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Competitive market mechanisms as social choice procedures
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Hammond, Peter J., 1945 (2007) Competitive market mechanisms as social choice procedures. Discussion Paper. [Coventry]: University of Warwick Economics Department. (Warwick economic research papers).

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Abstract
A competitive market mechanism is a prominent example of a nonbinary social choice rule, typically defined for a special class of economic environments in which each social state is an economic allocation of private goods, and individuals' preferences concern only their own personal consumption. This chapter begins by discussing which Pareto efficient allocations can be characterized as competitive equilibria with lumpsum transfers. It also discusses existence and characterization of such equilibria without lumpsum transfers. The second half of the chapter focuses on continuum economies, for which such characterization results are much more natural given that agents have negligible influence over equilibrium prices.
Item Type:  Working or Discussion Paper (Discussion Paper) 

Subjects:  H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory 
Divisions:  Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics 
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):  Social choice, Economics  Mathematical models 
Series Name:  Warwick economic research papers 
Publisher:  University of Warwick Economics Department 
Place of Publication:  [Coventry] 
Date:  11 July 2007 
Number:  No.804 
Number of Pages:  111 
Status:  Not Peer Reviewed 
Access rights to Published version:  Open Access 
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URI:  http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/12 
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