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Costly auction entry, royalty payments, and the optimality of asymmetric designs

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Bernhardt, Dan, Liu, Tingjun and Sogo, Takeharu (2019) Costly auction entry, royalty payments, and the optimality of asymmetric designs. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick. Department of Economics. Warwick economics research papers series (WERPS) (1200). (Unpublished)

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Official URL: https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/w...

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Abstract

We analyze optimal auction mechanisms when bidders base costly entry decisions on their valuations, and bidders pay with a fixed royalty rate plus cash. With sufficient valuation uncertainty relative to entry costs, the optimal mechanism features asymmetry so that bidders enter with strictly positive but different (ex-ante) probabilities. When bidders are ex-ante identical, higher royalty rates—which tie payments more closely to bidder valuations—increase the optimal degree of asymmetry in auction design, further raising revenues. When bidders differ ex-ante in entry costs, the seller favors the low cost entrant; whereas when bidders have different valuation distributions, the seller favors the weaker bidder if entry costs are low, but not if they are high. Higher royalty rates cause the seller to favor the weaker bidder by less, and the strong bidder by more.

Item Type: Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
H Social Sciences > HF Commerce
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Auctions, Auctions -- Econometric models, Cost -- Econometric models
Series Name: Warwick economics research papers series (WERPS)
Publisher: University of Warwick. Department of Economics
Place of Publication: Coventry
ISSN: 0083-7350
Official Date: June 2019
Dates:
DateEvent
June 2019Published
Number: 1200
Institution: University of Warwick
Status: Not Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Unpublished
Access rights to Published version: Open Access
RIOXX Funder/Project Grant:
Project/Grant IDRIOXX Funder NameFunder ID
17502717University Grants Committeehttp://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100001839

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