UNSPECIFIED. (2001) Cyclic games: An introduction and some examples. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 34 (1). pp. 138-152. ISSN 0899-8256

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Abstract

We introduce a model of a cyclic game. Designed to take advantage of the recurring nature of certain economic and social situations, a cyclic game differs from an extensive form game in that a cyclic game does not necessarily have an end. The same situations, although with different players, may be repented infinitely often. We provide an example showing that, even though a cyclic game has, in a sense, perfect information, it may not have an equilibrium in pure strategies. We demonstrate existence of equilibrium and illustrate the application of our model to an oligopolistic industry. (C) 2001 Academic Press.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
Journal or Publication Title:	GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
Publisher:	ACADEMIC PRESS INC
ISSN:	0899-8256
Official Date:	January 2001
Volume:	34
Number:	1
Number of Pages:	15
Page Range:	pp. 138-152
Identification Number:	10.1006/game.1999.0797
Publication Status:	Published
URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/12510

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