The structure of executive compensation contracts: UK evidence
UNSPECIFIED (2000) The structure of executive compensation contracts: UK evidence. LONG RANGE PLANNING, 33 (4). pp. 478-503. ISSN 0024-6301Full text not available from this repository.
In this article we examine CEO stock option contracts using UK data for the 1997 fiscal year. We show how the portfolio of options varies with firm wealth; describe the structure of the contract (in terms of vesting criteria related to performance targets); and illustrate whether the option performance criteria is historically 'demanding'. Finally, we show how the pay-performance term varies with the structure of the option contract. Our new evidence shows the complex structure of UK option contracts for CEOs. We augment this data with rich interview data to show the complexity of CEO compensation contracts and how they are set. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HF Commerce
H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD28 Management. Industrial Management
H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor
|Journal or Publication Title:||LONG RANGE PLANNING|
|Publisher:||PERGAMON-ELSEVIER SCIENCE LTD|
|Number of Pages:||26|
|Page Range:||pp. 478-503|
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