' or 'illegal acts' by labelling them, for example, 'theft' and 'encroachment'. They were totally foreign concepts for people who were conducting swidden agriculture, using timber for construction of their houses, and collecting fuelwoods and various other forest products for their living over the generations.

It is therefore not surprising that the relationship between forest villagers and the forest officials (especially the forest police) was negative. Although the former always suffered from shortages in firewood, timber and foods, the latter prioritised the safeguarding and successful implementation of 'scientific' forest management, and tightly controlled the former's use of forests and punished their 'illegal' forest use. In such circumstances, collective resistance to the state's oppression by the forest villagers was often reported, such as the Samin movement (non-violent resistance in the early 20th century).

In fact, 'the greatest number of people', for whom the forests are to be used, did not include the forest villagers who depended on the forests for sustaining their life. The number of recipients of the benefits from forests might have been larger than forest dwellers, but they were only the Dutch and a small number of Indonesian officials and businessmen, who were, in Plumwood’s (1998) term, 'remote' from the local ecosystem. The profits from timber were used for shipbuilding, wood exports, railroad sleepers, fuel for steam trains and others - they never helped improve the life of local people who needed them most.

State forestry did not make much contribution to socio-economic development or environmental conservation at the local level. The only benefits the forest people received from state forestry were, in exchange for labour for logging and reforestation, a small wage (if any) and the rights to grow crops in reforested lands only during the short period after tree-planting in which the growth of teak is not hindered. (This
reforestation system is called *tumpang sari*, and was used widely after the end of the 19th century. The requirement to meet the high demand for ship orders in a relatively short time resulted in forest destruction in some rich areas. Also, the Dutch planted teak even on lands that were more suitable for agriculture or other tree species because it is the most profitable species\(^7\). The benefits of forests to the forest-dependent peasants were further decreased by such environmental degradation and monoculture, in addition to the restriction on their access to the forests.

The forestry laws and ordinances in the Dutch era were still in effect in Indonesia after independence, as most of the laws were translated word-for-word (Perhutani, 1984). Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution stipulated the right and responsibility of the state to control natural resources 'for the general good of the Indonesian people'. These laws and regulations emphasised 'scientific' and 'modern' means to serve 'the greatest good of the greatest number of people' and disdained local people's lifestyles and knowledge. Both Sukarno and Suharto followed the colonial-style state forest management in such legal settings.

With the legal authority to 'own' the nation's forest resources based on the 1967 Forestry Law, the New Order regime banned local community members' access to concession and protection zones by regulations such as Forest Exploitation Rights and Forest Product Harvesting Rights (PP 21/1970; PP 28/1985) and Forest Planning (PP 33/1970), regardless of their conventional use of forest resources. In these regulations, 'commercial timber extraction was privileged over local forest use' which, for example, did not give communities equal rights (compared with logging companies) and opportunities for participatory mapping (Wrangham 2002: 23).

**Perhutani and Forest Management in Java in the Suharto Period**

Perhutani, whose predecessor was P.N. Perhutani formed in 1961 during the Sukarno era, was established in 1972, and the whole of Java and Madura were designated as its operation areas\(^8\). It is mandated to make profits to support itself and provide 55% of

\(^{7}\) The larger section of Java is, however, well suited for teak plantation.

\(^{8}\) Government Regulations (*Peraturan Pemerintah* or PP) PP15/1972. At the time of establishment, the operation area was only Central and East Java. West Java was attached to it in
them to the state (the National Development Budget; GOI/IIED, 1985: 11). As a state corporation, Perhutani’s budget is subject to government approval. It is divided into Unit I (Central Java), Unit II (East Java) and Unit III (West Java). The size of production forests, protection forests and total forest areas of each Unit is given in Table 6-1. As Table 6-2 shows, teak dominates among other species in the operation area; as Figure 6-1 illustrates, Units I and II are teak-rich and more profitable.

Table 6-1  Forests Managed by Perhutani

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Production Forests (ha)</th>
<th>Protection Forests (ha)</th>
<th>Total (ha)</th>
<th>Production Forests (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unit I</td>
<td>570,936</td>
<td>75,538</td>
<td>646,474</td>
<td>88.32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit II</td>
<td>811,452</td>
<td>315,505</td>
<td>1,126,957</td>
<td>72.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit III</td>
<td>552,065</td>
<td>240,402</td>
<td>792,467</td>
<td>69.66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,934,453</strong></td>
<td><strong>631,445</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,565,898</strong></td>
<td><strong>75.39%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Perhutani (2005)

Table 6-2  Tree Species in Perhutani’s Operation Area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tree Species</th>
<th>Size (ha)</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teak</td>
<td>1,100,399.85</td>
<td>56.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pine</td>
<td>579,753.38</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damar trees(for Resin)</td>
<td>82,962.49</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahogany</td>
<td>70,796.51</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meranti</td>
<td>20,770.33</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acacia mangium</td>
<td>18,744.18</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sonokeling (Rosewood)</td>
<td>16,463.64</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kayu Putih (Eucalyptus)</td>
<td>16,517.76</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sengon (Albizia)</td>
<td>6,982.00</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kesambi (Schleichera oleosa)</td>
<td>3,375.10</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>16,079.10</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,934,453.00</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Perhutani (2005)

1978.

9 Perhutani was once made a Limited Liability Company (Perseroan Terbatas or PT) through PP14/2001, but this was cancelled by the Supreme Court (Letter no. S-904/M-MBU/2003) and it became a Perum (state corporation) again by PP 14/2001 issued on 22/Sept/2001.
With the establishment of Perhutani, the New Order regime exerted ‘more stringent control in three ways: through the militarization of the forest protection system, the coupling of the principles of Pancasila with scientific forestry, and the initiation of community forestry programmes’ (Peluso, 1992: 124; emphasis added).

Perhutani controlled the traffic of people and goods in and out of forests through patrolling, transport inspection, and supervision of the practices of forest dwellers to prevent forest ‘crimes’. Sections of their police forces were authorised to carry weapons and were able to resort to repressive measures. Basically it was only Perhutani who was authorised to use the forests and forests products; forest villagers were excluded without explicit permission by Perhutani. Because of the value of the teak, Perhutani did not allow the peasants to sell even the teak and pine that grew on private lands (Peluso, 1992; ARuPA Staff, interview, 23/Oct/2002). Not surprisingly, forest ‘crimes’ have been very frequent since the colonial times up to today (Peluso, 1992: 147).

In addition to the so-called ‘forester’s syndrome’ which can be found in many other countries, Pancasila (or New Order’s ideology), in combination with the emphasis on a ‘scientific’ approach to forestry, has led forest officials to disdain and oppress by force the traditional practices of forest villagers. As government officials, they were supposed to support GOLKAR. This was a prerequisite for their promotion and

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10 ‘Forester’s syndrome’ refers to the forester’s tendency to love trees and dislike local people who degrade them.
therefore they were loyal to the government's policies, which prioritised economic growth at the macro level. Many field officers therefore viewed themselves as 'modern-day heroes of the state' and the 'guardians of state capital' (Peluso, 1992: 131).

The only opportunities that Perhutani gave for forest peasants to use forests were on an ad-hoc basis. The priority of Perhutani was not poverty alleviation but the reduction in the dependence of peasants on forests, to facilitate state forest management (Peluso, 1992). *Tumpang sari* was only for two years. *Tumpang sari* may have contributed to the improvement of the quality of life of local peasants to some extent, but it did not help the poorest who could not afford to initiate their *tumpang sari* activities. As a result, the peasants who had capital to buy livestock or hire labourers tended to gain more than the have-nots, although the opportunities were supposed to favour the poorer peasants (Peluso, 1992). In addition, personal connections with forest officials were important to obtain work for wages in forests, such as in reforestation, which rarely benefited the poor.

Despite these measures, including the coercive ones to implement 'scientific' forest management, environmental degradation did not stop. With the existing deforestation rate, Peluso (1992) warned that the teak in Central Java would be gone by, at the latest, 2022. There always was a strong pressure on Perhutani from the government to make profits (the state demanded Perhutani increase its real income by 4% each year). Besides, reforestation was more often than not unsuccessful because it was in the interests of the forest peasants who worked for reforestation to keep the land un-forested so that they could have access. In fact the disproportionate amount of land in the first stage of reforestation explains the repeated reforestation failures (Peluso, 1992: 146).³

In response, Perhutani started participatory forestry (which was called social or community forestry) in the 1970s as another preventive measure to 'forest crimes' and forest degradation as their result; in other words, the underlying goal of it was to 'control forest access by reducing local people's forest dependence' (Peluso, 1992: 151), and not to give them the rights of participation in forest management. Although more

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³ Actually, most of the state forest management throughout the Third World failed to maintain the quality of forest; one of the reasons was their failure in alleviating the poverty of forest dwellers, which can in part be attributed to institutions inherited from the colonial period (Blaikie, 1985:53). Indonesia's state forestry is not exceptional.
initiatives to involve communities in forest management have been introduced by Perhutani since then, the communities were always treated as not the managers but the labourers in the plantation of state-selected species (mainly teak). This was in return for minimal wages (and these often not paid) and the right to grow crops for a few years before the canopy formed, without, not to mention, the rights to harvest the planted species.

The state forestry policy also gradually shifted its perspective towards the involvement of communities in forest management. It was first motivated by the World Forest Congress held in Jakarta in 1978, entitled ‘Forest for the People’. The fair distribution of benefits from forests to local communities was argued there. Like other developing countries, Indonesia was quick to involve forest peasants in forestry; but it was in the context of the ideology of the New Order regime (Lindayati, 2002), accompanying resettlement and shifting cultivation control.

By and large, the regime allowed participatory forestry in order to maximise (and as long as it maximises) the state’s objectives; in other words, the regime regarded the participation of people in forest management in a utilitarian manner. Participatory forestry was ‘yet another form of state intervention and custodianship’ to achieve macro-level economic development; as Perhutani’s president director said, community development was a secondary objective to protecting the potential of natural resources in Java (Peluso, 1992: 238, 154). Accordingly, the capacity of Perhutani’s participatory forestry scheme to achieve its social objectives seems ‘doubtful’ (Peluso, 1992: 238).

6.2 Wonosobo, Environmental Problems, and Participatory Forestry
Wonosobo is a district located in Central Java Province (see Figure 6-1). Wonosobo's land, which is about 98,468km², is largely hilly or mountainous\textsuperscript{12}. Since it covers wide watershed areas for many rivers, forest management is significant for protecting fragile ecosystems (particularly from landslides) and the livelihood of around 757,340 people in Wonosobo, where there are few major industries (see Figure 6-2)\textsuperscript{13}. Wonosobo may

\textsuperscript{12} All the numerical figures in 6.2 are from Wonosobo district’s official data (BPS Kabupaten Wonosobo, 2004) unless otherwise indicated.
\textsuperscript{13} More than 40% of Wonosobo’s land has slopes with inclinations of 15%-40% degrees, and
not be the poorest district in Java, but more than one-third of the families are categorised as below the poverty line\textsuperscript{14}. The per capita income of Wonosobo people is only one-third of the national average (Kompas, 6/Feb/2001). Agriculture is by far the biggest industry in Wonosobo, accounting for almost half of its Gross Regional Domestic Product\textsuperscript{15}. As one can see from the fact that ‘won’ means forests or 30\% of it has 40\% degrees, ranging between 270-2,250 meters high from the sea level. The high level of waterfalls (around 2,000 mm-3,000 mm annually), especially in the rainy seasons, heightens the risk of landslides (BPS Kabupaten Wonosobo, 2004; Bachtiar, 2001).\textsuperscript{14} The group is statistically labelled Pra-KS (or keluarga prasejahtera, which literally means pre-prosperous family). Families in the Pra-KS do not have two meals per day, or a different garment for different occasions, non-dirt floor, or awareness that children should be treated by a doctor or a paramedic if they have problems.\textsuperscript{15} The share of agricultural sector in total Gross Regional Domestic Product was 47\% to 50\% between 2000-2003, while that of trade was around 10\% and manufacture around 8\%. See BPS and BAPEDA Wonosobo (2004)
agroforestry lands in Javanese, with versatile purposes such as agriculture, livestock use, and meeting the needs of sustaining life, forests or agroforestry are embedded deeply in the people's life.

Forestlands in Wonosobo are state-owned like all other parts of Indonesia, and they were managed solely by Perhutani, as in the other parts of Java. State forests occupy 19% of Wonosobo's land area (18,888 ha). Communities only receive minimal, if any, direct benefits from state forestry. Accordingly, a large section of forest dwellers, who are estimated at around 263,000 in total, are committing 'forest crimes' within state forestlands. In addition, Perhutani is insignificant for the District government's income. It only received Rp 52 million from the forest production tax (iuran hasil hutan) in 2002 (BPS and BAPEDA Wonosobo, 2004), in addition to the land and property tax via the Ministry of Finance. Perhutani has never allowed people in Wonosobo to plant and harvest teak in people's forests as Perhutani wanted to monopolise the market (Aji, interview, 19/Jan/2005). Even other species can be sold only with the permission of the village head (Down to Earth, 2002c).

On the other hand, people's forests (hutan rakyat) outside the state forests, in which mixed species are planted in an agroforestry manner on the private land, play a significant role not only in sustaining people's life but also in developing the local economy. The people in Wonosobo have conducted forestry in their own style for centuries. These lands, which are legally considered as cultivated land, now occupy around 20% (18,263 ha) of the District's total land area, almost equivalent to the size of the state forests. The communities in Wonosobo tend to plant fast-growing species such as Albizia, which only takes 5 to 10 years to harvest, unlike the teak and other species in state forests which may take 25 to 35 years to harvest, although the latter can sell at a better price. Albizia is used not only for fuel and timber but also for making compost.

16 There are two Perhutani forest management districts in Wonosobo: 'Kedu Selatan' and 'Kedu Utara', which almost coincide with the political boundaries of Wonosobo district.
19 Albizia also has other advantages. For example, its canopy is not so dense that it is suitable for pioneer and shade trees because other species such as coffee can be planted on the ground. It grows as a part of a copse ecosystem and increases nitrogen fixation. The dominance of Albizia is a characteristic of 'wono', while non-timber species such as coffee and others are dominant in.
from its leaves. It is mixed with such species as Suren, Mahogany\textsuperscript{20}, Durian, Coconut, Jackfruit as well as agricultural crops such as coffee, bananas, pineapples, guava, salacca, chillies and peppers\textsuperscript{21}. The government has also promoted the practice of planting trees on private land for improving the people's life as well as for re-greening the land. For the achievement of the people's forests, Wonosobo received a national reforestation award, or award for people's forestry, for five consecutive years from the mid 1990s. Wonosobo's people's forestry is one of the good practices of this kind in Indonesia.

The timber from people's forests was critical in local industry. Processed wood exports are the biggest source of foreign currency together with processed food, making more than Rp 10 billion for each, which equals more than 40\% of the non-oil and non-gas exports from Wonosobo; most of the raw materials come from the people's forests (Bachtiar, 2001). The industry employs many people, ranging from logging, transportation, trading and processing - there are 42 wood processing companies in Wonosobo (Ichiwandi and Shinohara, 2003). Considering the economic situation of Wonosobo, the wood industry based on people's forests has a significant potential for creating jobs.

This contrast between state forests and people's forests in terms of socio-economic and environmental impacts became even sharper after the reformasi period, especially through forest plundering. State forests were massively plundered while people's forests remained largely unchanged (see 6.3).

\textit{Defining Participatory Forestry}

Before turning to the case study, the definitions relating to participatory forestry need to be clarified\textsuperscript{22}. The government's initiatives in forest management to involve various stakeholders (especially local people) and provide them with benefits are often referred to as `social forestry' or `community forestry' (\textit{hutan kemasyarakatan}; see 7.1 for their

\textsuperscript{20} Mahogany takes about 15 to 20 years to harvest, which is still shorter than teak and pine. Mahogany is also planted in state forestlands managed by Perhutani.


\textsuperscript{22} See also Awang (2003) for the categorisation of these terms.
developments in Indonesia). As is mentioned in 6.1, this state-led participatory forestry (at least in the Indonesian context) mainly regards civic involvement in a utilitarian manner, in the sense that the participation is important in order to maximise (and as long as it maximises) the consequences. Besides, it was limited only to the implementation of policies already made by the government. They can include, for example, giving the communities some harvesting license or recognising customary use of state forests exceptionally in a particular region.

Noting the disregard of the ‘rights’ of communities in these government efforts, civil society groups and individuals often use ‘community-based’ forestry or forest management instead of ‘social/ community forestry’ when they advocate a more equal, fair and democratic management. Staff members of an NGO well-known in the field of the forest sector write that ‘community-based’ natural resources management has features such as a holistic world-view encompassing ecological, social, political and economic aspects; the integration of the environment with the economy at the local level by taking a multi-functional and multi-product approach; promotion of poverty reduction, equity and self-sufficiency; decision-making about local resources by local people; respect for spirituality and culture; co-operation and partnerships between community groups. Thus, this ‘community-based’ participatory forestry draws largely (but not exclusively) on the rights-based arguments on participation, in contrast to the state-led social/ community forestry.

One has to also note that customary forest management in ‘state forests’ is also often referred to as ‘community forestry’ and the land as community forest, while that on private land tends to be called ‘people’s forests’ (hutan rakyat), as was mentioned above.

To avoid confusion among these terms, ‘participatory forestry’ is used as a generic term to refer to the schemes introduced by the Indonesian government as well as the

\[23\] See Westoby (1989) for social forestry.


\[25\] In Java, it refers to the agroforestry conducted there, while in the Outer Islands, it emphasises the forestry based on customary law (adat; hutan masyarakat adat or customary community forestry). See www.asiaforestnetwork.org. (Accessed on 10/Sep/2005).
ones advocated by civil society groups and individuals\textsuperscript{26}. When the issues of who initiates the schemes (state or non-state actors) and how people are involved (top-down or bottom-up) are emphasised, the former is called ‘state-led’ participatory forestry and the latter ‘community-based’ participatory forestry. In this case study, the former is Perhutani’s PHBM (Pengelolaan Hutan Bersama Masyarakat or the Joint Forestry Management Approach)\textsuperscript{27} and the latter is PSDHBM (Pengelolaan Sumber Daya Hutan Berbasis Masharakat or Community-based Natural Resources Management), which is the term used in the Wonosobo regulation.

6.3 The Policy Window in 2001 and Democratisation

\textit{The Problem Stream: Agenda-setting}

Forest looting has been a major issue in Indonesia for a long time, in addition to the ‘illegal’ practices of the forest dwellers. The losses caused by unauthorised log production were estimated at US$ 1.3 billion per year for more than 20 years (Kartodihardjo, 2002).

However, log plundering became radically more rampant after the economic crisis and the end of the authoritarian regime. Illegal log supply became almost as great as the legal supply; in Java, the value of plundered teak increased 700\% in 1998 in one year’s time\textsuperscript{28}. The loss from illegal logging is now calculated as US$ 5.7 billion per year\textsuperscript{29}. Even the endangered \textit{ramin}, which is controlled under the Washington Convention (or CITES: Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora) is widely logged and sold\textsuperscript{30}.

\textsuperscript{26} FAO’s definition of ‘participatory forestry’ is closer to the ‘community-based’ forestry here. It is defined as processes and mechanisms that enable those people who have a direct stake in forest resources to be part of decision-making in all aspects of forest management, from managing resources to formulating and implementing institutional frameworks (www.fao.org/forestry/site/14111/en, accessed on 10/Sep/2005).

\textsuperscript{27} See Chapter 7 for more about Perhutani’s efforts on participatory forestry.

\textsuperscript{28} ITFMP (1999: 13), \textit{Bisnis Indonesia} (1999a) and (1999b). Calculating the demand and supply of timber in Indonesia, ‘unreported’ or illegal logs amount to around 30 to 60 million m\textsuperscript{3} (DFID 1998, EIA-TELAPAK 1999; FWI 2001; See also Kartodihardjo, 2002).

\textsuperscript{29} DFID’s David Brown’s calculation. \textit{Media Indonesia}, p2 18/June/2003. \textit{‘Kerugian akibat Illegal Logging Rp 46 Triliun’} (Loss from Illegal Logging - Rp 46 Trillion). The area of forests devastated by illegal logging increased from 1.6 to 2.5-3 million ha per year (Kompas, \textit{‘Kerusakan Hutan Makin Parah’} (Deforestation Worsened), p20, 2/Feb/2002).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>May 16</td>
<td>ARuPA was founded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Late 98-</td>
<td>Illegal Logging (forest looting) increased rapidly. ARuPA started research on the issue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Feb - Jul</td>
<td>The discussion between DPRD (Local Parliament) and ARuPA started. A multi-stakeholder dialogue was decided to be held. Participatory forestry and the opportunities provided by decentralisation were studied.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>A multi-stakeholder dialogue started, involving Perhutani, local forestry officials, security forces, community representatives (including farmers) and other civil society groups. A multi-stakeholder forum was decided to be held. Perhutani wanted to maintain its authority and cling onto the monopoly over commercial forestry operations in Wonosobo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Aug-Oct</td>
<td>Local MPs and ENGOs (ARuPA and KOLING) decided to make the most of decentralisation laws to pass a new legislation on community-based forest management. An initiative to set up a local government-controlled forestry company was rejected in favour of the 'community-based' participatory forestry. ARuPA drafted the regulation with experts from Gadjah Mada University. It was presented to Perhutani and local communities at a formal hearing of DPRD. A series of open meetings chaired by FKKM started. In consulting for the new draft, Perhutani only sent low-ranking officials to meetings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov</td>
<td></td>
<td>The first public consultation on the regulation was held, accommodating academics, NGOs, representative of the communities, MPs, local government officials, and journalists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td></td>
<td>Public hearings were held on illegal logging (forest plundering) and how to solve the forest land dispute (land occupation). As a result of the hearings, FKPPPH was set up by the District Mayor's decree, which included the local government, local MPs, journalists, ARuPA, KOLING, community leaders, and Perhutani.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td></td>
<td>Campaign on sustainable forest management and community based forest management was started by FKPPPH members (mainly NGOs). It included a weekly programme on the radio (talk show etc on forests) in collaboration with local radio station.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Feb-Apr</td>
<td>FKPPPH urged Perhutani and forest farmers alike to observe a six-month moratorium on all logging and forest farming from March 2001, to have more time to find solutions to stop deforestation. Also, it developed programmes for conflict resolution over lands and forests. As a result, Perhutani opted out. Other members visited villages to encourage communities' efforts and discuss other ways to protect local forests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar-Aug</td>
<td></td>
<td>Feasible studies on participatory forestry regulation were made by NGOs and others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr-Sep</td>
<td></td>
<td>Public consultations on the local regulation on participatory forestry were held.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep-Oct</td>
<td></td>
<td>Discussions on the regulation were made at the local parliament.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 20</td>
<td></td>
<td>The regulation passed DPRD (Peraturan Daerah Wonosobo Nomor 22 Tahun 2001 Tentang Pengelolaan Sumber Daya Hutan Berbasis Masharakat).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Information provided by ARuPA; Bachtiar (2001); Down to Earth (2002c).
Wonosobo is no exception. Almost 60% of the forests in the area were destroyed by timber raids, causing Rp 40.8 billion (around US$39 million) in losses to the state, in addition to climatic disasters, especially flooding and water shortages. According to the forestry officials, around 3,500 ha of state forestlands (a little less than 20% of the total) were affected by mid-2000, whereas field reports by NGOs suggest as much as a half of the total state forestlands were destroyed (Down to Earth, 2002c). Data from Perhutani also show the devastating impact on forests in Central Java and Wonosobo (a district of the former; Figure 6-3). This situation had negative impacts on people’s life, as well as the local ecosystem, especially for those dependent on forest products. Besides, it is potentially detrimental to the local tourist industry which is dependent on the beautiful scenery and historical Hindu temples on Dieng plateau. For Perhutani and the state, the ‘illegal’ occupation of the cleared forestlands by the peasants for farming was another major issue, because such land conversion leads to a decrease in future revenue and it costs them a lot to expel the farmers from the land and re-establish it as state forests, if this is even possible.

Figure 6-3 Loss by Forest Looting in Wonosobo and Central Java

In contrast with the large-scale illegal logging that hit the state forests, the conditions of the people’s forests in Wonosobo remained sound. NGOs and local people explain this as the fact that the forest looters, mostly outsiders, respect the property of

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the local communities for several reasons. One is that some have acquaintances, if not collaborators, in the local villages, and the former do not want to steal the latter’s property. Another is that they understand the life of the peasants or the significance of the trees for the local life because the looters tend to come from poor families. Moreover, the looters would have to run the risks of resistance from local people if they logged the trees from people’s forests, while locals have little motivation to protect the state’s property which provides few benefits to them. Rather, locals may support timber raids from state forests as they may have a chance to gain some economic benefit. A villager said to an NGO staff member ‘why should I care…I never get the wood anyway…rather, it can expand the farmlands’ (ARuPA staff, interview, 19/Mar/2003). A NGO staff member expressed the reciprocal relations as ‘tau sama tau’ (you know, I know) - you could conduct illegal logging, but not in my place (ARuPA staff, interview, 19/Mar/2003). Locals realise the ecological importance of the state forests, particularly in watershed areas, but they would not lay their lives on the line to protect them.

These contrasts between the conditions of the state forests and people’s forests were revealed and publicised by NGOs, which developed significantly after the end of Suharto regime. The Yogyakarta-based NGO ARuPA (Aliensi Relawan untuk Penyelamatan Alam or ‘Volunteers’ Alliance for Saving Nature), formed by students at the Faculty of Forestry at the prestigious Gadjah Mada University in 1998, launched research on the forests in Central Java. They started visiting Wonosobo at the beginning of 2000 to do research for their bulletin. Soon after they started collaboration with the Wonosobo-based NGO KOLING (Yayasan Konservasi Lingkungan or the Environmental Conservation Foundation).

Their research results relating to the conditions of people’s forests and devastated state forests impressed local MPs and government officials who were also concerned

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32 These views were expressed in various interviews with local NGOs and villagers. For example, ARuPA, interview, 19/Mar/2002.
33 ARuPA and Gadjah Mada University are located in Yogyakarta (Special Region of Yogyakarta). It is one of the closest big cities from Wonosobo, about 5 hours away by car.
34 KOLING was established in 1999, developed from local nature lovers’ clubs. KOLING is working for the communities in the field of natural resources and environmental management. According to a villager, some members of KOLING started fieldwork earlier in villages around 1996/97. Sukoco, interview, 22/Mar/2003.
about the escalating conflicts and communities' protests over land degradation and their economic conditions (e.g. interviews, Krustanto, 25/Oct/2002; Arief, 25/Oct/2002). This resulted in the start of discussions with them. A local MP Constantinus Krustanto said, 'it is proof the local community is capable of taking care of their forest.'

The Political Stream: Emerging Actors

The development of ENGOs advocating participatory forestry in Yogyakarta and Wonosobo can be seen from the context of the development of the participatory forest movement at the national level. In the early 1990s, there emerged activists and academics working for the participation of communities in forest management with emphasis on their pre-existing customary rights over forestlands and traditional forest management systems (see Chapter 4 for the impact of the fieldwork in the Outer Islands on the environmental movement). Some activists established a nationwide network called SHK (Sistem Hutan Kerakyatan or Community Forestry System) for research and advocacy on participatory forestry around 1992-93, based on their field experiences in places such as Kalimantan. A network of indigenous leaders and supportive NGOs formed JAPHAMA (Jaringan Pembelaan Hak-hak Masyarakat Adat or Indigenous People's Rights Advocacy Network) in 1993, which worked for indigenous people's rights in forest use.

This movement developed further towards the end of the Suharto period and in the reformasi period. FKKM is a multi-stakeholder network established in 1997 by NGOs, academics, students and reform-minded forestry officials. FKKM promoted participatory forestry in the policy community especially in the post-Suharto period (mentioned later). KpSHK was started in 1997 by NGOs and individuals to support participatory forestry and forest people's rights. It gradually expanded its operation areas from Kalimantan and Lampung Province to most of the archipelago (see also

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35 At that time, demonstrations were very common in Wonosobo on various issues such as agriculture, labour and the environment (ARuPA Staff, interview, 23/Oct/2002). Since Wonosobo includes many water catchments areas, flood and soil erosion was very serious. According to a local MP, Krustanto, soil erosion in Dieng in Wonosobo was 400 tons per ha although 70 to 140 tons per ha is the critical point. (Krustanto, interview, 25/Oct/2002).

Chapter 4 for FKKM and KpSHK). KUDETA (Koalisi untuk Demokratisasi Pengelolaan Sumberdaya Alam or the Coalition for the Democratisation of Natural Resources) was formed in the month after the resignation of Suharto, with more than 80 NGOs and student organisations, and demanded the revision of state forestland boundaries and forest institutions to recognise indigenous rights over forestlands and to promote participatory forestry. JAPHAMA was developed into AMAN with the participation of indigenous peoples' groups throughout Indonesia. This development of the movement impacted NGOs involved in the Wonosobo process. For instance, ARuPA and KOLING are members of FKKM and KpSHK, and the network supported their activities in various ways.

The political situation in Wonosobo at the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s was critically different from that in the Suharto era in three senses. First is the composition (and attitude) of the local parliament (DPRD or Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah: Local House of Representatives). Like the other regions of Indonesia, Wonosobo DPRD was always dominated by GOLKAR until 1998; as a result of the 1999 election, however, GOLKAR became only the fourth largest party in the parliament (Table 6-4). Newly elected MPs include those who were highly accessible to NGOs - a notable example is Krustanto, who became the head of the DPRD's Commission B that deals with environmental issues. Second is the increase in the authority of the local governments and the DPRD. The issuance of UU 22/1999 and UU25/1999 on decentralisation increased the role of the local authorities in many policy areas - 'natural resources management' is one of them. Third is the strengthening of the relationship between emerging non-governmental actors, MPs and the government after democratisation. At that time, according to local activists, MPs in general became more accessible to them. MPs were able to meet them formally and informally at their offices and even at home if they wanted (KOLING and SEPKUBA Staff, interview, 25/Oct/2002).

There was a political reason for them to have a good relationship with NGOs. For

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37 For example, local NGOs promoted a network, Mitra Dieng (Friends of Dieng), among the district government (especially forestry) officials and MPs when it was formed in 1999. (KOLING and SEPKUBA Staff, interview, 25/Oct/2002).
political parties, it became necessary to gain votes from communities, and NGOs were important in approaching them. In the case of Wonosobo, for example, PDI-P and PKB (*Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa* or the National Awakening Party) were close to KOLING and JKPM (*Jaringan Kerja Pendamping Masyarakat* or the Network for Working with Communities) respectively (KOLING and SEPKUBA Staff, interview, 25/Oct/2002). The reason for the former is that one staff member of KOLING was also a member of PDI-P and another is a neighbour of Krustanto; the latter relationship was built through a local Islamic institute (KOLING and SEPKUBA Staff, interview, 25/Oct/2002). In other words, this NGO-political party relationship was facilitated by the new parties, which tended to have an enhanced relationship with the public through the democratisation movement, and the newly elected MPs, who tended to have experiences in socio-cultural activities. In fact, many of the new MPs were somehow involved in NGO activities (Krustanto, interview, 25/Oct/2002).

Table 6-4 Legislative Seats in Wonosobo District: Before and After Reformasi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the Parties/Factions</th>
<th>1997</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PPP</strong> <em>(Partai Persatuan Pembangunan/ The United Development Party)</em></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GOLKAR</strong></td>
<td>26</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PDI-P</strong> <em>(Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan/ Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle)</em></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TNI-POLRI</strong> <em>(Tentara Nasional Indonesia-Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia/ National Indonesian Armed Forces-Indonesian Police)</em></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PKB</strong> <em>(Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa/ The National Awakening Party)</em></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PAN</strong> <em>(Partai Amanat Nasional/ The National Mandate Party)</em></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>45</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The Policy Stream: Network Formation and Change*

After the field research, ARuPA approached local MPs to raise their awareness of the issues. At first, they contacted one MP from GOLKAR. He invited ARuPA and held a

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38 PKB overlaps with *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU), the biggest Islamic organisation in Indonesia. The majority of JKPM are from *pesantren* (Islamic boarding school). JKPM did not directly deal with forest issues before but they started to get involved in the process to make the regulation to support farmers.
small meeting with Krustanto (from PDI-P) and Trimawan Nugrohadi (from PDI-P, who later became the District Mayor). After that, Krustanto became the major contact person for NGOs. This is because he was particularly interested in their research results and wanted to solve the farmers’ problems (interview with Krustanto, 25/Oct/2002).

The NGO report impressed the MPs, and the DPRD's Commission B started inviting them from February 2000. They discussed the causes of forest degradation and possible solutions, with reference to the decentralisation laws as well as the studies on participatory natural resources management. Perhutani was also invited to the hearings by the DPRD, although it often did not send anyone, supposedly because Perhutani did not regard it as important (KOLING and SEPKUBA Staff, interview, 25/Oct/2002).

After this, a multi-stakeholder ‘dialogue’ was held by involving local government, the DPRD, NGOs, academics, community (farmers’) representatives, and Perhutani. The community leaders were mainly from the villages where NGOs are active (ARuPA Staff, interview, 27/Dec/2004). It was decided there to set up a multi-stakeholder ‘forum’ on forest issues in Wonosobo involving more actors (such as security forces), and to make efforts to accommodate the communities’ interests. The former responsibility was assigned to NGOs and the latter was initiated by the DPRD and NGOs. The process to identify and develop options continued with the involvement of NGOs such as FKKM and JKPM as well as other experts.

The discussions between ARuPA, KOLING and MPs became more intensive between August and October. This resulted in the decision to make new local legislation on participatory natural resources management by making the most of the powers of regional autonomy. The process started from November. The draft regulation was made by ARuPA with experts from Gadjah Mada University. It was first presented at a formal hearing of the DPRD in November to Perhutani and local communities, although Perhutani only sent low-rank officials to those meetings.

Then it was discussed at a series of open ‘public meetings’ chaired by the Central Java regional facilitator of FKKM from January 2001. Participants included various stakeholders such as forestry officials, local governments, the mass media and the
public (mainly farmers). This series of public consultations served as an opportunity for disseminating information to and facilitating the learning of various stakeholders at the initial stage of the policy process. This also enhanced legitimacy and support for the proposed legislation. Discussion there occurred on various issues such as illegal logging and the involvement of officials, and ‘illegal’ occupation of degraded state forestlands by peasants for farming. As a result, it was agreed that an ad-hoc team (a forum) was to be created with the participation of various stakeholders to improve the draft by conducting more field research and continuing the public consultation.

After hearings at the DPRD on illegal logging and land disputes, a multi-stakeholder forum FKPPPH (Forum Konsultansi Penanganan Penjarahan dan Penataan Hutan or the Consultation Forum on Forest Looting and Arrangement) was established, based on District Mayor Decree No. 522/200/2001. This was headed by the Vice-Mayor with participation from local government, Perhutani, MPs, journalists, NGOs (such as ARuPA and KOLING), academia, security forces, community leaders, forest farmers associations, the district attorney, and others. At the same time, a campaign by NGOs on participatory forestry or natural resources management started, which included a weekly radio programme on forest issues.

FKPPPH not only tried to develop a programme for conflict resolution over forest issues and to stop forest looting, but also demanded a moratorium on any form of forest use such as logging and farming (jeda lingkungan or pause for the environment, in 40 villages) within the state forestlands for six months from March 2001, to have a longer discussion on the issue. In response to this, Perhutani withdrew from the forum; the other members tried to promote the idea of participatory forestry at the community level by visiting and talking with local villagers, with a view to solving land conflicts. This moratorium did not work effectively. Perhutani did not feel obliged to follow the decision by FKPPPH. Accordingly, there was no motivation for the farmers unilaterally

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39 Although Perhutani is managing the state forests in Java, there is a District Forest Office (DFO) at each district. DFO is in charge of coordinating with Perhutani, the Provincial Forest Office and the Ministry of Forestry, as well as supporting forestry (especially reforestation) on the private lands.

to stop their forest activities, including land occupation and cultivation of deforested land. As a result, the land occupied by the farmers increased. FKPPPH changed its name to Wonosobo Multi-stakeholder Forum (Tim Multipihak), with the same members except for Perhutani.

In addition, there emerged more civil society groups that supported the legislation, such as JAMIDI (Jaringan Mitra Dieng or Friends of Dien Network), and SEPKUBA (Serikat Petani Kedu and Banyumas or United Farmers in Kedu and Banyumas; a farmers’ network group in Wonosobo). Regular demonstrations also took place throughout the policy process. The DPRD building was often filled by villagers who demanded participatory forest management.

After feasibility studies and more public consultations, the draft regulation was examined and discussed by the DPRD. On 20 October 2001, the District Regulation No. 22 on Community-based Forest Resources Management (Peraturan Daerah Wonosobo Nomor 22 Tahun 2001 Tentang Pengelolaan Sumber Daya Hutan Berbasis Masharakat) passed the DPRD Wonosobo.

6.4 Impacts of Democratic Ideas on the Policy Outcomes and the Network

Emphasis of ‘Democracy’in the Regulation

The legal basis of this regulation can be sought in UU22/1999 on decentralisation. The decentralisation law devolves a significant area of authority to the district and town levels, bypassing the provincial level, including natural resources management. Article 10 states that regions are authorised to ‘manage’ national (natural) resources within their territories and are responsible for maintaining the sustainability of the environment.

The regulation emphasises its ‘democratic’ character. It mentions that it was made out of consideration for democratisation and decentralisation, environmental

43 The regulation defines ‘Community-based Forest Resources Management’ as ‘a management system of forest resources carried out by local community in a state-owned forest area based on its function and designation’ (translated by ARuPA, www.arupa.or.id/papers/33.htm, accessed on 6/Oct/2002. The following quotation of the regulation in English is from the same source.)
44 Under UU25/1999, there is also an increase in the share of revenue generated by the forestry sector allocated to the regions. See Chapter 4.
degradation, the ‘success stories’ of people’s forests, and ever-increasing people’s aspirations for an optimal use of forestlands. It goes on to mention that the new laws (UU22/1999 and UU25/1999 on decentralisation and UU41/1999 on forestry) oblige the district government to empower communities by giving them greater opportunities to create their own businesses, while the hitherto timber-oriented forest management had failed to acknowledge people’s rights. Based on these points, the regulations set out its principles of appreciating democracy and the three aspects of sustainable development, such as the ‘principle of sustainability of forest functions’; the ‘principle of community’s sustainable welfare’; the principle of social equitability (to implement and obtain benefit from forest management); the principle of public accountability; and the ‘principle of democratic natural resources management’ (which is intended to position the local community as the main actor in the implementation of forest management, District Government as the facilitator, with decision making through discussion and agreement).

These principles imply that the regulation was different from the conventional forest management. This used to be based on utilitarian ideas, to provide ‘the greatest good for the greatest number of people through ‘scientific’ modern forestry’. By contrast, this regulation emphasises the rights of participation of various actors. It aimed at the forest management of, for, and by the local people who need it most for sustaining their life.

The central element of the regulation is to grant permission to community groups to manage state forestlands in the district for a period of 30 years at most, with an initial trial period of 6 years. Permitted forest uses include timber cultivation in production forests and the harvest of non-timber forest products from protected forests only within the sustainability of forest functions. What is very significant is that the community can determine which trees or plants are appropriate for growing in the forest area, in keeping with the district’s land conditions. This is considerably different from monoculture under the state’s ‘scientific’ forestry.

The implementation process is highly democratic and allows for the participation of various stakeholders. Community groups can give criticism, advice and input to the local government through *Forum Hutan Wonosobo* or the Wonosobo Forestry Forum,
which consists of multi-stakeholders like FKPPPH and the Wonosobo Multi-stakeholder Forum. Together with the District Forest Office, NGOs can help communities to set up groups. The community groups can ask for third-party help in management, including capital investment, as long as it does not infringe the community’s role in implementing forest management. Theoretically, all the stakeholders, including Perhutani, can join the management. The community groups apply for a permit to the District Forest Office and the authorisation is made by the District Mayor. They are required to submit a management plan made in a participatory manner facilitated by the District Forest Office or NGOs.

In addition to the authorisation of the permit, the regulation requires some preparatory work, especially by the District Mayor, before actual implementation of it (this later caused a halt in the process of its implementation, because the District Mayor hesitated to collaborate in the process; see Chapter 7). For example, it stipulates that the District Mayor’s verdict is necessary in order to establish and legalise the site for the implementation of participatory forestry within the state forest areas, based on the inventory made by the Wonosobo Forestry Forum and communities in a participatory manner. Besides, the regulation states that the necessary details for the implementation that have not been explained yet in this regulation ‘will be further encompassed in the Mayor’s Verdict’ (Article 47), which means that the continuous support of the Mayor is important for the implementation.

Changes in the Resources Exchange in the Network

There are several reasons why the commission B of DPRD in charge of trade, industry, agriculture, fisheries, livestock, forests production and other estate crops, actively involved non-governmental actors from the beginning. In the context of the network theory it can be understood as a result of the increase in the NGOs’ resources, such as ‘legitimacy’, ‘information/expertise’ and ‘implementation resources’. First, the expertise of NGOs (and academics) such as field information, scientific knowledge and legal knowledge became necessary for MPs in policy making. A local MP said, ‘we needed

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45 The was almost unanimously mentioned by the MPs and the governmental actors involved in
expertise to draft the regulation...that is why we involved NGOs and academicians' (Krustanto, interview, 25/Oct/2002).

Second, working with NGOs legitimised the decision-making process and its outcomes not only in technical terms but also in political terms. Their involvement fitted with the democratic values that were significantly emphasised at that time. In other words, they critically increased one of its resources, legitimacy, after democratisation. A MP said, 'after reformasi, NGOs are regarded as a part of communities, and having their inputs became very important' (Sukamto, interview, 25/Oct/2002).

In relation to these points, thirdly, new MPs after the first democratic election tended to lack established means to obtain opinions from local communities, unlike NGOs. As was mentioned earlier, at the same time, connection with local people through NGOs was an important means to increase public support to the political parties.

Fourth, MPs increasingly recognised the importance of the implementation resources of NGOs, especially in terms of community empowerment and mobilisation, for the policy success (Arief, interview, 25/Oct/2002). NGOs had the capacity and experience to empower local communities who had been 'depoliticised' and excluded from decision making in the Suharto era, while MPs tended to be short of time and skills to do this and local government was not willing to take on the task as it was still influenced by the old paradigm. 'I do not know if farmers would be ready for the implementation of the regulation if NGOs stopped supporting them', said a local MP (Krustanto, interview, 25/Oct/2002).

Thus, NGOs' capacity to reach other actors was significant in shaping policy network. The academics were contacted through NGOs and some participated as the staff members of them (as in FKKM). The communities were mainly mobilised by NGOs. This is seen from that fact that they tended to come from the villages where NGOs were active, as was mentioned earlier.

Most of the major stakeholders participated in the policy process, and new initiatives were taken towards it (e.g. public hearings); these were largely due to the
emphasis on democratic values. With the facilitation of the district government, multi-
stakeholder dialogue started. This included local government, Perhutani, academia, mass media, NGOs, community leaders and farmers’ organisations. This dialogue resulted in a working group consisting of NGOs (such as ARuPA and FKKM), MPs and academic staff of Gadjah Mada University with a background in forestry and law, to produce a draft of the regulation. Other actors such as Perhutani and the local communities were able to give their opinions through the hearings of the DPRD. It was expanded to public consultation from January 2001. This produced FKPPPH with the involvement of yet more actors with various opinions ranging from local government, Perhutani, MPs, the District Forest Office, the District Attorney’s Office, the District Police, farmers’ groups, community leaders, NGOs and the mass media. Although ‘it was initially difficult to move away from the standard dynamics of a government-hosted meeting where only high level government officials could chair the meeting’, however, over time ‘the meeting dynamics changed’ and it was facilitated by the Vice-District Mayor, the Head of District Forest Office or even NGOs (ARuPA, KOLING and AFN, 2004).

The participation of various actors meant a relative decrease in the influence of the state and the state corporation in the local-level policy process. Among the members within FKPPPH, Perhutani was the only actor that had interests in the status quo of state-centred forestry system. In addition to MPs, local government, NGOs, and farmers, academics strongly supported participatory forestry, due not only to their proximity to NGOs (some academics worked closely with NGOs and often participated in the policy process via FKKM) and the ethos of democratisation, but also to the evidence of its effectiveness in ecological and socio-economic terms. The attitude of the mass media was significantly anti-‘ancien regime’ style forestry after democratisation. The District Forestry Office, which was technically a part of the state forest authority working under local government, was in a sense ambivalent, caught between state forestry and the success of people’s forestry, together with the staff’s connection to local actors. As a result, the Office remained rather neutral in its position.

Some staff with field experiences were having positive opinion to the regulation, although
In such circumstances, Perhutani could not successfully advocate the conventional state forestry system at the local level and it took the strategy of ‘exit’ rather than ‘voice’. In fact, Perhutani did not seem to be aware of the significance of the decentralisation laws or at least was late in responding to them. It only sent low-ranking officials to the meetings; moreover, it often did not send anyone. The information was late in reaching high ranking officials at the regional level, not to mention in Jakarta, which may have been due to the conventional top-down style of the management system of the state corporation.

After Perhutani’s exit, the members of the policy network were only the ones who support ‘community-based’ participatory forestry. Accordingly, one can easily imagine that the regulation made by the Wonosobo Multi-stakeholder Forum turned out to be more favourable to more participation of local communities in forestry.

Participatory forestry did fit the democratic values which were widespread at that time, which helped it to emerge from the ‘policy primeval soup’ and be proposed as an most appropriate policy option. Participatory forestry came up as an option in the intensive discussions between the DPRD, ARuPA and KOLING in 2000, which was the earliest stage of the process. From the beginning, participatory forestry was a significant option for NGOs and local MPs because of its environmental and socio-economic impacts on the communities, in addition to the contribution to the district budget (although MPs did not emphasise this point). The study on the decentralisation laws, together with other related issues such as the participatory forestry in other countries and field surveys enhanced the feasibility of a local regulation on participatory forestry, although there was another option - to set up a local government-run forest management company, as some districts in the Outer Islands do (KOLING and SEPKUBA, Staff, interview, 25/Oct/2002).

Participatory forestry was strongly promoted by a few reform-minded local MPs such as C. Krustanto (PDI-P) and M. Muqorrobin (PKB), both of whom were newly elected at the 1999 election. They were the Chair and Vice Chair of Commission B.

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Particularly Krustanto enthusiastically supported the idea, and communicated with NGOs and farmers from the beginning. In fact, he was the one to bring NGOs into the policy process. He played a role as a policy entrepreneur: without his assistance, the process would have been significantly different. A lecturer at Gadjah Mada University, who knows about the efforts of participatory forestry in other districts, suggested their significance by saying that the MPs and government officials in other regions tended to think it was 'stupid' of Wonosobo to be against the powerful Perhutani (Awang, interview, 24/Oct/2002).

6.5 Conclusion

The Wonosobo case study has shown that democratisation caused the changes in the governance at the local level. First, democratisation facilitated the emergence and development of new actors. The reformasi movement developed the community-based participatory forest management movement at the national level, which started in the early to mid 1990s. It had an impact on local ENGOs in Wonosobo. The 1999 decentralisation laws provided opportunities and authorities for local MPs and governments to cope with local issues by making local policies. There was an increase in the MPs who had been involved in the democratisation movement and local socio-cultural activities as a result of the first election in the post-Suharto era. They tended to be reform-minded with democratic ideas. In fact, MPs who played the role of 'policy entrepreneurs' such as Krustanto and Muqorrobin were elected after reformasi. They were very accessible to NGOs not only because they had sympathy with activists and villagers but also because political parties needed to raise public support through NGOs.

As a result, ENGOs played an important role in agenda-setting by presenting impressive 'information' and data to the local MPs. In addition to the demonstrations which became active together with the anti-Suharto protests, this was significant in creating the 'problem stream'.

Second, democratisation developed the policy network. ENGOs not only enhanced their relationship with MPs but also became involved in the policy process. One reason for this is that the information and expertise of NGOs was important for making the
effective measures to tackle the issue. Another is the *implementation resources* of NGOs. NGOs were important in community empowerment, and collaboration with NGOs was important for the success of government policies. More importantly, the spread of democratic ideas in the process of democratisation increased the ‘*legitimacy*’ for non-governmental actors to join the policy network. Of course, the involvement of ENGOs in the policy network was facilitated by the changes in formal-legal settings. However, one cannot overlook the significance of the spread of democratic ideas, which resulted in the increase in the resources of NGOs such as ‘legitimacy’, when considering the changes in the governance.

ENGOs played a significant role in shaping the policy network in the new political settings by connecting local villagers, academics and MPs. Academics were often involved by ENGOs, often as ENGO staff members. The community leaders who participated in the policy process were mostly from the villages where ENGOs were active. In other words, ENGOs reduced the ‘remoteness’ of the local people from the policymaking, who tend to be poor and the victims of environmental problems, while knowing about the sustainable means of forestry.

On the other hand, local Perhutani, which did not seem to appreciate the importance of democratic decision making at that time, opted out from the process when it realised that it was difficult to succeed in its advocacy of the conventional state-centric forest management. The top-down structure of Perhutani that was developed in the Suharto period was not adapted to the bottom-up information flow, and the Perhutani Jakarta was not able to understand the significance of the Wonosobo process before the regulation passed the local parliament.

One can also point out that democratisation, especially the spread of democratic ideas, also impacted the policy outcome or alternatives specification. Since most of the new actors in the policy community were pro-democratic, especially after Perhutani opted out, the PSDHBM emerged from the ‘policy primeval soup’ because it fitted the political climate at that time. The Wonosobo regulation was significantly different from the conventional forest management, which was state-centric, ‘scientific’ and utilitarian. PSDHBM emphasised the ‘rights’ of the people to participate in forest management, or
'community-based' type of forest management. Interestingly, the rights-based PSDHBM was also demanded for ecological reasons, in that it was found to be more effective in coping with forest looting as a result of ENGOs' fieldwork.

Local communities largely praised the regulation, as they believed it would make their lives better by bringing benefits from their own backyard which had been managed by Perhutani. A leader of a local farmers' group, SEPKUBA, said Perhutani was 'no use to the community' because 'Perhutani only enrich themselves, but never let us enjoy the profits from the timber estate' and called for the withdrawal of the company$^{51}$. In fact, profits from people's forests and intercropping allowed by Perhutani on the state forestlands were a major source of livelihood for many of the people in Wonosobo. The expansion in the area of land they can cultivate was significant not only in an ecological sense but also in socio-economic terms. ARuPA wrote that the villagers felt relieved because they did not have to be fearful any more of their plants (such as the forbidden Albizia) being cleared away by Perhutani, or paying a kind of tax on their intercrop profits, or being chased away from the state forestlands$^{52}$. However, unfortunately for the local actors, especially farmers, the regulation has not been implemented so far due to the backlash of the state actors since its issue (see the next chapter).

There are two major trends in forest management after democratisation and decentralisation in Indonesia. One is that, at the local level, there was the emergence of attempts to legalise participatory forestry and the community’s rights to natural resources, as in Wonosobo. Some examples can be found in the Outer Islands and fewer in Java; they include the villages on the border of the Kerinci Seblat National Park in Jambi Province, for which a district-level decision was made to recognise communities’ claims over forest areas regardless of the lack of higher authorisation (Edison, 1998).

The other trend is the intensification of the tug-of-war between the emerging actors and the state. The latter does not want to devolve power over forests, while redistributing the benefits from natural resources to the former in a ‘scientific’ manner in the light of economic and ecological consequences. Local and non-state actors advocated the rights to forest management of customary communities. The conflict was stimulated by the legal gap or the political uncertainties resulting from the inconsistencies between related laws. The decentralisation laws increased the authority of local governments, especially at the second (or district) level, concerning the natural resources management; however, they are often inconsistent with or contradictory to the existing or subsequent sectoral laws and regulations in forestry.

To put it another way, non-state actors demanded democratisation in forest

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1 See Down to Earth (2002c) for the cases of local villagers actions’ for demanding their rights over forest management in this period.
2 The inconsistencies are not only with forestry laws but also with laws and regulations in the other sectors of natural resources management, such as mining and fisheries-marine. See Fox, et. al (2005). See Resosudarmo (2005) and Colfer and Resosudarmo (2002) for the forestry sector. The 1967 Basic Forestry Law was revised in 1999.
management through decentralisation laws, while the state actors tried to maintain state-led 'scientific' forestry. Campbell (2002: 113) states that new forest policies made at the national level are 'still rooted in conventional, centralised management approaches' in favour of economic and utilitarian arguments. Despite the trends, not many studies have been made so far on the local-level participatory forestry policy process drawing on the new decentralisation laws and the politics between non-state actors and the state.

The story of the Wonosobo regulation is a good example of this state-local conflict. As a result of strong resistance from the state, particularly Perhutani, the regulation has not yet been put into effect. This chapter analyses the politics between the proponents of participatory forestry at the local level and opponents at the national level after the enactment of the regulation. For this purpose, this chapter starts with a review of the state's policies on participatory forestry, to understand its position on the issue.

7.1 Background
Participatory forestry in Indonesia, which started in the 1970s with Perhutani's pioneer projects and was pushed forward by the 1978 World Forestry Congress, developed further in the late 1980s for several reasons. One was the influence of the programmes by international organisations, which increased in the 1980s. Lindayati (2002) also pointed out the Suharto's speech at the 1987 National Regreening Week was a turning point, in which he showed his concern about the land degradation 'caused by shifting cultivation' by 'the poor and ignorant' local peasants. In response to these influences, the government embarked on the involvement of forest peasants in forest management, to distribute the profits from timber extraction to stop ecological degradation. The Ministry of Forestry obliged concessionaires to provide forest dwellers with economic assistance (SK 691/1991) and an allowance to collect forest products for subsistence purposes in concession areas (SK 251/1993). However, the use of forests by local communities and their tenurial rights were still illegal (Lindayati, 2002), and the policy was often criticised as 'yet another form of state intervention and custodianship' (Peluso, 1993).
These efforts were furthered in the 1990s by the appointment of Djamaludin Suryohadikusumo as Minister in 1993, who appreciated participatory forestry and the conditions of local peasants more than his predecessors. SK 691/1991 was expanded in 1995. It was called PMDH (Pembinaan Masyarakat Desa Hutan or Forest Village Community Development), which had been developed and conducted by Perhutani since 1982, aiming to ‘mitigate some of the negative effects of their operations’ (Wrangham, 2002: 27). The growing realisation of the Outer Islands’ diverse and complex local forestry systems and local people’s capacity for sustainable farming (which owed much to the work done by NGOs) promoted the efforts towards participatory forest management (Lindayati, 2002).

These programmes were, however, within the framework of the regime's ideology and more like ‘social welfare’ programmes in the sense that the concessionaires only provided schools, mosques, hospitals and other physical facilities, and not the opportunities to participate in forest management (Wrangham, 2002; Lindayati, 2002). The policy process remained ‘firmly top-down’ and therefore ‘local people were treated as objects, not subjects of the law, with a limited role and bargaining position’ (Wrangham, 2002: 29). To put it another way, these efforts were still based on economic (and ecological to a lesser extent) ‘consequentialism’ rather than on local people’s rights to use forests and on democratic decision making.

Some legal and regulatory texts also started to encourage the participation of local communities in forest management in the 1990s, such as REPELITA VI (1994-1999). UU 24/1992 (on Spatial Planning) and UU 10/1992 (on Population, Development and Family Welfare) recognised the rights of local communities in the determination and beneficial use of land. However, observers tend to think that ‘they were drafted and implemented within the bounds of the centralist system’ and ‘actual changes were minor’ (Wrangham, 2002: 27). The issue for the government was how to lessen the conflicts with local people so as successfully to continue the logging and other businesses by the concessionaires or, in general, to perpetuate the regime and its patrimonial system.
The State and Participatory Forestry: Reformists in the Suharto Period

There was a change within the hitherto monolithic Ministry of Forestry. Although elements against the devolution of power remained in the centre of policymaking, there emerged a reformist section among the Ministry’s high-ranking officials who supported the customary forest rights of the local communities (Lindayati, 2002). They started to form a network with NGOs, academics, local and national MPs, and local governments during this period to promote participatory forestry. FKKM is a good example of a group made of these multi-stakeholders. The participatory forestry it advocates is a ‘community-based’ type rather than ‘state-led’ forest management (see below). In other words, ENGOs gradually ‘entered the policy community and facilitated the development of an alternative policy discourse that challenged mainstream state beliefs’, drawing on the ‘growing research on indigenous knowledge’ (Lindayati, 2002: 48). Yet the government only allowed them to participate in the very early stages of the policy process relating to technical matters, leaving important discussions and decisions in the domain of highest level bureaucrats (Lindayati, 2002).

The participatory forestry policy shifted further in the late 1990s. One innovative effort made by the Minister Suryohadikusumo was the Ministeral Decision SK 47/1998, signed a few months before Suharto’s resignation. It created a forest use classification Kawasan dengan Tujuan Istimewa (Zone with Special Purposes) for 29,000 ha of agroforestry area in Krui in West Lampung District, Lampung Province. This was the first time the government had recognised indigenous rights and allowed forest people to continue to manage state forests in a traditional manner, and that without a time limit and including timber harvesting. NGOs and researchers participated even in the drafting process of the decree, which was very uncommon under the Suharto government.

The area was, as in the other forests in Indonesia, designated a state forest and concessions had been allocated to timber companies and palm plantations since the

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5 Lindayati (2002: 45) points out the international influence on this NGOs’ involvement: ‘their strong international links meant that the government could not totally turn a deaf ear to these critics’.

1970s, although the local people’s livelihood had been based on agroforestry there for centuries. Not surprisingly, the commercial operations in the forests had negative impacts on the agroforestry and the people’s lives by degrading deliberately mixed forests. This traditional agroforestry sustained the ecosystem, especially in the watershed areas, for a long time and also benefited the locals by providing necessities for their lives.

Many NGOs, researchers and other reform-minded people supported the protection of the agroforestry there. Some helped to nominate the prestigious Ministry of Environment’s *Kalpataru* Award to the local community for its environmentally-sound agroforestry practice. International research institutes such as ICRAF (World Agroforestry Centre) and CIFOR (Centre for International Forestry Research), together with local NGOs, supported the Ministry in the policymaking process, including the drafting. The Minister recognised not only the economic and ecological significance but also the authenticity of the traditional agroforestry which had continued since before the state designated the place as a state forest (Fay and Sirait, 2002). The problem was that ‘community forests’ did not have a clear legal foundation in the existing forest-related laws and that general acceptance of communities’ rights could lead to the collapse of the nation’s forestry structure, or further a ‘land reform’, with massive demands from other communities. The Minister therefore compromised by issuing a draft exclusively for the people of Krui to grant them stewardship rights, while forestlands still remained under the state’s control.

This decree was an exceptional case under the New Order regime although it was still within its ideological framework. It was very lucky for the forest people in Krui that there were no economic interests of Suharto and other political patrons in the region (Lindayati, 2005). In addition, it was more likely to have support of many researchers because it was close to Jakarta (Down to Earth, 2002c). Besides, it is important to note that the Minister happened to be a reform-minded person.

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7 The forests include *damar*, from which they harvest fragrant resin, as well as other plants such as rattan and coffee.

8 The award is given every year to community members, as individuals or as a group, who have carried out pioneering activities and made a contribution in supporting the efforts of conservation of the environment.
Persisting Utilitarianism in the Post-Suharto Period

Although the participatory forestry movement continued after the end of the New Order, observers tend to think its influence was still limited in terms of policies. This is because the post-Suharto regimes also retained the utilitarian forestry philosophy, emphasising its economic aspect or redistribution of the benefits of forests (collected by the state as concession royalties), and not the political or social aspects, particularly the rights of the local people to manage forests by themselves (see Lindayati 2002; Campbell, 2002).

To update SK 622/1995, the Ministry of Forestry issued SK 677/1998 on participatory forestry under the new President, to provide more opportunities for local communities to receive benefits from state forests. In particular, it allowed communities to harvest timber and other forest products, unlike previous decisions, if communities could form cooperatives and comply with the regulations relating to reporting to the government, although this was rather a high hurdle for forest peasants without help.

Initially its process of creation was open. It involved many academics, and NGOs such as FKKM, ICRAF and Bina Swadaya. They promoted more advanced participatory forestry with reform-minded people within the Ministry. Accordingly, the earlier drafts were more favourable to the communities.

Yet the final contents were significantly different from these drafts especially the ‘cooperatives’ part, which was because of the resistance within the Ministry (Campbell, 2002; Fay and Sirait, 2002). Also, the rights given to the communities became ‘utilisation rights’ and not ‘management rights’, which ‘stems from a fundamental perception within the forest bureaucracy that only the forest department...can “manage” the forest’ (Campbell, 2002: 120). In addition, the rights are only given for areas which are not covered by other licences, which are very limited. In subsequent decisions such

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9 See Fay and Sirait (2002) and Campbell (2002) for detailed accounts of SK 677/1998. Many observers of Indonesian forest policies have shown their concern for this cooperative part. Wollenberg and Kartodihardjo (2002: 88) mention ‘the degree of genuine devolution will depend on the extent that cooperatives are formed primarily by local communities and the extent that they primarily benefit these communities’. Brown (1999) warns that this can be a ‘new system of patronage’ because this can be used to favour politically connected recipients.
as SK 865/1999 and SK 31/2001, the emphasis was shifted ‘further towards business and forest exploitation and away from the original intention’, community-based forest management (Down to Earth, 2002c).

A similar tug-of-war between the rights-based demands and re-distribution (or status-quo) approach was seen over the new Forestry Law (UU 41/1999)\(^\text{10}\). Initially, the lawmaking process (even the drafting) was open, under the new Minister, Muslimin Nasution. He set up a reform committee with the involvement of individuals and groups from civil society to review the forestry laws made under the authoritarian regimes, including the 1967 Basic Forestry Law. Academics and NGOs participated mainly through FKKM and advocated the idea of community-based participatory forestry and indigenous people’s rights. For example, a policy group within FKKM advocated a reclassification of forests by creating ‘customary forests’ in addition to state (public) and private forests (Campbell, 2002). The process also included hearings from major stakeholders such as NGOs, international agencies, academics, local governments, forestry businesses, and others, although local people ‘still remained outside the process’ (Lindayati, 2002: 51).

However, it turned out that there was another group within the Ministry with the same task, and their operation occurred behind closed doors. Dissatisfied with the process, FKKM drafted a Forestry Law proposal by themselves. FKKM’s proposal (and the Committee’s proposal to a lesser extent) demanded more reform than the internal group’s proposal in the sense that it allowed for the rights of the local communities, while the latter left the authority over forest functions, use and tenurial arrangements with the Ministry.

The final version was made by the internal group. It did not go public by the time of submission to the parliament; even the World Bank only saw it at the last minute, and they were also surprised to see contents that differed considerably from the drafts by the Committee (Fay and Sirait, 2002). The final version was in favour of the status quo: it did not recognise customary forests as a distinct class, unlike its earlier drafts; the state could revoke the status of a traditional community; and the rights of communities were

\(^{10}\) See Fay and Sirait (2002), Lindayati (2002), and Campbell (2002).
recognised only when they did not conflict with national priorities (Wrangham, 2002)\(^{11}\). Although one may consider that it was progress for the state to mention in the Law the concept of 'customary forest'\(^{12}\), the contents were a significant disappointment for the civil society actors. It was passed into law in September 1999, despite the lobbying and protests against the process by the civil society groups and ex-Ministers of Forestry and Environment, Djamaludin Suryohadikusumo and Emil Salim.

**7.2 After the Local Legislation: Involvement of State Actors**

After the regulation was issued, the Wonosobo Multi-stakeholder Forum went to the relevant authorities in Jakarta. In February 2002, they consulted the DPR (National House of Representatives) and received favourable responses from them\(^{13}\). The Ministry of Home Affairs, which is in charge of decentralisation, praised it as a positive step towards regional autonomy\(^{14}\). In March, they held policy dialogues at Wisma PKBI (Indonesian Family Planning Association Building) and the Ministry of Forestry. The participants supported the regulation\(^{15}\).

In response to the positive opinions from Jakarta, the Forum advanced preparation for implementation, including the planning for a pilot project (ARuPA, KOLING and AFN, 2004). Based on the District Mayor’s decision (No 522/205/2002), a team was formed on 30 April to lay down guidelines to be issued by the Mayor for the implementation of the regulation. The team included the staff of local Perhutani, NGOs and the University of Gadjah Mada in addition to the government officials.

Despite Jakarta’s favourable attitudes in the beginning, the situation started to change when Perhutani reacted to the issue. Perhutani seems to have started recognising

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\(^{11}\) See Wollenberg and Kartodihardjo (2002) for the legal analysis of the Law.

\(^{12}\) Customary forest is defined there as state forest in the area of a customary community. According to the Law, NGOs may support community efforts in reforestation and forest rehabilitation, but nothing more than that.

\(^{13}\) This was mentioned by most of major actors in Wonosobo. For example, the Vice-Mayor Afief, interview, 25/Oct/2002.

\(^{14}\) This point was mentioned by various interviewees. For example, Krustanto, 25/Oct/2002; Afief, 25/Oct/2002.

\(^{15}\) See Saraswati (2002), a paper presented there. Sarastwati was the vice-head of the legislative board and a member of Commission II (on legal and home affairs) at the DPR. Saraswati argues that the Wonosobo regulation reflects the spirit of TAP MPR No IX/2001 (see below), and is more advanced than other relevant national level laws.
the gravity of the regulation by March 2002. Local administrators of Perhutani at Wonosobo sent the Wonosobo Mayor a letter of opposition to the regulation on 6 March. Concurrently at the local level, 'civil society group leaders' who were considered to have close relations with Perhutani started to approach local government around this period, although their number was far less than the proponents of the regulation. By April, Perhutani asked the Indonesian Supreme Court for a judicial review of the regulation (Down to Earth, 2002d). The verdict has not been produced yet.

The only legal ways to cancel the local regulation are through the Ministry of Home Affairs or the judicial review at the Supreme Court. However, the former can cancel a local regulation only within three months after issuance. After a half-year, what Perhutani and the Ministry of Forestry could do was to exert political power on the local actors not to implement it. Luckily for the state actors, the local regulation had to be complemented by guidelines from the Mayor for implementation, as mentioned above, which left some room for manoeuvre.

Perhutani took two approaches - one was pushing a state-led participatory forestry developed by Perhutani, namely PHBM, as an alternative. The other was emphasising the legal inconsistencies concerning the regulation (see the next section). Along these lines, Perhutani and other state actors put various pressures on the local actors, ranging from the Mayor to villagers.

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16 Suara Merdeka, 18/Mar/2002 'Dipertanyakan Elemen yang Peduli Hutan' (Questioned for the Care of Forests).
17 Twenty people visited the Vice-Mayor to express the fact that they preferred PHBM because farmers needed Perhutani's support, such as seeds. Suara Merdeka, 18/Mar/2002 'Dipertanyakan...'. See also Kedaulatan Rakyat 18/Mar/2002 'Gelombang Protes Bermunculan Perda PSDHBM Wonosob Dinilai Cacat Hukum' (Protest against Wonosobo PSDHBM Regulation for Legal Flaws).
18 The number of local regulations that may contain 'problems' in relation to the other laws is very large for the capacity of the Supreme Court. Out of 10,000 local regulations made in three years after the implementation of decentralisation laws, 700 are considered to be inappropriate according to the Ministry of Home Affairs (Gofar, 2003). In fact, every time the Forum asked the Court about the progress, they were told the regulation was on the long waiting list (ARuPA Staff, interview, 19/Mar/2003).
19 In the newly established UU 32/2004 on Local Government, which replaces UU 22/1999, local regulations can be cancelled by the state within 60 days if there is a conflict with higher regulations, although it was 90 days at that time (Down to Earth 2002d; interviews with HuMa, 31/Jan/2005; ARuPA Staff, 27/Dec/2004). See UU No. 32/2004 concerning Local Government, Article 145.
Table 7-1 Chronology: After the 2001 Window

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Events</th>
<th>Table 7-1 Chronology: After the 2001 Window</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 3</td>
<td>The Wonosobo Multi-stakeholder Forum met the Minister of Forestry. The Minister appointed Triyono to handle the issue.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jul-Early Aug</td>
<td>The Forum made an implementation guideline of the Wonosobo regulation. Perhutani took part in PSDHBM as a 'friendly organisation' on forest management and became a member of the Wonosobo Forestry Forum.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug 21</td>
<td>The Forum and Perhutani had a meeting at Hotel Radisson in Yogyakarta. It was chaired by the Vice Mayor Kholiq Arief. Some agreements were made there, including the implementation of PSDHBM in 30 villages in Wonosobo.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug 27</td>
<td>The Forum and Perhutani met again at the Ministry of Forestry. The MoU between them was not signed because of major differences between the MoUs prepared by both the parties. The Ministry proposed to them to sign it on 2 Sept after revisions.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sept 1</td>
<td>At 23:00, Triyono and Aji (Perhutani) called Wonosobo government and said that the Executive Director of Perhutani and the Ministry of Forestry cancelled the meeting (and the signing process) on 2 Sept.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sept 2</td>
<td>The Wonosobo Mayor, Trimawan Nugrohadi, promised to implement PSDHBM.</td>
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<td>Sept 16</td>
<td>Forest farmers and NGOs went to DPRD Wonosobo to demand the implementation of the regulation.</td>
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<td>Sept 18</td>
<td>The chairman of DPRD Wonosobo issued a letter of recommendation to the Mayor of Wonosobo for the rapid implementation of the regulation.</td>
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<td>Sept 19</td>
<td>Hundreds of farmers and University students urged the Mayor of Wonosobo to implement the regulation.</td>
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<td>Sept 23</td>
<td>Around 100 people wearing 'Mitra Perhutani'(friends of Perhutani) t-shirts went to DPRD Wonosobo, requested re-consideration of Perda PSDHBM.</td>
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<td>Sept 24</td>
<td>The Minister of Forestry sent a letter (No 1665/Menhut-11/2002) to the Minister of Home Affairs requiring the withdrawal of the Wonosobo regulation.</td>
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<td>Sept 26</td>
<td>Around 300 farmers, students and NGOs united as the Wonosobo Farmers' Alliance and the Action Committee for Farmer's Sovereignty made a demonstration for the implementation of the regulation.</td>
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<td>Oct 3</td>
<td>Perhutani invited the Wonosobo Forum for another talk on the MoU at Hotel Indonesia (HI). They reached agreements on the points for revision.</td>
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<td>Oct 17</td>
<td>Meeting was held in Bandungan (Central Java) as a continuation of the HI meeting. It resulted in the final draft of MoU between the Wonosobo Government and Perhutani Unit I. This MoU was scheduled to be signed on 30/Oct by the Mayor of Wonosobo and the Head of Perhutani Unit I, in the presence of the Executive Director of Perhutani, the Governor of Central Jawa, etc.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct 24</td>
<td>The Ministry of Home Affairs sent a letter to the Mayor of Wonosobo on 24 Oct (No. 188.942/2434/SJ), requiring stopping implementation of the regulation and recommending that DPRD cancel it.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct 30</td>
<td>While there was agreement on the concept of PSDH among the parties, the MoU was not signed.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nov 26</td>
<td>Concerned parties failed to agree in views on authority and technical aspects for reforestation included in the MoU.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jan 7</td>
<td>A hearing was conducted between the Wonosobo government and the Ministry of Home Affairs.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jan 17</td>
<td>Perhutani and the Wonosobo Forum met at Hotel Ambarukomo in Yogyakarta. After that, the negotiation between them was halted.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jan 16-17</td>
<td>Forum Antar Petani Wonosobo (Wonosobo Inter-village Farmers' Forums) were held.</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 9</td>
<td>The Wonosobo Forum visited the Ministry of Home Affairs again but only received a vague response on where to make revisions to the regulation.</td>
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</table>

Source: Information provided by ARuPA; Bachtiar(2001); Down to Earth (2002c).
**Perhutani’s Demand for Utilitarian Participatory Forestry (PHBM)**

PHBM was not particularly developed for the Wonosobo case. A section of staff members who understood the effectiveness of participatory forestry, such as Bambang Aji, emerged within Perhutani around the *reformasi* period and started developing PHBM, which came out as a policy in 2001.

In the period prior to PHBM, Perhutani developed PMDH after the 1980s to improve the social welfare of the forest villagers. It consisted of various activities ranging from making hospitals to developing income-generating activities such as beekeeping. ‘Participatory’ agroforestry was included in the late 1980s in PMDH with the support of the Ford Foundation. However, it did not go beyond mere benefits-for-labour deals, without sharing decision-making over forest management. Despite its objective, PMDH more or less failed to improve the socio-economic conditions of the villagers.

Although this failure may have been one motivation for Perhutani to embark on developing PHBM, there were more important ‘consequences’ to be achieved. One was to cope with ecological degradation, especially after the massive increase in forest looting in the *reformasi* period (Aji, interview, 17/Mar/2003; Lindayati, 2000). This was based on the assumption that greater involvement of locals would prevent forest looting, as they would start to have an interest in and responsibility for the protection of the forests although they had previously regarded them as state property and not theirs (Aji, interview, 19/Jan/2005). Another is the economic consequences for Perhutani. Because Perhutani’s poor financial conditions significantly worsened as a result of the forest looting, Perhutani felt the need to develop income sources other than timber by letting farmers grow non-timber forest products. In fact Perhutani is trying to develop businesses for such products (Aji, interview, 19/Jan/2005). The market message to its failure to contribute to the local communities can also be included here. SmartWood, 

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20 Aji (interview, 19/Jan/2005) mentioned that Perhutani is making a large deficit and would not be able to survive more than a few years if there is no improvement.

21 For example, Perhutani invited investors for making tapioca powder out of cassava, which most of the farmers used to grow only for subsistence purposes. Aji, a Perhutani staff member says ‘we cannot continue to make a deficit’ (*Kompas*, p20, 2/Feb/2002).
which is the world’s first independent forestry certifier and accredited by the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), suspended its certificate to Perhutani’s forest management for its failure in fair production sharing with local farmers and in coping with forest degradation (see Donovan, 2001).

Additionally, Perhutani had to respond to different political settings in the reformasi era (Lindayati, 2000; Mayers and Vermeulen, 2002). There was a rapid increase in the village farmers’ resistance against Perhutani’s forest management in the post-Suharto era (Achdian, 2001). A villager in Wonosobo says ‘peasants became braver after reformasi in the field against Perhutani’ (Sukoco, interview, 22/Mar/2003).

Importantly, Perhutani staff members with progressive ideas were not in the power centre. Issuing the official letter to order the adoption of PHBM as Perhutani’s new management approach (instead of the project-oriented PMDH) without mentioning the details of the concept itself, they tried to interpret the concept as being centred on a local people-Perhutani partnership (Lindayati, 2000). This allowed for an increase in the involvement of communities and portion of profit sharing for locals, even from the timber. Not surprisingly, it faced ‘fierce opposition from Perhutani mainstream management’ because ‘timber production sharing is out of the question’ for them, even though rises in wages or the expansion of land were no problem (Lindayati, 2000). The share of the locals for timber is 25% of the production with floor price at the maximum; the share from the non-timber forest products is decided according to the particular circumstances\(^{22}\). There is no time limit for the farmers to grow agricultural species, although the communities have to plant mainly teak in the interval\(^{23}\).

There are three significant differences between Perhutani’s PHBM and Wonosobo’s

\(^{22}\) That is, twenty five percent of the production with floor price multiplied by the years of collaboration divided by the years of the trees (in the case of thinning, years of collaboration and trees become years of collaboration in the interval and years of interval). For details, see Perhutani Unit I Jawa Tengah (2002). In the case of Kuningan, it was 20% for communities and 80 % for Perhutani in the case of timbers, while 80% for the former and 20% for the latter in the case of non-timbers. (Pikiran Rakyat, ‘Sistem PHBM Cegah Penjarahan’ (System PHBM Prevent Looting), p8, 31/Dec/2002.). In some villages in Wonosobo, the share of non-timber forest products goes 55% to communities, 30% to Perhutani, 5% to the village, and 5% to the administrative groups, etc (Kedaulatan Rakyat, 10/Sept/2002, \(www.kedaulatan-rakyat.com\); Suara Merdeka Cybernews, 5/Sept/2002, \(http://www.suaramerdeka.com/\)).

\(^{23}\) Kompas, p20, 2/Feb/2002.
PSDHBM: the decision-making process, the profit-sharing, and the choice of plants. As for the first point, the initiative is taken by Perhutani in PHBM, whereas it is by local government and communities in PSDHBM (local government acts on behalf of the state) instead of Perhutani. Perhutani conducts the management together (*bersama*) with communities but its practice is not always 'based' (*berbasis*) on communities. The difference in the meaning of the 'B' in the state-led PHBM and community-based PSDHBM illustrates the difference in decision-making processes between the two, making the latter emphasise the rights of local actors.

Since the local Perhutani has much discretion in determining details (e.g. the system of profit-sharing), the practice of PHBM is largely dependent on how Perhutani acts at the local level. Communities and other stakeholders can make a group and participate in the planning of forest management but whether it happens in the field in a democratic manner is a different story. PHBM in Kuningan district in West Java (namely Perhutani Unit III) was successfully initiated, perhaps because 'Perhutani there was good' (ARuPA Staff, interview, 27/Dec/2004)²⁴. NGOs such as LATIN were actively involved as well as the locals in the process, partly owing to the area's adjacency to the NGO-rich areas such as Bogor and Jakarta.

However, PHBM does not result in good outcomes for local people in many cases. This is because, as a Perhutani staff member admitted, the 'old philosophy' or 'old mindset' of state forestry lasted in Indonesia for hundreds of years is still embedded in the mentality of many of the Perhutani staff members (Aji, interview, 19/Jan/2005). Also, Perhutani is not exempt from the corruption endemic in Indonesian bureaucracy, and it may often be difficult for staff in the field to change their attitude to respect democratic values and abandon their privileges²⁵. Besides, the local officials have to have approval from the central Perhutani office before actual practices of forest

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²⁴ There is another village called Buniwangi in West Java that successfully negotiated with Perhutani for a profit share (20%) from timber they planted in a Perhutani scheme, although it is pine trees and not teak which is more valuable. See Mayers and Vermeulen (2002).

²⁵ It is reported that some local Perhutani staff required a fee in exchange for the forest use of the villagers. *The Jakarta Post.com* 'Wonasobo Awaits...', 25/Jan/2002. Perhutani has also been criticised for being corrupt. For example, at local level, it has been reported that it has illegally sold the land it is managing to private companies. *Sinar Harapan*, 29/Jan/2002

www.sinarharapan.co.id/
management are reformed. Even in Kuningan, while the district government sought to assume more control over the state forests in the district, the progress with Perhutani was unsatisfactorily slow (Down to Earth, 2002c). Perhutani seems to consider the ‘partnership’ as a means to reduce conflict with local people and to raise the productivity of timber (Mayers and Vermeulen, 2002). Therefore in PHBM, as the Vice District Mayor of Wonosobo mentioned, ‘people are still marginalized, and they will still be just labour’ (Arief, interview, 25/Oct/2002).

This is related to the second point, the profit-sharing issue. For example, it is happening in Wonosobo that farmers have to accept their share in the profits determined by Perhutani or they do not get anything in the case of PHBM, while profit-sharing is decided through negotiation based on the contribution in PSDHBM (ARuPA Staff, interview, 27/Dec/2004). There even are cases in which Perhutani does not pay for seeds or wages for planting trees.26 Besides, in the case of PHBM, Perhutani can use the floor price for calculating the share of the communities even though the products can be sold at much higher prices.

Third, importantly, farmers can decide the species to be planted in PSDHBM, while only the species Perhutani allows can be planted in PHBM. Farmers tend to wish to plant fast-growing and versatile Albizia, as in the people’s forestry, which is also good for growing other species and improving their income. However, Perhutani want to plant pine, mahogany and teak for their value as timber, although they grow slowly and are not suitable for mixed cultivation27. This difference, whether mixed or monoculture, should have ecological as well as economic impacts apart from the issue of forest encroachment. A village leader says, ‘the right to choose the species is important for us in economic and environmental senses’ (Sukoco, interview, 22/Mar/2003).

Considering the success of the people’s forest in Wonosobo, one may suppose planting Albizia might be good for Perhutani as well, even in economic terms. Nevertheless, Perhutani does not want to change the system. One NGO staff member pointed out that one of the reasons is that Perhutani makes a whole-Java level plan to

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26 See www.asiaforestnetwork.org for the story of Gunung Tugel village in Wonosobo. Also, Sukoco (interview, 22/Mar/2003) told a similar story in another village.

27 Land in Wonosobo is not very suitable for teak, which causes it to prioritise pine and then mahogany to be planted before teak. (ARuPA Staff, interview, 27/Dec/2004)
‘optimise’ the benefit from timber plantation and it is difficult to change it according to the smaller divisions (ARuPA Staff, interview, 27/Dec/2004). Another explanation provided by a Perhutani staff member is that the marketing system is inflexible and conservative, unlike that of private companies, and they do not know if and how much it can sell the new species to whom (Aji, interview, 19/Jan/2005). In other words, it can monopolise the market and make it easier to control it in the case of teak, mahogany and pines (ARuPA staff, interview, 19/Mar/2003.). Perhutani may also think it good to control ‘illegal’ logging by the farmers because it is difficult to tell whether the timber is from state forests or people’s forests if the species are the same (ARuPA Staff, interview, 23/Oct/2002; 27/Dec/2004).

**Politics in the Expanded Network: Perhutani’s Thrust**

In response to Perhutani’s demands, the Ministry of Forestry joined the ‘network’ of actors. On 3 July, the Wonosobo Multi-stakeholder Forum met the Forest Minister Muhammad Prakosa. Noting the disagreement between the Forum and Perhutani, he appointed the Director of Community Forestry Development Triyono to mediate between the two parties. Prakosa, who is an economist and became the Minister from the President Megawati’s party, ‘is keen to maintain tight central control over forest management’ from ‘all his talk about social forestry’ (Down to Earth, 2002d).

His concern about the Wonosobo regulation may not have been related to its actual economic impacts, because Perhutani was not profitable in Wonosobo anyway, especially after the rampant illegal logging. It should rather be the potential impacts caused if the other districts follow, which Perhutani feared most because it could lead to the decrease of its power. This fear of a ‘domino effect’ was almost unanimously pointed out by activists and others. As the Wonosobo case suggested, community-

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28 For example, see Jawa Pos 3/Oct/2002. In fact, many NGOs and MPs in other regions have visited Wonosobo and studied the case of the regulation. (interviews with Muayat, 18/Mar/2003; Sukoco, 22/Mar/2003). Wonosobo has also hosted a conference for local-level MPs in the whole Java-Madura on sustainable, fair and democratic natural resources management (Bakhtier and Nugraheni, 2001). West Java Province in fact tried to make a Provincial regulation which did not recognise Perhutani as the only actor to hold forest management permissions. Perhutani tried to stop this before its issuance. See for example, ‘Perhutani Ingin Perda tentang Kehutanan Jabar Direvisi’ (Perhutani Wants Local Forestry Regulation in West Java to be Revised’, Media Indonesia, p6, 3/Jan/2002.
based participatory forestry may well improve Perhutani’s financial conditions; however, Perhutani did not want to lose its authority. The Minister was probably only responsive to Perhutani’s demands. Most concerned individuals and groups in civil society pointed out that, Perhutani is more powerful than the Ministry because of the money that the former makes for the latter and it has a better-established organisation with a longer history (for example, interviews with ARuPA Staff, 23/Oct/2002; Krustanto, 25/Oct/2002).29

In response to the reaction by the Ministry, Wonosobo actors started trying to make progress by compromising with Perhutani. In the implementation guidelines (Pedoman Pelaksanaan) of the regulation prepared by the Forum at the behest of the Mayor, Perhutani was also supposed to participate in forest management as a ‘friendly organisation’ and a member of the Wonosobo Forestry Forum. On the other hand, Triyono started mediating between Perhutani and local actors. Through negotiation with various actors, he suggested having a ‘mid-way’ plan to reconcile the two parties.

There are several reasons why Wonosobo actors tried to negotiate with the state actors and did not implement the regulation without the state’s consent. In the context of network theories, the state’s ‘implementation resources’ were significant, since the state and Perhutani (and its local offices) had an effective control over the local forests, and collaboration with them was necessary for smooth implementation of the regulation (ARuPA Staff, interview, 18/Jan/2005). Another factor was the local political culture. The Mayor and the district government had a conventional idea of the state-local relations and they were very obedient to the state, as in the authoritarian period (see 7.4). As a result, they slowed down the process of making the implementation guidelines and emphasised talking with the state (Krustanto, interview, 25/Oct/2002).

Perhutani proposed to make a MoU (Memorandum of Understanding) with the Wonosobo government to conduct PHBM there, although this would not legally invalidate the regulation. On 21 August, the Wonosobo Multi-stakeholder Forum and Perhutani had a meeting at Hotel Radisson in Yogyakarta, which was chaired by the Vice Mayor of Wonosobo Kholiq Arief. Several agreements were made there. Among

29 One activist put it, ‘Perhutani in fact regards itself as ‘the state” (ARuPA Staff, interview, 23/Oct/2002).
others, a pilot implementation of PSDHBM would be conducted in 30 villages in Wonosobo district and PHBM in the other villages. Perhutani would participate in the PSDHBM as an investor, planner of forests in the District, and technical assistant. In addition, it was agreed to get the coordinating body Wonosobo Forestry Forum up and running.

From late August, Perhutani and the Ministry of Forestry tried harder to exercise leverage on the negotiation process. The Wonosobo Multi-stakeholder Forum and Perhutani met again at the Ministry of Forestry on 27 August to sign the MoU between the two. Wonosobo local government prepared a draft MoU based on the discussion at Radisson meeting. However, Perhutani brought another draft MoU, which was significantly different. Seeing that there were many points of disagreement, the Ministry proposed to sign this in Wonosobo on 2 September after further discussions.

Triyono, Bambang Aji of Perhutani, and staff members of Wonosobo Government and ARuPA managed to draft another MoU along the lines of the discussion at the Radisson meeting. Late at night before the signing, on 1 September, Triyono of the Ministry of Forestry and Aji of Perhutani made a call to the Wonosobo government and informed them that Perhutani and the Ministry of Forestry had cancelled the MoU. It was ‘without clear reason’ according to the Mayor of Wonosobo. NGOs claimed that Perhutani pressured the Minister by arguing that other districts would follow the MoU if it was signed and this would damage Perhutani (interviews with ARuPA Staff, 23/Oct/2002; KOLING Staff, 28/Dec/2004).

The state actors intensified their efforts against the regulation. On 11 September, Minister of Forestry Prakosa sent a letter (No 1665/Menhut-II/2002) to the Ministry of Home Affairs to ask for the revocation of the Wonosobo regulation. At the local level, around 100 people wearing t-shirts printed ‘Mitra Perhutani’ (Friends of Perhutani) went to the DPRD Wonosobo. Those who were against the regulation were

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30 The Central Java Provincial Government also showed discontent with the points of agreement, although they seemed to be resolved eventually (ARuPA Staff, interview, 19/Mar/2003).

allegedly manipulated by Perhutani, requesting re-consideration of the regulation32.

Local actors took more actions to press for the regulation. The forest farmers and NGOs demanded the DPRD should take initiatives to make progress. The Chair of the DPRD issued a letter of recommendation to the Mayor of Wonosobo on 18 September for the quick implementation of the regulation. Hundreds of farmers and University students urged the Mayor on 19 September to sign the necessary documents; around 3,000 farmers, students and local NGOs such as ARuPA, KOLING and JKPM were united under the names of Aliansi Petani Wonosobo (Wonosobo Farmers’ Alliance) and Komite Aksi untuk Kedaulatan Petani (Action Committee for Farmers’ Autonomy) and made a demonstration on 26 September to demand that the Mayor should sign the implementation guidelines of the regulation33. Sumaeri of a SEPKUBA, a farmers’ network, said the Mayor ‘does not have to be afraid of signing the documents for implementation because communities are backing him up’34.

The negotiations between local and state actors continued. On 3 October, the Wonosobo Multi-stakeholder Forum had another talk on the MoU with Perhutani in the presence of Trinoyo and the staff of Central Java Province at the Hotel Indonesia (HI) in Jakarta. They reached agreements on the revisions of the Hotel Radisson agreements, particularly to increase Perhutani’s involvement35. They also agreed to use the term PSDH (Pengelolaan Sumber Daya Hutan or Forest Resources Management) instead of PHBM and PSDHBM, as it was considered politically neutral. The Wonosobo Multi-

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32 See Suara Merdeka, 27/Sept/2002. A community leader of a village conducting PSDHBM mentioned that the pro-Perhutani demonstrators were hired by Perhutani for Rp 20,000 each; when he asked the demonstrators, they just replied that they just followed the demonstration without knowing what it was for (Sukoco, interview, 22/Mar/2003; personal communication with ARuPA Staff, 22/Apr/2003).


35 Interview with ARuPA Staff, 27/Dec/2004. One was made on Point 3 (Perhutani as an actor in the scheme of forest management in Wonosobo District) and Point 5 (the number of locations in which community-based participatory forestry is experimented). It was replaced by a point mentioning that Perhutani and the Wonosobo local government had agreed to conduct a pilot project in the places and on a scale to be determined.
stakeholder Forum proposed that they draft the concept of PSDH.

The state was becoming more serious about stopping PSDHBM. Minister Prakosa commented that the ‘central government does not agree to the concept of having two models there [in Wonosobo]’\(^{36}\). He was not aware of the effectiveness of participatory forestry or communities’ capacity, as well as the negotiation process (Aji, interview, 19/Jan/2005).

On 17 October, another meeting was held in Bandungan (Central Java) as a continuation of the HI meeting. They reached agreement on the final draft of the MoU between the Wonosobo Government and Perhutani Unit I (Central Java), which included basic agreements on PSDH in Wonosobo District. This MoU was scheduled to be signed on 30 October by the Mayor of Wonosobo and the Head of Perhutani Unit I, in the presence of the Executive Director of Perhutani, the Head of Central Java Province Forestry Office and the Governor of Central Java Province. On 30 October, however, they only agreed on the concept of PSDH. Yet again, the meeting on 26 November failed to agree in its views on authority and the technical aspects of reforestation. Perhutani was in favour of vague principles such as the importance of environmental aspects and collaboration, but it was against making specific statements. Among other points, Perhutani insisted on its authority over state forestlands and the choice of species planted (ARuPA Staff, interview, 18/Jan/2005). This stance has not changed up to the time of writing.

The Wonosobo actors enhanced the relationship with Jakarta-based NGOs\(^{37}\). HuMa (Perkumpulan Untuk Pembaharuan Hukum Berbasis Masyarakat dan Ekologis or the Association for Community and Ecology-Based Legal Reform), an NGO specialising in environmental law, supported their argument by conducting legal analysis through holding several open multi-stakeholder meetings and publishing papers (see Simarmata 2001; HuMa 2002; HuMa and WALHI 2002). A coalition of more than 70 civil society groups, KUNDERA (Koalisi untuk Penyelamatan Devolsi Pengelolaan Sumber Daya Alam or Coalition for Supporting Devolution of Natural Resource Management), was


\(^{37}\) ARuPA is a member of national-level NGO networks such as FKKM, KpSHK and Forest Watch Indonesia, and shares information about Wonosobo and forests in Java.
formed with WALHI, HuMA, Forest Watch Indonesia, LBH and other national and some international NGOs, and demanded that the Forest Minister should not to try to cancel the Wonosobo regulation\textsuperscript{38}. Various e-mailing lists contributed to the increase in the support of civil society actors from other regions for Wonosobo’s struggle.

\textit{Conventional Ideas and Informal Institutions: the Halting of the Process}

After the HI meeting, the mapping of the state actors changed; the people with ‘conventional’ state-centric ideas marginalised the people with progressive ideas on participatory forestry. Perhutani Unit I became the major actor from the Perhutani side. Perhutani Unit I, whose working area include Wonosobo District, was the powerful Unit within Perhutani for its scale and teak-richness, and the one which would suffer financial damage from the regulation. In addition, the Vice-Governor of Central Java Province was on the Board of Directors (\textit{dewan pengawas}) of Perhutani, and he insisted on taking the initiative in the negotiations (interviews with Aji, 19/Jan/2005; ARuPA Staff, 23/Oct/2002; Krustanto, 30/Dec/2004). Aji from Perhutani Jakarta was not appointed to the following negotiations, although he was the one who developed PHBM and a most knowledgeable person on the issue. He could have been too progressive, compromising, and close to NGOs for people whose ‘mindset was still old’ (Aji, interview, 19/Jan/2005). Aji says ‘there were many perceptions about the Wonosobo case among Perhutani staff… [some consider] it does not disturb Perhutani and it goes along with PHBM… [others consider it] is different from PHBM and should be deleted’ (Aji, interview, 17/Mar/2003).\textsuperscript{39}

Also at the Ministerial level, the party which supported the state-centric approach was gaining the upper hand. In response to the letter (and possibly the pressure) from the Ministry of Forestry, the Ministry of Home Affairs, which had given positive feedback to Wonosobo people, changed their position. The Ministry sent a letter to the Mayor of Wonosobo on 24 October (No. 188.942/2434/SJ), asking it to stop


\textsuperscript{39} There was a division of opinion within Perhutani from the view of the Wonosobo actors as well. The people supportive of participatory forestry were marginalised by the others at the following meetings, in the eyes of local actors (Krustanto, interview, 25/Oct/2002).
implementation of the regulation and suggesting that the DPRD cancel it. It says that the letter was made based on the result of analysis made by an internal team and the letter from the Ministry of Forestry. Because one year had passed since the regulation was issued, the Ministry could not cancel the local regulation and there was no means for them but to put pressure on the local government. At the local level, demonstrations were made also in Yogyakarta to demand the Ministry hold on to the spirit of decentralisation and maintain the regulation.

Facing the pressure from the state, the Mayor of Wonosobo Nugrohadi has not yet issued the necessary edicts for the implementation of the regulation, in opposition to his promise to do so after the failure of agreements on the MoU on 2 September, 2002 (ARuPA, 2003). His excuses suggest that he (and the state/provincial actors) still holds the conventional idea of top-down state-district relations instead of ideas based on the decentralisation laws in the post-Suharto period. The Mayor explained to the proponents of the regulation that he was told by the Governor and Vice Governor of Central Java Province and by the Minister of Forestry (before the letter was issued from the Ministry of Home Affairs) that the DAU (General Allocation Fund)\(^{40}\) to the District would be cut if he signed the implementation guideline for the regulation (interviews with Krustanto, 25/Oct/2002; ARuPA Staff, 23/Oct/2002). The Mayor said he could not sacrifice other sectors than forestry, as the Wonosobo government could not do without DAU, even though Krustanto had told him that DAU was not decided by the Ministry of Forestry but by the Ministry of Finance, based on a specific formula, and that there was nothing the Ministry of Forestry could do about it (Krustanto, interview, 25/Oct/2002)\(^{41}\).

Many consider that DAU is merely a cover for the Mayor, and they tend to think that he was simply not courageous enough to be against the Provincial government and the Minister, who is from the same political party, PDI-P (interviews with Sukamto, 25/Oct/2002; Krustanto 25/Oct/2002; 30/Dec/2004; ARuPA Staff, 27/Dec/2004). The Wonosobo Mayor commented 'although it is the era of decentralisation, local government cannot stand alone...as the Mayor, I do not want to be called a rebel'

\(^{40}\) See Chapter 4 for DAU.

\(^{41}\) Financially, Wonosobo Government is dependent on DAU. DAU accounts for about 90% of its total budget (Local BAPEDA Staff, interview, 30/Dec/2004).
PDI-P, which is the President Megawati's party, was apparently unhappy with the regulation. Krustanto, who is from PDI-P but strongly supports the regulation, was questioned by the Party for his reasons (Krustanto, interview, 25/Oct/2002). Although the Party was for the regulation in the beginning and constructed good relations with non-governmental actors, it is now only Krustanto who supports it, while PKB has become closer to NGOs. The Indonesian proportional-representation system, in which votes cannot be cast for each candidate but for the parties, and the information on each candidate on the roster is not made public in detail (including their policy pledges), makes each party member more susceptible to the policies of the party. This partly explains the difference in opinion between the Mayor and Vice-Mayor. The Vice-Mayor, who is from PKB, the second largest party in Wonosobo (the third largest at national level at 2004 election), is supportive of the regulation. He often says 'if I were the Mayor, I would sign the implementation guideline' (ARuPA Staff, interview, 27/Dec/2004).

Thus, the Wonosobo regulation process halted after the network expanded to include the state actors. Wonosobo actors needed their cooperation for smooth implementation of the regulation. Also, the conventional ideas on the state-district relations held by the District Mayor and local government offices as well as the state actors made the former susceptible to pressure from the state actors. In addition to these explanations focused on the informal aspect of the issues, one cannot overlook the formal-legal setting because the lack of its coordination allowed room for Perhutani's political manoeuvring. This point is reviewed next.

7.3 The Legal Aspects of Wonosobo Regulation

The legal status of the regulation is very complicated. The Ministry of Forestry and the Ministry of Home Affairs both point out that the regulation conflicts with UU41/1999 and PP25/2000. According to the letter from the Minister of Forestry to the Ministry of

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42 Interview with the staff of ARuPA (27/Dec/2004) and KOLING (28/Dec/2004). ARuPA staff say that many MPs from PDI-P are very new and tend not to have high education or economic background, so that they are susceptible to political pressure, while PKB is based on a religious group and is trying to gain support from the farmers. (ARuPA Staff, interview, 23/Oct/2002).
Home Affairs (No 1665/Menhut-II/2002), the regulation conflicts with Article 5 (3) of UU 41/1999 Basic Forestry Law, and Article 2 Paragraph (3) 4(c) of PP 25/2000. The letter from Ministry of Home Affairs to the Mayor of Wonosobo (No. 188.942/2434/SJ) states that the regulation conflicts with the same articles and same points because the authority to determine and change the status and function of state forests must only be with the state. Article 5 (3) of UU 41/1999 mentions that the state shall determine the status of forest as referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2) in the same article [i.e. whether state forests or private forests (hutan hak); and customary forests are included in the former], and customary forest shall be determined as long as it exists in reality and its existence is recognised. Article 2 Paragraph (3) 4(c) of PP 25/2000 says that it is the authority of the state to determine forestlands and change its status [state or private forests] and function [production or protected forests].

However, it can be argued, as many NGOs and academics do, that the Wonosobo regulation creates no problem in this context because it does not change the ‘status’ and ‘function’ of the forests: the area has remained state forest and its function is production forest (see Simarmata 2001; HuMa, 2002; HuMa and WALHI, 2002). It is clearly mentioned in the regulation that this is ‘not an authentication of land and forest area ownership’ (Article 18). In other words, state forests remain as state forests.

Letters such as the ones from the Minister of Forestry to the Ministry of Home Affairs have also pointed out the inappropriate relationship with PP 34/2002 (Forestry and Planning of Forest Management, Forest Exploitation and Forest Areas Utilisation), but they do not mention how it conflicts with the regulation. Gofar (2003) argues that the Wonosobo regulation does not seem to conflict with the PP. The Central Java Governor’s Decision No.24 in 2001 concerning Joint Forest Resource Management in Central Java Province is also mentioned, as it shows the Province’s will to implement PHBM within Central Java. Yet, legally, it is highly questionable if only a Provincial

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43 Tata Hutan dan Penyusunan Rencana Pengelolaan Hutan, Pemanfaatan Hutan dan Penggunaan Kawasan Hutan.
44 Some observers have criticised this PP because this conflicts with TAP MPR IX 2001, UU22 and UU25/1999, PP41/1999. See IHSA, HUMA and ICEL (2002).
Governor’s ‘decision’ is higher than district ‘regulation’, especially when the decentralisation laws provide related authorities to district government.

The official letter addressed to the author from the Wonosobo Government concerning his question why the Mayor has not issued the implementation guideline of the regulation\textsuperscript{46} says that the government regulations (PP) concerning Perhutani such as PP 53/1999, PP 14/2000 (change of status from Perum to PT) and PP 30/2003 (from PT to Perum) shows that Perhutani was given authority to manage state forests in Java-Madura by the state (central government), and the Wonosobo government was requested to revise the regulation.

The relations between the Wonosobo regulation and the PPs concerning Perhutani are not clear. For example, PP 53/1999, which was issued on 11 June after the decentralisation laws were made, still stipulates that the state provides Perhutani with the task and authority for undertaking activities in the working areas that are Java-Madura (Article 3 and 10). However, it is unclear whether Perhutani ‘monopolises’ the area, or others can also participate in forest management there when the state allows this, as is written in the Decentralisation Law (UU 22/1999). UU 22/1999 mentions that the district has the authority to manage natural resources in the region and it is responsible for maintaining environmental sustainability (article 10) except for the national level planning (article 7). In fact, the Wonosobo regulation was made to minimise the deterioration of forests, in addition to ensuring that the local farmers received benefits from forests\textsuperscript{47}.

Not only the local actors in Wonosobo who are supportive of the regulation, but also the third party specialists, consider that the UU 22/1999, issued four months before UU 41/1999, provides wide authority and accountability to the district government, bypassing the provincial level. One can see this from the report made by an expert team from ITTO (International Tropical Timber Organisation; ITTO 2001). The report states that, according to the laws [UU 22/1999 and UU 25/1999], ‘authority and responsibility for forest management have been decentralized to local level of government, mainly to

Kabupaten [district] level. Lands, including state forestlands, are to be under local government administration. All forestry activities with certain exceptions fall under local government management' (ITTO, 2001: 78)\textsuperscript{48}.

The ITTO team might have interpreted UU 22/1999 too favourably to local actors, especially when one considers the ambiguity in the Law and related regulations, and the conflicting contents of UU 41/1999. As for the former, Article 7 of UU 22/1999 states that 'utilisation' (but not management) of natural resources remains with the central government. The implementing regulation of this law, PP 25/2000, specified the authority of the central and provincial governments, rather than the authority of the district governments, which was strange in relation to the UU 22/1999 because it devolved authority and responsibility to the district level (Van Zorge Report on Indonesia, 'More Questions than Answers', 19-23/Sept/2000: 22).

This is mainly because the Ministry of Forestry was one of the last Ministries to agree to the relevant section in this law (Dermawan and Resosudarmo, 2002). This resulted in the inconsistent contents of the Forestry Law, which still 'acknowledge the dominant role of the central government in managing state forestlands' (ITTO, 2001: 80)\textsuperscript{49}. For example, it still stipulates that the state holds authority over forest administration (Article 4(2)). This law is particularly vague when it comes to the devolution of power. Although the Law mentions the rights of forest-dependent people, it is unclear what the permitted uses of customary forests are and how to solve the conflicts if customary communities, cooperatives, government and state or private corporations exist in the same forestlands. The ITTO team argues that 'with regard to formalization of decentralization process, enactment of most government regulations

\textsuperscript{48} The report says that the issues to be addressed at the district level after UU 22/1999 include forest administration (pengurusan hutan; planning, inventory, and forestland allocation and use), forest management (pengelolaan hutan; boundary delineation, monitoring, supervision, utilisation, control, reforestation, soil conservation, protection, nature conservation, research, training, forest products distribution and revenue collection.; supervision and monitoring is a multi-level activities), and standards and criteria of forest management, procedures for determining of forest status, and functions of forestlands (ITTO, 2001: 80-81). Therefore, the Forestry Ministry assumes 'a professional leadership role with more of a moral authority than an executive authority' while ownership (pengusahaan hutan) remains with the state (ITTO, 2001: 95-96).

and presidential decrees subscribing to UU 22/1999 and UU 25/1999 have been released, but almost none in respect of forestry. During the meetings and interviews the Mission was given to understand that there are some indications of reluctance in the Ministry of Forestry to formally release authority to the regions' (ITTO, 2001: 80-81).

From the viewpoint of pro-Wonosobo actors, the PPs and UUs that are allegedly inconsistent with the regulation can be considered as state-dominant and undemocratic; therefore they conflict with the decree made at the Parliament, TAP MPR No IX/2001, on Agrarian Renewal and Natural Resources⁵⁰. In this decree, the MPR required to review and revise laws related to agriculture and natural resource management. As for the latter, this particularly requires democratic management with transparency and participation, equality between genders and generations, acknowledgement, respect and protection for the community's customary rights and cultural diversity of the nations, decentralisation, and inter-sectoral coordination. Considering the spirit of the TAP MPR, it is very likely that these UUs and PPs need reviewing and revising. Accordingly, the Wonosobo regulation can be regarded as more ‘progressive’ or ‘advanced’ than the PP41/1999 in view of the TAP MPR, as NGOs and others argue⁵¹.

One may have to wait for the judicial review of the Supreme Court to see the legal status of the regulation, although no one knows when and if this will come out. At least, one can tell that the legal arguments made by the state actors are not convincing enough at this moment. Even some staff members at the Legal Section of the Ministry of Forestry admitted unofficially to the Wonosobo actors that the Wonosobo regulation did not conflict with higher regulations, and the person in charge at the Ministry of Home Affairs said he did not know much about the issue because it was the Ministry of Forestry which is technically in charge (ARuPA Staff, interview, 18/Jan/2005). This legal complexity is not a good situation for the supporters of the regulation, as the legal discourse is a most effective means to win over the resource-rich powerful state actors.

⁵⁰ Ketetapan Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia No IX/MPR/2001 tentang Pembaruan Agraria dan Pengelolaan Sumber Daya Alam. See also Chapter 4.
7.4 Towards Checkmate?: Perhutani’s Pressure on the Local Actors

To change the situation, the Wonosobo Multi-stakeholder Forum made further approaches to state actors. They went to the Ministry of Home Affairs to clarify the points to be improved about the regulation. However, the staff in charge merely politely asked the Forum to revise the regulation and mentioned that they did not have any legal analysis of the regulation, although it was mentioned in the letter from the Minister to the Wonosobo Mayor52.

On 17 January, the Wonosobo Multi-stakeholder Forum met Perhutani at the Hotel Ambarukomo in Yogyakarta. Agreeing that there were some articles in the regulation to be clarified in terms of authority among parties, the MoU process stalled. Perhutani became far less compromising with the letter from the Ministry of Home Affairs; after that, Wonosobo actors were only able to talk with lower (KPH) level officials at Perhutani (ARuPA Staff, interview, 27/Dec/2004).

At the local level, each party went its own way while waiting for the revision: Perhutani promoted PHBM, and the Wonosobo Multi-stakeholder Forum furthered the PSDHBM initiative. A few Wonosobo Inter-village Farmers’ Forums (Forum Antar Petani Wonosobo) were held. Confirming the status of the regulation, that it was not cancelled yet, the farmers agreed to support and hasten the preparation process and to submit the management plan quickly to the District Forestry Office. In response, Perhutani strengthened its approach to the village heads to implement PHBM.

The Wonosobo Multi-stakeholder Forum visited the Ministry of Home Affairs again on 9 May and asked for the points that needed improving, but they received only an ambiguous response. Perhutani and the Forum met a few times later to discuss the concept of PSDH, but they could not make progress.

During the process, Perhutani pressured the villages even more through various ‘conventional’ and informal political channels, which can be compared to those used in the Suharto period. Perhutani claimed that the regulation was ‘cancelled’ by the

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Perhutani was said to have given money to most of the village heads and to have promised to make buildings and other facilities in their villages if they collaborated with Perhutani; many of the village heads were influenced by the campaign except for the ones active in preparation of the regulation.  

NGOs, local MPs and many villagers report Perhutani often used gangsters (preman) to destroy trees planted by communities and their properties (for example, interviews with ARuPA Staff, 23/Oct/2002 and 27/Dec/2004; Sukoco, 22/Mar/2003; Arif, 29/Dec/2004). In fact, this was a major reason why Wonosobo’s pro-participatory forestry actors decided to have an MoU with Perhutani, although it may have been a compromise. ‘We do not want to have chaos like some other parts of Indonesia, such as Ambon and Maluku (Krustanto, interview, 25/Oct/2002). All these have created an internal division within the villages supporting PSDHBM, as some hamlets changed their attitude after Perhutani’s action.  

In addition, some NGOs were labelled by Perhutani as communists, which is still ‘fatal’ for civil society groups in Indonesia (Krustanto, interview, 25/Oct/2002). It could decrease villagers’ support for NGOs and weaken pro-PSDHBM connections. ARuPA was pressured not to publish a report on the Wonosobo’s regulation process and participatory forestry by saying that the information is ‘biased’ (Sirait, interview, 4/Feb/2005).

**Changes in the Attitudes of Local Actors and Informal Institutions**

Perhutani’s ‘conventional’ pressure changed the attitude of some ‘network’ members. One of these groups is MPs. They allegedly received some ‘benefits’ from Perhutani (Krustanto, interview, 25/Oct/2002). Because of this and the pressure from their party

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54 The Vice-Mayor of Wonosobo also mentioned that there were cases of intimidation against those supporting PSDHBM (Afief, interview, 25/Oct/2002). In Bogoran village, the preman was allegedly sent by Perhutani and devastated forests because the villagers there were following PSDHBM style agroforestry by planting Albizia. They claimed to have ‘legal awareness’ and tried to avoid explicitly relating themselves to Perhutani (ARuPA Staff, interview, 27/Dec/2004).  
56 The Vice-Mayor also put it, although implicitly, that ‘there are many pragmatic interests of certain local politicians’ without mentioning whose interests with whom (Arief, interview,
(see Krustanto's example, mentioned above), there are many MPs who are not supportive of the regulation within the Parliament now, whereas the local MPs at Wonosobo unanimously supported the regulation when it was made (there was no opposition or questions at the Parliament) (interviews with Sukamto, 25/Oct/2002; Krustanto, 25/Oct/2002). There are in fact MPs who now argue the state forests should be managed by Perhutani (local MPs, interview, 20/Mar/2003). How Perhutani approached them is unclear, but it is true that 'after we [Perhutani] discussed with the DPRD members, many have changed their perception and recognised that Perhutani should manage the state forests' (Aji, interview, 17/Mar/2003; emphasis added).

Another is government officials. There was a rumour that Perhutani bribed local government with a billion rupiah to implement PHBM instead of PSDHBM. An MP mentioned that some local government officials distorted the information to the MPs and the Mayor to promote Perhutani's arguments because they had vested interests in Perhutani's operation resulting from their long relations (Krustanto, interview, 25/Oct/2002).

Perhutani did not need to collaborate or involve NGOs, but they needed to involve local villagers, because they needed their 'implementation resources'. One NGO staff member says 'Perhutani cannot do without farmers. Farmers plant and cut the trees. They do almost every activity of Perhutani' (ARuPA Staff, interview, 23/Oct/2002).

Perhutani, on the surface, tried to make an MoU with Wonosobo District and sought a compromise (if not a win-win) solution, although it does not legally mean the revocation of the regulation. A Perhutani staff member at Jakarta puts it: 'Wonosobo's local regulation and UU41 on Forestry are both legal and the only solution is collaborative management [between the two]' (Aji, interview, 17/Mar/2003).

In hindsight, one can also think that Perhutani was trying to delay the policy process while they were creating 'accomplished facts' in the fields by pressuring villages so that they would not apply for PSDHBM even if the regulation were implemented. As NGO staff unanimously say, Perhutani approaches village heads; the farmers tend not to know


the difference between PSDHBM and PHBM, especially where NGOs are not active. Therefore, it is relatively easy for Perhutani to approach at the village level using the political channels they have established for a long time. An ARuPA staff member says that the power unbalance between Perhutani and the communities produced unfair negotiation process for the villagers (ARuPA Staff, interview, 27/Dec/2004).

Facing Perhutani’s pressure, many villages became pro-PHBM. At the end of 2004, there were around 59 villages who had registered as a group (notaris kelompok) to conduct PHBM, while 23 villages submitted a document in favour of implementing PSDHBM, out of 154 upland forest villages in Wonosobo (ARuPA Staff, interview, 27/Dec/2004), although it is uncertain how many villages are conducting these systems in the field. The District Forestry Office does not know how to proceed with the PSDHBM proposals since the Wonosobo Forestry Forum, which is supposed to handle the process, has not yet been set up by the District Mayor. Accordingly, it is not clear at all how long the villagers have to wait to ‘legally’ implement PSDHBM. They either go ahead to conduct the PSDHBM-style agroforestry in the field (namely conventional agroforestry in the people’s forests) with the risks of Perhutani’s intervention, or turn to PHBM to secure some profits, although their share is smaller.

At this moment, one cannot expect very much initiative from local government of Wonosobo, as it still seems to be holding to the top-down bureaucratic culture of the pre-reformasi period in its relations with the state without making the most of its increased authority. In other words, the ‘standard operating procedure’ in the Suharto period still remains for the local government officials concerning their relationship with the state. The local government is mostly looking towards Jakarta, not at local communities. It is passively waiting for the state to solve the issue. The official letter addressed to the author from the Wonosobo Government mentions that ‘the district government in fact hopes that the central government take care of the problem but there is no clear resolution from the centre yet’. It does not want to have conflict with the

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58 See also Gofar (2003) for the attitude of Wonosobo District government. This attitude of Wonosobo is not unique. A staff member of FKKM said the MPs and government officials in the other regions tend to consider that Wonosobo regulation is ‘stupid’ to be against Perhutani (Awang, interview, 24/Oct/2002).

state. Since it always asked for the state’s approval in the Suharto period, they still say that, at least ostensibly, it is necessary to have Jakarta’s endorsement for implementing local regulations, although this is not anymore after the decentralisation60.

This explains why it is not the District Forestry Office of Wonosobo but the SEKDA (Sekretaris Daerah or District Secretary), who came out against the regulation most. It is in charge of the administrative and budget coordination for the Mayor and has to maintain good relations with the state. Therefore, SEKDA tried to slow down the arrangement of implementation guidelines (interviews with Krustanto, 25/Oct/2002; Sukamto, 25/Oct/2002).

After all, as the Vice-Mayor of Wonosobo says, the Wonosobo government was not used to having different opinions from the state (Arief, interview, 25/Oct/2002) and it was ‘kurang berani’ (lack of bravery)61. In such circumstances, without the clear ‘implementation guidelines’ from the District Mayor, the local government including village-level authorities do not dare to proceed with policies that are opposed by the state.

Many villagers, NGOs and the MPs are still eager to implement the regulation. Demonstrations have often occurred to demand control over forests, especially when the economic situation has deteriorated62, which made MPs and NGOs work even harder to make progress on the implementation process to improve the socio-economic conditions of the local people.

However, there has been no major change at the policy level since the Ambarukomo Meeting, although it was agreed to start negotiations again in the October 2004 with local Perhutani, in a rather small meeting (ARuPA Staff, interview, 27/Dec/2004; 14/Jan/2005). An NGO staff member mentioned that ‘I assume that there is no change in the policy as long as there is no change in the political settings’, and hoped for a change in the Mayors to a pro-PSDHBM person in the next election (ARuPA Staff, Pertanyaan’. The local government officials from SEKDA also mentioned similar views in the interview (for example, Suwando, interview, 20/Mar/2003).

60 This view is seen in interviews with Yasip, 31/Dec/2004; with Suwando, 20/Mar/2003.


62 See for example, Suara Merdeka 25/Feb/2004 ‘Ribuan Petani Datangi DPRD Wonosobo’ (Demanding Perda to be implemented).
interview, 27/Dec/2004). At the same time, activists were uncertain about the positive impacts of the election for the MPs because of the difficulty in choosing the pro-PSDHBM candidates in the proportional representation system (ARuPA Staff, interview, 19/Mar/2003).

7.5 Conclusion

If 'sustainable forest management' is defined as managing forests in such a way that their economic, ecological, and social functions are maintained over time (FAO 1993: 11; ITTO 1992: 2), one may say that the state forestry by Perhutani failed to achieve all of these objectives. The unsatisfactory ecological and economic consequences, in such terms as forest degradation and profits of Perhutani, resulted in the demand for the shift of the policies of the state and Perhutani to involve people more in forest management.

In fact, the ecosystem of Java is in a critical condition. The Indonesian government has decided to halt Perhutani's logging activities because of the water shortage caused by deforestation; Java can now only supply 25 billion m³ of water while 38 billion m³ is needed to sustain the population there. It is estimated that 30% of the total land should be covered by the forests to maintain the ecological balance in Java, while it has decreased to a mere 5%. The government now have to consider providing money to compensate Perhutani to stop logging.

The economic aspects are also the key reasons for the state to adopt participatory forestry. The financial state of Perhutani has not been good especially since the rampant forest looting in the post-Suharto period. International markets were becoming more conscious about the manner of logging. In order to optimise the ecological and economic consequences, Perhutani promoted its participatory forestry schemes.

Recognising illegal logging as one of the major causes of forest degradation, participatory forestry was increasingly understood as an effective means to improve the ecological conditions. Perhutani's Aji, who developed PHBM, mentions that 'in the old system, communities saw the forests as Perhutani's and did not feel like protecting them

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64 The Jakarta Post, 'Ministry seeks compensation for Perhutani to Stop Logging', 27/Aug/2003, p4.
from looting. Rather, they ended up participating in it’ and argues therefore PHBM is effective in protecting forests\textsuperscript{66}. For Perhutani, the MoU between Perhutani and Kuningan District in West Java is made to implement PHBM mainly to prevent forest looting\textsuperscript{67}. Besides, participatory forestry is considered to increase local people’s income and decreases the necessity to clear the forests for their survival.

The state-led participatory forestry may represent progress and give more consideration to the life of local communities than it used to, but it is undeniable that the philosophy of conventional state forestry, or utilitarian view of people’s participation, is still deeply embedded there. It emphasises economic consequences through redistribution to local people far more than their ‘rights’ to participate in forest management. The state seems to retain control over the decision making over forest management, including profit sharing and choice of species to be planted. Although there is a mechanism of discussion with communities, it is not certain if they will be listened to and be free from the state’s manipulation. Although a group of staff at Perhutani, especially those who have an educational background in forestry and field experience, argue for more involvement of communities in forest management, its mainstream management and the local staff still seem to hold a conventional mind-set.

The Wonosobo regulation has yet to be implemented. The configuration of network actors changed after the involvement of national-level actors who held conventional utilitarian ideas on forestry; in other words, the pressure from the state has made the local policy network less cohesive than it used to be concerning the regulation. As a result, the politics has changed in favour of the state’s interests or the state forestry.

One reason for this network expansion was that the local actors needed to cooperate with the state actors for the effective implementation of the regulation. Another is that the local ‘conventional’ Javanese-style political culture is embedded in the state and some local actors. Their ‘standard operating procedures’ do not seem to have changed after democratisation. The Wonosobo regulation could increase the income of local

\textsuperscript{66} Kompas ‘Merakyatkan Hutan Pascapenjarahan’ (Forests for Community after Looting), p20, 2/Feb/2002. See also, Suara Pembaruan, ‘Cegah Illegal Logging dengan Hutan Kemasyarakatan’ (Prevent Illegal Logging with Community Forestry’, p13, 4/Dec/2002;
\textsuperscript{67} See for example, Pikiran Rakyat, ‘Sistem PHBM Cegah Penjarahan’ (System PHBM Prevent Looting’, p8, 31/Dec/2002.
government and communities, and result in the sustainable development of the district; however, the conventional ideas put constraints on the local government officials to implement it without getting the consent from the state, even if it is legally appropriate. One may also regard the action of the District Mayor as also being created from these kinds of 'conventional' attitudes, which suggests the difficulty of changing the tradition of 'asal bapak senang' (as long as father is happy). The vested interests at the local level resulting from the long relationship with Perhutani also worked against the implementation of the regulation.

The pressure from the state (or Perhutani) on village heads, local MPs and government officials to further the PHBM process and halt the PSDHBM process can be considered 'illegitimate' in a liberal democratic context, although it has proved very effective. Perhutani allegedly used coercive measures as well as bribes, although it is very difficult to prove what has actually been done and how. The fact that a state-forestry corporation itself exercised political leverage on these local actors reminds us of the authoritarian period. Perhutani’s legal arguments were so unclear that local actors could have kept on negotiating with the state actors to find the way out to implement PSDHBM. The financial pressure to cut the DAU to Wonosobo was also illegitimate, so that the local actors could have ignored it.

Due to the pressure, many local actors became explicitly or implicitly against the regulation. One major reason for their susceptibility seems to be the above-mentioned persisting hierarchical political culture. As for the MPs, one can also point out the problem with Indonesia’s proportional representation system. Another reason is the lack of their capacity. Wonosobo officials could have implemented the regulation if they had knowledge, experience and resources, without being afraid of the state. In interviews the author has gained the impression that the local officials, especially those who are against the regulation, tend to lack legal knowledge about the issue. For example, they often argue that the regulation shifts the ownership of the forests from the state to

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68 ARuPA showed its concern about the insufficiency of the resources in the Wonosobo government for the successful implementation of the regulation. (‘Community Forestry...’, www.arupa.or.id Accessed on 8/Mar/2003)
69 See also Campbell (2002: 123) for the shared view concerning the insufficient capacity of local forestry officials and the importance of developing it.
communities; they even say that the state officially cancelled the regulation\textsuperscript{70}. Villagers tend to have insufficient knowledge about the policy options and their impacts on their life. This can result not only in non-optimal political participation by the local people but also in the unequal outcome of decentralisation between regions with relatively knowledgeable constituencies\textsuperscript{71}. In such a case, the manipulation by a politically and financially strong actor - such as Perhutani - is possible.

At the national level, developmentalist-utilitarian ideas have remained dominant and have determined the actors who get close to the power centre, as in the Suharto period. The Ministry of Forestry, and later the Ministry of Home Affairs to some extent, followed Perhutani's preferences. In the process, the people in favour of community-based forestry tended to be alienated from the centre of decision-making, including the reformist people at Perhutani such as Aji. Instead, the most powerful section of Perhutani with various vested interests, namely Unit I, came to take the initiative.

The state wanted to retain its authority. For the state, the Wonosobo regulation itself does not have a significant impact on it because the forests there have not been very profitable, or they may have even been making deficits (ARuPA Staff, interview, 23/Oct/2002). There are two major reasons why Perhutani made great efforts to resist giving away authority to the other actors. One is that Perhutani was afraid of the 'domino effect' of the case, resulting in losing its authority over forests all over Java, although this kind of regulation could increase the profits of Perhutani. Perhutani has an established organisation, and attitudes that are state-centric, as a result of its long history dating back to the colonial era, which cannot be changed in a short period. For most of the other state actors, the status quo is the best situation regardless of the spirit of decentralisation laws, even in the forestry sector. To put it another way, they do not have strong interests in being against a powerful Perhutani.

Another possible explanation is given in the context of the local political culture in the 'process' of decision-making. The issue of Wonosobo is 'not the contents of the regulation itself, but the matter of dignity' (Sirait, interview, 4/Feb/2005). In fact,\textsuperscript{70,71}


\textsuperscript{71} See Wollenberg and Kartodihardjo (2002) for the argument of the regional inequality due to the various capacity of the local people.
legally speaking, the Wonosobo regulation is not very different from SK 677/1998 and SK 31/2001 on participatory forestry issued by the Ministry of Forestry, and there is no reason why these are only applicable outside Java, as one researcher pointed out (Sirait, interview, 4/Feb/2005). When all the forest-related laws are being revised, as ARuPA staff mentioned (interview, 27/Dec/2004), it is unreasonable that Perhutani was the only exception.

The contrast between Wonosobo and the successful case in West Lampung seems to show the importance of showing deference to the ‘father’ by consulting and involving the state in the local policy process to get the maximum benefit of the decentralisation, although this chapter has not made sufficient analysis of the other cases to argue this. In addition to the lack of major vested interests, an ICRAF staff member who participated in the process mentioned that the multi-stakeholder approach was the key to success; among others, the involvement of neighbouring districts and the Ministry of Forestry was significant (Sirait, interview, 4/Feb/2005). Wonosobo’s case was also significantly participative; however, it was bottom-up in nature and did not involve the state very much. The involvement of the state means to consult ‘father’ and let him make decisions, which has resulted in the Ministerial Decree from Jakarta rather than the District regulation in the case of Lampung; the involvement of the other districts or provincial level cooperation has helped the district not to stand out as ‘anak nakal’ (naughty child) (Sirait, interview, 4/Feb/2005).

The impact of democratisation on the local policy process cannot be understood without considering the impact of the state and political culture. Partly due to the rapid political transition, the state has also shown a lack of capacity as is seen in the conflicts between the laws such as between forestry laws and decentralisation laws72. This has opened a political space in which influential state actors can exert power to make decisions in a conventional state-centric manner. Wonosobo studies seem to show that, although institutional democratisation has increased opportunities for the local policy process to be more democratic, the outcome as well as the process itself can be changed

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72 The 1999 decentralisation laws, namely UU 22/1999 and UU 25/1999, were revised to be UU 32/2004 and UU 33/2004. Forestry laws are also often said to be revised, although the process has not taken place yet.
by the influence of the state exercised through 'conventional' channels.
Lafferty and Meadowcroft (1996b:2) state, 'there are good reasons for believing that the relationship between democracy...and good environmental practice...is far from being straightforward'. Considering the critical environmental conditions and unremitting democratisation around the world, however, enhancing environmental governance in a democratic transition is a crucial task for people in this generation. The first step towards it should be to understand the impact of democratisation on environmental governance.

This thesis divided governance into two aspects (the development of actors and of their networks) and studied the case of a developing country with emphasis on the local level politics. The research question of the thesis was: 'How did democratisation affect ENGOs and policy networks?'. The analysis of Chapters 3 and 4, which was made with reference to the theoretical framework in Chapter 2, showed the answer to the first half of the question (on ENGOs), with related findings. Chapters 5, 6, 7 attempted to answer the latter half of it (on networks).

The analysis in the preceding chapters shows that, in short, democratisation, especially democratic ideas, had significant impacts on environmental governance by stimulating the development of ENGOs and their involvement in policy networks. In other words, this thesis has shown that the impacts of democratisation on environmental governance can be seen clearly by focusing on ENGOs. This chapter first answers the research question based on the findings in this thesis according to the two dimensions of governance, with reference to the analytical checkpoints set out in Chapter 2 (in 8.1 below). Then, the implications for the discourses on democratisation and the environment are made clear (in 8.2). This is followed by the summary of the research
contributions of this thesis (in 8.3). This chapter finishes by identifying future research agendas (8.4).

8.1 The Impacts of Democratisation on Environmental Governance

The Growth of ENGOs

- How did the ‘developmental state’ in the pre-democratised period constrain the growth and activities of ENGOs?
- How did democratic ideas change ENGO strategies and the elites?

ENGOs started to grow in the authoritarian Suharto period in the late 1970s, because changes in the ideas (or those in the framing) related to the environment animated environmental activities, although the political structure was closed and the activities of civil society groups were restricted at that time. Before the late 1970s, forerunners to ENGOs such as the Scouts emerged. Together with international ENGOs, they increased people’s environmental understanding, including the perception that human activities were a cause of environmental degradation. International conferences such as UNHCE raised the environmental awareness of the elites. In addition to the environmental conditions which started to degrade at that time, this resulted in the emergence of ENGOs such as YIH. They engaged in more or less practical activities (such as green education) rather than advocacy.

The birth of WALHI and the development of ENGOs in the early 1980s were due largely to the efforts by the Environmental Minister Emil Salim. He was ‘a true believer in popular participation in sustainable development management’, as a WALHI leader says (Purnomo, 1994: 28)\(^1\). In other words, his appointment provided political opportunities for environmental groups because, as political opportunities theories argue, he was an elite ‘ally’ of NGOs within the state and he facilitated ENGO activities as well as protecting activists from political oppression. He hosted national-level meetings which resulted in WALHI. His appointment is better regarded as a change in informal institutions, because its positive impact on ENGOs was very much related to his personal traits rather than the formal position itself; one cannot expect a similar impact.

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\(^1\) One can also suppose that Salim tended to have sympathy for activists in general as he himself had been a student activist and had chaired the Student Council of the University of Indonesia.
if somebody else had been appointed to the position.

However, in the authoritarian political climate, the policies he pushed to develop ENGOs were largely ‘utilitarian’, to support the Ministry and the delivery of its environmental policies within the state’s ideology, but not to accommodate the various preferences represented by them in a liberal democratic manner. This attitude of the government can be seen from the articles in environmental and forestry laws.

Suharto allowed ENGOs as long as they did not go beyond the authoritarian corporatist style of state-interest group relations. Suharto could have acknowledged WALHI and others as a way to strengthen the control over civil society activities in environmental fields as well as to manage environmental issues. Salim encouraged ENGOs not to be confrontational towards the state, as one can see from his demand to use the label of ‘LSMs’ rather than ‘non-governmental’ groups. Environmental issues were considered as non-political; ENGOs also did not actively engage in political activities or go beyond the state’s ideology; otherwise, they could have been oppressed.

The spread of democratic ideas from the late 1980s (the participatory phase of democratisation) politicised ENGOs. In this period, ENGOs started to advocate and take various political actions, such as lawsuits and demonstrations. They also initiated efforts to strengthen the relationship with grassroots-level actors, to enhance their legitimacy and political influence. This was significant because the environmental movement had been separated from the grassroots struggle over natural resources management, and was predominantly an elite movement.

The democratic ideas became significant mainly for two reasons. One was the merger of social movements under the banner of democratisation. The influx of former student activists and legal groups into the environmental movement furthered its politicisation, particularly enhancing the rights discourse. The international conferences on human rights and the enhanced relationship with international NGOs pushed the trend forward. These trends brought social aspects into the ‘environmental’ arguments by ENGOs.

The other is the expanded geographical fields of ENGOs’ activities to include the Outer Islands. The fieldwork there was facilitated by the increase in the environmental
activists with expertise such as forestry, and the dissemination of skills such as PRA. It resulted in the *utilitarian arguments* to demand participation in natural resources management; namely, they found out that local people were capable of managing natural resources in a sustainable manner.

In addition, working with and for the environmental victims and indigenous people, they realised that the state-led top-down development projects caused many social as well as environmental problems. Environmental activists developed the *rights-based arguments* for more participation in natural resources management by pointing out local people’s poor socio-economic and political conditions resulting from the state-centric development policies. It was argued that participation was an effective means to achieve a fairer sustainable development. It follows from these points that democracy in environmental governance was also demanded for more practical ecological reasons, in addition to the ideological demands in the course of the democratisation movement.

ENGOs also ‘democratised’ themselves from the late 1990s (the decision phase of democratisation). Their motivation for these actions seems to have come from the spread of democratic ideas as well as the local political culture. Their activities shifted to being more collaborative with (although critical of) the government, and the radical section weakened. ENGOs also enhanced their ties with communities (particularly environmental victims and indigenous people). Like other East Asian countries, environmental victims did not form ENGOs in Indonesia; however, the existing ENGOs increasingly developed relations with them by organising communities and working as their agents (see also below) on various issues in the process of democratisation.

The ‘democratisation’ trend is more apparent when looking at their internal restructuring. They advanced information disclosure: this is significant because ‘an institution is democratic to the degree it is accountable to society’ and it happens in the Southern states in a transition period that ‘their accountability is not systematic and they may not be sustainable’ (Ribot, 2004: 18, 20). Many ENGOs enhanced participatory decision making systems and some developed ‘supporters’ systems. These are the responses by Indonesian ENGOs to the issues concerning NGOs’ legitimacy, accountability and performance in a democratic system, which can be questioned due to
their financial dependence on overseas (and domestic to a lesser extent) funding agencies and lack of clear public support. In other words, they made efforts to be legitimate as an actor in democratic environmental governance by democratising themselves.

- What were the influences of economic conditions (growth, slump, poverty, and the expansion of education) on ENGOs?

Economic growth was not a major factor in the development of ENGOs in Indonesia. In other words, ENGOs were able to grow in a society below the poverty line. Indonesia is still a poor country and the domestic funding sources have been insignificant for ENGO activities; besides, they shrank after the economic crisis in 1997/98.

At the same time, the international funding agencies remained significant for ENGOs. Their funds and strategies were more influenced by international factors rather than domestic factors in Indonesia. Importantly, the shift of their funds to community based activities and small-medium size ENGOs in the 1990s developed these groups and activities. Reflecting these trends, the networks of ENGOs continued to grow from the last years of the New Order regime.

The economic slump did not divert people’s attention from environmental issues, unlike what happened in Eastern Europe. This is partly related to the difference in the characteristics of major environmental problems: the demand for natural resources extraction increases because of the need for quick economic recovery through more exports, as well as for sustaining people’s livelihood, while pollution decreases in a period of economic stagnation and it can be technologically fixed. Rather, economic stagnation increased the unemployment rate, which turned the eyes of university graduates to NGOs as potential employers.

University students have been the major provider of human resources to ENGOs, and the expansion of higher education, to which economic growth contributed, facilitated ENGO activities. Having said that, there were other important factors bringing students into the environmental movement: the ban on political activities on campus, the spread of democratic ideas, and the economic slump. Besides, university
students (and the staff members of ENGOs) in Indonesia can still be considered as elites and not from poor families, who are the majority of the Indonesian population. Given these impacts, one cannot simply conclude that economic growth is the critical factor for the development of ENGOs, unlike the arguments made based on the experiences of Western countries (see Chapter 2).

- What are the impacts of the democratic arrangement of formal institutions?

Human resources for Indonesian ENGOs did not shift to parliamentary politics, unlike ENGOs in Eastern Europe and some other countries. One reason seems to be that Indonesian ENGOs were more established and committed to natural resources management, while the regime change sapped the momentum of the environmental movement in Eastern Europe (because the regime change was the real motivation of many ‘environmental’ activists there) and pollution became less intense after the economic slump.

The formal-legal settings facilitated the growth of ENGOs’ activities. Not to mention the political liberalisation in the post-Suharto era, the 1982 Basic Environment Law and the regulation on Environmental Impact Analysis (AMDAL) in 1986 helped NGOs to observe the environmental impacts of business and government projects.

However, it was the ‘ideas’ or ‘framing’ factors as well as the funding strategies that were no less important for the growth of ENGOs, as mentioned above, which can be overlooked if taking an ‘old institutionalism’ perspective. This can be partly seen from the continuity of the trend before and after the institutional democratisation. For example, ENGOs’ efforts to make the most of the parliamentary system, such as WALHI’s voter education project, started before a more democratic system was institutionalised.

The findings from the analysis in Chapters 3 and 4 can be summarised as below:

i. Democratic ideas have strengthened governance by growing ENGOs, as they have ‘re-framed’ environmental issues, and increased ‘political opportunities’ by shifting the values of government officials (even before the changes in formal institutions).

ii. Democratic ideas have strengthened governance by enhancing ENGOs’
accountability and their approach to stakeholders at the community level.

iii. The democratic arrangement of formal institutions facilitated ENGO activities, but it was only one of the factors for the development of ENGOs.

iv. The institutionalisation of electoral politics did not weaken the environmental movement.

v. The relationship between economic level and the growth of ENGOs was not straightforward. Economic growth is not necessary for the development of ENGOs.

Policy Networks

In the Suharto period, decisions over natural resources management were made in an oligarchical system involving only the chief executives of large corporations (i.e. the board members of APKINDO) and their political patrons, to maximise the macro-level economic growth and their own personal benefits. The patron-client relationship based on personal reciprocities such as family connections and economic dependency was the primary institution through which to channel such demands, and therefore proximity to the power centre was more important than official positions. This was underpinned by the Javanese political culture, which respects age and seniority, proximity to the power centre, and personal connections in decision making. In other words, natural resources were used to enhance the regime's authoritarian rule in a patrimonial way, in that they were provided as a reward of their loyalty to the ruler.

The regime's preference accommodation can be called 'authoritarian corporatism': functional groups were formed by the state to represent each sectoral interest, unlike in the liberal democratic style in which various actors compete for the allocation of values by the state. Possibilities to influence the policy-making process in a democratic manner, namely through political parties and MPs, were almost nil.

Involvement of NGOs in the process was 'quite rare' and the 'economist-dominated development planners emphasised growth-oriented modernisation as the ultimate national development goal', for which 'local-based and small-scale forestry practices were deemed irrelevant' (Lindayati 2002: 44). The activities of NGOs and local people
that could hinder the state's goals were often oppressed. Their importance was recognised by the state only in terms of their implementation resources to help the government policies.

The contributions of this system to the improvement of social and economic conditions of the local people (especially forest dwellers) were negligible, while its (negative) environmental impacts were significant. The state might have achieved macro-level economic growth to a certain extent; but at the local level, it was not successful in achieving sustainable development in all its three aspects.

- What was the role of ENGOs as network outsiders, and democratisation, in setting policy agendas and opening policy windows?

Civil society actors played an important role in bringing issues on to the political agenda. This was even true in the authoritarian period. In the preparation phase of democratisation, ENGOs played an important role in pushing the Indorayon issue on to the political agenda, together with the media and communities, through 'outsider' strategies such as lawsuits and protests. In the decision phase of democratisation, ENGOs' information on deforestation (forest looting) and the capacity of local people to manage the forests in sustainable manner attracted local MPs' attention in Wonosobo, leading to the local regulation on participatory forestry.

- How did democratisation change the participants in policy networks?
- How did different democratic ideas come up through network changes and influence the alternatives specification?

In the preparation phase of democratisation, the Indorayon case study shows that local actors started to emerge; however, they were not insiders of the decision-making networks, and their ties with communities and the elites were still weak in the face of the state's oppression. As a result, there was no major change in the state's decisions concerning the company's operation. ENGOs were involved only in the implementation of government policies, as a watchdog of pollution emissions by the companies. Basically, their participation was limited in a utilitarian sense; the government thought it would be better to do so to alleviate protests and improve ecological conditions, and not to listen to the preferences of the local people.
In the decision phase, ENGOs played a critical role in changing policy networks. ENGOs developed further and became involved in the networks. Importantly, they also started to link with various actors at the community, district and national levels. They assisted local people to organise in the case of Indorayon. In Wonosobo, ENGOs conducted fieldwork relating to the difficulties local villagers were experiencing and helped them to get into the policy process. The strengthened ties with local people enhanced ENGOs' legitimacy as their agent. Facilitated by the liberalised political climate, which reduced mental barriers for the hitherto cautious people to participate in the environmental movement, they also involved local and national level elites in the anti-Indorayon movement, which helped them to reach decision makers in Jakarta such as the President of Indonesia. The Wonosobo case study shows that ENGOs played an important role in connecting academics and local MPs, who increased in importance after the 1999 decentralisation laws. One can say that ENGOs reduced the political 'remoteness' of the relevant actors on environmental issues.

The involvement of ENGOs and other civil society actors in the decision making process was mainly due to an increase in their resources, especially 'legitimacy' and 'information/expertise'. The spread of democratic ideas among decision makers enhanced the former. It also contributed to the latter through the growth of ENGOs together with the political liberalisation which facilitated ENGO activities. Habibie involved YPPDT in making decisions concerning Indorayon's operation, as it was considered important to listen to NGOs in the political climate at that time. Wahid and his Environmental Minster Keraf were also accessible to ENGOs and community leaders as democratic gestures were important for the regime. These resulted in the halt of the operation of the company's mill in Porsea in 1999 and its partial closure in 2000. In Wonosobo, ENGOs were in the centre of policy making on participatory forestry because of their information about participatory forestry and local forest conditions, their increased legitimacy as representatives of the local people, and their 'implementation resources' especially in terms of community empowerment.

The findings of this thesis demonstrate contrasts with Potter's study of Indorayon's
case in the Suharto period. He concludes that ‘the analysis finds that NGOs in both
democratic and non-democratic political contexts may have little direct influence on
forest policy choices, more influence on policy implementation’ and ENGOs ‘may have
considerable influence on some policy choices in Northern democratic contexts..., but it
is wrong simply to suppose they are similarly influential in Southern democracies’
(Potter, 1996a: 30-31). The case studies in this thesis show that Southern ENGOs can
have considerable influence on the policy choices.

While the changes in the network members explain the timing of the decision
change, the types of ideas held among the members had an impact on the selection of
policies. When democratic ideas were held by most of the network members, the
outcome was one in favour of the local people’s interests. The involvement of civil
society actors in the Indorayon process turned out to be the partial closure of the Porsea
mill; the Wonoboso process at the local level resulted in the innovative participatory
forestry regulation after Perhutani’s opt-out.

One may want to go further to argue that the kinds of democratic ideas held by the
network members also influenced the process as well as the outcome. For example,
whether the decision makers held utilitarian ideas or rights-based ideas on people’s
participation made a difference. In the Indorayon case study, YPPDT was chosen not
because the government recognised the people’s rights to participate in the decision-
making process - otherwise, there were other more appropriate groups to be selected. It
was rather because the staff members of the group were acquaintances of the President
and they were recognised as appropriate to bring about good consequences because of
their scientific backgrounds. As a result, it was the temporary halt of the factory
operation rather than its closure which was demanded by the locals. The Wahid regime
was close and listened to the communities and ENGOs, but did not provide them with
the rights to participate in the decision-making. As a consequence, when the objectives
of the regime were shifted towards economic growth in the Megawati regime, the
government opened the Indorayon pulp mill.

In the case of Wonosobo, the local policy process was halted and the state-led

2 He compared the Indorayon case (the case from the authoritarian regime) with a case of forest
management from democratic India.
PHBM became a major alternative after the network was expanded to involve state actors due to their implementation resources: they regarded participation in a utilitarian manner, to maximise economic and ecological consequences. PHBM is a progress from the earlier versions of participatory forestry schemes by Perhutani in terms of its concern for the lives of local communities; nevertheless it did not depart from the utilitarian ideology of state forestry. The major motivations of PHBM were to curb forest looting and to improve the financial conditions of Perhutani, rather than to respect people's rights to manage the forests. The state (or Perhutani) controlled people's participation in order to maximise ecological and economic consequences. Facing the pressure from the state, local actors with conventional ideas of top-down decision making process ceased their support for the regulation and ENGOs.

The state's utilitarian arguments have been strengthened in relation to the increase of economic demands, which led to the rejection by the state of certain (potential) network members. Among the state actors, people who were close to civil society groups and could hinder the conventional vested interests were marginalised from the decision making, as is seen from Perhutani's Bambang Aji. Instead, the most powerful parties gained the upper hand such as Perhutani's Unit I. The Ministry of Forestry and the Ministry of Home Affairs followed Perhutani's will. In Megawati's cabinet, the Minister of Environment was alienated from the decision making concerning Indorayon; instead, the Minister of Trade and Industry and the Minister of Manpower and Transmigration were appointed to handle the issue.

- How did the existing components of networks (i.e. informal institutions such as conventional norms) mediate the impact of democratisation?

The case studies in this thesis have shown that 'informal institutions', which seem to have been persistent even after the democratic arrangement of formal institutions, constrained the behaviour of the actors in the networks. They were more or less 'habituated' in the 32 years of Suharto's reign underpinned by the Javanese political culture: they cannot be changed in a short period. Also, it has to be noticed that, almost by definition, they can hinder the democratic participation of new actors, for example local people, in favour of conventionally powerful actors.
Both the Wonosobo and Indorayon case studies show that the paternalistic relations between the state and the local government are still seen even after decentralisation. Local governments continue to follow the top-down ‘standard operating procedures’ from the Suharto period. The state actors ‘still act as in the New Order period’. Similar relations are also seen in the political parties such as PDI-P: local MPs and District Mayors tend to be subject to the preferences of their parties in Jakarta.

For the state actors, there are economic reasons to make efforts to retain their dominance. As an academic who helped to design the 1999 Decentralisation Laws says, ‘all the ministries in Jakarta are hesitant to give away powers, because many officials still have interests at the local level and want to protect their sources of private revenue’.

Nevertheless, the viewpoint of ideas and informal institutions is even more important to understand the state-district relations, given the attitudes of local actors and the findings from the Wonosobo case. The implementation of the Wonosobo regulation would have been better for the local government, as well as local constituencies, in terms of the increase in its revenue; however, the local government officials and the Mayor respected the will of the state and halted the process. For the state, the Wonosobo regulation itself was not a significant setback; rather, it could increase Perhutani’s profit as well as forest conservation. However, the state resisted giving away authority for fear of the ‘domino effect’ when other districts followed the regulation, which could result in the loss of control over forests all over Java. Also, the state wanted to be treated as ‘father’, like in the Lampung case; if the Wonosobo actors had consulted state actors from the beginning, even though legally they did not have to do so to make local regulations, the results could have been different.

State actors used the conventional informal political pressure on local actors, which resembles how the New Order regime acted, including coercive measures and bribing. Megawati tightened the grip on the anti-Indorayon protests at the local level by force. Perhutani allegedly approached local villages, MPs and government staff through

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3 HuMa’s Sandra Moniaga’s comment, Jawa Pos 3/Oct/2002, ‘Perda Kehutanan Wonosobo Lebih Maju’ (Wonosobo Local Regulation is More Advanced’).
4 University of Gadjah Mada’s Afan Gaffar’s comment quoted in Down to Earth, No. 51, November 2001, ‘Regional Autonomy: Future Uncertain’.
bribing, intimidation, and coercive measures. Besides, both cases were mainly handled by the state actors who are not formally in charge of the political negotiation with the local actors. For example, it was not the Ministries of Forestry and Home Affairs but Perhutani in the Wonosobo case, and it was not the Environmental Ministry but the other Ministers and Tim 11 in the Indorayon case, together with the security forces.

There are more findings from case studies showing the importance of informal aspects. For example, personal connection was still important, as is seen from how YPPDT was selected as a representative of ENGOs although there were other groups appropriate for the task.

The impacts of conventional informal institutions have been rather neglected in studies of the decentralised environmental governance in Indonesia, which tend to focus on the economic causes of the actors. So far, they have often pointed out that the local governments tend to try to 'secure short-term economic gains with inadequate attention to long-term environmental, social and economic considerations' with reference to over-issuing the forest concessions from the district governments (Resosudarmo, 2005: 125).

However, both the Wonosobo and Indorayon cases show that it was not only the economic gains of the local governments but also conventional paternalistic relations with the state which were significant in determining their practices. The different results may be due to the fact that the cases studied in this thesis were the downstream forest product processing industry (Indorayon) instead of concession allocation, and the case of Java (Wonosobo) where the state forestry is more established than the Outer Islands. The Wonosobo case also shows that the local MPs can take initiatives to make policies that demonstrate concern over the sustainability of forest management instead of the concern for economic gains. These case studies are suggestive in considering the state-local relations in environmental governance in the transition period, especially after the revocation of the rights of local governments to issue concessions in the Indonesian context.

The findings on environmental governance from Chapters 5, 6 and 7 can be summarised as follows:

i. Democratic ideas enhanced governance through involving ENGOs in policy
networks by increasing their resources, particularly legitimacy. ENGOs played a critical role in involving the communities and other actors (such as academics) in the networks.

ii. The increase in the network members with democratic ideas (or the spread of democratic ideas among them) pushed the agenda and policies that reflected the democratic values. The differences in the democratic ideas (i.e. utilitarian or rights-based) also influenced the alternatives specification.

iii. Conventional informal institutions still remained, and constrained actors, especially those who were less influenced by democratic values. This resulted in a relative increase in the influence of conventionally strong actors (e.g. the state and large businesses) and their utilitarian arguments.

iv. ENGOs were able to contribute to agenda setting with outsider strategies even in the authoritarian period, while they became able to politicise issues with their expertise under the democratic conditions.

8.2 Implications for the Discourses on Democratisation and the Environment

The differences in the utilitarian and rights-based arguments for democratisation of environmental governance have implications for sustainable development because they produce different outcomes. In summary, this thesis has shown that the former tended to neglect the social aspect of sustainability, which eventually hindered the achievement of the ecological and economic objectives of it as well. This can be seen from the failure of Perhutani's participatory forestry schemes (although it is too early to judge the consequences of the recently initiated PHBM). On the other hand, the conventional style of agroforestry or rights-based participatory forestry has proved its capacity for sustainable forest management in people's forests for a long time. The technological fix of the pollution problems from Indorayon may have reduced the air and water pollutants; however, locals still suffer from the environmental conditions, and conflicts still continue. Although it goes beyond the scope of this thesis to judge whether the level of pollution is high enough to cause environmental problems, this can also be attributed to the lack of social perspectives in the state's utilitarian approach. People did
not have the chance to reflect their preferences in decisions, while the participation of ENGOs was limited to the policy delivery at that time. One may argue that local people's participation could have reduced the conflicts with Indorayon by deepening the understandings of each party on the issue. In other words, the utilitarian approach to participation might have contributed to the improvement of environmental conditions, while it failed to achieve the social objectives of sustainable development, which left the environmental issues unsolved.

This seems to be because delineating the 'greatest good' for the 'greatest number of people' (or 'what' for 'whom') is very difficult. The lack of local communities' participation can divert the benefits of the natural resources to the politically powerful people from those who tend to be poor and directly engage in their management. The former people are close to the ecosystem and are the ones who suffer most from environmental degradation, but they are 'remote' from the decision making system. The latter are close to the power centre but 'remote' from the ecosystem, and may pay insufficient attention to the local ecological conditions because of their desire for quick economic gains. Since economic achievement at the macro-level tends to be more important in state-centric natural resources management, it is unlikely that the state will prioritise the improvement of the livelihood of local communities with complex social, cultural and institutional factors in mind.

Also, the best 'consequences' for decision makers can change from time to time. The Megawati regime respected economic consequences (especially at the macro-level) more than Habibie and Wahid, who valued the democratic process more. This resulted in her strong support for the opening of the pulp mill, even by use of coercive measures, while neglecting democratic governance and consequently the social objectives of sustainable development.

This thesis has shown that it is possible for the local people with ENGOs' assistance to make effective contributions to decision-making even in poverty, unlike some theories in the utilitarian approach (such as EM) suggest. Given that the ENGOs' capacity to reduce the 'remoteness' of the people, as is seen in the case studies, the liberal democratic understanding of participation needs to be enhanced in such contexts.
Liberal democratic political conditions may have to come earlier to reduce such ‘remoteness’ in Southern contexts before Plumwood’s (1998) ‘communicative participatory democracy’ to ecologise democracy.

Considering that the utilitarian and rights-based approaches to democracy or participation can result in different ecological, social and economic impacts, it is important to distinguish the two when arguing about the democratisation of environmental politics. One may go further to point out the weakness of the former in including social aspects of sustainable development, because of its potential conflicts with ecological and economic objectives, making its ‘consequential’ approach difficult. These three objectives (economic, ecological and social) are related to each other in a tighter manner in developing countries - the advancement of one of them can often conflict with that in another. The utilitarian arguments therefore need re-examining in consideration of the issue of participation in environmental governance in the Third World or the places where there are social and economic disparities. This point is suggestive when considering the applicability of the EM theory to developing countries.

8.3 Summary of Research Contributions

Democratisation and Environmental Governance: ENGOs and Networks

As is pointed out in Chapter 1, the impact of democratisation on environmental governance is rather a neglected topic despite the increasing attention to the relationship between the environment and democracy. In addition, existing studies are biased towards the cases in the North, although more dynamic political changes are taking place in the South. Walker (1997:257) says that ‘scholarly literature supporting the idea of congruence between democracy and environmental quality often does not differentiate between the experiences of Western societies and those of the ‘South’ and is generally more normative than analytical or empirical’. This is true in both dimensions of governance.

The studies of the impact of democratisation on the growth of ENGOs and the environmental movement are few, especially in the context of the Third World and in East Asia. This can mean that attention has been paid perfunctorily to the economic
constraints and the formal and informal political constraints in ‘successful’
developmental states.

Financial constraints can undermine ENGOs’ legitimacy, as they have to rely on
funding sources other than the wide public through membership systems like in the
North, which also constrains their political influence. As is seen in Appendix D (see also
Chapter 2.1), the number of members of Northeast Asian ENGOs are 10 to 100 times
less than those in Western countries, and the gap is much wider in the case of Southeast
Asian ENGOs. Although the spread of democratic ideas can stimulate Southern ENGOs
to cope with this situation, as this thesis has shown, this topic has attracted little
attention so far.

In countries where the states or bureaucrats have succeeded in economic growth,
they may not feel the need for providing political opportunities to ENGOs. Yet if
democratic ideas spread among a section of the elite (or people with democratic ideas
hold important posts within the government), it can change a section of the elite and
they can facilitate ENGO activities; yet again, few studies have been made on this
aspect.

The Indonesian case study in this thesis can contribute to these literature gaps. In
addition, the Indonesian ENGOs after transition have not yet been studied well. More
ink has been spent on them in the Suharto period, but few studies have been made on
the comprehensive historical development of them, and almost minimal reference to the
impact of democratisation. This thesis can also make a contribution to the literature in
this regard.

There is also a geographical gap in the studies of democratisation and the
environmental policy process (or networks). As Potter (1996) notes, the advocacy of
Southern ENGOs at the local and national policy process itself is a less studied topic,
not to mention those in a period of rapid political transition. This can hinder the efforts
to enhance democratic environmental governance there. Demands for growth are
stronger in developing countries and the extraction of natural resources is a quick way
to gain foreign currency, as many Southeast Asian countries did. The state-sponsored
efforts towards this resulted in accelerating the political and economic marginalisation
of weaker grassroots actors in the region (Hurst, 1990; Dauvergne, 1993/4; Bryant and Bailey, 1997: 57). The disparity between the rich and the poor tends to be bigger in developing countries. Together with the relative weakness of Southern ENGOs, the democratic transition of the environmental decision making process should have different consequences in developing countries. This thesis has contributed to the literature by studying the case of a democratising Southern country in East Asia.

The theories of the policy process have been largely developed in European and North American countries, which are better-off and relatively stable in political terms than developing countries, especially those in the process of democratisation. This raises concerns about the theories' capacity to travel to the South, particularly on how to consider exogenous factors to policy systems and conventional political cultures embedded in political actors from the authoritarian period.

In the case of the policy network theories, although it has been argued to be important to incorporate ideational and external factors to enhance them (Atkinson and Colman 1992: 172-6), they have been rather neglected so far. The dynamic exogenous factors such as democratisation can have considerable impacts on the policy process. By definition, informal institutions in the authoritarian period get along well with the authoritarian regime, which suggests that they can persist and work against greater participation of new actors in decision making.

Perhaps these points are related to the theories' insufficient attention to the role of outsiders, such as the NGOs' role in raising public concern over particular issues. This partly results in the theories' weakness in explaining the agenda setting phase, especially in the authoritarian period. With the help of the multiple streams perspective, this thesis has tried to make a contribution to the literature by analysing the case of democratising Indonesia, with attention to the exogenous factors as well as the role of

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5 Although this was not the focus of this thesis, international factors are also important in many cases in considering the environmental governance in developing countries. One reason is that the Northern based multi-national companies are very powerful and the Southern states are relatively weak in the current liberalising international economy. Another is that the international indebtedness of the South exacerbates the situation.

6 Having said that, there is an increase of important studies of the theories of policy processes in the Southern context. See Keeley and Scoones (2003) and Fairhead and Leach (2003) for example.
In other words, this thesis has tried to show that the theories of policy network and multiple streams are effective in analysing the case of developing countries in a rapid political transition, while also demonstrating the compatibility of these two. The policy network theories were flexible and helped to understand the changes in the networks through the transition from authoritarian to more democratic regimes, which resulted in changes in the public choices. The multiple streams complemented them by helping to understand the role of outsiders and exogenous factors, especially in the agenda setting phase.

**Discourses on Democratisation and the Environment**

This thesis has contributed to the discourses on the congruencies between democracy (democratisation) and the environment, which have not yet been studied well in the Southern context, by studying the Indonesian case. Also, this thesis has tried to show that it is meaningful to categorise the discourses into 'utilitarian' and 'rights-based' approaches to facilitate the arguments. The contribution of this thesis may be more significant for the former, as they tend to be more popular in developed countries. For example, one of the major discourses among the former is Ecological Modernisation (EM) theories, which are a dominant discourse in the North, while it has been pointed out that it is necessary to explore the extent to which EM applies outside the North (e.g. Young, 2000), especially countries with different levels of prosperity, social equality and state repression (Fisher and Freudenburg, 2001).

**Methodology**

This thesis has situated itself within one of the major theoretical approaches in politics: New Institutionalism (particularly Historical Institutionalism). Most of the literature based on the New Institutionalism tends to examine the politics under stable institutions in a comparative manner, which has resulted in the under-development of theories of institutional formation and change (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992). Historical institutionalists tend to study the process of how ideas are mediated by institutions and
result in political outcomes (e.g. Hall, 1992; King, 1992; and Weir, 1992), which may be because most of the studies have been made on cases in Northern states where institutions are relatively stable. This thesis has examined the case in which institutions are in transition, with emphasis on the interaction of institutions and ideas. Ideas (democratic ideas) are considered as the product and cause of ‘institutional dynamism’ in Thelen and Steinmo’s term (1992) (i.e. democratisation and governance), which can hopefully make some contribution to the literature.

New Institutionalism proved to be effective in analysing the cases in this thesis. The growth of ENGOs and the changes in the networks could not have been understood well if the emphasis was put exclusively on formal-legal arrangements, because ideas and informal institutions played a critical role in shaping both aspects of governance in the transitional period. Also, the case studies demonstrated that informal institutions are more stable than formal institutions and often are obstacles to change. Ideas that go along with the new formal institutional arrangement are not accepted by the conventional informal institutions, resulting in constraining actors in governance.

This thesis has shown the case study to be a useful method in analysing the impact of democratisation on environmental governance. As for the selection of the cases, this thesis has illustrated the importance of emphasising the local level politics with reference to the national level actors. Local people are sensitive to the changes in environmental conditions and they have higher motivation to improve the environmental policies. They are also keen on using natural resources for their economic benefit. It is especially true of the people living in the regions that are rich in natural resources. In centralised authoritarian states, they ‘are quite poor precisely because central governments and large companies have traditionally appropriated the great majority of benefits without reinvesting in the local area’ (Ribot, 2004: 53). The Wonosobo case study shows that it is also true of the regions in which natural resources are not very rich. In both cases, local people had been oppressed in the authoritarian period in order to maximise the economic benefits for the ‘greatest number of people’, and democratisation and decentralisation provide very good opportunities for reflecting their preferences in public policies.
On the other hand, this thesis has also shown the importance of paying attention to
to local-national relations in considering the impact of democratisation on environmental
governance. States tend to try to hold on to their authority over natural resources
exploitation (Campbell, 2002:113). The WRI research argues that 'in most
decentralisations highly lucrative opportunities are retained for central government
authorities' (Ribot, 2004: 49). Accordingly, there emerges a political tension between
the state actors and the local-level actors, which constrains local as well as national
level governance.

Lastly, the cases of Wonosobo (from Java) and Indorayon (the problems with the
downstream forest product processing industry) should have made some contribution to
the literature on the environmental (forest) politics in Indonesia, because existing
studies have tended to focus on the cases of the Outer Islands and of the issue of forest
concessions.

8.4 Future Research Agenda
The achievements of this thesis are only a small step forward and there needs to be
further research for more understanding of the theme of this thesis. One item of the
future research agenda is to follow up the cases included in this thesis. They are ongoing
cases and democratisation in Indonesia is also still in progress. The new Yudhoyono
government (from 2004) may follow different policies on ENGOs and forest
management. The District Mayor of Wonosobo was replaced in late 2005. The 1999
decentralisation laws were revised in 2004 (UU 32/2004 and UU 33/2004). According
to some government officials, it is possible that the forestry laws will also be revised.
The continuous studies of the impacts of these can help deepen the understanding of the
theme of this thesis. Also, study of the politics of the changes of these national-level
laws should also produce suggestive findings.

It would also be meaningful to conduct a further study of the cases in this thesis
from the viewpoint of 'the impact of the environmental movement on democratisation'.
This thesis has focused on 'how democratisation affected environmental governance';
however, as the development of utilitarian arguments for democratisation of
environmental governance suggests, the environmental movement should contribute to the democratisation movement and democratisation in other policy areas. This should lead to a better understanding of the relationship between democracy and the environment.

Another future research agenda concerns the issues raised by the empirical studies in this thesis. Some are for the practical efforts to enhance environmental governance of Indonesia or other transitional countries in general - particularly, formal institutional design and the dissemination of democratic ideas (see below). Others are for the further understanding of those issues by exploring them in wider contexts – such as theoretical discussion on democracy and the environment and environmental governance in East Asia (see below).

Formal Institutional Design to Enhance Networks

Although networks have developed in the course of democratisation, they are yet to be established as a channel of preference accommodation. As a local activist says (see Chapter 5), an election is still almost the only opportunity for the people to reflect their opinions in politics; but the parliamentary politics tend to result in disappointing results, which can lead to the people’s distrust of democracy itself.

The electoral politics and the networks are not separate from each other, as the improvement of the former may contribute to enhancing the latter. The case studies suggest that improving the proportional representation system would be a positive step. The current system makes it difficult for the constituencies to elect candidates with high environmental awareness. It tends to enhance political parties vis-à-vis candidates, as the former can make the list of the latter. Ribot (2004: 27) states ‘[a]round the world, upward accountability of local elected governments is produced through party-list elections...Candidates are effectively appointed by central political parties - usually the party in power. The candidates are often viewed by local people as accountable to the party, rather than to the local population’\(^7\). This explains the changes in the attitude of many local MPs in the case studies, being against local people’s preferences when they

\(^7\) He included Bolivia, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Niger, Senegal, South Africa, and Zimbabwe as examples.
faced demands from their parties, especially from Jakarta.

Also, as time goes by, the policies of PDI-P, which is led by Megawati, who used to be a symbol of the democratisation movement, have shifted from ones in favour of local people’s demands to ones in favour of economic interests at the national level. It came out against the Wonosobo regulation and supported the re-opening of Indorayon’s pulp mill, regardless of its campaign pledge at the time of 1999 election. The main reason for this is unclear, whether the need for economic recovery at the national level or Megawati’s rather conventional political stance close to the vested interests (e.g. the military and large corporations)\(^8\) or the need to raise funds for the 2004 election. However, this suggests the need to consider institutional arrangements which reflect the local people’s preferences through elections, which in turn translate into the policies affecting their lives.

Another issue suggested by the case studies is the problems with decentralisation, particularly the financial decentralisation as well as the authority allocation. District governments in both Toba Samosir and Wonosobo were highly dependent on DAU (the General Allocation Fund) from the state. This makes it difficult for local government officials to be against the state policies. Legally, DAU is decided based on a fixed formula and cannot be manipulated to pressurise local governments. However, given the local political culture, the feelings that the budget of local governments is dependent on the funds from the state can be a mental barrier to local autonomy. The case studies suggest it would contribute to substantial decentralised governance to improve these financial relations. These issues were not fully examined in this thesis, and so further studies are required to make practical recommendations.

The Spread of Democratic Ideas and the Development of Actors and Networks

This thesis has shown that democratisation contributed to the emergence and development of actors. It brought about the growth of ENGOs. There is also an increase

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\(^8\) An observer notes that Megawati was ‘strongly nationalist with close ties to the military’ and increased the military-state influence against decentralisation, unlike the previous Wahid regime, together with the Vice-President Hamzah Haz, who ‘is a known anti-autonomy figure’, and the Minister of Home Affairs Sabarno, a retired army lieutenant-general. (Down to Earth, No. 51, November 2001, ‘Regional Autonomy: Future Uncertain’.)
in the number of local MPs who demonstrate concerns for environmental conditions as
in the Wonosobo district. Communities were more organised and empowered with the
help of NGOs.

At the same time, the limit of the capacity of actors was also revealed, mainly in
two points. One is the lack of knowledge (expertise). For example, government officials
tend to lack understanding of the local environmental, social and economic conditions
as well as related legal issues. The inconsistencies in national-level laws and regulations
show the lack of coordination and law-making capacity of the state actors. The state
corporation Perhutani seems to be weak in bottom-up communication and slow in
understanding the local conditions, which makes it unsuitable for playing a role in
democratic environmental governance. On the other hand, as the WRI studies of
decentralisation in developing countries argue, the state uses this capacity issue as a
major reason to resist decentralisation (Ribot, 2004: 74)⁹.

It is important to study how to cope with this issue, given its significance. One may
want to pay attention to the role of NGOs. As this thesis has shown, NGOs can help
these actors. In the Wonosobo case, NGOs took initiatives and provided expertise for
the local government and MPs who tended to lack the policy-making capacity. NGOs
also disseminated information to and facilitated the involvement of the local
communities in the policy process. They often acted even as their agents¹⁰. By pointing
out some unclear parts in the Wonosobo regulation, one may argue that the capacity of
NGOs may not yet be sufficient to complement the other actors in the policy process¹¹,
but the Wonosobo case seems to have shown the potential of NGOs to play an important
role in the transitional political situation.

⁹ In Indonesia, the state pointed out the lack of local governments' capacity for sustainable
natural resources management as well as the need to unite a nation with diversity. Megawati's
Minister of Home Affairs Sabarno mentioned that 'certain regions rich in natural resources have
issued rules to help them boost their own revenue as high as possible, there seems to be a hidden
mission to separate from the unitary state some time in the future'. The Jakarta Post, 'Minister
¹⁰ Mainly in the context of the Outer Islands, Wollenberg and Kartodihardjo say 'the challenge
is therefore how to ensure the legitimacy of customary forest and to create the local institutional
capacities, transparency, and checks and balances that increase the security of customary
communities' rights and better channel benefits to them. Measures in the current laws such as
the forestry watch forum and the role of NGOs as support organisations make important strides
in this direction' (2002: 93).
¹¹ See for example, Simarmata (2001) for the weak points of the Wonosobo regulation.
The other point is the insufficient acceptance of democratic ideas by major actors, which can be an obstacle to enhancing the capacity of relevant actors and their networks. In order to play a significant role in democratic governance, each actor needs to be accountable, not only in an 'upward' sense but also in a 'downward' sense, as the WRI research suggests. Case studies show that there are many actors without such democratic ideas, which can be an obstacle to democratic environmental governance. Many local actors do not seem to have made their best efforts to achieve local constituencies' welfare, especially when facing the pressure from the state and large private companies. In Wonosobo, they could have implemented the regulation or at least made more effort to implement it in the negotiations with the state actors, but they left the solution to the state. Local MPs also tend to lack either the capacity or beliefs to act as representatives of the local constituencies, resulting in them being the followers of the policies of Jakarta. State actors' efforts to manipulate local and other civil society actors may be due to the former's lack of democratic ideas and values vis-à-vis conventional political culture.

In this context, it is significant to study how to spread democratic ideas among relevant actors, although this should require a multi-disciplinary approach. As is argued in this thesis, it enhanced the accountability and legitimacy of ENGOs as civil society actors. The same impact on the other actors can be expected from the further spread of democratic ideas. Conventional informal institutions tend to hinder the democratic decision making process by constraining the practices of the network members; however, their impact can be lessened if network members increasingly value liberal democratic ideas. Increasing understanding of the democratic decision making process would facilitate the communication between the decision makers and civil society actors, who had no other means but to use 'outsider strategies' such as demonstrations. Further case studies can also emphasise the aspect of policy implementation, while this thesis has emphasised the decision making phase.

One can also examine the spread of democratic ideas from other perspectives, such as social capital, in which social networks are the core subject. Social capital, as is mentioned in Chapter 2, is argued as a key to explaining the policy performance and the
stability of governance, and has been studied recently in the context of environmental governance. It has been argued that people tend to work together for problem-solving where there are more participants of face-to-face meetings, either as neighbours or through clubs and societies. Did the spread of democratic ideas (and its consequences such as the growth of ENGOs and their community organising) stimulate collaborative activities at the community levels to cope with environmental degradation in general? In other words, did it generate social capital? The source of social capital is increasingly discussed, particularly in development studies (e.g. Hooghe and Stolle, 2003). Conducting further research (especially on ‘networks’) in this direction, to link with the discussion of social capital, would make a contribution to the studies of environmental governance.

The spread of democratic ideas and the subsequent changes of political culture can have an impact on the future of the Indonesian ENGOs, not only their growth in scale, but also their strategies. Their strategies shifted to be more collaborative after the fall of Suharto. Indonesian ENGOs may be now approaching a turning point, whether they follow the ‘Western style’ of ENGOs representing large numbers of the middle-upper class who provide financial support to the groups, or follow an ‘East Asian style’ which tends to collaborate with the government and conduct pragmatic activities as grassroots organisations with volunteer members (as in Japan). NGOs like WALHI are now trying both ways by having two kinds of membership system. This issue can be connected to the study of social capital mentioned above.

Discussion on Democracy and the Environment

This thesis has pointed out the risk of the utilitarian arguments for democratisation of environmental governance ending by failing to achieve sustainable development, and the significance of the rights-based approach in the context of developing countries. However, it is too optimistic to regard the liberal democratic approach as a panacea in any context to enhance environmental governance; there need to be more case studies in this regard. WRI research shows that there are cases in which local peasants preferred unsustainable agriculture to escape from poverty, resulting in environmental degradation
(Ribot, 2004). This point seems to be linked to the issue of capacity building of local communities and of other actors.

The studies of Southern ENGOs in this thesis have also emphasised the differences between Southern and Northern groups. For example, in the Indonesian environmental movement, rights-based and utilitarian arguments tend to go together to demand democracy in environmental decision making. The human rights of indigenous people and their capacity for sustainable natural resources management are both emphasised in the community-based forest management movement. Importantly, one would rarely fail to find the rights-based approach in Indonesian ENGOs' arguments. In contrast, in Northern environmental discourse, environmentalism is often thought of as 'consequentialistic' (Dobson, 2000). Likewise, the hands-off approach of the 'preservation' movement is unlikely to be dominant in Indonesia, as natural resources need to be used for local people's livelihood. Further studies of ENGOs in both dimensions of governance in the South should contribute more to the discussion on democracy and the environment. The studies of activities of the Northern ENGOs in the South with these different approaches in mind could also provide interesting findings.

**Environmental Governance in East Asia**

The study of the Indonesian case made in this thesis could meaningfully be explored in the regional context. Many countries in East Asia are also in the process of transition from a conventional state-centric to a democratic participatory approach. The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) described 'a]n encouraging trend, in recent years, has been a shift from highly centralized and compartmentalized bureaucratic structures to decentralized and participatory governance in most developing countries of the region. Promotion of community participation, decentralization of administration, integration of national and local decision making processes, and involvement of NGOs and the private sector in policy making are some of the key changes taking place across the region' (ESCAP and ADB, 2000: 240).

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12 The environmental justice movement in the US is a notable exception here.
At the national level, for example, the Philippines amended the constitution to allow representatives of ENGOs to be involved in the government's decision-making processes (Kato and Harashima, 2000: 8-9). The Korean Environmental Impact Assessment Act of 1993 stipulates that a public consultation must be held to accommodate the opinions of civil society. Thailand's 8th National Plan (1997 to 2001) called for public participation in decision-making processes at the sub-district, district and provincial levels for the first time in the National Plan.

This trend can be seen clearly at the local level. For example, the enactment of the Local Government Code in the Philippines (1991) gives the directive that local government units 'shall share with the National Government the responsibility in the management and maintenance of ecological balance within their territorial jurisdiction' (Magallona and Malayang III, 2001: 70). In the case of political decentralisation in Thailand, villages have increased voice in development decision-making through elected Tambon committee and Tambon organisation, which assume responsibility for all development within jurisdiction including natural resources management (Dupar and Badenoch, 2002).

The findings of this thesis will hopefully facilitate the understanding of this transition in the region and contribute to the efforts to enhance it. For example, this thesis has shown how democratisation developed actors (particularly ENGOs) and their networks as well as how the process was constrained by informal institutions; one can suppose that the political culture in other East Asian countries can work likewise because of its paternalistic similarities.

In addition, the application of the dichotomy to the arguments for democratisation of environmental governance used in the thesis (i.e. rights-based and utilitarian arguments) could provide interesting findings. The Indonesian case suggests that, in practice, it can happen that the East Asian states only allow participation in a utilitarian sense due to their underlying developmentalism and their experiences of economic growth. For many experts in East Asia, the corporatist path that Japan has successfully taken to be a most 'green and clean' country of the world poses a highly attractive option because it supports the status quo or the rule by experts. The state can keep
participation minimal for good reasons. The pressure for economic recovery from the financial crisis in the late 1990s may also accelerate this state-centric tendency. Conducting more case studies with these two different views of participation in environmental governance in East Asia would also contribute to the discourse on democracy and the environment.

This thesis has not given much consideration to another major regional trend, economic globalisation. This has resulted in the development of new actors and political processes, which has impacts on environmental governance in each country. The involvement of multi-national corporations as well as export-oriented domestic companies became necessary for effective environmental management. The coordination with the international regimes, not only global but also regional ones, which are emerging recently, is becoming more important. Since economic globalisation often intensifies environmental pressure mainly through the increase in the production and consumption, the design of environmental governance in consideration of this is urgently needed.

13 They include the ASOEN (ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Senior Officials on Environment) of Southeast Asia, the TEMM (Tripartite Environment Ministers Meeting) between Japan, China and South Korea, and the NEASPEC (Northeast Asian Subregional Programmes of Environmental Cooperation) and the NAPEP (North Asia-Pacific Environmental Partnership) of Northeast Asia, including six and seven countries in the region respectively.
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321 (quoted by Dryzek, 1997, 124).


APPENDIX A
Socio-economic Data of the Major Countries Referred to in This Thesis

(1) GDP Average Annual Growth

(2) GDP Growth Rates in the Asia – Pacific Region

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2 Source: Asian Development Bank (2002; 2006); the data of Northeast Asia excludes Japan.
(3) The Socio-economic Development of Major Countries referred to in This Thesis

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3 Source: World Bank (2003). The explanations of the items on the left are as follow.
GDP per capita= constant 1995 US$
GDP per capita growth= annual %
Television sets = per 1,000 people
Radios = per 1,000 people
Tertiary education enrolment = gross enrolment ratio, % of relevant age group
Illiteracy rate, adult total = % of people aged 15 and above
Employment in agriculture = % of total employment
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment in agriculture</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>US</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>13773.28</td>
<td>16274.43</td>
<td>17937.87</td>
<td>19923.61</td>
<td>21413.02</td>
<td>24631.59</td>
<td>26400.53</td>
<td>29971.66</td>
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<td>GDP per capita growth</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>3.09</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>2.70</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>2.70</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>2.10</td>
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<td>Television sets</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>362.89</td>
<td>395.12</td>
<td>524.15</td>
<td>605.41</td>
<td>675.02</td>
<td>780.78</td>
<td>844.02</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>1934.18</td>
<td>2028.26</td>
<td>2119.32</td>
<td>2119.33</td>
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<td>60.21</td>
<td>79.79</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-</td>
<td>19346.12</td>
<td>21552.09</td>
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<td>26543.46</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>3.06</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>1.46</td>
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<td>Television sets</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>252.56</td>
<td>362.44</td>
<td>424.17</td>
<td>459.89</td>
<td>480.78</td>
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<td>683.56</td>
<td>716.09</td>
<td>742.52</td>
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<td>Illiteracy rate, adult total</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment in agriculture</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.68</td>
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</table>

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APPENDIX B
Information on the Democratisation Trend in East Asia

(1) Examples of Recent Legal Developments in Decentralisation in East Asia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Law/Act</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>The Law for Promotion of Decentralisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Law on Local Autonomy (revision)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Tambon Administrative Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>16th Constitution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>National Decentralisation Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>The Law on Local (Regional) Administration (No. 22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>The Law on Fiscal Balance Between the Central and Local Governments (No. 25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Local Government Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>The Regulation of Democracy in Communes (Grass-roots Democracy Decree; No 29/CP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>The 1992 Constitution</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) The Freedom House Ratings: East Asian Countries

Figure (2) and (3) show the general democratisation trend in East Asia. In Figure (2), the lower the rate is, the freer the countries.

![Freedom House Ratings Graph](http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/index.htm)

(3) Policy IV Project: Asia and Pacific by Types of Regimes (1946-2002)¹

The dotted vertical line shows the year of 1991; the Y axis shows the number of regimes.

![Policy IV Project Graph](http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/)

¹ Policy IV Project is currently managed by Maryland University, US.
APPENDIX C
The Growth of ENGOs in Some Countries Referred to in This Thesis

(1) The Growth of ENGOs in Eastern Europe

Figure (1) shows the years of establishment of ENGOs in the Eastern European countries where there are more than 150 groups. (Bulgaria, Hungary, Croatia, Czech, Poland, and Serbia and Montenegro; source: NGO Directory: Environmental Non-governmental Organisations in Central and Eastern Europe, The Regional Environmental Centre for Central and Eastern Europe, 2001; http://www.rec.org/REC/Databases/NGODirectory/NGOFind.html; Accessed on 10/May/2005). One has to note that the numbers of groups founded in the more distant past tend to be underestimated because there are groups which were founded and disappeared. OECD (1999) shows that, in the first half of the 1990s, about 200 new environmental groups were formed each year in Eastern Europe. Although more moderate, the growth of ENGOs can also be seen in the former Soviet Union in the same period (REC, 1995).

(2) The Growth of ENGOs in Japan

Figure (2) shows the years of establishment of Japanese ENGOs (Source: Kankyo Jigyodan, 1998). One has to note that the numbers of groups founded in the more distant past tend to be underestimated because there are groups which were founded and disappeared.

---

1 Figure (1) shows the years of establishment of ENGOs in the Eastern European countries where there are more than 150 groups. (Bulgaria, Hungary, Croatia, Czech, Poland, and Serbia and Montenegro; source: NGO Directory: Environmental Non-governmental Organisations in Central and Eastern Europe, The Regional Environmental Centre for Central and Eastern Europe, 2001; http://www.rec.org/REC/Databases/NGODirectory/NGOFind.html; Accessed on 10/May/2005). One has to note that the numbers of groups founded in the more distant past tend to be underestimated because there are groups which were founded and disappeared. OECD (1999) shows that, in the first half of the 1990s, about 200 new environmental groups were formed each year in Eastern Europe. Although more moderate, the growth of ENGOs can also be seen in the former Soviet Union in the same period (REC, 1995).

2 Figure (2) shows the years of establishment of Japanese ENGOs (Source: Kankyo Jigyodan, 1998). One has to note that the numbers of groups founded in the more distant past tend to be underestimated because there are groups which were founded and disappeared.
(3) The Growth of ENGOs in South Korea

Figure (3) shows the years of establishment of South Korean ENGOs (Source: Ku, 1996).
APPENDIX D

A Comparison of the Membership of the Largest ENGOs in Western Countries and East Asia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Ratio of Population: Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>4,000,000</td>
<td>70:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9,000,000</td>
<td>31:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>925,000</td>
<td>65:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>164:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holland</td>
<td>900,000</td>
<td>18:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>2,400:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>1,840:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>7,333:1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The organisations taken as examples are as follow.
US: The National Wildlife Federation (more than 4 million members).1
US: The Humane Society of the United States (more than 9 million members).2
UK: The Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (925,000 members).3
Netherlands: Vereniging tot Behoud van Natuurmonumenten in Nederland (900,000 members).4
Germany: Greenpeace Germany (500,000 members).5
Japan: The Wildbird Society and WWF-Japan (50,000 members).6
South Korea: Korean Federation for Environmental Movement/ 25,000 members.7
Taiwan: Wild Bird Federation in Taiwan/ 3,000 members.8

The national umbrella organisation of ENGOs in France has 850,000 members (Heijden, et. al, 1992).

2 http://www.hsus.org/ (accessed on 15/May/2006).
3 Rawcliffe (1998) p75. Greenpeace UK and WWF UK have a few hundred members.
5 Greenpeace Japan Staff, interview, 16/July/1999. The supporters of Greenpeace Germany were 600,000 and those of Greenpeace Netherlands were 830,000, in Heijden et. al (1992).
Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland or BUND (the German branch of Friends of the Earth are supported by 390,000 members. http://www.bund.net/ (accessed on 1/May/2005).
7 Lee (1999). In Korea, there are only five groups with more than 1,000 members; in addition, five of them were established by the government and only two groups (Korean Federation for Environmental Movement and the Green Korea) can be considered solely as civil society groups (Ku, 1996; Lee, 1999). The Green Korea has 15,000 members (http://www.greenkorea.org/, accessed on 15/May/2005).
8 The Wild Bird Federation Taiwan (established in 1988) has 3,000 members in ten societies island-wide (see http://www.bird.org.tw/; accessed on 20/May/2005). Wild Bird Society of Taipei (WBST), another largest ENGO, has 2,000 members (Tang and Tang, 1999). The Taiwan Environmental Protection Union(TEPU) which was established in 1987, has about 1,000 members. (http://tepu.yam.org.tw/; accessed on 20/May/2005)
APPENDIX E
A Note on the Questionnaire Survey

A questionnaire survey of Indonesian ENGOs was conducted in 2003 to obtain an overview of them, with assistance from RMI (an ENGO in Indonesia), in the following procedure.

First, the questionnaire was e-mailed to 203 ENGOs listed in LP3ES's directory (LP3ES, 2000) and to JPL (Jaringan Pendidikan Lingkungan; Environmental Education Network; with around 150 member organisations) between April 2003-December 2003.

Second, RMI staff asked ENGOs that had not responded via email to fill in the questionnaire at ENGO meetings/conferences/workshops in person between October 2003- January 2004.

The number of valid responses is 81 (organisations; the number of valid responses to each question varies.).

The questionnaire is as follows (original in Indonesian). The results which can be shown quantitatively are in the footnotes.

******************************************************************************
Organisational Data
1. History of the establishment of your organisation :
   * Please specify the background of the founders of your organisation (e.g. profession, involvement in any NGOs etc.).

   * Time and place of establishment:

   * Source of funds:

   * Issues raised in the establishment of your organisation:

   * Motivation of the establishment of your organisation:

2. The number of staff members:

1 The directory includes 416 NGOs in total. The 203 groups to which the questionnaire was sent declare by themselves that environmental issues are the major area of their activities.
2 The Median, Mode and Average of each of them are as follow: full-time (7; 5; 10.2), Part-time (3; 2; 4.7), and Volunteers (4; 2; 10.3). (n=80).
3. The major activity of your organisation:

________________________________________________________

4. The major sites of your activities:

________________________________________________________

5. Does your organisation publish a newsletter? (Y/N)³:

____________

6. What are the focal issues of your activities? Please select one to three issues from the list below⁴.

1=Water  2= Forest  3= Poverty  4=Energy (including Climate Change)
5= Waste Management  6=Health (including sanitation)
7= Marine and Coastal Environment  8=Land (incl. desertification and drought)
9=Agriculture  10= Air (incl. Air Pollution)  11=Biodiversity
12=Chemicals  13=Human Settlement  14= Consumption and Production Pattern
15=Population (incl. urbanisation)  16= Good Governance
17=Financial Mechanism/ODA  18=Business and Environment (incl. trade)
19= Education/Awareness/Capacity Building  20= Others (please specify)

________________________________________________________

On Funding

7. Annual Revenue⁵

(a) 0- 10,000,000 rp; (b) 10,000,001- 50,000,000 rp; (c)50,000,001-100,000,000 rp
(d) 100,000,001-250,000,000 rp  (e) 250,000,0001-500,000,000 rp
(f) 500,000,001-1,000,000,000 rp  (g) 1,000,000,001-

8. Which funding source do you rely on most? Please choose five and rank them in order of the amount of funds. (If you choose (m), please specify.) ⁶

³71% of the respondent organizations publish newsletter(s) (n=77).
⁴The five most popular topics for Indonesian ENGOs are as follows: Education (62% of respondent organisations), Forest (55%), Biodiversity (35%), Poverty (32%), Agriculture (22%). (However, the result of ‘Education’ is over-rated in that many of the respondents are the member of the Indonesian Environmental Education Network (JPL)). (n=78).
⁵The result is as follows: (a) 19 %of respondent organisations; (b) 11 %; (c) 19 %; (d) 17 %; (e) 17%; (f) 8 %; (g) 4 %. (n=72).
⁶If five points are given to the 1st choice, four to the 2nd, three to the 3rd, two to the 4th and one to the 5th, the result is as follows: (a) 93 points; (b) 74 points; (c) 119 points; (d) 145 points; (e) 73 points; (f) 95 points; (g) 30 points; (h) 75 points; (i) 36 points; (j) 10 points; (k) 72 points; (l) 55 points. (n=76).
1st: __________ (the funds from this source are the largest amount in your revenue)
2nd: __________ 3rd: __________ 4th: __________ 5th: __________

(a) Membership fee7 (b) Sales of goods (c) Public grant (Indonesian Government)
(d) Public grant (ODA=Foreign government) (e) Investment8 (f) Donation9
(g) Commission from government10 (h) Private grant (Indonesian)
(i) Private grant (overseas) (j) Private commission (k) Sponsorship (l) others

9. Have you noticed any changes in the strategy of funding agencies in the last 5 years? If yes, please describe it:

Strategies of Environmental NGOs
10. Please rank which strategy (methodology) your organisation emphasises in order of importance:

(a) Lobbying (b) Direct action12 (c) Practical activities (d) Environmental education
(e) Campaigning (f) Scientific research (g) Etc (please specify)

1st: __________ 2nd: __________ 3rd: __________ 4th: __________ 5th: __________ 6th: __________ 7th: __________

11. Please write the name(s) of NGO network(s) in which your organisation participates.

12. Is it easy for local people to influence your activities? How do they reflect their opinion in your activities?

On Recent Changes in Environmental Governance
13. Has it become easier/more difficult for NGOs to approach government officials since

---

7 Members are the non-staff members who periodically pay the membership fee. Participation fee in certain activities is not membership fee.
8 Investment is one of the funding sources for an organisation, including stocks, interests, etc.
9 Donation is a fund given without any proposal process (as in a grant), and not based on any request of the donator (as in commission).
10 Commission is the fund given to any organisation as a compensation for any work done upon request, differing from a grant, which is given for work proposed by the fund-receiving organisation.
11 If five points are given to the 1st choice, four to the 2nd, three to the 3rd, two to the 4th and one to the 5th, the result in the % of each item is as follows: (a) 13.5%; (b) 19.1%; (c) 17.7%; (d) 18.5%, (e) 15.3%, (f) 11.7%, and (g) 4%. (n=75).
12 This tends to mean field level activities in the Indonesian context.
around 1998?¹³
More difficult-1---------2---------3(Same) ---------4---------5-Significantly easier
(choose one) ______

14. Has it become easier/more difficult for NGOs to approach politicians since around 1998?¹⁴
More difficult-1---------2---------3(Same) ---------4---------5-Significantly easier
(choose one) ______

15. Has it become easier/more difficult for NGOs to have support from the local people since around 1998?¹⁵
More difficult-1---------2---------3(Same) ---------4---------5-Significantly easier
(choose one) ______

16. Has it become easier/more difficult for NGOs to have an influence on environmental policy making since around 1998?¹⁶
More difficult-1---------2---------3(Same) ---------4---------5-Significantly easier
(choose one) ______

17. If you chose 1 or 2 to questions 15 - 18 above, please give us your opinion why.
__________________________________________________________________________

18. If you chose 4 or 5 to questions 15 - 18 above, please give us your opinion why.
__________________________________________________________________________

19. How can government - non government partnership be promoted in the future? Please give us your opinion.
__________________________________________________________________________

¹³ The Average of the answer to this question: 3.5. (n=73).
¹⁴ The Average of the answer to this question: 3.4. (n=68).
¹⁵ The Average of the answer to this question: 3.7. (n=70).
¹⁶ The Average of the answer to this question: 3.4. (n=69).
APPENDIX F

Photos

Indorayon’s Porsea Mill
(Photographs: Author)

Wonosbo’s Forests

Above Left: People’s Forest and Farmland (Photograph: ARuPA)

Below Left: State Forest (pine trees) after Looting
(Photograph: ARuPA)

Below Right: A Site for PHBM
(Photograph: Author)