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Legality, ethnicity and violence in Austrian Galicia, 1890-1920

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Retrospectively everything seems straightforward. At the beginning of the twentieth century the time of the big land empires was running out. At the periphery empires were under threat from national and anti-colonial movements, in the centre empires were under pressure from nationalism and revolutionary socialism. The empires' minorities felt oppressed and exploited while nationalists in the centre believed that the dominant nation was being held back by the inherent conservatism of imperial governments. From outside, empires were being challenged by nation states, a new form of political organisation offering an alternative to empires and the remnants of feudalism.¹ In the view of nationalist historians, empires were a thing of the past. After the war, they created inherently teleological narratives, whereby the independent nation state represented the logical and necessary outcome of the nation's self-realisation. Accepting autonomy within an imperial framework did not fit in well with the average national narrative and – if it was discussed at all – was treated as an aberration from the 'rightful path' of national history.²

However, in 1914 empires were still very much alive. They had responded to the nationalist challenge by reforming and modernising. Aware of the growing strength of national movements and the dynamism of nation states and challenged by the nationalism of the dominant nation, imperial governments responded in different ways. Policies fluctuated between attempts to suppress national movements, sometimes – as in Russia's Ukrainian provinces – underpinned by efforts to homogenise the population, and concessions aimed at

placating the respective ethnicities.³ Loyalty to the empire and nationalism were not mutually exclusive. Before the Great War, many national movements were not demanding independence but campaigned for an autonomous ‘national territory’ and self-administration within existing imperial borders. Austria-Hungary in particular had developed a culture of compromise and created a legal framework, which managed to contain ethnic conflicts by providing, at least in the Austrian half, a space where national movements could develop.

The case of the crownland known as the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria, discussed in this essay, confirms the positive evaluation of Austrian-Hungarian nationality policy put forward by Gary B. Cohen, John Deak, Pieter Judson and others.⁴ Austria-Hungary not only compares favourably with other empires, but also with some of its successor states. After the disintegration of Austria-Hungary, ethnic conflicts in the region intensified and became more brutal. The essay will show (1) that in Galicia in 1914 the imperial framework was widely accepted by all ethnic groups, as it offered them legal protection while allowing each group to pursue their specific interests peacefully; (2) that war and military rule undermined the legal order and weakened the procedures which had previously been used to resolve ethnic conflicts peacefully;⁵ (3) that changes to the international context, the proclamation of the right of national self-determination by the new Soviet Russian government and by U.S. President Woodrow Wilson dramatically reduced the attraction of the imperial framework for the Polish and other national movements and significantly contributed to the dissolution of Austria-Hungary; (4) that the acceptance of the rules of peaceful conflict resolution by the Ukrainian and Polish national movements depended on

the imperial framework and that therefore (contrary to Judson's view)⁶ the collapse of Austria-Hungary marked a radical break with the past, despite the continuity of imperial institutions, practices and legal systems in the new Polish state.

A few words on the terminology used in this essay: 'ethnicity' and 'ethnic group' refer to a cultural community which shares the myth of a common origin and a set of historical memories and whose members stand apart from their environment through the sharing of one or more cultural traits such as language, customs and religion.⁷ The term 'ethnic group' entails the possibility that the main, but not the only, marker of difference can be denomination or religion. Following Anthony D. Smith, I use the term 'nation' to denote a named community with a history and culture, living on a connected territory, with a common economy, a system of mass education, and equality before the law or – and this goes further than Smith's concept – an ethnic group with a national mass movement which aims to create an independent nation state or achieve national autonomy within an existing state. This modified definition of what constitutes a nation takes the specific conditions in Eastern Europe in the 19th and 20th centuries into account, when nationalists from certain ethnic groups succeeded in forming national mass movements without controlling a state.⁸ This does not overlook the fact that a considerable number of people were nationally indifferent and did not identify with any nation.⁹

Nationalism and anti-Semitism contained: Galicia before the Great War

The Austrian-Hungarian compromise of 1867 was also the start of a new phase in the history of the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria. As a result of the compromise the Austrian Empire was divided into two parts, with the small river Leitha constituting the border between the two. The two halves had different governments and different parliaments but were united in the person of the Emperor of Austria, who was also King of Hungary, and shared three *kaiserliche und königliche* (k. u. k., imperial and royal) ministers (who covered foreign affairs, military matters and part of finances). The Hungarian government pursued a nationality policy which focused on strengthening its grip on the ethnically diverse lands of the 'crown of Stephen'. Their policies favoured Hungarians and the hungarised members of other minorities but discriminated against ethnic groups who refused to assimilate.¹⁰ In the Austrian part, known as Cisleithania, the nationality policy focused less on strengthening the 'German element' and more on keeping the empire together and defending its status as a great power. The Austrian government federalised Cisleithania and transferred prerogatives to non-German elites in the crownlands. This limited and controlled federalisation was accompanied by political liberalisation and democratisation.¹¹

This approach was also used in the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria, which lay in the Austrian half. The crownland had a complex ethnic structure, with Poles having a slight numerical advantage; in 1910, 46.5% of the roughly eight million inhabitants were Roman Catholics (most of whom identified as Poles), as opposed to 42.1% Greek Catholics (most of whom considered themselves as Ruthenians/Ukrainians¹²). Jews made up 10.9% of the population. Poles and Ruthenians, however, were not evenly distributed across West and East Galicia.

Roman Catholics constituted 88.6% of the population in the western part, with only 3.2% registered as Greek Catholic. In the Eastern part, Greek Catholics comprised 61.7% of the population and Roman Catholics a mere 25.3%. The percentage of Jews in East Galicia was higher than in West Galicia (12.4% compared to 7.9%).¹³ The overwhelming majority of Poles and Ukrainians were peasants, while the nobility was Polish or polonised. In most towns and cities, including those in East Galicia, Poles and Jews were in the majority.

Ethnicity, language, class, religion, and national identification were positively correlated but not conterminous. There were Roman Catholic peasants whose daily language was Ukrainian; their ethnicity was contested between Polish and Ukrainian nationalists and their national identification was anybody's guess. Many did not identify with any nation but only with their social status (peasant) or with their region or religion/denomination. Intermarriages between Roman Catholics and Greek Catholics were common, which further blurred the boundaries between ethnic groups. As these examples show, denomination or religion were important but were not the only factors deciding an individual's national self-identification or the group to which the state or society assigned an individual.¹⁴ The Jewish population was equally diverse, with some members of the economic and cultural elite identifying as ardent Polish patriots while others joined the Jewish national movement and supported Zionism or became socialists. The majority of Jews, however, did not join any national or other political project, were deeply loyal to the emperor, and clung to the religious and cultural traditions of Eastern European Jewry.¹⁵ While national indifference continued to exist, the two decades before the First World War saw a

nationalisation of ethnic, religious and social differences. The Polish, Ukrainian and Jewish national movements made rapid progress. The evidence for this is the dissolution of All-Galician institutions and parties, the emergence of parties, co-operatives, clubs and institutions organised along ethnic lines, and the success of such parties in elections.¹⁶

The government relied on its alliance with Polish noblemen and notables. While the crownland had not been given the same status as Hungary, important prerogatives, especially with regard to culture and education, were transferred to the Diet in Lemberg/Lwów/L'viv,¹⁷ and municipal self-government was introduced. The governor was appointed by the emperor and was directly responsible to him. Until 1914, the governor and the Minister for Galicia were always chosen from among the Polish elite, who also held the majority in the Diet and in the councils of the two major cities, Lemberg and Cracow. The Polish Club (faction) in the House of Deputies in Vienna usually backed the government, and the office of prime minister (*Ministerpräsident*) of the Austrian part of the Dual Monarchy was twice held by a member of the Polish nobility.¹⁸ The imperial reforms had given the Polish elites the opportunity to polonise the crownland. Exploiting their control of the institutions of the crownland, new Polish primary and secondary schools were established. Polish replaced German as the main language of teaching at Lemberg University and became the main internal administrative language of the crownland. German retained a role, as it was required for communications with Vienna. While on paper Ruthenian/Ukrainian was the second official language of the crownland, it suffered in the 1870s and 1880s as a result of polonisation, after which the status of the Ukrainian

language gradually improved again, mirroring the increasing strength of the Ukrainophile movement led by members of a growing secular Ukrainian intelligentsia.¹⁹ This movement considered Ukrainian speakers in Russia and Austria-Hungary to be part of a single Ukrainian nation and, from the 1890s, increasingly used the ethnonym 'Ukrainian' rather than 'Ruthenian'.²⁰

The Austrian government tried to de-escalate Polish-Ruthenian tensions and strengthen the loyalty to Austria-Hungary, also as an attempt to counter Russophile tendencies. In 1890, Governor Kazimierz Badeni, a member of the Polish elite but acting on behalf of the Austrian government, negotiated a settlement with Julian Romanchuk, the leader of the Ruthenian Club in the Diet. The equality of Ruthenians with Poles was theoretically established, and some new Ukrainian-language primary and (more importantly) secondary schools were established.²¹ These concessions did not satisfy the more radical members of the Ukrainian national movement, and tensions increased again after 1894. In the crownland there was poverty, corruption, bureaucratic inefficiency, democratic deficits and a class system which favoured the Polish nobility and patrician classes. Gendarmes and local authorities often served the interests of the big (usually Polish) landowners, but their power was gradually being eroded. The increase in liberalisation and democratisation and the level of federalisation in Cisleithania gave Galicia a flexible political framework which allowed all ethnic and most political groups to pursue their particular interests by peaceful and legal means. The political leaders of Galicia's different national movements negotiated with each other and lobbied on behalf of their particular interests at the centre, in Vienna. Liberalisation also led to the publication of numerous

newspapers and journals in several languages, a flourishing cooperative movement, and the emergence of modern political parties.²² After the collapse of the compromise negotiated between Badeni and Romanchuk, the Ukrainian movement managed to obtain concessions by negotiating and lobbying for electoral reforms, for the creation of Ukrainian-language primary and secondary schools, and for a Ukrainian university in Lemberg.²³

The decade before the war also saw Polish and Ukrainian nationalists making serious progress in winning over the peasants to their respective national projects. More and more people joined explicitly nationalist organisations and clubs. The journal *Ukrainische Rundschau* (previously *Ruthenische Revue*), published in German in Vienna and addressing an empire-wide audience, stated in 1908: 'We wish for the continuance (*Bestand*) and the might of Austria – in our own national interest... We are friends of this state (*Staatswesen*)..., but with a principal caveat: that this should be a home (*Heimstätte*) for us and not an emergency shelter'.²⁴ This shows that Ruthenian allegiance to the empire was no longer the 'blind' loyalism of 'Tyrolians of the East' but conditional on the empire providing a space for Ukrainian national development.

What made the nascent Polish-Ukrainian conflict so difficult to resolve was that nationalists on both sides claimed some of the same lands as their national space.²⁵ Over the long term, the Polish national movement aimed to achieve independent statehood and unification with the partitions still under Russian and Prussian rule. The opportunities offered by a Polish space in Galicia looked very attractive compared to what was happening to Polish cultural and political institutions in the Russian Empire and the discrimination directed against Poles

in the German Empire. In 1914, the Polish population in Galicia was loyal to the Habsburg emperor, but it was clear that independence would be back on the agenda, should the opportunity arise.²⁶ For the time being, the Polish Club in parliament pressured the government to grant more autonomy to Galicia, while the Ukrainian deputies opposed a more far-ranging autonomy, as long as the crownland was dominated by a Polish elite, and demanded the partition of the crownland into a Polish and a Ukrainian part, with the eastern part (East Galicia) run by Ukrainians.²⁷ The Austrian government was evasive. It was well aware that such a partition would alienate the Polish elites on whose loyalty Austrian rule in Galicia depended.

Violent clashes still occurred in those years, but such conflicts were usually confined to the weeks around election campaigns, when emotions ran high and the Polish establishment used all means at its disposal to block the rise of the Ukrainophile movement. The loyalty of the Ruthenian population to Austria-Hungary was tested in the regional and national elections of 1895 and 1897, when the police suppressed riots by Ruthenian peasants who were protesting against irregularities. Ten peasants were bayoneted to death, thirty were severely injured, and several hundreds were arrested. Nevertheless, the political and cultural conditions of the Ruthenian population continued to improve, even though equality was still far off. At the beginning of the twentieth century, in the teeth of opposition by the Polish club in parliament, the imperial authorities redrew the boundaries of constituencies, which raised the electoral chances of Ruthenian candidates, although the system still grossly disadvantaged the rural population (in East Galicia: the Ruthenian/Ukrainians).²⁸ Several other reforms

led to an increase in the number of people who had the right to vote in parliamentary elections. Universal and equal male suffrage above the age of twenty-four for the elections to the House of Deputies in Vienna was finally introduced in 1907, in stark contrast to the Diet in Lemberg which, in 1914, was still elected in curiae, favouring landowners and the wealthy (usually Polish) part of society.²⁹ The 1907 general elections saw a political cooperation between Zionists and Ukrainophiles, which helped both groups to increase the numbers of their deputies, but the elections were also accompanied by numerous incidents of violence, intimidation and fraud. The Polish-dominated local authorities and notables enlisted the help of the police to prevent votes from being counted. Some names were unlawfully removed from the register of voters, other would-be voters faced difficulties when trying to register. One example where such manoeuvring took place was Rohatyn, where Zionists and Ukrainophiles cooperated but were defeated by a controversial Polish national-democratic candidate.³⁰

During the elections to the Galician Diet in February 1908, the local authorities again used violence against peasants who were protesting the irregularities and manipulations of results, leading to the death of one peasant during the clashes. At the same time, Governor Andrzej Potocki used the Russophile party to reduce the electoral chances of Ukrainian parties. There was a clear tension between his role as a representative of the empire and his identification with the Polish national cause as defined by Polish national democrats and the arch-conservative Podolian nobility. It was not in the interests of the empire to support Russophile tendencies, but it gave Polish establishment candidates an

advantage in elections. Potocki's aim was to split the Ruthenian vote and reduce the number of Ukrainophile deputies. The violence against peasants and the governor's actions prompted the Ukrainian student Myroslav Sichyns'kyj to assassinate Count Potocki. The murder was preceded by violent clashes between Polish and Ukrainian students as Ukrainian students tried to reverse the polonisation of Lemberg university. Many Ukrainian politicians defended the murder of the governor, and Sichyns'kyj became a hero of the Ukrainian student movement.³¹ The assassination of Potocki and the death of the Ukrainian peasant in the 1908 election were, however, the exception. In the ten years before the outbreak of the First World War, the only other direct fatal casualty of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict was a Ukrainian student, Adam Kotsko, who was stabbed to death during a clash between Polish and Ukrainian students in Lemberg in 1910.³²

The reasons for such violent clashes were complex and not merely the result of nationalist Ukrainian-Polish conflicts and growing anti-Semitism.³³ Political violence in the region had its roots in a mix of social, political and ethnic conflicts. The bloodiest event exemplifying this occurred during the general elections in 1911 in Drohobych, a town ruled by an alliance of conservative Jewish and Polish notables. The local authorities supported the incumbent Nathan Löwenstein, a supporter of Jewish assimilation to the Polish nation. The Ukrainophiles supported the Zionist challenger. When the local authorities tried to prevent supporters of the Zionist candidate from casting their vote, a mixed Jewish and Ruthenian crowd tried to gain access to the ballot office by force. The authorities called for military support, which led to the deaths of 25 Jews and

Ruthenians. The events shocked Austria. An investigation was carried out, newspapers reported on the incident, and it was discussed in parliament.³⁴ In this case a Jewish and Polish elite controlled the local authorities and exploited their position to use k. u. k soldiers to fight a mixed Ukrainian-Jewish crowd.

The new governor Michał Bobrzyński, a conservative historian from Cracow, had a different understanding of Polish national interests than his predecessor. He tried to de-escalate Ukrainian-Polish tensions. He believed that it was not only in the imperial interest but also in the Polish national interest to find a compromise with the Ukrainophile movement. In 1913, Bobrzyński reached an agreement with Ukrainian representatives which would have led to the creation of a Ukrainian university within the space of ten years, more Ukrainian schools, more Ukrainian deputies in the Diet, and material support for Ukrainian education societies. The compromise was supported by Vienna. However, the agreement was never enacted, as parts of the Polish elite, including some influential Roman-Catholic bishops, protested against the – in their view – attack on the Polish ‘state of possessions’. On January 5th, 1913, Polish notables in Lemberg, worried about the agreement, held a closed meeting in the Town Hall with about 2,000 invited participants. The police noted that young people and women were strongly represented in the audience. Several hundred people, unable to find room inside, waited outside in the courtyard. A resolution was passed, protesting against the founding of a Ukrainian university and promising to fight all attempts to curtail the Polish character of the university. After the meeting, around 3,000 people marched to the university where two speakers then expressed their gratitude to the University Senate for its rejection of the proposal. After that,

most people went home.³⁵ Bobrzyński had not succeeded in persuading his compatriots that it was in the Polish national interest and worth their while to make significant concessions to the Ukrainian side in order to decrease Polish-Ukrainian tensions. Bobrzyński did have the support of the imperial centre; he managed to win a majority in the Diet and could have pushed ahead with the reforms, but he resigned as he had lost the backing of a considerable part of the Polish elite. The start of the war then put everything on hold, including the agreed creation of a Ukrainian university.³⁶

The Galician compromise shows that the political and legal framework of Austria-Hungary facilitated peaceful solutions to the Polish-Ukrainian conflict through negotiations and compromise. The authorities tried to contain the violence between ethnic and religious groups, and there were procedures which regulated the response to violations of people's rights. In an effort to protect the Jewish population from violence, the authorities intervened before the conditions for a pogrom could emerge. As already seen in the discussion of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict, Vienna could not always rely on the unconditional support of Polish-dominated local and regional authorities, and imperial intervention became crucial.

In the Galician countryside, violence against Jews was propelled by a combination of modern racist anti-Semitism, economic grievances, commercial competition, the impact of modernisation and traditional religious (Christian) anti-Judaism. In Western Galicia, the wave of violence directed against Jews in 1898 was only halted after the local authorities used violence and killed a number of rioters. Martial law was imposed across 33 districts, more than 1800

people were arrested, and 5,166 persons were accused of having committed crimes.³⁷ Sometimes attacks against Jews were predominantly fuelled by religious anti-Judaism. In some villages and towns near Jasło in the western, mostly Polish, part of Galicia, a tradition of holding so-called ‘Judasfeiern’³⁸ (Judas celebrations) developed. Every year, Christian (Polish) youths created a life-size puppet, dressing it in the traditional garb of Polish Jews. In the four days before Easter the puppet was carried through the streets; every few steps, it would be beaten with a stick while the crowd chanted ‘Hit the Jew’. After the procession, ‘the Jew’ would be taken to the top of the church tower and thrown down. Finally, the puppet would be brought to the river and thrown into the water while the crowd cheered. At one point, the local Jews finally had enough and contacted the Lemberg lawyer Marek Rappaport, who liaised with the Viennese branch of the Israelitische Allianz (Alliance Israélite), a Paris based international organisation which promoted Jewish education and fought anti-Semitism. Rappaport complained that dignitaries and ‘intelligent’ people, including the mayor, the pharmacist and the doctor, participated in this carnival, and that even children were taking part. Rappaport wanted the organisers to be prosecuted, as these ‘Judasfeiern’ were helping to spread rumours about Jews committing ritual murders. Catholic priests and ‘all-Poles’ (Polish national democrats) continued to fuel the anti-Jewish sentiments of peasants and young people. Roman-Catholic priests declaimed Easter sermons which reminded Rappaport of the racist propaganda disseminated by the violently anti-Semitic Black Hundred organisation in Russia. He feared that such anti-Semitic speeches and events were creating an atmosphere in which violence against Jews would become probable. Rappaport also referred to an earlier incident which had

occurred in one of the towns which held ‘Judasfeiern’ to demonstrate how easily the local gentile population could fall for anti-Jewish rumours.³⁹

In March 1905, in Żmigród (Nowy) near Jasło, a town of some 2000 inhabitants (more than half of them Jewish), a rumour spread that a group of Jews had kidnapped a 14-year-old Christian girl with the intention of murdering her and using her blood for ritual purposes. The rumour fell on fertile ground. At the time Żmigród was full of villagers waiting to attend a series of church events.⁴⁰ The girl, Katharina Tabak, told the police that she had been kidnapped by a group of Jewish men while she was on her way from the house of her employer to church. She accused the seventy-year-old vinegar maker Josef Zimet and his fifty-year-old son Sender of attempted rape, not of preparing a ritual murder. Fearing a pogrom, many Jews fled to larger towns. The police arrested Josef and Sender Zimet, their wives, and Josef’s unmarried daughter but released them after four days. This did not stop anti-Semitic newspapers from running the story and adding spurious salacious details – that the girl had been undressed, washed and locked in the cellar and that her clothes had been found buried in Jewish ground. The investigation, however, showed that the Jewish family was innocent. The girl had invented the story. On March 19th at 8 a.m. Katharina Tabak had told her employer, the peasant Jakob Bäl from Mytarz, that she would be going to church in Żmigród and would be back by noon. She only returned at 6 p.m. and without her shoes and shawl, which were later found in a nearby Christian cemetery. After a witness came forward, she admitted that she had been to another village to apply for a new job but insisted that she had been kidnapped. A local court found her guilty of perjury and sentenced her to three months in prison. Later,

an appeal court overturned the sentence and acquitted the girl due to ‘imbecility’ (*Geistesschwäche*). A pogrom had been averted, but even after the innocence of the five members of the Zimet family had been established, many villagers continued to believe the rumours of a planned ritual murder and continued to visit the ‘holy victim’.⁴¹

While this example clearly shows that the legal order provided a means of fighting unjust accusations, Rappaport believed that the authorities needed to do more to protect the Jewish citizens. He also called on the Polish local notables to fight anti-Judaism as he was afraid that such events would eventually lead to bloodshed. During the ‘Judasfeiern,’ one Jew might lose his nerve and defend himself against the insults or one of the gentile peasants might become excessively agitated and this would lead to fights and casualties. Moreover, the ‘Judasfeiern’ poisoned the relations between Poles and Jews. It should be the duty of teachers, intellectuals and the clergy to warn young people and stop this practice, but as this was not happening, Rappaport requested that the district captain or the governor disallow these ‘Judasfeiern’. The district captain of Jasło had imposed such a ban in 1912. When the ban was not renewed the following year, the ‘Judasfeiern’ became even more provocative. Clashes were only prevented by the judicious intervention of two or three prudent Jews.⁴²

These examples are typical in that they not only show the strong current of religious anti-Judaism in the region but also that grievances were heard and – at least sometimes – acted on. In 1898, 1905 and 1912, the local and regional authorities intervened to stop an event which incited religious hatred, but in 1913 ‘Judasfeiern’ were once again being held. As the Polish-dominated local and

regional authorities did not act, the centre (Vienna) and the Ministry of the Interior got involved, with the Ministry of the Interior ordering the Galician governor in 1914 to ban 'Judasfeiern'.⁴³

The erosion of the imperial order

The First World War injected new violence into these conflicts, which, for decades, had mostly been resolved peacefully. But in East Galicia, violence did not start from below. There were no clashes between Poles and Ukrainians or examples of anti-Semitic violence at the beginning of the war. The major ethnic groups had rarely been so united. When the war broke out, the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants of Galicia were loyal to Austria-Hungary. Hundreds of thousands of Polish, Ukrainian and Jewish men fought alongside one another in the Austrian-Hungarian army.⁴⁴ But despite the public expressions of loyalty displayed in both organised and spontaneous manifestations, the k. u. k. authorities did not trust all ethnic groups equally. Military units arriving from far afield mistook Ruthenians for Russians and overestimated the influence of the Russophile movement on the Ruthenian population.⁴⁵

In the summer of 1914 Austria-Hungary was in self-destruct mode. It not only started a war, risking the very existence of the empire, the civilian authorities also transferred extraordinary powers to the military, who did not sufficiently respect the principles of legality and the established procedures.⁴⁶ In East Galicia the military authorities weakened the loyalty of the Ruthenian population by arresting and executing an unknown number of Ruthenians as Russophiles. Like

their Russian counterparts, the k. u. k. army was afraid of treason and feared attacks by its own citizens. While the Ottoman Empire targeted Armenians and the Russian authorities came down heavily on Russian Germans and Jews suspected of holding sympathies for the enemy, the Austrian-Hungarian military turned against Ruthenians and South Slavs in the multilingual southern provinces. The k. u. k. authorities themselves undermined the legal order they had been so keen to uphold and brought extra-legal violence to a region where previously they had done so much to keep the volatile Polish-Ukrainian conflict and outbreaks of anti-Semitism under control.⁴⁷

After two weeks of fighting, the Imperial and Royal Army was in full retreat and the authorities were looking for scapegoats. The Austrian military relied on information provided by local authorities. This did not bode well for Ruthenians, given that most civil servants in Galicia were ethnic Poles. Some of them used the opportunity to undermine the trust of the military in the Ruthenian population. The offices of the district captains and the gendarmerie provided lists of suspicious persons, who were then arrested. Rumours spread that Greek-Catholic priests and peasants had used church towers to signal information about troop movements to the Russian Army. Individual cases were generalised into a pattern which shaped the perception of k. u. k. soldiers. Denunciations were a daily occurrence. Even Ukrainophiles took the opportunity to weaken the Russophile movement, but soon thereafter they themselves became the targets of denunciations. The campaign spiralled out of control. An unknown number of Ruthenians, possibly several thousand, were hanged or sentenced to death by military courts and summarily executed.⁴⁸ The Galician newspapers were full of

reports about arrested ‘Moskalophile’ (Russophile) traitors. On August 13th, 1918, for example, the newspaper Kurier Lwowski reported that 28 Ruthenian peasants from villages near Sokal had been sentenced to death and that 146 ‘Moskalophiles’, most of them peasants but also including one priest, had been transferred to the Brygidka prison in Lemberg.⁴⁹

The Brygidka prison was just a stopover on the way to the internment camps. One of the most notorious of these concentration camps was Camp Thalerhof near Graz, in the Austrian province of Styria. In November 1914, it already held 5,700 internees from Galicia and the Bukovina. Living conditions were poor, inmates were mistreated, and several thousand internees did not survive their internment.⁵⁰ After the war, the Ukrainian civic committee in Lemberg estimated that 25,000 Ukrainian civilians had been executed or otherwise perished in the prisons and camps. The true number is unknown, with estimates ranging from 11,500 to 30,000.⁵¹ The violence directed against Ruthenians and South Slavs suspected of holding pro-Serbian sympathies⁵² is strikingly similar to the atrocities committed by the German Army against French and Belgian civilians in the summer of 1914. In all cases, the atrocities were motivated by anger about military setbacks, a search for scapegoats who could be blamed for the defeats, wild rumours, and a fear of ‘traitors’ or attacks by non-combatants. The main difference was that in East Galicia (as in the Russian and Ottoman Empire) the acts of violence by the military were directed against their own people, and the denunciations came from out of the midst of the population.⁵³

The executions and arrests undermined the belief that the authorities were impartial and rational actors. But Ruthenian hatred was not directed, in the first

instance, against the state and army, that is, against those who carried out the actual executions and arrests, but focused instead on Polish civil servants and Jews, who were held to be responsible for the denunciations. State violence was interpreted according to ethnic patterns of perception and resulted in animosity being directed against other ethnic groups. Imperial interests and the interests of Polish nationalists diverged. The Polish-dominated local and regional authorities contributed to the persecutions as they used the confusion during the war to weaken the Ukrainian national movement. Governor Witold Korytowski, for example, wrongly reported to Vienna that the Ukrainian movement did not have much influence in the general Ruthenian population and that Ruthenians tended to be pro-Russian.⁵⁴ In July 1915, looking back on the first period of the war, the Austrian diplomat Leopold von Andrian blamed 'the personal motives and above all the rancour of influential local Polish elements against the hated Ukrainians' for the arrests and executions.⁵⁵

The loyalty of the population was tested further when the military defeats of the Austrian-Hungarian Army led to the occupation of East and parts of West Galicia by Russian troops. The period of transition between occupation regimes is always a time of uncertainty. The weakness or complete absence of state authority increases the probability of violent excesses and general lawlessness. It also shows whether the population expects to be punished for breaking the law and whether it expects the legitimate authorities to return. In Galicia the answer to both questions was no. Everywhere in the province, the time between the retreat of the k. u. k. army and the arrival of the Russian Army was used to rob, plunder, and settle accounts. People from all parts of society formed mobs and

robbed army and railway depots, empty flats and abandoned estates. In Lemberg, the three and a half days before the arrival of the Russian Army were 'true days of terror'.⁵⁶ Ethnic or religious categories were not particularly important. While looters were reported to have said that the rule of Jews and Polish masters had now come to an end, they did not spare abandoned Ukrainian flats and houses either. Russian soldiers participated in or sometimes even instigated the attacks.⁵⁷ After Russian military rule was firmly established, mob violence stopped, and the different ethnic groups had to settle in under Russian occupation.

The Jewish population fared worst under Russian occupation. More than 200,000 Jews from Galicia and the Bukovina (i.e., almost one quarter of the Jewish population) fled westwards, with many ending up in Vienna. Given the known loyalty of Jews to Austria, the Russian occupiers did not trust the Jewish population. Jews were discriminated against and subjected to appalling atrocities. There were murders, deportations, mass rapes and plundering. Cossack troops were the most notorious perpetrators, but they were often joined by gentiles who used the opportunity to rob Jews and seize their property.⁵⁸ In some places, Russian military commanders imposed contributions on the local Jewish community. The Russian occupiers forced thousands of Jews to leave their homes and march eastwards. In Lemberg, a pogrom committed by Cossack troops on September 27th cost the lives of at least 38 Jews. The Russian military-governor then prevented further pogroms from being carried out in such close proximity to his own headquarters, but the conquest of Przemyśl on 22 March

1915 was followed by attacks of Cossack troops on Jews and the expulsion of Jews from this Galician town.⁵⁹

The Russian occupiers played on local anti-Semitism to attract sympathy, but they did not succeed in winning the population over. This also applied to the majority of Ruthenians, many of whom would have had good reason to give up on Austria-Hungary. While a minority, the Russophile activists, welcomed the Russian troops as liberators, the much stronger Ukrainophile movement was vehemently anti-Russian. The Ukrainophiles were aware that all persons who identified as Ukrainians would lose out under Russian occupation, as the Russian government refused to acknowledge the existence of a Ukrainian nation and considered Ukrainian to be a Russian dialect and Ruthenians/Ukrainians (referred to as Little Russians) a branch of the Russian nation. The annexation of East Galicia was one of the major Russian war aims and was intended as the first step in the 'little-Russification' of the Ukrainian-speaking population. Already during the Russian occupation, the Ukrainian national movement was suppressed, its institutions closed, Ukrainian-language publications forbidden, and severe pressure was placed on the Greek-Catholic Church.⁶⁰

Under Russian occupation, the majority of Galicians, irrespective of religion, class, or ethnicity, remained loyal to the Habsburg emperor, but the fragmentation of Galician society along ethnic, religious and national fault lines continued. Even though the Jewish population clearly suffered most, many Ukrainians and Poles viewed them as war profiteers. They accused Jewish traders of having 'done business' with the occupiers. The Austrian Major General

Franz Riml later wrote that under Russian occupation anti-Semitism had reached a 'level previously unknown'.⁶¹

When Austrian troops returned to Lemberg on June 22nd, 1915 and subsequently liberated most of East Galicia, the population cheered the soldiers.⁶² The celebrations, however, did not last long. The initial defeat and the atrocities committed against Ruthenians had weakened the legitimacy of imperial rule, and Russian occupation had increased ethnic tensions. After all, the imperial army had not been able to protect the region, and the longer the war continued, the clearer it became that the empire was also incapable of feeding its population. The inhabitants of towns and cities in particular started to suffer from hunger. The state passed on the responsibility of feeding local populations to the respective local authorities, but they too struggled to meet demand. Welfare organisations – often organised along ethnic, social or religious lines – stepped in.⁶³ Most public kitchens in Lemberg were run by the municipality, but there were also some which served only one religious or ethnic group. Jewish, Ukrainian and Polish aid organisations operated independently from one another, which further encouraged the fragmentation of urban society along ethno-religious lines.⁶⁴

Democratic and participatory structures eroded during the war. The Austrian government did not return the region to civilian administration but appointed a military governor instead, who was not a member of the Polish elite but an Austrian-German general. Self-government in Lemberg was also suspended, but the city administration continued to operate under a government commissar who was advised by a council of state-appointed 'trusted men', many of them

previous councillors. Later on, the governor approved the constitution of a provisional council consisting of the old elected councillors but complemented by newly appointed or co-opted councillors, including, for the first time, several representatives of the Ukrainian population.⁶⁵

Aided by a spate of denunciations from all ranks of society, the k. u. k. government prosecuted real or imagined collaborators. Persons who had collaborated politically or had committed crimes against the life or property of fellow citizens were arrested. A series of trials against collaborators and informers, looters and robbers were launched. More Poles and Ukrainians were affected by these measures than Jews, who had had no incentive to collaborate.⁶⁶ In July 1918 the last Austrian governor, Count Karl von Huyn, criticised the policies implemented after the recapture of East Galicia. The patriotic enthusiasm of the population had cooled considerably following the sanctions meted out to suspected collaborators.⁶⁷ The author of an anonymous memorandum for the Austrian government went even further. The unjustified arrests had undermined the loyalty of the Polish population. 'In those circles which support Austria it is said with bitter sarcasm: the military administration should be awarded medals by the Russians, for it competently managed to alienate the inhabitants of Lemberg from Austria.'⁶⁸

Extra-legal violence against civilians by the Austrian-Hungarian and Russian military contributed to the deterioration of ethnic relations and the atmosphere of mutual distrust. After their return the Austrian-Hungarian authorities managed to keep ethnic conflicts under control but political and military

blunders, and the inability to provide sufficient food for the population undermined the legitimacy of imperial rule.

National self-determination

Changes to the international context, in particular the two Russian revolutions of 1917 and the ‘Wilsonian moment,’ further weakened the attraction of the imperial framework and induced Polish nationalists to sever ties with Austria-Hungary and Germany and go for full independence instead. The February Revolution in Russia was a pivotal moment for both the Ukrainian and the Polish national movements. The new provisional Russian government had accepted that Poland would become an independent state, while the Central Powers hesitated to guarantee full independence. For Polish politicians, the February Revolution in Russia reduced the attraction of the Austro-Polish option, while Galician Ukrainians, and even more so the Jewish population, were still firmly on the side of Austria-Hungary despite the promising developments in Russian Ukraine where a Ukrainian proto-government (the Central Rada) had been formed.⁶⁹

The October Revolution made the change irreversible: Poland would become independent. It was not U.S. President Wilson but the Bolshevik leader Vladimir I. Lenin who paved the way to independence for national movements all over Eastern Europe. In the Decree on Peace, which was passed on November 8th, 1917, the new Soviet Russian government proclaimed that peace should be based on the principle of national self-determination for all nationalities,

including colonies. This went much further than anything Britain, France or the USA had been prepared to propose. The unilateral decision by the Soviet Russian government to end the war meant that the Western Allies now faced no constraints on their policy towards Poland. With Russia under Bolshevik control and newly out of the war, Polish independence became an official part of the Allied war aims. In January 1918, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson stated in his famous Fourteen Points that Poland would become an independent state with access to the sea. The logical consequence of this was that Germany and Austria-Hungary would have to surrender territory to the new Polish state. From this point on, a victory by the Entente was very much in the interest of Polish state-building, as a defeat of the Central Powers would provide an opportunity to include both the Austrian and the Prussian partitions in the new Polish state. As a result, the Polish population increasingly tended to favour the Entente.

The final blow came with the bungled peace negotiations in Brest-Litovsk. The Central Powers agreed with the new Ukrainian People's Republic that the Chełm region, which had been part of Russian Poland, would belong to Ukraine. This led to fierce protests by the Polish population, while Ukrainians celebrated the fact that the Central Powers had recognised the existence of a Ukrainian state. Austria-Hungary had also secretly promised the Ukrainian government that Galicia would be divided, and that a Ukrainian crownland would be created. The secret did not remain a secret for very long and fuelled Polish protests even further. When the Austrian government retracted its promise, it managed to offend the Ukrainians while failing to win back the Polish population. The deteriorating living conditions and the political grievances coalesced. Polish

nationalists destroyed German and Austrian state symbols and tore down pictures of the emperors Wilhelm and Karl (who had succeeded Franz Joseph in late 1916). Politicians, teachers, members of the clergy, and – most worryingly – many civil servants openly rescinded their loyalty to Austria-Hungary and called for the creation of an independent Polish state.⁷⁰ It was not – as Judson rightly states – the ‘existence of national movements and nationalist conflicts in Austro-Hungarian politics’ as such which caused the downfall of the empire,⁷¹ but it significantly reduced the chances of the empire to survive a military defeat. Moreover, the impact of the Bolshevik Revolution and of the ‘Wilsonian moment’ can hardly be overstated as they opened the door to full independence, at least for some of the empire’s nations. ‘Pandora’s Box’ – as Robert Gerwarth called it – had been opened, and nationalist loyalties started to trump imperial loyalties.⁷²

For Ukrainian nationalists, however, Wilson’s Fourteen Points were much less attractive than they were for the Polish national movement. In point 10, Wilson had stated that the people of Austria-Hungary should be accorded the opportunity for autonomous development, but this announcement was too vague to persuade Ukrainian politicians to switch loyalties. In all Ukrainian territories, the power resided with Austria-Hungary and Germany. The weakness of the Ukrainian People’s Republic, which depended on German and Austrian-Hungarian military support, was one of the reasons why Galician Ukrainians were reluctant to push for full independence. Ukrainian politicians in Galicia continued to be loyal, even after the promise to divide the crownland was broken and the Chełm region was removed from Ukraine. German and Austrian-Hungarian armies continued to occupy the whole region and installed Hetman

Pavlo Skoropads'kyj, a more accommodating leader than the politicians of the Central Rada.⁷³ No help for the state-building efforts of Ukrainians in Austria-Hungary would therefore be forthcoming from the Ukrainian People's Republic. To contain Polish dominance, the Galician Ukrainians depended on Austrian support. Their best hope was still a Ukrainian crownland with far-reaching autonomy. Even in October 1918, the majority of Ukrainian politicians were not demanding a complete break with Austria-Hungary. The only exception was the small social-democratic party which demanded immediate unification with the Ukrainian People's Republic.⁷⁴ The Ukrainian daily Dilo wrote that under no circumstances should East Galicia be part of a Polish state.⁷⁵ For Ukrainian nationalists, self-determination did not mean breaking away from the empire but ending Polish dominance in the region.⁷⁶

By 1918, anti-Semitism was on the rise again and the Polish-Ukrainian conflict intensified. Especially in West Galicia attacks on Jews increased. Stories about ritual murders and other anti-Semitic tropes spread, Jews were accused of shirking and profiteering from the war.⁷⁷ The Jewish population remained the most loyal to the empire and remained loyal until the very end. This fuelled the anti-Semitism in Polish society, where national aspirations stood to benefit most from an Entente victory. The imperial authorities still tried to contain anti-Semitic violence and prevent pogroms. When anti-Semitic leaflets demanding the 'dejudaization of Poland' were distributed in Lemberg in February 1918, the police hunted down the culprit, a Polish Catholic priest from Lublin province.⁷⁸

On October 10th, 1918, the Ukrainian daily Dilo published an article commenting on the intention of the Polish Regency Council in Warsaw to create an

independent Polish state. The Poles and their leaders, the newspaper wrote, needed to know that they would have to choose between war and peace. If they wanted to claim East Galicia for a future Polish state, there would be a war with the Ukrainians. If they accepted minority status in a Ukrainian state where they would enjoy all minority rights, there would be peace.⁷⁹ The warning was ignored. When the collapse of Austria-Hungary could no longer be averted, Polish and Ukrainian politicians prepared to seize power in East Galicia. Governor General Karl Huyn refused to transfer power to either side without receiving authorisation from Vienna⁸⁰ but Polish politicians were sure that there was no alternative to the region becoming part of the Polish state. A delegation of the Polish Liquidation Committee was expected to arrive in Lemberg from Cracow on November 1st to claim the city and region for Poland. As the crownland's administration was dominated by Poles, a smooth transfer of power seemed to be assured. To pre-empt this proclamation, the Ukrainian National Committee proclaimed a Ukrainian state, the Western Ukrainian People's Republic with Lemberg as its capital. In the night to November 1st, Ukrainian soldiers of the Austrian-Hungarian Army, now acting on behalf of the Western Ukrainian government, took control of the city. In response, the secret Polish military organisations called on the Polish population to resist. A few thousand men and women, adolescents and children responded to the call.⁸¹

The Ukrainian politicians tried to legitimize their power grab. As Huyn refused to pass his authority on to the Western Ukrainian government, the Ukrainian leaders, many of them lawyers, found a way out. Huyn declared himself incapable of exercising power any longer and transferred his authority to his

Ukrainian deputy who passed it on to the Western Ukrainian government.⁸² This again shows the strength of a political culture strongly rooted in legal procedure. But the Polish majority in the city had no intention of accepting this fait accompli. Secret Polish military organisations organised armed resistance. For more than three weeks, troops of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic battled Polish volunteers for the control of Lemberg. The Kahal (a local body of Jewish self-administration) formed a militia to protect the Jewish quarter. It declared itself to be strictly neutral in this conflict, which was sliding into civil war and – after the proclamation of the Second Polish Republic on November 11th, 1918 – metamorphosed into a war between Poland and the Western Ukrainian People's Republic.⁸³

The Russian October Revolution followed by the commitment of Britain, France and USA to restore an independent Polish state with access to the Baltic Sea all but ended the chances of the Central Powers to win Polish support. In Austria-Hungary, the Polish population was no longer satisfied with anything short of full independence for a Polish state consisting of territory from all three partitions. The threat of a perpetuation of Polish dominance in East Galicia and the weakness of the Ukrainian People's Republic made the Galician Ukrainians still look for Austrian-Hungarian support to counteract Polish national aspirations, while an increase in anti-Semitic violence especially in West Galicia made the Jewish population weary of what a post-imperial future might bring.

The brutalisation of ethnic conflicts and the question of legitimacy

The Polish-Ukrainian war started slowly, as if both sides still had hopes that a compromise might be found, as had so often been the case in the previous 50

years under the aegis of Austria-Hungary. Old habits did not die quickly. Many attempts were made by moderate Ukrainian and Polish politicians to come to a negotiated solution, but the Polish military commanders refused to accept any compromise. In the end, the outcome was decided by military might. In the first few weeks of the conflict, Ukrainian and Polish soldiers were still able to interrupt their fighting and enjoy a cigarette together, but the fighting soon became more brutal.⁸⁴ This set off a downward spiral of violence, leading to atrocities. Both Ukrainian and Polish troops appear to have committed war crimes.⁸⁵ After three weeks of street fighting and the arrival of fresh troops, the Poles managed to oust the Ukrainian soldiers from the city on November 22nd, 1918. The Ukrainian Galician Army laid siege to Lemberg and continued fighting, but after a few more months and following the arrival of experienced Polish units from the Western front (the so-called Haller Army) the war ended in July 1919 with a Polish victory.⁸⁶

After fighting in the city had ended on November 22nd, 1918, Polish troops disarmed the Jewish militia and – three weeks after the end of Austrian-Hungarian rule in the region – a three-day pogrom began. The Polish military newspaper accused the Jewish militia of having supported the Ukrainian side. This prompted Polish soldiers to attack the Jewish quarter after its militia had surrendered its weapons. During this period of confusion, soldiers told their victims that their military commanders had allowed them to punish Jews for their behaviour during the three weeks of street fighting. Revenge was not the only motive. Greed was equally important. The pogrom was accompanied by arson, robbery, looting, and blackmail.⁸⁷ The main perpetrators of the violence

were Polish fighters, sometimes accompanied by civilians.⁸⁸ The pogrom ended after Polish commanders managed to re-establish public order, but individual attacks and anti-Semitic discrimination continued for several months. The new Polish government under head of state Marshall Józef Piłsudski and Prime Minister Ignacy Paderewski denied that anti-Semitism was a problem, blaming any excesses on the Jewish population's lack of loyalty to Poland.⁸⁹ There were more incidents of anti-Jewish violence in West Galicia, with yet more atrocities committed by Polish troops and the troops of its ally, the leader of the directorate of the Ukrainian People's Republic, Symon Petljura, during the Polish-Soviet war of 1920.⁹⁰

After the defeat of the Central Powers, Ukrainian politicians had pinned their hopes on the victorious powers. Now the right of self-determination and Wilson's different statements became important points of reference. Dilo reminded its readers that Wilson had only acknowledged the Polish right of self-determination for Polish territories to which, in its view, East Galicia and other regions with a Ukrainian majority did not belong.⁹¹ In numerous memoranda to the peace-makers, the Western Ukrainian government argued against Polish claims and called in vain for Allied support for an independent Western Ukrainian state. But on November 21st, 1919 the High Council of the Paris Peace Conference acknowledged the facts on the ground by placing East Galicia under Polish administration for a period of 25 years.

Previously blurred boundaries had now become sharply delineated. The Polish-Ukrainian war forced people to choose sides and pick their nation. The Jewish population was caught between a rock and a hard place. Jewish neutrality during

the Polish-Ukrainian conflict was interpreted by Polish society as a betrayal of Poland and had not won any Ukrainian sympathies either. The number of religious conversions increased dramatically after the war. Where national affiliation and religion or denomination appeared to be in conflict, people converted to the religion or denomination that indicated their national affiliation. In the six years before 1918, between 194 and 317 people in Lemberg/Lwów/L'viv converted annually to Roman Catholicism. In 1919, the number rose to 2,239 (out of a total of 2329 conversions) and the number of conversions stayed high in the three years that followed (865, 761, 645, respectively). In 1919, 2089 Greek Catholics and 130 Jews changed their religious affiliation. Almost all of them converted to Roman Catholicism to bring their denomination/religion in line with their national identification.⁹²

As Judson rightly states when referring to the successor states of Austria-Hungary, there was a strong continuity of institutions between the empire and the new nation states or 'little empires', as he calls them, due to most of them having substantial national minorities.⁹³ There were also strong personal continuities. Even after the dissolution of Austria-Hungary, the population saw the same politicians standing in elections, the same civil servants approving planning applications, the same policemen patrolling the streets, the same judges sitting in court applying the same law codes. In East Galicia, however, things were somewhat different. It is true that most of the officials who worked for the local authorities did not change, but some disappeared. Crucially, those who disappeared were Ukrainian civil servants, judges and officials who resigned or were forced to leave their jobs after they refused to swear an oath of allegiance

to the new Polish state. While Ukrainian nationalists and the Ukrainian population had accepted the imperial framework and its legal order, they did not recognise the legitimacy of the new Polish authority or the right of its representatives to rule over East Galicia. The political leaders of the Ukrainian population called for a boycott of the Polish census in 1921 and asked Ukrainians not to participate in the Polish elections in 1922 so as not to give the impression of legitimising Polish rule over this ethnographically Ukrainian territory. For the majority of Ukrainian politicians and for the Ukrainian population, the boycott ended on March 14th, 1923 when the Council of Ambassadors (from Italy, France, Britain and Japan) at the League of Nations, ignoring all Ukrainian protestations and memoranda, decided that East Galicia would be incorporated into Poland, with the expectation that the region would be given far-reaching autonomy. The Polish government was forced to sign a minority treaty guaranteeing the rights of Jewish, Ukrainian, Belarusian and German minorities.⁹⁴

The Entente, however, failed to hold the Polish government accountable. The League of Nations was meant to monitor whether Poland was meeting its obligations, but in fact this depended on the good will of the Polish government. The key promise, i.e. a promise to create an autonomous Ukrainian region in East Galicia, was never kept and Ukrainians suffered discrimination, with Ukrainian civil servants not permitted to return to the civil service. This radicalised the Ukrainian national movement and led to the formation of the Ukrainian Military Organisation (later replaced by the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists),

which carried out terrorist attacks targeting Polish politicians and officials and moderate Ukrainian politicians.⁹⁵

It is not an overstatement to say that the Second Polish Republic never managed to fully integrate its Ukrainian minority. While the Galician Ukrainians had accepted the imperial Austrian-Hungarian framework, even moderate Ukrainian politicians operating within the Polish national framework did so with strong reservations. Although their main focus was on improving the rights and living conditions of their fellow Ukrainian nationals, they never gave up hope that the affiliation with Poland would be only temporary and would be followed by an independent Ukrainian nation state.

Conclusion

In the decades before the Great War Austria-Hungary had managed to contain the Polish-Ukrainian conflict and limit anti-Semitic violence. The imperial framework had been transformed and provided mechanisms which encouraged compromise and the peaceful resolution of conflicts. Imperial and national loyalties were mostly compatible but diverging interests clashed, for example when the Polish dominated regional authorities favoured Russophile candidates against Ukrainophile candidates in elections

The empire managed to balance conflicting national interests as long as full national independence was not on the cards. In Galicia, as elsewhere in Europe, hopes were high that the war would not last long and would end with the comprehensive victory of their own side. Polish and Ukrainian politicians

expected that their loyalty would be rewarded. The problem was that their expectations contradicted each other. Defeat prevented Austria-Hungary's ability to negotiate compromises from being put to the ultimate test.

Imperial authority had already begun to erode early on in the war, and the principle of the rule of law was undermined by the introduction of military rule and the mass arrest and execution of Ruthenians. Under Russian occupation, the civil population, especially the Jews, became the victims of violence, oppression, arrests and deportations. It was, however, not war and military setbacks alone which caused the collapse of the empire. Political mistakes and the failure of the Austrian government to feed its populations contributed to its fall. And finally, it was the 'defection' of the Polish population which ended Austrian rule in East Galicia. The majority of the Jewish population remained loyal until the very end, and Ukrainians also continued to make plans with Austria very much in the picture.

There was a 'Wilsonian moment' in Galicia, but the two Russian revolutions were even more important. The February Revolution brought a new dynamic to the Polish question, with the acceptance by the Provisional Government that there would be an independent Polish state after the war. The right of national self-determination referred to in the Decree on Peace by the Soviet Russian government on November 8th, 1917 and then by U.S. President Woodrow Wilson in his Fourteen Points speech on January 8th, 1918 gave legitimacy to the claims of nationalists, with severe consequences for the fragile truce in multi-ethnic East Galicia. The October Revolution and the end of Russian participation in the First World War allowed Britain, France and the USA to play the Polish card

without having to take account of Russian interests. Thereafter, Polish nationalists refused to be satisfied with anything short of full independence and a Polish state which encompassed territories taken from all three partitions. This could only be achieved by an Entente victory. The Ukrainian movement in Galicia, on the other hand, could also refer to the right of national self-determination but was aware of what Poland had been promised. The best chance of achieving a united Ukraine was still linked to a victory of the Central Powers. It was only after Austria-Hungary had collapsed that Western Ukrainian politicians began placing their hopes in Wilson and the Entente.

In multi-ethnic East Galicia there was no peaceful transition of power from the empire to a new state. Instead, the demise of Austria-Hungary led to the collapse of public order and chaotic violence. It started in West Galicia with an increase of the number of attacks against the Jewish population. Greed, together with stories of ritual murders, of Jews profiting from the war and of not supporting the Polish nation led to anti-Semitic violence. In East Galicia the main reason for ethnic violence was the existence of two mutually exclusive state-building projects. The Polish minority in East Galicia denied the legitimacy of the newly proclaimed Western Ukrainian People's Republic, while the Ukrainian majority refused to recognise the integration of the region into the new Polish state. This led to the Polish-Ukrainian war and contributed to anti-Semitic excesses. Although the new Polish authorities were interested in maintaining law and order, they were not impartial arbiters and placed the interests of the Polish nation and state above all else. The Ukrainian population never felt the same degree of loyalty towards Poland as they had towards Austria-Hungary. The Entente, and later the League

of Nations, were incapable of providing the political framework for a negotiated solution of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict as, unlike Austria-Hungary, they lacked both the ability and the will to enforce it. The Ukrainian question in Poland was still unsolved when the Second World War began.

¹ There are a myriad of books and articles on nation building, nationalism and empire. A good overview on different approaches and theories of nation building is given in A.D. Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism*; Eley and Suny, *Becoming National*; Kunze, *Nation und Nationalismus*; Hirschhausen and Leonhard, *Nationalismen in Europa*. On empire, see for example Miller and Berger, *Nationalizing Empires*; Lieven, *Empire*; Miller and Rieber, *Imperial Rule*.

² Lawrence, "Nationalism and Historians," in Breuilly, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of Nationalism*, 713-729. See also the global case studies in Berger, *Writing the Nation*.

³ Miller and Berger, "Introduction: Building Nations in and with Empires," in Miller and Berger, eds., *Nationalizing Empires*, 1-30.

⁴ Judson, *The Habsburg Empire*. Deak, *Forging a Multinational State*. Cohen, "Nationalist Politics and the Dynamics of State and Civil Society in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1867-1914," *CEH*, 241-278.

⁵ Similar: Judson, *The Habsburg Empire*, 376-393.

⁶ Judson, *The Habsburg Empire*, 387.

⁷ This definition is based on A. D. Smith, *National Identity*, 19-20.

⁸ See the pioneering study by Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe*.

⁹ On national indifference, see Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed*.

¹⁰ In the Hungarian part of the empire, Jews made up 5% of the population. About three quarters of them reported Hungarian to be their main language, the remaining 25% were registered as German speakers. On the different nationality policy in Cisleithania and Transleithania, see Komlosy, "Imperial cohesion, nation-building, and regional integration in the Habsburg Monarchy," in Berger and Miller, eds., *Nationalizing Empires*, 369-427.

¹¹ See the overview in Judson, *The Habsburg Empire*, 218-384.

¹² Ruthenian/Ruthenians was the official name used to refer to the Greek-Catholic or Orthodox Ukrainian-speaking population of Austria-Hungary.

¹³ The Austrian census did not ask about nationality but only about denomination/religion and main language. Mark, *Galizien unter österreichischer Herrschaft*, 80-85.

¹⁴ See also Brubaker, *Nationalism reframed*, 13-22.

¹⁵ Polonsky, *The Jews in Poland and Russia*, vol. 2.

¹⁶ Mick, "Nationalisierung in einer multiethnischen Stadt," in Goehrke and Pietrow-Enker, eds., *Städte im östlichen Europa*, 171-213.

¹⁷ The Polish name for the city is Lwów, the Ukrainian name is L'viv. I will be using the city's German name, Lemberg, the name the city was widely known by when it was part of Austria-Hungary.

¹⁸ On the Polish influence in Vienna, see Buszko, *Polacy w Parlamentie Wiedeńskim*.

¹⁹ John-Paul Himka estimated that in 1900 this secular intelligentsia had no more than 10,000 members. They and Greek-Catholic priests were the spokespeople of the Ukrainian speaking population. Himka, "The transformation and formation of social strata," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 23, 3-22.

²⁰ Biehl, "Die Ruthenen," in Wandruszka and Urbanitsch, eds., *Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918*, vol. 3, part 1, 555-584.

²¹ Another important concession was the appointment of Mykhailo Hrushevskyj, who would go on to become the doyen of Ukrainian history as professor for Eastern European History at Lemberg University. His historical writings, delineating Ukrainian from Russian history, were popularised by Ukrainian education societies and helped to promote the idea of a distinct

Ukrainian nation. Maciak, *Próba porozumienia polsko-ukraińskiego*; Partacz, *Od Badeniego do Potockiego*, 45-83; Chornovol, *Pol's'ko-Ukrajins'ka Uhoda*.

²² Mick, "Nationalisierung in einer multiethnischen Stadt," *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 40, 171-213.

²³ On Ukrainian schools, see Pacholkiv, *Emanzipation durch Bildung*.

²⁴ "Die Ruthenen und Oesterreich," *Ukrainische Rundschau* 6 (1908), 547-550.

²⁵ Binder, *Galizien in Wien*; Feldman, *Stronictwa i programy polityczne w Galicyi*; Mick, "Nationalisierung in einer multiethnischen Stadt," *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 40, 210-213.

²⁶ On the polonisation of the crownland, see Bieberstein, *Freiheit in der Unfreiheit*.

²⁷ On the Ukrainian national movement, see Himka, *Galician Villagers and the Ukrainian National Movement*.

²⁸ Hryniuk, "Polish Lords and Ukrainian Peasants: Conflict, Deference, and Accommodation in Eastern Galicia in the Late Nineteenth Century," *Austrian History Yearbook* 24, 131. Binder, "Die Wahlreform von 1907 und der polnisch-ruthenische Konflikt in Ostgalizien," *Österreichische Osthefte* 38, 293-320.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Shanes, *Diaspora Nationalism and Jewish Identity*, 223-242.

³¹ The murderer was arrested and put on trial. He was defended by prominent Ukrainian lawyers and politicians. The court sentenced Sichyns'kyj to death but, following the advice of the new governor Michał Bobrzyński, he was reprieved by Emperor Franz-Josef. Three years after the murder, Sichyns'yyj escaped, first to France and then to the United States. For a contemporary Ukrainian perspective, Wladimir Kuschnir, "Der Statthaltermord," *Ukrainische Rundschau* 6 (1908), 161-168; Wladimir Kuschnir, "Graf Andreas Potocki als Statthalter," *ibid.*, 183-188. Transcripts of Polish and international newspaper reports on the assassination: "Die Pressestimmen über das Attentat Syczynskyjs," *ibid.*: 197-215.

³² "Krwawe zajścia na uniwersytecie" (Bloody incidents at the university), *Kurier Lwowskie*, July 2, 1910, 1-4.

³³ Alliances which crossed ethnic and religious boundaries were no rarity, but they were often indirectly linked to nationalist mobilisation. The Ruthenian/Ukrainian Radical Party and the Polish People's (peasant) Party cooperated during agrarian strikes. The arch-conservative Polish landowners in East Galicia formed an electoral alliance with the Ruthenian Russophiles. Zionists and Ukrainophiles helped each other to get their candidates through. In February 1914, Jewish Polish (assimilationist) students in Lemberg joined forces with Catholic Polish students to prevent a Zionist leader from Russian Poland from speaking, as he had made derogatory remarks about Poland. Binder, "Die Wahlreform von 1907 und der polnisch-ruthenische Konflikt in Ostgalizien," *Österreichische Osthefte* 38, 293-320. Buszko, "Die Stellung der Polen und Ukrainer zur jüdischen Frage im autonomen Galizien, *Österreichische Osthefte*, 38, 3, 282.

³⁴ Shanes, *Diaspora Nationalism*, 268-279; Schatzger, *The Jewish Oil Magnates of Galicia*, 119-134.

³⁵ Österreichisches Allgemeines Verwaltungsarchiv (AVA), Ministerium des Innern (MdI), Präsidiale, Allgemeine Abteilung, Unruhen und Exzesse, 2115. Daily report of the Polizeidirektion Lemberg, January 6, 1913.

³⁶ Partacz, "Przyczyny i przebieg konfliktu Ukraińsko," *Przegląd Wschodni* 2, 841-849.

³⁷ Struve, *Bauern und Nation in Galizien*, 425-431. A detailed discussion of the 1898 riots in Unowsky, *The Plunder: The 1898 anti-Jewish Riots in Habsburg Galicia*. See also Buchen, *Antisemitismus in Galizien*, 141-143.

³⁸ In several central and southern European regions, the traditional Easter Fire was also called 'Judasfeuer' or 'Judasbrennen'. One part of the celebrations consisted of burning an effigy of 'Judas'. Rappaport's intervention is also discussed in Hagen, *Anti-Jewish Violence in Poland*, 70-72.

³⁹ AVA, MdI, Präsidiale, Allgemeine Abteilung, Unruhen und Exzesse, 2116. Landesadvokat Dr. Marek Rappaport (Lemberg) to the Alliance Israélite in Vienna, March 17, 1914.

⁴⁰ See the first reports on the suspected ritual murder, *Deutsches Volksblatt*, April 2, 1905, 6. Communiqué of Alliance Israélite, published in *Neue Freie Presse*, June 1910, 1905, 11. *Neues Wiener Tagblatt*, June 10, 1905, 11. More detailed in *Monatsschrift der Österreichisch-Israelitischen Union* 17 (1905), no. 4, 27; *ibid* 17 (1905), no. 6-7, 22-23; *ibid.* 17 (1905), no. 8-9, 20-21.

⁴¹ Ibid.

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- ⁴² AVA, MdI, Präsidiale, Allgemeine Abteilung, Unruhen und Exzesse, 2116. Landesadvokat Dr. Marek Rappaport (Lemberg) to Alliance Israélite in Vienna, March 17, 1914.
- ⁴³ AVA, MDI, Unruhen und Exzesse, 2116. MdI to the Governor of Galicia (copy), March 27, 1914.
- ⁴⁴ On the enthusiastic support for Austria-Hungary's war effort. see Rosenblit, "Reconstructing a National Identity," pp. 39-58.
- ⁴⁵ Prusin, *The Lands Between*, 41-49.
- ⁴⁶ Judson, *The Habsburg Empire*, 391-393. Gumz, *Resurrection and Collapse*, 14.
- ⁴⁷ Mick, *Lemberg, Lwów, L'viv*, 19-21. On Russia Gatrell, *Russia's First World War*, 178-183.
- ⁴⁸ See the documents in *Thalerhof Almanac* (Talergofskij Al'manakh). See also Tsentral'nyj Derzhavnyj Istorychnyj Arkhiv Ukrayiny, m. L'viv (TsDIAL), f. 408, op. 1, spr. 112. Report by the Greek-Catholic priest Kyryl Levyts'kyj (1914); TsDIAL, f. 146, op. 6, spr. 1376, ark. 505-506. Presidium of the Ukrainian parliamentary representation to the k. u. k. High Command (copy), August 11, 1915; Veryha, *Vyzvol'ni zmahannja v Ukraini*, 24-33. Wendland, *Die Russophilen in Galizien*, 540-547.
- ⁴⁹ "Kronika," *Kurier Lwowski*, August 13, 1914. On August 16, Kurier Lwowski reported that 400 Russophile peasants had been brought to Brygidka prison. "Kronika," *Kurier Lwowski*, August 14, 1914. Ibid., August 15, 1914. More examples in Wendland, *Die Russophilen in Galizien*, 540-547.
- ⁵⁰ K. u. k. Kriegsüberwachungsamt (Military Office for Surveillance) to the governor's office in Graz, November 9, 1914, in *Talergofskij Al'manakha*, vol. 4, part 2, 134-137. Wesener, "Internment in WWI," in Luthar, ed., *The Great War and Memory*, 111-122.
- ⁵¹ TsDIAL, f. 462, op. 1, spr. 90, ark. 1-4. Memorandum of the Ukrainian Citizens' Committee (Bürgerkomitee), December 4, 1920.
- ⁵² Statistics in Moll, *Kein Burgfrieden*, 424-439.
- ⁵³ Horne and Kramer, *German Atrocities 1914*. Kramer, *Dynamic of Destruction*, 6-30.
- ⁵⁴ Note from Baron Giesl, the representative of the Austrian-Hungarian Foreign Office with the Army High Command, August 1914, in Hornykiewicz, *Ereignisse in der Ukraine*, vol. 1, 20-22; Berchtold (k. u. k. foreign minister) to Giesl, August 26, 1914, in ibid., 20. On Polish civil servants as informers, see also AVA, MdI, Präsidiale, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten, 22/2116. Report by Legationsrat Baron Andrian on his trip to East Galicia, Cracow, July 26, 1915.
- ⁵⁵ AVA, MdI, Präsidiale, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten, 22/2116: Report by Legationsrat Baron Andrian on his trip to East Galicia, Cracow, July 26, 1915.
- ⁵⁶ Chlamtacz, *Lembergs politische Physiognomie*, 21.
- ⁵⁷ Prusin, *Nationalizing a Borderland*, 24-32; Mick, *Lemberg – Lwów – L'viv*, 23-27.
- ⁵⁸ Mick, *Lemberg – Lwów – L'viv*, 23-27; Prusin, *Nationalizing a Borderland*, 24-32. Hagen, *Anti-Jewish Violence in Poland*, 61-86.
- ⁵⁹ Mick, *Lemberg – Lwów – L'viv*, 40-45; Prusin, *Nationalizing a Borderland*, 24-47.
- ⁶⁰ Bakhturina, *Politika Rossiijskoj Imperii*, 57-183; von Hagen, *War in a European Borderland*, 19-53; Bachmann, *Ein Herd der Feindschaft gegen Russland*, 259-271.
- ⁶¹ TsDIAL, f. 146, op. 6, spr. 118, ark. 413-423.
- ⁶² Mick, *Lemberg – Lwów – L'viv*, 62-64.
- ⁶³ On national segregation of welfare programs, see Zahra, "Each Nation Only Cares for Its Own": Empire, Nation, and Child Welfare Activism in the Bohemian Lands, 1900-1918," *AHR* 111, 1378-1402.
- ⁶⁴ Mick, *Lemberg – Lwów – L'viv*, 96-102. On a Jewish aid organisation set up in Lemberg during Russian occupation, Ansky, *The Enemy at his Pleasure*, 75-78.
- ⁶⁵ Kramarz, *Samorzqd Lwowa*, 58-73.
- ⁶⁶ Mick, *Lemberg – Lwów – L'viv*, 66-69.
- ⁶⁷ TsDIAL, f. 146, op. 6, spr. 121, ark. 1266. Governor Count Huyn to the Minister of the Interior, August 16, 1918.
- ⁶⁸ DALO, f. 3, op. 1, spr. 6011, ark 21. Memorandum on the situation in Lemberg (copy), sent by the Ministry of the Interior to Minister-President Karl Stürgkh, December 28, 1915.
- ⁶⁹ Liber, *Total Wars and the Making of Modern Ukraine*, 56-65. Mick, *Lemberg, Lwów, L'viv*, 80-96. Snyder, *The Red Prince*, 77-120.
- ⁷⁰ On the response in Galicia, Mick, *Lemberg – Lwów – L'viv*, 85-96. On Brest-Litovsk, see Chernev, *Twilight of Empires*, 41-78.
- ⁷¹ Judson, *The Habsburg Empire*, 381.
- ⁷² Gerwarth, *The Vanquished*, 171-186.
- ⁷³ Mędrzecki, *Niemiecka interwencja militarna na Ukrainie*, 165-192.

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- ⁷⁴ DALO, f. 257, op. 234, ark. 41-43. Commander of the k. u. k. gendarmerie in Galicia and the Bukovina to the k. u. k. Army High Command (Nachrichtenabteilung), October 21, 1918; Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (Political Archive of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PA), -R-8980. Rittmeister von Gebssattel to Chancellor Max von Baden, October 21, 1918.
- ⁷⁵ 'Zhydy i Nimtsi' (Jews and Germans), *Dilo*, 17 October 1918, p. 1.
- ⁷⁶ 'Odna ideja Zapizno' (One idea too late), *Dilo*, 18 October 1918, p. 1.
- ⁷⁷ Hagen, *Anti-Jewish Violence in Poland*, 87-122.
- ⁷⁸ TsDIAL, f. 146, op. 8, spr. 2688a. The director of Lemberg police, Reinlender to the district attorney in Lemberg, February 26, 1918; Ibid., spr. 2684, ark. 67-69. Reinlender to the district attorney, June 19, 1918; Ibid., ark. 92-96. Protocol of the questioning of the priest, July 4, 1918; Ibid., ark. 88-91. Police directorate to the district attorney, July 4, 1918.
- ⁷⁹ "Vybirajte, vijna chy myr?" (Choose, war or peace?), *Dilo*, 10 October 1918, p. 1.
- ⁸⁰ DALO, f. 350, op. 1, spr. 4434, ark. 41. Appeal by the governor of Galicia to the department heads of the governor's office and to all district commissioners (Kreishauptleute), October 28, 1918.
- ⁸¹ Mick, *Lemberg – Lwów – L'viv*, 137-147. Wehrhahn, *Die Westukrainische Volksrepublik*, 127-133.
- ⁸² Mroczka, *Spór o Galicję Wschodnią*, 96-97.
- ⁸³ Mick, *Lemberg – Lwów – L'viv*, 143-174. Wehrhahn, *Die Westukrainische Volksrepublik*, 127-156.
- ⁸⁴ DALO, f. 257, op. 2, spr. 1497, ark. 62. The Polish commander Czesław Mączyński to the command of the Ukrainian troops in Lviv (copy), November 8, 1918. The Ukrainian commander rejected the accusations. Ibid., ark. 63. Ukrainian High Command to the Polish High Command (copy), November 8, 1918. "Z kim vojujemo" (With whom we fight); *Dilo*, November 13, 1918; "Novynky," *Dilo*, November 13, 1918.
- ⁸⁵ See the numerous reports and memoranda sent by both sides to the British delegation at the Peace Conference. British National Archives (BNA), Foreign Office (FO) 608/195.
- ⁸⁶ On this war, see Kozłowski, *Zapomniana wojna*. Klimecki, *Lwów*.
- ⁸⁷ Hagen, "The Moral Economy of Ethnic Violence," 203-226.
- ⁸⁸ Mick, *Lemberg – Lwów – L'viv*, 158-174. Hagen, "The Moral Economy of Ethnic Violence," 203-226.
- ⁸⁹ DALO, f. 257, op. 2, spr. 24, ark. 37-38. Report by the press office of the delegation of the Jewish National Council for East Galicia, November 23, 1920. See also "Naczelnik Państwa o Żydach" (The Head of State on Jews), *Głos Narodu*, February 20, 1919; *Nowy Dziennik*, February 11, 1919; *Goniec Krakowski*, February 12, 1919; "Czy zwrot ku lepszemu" (Is it a turn to the better), *Chwila*, January 12, 1919; Golczewski, *Polnisch-Jüdische Beziehungen*: 200-202.
- ⁹⁰ Reder, "Im Schatten des polnischen Staates," 592-597. On this violence and on the 'image of the Jew' in Poland, Michlic, *Poland's Threatening Other*, 109-130.
- ⁹¹ "Borot'ba za Schidny Halychyny" (Fight for East Galicia), *Dilo*, October 24, 1918, 1. A more detailed denunciation of 'imperialist claims of the Poles' demanding Ukrainian territory in 'Zamoznachenija narodiv, pols'kyj imperialism i Ukrainsci' (The self-determination of nations, Polish imperialism and the Ukrainians), *Dilo*, October 26, 1918, 1.
- ⁹² *Wiadomości statystyczne*, vol 15.
- ⁹³ Judson, *The Habsburg Empire*, 387-388.
- ⁹⁴ On Polish nationality policy in its eastern provinces in the inter-war period, see for example Schenke, *Nationalstaat und nationale Frage*. Benecke, *Die Ostgebiete der Zweiten Polnischen Republik*. Redlich, *Together and Apart in Brzezany*. See also Gerwarth, *The Vanquished*, 217-219.
- ⁹⁵ On the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists in the inter-war period, see Bruder, "Den Ukrainischen Staat erkämpfen oder sterben!", 27-112. Shkandrij, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 17-48.