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Propositionalism about intention : shifting the burden of proof
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Campbell, Lucy (2019) Propositionalism about intention : shifting the burden of proof. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 49 (2). pp. 230-252. doi:10.1080/00455091.2018.1512819
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2018.1512819
Abstract
A widespread view in the philosophy of mind and action holds that intentions are propositional attitudes. Call this view ‘Propositionalism about Intention’. The key alternative holds that intentions have acts, or do-ables, as their contents. Propositionalism is typically accepted by default, rather than argued for in any detail. By appealing to a key metaphysical constraint on any account of intention, I argue that on the contrary, it is the Do-ables View which deserves the status of the default position, and Propositionalism which bears the burden of proof. I go on to show that this burden has not been met in the literature.
| Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy | ||||||||
| Journal or Publication Title: | Canadian Journal of Philosophy | ||||||||
| Publisher: | Routledge | ||||||||
| ISSN: | 0045-5091 | ||||||||
| Official Date: | 2019 | ||||||||
| Dates: |
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| Volume: | 49 | ||||||||
| Number: | 2 | ||||||||
| Page Range: | pp. 230-252 | ||||||||
| DOI: | 10.1080/00455091.2018.1512819 | ||||||||
| Status: | Peer Reviewed | ||||||||
| Publication Status: | Published | ||||||||
| Access rights to Published version: | Restricted or Subscription Access |
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