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Cyclic games: An introduction and some examples
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UNSPECIFIED (2001) Cyclic games: An introduction and some examples. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 34 (1). pp. 138-152. doi:10.1006/game.1999.0797
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0797
Abstract
We introduce a model of a cyclic game. Designed to take advantage of the recurring nature of certain economic and social situations, a cyclic game differs from an extensive form game in that a cyclic game does not necessarily have an end. The same situations, although with different players, may be repented infinitely often. We provide an example showing that, even though a cyclic game has, in a sense, perfect information, it may not have an equilibrium in pure strategies. We demonstrate existence of equilibrium and illustrate the application of our model to an oligopolistic industry. (C) 2001 Academic Press.
| Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions | ||||
| Journal or Publication Title: | GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | ||||
| Publisher: | ACADEMIC PRESS INC | ||||
| ISSN: | 0899-8256 | ||||
| Official Date: | January 2001 | ||||
| Dates: |
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| Volume: | 34 | ||||
| Number: | 1 | ||||
| Number of Pages: | 15 | ||||
| Page Range: | pp. 138-152 | ||||
| DOI: | 10.1006/game.1999.0797 | ||||
| Publication Status: | Published |
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