Competitive market mechanisms as social choice procedures
Hammond, Peter J., 1945- (2007) Competitive market mechanisms as social choice procedures. Discussion Paper. [Coventry]: University of Warwick Economics Department. Warwick economic research papers (No.804).
WRAP_Hammond_twerp_804.pdf - Requires a PDF viewer such as GSview, Xpdf or Adobe Acrobat Reader
Official URL: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/resear...
A competitive market mechanism is a prominent example of a non-binary social choice rule, typically defined for a special class of economic environments in which each social state is an economic allocation of private goods, and individuals' preferences concern only their own personal consumption. This chapter begins by discussing which Pareto efficient allocations can be characterized as competitive equilibria with lump-sum transfers. It also discusses existence and characterization of such equilibria without lump-sum transfers. The second half of the chapter focuses on continuum economies, for which such characterization results are much more natural given that agents have negligible influence over equilibrium prices.
|Item Type:||Working or Discussion Paper (Discussion Paper)|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory|
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics|
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||Social choice, Economics -- Mathematical models|
|Series Name:||Warwick economic research papers|
|Publisher:||University of Warwick Economics Department|
|Place of Publication:||[Coventry]|
|Official Date:||11 July 2007|
|Number of Pages:||111|
|Status:||Not Peer Reviewed|
|Access rights to Published version:||Open Access|
Aliprantis, C.D. and Border, K. (1999). Infinite dimensional analysis: a hitchhiker’s guide. 2nd. ed. Berlin: Springer.
Actions (login required)