Electoral coalition-building among opposition parties in Zimbabwe, Zambia and Uganda from 2000 to 2017

Nicole Anne Beardsworth

Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in Politics in the Department of Politics and International Studies (PAIS) at the University of Warwick.

June 2018

78 241 words
# Contents

List of Figures and Tables
Acknowledgements
Declaration and Inclusion of Published Work
Abstract
Abbreviations

1. Introduction

1.1 The Puzzle
1.1.1 Research Questions
1.1.2 Opposition Pre-Electoral Coalitions in Africa
1.1.3 The Argument

1.2 Design and Methods
1.2.1 Case Studies and Process Tracing
1.2.2 Case Selection
1.2.3 Data

1.3 Organisation of the Thesis

2. Consistent Coalition Formation in Uganda

2.1 Introduction
2.1.1 Political Parties and the Logic of Coalition Formation in Uganda

2.2 Coalitions Under the Movement System (1996-2005)
2.2.1 The 1996 Election and the IPFC Coalition
2.2.2 Kizza Besigye and the 2001 Alliance

2.3 Multi-Party Coalitions (2006-2016)
2.3.1 The 2006 G6
2.3.2 The 2011 Inter-Party Cooperation (IPC)
2.3.3 The 2016 Democratic Alliance (TDA) Coalition

2.4 Constant Coalition Formation, Constant Fragmentation

3. Opposition Coordination in Zambia’s Fluid Party System

3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Political Parties and the Logic of Coalition Formation in Zambia

3.2 Multi-Party Coalitions – 2001-2016
3.2.1 Fragmentation and Realignment in 2001
3.2.2 The United Democratic Alliance and the 2006 elections
3.2.3 The 2008 Presidential By-Election
3.2.4 The PF-UPND Pact from 2009-2011
3.2.5 Informal Alliances and Political Realignment – The 2015 By-Election
3.2.6 Consolidating the Playing Field in 2016

3.3 From Coalitions to Elite Inclusion


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1.1</td>
<td>Political Parties and the Logic of Coalition Formation in Zimbabwe</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>Multi-Party Coalitions – 2000-2016</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2.1</td>
<td>Mooted Coalitions for the 2000 Election</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2.2</td>
<td>Coalition Negotiations Ahead of the 2008 Election</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2.3</td>
<td>The Failed 2013 Coalition</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2.4</td>
<td>Looking Ahead to 2018</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>Comparing Opposition Coalitions</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1.1</td>
<td>Bringing Parties Back In</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1.2</td>
<td>Coalitions and the Political Salience of Ethnicity</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1.3</td>
<td>On Funding and Coalitions</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1.4</td>
<td>The Ambiguous Role of Party Presidents</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>The Politics of Coalitions</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>Beyond Opposition Coalitions</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>272</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix I</td>
<td>302</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Interviews conducted</td>
<td>302</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of Figures and Tables

Figures

Figure 1 The 2006 Ugandan Presidential Election Results by District 88
Figure 2 The 2006 Ugandan Presidential Election Results for the NRM (yellow), FDC (blue), DP (green) and UPC (maroon) in order of declining vote share 90
Figure 3 The 2011 Ugandan Presidential Election Results by District 100
Figure 4 The 2011 Ugandan Presidential Election Results for the NRM (yellow), FDC (blue), DP (green) and UPC (maroon) in order of declining vote share 102
Figure 5 The 2016 Ugandan Presidential Election Results by District 117
Figure 6 The 2016 Ugandan Presidential Election Results for the NRM (yellow), FDC (blue), DP (green) and TDA-U-Go Forward (burnt orange) in order of declining vote share 118
Figure 7 The 2001 Zambian Presidential Election Results by Constituency 141
Figure 8 The 2001 Zambian Presidential Election Results for MMD (blue), UPND (red), UNIP (orange), FDD (yellow) and PF (green) in order of declining vote share 143
Figure 9 The 2006 Zambian Presidential Election Results by Constituency 153
Figure 10 The 2006 Zambian Presidential Election Results of MMD (blue), PF (green) and UDA (red) in order of declining vote share 154
Figure 11 The 2011 Zambian Presidential Election Results by Constituency (both plurality and majority) 163
Figure 12 The 2011 Zambian Presidential Election Results of PF (green), MMD (blue) and UPND (red) in order of declining vote share 164
Figure 13 The 2015 Zambian Presidential By-Election Results by Constituency 176
Figure 14 The 2015 Zambian Presidential By-Election Results of PF (green) and UPND (red) in order of declining vote share 177
Figure 15 The 2016 Zambian Presidential Election Results by Constituency 184
Figure 16 The 2016 Zambian Presidential Election Results of PF (green) and UPND (red) in order of declining vote share 185
Figure 17 The 2000 Zimbabwean Parliamentary Election Results by Constituency 207
Figure 18 The 2002 Zimbabwean Presidential Election Results by Constituency 208
Figure 19 The 2005 Zimbabwean Parliamentary Election Results by Constituency 215
Figure 20 The 2008 Zimbabwean Presidential Election Results by Constituency 231
Figure 21 The 2008 Zimbabwean Presidential Election Results for MDC (red), ZANU-PF (green), MKD (yellow) in order of declining vote share 232
Figure 22 The 2013 Zimbabwean Presidential Election Results by Constituency 241
Figure 23 The 2013 Zimbabwean Presidential Election Results for ZANU-PF (green), MDC-T (red), MDC-N (yellow) in order of declining vote share 242
Tables

Table 1 The size and location of Ugandan ethnic groups 69
Table 2 Conflicts and Insurgencies in Museveni’s Uganda, 1986-2006 73
Table 3 The Geographic Spread of Parliamentary Candidates fronted by the FDC, DP, and UPC 121
Table 4 New Party Leaders and Electoral Coalitions in Uganda, 1996-2016 122
Table 5 New Party Leaders and Electoral Coalitions in Zambia, 2001-2016 188
Table 6 Official Results from the 2008 Zimbabwean Parliamentary Election 228
Table 7 Official Results from the 2013 Zimbabwean Parliamentary Election (Directly Elected Seats) 239
Table 8 New Party Leaders and Electoral Coalitions in Zimbabwe, 2000-2018 252
Acknowledgements

This doctoral thesis would not have been possible without a veritable city of people who held me up, housed me and forced me to push my own boundaries over the more than four years that I spent on this project. For those who provided intellectual guidance, the obvious first messages of thanks must go to my two supervisors, Professors Gabrielle Lynch and David Anderson. Dave provided an endless stream of insight, experience and encouragement that helped me to navigate the pitfalls of research and see a space for myself within the academy. Similarly, Gabrielle provided the necessary reassurance and gentle prodding when the words wouldn’t come, and she was an eagle-eyed editor and kind critic when they did. Without her, this thesis would not have been written. I will always be grateful to both Gabrielle and Dave for their wisdom, support and encouragement, especially when my life interfered with my studies.

Financial support for my research came from a variety of sources, but primarily from the Commonwealth Scholarship Commission (CSC), without which my doctoral studies would not have been possible. I was also fortunate enough to receive small grants from the Gilchrist Educational Trust, the British Institute in Eastern Africa (BIEA), and both the Department of Politics and International Studies (PAIS) and the Department of History at Warwick. These small grants went a long way towards making my research possible, helping to fund the many flights needed to cross a notoriously-expensive continent. At the end of my PhD, I was lucky enough to spend three months at the UNU-WIDER in Helsinki, and the feedback I received there was extremely helpful to the development of my argument. Finally, the material support that I received from friends who have become family – such as Mark and Gaye Prior in Harare – was also inestimable, and my research in Zimbabwe would have been impossible without it.

On the taxing intellectual and emotional journey of this PhD, I was lucky to be supported by many people. As an informal supervisor and friend, Nic Cheeseman was invaluable, helping me with information, advice, analysis and support along the way. Marja Hinfelaar gave me the tools that I needed to navigate a complex new set of research topics in a country that I hardly knew, she answered all my questions with patience and she became a friend as well as a mentor. Miles Tendi and Phillan Zamchiya were kind and helpful, and helped me to crack open the door to understanding the complexity of Zimbabwe’s politics. Several people read drafts of this thesis and provided invaluable feedback which only strengthened my arguments; I can’t express enough gratitude to Marja Hinfelaar, Sam Wilkins, Sishuwa Sishuwa, Alastair Fraser, Michael Wahman and Brian Raftopoulos. People such as Michaela Collord, Sebabatso Manoei, Dan Paget, Sam Wilkins, and Eloise Bertrand were indispensable friends, joining me on the path that I was treading and helping me to get up when I fell. I couldn’t have completed this research without the support and friendship of Vanya Bhargav, and I’m so grateful that we managed to finish this journey together. Mark
and Gaye Prior ensured that during my long stints of fieldwork, I was looked after, rarely lonely and always had someone to lean on. My family – although they haven’t read a word of my research – have always supported me and tried to understand the strange things that I spend my days pondering. I do so wish that my dad could have seen me complete this.

Finally, I am so grateful to Micah who helped me to maintain perspective, who comforted me when I couldn’t see the end and who always provided a home to come back to. Micah’s family were also a crucial source of strength and encouragement, even through some of their own most difficult days. To everyone mentioned here as well as the hundreds of people on the continent with whom I shared thousands of conversations and who gave me their time, insights and ideas, I am greatly indebted.
Declaration and Inclusion of Published Work

I declare that this thesis was composed by myself, that the work contained herein is my own except where explicitly stated otherwise in the text, and that this work has not been submitted for any other degree or qualification except as specified.

Parts of this work, particularly that which can be found in Section 2.3.3, appeared in print before this thesis was completed. It is published as:


The research for this article was conducted as part of my doctoral research undertaken for this degree.
Abstract

This thesis analyses the political negotiations that shaped pre-electoral coalition-building amongst opposition parties in Zimbabwe, Zambia and Uganda, over multiple rounds of elections between 2000 and 2017. Existing literature on opposition coalitions in Africa tends to draw upon quantitative research, using electoral data and a rational actor framework, and argues that access to funding is the key determinant of coalition formation, that electoral systems have a predictable effect on the likelihood of cooperation, and that ethnicity is an inhibitor of opposition cohesion. In contrast, this thesis adopts a qualitative and historical approach to the examination of factors and dynamics that encourage or impede opposition coalition formation by focusing on opposition parties in each of the three countries over at least three electoral cycles. The thesis draws upon 140 participant interviews with key opposition and civil society actors in the three countries, collected over a period of more than 14 months of fieldwork, including periods spent in-country monitoring the most recent elections and attending election rallies. Internal party discussion documents, coalition agreements, party literature and media reports of the election campaigns also provide important sources.

Coalition negotiations were held in 15 of the 17 elections under review, suggesting that pre-electoral coalition negotiations – and subsequent coalition formation – are much more prevalent than previously assumed. In turn, the findings challenge our existing understanding of the dynamics of coalition-building in Africa. More specifically, the experiences of opposition parties in each country highlight a variety of reasons for the limited success of coalition-building. In Zimbabwe, foreign governments have played a central role in aiding opposition parties, but it is shown that their involvement has reduced the effectiveness of cross-party cooperation. Domestic and foreign business interests have provided financial incentives to induce party co-ordination in Zambia, yet opposition parties have been unable to find common ground, or have aligned their interests with those of the governing party. In Uganda, the opposition has consistently attempted to build coalitions at every election, building on a long history of cooperative politics, but these efforts have been thwarted as smaller parties attempt to protect their narrow electoral constituencies against the expansionist aims of larger multi-ethnic opposition parties. Across the three cases, the most consistent predictor of coalition collapse is intra-opposition competition for the same constituencies, rebuttering previous theories that ‘ethnic’ parties are a hindrance to coalition formation and challenging the ethnic voting hypothesis. In sum, this thesis provides contextualised and historical accounts of coalition negotiation, formation and (frequent) collapse and identifies the multiple, complex reasons for the limited success of pre-electoral coalition-building. This contributes to a more nuanced and empirically-grounded understanding of the shifts in mobilisation strategies of African opposition parties, and brings the study of parties back into coalitions research.
Abbreviations

CCM  Chama Cha Mapinduzi
FPTP  First-past-the-post (electoral system)
KANU  Kenyan African National Union
NARC  National Rainbow Coalition (2002)

Uganda:
CA    Constituent Assembly
CIL   Change Initiative Limited
CMPD  Caucus for Multi-Party Democracy
CP    Conservative Party
DDP   Deepening Democracy Programme (2007-2012)
DGF   Democratic Governance Facility (2012-2016)
DP    Democratic Party (1954)
FAD   Foundation for African Development
FDC   Forum for Democratic Change (2005)
IPC   The Interparty Cooperation (2011)
IPFC  Inter-Political Forces for Cooperation (1996)
IRI   International Republican Institute
JEEMA Justice Forum (1996)
KIC   Christian Democratic International Centre
LRA   Lord’s Resistance Army
NRA   National Resistance Army (1981)
PAFO  Parliamentary Advocacy Forum (2001)
PDP   People’s Development Party (2011)
PPP   People’s Progressive Party (2005)
RWI   Research World International
TDA   The Democratic Alliance (2016)
TJP   Truth and Justice Platform
UFA   Uganda Federal Alliance (2010)
UPC   Ugandan People’s Congress (1960)

Zambia:
ADD   Alliance for Democracy and Development Party (2011)
ANC   African National Congress Party (1948)
AZ    Agenda for Zambia Party (1996)
FDD   Forum for Democracy and Development Party (2001)
GNU   Government of National Unity (2001)

---

1 Political party names are listed with the dates on which they were founded. Some, such as ZANU-PF were founded originally on one date, and their names were subsequently changed. Where necessary, this is reflected. Coalitions, where abbreviated, also have the relevant dates stated.
### Zambia:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HH</td>
<td>Hakainde Hichilema</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HP</td>
<td>Heritage Party (2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMD</td>
<td>Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (1990)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCC</td>
<td>National Citizens' Coalition (1999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDF</td>
<td>National Democratic Focus (2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td>National Party (1993)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PF</td>
<td>Patriotic Front Party (2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party (2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDA</td>
<td>United Democratic Alliance (2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>United Democratic Front Party (2016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIP</td>
<td>United National Independence Party (1959)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZAP</td>
<td>Zambia Alliance for Progress Party (1999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZRP</td>
<td>Zambia Republican Party (2001)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Zimbabwe:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AIPPA</td>
<td>Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIO</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>UK Department for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNU</td>
<td>Government of National Unity (2009-2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDASA</td>
<td>Institute for Democracy in South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDAZIM</td>
<td>Institute for a Democratic Alternative for Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRI</td>
<td>International Republican Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCD</td>
<td>Multi-Racial Christian Democrats (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDC</td>
<td>Movement for Democratic Change (1999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MKD</td>
<td>Mavambo/Kusile/Dawn (2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCA</td>
<td>National Constitutional Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDI</td>
<td>National Democratic Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDP</td>
<td>People’s Democratic Party (2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POSA</td>
<td>Public Order and Security Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZAPU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African People's Union (1961)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZCTU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZINASU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe National Students Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZIPRA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (1964)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZPF</td>
<td>Zimbabwe People First (2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUD</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Union of Democrats (1998)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Introduction

“The struggle for democracy always takes place on two fronts: against the authoritarian regime for democracy and against one’s allies for the best place under democracy,” Przeworski (1997, 67)

1.1 The Puzzle

In December 2014, two Zambian opposition party leaders met at a South African game lodge, where prominent businessmen put money on the table to encourage them to form a coalition ahead of an imminent unplanned election. This was in a context where Zambia’s ruling Patriotic Front (PF) party was suffering a series of financial and political crises, and it appeared likely that it would lose. The PF had alienated their ethnic base through failing to recognise the popular Bemba paramount chief and seeking to install another, as well as by failing to pay farmers for their crops or provide inputs for the new farming season. In urban areas, discontent was rising on the back of food price inflation, electricity blackouts, and public servant wage freezes. While the opposition were gearing up for an election, the ruling party was mired in succession battles that threatened to split it down the middle, and the supporters of different party factions held running battles in the streets of the capital. The opposition was acutely aware of the consequences of not working together, as the single-round (first-past-the-post) presidential electoral system had allowed the ruling PF to win the 2011 election with just 41% of the vote. In every election held since 2001, opposition parties had shared more than 50% of the vote.

In such circumstances, political science literature predicts that the opposition will coalesce because of the increased likelihood of winning the election, the availability of funds, the economic downturn, and the single-round electoral system, which provides greater incentives to opposition parties to coalesce. So why did the parties not agree to work...

---

together? This is also not a one-off. Across the three countries and 17 elections under consideration in this thesis, 15 polls (88%) witnessed coalition negotiations between opposition leaders – and of those, just seven coalitions (47%) survived to fight the election, though many of these excluded key opposition players who defected just before polling day. Why do coalitions that are negotiated – as in Zambia in 2011 – so often break down prior to the election? Is the full story about trust deficits, inter-ethnic competition and financial incentives as Arriola (2013) has argued in his seminal text on coalition politics in Africa, or is there more at play? This thesis will seek to explain why, in each country and across multiple elections, the opposition seeks to coalesce and why these coalitions so often collapse. This thesis will – in comparison to much of the existing literature – use a qualitative and historical approach, studying coalition negotiations over successive elections in three African countries to highlight the ways in which ethnicity, funding and trust interact to promote or hinder coalition formation.

1.1.1 Research Questions

This thesis seeks to answer several questions through comparative case study analysis:

1. **What are the factors that drive coalition bargaining and coalition formation in each case?**
   a. **What is the role of private financing in driving coalition formation?**
   b. **What role does ‘ethnicity’ play in driving or hindering opposition party coordination?**

2. **Why do these coalitions so frequently collapse?**

This thesis will use a small-N, multi-case approach to outline the dynamics of intra-opposition coalition bargaining and coalition-collapse across three African countries – Zimbabwe, Zambia and Uganda – from 2000 to 2017. In doing so, it will situate the establishment of coalitions within the political culture and history of the three countries, as well as outlining how contemporary political events shaped the dynamics of decision-making across electoral cycles. In making the case for why coalitions were created and so often collapse, it also documents inter- and intra-opposition dynamics, contributing to the sparse and often highly theoretical literature on opposition parties in Africa. This thesis challenges

---

existing theory on the role that ethnicity and resources play in hindering or helping intra-party bargaining and opposition coordination, arguing that existing understandings of the importance of both factors are insufficiently nuanced. It uses case studies and electoral heat maps to demonstrate changing opposition vote bases across electoral cycles, highlighting the propensity for anti-incumbent voters in each country to vote strategically, foregoing support for co-ethnic parties and party leaders in favour of a nationally-viable candidate. Among other things, this approach challenges the ‘ethnic voting’ assumption that remains prevalent in much of the literature on political parties in Africa. Finally, the research provides new hypotheses regarding the role of newly-elected party presidents in undermining coalition cohesion, suggesting a new variable to be considered in future quantitative studies of coalitions in Africa.

In the next section, this introduction will outline the literature on opposition pre-election coalitions in Africa, defining the boundaries of established scholarship on the subject, and highlighting the limitations of existing research on opposition parties and coalitions. Section 1.1.3 will then sketch out the argument that will be made over the course of the following four chapters. Following from this, Section 1.2 outlines the research design and methodology employed by this thesis, after which Chapter 1 concludes by discussing the organisation of the thesis and how the argument will be developed over the chapters that follow.

1.1.2 Opposition Pre-Electoral Coalitions in Africa

African opposition parties are at a significant disadvantage to incumbents, with the result that between 1989 and 2010, just 12 countries had experienced an electoral turnover from an incumbent president to the opposition. This number has increased quite dramatically since then. One factor which appears to have been crucial to many – if not most – of these electoral victories is that opposition forces within the country united behind a single leader within an electoral coalition, enabling the opposition to gain the votes needed to overcome the incumbent’s advantages. Thus, in 2000, the candidate of a coalition known colloquially as the ‘Sopi’ or ‘Change’ coalition won the Senegalese presidential elections, overthrowing

---

Abdou Diouf and 40 years of one-party dominance. That candidate, Abdoulaye Wade, was subsequently beaten by another coalition led by Macky Sall in a second-round election in 2012. However, the coalition that really drove scholarly interest in alliances was that formed in Kenya in 2002 when, after two multi-party elections in 1992 and 1997 in which the incumbent had won with 37 and 40% of the vote respectively, the previously divided opposition formed a mega-coalition, the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), which went on to win a landslide victory. Since then, coalitions have changed governments in Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Senegal, and most recently in Nigeria, Liberia, The Gambia and Sierra Leone.

Given this success, it is perhaps unsurprising that pre-electoral coalitions are an increasingly popular tactic used by opposition parties across both democratic and hybrid regimes. In 2015, an opposition coalition caused the first democratic turnover in Nigerian history, while a coalition in Tanzania the same year came closer than ever to overturning the hegemony of Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), in power since independence in 1962. Between 2012 and 2018, of 46 legislative elections that were held in Africa, 23 (50%) were contested by an opposition coalition. Of those, six countries experienced an electoral turnover, or a change in the majority party represented in parliament. Of the 47 presidential elections held, 17 countries (or 36%) saw the opposition coalesce, of which four countries then experienced an electoral turnover where the incumbent party lost to the unified opposition. These countries were Liberia (2017), The Gambia (2016), Comoros (2015) and Nigeria (2015). The coalitions in The Gambia and Nigeria both successfully (and surprisingly) ousted the entrenched

---

9 This thesis will look predominantly at opposition coalitions, as ruling party coalitions are fairly common and often-opportunistic alliances of an exchange of political support in return for (almost) guaranteed future access to positions or resources -- whereas with opposition alliances, access to resources is rarely guaranteed and the higher risk involved generally requires higher levels of commitment.

10 CCM was formed in 1977 following the merger of the independence party, TANU, and Zanzibar’s ruling Afro-Shirazi Party.

11 Nine elections were excluded from the sample because they were holding founding elections (Somalia), parties were banned from competing (Swaziland), the country was experiencing a civil war, revolution or substantial political unrest (Libya, CAR) or some parties were restricted from competing as the country had experienced a coup since the previous election (Burkina Faso, Mali, Madagascar, Guinea)


13 Nine elections were excluded from the sample as a turnover could not be coded due to a recent coup which led the ruling party to be disqualified from running a candidate (Burkina Faso, Egypt, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Madagascar), or because the president wasn’t directly elected (Somalia). Kenya (2013) was coded as not being a turnover, as former President Mwai Kibaki (PNU) supported the candidacy of Uhuru Kenyatta (TNA) and the PNU agreed not to run its own candidates in the election, but to support the TNA campaign.
incumbent president. There were also several more instances where a second-round runoff between the opposition and the incumbent prompted a coalition of opposition forces to support the most successful opposition candidate – who ultimately won. Between 2012 and 2018, this occurred in Senegal (2012), Benin (2016) and Sierra Leone (2018).

The growing prevalence of opposition coalitions has prompted the rapid growth of academic interest in party coalitions in Africa. As far back as 1997, Bratton and van de Walle identified the importance of opposition coordination as a precursor to democratisation by elections. But, as already noted, it was NARC’s defeat of the nearly 40-year incumbency of KANU in Kenya in 2002 that captured the imagination of political elites and scholars concerned with coalitions, regime transitions and democratisation. Then, in a 2006 study of democratisation in competitive authoritarian regimes, Howard and Roessler concluded that opposition coordination was the most prominent explanatory variable for progress towards a more democratic political terrain following an election. Their study suggests that opposition coordination ahead of an election is one of the most important predictors for electoral turnover, which has long been linked to democratisation.

As a result, research on coalitions has proliferated, with several key studies dominating the field. Generally, the literature on opposition coalitions seeks to answer three key questions. One, why do parties go into coalitions? Two, what leads to the success of opposition coalitions? And three, what is the outcome of these coalitions – or of electoral turnover by coalition – for democratisation? This chapter will outline the key arguments that have been put forward in response to each of the first two questions, while the third – on the consequences of successful coalitions – lies beyond the scope of this research project.

*Why Coalesce?*

Opposition parties in Africa face significant challenges when competing against entrenched ruling parties. Benefits that can and often do accrue to incumbents such as the use of state

---

14 Michael Bratton and Nicholas van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge University Press, 1997).
resources, patronage, and coercion place ruling parties at an enormous advantage that is particularly difficult for opposition parties to overcome.\textsuperscript{17} When the opposition then expend their energy, resources and political capital bickering between themselves and competing against each other for elected positions, their capacity to win parliamentary and national elections is further eroded. To overcome these challenges, it is argued, opposition parties must coalesce, usually in the form of pre-electoral coalitions.\textsuperscript{18} These are agreements reached between opposition parties ahead of an election, where they publicly declare to coordinate their campaigns and electoral strategies, either to front a joint presidential candidate and/or to run joint parliamentary candidates so that they do not split the vote at presidential or parliamentary level and enable the ruling party to win the election with a plurality of the vote.\textsuperscript{19} This is done with the expectation of sharing out the benefits that would accrue to the coalition in the event of victory at the polls.\textsuperscript{20} Pre-electoral coalitions enable parties to pool scarce resources and prevent unnecessary competition; cooperation facilitates the sharing of information and allows greater coordination with regards to mobilisation efforts, party agent deployment and vote protection mechanisms. Coalition formation often also allows opposition parties to access funding that may not otherwise be available – in Zambia in 2009, frustrated opposition funders demanded the formation of a coalition between the two largest opposition parties to maximise the returns on their investment.\textsuperscript{21}

Although it is rarely mentioned in the literature, opposition coalitions can also have an important demonstrative effect. Coalitions are frequently studied through an analysis of electoral mathematics – the proportion of the vote received by each coalition partner in the previous election is added together to calculate the likely vote-share of the coalition. But beyond basic electoral maths, it is important to remember that coalitions also serve as a signalling device to voters. Multiple rounds of Afrobarometer surveys have found that for


\textsuperscript{18} Howard and Roessler, ‘Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes’.


\textsuperscript{20} Sona Nadenechek Golder, \textit{The Logic of Pre-Electoral Coalition Formation} (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2006), 40.

\textsuperscript{21} Interview, Guy Leslie Scott, former PF and Zambian Vice President and Acting President, 25 February 2015.
various reasons, opposition parties are the least trusted actors across a variety of political institutions in Africa. Research by Logan (2008) found that across 18 African countries, 57% of survey respondents reported that they did not trust opposition parties. She suggests that this is a result of a cultural preference for consensus rather than contentious politics, but other explanations are that distrust of the opposition is the result of antagonistic engagement because of personal differences between leaders and the popular belief that politicians place their own interests and careers ahead of the public good. Bratton and Logan’s (2015) research supports this idea – 71% of Afrobarometer respondents reported that they believe that opposition “leaders are more interested in advancing their own political ambitions than in serving the interests of people.” In such a context, multi-party coalitions can act as an important signalling mechanism, regenerating faith in the opposition at election-time, increasing the perceived competitiveness of the election and potentially increasing turnout. As noted by a Zimbabwean opposition leader, when you create a coalition “you re-energise the people, you get them to believe once again that [the incumbent] can be defeated and when they believe that [they] will lose, you are able to mobilise many more people to vote and it will take much more arithmetic manipulation for [the ruling party] to win.” What coalitions signal to voters is that opposition leaders are displaying political maturity by foregoing their own personal ambitions and overcoming internecine squabbles to coalesce for the ‘good of the country.’

**Coalitions Literature in Established Democracies**

Since the 1950s, comparative and European political science considered the study of coalition-building as a key component of the broader political party literature. Riker (1962) produced one of the first studies on coalitions and hypothesised that parties, as office-seekers, try to maximise the value from being in government by maximising their size within a given governing coalition. His ‘minimal winning coalition’ theory suggests that parties always try to build a coalition with the smallest possible majority in parliament, to minimise the number

---

23 Bratton and Logan, ‘The Viability of Political Opposition in Africa: Popular Views’.
24 Interview, Welshman Neube, MDC-N President and former MDC Secretary General, 15 April 2015.
of ‘extra’ players between whom benefits should be shared. Subsequently, two schools of thought emerged – the first revolved around Riker’s ‘size’ principle, and the second around a ‘policy-seeking’ theoretical approach. This second school was most clearly articulated by De Swaan (1973) who argued that coalitions were most likely to form between parties with the most similar ideological inclinations. Leiserson (1966) theorised the minimal range theory, which predicts that (parliamentary) coalitions are most likely to be formed between parties with the smallest ideological range. The assumption behind this approach is that parties who enter into opportunistic coalitions with parties on opposite sides of the political spectrum would be punished by voters for betraying their core values.

However, most of this body of theory proved inadequate to explain the formation of coalitions in sub-Saharan Africa. As noted by Wahman (2013), the problem with these early theories of coalition-building, is that they were overly simplistic, their predictive power was weak and they were unable to explain over-sized coalitions – such as those most often established in Africa. Where this research focused predominantly on government coalition-building (the creation of governing coalitions within legislatures), coalitions in Africa tended to be formed ahead of elections, rather than after them. These coalitions were also often ‘oversized’ – involving a proliferation of parties and political groups – rather than the ‘minimal winning coalition’ as predicted by Riker. Equally, few coalitions in Africa appeared to be formed based on ideological distance. As noted by Manning (2005), the role of ideology in party formation and electoral competition tends to be weak, not least because of structural adjustment policies and the nature of the global economy which leaves limited options available to African policy makers. Bleck and van de Walle (2013) argue that rather than professing a strict ideological commitment, which is likely to garner less traction, African parties are most likely to couch their electioneering in terms of valence issues – broad issues with which it is hard to disagree, such as ‘development.’ Together, these issues make it

---

29 Wahman, ‘Offices and Policies–Why Do Oppositional Parties Form Pre-Electoral Coalitions in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes?’
difficult to apply theories of coalition-building in established democracies to the countries of democratising Africa.

An exception to this is the study by Golder (2006) on pre-electoral coalitions in Europe. This study begins with the simple, but crucial observation, that “pre-electoral coalitions arise from a bargaining process in which party leaders compare the expected utility from running independently to the expected utility from forming a coalition.” Golder finds that pre-electoral coalitions are surprisingly common in Western Europe, and that the likelihood of coalition formation is conditioned by the relative size of parties and the extent of party polarisation. This research places more emphasis on the party system as a factor that influences the likelihood of coalition formation, but its focus on coalitions in parliamentary systems in consolidated democracies makes it less applicable to African cases. However, it remains useful due to its emphasis on the decision-making process amongst political elites who are weighing up various strategies to determine the utility of coalition-building relative to the expected utility of running independently.

Coalitions Literature in Africa

The growing literature on coalitions in Africa is relatively new, emerging as it did on the back of the third wave of democratisation and spurred by instances of transition-by-coalition in Senegal in 2000 and Kenya in 2002. Only one book edited by Denis Kadima (2006) on qualitative comparative coalition studies currently exists, and it compares a wide range of diverse electoral alliances including South Africa, Malawi, Mozambique, Kenya and Mauritius. The wide range of case studies contribute to defining the emerging borders of African coalition studies, variously exploring the factors that drive coalition-formation, their ethnic underpinnings, their contribution to national cohesion and the stability of party systems. While this book was an important first contribution to the field, it was conceptually vague and covered a broad range of coordination-type behaviours amongst both ruling and opposition parties. Because of its breadth, this edited volume is unable to reach any firm conclusions regarding the specificities of opposition coalitions; thus, it is useful more for the data it presents for country-specialists rather than theorists. Since the publication of this

book, a burgeoning literature has emerged that tends to study coalitions ‘by numbers’, or by using quantitative and dataset analyses of coalitional behaviour.

The most ambitious of these studies is Leonardo Arriola’s (2013) book on multi-ethnic opposition coalitions in Africa. Arriola begins from the premise of a collective action problem: opposition parties in Africa face many barriers to effective electoral competition, and would thus benefit greatly from cooperation – however, they rarely coordinate successfully. He seeks to understand why opposition cooperation remains so elusive, and his answer is that ethnic cleavages and credibility gaps present formidable barriers to trust between opposition parties. He argues that parties can overcome these trust deficits through offering financial incentives to other party leaders – ‘pecuniary coalition-building’ – when private business is sufficiently free from political interference and fear of political reprisals to be able to fund opposition coalitions. Arriola finds that in countries that have undergone a process of economic liberalisation which has sufficiently de-linked the state from control over access to credit, incumbents lose the capacity to command the political allegiance of business. This business class is thus able to access credit, free of political constraints, and use it to fund the opposition’s pecuniary coalition-building strategy without the fear of financial reprisals from the ruling party. For Arriola, it is this factor that explains why coalitions cohere in some cases but collapse in others. This book’s key contribution is that it highlights the importance of party finance to the study of coalitions, which had previously not been theorised in any significant depth.

Arriola’s book is an important contribution to advancing the field, but it nevertheless has several shortcomings. Despite the central role accorded to ethnicity in the book, Arriola fails to explain how ethnic groups are conceptualised, and assumes that the political salience of ethnicity – and its role as a hindrance to cooperation – is uniform across the continent. Arriola also appears to suggest that opposition leaders are equally able to deliver the votes of their co-ethnics in stackable voting blocs that can be used to manufacture popular majorities, a proposition that often does not hold as clearly outside Arriola’s two cases of

---

35 Arriola, 19.
Cameroon and Kenya – and sometimes not even within them.\textsuperscript{37} As noted by Bogaards (2014), Arriola’s analysis, while ambitious in its complexity, offers a mono-causal explanation for coalition formation,\textsuperscript{38} which, while useful for hypothesis testing, fails to recognise the importance of other factors such as the provision of foreign funding for coalitions, personal animosity between politicians, and the strategic calculations of smaller parties. It is unable to explain within-case variation in outcomes – why coalitions fail to form in later elections – following the liberalisation of the banking sector and the incumbent’s loss of control over the allegiance of the private sector. Perhaps most importantly, Arriola’s book does not take parties seriously as multi-actor institutions constituted as an alliance of interests – frequently organised into factions – who jostle to achieve the supremacy of their interests over others. This will be dealt with in more depth below.

Several other studies have also been published on the topic, but despite the proliferation of quantitative research on opposition coalitions, there is relatively little consensus on the drivers of coalition formation and barriers to their successful consolidation. In part, this is a result of differences in the population of cases being measured. Some authors confine their cases only to opposition coalitions in democratic, or semi-authoritarian regimes, while others include ruling party coalitions and power-sharing governments within a broader group of coalition-type phenomena. Given the substantial differences between regime types and coalition types, these studies reach very different conclusions regarding what drives coalition formation. Even when authors are studying the same phenomenon amongst the same population of cases – as with Resnick and Arriola – their coding of various coalitions differs so substantially as to significantly alter the conclusions that they come to. This means that many of the conclusions in the literature are contradictory. Where Resnick (2014) finds that coalition formation has significantly increased post-2000,\textsuperscript{39} Arriola (2013) finds that ‘there is no significant increase or decrease in the incidence of opposition electoral coordination over


time. Arriola thus suggests that opposition parties fail to learn from unsuccessful coalitional efforts, a conclusion that contradicts the findings of Gandhi and Reuter (2013).

There are also several key differences that exist in the coalitions literature. The first is over the influence of electoral system design in promoting cooperative behaviour. Manning (2005) argues that the predominance of presidential systems in Africa discourages the formation of coalitions, due to the indivisibility of the position. However, as noted above, opposition coalitions are frequently formed in presidential systems. When one looks within this general category, electoral rules can have a significant bearing on the likelihood of coalitions, but there is little consensus on which electoral systems are most effective at encouraging cooperative behaviour. Kadima (2006) and Cox (1997) argue that a first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral system promotes the coordination of opposition efforts, while Resnick (2014) and Rakner and van de Walle (2009) find that a two-round run off system that requires that winners must receive 50% of the vote is more conducive to coalition formation. The conclusion reached by Resnick and Rakner and van de Walle, is likely due to the increased incidence of post-electoral coordination following a first round election – where the losers from the first round coalesce to support the largest opposition party, as in Senegal in 2000 and 2012. The logic advanced for Rakner and van de Walle’s position is that opposition candidates prefer not to create pre-electoral coalitions in the first round but to use it instead to gauge their political support, and then use the results to bargain for a better deal with their candidate of choice in the second round. By contrast, Gandhi and Reuter (2013) and Arriola (2013) find that electoral systems have no statistically significant effect on the incidence of coalitions.

The likely reason for the lack of consensus is that the effect of electoral institutions varies depending on political context. More specifically, opposition leaders’ choices are frequently mediated by their trust in the fairness of the first-round election, and the perceived likelihood

40 Arriola, Multi-Ethnic Coalitions in Africa, 212.
42 This, they argue, is a result of the system placing greater pressure on voters to avoid wasting their votes and providing greater pressure for parties to coalesce.
of pushing the incumbent below the electoral threshold. For example, in Zambia in 2016 a constitutional amendment changed the presidential election’s plurality system to a two-round electoral system, but the opposition still sought to build a pre-electoral coalition due to the need to win decisively in the first round. A lack of trust in the electoral system led party leaders to believe that if they won with a slim margin and/or with less than 50% of the vote, a potential second-round election would be manipulated or a narrow opposition victory would be massaged into an incumbent win. The perceived risk of a manipulated second-round election is high when parties do not believe that the electoral commission is independent. Zimbabwe’s experience in the 2008 presidential runoff is illustrative of this concern. As a result, parties who do not trust in the independence of the electoral commission would prefer to win decisively in a first-round election with an ‘oversized coalition’ rather than risking it all on a second round. In addition, opposition parties are aware that ruling parties prefer to win decisively in the first round, as it helps shore up their legitimacy, and a second round raises the risk of incumbent defeat as it raises hopes and turnout amongst anti-incumbent voters.

Although Resnick and Rakner and van de Walle suggest that two-round runoff systems are most conducive to coalition formation in the second round, this does not preclude the formation of coalitions in the first round. Despite the existence of a two-round presidential system in Senegal – through which a second-round opposition coalition had defeated the incumbent in 2000 – opposition parties in 2012 still sought to create a pre-electoral coalition to defeat incumbent President Abdoulaye Wade. When this pre-election coalition collapsed, opposition parties formed a coalition in the second round around the top opposition contender, Macky Sall, who went on to defeat Wade. This illustrates that two-round systems do not necessarily preclude pre-electoral coalitions, but instead the second-round provides a second opportunity to coalesce if the opposition is collectively strong enough to pull the incumbent under the 50% threshold. Second-round coalitions come at a lower cost than pre-electoral coalitions. As will be outlined below, first-round coalitions require higher levels of

---

trust, coordination, cooperation and sacrifice, and they carry higher costs in terms of party profile, branding and internal unity. The opportunity cost of a second-round coalition is much lower, as the ‘ranking’ of opposition contenders has been firmly established by the results of the first round, and therefore there is less uncertainty in bargaining. The negotiations are also less complicated, as parliamentary and local government races are normally concluded in the first round, making the complicated process of choosing joint parliamentary candidates redundant. Parties are much more willing to ‘bandwagon’ after the first-round has been concluded, as the payoffs are substantial but come at a vastly reduced cost.

The second difference is over the importance of ethnicity in driving or hindering coalition formation. A standard assumption in the literature – typified by Arriola – is that ethnic fragmentation makes coalition formation unlikely, as inter-ethnic rivalry and competition promotes ethnic out-bidding. Arriola operates from the assumption that ethnic fragmentation (and thus a lack of trust between ethnic groups and the parties that represent them) is the most significant barrier to coalition formation. However, Gandhi and Reuter (2013) find that ethnic fragmentation has no significant effect on coalition formation in their study of coalitions in semi-authoritarian regimes globally. Wahman (2016) builds on this conclusion, offering the insight that ethnicity has been overdetermined as a driver of voting (and thus coalitional) behaviour in Africa, and that a more contextual turn away from ethnic over-determination is needed in order to understand the complexities inherent in the relationship between parties and their constituencies and how that feeds into coalition formation.48 In fact, some new research suggests that in cases where parties’ support bases are geographically concentrated – as in Malaysia – parties may find it easier to negotiate and sustain pre-electoral coalitions as they face less resistance from lower echelons of the party.49

In contrast, in contexts where potential coalition partners compete at the local level, conflict frequently emerges over the demands for one party’s parliamentary candidate to concede ahead of the race in favour of the candidate from the other party to the coalition to ensure joint candidates in all electoral races. In other cases, such as Zimbabwe, prominent party

48 Wahman, ‘Opposition Coordination in Africa’.
leaders who are also representatives of ethno-regional groups in the largest opposition party may scupper coalitions with parties from the same region out of fear that they will lose their place as the most prominent political representative of their region.50

The existing dataset-driven studies of coalitions are often unable to separate the drivers and outcomes of coalitions. As these analyses are always undertaken retrospectively and based upon an exploration of electoral results, they find it difficult to deal with sequencing and endogeneity problems. Gandhi and Reuter (2013) find that the greater the incidence of electoral repression, the more likely it is that a coalition will form. This suggests that coalitions are more likely in authoritarian states – a conclusion that other scholars appear to doubt.51

The authors recognise that there may be an endogeneity problem in their conclusion – that rather than repression leading to the increased incidence of coalition formation, the creation of a coalition (and thus the prospect of more competitive elections) may in fact lead to ruling parties increasing their use of repression in order to dampen down the electoral threat.52

While Howard and Roessler (2006) find that opposition coalitions are the most significant determinant of electoral transitions, van de Walle (2006) contests this by arguing that the perceived imminence of an electoral transition forces a ‘tipping point’ which makes coalitional behaviour more likely as regime insiders jump ship, both weakening the ruling party and strengthening the opposition coalition.53 A dataset-driven analysis of the drivers of coalition formation is unable to distinguish between these two outcomes.

Finally, while the basic building blocks of coalitions are political parties, there has been little systematic research on coalitions that looks in any depth at the parties that comprise these formations, particularly across several electoral cycles. The clear majority of the literature on coalitions is based upon large quantitative datasets, using electoral data and a rational actor framework to theorise regarding the factors which promote or impede coalition formation. Of the studies of coalitions that have been done, few involve case studies. As Morten Jerven (2016) argues, there are some questions that lend themselves to large-N analyses, but that

52 Gandhi and Reuter, ‘The Incentives for Pre-Electoral Coalitions in Non-Democratic Elections’.
“when the distance between researcher and subject gets sufficiently long, the road from fact to fiction is short.”\textsuperscript{54} In dataset-driven analyses, conclusions are derived from a limited set of cases, which are weighted in favour of countries in which the turnover-by-coalition model is relatively common. For example, in Arriola’s book he counts 15 cases of turnover by coalition,\textsuperscript{55} but nine of the 15 were in just four countries.\textsuperscript{56} Where case material has been used, there appears to be a ‘success bias’ where cases such as Kenya and Senegal are over-represented due to their status as two of the most successful cases of coalition formation which helped to remove long-reigning ruling parties. Resnick (2011) noted that opposition coalitions – though frequently formed – rarely defeat ruling parties.\textsuperscript{57} Coalitions must be studied in context to understand the reasons for their formation, coherence and potential success. In this regard, more robust case study analysis is necessary to test the assumptions of the quantitative literature and resolve some of the unresolved questions over the drivers of and barriers to successful opposition coalition-building. This research will look at both failed coalitions and those that cohered to election day, both to highlight the reasons why some coalitions fail, and to explain how it is that successful coalitions manage to overcome fissiparous tendencies.

As the foregoing discussion introduced some of the broader concerns with the existing dataset-driven analyses of coalitions, the next four short sections will identify the four specific areas that this research will speak to. Each section will set out the specific critique of the literature, define the relevant concepts and outline the approach used in this thesis. These four sections relate to parties, ethnicity, funding and party leaders. This will set the stage for the next major section, Section 1.1.3, which outlines the core arguments of this research.

\textsuperscript{55} In the Nigerian case, although Arriola infers that it was a case of turnover-by-coalition, the coalition did not in fact win the 1999 election.
\textsuperscript{56} These countries are Benin (twice), Mauritius (three times), Madagascar (twice) and Mali (twice).
Bringing Parties Back In

Discussions of African political activity since the wave of independence swept across the continent in the 1960s have fluctuated between pessimistic accounts of ethnic violence, patrimonialism, and ineptitude to the unbridled optimism of the ‘Third Wave’ literature of the 1990s. Contrary to the emphasis on parties and partisanship in Western democracies, political scholarship on Africa has predominantly focused on the role of kinship and informal networks in structuring the relationship between governors and governed. Research on African political parties is surprisingly sparse and is dominated by what Carothers (2006) refers to as the ‘standard lament’ that parties are weak, corrupt, dominated by personal networks and ethnic affiliations, active only around elections, and lacking a significant ideological or policy focus. This narrative has so successfully overshadowed party scholarship in Africa that – even with a new wave of literature on political parties by scholars such as Elischer (2013) and LeBas (2011) – relatively little research has been carried out on the ideology, organisational structure and mobilisation strategies of individual parties or specific party types.

This pessimism has similarly pervaded the study of opposition coalitions, which is typified by the assumption made in Arriola’s *Multi-Party Coalitions in Africa* that parties are little more than the personal vehicles of party leaders who are easily “paid to leverage their own reputations in mobilising their co-ethnics’ votes.” This leaves little room for a nuanced discussion of the ways in which lower level political players influence the coalition-building process. However, as this thesis will show, lower-level political officials are frequently able to shape the coalition behaviour of parties, thwarting coalitions that threaten their personal interests. Similarly to European political parties, more institutionalised African parties are comprised of “different coalitions of forces [which] are being formed within the party, and actors striving for dominance interact with each other in the struggle for relative influence within the organisation.” The parties studied in this research frequently find themselves riven by factionalism during coalition-building processes, as more junior party

---

58 Carothers, ‘Confronting the Weakest Link’, 4.
59 Two excellent, recent exceptions to this are Adrienne LeBas, *From Protest to Parties: Party-Building and Democratization in Africa* (Oxford University Press, 2011); Sebastian Elischer, *Political Parties in Africa: Ethnicity and Party Formation* (Cambridge University Press, 2013) There are signs that this is changing, with early career scholars such as Dominika Koter and Catherine Lena Kelly focusing on these topics.
leaders contest the coalitional strategies of the leaders and frequently stage mutinies. This complicates coalition-building processes, while a history of personal interactions between these deputies and other opposition leaders may impede future coalitions.

This tracks the recent shift within European coalition research, which has begun to theorise parties as complex, multi-level organisations that are frequently organised into factions who jostle to achieve their preferred outcomes. This research has begun to consider intra-party politics as being determinative of coalition-building, as it seeks to move beyond the ‘unitary actor assumption’ of formal coalition research. Pederson (2010) argues that rather than the assumption in the coalitions literature that parties are able to negotiate as unconstrained unitary actors seeking to maximise policy, votes or seats, parties are constrained by internal factors such as the balance of power between the parliamentary caucus and the extra-parliamentary party structures. The balance of power and relationships between these structures helps to determine which coalitions form and which are scuppered. Coalition negotiations can be particularly damaging for party unity, as “the choice of coalition partners, the type of interparty commitment, the content of the coalition agreement and the timing of the coalition formation, to mention only few, are often divisive issues within the party.”

The party’s leadership is constrained from below by the demands of party members, and their actions may serve to undermine party unity if there is a sufficiently strong group of members who disagree with the party leader’s actions. As Maor (1998) argues, when parties are factionalised, the credibility of party leaders’ threats and proposals during coalition negotiations are compromised by their perceived inability to exert control over their own political parties. This affects the coalition negotiation process as the public critiques and defections of disaffected political notables often undermine the bargaining power of party leaders within parties that do not have organised structures for managing internal dissent. This is the case in the three countries under study, where political notables threaten to abandon the party if their needs are not met during multi-party coalition bargaining processes.

---

63 Pedersen, ‘How Intra-Party Power Relations Affect the Coalition Behaviour of Political Parties’.
64 Maor, *Parties, Conflicts and Coalitions in Western Europe*, 2.
65 Maor, 11.
This serves as a potential constraint on the bargaining behaviour of opposition party leaders, who are thus less free (in many cases) to enter coalitions than current coalition theories allow.

While Pederson’s work theorises about the negotiation of government coalitions in parliamentary systems, many of the insights provided are nonetheless relevant to African inter-party coalition negotiations. Parties tend to fragment along similar fault-lines depending on the power distribution between the parliamentary caucus and the non-parliamentary party organisation. For Pederson, the positions of these two groups differ more along policy lines – she argues that parliamentary representatives are more likely to recognise that compromise is necessary in coalition formation, while extra-parliamentary party factions are more likely to take a hard line on policy positions.66 Although the fault-lines in African parties are similar, the reasons for conflict are often quite different. In many of the negotiations outlined below, the party’s extra-parliamentary leadership face dissent from the parliamentary wing of the party over the need to compromise and share out parliamentary seats in coalitions, necessitating some parliamentary candidates to step down for others. This often breaks out into open factional fighting or party splits which undermine the party leader’s bargaining position and compromise their ability to successfully negotiate a coalition. Bäck (2008) finds, with reference to Swedish local government coalitions, that factionalised parties and those with a more internally democratic dispensation are less likely to successfully negotiate coalitions.67 This is because party leaders are more constrained by their parties and the need to maintain unity and retain their position, leading them to be less capable of making the unilateral decisions that are often necessary during bargaining processes. Similar conclusions were reached by Ceron (2016), who found that in Italy, parties with more centralised decision-making and leaders who were autonomous from the concerns of party factions were more able to successfully negotiate coalitions, and stick to coalition agreements.68

Arriola’s pecuniary coalition-building theory suggests that smaller opposition parties exist merely to sell their support to the highest bidder. However, this is often not the case. Not all parties are so easily bought or co-opted. While many smaller African parties frequently sell

---

their endorsements and may even shift from the opposition to an alliance with the ruling party, this is certainly not the case with all parties. As Kelly (2018) shows for Senegal, while some parties yield to co-optation by incumbents relatively regularly, other parties remain consistently in opposition.69 The first distinction that Kelly makes is between parties that were formed to contest elections – requiring relatively sophisticated organisational structures, systems and mobilisation strategies – and those that function primarily as vehicles for attracting patronage and raising the public profile of the party leader.70 Many parties begin as the second type, and slowly become functional organisations over time, but most remain little more than briefcase or “telephone booth” parties (as they are known in Senegal) and they never become sufficiently electorally significant.71 Briefcase parties are less likely to be able to amass the necessary financial resources to remain consistently in opposition, and are thus more likely to opportunistically enter into coalitions with incumbents or larger opposition parties in order to attract patronage, or further their aims of raising the party leaders’ profile. However, electorally significant parties with a substantial organisation, significant party membership and a relatively consistent vote base are less likely to enter into coalitions with the incumbent – particularly in more polarised political contexts – for fear of alienating their constituents. At the same time, as will be outlined in the three cases below, the costs of entering into opposition coalitions can be high for party unity, profile and support. Leaders of electorally significant parties try to weigh up the benefits of coalitions with the potential risks of coalescing and conceding their party brand, allowing other parties to run candidates in their ‘strongholds,’ and opening up their parties to the defection of political notables as cross-party links are strengthened.

Coalitions and the Political Salience of Ethnicity

From early works that emphasised the ‘static’ and ‘primordial’ nature of ethnicity in Africa, recent political science and Africanist research has made the turn to a constructivist and more

---

70 Kelly, 212.
71 By electorally significant, it is meant that these parties do not consistently attract 5% or more of the popular vote.
contextually-grounded approach to ethnicity in Africa. Having overtaken the ‘primordial’ and ‘instrumentalist’ approaches to ethnicity that were dominant in the first half of the twentieth century, the constructivist school holds that ethnic groups are socially-constructed ‘imagined communities,’ that have historical roots and may impose moral constraints on group members, but that these relationships are somewhat fluid and subject to constant negotiation between group leaders and members. In turn, the political salience of ethnicity is the subject of an often-heated debate amongst scholars. In 1985, Horowitz argued that in democratising Africa, the nature of ethnic cleavages and the fairly static and predictable way in which ethnicity impacts on political behaviour would lead elections to become little more than an ‘ethnic census’ where ethnic groups become represented by ethno-political entrepreneurs, and voters simply line up behind their co-ethnic party leader. According to this model, the number of votes that each ethnic party leader can muster would be highly correlated to the size of their ethnic community. This view has had surprising longevity, though it has been increasingly challenged since 2000. While some scholars employ a bottom-up approach, investigating whether voters make electoral choices solely based upon ethnic calculations, others have focussed on a top-down approach to discover whether most African parties can accurately be characterised as ‘ethnic’ – in that they mobilise electoral support almost solely based upon appeals to a single ethnic group.

Arriola’s pecuniary theory rests on the assumption that African opposition parties mobilise support only amongst ethnically-defined constituencies, most of which do not approximate an electoral plurality. This requires that they enter into multi-ethnic coalitions in order to win elections, either by buying the endorsements of other ethnic party leaders, or having their support bought. The ethnic constituencies of these parties can then be added and subtracted to manufacture popular majorities. Although he does not define ‘ethnic’ parties in his book, we can infer that Arriola uses a similar framework to Horowitz (1985) who argues that “An ethnically based party derives its support overwhelmingly from an identifiable ethnic group (or cluster of groups) and serves the interests of that group.”

Arriola’s argument assumes that parties represent ethnic groups, and that party leaders are thus able to leverage their positions as ethnic vote-brokers to predictably negotiate coalitions. But he fails to operationalise what he means by ‘ethnic-based parties’ and he extends his cases to all countries in sub-Saharan Africa, irrespective of the degree of ethnic voting. Despite the long-standing belief that most African parties are ‘ethnic’ in nature, Sebastian Elischer (2013) finds little support for this, arguing that ethnic parties are “neither inevitable nor ubiquitous.”

The widespread characterisation of parties as ethnic – and the corollary ubiquitous nature of co-ethnic voting – has been frequently challenged by scholars in both case studies and cross-national comparisons.

As the three case studies below will illustrate, parties in Zimbabwe, Zambia and Uganda rarely seek to mobilise only a single ethnic community, and few ethno-regional groups vote solely and reliably for co-ethnic leaders. This complicates coalition bargaining, as parties seek to mobilise adherents amongst several groups, it brings them into direct competition for voters. In such contexts, coalitions carry costs for parties in terms of the potential that they have to

---

82 Although some of these parties may have regional strongholds which vote more reliably for them than for others – as with the Zambian UPND’s Southern Province base – they are more often able to effectively capture votes from a pan-ethnic cross-section of the country.
undermine the profile, membership and vote base of smaller political parties. When ethnic groups cannot be counted on to bloc vote for co-ethnics, this introduces greater uncertainty in coalition negotiations. This thesis will show that the electoral salience of ethno-regional identities varies over time, and that so-called ‘ethnic parties’ in the three cases cannot always count on the votes of their co-ethnics. This complicates the coalition negotiations process, as it introduces greater uncertainty than in places such as Kenya, where parties tend to draw the majority of their support from particular ethnic groups and ethnic bloc-voting (and thus ethnically-determined coalition-building) has been a relatively stable component of recent elections.83

Following from Max Weber, this research takes ethnicity to be a subjectively felt sense of belonging, which based on a commonly-held belief in a shared culture and common ancestry.84 People’s experiences of ethnicity – and its political salience – are conditioned by everyday experiences of interactions with the state, perceptions of history, and “remembered or interpreted collective histories of victimhood, marginalisation, and entitlement.”85 While the physical and historical basis for these shared identities may be contingent or accidental, the identities they circumscribe have become infused with meaning over time. In this thesis, I will use the categories deployed in each of the three countries under study, variously describing ‘ethnic,’ ‘ethno-linguistic’ and ‘ethno-regional’ groups. These are largely interchangeable and are the most politically-salient identities. In many cases, smaller ethnic groupings have amalgamated into larger linguistic groups (often a result of missionary and colonial classification systems), and although they are relatively recent ‘inventions,’ these linguistic groups have themselves been invested with meaning and become a politically salient category.86 For example, although there are said to be more than 50 ethnic groups in Zambia, these groups were amalgamated into four language groups, and it is these ethno-linguistic (and also ethno-regional) groupings that have become the key identity markers that are deployed to motivate political action.87 In each country, ethnic groups originate from and

predominate in particular regions (therefore ‘ethno-regional’). In many cases, despite the ethnic heterogeneity of the region, smaller ethnic groups have adopted the identity and grievances of the larger group. This is frequently a result of the political or economic marginalisation of the broader region, which allows for the mobilisation of political action along regional lines, in response to perceived persecution. When speaking about the coterminous nature of ethnic group boundaries and regional boundaries, this thesis does not deny intra-regional ethnic diversity, but rather intends to speak about the larger politicised ethnic (or ethno-regional) identities which have become a locus for political action.

On Funding and Coalitions

A lack of finance has long been cited as a constraint on opposition parties’ ability to win elections in Africa. Opposition parties are notoriously underfunded relative to ruling parties, and this affects the opposition’s capacity to maintain organisational integrity between elections and to campaign successfully across the country at election-time. A dire lack of resources is also often cited as the reason that opposition leaders will sell their support to incumbents, joining a ruling party’s coalition in exchange for financial rewards. However, this has been a difficult area for scholars to study as there is little available, accurate information on opposition party funding due to a lack of public declarations by parties, inadequate bookkeeping and a desire to protect the identities of funders to insulate them from political fallout. Besides Arriola, no other scholars working on African coalition formation have highlighted the importance of funding as a driver of successful coalition-building. However, while Arriola makes a crucial contribution by drawing attention to this hitherto ignored factor, he over-determines funding as a driver of successful coalition building.

More specifically, while Arriola’s argument hinges on domestic businessmen providing funding to opposition parties to finance coalitions, he misses several important issues. He argues that financial liberalisation makes it more difficult for ruling parties to discipline capital, allowing local business elites to finance coalition formation. However, in cases such as Uganda, financial liberalisation has not sufficiently constrained the NRM’s ability to

---


89 Kelly, ‘Party Proliferation and Trajectories of Opposition’.
penalise businesses who associate with their opponents. Kiiza (2008) quotes a member of the opposition as saying:

While multi-partism is allowed under the current legal regime, support for the FDC in all its forms is criminalised by the ruling party. Businesses that offer us financial and material support strictly demand anonymity as a condition for supporting us. They fear that if their support for FDC becomes public, URA [Uganda Revenue Authority] officials will be deployed immediately to harass their businesses and/or drive them to bankruptcy [through strict implementation of taxation policies].

The ruling party is similarly able to discipline errant businessmen in Zambia, despite the thorough liberalisation of the country’s economy and banking sector. Following the 2015 elections, an opposition-supporting newspaper mogul’s business empire was suddenly reviewed by the Zambian Revenue Authority (ZRA), despite allegations that the tax bill in question had already been settled, the ZRA attached all the newspaper’s assets and shut down the business. Thus, while liberalisation frees business elites from political constraints in accessing credit, their businesses remain vulnerable to other types of interference from the state.

Moreover, contrary to Arriola’s argument, business financing of opposition parties is not that unusual, and many businesses that support the ruling party financially also contribute to opposition coffers. For example, Ugandan business tycoon Sudhir Ruparelia and the Sugar Corporation of Uganda Limited (SCOUL) were both said to have contributed substantially to the election campaigns of both the NRM and opposition FDC in the 2006 polls. But according to the DP Secretary General, when businesses give 10 million Shillings to the DP, they give at least ten times that to the NRM. Kiiza (2008) quotes Professor Kagonyera, the former Minister of the Presidency, as saying “don’t be surprised. Business companies seek to diversify their ‘investments.’” This mirrors other common business practices, where corporations hedge their bets in order to minimise the potential fallout for their business if

---

91 Kiiza, 249.
92 Kiiza, 249.
93 Kiiza, 249.
there is a change of power at the head of state level. What determines how political donations are split is the likelihood of defeat of the ruling party, or the level of investment of the business in a new political elite. For example, businesses that are being persecuted by the state (perhaps through the revenue authority, or by being excluded from new government contracts) may have an added incentive to fund the opposition, to ensure a more favourable political dispensation following the elections. This is often the case with external businessmen, who seek to land future government contracts or create an enabling business environment by donating to the opposition. This was the case with the 2015 and 2016 elections in Zambia, where the Brenthurst Foundation – funded by Anglo-American Corporation – assisted the opposition UPND both in cash and kind to form an opposition coalition, and then to run a formidable electoral campaign (see the Zambia chapter).

At the same time, opposition parties may receive funding from sources other than domestic and international businessmen, such as in Zimbabwe in the early 2000s. The Zimbabwean opposition MDC was heavily supported – both in cash and kind – by various Western embassies and donor agencies, as well as by partisan political foundations. These actors sought to shift the balance of power in Zimbabwe towards the opposition, in order to have a more amenable political dispensation in Harare. This highlights that opposition sources of funding are often more diverse than expected, and that the constraints on businesses described by Arriola may remain a concern long after the liberalisation of the country’s financial sector. Finally, as will be shown below, at times party leaders have little interest in selling their support to the highest bidder and opt to contest elections on their own party ticket. This highlights that there is more at play than simply concerns over access to electoral financing or patronage. This thesis will present cases that complicate the neat ‘pecuniary coalition-building’ theory, arguing that it is an important factor but that party leaders are also balancing other considerations during negotiations.

The Ambiguous role of Party Leaders

Finally, as a corollary of the section on theorising parties as multi-level actors, it is necessary to address the role of party leaders. As noted above, parties and party leaders are normally treated as one and the same within a ‘unitary actor’ framework of opposition party behaviour. Parties’ interests are believed to be largely indivisible from the interests of the party leader,
as parties across most of Africa are considered to be little more than “ephemeral vehicles for personal ambition.”

This may be true of briefcase parties which have few structures, limited staff and a narrow membership base. However, parties that are more institutionalised – such as the MDC-T, FDC and UPND – are comprised by factions which have their own interests and supporters, and will advocate to advance their own agendas during coalition negotiations. Flattening party types leads to a failure to account for the constraints on the behaviour of the party leader that are imposed by more organisationally robust opposition parties. Party leaders are concerned with maintaining their own positions, and will act to try to secure those positions from both internal and external threats.

These leaders were also brought to power by a coalition of political forces, and often find themselves accountable to the political and financial interests that helped to elect them. Partly as a result of this and due to a lack of reliable polling – which makes electoral results unpredictable – newly-elected party leaders appear to over-estimate their political support. As will be shown below, new party leaders almost always insist on running as a presidential candidate in the first election in which they are party president. In subsequent elections, following a disappointing result, these leaders are more likely to enter into pre-electoral coalitions. This is likely due to the party leader having expended both their political and financial capital on their debut polls, and their inability to recoup both because of their obvious infeasibility as a national candidate. However, this does not necessarily make later coalitions more straightforward to negotiate.

Each coalition negotiation is one set in what is understood to be an iterative game, where the previous behaviour of coalition partners has a bearing on the future behaviour of other party leaders. Tavits (2008) notes that defection from a coalition makes the subsequent inclusion of the same parties in later coalitions less likely. She finds that this is due to defecting parties losing credibility in the eyes of their coalition partners, and thus being punished in future negotiations. Although it was developed to explain the likelihood of inclusion following defection from governments, this theory also applies to opposition pre-electoral coalitions.

---

96 Tavits.
As will be shown below, parties’ and leaders’ past behaviour in coalitions helps to determine whether and how they are included in later coalition negotiations. In sum, party leaders are constrained by their attempts to retain their positions, and thus by the interests of party members and factions as well as by the political and financial interests that supported their ascent. Leaders may use coalition negotiations to further their own interests, and to punish former coalition partners for their actions during previous negotiations.

1.1.3 The Argument

The first conclusion to note is that coalition negotiations are more common than is usually recognised. Following from the cases studies, this dissertation makes a four-part argument. The first is that political parties should be treated seriously as multi-level organisations comprised of groups with competing interests and ideas on tactics and strategy, and the ability to scupper coalitions to protect their own interests. The second is that ethnic diversity may be less of a hindrance to coalition formation than is generally thought. The third finding is that the offer of funding is not necessarily a guarantor of successful coalition formation, but one of several considerations for party leaders. Fourth, newly elected party leaders almost always seek to contest elections under their own banner; in subsequent elections they will often enter a coalition but use the negotiations to further their own interests. Each of these issues will be highlighted briefly below, after which a discussion of all four will be woven through the chronological discussion of coalitions in each of the subsequent empirical chapters and the threads of the argument drawn together again in Chapter 5.

Parties

This thesis will argue that much of the pressure that forces multi-party coalitions to collapse is exerted by functionaries and candidates below the level of the party leader, whose interests are not necessarily served by cooperation. Key actors such as the Secretary General or Vice President may seek to scupper party coalitions as they fear the loss of their own positions within the party and prospective government hierarchies. While party coalition agreements divvy up Cabinet positions amongst the coalition principals (i.e. party presidents), lower level members of party executives (such as vice presidents and secretaries general) often see their own positions in a potential government hierarchy threatened by this arrangement.
Equally, coalitions frequently seek to run joint candidates at parliamentary level (to avoid splitting the opposition vote), this entails party leaders trying to persuade aspiring parliamentary candidates not to run – in favour of a candidate from another party. Parliamentary candidates have often spent the preceding parliamentary term building their profiles within their preferred constituency, sinking wells, paying school fees and addressing community needs. Requiring a candidate to forego a shot at the parliamentary seat – and thus an opportunity to recoup these costs – is often extremely unpopular. This can be devastating for local-level party unity and the maintenance of party structures, and it can open rifts between the parliamentary caucus and the party’s executive that ultimately threatens the political survival of the party leader. When party presidents are facing internal revolts (often but not always due to coalitions), they will seek to join or abandon coalitions depending on what they think will strengthen their hand within their own parties.

Ethnicity

Although it is commonly presumed that the high salience of ethnicity in electoral politics is a barrier to coalition formation, this is not always the case. Considering the above discussion of how MPs might undermine coalition cohesion, in cases where ethnic groups are geographically concentrated, and parties organise almost exclusively around ethnic cleavages, coalitions comprised of parties that compete less at parliamentary or local government level are more likely to remain cohesive. The lack of competition with other parties over the same parliamentary seats leads to less pushback from lower levels of the party, and thus greater party unity and coalition stability.

Across the three cases, ethnic bloc-voting is also less predominant than is predicted by coalition theories – which makes coalition negotiations less predictable. As in Uganda since the early 2000s, ethno-linguistic groups have largely failed to bloc-vote for their co-ethnic leader, or the opposition party that historically represented their region. Instead, anti-incumbent voters frequently voted for an opposition party led by a non-co-ethnic politician who looked capable of winning, and often rejected leaders of smaller but co-ethnic opposition parties. The same argument can be made for politics in Zimbabwe since 2005, when voters in the Ndebele-speaking Matabeleland regions consistently rejected a co-ethnic

---

97 With one or two effective parties representing each ethnic group
Matabeleland-based party in favour of a Shona-dominated party that was more likely to win the election at the national level. Cross-ethnic voter coordination occurs with surprising regularity across the three cases outlined in this thesis, which serves to undermine Arriola’s ‘ethnic bloc-voting’ assumptions, in which ethnic constituencies can be added or subtracted predictably to build an oversized coalition capable of winning a national election.

Funding

While Arriola (2013) argues that access to funding is the key determinant of the successful formation of opposition coalitions, the historical cases in the following chapters undermine this and suggest that there is more at play. Opposition party presidents who are offered a financial incentive to cooperate in Zimbabwe and Zambia opted to turn the offer down due to personal animosity or strategic calculations regarding where their interests would be best served. In Zimbabwe, the provision of funding and support by external donors to just one opposition party hindered cooperation, entrenching intra-party animosity and limiting the likelihood of coalescing. In Zambia in 2015, despite the offer of private financing for the endorsements of two party leaders, both opted to turn it down – one to work with the ruling party candidate, and the second to run his own presidential campaign. This suggests that party leaders might have other preferences than merely to secure a financial reward to endorse another candidate – party leaders in Arriola’s theory have few other interests but to sell their endorsements to the highest bidder. This theory does not hold true in the majority of coalition negotiations under review in this thesis, which suggests that while funding is important, it is just one consideration amongst a range of considerations for party elites during negotiations. As argued below, the provision of funding can both build and undermine trust.

The Party Leader

The argument regarding the main party leader is three-fold. First, across the three cases under study, newly-elected opposition party leaders have consistently resisted entering into coalitions where their party is the junior partner. In nearly every negotiation process, newly-elected party leaders opt instead to contest as a presidential candidate if their party is not chosen to front the joint candidate. This suggests that new party leaders either have an inflated sense of how much support they can muster at the ballot box, or they are accountable
to the political or financial interests that helped elect or nominate them. Following an unsuccessful electoral campaign, party leaders frequently choose to enter into coalitions in the polls that follow.

Secondly, party leaders are often constrained by their assessments of what course of action best serves their preservation of their positions within their parties, and what consequences party disunity (as a result of coalitions) might have on their ability to maintain their own positions. If party leaders are concerned about party unity, maintaining their positions, obtaining financing and maximising electoral outcomes, they frequently find themselves trying to make complex decisions in an atmosphere of incomplete information.

Finally, existing studies of negotiations assume that each negotiation is a single-shot event in which party leaders have had no previous interactions. But, given the small size of the political elite, party leaders have invariably had previous interactions with their prospective coalition partners and the nature of this previous relationship helps to condition their behaviour in later coalition negotiations. The outcomes of previous interactions including coalition negotiations – and perceived slights – are a frequent barrier to forming successful partnerships. The actions of party leaders are conditioned both by previous interactions and by expectations of future benefits within coalitions.

**Contribution to the Literature**

This research can be seen as an expansion of the problem that Arriola sought to explore, which was under what conditions do coalitions cohere? More specifically, this research outlines instances in which coalitions cohere but also, significantly, instances in which they collapse. It is only through studying instances of coalition collapse more rigorously that the reasons for coalition cohesion are made plain. This thesis is the first attempt to undertake a multi-country, longitudinal approach to studying the dynamics around coalition formation and collapse in Africa. Equally, it is the first attempt to give an account of the multi-party opposition coalitions in these three cases, which have been largely ignored within the broader field of coalition studies. Beyond this, the detail and depth provided in the three empirical chapters (Chapters 2-4) give an account of the dynamics of intra-opposition competition, highlighting changes in their support bases across electoral cycles and thus changes in coalition strategy.
While this thesis tests assumptions on the role of ethnicity and funding in driving or hindering coalition formation, it also problematizes assumptions regarding ‘ethnic voting’ by using electoral heat maps to outline party support bases and the importance of non-co-ethnic anti-incumbent voting in all three countries. This research makes four original contributions to existing knowledge on this topic. First, it is the first study to examine African pre-electoral coalitions chronologically, looking at the ways in which previous coalition negotiations shape or hinder later cooperation. Secondly, it studies these negotiations in three countries which have previously been largely excluded from coalition studies, and argues that the experiences of these three countries can help to explain broader constraints on successful negotiations elsewhere. Third, this research problematises existing research, and formulates new hypotheses for why coalitions fail to form which can then be tested in future studies. And finally, this research contributes to the sparse literature on opposition parties in Africa, it highlights various mobilisation strategies employed and how these change over time, as well as how parties’ electoral constituencies shift across electoral cycles.

1.2 Design and Methods

1.2.1 Case Studies and Process Tracing

This section will discuss the use of case studies, the grounded theory approach that was used for data collection and hypothesis generation, as well as the process tracing method that is used throughout this research to substantiate the arguments. Section 1.2.2 will discuss case selection, while Section 1.2.3 will give a detailed account of the methods of data collection and the types of data used to make the argument and derive the conclusions.

This research takes the form of a comparative study of opposition parties in three countries, grounded in the qualitative research tradition. This thesis employs a mixed methods approach to three case studies; the project formulation and data collection was conducted using grounded theory method, while the argument is developed by employing process tracing and historical explanation. Grounded theory method, as elaborated by Glaser and Strauss (1967), uses an inductive research design where the researcher enters the field with a broad subject area or problem in mind, and allows the research questions to emerge first from data
The data is simultaneously collected, coded and analysed, and observations from the field are ultimately used to derive empirically grounded theory. In the early stages of the research, “as many different people, situations and documents as possible are selected to obtain data covering the complete spectrum of the research question.”\(^9^9\) This was the approach used in this research, where the researcher went into the field to study the broad area of opposition party mobilisation, and from observations regarding the pervasiveness of opposition coalition formation and collapse across the three countries, the research question was narrowed down. While in the field conducting research on opposition mobilisation strategies, it became clear that all three of the large parties under study were in the process of negotiating coalitions for upcoming elections. Upon further reading it became clear that these negotiations – and those that had preceded them – had not been covered in the coalitions literature, and that the existing literature was insufficiently able to explain the outcomes observed.

The methods that were used include interviews, participant observation, archival research and electoral data mapping. This thesis seeks to use these case studies to test the validity of existing theory – ‘theory-testing’ – through collecting the insights gained in each case to assess whether existing theory (developed largely through statistical analysis) is able to explain the observed outcomes. As outlined above, the majority of existing research on pre-electoral coalitions in Africa was undertaken using a quantitative design, seeking to map out the variables that make coalition formation more or less likely. Despite the proliferation of research in this area, there are few rigorous case studies of coalition negotiation processes, and even fewer that study negotiations across multiple electoral cycles. Existing quantitative research treats each coalition as a single-shot occurrence,\(^1^0^0\) and is thus unable to track and account for continuities and changes over time. In the existing research, each election and each coalition is analysed separately, as though the parties had ‘no history and no future.’\(^1^0^1\) However, as this thesis will show, parties’ strategies in elections and coalition negotiations

---


\(^1^0^1\) Strom, 596.
are conditioned both by past events and by expectations of future benefits. This is only possible with a case study approach, which seeks to illustrate continuities and changes over time.

Coalition negotiations are complex events, characterised by information asymmetries and competing interests and strategies. This makes them particularly difficult to predict using statistical methods. As noted by Hall (2003), regression analysis is useful when the effects of a few variables are very strong, and easily measurable – but when the interaction effects are complex, and the data is limited, regression analyses fail to adequately explain social and political phenomena.\textsuperscript{102} Charles Tilly (2006) suggests the use of process tracing as a method for social science investigation in situations where theoretical propositions should be based not on “large-\textit{N} statistical analysis” but on “relevant, verifiable causal stories resting in differing chains of cause-effect relations whose efficacy can be demonstrated independently of those stories.”\textsuperscript{103} In this case, process tracing and historical method will be used to test the assumptions and draw out the causal processes inferred by existing large-\textit{N} statistical analyses of coalition processes.

The theories developed by statistical analyses of coalitions will be assessed and tested using process tracing methods. Process tracing is particularly useful in theory-testing, as George and Bennet (2005) note: “In process tracing, the researcher examines histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, and other sources to see whether the causal process a theory hypothesizes or implies in a case is in fact evident in the sequence and values of the intervening variables in that case.”\textsuperscript{104} Small-\textit{N} comparative studies are well-suited to theory testing in comparative politics, “precisely because such research designs cover small numbers of cases, the researcher can investigate causal processes in each of them in detail, thereby assessing the relevant theories against especially diverse kinds of observations.”\textsuperscript{105} Small-\textit{N} studies are relevant and useful for the current project as they are a useful method of analysing


\textsuperscript{104} Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, \textit{Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences} (MIT Press, 2005), 6.

\textsuperscript{105} Hall, ‘Aligning Ontology and Methodology in Comparative Politics’, 397.
the underlying causal mechanisms. While statistical methods and large-N studies identify the correlations between input and outcome variables, case studies can identify the causal mechanisms between the inputs and outcomes. As noted by George and Bennett (2006), “The method of process-tracing is relevant for generating and analysing data on the causal mechanisms, or processes, events, actions, expectations, and other intervening variables, that link putative causes to observed effects.” With regards to this project, case studies and process tracing allow a closer analysis of the ways in which ethnicity, funding, parties and party leaders interact within coalition negotiations across multiple electoral cycles.

To mitigate the potential shortfalls of the types of data used for this research (discussed in more depth below) – including interviews, WikiLeaks Cables, party documents, personal archives and newspaper sources – this research will triangulate all data where possible. Triangulation is necessary and useful as it helps to ensure the validity of the data, and thus of the research findings. Good research practice is expected to involve triangulation, which is the use of multiple methods and data sources to enhance the validity of research findings. This is a strategy that will “aid in the elimination of bias and allow the dismissal of plausible rival explanations such that a truthful proposition about some social phenomenon can be made.” In this case, I used multiple methods and data sources to confirm information provided by a single method. For example, I triangulated information provided in interviews by politicians with data gathered from WikiLeaks and newspaper archives, as well as with interviews with other actors such as diplomatic staff and civil society leaders. This strategy leads to a high level of reliability and validity of the data and conclusions presented below.

The fieldwork-driven case study approach chosen for this thesis allows for the identification of new variables that have not yet been considered, and the formulation of new hypotheses. Based on three country case studies, which include multiple rounds of coalition-building, this thesis’s conclusions are both theory-testing and hypothesis-generating. However, due to the size of the sample, the conclusions reached with regards to coalition formation must be considered tentative with regards to their broader theoretical implications. Yet, the study

---

106 George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, Note 431.
108 Mathison, 13.
yields original insights with regards to the changing incentives that prompt party leaders to seek to build or abandon coalitions in each of the three cases.

1.2.2 Case Selection

This research used an inductive research design, using extensive field research to guide the development of research questions, test the relevance of existing theories and posit new explanations for observed phenomena. When embarking on this study, the intention was to study the mobilisation strategies of ‘strong’ opposition parties in Anglophone Africa. It became apparent during the 14 months of fieldwork that each opposition party saw pre-electoral coalitions as a viable mobilisation strategy, and they were in the midst of negotiations to form coalitions which prompted the more focused topic of this study. Zimbabwe, Zambia and Uganda were initially selected due to the existence of relatively strong opposition parties, thus selected on the ‘most similar’ principle. The opposition had either consistently received more than 25% of the vote in presidential elections (Uganda), or managed to win an election (Zambia and Zimbabwe).109

The cases were also selected because they are broadly three ‘hybrid’ regimes, which exhibit varying degrees of democracy. In 2012, the Economist Intelligence Unit’s (EIU) Democracy Index ranked Zambia as a ‘flawed democracy,’ Uganda as a ‘hybrid regime’, and Zimbabwe as an authoritarian regime.110 This correlated with the findings of both the 2013 Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) and the Freedom House Index of Freedom in the World’s findings.111 By 2017, the EIU’s Democracy index had downgraded Zambia from a flawed democracy to a ‘hybrid regime’ (in 2016, the country’s ranking dropped) while Zimbabwe shifted towards the upper limits of the ‘authoritarian regime’ category as the

109 There are debates regarding which of the elections held between 2000 and 2013 were, in fact, won by the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), however there is consensus that they won the 2008 election, leading the incumbent-sympathetic Electoral Commission to delay the announcement of the results for five weeks.


111 Zimbabwe is placed at 47th of 52 countries by the Mo Ibrahim Index and received score of ‘Not Free’ by Freedom House, attaining a score of 6 (of a possible low of 7) on both political rights and civil liberties. Uganda is ranked at 18th of 52 countries by the Mo Ibrahim Index while having a score of ‘Not Free’ accorded by the Freedom House index after gaining a measure of 4 on civil liberties and 5 on political rights. Finally, Zambia is rated at 12th of 52 countries by the IIAG and is considered ‘Partly Free’ by Freedom House, with a score of 4 on civil liberties and 3 on political rights.
country’s politics appeared to experience a positive shift. Meanwhile Uganda’s place remained stable as a ‘hybrid regime’\textsuperscript{112} The findings of the Ibrahim Index and Freedom House continued to track those of the EIU, noting a downward trend for Zambia but relatively stable levels of authoritarian and hybrid governance in Zimbabwe and Uganda.\textsuperscript{113} However, while the nature of regimes was initially theorised to be a determining factor on the nature of opposition party mobilisation, given that the parties under study in this thesis sought to create a coalition in 15 of the 17 elections under study – the exceptions being the 2002 and 2005 elections in Zimbabwe – it soon became evident that regime type was not a determining factor of cooperation. Regime type may have a bearing on the likelihood of a coalition to cohere until Election Day, but the sample is too small for this to be definitively argued.

The three countries also share a broadly similar colonial history (although Uganda was a British protectorate rather than a colony), which has resulted in similar political systems inherited from the British parliamentary model. The three countries have a presidential system with legislative power invested in a house of assembly. Elections for parliamentary seats are based on a first-past-the-post system in single-member constituencies. This means that the nature of contestation for political power at the local level is kept relatively constant across the three cases. In Zimbabwe and Uganda, elections for the presidency are conducted under a two-round electoral system where the winning candidate must achieve 50%+1 of the vote. Zambia used a simple plurality system between 1996 and 2016 when it changed the electoral system to a two-round run-off system. This provides an interesting test to see how opposition parties respond to changing electoral rules.

While the focus of this study quickly shifted from regime type, the three country case studies were maintained because they were believed to give particularly good insights into the conditions under which coalitions are formed and collapse. First, none of the three cases


\textsuperscript{113} Zimbabwe is placed at 40\textsuperscript{th} of 54 countries by the Mo Ibrahim Index and received score of ‘Not Free’ by Freedom House, attaining a score of 6 (of a possible low of 7) on political rights and 5 on civil liberties. Uganda is ranked at 19\textsuperscript{th} of 54 countries by the Mo Ibrahim Index while having a score of ‘Partly Free’ accorded by the Freedom House index after gaining a measure of 4 on civil liberties and 6 on political rights. Finally, Zambia is rated at 16\textsuperscript{th} of 54 countries by the IIAG and is considered ‘Partly Free’ by Freedom House, with a score of 4 on civil liberties and 4 on political rights.
have been the subject of substantive or comparative previous research into coalitions, and, as a result, existing studies underestimate the frequency of coalition negotiations in each case. Second, all three cases – due to the initial case selection – have relatively effective and institutionalised opposition parties, which is useful for studying the intra-party effects of coalitions and how party leaders manage dissent and maintain their positions in the face of factionalism. Third, differences in the political salience of ethnicity allows for variance in studying the impact of ethnic diversity on coalition negotiations. Zambia is often presented as a case where ‘ethnic voting’ and ethnic parties predominate, so it is a useful test case of the interaction between ethnicity and coalition formation. Similarly, Uganda is a highly ethnically diverse country, but its consistent coalition formation illustrates the limits of the ‘ethnicity as a barrier to coalitions’ argument, and instead helps to highlight how inter-party competition for the same voters helps to undermine cooperation. Fourth, Zimbabwe is a good illustrative case of how and why well-funded opposition parties forego coalitions, particularly when parties are competing for the same electoral seats. Finally, Zambia is perhaps the most interesting case for demonstrating how opposition party mobilisation strategies change over time, from forming inter-party coalitions to an individualised system of ‘elite inclusion’ which forms the basis for an inclusive multi-ethnic mobilisation strategy.

Each case provides a variety of instances of successful (the coalition cohered until the election) and unsuccessful coalition negotiation, which adds vital empirical data to the currently limited case study material on opposition coalitions in Africa. The time period of 2000 to 2017 (with the inclusion of the 1996 coalition in Uganda) was chosen rather than just the selection of several cases. This was done to enable this thesis to explore and explain changes over time, to demonstrate the ubiquity of coalition negotiations and to prevent the intentional selection of cases that confirm the hypothesis (sampling on the dependent variable). In many instances, successful coalitions are formed after a series of unsuccessful prior negotiation processes, and this is something that this research has attempted to track. The period between 2000 and 2017 is also particularly interesting, as it is when the ruling party in each case comes under more sustained pressure from the opposition as the politics of each country becomes more competitive.
1.2.3 Data

I collected the data for this project over 15 months of fieldwork, spending approximately five months in each country. My first intensive period of field research commenced on 22 October 2014 in Harare, Zimbabwe. Following the death of President Michael Sata on 28 October and the calling of a snap election, I travelled to Lusaka, Zambia. My fieldwork in each case was conducted around an election, even if I was not in the country on election-day. I was present for both the 2015 and 2016 elections in Zambia, and I was in Uganda five months before and two months after the 2016 election. For Zimbabwe, my fieldwork period fell 15 months after the 2013 election, though I had been in Zimbabwe conducting research for my masters’ degree four months before the 2013 polls. This thesis was submitted one month prior to Zimbabwe’s 2018 election. My fieldwork periods were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dates:</th>
<th>Location:</th>
<th>Data:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22 Oct – 15 Nov 2014</td>
<td>Harare</td>
<td>Interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Nov – 28 Feb 2015</td>
<td>Lusaka, Kasama,</td>
<td>Interviews, attending rallies, debates and press</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monze</td>
<td>briefings, internal party documents, newspaper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>archives, election observation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Feb – 27 May</td>
<td>Harare, Bulawayo</td>
<td>Interviews, party documents, newspaper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Jun – 19 Sept</td>
<td>Kampala</td>
<td>Interviews, party documents, attending press</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Mar – 12 Apr 2016</td>
<td>Kampala</td>
<td>interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>briefings, inter-party coalition documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Jul – 1 Aug 2017</td>
<td>Lusaka</td>
<td>Interviews</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

My research was predominantly concentrated in the three countries’ capital cities of Harare, Lusaka and Kampala, but I also undertook several short trips to other regions and cities to observe rallies and speak to members of parties’ regional branches.

This research was undertaken using a mix of data, including newspaper articles, NGO reports and other grey literature, personal and party archives, manifestoes and campaign speeches;
semi-structured elite interviews with opposition activists and leaders; and participant observation of rallies and party meetings. A final important source of data was the electoral results from each poll, which were used to generate electoral heat maps to illustrate the extent of opposition and ruling party support across each case and make the case for regional voting patterns for both the opposition and incumbent parties. The following three short sections offer information on how some of this data was gathered and analysed, its limitations and how the thesis overcomes these limitations through triangulation with other data sources.

**Interviews**

In accordance with the research methods outlined above, interviewees were chosen for their proximity to the events under study for this research, and as a result, were chosen through a non-probability, purposive sampling method. As noted by Tansey (2007), this is a suitable method of selecting research participants when employing a process tracing approach. Over the course of 14 months, I conducted 137 formal interviews, which lasted an average of 1.5 hours. The interviewees were chosen through a mix of purposive and snowball sampling methods, as well as through the use of grounded theory method which encourages simultaneous data collection and analysis to enable the reflection necessary to inform the evolving choice of research participants. These interviews were semi-structured, and involved a pre-defined set of questions depending on the interviewee’s position and political history. Most of these interviews were recorded using a voice recorder. Due to the high volume of interviews and the length of most, it was not possible to transcribe every interview. However, the files have been kept carefully and stored safely, in accordance with all national laws and regulations as well as the UK Data Protection Act and new General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR).

The interviews were conducted with a range of informants, from party elites – party presidents, secretaries-general, chairpersons and vice presidents – to party activists and grassroots members. I also interviewed the heads of civic organisations, diplomatic staff, former presidents and prime ministers, members of government, MPs and civic activists. Each interviewee was selected for their knowledge of the case, and asked

---


115 The shortest was approximately half an hour and the longest was over 4 hours.

116 In addition, my research did not involve children or other sensitive groups.
questions on the country’s electoral history, party histories, party mobilisation strategies or specific instances of coalition formation depending on their proximity to negotiations. This breadth of information helped to inform the background for the more specific study, and enabled the narrowed focus of this research as per grounded theory method.

In developing my interview questions, I was guided by the grounded theory approach. Due to the wide-ranging positions and interests of research informants, several basic sets of questions were created for each interview type, in each country, which were then supplemented with follow-up questions during the interviews. As noted by Charmaz and Belgrave (2012), developing questions for qualitative interviewing using grounded theory method involves identifying the “area of interest and form[ing] preliminary interviewing questions to explore it. We learn about research participants’ concerns and experiences and then successively develop our interview guides from the data and our emerging analysis of these data.”117 As a result, I employed a semi-structured or open-ended interview method as per the grounded theory method, which allowed for sufficient flexibility to be able to adjust to the nature of the informant and the breadth of material covered.

Elite interviews – such as those conducted for this thesis – can be a problematic data source,118 as political elites may exaggerate their roles or seek to portray themselves and their actions in a positive light relative to their (opposition) competitors. To offset this potential methodological pitfall, I conducted interviews widely, with far greater numbers of informants than just the political elites involved in negotiations. These interviewees were from the diplomatic, civic and academic sectors, and represented a broad array of views. In addition, I triangulated my interview data with contemporaneous sources such as newspaper archives, participant observation at party conventions and rallies, the WikiLeaks diplomatic cables, generally well-informed subscription-based political analysis such as that provided by Africa Confidential,119 and intra-party communications in some cases. This information was then

119 Africa Confidential is a fortnightly subscription-based newsletter (in operation since 1960) that outlines key political dynamics in African countries. It is marketed to corporations, diplomatic and government agencies, think tanks and risk analysis firms to inform policy and investment decisions. Although its contributors are
supplemented and cross-referenced with secondary sources – both published and unpublished – to ensure the accuracy of information and analysis. Finally, each empirical chapter was reviewed by country specialists to validate the data and interpretation. The reviewers for each chapter were Dr Marja Hinfelaar (Zambia, Zimbabwe), Dr Sishuwa Sishuwa (Zambia), Dr Sam Wilkins (Zimbabwe, Uganda) and Professor Brian Raftopoulos (Zimbabwe). As a result of this rigorous cross-referencing of data sources and peer review of the analysis, the information presented below can be considered to be of a high level of validity and reliability.

Ethics

All interviews were conducted within university guidelines, and interviewees were asked to provide informed consent. As per Marzano (2012), informed consent involves providing participants with detailed information on the purpose, duration, and methods of the research. The researcher must then describe the risks and benefits of participation in the study and give guarantees as to “absolute confidentiality and the respondent’s right to withdraw his or her consent at any time.”120 At the beginning and end of each interview conducted for this thesis, the interviewee was asked if they would like the information that they provided to be anonymised. I received informed consent from all interviewees, and in no cases did the interviewee ask to end the interview early. In just a few cases – almost exclusively in interviews with diplomatic staff – interviewees requested that their names, positions and affiliations be withheld, though they were willing to let me use the information provided. In one further case, although the research participant did not request that the interview be anonymised, the information that he provided was of such a sensitive nature, and the personal consequences for him providing the information are potentially serious enough that I believe it warranted anonymization. Otherwise, all interviewees cited are referred to by name, position held, date and location of the interview. A full list of interviews conducted is included as Appendix I.

The advantage of naming the interviewees is that many of them were participants in the events under study, and their perspective adds important and pertinent information regarding the negotiations that were the subject of this research. Without attribution, the information carries less weight. Those who were anonymised have been treated in two ways. The first category, is for diplomatic staff who are referred to as “Anonymous Western Diplomat.” The second is the source that I decided to anonymise out of concern for the potential personal consequences of the research, who I have referred to as “Anonymous Former Governance Advisor to USAID.” As there were very few anonymizations, I felt that this simple system would suffice to both give enough information on the interviewees to readers and simultaneously protect their identities.

My safety and that of my interviewees was ensured by meeting during the day in public places such as cafés and restaurants, where it was unlikely that our conversations would be overheard. In some cases, interviews were held at the home of the interviewee, but this was only done when a driver was available to wait outside (for safety reasons). The interviews were recorded by hand in a series of notebooks, and also – for most of them – with a voice recorder. The files from these interviews were kept safely encrypted while on fieldwork, to prevent them from falling into the hands of authorities. They remain safely stored as per the UK Data Protection Act and 2018 General Data Protection Regulation. The safety of research participants – and myself – was ensured though the secure storage of the data arising from interviews, the choice of safe, public spaces for interviews and the availability of an ‘opt-out’ option for all interviewees at any time during the process. There have been no undue personal consequences for any of my informants or for myself during the course of (or arising from) my fieldwork for this thesis. A section below will deal with the ethics of using online sources, and controversial data such as that provided in the WikiLeaks online archive.

Archives: Newspaper, WikiLeaks and Political/Personal Archives

For all three cases, newspaper archives were an important source of information on intra-opposition politics and coalition formation. As the research period is from 2000 to 2017, many of the newspapers used have online archives that are easily accessible. The print media space in all three countries is highly contested, and there is evident bias in many news sources. As a result, this thesis endeavoured to use a mix of government and independent media, and
to corroborate the information gleaned from newspapers with interview data, party
documents and secondary sources. To access older newspaper material that was no longer
archived digitally, I accessed two newspaper archives – those housed at the Media Institute
for Southern Africa (Lusaka, Zambia) and at the Makerere Institute of Social Research
(Kampala, Uganda). In Zambia, this thesis relied on the unofficial ‘paper of record’ for the
period, The Post, an independently-owned publication that was seen to be the most reliable
Zambian daily between 2000 and 2011. It also used the Lusaka Times, an online publication
with mixed sources and viewpoints. In Uganda, this thesis drew upon the Daily Monitor and
The Observer, an independent daily and weekly owned by Nation Media Group, itself owned
by the Aga Khan Foundation. It also used information published by the donor-supported
Uganda Radio Network, which is written and recorded by stringers and community-based
journalists from across Uganda. In Zimbabwe, a mix of newspapers was used including the
government mouthpiece the Herald, and the independent and opposition-sympathetic
DailyNews, and Zimbabwe Independent. All online newspaper articles cited have been saved to a
Zotero archive, and are accessible even if the live page has been taken down by the
newspaper. Beyond these newspapers, the thesis used a broad selection of media sources to
corroborate information provided by sources such as interviewees, Africa Confidential, and the
WikiLeaks online archive.

Some sections of this thesis use information stored in the WikiLeaks online archive of leaked
diplomatic cables. This archive was created by the controversial leaking of 251,287 diplomatic
cables covering the period 1966 to 2010 by a group of whistle-blowers. The cables were
published between February 2010 and September 2011, and have raised substantial debate
within the academic community as to whether they can be used as a reliable source of
information.121 Oxford University’s Timothy Garton Ash described the WikiLeaks trove as
the ‘Historian’s dream,’122 but concerns over the way that the cables were accessed and the
potential for manipulation have been cited as reasons why they should not be used by

121 Gabriel J. Michael, ‘Who’s Afraid of WikiLeaks? Missed Opportunities in Political Science Research’,
45.
diplomacy-us-media-war.
academics. In the wake of the leaks, several American universities warned their students not to access, cite or read the files\textsuperscript{123} – and this scepticism regarding the validity and ethics of using the data has continued. The most contentious data revealed in the leaks relates to information from active warzones such as Afghanistan and Iraq, where sensitive data regarding informants and strategy could have disastrous personal and political consequences. However, the \textit{WikiLeaks} cables relating to Africa were more embarrassing than dangerous for the US Government.

The cables reveal thousands of conversations and assessments of politics in African countries, revealing embassy analyses of the prospects of opposition leaders, frank discussions of manipulated by-elections and the intrigue that goes with high-level meetings with government officials. As with all sources, the data provided must be treated with caution – embassy officials were reporting contemporaneously, in the interests of the US State Department, and often with limited or incomplete information. The cables represent an incomplete and one-sided picture of the circumstances in the affected countries. The US Department of State reported that for the 2006 to 2010 period in which the majority of the relevant leaks for this project were posted, the leaks in ‘Cablegate’ represent just one tenth of total diplomatic traffic, and thus they are an incomplete record.\textsuperscript{124} The particular circumstances of the diplomatic post also affects the accuracy of the information; for example, in Zimbabwe in the late 2000s, it was very difficult for US Embassy staff and defence attachés to secure high level meetings with most senior (ZANU-PF) government officials, due to the frosty relationship between Harare and Washington DC. This meant that most information reported by the embassy on the Zimbabwean government came from third parties, or other interested groups and it may thus have been less accurate than acknowledged. Because of these limitations, the information used from \textit{WikiLeaks} in this thesis is cross-referenced where possible. As no other documentary evidence exists on the nature of the relationship between the Zimbabwean opposition and Harare-based embassies, the \textit{WikiLeaks} documents provide important insights into US Government support (both implicit and overt) for the MDCs. At other points, such as with regards to the Zambian

---


\textsuperscript{124} As reported in Michael, ‘Who’s Afraid of WikiLeaks?’
opposition, *WikiLeaks* reports of electoral campaigns are used as the frank assessments of relatively disinterested observers. More recently, authors such as Lefebvre (2012) and Hoekman (2013) have used the *WikiLeaks* archive to bolster their arguments. This thesis uses the *WikiLeaks* cables cautiously and predominantly for parts of the thesis where it gives insight into foreign support and considerations, ensuring reliability by triangulating the data where possible.

Finally, a small selection of personal or political archives were made available for this thesis. In Uganda, the Foundation for African Development (FAD) provided access to a selection of documents related to the inter-party coalitions negotiated between 2006 and 2011. Deo Hasubi Njoki, programme manager at FAD, provided access to the institution’s archive. The FAD was established in 1980 as a semi-independent think-tank and policy institute for the Democratic Party (DP) of Uganda. In Zambia, former Patriotic Front (PF) Secretary General, Wynter Kabimba, offered his personal archive of intra-party communications from the 2011 Pact coalition, negotiated between the PF and the United Party for National Development (UPND). This archive was clearly incomplete, but the communications that it held were instructive for illuminating the nature of the relationship between the parties and the sticking points within the coalition. The final personal archive accessed was that of former Zambian Cabinet Minister, Dipak Patel. Patel was the campaign manager for UPND candidate, Hakainde Hichilema, in the 2015 and 2016 elections. The archive was a trove of campaign planning documents which included flight planning and resource management documents from the 2015 campaign. The information used from all archival sources was corroborated with other external sources, such as interviews and newspaper articles. Finally, this thesis makes use of several coalition documents which were either available in the public domain or received from one of the parties to the coalitions.

**Election Results**

---

125 Zambia was much lower on the US State Department’s list of priorities, and the information available in the cables from Lusaka reveal a largely disinterested and apolitical post.
In most cases, the election results used in this thesis – largely to generate the electoral ‘heat maps that illustrate voting patterns – were retrieved from the relevant electoral management body’s website archive, or directly from the commission. However, in Zimbabwe, much of this information was not available directly from the electoral commission, and instead a list of results compiled and archived by civic actors was used instead.\(^{128}\) Several elections referenced in this thesis – notably Zimbabwe in 2008 and Zambia in 2001, amongst others – were believed to have been so openly manipulated by the party in power that the results announced by the relevant electoral commission were not believed to have been an accurate representation of the popular will. Others were widely known to have been manipulated,\(^ {129}\) but the results have been used nonetheless as they are indicative of broader patterns of political support.

Taken together, the mix of data used for this thesis gives as complete a picture as possible of a series of highly opaque coalition negotiations, and seeks to outline the complex, multifaceted nature of inter-party cooperation. The limitations of each source are mitigated as far as possible by the triangulation of data with other primary and secondary sources, giving the data presented a high degree of reliability.

1.3 Organisation of the Thesis

This thesis is organised into five chapters. This first introductory chapter describes the research questions, outlines the existing literature and gives an overview of the argument, the methods and the data that will be used to make the argument. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 are the main empirical chapters which outline the opposition coalitions negotiated in each country between 2000 and 2017. These chapters have been written as case studies, as they present data on the relationships between opposition parties that has not previously been collated. It is expected that such case studies are more usefully and coherently presented as cases than if they had been presented thematically. In addition, in this format they will be more useful for country specialists who are seeking out information on each of the three cases. The length of the three chapters vary, due to the amount of material to be presented within each case. It

---

\(^{128}\) These can be found at [www.kubatana.net/category/elections/](http://www.kubatana.net/category/elections/) and the Election Resource Centre, [www.erczim.org](http://www.erczim.org).

was thought prudent to let the cases speak for themselves, rather than trying to fit each chapter into a strict word limit. Chapter 5 is the concluding chapter which gathers the insights from the three case studies and makes clear the arguments explored across the thesis’ three cases and concludes by briefly drawing the research outwards, highlighting the wider significance of the argument and the information presented within the three core empirical chapters.
2. Consistent Coalition Formation in Uganda

2.1 Introduction

Opposition coalitions form in Uganda with surprising regularity – opposition coordination has been attempted in every executive election in the country’s post-colonial history, barring the 1980 election following the fall of the Idi Amin regime. Despite this, opposition parties and party coalitions are understudied. This is the result of disparaging assumptions by observers – frequently borne out by party behaviour – regarding the frailty and fractious nature of opposition parties as well as their inability to mount a substantive challenge to the ruling party. Since the National Resistance Movement (NRM) took power in 1986, none of the opposition coalitions that have been formed have been able to unseat the ruling party.

The motivations for building coalitions in Uganda are clear – in a context where political party activities were restricted for more than two decades, even the oldest and most established opposition parties are weak, fragmented and severely under-resourced. This weakness, alongside frequent government interference and the fusion of the NRM to the state architecture at the local level – through the local council system and the deployment of resident district commissioners and district intelligence officers – prevents opposition parties from organising effectively and establishing structures across the country.

Politics in Uganda is characterised by both party polarisation (driven by ‘liberation’ rhetoric) and high levels of elite cooperation. In every executive/presidential election – with the notable exception of 1980 – there has been the emergence of an alliance of opposition forces

---

130 Coalitions were formed in 1962 (UPC, KY); 1996 (IPFC); 2001 (Besigye, DP, UPC and Reform Agenda); 2006 (G6); 2011 (IPC) and 2016 (TDA).


to challenge the status quo.\textsuperscript{134} These alliances were anti-incumbent in nature, most collapsed prior to the election, and all but the first – created in 1962 – have been unsuccessful in changing the status quo. However, coalitions have an important place in both the popular imagination and in opposition mobilisation strategies. This chapter will demonstrate that party coalitions in Uganda are a response to the weakness of the opposition, and the inability of smaller parties to run national campaigns against the NRM. Parties seek to cooperate in order to run candidates across the country, to maximise the returns on scarce resources and to have a national platform from which to approach the electorate. However, despite the recognition that coalitions are necessary, they almost invariably collapse when newly-elected party leaders withdraw from the alliance to run their own campaigns and test their electoral viability. When they perform poorly, these party leaders seek to enter into coalitions in later elections but the intra-opposition competition for limited constituencies – due to the NRM’s hegemony – pushes party leaders to negotiate cynically within coalitions, ultimately leading to the collapse of the broader coalition. This chapter concludes that, contrary to existing scholarship, coalitions comprised of geographically-limited ethnic parties may be more cohesive, as parties are less likely to compete for the same voters.

This chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2.1 provides crucial background information to the Ugandan case, highlighting the key factors that animate politics in Uganda, from ‘liberationism’ to the role of ethnicity in electoral contests. It also outlines the weakness of the Ugandan opposition, and links that to a long history of cooperative behaviour. Section 2.2 sketches out two coalitions formed under the movement system (prior to the reintroduction of multi-party politics in 2005), which were important precursors to the coalitions formed from 2006 onwards. In 2.3, three pre-electoral coalitions are traced – from the 2006, 2011 and 2016 polls – and the reasons for their cohesion or collapse are highlighted. Finally, this chapter will conclude by outlining the reasons for frequent coalition collapse in Uganda. These are the competition between parties for the same groups of voters, the decision by newly-elected party presidents to stand on their own party tickets, and the impact of intra-party factionalism on inter-party coalition negotiations.

\textsuperscript{134} National elections were held to elect the executive in Uganda in 1962, 1980, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2011 and 2016. ‘Parliamentary’ elections were held under the movement system in 1989 (to the National Resistance Council Parliament) and 1994 (to the Constituent Assembly, which wrote the new constitution). In addition, local government/local council elections were held in 1964, 1992.
2.1.1 Political Parties and the Logic of Coalition Formation in Uganda

‘Liberationism,’ inclusionary strategies and regime maintenance

Uganda and Zimbabwe bear several similarities – the first among them is that both are ‘liberation’ regimes. This connotes that the ruling party came to power via a liberation struggle or period of violent conflict. This is important for this study for two reasons – the first is that the ruling party seeks to use its liberation history to legitimate its continued hold on power, and the second is the persistent involvement of the military or military elites in politics. The leaders of liberation parties derive much of their legitimacy from this history, and indeed rely on it for continued legitimation of the elite’s increasingly tenuous hold on power. This history is also important as it has meant – in both Uganda and Zimbabwe – that the military and former military leaders have continued to have significant sway over politics and a considerable role in successive post-conflict governments. Even though it has been more than thirty years since Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni and his NRM took power, the war looms large in symbolic politics, with Museveni still frequently referring to himself as ‘freedom fighter number one’ (Sabahwanyi Number One). The salience of this liberation narrative – and how people remember the protracted conflicts that preceded 1986 – continues to drive Museveni’s vote-base, and limits what the opposition can achieve.

For the first 20 years of Museveni’s rule, political parties were banned in Uganda and all political activity was organised under the ‘movement system’ – in essence a militaristic hegemonic-party state. The ostensible reason for this – similar to that proffered by Idi Amin’s regime in 1971 – was that the partisan mobilisation of ethnic and regional identities had previously been the cause of cycles of ethnic exclusion, political violence and insecurity.


61
experienced since independence.\textsuperscript{139} During the movement system, political parties were allowed to exist, and elections were held, but these were under the ‘individual merit’ system, where political leaders were elected at the local level based on their personal characteristics rather than national political alignment.\textsuperscript{140} Parties could maintain national headquarters, but they were legally barred from membership drives, holding rallies, or officially promoting candidates in elections. The movement system made politics highly localised (through a complex system of locally-elected councils)\textsuperscript{141} and personalised (through ‘individual merit’). This created an atomised political environment, and one in which both the NRM and President Museveni are largely held above the fray of local grievances and governance failures. As noted by Wilkins (2018):

The NRM system relies on ingrained and embedded narratives that elevate the local polity, not the national one, as the key forum for the resolution of political grievance. This “shape” of accountability politics allows the president to play a transcendent, almost monarchical role, somewhat aloof from the substance of local grievance.\textsuperscript{142}

Long after the movement system was abolished in 2005, the legacy of the ‘no-party’ system looms large. In the NRM’s strongholds in the rural south-west, the ruling party is seen less as a party within a multi-party system than as the ‘conditions’ within which politics occurs.\textsuperscript{143} This is demonstrated by the often-absent opposition candidates, and the extremely high numbers of citizens who stand and vote in the NRM primaries. As many or more citizens participated in the NRM’s primary elections in 2011 and 2016 than voted in the national polls, underlining the importance of intra-NRM contestation within local-level politics.\textsuperscript{144} In 2016, 2700 candidates vied to be chosen as the NRM’s candidate for just 400 parliamentary

\textsuperscript{139} Carbone, 486.
seats. For those who lose out in the NRM primaries, few turn to opposition parties. Instead, most choose to contest as independent candidates, hoping to win their seats on the basis of their ‘individual merit’ and negotiate a new, favourable relationship to the ruling party and executive. In the 2016 polls, 43% of all parliamentary candidates were independents – a total of 907 – while 91 seats were not contested by a single opposition candidate. Although ostensibly independent, most of those parliamentary candidates who competed in the election on an ‘independent’ ticket campaigned for President Museveni, helping to maintain his ‘monarchic’ presidency.

Although the characterisation of the NRM as the forum for political contestation holds for the NRM’s heartlands in the rural south-west, there is substantial regional variation in voting patterns and political culture across the rest of the country. Beyond the rural south-west, and particularly in the anti-NRM regions of the north and east, voters have repeatedly used their ballots to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with the ruling party – but party labels are still far less important than in Zimbabwe’s polarised political space (Chapter 4). Instead, voters will vote either for locally popular candidates or for the opposition party with the greatest potential to confront the unpopular incumbent, sometimes doing both by splitting their parliamentary and presidential votes between parties. The ‘individual merit’ system has helped to entrench a culture of intra-opposition fluidity, though in anti-incumbent regions it remains a politically risky prospect for prominent opposition elites to align with the ruling party. This mix of polarisation and fluidity places Uganda between two extremes – the highly fluid nature of Zambian politics, and the highly polarised politics of Zimbabwe (see chapters 3 and 4).

147 The vast majority of these ‘independents’ were aligned to the NRM, and had lost out on the party ticket in the primaries, thus opting to contest as an ‘NRM-aligned’ independent.
In 2005, multi-party politics was reinstated by the Omnibus Bill, which also removed presidential term limits. The NRM has dealt with the competition of multi-party politics by seeking to outmanoeuvre its opponents and minimise dissent through ‘inclusionary’ strategies used interchangeably with repression. To deal with the demands from below and competition from the opposition in anti-incumbent regions, the NRM has also presided over an ever-growing patronage machine at all levels of the state, party and society. While the number of districts (and their attendant bureaucracies) has jumped from 56 in 2002 to 112 by 2016, the number of parliamentarians has ballooned from 295 to 427. At the same time, the president has appointed an ever-expanding cabinet – from 21 ministers in 1996 to 81 in 2016 – and a bevy of over 140 ‘presidential advisors.’ As Reuss and Titeca (2017) argue, these advisors are largely irrelevant but the position serves as an inclusionary mechanism to buy in an “ever-increasing number of friends and foes.” Many of these advisors are young, energetic and educated elites who are bought into the presidential fold to minimise the threat that they might otherwise pose from outside of the NRM’s ‘big tent.’ The NRM also deploys patronage to minimise the threats posed by other organised social actors who might be a locus for political organising such as the kingdoms, chiefs and churches, largely keeping them sympathetic to the ruling party’s agenda. In addition, the NRM also organises disorganised groups who might otherwise present a challenge to its hegemony, such as ‘crime preventer’ groups in the 2016 election. Crime preventers were groups of marginalised and unemployed ‘youths’ – allegedly numbering as many as 1.6 million – who were organised into quasi-military units and given limited training and the amorphous tasks of curbing crime and supplementing security during the polls. Despite widespread fears of anti-opposition violence from these groups – which largely failed to materialise – it became apparent that the reason for mobilising them was as yet another extension of state patronage and control to

153 Reuss and Titeca, 7.
marginalised groups that might otherwise challenge the ruling party.\textsuperscript{156} The NRM’s patronage state has become expensive to oppose, but also lucrative for some and expensive for public finances to maintain, prompting ever-greater financialization of elections and governance.\textsuperscript{157}

As noted by Khisa (2016), Museveni and the NRM deploy a carrot and stick approach to governance and regime maintenance – enticing elites with patronage, legitimising its continued rule with reference to previous episodes of violence and using coercive strategies to raise the costs of defection.\textsuperscript{158} The ruling party deploys a similar strategy to deal with opposition parties and their supporters, offering them positions and financial rewards for defection (as will be outlined further below) or limiting their ability to operate, both financially and through coercion.\textsuperscript{159} As former NRM heavyweight turned opposition MP Augustine Ruzindana put it, “being in opposition is very costly here. Your children become unemployable and you cannot do business. They have made being in opposition a very costly venture.”\textsuperscript{160} The opposition thus face an entrenched and strategic incumbent which makes the costs of staying permanently in opposition very high.

\textit{Opposition weakness and a history of cooperative politics}

Opposition coalitions are a frequent feature of elections in Uganda. In each election held since the NRM took power in 1986, opposition forces have aimed to forge pre-electoral coalitions around a single candidate to challenge Museveni. This was done first from within the movement system in 1996 and 2001, and later within the context of a (hegemonic party-dominated) multi-party dispensation. Several of Uganda’s opposition parties long pre-date those found in Zimbabwe and Zambia, giving them a historical rootedness and a somewhat loyal following, but they remain generally weakly institutionalised. They also find themselves struggling to break out of their narrow historical ethno-regional and religious support bases.

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{158}{Khisa, ‘Managing Elite Defection in Museveni’s Uganda’, 742.}
\footnotetext{160}{Khisa, ‘Managing Elite Defection in Museveni’s Uganda’.

65}
to develop a national following. Uganda’s newest opposition party – the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC), officially registered in 2006 – was the product of a multi-ethnic breakaway faction from within the NRM, and has proven to be the most successful at challenging the regime. The FDC has been able to run more parliamentary candidates than the historical parties since its formation in 2005 and has proven to be more ‘national’ in its support at the presidential level. However, this party’s success has come at the expense of older opposition parties, and this has limited the potential for inter-party collaboration, as outlined below.

The no-party (movement) system in place between 1986 and 2005, and the suppression of parties prior to that, undermined the institutionalisation of Uganda’s opposition.\(^{161}\) Even the oldest and most established opposition parties, such as the DP (formed in 1954) and UPC (formed in 1960), are weak, fragmented and plagued by severe resource deficits.\(^{162}\) This weakness inhibits opposition parties from organising effectively and establishing structures across the country. Instead, parties are limited to their traditional strongholds or pockets of influence – where a strong opposition leader has succeeded in building a loyal following, amassed substantial personal resources and embedded themselves within local politics. At the same time, the NRM’s control of large swathes of the country leaves opposition parties competing for many of the same constituencies. Even though it is the strongest and most nationalised opposition party, in 2016 the FDC contested just 65% (262) of the 402 parliamentary seats. Meanwhile, 91 constituencies or 22% of the directly elected seats available were not contested by an opposition candidate. Instead, the opposition ran multiple competing candidates in at least half of the constituencies that they contested – highlighting that there is significant overlap in the various parties’ electoral bases. This limited geographical reach of parties prevents them from challenging the NRM effectively at the national level, while the opposition compete for the same groups of anti-incumbent voters across electoral cycles (see below).

Simultaneously, the weakness of centralised civic associations through which the opposition might otherwise be able to mobilise hampers their capacity to do so. Nascent opposition

\(^{161}\) Carbone, ‘Political Parties in a “No-Party Democracy”: Hegemony and Opposition Under “Movement Democracy” in Uganda’.

\(^{162}\) Carbone.
parties with weak grassroots structures in places such as Zambia in 1990 and Zimbabwe in the early 2000s capitalised on the existence of strong civic groups such as churches, trade unions, NGOs and student movements. In both countries, the opposition co-opted these groups to build their structures and sustain a successful mobilisation machine.\textsuperscript{163} The potential for associational mobilisation for the opposition in Uganda is low, as religious organisations and kingdoms are legally barred from engaging in partisan politics, while salaries and patronage provided by the government limit the desire of individuals to step into overtly political territory. Churches are more likely to operate in favour of the ruling party, either deliberately or inadvertently.\textsuperscript{164} The opposition are also largely unable to capitalise effectively on local-level civic associations and funding networks that link back to the Kampala elite.\textsuperscript{165} This leaves opposition parties in a weak position. Unable to mobilise through other groups and limited by resources and state attrition from establishing strong structures, parties are left with few options but to form coalitions to try to attract and pool resources, prevent intra-opposition competition and share information. When pressed to reveal their reasons for forming coalitions in Uganda, each of the key opposition party leaders admitted that in a context where parties are weak and government interference makes it difficult to mobilise effectively, the opposition can achieve little individually and must collaborate to run a national campaign and pressure the NRM to concede ground.\textsuperscript{166} As President of the Justice Forum Party (JEEMA) Asuman Basalirwa stated:

In the current political environment characterised by repression, restriction, logistical constraints and structural challenges, it is extremely difficult to build functional and strong party structures across the country that would enable us to field candidates from the lowest position to the highest position. Given these constraints, it can only make sense to collaborate. Even the biggest opposition parties cannot front candidates in all positions. So, what can only make sense is to say come, let’s sit together, who is going where. So, at the end of it all we can be able to occupy space all over the country. It’s about creating a national campaign.\textsuperscript{167}

Party-based incentives for coordination are buttressed by substantial public support for coalitions. An opinion poll undertaken in 2014 by the UGMP civil society alliance found

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{163} LeBas, \textit{From Protest to Parties: Party-Building and Democratization in Africa.}
\item \textsuperscript{164} Alava and Ssentongo, ‘Religious (de)Politicisation in Uganda’s 2016 Elections’.
\item \textsuperscript{166} Interview, Gregory Mugisha Muntu, FDC President, 9 September 2015; Interview, Norbert Mao, DP President, 10 September 2015.
\item \textsuperscript{167} Asuman Basalirwa, JEEMA President, 1 April 2016.
\end{itemize}
widespread support for opposition coalitions amongst voters.\(^\text{168}\) Of the 2100 respondents, 47% answered that they would vote for the opposition if it fielded one candidate – this was more clearly the preference of urban citizens and younger voters as 52% of respondents between the ages of 19 and 34 were in favour of voting for a coalition candidate, while 58% of urban respondents reported the same.

*Ethno-regional grievances and shifting opposition bases*

The Ugandan population can be grouped into two major ethno-linguistic family groups, the Bantu-speaking majority who live in the central, southern and western regions, and the non-Bantu speakers (grouped into people of Nilotic and Central Sudanic origin) who live in the north, eastern and north-western parts of the country. These two major language groupings are further split into more than 66 recognised ethnic subgroups,\(^\text{169}\) making Uganda one of the most ethnically diverse countries on the continent.\(^\text{170}\) However, none of these groups make up a majority of the population – the largest ethnic group is the Baganda, who make up just 16.5% (see Table 1). This means that no party can use a strictly mono-ethnic mode of electoral mobilisation and hope to win elections at the national level. Instead, parties must seek to draw support from across ethnic cleavages or form multi-ethnic alliances, while the ruling party needs to balance ethno-regional interests to maintain legitimacy and stave off threats from the opposition. Similarly to Zimbabwe’s ruling party (see Chapter 4), Museveni’s ‘liberationist’ rhetoric seeks to paper over ethnic cleavages, to use a nationalist-liberation discourse to legitimate its continued hold on power. But ethno-regional grievances based on a regionalised history of conflict with the central government and marginalisation from the levers of political and economic power have, at times, undermined the efficacy of this narrative in sustaining the ruling party’s support.


Table 1: The size and location of Ugandan ethnic groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Sub-Region</th>
<th>Number (Millions)</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baganda</td>
<td>Buganda (Central)</td>
<td>5.56</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banyankore</td>
<td>Ankole (Western)</td>
<td>3.22</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basoga</td>
<td>Busoga (East Central)</td>
<td>2.96</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bakiga</td>
<td>Ankole (Western)</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iteso</td>
<td>Teso (East)</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Langi</td>
<td>Lango (North)</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bagisu</td>
<td>Elgon (East)</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acholi</td>
<td>Acholiland (North)</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lugbara</td>
<td>West Nile (North)</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other ethnic groups</td>
<td></td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>32.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>33.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: This table was compiled using data from a 2014 report by the Ugandan Bureau of Statistics.171

At independence in 1962, the new government of Uganda inherited a state divided along multiple overlapping fault lines. Ethnicity, region, religion and class intersected in complex ways to segment both the population and the political elite whose primary interests became the capture and retention of state power. The relationship between ethnicity and politics in Uganda is as complex as it is varied.172 There is yet to be a comprehensive study of the impact of ethnicity on politics in Uganda. This thesis has neither the space nor the mandate to achieve comprehensive coverage of this important topic, but it is a critical factor in any discussion of Ugandan politics and opposition dynamics. A complex history of ethnically-defined territory, colonial sub-imperialism, post-colonial dominance of various groups at several historical junctures and a history of ‘liberation’ that is understood in multiple ways by these different groups has produced a particularly convoluted relationship that is both highly contextual and fluid. Several regions of Uganda have a fraught or contentious relationship with the country’s central government, for reasons of ethno-regional marginalisation, grievances over political representation at the centre and/or a history of violence deployed along ethno-regional lines.

172 Although religion was once a key political cleavage in Uganda, its importance has declined throughout the last 30 years, and thus it will not be looked at separately in this chapter. See Stefan Lindemann, ‘Just Another Change of Guard? Broad-Based Politics and Civil War in Museveni’s Uganda’, African Affairs 110, no. 440 (1 July 2011): 394.
The nature of these relationships frequently finds expression in the country’s electoral dynamics. Regions that have historically (and with relative consistency) supported the opposition since the first elections under the Movement system in 1996, include much of the northern region (including the Acholi, Lango, and West Nile sub-regions), Kasese in the far west, Teso in the east, and the central region (dominated by the Buganda) to varying degrees. The likelihood of each region to vote against the incumbent NRM depends on the issues that motivate the politics of the day, including the rising and declining influence of insurgencies, legislative changes, and the creation of new districts to accommodate ethno-political demands. The maps provided in later sections of this chapter give a sense of how each region relates to the central government at each election. What stands out from the discussion below is the relatively low salience of ethnic bloc-voting in favour of co-ethnics, compared to anti-incumbent bloc-voting. Across electoral cycles, certain regions abandoned their ‘traditional parties’ or co-ethnic leaders in favour of the newest and most ‘nationalised’ opposition party. This party, the FDC, was broadly supported by anti-incumbent voters even though it was led by a westerner and former Museveni-ally, as the party appeared to have the greatest chance of unseating the unpopular incumbent. This suggests that the politics of these regions may be more complicated than being merely ‘ethnic’, though ethnicity remains an important register for articulating grievances and coordinating popular demands for greater political representation at the centre.

At independence in 1962, the colonial administration in Uganda left a bifurcated state in which people from the north of the country dominated the military, while people from the south largely controlled the commercial sectors, the bureaucracy and civilian administration. The initial use of Buganda’s army and administration to subjugate and then rule much of the population between 1894 and 1905 had produced widespread anti-Buganda sentiment. When Buganda was de-militarized in 1905, recruits for the army and police came primarily from the north and east of the country – people who were ostensibly more ‘militaristic’ – to

---

check the growing power of Buganda within the British Protectorate. The system of divide-and-rule that emerged from this would have long-lasting consequences. As noted by Richard Reid:

The British had set up a political system doomed to fail: rooted in armed force, both real and implied and the militarisation of political culture; a system of staggering geopolitical inequity, with Buganda as the capstone and outlying areas as marginalised zones of conquest; and thus a system which institutionalised ethnic competition and the politics of zero-sum.

Following the departure of the colonial administration, control over the Ugandan state would largely fall to northerners who were able to exert control over and demand loyalty from the military. The first series of long-lived Ugandan governments under the UPC and Milton Obote (1962-1971), Idi Amin (1971-1979), Milton Obote (1980-1985) and the Okello’s (1985-1986) had heads of state who were from the north of the country, while northerners continued to be over-represented within the government, military and police. However, when Museveni’s National Resistance Army (NRA) came to power in 1986 after its largely southern-based and southerner-supported insurgency, which it framed as “Bantu southerners united against Nilotic northerners,” people in the north were sceptical of the country’s first southerner-dominated government.

The suspicion of southerners in the north was entrenched and exacerbated by the NRA’s violent counterinsurgency in the north to wipe out any remaining resistance – with tens of thousands of northern civilians interned in concentration camps, the decimation of cattle herds and destruction of villages under a scorched earth policy. When resistance to the NRA’s military advances manifested in armed insurrection by Alice Lakwena’s Holy Spirit Movement and its successor, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), the government’s violent response firmly entrenched anti-government and anti-NRM sentiment in the north. As

---

182 An excellent analysis of this history can be found in Chapter 2 of Branch, *Displacing Human Rights: War and Intervention in Northern Uganda*. 

71
Omach (2014) argues, “Two decades of violent conflict polarised the country and entrenched the development of two countries and two economies: a peaceful and prosperous south and a conflict-ridden and poverty-stricken north.” From the perspective of many people in Acholiland, Museveni was long seen as complicit in their suffering – at best he ignored their plight, while the army’s insurgency claimed lives and livelihoods, at worst he intentionally prolonged the war and forced 1.6 million people into displacement camps to disrupt political opposition and justify high military spending. This dissatisfaction with Museveni and the NRM would entrench majority opposition support in the northern Acholiland sub-region, creating a ‘base’ from which opposition parties would try to expand their electoral support.

Similarly to the north, the NRA’s success was not greeted with enthusiasm in the east of Uganda, and it represented a serious threat to the people of the Teso sub-region. The Iteso people had held a privileged position under Milton Obote (II) – a northerner from Lango sub-region – particularly in the armed forces and police. Following Obote’s overthrow and the region’s loss of political power, Peter Otai’s Uganda People’s Army (UPA) undertook an insurgency against the NRM government from 1987 to 1992. The government’s response to the insurgency and the subsequent marginalisation of Teso sub-region – along with spill-over effects of the LRA incursion and cattle-rustling from Karamoja – exacerbated the region’s dislike of the government based in Kampala. West Nile sub-region (in the north west) also distrusted the NRM regime; former members of Amin’s army had staged an insurgency from 1995 to 1997 in response to widespread perceptions of the economic and political neglect of the region. The West Nile sub-region has continued to be economically and politically marginalised since 1986, with few people from the region being represented within the upper echelons of the state. Due to the recurrent cycles of conflict and perceptions of the economic (and later, political) dominance of the south over the north and east, the northern and eastern regions of Uganda have long been bastions of opposition (anti-NRM) support. In 1996,

185 Lindemann, ‘Just Another Change of Guard?’, 411.
186 Lindemann, 512.
despite being a Muganda (from Buganda in the south), DP President Paul Kawanga Ssemogerere won significant support in Acholiland and West Nile. Ssemogerere had campaigned on promises of peace talks with the rebels and had been backed by Milton Obote’s UPC, and as a result he won 88% of the vote in strife-torn Kitgum, 86% in Gulu and majorities in other northern districts.188

The cycles of conflict that emerged following the NRM’s successful insurgency would have a lasting impact on the voting patterns across the country, and would help define the opposition’s fortunes and limit the success of coalition formation in the multi-party dispensation. Table 2 outlines the conflicts that have occurred since Museveni took power; and it is in these conflict-prone areas that the opposition have largely been able to capitalise on anti-NRM sentiment.

Table 2 Conflicts and Insurgencies in Museveni’s Uganda, 1986-2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civil War</th>
<th>Sub-Region</th>
<th>Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA)</td>
<td>Acholiland (North)</td>
<td>1986-1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holy Spirit Movement (HSM)</td>
<td>Acholiland (North)</td>
<td>1986-1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lords’ Resistance Army (LRA)</td>
<td>Acholiland (North)</td>
<td>1987-2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda People’s Army (UPA)</td>
<td>Teso (East)</td>
<td>1987-1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Nile Bank Front (WNBF)</td>
<td>West Nile (North)</td>
<td>1995-1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rwenzori Mountains</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)</td>
<td>(West)</td>
<td>1996-2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF II)</td>
<td>West Nile (North)</td>
<td>1998-2002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Table reproduced from Lindemann (2011), p. 388

Buganda’s relationship to the central state also, at times, reflects the uneasy relationship between the state and the country’s powerful kingdoms. The central region (which is largely coterminous with the historical Buganda kingdom) played host to the Luweero bush war that brought the NRA to power, and it suffered most from the counter-insurgency of the Obote regime in the 1980s. During the 1980s most of the NRA’s support came from the southern region of the country, and from Buganda in particular. However, since 1996, the relationship between the region and the central government has been strained at moments, over the federal status of the kingdom, land usage rights, the contestation over the limits of the

political and cultural powers of the king (Kabaka) and the ‘return’ of 9000 square miles of land that was confiscated by the government decades ago.\(^{189}\) The Democratic Party (DP) originates from Buganda and has almost exclusively been led by Baganda presidents. The region has long been sympathetic to the DP. The Buganda sub-region also plays host to the country’s capital – Kampala – which, due to reasons of information access, class, inadequate service delivery and demographic change, has become a bastion of anti-NRM sentiment.\(^{190}\)

Since 1986, despite the claims of inclusivity by Museveni, successive NRM administrations have been marked for their over-representation of westerners and southerners in key positions of power and authority.\(^{191}\) In particular, the Banyankole and Bahima from Museveni’s region\(^{192}\) (in the south west) have been given a privileged position in successive cabinets, making up nearly 70% of powerful positions.\(^{193}\) This is mirrored in the military where all those appointed to the rank of full general since 1986 are Bahima, and westerners account for 61% of all top command positions.\(^{194}\) By contrast, northerners have been marginalised within the state, making up just 1.8% of all powerful positions between 1986 and 2008.\(^{195}\) This marginalisation from the core levers of power has further entrenched a sense of relative deprivation and exacerbated the grievances produced by the government’s heavy-handed response to regional conflicts. The electoral consequences of this are that the regions that have suffered most under the NRM have tended to vote for the opposition, while the rural south-west has proven to be an unassailable NRM heartland where the opposition is unable to make a firm foothold – even though the main opposition leader, Kizza Besigye, hails from there.\(^{196}\)

---


\(^{191}\) Lindemann, ‘Just Another Change of Guard?’

\(^{192}\) Though his ethnic identity is disputed, Museveni’s autobiography - *Sowing the Mustard Seed* - states on the first page that “I was born among the Banyankore Bahima nomads of south-western Uganda.”

\(^{193}\) These are defined as the presidency and Defence, Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs, Finance, Planning and Economic Development, Commerce, Agriculture, Local Government, and Justice Ministries in Lindemann, ‘Just Another Change of Guard?’, 396.

\(^{194}\) Lindemann, 404.

\(^{195}\) Lindemann, 399.

Following on from the above discussion regarding the motivations for coalitions, weakness of opposition parties and the ethno-regional support bases of both the NRM and the opposition, the subsequent sections will outline the negotiations around opposition coalition formation in Uganda since 1996. They highlight the ways in which ethnicity, party support bases, elite dynamics and government manipulation facilitated or hindered the successful formation of opposition coalitions. While the frequency of coalition efforts has helped to build relationships between partners, the internal weaknesses of parties and their fractious nature undermines cooperation. Newly-elected party leaders regularly pull their parties out of coalitions as they seek to test their own electoral support. When these leaders perform poorly in the presidential election, they often go into coalitions in subsequent polls. But this does not guarantee that the coalitions will cohere. Intra-opposition competition over the same anti-incumbent voters helps to create competition between parties that undermines the collective goal of coalition-building, while uncertainty and information asymmetries regarding who might most effectively eat into the NRM’s vote share creates tensions within coalitions. These tensions may manifest in party splits and divisions that create further antagonism as party factions align themselves with other parties, making future coalitions more difficult to sustain. Contrary to Gandhi and Reuter’s (2013) suggestion that fractionalised party systems inhibit coalitions because parties lack a stable past of interaction, opposition parties in Uganda have a long history of interaction – and inter-party competition. This stable history of interaction has created and entrenched grievances that have undermined successive coalitions, as party leaders (at various levels) have used coalitions as forums through which to achieve their own particularistic aims, rather than privileging the common aim of removing the incumbent.
2.2 Coalitions Under the Movement System (1996-2005)

2.2.1 The 1996 Election and the IPFC Coalition

The 1996 election would be held under the movement system but appeared to be a multi-party election. Following the creation in the Constituent Assembly\(^\text{197}\) of an alliance of those supporting the reintroduction of a multi-party system within the Movement who allied with the ‘old’ parties, the DP’s President, Paul Kawanga Ssemogerere, opted to run against President Yoweri Museveni for the presidency. Although parties’ activities were constrained, they had continued to exist and members of the old parties, such as Ssemogerere, had joined the NRM’s broad-based government formed after the fall of the Obote regime and the capture of power by Museveni’s NRA. Several prominent members of the DP took up seats in the NRM’s administration after 1986 and Ssemogerere was granted the position of Second Deputy Prime Minister.\(^\text{198}\) By 1995, given the rise to prominence of the cross-party Caucus for Multi-Party Democracy (CMPD) within the Constituent Assembly (CA), the number of DP ministers had declined drastically. The party became increasingly concerned about their decreasing leverage within the Movement. When Ssemogerere pulled out of the broad-based government and announced his intention to stand against Museveni, he found that many DP leaders who had joined the Movement government with him were unwilling to cede their positions and they deserted the DP.\(^\text{199}\) This loss of party members to other parties would be a recurring problem for the DP when joining coalitions – and is frequently cited as a key reason for the party’s reluctance to join forces with larger or more prominent political organisations.

Coalition Formation

The political alliance that would become the Inter-Political Forces for Cooperation (IPFC) emerged from within the CMPD in the Constituent Assembly when it became clear that their aims to have the restoration of multi-party politics entrenched in the 1995 constitution had

---

\(^{197}\) The Constituent Assembly was the first elected body which functioned as a parliament-type body which debated and wrote the country’s 1995 constitution. Elections were held for the CA in 1994.


\(^{199}\) Interview, Paul Kawanga Ssemogerere, Former DP President and Deputy Prime Minister, 28 August 2015.
failed.\textsuperscript{200} The key actors in the CMPD were from the DP, UPC and a group known as the ‘Federalists’ who had advocated for the institution of a federal system. The opposition caucus in the CA was significant; there were 70 members of the two historical political parties within the CA, though two thirds of the body was taken up by movementists.\textsuperscript{201} Based on the consensus reached within the CMPD, the DP and a faction of the UPC formed the IPFC to contest the 1996 election. Despite their history of decades of animosity, rivalry and even bloodshed, the DP and UPC resolved to work together to try to defeat Museveni. This alliance was based upon ethno-regional calculus, which hoped to be able to stitch together the DP’s Buganda base and the UPC’s northern strongholds (Acholiland, Lango, and to a lesser extent West Nile and Teso). The party leaders believed this would create a broad multi-ethnic alliance to challenge the NRM, but they underestimated the NRM’s popularity and the broad unpopularity of Milton Obote’s UPC in the south west of Uganda. As Milton Obote was still in exile in Zambia and reluctant to partner with the DP, the coalition was spearheaded and negotiated by UPC-heavyweight and acting-Secretary General Cecelia Ogwal.\textsuperscript{202} This prominent politician – who would later be dubbed the ‘Iron Lady’ – had established herself as a pragmatic politician and UPC reformer.\textsuperscript{203} Despite Obote’s initial reluctance, the two parties signed an agreement which outlined that in the event of victory, the two parties – rivals for 45 years – were to share power.\textsuperscript{204} Despite their apparent unity, the alliance would struggle to challenge the popularity of Museveni’s presidency and compete on a skewed playing field.

The parties had based their campaign upon faulty assumptions – the first was that Ugandans would be generally sympathetic to their intentions to reinstate party politics. It had been only a decade since the end of the NRA insurgency – itself prompted by a divisive multi-party election – and the NRM had presided over significant economic growth and growing stability in the south, west and centre of the country. Given that the NRM had allocated blame for

\textsuperscript{201} Carbone, ‘Political Parties in a “No-Party Democracy”: Hegemony and Opposition Under “Movement Democracy” in Uganda’, 171.
Uganda’s previous instability to the nefarious influence of political parties, the IPFC’s beliefs regarding Ugandan sympathies towards parties were likely ill-founded. The alliance was also based on a similar calculus to the 1962 election – the DP assumed that their calls for federalism would endear them to the Baganda, while the UPC’s traditional base in Acholiland and Lango sub-region (fearing marginalisation since the fall of the Obote regime) would vote in favour of the recently-ousted and humiliated former ruling party and its allies. However, the UPC under Obote had been responsible for banning political parties and the abolition of the semi-federal system that existed at independence; as a result, most southern Ugandans were sceptical regarding the likelihood that a DP-UPC alliance would deliver on its promises. Baganda (and other groups across the south west) were sceptical of the alliance, fearing that it would lead to a repeat of the coup and constitutional crisis left in the wake of the breakdown of the 1962 UPC/Kabaka Yekka alliance.

Museveni played on these fears and vilified the coalition by raising the spectre of the return of Obote to Uganda – a trap that Ssemogerere fell into while campaigning in the northern city of Lira, where he promised to return the unpopular exiled president. This was disastrous for the DP’s campaign in its Buganda strongholds; this region had borne the brunt of Obote’s repressive regimes (1966-1971, and 1980-1985) and been hardest hit by the abolition of the kingdoms in 1966. The alliance’s strategic gaffe was further compounded by the Museveni campaign’s use of full-page adverts in the government-owned New Vision newspaper showing the skulls of people who had died in the Luweero Triangle (in Buganda) allegedly at the hands of Obote’s soldiers during the 1980s war. The south west of the country also feared that a win for Ssemogerere would ultimately lead to his overthrow by Obote and the return of dominance by northerners. Critically, Ssemogerere’s campaign served to foment disunity within the DP, as key politicians such as the Secretary General and


\[206\] Byarugaba, 100.


Vice President stayed away from his campaign, while DP Vice Chairman Andrew Adimola denounced him as “utterly incompetent to lead the country.”

Ultimately the IPFC’s presidential campaign was unsuccessful, with Ssemogerere garnering just 23.6% of the national vote compared to Museveni’s 74.3%. The alliance candidate only succeeded in supplanting the president in Apac, Arua, Gulu, Kitgum and Lira – the districts most affected by Obote’s ouster and the continuing instability in the country’s Northern Region. In perhaps the election’s strangest turn, Joseph Kony of the LRA had declared a temporary ceasefire for the duration of the election, and endorsed Ssemogerere for the presidency.

In the northern region, the coalition received 56% of the vote, signalling their dissatisfaction with Museveni and the NRM. In the DP’s traditional Buganda stronghold, the coalition was routed with Museveni receiving 79%, and Ssemogerere a meagre 18%, while the coalition received just over 2% in the NRM’s western stronghold. Following their relatively dismal showing in the presidential election, the IPFC alleged that they had been rigged out of the election and refused to participate in the parliamentary poll. Despite the formal boycott many UPC and DP members ran for election (as independents, under the movement system) and some were successful in winning their seats. This allowed some ‘multi-partyists’ to re-enter parliament and pave the way for the future formation of the 2001 parliamentary alliance. Despite the existence of the presidential alliance, there were no formal coalition mechanisms to assist parliamentary candidates in their elections.

2.2.2 Kizza Besigye and the 2001 Alliance

The late 1990s would see the emergence of a credible threat to the NRM regime, but it would not come from the traditional opposition parties. In November 1999, a Movement ‘historical’ – Warren Kizza Besigye Kifefe – would write a missive distancing himself from the excesses of the movement government, and set himself up in opposition to

210 ‘Making the President Nervous’.
212 These were a group of founding members of the NRA who were mentioned in the party’s constitution as being members of specified units on specific dates in 1986 and 1987.
Museveni. Besigye is a Mukiga from the western region where Museveni originates from. The Bakiga are generally closely aligned with the Banyankole and live in Ankole sub-region in the NRM’s heartlands. Because of their support for the NRM and their importance within Museveni’s circles, the Bakiga are over-represented within the state’s institutions, relative to the group’s small size. They make up 7% of the population, but have held 25% of the ‘inner core’ positions in the NRM’s administrations between 2000 and 2008. As will be outlined below, although Besigye is from a small ethnic group that is affiliated to the NRM and is seen to be privileged relative to historically marginalised regions, he has proven to be able to draw on the votes of anti-incumbent non-co-ethnics in these places. This highlights the limits of co-ethnic bloc-voting in Uganda.

Coalition Formation

In October 2000, Besigye announced that he would be standing against Museveni as a Movement (and then an independent) candidate in the upcoming 2001 elections. Besigye had expected that the other ‘historicals’ would break with Museveni and support his bid – but almost all returned to the fold after Museveni promised them that the 2001 election would be his last. Instead, Besigye found himself reliant on his ‘Reform Agenda’ pressure group, as well as the Parliamentary Advocacy Forum (PAFO) – a grouping of parliamentary Young Turks who were increasingly frustrated with the NRM’s parliamentary and government old guard.

In 2001, the official leadership of the DP (which was largely Buganda-based), facing internal squabbles and a succession battle pushed by a younger generation of leaders, opted to support Besigye’s independent presidential bid in 2001. A breakaway faction which included most of the party’s MPs and prominent Northern members decided to field their own candidate –

---

215 The “inner core” of political power is defined as comprising the President and what my interviewees considered his key ministers – Defence, Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs, Finance, Planning and Economic Development, Commerce, Agriculture, Local Government, and Justice.’ Lindemann, ‘Just Another Change of Guard?’, 397.
216 Kalinaki, ‘Dr Kizza Besigye’.
217 This was set up as a task force to drive his presidential bid.
Francis Bwenge – who performed dismally at the polls. The internecine squabbling within the DP would continue until 2005, involving court battles, disputed internal elections and a regional divide that proved difficult to overcome. These battles were only papered over in 2005 when a court ruled that the party would be unable to register in the new multi-party dispensation unless they resolved the leadership question.\textsuperscript{220} For their part, the UPC was also seriously divided between two factions – one headed by exiled party leader, Obote, and the second headed by UPC heavyweight Cecelia Ogwal. The Lira MP was the head of a younger generation of UPC members who objected to Obote’s remote control leadership of the party, and his prescriptions to refrain from legislative politics. The party had split in 1996 over the IPFC and Obote’s demands that members observe a boycott of the legislative elections – while Ogwal and some of the party’s parliamentary caucus saw participation in parliament as a way for the UPC to remain relevant under the Movement system.\textsuperscript{221} The events of 2001 would be a precursor to the 2011 and 2016 elections, where the two older parties would be internally divided on strategy, leading to a regional split within the leadership ranks. After the DP supported Besigye’s candidacy, several prominent DP members defected to supporting Besigye on a more permanent basis, and ultimately joined the FDC when it was formed a few years later.

The 2001 elections were hard-fought and brutal, with violence meted out by the military against Besigye’s supporters, leaving several people dead. Museveni derided his opponent, calling him and his prominent wife (MP Winnie Byanyima) traitors and accusing Besigye of having AIDS.\textsuperscript{222} The election was held on 12 March 2001, and after serious electoral malpractice and widespread claims of rigging and ballot-stuffing,\textsuperscript{223} Museveni was declared the winner with 69% of the vote, compared to Besigye’s 28%. Although his national tally was relatively low, his successes in 2001 would go on to define his future political party’s voting base. Besigye won in eight of the country’s 53 districts, and all but one were in the Northern region – in the typically anti-NRM Acholi, Lango and West Nile sub-regions. Besigye also

\textsuperscript{220} Carbone, 124.
\textsuperscript{221} Carbone, \textit{No-Party Democracy? Ugandan Politics in Comparative Perspective}, 127.
\textsuperscript{223} ‘Ungracious Winner’. 
won narrowly in Kampala, with just 50.2% of the vote, calling attention to the growing
disenchantment of urban voters with President Museveni and his administration. 

2.3 Multi-Party Coalitions (2006-2016)

2.3.1 The 2006 G6

As early as April 2002, members of the two historical parties (DP and UPC) and the Reform
Agenda parliamentary pressure group met in Kampala to discuss the resurrection of the 1996
IPFC alliance. The process was given further impetus with the success of the opposition
National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) alliance in neighbouring Kenya later that year.

However, little was concretised until mid-2004 with the formation of a new political party
that would fundamentally alter the electoral field. At a meeting in July 2004, three
organisations (including approximately 28 MPs) would merge to form Uganda’s newest and
most formidable opposition party. These groupings were Kizza Besigye’s ‘movementist’
Reform Agenda, Augustino Ruzindana’s PAFO and Chaapa Karuhanga’s National
Democrats Forum. The newly-founded FDC included a list of prominent former
movementists, including former ministers, an army commander and respected and outspoken
parliamentarians from all sides – including the DP and UPC. Many of these former
movementists, such as Besigye, Mugisha Muntu and Winnie Byanyima, had been members
of the NRM’s (and Museveni’s) inner circle. This group also included two prominent
members of the DP and two who had defected from the UPC. In 2005, multi-party
competition was reinstated, but with little time ahead of the 2006 elections. It appeared that
the NRM government intentionally stalled opposition party registration processes to frustrate
party structure-building and candidate selection processes. The DP had gingerly papered
over the cracks left from the 2001 election and the UPC was facing internal generational and

---

224 Unfortunately, it wasn’t possible to render electoral maps for the 1996 or 2001 elections as these shapefiles were unavailable.
226 ‘Museveni Wants Many Parties, as Long as His Own Provides the President’, Africa Confidential, 24
September 2004.
227 PAFO was the NRM successor of the anti-corruption Young Parliamentarians Forum and was
consolidated in the push to oppose Museveni’s removal of term limits
228 Carbone, ‘Political Parties in a “No-Party Democracy”: Hegemony and Opposition Under “Movement
Democracy” in Uganda’, 193.
229 For a full outline of this process, see Sabiti Makara, Lise Rakner, and Lars Svåsand, ‘Turnaround: The
National Resistance Movement and the Reintroduction of a Multiparty System in Uganda’, International Political
strategic divisions resulting from Obote’s remote-control leadership after two decades in exile. When Obote died unexpectedly in exile in October 2005, the UPC chose his wife – Miria Obote – as leader, side-lining the party’s de facto Kampala leadership. The two old parties were in a state of flux, while the FDC had only just begun to develop its own organisational structure.

Coalition Formation and Collapse

Two years before the election, in recognition of the weakness of their position relative to the NRM, six major opposition parties came together to form the Group of Six or G6. These were the UPC, DP, FDC, Conservative Party (CP), Justice Forum (JEEMA) and The Free Movement. The G6 resolved to coordinate their electoral efforts and front a single presidential candidate and joint candidates at parliamentary level. The G6 coordinator, Chaapa Karuhanga, highlighted the importance of opposition cohesion, saying that since the parties were being “oppressed together” it was in their interests to work together.230 “Unless we are stupid, we should not be divided to have each party field a candidate because we have one common goal of restoring democracy in the country,” noted the FDC’s Reagan Okumu.231 Despite the recognition that a coalition was necessary, party leaders would still struggle to reach consensus on who should lead the multi-party alliance.

Commitment soon waned as disagreements emerged over the G6’s presidential candidate. When Besigye returned from four years in exile in South Africa on 26 October 2005, he was joined on-stage by members of the DP and the CP, but the leadership of the UPC and JEEMA were absent.232 Besigye was seen as the natural leader of the alliance from early on, as he had garnered 29% of the vote in the previous election, demonstrating that he had sufficiently broad national appeal to run against Museveni. Ultimately, however, the search for a joint presidential flag bearer was fruitless as the various party leaders refused to concede the chance to run as a presidential candidate. The UPC and DP were fronting new leaders – Miria Obote and John Ssebaana Kizito respectively – who had not previously run in a national election. Both leaders were eager to test out their electoral strength under the new multi-party

231 Mwanguhya and Luggya.
dispensation, and were wary of ceding the top seat in the alliance to the FDC candidate. Both leaders believed that the historical parties would be able to regain their old roles and constituencies, returning to the levels of support that they had enjoyed prior to the banning of political parties. These concerns over support base and strategy were further complicated by the NRM’s attempt to clamp down on Besigye ahead of the polls. Besigye was arrested and charged with treason and rape on 14 November – four weeks before presidential nominations – which led to him being imprisoned or shuttling back and forth to court for most of the duration of the election campaign.  

Several G6 coalition partners argued that he could not front the coalition under those circumstances. The UPC and DP were both fronting untested presidential candidates, so the FDC insisted that Besigye was the most popular opposition leader and should thus lead the alliance. The UPC argued that they had supported the DP's candidate in the 1996 election and that it was now time for Kizito’s party to return the favour. For their part, the DP argued that their candidate was the best-placed to lead the alliance as he did not have “blood on his hands”, unlike both the UPC's and FDC’s leaders who had been a part of previous governments. The G6 collapsed shortly before the election, undermined by leadership wrangles. Besigye was registered as the FDC’s candidate in absentia, while Miria Obote ran on the UPC ticket and John Ssebaana Kizito fronted the DP campaign. During the campaign, the parties spent almost as much time de-campaigning each other as they did the NRM president and they ran competing candidates in subsequent by-elections.

In the presidential election, Besigye and the FDC’s dominance was again asserted, with the former NRM political commissar receiving 37.4% of the vote to Museveni’s 59.3%. In comparison, the DP’s Kizito polled a dismal 1.6%, while Miria Obote of UPC garnered only 0.8%. The UPC’s candidate received only 3% in the party’s heartlands in the north (compared to Besigye’s 62.9%), highlighting how far the party had fallen since Obote’s exile and his death in 2005. At parliamentary level, the FDC failed to perform as well as it did in the

---

233 Besigye was only released in January, six weeks before the election.
235 Id.
237 The opposition together took 40% of the vote.
presidential poll, collecting only 37 of 309 parliamentary seats (12% of the total). The UPC and DP also performed relatively poorly, collecting only 9 seats each, all of which were concentrated in their traditional constituencies. As Gloppen et al. (2006) suggest, the opposition’s poor performance was a result of their inability to coalesce in the face of a Movement onslaught against high profile opposition ‘safe’ parliamentary seats. The FDC had also spent most of its campaign finances on the presidential campaign, expecting parliamentary candidates to source their own supplementary funds. The weakness of all parties ahead of the 2006 election was clear. The DP and UPC had been reduced to shadows of their former selves under the Movement system, while the FDC had not had a chance to establish meaningful structures due to substantial state harassment and the short timelines between the legalisation of parties and the election. While the NRM could field candidates in all 215 constituencies, the FDC fielded just 127 – compared to the UPC’s 74 and the DP’s 68 parliamentary candidates.

Although both Museveni and Besigye hail from the west of the country, Besigye was again supported in large numbers by voters in the northern regions and in the urban areas of Kampala (where he won eight of nine constituencies). Although the UPC and DP had deeper historical and ethnic ties to the north and the Baganda-dominated capital, disaffected voters saw the FDC as having the best chance of defeating the NRM and they abandoned their traditional political affiliations and co-ethnic leaders. As noted by Izama and Wilkerson (2011), “by being the man most likely to unseat Museveni, Besigye became the North’s favourite son.” Despite having just been registered, the FDC quickly displaced the older parties as it became the largest parliamentary opposition – with 39 seats. Besigye’s personal appeal was apparent, having won 9% more than in 2001, taking 37% of the total vote. Museveni’s vote share declined to 59%. But, the FDC’s growth was at the expense of the

239 Carbone suggests that the party had less than half of the funding deemed necessary for the campaign. See Carbone, ‘Political Parties in a “No-Party Democracy”: Hegemony and Opposition Under “Movement Democracy” in Uganda’, 196.
240 On this, see Carbone, No-Party Democracy? Ugandan Politics in Comparative Perspective.
241 Carbone, 198.
242 Carbone, 198.
older opposition parties, who lost members, voters and their regional support bases to the new party.

The FDC performed very well (see Figure 1 and the blue map in Figure 2), taking districts in West Nile, Acholiland, Lango (all former UPC heartlands) and Teso as well as Kampala and Kasenze (in the NRM’s western heartland). This was a result of the continuing insecurity in the north (as noted above), the 2003 LRA insurgency and chronic insecurity in the east as well as the east’s growing frustration with western dominance of government positions and development funds.\textsuperscript{244} The Teso sub-region (in the east) provided the greatest returns for Besigye and the FDC, which won in every district and contributed a third of the party’s 37 parliamentary seats.\textsuperscript{245} In Kasese (the blue district in western Uganda) Besigye’s showing was the result of strong opposition organisers affiliated to the local royal family, and a protest vote due to Museveni’s repeated refusal to recognise the Rwenzururu Kingdom – an important driver of local political action.\textsuperscript{246} The impressive performance of the FDC was contrasted with the poor performance of the older opposition parties. Obote won between 1 and 4\% of the vote across the UPC’s traditional northern base, except for two constituencies in Lango sub-region (Milton Obote’s home region) where she took 6 to 8\% (see the maroon map in Figure 2 below). Ssebaana Kizito managed to attract a small percentage of the vote (see the green map in Figure 2) across many of Uganda’s traditional opposition-sympathetic regions (the north, Karamoja, Buganda), but despite being a Muganda from the DP and the former mayor of Kampala, he was unable to attract more than 5\% of the vote in the central region (home to the Baganda) or the capital. Similarly to the 2001 and 2015 elections in Zambia, the G6 coalition faltered as the newly-elected leaders of parties to the coalition overestimated their own support, underestimated that of the FDC and ran independent campaigns. The spectacular failure of the DP and UPC’s presidential campaigns would then set the scene for the attempt to create yet another coalition in 2011,

\textsuperscript{244} ‘Making the President Nervous’.
as the party leaders realised that they were better off competing together than against one another.
Figure 1 The 2006 Ugandan Presidential Election Results by District

The NRM’s Presidential Vote
The FDC’s Presidential Vote

The DP’s Presidential Vote
The UPC’s Presidential Vote

Figure 2 The 2006 Ugandan Presidential Election Results for the NRM (yellow), FDC (blue), DP (green) and UPC (maroon) in order of declining vote share
2.3.2 The 2011 Inter-Party Cooperation (IPC)

Coalition Formation

In August 2008, five opposition parties signed a protocol to present a united front to pressure the NRM government and the Ugandan electoral commission to introduce electoral reforms ahead of the 2011 elections. The alliance was formed between most of the parties to the 2006 G6; the FDC, DP, CP, JEEMA and UPC. The small Social Democratic Party (SDP) also joined later. The Interparty Cooperation (IPC), as it became known, was given financial and technical assistance by a Swedish opposition coalition, channelled through a Swedish NGO called the Christian Democratic International Centre (KIC). The KIC had signed a formal agreement with a Ugandan NGO, Change Initiative Limited (CIL), which then became the IPC Secretariat. The IPC would later receive funding and technical assistance from the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS), the International Republican Institute (IRI), and the Deepening Democracy Programme – a multi-donor basket fund to improve democracy and accountability in Uganda. The IPC developed a much more complex governing structure compared to previous coalitions. Based on a Swedish opposition coalition’s structure, it had a ‘Steering Committee’ (made up of two elected members of each party), the ‘Summit’ (comprised of presidents and secretary generals) and a ‘Secretariat’ which managed a joint IPC bank account, oversaw ten thematic committees and the day-to-day running of the coalition. It was agreed that each party leader who supported the IPC flagbearer would then be considered for one of the following posts: Vice President, Prime Minister, House Speaker, Ministers of Defence, Finance, Internal Affairs or Foreign Affairs.

---


248 This financial assistance was limited to capacity building, sensitisation, training workshops and party congresses, but not linked to campaign funding as noted in ‘Donors Stop Funding IPC Campaigns’, The Observer, 29 August 2010, http://www.observer.ug/news/headlines/9905-donors-stop-funding-ipc-campaigns.


‘additional protocol’ also provided that all other cabinet positions would be divided ‘equitably’ and that 40% of cabinet posts should be reserved for women.

In 2010 the alliance shifted from a common front to push for electoral reforms, to an electoral coalition that resolved to front joint candidates in the upcoming 2011 elections.\(^{253}\) In response, the DP pulled out of the coalition. The party had recently changed political leadership with the election of popular Acholi politician, Norbert Mao, to the party’s top post. In a missive to explain his decision to lead his party out of the coalition, Mao described the IPC as “a trap laid to snare the Democratic Party” and vowed to lead his party to defeat Museveni in the 2011 elections.\(^{254}\) The charismatic DP leader believed that the IPC would threaten the DP’s identity, and he saw it as little more than an FDC machine. Mao’s election was not uncontroversial, and led to a court challenge and significant dissent by the party’s Buganda faction.\(^{255}\) This faction would then – along with a few Baganda politicians from other parties – create a new Mengo-aligned\(^{256}\) pressure group to advance Ganda interests within the opposition field. This was in response to what they believed was the side-lining of the Baganda within the DP. This pressure group was called \textit{Suubi} or ‘hope,’ in Luganda. The willingness of other opposition politicians to work with this DP breakaway faction would create long-lasting fissures within the fractured opposition landscape.

\textit{Broad Coalition Collapse}

Despite repeated overtures, Mao refused to join the IPC unless he was chosen as the flagbearer, with senior DP figures reporting that “the coalition needs him more than he needs a coalition.”\(^{257}\) Mao argued that it was not necessary for the opposition to unite in the first round of the election (Uganda has a two-round presidential election system), but that if the opposition was collectively strong enough to bring Museveni’s vote under 50%, he would support the strongest opposition candidate in the second round.\(^{258}\) But the IPC had more


\(^{256}\) Mengo is the name used to represent the Buganda royal establishment, and it also refers to the hill on which the Buganda parliament sits.


concerns than just the exclusion of the DP. Although the JEEMA remained within the coalition, there were clearly antagonistic relationships between the party and other alliance members. A JEEMA Bulletin in May 2009 stated that during a party convention in late April, the party’s ‘founding fathers’ had opposed participation in the IPC because some of the parties had a “verifiable history of insincerity.”

The Bulletin accused the FDC of having operated in bad faith in 2006 by fielding candidates against JEEMA, in violation of the coalition agreement. Echoing what other parties appeared to believe, JEEMA’s internal newsletter feared that the party would be swallowed in an alliance, and stated that “FDC was a cunning opportunist merely seeking to ride on the back of unsuspecting parties in the proposed alliance to seize power for itself.” This theme of distrust ran through each of the major parties to the coalition.

Although the UPC had been an early signatory – and even instigator – of the IPC, its participation was not guaranteed as the party was also undergoing a simultaneous internal leadership change. In August of 2009, Olara Otunnu, a former UN Under-Secretary General who had lived in exile since 1986, returned to Uganda. Within a month of his return, Otunnu was touring the northern and south-western regions of the country with an American documentary filmmaker, gearing up for his presidential bid. The UPC was undergoing a leadership crisis, following a reshuffle by President Miria Obote which ended in a court battle. Ultimately, Otunnu won the UPC presidential race by beating Milton Obote’s son Jimmy Akena, and lined himself up to be the UPC’s candidate for the IPC presidential flagbearer position. Within the IPC, Otunnu repeatedly pressured the other parties to declare a boycott of the elections, unless a new electoral commission was put in place. The commission had been found by the courts to have seriously failed in administering the 2006 election and the commissioners were known to have extensive links to the NRM, but despite local and international pressure, their mandates were extended.

---

election gained little traction within the coalition, and after prevaricating for weeks and delaying the choice of flagbearer, Otunnu pulled out of the IPC in mid-August 2010. According to *The Independent*, "Otunnu alleged that IPC had abandoned the original objective to shun the electoral process until President Museveni disbanded or reconstituted the Electoral Commission. He also accused FDC of hijacking and dominating the IPC process and acting in bad faith." 

Despite his strong views on the boycott, Otunnu ultimately resolved to contest the election although his reported reason for pulling out of the coalition was that he believed that the IPC should refuse to participate in elections prior to the conclusion of an electoral reform process. Otunnu’s position within his own party was not secure, and he had struggled to garner support for participation in the IPC coalition. The UPC did not support the idea of fronting a joint presidential candidate, and in March during the UPC National Council meeting that elected Otunnu to the head of UPC, 86 members voted against having a joint IPC candidate, while just 40 supported the idea. The National Council resolved that they would only agree to a joint candidate if they were from the UPC, as they had previously allied with other parties and it was now their ‘turn’ to be supported by a coalition. This group apparently cited the 1996 IPFC coalition when the UPC supported the DP’s Ssemogerere, and the 2001 polls when they had supported Kizza Besigye. When Otunnu pulled out of the coalition, but threatened to boycott the election, he faced a revolt within the UPC ranks as the parliamentary caucus – led by Jimmy Akena – threatened to run as independents. Thus, ultimately Otunnu contested.

The entry of the Suubi pressure group into the IPC further cemented divisions within the opposition. Suubi 2011 was a Buganda Kingdom-sympathetic pressure group, formed with the intention of advancing the kingdom’s aims of achieving a federal system and the return of Buganda’s ‘lost counties.’ Suubi was the outcome of a factional fight within the DP
following the election of prominent Catholic Acholi politician, Norbert Mao, as the party’s president – ahead of Bugandan Muslim heavyweight Hajji Nasser Sebaggala. The DP was initially formed as a Catholic party with a Buganda base (though in opposition to the Protestant royal establishment), and since its inception in the 1950s, it has been led by Catholics and a single Anglican – but all leaders (apart from Mao) have hailed from Buganda.

In response to Mao’s 2010 election, several Buganda-based party leaders formed the Suubi group to pressure politicians to advance the Buganda kingdom’s agenda within the DP, and beyond.269 This came on the back of increasing tensions between the Buganda royal establishment and the Museveni government following the controversial 2007 Land Bill,270 the 2009 Buganda riots,271 which led to the deaths of at least 40 people, and the year-long closure of Buganda’s CBS radio station.272

The Suubi group resolved to work with the IPC, and officially joined the coalition in late October 2010 after the signing of an agreement that would soon prove to be controversial.273 The agreement gave the Suubi group dominance over candidate selection and mobilisation in Buganda sub-region, despite the existence of other parties to the agreement having their own candidates to run in Buganda. Suubi hoped to ensure that only pro-Mengo MPs would be selected as joint candidates, but this caused tensions and fractures within the coalition.274

The distrust between the DP and the FDC – which was exacerbated by the FDC’s support of Suubi’s members and aims – was openly reported in the media, and would continue to colour the relationship between the two parties beyond the end of the 2011 election cycle. Mao denounced the IPC, saying that it was a ploy intended to “hoodwink the public and divert DP’s support in Buganda region.” The DP Publicist, Kenneth Kakande, stated that the coalition with Suubi “is a political ploy by FDC to grab Buganda region using our own


party members who have resolved to betray their party because they never supported Norbert Mao [DP president].” The DP saw the FDC’s support of Suubi as an attempt to split and weaken the older party, particularly in its Buganda strongholds.

Although the FDC was undoubtedly the strongest and most popular of the remaining parties in the IPC (JEEMA, CP, FDC and SDP), the candidate selection process was still contentious. Polls conducted in July 2010 by the Daily Monitor newspaper and the Deepening Democracy Programme (DDP) put Besigye far ahead of the rest of the opposition field, with 30% of the popular vote – ahead of all other candidates who took less than 5%. Besigye was the obvious choice, but the IPC flagbearer selection remained hotly contested. After a deadlock in negotiations, a team led by Professor Dani Nabudere and Professor Bwogi Kanyerezi held an eight-hour meeting and finally brokered a deal that led the other contenders – Hussein Kyanjo of JEEMA, CP’s Prof James Kigongo and SDP’s Michael Mabikke – to support Besigye. Ultimately, the coalition leaders agreed to have Besigye front the coalition due to the FDC having more effective grassroots structures; Besigye’s previous experience as a presidential candidate and his being “more prepared to guide the IPC to victory.” But despite having elected a single presidential candidate, the coalition failed to select joint flagbearers at lower levels, ultimately allowing the various parties to run competing candidates in the parliamentary and local races.

By the time that campaigns kicked off in earnest, the IPC existed in name alone. Following the retreat of both the DP and UPC from the broader coalition, the opposition leaders repeatedly attacked each other on stage at rallies and in the press, often reserving more of...
their ire for fellow opposition leaders than for President Museveni. The coalition’s campaigns were sorely under-funded, while the NRM used patronage and positions to coax opposition members to shift allegiance. A 2013 report commissioned to look into the failings of the IPC noted that following the selection of Besigye as the joint candidate, he largely neglected to manage the coalition and “what followed was manipulation, intrigue and open rivalry among IPC constituent parties. It is that state that cost not only the IPC, but also other opposition parties’ seats at Parliamentary and Local Government levels mainly in Kampala and the Central region.” It noted that the DP and UPC had left the coalition after accusing the FDC of dominating and hijacking the process.

In contrast to the opposition’s disarray and lack of funds, Museveni ran a high energy, high-tech election, which, among other things, used rap music and pop stars to woo younger voters. He also plied voters with cash, and funds flowed liberally through the movement’s patronage structures, while using subtle threats of violence to encourage voters to give him ‘another rap.’ Besigye and other opposition leaders focused their electoral campaigns on diminishing access to services and corruption in the delivery of public goods, but this failed to resonate with voters – most of whose perceived access to services was improving. Opposition parties’ organisational structures were generally weak and subject to political obstruction at the local level, undermining their electoral campaigns. The weakness of the opposition was highlighted by the number of candidates that the parties were able to sponsor for parliamentary races – while the NRM sponsored candidates for all but one of the

country’s 238 directly-elected constituency seats, the FDC sponsored just 188 (79%), followed by the UPC on 102 (43%), DP at 86 (36%), JEEMA sponsored 12, the CP seven and the SDP five.

At the beginning of the campaign, conventional wisdom held that Museveni’s vote share would continue its downward slide of 2001 and 2006, and that the opposition may collectively be able to pull the president under the 50% threshold. Although eight candidates registered to contest the presidential election, the contest was – once again – a two-man race. When the results were announced, President Museveni had won with 68.38% of the votes (a 9% increase from 2006, and his highest vote share since 1996), while the IPC’s Besigye took 26% - this was 11% less than his total five years earlier. The remaining 6 candidates garnered just 5.38% of the total votes cast. The NRM also won 263 seats out of the new 375 seat parliament, with 69.3% of the constituency seats and 77% of the Woman MP seats. The remaining members included just 34 for FDC, 12 for DP, 10 for UPC, 1 for CP, 1 for JEEMA and 43 independents (the majority of whom are NRM supporters). The high number of MP candidates who contested as independents highlights the lack of appeal of the opposition, the legacy of ‘individual merit’ and the low salience of party labels in Uganda. After running separate candidates, the opposition split the vote in at least 12 of the 238 directly-elected parliamentary constituencies (5% of the total). Museveni and the NRM won a majority in every region of the country, including the opposition’s former northern strongholds. This was due to: four years of relative peace in the north; improved access to services; the return of displaced people to their homes; the appointments of several high-profile Acholi members of government and promises by Museveni regarding the region’s rejuvenation. Meanwhile, Mao and Otunnu’s support in Acholiland drew votes away from the FDC.

289 The eight were Museveni (NRM), Besigye (FDC), Norbert Mao (Democratic Party), Jaberi Bidandi Ssali (People’s Progressive Party), Beti Olive Kamya (Uganda Federal Alliance), Abed Bwanika (People’s Development Party), Olara Otunnu (UPC) and Samuel Lubega (Independent, broke away from DP).
291 Golaz and Méard, 60.
Besigye won a majority of the presidential vote in just four districts, three of which were in Teso sub-region (see Figure 3 below) and the fourth was in Kampala. The FDC was routed in Teso by the NRM’s superior campaign, the opposition’s weak structures and poor messaging as well as due to the region’s wager that their exclusion from national development in the past had been a result of their anti-NRM stance.294 The DP’s Mao won a majority of the vote in one district and a plurality in two districts in Acholiland (see Figure 3), while Otunnu was the runner-up in two northern districts but failed to win a plurality of the vote in any district around the country. In their presidential campaigns, both Otunnu and Mao received less than 2% each – making it clear that neither leader could hope to win against Museveni in 2016 (see the green and burgundy maps in Figure 4). The two regions that had given the FDC their votes in 2006 – Acholiland and Teso – had voted strategically again – hoping to end their political and economic marginalisation by voting for Museveni.295 It was expected that Buganda would be a promising area of opposition support in the 2011 elections due to the rift that had opened between the government and Mengo between 2009 and 2010. However, opposition success in the region was limited by the NRM’s patronage machine,296 the limits of the opposition’s neo-traditional platform due to the region’s cosmopolitanism and the rapprochement reached between the NRM and Buganda in late 2010 with the re-opening and ‘taming’ of the Buganda radio station, CBS.297 Once again, as in 2006, the DP and UPC’s newly-elected party leaders were reluctant to go into a coalition in which they were not the flagbearer. The two new party leaders wanted to test their electoral strength against the FDC, and both overestimated their reach. Instead, the dramatic losses for the DP’s Mao (particularly in the party’s Buganda strongholds) and UPC’s Otunnu (especially in Lango sub-region) highlighted their lack of national reach, which would be a critical factor in their decisions in 2016 to contest within an opposition coalition, rather than going it alone once more.

294 This narrative was repeated frequently by Museveni and the NRM during the campaigns. Perrot, ‘An NRM Recapture of Teso in 2011? What Voting Means in a Hybrid Regime’.
The marker of ‘Run-off’ suggests that neither candidate won a majority of the vote, but instead the winning candidate took the district with a plurality of the vote.
The FDC’s Presidential Vote

The DP’s Presidential Vote
Figure 4: The 2011 Ugandan Presidential Election Results for the NRM (yellow), FDC (blue), DP (green) and UPC (maroon) in order of declining vote share.
2.3.3 The 2016 Democratic Alliance (TDA) Coalition

Coalition Formation

On 5 April 2013, key members of the major opposition parties met once again at the UPC headquarters at Uganda House in Kampala to discuss cooperation ahead of the election in three years’ time.\(^{299}\) They appointed a committee to submit a working paper clearly identifying the failings of the 2011 pre-electoral alliance and charting the way forward for the coming election. The report produced by this committee highlighted the IPC’s weak regulatory and legal frameworks, the national campaign team’s lack of policy competency, disagreements within the coalition over electoral boycotts and reforms and the failure to build relationships with civic actors.\(^{300}\) Other key findings were that funding deficits and insufficient grassroots structures had hampered the opposition’s mobilisation efforts and vote protection system while a breakdown in trust between party leaders had dashed the opposition’s hopes for greater parliamentary representation. The committee resolved to consider creating a new alliance ahead of the upcoming election, and they began the process early to try to avoid some of the pitfalls of the IPC. The Democratic Alliance (TDA) was built upon the foundations laid by the multi-party coalitions in 2006 and 2011, and was facilitated by inter-party collaboration during the 2011 Walk to Work protests and an electoral reform programme championed by civil society groups since 2010.\(^{301}\)

The coalition was formally launched to much fanfare in June 2015 and was comprised of seven opposition political parties and two pressure groups.\(^{302}\) In recognition of the failures of the 2011 IPC, the TDA endeavoured to institutionalise the coalition by creating a complex formal structure of representative bodies and committees.\(^{303}\) The aim of the coalition was to ‘win power and form government’ in the form of a transitional government of national unity.

---

\(^{299}\) Parts of this section have been published in Beardsworth, ‘Challenging Dominance’.


\(^{302}\) The political parties that joined the alliance were the FDC, DP, UPC, Conservative Party (CP), Uganda Federal Alliance (UFA), Justice Forum (JEEMA), and the People’s Progressive Party (PPP). The pressure groups were the Pressure for National Unity (PNU) headed by former Vice President Gilbert Bukenya and the Go Forward pressure group fronted by Amama Mbabazi. The Platform for Truth and Justice was a third pressure group – comprised of a DP splinter faction under Erias Lukwago – which applied for membership but was never accepted.

which would govern for a 5-year period. The parties included Uganda’s largest opposition party – the FDC – as well as the DP and the UPC alongside four smaller parties with little or no parliamentary representation. The 2016 coalition was a product of the recognition by smaller opposition parties – primarily the DP, UPC and JEEMA – that they were unable to mount a national campaign for the presidency. Following the election of Mao and Otunnu to the DP and UPC presidencies, respectively, in 2010, both had opted to run in the 2011 presidential election. However, both candidates found that they were unable to mobilise support beyond their traditional strongholds (see previous section). Besides political parties, the TDA admitted two ‘pressure groups’ and several ‘eminent persons.’ The FDC’s status as the largest and most nationalised opposition party initially gave it an advantage in the alliance, and it was widely expected that – as in 2006 and 2011 – the party’s flagbearer would be the coalition candidate for the election. However, in early September, stirrings of dissent and fissures began to form within the alliance following the FDC’s election of three-time presidential aspirant and former FDC president Besigye as the party’s flagbearer ahead of Party President Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Gregory Mugisha Muntu.

Matters were further complicated by speculation that former Prime Minister John Patrick Amama Mbabazi – who had announced that he would stand as an independent candidate in the presidential election – might join the opposition alliance. Mbabazi’s entry into the race served to ignite debate and discussion around the potential for elite fragmentation within the NRM. Rumours circulated that a growing faction of the ruling party was increasingly disenchanted with NRM’s governance record and Museveni’s continued grip on the party. It was also expected that Mbabazi – who had served as NRM secretary general for a decade –

---

305 The eminent persons were predominantly religious leaders and included people such as Father Gaetano Batanyenda, Bishop Macleord Baker Ochola II, Imam Kasozi, Professor Frederick Ssempebwa and Dr Thelma Awori. The former Katikkiro of Buganda, Joseph Mulwanyamuli Ssemwogerere, was appointed as the head of a reconciliation committee.
306 Nationalised here refers to the party’s geographical spread, as in Wahman, ‘Nationalized Incumbents and Regional Challengers: Opposition- and Incumbent-Party Nationalization in Africa’.
had stacked the party’s structures with his allies and that his defection would likely lead to widespread desertions and disarray within the ruling party. Mbabazi originated from the same region as Museveni, which led to speculation that people from his home region in the NRM’s heartland might be persuaded to vote against the NRM, in favour of their high-profile co-ethnic leader. The TDA immediately began to court Mbabazi and his newly-established Go Forward pressure group, and he joined the alliance in mid-September, two weeks ahead of the summit to elect the joint presidential candidate.

With Mbabazi’s entry into the TDA, the cracks widened as party leaders made their own calculations regarding who should serve as joint candidate. The smaller parties – including the UPC and DP – were in favour of the Go Forward candidate fronting the alliance, as they expected that his alleged extensive campaign war chest would be mobilised in their favour, and they hoped that having an independent as the candidate would prevent the FDC from ‘swallowing’ the smaller parties and dominating the coalition as it had in 2006 and 2011. As the former Attorney General, Minister for Internal Security and Prime Minister in various NRM governments, Mbabazi had been privy to the inner workings of both the NRM and state machinery – particularly with regards to past electoral malpractice – and the opposition expected that as flagbearer, he would use that knowledge to their advantage. It was also hoped that the mobilisation of Mbabazi’s NRM network would translate into widespread support for the opposition from within the government bureaucracy, army, police, prisons and intelligence services.

A candidate selection committee was constituted to rate the four contenders who were standing for the position of joint flagbearer. The committee would rank the four aspirants according to set criteria and make recommendations to the TDA summit which was then to appoint a candidate by consensus. The emphasis on ‘fairness’ gave smaller parties disproportionate bargaining power and created the conditions that would ultimately lead to the broad coalition’s collapse.

310 Oloka-Onyango, ‘Enter the Dragon, Exit the Myths’, 114.
313 URN, ‘TDA: Besigye Team Wants Mbabazi “Disqualified”’. 
Following the completion of the committee’s evaluation, seven of the nine formations within the TDA supported the nomination of Mbabazi as joint presidential flagbearer, with only John Ken Lukyamuzi’s Conservative Party and the FDC dissenting.\textsuperscript{314} While the FDC was determined that its flagbearer should hold the coalition’s position, the smaller parties allied against them to try to ensure that Mbabazi would be fronted as the face of the TDA. The FDC repeatedly questioned what Mbabazi (who had not yet competed in an election) would bring to the coalition, both in terms of resources and mobilisation structures. They felt it was too risky for both Besigye and the FDC to cede their dominant position within the opposition to an untested candidate.\textsuperscript{315} Abrahamsen and Bareebe (2016) argue that the TDA’s donors – or ‘donors’ more generally – pushed for the selection of Mbabazi, due to their dislike of Besigye’s style of politics, and their souring relationship with him.\textsuperscript{316} However, the authors never outline who these ‘donors’ are, and appear to conflate the groups that funded the TDA with the traditional donor community. They do so despite the broad consensus that the traditional donors in Uganda are largely supportive of the Museveni government,\textsuperscript{317} and denounce the so-called “activist-Ambassadors” who supported the opposition in Zimbabwe in the mid-2000s.\textsuperscript{318} A basket fund of Western donors gave support to opposition parties through the Democratic Governance Facility (DGF) and the International Republican Institute (IRI), but this was predominantly delivered through trainings for aspiring MPs and polling agents, support for elective congresses and ‘party strengthening’ activities.\textsuperscript{319} While the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung funded some of the TDA’s administrative budget, it appears that no other traditional donors gave substantial funds to the TDA. As for other potential TDA funders, it is possible that they placed some pressure on the coalition to choose


\textsuperscript{318} Interview, Anonymous, Western Diplomat in Kampala, 24 August 2015.

\textsuperscript{319} Interview, Lara Petricevic, IRI Uganda Resident Country Director, 4 September 2015; Interview, Helen Mealins, Head of Programme of the DGF Programme Unit, 11 September 2015.

106
Mbabazi, but this was not confirmed. However, it is certain that if this pressure was exerted, it aligned with the parties’ own interests in pushing Mbabazi to the fore.

The smaller parties – including the UPC and DP – were in favour of the Go Forward candidate, as they expected that his supposedly extensive campaign war chest would be mobilised in their favour, and they hoped that having an independent as the candidate would prevent the FDC from dominating the coalition as it had in 2006 and 2011. They used the coalition to leverage their individual aims, hoping to ring-fence their traditional strongholds from FDC encroachment. In contrast to Besigye and his party who were electorally popular in the north, Mbabazi was an independent candidate who originates from the NRM-dominated western region. Mbabazi thus did not pose a threat to the DP or UPC presidents or their parties’ electoral support. This was the key point at which the broader coalition collapsed; the FDC felt that their candidate was better placed than Mbabazi to represent the TDA and when it became clear that he would not be chosen, a section of the FDC pulled Besigye out of the process. The FDC, by virtue of its dominant position within the opposition, felt that it could and should exit the coalition in order to preserve its position.

Efforts at mediation by Raila Odinga in Nairobi and Kofi Annan in London in late October would ultimately prove fruitless, despite the signing of a power-sharing agreement that formalised the division of positions within the mooted coalition. When the attempts to choose a joint candidate by consensus failed, the TDA Secretariat withdrew from the process, insisting that what remained of the coalition which had decided to rally behind Mbabazi could no longer use the coalition’s brand. Equally, resources that had been promised to the TDA failed to materialise following the collapse of the joint candidate negotiations. By the end of 2015, the splintered and now-renamed TDA-U-Go Forward was left as an ‘alliance of the willing’ with the DP, UPC, UFA, PPP and JEEMA, but lacking the structures and gravitas of the country’s largest opposition party.

---

322 Interview with Godber Tumushabe, TDA Policy Advisor, 30 March 2016.
323 Tumushabe.
324 Olara Otunnu, ‘Memorandum to TDA Summit’, 30 September 2015.
Disjointed Opposition Parties

Despite its position as the largest opposition party, the FDC was not a unified force. There was a sense of discontent amongst some factions with Besigye’s candidacy as FDC flagbearer, because of divisions that had emerged around the party’s 2012 presidential election. Despite his popularity as the party’s founding president, Besigye’s decision to withdraw from the post in 2012 had been broadly commended as an attempt to move beyond the personalisation of the party. The race to succeed him had been contentious with two camps forming around retired Major General Mugisha Muntu and Nathan Nandala-Mafabi, a popular and wealthy politician from the Eastern Region.325 Although Muntu won the controversial election, the fractures that it caused would continue to dog the party until the 2016 election. Between his election in 2012 and the 2016 polls, a number of high profile FDC leaders expressed concerns in the press regarding Muntu’s leadership, arguing that he was not doing enough to raise the party’s profile though he defended himself by contending that he was working behind the scenes to quietly build the party’s structures across the country – something that would be increasingly important as the election approached.326 While some FDC members expressed concern with Muntu’s leadership, others concluded that Besigye’s brand was in decline following his three unsuccessful attempts at the presidency and dwindling vote share in 2011; they believed – like many in the wider opposition – that a new face was needed to lead the opposition.327 The unhappiness in some quarters with Besigye’s election as FDC flag-bearer would play out within the TDA as some party members opted to defy the party line, supporting Mbabazi as the coalition candidate.328 With all of the parties to the alliance divided

---

on strategy, the consensus required to choose the TDA’s joint flagbearer would be difficult to find.

The fragmented nature of the constituent parties and the egos and interests of the key party leaders within the alliance undermined efforts to achieve unity. Attempts to expand beyond the DP and UPC’s traditional bases with the election of new party presidents in 2010 had caused disunity within the two parties. This resulted in diverging interests at parliamentary and presidential level as both parties faced down insurrections from popular leaders within the party’s traditional bases. Having recently suffered a damaging election battle, the UPC’s leadership was divided between the presidency and parliamentary caucus. Outgoing party president Olara Otunnu was one of the key leaders within the TDA, though it was widely known that the majority of the party’s MPs and the rank and file were rallied behind contested president-elect Jimmy Akena Obote.329 Akena, the son of former President Obote, was nominated as the new party president in late June 2015 but contravened the UPC’s procedures in order to assume the presidency, leading to a series of court challenges and public spats.330 Akena’s claim to the presidency was overthrown in court in December. As a result of the confusion within the former ruling party, both factions found themselves in financial trouble, unable to facilitate the campaigns of their parliamentary candidates.331 This confusion also impacted the alliance as Akena contested Otunnu’s leadership within TDA and attempted to withdraw the party from the coalition.332 Otunnu remained within the alliance, but without the support of the majority of UPC’s members, structures and MPs, he was little more than the ceremonial head of the party.

Similarly, the DP was facing a fractious battle between DP President Norbert Mao and Kampala Lord Mayor and Buganda-region heavyweight Erias Lukwago. The fallout between

the two leaders had begun with what Lukwago termed a ‘coup’ by Mao at the point of his election in 2010, when the Acholi politician was selected to head the predominantly Baganda-supported party.\textsuperscript{333} This culminated in Lukwago joining the Suubi group in 2011 and supporting Besigye rather than the DP President (see previous section). Following from Lukwago’s holding of an aborted parallel delegates conference in late 2015, he formed an anti-Mao pressure group named the Truth and Justice Platform (TJP) whose stated aim was to “restore the role of DP, the core values of the party that is; truth and justice, fundamental human rights, rule of law and constitutionalism.”\textsuperscript{334} Following their application to join the alliance, Mao refused the TDA’s efforts to admit the Lukwago faction, fearing that it would legitimate their putschist aims.\textsuperscript{335} As in 2011, the Lukwago camp – and his substantial following in Kampala – ultimately rallied behind Besigye and the FDC.\textsuperscript{336} This parallels a similar issue in the 2011 IPC coalition when the decision by the alliance to admit Lukwago’s Suubi\textsuperscript{337} pressure group led the DP to boycott the coalition efforts, opting instead to go it alone. Mao has repeatedly stated that he holds the FDC and Besigye responsible for much of the instability within DP, particularly through the informal alliance forged between Besigye and Lukwago’s Suubi group in 2011.\textsuperscript{338} Equally, Mao contended that the FDC had co-opted several of the DP’s members over various coalitions, including during the formation of the FDC. In an interview in September 2015, Mao stated that “as DP, our members have been co-opted, particularly by FDC, so that has created some tension between FDC and DP.”\textsuperscript{339} These internal party fissures are largely responsible for the ultimate collapse of both the TDA and IPC.

\textsuperscript{333} Interview, Interview, Erias Lukwago, DP Kampala Lord Mayor, 6 April 2016.
\textsuperscript{339} Interview, Interview, Norbert Mao, DP President, 10 September 2015.
Distrust also played a significant role in the collapse of the broad alliance, as concerns about Mbabazi’s commitment to the opposition cause were raised by the FDC and fuelled by the defection of two other key players. Former national Vice President Gilbert Bukenya had been admitted to the TDA as an eminent person and potential flagbearer, but his departure in early October pushed the process into a tailspin, fuelling fears about a hidden hand and state interference. Bukenya left the alliance, vowing to support Museveni’s candidacy amidst a storm of speculation that he had been bought off by State House. This was further compounded by the departure of the Akena faction, who also later pledged to canvass support for Museveni, allegedly in return for nearly a billion shillings. Fearing that both Bukenya and Akena had been sent by the state to destabilise the alliance, distrust escalated and divisions deepened. The Besigye camp frequently expressed misgivings about Mbabazi’s loyalties, given his recent defection from the ruling party. Ultimately the broad coalition was scuppered by distrust, vested interests, and strategic errors.

The Fractious Coalition

Following the withdrawal of the FDC and CP, the electoral alliance continued under the banner of the TDA-U Go Forward, fronting Mbabazi as their presidential candidate. With the exit of Bukenya’s Pressure for National Unity (PNU) group in October, the alliance was left with five smaller parties and the Go Forward pressure group. The DP’s Mao and UPC’s Otunnu were most visible on the campaign trail, appearing at rallies and appealing to their constituents in the Northern and Central Regions to support the former NRM heavyweight. Despite the involvement of opposition actors in the ostensible alliance, Mbabazi’s Go Forward campaign was run from his offices in Crested Towers and spearheaded by his sister-in-law and his daughters. Despite having joined the opposition,

343 Walusimbi, ‘Col Besigye on Who Killed TDA Dream’.
345 Interview with Interview, Norbert Mao, DP President, 5 April 2016.
Mbabazi attempted a tricky balancing act; he continuously insisted that he was still a member of the ruling NRM, but that party had lost its way, and that he should be the one to continue to carry the ruling party’s mantle, eradicate corruption and restore government’s credibility. However, the campaign was dogged by the NRM’s structured ‘anti-visibility’ campaign, where the ruling party anticipated each of Mbabazi’s moves, tore down his posters, bribed local organisers, double-booked his rally and accommodation venues and sent teams of ruling party supporters to chant NRM slogans while he travelled through rural towns.346 Museveni managed the potential ethnic fallout from his removal of Mbabazi by appointing a Prime Minister from the same region – Ruhakana Rugunda from Kigezi – along with five more Cabinet ministers from the same area and ethnic group.347 This helped contain any potential fallout within one of the NRM’s core constituencies.

The final week of Mbabazi’s campaign was spent in the Northern and Central Regions where his coalition partners are strongest. He was hoping to capitalise on the coalition’s mobilisation capacity. But all was not well within the Go Forward camp; it presented a difficult working relationship as local level opposition mobilisers struggled to work with the NRM defectors that comprised Mbabazi’s teams.348 The coalition was unable to establish and maintain effective structures at the local level, or to coordinate effectively between existing opposition structures. Despite the initial momentum that the campaign appeared to have, it lost steam by early December as Mbabazi’s spending declined by 41%, igniting further speculation that he was shifting his sights instead towards 2021. The facilitation funds promised to mobilisers and coalition candidates never materialised and their commitment waned,349 aided both by state intimidation and the enticements back into the NRM fold.350 The expected widespread

346 Oloka-Onyango, ‘Enter the Dragon, Exit the Myths: The Contested Candidacy of John Patrick Amama Mbabazi’.
347 Oloka-Onyango, 114.
348 Interviews with Okello Lucima, UPC Spokesperson, 5 April 2016; Interview, Norbert Mao, DP President, 5 April 2016.
NRM defections failed to occur, while hundreds of TDA defections were reported daily in the government press, with key Mbabazi mobilisers invited to State House in public displays of disaffection. The removal of key figures helped cripple the campaign in some regions, contributing to the sense that the Go Forward campaign was largely absent across the country. As the election drew nearer, even purportedly committed members of the TDA alliance appeared to switch tack just before election day, reading the national mood and advising voters to use their discretion in the presidential race.

The campaign faced an onslaught from the ruling party; Museveni attacked the alliance at rallies, likening it to the unpopular ‘unprincipled political alliance’ formed in 1962 between the Baganda Kabaka Yekka movement and Milton Obote’s UPC. Justice and Constitutional Affairs Minister Kahinde Otafiire denounced Mbabazi as a ‘poisonous snake’ and warned NRM members and voters against joining the alliance and potentially dragging the country into turmoil. Museveni’s attacks were extended to the opposition more broadly:

Politics is not a joke if you elect people from the opposition they will not be in touch with us. [I] am the head of government but if I can’t meet your local leader to tell me about the needs of the area how will I know them? So, you need to vote wisely.

The president frequently implored voters to ‘vote wisely’, and asked them not to support candidates whose election could throw the country into ‘anarchy’.

These statements could be variously interpreted as valorising the NRM’s record of restoring peace and security across much of the country, but also as a veiled threat that the NRM – and by extension, the army

---


352 Kajubu, ‘Poor Mobilisation Mars Mbabazi’s Campaigns In Kabarole’.


357 ‘President Urges Ugandans to Ignore Politicians in Coalitions’.

358 ‘Museveni Urges Ugandans to Vote NRM to Avoid Chaos’ (NTV Uganda), accessed 2 June 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WBdi7FA4g6o.
would not accept an opposition victory. This was anything but an idle threat considering the NRM’s history of having won power through an insurgency begun following a disputed election. Given that 44% of Ugandans surveyed in a Research World International (RWI) poll reported that their main fear at election time was political instability, Museveni’s warnings are likely to have resonated with many voters. Forty-one percent of respondents believed that political power could not be transferred peacefully through an electoral process, while a similar poll conducted in August 2015 found that 61% of those polled believed that Museveni would not peacefully surrender power if he was defeated. In contrast to TDA-U-Go Forward, Besigye’s campaign had picked up momentum, riding a wave of energy and excitement that made the election appear highly competitive. His rallies were notable due to the high numbers of people who turned out and the donations made in both cash and kind to the party. The FDC campaign was not subjected to the same levels of disruption as that of the Mbabazi alliance, though the last few days of the campaign saw increased levels of police intervention – most notably when Besigye was arrested three days before the election and again on polling day.

As the results began to come in, it became apparent that Mbabazi’s presidential campaign had performed poorly; he came a distant third in the race with 1.4% of the vote behind Museveni’s 60.62% and Besigye’s 35.61%. This was far lower than the 12% that he had polled in surveys conducted just prior to the election. His best performance was in Acholiland in the North where he received between 8% and 20% of the vote in six of the region’s seven districts (see the burnt orange map in Figure 6). In the same region, Besigye captured 42.03% compared to Museveni’s 41.1% (see the blue map in Figure 6). Between Besigye’s count and Mbabazi’s 10.91% of the vote, most voters in the Acholi sub-region voted against the incumbent. Mbabazi’s performance, though hardly impressive, was due to Mao’s

---


363 Pader (8.8%), Amuru (9.97%), Gulu (10%), Lamwo (11.55%), Kitgum (16.81%), Nwoya (20.92%),
influence and strong anti-incumbent sentiment in the Acholi sub-region. By contrast, Otunnu was unable to swing the UPC’s traditional voting bloc in Lango sub-region in favour of the former premier. Mbabazi received only 1.64% in Lango compared to Besigye’s 41.6%; much like results at the national level, the FDC candidate had consolidated the anti-incumbent vote in the region. The FDC’s vote in 2016 was not as geographically concentrated as it had been in 2006 (see Figure 5), but his vote was more evenly spread across the country – including in the west where he took between 20% and 30% of the vote in most districts (see blue map in Figure 6). Most of his support came from the northern, eastern and central regions – echoing voting patterns in the 2006 poll.

The TDA’s overwhelming concentration on the joint presidential candidate selection process led the coalition to neglect the selection of joint parliamentary candidates. Ultimately, what remained of the TDA fronted 157 Go Forward-leaning independents for the directly elected seats. The opposition parties that remained under the coalition banner ran competing candidates in 68 constituencies. The alliance also competed against the FDC in all 157 constituencies. The FDC contested just 65% (262) of the 402 directly-elected parliamentary seats. Ninety-one constituencies or 22% of the seats available in 2016 were not contested by an opposition candidate. The failure to coordinate their candidates and campaigns led the opposition to split the vote in 14 constituencies, allowing the ruling party or NRM-leaning independent to win the seat with a plurality of the vote. In sum, the TDA elected fifteen members of DP, three UPC-leaning independents and four Go Forward-leaning independents. None of the four smaller parties secured the election of their members to parliament. Overall, Go Forward leaning candidates performed very poorly, frequently coming last in the parliamentary polls. Thirty-six members of the FDC were elected, giving a total of 58 official opposition MPs of the 402 directly-elected seats (14%). Meanwhile, 66 independent MPs were elected – exceeding the size of the opposition caucus – the majority of these were NRM-leaning independents who had lost out in the party primaries. Despite the high turnover of NRM MPs, the opposition performed relatively poorly leaving the NRM with 283 MPs and approximately 32 NRM-leaning independents, giving them over 80% of

---

364 Olara Otunnu performed relatively well in Acholi in 2011, coming second behind President Museveni in Kitgum, Pader and Lamwo. His presence at Mbabazi’s rallies in these districts may also have aided the former Prime Minister’s cause.

365 In 2011, Besigye received 30.14% of the sub-regional vote compared to Otunnu’s 8.03% which suggested that the former diplomat had failed to consolidate his support within the UPC’s traditional stronghold.
the seats in parliament prior to the addition of the 25 reserved seats for the military, youths, persons with disabilities and workers. Despite Besigye’s increase at the presidential poll, it is a hollow victory as it was not followed by a corresponding increase in the number of FDC or opposition parliamentarians. The fragmented coalition dashed hopes for both regime transition and greater parliamentary representation.

After the elections, Jimmy Akena’s faction of the UPC – which had supported Museveni’s bid – was granted two Cabinet posts, one of which went to Akena’s wife. Beti Kamya, the president of the UFA, which had ostensibly been party to the TDA, was given the position of ‘Minister of Kampala Affairs’ within Museveni’s Cabinet. Within the opposition, these appointments gave further credence to suspicions that some members of the coalition had been operating in bad faith, and had instead been ‘planted’ by the NRM to undermine the alliance. These appointments highlight how the NRM under Museveni plays a strategy of divide-and-conquer, using positions and patronage to undermine trust amongst the opposition. In a context where the ruling party has managed to capture and contain political competition within its structures, opposition parties have been relegated to a somewhat secondary position. Coalitions have thus become how the opposition attempts to achieve relevance and to pose a meaningful challenge to NRM hegemony.

---

Figure 5: The 2016 Ugandan Presidential Election Results by District

The NRM’s Presidential Vote
Figure 6 The 2016 Ugandan Presidential Election Results for the NRM (yellow), FDC (blue), DP (green) and TDA-U-Go Forward (burnt orange) in order of declining vote share
2.4 Constant Coalition Formation, Constant Fragmentation

*Why Coalesce?*

The motivations for building coalitions in Uganda are clear – in a context where political party activities were restricted for more than two decades, opposition parties are weak, fragmented and plagued by severe resource deficits. Unable to build or sustain effective organisations, parties are limited to their traditional strongholds or to areas where a strong opposition leader has succeeded in building a loyal following and is able to draw on an individualised network of power and patronage. The NRM's dominance in the rural south west remains unassailable, which leaves opposition parties competing amongst themselves for the votes in anti-incumbent regions across the north and east. The limited geographical reach of parties then prevents them from challenging the NRM effectively at the national level, raising the incentives to cooperate. But despite the consensus that exists around the need to coalesce – and entering into regular negotiations – a broad coalition of opposition actors continues to elude Uganda’s opposition.

*Why Collapse?*

The fractiousness of Ugandan opposition parties means that coalition negotiations are not straightforward with party presidents simultaneously negotiating on multiple fronts and trying to combat threats to their positions. In a context of party instability and factionalism, party leaders endeavour to use coalition negotiations to serve their own interests, undermine their rivals and settle scores with other parties. While funding concerns, per Arriola,\(^{367}\) were an important driver of decision-making for the smaller parties, it was certainly not the only consideration. Intra-party competition and attempts to safeguard electoral ‘strongholds’ undermined the unity that the coalition sought to achieve. Party principals made strategic choices based on little reliable information regarding actual electoral support and assumptions regarding what would be in their own best interests. As the smaller opposition parties felt threatened by the larger party and found themselves competing for the same electoral constituencies, they sought to protect their own gains. This suggests that coalitions may be more successful or cohesive when parties have complementary rather than competing

---

bases of support – as in Kenya where relatively reliable ethnic voting produces somewhat more predictable outcomes depending on turnout levels in ethnic strongholds. In other words, contrary to Arriola, when ethnic groups are geographically contained and can be relied on to bloc vote for their ‘ethnic’ political party, this may in fact produce more stable coalitions.

Intra-opposition competition for the anti-incumbent vote has historically been largely limited to urban areas and the anti-NRM parts of Northern, Eastern and Central Regions. Opposition parties thus compete for the same voters rather than having different, complementary constituencies, which creates intra-opposition rivalries that undermine cooperation. While the FDC is able to run a national presidential campaign and front competitive parliamentary candidates across much of Uganda (Table 3), the DP and UPC have found their support to be increasingly limited to enclaves. Although there is some pro-FDC sympathy in the NRM’s heartland in the rural South West, this region continues to vote overwhelmingly in favour of the ruling party at both presidential and parliamentary level – remaining largely out of the opposition’s reach (see Table 3 below).


The FDC’s growing success in the DP and UPC’s strongholds (Central, Eastern and Northern Regions respectively) has created tensions amongst the opposition. The region with the lowest intra-opposition competition is in the NRM’s western strongholds, where the ruling party maintains its dominant position and crowds out opposition competition. These parties thus find themselves competing for support among the more opposition-sympathetic voters of West Nile, Acholiland, Lango, Buganda and Teso sub-regions, where the FDC has run an increasing number of candidates in every parliamentary poll. This helps to explain why the leaders of the smaller parties would seek to use the coalition negotiation process to try to consolidate their own gains and protect their electoral enclaves from what they see as the encroachment of the FDC. In cases where opposition parties are unable to break into the ruling party’s strongholds, and instead find themselves competing for the same groups of voters, party presidents may behave cynically within coalitions in order to try to ring fence their constituencies from competition and protect their own positions from pressure exerted by lower level functionaries.

Finally, many broader coalitions in Uganda collapsed due to the defection of newly-elected party leaders, who sought to test their electoral viability and contain the threats to their leadership that emerged during the race to succeed a former party leader. As shown in Table

**Table 3 The Geographic Spread of Parliamentary Candidates fronted by the FDC, DP, and UPC**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Candidates Won</th>
<th>Second Placed</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>DP</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FDC</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UPC</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>FDC</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UPC</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DP</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>FDC</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UPC</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DP</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>FDC</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DP</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UPC</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: This table was compiled using data from the Ugandan Electoral Commission website (ec.or.ug), collated by Sam Wilkins.

a the 2006 totals do not include the numbers of women MPs as party affiliation was not supplied for candidates by the Electoral Commission.
4 below, when new opposition leaders are elected to the head of their respective parties, they almost always withdraw from coalitions and seek to contest elections under their own party banner.

**Table 4 New Party Leaders and Electoral Coalitions in Uganda, 1996-2016**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yoweri Museveni</td>
<td>Movement/NRM</td>
<td></td>
<td>75.50%</td>
<td>69.40%</td>
<td>59.26%</td>
<td>68.38%</td>
<td>60.62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul K Ssemogerere</td>
<td>Movement/DP</td>
<td></td>
<td>22.30%</td>
<td>Coalition</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milton Obote*</td>
<td>UPC</td>
<td></td>
<td>Coalition</td>
<td>Coalition</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhammad K. Mayanja</td>
<td>Movement/JEEMA</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.20%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>Coalition</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kizza Besigye</td>
<td>Movement/FDC</td>
<td></td>
<td>27.70%</td>
<td>37.39%</td>
<td>26.01%</td>
<td>35.61%</td>
<td>RP Coalition: the opposition leader went into a coalition with the incumbent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ken Lukyamuzi***</td>
<td>CP</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Coalition</td>
<td>Coalition</td>
<td>Coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Ssebaana Kizito</td>
<td>DP</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.58%</td>
<td>Coalition</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abed Bwanika</td>
<td>Indep/PDP</td>
<td>Coalition</td>
<td>0.95%</td>
<td>0.65%</td>
<td>0.90%</td>
<td>RP Coalition: the opposition leader went into a coalition with the incumbent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miria Obote</td>
<td>UPC</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.82%</td>
<td>Coalition</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asuman Basalirwa***</td>
<td>JEEMA</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Coalition</td>
<td>Coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norbert Mao</td>
<td>DP</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.86%</td>
<td>Coalition</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olara Otunnu</td>
<td>UPC</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.58%</td>
<td>Coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beti Kamya</td>
<td>UFA</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.66%</td>
<td>Coalition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Independent candidates and those not sanctioned by their parties have been excluded

**Milton Obote was living in exile at the time

***Lukyamuzi’s CP and Basalirwa’s JEEMA have not contested in a presidential election, because of their small constituencies

Following their poor results achieved in their debut election, these leaders – such as Miria Obote, Norbert Mao and Olara Otunnu – almost always choose to enter into a multi-party coalition in the polls that follow. However, for the reasons mentioned above, this still does not necessarily ensure that the coalition will cohere until election day.

Finally, this chapter highlights an often-neglected aspect of coalition negotiation – the costs that alliances impose on parties. These costs are frequently counted in members, supporters and sympathisers lost to a rival political party, party instability (particularly between the party hierarchy and parliamentary caucus), and the loss of party leaders who defect to a more effective or better-funded opposition party. In Uganda, the TDA process has served to further corrode trust within the fractured opposition. The FDC has emerged battered and
rudderless without a coherent strategy to deal with the loss of the election. The DP and UPC are also more fragmented following the election. Given the high costs of the TDA for party unity and the low rewards produced by the coalition, future coalition-building may be even more difficult to achieve.

---

3. Opposition Coordination in Zambia’s Fluid Party System

3.1 Introduction

Zambian coalitions are understudied. Opposition coordination has not yet been the subject of significant academic study, despite being frequently cited as a case where consistent opposition fragmentation has allowed the ruling party to retain power.\(^{372}\) In the 2001, 2006 and 2008 elections, the opposition collectively commanded a majority of the presidential vote, and it is frequently suggested that the formation of an opposition coalition in one of these polls may have led to a different outcome. Zambia presents a conundrum for ‘coalition’ scholars; despite the clear need for coordination amongst opposition actors, a review of the literature appears to suggest that no coalitions were formed to challenge the ruling party’s hegemony between 2000 and 2016. This chapter will show that this apparent lacuna is not in fact the result of a lack of coalition negotiation and formation, but rather due to differences in the definitions and measurements deployed by political scientists, which has led to a lack of academic consensus in accounting for coalitions in Zambia. The only scholar to account for a coalition in Zambia is Leonardo Arriola. In his coalitions database, Arriola (2013) codes the 1991 election in Zambia as a ‘coalition’ case, in effect arguing that the MMD was a coalition rather than a single political party. However, although the MMD constituted a broad alliance of forces, including trade unions, civic groups and politicians from across the political spectrum, it was still a political party rather than a multi-party coalition.\(^ {373}\) Defining coalitions as loosely as Arriola does is problematic, but it does raise important questions regarding the unit of analysis employed. This has proven to be a recurring problem in Zambia, as this chapter will highlight. Coalition negotiations are messy, complex political processes and the resulting alliances frequently defy simple characterisations.


\(^{373}\) Resnick, ‘Compromise and Contestation’.  

124
Rakner and Svasand (2004) suggest that coalitions in Zambia are discouraged by the electoral system – a FPTP system for both the presidency and parliament.374 This is a common argument in the coalitions literature, which suggests that electoral systems have significant bearing on coalition formation. The electoral system (and highly presidential nature of government) remains fairly constant over time, so one might expect that coalition-building would also consistently fail. However, this is not the case (see the section on the 2006 UDA). Similarly, when the electoral system changed from a plurality to a majority system in 2016, the effect on coalition formation did not conform to predictions. Rather than discouraging a first round coalition in favour of a second-round coalition, the majority system encouraged first-round cooperation. This is predominantly because opposition actors believed that there was little likelihood of any of them being able to achieve 50% of the vote individually (this had not happened since the rise of more competitive elections in 2001) and they did not trust that the ruling party would allow the election to go to a second round. This suggests that, although the electoral system has a bearing on coalition formation, there are intervening factors that determine the ways in which electoral systems impact on coalitions.

In Zambia, political parties seem to appear and disappear with almost clockwork-like regularity as politicians fall out with members of their previous party and form a new electoral vehicle. While some parties – such as the Patriotic Front (PF), Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), the Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD) and United Party for National Development (UPND) – have been a stable presence across electoral cycles since 2001, dozens of smaller parties have been formed and dissolved. Many of Zambia's political parties appear to be little more than a collection of notables whose political allegiance can vary greatly between just two elections. This fluidity can make it tricky to define coalitions in instances such as the 2015 presidential by-election where the opposition UPND was in a ‘coalition’ with Charles Milupi’s Alliance for Democracy and Development (ADD). The ADD (and by extension, the resulting coalition) would not be considered ‘electorally significant’ as per Gandhi and Reuter (2013), as the party had only won a single parliamentary seat and 0.9% of the presidential vote in 2011.375 Equally, in the same election, approximately 20 of the MMD’s remaining 35 members of parliament supported the UPND president, even

---

though their own party president was standing in the same election. Do such endorsements – particularly when so widespread – count as a coalition? This chapter will argue that such informal arrangements, though not entirely new, are a result of failed coalition attempts and the highly personalised nature of politics in Zambia. Despite their lack of coverage in the academic literature, there has been at least one coalition negotiation process that has characterised each of the five elections held in Zambia between 2001 and 2016. However, most of these coalitions did not survive until election day. Why are coalitions so frequently mooted in Zambia? And why do they so often collapse?

Unlike Uganda where opposition political parties continued to exist, to have nominal structures and to participate in government under the movement system, the Zambian one-party state was much worse for political party identities. No political party except UNIP survived the one-party era, though the informal alliances and networks of people who had served in them would continue to influence Zambia’s politics in the Third Republic. When the political system changed from the one-party state to multi-party democracy in 1990, many of the actors who had been key to Kaunda’s administration joined the newly-formed Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD). This rapid shifting of political loyalties would set the tone for politics in the new multi-party dispensation, where politicians’ allegiances would shift drastically both between and at election time.

This has led to the emergence of what is known in Zambian media and popular culture as the ‘recycled politicians’ phenomenon. Politicians who have fallen out of favour with the ruling party frequently shift political allegiances ahead of elections, and the same politician may shift parties drastically between and across election cycles. Michael Sata, the fifth Republican President, is emblematic of the fluidity that characterises the Zambian party system. Sata served as Governor of Lusaka and a cabinet minister under Kaunda’s United National Independence Party (UNIP) government (1985-1991); he was the head of four different ministries and

376 This is explored in more detail in Miles Larmer, Rethinking African Politics: A History of Opposition in Zambia, Empires and the Making of the Modern World, 1650-2000 (Surrey: Ashgate, 2011) Although the UPP initially survived the one-party state, it was suppressed by Kaunda in the 1970s and opposition to the one-party state became increasingly fought by prominent individuals within UNIP.
Frederick Chiluba’s right hand man within the MMD (1991-2001), and after falling out with Chiluba in 2001, he formed the Patriotic Front (PF) party with which he won power in 2011. This fluidity interacts with and impacts on the process of coalition formation as – particularly prior to and since the 2011 election – individual endorsements and the recruitment of party and ethnic elites has increasingly short-circuited messy inter-party coalition negotiations. This chapter will argue that the turn towards individual endorsements, or what Sishuwa Sishuwa (2016) terms ‘elite inclusion’, was part of a learning process following a series of failed coalition negotiations between 2006 and 2011. This problematises Arriola’s argument that opposition parties fail to learn from previous coalition experiences. By tracing the emergence and frequent collapse of coalitions in Zambia between 2000 and 2016, this chapter will seek to demonstrate the ways in which previous coalition attempts impact on future party strategies, the relationships between opposition parties and the ways in which they seek to maximise votes in future elections. In doing so, it will also point to the limitations of existing theories, and highlight the ways in which funding impacts coalition formation, problematising Arriola’s ‘pecuniary’ coalition building theory. The maps that are included in the pages that follow will give the reader a sense of the regional strongholds of parties in Zambia, and how opposition parties have attempted to broaden their electoral support through building cross-ethnic multi-party coalitions.

This chapter begins by contextualising party politics and the logic of coalition formation in Zambia. In Section 3.1.1 it outlines the weakness of Zambian political parties, the fluid nature of political allegiance and the political salience of ethnicity. Section 3.2 the sets out, in chronological order, the six elections held between 2001 and 2016, and outlines the negotiation processes that accompanied each poll. The chapter will highlight the reasons for the collapse of negotiations in 2001, 2008, and 2011 and the failure of broader multi-party coalitions in 2015 and 2016. It will argue that the repeated failure of inter-party coalition building – along with a fluid political elite and increased likelihood of electoral success – produced a successful shift in strategy from party coalitions to individualised elite inclusion to broaden out the opposition’s electoral base and appeal to new ethno-regional constituencies. The following historical analysis will reflect upon the coalitions literature outlined in Chapter 1, highlighting the limits of Arriola’s pecuniary theory of coalition

379 Arriola, Multi-Ethnic Coalitions in Africa, 212.
formation, and illustrating the dynamics that undermined successful coalition-building. The cases of coalition formation and collapse outlined below suggest that financial incentives for coalition formation are insufficient explainers for coalition survival (as in 2011 and 2015); that parties should be taken more seriously as multi-level actors as lower level functionaries frequently act to scupper coalitions (2011); and that newly-elected party leaders who have not yet competed in a national poll are less likely to enter into coalitions (2001, 2006, 2015). Following the failure of many of these coalitions, opposition parties sought to bypass the difficult and time-consuming process of party cooperation by instituting an individualised ‘elite inclusion’, securing the endorsements of each political notable individually. In concluding, this chapter will suggest that it was intra-party politics and a lack of trust that undermined earlier coalition efforts. Similarly to Uganda, newly-elected opposition leaders frequently snubbed coalition negotiations in favour of running alone, and seeking to form coalitions in later electoral cycles. In Zambia, as in Uganda, financial incentives often proved inadequate to entice collaboration, indicating that these negotiations are significantly more complex than has previously been considered.

3.1.1 Political Parties and the Logic of Coalition Formation in Zambia

*Party Weakness and Elite Fluidity*

There is no legislation specifically governing political parties in Zambia; parties instead fall under the Societies Act (Chapter 119) of the Zambian constitution. This act includes any type of club or society (of which a political party is considered to be) and thus contains no specific information governing the behaviour of parties as a specific type of club with important public political rights and responsibilities. Partly because of this lack of regulation, parties tend to function as relatively opaque organisations where the divulgence of information regarding structure, constitution, internal procedures and funding models is done largely at the whim of the party leadership. Due to this legal gap in the governance of political parties, there is also no legislated provision of state funding to opposition parties unlike in other countries in the region, including Zimbabwe. Regular funding from other sources (such as

---

380 This doesn’t necessarily mean that they were elected in a competitive process, they may have been selected by their predecessor.
investments and property) is also largely unavailable; unlike the ANC in South Africa or even UNIP in Zambia, no other Zambian parties have created investment arms or amassed assets such as property which would bring them a regular income. This leads opposition parties to be largely dependent on private donations from members, parliamentarians, local and foreign businesses, and international ‘sister parties’, as well as other, more illicit, funding sources. While there is a vibrant private sector in Zambia which donates funds to the opposition, their incentive to do so is limited as many businesses still fear being victimised by the ruling party for supporting the opposition.  

Partly because of funding concerns, parties in Zambia acquire a particular structure and are hampered by several serious shortcomings. The party’s day-to-day activities are funded by contributions of approximately K3000-3500 per month from their elected members of parliament. These funds may be enough to sustain the very basic party structures on a monthly basis, but they are certainly insufficient for running large, expensive election campaigns at parliamentary or presidential level. It also means that once a party faces a decline in its number of parliamentarians, the party’s ability to sustain itself and its broader programme is severely compromised. Candidates running for parliamentary seats are – due to limited party funding – expected to largely finance their own constituency-level campaign as well as that of the candidates for council and local government positions. When in government, the MMD would finance approximately 50% of their campaigns with MPs making up the shortfall, while in opposition, MPs are often expected to finance 80 to 100% of the costs. This limits participation in politics to those who have already acquired substantial wealth, which is frequently sourced through prior access to government positions or contracts. This produces a tendency towards the circulation of positions within a small elite political class. It also increases the likelihood that prominent parliamentary candidates will desert the party if they feel that a particular party ticket may hurt rather than help their electoral prospects. Because parliamentary candidates are largely left to self-fund their expensive campaign efforts (and by extension, much of the constituency-level presidential


382 Interview, Bradford Machila, Former MMD MP for Kafue, 2 February 2015; Interview, Professor Geoffrey Lungwangwa, Former MMD (current UPND) MP for Nalikwanda, 3 February 2015.
campaign), they have few incentives to remain in parties that appear to be unpopular with the electorate. This is a similar dynamic to Uganda, where opposition parties are comprised of prominent individuals who are able to abandon the party at will to find a better deal – either with the incumbent or another opposition party. By contrast, in Zimbabwe, party labels are important social signifiers, the opposition itself had substantial funding (at least until 2013) and there are relatively high levels of party loyalty amongst voters, which prevents parliamentarians from establishing their own power bases independent of the party. This is illustrated by the dire electoral fortunes of parties established from splits in the two main Zimbabwean parties (see Chapter 4).

One of the main criteria when a Zambian opposition party selects a presidential or parliamentary candidate is the personal wealth of the individual or at least their ability to undertake significant fund raising in order to fund their own campaigns and supplement the party’s war chest. The contentious 2006 leadership battle within the UPND following the death of Anderson Mazoka was largely decided by the personal finances of the two contenders. Party presidents are expected to carry the party financially, which leads to the centralisation of power and control within the person of the president. The result for parties is the overwhelming importance of individuals and personalities in determining party agendas and activities. The funding and personalisation of parties lead to a generalised lack of intra-party democracy, whilst the importance of MPs in funding and running their own campaigns often creates tension within party hierarchies when big personalities feel that they are being side-lined or their ambitions are being frustrated. This exacerbates the tendency towards fluidity in political allegiances and the likelihood that politicians will shift parties depending on their assessments of the likelihood of electoral success or financial incentives. It also presents a potential source of conflict between the parliamentary caucus and the party leadership when differences in strategy arise.

---


In contrast to Uganda’s semi-polarised and Zimbabwe’s polarised political party system, Zambia is characterised by an extremely fluid political elite whose position within and between parties may change dramatically across election cycles. An opposition party spokesman highlighted this following the 2001 election when his Zambian Republican Party (ZRP) lost to the ruling MMD; he stated that opposition MPs would not be spared from the ‘scourge’ of being bought by the MMD and that “Zambia will witness a flow of such politicians who have a nose for cash from the opposition to the ruling party. They will move at the twinkle of an eye where they think there is a new deal.” This phenomenon was not limited to the early 2000s, but it has a long history and has continued into the present. Of the 40 Cabinet members appointed by President Edgar Lungu after the 2016 election, at least 18 ministers had previously held positions in other political parties. Of the 18, twelve ministers had belonged to the previous ruling party, the MMD. Justice Minister Given Lubinda is a current PF cabinet minister who was central to the rise of President Lungu in 2015; he was previously an MP for the UPND (2001-2006), and who in 2006 following a contentious succession battle, abandoned the party for the newly-formed United Liberal Party (ULP) just to stand on a PF parliamentary ticket two months later. This kind of party switching is a common theme in Zambian politics, repeated across election cycles since the first fracturing of the ruling MMD in 2001. To attract and retain the ‘best’ political notables – particularly from outside their home regions – opposition parties need to demonstrate their electoral viability. By appearing to be a viable alternative government, which could later offer its own share of patronage and lucrative state contracts and appointments, opposition parties could attract notable power-brokers from outside their regional strongholds, and in doing so they are able to attract voters and sway electoral results.

---

385 Polarisation as a political tactic is outlined in LeBas, *From Protest to Parties: Party-Building and Democratization in Africa*.


387 Momba noted that even as early as 1963, politicians and peasants deserted the African National Congress (ANC) for UNIP despite their strong social and ideological linkages to the party. This was because they believed that the ANC had ‘no possibility of ever forming a government.’ Jotham C. Momba, ‘The State, Rural Class Formation and Peasant Political Participation in Zambia: The Case of Southern Province’, *African Affairs* 88, no. 352 (1989): 142.

The relationship between parties and the electorate in Zambia – and their methods of mobilisation – has recently become the subject of significant debate. Bemba is the largest ethno-linguistic group in Zambia, comprising about 33.5% of the population and followed by Nyanja (14.8%) or Nyanja family (24.6% including Nyanja, Chewa, Nsenga, and Tumbuka), Tonga (11.4%), and Lozi (5.5%). While Bemba-speaking groups originate from the north of the country (Northern, Luapula, Muchinga Provinces), they are also a dominant group on the Copperbelt and in urban Lusaka. Nyanja-speaking and affiliated groups originate predominantly from the eastern parts of the country, but Nyanja has also increasingly become a lingua franca in Lusaka and other urban areas. Tonga-speaking (and related language) groups predominate in the rural south of the country (Southern Province), but they share some socio-political identity markers with the so-called ‘Bantu Botatwe’ group (the Toka, Tonga, Ila, Sala, Lenje, Totela and Subiya – and sometimes also the Lunda, Luvale and Kaonde) who come from the Western, Central, North-Western and Southern Provinces. Finally, Lozi-speaking groups are largely concentrated in Barotseland, or what is now called Western Province. Each ethno-linguistic group is largely geographically-concentrated, and none of them make up a majority of the population, which makes it difficult for parties to use a strictly mono-ethnic method of electoral mobilisation. Instead, parties must seek to build multi-party coalitions that knit together a multi-ethnic constituency which can carry them into power.

Posner (2005) highlights the important role that ethnicity plays in driving political behaviour in Zambia. Posner’s argument is that the way in which party politics developed in the post-colonial period created a strong relationship between the ethnic identities of politicians, parties and their constituencies. He notes that, “notwithstanding the fact that many Zambian political parties have historically enjoyed significant support across ethnic lines, every major political party in Zambia since independence has been perceived, to at least some degree and by some citizens, to represent the interests of a particular ethnic group or region of the

country.’’\textsuperscript{391} As a result of high levels of ethnic fragmentation and the lack of a majority ethnic group (the largest ethno-linguistic group, the Bemba, constitute only 33.5\% of the populace), political parties “must win support across ethnic communities, and this means eschewing public identification with any single ethnic group… The goal… is to construct a solid ethnic coalition in the party’s home region while still preserving the ability to win pan-ethnic (or non-ethnic) support in the rest of the country.”\textsuperscript{392} Scarritt (2006) takes Posner’s conclusions further, and tried to prove that all relevant Zambian political parties are, to some degree, pan-ethnic. He uses an analysis of electoral results to suggest that all successful parties in Zambia have sought to build pan-ethnic alliances to win the presidency, and that as of 2006, the only ‘potentially ethnic’ party was Sata’s Patriotic Front.\textsuperscript{393} Following from this, Cheeseman and Hinfelaar (2010) highlighted the ways in which Michael Sata sought to mobilise the Bemba ethnic group using the language of grievance and marginalisation, but also wielded economic and class-based appeals in urban areas to build a multi-ethnic constituency in 2008.\textsuperscript{394} Cheeseman and Larmer (2015) highlighted the same trend, that some parties in and beyond Zambia will use both ethnic and populist appeals to bring together citizens with diverse interests and motivations in order to create a broad alliance of voters that constitutes a ‘minimum winning coalition.’\textsuperscript{395} Building multi-party (and thus multi-ethnic) coalitions or using populist appeals represent two of the various methods of mobilisation that have been used (to varying degrees of success) by parties in Zambia.

The relationship between political parties and ethnicity in Zambia has changed over time. Following from Kenneth Kaunda’s inclusive elite bargain in the early years of independence, his governing alliance became more exclusive in the 1980s.\textsuperscript{396} The MMD – which replaced the UNIP government in 1991 – had initially represented a broad, multi-ethnic alliance of forces. However, Chiluba’s third term bid and perceptions of the dominance of his Bemba-

\textsuperscript{392} Posner, 110.
\textsuperscript{393} Scarritt, ‘The Strategic Choice of Multiethnic Parties in Zambia’s Dominant and Personalist Party System’.
speaking group increasingly undermined the party’s broad ethno-regional alliance. As the opposition to Chiluba’s MMD fragmented into smaller parties, each party developed its own regional strongholds, mobilising using existing affective, ethnic and party-political ties to build and consolidate their own bases before broadening out beyond their region.

In the first multi-party elections in 1991, UNIP had been reduced to a regional party with all 25 of its parliamentary seats being won in Eastern Province. Kaunda’s party would never recover from this marginalisation. The UPND, formed by a Tonga-speaking Southerner in 1998, was intended as a national party and it swallowed the National Party (NP) – an MMD splinter group with strong support in North-Western (and to some extent, Western) Province. In the early days of the UPND, the majority of President Anderson Mazoka’s vigorous campaigning was done in Lusaka and his home region of Southern Province, capitalising on popular sentiments regarding political and economic marginalisation of the South – particularly in the wake of the MMD’s reduction of farming subsidies in the 1990s in the predominantly agricultural region. He also capitalised on pre-existing political sympathies towards the defunct but still regionally-popular African National Congress (ANC), attracting the children of the party’s leader and espousing a very similar political and economic platform. Finally, the UPND attracted important figures in Western Province and managed to knit together an alliance that was comprised of voters from Southern, Western and North-Western Provinces as well as attracting some support in the more urban and disaffected Lusaka, Central and Copperbelt provinces. As Michael Sata established the PF in 2001, he sought to bring established MMD structures with him into his new party, capitalising on the affective, political and economic networks in the Bemaphone North that he had cultivated in UNIP and the MMD. The Forum for Democracy and Development

399 While the NP was founded by an MP from Lunte Constituency in the Northern Province, it contained several prominent and influential Westerners including Akashambatwa Mbikusita-Lewanika and Arthur Wina and the first president was a Lozi from Western Province. Sishuwa Sishuwa (2016) notes that the party was a Bemba-Tonga-Lozi alliance.
(FDD) was another offshoot of the MMD’s internal battles; the party was expected to be the largest challenger to the MMD in 2001, but its limited structures and mobilisation capacity meant that its vote was largely confined to chipping away at UNIP’s dominance in the East (where the party’s leader hailed from) and the MMD’s urban vote share in Lusaka. Since 2001, coalition-building focused on broadening out the regional representation of parties through party coalitions, and then increasingly through systems of ‘elite inclusion’ following the failure of a multi-party coalition in 2011.

3.2 Multi-Party Coalitions – 2001-2016

3.2.1 Fragmentation and Realignme

After the labour-backed MMD came to power in 1991 on the back of sustained anti-UNIP momentum driven by high food prices and labour militancy, the party’s hegemony continued largely unchecked until 2001. In 1991, the party was carried into government with 76% of the vote and after controversially blocking former president Kaunda’s candidacy in 1996, the MMD maintained its enormous lead by gaining 73% of all votes cast. But by 2001, the party’s reputation was in shambles. The structural adjustment programme that had been so enthusiastically carried out under Chiluba had begun to bite; there were daily reports in the independent press of widespread corruption in the MMD and Chiluba’s attempt at a third term bid had galvanised the opposition and civil society into a broad movement challenging the ruling party. The key factor that drove the reversal of the MMD’s fortunes was Chiluba’s attempt to retain the presidency, which led to him – and his right-hand man Michael Sata – expelling 22 party MPs, and sending ruling party cadres to intimidate and beat MMD members who refused to toe the line. The political ructions produced by this led to the formation of a myriad of new parties including the Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD), the Heritage Party (HP), the Zambia Alliance for Progress (ZAP), and the Zambia Republican Party (ZRP). These new parties joined older – but often little more established –

---

406 Formed largely by the 22 expelled MMD MPs.
parties formed from previous splits and expulsions such as the National Party (NP), Zambia Democratic Congress (ZDC), Agenda for Zambia (AZ), and the United Party for National Development (UPND). When his attempt at a third term was defeated, Chiluba overlooked Michael Sata in favour of Levy Mwanawasa for the MMD’s presidential nominee. Sata left the MMD with the doors banging behind him, and formed the PF just three months before the election. It was in the context of economic contraction, a fragmented opposition playing field, a discredited ruling party suffering daily defections and an unpopular ruling party presidential candidate that the 2001 elections were held.

Even in 2001, a coalition of the fragmented opposition was mooted. Called the Government of National Unity (GNU), it was proposed to unite six relatively small political formations with the three-year old UPND. These parties were: the former ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP), UPND, the FDD, National Citizens' Coalition (NCC), ZAP, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and Agenda for Zambia (AZ). The front-runners to lead the coalition were Anderson Mazoka (UPND), ex-Legal Affairs Minister Vincent Malambo (FDD) and Dean Mung’omba of the ZAP. The UPND’s Mazoka appeared to have the upper hand in the negotiations to lead the grouping. The UPND had been formed in October 1998 by Anderson Mazoka, a charismatic Tonga-speaking businessman from the south. The new party built upon – and claimed – the political legacy of the country’s first nationalist party the African National Congress (ANC), which had been particularly popular in Zambia’s southern region prior to its incorporation into the ruling UNIP in 1973. Along with political elites from the south, many others joined the new UPND including elites from the Western and North-Western Provinces, creating a broad alliance across the south and west of the country. By the time of the 2001 elections, the small north-west-based NP had been integrated into the UPND, and the party held the largest bloc of opposition seats in parliament, with a total of 11 MPs. Because of the UPND’s prominent position within a

---

407 Formed in 1993, the NP supported the UPND in the 2001 elections and later disintegrated.
408 Formed in 1995 by expelled former MMD Ministers Derrick Chitala and Dean Múngomba
410 ‘Puppet or Prince?’
411 Mazoka had been the Zambian CEO of mining giant, Anglo American and was considered an important public personality prior to resigning from Anglo to form the UPND.
The key reasons for the collapse of the alliance were first, the lack of certainty regarding the electoral support that each party could muster as almost all were new and had not yet contested an election, and second, that enough funding was being dispersed to the opposition parties individually that none of them were reliant on funding from the coalition to make the concessions that the coalition effort demanded. According to *Africa Confidential*, the FDD’s convention in 2001 was conspicuously well-funded, with all delegates housed at expensive

---

413 Stellah Chifuwe, ‘We Are All Interested in State House’, *The Post*, 17 October 2001.
417 Ibid
hotels and with a five-star hotel providing the catering for the event.\footnote{‘Payback Time’, \textit{Africa Confidential} (blog), 26 October 2001, http://0-www.africa-confidential.com.pugwash.lib.warwick.ac.uk/article/id/716/Payback_time.} \footnote{‘Payback Time’.} This kick-started the Lusaka rumour mill, with critics alleging that the money had been provided by Rwandan President Paul Kagame (apparently a good friend of Tembo’s) or the regime in Luanda.\footnote{‘Payback Time’.} \footnote{‘Payback Time’.} However, a senior party member countered this by saying that the money had been raised from ‘well-wishers’ in the United States.\footnote{‘Puppet or Prince?’} Either way, contemporaneous reports suggest that the party’s campaign was well-supported, and that commitments had been made which were difficult to go back on. The UPND, too, was well-funded ahead of the 2001 election.\footnote{Interview, Neo Simutanyi, Former UPND office holder and political scientist, 17 December 2014.}

as a vehicle for advancing a ‘Bantu Botatwe’ political agenda. Suggestions abounded that the party was very well-funded in 2001, but as always, it is very difficult to trace the source of those funds and verify reports of party funding. The most likely scenario in 2001 was that the UPND had access to a mix of funds – including from prominent Lozi interests, farmer’s unions in the South and foreign financiers. In any event, it is clear that significant funds were flowing to the major opposition parties in 2001, and this provided a disincentive to make the necessary concessions to form a coalition in the face of uncertainty over the electoral support that each party could muster. This supports Arriola’s focus on funding, and suggests a potential limitation to his theory of pecuniary coalition building – that when parties are sufficiently well-funded, they may have little interest in selling their endorsements to other party leaders.

The 2001 polls were the first seriously competitive election since Zambia’s return to multiparty democracy in 1991. However, despite the adverse circumstances, the ruling party managed to clinch victory from the jaws of defeat due to the fractured and divided opposition. With 28 registered political parties and 11 presidential candidates contesting the elections, a divided ruling party faced a divided opposition field. Because of the division in opposition ranks, five parties split the presidential vote – each winning the presidential vote in multiple constituencies (see Figure 7 below) – and the MMD’s Mwanawasa scraped through with just under 29% of the vote. Only 35,000 votes or 1.9% separated Mwanawasa from Mazoka, in an election that was plagued with irregularities and is still widely believed to have been ‘stolen’. Christon Tembo’s FDD came third with 13%, followed closely by UNIP on 10% and the Heritage party at 8% of the vote. Collectively, the opposition shared 71% of the presidential tally. The MMD only won 69 of 150 seats in parliament, and even failed to reach a parliamentary majority after appointing its eight presidential nominees. However, the ruling party remained the most ‘nationalised’ party (see Figure 8 below for each party’s electoral support) – or the party whose electoral support was most evenly spread

across the country. The UPND had won the presidential vote in four of the country’s nine provinces – Southern, Western, North-Western and Lusaka – while the MMD won in another four and UNIP won in just the Eastern Province. Seven parties were represented in parliament, but the UPND’s dominance within the crowded opposition field was clear as it held 49 of 150 seats (to the FDD’s 12 and UNIP’s 13) and it thus formed the official opposition.

The UPND had performed impressively in the south, west and centre of the country, but failed to capitalise on dissatisfaction on the Copperbelt and in the north (see Figure 8). UNIP and the FDD were largely confined to the Eastern Province, though Tembo’s party also performed relatively well in the north. The PF, mentioned as little more than a footnote in the 2001 election, proved to be confined to just a few constituencies in the Bemba-speaking north, and mustered lukewarm support on the populous Copperbelt. At the national level, Michael Sata achieved only 3% of the total presidential vote, which belied the impressive growth that the party would achieve ahead of the next election. The 2001 election results proved that if they wanted to win an election, these regionally-limited parties would need to work together to overcome the MMD’s electoral machine – on their own they could not easily build the necessary cross-regional coalitions to defeat the ruling party. The opposition’s failure to overthrow the MMD’s hegemony in 2001 and the regional spread of party support (indicated in Figure 8) would provide the major impetus for the proposed formation of the United Democratic Alliance (UDA) in 2005, as the parties sought to build a complementary coalition of their various regional strongholds to overcome MMD dominance. Ultimately though, fate – or possibly government agents – would intervene to scupper the opposition’s plans.

In interviews, members of the UPND and several members of Mazoka’s family averred that he was poisoned, and they either insinuated or alleged that this had been carried out by government operatives. Suspicions of the same were also widely reported in the independent press at the time and Mazoka’s name currently appears on an arsenic poisoning Wikipedia page (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arsenic_poisoning#Anderson_Mazoka).

---

432 In interviews, members of the UPND and several members of Mazoka’s family averred that he was poisoned, and they either insinuated or alleged that this had been carried out by government operatives. Suspicions of the same were also widely reported in the independent press at the time and Mazoka’s name currently appears on an arsenic poisoning Wikipedia page (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arsenic_poisoning#Anderson_Mazoka).
Figure 7 The 2001 Zambian Presidential Election Results by Constituency

The MMD’s Presidential Vote
The UPND's Presidential Vote

UNIP's Presidential Vote
The FDD’s Presidential Vote

Figure 8 The 2001 Zambian Presidential Election Results for MMD (blue), UPND (red), UNIP (orange), FDD (yellow) and PF (green) in order of declining vote share

143
3.2.2 The United Democratic Alliance and the 2006 elections

Between 2001 and 2006, the ruling MMD was responsible for fomenting distrust and disunity amongst the opposition. Considering Mwanawasa’s weak electoral mandate in 2001, his predecessor’s continued control over the ruling MMD and the opposition’s collective majority in parliament, the president set about trying to consolidate his power and build a working coalition in parliament. To do this – particularly following his purge of Chiluba allies in Cabinet – Mwanawasa poached several opposition MPs. In 2003, President Mwanawasa appointed three FDD MPs to ministerial positions (Dipak Patel, Geoffrey Samukonga and Chance Kabaghe) and a UPND MP to the post of deputy minister. In addition, two UPND MPs (UPND SG Benny Tetamashimba and Austin Liato) were also appointed to sit on Mwanawasa’s Constitutional Review Commission, contrary to the party’s wishes. These MPs were expelled by their parties, and most were adopted by the MMD to stand in the by-elections triggered by their expulsions. Most expelled MPs successfully defended their seats on a ruling party ticket, reducing the size of the opposition caucus and fomenting distrust within and between opposition parties. Between 2002 and 2003, seven opposition MPs were tempted to join the MMD, expelled by their parties and re-elected on a ruling party ticket.\footnote{Neo Simutanyi, ‘Parties in Parliament: The Relationship between Members of Parliament and Their Parties in Zambia’ (Johannesburg: The Electoral Institute of Southern Africa, 2005), 7, https://www.eisa.org.za/pdf/OP36.pdf.}

This allowed Mwanawasa to build a majority in parliament and foment dissent within the ranks of the numerically-dominant opposition. That these MPs were re-elected despite hopping from one party to another suggests that many won their seats on the strength of their individual networks rather than those of their previous parties, highlighting the trend noted in the first section regarding the weakness of parties, importance of the personal profiles of candidates and the fluid allegiances of Zambia’s political elite.

By the end of the 2006 election period, although the MMD retained the executive, the PF’s Michael Sata had emerged as the poll’s ‘big winner.’ Having risen from seventh place in the 2001 presidential elections, Sata was second to Levy Mwanawasa by 2006 and had expanded the PF’s parliamentary caucus from one to 43 seats, while taking hegemonic control of most of the municipal councils along Zambia’s line of rail. The PF dominated on the urban Copperbelt, in Lusaka and in the Northern Province capital of Kasama. Although in
retrospect it may appear that Sata’s success in 2006 and the rise of the PF to the position of the largest opposition was inevitable and foreseeable, this was simply not the case. As Gould (2010) does, this section argues that Sata’s rise owes a great debt to ‘Mazoka’s ghost’ and the ill-fated coalition between the three strongest opposition parties to emerge from the 2001 election. Gould notes that, just ten months before the election, political pundits in Lusaka could hardly muster even ‘lukewarm support’ for Sata.434 Certainly, a review of the coverage of political manoeuvring in 2006 in The Post newspaper – Zambia’s largest daily and (at the time) the most reliable independent print publication – shows that even influential newspaper mogul, Fred M’membe, did not see Sata as a serious contender until just weeks before the polls. Sata’s rise was due in part to the rapid demise of the prospects of the UPND and the coalition that it intended to lead to victory in late 2006.

Given that in the 2001 elections, the opposition had collectively garnered 71% of the presidential vote, it was clear to all opposition parties that a broad coalition should be formed ahead of the next general election. Equally, in 2002, the opposition in Kenya had united and overturned the three-decade-long hegemony of KANU, a point not lost on the Zambian opposition. In January 2003, the opposition began to discuss the possibility of fronting joint candidates in parliamentary by-elections, but the defeat of the joint opposition candidate in February by-elections in Keembe (Central Province) rattled the nascent alliance.435 By June 2003, the budding coalition had all but collapsed as UNIP went into an alliance with the ruling MMD and the UPND pulled out, blaming the other opposition parties for not working together.436 However, in early 2005, opposition leaders again began to meet to plan for a pre-electoral coalition to unite all of the key players.437 Early on, Sata had called for a coalition of opposition forces with himself as the presidential candidate.438 This was rejected by other opposition parties on the grounds that the PF had just a single seat in parliament and had garnered only 3% of the presidential tally in 2001, compared to the combined 74 seats and

50% of the executive vote collected by the other candidates. Instead, the parties decided to use the 2001 results as a guide for distributing positions in the nascent alliance, with the implicit agreement that the leader of the party that won the largest proportion of the 2001 presidential vote would be the face of the coalition.

The resulting United Democratic Alliance (UDA) was launched on 1 March 2006 to much fanfare, with the leaders of the constituent parties appearing in each other’s party colours in a broad show of unity at the Mulungushi Conference Centre.439 But the celebrations did not last long, as bickering soon set in amongst the three parties to the coalition – Edith Nawakwi’s FDD,440 the UPND and Tilyenji Kaunda’s UNIP. The pre-electoral coalition was conceived to bring together the complementary constituencies of the various opposition parties – the UPND’s Southern, Central, Western and North-Western support, the FDD’s Northern and Eastern base, and UNIP’s Eastern Province strongholds. Between them, the parties held 74 of the country’s 150 parliamentary seats, across seven of Zambia’s nine provinces.441 But this neat arrangement of ethnic balancing and complementary alliance building was soon shattered by ego, interests, and tragedy.

Although many believe that the UPND won the 2001 elections,442 by 2006 the party was suffering from a crisis. The party’s president and primary funder, Anderson Mazoka, was gravely ill and had spent most of 2005 in South Africa seeking medical treatment. His deputy, Sakwiba Sikota, had done much of the day-to-day running of the party in Mazoka’s absence and when the party president died in Johannesburg on 24 May 2006, Sikota expected to inherit the leadership of the party. Instead, a fierce war erupted with outspoken factions of the party (including Mazoka’s wife) demanding that only a southerner – a Tonga-speaker, as Mazoka was – could take over the party’s reins.443 The public spat was splashed across the

---

439 A second – largely Bembaphone – opposition alliance was also formed, named the National Democratic Focus (NDF) which initially included the Patriotic Front and five parties which had no significant following or parliamentary representation. The PF withdrew from the alliance prior to the signing of the memorandum and the alliance was later plagued by allegations of a rigged convention, a nullified electoral process, expulsions and withdrawals. Ultimately the NDF did not run in the presidential race (instead supporting Mwanawasa) and only elected a single parliamentarian – contested alliance President Mwila (Chiluba’s uncle).

440 In 2005, Nawakwi had succeeded the FDD’s first President Christon Tembo at an elective party conference.

441 Later sections speak about ten provinces, this is due to Sata’s creation of “Muchinga” as the country’s tenth province after his election in 2011.


pages of *The Post* newspaper for more than six weeks, with accusations of ‘tribalism’ and ethnic exclusion marring the party’s image. When Hakainde Hichilema, a relatively unknown but wealthy southern businessman was elected president amidst accusations of bribery and intimidation, Sikota and many party heavyweights – Princess Nakatindi, Sikota Wina, Inonge Wina, Robert Sichinga and Given Lubinda amongst others who were predominantly from Western and Bembaphone provinces – deserted the party to start their own or to join the ruling MMD. Sakwiba Sikota, Lubinda and others formed the United Liberal Party (ULP), which they initially used to try to join the UDA coalition, but after being blocked by the UPND they went into an alliance with Sata’s PF.

The UPND split was extremely acrimonious, with insults and accusations of ‘tribalism’ – that the UPND was increasingly ethnically exclusivist – flying daily across the pages of Zambia’s major newspapers. This severely weakened the party’s profile and support base, particularly in Western Province where many of the party’s structures were taken over in their entirety by the ULP. Of the UPND’s 13 Western Province MP’s elected in 2001, eight defected to the ULP in 2006, three failed to recontest, and two stood again – of which only one parliamentarian retained their seat. From 13 of the 17 provincial seats they had held in 2001, the UPND (within the UDA) retained only a single seat, with most seats going to the ruling MMD. The ULP only won two seats in Western Province, their insurrection was largely overtaken by the MMD’s resurgence. Due to the split within the UPND and perceptions that the party was ethnically biased against Sikota (a prominent Lozi from Western Province) and Westerners more generally, Hichilema’s presidential vote share in the province was just 12% in 2006, compared to Mazoka’s 49% in 2001. The MMD also won the presidential vote in every constituency in Western Province, unlike in 2001 when the UPND had almost achieved a clean sweep in the West. The MMD’s resurgence was also based partly on the support of the Lozi Litunga, the prominence of Western politicians such as Inonge Mbikusita-Lewanika and Mwanawasa’s popular agricultural policies which provided a steady supply of fertiliser.

and farming inputs. Meanwhile, in Southern Province, Sakwiba Sikota was returned to his Livingstone parliamentary seat – the only seat that his ULP would win in the province.

Despite the turmoil in the UPND, the UDA attempted to continue building the alliance. Following Mazoka’s death, it was widely claimed that it had been agreed between the three parties that the UPND leader had been granted the presidency of the alliance, and that Nawakwi was to hold the post of secretary general on behalf of the FDD. Most commentators argued that this would be ‘natural’ as the UPND was the largest party in the alliance, having won 49 seats in parliament in 2001 in contrast to the FDD’s 12 and UNIP’s 13. Equally, Mazoka had received more than double the vote share of either of the two parties in the previous presidential election. As Anderson Mazoka had negotiated the UDA agreement, was the likely leader of the alliance and had subsequently died, the coalition also suffered from the turbulence within its largest constituent party. Publicly, alliance members – who had a vested interest in the leadership selection – involved themselves in debates over the choice of the new UPND president, undermining trust and fomenting personal rivalries. When it became clear that a relatively unknown businessman with no direct political experience was to assume Mazoka’s mantle, FDD President Nawakwi announced her intentions to run as the coalition’s presidential candidate. In response, the FDD’s party chairperson publicly accused Nawakwi of ‘opportunism’ and of destabilising the alliance, arguing that the president of the smallest party to the alliance should not attempt to mount a challenge for the presidency. The chairperson was subsequently expelled and a public war of words ensued. In the wake of infighting and uncertainty amongst party leaders regarding the relative strengths of each of the opposition parties, the FDD opted to engage in last-

---


449 George Chellah and Bivan Saluseki, ‘UPND Members Threaten to Burn Their Voters’ Cards’, The Post, 26 May 2006.


minute bargaining with Sata’s PF.\textsuperscript{453} However, the prospective agreement fell through due to Nawakwi’s hefty demands – she allegedly insisted on being granted 56% of the parliamentary seats and an executive prime ministerial position.\textsuperscript{454} Ultimately, the FDD remained within the UDA alliance – at least publicly. On the 3 August, it was finally announced after a contentious debate between the coalition’s partners, that Hichilema would be the UDA candidate.\textsuperscript{455}

As the election drew nearer, Hichilema’s tactic was to campaign actively in the populous Lusaka and Copperbelt Provinces, and to try to court traditional leaders in Northern and North-Western Provinces to broaden his vote outside of his Southern Province base.\textsuperscript{456} But the problems in the alliance were clear and were frequently reported on in both the government and independent press. The FDD’s Nawakwi rarely appeared with Hichilema on the campaign trail,\textsuperscript{457} and was not present at the filing of his nomination papers at the supreme court or the rally at the Freedom Statue thereafter – a rare opportunity to use a public show of force in Lusaka to project party strength and win over undecided voters. News reports circulated that the rift had deepened to the degree that FDD candidates were denied funding by the UDA and Nawakwi had begun printing campaign materials for her candidates in the FDD’s colours rather than under the coalition’s banner.\textsuperscript{458} Reports suggested that Nawakwi had ‘gone underground’ and would only reappear again after the election,\textsuperscript{459} while she told reporters that she was giving Hichilema ‘space to make it for himself.’ The internal fighting within the alliance was not just present at the top levels of the party, but also locally; tension was exacerbated by the imposition of parliamentary candidates in some constituencies, and one such incident nearly led to violence between FDD and UPND cadres.\textsuperscript{460} The imposition of candidates allegedly led to the FDD having just 32

\textsuperscript{454} George Chellah and Amos Malupenga, ‘Sikota to Be Sata’s Vice-President’, \textit{The Post}, 4 August 2006.
\textsuperscript{456} ‘Zambian Elections--Mwanawasa Leads, but Sata Gains’.
\textsuperscript{458} George Chellah, ‘UDA Declines to Assist FDD Candidates with Campaign Funds’, \textit{The Post}, 10 September 2006.
\textsuperscript{459} Silwamba and Chellah, ‘Nawakwi Goes Underground’.
candidates in the parliamentary race, less than the 50 of 150 that had been agreed upon. The instability within the coalition’s constituent parties introduced uncertainty over each party’s electoral strength, which prompted infighting for the position of coalition leader – ultimately undermining the success of the alliance. The negative coverage of the coalition continued until election day and the three parties did not seem to pull together, whilst Sata grabbed headlines – and the post of opposition leader – through his mega-rallies, popular slogans, anti-China rhetoric and populist electioneering in the urban areas along the line of rail.\textsuperscript{461}

While the UDA was fighting, Sata’s party was turning Mwanawasa’s anti-corruption campaign into an ethno-regional campaign issue. The PF grew in leaps and bounds between 2001 and 2006, with many of the FDD’s and MMD’s northern Bemba-speaking elites defecting to join the party. All of former president Chiluba’s allies that had been expelled by Mwanawasa crossed to the PF, a trend which was aided by Mwanawasa’s apparent anti-Bemba campaign. In 2001, for the first time in Zambian history, two non-Bemba’s occupied the top two seats in government and Mwanawasa filled the public service and foreign missions with non-Bemba speakers, further entrenching a sense of Bemba political marginalisation and fuelling the growth of Sata’s ethno-regional party in northern Zambia.\textsuperscript{462}

As Sata’s party rose in the north, the PF’s campaign in 2006 was reported to have been ‘flush with money’ which was believed to have come from former President Chiluba and others indicted on corruption charges, as well as from Taiwanese interests.\textsuperscript{463} According to internal US Embassy memos, it was widely rumoured that former Director of Intelligence Xavier Chungu (from Luapula Province in the north), who had been expelled from the MMD and prosecuted alongside Chiluba, had provided extensive financial support for the PF’s 2006 campaign.\textsuperscript{464} Sata had also promised, while campaigning in Luapula in 2006, that he would allow Chungu to return to Zambia from exile without fear of facing corruption charges, and he also promised to drop the charges against Chiluba.\textsuperscript{465} The funding that Sata was able to access helps to explain why he was able to resist entering into a coalition with the UPND and

\textsuperscript{461} Larmer and Fraser, ‘Of Cabbages and King Cobra: Populist Politics and Zambia’s 2006 Election’.
\textsuperscript{465} ‘Zambian Elections--Mwanawasa Leads, but Sata Gains’.
others – he was not in need of the funds that an alliance with the UPND would offer, and he saw the alliance as an anti-Bemba political machine. This again suggests that Arriola’s theory of pecuniary coalition building is limited, that its efficacy depends on the lack of availability of funds from other sources. When funding is readily available to most players, this reduces the utility of financial incentives to cooperate.

As the dust settled after the election, it became clear that Mwanawasa had won the 2006 polls by a significant margin, and that Sata’s PF had supplanted the once-mighty UPND as the official opposition, taking 29% of the total (see Figure 9). Mwanawasa had reclaimed many rural areas (see the blue map in Figure 10) and Sata had increased his electoral support outside of his Northern Province base, capturing disaffected urbanites in Lusaka and mining communities in the Copperbelt (see the green map in Figure 10). The UDA’s Hichilema achieved only 25% of the national tally, collapsing in the cities and winning predominantly in rural Southern and Eastern Provinces (see the red map in Figure 10). In parliament, the PF’s seats had increased from one to 43, while the PF took hegemonic control of most of the councils along the line of rail – namely, the urban Copperbelt, and in Lusaka and Kasama. By contrast, the UDA’s collective 74 seats in 2001 had shrunk to just 26 seats – two in Central province, four in Eastern, two in North-Western, 17 in the Southern Province and a single seat in Western Province.

Following their relatively poor showing in the 2006 election, UDA Vice President Nawakwi announced that she would seek to stand as the alliance’s presidential candidate in 2011. She argued that there had been a ‘gentleman’s agreement’ that if the 2006 UDA candidate lost the election, the runner up (in this case, herself) would stand as the coalition candidate in 2011. In response, Hichilema and the UPND protested that Nawakwi had tried to ensure that the UDA lost the 2006 election; a defecting FDD coordinator even went so far as to say that she had ‘de-campaigned’ the UDA during the campaign period. Ultimately, the UDA

---

466 This was a point made by Sishuwa Sishuwa on the basis of his many hours of interviews with Sata for Sishuwa’s DPhil thesis, “I am Zambia’s Redeemer.”
coalition did not last long beyond the election – the distrust between the parties scuppered any meaningful inter-election cooperation and would have lasting repercussions for relations between the UPND and the FDD. In 2012, Nawakwi opened up to reporters about her time in the UDA while reflecting on a mooted alliance between the UPND and MMD:

I hope that the UPND will accept that they are the junior partner. I hope that my colleagues in UPND calmly take the statement that they have fewer seats, they are younger because that is how we felt. I hope that they are not feeling as bad as we felt when we were being told we had 12 seats in the House and that we didn't have enough money. They should take their status calmly and accept it just as they expected us to accept it because we were being told that we couldn't provide helicopters and we only had 12 seats. It is the same language which is being played on them that they played on us.\textsuperscript{470}

This perceived slight was something that Nawakwi would continue to resent until 2016, and it would help prevent the formation of any future coalitions between the two parties.

Figure 9 The 2006 Zambian Presidential Election Results by Constituency

The MMD’s Presidential Vote
The PF’s Presidential Vote

Figure 10 The 2006 Zambian Presidential Election Results of MMD (blue), PF (green) and UDA (red) in order of declining vote share
3.2.3 The 2008 Presidential By-Election

When President Levy Mwanawasa died suddenly in August 2008, it triggered the first presidential by-election in Zambia’s history. With just 90 days to arrange an election, parties scrambled to raise funds and put together a campaign which would carry them into State House. The MMD was riven by factional battles, but ultimately Mwanawasa’s Vice President, Rupiah Banda, emerged victorious and called the election more than two weeks early, hoping that the opposition would be caught unprepared by the short timeline. Sections of the opposition – eager to make the most of another chance at the presidency – attempted to set aside their differences and form yet another coalition. On 16 August, Sata and Hakainde Hichilema (popularly known as HH) held a joint rally in Lusaka to protest cabinet members awarding themselves huge salary increases. The two had been trying to negotiate an alliance since early August, but with limited success. At the urging of his son, Lt Col Panji Kaunda, former President Kaunda met with UPND President Hichilema on 24 September to try to encourage the formation of an alliance with the PF. The following morning, the leaders of the PF and UPND met at Kaunda’s residence to discuss the formation of an electoral alliance to contest the election that was to be held in a month’s time. The meeting was brokered by Panji Kaunda, a known supporter of HH’s, who tried to persuade Sata to renounce his candidacy in support of Hichilema. “As you know, I support HH and the UPND; I saw a danger that [if] each opposition political party goes each way, they will split the votes,” Panji Kaunda argued. Following reports of the meeting’s collapse after Michael Sata and Guy Scott (the PF vice president) stormed out, Hichilema told reporters that “we cannot withdraw for Sata, unless there is another person of quality. Sata is just a dictator. We don’t want those dictatorial tendencies.” The pact had collapsed because the two politicians did not trust each other, each had refused to step aside for the other and the short timeline ahead of the polls did not allow for a compromise deal to be negotiated.

Meanwhile, at the MMD’s final rally in Mandevu township in Lusaka, Rupiah Banda rolled out a bevy of opposition leaders who had lined up to endorse him for the election, including

---

474 Silwamba and Malupenga.
the UNIP Vice-President, former Vice-President Christon Tembo, National Democratic Focus (NDF) President Mwila, ULP President Sakwiba Sikota and FDD President Edith Nawakwi.  

Nawakwi and the other opposition leaders launched into scathing critiques of the PF and UPND leaders, warning that if they won the election, the country would be plunged into instability. It had been alleged a few weeks earlier that the ruling party had been paying smaller opposition parties to endorse Banda’s presidential candidacy. The Secretary General of the Zambian Republican Party alleged to The Post that the party had resolved to endorse Hichilema for the presidency, but that a meeting with MMD presidential candidate Rupiah Banda and an envelope of K15 million (approximately $1 500) had changed the party president’s mind.  

As theorised by Arriola, this kind of ‘cash for support’ accusation is common in Zambia and elsewhere, with frequent reports emerging of party presidents and candidates paying off members of their own or other parties during electoral contests. Hichilema was accused of similar bribery during the UPND elective congress and the UDA’s candidate selection meeting in 2006. When the election was called in 2008, the PF’s campaign coffers were empty. The Taiwanese government, who had allegedly supported the PF campaign in 2006 had been embarrassed by Sata’s campaigning behaviour and would not offer further support in 2008.  

Senior PF representatives – including the secretary general – had approached US embassy staff in Lusaka for campaign donations as they did not have sufficient resources for the campaign or polling station agent deployment. However, despite their financial hardships, the PF declined the UPND’s advances. This suggests that, contrary to Arriola’s (2013) thesis, there is more at play than a simple exchange of funds for political support. When the presidential by-election results were announced, it became clear that, as in 2001 and 2006, the opposition had again garnered most of the votes – with a collective 58% compared to Rupiah Banda’s 40%.

478 ‘Michael Sata’; ‘Zambia Political Roundup’.  
479 ‘Michael Sata’. 
3.2.4 The PF-UPND Pact from 2009-2011

Coalition Formation

Less than ten days after the 2008 poll, the UPND began to consider the creation of another electoral alliance with the PF ahead of 2011.\textsuperscript{480} On 4 June 2009, the two parties signed a memorandum of understanding on the creation of an opposition coalition – known as ‘The Pact’ – with which to remove the MMD from power in the 2011 election.\textsuperscript{481} In response, the MMD moved quickly to confirm Rupiah Banda as the ruling party’s candidate in a ‘pre-emptive strike’ to enforce party discipline.\textsuperscript{482} It appeared that the battle lines had been drawn and Banda’s beleaguered MMD would finally face a united front that combined opposition strongholds in the north, the south and urban centres – potentially a demographically dominant alliance.\textsuperscript{483} The Pact managed – partly by virtue of the complementary constituencies held by the two parties – an impressive degree of coordination in parliamentary and local government by-elections. Wins in 60% of the parliamentary by-election races held between 2009 and 2011 made the Pact appear almost unassailable.

After the formation of the Pact, the alliance fronted joint candidates in ten parliamentary by-elections. Of the ten, the PF and UPND each won three seats, in their respective Northern, Copperbelt, North-Western and rural Lusaka strongholds. However, despite their remarkable outward success in winning by-elections and stifling intra-Pact competition, internal papers show high levels of distrust and disunity between the partners to the agreement. While the Pact tried to score political points early on by initiating impeachment procedures against President Rupiah Banda in July 2009, it back-fired when 18 PF MPs refused to support the motion,\textsuperscript{484} triggering distrust and disunity between the party’s parliamentary caucus and its

\textsuperscript{480} Kachali, ‘UPND Ponders Pact with PF’.
executive. This exacerbated tensions that had emerged when 22 PF members had refused to follow the party’s directive not to participate in President Banda’s National Constitutional Conference (NCC). The UPND had resolved to participate in the NCC, and ultimately voted in favour of introducing a constitutional clause that required that presidential hopefuls possess a university degree – automatically disqualifying Sata from the presidential race.\textsuperscript{485} This cemented disunity within the coalition which was exploited in the government press.\textsuperscript{486} Sata responded by stating in an interview that his presidential ambitions would not be deterred, while Hichilema retaliated by declaring that he would run in the presidential race.\textsuperscript{487} Inexplicably, the NCC ultimately threw out the degree clause,\textsuperscript{488} but the damage had already been done to trust within the Pact.

\textit{Coalition Collapse}

Much of the Pact’s internal discussion in 2010 – documented in Wynter Kabimba’s personal papers\textsuperscript{489} – related to how the two parties would split up the various provinces. The substance of most of the communications contained debates between the two which revolved around the allocation of seats in Western Province. As noted in the previous section, the UPND had suffered a devastating collapse in Western Province during the succession battle that followed Mazoka’s death in 2006. While the PF had not been the primary beneficiary of this collapse, the party had inherited some of the UPND’s structures in the province that had defected to the ULP. The UPND was determined to use the Pact to regain its previous levels of support in Western Province, but equally the PF saw the area as ripe for its own expansion. The marginalised region became a key Pact battlefield. Within internal PF documents, accusations flew that the UPND was trying to recruit PF members and leaders in the province.\textsuperscript{490} In

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{488} ‘NCC Tosses out Degree Clause’, \textit{Lusaka Times} (blog), 14 August 2010, https://www.lusakatimes.com/2010/08/14/ncc-tosses-degree-clause/.
\item \textsuperscript{489} Photographs of the documents cited are in the author’s possession and are available upon request.
\item \textsuperscript{490} Unknown, ‘Some Observations on the Pact’, ca 2010, Wynter Kabimba Personal Papers, Lusaka.
\end{itemize}
Solwezi in the North-Western Province, the PF had complained that the UPND had been distributing flyers that stated “Vote Hakainde Hichilema for President.” A few weeks later, PF officials in the Western Province wrote to the party’s secretariat to say that the UPND had been telling the public in Western Province that it had been allocated to them and was a “no go area for PF.” According to the PF officials, local UPND structures had been “assassinating the character of our Party President, the aspiring candidates and PF as a party… that is no [sic] all, they are busy poaching some of our aspiring candidates and influential members to join them.” The letter went on to request that the PF dissociate itself from the Pact. A flurry of letters passed between the two parties’ headquarters, but the UPND did not deny or dissociate itself from the accusations levelled by the PF’s local structures.

Parliamentary by-elections proved to be a key front as the two parties tried to jostle for supremacy within the coalition. The fight for Luena constituency in Western Province’s capital city of Mongu was particularly acrimonious, as both parties tried to lay claim to the province. In May 2010, the two parties convened a joint fact-finding mission to determine the relative strengths of the Pact members in Mongu ahead of the by-election to be held in August. They used a ‘random sampling’ technique while driving around the constituency and asking people the question “which party would you like to contest the Luena seat between UPND led by President Hakainde Hichilema and PF led by President Michael Sata?” Of the 67 people randomly selected, 52 were reportedly in favour of the UPND contesting the seat. During a meeting to discuss the results of the trip, the PF accused the UPND of having influenced the results through the airing of a radio programme the night before in which...

---

492 PF Kaoma District Chairman Chingi Kavindama and PF Kaoma District Political Secretary Joster Manjolo, ‘Letter from PF to UPND Regarding Conflicts within the Pact’, 12 January 2010, Wynter Kabimba Personal Papers, Lusaka.
UPND officials urged people to vote for the UPND rather than the PF.\textsuperscript{495} The distrust between the coalition partners deepened when the PF advertised for members to contest the by-election despite an agreement that the UPND would front the joint candidate.\textsuperscript{496} The UPND ultimately fronted the joint Pact candidate,\textsuperscript{497} but despite the findings of the fact-finding mission, the candidate placed a dismal third with only 21\% of the vote, undermining the party’s claims of its popularity in the West and reinforcing the PF’s suspicions that the informal survey had been rigged.\textsuperscript{498} There were frequent claims from both sides that the other was operating in bad faith, and this lack of trust undermined both the working relationship between the parties and the Pact’s prospects. In turn, the campaigns highlight how competition for the same seats forces opposition allies to compete amongst themselves, and raises the possibility that parties will behave cynically to outwit their competitor. This helps to foment distrust and undermines cooperation at the local (and potentially the national) level.

Throughout the life of the Pact, speculation was rife in both the government and independent media concerning who would lead the coalition in 2011. Internal discussion documents suggest that this question was glossed over and not addressed until early in election year. Reports surfaced in mid-February 2011 that the Pact had decided on an allocation of seats and cabinet posts – with the presidential seat going to Sata and Hichilema serving as his vice president.\textsuperscript{499} In addition, 60\% of parliamentary and cabinet positions were to go to the PF with 40\% of allocations going to the smaller UPND. These media reports would finally lead to the disintegration of the promising coalition. The allocations were mentioned as part of a confidential internal memo written by Professor Clive Chirwa – at that point the UPND Chairman for International Relations. The memo had been sent to the leadership of both parties for discussion when PF Secretary General, Wynter Kabimba, called a press conference and – flanked by senior party leaders Guy Scott and Inonge Wina – announced that a deal

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item UPND Secretary General Winstone S. Chibwe, ‘Letter from UPND to PF Regarding Participation of UPND in the Forthcoming By-Elections’, 23 June 2010, Wynter Kabimba Personal Papers, Lusaka.
\item Interview, Wynter Kabimba, Former PF Secretary General and Zambian Minister of Justice, 15 January 2015.
\item ‘The PF-UPND Pact Is Finally a Real Pact’, Zambia Weekly (blog), 18 February 2011.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
had been reached and Sata was to be the Pact candidate. In response, the UPND denied that it had sanctioned the document and castigated Kabimba for releasing it. Following a public war of words – covered extensively by the delighted government press – both parties declared that the Pact was dead.

Despite the obvious benefits of pooling the two parties’ complementary constituencies, it appears that neither party was entirely committed to the fractious partnership. During an interview with Guy Scott in 2015, shortly after the presidential by-election, Scott alleged that the 2011 Pact was in fact pushed by Xavier Chungu (the PF’s 2006 election campaign financier), who had tired of funding multiple parties. Despite the pressure from his funders, Sata was resistant to working with other members of the opposition. Sishuwa Sishuwa (2016) suggests that the reason for Sata’s unwillingness to enter into party coalitions was that he was determined to become the president and, as a result, would refuse to enter into any coalition where he would not be the presidential candidate. There is merit to this analysis, as Sata was indeed determined to elevate himself into the presidency, however the collapse of the Pact in 2011 was not solely attributable to Sata’s intransigence. The Pact agreement was ultimately scuppered by PF Secretary General Wynter Kabimba, when he called the press conference and publicly declared the Chirwa proposals to be Pact policy. Kabimba had presidential ambitions and was to be the first in line to succeed his ailing party president. The coalition with the UPND would have meant him ceding his position to the UPND president and possibly losing his place in line altogether. Ultimately, Kabimba’s gamble paid off as the party went on to win the 2011 elections alone, though his succession plans were later thwarted by Sata in 2014. This highlights the importance of lower-level party players in driving coalition collapse when their interests are threatened by inter-party cooperation.

The results of the 2011 elections – as depicted in the maps below – highlight the way in which the PF successfully merged a Northern ethno-regional campaign with Sata’s populist

503 Interview, Guy Leslie Scott, former PF and Zambian Vice President and Acting President.
messaging amongst more cosmopolitan urbanites on the Copperbelt and in Lusaka.\textsuperscript{504} In addition, through making promises and appealing to local grievances in Western Province, Sata managed to increase his vote-share in the province, gaining a surprising 23\% of the vote (just behind the UPND’s 28\% and Rupiah Banda’s 33\%) which helped to push him over the electoral threshold and into the presidency (see the green map in Figure 12).\textsuperscript{505} While this balancing of interests and constituencies was enough to get Sata into State House, his hold on government was fairly precarious. The PF had 60 members of parliament, just five parliamentary seats more than the displaced MMD and far short of a majority in the 150-seat parliament. For their part, the UPND became even more confined to the Southern and Western regions of the country, as its ascendancy in the east (as part of UDA in 2006) was checked in 2011 by the resurgence of the MMD in the eastern region (see Figure 11) – predominantly due to substantial support for easterner MMD President Rupiah Banda. While the MMD continued to have the greatest geographic spread of any party (common for ruling parties),\textsuperscript{506} the party gained relatively low proportions of votes in most constituencies (see the blue map in Figure 12). The 2011 results and Sata’s need to manufacture a parliamentary majority in the wake of electoral turnover would drastically reshape Zambian politics ahead of the next election in 2015.

\textsuperscript{506} Wahman, ‘Nationalized Incumbents and Regional Challengers: Opposition- and Incumbent-Party Nationalization in Africa’. 

162
Figure 11 The 2011 Zambian Presidential Election Results by Constituency (both plurality and majority)

The PF’s Presidential Vote
The MMD’s Presidential Vote

Figure 12 The 2011 Zambian Presidential Election Results of PF (green), MMD (blue) and UPND (red) in order of declining vote share
3.2.5 Informal Alliances and Political Realignment – The 2015 By-Election

As with most party coalitions, it is not possible to understand the drivers of coordination without understanding the realignments that occurred within parties over the course of a parliamentary cycle. The opposition United Party for National Development (UPND) – which since the rise of the PF in 2006 had been largely confined to its stronghold in the Southern Province – had begun a resurgence. Widely labelled as a ‘Tonga’ party, the UPND had ceased to be a national challenger after the disputed 2001 elections. But the ethnic group that comprises the party’s key constituency makes up only about 17% of the population, making it impossible for a party to win an election based solely upon the support of Tonga-speaking (and even allied) groups. Major shifts occurred within the former ruling party after their unanticipated loss in 2011, which provided an enormous opportunity to both the ruling PF and the ascendant UPND. Similarly, the fractures that opened within the PF during the drastic and hasty realignment that occurred in the wake of President Sata’s death in late 2014 caused a fundamental shifting of the political playing field and the apparent emergence of a two-party system. Under tight deadlines with an unexpected election looming, the opposition UPND managed to secure the electoral support of a series of notable politicians and smaller parties – forming a broad anti-PF alliance, while the ruling party was mired in a dirty succession struggle. Having learnt from Sata’s strategy to entice disgruntled members of other parties into his own individualised ‘coalition’ following the failure of the Pact coalition, Hichilema had spent the three years since the 2011 elections in dialogue with key party heavyweights, waiting for the political tide to turn. This preparation paid off as the PF appeared to implode before the 2015 election, and the UPND enticed the support (both formal and informal) of disgruntled members of the ruling party and the dwindling MMD.

Following the MMD’s bruising loss to the PF and Sata in 2011, the party underwent a process of introspection and reconfiguration, and then imploded. When Rupiah Banda stepped down from the party’s presidency in 2012, he hoped to ensure the election of a favourable – and malleable – successor. A contentious party convention witnessed the battle between Felix Mutati, a former Minister of Commerce and party notable and the eventual winner, Nevers Mumba, a former pastor and Vice President under Levy Mwanawasa. Since his election with a parliamentary minority in 2011, Sata’s strategy had been to buy off opposition MPs with
cabinet and government positions and trigger parliamentary by-elections to bolster his parliamentary contingent. The PF began its parliamentary consolidation by petitioning the results in 50 parliamentary constituencies where it had narrowly lost the race.\textsuperscript{507} Having learned from Mwanawasa’s post-2001 strategy, Sata divided the opposition by appointing 13 opposition MPs to serve in his government as ministers or deputy ministers. By May 2013, the defections and wins in by-elections prompted by this strategy had increased the PF’s representation in parliament to 71. As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the resource constraints and the personality-focused nature of Zambian political parties had led many former-MMD politicians to switch allegiance to the new governing party. For those who stayed within the MMD, they soon became disgruntled with the actions of the new party president who alienated and marginalised the losing faction after the 2012 election.

For the PF, the presidential by-election campaign began with a shaky start, marred by infighting, intimidation and intra-party violence.\textsuperscript{508} Following the announcement of Sata’s death on 28 October 2014, a rapid realignment occurred. Prior to his final trip to London, ailing Sata had announced that during his absence, Defence and Justice Minister Edgar Lungu would be the acting president. When Sata subsequently died, the succession battle that had been quietly raging in the background for nearly three years came to the fore. The amorphous succession struggle coagulated into two camps and a fight soon ensued between Guy Scott’s faction and Edgar Lungu’s faction. This was over whether the acting president at the time of the president’s death (Lungu) or the Vice President (Scott) would take on presidential duties during the 90-day window before a presidential by-election could be held.\textsuperscript{509} Ultimately, Scott continued as interim president, and the battle shifted to the selection of a new presidential candidate. The party was divided over the choice of Sata’s successor, with eleven candidates vying for the top job including Sata’s uncle, nephew, wife and a host of other heavyweights. Acting President Scott attempted to block Lungu’s rise at every turn while trying to position his preferred candidate – Deputy Commerce Minister Miles Sampa – for the party’s top

\textsuperscript{509} Beardsworth.
Following a long string of accusations, suspensions, court injunctions and public spats that played out in the media, the party only united behind Lungu just before the nomination of presidential candidates on 20 December 2014. With only a month left to campaign and a relatively unknown candidate for the presidency, Lungu played on President Sata’s popularity and charisma, standing on a platform of ‘continuity’ and positioning himself as the guardian of the late president’s legacy.

**Forming a Broad Coalition**

In contrast to the PF, the opposition wasted little time. Foreign businessmen with a stake in Zambian businesses – many of whom saw the PF as ‘anti-business’ – sought to influence the outcome of the elections by facilitating the formation of an alliance between the MMD and UPND. *Africa Confidential* reported that prior to Sata’s funeral on 11 November, the South African Oppenheimer-funded Brenthurst Foundation had sponsored a meeting in South Africa between Hichilema and Rupiah Banda (who had links to the foundation and still commanded significant support within the MMD) to try to facilitate a coalition to oust the PF. The coalition formateurs represented business interests in mining (Anglo-American) and arms and aerospace (Paramount Group, represented by Ivor Ichikowitz) who seemingly hoped that under a new, more amenable political dispensation, their interests would be better served. Regional business elites were dissatisfied with the PF largely due to policy inconsistency and unpredictability, which was creating an insecure investment environment and undermining their returns. It was also due to alleged rent seeking behaviour on the part of ruling party members and the PF’s tendency to award contracts only to foreign firms that could pay larger bribes. In addition, the mining tax regime introduced by the PF in 2014 threatened to significantly cut into mining profits and had undermined investor confidence and finally, business leaders had far greater confidence in a future

---


511 ‘Foreign Boost for Opposition’.

512 Both UPND leaders – Anderson Mazoka and Hakainde Hichilema – had substantial links to the mining conglomerate.

513 Interview, Anonymous, Western Diplomat in Zambia, 10 February 2015.

UPND administration due to Hichilema’s significant business background and pro-business political platforms. The Brenthurst Foundation had allegedly invited the leaders together as their research had shown that none of the opposition parties could win the election without the backing of the others. The coalition negotiation meetings between Hichilema and Banda were brokered by former Nigerian President and Brenthurst Chair Olusegun Obasanjo, who asked Banda to supply a list of lieutenants to be appointed as ministers in a potential Hichilema cabinet. In return for supporting the UPND president, it was expected that Hichilema would restore Banda’s immunity from prosecution, ensure that corruption charges were dropped against Banda’s son Henry – who was living in exile – and grant him a prestigious government position. Banda initially agreed to the deal but, recognising his strong negotiating position, he went back on the agreement when asked to sign a formal MoU a few days later. Banda insisted that Hichilema should support him instead, and the talks ultimately collapsed. Meanwhile, Rupiah Banda returned to Lusaka to foment an insurrection within the MMD – which was still heavily reliant on his funding – and stage his own push for the presidency.

Following the breakdown of the talks with the former president, the negotiators sought to bypass Banda, and flew MMD President Nevers Mumba to South Africa to offer him a similar deal. The meeting ended in a stalemate when the MMD’s Muhabi Lungu said that the leaders were unable to reach such a decision amongst themselves, and would need to put it to the National Executive Committee (NEC) instead. The two leaders agreed to continue talks in Lusaka following Sata’s funeral on 11 November, and the negotiating teams (minus the leaders) came up with a template for the agreement. The mooted agreement suggested that whoever ran for the presidency in the 2015 by-election would stand down for their

---


513 Interview, Anonymous, Western Diplomat in Zambia.

514 Presidents in Zambia are immune from prosecution, but this immunity can be (and often is) lifted by their successors. Rupiah Banda’s immunity was lifted by Justice Minister Wynter Kabimba in March 2013 when the Sata administration decided to pursue criminal charges against Banda for corruption. Banda’s immunity was finally restored by the Lungu administration in 2016 as the state withdrew all charges against the former president.

515 ‘Foreign Boost for Opposition’.


517 Muhabi Lungu is of no relation to Edgar Lungu, and was at that time the MMD’s National Secretary. He attended the Brenthurst negotiations with Nevers Mumba in South Africa.
supporter in the 2016 election – a scheduled tri-partite election which was to be held in just over 18 months. The draft agreement also suggested that whichever party was granted the presidential ticket, they should only be granted 40% of the cabinet posts, while their partner should be granted 60% of the portfolios in cabinet. Muhabi Lungu, who largely drafted the proposed agreement, confided that many of the clauses that he included were intended to test the commitment of the UPND to an ‘equal’ arrangement: “there were a number of issues that were specifically designed – one, to determine their level of seriousness and genuineness and trust, and secondly to be able to determine whether they were actually prepared to cede control and whether they were willing to govern in a real coalition.” The distrust between the partners and unwillingness on both sides to cede the top position or negotiate an unfavourable arrangement largely scuppered the talks.

In the same week that party leaders were meeting in South Africa, a meeting was held between the MPs from various parliamentary opposition parties. At this meeting, the MP’s – including approximately half of the MMD’s parliamentary contingent – decided to coordinate their actions ahead of the looming presidential by-election. They believed it to be necessary as they were convinced that none of the opposition parties could win alone, and they named the mooted coalition the ‘Jubilee Alliance’, perhaps inspired by the Jubilee Alliance in Kenya which had won the country’s presidential election the previous year. The MPs involved in discussions to form this coalition were from the ADD, MMD, UPND and an independent MP – Lubansenshi MP Patrick Mucheleka. These MPs agreed to engage the leadership of their various parties on the formation of a broad alliance, to back the UPND’s presidential campaign. The majority of this committee was MMD, with two MPs per province represented in the meeting – including some Eastern Province MPs who would later support a ‘mutiny’ in favour of Rupiah Banda. At the MMD’s NEC meeting held on 16 November, MPs were briefed on the discussions that had taken place at both executive and parliamentary caucus levels and a report was tabled on the forging of a formal alliance between the MMD

520 Interview, Muhabi Lungu, Former MMD National Secretary, 23 February 2015.
521 Interview, Muhabi Lungu.
522 Interview, Felix Mutati, Former MMD Minister of Energy and Minister of Trade, Industry and Commerce.
523 Interview, Felix Mutati.
524 The single MP from the FDD was also implicitly involved, but didn’t want to be seen to be subverting his party’s agenda.
525 Interview, Felix Mutati, Former MMD Minister of Energy and Minister of Trade, Industry and Commerce.
and the UPND. But it was at this meeting that events began to unravel – as former President Rupiah Banda staged his bid for the party’s presidential nomination.

At the MMD NEC meeting on Sunday 16 November 2014, following discussions of the modalities of an opposition alliance and the appointment of a committee to negotiate formally with the UPND, the next item on the agenda was the selection of the presidential candidate for the upcoming election. It was expected by many that the meeting would endorse President Mumba, but it soon became apparent that Rupiah Banda had a critical mass of supporters on the NEC – predominantly Eastern Province MPs and committee members. The meeting was adjourned following a lack of consensus on the choice of candidate, and the two leaders were requested to report back following discussions the following day. Rumours spread on the 17 November that Mumba was seeking an injunction against the holding of the meeting and the finalisation of the choice of candidate, and in response, the Banda-supporting faction held their own parallel NEC meeting. Nevers Mumba was overruled and Rupiah Banda was installed as the ‘official’ candidate for the MMD. In response, each leader suspended the other and their supporters in parallel NEC meetings, which were decried as illegal by the opposing side, and finally Mumba took the issue to court. A protracted court battle ensued in which the two party leaders tried to wrest control of the party from the other. Rupiah Banda appeared to be in control of the party secretariat and running battles were staged between cadres loyal to the two factions outside the party’s headquarters in Kabulonga.

When Nevers Mumba was finally reinstated on 18 November 2014, following a Supreme Court judgement, it was agreed that he would be engaged to join the de facto alliance that

---

526 Interview, Bradford Machila, Former MMD MP for Kafue, 2 February 2015; Interview, Professor Geoffrey Lungwangwa, Former MMD (current UPND) MP for Nalikwanda.
528 Interview, Muhabi Lungu, Former MMD National Secretary.
529 Interview, Muhabi Lungu.
had emerged between the UPND and 22 of the MMD’s MPs. But instead, contrary to the wishes of the majority of the MMD’s MPs and the NEC, Mumba decided to register to contest the by-election on the MMD’s ticket with the backing of just two of the party’s parliamentarians.\textsuperscript{533} As for Rupiah Banda, he and approximately five Eastern Province MMD MPs aligned themselves with the PF, and vowed to deliver the MMD’s support in the East for PF candidate Edgar Lungu. Mumba’s decision was difficult to understand, and two reasons were offered for his choice.\textsuperscript{534} The first was that he – never having contested a national election as MMD president – out of ego and an inflated sense of his own popularity, wanted to take his chances in the election. The second was due to financial concerns.\textsuperscript{535} Several MMD MPs suggested that Mumba had decided to contest because he had already made commitments to and received and spent finances from his backers, and was thus unable to change course. Mumba (an ordained pastor and head of his own ministry) had also allegedly received a prophecy from two different West African churches who had predicted that he would be the next president – something which he reportedly firmly believed.\textsuperscript{536} Again, another newly-elected party president declined a financial incentive and the potentially high returns from cooperation for supporting a stronger candidate, and opted to run independently despite there being no reasonable prospects of success.

\textit{The Broad Alliance and the Campaign}

On 23 November, the UPND launched its electoral campaign at a small, Chinese-owned hotel in downtown Lusaka. Despite the collapse of negotiations with both MMD leaders, the campaign launch was attended by a who’s-who of Zambian politics. Maureen Mwanawasa – the popular widow of former President Mwanawasa – sat to Hichilema’s right, while controversial veteran MMD politician and diplomat Vernon Mwaanga\textsuperscript{537} and former Secretary to Cabinet Sketchley Sacika sat far to the left. The event was also attended by

\textsuperscript{533} Interview, Bradford Machila, Former MMD MP for Kafue, 2 February 2015; Interview, Professor Geoffrey Lungwangwa, Former MMD (current UPND) MP for Nalikwanda.

\textsuperscript{534} Interview, Muhabi Lungu, Former MMD National Secretary; Interview, Bradford Machila, Former MMD MP for Kafue, 2 February 2015; Interview, Professor Geoffrey Lungwangwa, Former MMD (current UPND) MP for Nalikwanda.

\textsuperscript{535} Interview, Professor Geoffrey Lungwangwa, Former MMD (current UPND) MP for Nalikwanda.

\textsuperscript{536} Interview, Muhabi Lungu, Former MMD National Secretary.

\textsuperscript{537} Mwaanga is an old UNIP-era politician with substantial wealth and power who had been instrumental in funding and driving the rise of Rupiah Banda to the head of the MMD in 2008. Cheeseman and Hinfelaar, ‘Parties, Platforms, and Political Mobilization’. 
Rupiah Banda’s son Andrew, Geoffrey Samukonga, the former MMD MP for Chawama, former army commander Malimba Masheke, former MMD Chimbamilonga MP Brian Sikazwe and former MMD treasurer Suresh Desai. Each of these well-known personalities endorsed the UPND leader for the presidency, and continued to do so at a massive rally held hours later in the low-income, high-density Kanyama constituency in Lusaka. Several notable personalities turned up for Hichilema’s rally including former MMD Defence Minister Michael Mabenga, former Mines Minister Maxwell Mwale, political activist Dante Saunders, former MMD Foreign Affairs Minister Kelly Walubita, former MMD Minister of Commerce Dipak Patel and popular local musician Pilato.

In the days that followed, other high profile leaders and politicians offered their endorsements of the UPND candidate, including ADD President Charles Milupi. The group of parliamentarians that had agreed to endorse Hichilema did so at a media briefing outside parliament and again at a press conference where a memorandum was handed over to Hichilema by the group’s leader, MMD MP Felix Mutati. The endorsements made the so-called ‘Tonga’ party appear to be more ethnically and regionally diverse, as Northerners, Westerners and politicians from Central, Lusaka and Copperbelt Provinces lined up to support the party’s presidential candidate. Despite the failure to form a formal coalition with any major opposition party (except the small ADD), the UPND had created a broad alliance with prominent individuals that would help to redefine its political fortunes. Charles Milupi – a member of the traditional leadership in Mongu, Western Province – was elected MP for Luena in a 2011 by-election on the ticket of his Alliance for Democracy and Development

---

540 Field notes, 23 November 2014.
(ADD) party. He had formed the party after splitting from the MMD and intended to use it to enlist dissatisfied members of the UPND and MMD in Western Province to build a base and launch pad for Lozi political demands.\textsuperscript{544} The Lozi leader had come fourth with 11\% of the vote in Western Province in 2011, and had won the presidential vote in Luena constituency. In 2015, Milupi threw his weight (and his finances)\textsuperscript{545} behind Hichilema, while the party was also actively supported by the campaign efforts of MMD MPs across the country.

Ultimately around 20 MMD MPs actively supported the UPND’s campaign, with several others displaying lower levels of commitment. In some places – such as Kasama Central – disgruntled PF MPs also gave implicit support to Hichilema’s campaign, ensuring that cadres were discouraged from tearing down posters, beating opposition supporters and encouraging their supporters to attend the UPND’s campaign rallies. Kasama had previously been a site of significant violence during elections, not least because of the influence of the area’s PF MP, Geoffrey Bwalya Mwamba (popularly known as GBM).\textsuperscript{546} However, in 2015, he was a relatively peripheral member of the anti-Lungu camp within the PF, and as such, he helped to facilitate Hichilema’s campaign in the PF’s Bemba heartland by arranging transport to rallies and preventing his cadres from pulling down opposition posters.

Despite the failure of the executive-level coalition with the MMD, the alliance formed with the 20 MMD MPs was surprisingly effective in changing the electoral fortunes of the UPND. In trying to understand how this came about, it is important to consider how the PF grew between 2001 and 2011. Sishuwa Sishuwa (2016) notes that Sata’s strategy was to grow his party through ‘elite inclusion’, that as local political elites became disenchanted with the MMD or fell out of favour with the leadership, they were approached by Sata and his party. A common thread from all the MMD MPs who supported the UPND in 2015 was that they had all been approached by Hichilema, either in person or through an intermediary, between

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{545} One of Zambia’s wealthiest politicians, Charles Milupi had declared his personal assets to be ZMK 35.5 billion (3.7 million USD) in 2011.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
2011 and 2016. A significant portion of the coalitions literature assumes that every coalition negotiation represents a negotiation between elites who have no links or ties, and that each attempt requires the building of relationships and trust. However, in Zambia (as in many other countries), while parties may be relatively unstable (forming and disappearing between election cycles), the collection of politicians that populate them is relatively stable over time. Many of these politicians had served together in a party or coalition previously, or were childhood friends. Politicians leverage these affective ties to build coalitions and alliances when elite cohesion within the ruling party (or other opposition parties) breaks down or the party appears capable of losing an electoral contest. Hichilema learnt from Sata’s party-building strategy and had approached and persuaded enough politicians from within the ruling PF and MMD that when party-level coalitions faltered, his mobilisation strategy remained effective based on individualised elite inclusion. At rallies in high density areas, public ‘defections’ of local elites and councillors (and even the occasional entire MMD or PF branch office) were staged, to the delighted cries of the crowds. The UPND had learnt from the populist toolkit of Michael Sata, and used his tactics to increase the profile and vote-share of the UPND in 2015.

According to most observers including the public and independent press, the 2015 election was significantly marked by regional and ethnic voting patterns and was, in the eyes of one diplomatic observer, a “very tribally determined election.” There was a clear split between former North Eastern Rhodesia (Northern, Eastern, Muchinga and Luapula Provinces) and North Western Rhodesia (Western, Southern, North-Western, and Central Provinces), almost down to the constituency (see Figure 13). It was expected that the former ruling party would perform badly, but the full extent of its collapse was astounding: Nevers Mumba’s MMD declined by 973,000 votes compared to 2011, receiving just over 15,000 votes out of a total of 1.7 million. By comparison, HH’s share of the vote climbed by nearly 30% from 18% in 2011 to 47% in 2015 – from a distant third-placed candidate to losing the election by just 27,000 votes. The UPND’s inclusion of local elites bolstered its vote share in non-traditional constituencies, gaining 25% of the vote in Lunte Constituency (HH received

547 Gandhi and Reuter, ‘The Incentives for Pre-Electoral Coalitions in Non-Democratic Elections’.
548 Interview, Anonymous, Western Diplomat in Zambia.
549 I have left the two most populous and urbanised provinces (Lusaka and Copperbelt) out of the grouping, as urban voting dynamics differ significantly from more rural constituencies.
just 0.9% there in 2011) in the Northern Province, on the back of steady campaigning in the region and the support of MMD MP Felix Mutati. In the Northern Province capital’s Kasama Central constituency, with the implicit support of PF MP Geoffrey Bwalya Mwamba, the UPND attained 22% of the vote – a dramatic rise from less than 1% five years earlier. Having gained few votes in the Northern and Eastern regions as well as the urban Copperbelt and Lusaka Provinces in 2011 (refer to the maps in Section 3.2.4), 31% of the UPND’s vote share came from these non-traditional regions in 2015. However, the clear majority (60%) of Hichilema’s vote share still came from the party’s three stronghold provinces – Southern, Western and North-Western Provinces, while Central Province also swung behind the Southerner. The spread of the UPND’s vote share in 2015 is illustrated by the red map in Figure 14. The UPND consolidated its vote share in its strongholds but the party also managed to gain at least 3% of the vote in every constituency, and gained significant ground in the Eastern, Central and far Northern regions. The informal alliance formed around the 2015 by-election would set the stage for a highly contentious and competitive election just 18 months later.

---

550 This was the combined share of Hichilema’s vote that came from Northern, Luapula, Muchinga, Eastern, Copperbelt and Lusaka Provinces.
As some of the constituency boundaries had changed between 2011 and 2015 but the electoral boundaries were only consolidated in 2016, the 2016 boundaries have been used and the constituency results averaged.
over new districts and constituencies (approximately 6). This had relatively little impact on the appearance of the maps.
3.2.6 Consolidating the Playing Field in 2016

Much of the literature on coalitions assumes that a two-round majority voting system discourages first round pre-electoral coalitions, that in circumstances where a strong-but-divided opposition can force the ruling party under the 50% threshold, opposition parties often opt to contest separately and coalesce in the event of a second round.\textsuperscript{552} However, in Zambia in 2016 the opposite was true. Opposition MMD MP Felix Mutati noted in 2015 that “On the basis that the new constitution is passed and there is the 50%+1, there will be no single party that is going to cross the 50+1. So, it will give a much, much stronger case for alliances.”\textsuperscript{553} In 2016, this change to the electoral laws prompted rapid-fire bargaining between opposition parties who believed that a united opposition would have a ‘demonstration’ and ‘contagion’ effect, increasing the proportion of the vote that the opposition could draw and increasing the likelihood of victory. As was the case in Zambia, opposition parties rarely trust that a second-round election will be fair – as Zimbabwe’s experience in 2008 demonstrated – and prefer to win decisively in a first round before the ruling party can regroup and force an electoral victory. This may help to explain why the literature on the relationship between electoral systems and the likelihood of coalition formation is plagued by divergent conclusions; there are hidden intervening variables such as the opposition’s levels of trust in the fairness of the electoral system. In Senegal, which has a long history of democratic elections and some stability in the party system, coalitions are most frequently formed in the second round, and ruling parties have consistently lost to electoral challengers under such circumstances.\textsuperscript{554} The level of trust in the system is clearly high enough to allow parties to negotiate following an inconclusive first round, rather than believing that the stakes are too high to allow for a first-round loss.

In the 2016 Zambian election, what might be considered an atypical coalition or broad alliance was formed. Most studies of coalitions have a high threshold for what they consider to be electorally significant coalitions, in most instances they code only coalitions in which

\textsuperscript{553} Interview, Felix Mutati, Former MMD Minister of Energy and Minister of Trade, Industry and Commerce.
the junior partner to the coalition received at least 5% of the vote in the previous election – suggesting that they were electorally important.\(^{555}\) Intuitively this makes sense, but it tends to obscure other important dynamics around the role of political notables and their personal networks in party mobilisation. In Zambia, as this chapter has outlined, parties are made up of collections of notable politicians who have developed their own local patronage and political structures, and who are often able to campaign on the basis of those structures and appeals to ethno-linguistic ties. These individuals are tied to particular constituencies or regions where they have developed a base, and they may be able to wield that support in favour of the ‘coalition.’ When, as in 2015 and 2016, these politicians defect to a party that has previously been seen as appealing to a narrow ethno-linguistic group and campaign alongside the leader of that party, it makes the party appear to be more national in character and to represent a broader range of identity groups. This effect is even more pronounced when many such notables join a party’s campaign, entreating their co-ethnics to vote for a non-co-ethnic party leader. In Zambia, such individualised coalition-building or ‘elite inclusion’ is also a response to the failure of previous multi-party coalitions, to sidestep complex negotiations and coalition instability.

The 2016 Zambian coalition was officially formed between the UPND and two smaller parties, Miles Sampa’s United Democratic Front (UDF) and Charles Milupi’s ADD – with Nevers Mumba’s faction of the MMD joining later in the campaign. While the ADD is almost completely electorally insignificant – coming fourth in 2011 with 0.95% of the national presidential vote – Charles Milupi is one of the wealthiest politicians in Zambia. Although no details have been leaked of the deal struck between the two parties, it is likely that Milupi contributed significant funds towards the campaign in return for an important position in the future cabinet. At the same time, as noted in the previous section, Milupi is an important figure in the traditional leadership structures of the Lozi-speaking Western Province, and he had built up an independent political base for himself in the province. Milupi had placed fourth in Western Province’s 2011 presidential race, with a reasonable 11% of the vote and a winning count in a single constituency. Although the alliance with the ADD would add

\(^{555}\) Gandhi and Reuter, ‘The Incentives for Pre-Electoral Coalitions in Non-Democratic Elections’. 
little at the national level, it made the UPND appear more inclusive and more able to garner votes in the western region of the country.

As for the UDF – it had not existed in previous elections and had a relatively small following, but was nonetheless important. The UDF president, Miles Sampa, is the nephew of popular former president Michael Sata, and was a key member of the PF. He is a Bemba-speaking politician who set up his own party after losing to Lungu in the race to succeed Sata at the helm of the PF in early 2015. Following the frustration of their attempts to run their own presidential candidate in August 2016, the UDF allied itself to the UPND – broadening the UPND’s appeal to Bemba-speaking voters – who make up 33.5% of the population and reside predominantly in the rural Northern, Muchinga, Luapula and Copperbelt provinces. 

Nevers Mumba – another Bemba-speaking politician – brought his faction of the MMD into the UPND’s broad coalition, and campaigned extensively on its behalf in Bemba-speaking regions. The UPND was also able to attract the endorsements of a wide range of Bemba-speaking politicians and prominent personalities from other parties, including late President Sata’s son as well as veteran politicians Robert Sichinga and Vernon Mwaanga. These politicians went on to appear at UPND rallies in Bemba-speaking regions, entreatng fellow citizens to vote for the party. At the same time, most of the MMD MPs who had supported the UPND in 2015 resigned from their parties and contested their seats on a UPND ticket in 2016. Four Western Province MMD MP’s also defected to the UPND, and were ultimately re-elected on the party’s ticket.

The existing literature on coalitions is unable to account for the broad alliance that emerged (which may appear as little more than a collection of notables) and their impact on the election results. According to the coding used by most scholars in the field, neither the UDF nor the MMD coalition with the UPND would be considered significant as the MMD had received less than 1% of the vote in the previous election and the UDF didn’t exist prior to 2016. Yet it is clear that the coalition had a significant impact at the subnational level, and ultimately at the national level. On the Copperbelt, the UPND went from 3.5% of the vote in 2011 to 35% in 2016. Similarly, in Northern Province the party had received 0.78% in 2011.

---

556 According to the 2014 Census Report, Bemba is spoken by 33.5% of the population, and is spoken by a majority of citizens in Copperbelt (83.9%), Luapula (71.3%), Muchinga (49.6%) and Northern (69.2%) Provinces.
but 22% in 2016. Contrary to existing hypotheses regarding the nature of ‘ethnic voting’ in Zambia and the limited support of the UPND outside of Southern Province, 45% of HH’s 2016 vote share came from the predominantly Bemba-speaking Copperbelt, Muchinga, Luapula and Northern Provinces, as well as Nyanja-speaking Eastern and Lusaka Provinces – areas outside of the UPND’s traditional strongholds. This suggests that the cross-ethnic alliance that was built by the UPND was successful in its attempts to broaden the party’s support beyond its traditional electoral base. The UPND chose to create a broad coalition and a strategy of inclusion because it needed to broaden its appeal beyond its traditional strongholds. The party found itself in a strong bargaining position as it had become the largest opposition contender after the 2015 presidential by-election where it proved its capacity to win, though the UPND still lost the election by just 27,000 votes.

As for the FDD President Edith Nawakwi, who had been the UPND’s alliance partner in 2006, she had placed third but garnered just 0.9% of the popular vote in 2015. As Hichilema sent out his envoys to approach politicians to join him in a coalition, an envoy was sent to invite the FDD leader to join the alliance. When she was approached to join an opposition coalition in 2016, she insisted that she should lead the alliance because she had supported the opposition front-runner in a 2006 coalition, and it was now his turn to support her. This was despite the low likelihood of FDD success at the ballot box, the UPND’s proven levels of support in 2015 and the likely exchange of offers of financial incentives to encourage the FDD leader to join Hichilema’s campaign. This suggests firstly that politicians’ experiences in previous coalitions (as noted in the section on the 2006 UDA) do help to shape the likelihood of entering into another coalition in the future, and secondly that financial incentives are insufficient motivators of coalition behaviour.

The UPND has, historically, had a very limited impact in Bemba-speaking regions. When the presidential election was held in 2011, the UPND received over 71% of the vote in its Southern Province stronghold, but took just 0.78% and 3.57% in Bemba-speaking Northern and Copperbelt Provinces respectively. In the 2015 and 2016 elections, three things were

---

557 Or areas populated by the so-called Bantu Botatwe – the Toka, Tonga, Ila, Sala, Lenje, Totela and Subiya. These groups tend to be concentrated in Western, Central and Southern Provinces. They are often also lumped together with the Lozi (Western Province) and Lunda, Luvale, Kaonde (North Western Province) as they have voted along the same lines in recent elections.

558 Interview, Bradford Machila, Former MMD MP for Kafue, 17 August 2016.
different. The first was that the UPND campaigned extensively in the North, something that they did not have the resources (or incentives) to do in 2011. The second difference was that between 2011 and 2015, the UPND had actively courted prominent Bemba-speaking politicians – predominantly those marginalised within the MMD and PF – resulting in a powerful line-up of Northern and Copperbelt elites joining the party on the campaign trail in 2015 and 2016. The third was the absence of a viable Bemba party leader – someone who commands support in Bembaphone provinces in the way that Sata had done between 2006 and 2014 when he died. The absence of such a leader meant that Bemba-speaking voters had to find another leader either from their own ethno-linguistic group or beyond it, perhaps from parties where one or more Bembas occupied senior or top leadership positions. Because of both the MMD’s implosion and the PF’s shifting internal balance of power, marginalised Bemba politicians from within both parties were susceptible to the UPND’s advances and they helped the party to rebrand and appear more diverse. Critically, a northern Bemba-speaking former PF heavyweight – Geoffrey Bwalya Mwamba – was appointed party Vice President and presidential running mate in 2016 after he defected from the ruling party. The UPND’s National Chairperson, Mutale Nalumango, was another prominent Northerner who had deserted the MMD a few years earlier to join the UPND. The coalition with MMD President Nevers Mumba and the UDF’s Miles Sampa was also used to bulk up the representation of Bemba-speaking politicians. These politicians campaigned almost exclusively in the Bemba-speaking provinces, trying to change preconceptions of the UPND’s mono-ethnic disposition using a range of economic, class-based and ethnic appeals to Bemba-speaking voters.559 By 2016, Hichilema was speaking Bemba on the campaign trail in Bembaphone provinces, attempting to change widespread perceptions (peddled by opposing politicians) that he was just a Tonga ‘tribalist.’560 At the same time – and because of the collapse of the MMD’s electoral viability – the UPND consolidated the anti-incumbent vote around the country.

559 Rally Recordings, Field Notes and Translations from Kafue (18 December), Kasama (14 December) and Mtendere (10 January), 2014.
It is clear from Figure 15 below that the polarisation of the political space into two camps which began with the 2015 by-election was consolidated in 2016. The MMD supported the UPND president and did not run their own candidate, which meant that the 2016 election was effectively between the PF and UPND. The third-placed candidate, Edith Nawakwi, received just 24 000 votes or 0.7% of the total vote. President Edgar Lungu was re-elected by a wafer-thin margin, making it over the new 50% threshold by 0.35% of the vote, or 13 022 ballots. The difference between the tallies of the two candidates was 100 000 votes, with Hichilema taking 48% of the total. As noted above, the results were remarkable for the extent that the UPND branched out beyond its traditional base, garnering at least 6% of the vote in every constituency across the country and receiving 92%, 87% and 82% in Southern, North-Western and Western Provinces respectively. But even in provinces where the party had previously performed extremely poorly, Hichilema’s results were surprising. The UPND received 22%, 16%, 14% and 13% from Northern, Eastern, Luapula and Muchinga provinces respectively. Despite his ethnicity and because of his broad coalition, Hichilema consolidated the national anti-incumbent vote and came within inches of winning the presidency against a sitting incumbent. This challenges the ‘ethnic census’ model of African electoral behaviour, suggesting that voters are more open to voting for candidates outside of their ethno-linguistic groups than is generally recognised. This appears to confirm the research of Basedau and Stroh (2011) that “elite strategies, cross-cutting cleavages, and rational preferences” are also important drivers of voting behaviour. In Zambia in 2015 and 2016, the atypical coalitions that were formed through both elite inclusion and multi-party pacts were successful at rebranding the UPND, and enabling the party to draw on larger and more diverse electoral constituencies.

561 It must be noted that there were some serious concerns about the totals at several polling stations, particularly in Lusaka, where PF cadres forced observers out of polling stations during the count and the opposition was never given verified forms from polling station officials which outlined the final tally. In addition, there were reports of boxes of pre-ticked ballots found in some constituencies. The slow pace of counting and reporting by the Zambian Electoral Commission (predominantly in Lusaka, where counting and reporting should have been easiest) heightened suspicions that the tallies were being adjusted in favour of the ruling party.

562 Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. 

183
Figure 15 The 2016 Zambian Presidential Election Results by Constituency

The PF’s Presidential Vote Share
Figure 16 The 2016 Zambian Presidential Election Results of PF (green) and UPND (red) in order of declining vote share
3.3 From Coalitions to Elite Inclusion

\textit{Why Coalesce?}

Despite the lack of scholarly coverage, opposition coalitions – both formal and those characterised by elite inclusion – are a frequent feature of Zambian electoral politics. When opposition fragmentation allowed the unpopular ruling MMD to retain the presidency with less than a majority of the vote in each poll since 2001, opposition parties frequently sought to address this by building coalitions to bring together their diverse electoral constituencies. Parties in Zambia have always been perceived, to varying degrees and by various groups, to represent the interests of one ethno-linguistic group or region.\footnote{Posner, \textit{Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa}, 107.} Without a clear majority ethno-linguistic group, parties were forced to seek out cooperation with others who could draw on complementary constituencies to build a winning majority. But despite these frequent attempts to forge unity, it continued to elude the main opposition parties.

\textit{Why Collapse?}

Politicians are aware that coalitions are likely to increase their ability to defeat the ruling party – and thus are mooted at every election – but they often collapsed due to vested interests at various levels of the party, or because of grievances formed in previous rounds of coalition negotiations. Crucially, the existing literature on coalitions fails to take parties seriously, treating them as though they are little more than vehicles for the personal political advancement of the party leader. While parties in Zambia are highly personalised, it is often at the lower echelons of the party that the most resistance to coalitions is present. This was the case during the 2011 Pact between the UPND and the PF – when, despite the complementary constituencies held by the two parties and the demographic dominance it allowed, the coalition was scuppered by the PF Secretary General who was concerned about his own position in the coalition and resulting government. While it is usually easier to negotiate a coalition when parties are not competing for the same seats (as was largely the case in 2006), the 2011 Pact shows that this can also be a fraught process, as a lack of trust and vested interests in both parties can lead to very public spats and the collapse of a promising alliance. The Kabimba Papers show that the intra-coalition competition for the parliamentary seats in ‘expansion zones,’ or areas where neither party has a clear claim to the
constituencies, can help to foment distrust and undermine the parties’ working relationship. Such public spats and divisions can also damage the partners to a coalition and possibly reduce their share of the national vote – making coalition-formation a risky and potentially-costly exercise.

While Arriola (2013) proposes a ‘pecuniary’ theory of coalition building where coalitions are only likely to be formed in countries with a liberalised financial sector, which affords businesspeople the independence to be able to finance opposition coalitions, this chapter argues that the role of finances in coalition formation are significantly more complex. Funding for coalitions may also come from outside the country – as in the 2015 presidential by-election – and even that may not be enough to persuade political elites to back the strongest opposition contender. In 2015, despite the financial and other incentives on the table, the MMD’s Rupiah Banda took his allegiance to the ruling PF while Nevers Mumba opted to contest the election alone, contrary to advice from within his own party. The deals brokered frequently involve both the exchanging of promises of future positions, and financial incentives – either used to fund campaigns or to ‘sweeten the deal’ and entice an opponent to cede their claims to a position. But whose deal is accepted is frequently a function of the subject’s assessment of where they are likely to receive the most benefits and face the lowest costs. If it appears that the ruling party is likely to lose, promises of positions may ring hollow and larger financial incentives may be required, or smaller opposition leaders may just flock to the strongest opposition candidate as they believe that having a small stake in the state is better than making a lucrative short-term deal to then be locked out of future positions within a new governing party.

The evidence in this chapter also suggests that coalitions are easier to form when there are reliable indicators of party strength – as this helps parties to make more informed decisions as to the electoral viability of the various candidates and the potential division of future benefits. In 2001, most of the parties to the nascent coalition were just a few months old, and headed by formerly prominent politicians from the MMD government. Each party appeared to be well-funded, and speculation abounded regarding the electoral viability of each. In the absence of reliable indicators of party strength, each party leader could make excessive demands which ultimately scuppered the negotiations. However, after the 2001 elections, it was apparent that the UPND was by far the most popular party in the opposition,
and the ‘strongholds’ of each of the other parties had become apparent, making coalition negotiations more straightforward. In later coalitions, calculations regarding the dispersal of positions and benefits were made based on electoral support in the previous election – though several parties still made untenable demands that were unsupported by their levels of popular support.

Similarly to the Ugandan case, newly-elected party leaders who have not yet competed in a national election are less likely to enter into multi-party coalitions in which they are not the leader (See Table 5). The reasons for this may vary, though it appears that they often overestimate their levels of popular support, and need to be accountable to their political and financial backers. Opposition leaders in Zambia – as outlined at the beginning of this chapter – have extremely fluid political allegiances, and are thus far more likely than their Ugandan counterparts to go into a coalition with the ruling party.

Table 5 New Party Leaders and Electoral Coalitions in Zambia, 2001-2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Levy Mwanawasa</td>
<td>MMD</td>
<td>29.15%</td>
<td>42.98%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anderson Christon</td>
<td>UPND</td>
<td>27.20%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tembo</td>
<td>FDD</td>
<td>13.17%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tilyenji Kaunda</td>
<td>UNIP</td>
<td>10.12%</td>
<td>Coalition</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>Coalition</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Godfrey Miyanda</td>
<td>HP</td>
<td>8.09%</td>
<td>1.57%</td>
<td>0.76%</td>
<td>0.17%</td>
<td>0.34%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Sata</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>3.40%</td>
<td>29.37%</td>
<td>38.13%</td>
<td>41.98%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nevers Mumba</td>
<td>MMD/RP</td>
<td>2.24%</td>
<td>Coalition</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.87%</td>
<td>Coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benjamin Mwila</td>
<td>NDC/RP</td>
<td>4.92%</td>
<td>Coalition</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hakainde Hichilema</td>
<td>UPND/RP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>25.32%</td>
<td>19.70%</td>
<td>18.17%</td>
<td>46.67%</td>
<td>47.63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edith Nawakwi</td>
<td>FDD/RP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Coalition</td>
<td>Coalition</td>
<td>0.24%</td>
<td>0.92%</td>
<td>0.65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rupiah Banda</td>
<td>MMD/RP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>40.09%</td>
<td>35.42%</td>
<td>Coalition</td>
<td>Coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Milupi</td>
<td>ADD/RP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.94%</td>
<td>Coalition</td>
<td>Coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elias Chipimo</td>
<td>NRP/RP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.38%</td>
<td>0.36%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edgar Lungu</td>
<td>PF/RP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>48.33%</td>
<td>50.35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miles Sampa</td>
<td>UDF/RP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Christon Tembo negotiated the UDA, after which the party presidency was assumed by Edith Nawakwi
**Sampa was unsuccessful at registering as a candidate, and subsequently went into a coalition
RP Coalition: the opposition leader went into a coalition with the incumbent or ruling party candidate
As suggested by Van de Walle (2006), the increased likelihood of an electoral loss by the ruling party makes coalition-building easier and more stable, (as in 2015 and 2016) as elites flock to the strongest opposition party. But in some cases, and despite the obvious predominance of one party to a coalition – as was the case with the UPND after the 2015 by-election – the leaders of smaller parties are still unwilling to enter coalitions with larger parties. This was the case when the FDD’s Edith Nawakwi rebuffed the advances of the UPND in 2016, arguing that they should instead endorse her for the presidency, even though the UPND had displayed its evident popularity in the 2015 election. Clearly, party leaders are at times motivated by interests and concerns that do not fit into the ‘rational actor’ framework that is generally employed to predict coalition behaviour.

Zambia presents an interesting test case for various theories of coalition formation and survival. Much of the literature casually dismisses coalitions formed with small opposition parties who either did not exist in the previous election or received a very low vote-share. However, the results of the 2015 and 2016 elections – in which the UPND went into an alliance with two relatively electorally insignificant parties – show that in countries like Zambia, where ethnic representation matters, coalitions with small parties or collections of political notables can still have an impact on shifting voting patterns. Finally, this chapter highlights how parties might learn from failed coalition attempts. Following the poor outcomes of the 2006 and 2011 coalitions, the UPND had learnt from the PF and sought to employ an individualised elite inclusion strategy to circumvent complex inter-party negotiations. Despite the failure of the 2015 coalition between the MMD and the UPND, the support of the MMD MPs helped to drive the UPND’s success in the presidential by-election, which ultimately undergirded the success of its 2016 campaign.
4. Opposition Coordination in Zimbabwe’s Polarised Party System

4.1 Introduction

Zimbabwe is rarely mentioned by coalition scholars. The exception is the 2008 elections when opposition parties won more than 50% of the national vote. In so doing, they forced the ruling ZANU-PF to a second-round election, but if they had created a pre-electoral coalition, might have carried the polls in 2008 and fundamentally altered the course of Zimbabwean history. Since the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999, several attempts at building pre-electoral coalitions were scuppered due to resistance from lower echelons of opposition parties and the belief that the party could rely on a base of other social groups such as trade unions, activists and civil society groupings to assist in mobilisation efforts. As these groups have declined and their relationships with the opposition has soured post-2013, the MDC has become increasingly open to coalition formation as a mobilisation strategy. If coalitions are consistently mooted in Uganda because of party weakness, lack of geographical reach, weak associational mobilisation and a lack of resources, might party strength, national reach, strong associational mobilisation and a relative abundance of party resources in Zimbabwe have played a part in the MDC’s decision – under the leadership of Morgan Tsvangirai until his death in February 2018 – to forego coalition efforts ahead of the 2008 and 2013 elections? And might the shifting playing field – with Mugabe’s departure from power and Tsvangirai’s death and changed socio-economic climate – now be contributing towards greater sympathy to creating a broad opposition front ahead of 2018? With 6 weeks to go until the 2018 Zimbabwean elections, sections of the opposition have finally managed to forge a degree of unity from a now-fractured playing field, with more than 50 political parties and 23 presidential candidates registered to compete in the polls.  

Despite some important differences, Zimbabwe and Uganda are similar on several key dimensions. Both regimes are the product of a ‘liberation struggle’, which led to military and intelligence elites holding significant power within the post-conflict political establishment, while long-serving autocrats have become increasingly intolerant of challengers to their continued rule.\textsuperscript{565} From independence in 1980 until President Mugabe’s removal through military intervention and mass protests in 2017, Zimbabwe has held regular multi-party elections but had only a single president and has not experienced a transition from one party to another. Both governments came into power with significant levels of domestic and international legitimacy, having defeated unpopular regimes – and both governments have continued to deploy this history as their key source of regime legitimation.\textsuperscript{566} As both countries’ ruling parties have come under increasing pressure from resurgent opposition parties since the early 2000s, they have stepped up both legal and extra-legal attempts to undermine opposition mobilisation. This was done through passing legislation that made opposition mobilisation more difficult, imprisoning opposition members and leaders on dubious grounds, deploying violence and threats of violence to undermine parties, and using state institutions to infiltrate and divide the opposition. This has had disastrous effects on intra-opposition trust, making opposition coalition formation more difficult. While in Uganda, there are relatively high levels of fluidity within opposition parties – with many party members shifting allegiance between parties – Zimbabwe presents a much more polarised political system where breakaway factions and independents are much less likely to succeed at the polls (see Section 4.1.1). This has made coalition-building an even more difficult prospect, as the largest opposition party can and does deride its smaller coalition partners as electorally insignificant. Like Uganda, opposition parties in Zimbabwe find themselves competing for the same voters – notably in urban areas and the opposition heartlands of Matabeleland – which hinders the successful formation of coalitions. This competition for the same voters makes compromise over joint candidates (particularly at parliamentary level)

\textsuperscript{565} Brian Raftopoulos and Alois Mlambo, eds., \textit{Becoming Zimbabwe: A History from the Pre-Colonial Period to 2008} (Harare: Weaver Press, 2009); Tripp, \textit{Museveni’s Uganda}.

and the division of constituencies more difficult to attain, while a lack of trust between leaders and access to other avenues for electoral mobilisation limits the incentives for cooperation.

This chapter will outline the Zimbabwean opposition’s history of fragmentation and subsequent coalition negotiations and offer insights into why coalition-building has so frequently failed. The tone for opposition coalition negotiations was set in the 2000 parliamentary election, where smaller opposition parties requested that the newest opposition party – the MDC – agree not to compete against their parliamentary candidates in return for their support at presidential level. Unwilling to cede even a single seat, the MDC gambled that they would easily monopolise the opposition field, a gamble which paid off as the political playing field quickly consolidated into two behemoth opposing camps. The party-based political polarisation that ensued made coalition formation difficult and costly, while intra-elite squabbles and competition for the same voters scuppered negotiations. Tsvangirai’s MDC, the darling of international donors and preferred electoral vehicle for civic bodies, could forego coalitions due to this support. But as the funding dried up and the party’s ability to count on civic actors waned after the 2013 elections, the party has increasingly looked to coalitional politics to regain its predominance. Ahead of the next presidential elections scheduled for 2018, the MDC-T has formed a coalition with key opposition players – notably reuniting the MDC parties that broke away in 2006 and 2014 – in the ‘MDC Alliance’ on 5 August 2017. This chapter will analyse the various opposition coalitions that were brokered in 2000, 2008 and 2013 and the key reasons for their collapse, and look ahead to the 2018 polls which will be contested by a broad opposition coalition.

The Zimbabwean case contributes to the broader discussions around the importance of funding for pecuniary coalition building, and the role of lower-level leaders in undermining coalition negotiations. It will also highlight the ways in which restricted electoral mobilisation and funding options has forced the largest opposition party to turn to coalitional strategies to regain its lost momentum which peaked in the mid-2000s.

4.1.1 Political Parties and the Logic of Coalition Formation in Zimbabwe

There are two dimensions of Zimbabwean politics that need to be explored to unpack the dynamics of opposition politics and cross-party coalition formation. Two key cleavages
animate Zimbabwean politics: party-based polarisation and ethnicity. This section will explore each of these, first describing the way in which Zimbabwe’s political landscape quickly became bipolar following the emergence of the MDC in 1999 and how party-cleavages became the key locus for political action. Second, it will address the issue of ethnicity, which impacts on voting patterns, party support bases and inter-party coalition negotiations. The rest of the chapter will then outline how these two dynamics shaped opposition politics and the complex negotiations around pre-electoral coalitions.

**Polarisation**

Two social cleavages have influenced the bases of political parties in Zimbabwe. From the 1980 independence elections until 1987, just two major parties existed in Zimbabwe. The Shona-dominated Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) held 60% of the parliamentary seats, while a Matabeleland-based Patriotic Front–Zimbabwe African People’s Union (PF-ZAPU) held just 20%. Following a counter-insurgency campaign by the ZANU government and the military suppression of popular dissent and PF-ZAPU in the Matabeleland provinces, PF-ZAPU was forcibly integrated into the governing ZANU in 1987. This created a multi-ethnic dominant party system under Robert Gabriel Mugabe’s ZANU-PF which would rule the country virtually unchallenged until the emergence of the MDC as a coalition of civic groups, church bodies and trade unions in 1999.

With the formation of the MDC, Zimbabwe’s politics in Zimbabwe coagulated into a bipolar system which became more polarised with each election cycle. This polarisation – driven by rhetoric, violence and ideology – became the primary constraint on the actions of political elites. This is driven primarily by the partisan ideological project of the ruling party, and attempts by the opposition to construct an alternative narrative. While in the 1980s, ZANU-PF had mobilised the concepts of ‘reconciliation,’ ‘development,’ ‘unity’ and nationalism as

---

567 These parties’ origins can be traced to the nationalist independence struggle of the 1960s and 1970s. Initially a single party, several high-profile leaders split from ZAPU to form ZANU. The bulk of ZAPU’s support thereafter was concentrated in the Matabeleland regions, while most of ZANU’s support base was from the Mashonaland provinces.

568 The Lancaster House constitution ensured that the remaining seats were ‘reserved’ for the country’s white population.

569 This resulted in the deaths of an estimated 20,000 civilians which would come to be known as ‘Gukurahundi’

its legitimating discourse, its response to growing popular dissatisfaction and the economic crises of the 1990s that midwifed the opposition movement was to construct a new legitimating ideology with ‘liberation’ as its fundamental principle. As the 1990s structural adjustment programme began to bite and the failure of ZANU-PF to deliver economic development became apparent, the party reinvigorated its tried and tested appeals to ‘nationalism’ and the selective deployment of violence against those identified as the ‘enemies’ of the nation.571 Zimbabwe’s ruling party uses ‘revolutionary’ and ‘liberationist’ rhetoric to legitimate its continued rule,572 and to denigrate those who were not part of the liberation struggle as unworthy of holding political power. Various authors have sought to unpack the stark liberation nationalism constructed by ZANU-PF, and the way in which the ‘nation’ and nationalism is conceived.573 Ranger (2004) dubbed the ruling party’s nationalist construction of history as ‘patriotic history,’ suggesting that the ruling party has created a dominant nationalist discourse in which a sympathetic reading of Zimbabwe’s past legitimates its rule in the present and into the future.574 Patriotic history – which emerged shortly before the 2002 elections – and its ideological and political projects are central to any understanding of contemporary Zimbabwean politics.

Patriotic history was the ideological foundation of party polarisation. Viewing Zimbabwean politics through the lens of this ideological project illuminates the ways in which the ruling party and opposition parties battle for control by appealing to history and a legacy of ‘struggle.’ Alternatively, as in the case of most opposition parties, these appeals are couched in a discourse of human rights (decried as ‘bogus universalism’ by ideologues of patriotic history)575 and economic deprivation. As Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012) noted, “since assuming power in 1980, ZANU-PF quickly penetrated the state and nation… through selective deployment of history, memory, and commemoration to claim uncontested political

572 The origin of this discourse in the concept of Chimurenga deployed by ZANU-PF is explored in Ndlovu-Gatsheni.
574 Ranger, ‘Nationalist Historiography, Patriotic History and the History of the Nation’.
575 Ranger, 225.
legitimacy.” This has continued into the present, as captured in ZANU-PF’s 2013 election manifesto which states that:

This People’s Manifesto is a solemn call from the fallen and living heroes of our liberation struggle, indeed from the wailing bones that lie in many places known and others yet to be discovered, for every Zimbabwean to patriotically cherish and jealously guard the gains of our heroic liberation struggle.

The manifesto goes on to denigrate external forces for the economic ills of the period, and to exhort Zimbabweans to go out and perform their ‘national duty’ of voting for the ruling party – the party that brought liberation. Patriotic history also polices politico-geographic boundaries – it glorifies (pro-ZANU-PF) rural peasants and farmers and derides (pro-opposition) urban populations as ‘unpatriotic’, ignoring trade union and worker struggles.

It is precisely this construction of the nation, national history and duty that has defined Zimbabwe’s political discourse since 1980, but particularly since 1999 when the ZANU-PF came to face a more serious electoral threat in the MDC.

The president, party and ZANU-PF-aligned intellectuals have used this constructed history to create a polarised national narrative of ‘patriots’ or ‘revolutionaries’ and ‘sell-outs.’ This has been effectively mobilised against the threat posed by the MDC and against the much-maligned external ‘neo-colonial’ threat posed by the interference of British, American and European governments in Zimbabwean affairs. Ndlovu-Gatsheni highlights the way in which the ruling party articulated and wielded the concept of chimurenga (‘legitimate’ violence in service of the ‘nation’) to:

…polarize the nation, fragmenting the people of Zimbabwe into patriots, war veterans, puppets, traitors, sellouts, born-frees, and enemies of the nation. The category of patriots and veterans is reserved for those who participated in the liberation struggle in general and all members of ZANU-PF specifically. Members of MDC political formations are categorized as traitors, sellouts, and puppets who deserve to die if the Zimbabwe [sic] nation is to live.

576 Ndlovu-Gatsheni, ‘Rethinking “Chimurenga” and “Gukurahundi” in Zimbabwe’, 5.
579 Ranger, 223.
580 Tendi, Making History in Mugabe’s Zimbabwe.
581 Ndlovu-Gatsheni, ‘Rethinking “Chimurenga” and “Gukurahundi” in Zimbabwe’, 10.
This discourse has dominated Zimbabwe’s political landscape since 2000, polarising Zimbabweans and even influencing scholarship on the country. Although it is relatively widely known and accepted that the opposition received funding from Western governments and government agencies in the early 2000s, this has not yet been covered in the academic literature. This is likely the result of fear by scholars that exploring this aspect of opposition politics would legitimate the ruling party’s narrative that the opposition “are not an authentic Zimbabwean political party but rather a creation of the U.K. and the U.S. as part of their neoimperialist [sic] agenda of regime change.”

It was precisely the use of earlier academic histories by scholars such as Ranger that formed the (skewed) historical base of patriotic history, giving credence to concerns that academic research written on the topic of opposition party funding would be used to discredit the MDC. This means that a critical political variable – party funding – that influences opposition parties’ behaviour is left unexamined in the scholarship on Zimbabwe’s 21st century history. This thesis will aim to begin the conversation on the ways in which foreign funding influenced opposition party behaviour in Zimbabwe.

But what was the role and purpose of this polarisation and the political binaries it created? And was it just the hegemonic narrative or was it adopted, shaped and re-deployed by opposition forces as well? As Adrienne LeBas (2006) argues, political polarisation served a distinctly political agenda for both the ruling and opposition parties – it politicised constituencies, increased parties’ mobilizational capacities and prevented organisational fragmentation. Polarisation forces groups (in this case parties and political actors) to define themselves in opposition to one another, limiting interaction and negotiation across group boundaries, boosting internal solidarity and silencing moderates by accusing them of disloyalty. In such polarised political circumstances, it is difficult for individuals or groups to claim neutrality, and the middle ground of politics is “hollowed out.” This is precisely what occurred in Zimbabwe between 2000 and 2013 – political and civic actors (including the churches, unions, civic groups and NGO’s) were brought willingly or unwillingly into the

583 Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 10.
584 Ranger, ‘Nationalist Historiography, Patriotic History and the History of the Nation’.
586 LeBas, 422.
587 LeBas, 422.
binary constructions of patriotic history and its antithesis. In order to counter ZANU-PF’s hegemonic narrative, the MDC deployed a rights-based discourse premised on political morality, painting members and supporters of the regime as morally corrupt. Both the MDC and ZANU-PF utilised political polarisation to police group boundaries and make partisan identities the central political cleavage.

The two parties – ZANU-PF and MDC – resorted to ever-more confrontational tactics, using the rhetoric of ‘traitors,’ ‘patriots,’ legitimacy and illegitimacy to drive the distinction between the in-group and the out-group; the ‘us’ and the ‘them.’ Party members and sympathisers were policed and in turn policed others for signs of sympathy for the ‘other,’ leading to ever-more extreme behaviour and violence meted out against those accused of disloyalty. Polarisation was in turn intensified by state-sponsored violence which reified the boundaries, increased the costs of defection and led to increased opposition radicalisation and intra-opposition violence. In the face of rising state-perpetrated repression, the MDC began to refer to its struggle in explicitly moral terms, which in turn increased the polarisation of less-politicised civil society members and citizens into camps of ‘for’ and ‘against.’ Polarisation had a critical impact on reducing defections, making the party brand more important than the stature of local elites and reducing elite fluidity (compared to Zambia and Uganda). However, when defections occurred, the resulting parties were treated with as much disdain and contempt as the party’s main rival. Party polarisation would thus also have a decisive impact on how opposition parties perceived themselves and their ostensible opposition ‘allies’ – limiting the potential for negotiation and compromise during coalition negotiations. Equally, in the coalition negotiations with former ZANU-PF insiders who had defected to the opposition (or been pushed out of ZANU-PF) ahead of the 2018 elections, it would help to complicate bargaining. But did patriotic history serve another purpose? What cleavages does this selective binary seek to hide or paper over?

---

591 LeBas, 175.
**Ethnicity**

Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Muzondidya (2007) note that ethnicity is an ‘echoing silence’ within Zimbabwean historiography, but that despite this lacuna, “ethnicity has continued to shape and influence the economic, social and political life of Zimbabwe since the achievement of independence in 1980.” Ranger argues that ZANU-PF’s memorialisation of the liberation struggle – and posthumous valorisation of Ndebele nationalist Joshua Nkomo – also seeks to paper over ethnic divides. Patriotic history seeks to provide a unitary narrative of the nation, downplaying ethno-regional divisions and refusing to acknowledge the murder of approximately 20,000 Ndebele civilians in Matabeleland in the 1980s. Gukurahundi, as this campaign was known, was an anti-insurgency operation carried out by the North Korean-trained 5th Brigade between 1983 and 1987 in the Ndebele (ZAPU) political heartlands. Brian Raftopoulos argues that patriotic history attempts to “naturalize the unity of the nation by concealing the internal ethnic tensions within the polity and the reality of Shona political dominance.” While ethnicity is not a part of the political discourse in Zimbabwe in the way that it is in Kenya or Zambia, this is not to say that it is not an important – though less visible – motivator of political behaviour. It is commonly stated that the Zimbabwean population is not constituted by a multiplicity of ethnic groups like Zambia and Uganda; instead it is said to be made up of only two, the Shona-speaking majority (82% of the population) and a Ndebele-speaking minority (14% of the total population). However, this is an over-simplified account which overlooks the importance of intra-ethnic clan structures and minority ethnic groups. Zimbabwe is in fact a multi-ethnic society in which several minorities live on the country’s periphery. The Shangani/Tsonga/Hlengwe occupy the South-Eastern region, the Venda live in the South and on the border with South Africa, the Tonga people in the North (on Zambia’s frontier), while the Kalanga, Sotho-Tswana and Ndebele occupy the South-West of the country. However, these smaller groups are often marginalised from the broader public discourse.

---

595 As quoted in Ndlovu-Gatsheni, ‘Rethinking “Chimurenga” and “Gukurahundi” in Zimbabwe’, 14.
Although the ‘Shona’ are often presented as a single group, they are linguistically and spatially dispersed into the Karanga (Southern plateau including Masvingo), Zezuru and Korekore (Mashonaland West, East and Central Provinces), and Manyika and Ndau in the East (Manicaland and Chipinge to the Mozambican border). A colonial-era attempt (led largely by missionaries) to unify linguistic dialects for education and devotional purposes led to the standardisation of the Shona language and contributed to the founding of a greater ethno-regional Shona identity that stands in opposition to the greater Ndebele ethno-regional identity. Ranger (1984) and others have illustrated that the Shona sub-groups were initially little more than loose groupings or geo-spatial monikers, but over time and through administrative practice and shared history and grievance, these ‘invented’ categories became filled with social and political meaning. At the same time, the creation of colonial administrative units along these ethno-linguistic divisions would shape the future of the state’s boundaries and partly explain regional voting patterns in the post-independence state. The colonial state divided the country into: Matebeleland for Ndebele-speaking groups; Mashonaland for Zezuru-speaking Shona; Fort Victoria (later named Masvingo) for Karanga-speaking Shona people; and Manicaland for Manyikas, incorporating other ethnic minorities into these units and subsuming their identities within the larger groups.

The supposed Shona-Ndebele binary also fails to grasp the distinctions within these groups. Although the Manyika people are part of the larger Shona ethno-linguistic group, they self-identify as a distinct group. The Manyika (from the Manicaland region of Zimbabwe) have – at times – supported the opposition in significant numbers due to grievances with the ruling ZANU-PF which originated during the liberation struggle when the Manyika ZANU national chairman and popular nationalist – Herbert Chitepo – was killed, allegedly by ZANU members of Karanga and Zezuru origin. The Manyika have continued to feel marginalised

---

597 Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 98.
598 Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 100–101.
600 Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni, ‘Echoing Silences’, 278.
by the dominant Karanga and Zezuru groups within the ruling party and dominant ethnic group; a feeling that has been exacerbated by the violence meted out against people in the Marange diamond fields in Manicaland and the expropriation of all mining proceeds since 2006 by central figures of the (Zezuru- and Karanga-dominated) ZANU-PF regime. The struggle that raged within the ruling party to succeed Mugabe in 2017 – as with previous succession battles and factional struggles – took on an ethnic dimension. While the smaller ethnic groups who live in the country’s hinterlands are all but ignored by the state, the major groups that constitute the Shona ethno-linguistic group debate amongst themselves over perceived state bias in appointments and cabinet positions. Although neither the ruling party nor the main opposition parties position themselves as representing the interests of one ethno-linguistic group – in fact both attempt to paper over ethnic difference by constructing a party-political binary – ethno-regional considerations certainly play into Zimbabwean politics.

History and grievance has produced a Ndebele identity which emerged amongst the people living in the Matabeleland regions. Their experience of state-orchestrated violence in the 1980s and a common sense of economic and political marginalisation has produced a sense of unity even amongst non-co-ethnics. These grievances against ZANU-PF and perceived ethnic marginalisation by the government have led the people of Bulawayo and the Matabeleland provinces to repeatedly reject the ruling party at the ballot box, and this has turned the region into a battleground for the major opposition parties, as will be outlined below. While both the MDC and ZANU-PF have invested in polarising the political sphere

---

606 Alex Magaisa, ‘Big Saturday Read: To Stay or Not to Stay – a Crocodile’s Dilemma’, *Big Saturday Read* (blog), 16 September 2017, https://www.bigsr.co.uk/single-post/2017/09/16/Big-Saturday-Read-To-stay-or-not-to-stay-%E2%80%93-a-crocodile%E2%80%99s-Dilemma.
608 Ndlovu-Gatsheni notes that besides one book written by Masipula Sithole which outlines the way in which ethnicity played out in Zimbabwe’s liberation movements, Zimbabwean historians have proven to be reluctant to engage on issues of ethnicity. Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, *Do Zimbabweans’ Exist?: Trajectories of Nationalism, National Identity Formation and Crisis in a Postcolonial State* (Peter Lang, 2009), 106.
along party rather than ethnic lines, the MDC has also endeavoured (as do all opposition parties) to mobilise voters on the basis of political grievances which correlate with regional and ethnic divisions. The outcome of this will be outlined below.

These two dimensions of Zimbabwean politics – polarisation and ethnicity – are important because they help to explain opposition party behaviour and to complicate coalition negotiation. The polarisation that began with patriotic history – which was internalised and redirected by the MDC – was also used against splinter factions who broke away from the main opposition formation (see below). This made coalition negotiation difficult, as the relationship between the parties, and between party leaders, was strained. Similarly, ethnicity and ethnic- and clan-based patterns of opposition support undermined coalition formation in two ways. First, perceptions of ethnic bias within the MDC prior to 2006 and within national politics more broadly made cross-party collaboration difficult. Second, a history of ethnic marginalisation produced opposition ‘strongholds’, which provided the base of the MDC’s electoral support. As a result, opposition parties were wary of stepping down for the other in the region’s parliamentary races – fearing that they would alienate their base and lose their positions. As noted in the introduction, when opposition parties compete for the same seats rather than having complementary constituencies, pre-electoral coalitions are much more difficult to sustain. So, while ethnicity was not necessarily a direct inhibitor of coalition formation (as per Arriola, 2013), it interacts with electoral patterns and intra-elite dynamics in ways which can (and did) undermine opposition coalition formation. The prevailing theories of coalition negotiation and formation also concentrate solely on the level of principals, failing to recognise that political parties are multi-level organisations and that coalitions are often formed and fractured below the level of party presidents. As will be outlined below, it was party actors in the upper echelons – but below the party president – who scuppered the coalitions in 2008 and 2013. This was done due to vested interests, competition over constituencies in the opposition heartlands and a fear by these party functionaries that they would lose their ‘special status’ within their parties and within their ethnic homelands.
Currently the largest opposition party in Zimbabwe, the MDC(-T), was established in 1999 after waves of popular protest against the regime. The party initially emerged from a multi-stakeholder platform that included numerous actors outside of the state, which came together to advocate for constitutional change. At its launch the MDC had the backing of Zimbabwe’s church movements, the powerful trade union congress and the student movement amongst others. The party presented itself as a ‘broad church’, which incorporated all ‘progressive’ elements advocating for constitutional change, improved governance and greater respect for human rights. In its early years, the MDC grew its organisational reach on the back of the trade union movement and other aligned civic bodies. However, the party soon faced high levels of repression and violence from the state, which sought both to eradicate the new party’s structures and its sources of funding and support. It was against this background of obstruction and state sponsored violence that the MDC would seek to change the country’s government. However, a series of intended and unintended consequences would arise from this violence, notably the growing paranoia of the opposition party’s leadership and an increasingly entrenched culture of intra-party violence which would lead to two splits, in 2006 and 2014. It was with these former comrades that the MDC-T led by Morgan Tsvangirai – would seek to build coalitions around the 2008, 2013 and 2018 elections.

In 2000, following the overwhelming success of the MDC-driven ‘No’ campaign in the constitutional referendum, the government rolled out its now-infamous ‘fast track land reform’ programme, which sought both to pacify ZANU-PF’s increasingly restless ‘war veterans’ and to undermine the MDC’s core funders and supporters. Over that period, approximately 12 000 MDC supporters fled from rural areas afflicted by farm invasions and

---

610 LeBas, ‘Polarization as Craft’, 426.
611 LeBas, From Protest to Parties: Party-Building and Democratization in Africa.
612 For clarity, the ‘MDC’ will refer to the unified MDC (prior to the 2006 split), MDC-T will refer to the main party headed by Morgan Tsvangirai (post-2006), and MDC-M and MDC-N will be used to refer to the smaller MDC faction that resulted from the 2006 split and was headed first by Arthur Mutambara (2006-2011) and thereafter, by Welshman Ncube (2011-2017).
inter-party violence, many had been subject to arson, beatings, torture and property destruction.\textsuperscript{614} Similar violence against the opposition continued – and became more structured and coordinated – between 2000 and 2005, frequently escalating around elections.\textsuperscript{615} By 2002, violence against the opposition was systematic and there was a ‘seeking-out’ of political activists, teachers and suspected MDC members by ruling party members and ZANU-PF’s new youth militia – the “Green Bombers.”\textsuperscript{616} Although the 2005 elections were characterised by lower levels of violence, the threat of violence was pervasive and violence continued in the months prior to the election, even if it decreased at election time.\textsuperscript{617}

Following the election, in May 2005, the government carried out Operation Murambatsvina (‘clearing the filth’) which destroyed the homes of an estimated 600,000 urban dwellers, apparently in retaliation for widespread urban support for the MDC.\textsuperscript{618} The emerging party’s support base was predominantly urban; in 2005, the MDC had swept all the seats in Bulawayo and all but one of the urban seats in the country’s capital – Harare – winning 80% and 76% of the total vote respectively.\textsuperscript{619}

In response to this violence meted out against the opposition and its supporters, the MDC’s leadership became increasingly paranoid. They became suspicious of party members who they suspected might have been ‘planted’ by the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) to

\textsuperscript{614} LeBas, 194.
\textsuperscript{616} LeBas, \textit{From Protest to Parties: Party-Building and Democratization in Africa}, 194.
undermine the party. As a result, the MDC became less tolerant of dissent and clamped down on perceived internal threats to its leadership. Already by late 2005, Raftopoulos noted concerning trends within the opposition movement – that it had begun to develop a political culture reminiscent of that found in the ruling ZANU-PF. As a result of debates within the party over the merits of political and electoral participation versus mass action in a context of shrinking democratic space – which played out largely between the President and the Secretary-General – a faction cohered around the party’s president, Morgan Tsvangirai, which constructed a parallel structure for mobilisation. This integrated and formalised activist groups that were formed earlier, such as the ‘Drug Section’ – a self-protection and mobilisation unit formed in the high density suburb of Mabvuku. Adrienne LeBas (2005) described the parallel structures as a “shadowy party structure… designed to facilitate top-down organising and speedy response to orders from national leadership.” The parallel structures were also used to mobilise violence against MDC members and enforce party discipline, a fact which first emerged in 2004 with the beating of party officials at the party’s headquarters. Violent incidents intensified in 2005, and were a significant driver of the split that occurred in February 2006 when MDC Secretary General Welshman Ncube led his faction’s attempted expulsion of Tsvangirai and then formed a breakaway MDC party. Following this split, violence was again meted out against Tsvangirai’s critics, after which the

620 This paranoia was likely justified. In 2007, a senior South African government official noted (as reported by the US Embassy in Pretoria) that the South African government received copies of letters from the MDC via the Government of Zimbabwe before the opposition had even sent them to Pretoria. This suggests that the CIO infiltration of the opposition was thoroughgoing. ‘(C) Zimbabwe: Senior Sag Officials Outline Views to Ngo Contact’, Wikileaks Public Library of US Diplomacy (South Africa Pretoria, 30 April 2007), https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07PRETORIA1495_a.html.
622 Raftopoulos, 12.
623 Wilkins, ‘Ndira’s Wake’, 888.
626 The split occurred in late 2005, but was formalised in February 2006 when both factions held separate congresses and claimed to be separate entities.
party again failed to address the key drivers of the use of violence by party cadres.\textsuperscript{628} Such violent incidents continued in the years leading up to the next elections scheduled for July 2018.\textsuperscript{629} They contributed to another split between Secretary General Tendai Biti and Tsvangirai in 2014 when the former was identified as part of a faction calling for the latter’s resignation following the MDC-T’s disastrous performance in the 2013 elections.\textsuperscript{630}

4.2.1 Mooted Coalitions for the 2000 Election

\textit{Coalition Negotiation}

Prior to the emergence of the MDC, there were several other small opposition parties in Zimbabwe that had a limited impact during the elections held in 1990 and 1995. When the MDC was formed in 1999, only one of these small parties formally disbanded and joined the MDC. The rest – led by Margaret Dongo’s Zimbabwe Union of Democrats (ZUD) – proposed an electoral pact with the MDC ahead of the 2000 parliamentary elections.\textsuperscript{631} The pact was to include the United Parties, ZANU-Ndonga (a ‘regional’ party which mobilised the Ndonga sub-group) and the small Liberty Party. The agreement offered to the MDC was to work together on the condition that they did not compete against the other parties’ candidates in several constituencies. LeBas (2011) suggests that the MDC refused to agree to the deal as they did not see the parties as attractive coalition partners (they lacked popular constituencies) and such a deal was incompatible with the MDC’s process of locally-based party nominations.\textsuperscript{632} It is also likely that the MDC was over-confident due to its historic defeat of ZANU-PF’s draft constitution a few months earlier and the new party was keen to test their wings alone. The MDC was unwilling to cede too much to other parties for an uncertain reward. This strategy paid off – the MDC delivered an astounding result in the parliamentary elections, capturing 47% of the national vote and winning 57 of 120 seats. As noted in the

\textsuperscript{628} Wilkins, ‘Ndira’s Wake’; Raftopoulos, ‘Reflections on Opposition Politics in Zimbabwe: The Politics of the Movement for Democratic Change’.
\textsuperscript{629} The Zimbabwe Peace Project and Kubatana reported that on 6 August 2017, youths affiliated to Morgan Tsvangirai disrupted a meeting that was being held by the party’s Vice President Thokozani Khupe in Bulawayo. Videos circulated on social media which showed people being assaulted with blood spilt on the floor. Khupe was later hospitalised.
\textsuperscript{631} LeBas, \textit{From Protest to Parties: Party-Building and Democratization in Africa}, 183.
\textsuperscript{632} LeBas, 183.
chapters on Zambia and Uganda, it is common for new parties and parties with new leadership to forego coalitions to test their electoral viability.

Surprisingly for such a recently-established party, the MDC ran candidates in every one of Zimbabwe’s 120 electoral constituencies; this was the result of impressive grassroots organising by the party’s backers and constituent elements (notably the trade unions and National Constitutional Assembly) in the year before the 2000 election. The party’s support was most concentrated in the urban provinces of Harare and Bulawayo as well as the two Matabeleland provinces – though the party also won at least 30% of the vote in four of Zimbabwe’s remaining six provinces. The decision to forego the electoral alliance with the other opposition parties did not harm the MDC but did displace the smaller parties, whose collective vote share, together with independents, dropped from about 20% in 1995 to less than 5% in 2000. ZANU-Ndonga won just two seats, while all other opposition formations failed to secure a single seat. The party system had begun its partisan and ethno-regional polarisation, as can be seen in Figure 17 below. This election result – and the predominance of the MDC within the opposition field – would set the tone for politics for the next decade. These results stand in stark contrast with the 2001 election result in Zambia where opposition fragmentation (the largest party won just 29% of the vote) set in motion successive cycles of coalition formation as opposition parties endeavoured to build working coalitions in each subsequent election. Following the ascendance of the MDC in 2000, smaller parties largely fell by the wayside and fewer independent candidates ran in each election as the party system became increasingly polarised into two competing blocs. This would have a lasting impact on coalition politics by contributing to an over-confidence on the part of the MDC that they could win elections on the back of their trade union support – and without the assistance of smaller parties.

---

633 LeBas, 187.
The polarisation that began in 2000 was consolidated by the 2002 presidential elections. Although there were five contenders to the presidency – including ZANU-Ndonga – no other political party outside of the MDC and ZANU-PF won in a single constituency across Zimbabwe. Although five presidential candidates ran in the polls, just two – Mugabe and Tsvangirai – shared 98.2% of the vote. The third-placed candidate from ZANU-Ndonga received just 1%. It does not appear that any attempts were made to include the smaller parties within the MDC fold, and so no alliances were brokered for the 2002 election. The election was marred by intimidation, violence, pro-ZANU media dominance and the reduction of polling stations in urban areas, which created long queues and suppressed urban voter turnout. Despite this, President Mugabe garnered just 56% of the vote to Tsvangirai’s

---

634 Unfortunately, the Zimbabwean election results were very difficult to access from ZEC, and ultimately, only parliamentary maps could be produced for all elections except the 2013 polls. Party heat-maps were produced for the 2008 elections. Data for the maps was compiled by Kubatana.net, or provided by the Electoral Resource Centre. (http://kubatana.net/category/elections/)


---
42%. The remaining 1.8% of the vote was split between the three other contenders. Approximately 85% of the president’s support came from the predominantly rural provinces of Mashonaland Central, Mashonaland East, Mashonaland West, Masvingo, Midlands and Manicaland.636 A week after the election and due to intimidation, violence and a deeply flawed electoral process, the governments of Nigeria and South Africa first proposed the creation of a government of national unity, and Zimbabwe was suspended from the Commonwealth for a year.637

Figure 18 The 2002 Zimbabwean Presidential Election Results by Constituency

638 As the constituencies changed drastically between 2002 and 2008 and this map uses the 2008 boundaries, the electoral boundaries are as accurate as they can be but aren’t completely accurate. It wasn’t possible to access an older electoral shapefile. This one was received from the Electoral Resources Centre, Harare.
The 2005 parliamentary elections – as suggested in the previous section – were less coercive than those that came before them. This was partly because of the SADC intervention, and due to ZANU-PF’s attempts to regain some legitimacy following particularly violent polls in 2002.\textsuperscript{639} It was during and after the 2002 elections that patriotic history became a strong feature of ZANU-PF’s electoral mobilisation. Although violence diminished significantly in 2005, ZANU-PF ramped up its rhetoric around the ‘conspiracy’ between the MDC, NGOs and foreign ‘imperialists’ – notably the Tony Blair and George W. Bush administrations – to effect what the party termed an “illegal regime change agenda.”\textsuperscript{640} In this vein, the ruling party’s 2005 election manifesto stated that:

As the ZANU PF Government decisively implemented its bold land reform programme, the western world led by the Blair Administration began to build and sponsor opposition to the Party, Government and the Land Reform Programme. Apart from the MDC itself, the imperialist world launched and sponsored phoney non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which in reality were disguised opposition, to fight ZANU PF… In both the June 2000 general election and the 2002 Presidential poll, they organized and campaigned for the MDC, using their pseudo-humanitarian face and the abundant resources made available to them through organisations like the British Westminster Foundation, to penetrate, inveigle and subvert communities into supporting the opposition.\textsuperscript{641}

As noted in previous sections, elements of civil society such as the constitutional movement, the student movement, the unions and certain community-based organisations, were critical to the MDC’s formation and mobilisation machinery. In the 2005 elections, they again assisted in campaigning for the party. But, besides the party’s civic allies, the MDC received support from other sympathetic groups.

\textit{The Donors}

Although ZANU-PF’s accusations against the opposition and foreign governments were used to denigrate and delegitimise the opposition in the eyes of voters, it is now apparent that the MDC was receiving support from embassies, donor agencies and political foundations.\textsuperscript{642} The nature of this aid was qualitatively and quantitatively different from ‘party


\textsuperscript{640} Alexander and Raftopoulos, 79.

\textsuperscript{641} From page 6 of the ZANU-PF manifesto, as quoted in Alexander and Raftopoulos, 78.

\textsuperscript{642} It is critical to disaggregate this, but it has been difficult to ascertain – from information in the public domain – the degree to which donor governments (predominantly the USA and UK, as well as Australia and the EU) supported the opposition. This thesis will deal predominantly with US funding, as evidence of this was found in the WikiLeaks Public Library of US Diplomacy.
strengthening’ programmes run in other African countries. This assistance came in several guises – first in ‘kind’ in terms of election advisors, technical expertise and training from US government agencies and USAID-supported groups (largely the International Republican Institute (IRI) and National Democratic Institute (NDI)). Second, in terms of strategic advice from foreign embassies; and finally, in the form of more direct financial assistance. The IRI and NDI – apparently funded at least in part by USAID – began working with the MDC from about 2000, providing extensive training, skills development and strategic advice. The IRI also worked to build Tsvangirai’s personal brand, beginning in the early 2000s and working until 2011 to help build him as a counterpoint to Mugabe and the ‘face’ and focal point of the MDC. The WikiLeaks cables are replete with references to trainings run by the IRI on communications, strategy, policy formulation and negotiation tactics. The work of the IRI and NDI with the opposition quickly raised the ire of ZANU-PF, and they resolved as early as 2000 to conduct most of their activities with the MDC from outside

643 The USAID’s Office on Transitional Initiatives was active in Zimbabwe between 1999-2006 and 2009-2013. During the first programme, the OTI project was one of the largest run by USAID in Africa, totalling $29 million USD. Its intent was to ‘Provide short-term technical support to help prepare for a reformminded government coming to power.’ See Marian Leonardo Lawson, ‘USAID’s Office on Transitional Initiatives after 15 Years: Issues for Congress’ (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 27 May 2009), 7, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40600.pdf.

644 See ‘Mutambara Backs Tsvangirai for 2008’, Wikileaks Public Library of US Diplomacy (Zimbabwe Harare, 12 April 2007), https://search.wikileaks.org/plsd/cables/07HARARE311_a.html; Hoekman, ‘Testing Ties’ Although this applies to the inclusive government era, the relationship between the embassies and the upper echelons of the MDC was close - as was also revealed in the Wikileaks cables.

645 At the very least, the US Embassy in Harare appears to have frequently paid for equipment and trips to the USA for MDC officials. See ‘A Chastened Mutambara Seeks Assistance and Touts Commitment to Democratic Unity’, Wikileaks Public Library of US Diplomacy (Zimbabwe Harare, 29 June 2006), https://search.wikileaks.org/plsd/cables/06HARARE772_a.html.


648 Interview, Anonymous, Former Governance Advisor to USAID, 8 May 2015; Interview, Welshman Ncube, MDC-N President and former MDC Secretary General.

the country.\textsuperscript{650} Ahead of the 2013 election, the IRI was forced to operate using even more ‘covert’ tactics from neighbouring South Africa.\textsuperscript{651}

The actual financial assistance provided to the MDC by donor governments and foreign embassies is somewhat more complex.\textsuperscript{652} There are references in WikiLeaks that suggest that the United States government was providing funding to the MDC, either directly or through third parties.\textsuperscript{653} In a 2007 cable which details a meeting between Arthur Mutambara and US Ambassador Dell, the ambassador notes:

\begin{quote}
[Mutambara] said that resources were tight and inquired about USG support. The Ambassador responded that although the USG could not provide direct financing it could assist the opposition indirectly through an umbrella coalition such as “Save Zimbabwe.”\textsuperscript{654}
\end{quote}

In the US Embassy’s post-2005 election review cable, the post noted that the key lesson learned for the US government following the MDC’s electoral loss, was that “we need to provide sufficient and sustained resources to the democratic forces in Zimbabwe to achieve meaningful change.”\textsuperscript{655} One way of doing this was to provide resources to the MDC through civic groups. The Institute for a Democratic Alternative for Zimbabwe (IDAZIM) was one such organisation, which ultimately became a conduit to funnel donor funds to the opposition.\textsuperscript{656} A former Zimbabwean Senior Governance Advisor to USAID also outlined

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[651] Interview, Lara Petricevic, Head of the International Republican Institute (IRI) in Kampala, and formerly head of the Zimbabwe programme, 4 September 2015.
\item[652] In his farewell address in 2007, US Ambassador Dell highlighted his perception of other embassies and donors in addressing the Zimbabwe question as such: ‘We need to keep the pressure on in order to keep Mugabe off his game and on his back foot, relying on his own shortcomings to do him in. Equally important is an active U.S. leadership role in the international community. The UK is ham-strung by its colonial past and domestic politics, thus, letting them set the pace alone merely limits our effectiveness. The EU is divided between the hard north and its soft southern underbelly. The Africans are only now beginning to find their voice. Rock solid partners like Australia don’t pack enough punch to step out front and the UN is a non-player. Thus it falls to the U.S., once again, to take the lead, to say and do the hard things and to set the agenda.’ See, ‘The End Is Nigh’, Wikileaks Public Library of US Diplomacy (Zimbabwe Harare, 13 July 2007), \url{https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07HARARE638_a.html}.
\item[653] Due to a lack of hard evidence (despite substantial anecdotal evidence) regarding other donor countries’ involvement in funding the MDC, this section highlights the involvement of the USA.
\item[654] ‘Mutambara Backs Tsvangirai for 2008’.
\item[656] Interview, Dewa Mavhinga, Former board member of the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 7 May 2015; ‘Zimbabwe Elections: South Africa to Send 50 Observers as Part of Sadc Delegation’, Wikileaks Public
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
the way in which he and other Zimbabwean activists and aid/embassy workers ensured that funds were channelled to and through civil society, with NGO’s encouraged to siphon off funds for activities and equipment and redirect them to the MDC.\textsuperscript{657} He (and other highly-placed civil society leaders) suggest that this was done with the implicit or explicit support of embassies and agencies. The secrecy around the provision of resources to the party meant that it was difficult to account for significant portions of these donor funds, so embassies and agencies faced a quandary when trying to trace money that was also siphoned off for personal use by civic and party actors.\textsuperscript{658} This would, in part, lead to significant reductions in donor funds and ‘blacklisting’ of particular civic leaders prior to and after the 2013 elections.

As well as funding the opposition through NGOs, these foreign agencies and governments increasingly channelled resources to NGOs and civil society bodies, to assist in the broad anti-ZANU-PF fight. This funding, coupled with the economic crisis and shrinking economic opportunities for middle class and poor Zimbabweans alike produced distortions in civil society, or what Zeilig (2008) refers to as a ‘donor syndrome.’\textsuperscript{659} As these organisations saw a massive influx of funds – largely for programming related to governance, accountability, reforms and elections – grassroots activism and civic struggles became commodified, paid for by donor funds. Few people would attend meetings, workshops or events without per diems or sitting allowances, and the leadership of civics became increasingly concerned with maintaining their positions – and thus their lifestyles – than with the risks involved in genuinely holding government to account. As donors – and particularly those linked to the US government – invested more in the MDC’s success, civic leaders who criticised the opposition found their positions and funding at risk, leading to self-censorship and a lack of critical engagement. Following the MDC’s loss in the 2005 parliamentary elections, the US Embassy in Harare resolved to take a firmer line on NGO’s to ensure that they played a supportive role to the major opposition party, noting:

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{interview1} Interview, Anonymous, Former Governance Advisor to USAID.
\bibitem{interview2} Interview, Tendai Biti, Former MDC-T Secretary General and Finance Minister, 11 May 2015; Interview, Dewa Mavhinga, Former board member of the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition; Interview, Anonymous, Former Governance Advisor to USAID.
\end{thebibliography}
Another lesson we should take away from this election is that we need to take a more active role in fostering coordination among the democratic forces, using our leverage as the key donor. The middle ground in Zimbabwe remains extremely thin and if elements of the church or organized labor again choose to sit on the fence, additional USG support to them should be curtailed. Instead, support should flow to enlightened, committed, non-violent, but activist, civil society groups, key regional partners, the more progressive elements in organized religion and labor.\footnote{Lessons Learned from Zimbabwe’s 2005 Parliamentary Elections.}

This appears to have been translated into policy at a local level after 2005, as several civil society leaders interviewed in Harare and Bulawayo noted that funding became increasingly dependent on the grantee’s proximity to the MDC-T.\footnote{Interview, Dewa Mavhinga, Former board member of the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition.}

There is some debate as to how much centralised planning there was in the upper echelons of the embassies and donor bodies regarding the diversion of funds to the MDC-T (particularly after 2005), but it is certain that what was known, was either sanctioned or ignored – until 2013.\footnote{Interview, Anonymous, Western Diplomat, 26 May 2017.} During an interview with an Harare-accredited Western diplomat in Johannesburg in May 2017, the diplomat offered that it was now “established fact” that certain Western embassies had been channelling funding to the MDC or MDC-aligned CSOs (with the implicit or explicit aim to redistribute funds to the party).\footnote{Interview, Anonymous, Western Diplomat, 26 May 2017.} A Western diplomat in Kampala had referred to these Zimbabwean diplomats as “activist ambassadors” and noted that Western embassies had been burned quite badly in the resulting backlash from their interventions in the Zimbabwean electoral process. This had gone on to inform Western embassies’ more cautious approach to other countries undergoing democratic backsliding – such as Uganda.

**The 2005 Election**

No coalitions were mooted for the 2005 election, as the playing field had clearly consolidated into just two camps. The polls saw an apparent reduction in support for the MDC; they saw their parliamentary seats decline to 41, from 57 in the 2000 polls. There had been some debate within the opposition party with regards to participation in the election. The party had previously resolved not to participate in another electoral process until the ruling party

\footnote{Foreign donors saw Tsvangirai’s faction as the most viable, and thus gave preference to the MDC-T.}
complied with the SADC guidelines. But it came under pressure from external allies, regional governments and internal forces to participate, and ultimately did so because of the lack of a coherent boycott strategy. This caused some friction with their civic allies – particularly the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) – who had resolved that in the absence of electoral reforms, the opposition should boycott the polls. Prior to the election, the MDC leadership was also fragmented into camps organised around Secretary General Welshman Ncube and President Tsvangirai – and there were escalating tensions around ethnicity and tensions between the trade unionists (such as Tsvangirai) and the intellectuals (such as Ncube). These issues led the party to enter the 2005 election season under severe strain. However, once the election campaign began, a feeling of hope again emerged. The official results announced after the 31 March 2005 elections are widely believed to have been exaggerated in ZANU-PF’s favour.

Succession politics within ZANU-PF was charged by dissatisfaction over the increasing influence of the Zezuru faction (headed by Mugabe) within the ruling party, which allowed the MDC to make some inroads in rural areas – notably in the Karanga homelands of Midlands and Masvingo provinces. At the same time, the MDC consolidated gains in the Matebeleland provinces. But still, the MDC won 16 fewer seats in 2005 than it had in 2000, declining from 57 to 41 seats in the 150-seat parliament. The party’s bruising loss set up an internal battle that manifested along leadership, ideological, ethnic, strategic and generational lines. Although five parties ran in the elections, ZANU-PF and the MDC shared 99.1% of

---

665 Alexander and Raftopoulos, 9.
666 Alexander and Raftopoulos, 10.
668 In 2005, Solomon Mujuru and his wife Joyce Mujuru (widely perceived to head the Zezuru faction) were promoted and positioned as likely successors while Karanga faction leader, Emerson Mnangagwa, was demoted. At the same time, several of Mugabe’s Zezuru family members were promoted to cabinet and key government positions.
the total vote. While 15 independents ran, just one (former ZANU-PF minister, Jonathan Moyo) managed to win their seat.

![Zimbabwean Parliamentary Election Results by Constituency](image)

**Figure 19 The 2005 Zimbabwean Parliamentary Election Results by Constituency**

*The MDC’s First Split*

As noted above, in 2006 – shortly after the 2005 election and the internal dissent that it helped to foster – the MDC experienced a damaging split. The split occurred between two camps; one group consisted of the ‘moderates’ who had rallied behind the Ndebele Secretary General Ncube. This faction was largely made up of professionals, academics, the leaders of various civic groups and the ‘moderates’ who preferred to take electoral disputes to the courts rather than the streets.\(^671\) The more radical faction that cohered around Shona party President Tsvangirai were largely comprised of former trade unionists who preferred a ‘mass action’ approach to resolving disputes and included the key members of his so-called ‘kitchen

Divisions had been deepening for some time, as evidenced by the intra-MDC violence noted above that first occurred in 2004, and the party’s leadership had become increasingly divided along ethno-regional and anti-intellectual/intellectual lines. A later inquiry into the violence found that the party leadership had been fuelling ethnic tensions, contributing to the “strong anti-Ndebele sentiment that has been propagated, orchestrated and instilled into the innocent party members’ minds by a senior party leader under the guise of sheer hatred for the Secretary General at a personal level.” Differences in strategy and personality between Tsvangirai and Ncube were constructed in both ethnic and anti-intellectual terms, and exacerbated by the parallel structures that were no longer accountable to the party’s institutional centre. The split was widely seen as the product of Shona-Ndebele rivalry, and the resulting parties were more ethnically exclusive than the united MDC had been.

This division ultimately manifested in a split in early 2006 following a debate within the party over whether or not to participate in the elections for the newly-created Senate. On 12 October 2005, the MDC National Executive Council (NEC) voted 33 to 31 to participate in the elections. Tsvangirai vetoed the decision, accusing Ncube’s pro-Senate faction of bribery and ballot-stuffing. Although the pro-Senate faction ultimately conceded, seven MDC branches (primarily in Ncube-supporting Matabeleland Provinces) defied Tsvangirai and fielded candidates to the Senate elections. The two groups traded insults in the media and campaign rallies in Mashonaland East and Bulawayo ended in tussles between the two...
After the results of the damaging 2005 election became public, the pro-Senate faction accused Tsvangirai of de-campaigning the party and suspended him. In return, Tsvangirai’s faction suspended members of the pro-Senate faction and the split became official after the two factions held their own party congresses in February and March 2006. The pro-Senate faction – headed by Ncube and made up predominantly of leaders from the Matabeleland regions – opted to choose a Shona leader, former student activist Arthur Mutambara, to maximise its national appeal. This faction retained the original name of the MDC. The Tsvangirai faction, who renamed themselves MDC-T (for Tsvangirai) repeatedly attacked the ‘MDC-M’ in the press – accusing them of being in cahoots with the CIO and South African President Thabo Mbeki. The split between the two factions of the MDC would make the 2008 elections a difficult one – MDC-M was widely seen as a Ndebele party – with 20 seats (predominantly from Ndebele-speaking regions), while the MDC-T held 21 seats. It was under these circumstances that the opposition would face the 2008 election, unless the two could broker a reconciliation – or at least a coalition – to prevent electoral fragmentation and the continued stay in power of Mugabe’s ZANU-PF.

In her book chapter on ‘polarisation as craft,’ LeBas describes how both the MDC and ZANU-PF invested in political polarisation to build their brands, using the other as a foil against which to be projected as ‘hero’; either liberator or democrat. In doing so, the MDC and ZANU-PF made defection expensive. However, following the 2006 split, the Tsvangirai faction did not just aim its polarising rhetoric at the ruling party, but also branded Mutambara’s MDC as ‘sell outs’ and ‘traitors.’ In doing so, they sought to project themselves as the ‘real MDC’ and the only legitimate opposition, thus making reconciliation and even alliance-building a nearly-impossible exercise. This polarisation infused all levels of the party, and occasionally manifested in violence perpetrated by grassroots activists who accused the Mutambara MDC of being ‘sellouts’ and ‘political prostitutes.’ The MDC-T’s derision

---

680 There is a commonly-held view in Zimbabwe that a Ndebele leader wouldn’t be voted in as president by a majority-Shona populace.
681 Although they retained the MDC name, this will be used to refer to the Mutambara/Ncube faction, for clarity.
684 Wilkins, ‘Ndita’s Wake’, 891.
towards the MDC-M mirrored the narrative previously deployed by ZANU-PF against the MDC. The breakaway faction was derided as ‘sellouts’ and ‘traitors,’ from the top echelons of the party\textsuperscript{685} to the MDC’s grassroots youth activists.\textsuperscript{686} This rhetoric – and the violence that accompanied it – would make cross-faction reconciliation and alliance building particularly difficult ahead of the 2008 and 2013 elections.

### 4.2.2 Coalition Negotiations Ahead of the 2008 Election

#### Coalition Formation

Following Mutambara’s ascent to the leadership of the MDC’s pro-Senate faction, his conversations with the US embassy in Harare suggested that he was in favour of reuniting the divided opposition.\textsuperscript{687} Soon thereafter, his discussions of reunification turned to promises of a coalition to be built ahead of the next elections.\textsuperscript{688} Negotiations to form a coalition between the two MDC formations began in earnest in August 2006\textsuperscript{689} but ground to a halt in late May 2007. While the MDC-T was widely acknowledged to have greater grassroots support than the Mutambara faction, the two sides were at near parliamentary parity with 21 and 20 legislators in their respective camps.\textsuperscript{690} The MDC-M’s legislators were all from the three Matabeleland provinces, while the MDC-T’s parliamentarians had much greater national spread. The Mutambara faction decided in the wake of the split that it would concentrate on winning support in the Matabeleland regions – all but ceding Mashonaland to Tsvangirai – to ensure that neither the MDC-T nor ZANU-PF could win in the Ndebele-speaking regions without its support.\textsuperscript{691} However, the personal animosity between Tsvangirai and his former deputy, Ncube, would make reaching an agreement extremely difficult.\textsuperscript{692}

\textsuperscript{686} Wilkins, ‘Ndira’s Wake’.
\textsuperscript{688} ‘A Chastened Mutambara Seeks Assistance and Touts Commitment to Democratic Unity’.
\textsuperscript{689} In August, the two parties – represented by both the presidents and secretaries general – signed a code of conduct outlining how the factions would work together in parliament and beyond.
\textsuperscript{692} ‘Zimbabwe: An End to the Stalemate?’, 9.
Unlike in coalition negotiations in Uganda and Zambia, there was little debate over who should head the mooted coalition. It was decided in negotiations over Easter 2007 that the two factions would create a coalition that would front Tsvangirai as the flagbearer and Mutambara would be sworn in as national vice-president in the event of an election victory. The two parties agreed to share portfolios and ministerial positions with the MDC-T having an advantage of an extra three. On the modalities of cooperation during the election, the parties agreed to allow each side to run unopposed by the other faction in the constituencies that they held at the time, while there would be equity in the selection of candidates in ZANU-PF held constituencies. Following this discussion, the MDC-T shifted the goalposts by presenting a new agreement, which called for two vice presidents (one from each faction) and an electoral college to select candidates. Mutambara’s faction opposed this move as they suggested that the electoral college would prove unwieldy and would be vulnerable to CIO infiltration. Equally, the electoral college would mean that all parliamentary candidates would be subject to a nominating process – including those seats currently held by the Mutambara faction – which would mean that there were no ‘safe’ or guaranteed seats for either faction. This would work in favour of the MDC-T, which had stronger grassroots support and more extensive organisational machinery (including the support of organised labour and the civic movement).

Despite the troubles within the negotiations, Mutambara emphasised to embassy officials that the opposition would have to achieve unity if they were to defeat ZANU-PF in the upcoming elections. This was a narrative that was consistently repeated over a period of approximately 18 months and 5 rounds of coalition negotiations. Finally, during the fifth attempt at building a coalition, the two MDC factions appeared to reach an accommodation between 18-20 January 2008. The negotiations were funded by the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) and chaired by Zimbabwean activist academic, Professor Brian

Raftopoulos. Each of the MDCs were represented by ten members, headed by their respective Secretaries General – Tendai Biti (MDC-T) and Ncube (MDC-M). The parties agreed to front joint candidates at presidential, parliamentary and local government level. According to the agreement, Tsvangirai would be the MDC coalition presidential candidate, while Mutambara would contest a ‘safe’ parliamentary seat in Harare.

Coalition Collapse

But this neat deal was scuppered by the MDC-T’s intransigence over just two seats in Bulawayo. It was agreed that the MDC-T would contest 70% of the seats in seven of the country’s ten provinces, while the Mutambara faction would be entitled to 70% of the seats in Bulawayo, Matabeleland North and South. The parties also agreed that they would each contest the seats that they had held prior to the election – and any other opposition candidates for those seats would be required to cede their candidacy. The agreement was reached by Biti and Ncube, but the MDC-T’s national council refused to ratify the agreement and pushed for a renegotiation over two seats in Bulawayo. Following the MDC-M’s unwillingness to cede these two seats, the MDC-T pushed for parity in the three Matabeleland provinces, effectively killing the coalition. The MDC-T’s inflexibility was pushed by the party’s Bulawayo faction, who refused to concede their positions in the opposition-sympathetic province.

The larger MDC sought “to establish its dominance in both its existing areas of support and in those areas claimed as strongholds by the MDC Mutambara” – this was particularly the case in the western Matabeleland regions where the MDC had previously won with large majorities, and from where many of the Mutambara MDC’s most notable leaders came.

---

697 ‘Mdc Formations Agree on Electoral Pact, Unification Within 12 Months’.
700 ‘Mdc Reconciliation Fails’.
This intransigence was driven by key Ndebele leaders within the MDC-T who did not want to cede ground to the MDC-M and risk losing their profile in their home region. MDC-M Senator, David Coltart, noted that the issue of the two seats was just the ‘proximate cause’ of the collapse of negotiations, and that the deeper reason was that both party leaders believed that they could do a lot better on their own.\textsuperscript{703} This was corroborated by Biti who contends that both party leaders felt that they were doing each other “a favour,” which contributed to both parties digging in and refusing to concede in order to achieve a successful coalition.\textsuperscript{704} Both sides were over-confident, based on misplaced perceptions of party strength. Evidence from \textit{WikiLeaks} suggests that foreign embassies (particularly the US embassy) – who by 2007 were providing logistical and other support – were more supportive of the MDC-T, and didn’t believe that Mutambara’s party were a major electoral factor (see below).\textsuperscript{705} This external support exacerbated the MDC-T’s intransigence, as they believed that, with the support of their external allies and the key civic bodies, they had little need to ally themselves with the MDC-M.

While the MDC was supported and funded by foreign embassies and government bodies – either directly or indirectly through third parties – the MDC-M apparently received little funding and was held in low esteem by foreign diplomats. This passage in US Ambassador Dell’s farewell address in 2007 is emblematic of various embassy administrations’ thinking on the leadership of the MDC-M:

Arthur Mutambara is young and ambitious, attracted to radical, anti-western rhetoric and smart as a whip. But, in many respects he’s a light-weight who has spent too much time reading U.S. campaign messaging manuals and too little thinking about the real issues. Welshman Ncube has proven to be a deeply divisive and destructive player in the opposition ranks and the sooner he is pushed off the stage, the better. But he is useful to many, including the regime and South Africa, so is probably a cross to be borne for some time yet.\textsuperscript{706}

\textsuperscript{703} Interview, David Coltart, Former MDC-N Minister of Education under the Inclusive Government, 15 April 2015.
\textsuperscript{704} Interview, Tendai Biti, Former MDC-T Secretary General and Finance Minister.
\textsuperscript{706} ‘The End Is Nigh’.
The US Embassy in Harare’s disdain for the MDC-M and belief in the MDC-T is evident in the WikiLeaks cables, where the Ambassador advises that the US State Department receive Mutambara during a visit to the USA “at a level lower than Tsvangirai.” This preferential treatment afforded to the MDC-T by donor governments helped to create resentment and entrench animosity between the two MDC factions, making it more difficult to reach a rapprochement.

A Third Candidate

While the MDC was negotiating around the upcoming election, there were wrangles within the ruling party and factions moving against President Mugabe. ZANU-PF insiders including Jonathan Moyo and Ibbo Mandaza (both former CIO operatives with then-contentious relationships with Mugabe) were trying to foment a coalition within ZANU-PF to challenge Mugabe’s candidacy in the 2008 election. The candidate was to be ZANU-heavyweight and politburo member Simbarashe Makoni, a former Minister of Finance and well-respected politician both at home and abroad. Makoni also allegedly had the backing of a number of party heavyweights including Solomon and Joice Mujuru (a ZANU-PF power couple who had been angling to succeed Mugabe) and Dumiso Dabengwa, (a highly respected Ndebele lieutenant of Joshua Nkomo’s ZIPRA who had joined ZANU-PF under the 1987 unity accord).

The ruling party was deeply divided, with cracks emerging around the issue of leadership succession and the ever-worsening economic crisis, which included unprecedented hyperinflation. Members of the South African government, including Intelligence Minister Ronnie Kasrils, also appeared – according to WikiLeaks cables – to be engaged in destabilising ZANU-PF.

707 ‘A Chastened Mutambara Seeks Assistance and Touts Commitment to Democratic Unity’.
709 Makoni is a Shona-speaking Manyika politician from Manicaland with ‘liberation credentials’ and a PhD in medical chemistry from Leicester Polytechnic.
710 “The Zimbabwe Independent reported that Makoni enjoyed the support of vice-presidents Joseph Msika and Joice Mujuru, speaker of parliament John Nkomo, defense minister Sydney Sekeramayi, women affairs minister Oppah Muchinguri, youth minister Saviour Kasukuwere, Solomon Mujuru, retired general Vitalis Zvinavashe, and Mashonaland East governor Ray Kakunde, but to date none of these individuals has gone public.” “The Simba Makoni Factor”.
711 ‘(C) Zimbabwe’.
The negotiations amongst political groupings in Harare appeared to escalate as the election drew nearer – with extensive dialogue occurring across highly polarised party lines. Intra-party consensus seemed to be collapsing, and factions were seeking solutions to the crisis that breached the country’s deep political divides.\textsuperscript{712} While the two MDC factions were negotiating over the formation of an electoral coalition, Mutambara’s party had also held discussions with factions in ZANU-PF regarding a potential pact, and the Tsvangirai grouping had been in negotiations with the Mujuru faction of the ruling party.\textsuperscript{713} There had also been a series of secret meetings between the key players in the Makoni camp and the Mutambara faction, who were eager to forge an alliance with either Makoni or Tsvangirai due to their limited resources and mobilisation capacity.

\textit{A Second Coalition?}

Following the collapse of the MDC negotiations in January 2008 and Simba Makoni’s announcement that he would stand as an independent (under the banner of Mavambo/Kusile/Dawn) on 5 February, both MDC factions intensified discussions with the former ZANU-PF insider.\textsuperscript{714} The US embassy expressed serious misgivings about what would happen if Makoni and Tsvangirai ran separate campaigns, they believed that the two would split the urban and Mashonaland vote and ultimately benefit Mugabe.\textsuperscript{715} Makoni needed the support from either the Mutambara or Tsvangirai MDC as it was just two months to the election and he had few existing party structures; equally he needed to supplement his supposed support bases in the traditional heartlands of ZANU-PF (the Mashonaland provinces) with support in other regions. By contrast, both the MDC factions had relatively developed structures and much of their support derived from the Matabeleland provinces – which largely display an anti-ZANU-PF bias due to historical grievances over the liberation war and 1980s Gukurahundi atrocities. While Makoni’s entry into the race is widely reported to have created a real air of expectation and excitement – not least prompting speculation

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{712} ‘Zimbabwe: An End to the Stalemate?’
\textsuperscript{714} ‘The Simba Makoni Factor’.
\textsuperscript{715} ‘The Simba Makoni Factor’.
\end{flushright}
about much broader levels of dissent within ZANU-PF – it also raised the stakes within opposition camps.

A broad opposition alliance comprising the two MDC factions and the Makoni camp was expected to be almost unbeatable, though US embassy officials were concerned that an alliance would not be achievable in such a short time frame, and that a divided opposition would instead split the vote.\footnote{716}{The Simba Makoni Factor}. In a meeting relayed to the American ambassador by a party source, the meetings between Tsvangirai and Makoni led to each trying to highlight the reasons why they should be the coalition candidate. Makoni argued that registration of voters in the Mashonaland provinces had jumped significantly since he had announced his candidacy, while Tsvangirai maintained that Makoni was an unproven entity who was too risky a bet to front the coalition. Publicly, the MDC-T leader referred to Makoni as “old wine in new bottles”, while privately expressing scepticism regarding his support base.\footnote{717}{The Simba Makoni Factor} According to a later discussion between the American ambassador in Pretoria and MDC Treasurer Roy Bennet, Tsvangirai was open to an alliance but expressed that he would not subordinate himself to the former ZANU insider and would not even accept an alliance without guarantees that Makoni could bring the support of the military to the table.\footnote{718}{Mdc Treasurer Bennett Says Party Will “Shock the World” in Upcoming Elections', Wikileaks Public Library of US Diplomacy (South Africa Pretoria, 21 February 2008), https://search.wikileaks.org/plsd/cables/08PRETORIA348_a.html.} This is an interesting parallel to the coalition mediation between Besigye and Mbabazi in Uganda – where an unproven, recently-defected regime insider is the coalition favourite, but the leader of the largest opposition party (with obvious vested interests) refuses to allow them to stand as the candidate due to their unproven support base. This was surprisingly not the case in Tanzania in 2015 as, following the Ukawa alliance’s commissioning of a special report into various election scenarios, their ‘research’ pointed to a favourable outcome if they selected recently-defected ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) stalwart, Edward Lowassa, as their coalition candidate.\footnote{719}{Personal Communication, Michaela Collord, Doctoral Candidate at the University of Oxford, working on Opposition in Tanzania, 10 December 2015; Kelvin Matandiko, ‘Hesabu Zinavyoibebe CCM’, Mwananchi, 12 August 2015, http://www.mwananchi.co.tz/habari/Makala/Hesabu-zinavyoibebe-CCM/1597592-2829202-cjwpusz/index.html.} Lowassa ultimately lost to the ruling party’s candidate, John Magufuli, who despite being in the unpopular ruling party, was elected as a ‘change’ and anti-corruption
candidate. Magufuli vowed to clean the ruling party of corrupt elements – as Edward Lowassa was widely believed to be.

In Zimbabwe, the need for funds was an important factor in coalition formation for the Mutambara faction of the MDC, but it was less crucial to the larger and better funded MDC-T. Contrary to Arriola’s theory, the coalition collapsed despite the availability of funds that were offered if the two parties reconciled. According to Bennett, “the Swedish Olof Palme Foundation and the Dutch [Netherlands] Institute for Multiparty Democracy both ‘put money on the table’ for the parties if they reunited, creating a strong incentive to make a deal.” But the MDC-T had received significant funds – allegedly from nationals in exile – to the degree where the MDC-T was able to give a $1000 USD campaign contribution to every MP candidate with a $5000 USD bonus promised if they were able to win their seats. Similarly, local council candidates were given $100 USD with a further $500 if they won the election. This amounts to an initial layout prior to the election of $210 000 USD for parliamentary races and $73 900 for local council elections. As 748 councillors won their seats, and so did 100 MPs, this would have meant an additional outlay of $500 000 USD to parliamentarians and $374 000 for local councillors. This is a vast campaign chest, to say nothing of the cost of t-shirts, posters, handouts and the facilitation costs of mobilisers. This suggests that the MDC-T, at least in Treasurer Bennet’s estimation, likely had somewhere in the region of $1.2 million for facilitation fees. It’s likely that the financial incentive offered by the European donor foundations was insufficient given that Tsvangirai’s MDC had alternative sources of campaign funding.

Makoni’s campaign was wholeheartedly supported (and likely funded to some extent) by prominent exiled Zimbabwean businessman Trevor Neube, publisher of the South African weekly newspaper the Mail & Guardian, as well as the Zimbabwean newspapers, The Sunday Standard and The Zimbabwean Independent. By contrast, the MDC-T’s campaign was supported by South Africa-based Econet founder and CEO Strive Masiyiwa who provided

---

strategic advice, funds and helped to set up an anti-rigging unit.\textsuperscript{724} Despite the offer of funds for the two groups to unite, both parties opted to contest separately. This suggests that (contrary to Arriola) the availability of funding is not the primary reason for opposition cohesion, but that instead the availability of funding can act as a disincentive for cooperation, or when it is provided disproportionately to one side, it can help undermine trust and coalition-formation.

Due to the support that the MDC-T was already receiving in cash and kind from embassies and agencies and its privileged position with its civil society allies, the party had few incentives to concede to the MDC-M’s demands. The larger party also faced an internal revolt from its Ndebele leadership – over their privileged position in the region and future positions in the party’s hierarchy – and Tsvangirai wagered that it was better to go it alone than cede control or positions in return for further resources from donors. Besides financial support, the MDC-T’s campaign was supported by the powerful civic organisations that had led to the formation of the MDC in 1999 – the unions under the ZCTU, the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) and the Zimbabwe National Students Union (ZINASU) amongst others.\textsuperscript{725} This was done under the banner of the Save Zimbabwe Campaign, which also included churches, women’s groups and community-based organisations.\textsuperscript{726} It appears that the MDC-T also wagered that with the support of the civic movement, they did not need a coalition with the MDC-M to bolster their electoral fortunes. The labour movement and civic groups had historically formed the backbone of the MDC’s mobilisation machine,\textsuperscript{727} and the 2006 split had done little to undermine this. In fact, because of this support, both MDCs had invested relatively little in organisational development, relying on their partners to help drive member and voter recruitment.\textsuperscript{728} This would become a serious concern as their relationship with key

\textsuperscript{725} Hoekman, ‘Testing Ties’, 907.
\textsuperscript{726} ‘Zimbabwe: An End to the Stalemate?’, 10.
\textsuperscript{727} LeBas, From Protest to Parties: Party-Building and Democratization in Africa.
\textsuperscript{728} Raftopoulos, ‘Reflections on Opposition Politics in Zimbabwe: The Politics of the Movement for Democratic Change’.
civic groups broke down after 2009 and the mass informalisation of the economy decimated the mobilising capacity of the unions.

Ultimately, the MDC-M rallied behind Simba Makoni, lending their support to his presidential campaign while running candidates at local and parliamentary levels. The MDC-T ran candidates in every constituency, with some disgruntled players who had lost in the party primaries opting to contest as independents. This meant that in many seats, a single ZANU-PF candidate faced two – or sometimes even three – opposition members. As a result, the two MDCs split the vote in at least eight of the 210 constituencies, allowing the ruling party to take those seats with a plurality of the vote. More importantly, the parties split the presidential vote – with Makoni (backed by the MDC-M faction) garnering an official 8.3% of the vote. After the elections, the MDC-T failed to adequately align themselves with the other opposition formations in a bid to create a common front against ZANU PF’s manipulation of the results declaration process.

The results of the 2008 elections were surprising (see Figure 20 below). For the first time since independence, Robert Mugabe came second in an election. The official presidential election tally – announced after a tense five-week delay – gave Tsvangirai 47.9% to Mugabe’s 43.2% while Makoni received the remaining 8%. Discontent within ZANU-PF regarding the dire economic situation and the lack of adequate succession planning had led dozens of ZANU-PF MPs to deploy a strategy which became known as *bhora musango* (‘kick the ball into the long grass’) in which they urged their constituents to vote them in at parliamentary level, but vote for whomever they pleased at presidential level. This strategy was also allegedly sanctioned by politburo members from the highest echelons of the party – ostensibly Joice and Solomon Mujuru (who had also been supporting Makoni’s campaign). Tsvangirai’s support was far more widespread than it ever had been (see Figure 20), and at the same time as they won a presidential majority, the opposition also won control of parliament. Once the final tally was announced, the combined opposition had garnered 109

---


730 The delay has been widely attributed to the electoral commission and military trying to ‘amend’ the results that likely gave Tsvangirai a clear first-round win. This was apparently confirmed when Mugabe noted in a ruling party meeting in December 2014 that Tsvangirai had won the election with 73% of the vote.

seats (MDC-T 99 seats; MDC-M ten) against just 97 for ZANU-PF. In the Senate election, the 60 seats were evenly distributed between the combined opposition (MDC-T 24 seats; MDC-M six) and ZANU-PF. All ten MDC-M seats were won in rural Matebeleland, with relative unknowns on MDC-T tickets sweeping seats from well-known MDC-M incumbents in urban Bulawayo.\(^\text{732}\)

Urban voters demonstrated allegiance to parties rather than individuals, demonstrating again that party brand trumped local prominence. Although 102 candidates ran as independents, just one (Jonathan Moyo) won their seat – highlighting the importance of party brands. The elections confirmed – yet again – that there was little space in Zimbabwean politics for candidates who stood outside the two main parties. As noted by *Africa Confidential* at the time:

> Most of all, the elections showed a polarisation between Mugabe and Tsvangirai supporters; Makoni and Mutambara and their organisations were marginalised and there appeared to be doubts in voters' minds about what they stood for. People voted for the party line, not the local candidate. Only one independent won, Jonathan Moyo; this was largely because he had Tsvangirai's endorsement.\(^\text{733}\)

Independent candidates won less than 3% of the total votes cast in the parliamentary ballot.\(^\text{734}\)

This stands in stark contrast to both Uganda and Zambia, where party brands matter significantly less and individuals are able to shift parties or run as independents and still be re-elected to their seats through mobilising their personal profiles and networks (see Table 6 below).

### Table 6 Official Results from the 2008 Zimbabwean Parliamentary Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>ZANU-PF</th>
<th>MDC-T</th>
<th>MDC-M</th>
<th>Independent</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulawayo</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harare</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manicaland</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland Central</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland East</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland West</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masvingo</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matabeleland North</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matabeleland South</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midlands</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>99</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>10</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>210</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---


While eighteen ZANU-PF heavyweights were defeated, the MDC-T was the big winner. Mutambara’s success was limited and the MDC-M lost a lot of ground to the MDC-T in its heartlands. Mutambara's MDC lost ten seats, and he failed in his own parliamentary bid for the Zengeza East seat in Harare. The MDC-M lost control of Bulawayo, ceding it to the larger MDC faction. Mutambara’s deputy, Gibson Sibanda, also lost his seat as did Secretary General Ncube, the Treasurer and Elections Director Paul Themba Nyathi, and the Mayor of Bulawayo, Japhet Ndabeni-Ncube. Only David Coltart, who won his Senate seat on the MDC-Mutambara ticket, saved the party from total humiliation in Bulawayo. ZANU-PF also lost two seats in Bulawayo where the MDC-T took all the seats. Meanwhile, Makoni performed quite badly at Senate- and parliamentary-level; four of his top supporters lost their seats and none of his prominent Senate candidates were elected. However, in the presidential race, Makoni won several constituencies in rural Matabeleland on the back of support from the MDC-M and Dumiso Dabengwa (see Figure 20). The Manyika former ZANU-PF politician received most of his support from non-co-ethnic Ndebele voters, while voters in Manicaland rallied behind the MDC-T (see the yellow and red maps in Figure 21). Unfortunately for the former ZANU-PF heavyweight, the anticipated widespread defections from ZANU-PF failed to occur and their supporters retreated into the shadows of the ruling party. In Harare, the MDC-T almost cleared the board, while key former party members Job Sikhala and Trudy Stevenson, who had defected to the MDC-M, lost their seats. Despite his success in the West, Tsvangirai failed to make significant inroads into Mashonaland East, Central and West, as well as the Midlands. Though he had substantial success in Masvingo, where he matched ZANU-PF, and Manicaland, where his party was granted the majority. The split between the two factions of the MDC cost the parties at least eight seats.

Following the officially inconclusive results of the first round of the presidential election, a run off was held. In the months between the March and June rounds, the ruling party unleashed unparalleled violence on the MDC-T, its supporters, civic organisations and the rural populations that had dared to vote against the ruling party. As a result, the opposition

---

735 This can be found at http://archive.kubatana.net/html/archive/elec/080329kubres.asp. The table includes the results of four by-elections held on 27 June 2008.
736 ‘Tsvangirai’s Transient Victory’.
withdrew from the race and SADC stepped in to negotiate a transitional government between the two bitter rivals. The two MDC’s and a recalcitrant ZANU-PF were forced into an unhappy marriage in a Government of National Unity (GNU) that would stabilise the country, but undermine the opposition’s position.\textsuperscript{737} In standing against Mugabe and winning – against all odds – without the support of the smaller MDC faction, Tsvangirai’s MDC believed that victory in the next elections in 2013 would be nothing short of certain. However, the five intervening years would be harsh on the MDC-T, who would go into these elections full of bravado, foregoing a promising electoral coalition.

Figure 20 The 2008 Zimbabwean Presidential Election Results by Constituency

The MDC-T’s Presidential Vote
Figure 21 The 2008 Zimbabwean Presidential Election Results for MDC (red), ZANU-PF (green), MKD (yellow) in order of declining vote share
4.2.3 The Failed 2013 Coalition

Following the violence that characterised the presidential run-off\textsuperscript{738} in June 2008 and the clear manipulation of the first round of the vote (evidenced by the five-week delay in announcing the results), the opposition pulled out of the second-round election. To address the growing political crisis, President Mbeki and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) intervened, mediating an end to the crisis and brokering a power-sharing agreement and Government of National Unity (GNU) on 15 September 2008.\textsuperscript{739} Under this arrangement, Mugabe would continue to serve as President, while Tsvangirai would be made Prime Minister with Mutambara serving as his deputy. The parties agreed to share cabinet posts, but these were ultimately distributed unevenly with ZANU-PF retaining all the key ‘hard’ ministries (such as Defence, Justice and Mines), while giving the opposition control over less-powerful portfolios (such as Health, Education and Public Service). The one exception to this was that MDC-T Secretary General Tendai Biti was appointed as Finance Minister to allay the fears of international donors and financial institutions of continued fiscal irresponsibility under a ZANU-PF finance minister. The Global Political Agreement (GPA) – the document which outlined the GNU and stipulated reforms that needed to be met before a new election could be called – was insufficiently implemented ahead of the 2013 election. The goalposts were constantly shifted and donor/SADC expectations were progressively revised downwards as the GNU wore on. With ZANU-PF blocking most meaningful reforms, the MDC’s inability to make their parliamentary dominance count and most of their intended victories being thwarted by hardliners in ZANU, the opposition was unable to capitalise on their time in government.\textsuperscript{740} Despite their often-valiant efforts (and some notable successes)\textsuperscript{741} during the GNU, the opposition emerged significantly weaker following the end of the power-sharing arrangement in 2013.

Experiences of co-operation and competition during the inclusive government era helped to define the likelihood of an opposition coalition ahead of the next election. The two MDCs largely proved unable to work together during the GNU, except to elect the speaker (who was a member of the MDC-T), after MDC-M MPs rebelled against a direct instruction from Mutambara.\textsuperscript{742} The two parties failed to pursue a meaningful and productive legislative agenda, and their inability to capitalise on their parliamentary majority was a significant failure which blemished their time in government. In particular, the two MDC’s failed to effect any meaningful reform of repressive state institutions, and were even unable to repeal or replace repressive legislation such as the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) and the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA).\textsuperscript{743} Despite the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) having spent £450 000 over six months in 2009 alone in support for the Office of the Prime Minister (Tsvangirai),\textsuperscript{744} this office performed few of its intended functions and was particularly poor at monitoring, communication and policy formulation.\textsuperscript{745} The personal rivalries and animosity between Welshman Ncube and Tsvangirai also limited what was achieved between the two parties.

In early 2011, the MDC-M resolved to remove Mutambara from the party’s presidency – on charges of having sold out to ZANU-PF – replacing him with Ncube.\textsuperscript{746} In a catastrophic strategic failure, Tsvangirai sided with both Mugabe and Mutambara in marginalising Ncube and preventing him from taking up the Deputy Prime Minister position (as per the GPA) following his ascent to the now “MDC-N” presidency. The political bickering over the issue


\textsuperscript{745} Per DFID, two consultants from the Adam Smith International, were seconded to the OPM in a programme which ran from June 2009 until the end of December. It was intended to “strengthen the systems for designing, monitoring and communication of Government of Zimbabwe’s policies and priorities” and “enable the Office of the Prime Minister to perform the normal functions that a head of government’s office would usually undertake, including oversight of the budget, ensuring ministries followed through on the Government’s agreed work plan and helping to resolve disputes between government departments.”

encouraged the resurgence of regional and ethnic politics within the two MDC’s, undermining support for the MDC-T and re-igniting a debate over Ndebele marginalisation and the unacceptability of a potential Ndebele president in a majority-Shona country.\footnote{Muzondidya, ‘The Opposition Dilemma in Zimbabwe: A Critical Review of the Politics of the Movement for Democratic Change Parties under the GPA Government Framework, 2009-2012’, 54.} That ostensible enemies, Mugabe and Tsvangirai, would close ranks to support Shona-speaking Mutambara over Ndebele-speaking Ncube appeared to many to be yet more evidence of ethnic favouritism.\footnote{Muzondidya, 54.} Qubani Moyo, the MDC-N Organising Secretary suggested that “the people of Matabeleland have seen Welshman as a victim of a tribal agenda to try to deny the people of Matabeleland space in determining important national issues,” ostensibly helping to erode the MDC-T’s support in the Matabeleland provinces.\footnote{Interview, Qhubani Moyo, Organising Secretary of MDC-Ncube party, 4 October 2013.} Ultimately though, while the MDC-T would perform particularly badly in the Matabeleland provinces (outside of urban Bulawayo), the MDC-N would disappear entirely in 2013 – failing to secure even a single seat.

**Coalition Negotiation and Collapse**

Despite the lack of cooperation between the former allies during the inclusive government period, there was some recognition ahead of the 2013 election – partly because Makoni had split the opposition vote in 2008 – that a coalition between the major players was necessary. A team of independent consultants – convened by Secretary General Tendai Biti – comprised of academics, lawyers and civic leaders advocated for the formation of a coalition.\footnote{Zamchiya, ‘The MDC-T’s (Un)Seeing Eye in Zimbabwe’s 2013 Harmonised Elections’, 959.} According to Ncube, there was also a concerted effort by British High Commissioner Deborah Bronnert (undertaken through shuttle diplomacy) to encourage the two MDC’s to unite.\footnote{Interview, Welshman Ncube, MDC-N President and former MDC Secretary General.} But despite this pressure, negotiations were left to the last minute, only beginning in earnest in late June and early July 2013, ahead of the election to be held on 31 July.\footnote{Dumisani Sibanda, ‘Grand Coalition Leaders Meet’, NewsDay Zimbabwe, 19 June 2013, https://www.newsday.co.zw/2013/06/19/grand-coalition-leaders-meet/; ‘Tsvangirai Warms up to Grand Coalition’, NewsDay Zimbabwe, 28 June 2013, https://www.newsday.co.zw/2013/06/28/tsvangirai-warms-up-to-grand-coalition/; Interview, Tendai Biti, Former MDC-T Secretary General and Finance Minister.} In late June, Simba Makoni held a press conference to announce that he would withdraw from the presidential race in favour of a coalition with other opposition forces. Popular Ndebele
politician, Dumiso Dabengwa, of ZAPU-Dabengwa, also made announcements that negotiations were ongoing to form a broad front of opposition parties. However, it appears that the negotiations were not particularly detailed, though they seem to have involved promises that Welshman would be granted the Vice Presidency, and that Makoni and Dabengwa would be given cabinet positions. However, such an arrangement would necessarily disrupt the existing hierarchy within the MDC-T if the coalition were to succeed, so members of the party with vested interests sought to undermine the coalition efforts. Phillan Zamchiya (2013) contends that it was the faction within the MDC-T that had the most to lose from such a coalition that managed to scupper it. As in 2008, it was the leaders from the party’s Ndebele heartlands – Vice President Thokozani Khupe, Lovemore Moyo and Abednico Bhebhe – who advocated against a coalition with the MDC-N. These leaders argued that a coalition with Ncube would merely prop up his waning political brand, that they had enough support to win the election in the Matabeleland region and that a coalition with the MDC-N would be read as a lack of confidence in their leadership.

Gallagher (2015) suggests that the failure of the two MDC’s to form a coalition in 2013 left some voters disillusioned, such as one respondent in Bulawayo who reported that: “Morgan [Tsvangirai] and Welshman [Ncube] were supposed to reconcile and fight for the people of Zimbabwe but they went back to fight each other.” Chan and Gallagher (2017) reported that many grassroots activists and party members became disillusioned with both MDCs and their inability to surmount their differences; many questioned, “how could they be expected to run a country when they couldn’t even pull together to oppose ZANU PF?” The MDC-T did, however, manage to ally itself with Makoni – but by 2013, all the previous goodwill invested in his 2008 campaign had been spent. In return for supporting Tsvangirai

---

753 Interview, Tendai Biti, Former MDC-T Secretary General and Finance Minister.
755 Zamchiya, 959.
756 It is likely that this was predominantly the case amongst voters from the Matabeleland and Bulawayo Provinces, for whom the 2006 split had been the most contentious and whose political allegiance had been split between the two parties – with the MDC-M/N concentrating on garnering support predominantly in these regions. In these regions, the two parties were also more likely to split the vote and allow for a ruling party parliamentary victory.
for the presidency in 2013, the MDC-T withdrew its candidate in Makoni Central, sparking an internal revolt against the party’s imposition of centrally-approved candidates over locally-popular individuals.\textsuperscript{759} Ultimately, the MDC-T chapter in Makoni Central revolted against the central leadership and ran an unsanctioned parliamentary candidate – which allowed the ZANU-PF candidate, Patrick Chinamasa, to take 50.14\% of the vote, while Makoni, the MDC-N and unsanctioned former MDC-T candidate shared the rest of the vote. The MDC-T’s poor handling of the 2013 nominations process entrenched internal divisions and generated dissent and suspicion, which led to 28 of the party’s failed parliamentary candidates contesting the elections as independents.

Meanwhile, the economy had recovered somewhat from the nadir of hyperinflation that peaked in 2008 – creating just enough breathing space for ZANU-PF. Diamonds had been discovered in 2006, and the diamond fields were violently secured by the military in 2008.\textsuperscript{760} The funds were used to pay for ZANU-PF’s 2013 re-election campaign, and to create the necessary breathing space for them to run an effective campaign. ZANU-PF cohered ahead of the polls, and drew on its reconfigured and expanded ‘social base’ – those who owed their livelihoods to the party through its control of land redistribution, informal mining, petty trading and the provision of farming inputs.\textsuperscript{761} The shadow economy and all who worked in it found themselves beholden to the state, while the opposition-supporting labour movement was decimated by the collapse of the formal economy. By 2013, the formal sector unemployment rate was estimated at over 80\%.\textsuperscript{762} Mass informalisation had left the once-powerful trade unions with little mobilising power. This had always been central to the MDC’s electoral mobilisation machine, and the loss of capacity represented a threat to the party’s electoral fortunes. The opposition went into the election highly fragmented, with bitter internal rivalries souring relations within and between parties. The party’s time in government had undermined their previously clean reputation with corruption scandals and


\textsuperscript{760} Global Witness, ‘An Inside Job: The State, the Security Forces, and a Decade of Disappearing Diamonds’.


personal indiscretions. The mobilising capacity of the MDC-T’s civic allies had also eroded – as many competent leaders had been brought into government, and the relationship with others had become strained during the inclusive government period. In sum, the opposition entered the 2013 election in a severely weakened state, though the MDC-T was full of bravado and believed that victory in the election was all but certain.

In the 2013 polls, ZANU-PF achieved a landslide victory – attracting 61% of the vote and more than two-thirds of the parliamentary seats. Tsvangirai’s vote was reduced to 35%, while the smaller MDC received just 2.7% of all ballots cast. ZANU-PF won 197 parliamentary seats while the MDC-T took 91, leaving the party with a third of the seats and severely handicapped in terms of advancing a legislative agenda. Although there were widespread accounts of electoral fraud and a highly uneven playing field (amongst other distortions of the electoral process), the scale of ZANU-PF’s victory is interesting. While it is frequently expected that ruling parties rig their way to victory in close elections, it is difficult (as ZANU-PF found in 2008) to change a losing election result into a victory. Despite the MDC-T’s protestations that the election had been stolen from them in 2013, many Zimbabwe analysts believe that the election was manipulated, but that the manipulation served only to increase the margin of the ruling party’s victory.

Rumours in Harare in the aftermath of the election appeared to corroborate this – they suggested that high-ranking members of ZANU-PF had also been surprised by the scale of their victory. Debates over the veracity of the results are ongoing with scholars such as Chan and Gallagher (2017) arguing that there was a genuine collapse in the MDC-T vote with many voters defecting to ZANU-PF, with others such as Bratton et al (2016) and Harare-based Research and Advocacy Unit (RAU) (2014) unpicking

764 Muzondidya, 58.
768 This tally includes the seats won in the newly-created women’s proportional-representation race
770 This is put forward most strongly by Chan and Gallagher, Why Mugabe Won.
ZANU-PF’s highly unlikely extra 1 million votes garnered\(^{771}\) between 2008 and the 2013 election – when the total votes cast reached just 3.4 million.\(^{772}\) By contrast, the MDC-T’s reported tally from 2008 stayed relatively constant, decreasing by only 23,000 votes. RAU’s report is persuasive, and makes it clear that there was extensive manipulation of the voting process, but also that the MDC-T had failed to persuade more voters to support them over the course of the GNU. Despite their dramatic loss, the MDC-T still attracted 80% of all ballots cast for the opposition.\(^{773}\) Although 71 independent candidates ran for parliamentary seats, just one succeeded – emphasising yet again that party identities remain key signifiers in Zimbabwe. In the wake of the election, the MDC-T found itself largely confined to the two most urbanised provinces (see Table 7) – Bulawayo and Harare – while its 2008 rural vote base had all but collapsed. The MDC-N’s vote completely collapsed, and they failed to secure a single parliamentary seat – even in their Matabeleland and Bulawayo heartlands.

*Table 7 Official Results from the 2013 Zimbabwean Parliamentary Election (Directly Elected Seats)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>ZANU-PF</th>
<th>MDC-T</th>
<th>MDC-N</th>
<th>Independent</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulawayo</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harare</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manicaland</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland Central</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland East</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland West</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masvingo</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matabeleland North</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matabeleland South</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midlands</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>160</strong></td>
<td><strong>49</strong></td>
<td><strong>0</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>210</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Zimbabwe Electoral Commission*\(^{774}\)

\(^{771}\) RAU notes that despite the requirements in the constitution that all election results be collected and released simultaneously, the local government election results still had not been released by March 2014. A number of case studies conducted by RAU suggested that the local government elections had far fewer ballots cast than in the parliamentary and presidential races, calling the veracity of the two elections’ results into question. Research and Advocacy Unit [RAU], ‘Syncopated Numbers: Arithmetic Discord and Zimbabwe’s 2013 “Harmonised” Election.’ (Harare: Research and Advocacy Unit [RAU], March 2014)


\(^{774}\) As found in Bratton, Dulani, and Masunungure, ‘Detecting Manipulation in Authoritarian Elections’, 15.
The failure to create a coalition between the two MDCs in 2013 severely undermined their electoral prospects. At the presidential level, Tsvangirai won in just three of the country’s ten provinces – Harare, Bulawayo and Matabeleland North. Figure 22 shows how the MDC-T’s presidential vote was eroded, though the red map in Figure 23 highlights that the MDC-T did still have significant support across parts of the country, but that it was unable to muster a majority of the vote in many of its old stronghold constituencies. Support for the MDC-N had waned significantly, and it got no votes in many constituencies and found itself entirely confined to the western Matabeleland regions (see the yellow map in Figure 23). At the parliamentary level, the parties lost key seats to ZANU-PF as they split the vote between themselves. In Matabeleland South, 8 of the 13 seats were lost because of the split vote, while in Matabeleland North the united MDC’s would have won 11 of the 13 seats – but instead ZANU-PF took 7 of 13. Four more seats were lost to a split vote in Kwekwe, Zvishavane, Masvingo and Kadoma.775 Had the opposition been united in 2013 – and won the 17 seats where they split the vote – they would have had control of four of the country’s ten provinces rather than just two.776 But of course, simple electoral calculations such as these are inadequately able to capture the likely effect of coalitions, as not all votes would necessarily be transferrable, and perhaps not all voters would have turned out or repression may have increased – or perhaps more would have transferred their votes or turned out to vote. It is also possible that the combined MDCs would have won more seats and a greater share of the presidential vote as coalitions often have a ‘demonstration’ effect, increasing the electorate’s confidence in an otherwise frequently-distrusted group.

Figure 22 The 2013 Zimbabwean Presidential Election Results by Constituency

ZANU-PF’s Presidential Vote
The MDC-T's Presidential Vote

Figure 23 The 2013 Zimbabwean Presidential Election Results for ZANU-PF (green), MDC-T (red), MDC-N (yellow) in order of declining vote share
4.2.4 Looking Ahead to 2018

Already in 2014, there were moves afoot to correct the fractiousness of the Zimbabwean opposition that had caused so much trouble in 2013. Considering its diminishing electoral returns, the MDC-T leadership was bullish, blaming ZANU-PF for its spectacular failures in the 2013 election and chalked their loss up to rigging. However, many activists and those outside of Tsvangirai’s inner circle were aware that the party’s fractured internal unity and the fragmentation of the playing field had led – in part – to the poor showing in the polls. As noted in a previous section, the party’s poor showing in 2013 and a growing rift between the Secretary General, Tendai Biti, and President Tsvangirai degenerated into fractiousness that would result in yet another split. As noted by Zamchiya, the Tsvangirai faction of the party had gone into the elections expecting a resounding victory – they refused to listen to the ‘intellectuals’ in the party (or Biti’s consultants) who were concerned that the party’s support base and mobilisation capacity had been eroded, making victory unlikely. The anti-intellectualism deployed against Ncube in 2005 was wielded against Biti in 2013, who was accused of trying to undermine the president in order to usurp his position at the head of the party. When Biti’s concerns proved well-founded and the MDC-T found itself facing a new 5-year term in which ZANU-PF had won itself regional and (a semblance of) domestic legitimacy through an election victory, calls grew within the party for Tsvangirai to step down.

This came to a head in early 2014 when a letter written by Elton Mangoma requesting leadership change within the party saw him expelled from MDC-T headquarters (Harvest House) and assaulted by party youths outside. In the wake of this incident, Tendai Biti, Elton Mangoma and a host of other party heavy-weights split (or were expelled) to form a new party, the MDC-Renewal. The split led to 22 MDC-T MPs breaking away from the main formation, and Tsvangirai conspiring with the ruling party to expel them from parliament.

---

777 Interview, Charles Mangongera, Political Analyst and Tsvangirai Advisor, 10 April 2013; Interview, Toendephi Shonhe, Former Director General of the MDC-T, 10 April 2013.
779 ‘Leadership Renewal: Tsvangirai Outfoxes Rivals’, The Standard, 26 January 2014,
780 Clemence Manyukwe, ‘Zimbabwe: MDC-T Faces Split’, Financial Gazette (Harare), 20 February 2014,
leading to by-elections in 14 constituencies which were boycotted by the MDC-T. The MDC-Renewal later split again, into the Renewal Democrats of Zimbabwe (RDZ) under Elton Mangoma, and the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) under Tendai Biti. The MDC-N under Ncube has similarly faced a series of desertions, weakening the party even further. After announcing in 2016 that he was battling colon cancer, Tsvangirai passed away in Johannesburg on 14 February 2018. He failed to name a successor before his death, and in the wake of his passing, a hard-fought battle played out between the MDC-T’s three vice presidents. Nelson Chamisa – who had turned 40 just days before ultimately won the contentious (and at times, violent) struggle. Chamisa then purged the party of Vice President Khupe and 19 of her allies from the Bulawayo Provincial Executive. Having excised the group who had been so resistant to previous coalitions, this left the leadership unchallenged in pushing forward with its 2018 electoral coalition.

While the MDCs faced internal battles, ZANU-PF housed fresh crises of its own. In 2011, General Solomon Mujuru was found dead in his home following a suspicious house fire. In December 2014, President Mugabe expelled Solomon’s widow Joice Mujuru and her supporters from the ruling party – including eight allies in Cabinet. Over the months that followed, those who supported her in the provinces were also purged as the opposing faction

---


783 Tsvangirai appointed two more vice presidents in 2016, to dilute the power of VP Thokozani Khupe.

784 According to the constitution, presidential candidates must be aged 40 or above to contest a national election.


788 Her husband – ZANU heavy-weight Solomon Mujuru – had died under suspicious circumstances in a house fire in 2011 which is widely believed to have been an assassination by members of the ruling party in return for his support to Simba Makoni and the opposition (as widely reported in the WikiLeaks Cables released between 2010 and 2011).

of the ruling party sought to consolidate power. Mujuru went on to form her own party – Zimbabwe People First (ZPF) – which also later fractured and led her to form a new party in 2017, the National People's Party (NPP). Mugabe, Grace Mugabe and the ruling party faction that surrounded them then moved to expel Vice President Emerson Mnangagwa in November 2017, while apparently lining Grace Mugabe up to succeed her husband. A little more than a week later, in a shock move, the Zimbabwean military appeared on the state broadcaster to announce that they had surrounded the president’s residence and taken control of the capital in what appeared to be a military coup. A week-long, tense standoff ensued, and on 21 November as parliament was beginning a special sitting to impeach him, Mugabe resigned. Emerson Mnangagwa, Mugabe’s long-serving right hand man, was installed as the country’s president a week later. As the country moved ever closer to the 2018 election, it was clear that these polls would not look like any of those held in the last two decades.

Coalition Negotiations

From the moment that Mujuru was expelled from ZANU-PF, speculation began regarding her intention to join the opposition. Pundits in Harare hoped that if she joined the existing opposition, it might lead to widespread defections from within ZANU, and it might finally break down the polarisation that has characterised Zimbabwe’s politics since 2000. The parties have been engaged in a dance around the issue of a coalition since 2015, but with little more than an MoU on potential collaboration. Meanwhile, Mujuru launched her own small

---

idUKKBN1DQ0AB.
‘People’s Rainbow Coalition’ in October 2017 with two small parties and a breakaway faction of Biti’s PDP. The ‘MDC Alliance,’ as the coalition became known, entered into discussions with Mujuru’s coalition about a broader opposition front, but nothing ultimately came of it. Party polarisation makes collaboration across partisan lines particularly difficult, as much energy has been invested in reifying party boundaries and defining the opposition as the antithesis of the ruling party. A coalition with former ruling party members threatens to derail the MDC’s message and alienate its ‘hardcore activist’ base. The MDC-T’s youth leader in 2015 described the coalition talks between Mujuru and Tsvangirai as a “great betrayal of those who died for the democratic struggle if we are to be seen to work together with people who presided over the abuse and killings of our people in Mashonaland Central.” As Mujuru prevaricated, the various former MDC formations came together in August 2017 to form the ‘MDC Alliance,’ which comprised of seven groupings – MDC-T, PDP, MDC-N, Transform Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe People First (ZPF), the Multi-Racial Christian Democrats (MCD) and ZANU-Ndonga. At the coalition launch on 5 August 2017, all the party leaders took to the stage to preach unity and forgiveness and a willingness to put aside their differences in order to confront the ruling party in the 2018 election.

The MDC-T had again faced an uphill battle to negotiate the alliance, as the party’s Bulawayo leadership rebelled against the alliance once again. In August 2017 Tsvangirai’s deputy, Thokoanzani Khupe, along with Abednico Bhebhe and Lovemore Moyo, wrote a letter to the president asking him to delay the coalition, expressing their concerns with the alliance and

---

the distribution of seats in Bulawayo and the Matabeleland provinces. Khupe and others argued that the MDC-T has no need for an alliance in the Ndebele regions as the party had performed well there in the past, but they conceded that an alliance in the Mashonaland regions would be beneficial.\textsuperscript{800} As in 2008 and 2013, this appeared to be an attempt by the MDC-T’s regional leadership to protect their positions within the party and the Matabeleland regional hierarchy. In response to the dissent from Khupe, party youths disrupted a meeting that she and others held in Bulawayo, where Khupe was assaulted.\textsuperscript{801} The reticence of the Bulawayo faction contributed to a widening rift between Tsvangirai and Khupe. At the same time, Tsvangirai’s worsening health became a concern for both the coalition and MDC-T leaders who wanted to position themselves to take over the party. As Tsvangirai became increasingly ill, jostling began within the MDC-T to replace him, and to select a new leader for the nascent alliance. In defiance of Nelson Chamisa who had been appointed as acting party president, Khupe and MDC-T Secretary General Mwonzora attended an externally brokered meeting in Cape Town on 13 February 2018 with Joice Mujuru and other opposition members. They negotiated Mujuru’s accession to a new, broader alliance of 84 political formations.\textsuperscript{802} However, Tsvangirai’s death the following day and Chamisa’s rapid takeover of the party scuppered their plans. In the wake of her expulsion, Khupe vowed to contest for the MDC-T party name and symbol,\textsuperscript{803} and take her faction into Joice Mujuru’s People’s Rainbow Coalition.\textsuperscript{804}

While in 2008 and 2013, Khupe’s faction won out against coalitions with the largely Matabeleland-centric MDC-N, in 2018 there was an attempt to suppress their dissent and force unity on the recalcitrant faction. There are two explanations for this. The first is that Tsvangirai’s faction in the MDC had finally recognised that the failure to form a coalition in previous elections was a hindrance to achieving a transfer of power from ZANU-PF. The second, and likely the most important factor, is the MDC-T’s declining mobilisation capacity.

\textsuperscript{800} Nqobani Ndlovu.
As noted previously in this chapter, the MDC and later MDC-T have always relied heavily on the mobilisation capacity of its civic allies – the trade unions, NGO’s, community-based organisations and churches. The previously-formidable Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) – which was the backbone of opposition mobilisation – has atrophied under the weight of splits, funding declines, deindustrialisation and disastrous informalisation of the economy. Zimbabwe’s current unemployment rate is estimated by the ZCTU to stand at over 90%. With rapid deindustrialisation, business closures and shrinking opportunities for formal sector employment, the clear majority of Zimbabweans are engaged in informal sector subsistence activities, which has drastically reduced the ability of political parties to mobilise citizens through unions or along class lines and in favour of workers struggles. NGOs and civil society bodies are facing massive financial shortfalls, with Zimbabwe having slipped off the international agenda. Equally, the relationship between the MDC-T and many civic groups has soured, and donors now actively seek out apolitical NGO’s and NGO leaders for financial support. This has reduced the number and efficacy of the MDC-T’s allies, and by extension the party’s ability to mobilise at election-time. Finally, having been abandoned by their donor allies – who are instead re-engaging with ZANU-PF and seeking to mend fences – opposition parties are facing serious financial shortfalls. In July 2017, furniture in the MDC-T’s Harvest House headquarters was attached by debt collectors because the party had failed to pay its debts. Even Strive Masiyiwa has reportedly abandoned the party. Each of these factors has served to increase the likelihood of a coalition as opposition

---

805 Sintha Chiumia, ‘Is Zimbabwe’s Unemployment Rate 4%, 60% or 95%? The Data Is Unreliable’, *Africa Check* (blog), 1 October 2014, https://africacheck.org/reports/is-zimbabwes-unemployment-rate-4-60-or-95-why-the-data-is-unreliable/.


807 Research & Advocacy Unit, ‘Zimbabwe since the Elections in July 2013: The View from 2017’ (Harare: Research & Advocacy Unit, August 2017), http://researchandadvocacyunit.org/system/files/Zimbabwe%20since%20the%20elections%20in%202013_the%20view%20from%202017.pdf.


parties seek to pool their meagre financial and human resources to pose a credible threat to ZANU-PF’s rural and urban resurgence.\textsuperscript{812}

Many Zimbabweans interviewed in the Round 7 Afrobarometer survey (in February 2017) support the idea of a ‘grand coalition’ of the opposition. In response to the statement that “in order to win the 2018 presidential election, opposition political parties should work together under a grand coalition,” 45% of all respondents agreed.\textsuperscript{813} Amongst those who reported supporting the MDC and other ‘traditional’ opposition actors, support for a coalition increased to 63%. By 2018, support for an opposition coalition had risen to 56% of all respondents.\textsuperscript{814} But it remains to be seen whether the MDC-T can avoid alienating their alliance partners, and whether the MDC-T’s fallout with its Matabeleland leadership will undermine the alliance’s efficacy in the opposition’s heartlands ahead of the rapidly-approaching 2018 election.\textsuperscript{815} Ahead of 2018, the opposition is likely to face a difficult uphill battle. Of the 210 seats in the national assembly, 68% are in rural areas in which the opposition have few structures and little control over voter mobilisation. ZANU-PF’s new command agriculture programme has likely helped to shore up their rural base, despite almost universal un- and under-employment and urban dissatisfaction with the ruling party. In rural areas, ZANU-PF retains control of traditional leadership and land redistribution, which have proven to be effective vote mobilisers in the past. In urban areas, the once-mighty workers’ movement is little more than a shadow of its former self, as most Zimbabweans have been forced into petty trading to make ends meet. The rise of Emmerson Mnangagwa in 2017, his re-engagement with the international community and broad promises of sweeping change have also taken the wind out of the MDC Alliance’s ‘change’ narrative.\textsuperscript{816} Considering these challenges and the broader erosion of opposition support, a coalition of opposition forces

\textsuperscript{812} On this, see Raftopoulos, ‘The 2013 Elections in Zimbabwe’.


\textsuperscript{814} Mike Bratton, ‘Afrobarometer: Findings from a Pre-Election Baseline Survey in Zimbabwe: April/May 2018’, (7 June 2018).


will be a necessary but certainly not sufficient condition for electoral turnover in Zimbabwe in 2018.

4.3 From Polarisation to Cooperation

*Why Coalesce?*

This chapter has outlined the coalition negotiation processes undertaken in Zimbabwe around the 2008 and 2013 elections, and ahead of the upcoming 2018 polls. Unlike in Uganda and Zambia, there was little debate over who would be the face of these coalitions, with Tsvangirai the undisputed leader of the country’s increasingly fractious opposition. Coalitions were negotiated with factions of the MDC that had broken away from the main formation; this was done in recognition that the splits may undermine the party’s electoral success in the 2008 and 2013 elections.

*Why Collapse?*

Instead, dissent welled from within the MDC-T’s Ndebele leadership, who sought to ring-fence and protect their positions from Ncube’s MDC-N – which was itself formed from a regional breakaway from the main opposition party. Competition over the spoils of opposition politics in one region served to repeatedly undermine opposition unity, and led the two parties to split the presidential vote in 2008 and a significant number of parliamentary races in both 2008 and 2013. The same issue, and the same group of leaders, threatened to derail the opposition coalition again ahead of the 2018 elections. This problematises existing research which predicts that the existence of ethnic parties\(^\text{817}\) is a barrier to the formation of coalitions.\(^\text{818}\) In fact, as the preceding chapter has highlighted, when parties are competing for the same voters within the context of a multi-ethnic party, it may make coalition formation more difficult as party members from lower echelons refuse to concede their pre-eminent position within a particular region, or as the party’s highest-ranking representative of their particular identity group. As a result, these party members seek to scupper coalition negotiations and rally others to their cause, making it much more difficult for parties to reach an agreement.

\(^{817}\) Parties that draw votes predominantly from one region or a single ethno-linguistic group.

\(^{818}\) As per Arriola, *Multi-Ethnic Coalitions in Africa.*
The Zimbabwean case also highlights the importance of taking parties seriously as organisations that draw together different interests. The literature on coalitions largely ignores lower level party members, and treats parties as little more than vehicles for the personal interests of the party leader. Instead, and as the Zimbabwean case demonstrates, parties knit together factions with different interests, and some of those interests are not best served by joining a multi-party coalition. While coalitions may offer benefits for party leaders if the coalition is successful, the same agreement may carry costs for actors and factions in lower echelons. These costs may be quantified in terms of prestige and profile, their position in the party hierarchy or parliamentary seats in their home region. Whose interests win out in each circumstance depends on the balance of power at the point of reaching the agreement, the spoiler capacity of lower party members and whether or not the party can afford – financially and politically – to run their own campaign or alienate lower-level functionaries. Finances are an important part of this equation, as the preceding discussion shows.

However, as the discussion of party funding, donor support and financial incentives for coalition-building suggests, pecuniary coalition-building is not necessarily as straightforward as Arriola (2013) suggests. As outlined in previous chapters, funding frequently comes from other external sources, and parties are rarely just reliant on domestic businessmen to fund their coalitions. When funding is offered for cooperation – as in Zimbabwe in 2008 – it still does not guarantee cooperation. Even smaller, more regionally-contained parties with little funding are, at times, able to turn down financial incentives for coalitions when they believe that going into a coalition might compromise their vote base. In addition, large, well-funded parties – such as the MDC-T – feel little need to partner with smaller parties when they are well-funded, confident of victory and forced to concede more than they are willing to. This is particularly the case in Zimbabwe’s polarised party system, where party brands are important social markers that appear to trump the personal profile of parliamentary and local government candidates.

The importance of party labels has also restricted the number of newly-elected party presidents deciding to contest alone. Most newly-elected and untested opposition leaders recognise that there is little to be gained by running against the two behemoths – ZANU-PF and MDC-T – except for Simba Makoni’s candidacy in 2008 (see Table 8). Makoni was the only untested opposition leader who scuppered a coalition with the MDC-T in order to run
his own campaign, but he was ultimately supported by the MDC-N. Coalition efforts were frequently scuppered by the largest party to the coalition – the MDC-T – rather than by the smaller partners who overestimated their national following. No opposition leader has gone into a coalition with the ruling party, further highlighting how different Zimbabwe’s polarised politics is from that of Uganda and Zambia.

Table 8 New Party Leaders and Electoral Coalitions in Zimbabwe, 2000-2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Robert Mugabe</td>
<td>ZANU-PF</td>
<td>48.60%</td>
<td>56.06%</td>
<td>59.59%</td>
<td>43.24%</td>
<td>61.88%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morgan Tsvangirai</td>
<td>MDC/MDC-T</td>
<td>47.00%</td>
<td>42.10%</td>
<td>39.52%</td>
<td>47.87%</td>
<td>34.37%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ndabaningi Sithole</td>
<td>ZANU-Ndonga</td>
<td>0.80%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilson Kumbula</td>
<td>MDC/MDC-T</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0.25%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simba Makoni</td>
<td>MKD*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8.10%</td>
<td>Coalition</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arthur Mutambara</td>
<td>MDC-M/N</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welshman Ncube</td>
<td>MDC-M/N</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.72%</td>
<td>Coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dumiso Dabengwa</td>
<td>ZAPU</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.75%</td>
<td>Coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tendai Biti</td>
<td>PDP**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agrippah Mutambara</td>
<td>ZPF</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Coalition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Simba Makoni was in a coalition with Arthur Mutambara’s MDC-M

**The PDP was formed during the MDC-T’s 2014 split

Finally, the Zimbabwean case highlights how personality, ethnicity and funding might interact to derail coalition-building. While Gandhi and Reuter (2013) suggest that in highly fractionalised party systems, parties struggle to reach agreements as they do not have a stable past of interactions, this is rarely the case. In Zimbabwe, most opposition actors have – at some point in the past – been members of the same organisation and have worked together closely. However, in many cases, the antagonisms entrenched during their years together became a barrier to future coalitions. Some of the themes that emerged from this chapter highlight the distrust and factionalism between coalition principals as well as high levels of paranoia about state interference and attrition. Looking ahead to 2018, it appears that – as in Uganda in 2016 – party weakness and a lack of funding may lend itself to the greater
likelihood of coalition cohesion, where opposition parties wager that it is better to pool resources in a coalition than to compete individually.
5. Conclusions

5.1 Comparing Opposition Coalitions

This research began with the puzzle which asked why a coalition failed to materialise between two Zambian opposition party leaders – Hakainde Hichilema and Nevers Mumba – in December 2014. In a context where the ruling party’s collapse appeared imminent and foreign businessmen had put money on the table to encourage cooperation, the mooted coalition was stillborn. The coalitions literature predicts that in such cases, the opposition will coalesce because of the increased likelihood of the opposition winning the election,\(^{819}\) the availability of funds which allows the larger party to buy the allegiance of the smaller grouping,\(^{820}\) and the single-round electoral system which provides incentives for opposition parties to cooperate before the polls.\(^{821}\) Instead, Nevers Mumba – who had not yet competed in an election as MMD president – opted to run alone. Ultimately Mumba came fourth in the polls, with less than 1% of the total vote.

It has been argued that existing theories of opposition pre-electoral coalition formation are insufficiently nuanced to explain the dynamics around the (un)successful negotiation of such arrangements because they adhere to the ‘unitary actor assumption,’ assume that ethnicity is a hindrance to cooperation, argue that the provision of funding leads to successful coalition negotiations and fail to account for the diverse interests and strategies pursued by party leaders. In 2014, Nevers Mumba decided to contest the polls on his own party ticket as he had not yet competed in an election as the president of the former ruling MMD, and he overestimated the levels of popular support that remained for the party – and for him as its president. Mumba was also accountable to the political and financial interests that helped to elevate him to his position, and so he decided, in the face of stiff resistance from within his party and foregoing funding, to contest alone. When he performed particularly poorly – placing fourth and taking less than 1% of the vote – it was clear that he was not a nationally viable candidate. By the next election, held just 18 months later, Mumba decided to go into

---

\(^{819}\) van de Walle, ‘Tipping Games: When Do Opposition Parties Coalesce?’

\(^{820}\) Arriola, *Multi-Ethnic Coalitions in Africa*.

the coalition with Hichilema and the UPND, as he had spent all his political and financial capital in 2015. Across the three cases outlined in this research, the majority of newly-elected party leaders opted to forego coalitions and to contest on their own in their maiden polls.

This chapter will bring together some of the key lessons from the three case studies to reflect on the arguments developed in Chapter 1. It will put the cases in conversation with each other and point to the similarities and differences between instances of coalitions across the three countries.

Why Cooperate?

The reasons why opposition parties coalesce in the three cases under study appear to be fairly straightforward – in cases where parties are weak and poorly funded, they collaborate to maximise scarce resources and minimise competition. Cooperation also helps parties with limited constituencies to broaden out their voter base. This suggests that parties are more likely to coalesce when they are ‘weak’ – when their funding, organisational capacity and spread are limited. This is certainly true of the opposition in Uganda and Zambia (until 2011), where parties with limited resources and confined constituencies sought to cooperate to achieve better electoral outcomes. In Zambia in 2015 and 2016, the UPND sought to build a broad, inclusive coalition to expand their reach beyond their traditional (ethno-regional) base, and to ‘rebrand’ in the face of accusations of ‘tribalism’ and ethnic exclusion. However, even strong opposition parties – such as the MDC(T) from 2000 to 2013 – still seek out coalitions with other parties, but they are less likely to make the concessions necessary to sustain them when negotiating from a position of strength. When the funding and organisational capacity of the MDC-T declined, the party was more concerned with inter-party unity and cooperating with members of splinter parties. As argued by van de Walle (2006), it is easier to build and sustain a coalition when the ruling party’s chances of retaining power appear slim, and this was certainly the case in Zambia in 2015 and 2016 when the growing likelihood of an incumbent party defeat made opposition cooperation more attractive. In such cases, it is common to see opposition actors and former regime insiders defect to the coalition, as they seek out a better deal in a more likely opposition-led administration. But even then, the UPND’s experience in 2015 highlights that gaining full cooperation of all relevant opposition actors still is not straightforward. This suggests that opposition parties form coalitions both when they are weak and when they are ‘strong.’
There is significant debate in the literature over how electoral rules impact on opposition coalition formation. The previous three chapters highlighted that the effect of electoral institutions across the three cases is difficult to predict. When the Zambian electoral system was changed in 2016 from a first-past-the-post (FPTP) system to a two-round voting system with a 50%+1 threshold, opposition elites saw this as giving even more impetus to coalition formation. However, Zambian parties had regularly attempted to negotiate coalitions around each electoral cycle under the FPTP system. The two-round system prevailing in Zimbabwe did not preclude coalition negotiations but such cooperation remained elusive until 2018 when under the same electoral rules, the opposition has cohered. Uganda has had a two-round electoral system since the mid-1990s—a system that some suggest discourages first round coalition formation but this has not proven to be the case. Opposition parties in Uganda have sought to form multi-party coalitions in every election, and with more success than the parties in the other two cases. Electoral rules do not preclude the coalition negotiations, and may partly explain why the evidence is mixed with regards to how electoral systems impact on the likelihood of coalition behaviour. This research suggests that two-round electoral systems do not preclude pre-electoral coalition negotiations, but they do lower the incentives for cooperating in the first round as parties can make the case to run separately before cooperating in the second round. First round coalitions—as outlined above—require higher levels of trust, coordination, cooperation and sacrifice and they carry higher costs in terms of party profile and internal unity. Second-round coalitions offer higher rewards at a significantly reduced cost, once the ‘ranking’ of opposition parties has been firmly established by the results of the first-round election. However, most opposition players would prefer to win decisively in the first round. This is to encourage a demonstration effect which may increase turnout and to avoid the risks of a second-round election in which the ruling party might be more willing to deploy violence and manipulation to swing the results in their favour. When there is low trust in the electoral commission and a belief that the incumbent is unlikely to play fair, opposition parties in two-round systems will still endeavour

---

to form an oversized coalition in the first round to mitigate the risks of incumbent malpractice.

Pre-electoral coalitions are formed for various reasons. Van de Walle (2006) argues that coalitions are like tipping games – that they are more likely to occur and coalesce when the fall of the incumbent appears imminent. This prompts defection from the ruling regime, which bolsters the ranks of the opposition and further increases the likelihood of electoral success. The 2015 and 2016 coalitions in Zambia appear to confirm this theory – the PF was in disarray and their prospects for retaining power after the loss of Michael Sata looked slim. This led to the coalescing of various interested parties (and individuals) who sought to join a coalition to maximise their chances of gaining a powerful position in the wake of the polls. However, the Zimbabwean and Ugandan cases illustrate that cooperative behaviour can equally be a response to party weakness, a lack of funds and inadequate geographic reach. In Uganda, the weakness of parties, their meagre financial resources and the barriers to competition imposed by the dominant party-state forces parties to seek cooperation repeatedly across electoral cycles. In Zimbabwe, a fairly strong and well-resourced MDC (and then MDC-T) frequently defected from negotiations, but after its mobilisation machine and resource base declined post-2013, the party sought out and committed to the 2018 electoral coalition to try to revive its ailing fortunes. Although it seems logical that opposition parties should cooperate, this thesis highlights that cooperation is difficult to achieve and even harder to sustain. This is due to the many competing interests at various levels of each party and the limited information available regarding which course of action best suits the interests of the party and party leader.

5.1.1 Bringing Parties Back In

Political science literature on parties in Africa is sparse and dominated by pessimistic accounts of patrimonialism, ethnic determinism and the predominance of party leaders. The literature on coalitions in Africa builds on these assumptions, treating parties as little more than ‘ephemeral vehicles for the personal ambitions’ of the leader. This leaves little space for a discussion of African parties as complex organisations constituted by factions who compete for ascendance. Previous research on coalitions in Africa makes use of the ‘unitary actor

---

824 van de Walle, ‘Tipping Games: When Do Opposition Parties Coalesce?’
assumption’ with regards to opposition parties, but this research highlights that African opposition parties are rarely cohesive and this internal discord impacts on coalition negotiations. Parties are frequently divided into factions who are competing to advance their own interests. This is even more prevalent when negotiating coalitions, as party factions jostle to define the party’s strategy and candidatures ahead of the polls in the hope of achieving their own aims. These factions complicate internal party processes, potentially undermining the position of the party leader and compromising his position within negotiations. Rather than the assumption that parties (and party leaders in particular) can negotiate as unconstrained unitary actors who seek to maximise votes, policies or seats, parties are constrained by their internal balance of forces.\textsuperscript{826} Coalitions can be damaging for parties’ internal unity, as rifts can emerge over a multitude of issues such as the choice of coalition partners, the nature of the coalition, the timing of the agreement and the choices of joint candidates. Party activists and structures at the local level often resist the choice of joint parliamentary candidates from coalition partners, and the disruption caused by this can have grave consequences for local party structures. Party presidents are often simultaneously combating threats to their positions whilst bargaining with other party leaders. This can be further complicated by cooperation between dissenting party factions and potential coalition partners, as in Uganda in 2011 and 2016. As suggested by Maor (1998), the credibility of party leaders’ threats and proposals during coalitions may be compromised by defections and dissent, which are seen as an inability to exert control over their own organisations.\textsuperscript{827}

When considering opposition behaviour during coalitions, it is important to distinguish, as Kelly (2018) does, between parties that were formed to contest elections – with fairly sophisticated organisational structures, systems and mobilisation strategies – and those that function primarily as vehicles for attracting patronage and raising the profile of the party leader.\textsuperscript{828} Across the three cases outlined in this research, it is clear that that while some smaller parties which are little more than ephemeral vehicles for the interests of the party leader do in fact conform to the unitary actor assumption, this is not the case for larger and more established parties. Larger opposition parties find themselves riven by greater levels of factionalism, with multiple groups competing for ascendancy and often trying to undermine

\textsuperscript{826} Pedersen, ‘How Intra-Party Power Relations Affect the Coalition Behaviour of Political Parties’.
\textsuperscript{827} Maor, \textit{Parties, Conflicts and Coalitions in Western Europe}, 11.
\textsuperscript{828} Kelly, ‘Party Proliferation and Trajectories of Opposition’, 212.
coalition negotiations which they see as being inimical to their interests. Equally, Arriola’s theory suggests that opposition parties always seek to sell their support to the highest bidder, but not all parties are so easily bought in or co-opted. Larger parties – particularly the largest opposition party – are far less likely to sell their endorsements to others.

Uganda presents a valuable case study of the ways in which factionalism and inter-opposition competition can undermine coalition bargaining. As noted in Chapter 2, between 2011 and 2016, an insurrection from within the DP’s Buganda ranks served to destabilise the party and shift the strategic calculations of the party’s leader, Norbert Mao. The latter was simultaneously negotiating within a multi-party coalition to try to protect his own position, and undermine the opposing DP faction. When the rival FDC cooperated with the dissenting group, this cemented existing DP-FDC antagonism and undermined future coalition-building efforts. Due to factional infighting and close cross-party collaboration, several DP members and activists crossed over to the FDC during coalitions. The Ugandan case demonstrates that coalitions can be high-cost endeavours for parties, as they often lead to the loss of members and activists and undermine party unity. Strategic differences between the party’s structures can easily prompt party splits, and thus party leaders find their actions constrained by what they wager is the option most likely to enable them to retain their positions. In the case of the 2016 election, the DP’s Mao and several other small fractious parties voted for newcomer and NRM stalwart, Amama Mbabazi, over the FDC’s Besigye to protect their positions and ring-fence their constituencies from FDC encroachment. Fractious parties undermine the bargaining position of leaders, so party leaders will attempt to strengthen their hand in coalitions by leveraging what bargaining tools they do have.

Party leaders are also constrained by the actions of their subordinates, and coalitions can easily be scuttled by leaders below the party president. Zambia’s most promising pre-electoral coalition was dashed in 2011 by the revelation of internal party documents to the press by the PF Secretary General, Wynter Kabimba, who feared losing his position in the PF (and potential government) hierarchy to another party’s leader. Similarly, the promising coalitions between the MDC factions in Zimbabwe in 2008 and 2013 were undermined and undone by the MDC-T’s prominent Ndebele leadership, who feared that cooperation with the Ndebele-led MDC-N would undermine their positions within their ethnic stronghold. In 2018, another attempt to do so by the same regional leaders was thwarted by the party leader when the
regional leadership was violently ‘disciplined’ and ultimately expelled from the MDC-T. These instances highlight the inadequacy of the ‘unitary actor assumption’ which is prominent in most coalition studies, and implicit in Arriola’s theory. In extreme cases, party structures take decisions that fly in the face of the party president. In Zambia in 2015, the majority of the MMD’s parliamentary caucus voted to go into a coalition with the UPND, though the party’s leader had not formally agreed to cooperate. Ultimately, the party leader decided to contest the election on an MMD ticket, while the majority of the party’s MPs supported another candidate in the presidential by-election. This is indicative of the ways in which parties’ behaviour in coalitions is determined by the shifting balance of power and the competing interests of factions within parties.

Most coalitions seek to run both a joint presidential candidate and joint parliamentary flagbearers. The struggles over the allocations of constituencies can be a highly fraught and contentious process, with disruptive consequences for both coalition unity and local party structures. The division of the constituencies in the Western Province of Zambia during the PF-UPND Pact (Chapter 3) highlights these difficulties, and points to how divisive it can be for parties to try to select joint candidates. As both parties saw Western Province as ripe for their expansion, both sought to claim the majority of seats there ahead of the 2011 polls. In so doing, parties allegedly resorted to underhanded tactics to try to wrest constituencies from their ostensible ally. This resulted in local party structures protesting and requesting that the party’s headquarters withdraw from the coalition. It also sowed distrust between the coalition partners when it became apparent that the UPND had ‘rigged’ a fact-finding mission to gauge party support, and the UPND’s candidate placed poorly in the polls. Intra-party competition for the same seats increases incentives to manipulate perceptions of competitiveness, and decreases trust between allies. In Zimbabwe in 2013, the MDC-T’s imposition of Simba Makoni as the coalition candidate for Makoni Central prompted disunity and dissent amongst the party’s structures (Chapter 4). The MDC’s candidate who had been forced to step down ran as an unsanctioned independent, allowing a ZANU-PF minister to take the seat with a slim majority. Ahead of the 2018 polls, there are rumblings of similar fallouts at the local level over the perceived imposition of parliamentary candidates by the MDC Alliance. These

scuffles over local representation can cast a long shadow over the unity of local party structures, which has long-lasting consequences for the party’s mobilisation capacity.

This research argues that, in seeking to understand opposition pre-electoral coalitions, it is crucial to look at the internal balance of power within parties, and the degree to which the party leader is subject to constraints and various demands from below when negotiating. Such constraints and demands are crucial to understanding why so many of the coalitions outlined above collapsed prior to the polls. Much of the pressure that is exerted to push for coalition collapse comes from lower levels of parties, whose interests are not necessarily served by collaboration. While coalition agreements divvy up positions between party presidents, lower level members see their potential for ascending to the top of the party or potential government as being thwarted by the entry of other opposition leaders. Coalitions also hold substantial costs for parties at the local level, where they may prompt disunity and disorder in the wake of choosing joint candidates and requesting that others withdraw from the races. In order to understand multi-party coalitions, it is crucial to understand the dynamics within parties from which they are constituted.

5.1.2 Coalitions and the Political Salience of Ethnicity

This research challenges conventional wisdom regarding the ethnic voting hypothesis, and the role that ethnicity is believed to play in undermining coalition-formation. Arriola’s pecuniary coalition-building theory rests on a set of assumptions that incorporate Horowitz’s ‘ethnic census’ model of African electoral behaviour. The first assumption is that parties in multi-ethnic African countries mobilise ethnic voters predominantly through appeals to ethnic solidarity, and citizens make voting choices predominantly along these affective lines. The second assumption is that in most African states, the presidency is the key locus of patronage and the president’s co-ethnics are the primary beneficiaries – through systems of patronage – of the benefits of state power. Following from this, because the benefits of an electoral victory in a presidential system cannot be equally shared, ethnic opposition parties resist cooperation and engage instead in ethnic outbidding. More specifically, ethnicity is seen as a barrier to pre-electoral coalition formation that can only be overcome through providing financial incentives to coalesce. However, the theory only holds, when opposition leaders are

able to pay upfront for the support of other ethnic parties – who are then able to deliver their co-ethnic’s votes – and provide the necessary stackable ethnic voting blocs to constitute a winning majority. This thesis challenges these assumptions, arguing instead that voters’ choices are less determined by ethnicity than is commonly believed, that the parties studied do not engage in ethnic outbidding, and that parties’ abilities to deliver the votes of their co-ethnics is far from assured. Instead, this thesis suggests that because parties compete for the same seats, and voters do not reliably vote for co-ethnic leaders, this creates greater uncertainty in negotiations and coalitions are less likely to cohere as party leaders seek to ring-fence their strongholds from their coalition allies. This implies that coalitions formed between ethnic parties who do not compete at the local level and can more reliably deliver the votes of their co-ethnics – as in Kenya – may be more likely to cohere.

Pre-electoral coalitions are often negotiated to address an opposition party’s inability to win national elections due to some combination of their narrow constituencies (ethnic or religious), a lack of resources, state harassment or a lack of voter trust. Existing research presumes a static relationship between ethnicity and coalition formation, that greater ethnic fragmentation and the existence of ‘ethnic parties’ hinders cooperation because of inter-ethnic competition over limited political resources. However, the research presented in this thesis questions these assumptions, showing that the importance of ethnicity in politics varies across the three cases, and that voters rarely vote for their co-ethnic party leader solely on the basis of his or her ethnicity, especially if they are unlikely to be nationally competitive.

While some opposition parties in each country are limited to drawing on one or two ethno-regional or ethno-linguistic groups (such as the DP and UPC in Uganda, the MDC-N in Zimbabwe and the ADD in Zambia), the largest opposition parties are multi-ethnic (such as the MDC-T in Zimbabwe and the FDC in Uganda) or pursue strategies to expand their vote base beyond their traditional ethno-regional strongholds (as with the UPND in Zambia). Both the MDC-T and the FDC have consistently fronted presidential candidates who are from the ethnic group that held the presidency at the time. Despite this, they have consistently consolidated the anti-incumbent vote in non-co-ethnic regions, to the disadvantage of smaller co-ethnic opposition parties. This finding supports and extends the findings of Ishiyama (2012) who found that groups who are both geographically-concentrated and perceive themselves to be discriminated against are more likely to bloc-
vote for the opposition. In Zambia, despite higher reported levels of ethnic voting than the other two cases, the opposition UPND leader successfully consolidated the anti-incumbent vote in non-co-ethnic regions in 2015 and 2016, in spite of the existence of co-ethnic candidates on the ballot – again highlighting the limitations of the ethnic voting model. This provides substantial evidence that anti-incumbent voters (particularly in marginalised regions) coordinate their voting choices to support who they perceive to be the most viable opposition challenger, whatever their ethnicity. Indeed, the most viable challenger is often not a co-ethnic and may originate from the incumbent’s ethnic group (or region) – as with Besigye in Uganda and Tsvangirai in Zimbabwe.

If the ethnic voter hypothesis does not hold, what are the implications for coalition research? It suggests that party leaders face greater uncertainty with regards to their claimed constituencies than was previously recognised. While some party leaders may claim to bring their co-ethnics along with them, larger parties with greater national reach will question the reliability of smaller parties’ constituencies and may wager that they are better able to compete in those regions. Contrary to Arriola’s thesis on ethnic leaders being able to bargain reliably on the basis of delivering the votes of their co-ethnics, the coalitions outlined in this thesis are subject to much higher levels of uncertainty. If larger opposition parties feel that they can draw support from non-co-ethnics in the ethno-regional strongholds of their coalition partners, they are less likely to commit to coalitions, and more likely to defect when the deal on offer is not favourable to them. In Uganda, despite a history of party support that co-aligns with ethnic and regional interests, parties can no longer rely on ethnic bloc-voting for co-ethnic party leaders. Instead, anti-incumbent regions such as the north and east have repeatedly rejected parties led by co-ethnic leaders in favour of politicians who are more competitive at the national level. This increases uncertainty in coalition bargaining, as parties cannot reliably leverage their co-ethnic support base to make an argument for a predictable voting bloc that they can deliver at election-time.

831 Both Nevers Mumba and Edith Nawakwi originate from the north of Zambia, Mumba is Bemba from Chinsali, and Nawakwi is Namwanga (but Bemba-speaking) from north eastern Zambia.
832 To a lesser degree this was also true of some voters in the west and south of Zambia in 2011, when they abandoned co-ethnic leaders and voted for Michael Sata.
This means that parties then often find themselves in direct competition with each other over the same voters, making it more difficult to run joint coalition candidates at parliamentary level. Doing so runs the risk of the party compromising their local party structures, their party profile and image, with potentially lasting consequences for the unity of local party structures. Competition for the same voters and constituencies can cripple a nascent alliance as ethnic entrepreneurs battle for ascendancy within their regions, and try to outmanoeuvre their co-ethnic opposition ‘allies.’ In Zimbabwe, the key cleavage for voters was not an ethnic but an anti-incumbent one. Although ethno-regional identities are strong, and a sense of collective grievance motivates bloc-voting, the beneficiaries are not regional parties but the largest opposition party which is headed by a non-co-ethnic. While negotiating the 2008 coalition between the smaller Matabeleland-based MDC-N and the larger MDC-T, the MDC-T was aware that it was competitive within the Matabeleland region and believed that it had few reasons to concede seats to the smaller faction. Ethnic competition scuttled the nascent coalition, but not for the reasons that Arriola and others predict. Instead, it was prompted by intra-party factionalism as the MDC-T’s Ndebele vice president opposed the deal. This was due to concerns that she and other Ndebele leaders within the MDC-T would be forced to cede their primary positions within the party and coalition hierarchy as the region’s pre-eminent representatives and power-brokers. The same group helped to undermine the 2013 coalition for the same reasons of intra-regional competition for the Ndebele vote. As an example of the importance of both ethnic competition and intra-party factionalism in determining coalition outcomes, the Zimbabwean case is instructive.

When opposition parties compete for the same groups of voters whilst simultaneously negotiating a coalition, it is reasonable to expect that – as happened in Uganda (2016), Zambia (2011) and Zimbabwe (2008, 2013) – parties will use these negotiations to try to outmanoeuvre their competitors. In cases where they are likely to be pushed to accept another party’s presidential candidate, larger opposition parties frequently wager that it is better to compete alone. Contrary to Arriola’s theory, it is likely that coalitions are easier to negotiate and less likely to fragment in circumstances where ethnic parties can reliably deliver the votes of their co-ethnics, and where parties do not compete for seats at the local level. Recent research by Dettmann (2017) suggests that similar dynamics operate in Malaysia.833

833 Dettmann, ‘Growth without Moderation?’
This is the case because the costs of cooperation for party unity are lower, and party leaders are less concerned with protecting their own positions from rivals within the party’s and coalitions’ ranks.

5.1.3 On Funding and Coalitions

A lack of finance has long been credited as a key reason for the lack of competitiveness of African opposition parties. The massive disparities in spending potential undermines the opposition’s ability to wage a competitive campaign against a well-funded ruling party. A lack of resources is also often pointed to as the reason that parties might sell their endorsements to the incumbent, joining their coalition in return for financial rewards. Arriola’s major contribution to the field of coalition studies is his emphasis on funding as a determinant of coalition cohesion. His pecuniary coalition building theory holds that coalitions are more likely to stay together when the party that seeks to form the coalition is able to provide financial incentives for ostensible opposition rivals to support his bid for the presidency. This funding is crucial for underfunded parties, who were previously unable to access funding due to political constraints on the domestic business community. However, as this thesis has demonstrated, while funding plays a critical role, opposition parties’ sources of funding are more diverse than Arriola allows. As outlined in this thesis, party funding came variously from foreign governments (Zimbabwe), foreign party organisations (Uganda), and foreign businessmen (Zambia). And despite this provision of resources to parties, negotiations failed and coalitions frequently collapsed. This suggests that while funding is an important element of cooperation, there is more at play than Arriola allows for, and that he overdetermines funding as a driver of successful coalition-building.

A potential caveat that comes from Arriola’s theory, but which he does not explore, is that party leaders are less likely to cooperate when they are sufficiently well-funded to be able to run their own campaigns. Evidence of this comes from several negotiations processes outlined in this research – namely Zambia (2001, 2006) and Zimbabwe (2008). Even though funding was provided for parties to cooperate, these parties still ran individual campaigns and competed against each other, ultimately allowing the ruling party to win with a plurality of the vote. Although funders had provided the opposition with funding in the 2011 and 2016 elections in Uganda, this was still not sufficient to encourage parties to coalesce (Chapter 2). In Zimbabwe in 2008, several international organisations had offered the two MDC factions
a financial incentive to reach a compromise and strike a coalition deal (Chapter 4). The larger MDC-T was sufficiently well-funded by sympathetic governments and business elites that it could easily have offered the smaller MDC faction (or Simba Makoni) a financial incentive to support them. Instead, the selective support of one MDC faction by external actors drove an even deeper wedge between the two parties, and encouraged the larger faction to act unilaterally. This indicates that pecuniary coalition building is not always sufficient to forge unity from disparate opposition parties, and that the availability of funding can instead be a hindrance to successful cooperation by undermining trust and the relationships between parties.

Arriola (2013) suggests that opposition parties are incentivised to sell their support to the highest bidder, which in many cases is the ruling party. However, as noted by Kelly (2018), parties – and party presidents – are not uniform in the extent to which they are willing to sell their support to the incumbent. While smaller parties in Zambia’s fluid party system enter coalitions with the incumbent fairly frequently, this is less common in Uganda and almost unheard of in Zimbabwe’s polarised political space. In particular, large electorally-significant opposition parties with a fairly stable electoral base – such as the UPND in Zambia, the FDC in Uganda and the MDC in Zimbabwe – are the least likely to enter into coalitions with the ruling party. Given the degree of coordinated anti-incumbent voting described in this research, these parties would likely undermine their electoral base by entering into a coalition with the incumbent. This all suggests that parties have other preferences than just to sell their support to the highest bidder, and that while funding is an important consideration, it is just one of a range of considerations for party elites during negotiations.

5.1.4 The Ambiguous Role of Party Presidents

Finally, as a corollary of the section on theorising parties as multi-level actors, this research has addressed the ambiguous role of party presidents. In the existing literature, the interests of parties are seen as indivisible from that of party presidents, and they are treated as one and the same. This research has shown that this assumption is largely misplaced, and that the interests of various party leaders should be disaggregated in order to understand coalitional behaviour. Across the three cases explored in this research, just seven newly-elected party

---

leaders agreed to go into coalitions with their ostensible allies. By contrast, 17 new opposition presidents pulled out of negotiations and opted instead to contest the election alone. This occurs frequently, but has not previously been recognised by coalition scholars due to inattention to coalition negotiations across multiple election cycles. The reasons why new leaders defect from coalitions appear to be their over-confidence in their ability to win the election – due in part to a lack of trusted and reliable polling data on the political support of candidates – and their accountability to the political and financial interests that helped them achieve their position. In addition, several of these ‘new party leaders’ or potential coalition partners were recent defectors from the regime – as with Amama Mbabazi (Uganda) and Simba Makoni and Joice Mujuru (Zimbabwe). These politicians, who had gambled their political fortunes by defecting from the ruling party and who project a view of the opposition as tired and incapable of winning, would insist on being chosen as the coalition’s candidate in any broad opposition alliance. In such cases, the largest opposition party – or that which came second to the incumbent in the previous polls – is more likely to withdraw from the coalition. In most instances where a new party president competed, they performed poorly at the polls in their maiden attempt and, having expended their political and financial capital, they enter into coalitions with other parties in subsequent electoral rounds.

However, this still does not guarantee a broad, inclusive coalition that coheres until election day. Party presidents will still seek to use coalition negotiations to their own advantage, importing grievances from previous rounds of negotiations into new coalitions. In Uganda in 2016, DP President Mao was facing an insurrection within his party from the Buganda faction, which had aligned itself with the FDC presidential candidate. This exacerbated existing grievances which had been cemented in previous elections where the DP (and other smaller parties) had complained that the FDC had dominated the coalitions, run competing candidates in their strongholds and undermined their party’s unity. In response, and to try to retain control over his fractious party, Mao chose to elect Mbabazi as the TDA coalition candidate in 2015. Mao had calculated that Mbabazi was less likely to pose a threat to Mao’s position (or that of his party) than the FDC’s Besigye, as Mbabazi had no party or organised structures. Party leaders are constantly operating within a complex game where they are negotiating on multiple fronts, and trying to compare the expected utility from competing in a coalition with that of competing alone.
Although rarely seen as such by scholars, each coalition negotiation is seen by the players as one set in an iterative game, where the previous behaviour of coalition partners has a bearing on future behaviour of party leaders. Some party leaders, having previously participated in coalitions, will refuse all later offers by the same partners. In Zambia, FDD President Edith Nawakwi – despite having lost with less than 1% of the vote in 2015 – refused to go into a coalition with the UPND in 2016, arguing instead that the larger party should support her electoral bid as she had supported theirs in 2006. Nawakwi has a small and unreliable base and limited party structures, but insisted that the UPND (which had nearly won the previous election) should support her bid for the presidency. This behaviour does not conform to any traditional theory of coalition behaviour, or rational actor framework, and although it may be an outlier, it complicates neat theories of coalition formation.

Finally, in the wake of several failed coalition attempts, party leaders may make strategic choices to shift from a coalitional strategy to one of individualised elite inclusion, as in Zambia after 2011. Following the collapse of inter-party negotiations between 2001 and 2011, the PF sought to co-opt individuals into its ranks, bolstering its ability to compete nationally. This strategy was adopted by the UPND after 2011, who sought to broaden out their narrow electoral base by approaching disgruntled members of other parties and bringing them in as individuals, thereby short-circuiting complex inter-party negotiations.

5.2 The Politics of Coalitions

Coalition negotiations are highly complex and extremely fraught processes, which are plagued by information asymmetries and strategy dilemmas. Rather than being a straightforward question of whether to cooperate or not, parties find themselves trying to compare the expected utility of cooperation with the expected utility of running independently while choosing amongst potential coalition partners in often complex parallel negotiation processes. In contexts where ruling parties frequently try to subvert the opposition, party leaders must also contend with the possibility that some of their potential allies have instead been sent by the state to destabilise their electoral prospects – as in Ugandan in 2016. These parties face high levels of uncertainty over actual levels of political support, and the political support of new entrants to the coalition – including recent defectors from the regime.

835 Tavits, ‘The Role of Parties’ Past Behavior in Coalition Formation’.
Decision-making is hindered by a lack of precise polling, which is used in other contexts to determine the likely outcome of various sets of potential coalitions. In France and elsewhere, parties who were considering pre-electoral coalitions would frequently undertake opinion polling and voter sampling to test assumptions regarding the effect of the mooted coalition.\footnote{Golder, *The Logic of Pre-Electoral Coalition Formation*, 72–73.} This creates a greater sense of certainty regarding the potential benefits (and costs) of coalitions. Golder (2006) describes how Korean politicians decided which opposition leader would step down in favour of their opponent based upon opinion polling of a few thousand voters.\footnote{Golder, 81.} Such polls are rarely conducted in African countries, and those that are conducted are seldom believed.\footnote{‘MDC Dismisses Poll Survey’, *NewsDay*, 4 September 2012, https://www.newsday.co.zw/2012/09/2012-09-04-mdc-dismisses-poll-survey/; Deo Walusimbi, ‘Besigye Dismisses Kenyan Firm’s Opinion Poll’, *The Observer - Uganda*, 21 December 2015, http://observer.ug/news-headlines/41765-besigye-dismisses-kenyan-firm-s-opinion-poll.} This uncertainty helps prompt new opposition party presidents to overestimate their electoral support, and insist on running an independent campaign. The widespread perception of electoral malpractice by the incumbent also renders many opposition parties and their allies to be more optimistic of their electoral fortunes than is warranted.

The complexity of decision-making during negotiation processes is rarely highlighted. Much of the traditional theory assumes that it is a fairly simple calculation between two actors over who has greater electoral support, and thus who should step down in favour of the other. However, in many of the cases outlined in the empirical chapters, these coalitions are highly complex – with many simultaneous negotiations occurring between more than just two parties. In Zimbabwe in 2008, the two MDC parties were both in negotiations with each other to form a coalition, but at the same time both groups were in simultaneous negotiations with factions within the ruling party. Without an accurate measure of the popularity of some candidates relative to others, these can be difficult decisions to make. At the same time, these parties are trying to weigh up the potential electoral costs and benefits to allying themselves with a former (or current) member of the ruling party. And these decisions need to be made within an uncertain environment where the opposition believe that their ranks have been infiltrated by agents from the government’s security sector – which automatically undermines trust.

---

\footnote{Golder, *The Logic of Pre-Electoral Coalition Formation*, 72–73.}
Coalition negotiations collapse for several reasons, and this research has explored some of them. The first relates to how the interests of party factions can work to undermine cooperation. The second relates to difficulties in securing cooperation when parties are competing for the same groups of voters, rather than having complementary constituencies which lead to lower levels of inter-party competition. Third, the availability of funding can help to scupper a coalition if it is widely available and parties are not in need of the finances that come with coalescing, but also if it is provided just to one party as this can undermine inter-party relationships. The provision of funding for cooperation is not a guarantee of coalition coherence, and instead this is dependent on the interests of the party leaders. Finally, party leaders have an ambiguous role to play in driving coalition coherence. Newly-elected party leaders and those who came second in previous elections are less willing to enter into or remain in coalitions in which they are not the presidential candidate than more seasoned, but less successful, candidates, and some will continuously renege on coalitions despite their lack of national reach. The complexity and contingent nature of the factors outlined above – and the history of the cases expanded upon in this thesis – helps to explain why so little academic consensus exists with regards to the drivers of successful coalition-building in Africa.

5.3 Beyond Opposition Coalitions

While this research is valuable for hypothesis-testing, as has been done above, it has broader relevance beyond this. It has also highlighted the importance of factors such as the role of party leaders and party members in scuttling negotiations. This suggests new variables that might be usefully included in future comparative studies of coalitions. This research advocates for more in-depth research into political parties in Africa, and the various mobilisation strategies that they deploy. Coalition negotiations are but one of a range of options available to parties at election time, and parties may change their electoral strategies in response to failed coalitions. This research has outlined how, in the wake of the collapse of several coalition processes, Zambian opposition parties sought to expand their narrow social bases through individualised elite inclusion, circumventing complex inter-party negotiations.
More broadly, this dissertation has contributed to the sparse literature on opposition parties in Africa, highlighting the varied histories and mobilisation methods of the parties in each of the three countries. In Zambia, it traced the changing mobilisation methods of the UPND and outlined how a previously nationally uncompetitive party can branch out beyond their traditional constituencies and grow its electoral base, especially amongst non-co-ethnics. With regards to Zimbabwe, this research has begun to outline the effects of foreign intervention on the opposition and civic actors during the country’s long 21st century decline. This is also the first piece of research that has sought to outline the complex relationships between the opposition parties in Uganda’s hegemonic party-state.

Beyond this, these three cases have highlighted the limitations of the ethnic voting hypothesis which remains the touchstone of much of the political science literature on Africa. It has shown that anti-incumbent voters frequently abandon co-ethnic party leaders and parties who are not perceived to be nationally viable, in favour of non-co-ethnics who stand a greater chance of defeating the incumbent. Finally, this dissertation has also provided an important reminder of the rich insights that can be gained from both small-N case studies and longitudinal studies, by teasing out the complex dynamics around key political phenomena.
Bibliography


building-my-productbehind-the-scenes---Muntu/-/688334/2457214/-/bn3srfz/-/index.html.


Basilirwa, Asuman. JEEMA President, 1 April 2016.


Chellah, George, and Amos Malupenga. ‘Sikota to Be Sata’s Vice-President’. *The Post*, 11 August 2006.


Chiumia, Sintha. ‘Is Zimbabwe’s Unemployment Rate 4%, 60% or 95%? The Data Is Unreliable’. Africa Check (blog), 1 October 2014. https://africacheck.org/reports/is-zimbabwes-unemployment-rate-4-60-or-95-why-the-data-is-unreliable/.


Interview, Bradford Machila. Former MMD MP for Kafue, 2 February 2015.

Interview, Guy Leslie Scott. Former PF and Zambian Vice President and Acting President, 25 February 2015.

Interview, Helen Mealins. Head of Programme of the DGF Programme Unit, 11 September 2015.

Interview, Lara Petricicvic. Head of the International Republican Institute (IRI) in Kampala, and formerly head of the Zimbabwe programme, 4 September 2015.

———. IRI Uganda Resident Country Director, 4 September 2015.

Interview, Muhabi Lungu. Former MMD National Secretary, 23 February 2015.

Interview, Neo Simutanyi. Former UPND office holder and political scientist, 17 December 2014.

Interview, Norbert Mao. DP President, 10 September 2015.

———. DP President, 5 April 2016.

Interview, Paul Kawanga Ssemogerere. Former DP President and Deputy Prime Minister, 28 August 2015.

Interview, Professor Geoffrey Lungwangwa. Former MMD (current UPND) MP for Nalikwanda, 3 February 2015.

Interview, Qhubani Moyo. Organising Secretary of MDC-Ncube party, 4 October 2013.

Interview, Tendai Biti. Former MDC-T Secretary General and Finance Minister, 11 May 2015.

Interview, Toendephi Shonhe. Former Director General of the MDC-T, 10 April 2013.

Interview, Welshman Ncube. MDC-N President and former MDC Secretary General, 15 April 2015.

Interview, Wynter Kabimba. Former PF Secretary General and Zambian Minister of Justice, 15 January 2015.


282


Lucima, Okello. UPC Spokesperson, 5 April 2016.


Magaisa, Alex. ‘Big Saturday Read: To Stay or Not to Stay – a Crocodile’s Dilemma’. Big Saturday Read (blog), 16 September 2017. https://www.bigrsr.co.uk/single-post/2017/09/16/Big-Saturday-Read-To-stay-or-not-to-stay-%E2%80%93-a-crocodile%E2%80%99s-dilemma.


———. ‘Tribalism Cited in Kibirige Mayanjas Move to Contest in Kampala Central’. 

Malambo, Clement. ‘Nevers Mumba Suspended from MMD; RB Adopted as Candidate’. 
_Zambia Reports_ (blog), 18 November 2014. 


https://www.newsdaily.co.zw/2017/10/3096224743974904/.


‘Museveni Wants Many Parties, as Long as His Own Provides the President’. Africa Confidential, 24 September 2004.


‘Otunnu, Besigye Fallout’. The Independent. 15 September 2010.


Otunnu, Olara. ‘Memorandum to TDA Summit’, 30 September 2015.


Personal Communication, Michaela Collord. Doctoral Candidate at the University of Oxford, working on Opposition in Tanzania, 10 December 2015.


Rally Recordings, Field Notes and Translations from Kafue (18 December), Kasama (14 December) and Mtendere (10 January), 2014.

Seminar, University of the Witwatersrand, 2 April 1984.
http://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/handle/10539/9582.


http://researchandadvocacyunit.org/system/files/Zimbabwe%20since%20the%20elections%20in%202013_the%20view%20from%202017.pdf.


http://www.solidaritypeacetrust.org/download/The%20End%20of%20A%20Road%20final%20version.pdf.


https://www.newsday.co.zw/2013/06/28/tsvangirai-warms-up-to-grand-coalition/.

Tumushabe, Godber. TDA Policy Advisor, 30 March 2016.


Appendix I

List of Interviews conducted

Zambia

1. Marja Hinfelaar, SAIPAR Director of Research, Lusaka, 17 November 2014
2. Morgan Muunda, UPND Organizer, Lusaka, 3 December 2014
3. Dante Saunders, Political Activist, Lusaka, 3 December 2014
4. Derrick Mbita Chitala and Dante Saunders, Former MMD Deputy National Secretary and Political Activist, Lusaka, 3 December 2014
5. Dr Choolwe Beyani, UPND Head of Policy Research, Lusaka, 5 December 2014
6. Dipak Patel, UPND Presidential Campaign Manager, and former MMD Minister of Commerce, Lusaka, 6 December 2014
7. Suresh Desai, former MMD National Treasurer and UPND Lusaka Campaign Manager, Lusaka, 7 December 2014
8. Bradford Machila, former MMD MP and UPND Advisor, Lusaka, 8 December 2014
9. Mutinta Mazoka & Family, wife of former UPND President Anderson Mazoka, Lusaka, 8 December 2014
10. Munazemba Bweembelo, UPND Organiser, Lusaka, 10 December 2014
11. Emmanuel Kapampa, ZANIS Journalist and Fixer, Kasama, 13 December 2014
12. Marketeers, Kasama, 13 December 2014
14. Geoffrey Bwalya Mwamba, former PF Defence Minister and current UPND Vice President, Kasama, 13 December 2014
15. Members of UPND Campaign Structures, Kasama, 13 December 2014
16. Professor Neo Simutanyi, former UPND office-holder and political scientist, Lusaka, 17 December 2014
17. Isaac Chipampa, Information and Broadcasting Services acting Permanent Secretary, Lusaka, 13 January 2015
18. Godfrey Malama, Managing Editor of the Times of Zambia, Lusaka, 13 January 2015
20. McDonald Chipenzi, Former Director of Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP), Lusaka, 29 January 2015
24. Geoffrey Lungwangwa, former MMD MP, Lusaka (Mumbwa Road), 3 February 2015
25. Dr Gilbert Mudenda, Director of the Institute for Policy Studies, Lusaka, 6 February 2015
27. Dipak Patel, UPND Presidential Campaign Manager, and former MMD Minister of Commerce, Lusaka, 9 February 2015
28. Anonymous, Western Diplomat, Lusaka, 10 February 2015
29. Lady Kathy Short, Programme Manager at Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Lusaka, 13 February 2015
31. Dr Canisius Banda, former UPND Vice President, Lusaka, 13 February 2015
32. Anonymous, Western Diplomat, Lusaka, 16 February 2015
33. Father Leonard Chiti, Head of the Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection, Lusaka, 16 February 2015
34. Kuchunga Simusamba, UPND deputy Secretary General, Lusaka (UPND Secretariat), 17 February 2015
35. Sakwiba Sekota, former UPND Vice President and former President of the United Liberal Party, Lusaka, 17 February 2015
36. Inambao Inambao, Legal Practitioner at Central Chambers, Lusaka, 17 February 2015
37. Sally Chiwama, Programme Officer at Media Institute for Southern Africa, Lusaka, 18 February 2015
38. Elias Chipimo, NAREP President, Lusaka, 18 February 2015
40. Muhabi Lungu, former MMD National Secretary, Lusaka, 23 February
41. Maureen Mwanawasa, wife of MMD and Zambian President Levy Mwanawasa and UPND Lusaka Mayoral Candidate 2016, Lusaka, 25 February
42. Vernon J Mwaanga, former UNIP and MMD Politician and Diplomat, Lusaka, 27 February
43. Guy Scott, former PF and Zambian Vice President, Lusaka, 28 February
44. Hakainde Hichilema, UPND President, Lusaka, 1 March
45. Nevers Mumba, MMD President, Lusaka, 4 March
46. Mutale Nalumango, UPND National Chairperson, Lusaka, 4 March
47. Morgan Muunda, UPND Organizer, Lusaka, 5 March
Zimbabwe

49. Dr Pedzisai Ruhanya, Head of the Zimbabwe Democracy Institute, Harare, 25 March 2015
52. Tawanda Chimhini, Head of the Electoral Resource Centre, Harare, 31 March 2015
54. McDonald Lewanika, former Director of the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, Harare, 3 April 2015
55. Anonymous, Western Diplomat, Harare, 6 April 2015
56. Toendepi Shonhe, former Director General of the MDC-T, Harare, 7 April 2015
57. Ibbo Mandaza, Director of SAPES Trust, Harare, 8 April 2015
58. Charles Mangongera, Political Analyst and former Tsvangirai Advisor, Harare (SAPES Trust), 8 April 2015*
59. Professor James Muzondidya, Professor of History at the University of Zimbabwe, Harare, 8 April 2015
60. Derek Matyszak, Senior Researcher at Research and Advocacy Unit, Harare, 9 April 2015
61. Arnold Tsunga, former Executive Director of Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights, Harare, 9 April
62. Job Sikhala, former MDC-T MP, Chitungwiza, 11 April
63. David Coltart, MDC-N Senator, Bulawayo, 14 April
64. Thabitha Khumalo, MDC-T deputy spokesperson and Bulawayo East MP, Bulawayo, 14 April
65. Gordon Moyo, former MDC-T MP and Minister of State in the Prime Minister's Office and current Secretary General for the PDP, Bulawayo, 14 April
66. Welshman Ncube, MDC-N President and former MDC Secretary General, Bulawayo, 15 April
67. Mmeli Dube, Director of Bulawayo Agenda NGO, Bulawayo, 15 April
68. Abednico Bhebhe, former MDC-T MP and former MDC-T deputy organising secretary, Bulawayo, 15 April
69. Eddie Cross, MDC-T MP and MDC-T Policy Coordinator General, Bulawayo, 16 April
70. Brigitte Juchems, Resident Director of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Harare, 27 April
71. Jurgen Langen, Resident Director of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Harare, 28 April
72. Morgan Tsvangirai, President of the MDC-T, Harare, 30 April
73. Promise Mkwanazi, former MDC-T Youth Secretary General and Tajamuka-Sesijikile Campaign leader, Harare, 30 April
74. Maureen Kademaunga, Student Activist and Women for Women National Chairperson, Harare, 6 May
75. Dewa Mavhinga, former Regional Coordinator for Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, Harare, 7 May
76. Anonymous, former Governance Advisor to USAID, Harare, 8 May
77. Sekai Holland, former MDC-T Co-Minister of State for National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration, Harare, 8 May
78. Tendai Biti, former MDC-T Secretary General and Finance Minister, Harare, 11 May
79. Dumisani Muleya, Editor of The Zimbabwe Independent, Harare, 11 May
80. Mfundo Mulilo, Executive Director of the Concerned Harare Residents Association, Harare, 13 May
81. Raymond Majongwe, member of the ZCTU General Council and head of the Progressive Teacher's Union of Zimbabwe, Harare, 13 May
82. Japhet Moyo, Secretary General of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions, Harare, 13 May
83. Wisborn Malaya, General Secretary of Zimbabwe Chamber of Informal Economy Associations, Harare, 15 May
84. Sesel Zvidzai, MDC-T Chief of Staff and MP, Harare, 15 May
85. Simba Makoni, President of Mavambo/Kusile/Dawn, Harare, 20 May
86. Douglas Mwonzora, Secretary General of the MDC-T, Harare, 20 May
87. Benjamin Nyandoro, former Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition Information Officer, Harare, 21 May
88. Prof Brian Raftopoulos, Professor at UWC and former MDC Consultant, 25 May
89. Blessing Vava, former NCA Information director, Johannesburg, 29 May

Uganda

90. Andrew Karamagi, FDC-aligned Activist, Kampala, 25 June 2015
91. Maike Messerschmidt, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Programme Officer, Kampala, 22 July
92. Crispy Kaheru, Coordinator of the Citizens' Coalition for Electoral Democracy in Uganda, Kampala, 24 July
93. Dr Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, Political Analyst, Kampala, 27 July
94. Moses Igunyu, Programme Officer at the International Republican Institute in Uganda, Kampala, 29 July
95. Nathan Nandala-Mafabi, Secretary General of the FDC, Kampala, 10 August
96. Job Kiija, Programme Assistant at Ugandan National NGO Forum, Kampala, 11 August
97. Professor Julius Kiiza, Economic Policy Research Centre at Makerere, Kampala, 11 August
98. Innocent Ayo, President of the FDC Youth Wing, Kampala, 13 August
99. Shaban Kalema, President of the JEEMA Youth, Kampala, 13 August
100. Patrick Aroma, UPC National Youth Chairman, Kampala, 13 August
101. Godber Tumushabe, Director of GLISS and TDA Policy Advisor, Kampala, 17 August
102. Deo Njoki, Executive Director of the Foundation for African Development, Kampala, 20 August
103. Catherine Promise Biira, Ugandan Statistics Bureau, Kampala, 21 August
104. Anonymous, Western Diplomat, Kampala, 24 August
105. Bishop Zac Niringiye, Director of the TDA Secretariat, Kampala, 25 August
106. Anonymous, Western Diplomat, Kampala, 25 August
107. Yusuf Kiranda, JEEMA Makerere Guild President, Kampala, 28 August
108. Paul Kawanga Ssemogerere, former DP President, Kampala, 28 August
109. Arthur Larok, Director of ActionAid Uganda, Kampala, 31 August
110. Michael Bayigga Lulume, DP MP, Kampala, 31 August
111. Lara Petricevic, Head of the International Republican Institute (IRI) in Kampala, and formerly head of IRI Zimbabwe, Kampala, 4 September
112. Augustine Ruzindana, former Movement and FDC MP, Kampala, 4 September
113. John Baptist Kawanga, former DP Vice President, Kampala, 8 September
114. Omar Kalinge-Nyago, former JEEMA Secretary General, Kampala, 8 September
115. Mugisha Muntu, FDC President, Kampala, 9 September
116. Norbert Mao, DP President, Kampala, 10 September
117. Helen Mealins, Head of Programme of the DGF, Kampala, 11 September 2015
118. Joseph Munyangabo, Programme Officer at IRI, Kampala, 17 September 2015
119. Dr Patrick Wakida, Director of Research World International, Kampala, 24 March 2016
120. Deo Njoki Hasubi, Executive Director of the Foundation for African Development, Kampala, 24 March 2016
121. Ambrose Barigye, Journalist for Kuchu Times Media Group, Kampala, 26 March 2016
122. Godber Tumushabe, Director of GLISS and TDA Policy Advisor, Kampala, 30 March 2016
123. Arthur Larok, Director of ActionAid Uganda, Kampala, 30 March 2016
124. Anthony Masake, Program Assistant at Chapter Four Uganda, Kampala, 31 March 2016
125. Asuman Basalirwa, JEEMA President, Kampala, 1 April 2016
126. Okello Lucima, former Secretary General for UPC, Kampala, 5 April 2016
127. Norbert Mao, DP President, Kampala, 5 April
128. Erias Lukwago, Lord Mayor of Kampala, Kampala, 6 April

306
129. Medard Ssegona Lubega, DP MP, Kampala, 6 April
130. Helen Mealins & Frank Rusa Nyakaana, Head of Programme of the DGF and Deputy Manager of the Deepening Democracy Component of the DGF, Kampala, 7 April
131. Raila Odinga, former Prime Minister of Kenya and ODM President, Nairobi, 9 April

**Zambia**

132. Wynter Kabimba, former Secretary General of the PF, Lusaka, 3 August 2016
133. Bradford Machila, Lusaka, 2 August 2016
134. Lawrence Nyanda, Bradford Machila, O'brien Kabba, Lusaka, 17 August 2016
136. Anonymous, Western Diplomat, 17 August
137. Guy Scott (former PF VP), Nevers Mumba (MMD President), Miles Sampa (UDF President), Lusaka, 19 August