UNSPECIFIED (2000) Inconsequential arbitrage. In: 1998 Econometric-Society Winter Meeting, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, JAN, 1998. Published in: JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, 34 (4). pp. 439-469.

Abstract

We introduce the concept of inconsequential arbitrage and, in the context of a model allowing short-sales and half-lines in indifference surfaces, prove that inconsequential arbitrage is sufficient for existence of equilibrium. Moreover, with a slightly stronger condition of nonsatiation than that required for existence of equilibrium and with a mild uniformity condition on arbitrage opportunities, we show that inconsequential arbitrage, the existence of a Pareto optimal allocation, and compactness of the set of utility possibilities are equivalent. Thus, when all equilibria are Pareto optimal - for example, when local nonsatiation holds - inconsequential arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for existence of an equilibrium. By further strengthening our nonsatiation condition, we obtain a second welfare theorem for exchange economies allowing short sales. Finally, we compare inconsequential arbitrage to the conditions limiting arbitrage of Hart [Hart, O.D., 1974. J. Econ. Theory 9, 293-311], Werner [Werner, J., 1987. Econometrica 55, abs 1403-1418], Dana et al. [Dana, R.A., Le Van, C., Magnien, E, 1999. J. Econ. Theory 87, 169-193] and Allouch [Allouch, N., 1999. Equilibrium and no market arbitrage. CERMSEM, Universite de Paris I]. For example, we show that the condition of Hart (translated to a general equilibrium setting) and the condition of werner are equivalent. We then show that the Hart/Werner conditions imply inconsequential arbitrage. To highlight the extent to which we extend Hart and Werner, we construct an example of an exchange economy in which inconsequential arbitrage holds (and is necessary and sufficient for existence), while the Hart/Werner conditions do not hold. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.

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