UNSPECIFIED. (2001) Tiebout economies with differential genetic types and endogenously chosen crowding characteristics. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 98 (2). pp. 261-294. ISSN 0022-0531

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Abstract

We consider a Tiebout economy with differential crowding and public projects in which agents are distinguished by their tastes and genetic endowments. Agents choose which crowding characteristic, for example, a skill, they with to express, and this affects their value to other members of their jurisdiction, club, firm. etc. An agent's choice is influenced both by his genetic endowment. which affects his cost of acquiring crowding characteristics. and by his preferences over which crowding characteristic he expresses. We show that if small groups are strictly effective, the core is equivalent to the set of anonymous competitive equilibrium outcomes, but that the core generally contains taste-homogeneous jurisdictions. (C) 2001 Academic Press.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
Journal or Publication Title:	JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
Publisher:	ACADEMIC PRESS INC
ISSN:	0022-0531
Date:	June 2001
Volume:	98
Number:	2
Number of Pages:	34
Page Range:	pp. 261-294
Identification Number:	10.1006/jeth.2000.2716
Publication Status:	Published
URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/12040

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