Skip to content Skip to navigation
University of Warwick
  • Study
  • |
  • Research
  • |
  • Business
  • |
  • Alumni
  • |
  • News
  • |
  • About

University of Warwick
Publications service & WRAP

Highlight your research

  • WRAP
    • Home
    • Search WRAP
    • Browse by Warwick Author
    • Browse WRAP by Year
    • Browse WRAP by Subject
    • Browse WRAP by Department
    • Browse WRAP by Funder
    • Browse Theses by Department
  • Publications Service
    • Home
    • Search Publications Service
    • Browse by Warwick Author
    • Browse Publications service by Year
    • Browse Publications service by Subject
    • Browse Publications service by Department
    • Browse Publications service by Funder
  • Help & Advice
University of Warwick

The Library

  • Login
  • Admin

Two notions of intentional action? Solving a puzzle in Anscombe’s Intention

Tools
- Tools
+ Tools

Campbell, Lucy (2018) Two notions of intentional action? Solving a puzzle in Anscombe’s Intention. British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 26 (3). pp. 578-602. doi:10.1080/09608788.2017.1396959

Research output not available from this repository.

Request-a-Copy directly from author or use local Library Get it For Me service.

Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2017.1396959

Request Changes to record.

Abstract

The account of intentional action Anscombe provides in her (1957) Intention has had a huge influence on the development of contemporary action theory. But what is intentional action, according to Anscombe? She seems to give two different answers, saying first that they are actions to which a special sense of the question ‘Why?’ is applicable, and second that they form a sub-class of the things a person knows without observation. Anscombe gives no explicit account of how these two characterizations converge on a single phenomenon, leaving us with a puzzle. I solve the puzzle by elucidating Anscombe's two characterizations in concert with several other key concepts in ‘Intention’, including, ‘practical reasons’, the sui generis kind of explanation these provide, the distinction between ‘practical’ and ‘speculative’ knowledge, the formal features which mark this distinction, and Anscombe's characterization of practical knowledge as knowledge ‘in intention’.

Item Type: Journal Article
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy
Journal or Publication Title: British Journal for the History of Philosophy
Publisher: Routledge
ISSN: 0960-8788
Official Date: 2018
Dates:
DateEvent
2018Published
21 November 2017Available
23 October 2017Accepted
Volume: 26
Number: 3
Page Range: pp. 578-602
DOI: 10.1080/09608788.2017.1396959
Status: Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Published
Access rights to Published version: Restricted or Subscription Access

Request changes or add full text files to a record

Repository staff actions (login required)

View Item View Item
twitter

Email us: wrap@warwick.ac.uk
Contact Details
About Us