Roessler, Johannes (2016) Thinking, inner speech, and self-awareness. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 7 (3). pp. 541-557. doi:10.1007/s13164-015-0267-y ISSN 1878-5158.

Research output not available from this repository.

Request-a-Copy directly from author or use local Library Get it For Me service.

Request Changes to record.

Abstract

This paper has two themes. One is the question of how to understand the relation between inner speech and knowledge of one’s own thoughts. My aim here is to probe and challenge the popular neo-Rylean suggestion that we know our own thoughts by ‘overhearing our own silent monologues’, and to sketch an alternative suggestion, inspired by Ryle’s lesser-known discussion of thinking as a ‘serial operation’. The second theme is the question whether, as Ryle apparently thought, we need two different accounts of the epistemology of thinking, corresponding to the distinction between thoughts with respect to which we are active vs passive. I suggest we should be skeptical about the assumption that there is a single distinction here. There are a number of interesting ways in which thinking can involve passivity, but they provide no support for a ‘bifurcationist’ approach to the epistemology of thinking.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy
Journal or Publication Title:	Review of Philosophy and Psychology
Publisher:	Springer Netherlands
ISSN:	1878-5158
Official Date:	September 2016
Dates:	Date Event September 2016 Published 23 May 2015 Available 2015 Accepted
Volume:	7
Number:	3
Page Range:	pp. 541-557
DOI:	10.1007/s13164-015-0267-y
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access

Request changes or add full text files to a record

Repository staff actions (login required)

View Item